I undertook the assignment of writing this history to

satisfy my historical curiosity. To understand what happened

and why it happened. And wherever judgement appeared to be
called for, to judge not by what happened but was expected to
happen.

History is built on rational explanation. By combining

significant source material and memoirs with interviews of
participants and personal knowledge, I have presented a
reconstruction of events that is as accurate and authentic as
I could make it. My aim has been to make the reader well
informed enough to arrive at his own judgements.

Broadly speaking, there are only two ways of responding to

the problems of historical understanding of controversial
incidents like the loss of the KHUKRI or the amphibious
landing at Cox's Bazar. One is to say that the participants
knew perfectly well why they undertook a particular operation
but simply could not later admit the reason, for to do so
might indicate their responsibility. The historian must ferret
out the original motives and present a convincing
reconstruction of the environment that may reveal the motives,
or at least the main objectives of the principal players.

A second broad approach is to try and explain a disaster

in terms not of motive but rather of drift. If indeed there
was no sharply defined purpose, then one is probably examining
a vague process of institutional momentum. In this conception,
a patently flawed idea that has been around for some time
gradually acquires support simply because institutions and
policy makers adapt to it and begin to calculate how they can
use it to advantage. It is in this context that the section on
the "Sinking of the KHUKRI" would provide food for thought in
the extremely complex area of anti submarine warfare.

The tragic loss of the KHUKRI will remain a vexed issue.

If at all, a two ship Search and Attack Unit (SAU) had to be
sailed to take on a submarine whose capabilities were known to
be superior to those of the ships of the SAU, then the SAU
should have been closely supported by all available anti
submarine air effort - Seakings, Alizes and Super Connies. On
the other hand, had KHUKRI been following well established
torpedo counter measure procedures like high speed, zig-zags
and weave, she would never have been such an easy target. The
Captain of KHUKRI took the calculated risk of overcoming the
limitations of his ship's sonar by doing slow speed and using
the BARC developed sonar modification to help increase his
sonar's detection range. Luck was not on his side.

It is not my intention to invite controversy. Without

trying to vindicate or to criticise, controversial events have
been presented dispassionately, leaving judgement to the
reader. I accept full responsibility for the facts as stated
and the opinions expressed. I would welcome inputs which would
help to make the next edition more accurate.

Although this volume of the history has been sponsored by

the Indian Navy, the views and the interpretation to facts are
entirely my own. They are not necessarily either those of the
Indian Navy or of the Government.

To make it easier for the lay reader, contemporary names

of countries have been freely used such as Britain for United
Kingdom, America for USA and Russia for Soviet Union etc.

There is a saying "The past is a work of art, free of

irrelevancies and loose ends". My hope has been to recreate
past events after enough time has elapsed to recollect them in
relative tranquility, but not before the "irrelevancies and
loose ends", which are the spice of history, have disappeared.

(GM Hiranandani)
New Delhi
Vice Admiral
15 October1999
(Retd)PVSM,AVSM,NM,Ph.D.

CHAPTER 1

THE GROWTH OF THE NAVY TILL 1965

The Navy's Growth during the Second World War : 1939 to 1945

Prior to the Second World War, Britain's Royal Navy was responsible for
the overall maritime defence of India. For this purpose, the Royal Navy
maintained:

- a Fleet based at Trincomalee in Ceylon.

- a Fleet at Singapore.
- a Squadron at Bahrein.

The Royal Indian Navy (RIN) was responsible for coastal defence only. It
had one naval base at Bombay and training establishments scattered in
many regions of India.

In September 1939, when the Second World War started, the Royal
Indian Navy had only five sloops, one trawler, one survey ship and one
patrol craft. It had 114 officers and 1732 ratings (sailors were called
ratings). All the six rating training schools were concentrated inside the
Naval Dockyard in Bombay - Gunnery, Seamanship, Signals, Anti-
submarine, Boys Training Establishment (BTE) and Mechanical Training
Establishment (MTE). There were no rating training schools for Torpedo,
Electrical or Radar. Officers went to Britain for basic and advanced
training in all disciplines. Eighty percent of rating recruits came from the
Punjab and from the Bombay Presidency - mainly Konkan, and of them,
seventy five percent were Muslim and nine percent Hindu.

During the war, the Royal Indian Navy underwent a phenomenal

expansion. Thirty one small vessels were immediately requisitioned to
serve as minesweepers and patrol craft until newly built ships could enter
service. The first Basset class trawler built in Garden Reach Workshop
Calcutta entered service in 1941 - it was followed by five more. The first
Bangor class fleet minesweeper built in India entered service in 1943. Six
new sloops came from Britain and were named after Indian rivers.
Bathurst class minesweepers came from Australia. Numerous minor
vessels like motor minesweepers, harbour defence motor launches and
landing craft came from Britain, America and Australia. The naval base
and Naval Dockyard at Bombay were modernised. Three new branches
were created - Electrical, Education and Medical.

In 1945 when the war ended, the Navy had seven sloops, four anti
submarine frigates, eight corvettes, fourteen minesweepers, sixteen
trawlers, one survey ship, two depot ships, thirty auxiliary vessels, one
hundred and fifty landing craft, two hundred harbour craft and forty five
harbour defence launches. The number of personnel had risen to 3014
officers and 27,433 ratings, most of whom served in shore
establishments. The recruiting pattern had changed noticably - there was
a large increase from the Madras and Bengal Presidencies and a steep
decline in recruitment from the Bombay Presidency and the Punjab. The
intake of Hindus had risen to forty two percent and that of Muslims had
fallen to thirty five percent. Several new naval base establishments and
training establishments had come up all along the West and East coasts

PRE-INDEPENDENCE PLANS FOR THE NAVY'S DEVELOPMENT

British Strategic Perceptions in 1944

As Britain gradually reconciled itself to the inevitability of India becoming

independent, the Commander in Chief India assessed that the vital
strategic interests of the British Commonwealth in the Indian Ocean were:

(a) Oil supplies,

(b) Control of the eastern and western approaches to India.
(c) Air communications to Iraq, Ceylon, Burma and Malaya.
(d) Control of the seas and the island territories.

In his view, should India be unfriendly or liable to be influenced by a

power such as Russia, China or Japan hostile to the British
Commonwealth, Britain's strategic position in the Indian Ocean would
become untenable and British communications with New Zealand and
Australia most insecure.

The Plans for the Navy's Development in 1944/45.

As the Second World War neared completion, three separate studies

emerged sequentially on the future development of the Navy.

The Godfrey Plan of 1944.

This plan was prepared in April 1944 by Vice Admiral Godfrey, the
Commander in Chief of the Royal Indian Navy, for submission to the
Chiefs of Staff Committee. It had two phases. Phase I proposed the
replacement of inefficient ships by modern frigates and sloops, acquisition
of eight destroyers and training of personnel by 1947 to man a cruiser.
Phase II envisaged the acquisition of aircraft carriers and submarines with
associated training and maintenance facilities.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee Report of 1944 on The Size and

Composition of the Post War Forces in India.

This report assumed the only threat to be from Russia, that independant
India would continue to remain in the British Commonwealth and that
reinforcements would arrive from Britain and other parts of the British
Empire to help India defend her frontiers.
The Committee viewed the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) as a
`Dominion Navy', responsible:

(a) Primarily for the safety of Indian and `Empire shipping in the
sea areas contiguous to India's coastline, their approaches and the
trade routes in the Indian Ocean.

(b) Secondly for the combined operational training of the Indian

Army's specialist amphibious formations, providing escort and
assault ships and craft for landing these formations on hostile
shores, for which a nucleus force of assault ships and craft and a
training organisation was to be maintained.

(c) Thirdly, in conjunction with the Air Force, the Navy was to
ensure the timely neutralisation of any foreign invading force
attempting a landing on the shores of India. It was therefore
essential for the RIN to have an adequate air component for
seaward reconnaissance and for air strikes in support of surface
forces.

For these tasks, the Committee recommended a naval force of one

Cruiser Squadron (3 cruisers), one Destroyer Flotila (8 destroyers), one
Training Flotilla (8 Sloops), one General Duty Flotilla (8 frigates) and
flotillas of minesweepers, motor torpedo boats and harbour defence
launches, alongwith survey ships, assault ships and a depot ship for
repairs.

Committee for Planning the Requirement of the Armed Forces

1945.

After the cessation of hostilities in August 1945, the Government

appointed a Committee to plan the requirements of India's Armed Forces,
based on the Chiefs of Staff Committee Report of 1944. The gist of this
Committee's Report was that by the end of the War, Japan would have
been completely subdued, the principal foreign powers in the East would
be the USSR, the USA and China and that India would be responsible for
maintaining sufficient forces to overcome a minor power and to hold out
against a major power until Imperial Forces could arrive. It did not take
into account an independent India after the War. It did anticipate that
India would be a member of the British Commonwealth. Since no one part
of the Commonwealth could, in peace or war, be self-sufficient or
independent of supplies from other parts, the economy and defence of
each nation of the Commonwealth would therefore, largely depend on the
use of the sea and air routes and ports. While the main responsibility for
keeping open these sea and air communications would rest with the Royal
Navy and Royal Air Force under the orders of the British Government,
each component part of the Commonwealth would need to be prepared to
bear its share. India, in common with other countries of the Empire,
would, therefore, need to maintain naval and air forces as necessary to
ensure the defence of her bases and the security of shipping within her
coastal waters from submarine, mining and air attack and to assist in the
protection of trade in the ocean shipping routes.

India's central position in the Indian Ocean was likely to make her
particularly sensitive to the need for an increased naval force and
especially for larger warships than she at present possessed. Such ships,
unlike the small units which the Royal Indian Navy had, would be capable
of adequately representing India in other parts of the Commonwealth,
foster better understanding of India and improve relations within the
Empire.

Russia was viewed as the only major power likely to seriously threaten
India. Aggression by Russia was therefore taken as the basis for
estimating the forces which India would require for her defence against a
major power. It was not possible to forecast the strength of the forces
which Russia might be able to bring to bear against India. The scale of
attack would depend on conditions which would change from time to time.
As these conditions changed, the scale of enemy attack would need to be
reviewed and defensive measures brought up-to-date.

So long as India was connected with Great Britain, either as a Dominion

or by a treaty guaranteeing assistance, hostilities between Russia and
India could only be either the cause of or the result of a war between
Great Britain and the USSR. Such a war would, inevitably, sooner or later,
develop into another world conflict. While India's contribution to a war of
this nature would depend very largely on the defence policy of the British
Empire as a whole, India was likely to bear the first brunt of such an
attack and would need therefore, to be prepared at all times to defend
her frontiers until Imperial reinforcements arrived.

The principal responsibility of India's Navy after the war would be the
safety of Indian and Empire shipping in the ports of India and their
approaches; India would also wish to take her share in the protection of
this shipping on the trade routes within the Indian Ocean. It would be an
important task of India's Navy to provide facilities for the combined
operational training of the Army formations maintained in the country and
to provide a share of the escorts, assault shipping and craft required to
land these formations on a hostile shore, should this prove necessary.
This implied the maintenance in peace of a nucleus force of assault
shipping and craft and appropriate training organisations, as well as
personnel possessing an expert knowledge of amphibious operations. In
addition, the Navy, in conjunction with the Air Force, would need to be
prepared to take its share in intercepting and attacking any foreign
invading force which might attempt a landing on Indian shores.

The Army would be responsible for coastal defence and the Air Force for
seaward reconnaissance, shipping protection and co-operation with the
RIN. Naval units might be required to proceed at short notice to ports in
occupied countries in case disturbances arose and to patrol the river
approaches to such ports. As regards superpower aggression on
Afghanistan, sufficient aircraft would need to be available to prevent the
Afghans from being overawed by the Russian air strength on their border.

Naval forces to counter these threats, could not be quickly improvised in

times of war. The main task of the Navy in peace, in common with the
other Services, would be prepare for war but since the full strength of the
naval force might be needed immediately on the outbreak of war and a
long period was required both for the construction of warships and the
training of naval personnel, naval forces, and air forces to co-operate with
them, would need to be maintained in peace at a high standard of
preparedness.

While for purposes of local defence, a number of small ships would need
to be maintained, a proportion of large ships would also be necessary.
The provision of such ships would produce a balanced naval force, form
an added incentive to recruitment and increased pride in the service,
besides assisting considerably in the training of personnel which could not
be adequately carried out in small ships. In addition, great importance
was attached to the formation of an adequate air component for seaward
reconnaissance and a striking force and also to the maintenance of
modern coast defences and material for local seaward defences such as
booms, mines, nets and indicator loops.

The establishment of industries within India would tend to make her

economy and prosperity more dependent on the security of her export
trade and so maintain, and possibly increase, the importance of her ports
and overseas communications. Therefore, India needed to maintain
adequate naval forces and ensure that the ports on which she was
dependent were kept up-to-date in accordance with modern
requirements. The coastal trade of India was not only an essential part of
her peace and war economy but was also an important factor in her
transportation system. The requisitioning of the majority of her coastal
steamers at the beginning of the present war for naval purposes had
greatly increased the congestion on the railways. It was, therefore,
important that encouragement be given to the development of the coastal
trade and the shipbuilding industry, that sufficient naval force be
maintained to avoid being obliged to requisition mercantile shipping
immediately on the outbreak of war.
 THE WANSBOROUGH JONES REPORT OF 1946

In 1946, an Interim Government was formed under Prime Minister Nehru.

India's Independence was clearly foreseeable. The Prime Minister
commissioned a British adviser, Mr Wansborough Jones, to recommend
the scientific and organisational measures required to make India a self
supporting defence entity. The Jones report outlined four basic roles for
the Indian Armed Forces:

(a) To secure the land frontier against raids from border tribes or
attack from a second class army.

(b) To support civil power.

(c) To provide a small expeditionary force capable of protecting

India's regional interests.

(d) Within available financial resources, to develop a force capable

of taking the field in a first class war.

