EN BANC

[G.R. No. 167726. July 20, 2006.]

ROBERTO M. VILLANUEVA , petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS and

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Represented by ROBERTO P.
NAZARENO, in his capacity as Secretary General , respondents.

DECISION

TINGA , J : p

Assailed in this Rule 45 Petition for Review 1 is the Decision 2 dated 27 August 2003
of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 75002, and its Resolution 3 dated 29 March
2005 denying herein petitioner Roberto M. Villanueva's (Villanueva) Motion for
Reconsideration. 4 The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE , the writ of certiorari is GRANTED . The questioned
resolutions of the Civil Service Commission is (sic) hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE , and the said respondent ORDERED to CEASE AND DESIST from
implementing the same. The Decision of the House of Representatives
Disciplinary Board dated 07 June 2000 is hereby REINSTATED , and respondent
Villanueva is ORDERED DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED. 5

The antecedents are as follows:

On 24 November 1997, Villanueva, married man and the Legislative Assistant II of
the Cashiering and Administrative Records Division of the House of Representatives (the
House), was charged with Grave Misconduct, Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service before the House Disciplinary Board. The charges were
based on an entry in the O cial Log Book as well as a Spot Inspection Report
accomplished, respectively, by Frederick Maramba (Maramba) and Orencio Castillo
(Castillo), both security officers of the House who were on regular roving patrol duty on the
night of 16 October 1997. Their routine inspection tour included Room 305, Northwing
Building, O ce of Representative Constantino H. Navarro, Jr., of the First District of
Surigao Del Norte. 6
Maramba and Castillo narrated that when they came upon said o ce at around 9:30
of that night, they saw Villanueva, a married man 7 and a female asleep on the couch, both
naked, with the woman's arm resting on Villanueva's body. The female was later identi ed
as Elizabeth Navarro-Arguelles (Navarro-Arguelles), Representative Navarro's daughter and
confidential assistant, herself a married woman. 8
Villanueva's immediate supervisor, Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuano, Chief of the
Cashiering and Administrative Records Division, lodged the complaint against the former. 9
Incidentally, no charges were led against Navarro-Arguelles as the House Disciplinary
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 Board has no jurisdiction over confidential assistants of Representatives. 1 0
The House Disciplinary Board, after hearing, found Villanueva guilty as charged and
suspended him for one (1) year without pay with a stern warning that any infraction in the
future will be dealt with more severely. 1 1 However, acting on Villanueva's motion for
reconsideration, the House Disciplinary Board increased the penalty to dismissal with
forfeiture of all benefits. 1 2
Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. a rmed the latter Decision of the House Disciplinary
Board in a Resolution 1 3 dated 5 October 2000. Villanueva moved for a reconsideration of
the Decision but this was denied by Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr., in a Resolution 1 4
dated 28 May 2001. 1 5
Villanueva then interposed an appeal before the Civil Service Commission (the
Commission) which, on 12 April 2002, modi ed the penalty to suspension. The dispositive
portion of the Commission's Resolution No. 020536 1 6 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE , the appeal of Robert[o] M. Villanueva is hereby partly
GRANTED . The Commission holds that Villanueva is guilty of Disgraceful and
Immoral Conduct for which he is meted the penalty of one (1) year suspension. In
all other respects, the decisions appealed from are affirmed.
TIESCA

Considering that Villanueva has been out of the service for more than the
imposed suspension, he should now be reinstated to his former position. It is
understood that this reinstatement shall not carry with it the payment of back
salaries and other entitlements, for he is not totally exonerated. 1 7