POST INDEPENDENCE PLAN FOR

"THE REORGANISATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIAN
NAVY"

After partition in August 1947, the RIN comprised:

-Four Sloops (KISTNA, CAUVERY, JUMNA, SUTLEJ),

-Two frigates (KUKRI, TIR)
-One Corvette (ASSAM)
- Twelve coastal minesweepers (ORISSA, DECCAN, BIJNOR,
KUMAON
KHYBER, ROHILKHAND, CARNATIC, RAJPUTANA, KONKAN,
BENGAL,BOMBAY, MADRAS). After the cyclone which hit Bombay in
1948, only KONKAN, BOMBAY, BENGAL and MADRAS remained in
service. The remainder were so severely damaged that they had to
be sold as scrap.

- One survey ship (INVESTIGATOR)

- Four trawlers, four motor minesweepers, one motor launch,four

harbour defence motor launches and landing craft.

In August 1947, Rear Admiral JTS Hall, RIN, was appointed as India's first
Flag Officer Commanding Royal Indian Navy. His Chief of Staff (now called
the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff) was Commodore Martin H St L Nott.
These two farsighted officers, guided by Rear Admiral Lord Louis
Mounbatten, then Viceroy of India, and assisted by Cdr (later Admiral) AK
Chatterji the first Director of Naval Plans, the Staff Officer Plans Lt Cdr
(later Vice Admiral) N Krishnan and Lt Cdr YN Singh, the navy's first
aviator, prepared on "Outline Plan for the Reorganisation and
Development of the Indian Navy". It visualised four essential roles for the
Navy:

(a) To safeguard Indian shipping.

(b) To ensure that supplies could reach and leave by sea in all
circumstances.

(c) To prevent an enemy landing on India's shores.

(d) To support the Army in sea borne operations.

The minimum force recommended was two aircraft carriers, three

cruisers, eight destroyers, four submarines and miscellaneous small ships
to be built up in 10 years. The plan envisaged gradual development of the
Navy to form two fleets, each to be built around a light fleet carrier.

The plan clearly reflected the Indian Navy's aspiration for regional pre-
eminence. Apart from several seminal recommendations to remedy the
after-effects of the partition of the Navy, like shortages of manpower,
constructing new training establishments, disposing of old ships and
acquiring immediate replacements.

At the end of 1947, based on the above, a ten year plan for the expansion
of the Navy was submitted to the Government and was approved in
principle by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet in 1948 but without
financial commitment.

THE PROFESSOR BLACKETT REPORT

Whilst these proposals were being discussed, Prime Minister Nehru in

1948 sought the advice of Professor PMS Blackett. He was a renowned
British physicist who had pioneered naval operational research in the
British Navy during the Second World War. Professor Blackett was asked
to prepare a report outlining the measures necessary for India to become
near self sufficient in defence production over a period of seven years.

Whereas previous studies had assumed that in the event of hostilities, the
British and Commonwealth Navies would assist India, Prof Blackett's basic
premise was that a newly independant India would wish to stand unaided
where defence was concerned. In his view a Third World War was unlikely
- the immediate need was to plan and prepare for a small scale war.
Professor Blackett's report on how best India should meet her defence
needs within available scientific, financial and industrial resources
highlighted that:

(a) India was economically weak. To become self sufficient, a strong

economy and industrial base was essential.

(b) The import of sophisticated defence equipment, though

inescapable, had to be minimised to conserve foreign exchange for
industrialisation and for improving agriculture, on which future rise
in defence expenditure would be based.

(c) Front line platforms which depended upon state of the art
technology for optimum performance during combat, like fighter
aircraft, heavy tanks and aircraft carrier task forces, could not be
afforded in the quantities required to confront a major power. The
major powers were, in any case, unlikely to be drawn into a
regional conflict as between India and Pakistan. On the other hand,
both the USA and Britain had large stockpiles of weapons and
material rendered surplus after World War II which did not require
optimum performance in order to be effective.
(d) If India bought these surplus stocks, if India avoided expensive
high performance weapons and chose low performance systems
relevant to local scenarios, then self sufficiency was possible.

(e) The import of a new and improved weapon system should only
be considered if its performance was so markedly superior to its
predecessor as to justify the initial cost by reduced running and
maintenance costs or to provide training schools with single models
to keep the services in touch with weapon developments.

(f) In the long run, self sufficiency would create freedom of choice
in foreign policy rather than strategic isolation.

Prof Blackett made specific recommendations regarding the compositon of

the three services. In his view, the Indian Navy's missions were:

(a) Protection of coastal shipping against mining, submarines,

surface and air attack, with the capability to respond in kind.

(b) Escorting and protecting a small number of ocean convoys

between Aden and Singapore but no further (merchant shipping was
important for the development of trade and a valuable national
asset).

(c) Co-operation with the Army and the Air Force in repelling
 landing operations and advances along coastlines, and to be able to
undertake similar operations against the enemy.

(Note: In his book on "Naval Aviation", Admiral Chatterji, states

that as a result of several meetings with Prof Blackett, Government
accepted in principle the proposal to acquire light fleet carriers. It
was envisaged that the first carrier would be purchased in 1955 and
the second two years later).

DEVELOPMENTS 1948 TO 1952

In 1948, Vice Admiral Sir Edward Parry succeeded Rear Admiral Hall as
Commander in Chief and Chief of the Naval Staff of the Royal Indian
Navy. He was able to tell the British Admiralty that India's Ministry of
Defence did not want the Indian Navy to be just an adjunct of the British
Navy but to be a real Navy capable of carrying out major operations of
naval warfare (" Sea Power and Indian Security" by Rahul Roy Choudhary,
Page 29).

In September 1948, a 69 ship Navy was proposed. However, because of

budgetary constraints, the Navy had to recast its requirements. In
October 1948, a revised plan proposed a 49 ship Navy.

In December 1948, another revised plan spelt out the `The Role of the
Navy' and proposed a smaller 47 ship Navy comprising two aircraft
carriers, three cruisers, eight escort destroyers, four fleet destroyers
(British Battle Class/Weapon Class), four submarines, four A/A frigates,
two A/S frigates, six fleet minesweepers, one LST, one survey vessel,
five motor launches, seven minor landing craft and two squadrons of
aircraft per carrier (one each for fighter and strike and one for SAR).

In 1949, Government approved only those proposals of the 10 year naval

plan which related to the recruitment and training of personnel. The
expansion of the Fleet, though restricted to one aircraft carrier, frigates, a
survey ship and a landing ship, did not exclude submarines.

This setback was compounded by the difference in opinion between the

Indian naval planners in Delhi and the British Admiralty. When Admiral
Parry forcefully pressed the Admiralty to meet his plan requirements, the
Admiralty told him that the primary function of the Indian Navy was the
protection of the coastline and harbours of India and to perform specific
functions in the defence of the British Commonwealth.

In 1951, Vice Admiral Sir Mark Pizey succeeded Vice Admiral Parry as the
Chief of the Naval Staff. Since the Government was unable to afford large
scale naval expansion and the British were not willing to give India what it
wanted, Admiral Parry's plan had to be shelved. Instead, Admiral Pizey
proposed a 10 year replacement program. It was carefully phrased to
minimize opposition, both from the Government of India and the British
Navy.

THE ARMED FORCES REORGANISATION COMMITTEE - 1952

In 1952, this Committee was constituted to reduce the expenditure on the

Indian Armed Forces during the period 1952/53 to 1954/55. The
Committee recommended that two cruisers be acquired in addition to INS
DELHI. In due course MYSORE was commissioned in 1957. The acquisition
of the aircraft carrier was deferred. It was eventually sanctioned in 1956.

The number of ships to be acquired during this period were reduced.

Since destroyers were not readily available, the newest available frigates
were ordered from Britain.

(Note: For details of developments during this period, see "No Easy
Answers" by Goldrich and "Sea Power and Indian Security" by Rahul Roy
Choudhary.)

DEVELOPMENTS 1954 TO 1962

In 1954, agreements were signed for the acquisition from Britain of eight
new frigates (3 anti aircraft, 2 first rate anti submarine, 3 second rate anti
submarine) and 6 minesweepers (4 coastals and 2 inshores).

As part of the Naval Replacement Programme, the Government also

sanctioned two Fleet tankers. A second hand tanker had been purchased
from Italy in 1953 and commissioned as SHAKTI in 1954. The
Government sanction stipulated that the second tanker should be built in
India.

In 1956, Vice Admiral Sir Stephen Carlill took over as Chief of the Naval
Staff. By this time, Pakistan had joined CENTO and SEATO and had been
promised substantial naval assistance. America committed to directly
supply two destroyers and eight minesweepers and pay Britain for
refurbishing and supplying a cruiser and four destroyers. Naval
Headquarters, already preoccupied with pressing the case for the aircraft
carrier, found itself compelled to propose:

(a) the acquisition of three destroyers from Britain to match

Pakistan's acquisitions and
 (b) the outright purchase of the three Hunt class destroyers which
were on loan from the British Navy since 1952.

In April 1956 Government approved the development of combatant naval

aviation. The light fleet carrier HMS HERCULES was purchased from the
British Navy.

In 1957, the Navy proposed to the Government the retention of existing

ships in commission. If approved, this together with the new acquisitions
under construction in Britain would double the number of ships in the
Fleet and enable it to cope with the increased size of the Pakistan Navy.

In 1958, the Government:

(a) Agreed to NHQ's proposal to keep the existing ships in

commission till 1962/63 or expiry of life, whichever was earlier.

(b) Approved the outright purchase of the three Hunt Class

destroyers that were on loan from Britain.

(c) Agreed in principle to the acquisition from Britain of three new

destroyers in lieu of three of the six second rate A/S Type 14
frigates of the KHUKRI Class proposed in 1950. These destroyers
were required to provide the aircraft carrier with anti submarine
protection and at night act as VIKRANT's escorts in the event of
surface action.

Pursuant to these decisions:

(a) The Navy floated informal inquiries to the British Admiralty
regarding the availability of three Daring or Later Battle Class
destroyers.

(b) Since the Bombay Dockyard would not be able to berth the
envisaged size of the Fleet, the Navy proposed the setting up of a
major naval base at Visakhapatnam and made plans for the
immediate construction there of a 1120-foot jetty and a workshop.

(c) To establish a presence in the A & N Islands and to keep an eye

on naval activity in the Bay of Bengal, the Navy proposed to
Government the positioning of a Resident Naval Officer (RNO) at
Port Blair.

(d) The Navy decided to dispose off the old minesweepers which
were occupying precious alongside berths. RAJPUTANA,
ROHILKHAND and two LCTs had already been disposed of in 1956.
Action was now taken to dispose of BOMBAY, MADRAS and BENGAL.
Only KONKAN was retained as a general-purpose vessel.
In 1958, Vice Admiral RD Katari took over as the first Indian Chief of
Naval Staff. By this time, the first of the eight new frigates of Admiral
Pizey's naval replacement plan had started commissioning and the aircraft
carrier was being modernised. The Navy re-started its case for a
submarine arm.

In 1959, Britain indicated that neither Daring nor Later Battle Class
destroyers were available. The Navy then proposed to Government the
acquisition from Britain of three Early Battle Class destroyers which were
older than those earlier requested.

In pursuance of the decision to relieve the congestion of ships at Bombay

and to ease the growing workload on the Naval Dockyard at Bombay, the
Navy proposed to Government the basing of some ships at Cochin,
Visakhapatnam and Calcutta.

In April 1960, Government acquired Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL) and asked
it to prepare a preliminary report on the facilities required to modernise
MDL for building frigates. In November 1960, Government approved in
principle that three frigates should be built in India.

The Navy's efforts to get the second fleet tanker built in India did not bear
fruit. Government sanctioned the acquisition of a new Fleet Tanker to
replace the old second hand tanker SHAKTI.

In January 1961, MDL submitted its preliminary report. Government

deputed a team to discuss with the Admiralty, the collaborating
shipbuilders and the armament suppliers the steps to be taken to execute
the Frigate Project expeditiously and economically. The team
recommended construction of three Leander class frigates in collaboration
with Britain.

In December 1961, the Portuguese were evicted from Goa. The airfield at
Dabolim was taken over by the Navy. In Delhi, there was difference of
opinion between the Ministries whether Goa should be developed solely as
a mercantile port or whether the Navy's requirement to have a naval base
half way between Bombay and Cochin could be accommodated. This
discussion continued until 1963.

Frigate Project

By 1962, in response to global enquiries, Sweden and Holland had also

submitted proposals to build frigates in India. In mid 1962, a team led by
the DCNS visited Sweden, Holland and Britain to make a final techno-
economic assessment of the British proposal vis a vis the others. The
team recommended the British Leander frigate. In view of the difficult
financial position and the shortage of foreign exchange, the final decision
awaited the negotiation of credit on soft terms.

When China attacked in the end of 1962, the age profile of the Navy's
ships was as follows:

(a) Acquisitions After 1947. One aircraft carrier, two cruisers, six
destroyers, one tanker and one stores ship, all of which were
second hand. The new acquisitions were eight frigates, four coastal
minesweepers and two inshore minesweepers.

(b) Old Ships Pre 1947. Six frigates and one LST.

DEVELOPMENTS 1963 TO 1965

After the military reverses during China's attacks in end 1962, India
sought defence assistance from America, Britain and the Commonwealth.
These countries asked for details of specific assistance. These details were
sent. The requirements were phased in the form of a five-year plan and
led to the formulation of the 1964 - 69 Defence Plan.

Meanwhile the American President and the British Prime Minister, who had
met at Nassau in the Bahamas in December 1962, had decided that:

(a) America would not supply "lethal" equipment to India, except

for equipping the Army's mountain divisions on the Indo Chinese
border.

(b) Britain, the 'traditional supplier', would deal with the Navy's
requirements.

(c) The envisaged aid to India of $120 million would be shared

equally between America and Britain.

Immediately after China's attack:

(a) The first RNO Port Blair was appointed in November 1962.

(b) Government accorded sanction for the construction of the new

1120 foot wharf at Visakhapatnam.

The year 1963 was a major milestone in Indian naval planning. The
Government initiated an exhaustive review of defence requirements.
China was viewed as the primary threat. The Government decided that
the Army's strength should be raised to 825,000 men and the Air Force's
strength to 45 squadrons. The resources required to achieve this meant
that the Navy could not be strengthened. Whereas the Navy had proposed
a force level of 130 ships, the Defence Plan for the Navy envisaged "a
phased programme for replacement of over-aged ships".

During 1963:

(a) With a view to take up the construction of frigates in India, a

team of officers headed by the DCNS visited Britain and Sweden to
evaluate their offers of collaboration.

(b) The responsibility for Seaward Defence was entrusted to the

Navy. The Coast Batteries which till then were manned by the Army
were taken over by the Navy.

(c) The Navy was asked to garrison the A&N islands. INS JARAWA
was commissioned as a naval establishment. A naval garrison was
stationed at Port Blair and provided with vessels for moving
between the islands.

(d) It was decided to set up at Visakhapatnam, the full fledged

Naval Base and Dockyard which had been proposed in 1957.

(e) It was decided to develop Goa as a naval base. INS GOMANTAK

was commissioned as a naval establishment. The Naval Air Station
Daboim's facilities were updated to make them capable of operating
jet aircraft.

By early 1964, the Defence Plan 1964-69 had crystallised. The

requirements of the Plan were discussed by the Defence Minister's
Delegations during their visits to America in May 1964, to Russia in
August 1964 and to Britain in November 1964. Neither America, Britain
nor Russia perceived any threat to India from China's Navy. In their view,
India's priority was to contain China on India's land borders by
strengthening the Army and the Air Force. Russia however was willing to
meet the Navy's needs.

In his book "Indian Navy's Submarine Arm", Admiral Chatterji states:

"From the Soviet point of view, India's naval shopping list no doubt
came at a propitious time. Following the victory of the Chinese in
the eastern Himalayas and Peking's sharp attacks on Soviet foreign
policy in the Indian Ocean, Moscow's geo-strategic analysis of
Southeast Asia welcomed a powerful Indian Navy that would
associate and cooperate with the Soviet Navy to contain China in
the region. Whatever may be the reasons for the Soviet Union's
prompt and positive responses to India's Naval requirements, it was
certainly very helpful and timely in making up the various
deficiencies in the Indian Fleet".<
By 1965, collaboration agreements had been concluded with Vickers
Yarrow of Britain for the indigenous construction of three Leander class
frigates. Britain offered a special defence credit of 4.7 million pounds to
cover the external cost of the Frigate Project for the first four years, as
well as for the expansion of Mazagon Docks Ltd.

Negotiations were also finalised for the Navy's tanker to be built by a

public sector shipping line in a foreign shipyard and on completion, for the
tanker to be chartered to the Navy.

When the Rann of Kutch incident occurred in April 1965 the position
regarding the Navy's requirements was:

(a) America had said that Britain should deal with the Navy's needs.

(b) The British Navy had expressed its inability to spare either the
type of destroyers or the type of submarines which the Navy
wanted. British shipbuilders were willing to build a new Oberon class
submarine which India wanted. India's suggestion for soft credit, as
had been extended for the Frigate Project was being reconsidered
by the British Government.

(c) Russia had offered a variety of ships and submarines to meet

the Navy's needs.

In May 1965, soon after the Rann of Kutch incident, a series of events
occurred with startling rapidity.

(a) In April, Pakistan intruded into Kutch.

(b) In May, Britain informed India that they were unable to extend
financial assistance for an Oberon class submarine to be built in a
Britain shipyard.

(c) In June, there was an increase in Indonesian intrusions into the

Nicobar Islands. The Navy recommended to the Government an
immediate increase in naval presence in the Bay of Bengal to deter
further intrusions.

(d) The refusal of British credit to build the Oberon class submarine
and the need for increased naval presence in the A & N islands
combined to precipitate the decision to accept the Russian offer of
ships and submarines which they had made in September 1964.

(e) In September 1965, an agreement was signed for the

acquisition from Russia of four submarines, a submarine depot ship,
five Petya class submarine chasers, two Landing Ships Tank Medium
 and five patrol boats, all for deployment in the Bay of Bengal and
the A & N Islands.

In a letter to Rear Admiral Sridharan in November 1965. Admiral

Mountbatten wrote: (Maritime History of India by Rear Admiral K
Sridharan, )
"I have a specially soft spot in my heart for the Indian Navy, having
done so very much for it from the time I was the Supreme Allied
Commander and had most of the Navy serving under me from 1943
to 1946 until I was Viceroy and then Governor General, when I took
a great personal part in the division and reconstitution of the Navy.

"Ever since then I have been instrumental in getting almost all of

the requirements of the Indian Navy met by the British
Government, including the two cruisers, the aircraft carrier, the
destroyers, the organisations for building the frigates at Bombay
etc.

"I had even managed to get more favourable terms for the
construction of a British submarine but alas it all took so long that
this particular transaction fell through".

AN OVERVIEW OF THE NAVY'S GROWTH 1947 TO 1965

Viewed in retrospect, even though the allocations to the Navy were low, it
was possible to gradually build up a modest force, using the sterling
balances built up during World War II. Despite the disinclination to
increase defence expenditure and even after meeting the pressing needs
of the Army and Air Force, the Navy's percentage share of the defence
budget rose from 4 per cent in 1950/51 to 9 per cent in 1956/57 and 12
per cent in 1959/60. From 1961 onwards, the Navy's allocation steadily
declined to 4% in 1964/65, mainly because of the over-riding need to
swiftly modernise the Army and Air Force after the Chinese aggression of
1962.

It is also interesting to note how the long awaited approval for the
Submarine Arm resulted not only from a curious combination of several
geopolitical and economic factors but also as part of a much larger
decision to start acquiring the Navy's requirements from Russia.

As can be seen from the following table of ship acquisitions between 1947
and 1965, the Navy's growth was moderate, slow and steady, with new
construction ships from the UK replacing those of World War II vintage
and with indigenous construction gradually acquiring momentum.

CHAPTER-2
 THE INTERNATIONAL GEOPOLITICAL WEB

The partition of India in 1947 was the outcome of attitudes whose

historical origins went back several centuries. Starting in the 8th century,
the Hindu kingdoms of India were subjugated by Muslim invaders, first
from Afghanistan and then by the Mughals from Central Asia. The British
East India Company stepped in as Mughal power declined. After the first
Indian struggle for independence in 1857, two things happened. Britain
formally took over the governance of India from the East India Company.
And the British started depending more on the Hindus who for many
years had been availing of English education and had been exposed to
Western thought. The Muslims, having ruled India for several centuries,
started resenting this rise in Hindu status. As the movement for freedom
from British rule gathered headway, fears of Hindu economic domination
led the Muslims to demand separate Hindu and Muslim electorates. Over
time, this led to the Muslim League's demand for a separate Muslim state,
to be called Pakistan, comprising the Muslim majority provinces of
Baluchistan, Sind, West Punjab, the Northwest Frontier province and East
Bengal. The Muslim League, led by Mr Jinnah, was able to mobilise the
Muslim middle class. He played on their fears of Hindu domination and
they followed him.

On the other hand, the Congress leaders of India's freedom movement,

both Hindu and Muslim, were determined that independent India must be
a secular state, where the pull of religion did not intrude into matters of
governance. The Congress party, led by Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Nehru,
Sardar Patel, Netaji Bose, Maulana Azad, Frontier Gandhi Abdul Ghaffar
Khan and innumerable other Hindu and Muslim nationalist leaders
fervently believed in a composite Hindu Muslim culture and staunchly
opposed the partition of India into two homelands. They were unable to
allay the insecurity which the Muslim League played upon. When the
Muslim League leaders were asked what would happen to the millions of
Muslims who would remain in India in the provinces in which they were in
a minority, their answer was that "they would have to manage". To Indian
leaders, this "two nation theory" was impractical and repugnant. The
history of India's freedom struggle until 1947 is a record of the failure of
innumerable efforts to achieve Hindu Muslim political unity.

In April 1947, Rear Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten was appointed as the
last Viceroy of India to hand over power by mid 1948. After assessing the
situation, he concluded that partition could not be avoided and the
handing over would have to be preponed. He presented to the Congress
and the Muslim League a plan to partition the country into India and
Pakistan. The boundaries of the two countries would be demarcated by a
commission. The Princely States could stay free or join either country.
Power would be transferred on the basis of 'Dominion Status' and
thereafter either Government could withdraw from the British
Commonwealth if it wished. With rioting spreading beyond control, the
date for the end of British rule and the transfer of power was proponed by
nearly a year to two months hence, on 15 August 1947.

Despite serious differences of opinion on the concept and the timing, the
partition plan was accepted by both parties. The enormous violence of the
Hindu Muslim riots and the loss of life and property that followed when
millions of families migrated from one side to the other left deep scars of
mutual suspicion in both countries.

The 567 rulers of the Princely States were advised to accede either to
India or to Pakistan. 559 states acceded to India. 5 states acceded to
Pakistan. Three states were undecided - Junagadh, Hyderabad and
Kashmir:

- The Muslim ruler of Hindu majority Junagadh, a small state on the

Saurashtra coast, first acceded to Pakistan. The population
objected. The ruler changed his mind and acceded to India. The
Navy's role in this operation is recorded in the history of the Navy
for the period 1945 to 1950 "Under Two Ensigns".

- The Muslim ruler of Hindu majority Hyderabad,a land locked state

in the centre of India, wanted to remain free. However the anti
Hindu terrorist violence unleashed by the Razakars, an extremist
Muslim organisation dedicated to maintaining the supremacy of
Muslim power in the Deccan, led to a swift police action by India to
restore law and order. The Nizam accepted Hyderabad becoming a
part of India.

- The third state, Muslim majority Kashmir, not only became the
cause of the 1947, 1965 and 1971 Indo Pakistan wars but also the
cockpit for international geo-politics. Like the Nizam of Hyderabad,
the Maharaja of Kashmir wanted to remain free. This was not to
Pakistan's liking. Pakistan sent into Kashmir tribesmen, followed by
irregular forces, to take over Kashmir. The tribesmen entered
Kashmir in October 1947 and within days had advanced to the
outskirts of Srinagar. The Maharaja sought India's assistance to
repel the raiders. India insisted that this could only be done after
his state had formally acceded to India. This was done. The first
Indian troops reached Srinagar on 27 October and the raiders were
pushed back. Pakistan then sent in its regular forces in civilian
clothes. They too were pushed back.

On 1 January 1948, India referred the Kashmir issue to the United

Nations, stating that despite the ruler and the people having acceded to
India, the Government of India, to keep the matter above board, would
hold a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the people after law and
order had been re-established in the entire state. The Security
Council, particularly America and Britain, instead of recognising that
Pakistan's aggression had created a warlike situation, passed a resolution
calling on both sides to ease the tension. A few days later the Security
Council passed another resolution to create a United Nations Commission
to exercise a mediatory role and investigate the facts.

India was dismayed at the America and British attitude, as was the
Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, at their deliberate refusal to recognise India's
transparently sincere intentions, despite the communal holocaust of
partition. In later years, this American and British attitude of equating
India and Pakistan, despite repeated aggression by Pakistan, became the
basis of Anglo-American policy. Proposals for arms aid were assessed, not
on the criterion of need but on not disturbing the military balance in the
Asian sub-continent.

The Government of India told the Indian Army to clear the Pakistanis up
to a point which could be militarily defensible. The Army strongly pressed
for advancing farther. The Government felt that "going farther would have
embroiled Indian forces unnecessarily in an area and terrain which was
unfavourable, geographically as well as population wise". (Distant
Neighbours by Kuldip Nayar Page 71)

The United Nations Commission arrived in July 1948. Pakistan admitted

that it had sent in three brigades of troops. The Commission made
various suggestions. Negotiations followed. The UN resolution
stipulated that the very first step was Pakistani withdrawal of its
forces from the areas it had occupied in Kashmir. The second step
was to restore the jurisdiction of the Srinagar government over
the whole of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. A plebiscite was to
be held only after these two conditions were fulfilled. A cease fire
came into effect on 1 January 1949, one year after India's initial
complaint to the UN. By this time, Indian troops had pushed the
Pakistanis back to a cease fire line, (CFL) across which Indian and
Pakistani troops faced each other to prevent intrusions.

Prior to the cease fire, India insisted upon and obtained three safeguards
:

- The administration of the territory held by Pakistan (which

Pakistan called Azad Kashmir ) would not mean loss of sovereignty
for the Kashmir Government over these territories nor recognition
of the Government of Azad Kashmir.

- India would maintain its forces, not only to ensure law and order,
but also to defend the state against external aggression.
 - Pakistan, having no locus standi, would play no role in holding the
plebiscite. In subsequent years, no plebiscite could be held because
Pakistan declined to vacate the part of Kashmir territory which it
had forcibly occupied in 1947.

In 1950, the Kashmir State Constituent Assembly was convened. Pakistan

threatened a 'jehad' (holy war). Forces of both sides advanced to the
borders. Pandit Nehru made it clear that an attack on Kashmir would
mean an attack on India and would invite retaliation. Fifteen years later,
in 1965, that warning was made good. Meanwhile various proposals
continued to be made by the U N Commission and by others to resolve
the deadlock but to no avail.

In 1949, the Communist Government of Mr Mao Tse Tung assumed power

in China. The American supported Kuomintang forces under General
Chiang Kai Shek fled to Taiwan (earlier called Formosa). In end 1950,
Chinese troops intervened on the side of the North Koreans and inflicted
reverses on the United Nations forces in Korea leading to an armistice.
India sent a substantial military force to keep the peace.

The Korean war compelled America to take a wider view of the Cold War
which had been going on with Communist Russia since the end of the
Second World War. America started putting together a chain of military
alliances, stretching eastwards from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific
Ocean to encircle the southern flank of the Russian and Chinese landmass
and contain the spread of communism.

The gist of America's geo-strategic perception of Asia at that time was

that with China under communist domination and Communist Russia on
India's northern border, India had become the pivotal state in non-
communist Asia. If India went communist, for all practical purposes, all of
Asia would be lost. President Truman approved his National Security
Council's recommendation for military and economic aid to India. India
received Sherman tanks for the Army and C 119 Packet military transport
aircraft for the Air Force. No naval aid was either sought or offered. Even
though tanks and aeroplanes were being purchased, India was not in
favour of strategic linkages. In Pandit Nehru's view, it was better for India
to keep aloof from power alignments and military alliances than to take
sides, either with America or the Communist bloc. More was to be gained
for the cause of peace by facilitating better mutual understanding.