In its motion for reconsideration, the House prayed for the re-imposition of the
penalty of dismissal on Villanueva. For his part, Villanueva moved for partial
reconsideration, seeking that he be awarded his bene ts for the period of January 1999 to
February 2001. The Commission denied both motions in Resolution No. 021492 1 8 dated
18 November 2002, a copy of which the House received on 21 November 2002. 1 9
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure led on
20 January 2003 before the Court of Appeals, the House ascribed grave abuse of
discretion to the Commission for reducing the penalty to a mere suspension.
In its challenged Decision, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari
and sustained the Decision of the House Disciplinary Board dismissing Villanueva. In
arriving at this conclusion, the Court of Appeals emphasized the similarity of the factual
circumstances of the case at bar with Dicdican v. Fernan, Jr . , 2 0 wherein the Court
dismissed the court personnel found guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct. 2 1 The
appellate court stated that adherence to case law dictates the imposition of a similar
penalty for the similar offense in the case at bar. Otherwise, the Court would be imposing
on judicial employees more stringent standards than employees of the Legislature or the
Executive. 2 2
The appellate court likewise pointed out that the Commission gravely erred in failing
to recognize the gravity of Villanueva's misconduct, stressing that Villanueva not only
disregarded his marriage vows but also exhibited total disrespect of the marital status of
Elizabeth Navarro-Arguelles. 2 3
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that Villanueva's offense relates to his o cial
functions as it was made possible precisely by his o cial functions. By virtue of his
position, Villanueva had free rein inside the building even after o ce hours. Clearly,
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 therefore, Villanueva used his o ce to commit the misconduct for which he was charged,
2 4 it concluded. CIAacS

Finally, the appellate court disclosed its desire to improve the public regard of the
government sector by safeguarding morality in the ranks. 2 5
The Court of Appeals likewise denied Villanueva's Motion for Reconsideration. 26
Thus, Villanueva filed the instant petition.
In the instant petition, Villanueva insists that the appellate court did not have
jurisdiction over the House's petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure as it was a substitute for lost appeal. 2 7 Villanueva also maintains that the
Commission acted well within the con nes of its jurisdiction when it imposed the penalty
prescribed by law for disgraceful and immoral conduct. 2 8 Villanueva likewise contends
that the Dicdican adjudication nds no application in the instant case as it was arrived at in
the Court's exercise of its administrative jurisdiction over its personnel. 2 9 Further,
Villanueva points out that his misconduct is in no way connected with his o cial functions
and it cannot thus be equated with grave misconduct as defined by law. 3 0
In its Comment, 3 1 the House contends that an appeal from the decision of the
Commission would not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy thus necessitating the
resort to the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65. The House reasons that the decision of
the Commission was immediately executory and its execution would not have been stayed
by an ordinary appeal. 3 2 The House also maintains that the ruling of the appellate court is
in accordance with law and jurisprudence, particularly the Dicdican case. The House argues
that employees of the legislature, just like employees of the judiciary, should be subject to
the same exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private
conduct. 3 3
Lastly, the House posits that since Villanueva was found guilty of Grave Misconduct,
Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, dismissal indeed is the appropriate penalty. 3 4
In his Reply, 3 5 Villanueva maintains, among other things, that even if an appeal
before the Court of Appeals does not stop the execution of the Commission's Decision the
House could have applied for a restraining order or injunction to stay it, 3 6 noting that
Section 82, Rule VI of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service 3 7
provides, thus:
Section 82. Effect of Pendency of Petition for Review/Certiorari
with the Court . — The ling and pendency of a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals or certiorari with the Supreme Court shall not stop the execution of the
nal decision of the Commission unless the Court issues a restraining order or an
injunction.

Moreover, Villanueva points out that the House could have easily availed of the
remedy of appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The House received a
copy of the assailed resolution of the Commission on 21 November 2002. According to
the Rules, the House had fteen (15) days, or until 6 December 2002, to perfect an appeal
which apparently, it did not do. Instead, it led a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to
make up for the lost remedy of appeal. 3 8
The Court finds merit in the petition.