Until the early 1950s, Russia found it difficult to understand how India
could be independent while still remaining in the British Commonwealth.
It viewed India's non alignment as tilted towards the Western
"imperialist" bloc rather than towards the "socialist" bloc of Russia and
China. When India refused to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty with
Japan (preferring to sign a separate treaty giving up reparations), Russia
began to understand India's independent foreign policy. After 1952, when
it first exercised its veto in the Security Council, Russia's support of
India's stand on Kashmir became firm.

The NATO alliance was formed in 1949 followed by CENTO, SEATO and
ANZUS. America invited India to join some of these alliances. When India
declined to do so, America invited Pakistan. Pakistan responded
favourably to joining a Middle East defence pact, in return for extensive
military and economic aid. India pointed out to Pakistan that with
American arms increasing Pakistani fighting potential, it would be
ridiculous to talk of the demilitarisation of Kashmir as the first step to hold
a plebiscite.

Until the early 1950's, all of India's core defence requirements like tanks,
field artillery, cruisers, destroyers and frigates, bombers and fighter
aircraft were being acquired from Britain. In step with their better
understanding of Indian policy, the Russians started making overtures to
displace Britain as the prime source for India's defence needs. Mr PVR
Rao (later Defence Secretary from 1962 to 1967) was the Deputy High
Commissioner in London. He recalls:

"When the Air Force had come to England in 1952 to negotiate for
the Canberra bombers, I remember the Soviet Military Attache
asking me "why don't you approach us for assistance, rather than
approach America and Britain?"

"I also recall Prime Minister Nehru's talk to senior Indian High
Commission officials in 1952 "It is all very well that Russia and
China are making many overtures to us, but with America and
Britain also, you never know which way these things will turn. We
should be equally distant from both, just to safeguard all our
interests."

In 1953, Pakistan joined the American sponsored four nation Baghdad

Pact-Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. The US-Pakistan Military Defence
Agreement was signed in May 1954. This was followed by Pakistan joining
the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) comprising the
Philipines, Thailand and Pakistan. America informed India of its decision to
provide military aid to Pakistan. India protested. America replied that it
was willing to give the same arms to India. India declined. America did
however give assurances that it would not permit American arms to be
used against India. American President Eisenhower wrote to Prime
Minister Nehru that " --- I am confirming publicly that if our aid to any
country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in
aggression, I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my
constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the
UN to thwart such aggression."

In 1954, Pandit Nehru visited America. He found the American

Government deeply involved in their Cold War with Russia and not at all
interested in transfering the technological assistance which India was
seeking for developing her heavy industry. When he visited Russia in
1955, he found there a much greater willingness to help India. In 1956,
when the First Secretary of the Russian Communist Party, Mr Krushchev
visited India, he stated categorically that Russia considered Kashmir an
integral part of India. From then onwards, the relationship between India
and Russia started becoming extensive. Russia stood by India steadfastly,
using its veto in the Security Council to counter American supported pro-
Pakistan resolutions on Kashmir. Also from 1956 onwards, Russia started
extending credits on favourable terms for India's industrial development,
particularly for huge projects like the Steel Plant at Bhilai and the Heavy
Engineering Corporation at Ranchi.

The mid 1950s marked a high point in India's policy of non- alignment.
The Conference of Afro Asian Nations at Bandung in Indonesia, the
Panchsheel Declaration and slogans of India - China friendship signalled
to the developing world India's model for socio-economic development,
without getting embroiled in Cold War military alliances as a precondition
for aid.

By 1958, these slogans had worn thin. India and China had started to
drift apart. Indian and Chinese patrols clashed in the northern Himalayas,
in Aksai Chin, an area which India regarded as its own and which China
found vital to control because it connected Sinkiang with Tibet. Pakistan
seized the opportunity to exploit to its advantage, the widening rift
between India and China. Acting on the principle that your enemy's
enemy is your friend, Pakistan requested China to demarcate the border
between the two countries, part of which lay in the territory of Kashmir
under Pakistani occupation. China did not respond.

In 1958, there was an anti western coup in Iraq. Iraq withdrew from the
Baghdad Pact and it was renamed as the Central Treaty Organisation
(CENTO).

Between 1955 and 1959, the Pakistan Navy received American assistance
for: (Story of the Pakistan Navy, Pages 184 et sea)

- Acquiring eight American Navy coastal minesweepers as grant aid

 - Acquiring one cruiser and five destroyers from the British Navy's
reserve fleet, which were modernised in Britain with American
support

- Building a new naval armament depot and a new naval stores

depot

- Acquisition by the Pakistan Air Force of a squadron of twenty, twin

engined Albatross aircraft for anti submarine patrols

- Jetties and wharves

- Ammunition and stores

Early in 1959, under the auspices of SEATO, America signed with Pakistan
a bilateral agreement of cooperation for security and defence. Later it
became known that this agreement was accompanied by a secret
commitment specifically assuring Pakistan of American help if attacked by
India. It was this secret commitment that Pakistan invoked and in
response to which America sent a naval task force with the nuclear carrier
ENTERPRISE into the Indian Ocean in the 1971 Indo Pakistan war.
Pursuant to this agreement, America started using Peshawar for spying on
Russia. U 2 spy planes started taking off from the Peshawar Air Force
base and electronic listening posts were set up for monitoring Russia's
missile tests and other electronic transmissions.

In Indonesia, the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) had grown in

strength and established strong linkages with Russia and China. In the
years after the Bandung Conference of 1955, Indonesia had distanced
itself from India, and moved closer to Pakistan. Between 1959 and 1964,
the Indonesian Navy had acquired on enormous fleet from Russia. It
comprised one heavy cruiser, eighteen destroyers and frigates, twelve
submarines, sixty seven corvettes and motor torpedo boats, twelve
missile boats, twenty one minesweepers, eleven landing ships, six landing
craft, four transport ships and four oilers.

In 1960, Mr Kennedy became the American President. American policy

changed significantly. Instead of depending on military bases and
alliances, America decided to help economically strong, free and neutral
nations to contain Communism. This increased India's significance in
American policy and decreased that of Pakistan. The border dispute
between India and China and America's own difficulties with China over
Taiwan made it pragmatic for America to join hands with India in dealing
with China. 1960 was also the year that the tussle was developing
between Communist Russia and Communist China on the ideological
leadership of the International Communist Movement. Anticipating that
President Kennedy may provide arms to India, Pakistan sought and
obtained assurances from America in 1961 that `if and when arms aid
was given to India, Pakistan would be consulted'.

Sensing these shifts in geo-political alignments, Pakistan sought to

improve relations with other countries. In 1960, Pakistan accepted
Russia's offer for oil prospecting. President Nasser of Egypt was invited to
Pakistan. Along with Iran and Turkey, Pakistan formed the Regional
Cooperation for Development (RCD). Outwardly it was an alliance for
economic and cultural cooperation. Years later, both Iran and Turkey gave
Pakistan arms which it used to fight India.

In 1961, Pakistan repeated its earlier suggestion to China seeking

demarcation of borders. Within weeks of the Indo China conflict in 1962,
Pakistan conceded China's territorial claims in the Hunza area. In an
agreement signed in 1963, Pakistan gave away to China 2200 square
miles of Pakistani Occupied Kashmir bordering Sinkiang. In return, China
helped to build the Karakoram Highway from Sinkiang into Pakistan.

In 1961, under Defence Minister Krishna Menon's determined drive for

self reliance, an agreement was signed with Russia for the manufacture in
India of Russia's latest fighter aircraft, the MIG 21. The Air Force became
the first of India's armed forces to go in for Russian acquisitions. Two
other major self reliance projects were the indigenous manufacture of
frigates for the Navy and tanks for the Army.

When China attacked India in October 1962, India appealed to Russia,

America, Britain and the Commonwealth for military aid. The immediate
response was positive. A strengthened India on China's southwest border
suited their interests. It could help lessen the pressure China was exerting
on Taiwan, an American protege. It could help lessen China's pressure on
Britain in Malaya. And it could help distract China from the pressure it was
exerting on Russia's eastern border. Russia agreed to meet India's needs
and to deliver before the due dates, the equipment for which contracts
had already been signed (See "Stalin to Gorbachov" by TN Kaul. Page
46).

Soon after India's request for military assistance, President Kennedy of

America and Prime Minister Macmillan of Britain happened to meet at
Nassau in the Bahamas. It was agreed that the West need not be over-
generous in their response as it would disturb the military balance with
Pakistan. Of the total aid of 120 million dollars promised initially, 60
million each would be given by America and Britain. Emergency aid of
light arms, ammunition and winter clothing was airlifted to India.
When China resumed its attack in November 1962 and advanced into
Assam, India asked America to intervene militarily with air support. By
the time China declared a unilateral cease fire on 22 November, America
had despatched to the Bay of Bengal a naval task force which included
the nuclear powered aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE. By a curious
coincidence, the same aircraft carrier was sent to the Bay of Bengal
during the 1971 Indo Pakistan War as a gesture of support to Pakistan.

Of the military assistance of non-lethal items such as spares for transport

aircraft, communication, engineering and medical equipment and some
light infantry weapons for mountain divisions, about half was delivered by
mid 1965. The remainder was stopped when war broke out in September
1965.

Whilst responding to India's request for military assistance, America and

Britain insisted on the pre-conditions of restarting discussions to solve the
Kashmir problem, of making a formal declaration that the arms received
would not be used against Pakistan and of inspection by American military
officers that the arms given would only go to the forces facing the
Chinese. The Indo Pakistan talks broke down in May 1963. Apart from the
earlier basic differences, India was unwilling to agree to the boundary
agreement between China and Pakistan over areas of illegally occupied
Kashmir.

After China's attack in 1962, the Indonesian Communist Party's pro-China

line further soured Indonesian relations with India. The growing size of
Indonesia's Russian supplied fleet bolstered the Indonesian Navy's
confidence. Bellicosity increased - claims were voiced to the Nicobar
Island chain. Intrusions increased in the southernmost island, Great
Nicobar, which was a mere 90 miles from the northern tip of Sumatra.
Statements were made that the Indian Ocean should be renamed as the
Indonesian Ocean.

From 1963 onwards, Pakistan increased its violations of the cease fire line
in Kashmir. A perception grew in Pakistan that India would become too
strong as a result of the major decisions being taken in India's Defence
Plan 1964 - 69 and that it was best to settle scores with India sooner
rather than later.

Politically India continued its measures to integrate Kashmir into the

Indian mainstream. Kashmir's representatives in the Indian Parliament,
hitherto nominated, would be elected by the people. The President of
India was empowered to extend President's rule to Kashmir, as he could
in the other states of India,in the event of a breakdown of the
constitutional machinery.

Between 1959 and 1965, America gave the Pakistan Navy a floating dock,
(1961) a fleet tanker, DACCA(1963) and a submarine, GHAZI (1964)
along with equipment for training establishments and the dockyard (Story
of the Pakistan Navy, Pages 204, 208, 209).

In May 1964, Prime Minister Nehru died. He was succeeded by Mr Lal

Bahadur Shastri. Pakistan intensified its anti India campaign and decided
that 1965 was the right year to force a settlement of the Kashmir issue
that had eluded them in 1947-48.

During 1964, delegations headed by Defence Minister Chavan held

discussions with America, Russia and Britain regarding assistance for
India's Defence Plan 1964-69. America could not offer what India wanted.
Russia offered the Army and Navy what they sought. The Army
contracted for light tanks and artillery. The Navy did not want to strain its
connections with the British Navy and waited for the outcome of
discussions with Britain.

The Defence Minister's delegation visited Britian in end 1964. It found

that Britain's decision to reduce the size of its Navy precluded it from
meeting the Navy's immediate requirements of ships and submarines.
However, negotiations were concluded for British collaboration in the
construction in Bombay of the British Navy's latest design of Leander
class frigates.

In end 1964, Britain's economy was under serious strain. A major review
of defence and foreign policy had concluded that Britain could neither
afford its overseas defence commitments nor the size of its Navy. It was
mutually agreed that the burden of Cold War naval deployment in the
Indian Ocean should be borne by America. In due course, the British
withdrew from Gan in Addu Atoll and America established its presence in
Diego Garcia. Likewise, the American Navy gradually replaced the British
Navy's presence in Bahrein in the Persian Gulf.

By 1965, there were sharp differences in Britain about Indian Ocean

policy. In one view, Britain's economic difficulties and the conclusions of
the strategic defence review carried out in 1964 required that Britain
withdraw from the Indian Ocean and concentrate on Europe. The opposite
view was that in view of China's nuclear explosion in 1964, Indonesia's
confrontation with Malaysia in the east and Egypt's `subversion' of Aden
and the Persian Gulf in the west, Britain should not withdraw from the
Indian Ocean, because it would leave friends and allies in the lurch. Even
though Indonesia and Egypt were not overtly communist, the British
viewed their actions as serving communist objectives. In their view, the
security of the Indian sub-continent was central to Indian Ocean Policy
and it would not avail to stand fast on the Himalaya, if the western and
eastern flanks of the area were turned. (Note: Letter to the London Times
29 Apr 65 by Sir Olaf Caroe and others).
In May 1965, Pakistan intruded into the Rann of Kutch. At the same time,
there was a marked increase in intrusions in the Nicobar Islands. The
Navy recommended an immediate increase in naval presence in the Bay
of Bengal. This precipitated the decision to accept the ships and
submarines which Russia had offered to the Defence Minister's delegation
in 1964 and to base them in Visakhapatnam.

Within a brief period of four years between 1961 and 1965, the
geopolitical and economic compulsions of America and Britain had led
India's Air Force, Army and Navy to accept Russia's generous offers of its
latest conventional defence systems on extremely favourable financial
terms. The 1956 Rupee-Ruble Trade Agreement was extended also to
defence sales from 1965 onwards.

During the 1965 war, Indonesia's stance was markedly pro-Pakistan.

There was an increase in the sightings of unidentified submarines and
aircraft in the Andaman and Nicobar islands. In response to Pakistan's
request for assistance, the Indonesian Navy sent two submarines and two
missile boats to Karachi. The Indonesian Naval Chief even volunteered to
distract India by making moves to take over islands in the Nicobars (For
details see "The First Round" by Air Marshal Asghar Khan, Page 45). It
was this vulnerability in August 1965 that impelled Naval Headquarters to
keep the Indian Fleet in the Bay of Bengal for as long as possible, so as to
deter adventurist Indonesian naval moves.

After the 1965 Indo Pakistan War, Russia's mediation at Tashkent helped
to negotiate the postwar settlement. From 1966 onwards, Russia tried to
wean Pakistan away from American and Chinese influence by offering
defence assistance and economic aid. By 1969, it was clear that this had
not succeeded. In the same year, discussions started on what in August
1971 was to become the Indo Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and
Cooperation (Note: for details see "War and Secession" by Sisson and
Rose, Page 197). Russia offered to sign a similar treaty with Pakistan
provided they got out of CENTO, SEATO and the American Military
Assistance Programme. Pakistan rejected the offer (See "My Years with
the IAF" by Air Chief Marshal PC Lal page 333).

In the 1960's, America's naval policy in the Indian Ocean had many
ingredients. The foremost was to deter Russia from interrupting the flow
of oil from the Persian Gulf countries to America and Europe. Politically,
this entailed American support of Iran to counter Russian influence in
Iraq. It entailed maintaining a naval presence in the Persian Gulf, and
wherever possible, in the countries on the rim of the Indian Ocean, not
only to secure the sea lines of communication which criss-crossed the
Indian Ocean but also to inject military force from seaward when
required. By 1968, the American Navy had effected the necessary
adjustments in its global naval deployments. In 1968, Britain announced
its intention to withdraw from East of Suez by 1971 and generated debate
on "the Vacuum in the Indian Ocean". Russia's naval presence in the
Indian Ocean increased to keep pace with the American naval presence.

America felt that Russia was articulating anxiety to forestall American

naval deployment. The Russians on the other hand, felt that the
establishing of communication facilities in Diego Garcia and in Northwest
Cape in Australia could be interpreted clearly as reflecting an intention to
deploy submarines in the Indian Ocean whose ballistic missiles were
targeted on Russia.

Fears of a naval vacuum in the Indian Ocean were soon overtaken by

fears of the militarisation of the Indian Ocean. America neither denied nor
acknowledged the deployment of submarine launched ballistic missiles.
The Russian Navy started showing its flag in the Indian Ocean, partly to
fill the naval vacuum, partly to counter the American Navy and partly to
demonstrate to the littoral states that the Russian Navy was a force to
contend with. Since Russia lacked naval bases in the Indian Ocean, an
anchorage was developed off Socotra near the Gulf of Aden. Overall,
there was a steady increase in the presence of American and Russian
naval ships.

In 1969, American President Nixon's "Twin Pillar" strategy entrusted the

security of the Persian Gulf region to the monarchies in Iran and Saudi
Arabia. America started heavily arming both countries under the Nixon
Doctrine. In 1970, the Russians became active in the Dhofar rebellion in
Oman, which was a Persian Gulf choke-point. These moves towards
militarisation of the Indian Ocean triggered countermoves to make the
Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace. And both these moves and countermoves
had to take into account the overall American hyper-sensitivity regarding
West Asian oil supplies.

In 1971, the Indo Soviet Friendship Treaty and Russia's veto in the
Security Council during the Indo Pakistan war helped India to liberate
Bangladesh so that ten million refugees could return to their homes.
America made its gesture of support to Pakistan by sending the
ENTERPRISE carrier group into the Bay of Bengal. The Russian Navy, in
an equally reassuring gesture of support to India, shadowed the American
Navy's task force into the Indian Ocean. After the 1971 war, the Russian
Navy worked alongside the Indian Navy to clear the mines laid by the
Pakistan Navy in the approaches to Chittagong harbour.

In 1971 also, the concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

crystallised in the UN. The original idea of the Non Aligned Movement was
that the Great Powers should not enhance their military presence in the
Indian Ocean area. The UN's 1971 resolution for an Indian Ocean Peace
Zone was very specific about the scope of the Zone. The Indian Ocean
covered not only the ocean, but also its natural extensions like the Red
Sea, the Persian Gulf etc. It did not include the adjacent land mass. The
main thrust of the resolution was directed against Great Power rivalry in
the Indian Ocean. It did not try to find a solution to the politics of the
littoral. Nor did it make the acceptance of the Zone of Peace by the Great
Powers conditional upon reciprocal obligation by the littoral and hinterland
states. However, since this did not suit the Cold War interests of the two
super powers, the UN's Adhoc Committee attempted to reverse the
priorities. The Great Powers were able to divert attention from their own
obligations by demanding that the regional powers should themselves
accept de-nuclearisation first. And, as usual, they were able to manipulate
regional dissensions and rivalries to stall the convening of a Zone of Peace
Conference.

In 1972, Iraq nationalised her oil companies. The Iraqi Navy established a
naval base and positioned Russian supplied missile boats at Umm Qasr at
the head of the Persian Gulf in the Shatt-el-Arab, not far from the Iranian
oil fields of Abadan. America commenced the construction of naval
facilities on Diego Gracia to support a carrier task force for 30 days. Three
submarine pens were to be constructed for the attack submarines which
accompany a carrier battle group. The runways were to be lengthened to
operate B 52 strategic bombers. America indicated that it did not intend
to employ nuclear weapons on these B-52's nor deploy submarine
launched ballistic missiles from Diego Garcia.

In 1973, the Arab Israeli war persuaded the OPEC states to use oil pricing
as a weapon against the West to offset the continued economic, political
and military arms support for Israel. They raised the price of oil. The
results were many and diverse. The nations of the West reacted with
hysteria to start with, but soon turned it to advantage. There was a
massive increase in wealth for the OPEC states, who then significantly
increased their military expenditures and arms purchases. The Western
banks, faced with mounting deposits of petro dollars, increased their
lending to non OPEC Third World countries. This credit boom offered an
excellent opportunity to upgrade defence equipment, particularly as
Western suppliers were increasingly keen to export state of the art
weapons and equipment to offset domestic economic decline and balance
of payment difficulties, both of which were being aggravated by rising oil
prices. Concurrently, extensive plans were initiated for oil substitutes and
diversification of oil supplies. The number of new producers increased.
Soon supply exceeded demand, prices fell and the crisis shifted from the
consumers to the producers.

In 1973 also, America decided to create a Quick Reaction Force to deal

with crises in the Persian Gulf. The Russian Navy symbolised its presence
when it helped to clear mines in the Red Sea. In 1974, Russian influence
started building up in Somalia and the Russian Navy helped in clearing
the Suez Canal of mines.

Pakistan's naval relationship with China started in September 1970 when

the C-in-C Navy first visited there. By this time, unrest was brewing in
East Pakistan and China agreed to strengthen the Navy in East Pakistan
by supplying small shallow craft for riverine patrols. The patrol craft could
not be delivered until after the establishment of Bangladesh, when the
contract was amended. In subsequent years, China supplied the Pakistan
Navy with hydrofoil torpedo boats, gunboats, missile boats and large
patrol craft. (Story of the Pakistan Navy Page 302).

In the years after the 1971 war, the Pakistan Navy acquired one more
Daphne class submarine, two Agosta class submarines and Atlantic
maritime patrol aircraft from France, frigates and anti submarine Seaking
helicopters from Britain and destroyers on loan from America.

CHAPTER 3

THE 1965 INDO PAKISTAN WAR

Preamble

The analyses of all wars and all naval operations invariably reveal facets which caus
achievement. From the records presently available of events in 1965, two general featu

(a) 1965 was the first time after independence in 1947 that the Cabinet, the Min
Committee and the Services Headquarters came face to face with the procedural
implications. Every single personage and institution had to carefully feel the way
Expectedly, there was considerable confusion. Had the war been longer, many gr
Instead, its short duration permitted achievements to be exaggerated and shortc

(b) The second feature was the clear determination of both the Indian and Pakist
desist from attacks on cities and non-military targets and to anticipate reciprocity
This too created confusion. In the doctrines prevalent at that time, the Armed Fo
were not accustomed to the political niceties of only one or two Services fighting
defensive action within geographical limits. The media on both sides were sensat
respective Armed Forces. For all practical purposes India and Pakistan were actu
broadcast on 6 September, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan stated that Pakistan
India nor of Pakistan formally "declared war", thereby increasing the confusion.

With hindsight, it is clear that the interplay of factors was complex. India wanted to tre
and hence an internal affair. Pakistan wanted to internationalise the Kashmir issue. The
the same British Commonwealth being at war with one another. In fact Britain, Americ
September on all supplies of military equipment and stores to both India and Pakistan.
imposed a similar embargo. In a wider perspective, declaration of war could have invit
Nations intervention.

For the Navy, the events of 1965 yielded invaluable lessons. Many of the shortcomings
of the inherent contradictions of "being at war without formally declaring war" re-surfa

The Dramatis Personae in the 1965 War

General J N Chaudhuri was the Chief of the Army Staff and Chairman of the Chiefs of S
was the Chief of the Naval Staff. Air Marshal Arjan Singh was the Chief of the Air Staff.
Officer Commanding Indian Fleet (FOCIF).

Mr Lal Bahadur Shastri was the Prime Minister. Mr Y B Chavan was the Defence Ministe

In the Ministry of Defence, Mr P V R Rao was the Defence Secretary, Mr HC Sarin was t
Sheth was the Additional Secretary and Mr DD Sathe was a Joint Secretary. Mr LK Jha
Minister. Mr CP Srivastava, the Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, published his m
Pradhan, the Private Secretary to the Defence Minister, published his memoirs "Debacl

Pakistan's Plan

The picture that emerges from published Pakistani sources and memoirs is of an aggre
named Desert Hawk, Gibraltar and Grand Slam.

The first phase, Operation Desert Hawk, to be launched in early 1965, was a probing e
Kutch, where the boundary had not yet been demarcated. This operation was meant to
India's responses. Next to draw India's military forces southward to Kutch, away from
forces a dress rehearsal for a full scale invasion of India later in the year, initially in Ka
test how far America was serious in enforcing its ban on the use of American supplied P
for an attack on India.

Concurrently with this first phase, the training was to be started of about 30,000 men
men were to be formed in ten 'Gibraltar' forces, each commanded by a Pakistani Army
companies of 110 men per company. Each company comprised regular troops of the A
Pakistan Army, along with Mujahid (volunteers for a jehad) and Razakar (defenders of
were placed under the command of a Major General of the Pakistan Army who was also

The second phase, Operation Gibraltar was to commence in early August 1965 and env
penetrate sixty locations throughout Kashmir and at each location initiate terror,arson,
and government property. After a few days of large scale damage, it would be announc
Kashmir' that the people of Kashmir had risen in revolt. In due course, after describing
radio station would announce the formation of a National Government. Concurrently th
Indian Government's allegations of infiltration and label as aggression the Indian Army
Occupied Kashmir to stop further infiltration.

Towards end August, the Pakistan Army would launch the third phase Operation Grand
across the India - Pakistan international boundary into the Chamb area in order to cap
with Kashmir. Pakistan would allege that this was a response to India's aggression acro
launch of the thrust to Akhnoor, the Pakistan Army would launch a massive attack with
and as much Indian territory as possible for eventual exchange after the cease fire.

Since none of the foregoing was known to India at the time, India's responses to these
why's and wherefore's of the Indian Navy's actions in 1965.

The Intrusion in KUTCH - Operation Desert Hawk - April 1965

The Rann of Kutch is a marshy area about 300 miles long and 50 miles wide on the we
in January 1965 with Pakistan claiming the entire Rann of Kutch on the grounds that S
exercise administrative control over the area during the British period. This was one of
since partition in 1947. Pakistan was keen to have at least the northern portion of the
drilling with the help of an American oil company. India asserted that Kanjarkot, Chadb
belonged to India and not to Pakistan.

Operation Desert Hawk started with skirmishes between Indian police patrols and Pakis
track, a mile and a half inside Indian territory where Pakistani forces established two p
to within 10 miles of the fort at Kanjarkot. On 9 April, Pakistan forces in brigade streng
manned Sardar post near the old ruined fort of Kanjarkot. The CRPF contingent was fo
area was then taken over by the Army. The Indian Army asked the Pakistan Army to v
On 16 April, Pakistan claimed Kanjarkot to be Pakistan territory. On 24 April, Pakistan
tanks and field guns. The attack was contained with considerable casualties on both sid
British Prime Minister initiated moves to secure a cease-fire. During the Commonwealth
London, he succeeded in his efforts. A simple cease fire was declared on 29 April. On 1
formal cease fire was signed in London restoring India's police control over the dispute
use of the disputed track.

Both the national and the international press commented adversely on the performanc
nor fare as badly as Pakistan claimed, Pakistan did make local gains. Logistics favoured
it had deployed F 86 Sabre fighter aircraft. And Pakistan had deployed its Army in force
tanks, including the Patton tanks recently received from America. India protested to Am
supplied arms and America protested to Pakistan. Nothing much happened.

On the naval side, no encounter occurred. Early in 1965, the Indian Fleet had visited B
carrier VIKRANT had carried out a routine cooperation exercise with the Army in the Ku
ships were on routine assignments on both coasts and in the Andamans. Most ships we
preparation for the annual exercises in the Bay of Bengal for the duration of the southw
disembarked her air squadrons and was on her way back to Bombay for docking. When
ordered to sail back and reembark her aircraft. By the time she had done so, the cease
docking was to result in the carrier not being available for operations later in the year.

The official history of the Pakistan Navy titled `Story Of The Pakistan Navy 1947 - 197

"In March 1965 the Indian Navy, having completed a series of exercises off Bombay an
number of destroyers and frigates on a goodwill visit to the Gulf ports. On their return
and carried out extensive exercises off Kutch. These exercises included anti submarine
missions by carrier borne aircraft. This appears to have been a prelude to the Kutch op
an important role in transporting men and material to the port of Kandla, which was be
the area.

"In Karachi, COMPAK arrived suddenly one afternoon and enquired how soon ships cou
made ready and proceeded to sea a few days later for the Rann of Kutch operations wh
War.