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 At the outset, we nd that the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the
House's petition for certiorari as it was led in lieu of an appeal which is the prescribed
remedy. Section 5, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that nal orders or
resolutions of the Commission are appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition
for review. However, instead of availing of the remedy of appeal, the House resorted to the
wrong remedy of certiorari. IaCHTS

Notably, the House received the assailed resolution of the Commission on 21

November 2002, and thus it had until 6 December 2002 or fteen (15) days after, to le an
appeal. Despite the su cient time, the House allowed the period to elapse and instead
led a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on 20 January 2003, close to two (2) months
after its receipt of the resolution. Failing to undertake an appeal, the House interposed a
special civil action of certiorari. Evidently, the House intended to make up for the lost
remedy of appeal and substituted it with a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Settled is the rule that a special civil action of certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
or lapsed remedy of appeal. 3 9 As the Court aptly held in David v. Cordova, 4 0 to wit:
. . . . Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for
certiorari will not be entertained. The remedies of appeal (including petitions for
review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence,
certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own
negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One
of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not
prosper, even if the ground therefor[e] is grave abuse of discretion. 4 1

That appeals to the Court of Appeals do not stop the execution of decisions of the
Commission is not su cient justi cation for resorting to the remedy of certiorari. As
correctly pointed out by Villanueva, the execution of the decision of the Commission may
be stayed if the House applies for and the appellate court so issues a restraining order or
an injunction. 4 2 This thus enunciates the reality that, under the circumstances, an appeal
from the decision of the Commission was an adequate and speedy remedy foreclosing the
need for a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
As the House failed to le a timely appeal, the Court of Appeals should have denied
outright its petition for certiorari. Moreover, even if such petition was not procedurally
flawed, still and all, it was bereft of merit and the appellate court erred in granting it.
First, the appellate court erred when it concurred with the House's contention that
Villanueva's offense should be classified as grave misconduct.
Following a string of precedents, Amosco v. Magro 43 de nes misconduct in this
wise:
Misconduct in o ce has a de nite and well understood legal meaning. By
uniform legal de nition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his
duties as an o cer and not such only as affects his character as a private
individual. . . . It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance
warranting removal from o ce of an o cer, must have direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of o cial duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties
of the office. 4 4
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 Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior, especially by a government o cial. To constitute an administrative
offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the o cial
functions and duties of a public o cer. In grave misconduct as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or agrant disregard
of established rule, must be manifest. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct
consists in the act of an o cial or duciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his
station or character to procure some bene t for himself or for another person, contrary to
duty and the rights of others. 4 5
In the present case, Villanueva's offense was in no way connected with the
performance of his functions and duties as a public o cer. Sure, his o ce was used as a
venue for the commission of the offense and de nitely, his offense speaks despicably of
his character as a man but it in no way evinced any failure on his part to discharge his
duties as a public o cer. Yes, Villanueva's offense is gravely immoral and reprehensible
but it falls short of grave misconduct as defined by law.
DEHaAS

To determine whether a public o cer committed misconduct, it is necessary to

separate the character of the man from the character of the o cer. 4 6 Here, Villanueva's
transgression laid bare the values of his inner being but did not expose any of his
shortcoming as a public o cer. Who Villanueva is and what he believes in are
inconsequential in concluding whether his misdemeanor amounts to misconduct. Rather,
what is material is whether Villanueva properly discharged his public functions which we
believe in no way was compromised or affected by the commission of his offense.
However, as correctly found by the Commission, we believe that Villanueva is guilty
of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct for having engaged in an illicit affair. In a catena of
cases, the Court has ruled that government employees engaged in illicit relations are guilty
of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" for which he/she may be held administratively liable.
47