"A notable feature of the 1965 war was that both its genesis and its outcome have rem
frictions generated by the gradual change in India's stance over the Kashmir issue. In
evident that India wanted to do a volte face on its commitment to a plebiscite in Kashm
of its leaders and by the practical steps initiated for the incorporation of the disputed te
view in Pakistan was that if nothing was done to thwart India's efforts, she would be em
for the assimilation of the state into its territory. Lack of any response on Pakistan's pa
to strengthen their claim over the State as time passed."

In June, a formal cease fire agreement was arrived at, effective from 1 July. It provide
not produce a compromise, would be followed by reference of the Kutch issue to a tribu
ministerial meeting never took place - Pakistan did not reply to India's communications
upheld by 2 to 1 Pakistan's claim to the northern half of the Rann and awarded 10 perc

Mr Pradhan's memoirs state:

"After the cease-fire on the Rann of Kutch the Indian army had started moving tr
of restraining any Pakistani adventure in the Punjab or in Jammu and Kashmir. H
the movement was considerably slow. During March and April 1965, the Kashmir
propaganda. In May 1965 the Indian government was forced to rearrest Sheikh A
and the Pakistani hawks decided that the time was ripe to launch a guerrilla type
`Operation Gibraltar'."

Pakistan's incursion into Kutch roused strong feelings amongst the people of India. The
India had suffered at the hands of the Chinese in 1962. The opposition parties alleged
firmly enough. Several considerations appear to have weighed with the Prime Minister
Srivastava was the Private Secretary to the Prime Minister in 1965. His memoirs "Lal B

"At the back of his mind was always the firm advice of the Army Chief that an es
was, tactically, not in the country's interest and that if there had to be a trial of s
should be elsewhere."

Mr L K Jha, the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister in 1965, recalls:

 "I was involved with some of the overall considerations which were guiding the w
Committee of the Cabinet as`well as the Secretaries where some aspects were v
but equally from an operational point of view.

"Now, first of all, the attempt on our part was to keep the whole thing co
otherwise, to a local conflict, rather than allow it to assume the characte
prime objective of our policy - it had been in the past also. But at the sam
on terrain chosen by the enemy would always leave you at a disadvantage. This
of Kutch affair when Pakistan had all the logistic advantage and we had a tremen
supplies moving to the front.

"At that very time, a political decision had been taken that we would not
backs and therefore a plan for opening a second front in the Punjab by m
and perfected. But it was not launched because a cease fire came into existenc
peaceful way of resolving the Rann of Kutch dispute would be evolved and in fact

"But even when there was the state of uncertainty, a kind of simple cease fire wi
Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference was taking place in London. Shastrij
when going, there was concern - supposing things hotted up in our absence, sho
launched or not? The arrangement I made with Shri Y B Chavan, who was then t
contingency arose, he would send me a message indicating the date by which th
were about to move forward. However the contingency did not arise.

"In fact I recall, and it might be useful for the record, a meeting between Prime M
the Commonwealth Conference session. It was a private meeting and I was there
know, your chaps tried to commit aggression on our territory, our chaps gave th
Then Shastriji said "Mr President, you are a General. I have no military knowledg
attack Pakistan, I would choose a terrain where we have no logistic support and
would make such a mistake or any of my Generals would allow me to make that
of President Ayub that this thought startled him. Because quite obviously he had
Bhutto, that the Indians had attacked in the Rann of Kutch. And he was firmly of
Shastriji. I could see him visibly pause and not pursue the point any further". (Bl

Mr C P Srivastava's memoirs state: (ibid Page 199)

"Why was air power not deployed in the Rann of Kutch conflict? Air Chief Marsha
that soon after the commencement of hostilities in the Rann of Kutch region, he
Asghar Khan, his counterpart in Pakistan, suggesting an informal agreement that
the conflict. Arjan Singh himself agreed on the wisdom of this proposal but he co
political clearance from the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister. Arjan Singh
Kutch was not a suitable area for large-scale operations by India".

"Shastri was a man of peace and he was determined to go to the farthest extent
and honour, to maintain peace with Pakistan."

Another consideration seems to have been Prime Minister Shastri's belief that it would
people of which were of the same stock as Indians, than to make up with China. He wa
upon India then, whilst reacting in whatever manner India thought fit, the conflict shou

Yet another consideration seems to have been the international political climate. After
to be more friendly with her neighbors Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, who were still memb
directed against Russia. In trying to woo Pakistan, Russia appears to have been influen
closer to China. Russia invited President Ayub Khan. He visited Moscow in April 1965 d
noticed that Russia tended to take a neutral position in the conflict. It was reluctant to
woo Pakistan. India also came to know that Russia was considering President Ayub Kha
visited Russia soon after President Ayub Khan. Russian leaders reassured him that they
military pacts as well as from China and if they were successful, India would benefit m

There was also the lurking threat from China. After the Sino Pakistan border treaty in 1
made a state visit to Pakistan in 1964.This was followed by a state visit by President A

And there was Indonesia, whose relations with India had deteriorated after the Bandun
of Indonesia had come to power and had close links with Communist China. In the end
had increased substantially. Between 1959 and 1965, Russia gave Indonesia one cruise
eight anti submarine patrol vessels, twenty missile boats and several motor torpedo bo
a mutual defence arrangement with Pakistan. Indonesian leaders started voicing claim
Sumatra and wanting the Indian Ocean to be renamed as the Indonesian Ocean.

After China's attack on India's northern frontiers in 1962, the Army's hands were more
charged with the garrisoning of the Andaman and Nicobar islands. In 1965, the Navy w
islands.

Not the least of Prime Minister Shastri's worries was the internal situation - the likeliho
opinion, between political parties and within the Cabinet, on how to deal with Pakistan'
in Parliament at a time when there was a pressing need for greater unity.

Naval Movements Between May And August 1965

The `Story of the Pakistan Navy' states:- (Page 215)

"After the Rann of Kutch operations, the Pakistan Navy's ships went to sea frequ
Changes of formation from surface to anti aircraft disposition were carried out wh
Karachi. Exercises continued throughout the monsoons. In August, all leave was
made for possible hostilities".

The `Indian Navy's History 1951 - 1965' states:-

"The Indian Fleet sailed for the Bay of Bengal in end June. No directive had been
war. It had been arranged for a British submarine to be available off Madras in Ju
was planned that ships of the Fleet visit the Andamans,Calcutta and Visakhapatn
The Intrusions in Kashmir - Operation Gibraltar - August 1965

It is clear from Pakistani published sources that in mid May,six weeks before signing th
Ayub Khan was given a military presentation on Operation Gibraltar. During the presen
was included in Operation Grand Slam. He accorded approval for Operation Gibraltar to
Force Commanders of Operation Gibraltar.

The first infiltration across the Cease Fire Line (CFL) started on 1 August over a 700 kil
Indians as well as the local Kashmiris were taken by surprise.

Operation Gibraltar commenced on 5 August. Sixty companies of Pakistani armed pers

weapons and explosives, infiltrated across the cease fire line to blow up strategic bridg
arson. On 5 August itself, some infiltrators were apprehended.

In his foreword to Air Marshal Asghar Khan's book `The First Round', Mr Altaf Gauhar,
Broadcasting states: (Page xii)

"The truth is that the first four volunteers who were captured by the Indians desc
India Radio on 8 August 1965, nearly a month before India crossed the internatio

On hearing these broadcasts, Pakistan realised that their secret plan was now open kn

Mr C P Srivastava's memoirs state: (Page 208)

"It was only on 8 August 1965 that more detailed information about extensive in
provided to Prime Minister Shastri. He immediately summoned a meeting of the
Chief of Army Staff attended this meeting. He assured the Prime Minister that th
situation, the raiders were being rounded up but further sabotage could still occu
Minister asked the Chief of Army Staff to take whatever action he considered nec

"On 9 August, as per its pre-arranged plan, Pakistan announced a rebellion in Ka

fighters who were helping them. It also reported receiving a broadcast, by a secr
Kashmir', of the setting up of a Revolutionary Council to take over all authority in
clear to the world that this was a propaganda hoax. Soon even Pakistani newspa
August, the Pakistan Army realised that Operation Gibraltar had flopped. From 1
stepped up its violation of the cease fire line on the Srinagar - Leh road".

Mr PVR Rao, the Defence Secretary in 1965, stated in his 1972 USI Lecture:

"The firm decision that the Army should cross the Cease Fire Line to root
Pakistan regular forces intervened, our forces should be free to retaliate
was taken on the night of the 13th August by the Prime Minister, when t
including the Chief of the Army Staff were present. These decisions were
Army Staff that to check infiltration, the infiltrators' bases should be des
forces, the Services should not be restricted. Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri was a
 but was determined that measures to liquidate infiltrators should be pursued vigo
publicly to the decision taken at his speech from the Red Fort on the 15th Augus
sword will be met with the sword'. And even as the speech was being made, our
Cease Fire Line near Kargil and, in the following days, occupied various places ac
and destroyed the infiltrators' hideouts. After giving the broad directive on the 13
concern himself with the details of the operations. He left all operational decision
but I used to report to the Prime Minister at his residence every evening the prog

In Naval Headquarters in Delhi, the situation had become quite vexed. With all the ope
East, the resources available in Bombay were meagre. The frigate TALWAR, which had
was hurriedly boxed up and sent for investigating the presence of possible enemy vess
of the Indo Pakistan border in the Gulf of Kutch.Her first patrol was for 5 days from 12
August. No encounter occurred.

From the East, the Flag Officer Commanding the Indian Fleet (FOCIF), Rear Admiral B
in Kashmir, rang up the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS), Vice Admiral Soman, on more t
Fleet return to Bombay. He was told that the Fleet should adhere to its programme of

Operation Grand Slam - September 1965

Mr Pradhan's book states: (Page 251)

"By the first week of August, the infiltrators had not achieved their objective. In
spark the support of the local population, Pakistan undertook a limited offensive
counter offensive, in the northern sector, Indian troops crossed the CFL and capt
of the Leh-Srinagar road. Further, in order to hit the infiltrators' bases, India dec
and capture two strategic areas in POK the Hajipur Bulge and the Kishanganga B
and four days later, an Indian column led by Major Ranjit Singh Dayal (later Lieu
and captured the 18,600 feet high Hajipur pass. The Pakistanis were ill-prepared
the Indian offensive unnerved them. By the end of August, Pakistan had failed to
was under pressure to do something to check the loss of further territory and avo

"Pakistan had limited options of regaining the initiative in Jammu and Kashmir ex
west in the Chhamb area. It offered many advantages. It was contiguous to Paki
Pakistan's rail and road network and the nearby cantonments of Sialkot, Kharian
Akhnur, being suited to the use of armour, Pakistan could threaten the Akhnur b
between India and its garrisons in Chhamb, Naushera, Rajauri and Poonch passe
capturing the bridge, it could cut off the logistic requirements of the Indian troop

When Pakistan Army Headquarters found that the tide was turning against them, press
situation by launching the third phase - Operation Grand Slam - to capture Akhnoor an
only be resolved with the approval of President Ayub Khan, was that this operation wou
the international frontier between Sialkot and Jammu. President Ayub gave his approva
heavy preparatory artillery fire, a column of seventy tanks and two brigades of troops
supply line from Punjab to Kashmir.

The Developments in Delhi

Mr Pradhan's memoirs state: (Page 252 et seq)

"On 30 August, General Chaudhuri went to Srinagar for an on-the-spot assessme

September. That very morning at 3.45 am, Pakistan started the bombardment o
offensive was planned to exploit Pakistani superiority in armour and heavy artille
Indian commanders by surprise - a full scale war had erupted".

"In the morning meeting on Wednesday, 1 September 1965, General Kumarman

before Pak should retaliate.

"The VCOAS's assessment that sixteen days would be the minimum period before
faulty both military assessment and intelligence were".

Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh recalls:

"In the Air Force, we were aware of the seriousness of what was happening. We
Army may not accept it, the attack on Chamb Jaurian took the Army by surprise.
Army. As far as I know, we only had a Brigade plus. The main purpose of the Pak
the vital link between Jammu, Rajouri and Poonch. If the Pakistanis had captured
have cut the LOC and then there was no way of supplying that area except by air
that, probably their attempt would have been to cut the Jammu, Udhampur and
the valley.

"It was a big attack and our Army was quite overwhelmed by it. The Pakistanis k
Chaudhuri came to me first and said that he would like the Air Force to participat
participate but I cannot do it unless it is a decision of the Government. Once you
of war and that means all out war". Then he and I went to Mr Chavan. At that tim
sunset. Things were getting bad there and the Army were very concerned that du
damage and advance further and probably even capture Akhnoor. I must also sa
very keen that we should participate, otherwise, we felt, why have an Air Force?
not take more than five minutes to tell me to go ahead. He did not say what sho
you do it the way you like. Attack where you like, the way the Army wants it".

"We had only one air station at Pathankot which was nearest to Chamb-Jaurian,
everything we had readily available over there, about 20 aircraft or so. We lost fo
bit out of date. However, though I felt sorry to have lost them, but I thought the
the Pakistan Army's attack would not have been halted. It is recognised by the A
Pakistan troops did not move forward. We probably did not do extensive damage
they were attacked from the air and probably would be again attacked at night. W
but PAF may have thought it otherwise. That attack was absolutely essential and
 it stopped the Pakistan Army advancing on to Akhnoor and cutting the only LOC

"It was at about that time that we decided to react at a place of our choice. Pakis
places of its choice. That is obviously the right thing to do. Everybody wants to fi
Pakistan's endeavour has always been to get the Army involved in a big way in K
They have the advantage over there. Our endeavour has been, and it had been c
that any attack by the Pakistan Army on Jammu and Kashmir will be considered
Prime Minister Shastri even during August when attacks were going on in J&K. So
it seriously. They thought that because they had attacked Chamb Jaurian which w
reaction will be only there and not somewhere else. But even for our own sake, t
be attacked somewhere else and not in Jammu and Kashmir. You cannot tie the
area and fight the war against Pakistan at places which are more favourable to th
Gurdaspur and not far from Rawalpindi and Lahore. All the forces kept there cou
our troops were sitting around Pathankot, Amritsar, Ferozpur and Ambala. They
places, and could not be withdrawn easily. So that is how the decision to attack o

In his 1972 USI National Security Lecture 1972, Mr PVR Rao states:

"The attack by Pakistan at Chamb on the morning of the 1st September came as
From about the 26th August, there were heavy Pak troop movements in this area
Army had concluded that the attack would come further north. Because of this, t
of the Air Force, there were no coordinated plans. When the Pak attack came thr
returned to Delhi at about 4.30 p.m. and came straight to the Defence Minister's
he walked in, the General asked for immediate air support, stating that he had ju
there was having the aircraft ready. Air Marshal Arjan Singh agreed without hesi
out that in attacks launched without adequate preparation, losses must be accep
between friend and foe. The Defence Minister agreed that the attack may go in fo

Mr C P Srivastava's memoirs state: (Page 224)

"Shastri received information about the Pakistani invasion by about midday over
was then in Srinagar and immediately convened a meeting of the Emergency Com
Committee was considering the situation, General Chaudhuri reached New Delhi
important proposal for the Prime Minister's approval. General Chaudhuri reported
putting up resistance, the Pakistan Army, which had Patton tanks, was pushing a
armour and were thus not in a position to stop the invasion. He said the situation
support from the Air Force.

"A similar situation had arisen in 1962 at the time of the Chinese invasio
Air Force had been considered in order to halt the forward rush of the Ch
Government had decided against the use of the Air Force. On this occasion
that the Air Force should immediately go into action. He was conscious of the dan
Indian cities or vital installations but this was a danger that had to be faced. The
Minister Y B Chavan conveyed the decision to the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marsh
Air Force was ready".

Air Chief Marshal P C Lal was the Vice Chief of the Air Staff in 1965. His memoirs "My Y
 "The IAF was kept informed of what was happening and was more or less ready
till asked to do so by the Government and by the Army. Vampire aircraft had bee
Air Force's own initiative on 30 August.On the afternoon of 1 September, the Arm
Defence Minister to request the Indian Air Force for ground support. The DM's re
Vampires at Pathankot were airborne".

Intense air battles took place over the next few days between India's Vampire, Mystere
supplied Sabre and Starfighter aircraft. The Pakistan Army had achieved initial surprise
occupied areas up to a depth of five miles. By 5 September, they were at a village calle
their way to the crucial Akhnoor bridge over the River Chenab. The Air Force halted the

Regarding the developments on 4 September, Mr Pradhan's book states: (Pages 265 e

"The loss of Akhnur would be a major disaster and Chavan decided to go ahead w
after the Rann of Kutch incident. On 20 April, Shastri had declared before Parliam
reason and persists in its aggressive activities, our Army will defend the country
of its manpower and equipment in the manner it deems best." General Chaudhur
had worked out a plan code-named `Operation Riddle' to launch an offensive act
Ichhogil Canal. It was felt that the mere presence of the Indian troops on the can
forces from Sialkot and other area and thus reduce its offensive capabilities in ot
establish a bridgehead over the canal, the Pakistan army would be forced to figh
her smaller army. By basing the defence line along the canal, India would confine
acquiring a large chunk of Pakistani territory. Operation `Riddle' was planned to
were facing on 4 September".

The Entry in Defence Minister Chavan's diary on Tuesday, 7 September 1965 reads: (P

"Morning Meeting-Army is doing well according to plans. CAS gave further bad ne
in West Pakistan.

"Bombing by both sides in East Pakistan has created a problem. I told CAS to ho
any wasteful escalation there. Politically also, it would be unwise to do anything w
He (CAS) agreed".

Mr Pradhan's amplifying note states:

"A difficult situation had arisen when the Pakistan Air Force attacked Kulaikunda
paratroops between Gauhati and Shillong in Assam. All of them were captured.

"Chavan did not want any escalation in the east and had advised CAS not to initi
some misunderstanding, the same day Canberras of the Eastern Air Command a
retaliation, the Pakistan Air Force attacked Indian bases at Kulaikunda, Bagdogra
the ground".

Mr L K Jha recalls: (Blueprint to Bluewater Pages 460 et seq)

"When the conflict started in the Jammu area of Kashmir and their tanks came in
easily go because the bridges were not strong enough, there was a real dilemna.
 Chaudhuri were present at a meeting to discuss things where we all turned to Ar
the Pak tanks from the air. Now there was a great deal of hesitation, again
conflict as narrow-based as possible and in not involving the Air Force. W
matter where a very crucial decision was involved but there seemed to b
take the Pak tanks on at very short notice without any prior preparation and eve

"It was still being thought of as a local battle. But we realised that the terrain wh
much more vulnerable and communication depended on a couple of bridges - if t
completely cut off. And therefore thought turned to using the plan which h
into Lahore. But even then it was a very firm decision that we would not
war - I mean war in the legal sense - between India and Pakistan.

"Admiral Soman had in the meantime - ever since the involvement of the
saying 'look, let me go into action'. But again the same consideration wh
the Air Force or going into Lahore - prevailed. It was felt that if we now
would become a major engagement and would no longer be a matter of
taken that the operation to march into Lahore would be launched but tha

"The Indian Army crossed the international border at Wagah on the mor
Lahore. President Ayub went on the air. It was a very, very strong and a
that the opening of the Lahore front meant that a no holds barred situati
signal that we were at war with Pakistan. This signal had to be counterm
to that stage so soon. But still we realised that the Navy had the capabili
don't think there would have been too long a hesitation to use it. But the
contain the Pakistani forces and hold them on land, then perhaps it woul
I knew that the Navy was not happy with this decision because they wer

Admiral Soman recalls the details of the constraint placed on the Navy and what he did
et seq)

"One morning, I received a file signed by HC Sarin, ICS, (then Secretary Defence
operate north of the latitude of Porbandar, and is also not to take or initiate offen
forced to do so by offensive action by the Pak forces.' If I remember correctly, bo
ICS, and the Defence Minister, Shri Y B Chavan, were out of Delhi at that time. I
accept that order and was seeing the Defence Minister as soon as he returned, w

"When I saw Chavan he said that he was sorry that even after the Chine
continued to be overlooked and as such it would perhaps be better if the
said that while I was most grateful to him for having appreciated that we were a
non participation by us in an aggressive manner in this war would not only adver
Navy's image in the public would go down the drain. He mentioned the fact of
and the responsibilities assigned to the Navy for the defence of the Anda
possible and probable attack from Indonesia which, in the Government's
than naval operations against Pakistan.

"I assured him that I was fully aware of these implications of the Navy's operatio
been deployed in that area and all that I was asking for was to leave the Navy to
instead of remaining passive. Finally the Defence Minister said that even the Prim
 want the conflict to escalate at sea and that was that. I requested him for permis
convince him of what I felt strongly about and he readily agreed.

"When I called on the Prime Minister, he brought up the same two point
since the Sino Indian conflict and its responsibilities in the Andaman and
than in the Arabian Sea. I told him that it was wrong in principle to tie d
passive action in a war situation. It should have the freedom to act offen
than it could chew. When he brought up the question of the undesirability of an
him of what happened to Germany on a few occasions in the two World Wars wh
that I was sure that had they used their Navy fully, from the start of the wars, th
different, however much the rest of the world disliked this possibility. On this he
have no choice '. I then asked him whether he had any objection to my seeing th
meaning the President. He smiled and politely said " No, you do not have to see

Mr PVR Rao, the Defence Secretary, recalls:-

"I was Secretary at the time and have not signed any such order. The Additional
operational matters. What the Admiral has stated was substantially the Governm
at best in the minutes of the Defence Minister's morning meeting, which were iss
the minutes were approved by me."

In Mr Pradhan's memoirs reproduce the entry in Defence

"Morning meeting gave some hopeful and encouraging glimpse of the situation o

"Had discussions in the presence of the PM with CNS (Admiral SMS Nanda). Nece

"Had a talk with CNS about his plans. He is rather too keen to do something. I ha

(Note: The Defence Minister had inadvertently written the wrong name. The CNS
Admiral Nanda was Managing Director of Mazagon Docks in 1965.)

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN SEPTEMBER 19

The Pakistan Navy's Role and Deployments

The Pakistan Navy comprised one cruiser (BABUR), one submarine (GHAZI), seven des
JAHANGIR, ALAMGIR, TUGHRIL, SHAHJAHAN, TIPPU SULTAN) and one tanker (DACCA)
under refit. The remaining ships comprised the Pakistan Flotilla. The Pakistan Air Force
fighters and maritime reconnaissance aircraft operating from Karachi.

The Story of the Pakistan Navy' states: (Pages 216 et seq)

"The role assigned to the Pakistan Navy was the maritime defence of Pakistan. T
seaward defence of the ports of Pakistan, keeping the sea lines of communication
 of coasts against amphibious assaults, interdiction of shipping and assisting the a
Pakistan".

"The surface units were deployed as one force to patrol on an arc 100 miles from
provide seaward defence and attack the enemy as one group".

"The submarine GHAZI was sailed on 2 September to patrol off Bombay and inst
Indian Navy i.e. VIKRANT, MYSORE and DELHI. She was in position by the morni

`The Story of the Pakistan Navy' states the following reasoning for the Dwarka o

"The Indian Navy, with considerable numerical superiority, was bottled up in harb
in their waters. This situation afforded an opportunity to the Pakistan Navy to car
without any hindrance from the Indian Navy. The Dwarka bombardment was und
the heavy enemy units out of Bombay for the submarine to attack, to destroy the
Indian morale and to divert Indian air effort away from the north".

"On 6 September, the Pakistan Flotilla received the news that the Indian Army h
the Lahore area and ships sailed for their pre-assigned war stations. Thereafter,
27 September. Simultaneously the Naval Control of Shipping Organisation was a
Pakistan merchant ships. An embargo was declared on all merchant ships carryin
directed the Chairman IWTA to seal off all river routes used by Indian steamers t
all such vessels and their cargo. All these measures, implemented without delay,
valuable cargo, ships and river craft".

"On the afternoon of 7 September, Pakistan Naval Headquarters directed a task

destroyers ( KHAIBAR, BADR, JAHANGIR, ALAMGIR and SHAHJAHAN) and a friga
same night and added that one or two enemy frigates may be encountered in the
task group refueled from their tanker and arrived off Dwarka at midnight. Dwark
identified on radar. Bombardment commenced at 0024 at ranges between 5 and
ship having fired 50 rounds. Shortly thereafter, Pakistan Air Force aircraft attack
green Verey's light. The task group withdrew at full speed. During the withdrawa
on her surface radar. Ships were ordered to engage any aircraft that came within
The task group resumed patrol on the 100 mile arc by sunrise".

"After the Dwarka operation, the Pakistan Flotilla continued patrolling the 100 mi
occasion, on 20 September, five radar contacts were seen near Kori Creek and sh
action. Later the five ships retreated southwards."

The Indian Navy's Role and Deployments

The Indian Navy comprised one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, nineteen destroyers/ friga
were under refit at Bombay - the carrier (VIKRANT), one cruiser (DELHI), three destro
frigates (TRISHUL and BETWA), three ships (the training frigate KISTNA and survey sh
(SHAKTI) was barely servicable. Training frigate TIR was in the Andamans. Survey ship
were in Visakhapatnam. Two Hunt class destroyers (GODAVARI and GOMATI) were at
destroyer (RANJIT), and six frigates ( BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS, TALWAR, KHUKRI, KUTHA
The Seahawk and Alize air squadrons, which had disembarked from the aircraft carrier
between Bombay, Goa and Cochin. Indian Air Force Liberator aircraft were available fo

The Indian Navy's role was the maritime defence of the Western and Eastern coasts an
were first to carry out sweeps off the west coast of Pakistan to disrupt the port of Kara
installations if ordered, next the destruction of Pakistan naval forces if ordered, third p
the major ports on the west coast and fourth, the provision of general cover and prote
Sea, especially those plying to and from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. After the Go
offensive action, these tasks boiled down to defending territory in the Andaman, Nicob
and defending the major ports of Bombay, Goa and Cochin on the west coast of India.

On 1 September, when the Pakistan Army crossed the international border and advanc
had already moved to the Air Force Station at Jamnagar for an armament work up whi
Headquarters immediately recalled the Indian Fleet to Bombay from the Bay of Bengal
reconnaissance and anti submarine patrols. Some ships were in Calcutta and some wer
the fleet had various speeds and were not in good material state having been away fro
months. MYSORE, with only half of her boilers functioning, had her maximum speed re
BRAHMAPUTRA and BEAS could only do 15 knots while their rated speed was 24 knots.

Meanwhile the Navy's Seahawk aircraft, which had moved to Jamnagar on 1 Septembe
the operational control of the Western Air Command on 3 September. They were taske
installation at the nearest Pakistan Air Force station at Badin. On 5 September, the Sea
and the strike on the Badin radar installation was scheduled to be launched at dawn on

On 6 September, when the Indian Army crossed the international border and advanced
attacked Indian airfields. On the evening of 6 September, the Indian Air Force station a
Canberra bombers. Bombing continued throughout the night. IAF aircraft, the air traffic
damaged. The Seahawks were lucky - they escaped damage. On 7 September, the stri
Seahawks were withdrawn from Jamnagar to Bombay. The air defence of Bombay, whi
entrusted to the Navy's Seahawks because the Air Force had become fully committed i

After the Indian Army crossed the international border on 6 September, a signal was in
to all Pakistan naval units to execute Operation Response, which apparently referred to
CNS, Admiral Soman, issued a signal to all naval units and formations stating that war
measures were to be immediately adopted for neutralising any misadventure on the pa
of this signal being issued, the Government directed the CNS to cancel this signal, ther
embarrassment. The Government's view was that although hostilities had commenced
had been fully committed to the operations, no declaration of war had taken place. In a
November 1978, Admiral Soman stated that the Ministry of Defence directed Naval Hea
to operate in a threatening or offensive manner north of the latitude of Porbandar and
to initiate any offensive action against Pakistan unless forced to do so by their action.