According to Section 22 (o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 and Section 52 A (15) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, 4 8 the rst offense of Disgraceful and Immoral
Conduct is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. A
second offense is punishable by dismissal.
As Villanueva is a rst-time offender, the proper penalty is suspension. The
Commission therefore correctly meted out said penalty. It clearly acted in accordance with
law and no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to it contrary to the appellate court's
finding.
Moreover, we do not agree with the appellate court's ruling that Dicdican should be
the controlling precedent such that the penalty of dismissal should be imposed in the
instant case.
As correctly pointed out by Villanueva, when the Supreme Court acts on complaints
against judges or any of the personnel under its supervision and control, it acts as
personnel administrator imposing discipline and not as a court judging justiciable
controversies. 4 9
In Dicdican, the Court sanctioned its errant personnel according to what it believed
to be the commensurate punishment. We deemed it wise to impose more stringent
standards primarily to show that we are serious in policing our ranks. We imposed
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 punishment in Dicdican as we deemed it proper, according to our own policies, but not
without the guidance of the rules in the civil service. In this case, however, we are not
acting as a personnel administrator but rather as the adjudicative appellate tribunal of last
resort reviewing the decisions of lower courts. It is our responsibility to con rm whether
the lower courts upheld the law. The law in this case clearly states that the proper penalty
is suspension and not dismissal as held by the appellate court, hence, suspension it must
be. CScTED

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 27 August 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.- G.R. SP No. 75002 and its Resolution dated 29 March 2005
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Resolution
No. 020536 dated 12 April 2002 and Resolution No. 021492 dated 18 November 2002 of
the Civil Service Commission are AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, Garcia and Velasco,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., is on official leave.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 10-25; Dated 11 May 2005.
2. Id. at 26-36; Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner with the concurrence of
Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Arturo D. Brion.
3. Id. at 44-47.
4. Id. at 37-43; 23 September 2003.
5. Id. at 35.
6. CA rollo, pp. 39-40.
7. Id. at 123.
8. Rollo, pp. 27-28; CA Rollo, p. 40; See also Rollo, p. 33.
9. CA rollo, p. 92.
10. Id. at 40.
11. Rollo, p. 29; In a Decision dated 10 September 1999; CA rollo, pp. 39-68.
12. Id. at 29; In a Resolution dated 7 June 2000; CA rollo, p. 70-74.
13. CA rollo, pp. 80-85.

14. Id. at 86-88.

15. Rollo, p. 29-30.
16. CA rollo, pp. 90-125.
17. Id. at 125.
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 18. CA rollo, pp. 24-32.

19. Rollo, p. 30; CA rollo, p. 11.

20. 335 Phil. 532 (1997).
21. Rollo, pp. 31-32.
22. Id. at 34.
23. Id. at 32-33.
24. Id. at 33-34.
25. Id. at 35.
26. Id. at 37-43; Dated 23 September 2003.
27. Id. at 17.
28. Id. at 18.
29. Id. at 19.
30. Id. at 20.
31. Id. at 54-64; Dated 1 September 2005.
32. Id. at 56-57.
33. Id. at 60.
34. Id. at 61.
35. Id. at 72-82; Dated 2 December 2005.
36. Id. at 74.
37. Effective 27 September 1999.

38. Rollo, p. 75.

39. David v. Cordova, G.R. No. 152992, 28 July 2005, 464 SCRA 384, 395; Tuazon, Jr. v.
Godoy, G.R. No. 146927, 10 December 2002, 393 SCRA 631, 635-636.
40. David v. Cordova, G.R. No. 152992, 28 July 2005, 464 SCRA 384.
41. David v. Cordova, supra note 39 at 394-395.
42. Rollo, p. 74; UNIFORM RULES ON ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IN THE CIVIL SERVICE,
RULE VI, Section 82.
43. Adm. Matter No. 439-MJ, 30 September 1976, 73 SCRA 107.
44. Id. at 108-109.
45. Civil Service Commission v. Belagan, G.R. No. 132164, 19 October 2004, 440 SCRA 578,
599-600.

46. Supra note 43, at 109.

47. Maguad v. de Guzman, 365 Phil. 12, 19 (1999).
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 48. Which repealed or modified accordingly Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Administrative Code of 1987.
49. Icasiano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 95642, 28 May 1992, 209 SCRA 377, 383.

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