FOCIF, in his flagship, the cruiser MYSORE, was the first to arrive in Bombay on 7 Sept
announced "Our Army and Air Force have already acquitted themselves creditably in th
behind". Action by the Pakistan Navy seemed imminent. Naval Headquarters informed
Bombay that night. FOCIF sailed the same evening with one cruiser and three escorts.
same night, the Pakistan Flotilla bombarded Dwarka.

TALWAR, which had been carrying out an independent patrol off Kori Creek from 28 Au
Headquarters on 2 September to carry out a barrier patrol off the north-west tip of the
Okha, to provide advance warning of the approach of the Pakistan Flotilla. On 6 Septem
condensers resulting in a serious problem of boiler feed water contamination and had t
Okha, being only a few miles from Dwarka, TALWAR detected the transmissions of the
the gunfire of the bombardment. Next morning, she was directed to send a team to Dw
that most of the shells had fallen on the soft soil between the temple and the railway s
attack had damaged a railway engine and blown off a portion of the Railway Guest Hou

FOCIF and his ships returned to Bombay on 8 September. By 9 September, all ships ha
also arrived from Okha after temporary repairs. All Fleet ships were now in Bombay, ha
attended to and getting ready to sortie out. The dilemma was for what task? On the on
Government that to localise the conflict, the Navy was not to go beyond Porbandar. On
bombarded and needed to be avenged. Within the Navy, the lower levels were itching
with the problem of how to bring the Pakistan Flotilla to action without violating the sp
Indian Parliament, a member acidly enquired 'What was the Indian Navy doing when th

Some Tactical Considerations in the North Arabian Sea

For the lay reader, it would be useful to be aware of some of the phenomena which aff
help to understand better the actions of the Pakistan Flotilla and the actions of the Ind

- The atmospheric conditions in the sea areas off the north-west coast of India a
conducive for anomalous propagation called 'anaprop.' Depending on their `frequ
magnetic transmissions either travel very long distances ( warships off Saurashtr
they were very near or vice versa ) or travel no distance at all ( on certain freque
communications between Saurashtra and Bombay and vice versa ). Similarly on
distant ships as if they are very near and display spurious echoes behaving suspi

- In these waters, analogous phenomena prevail below the sea. Sonar detects ec
submarine contacts. Both in peace and in war, such contacts have been attacked
only to find that the contacts could not have been submarines at all, because no

- Both the Indian Fleet and the Pakistan Flotilla were aware of the hazards of bei
aircraft during day time. The damage that determined air attacks could inflict on
abundantly demonstrated during the Second World War. No responsible comman
force to such risk. A force would venture within the other side's air strike radius o
depth as would enable it to be out of enemy air reach by first light. The depth of
the speed at which the intruding force could withdraw to safety from air attack.

- The North Arabian Sea is criss crossed by the Pre Determined Routes (PDR's) u
Bombay and West Asia. Without height-finding radars, the behaviour of radar ec
enemy reconnaissance aircraft. This triggers tactical reflexes that affect subsequ
 the enemy and should I change my plan or is it just a civilian aircraft in a PDR an

The Indian Fleet's Sorties 10 to 23 September

Rear Admiral Samson recalls his Fleet's sorties from 10 to 14 and from 18 to 23 Septem
seq)

"Earlier my assumption was that I would have adequate air search capability to p
enemy, and on this basis I would have deployed the Fleet to a position which wo
the tasks of bringing the enemy to action, to afford protection to our major ports
our merchant ships from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. But with the very lim
had to revise my plan. The problem really was to find the enemy.

"I decided to sail on the night of 10/11 September and probe as far north and no
possibility of another Pak raid on one of the ports in Saurashtra. I hoped I would
at sea as long as possible, refueling from the tanker, SHAKTI. This ship, having o
disabled and could not replenish me at sea and so I planned for her to sail indepe
the Fleet on 13 and 14 September. In the event, her second engine also packed
my period of stay at sea. RAJPUT, one of the two destroyers, also packed up and

"As regards air cover, I decided to stage two Alizes from Jamnagar and to carry o
minutes from 2000 hours on 11 September onwards and to arrange for six to eig
from 0600 hours on 12 September for launching strikes on Pak ships or the subm
Jamnagar. The IAF Liberators would carry out searches in areas south of latitude

"Flying my flag on board the MYSORE and with the BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS, BETW
company, I sailed out of Bombay on our first sweep on the night of 10/11 Septem
within hours of our departure from Bombay, BEAS reported an unidentified aircra
appeared to have been shadowing our forces and was evaluated as a 'snooper'. T
Bombay but could not intercept the unidentified aircraft as it had disappeared by
scene. Our position was thus likely to have been compromised.

"An Alize search was launched from Jamnagar at 2000 hours on the evening of 1
up a number of contacts confirming the presence of two groups of Pak ships only
detailed wireless report on the disposition of the contacts to me and repeated it a
due to freak anomalous wireless propagation conditions prevailing in the area on
aircraft suffered unusually high attenuation by the atmosphere and multiple refle
result of which the signal did not reach me or any other ship of the Fleet nor was
Alize aircraft landed at Jamnagar and transmitted the report to the Maritime Ope
even the rebroadcast of the signal by the Naval Signal Centre, Bombay at 0200 h
anaprop conditions still prevailing west of Saurashtra on that night.

"At 0300 hours on 12 September, another Alize took off from Jamnagar, establis
after carrying out a search, reported a few surface contacts about 90 miles north
investigate them further because of lack of endurance, returned to base. A third
12 September and searched the area, without success, as by this time the Pak w

"There was no doubt about the identity of these ships as when the first Alize was
lights and fired green Verey's flares for purposes of identification but when the A
had quickly realised that the aircraft was not their own and had then quickly swit
the Pakistan coast at full speed to be in safe waters before daybreak. Thus 'anap
rich haul that was there for the asking. By 0700 hours on 12 September the Pak
our Fleet had been detected and reported at 2030 hours the previous night, had

"The Fleet continued to proceed north until it reached the northern limit of its sea
Seahawks which had come from Bombay to Jamnagar and two Toofanis (erstwhi
carried out a sweep in the area after refueling but without success.

"On the morning of 12 September, TALWAR had another machinery breakdown a

she was detached from the Fleet to limp back to Bombay.

"Towards sunset on the same day, the remaining force proceeded northwards on
early hours of 13 September when it intercepted two merchant ships laden with
and SS Steel Protector. The ships had to be forced to stop under threat of fire bu
clearance from higher authorities, as it had been made very clear that the Indian
was`permitted to open fire in self defence. And so the Steel Vendor and the Stee
Karachi, 'escorted ' by the Indian Fleet at a distance of only two cables, until the
sweep, when the merchant ships, after bidding adieu, disappeared over the horiz

"At about 1000 hours on 13 September, KUTHAR picked up an underwater 'sona

KHUKRI joined in the hunt. The contact was held intermittently until 1100 hours
deliberate attacks with full salvos from her anti submarine mortars. The contact
action terminated. The contact was assessed to be tracking at seven knots for a
led to the conclusion that it may well have been a submarine.

"Ships were now beginning to run short of fuel and the only tanker, SHAKTI, not
Frigate Squadron, KHUKRI, KIRPAN and KUTHAR, and the destroyer RANJIT, wer
September to carry out an offensive anti submarine sweep off the approaches to
returned to Bombay on the morning of 14 September.

"On 17 September KHUKRI, KIRPAN and KUTHAR, with gunfire support provided
search of an area of about 5000 square miles off Bombay as the Pakistan subma
the southern approaches to Bombay. On 21 and 23 September, 'sonar' contacts
these ships but the contacts were soon lost. The ships continued on their anti sub
after the implementation of the cease fire.

"During its second sortie, the main body of the Fleet comprising the MYSORE, BE
BRAHMAPUTRA and the TALWAR had by now developed major defects and could
Sea from 18 September to 23 September. This was originally planned to be carri
Aden to provide support for a number of ships bringing vital defence cargo from
aware of the nature of cargo in these ships and their shipping programme and he
ships being intercepted and either captured or destroyed. The distance from Bom
sweep would entail operations far away from our shores but it was considered we
Fleet. Reports indicating likely Pakistani seaborne landings on the Saurashtra coa
Fleet was promptly sailed to intercept the Pak Fleet off Saurashtra.

"I sailed in MYSORE with RAJPUT, RANJIT, BEAS and BETWA on the morning of 1
Saurashtra coast as early as possible to counter the landings and so proceeded a
BEAS behind to follow, as she could do only 19 knots.

"That evening at abut 2015 hours, while I was on my northerly leg, an aircraft w
aircraft was sighted by BEAS and was heard to be reporting to the Karachi transm
our ships most accurately. The aircraft continued to shadow us and finally faded
midnight and then turned southwest. No enemy ships were sighted and it was ev
by the enemy on our coast. It is probable that the seaborne landing operation wa
presence near the Saurashtra coast was compromised.

"Nevertheless, I continued to carry out sweeps in the same area on 20, 21 and 2
intercepted wireless transmissions which were obviously from Pak ships and indic
a south-westerly course at 10 knots. These transmissions were picked up by sev
we were in close proximity of the enemy. However, it was not possible without d
direction of these transmissions but they appeared to be northerly and so we con
however, that we continued in this direction for several hours at our best speed,
enemy. Bearing in mind that the intercepted message indicated that the contact
direction, it was obvious that this contact could not be the Indian Fleet and in all
proceeding out of Karachi or the Gulf of Kutch. I therefore turned towards the Gu
intercept one of our merchant ships from this area. I found nothing and it was cl
'anaprop' electromagnetic conditions and that these intercepted messages were b
outside Karachi Harbour. Thereafter, despite repeated high speed sweeps as far
was gained.

"However, we continued to intercept Pak wireless transmissions and it was clear

shadowed more or less throughout this operation. It was also clear from these tr
Pak surface ships. Unfortunately our Alizes or Seahawks could not operate from J
attacks had rendered the airfield untenable. The Liberator maritime reconnaissan
carry out reconnaissance sweeps of the northern part of the Arabian Sea but faile
In fact, on two occasions our forces were reported by them as enemy and on one
reported in plain language!

"On the morning of 22 September I had to detach the RAJPUT and RANJIT as the
had received a further signal concerning the merchant ships arriving from the Gu
so I altered course with the MYSORE, BEAS and BETWA towards the central Arab
within a few hours of our sailing on our new mission, we received a message from
Government's acceptance of the United Nations' cease fire proposal from 0330 h
return to the Saurashtra coast to forestall any attempt by the Pakistan Navy to c
bid to gain propaganda value. I returned to Bombay with the regret that I had m
Pakistan Navy in battle, despite waiting just outside its lair for nearly two weeks.
Submarine and Anti Submarine Operations in September 1965

The Story of the Pakistan Navy States:

"Just after the Dwarka attack on night 7/8 September, the Pakistan submarine G
coast. She tracked 4 to 5 escorts on passage from Bombay proceeding up the co
were to attack only heavy ships."

While on return passage to Bombay from the East coast, BEAS picked up a submarine
miles south of Bombay. She carried out an urgent attack, followed by a deliberate atta
lost. GHAZI makes no mention of this attack.

On 11 September, there were intensive anti submarine air patrols off Bombay. One Ali
snorkeling but failed to detect her. GHAZI returned to Karachi thereafter to rectify her
equipment and resumed patrol on 15 September.

Between 7 and 10 September, the Indian Fleet was in Bombay. When GHAZI was in Ka
repairs, the Indian Fleet was operating off the Saurashtra coast. When GHAZI resumed
was in Bombay from 14 to 17 September, in between sorties.

On 17 September, FOCIF sent out five escorts for an anti submarine search in the sout
an area of 5000 square miles between 17 and 23 September. Several sonar contacts w
September, contacts were attacked for several hours. GHAZI makes no mention of the
near.

GHAZI's `Record of Service', retrieved from the sunken hull in 1972, indicates that "In
Bombay, GHAZI encountered three frigates. She fired four torpedoes and scored three
BRAHMAPUTRA".

The Story of the Pakistan Navy' mentions that:

"Off Bombay, on 22 September, GHAZI gained a firm contact. After tracking the
torpedoes at an ' A A frigate ' in the evening. After one and a half minutes, the fi
seconds later by another hit. GHAZI's sonar reported patterns of explosions bein
Karachi on 23 September where the Captain was decorated for having sunk the I
BRAHMAPUTRA".

After the cease fire, FOCIF invited the foreign naval attaches from New Delhi on board
any doubts that the ship was afloat and fighting fit.

Overall, the above account provides a glimpse of the complexity of submarine and anti
predicting, with any degree of certainty, the outcome of submarine and anti submarine

Other Minor Incidents

There were two other incidents which to this day remain unexplained:

(a) On 11 September an unidentified aircraft was reported over Visakhapatnam.

Naval Coast Battery. The History of the Pakistan Air Force makes no mention of a
September.

(b) On 15 September, unidentified aircraft were reported over Cochin. Fire was o
by the Naval Battery located at the harbour entrance. Some shells fell into the po
shells, which fell into the water near the harbour entrance were mistaken for air
from Goa to Cochin to sweep the mines - no mines were found. A Seahawk aircra
intercept the aircraft - no encounter occurred. The History of the Pakistan Air For
Cochin on 15 September. A post war analysis suggested that the jet aircraft coul
aircraft carrier task force which might have been operating in the area. The remi
indicate that there were no echoes of any aircraft on the scans of the warning ra

Analysis of the Reasons for Not Using the Navy Offensively

In considering the reasons why the Navy did not achieve anything significant, several b
the higher direction of war? After the Rann of Kutch incident, why was the Fleet sent to
started in Kashmir in early August, why wasn't the Fleet immediately recalled to the W
the Government, could the Navy have done better than it did?

The Higher Direction of War

There were two aspects of the higher direction of war in 1965 which created confusion.
sincere belief that in modern warfare, it was meaningful to engage in warlike activity w
was that once the Government had decided to counter hostile acts by Pakistan, it was
confined to only one or two of the Armed Forces. As regards the first aspect, the extrac
Defence Secretary in 1965, the memoirs of Mr C P Srivastava, the Private Secretary to
recollections of Mr L K Jha, the Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Shastri in 1965 ma
determined not to enlarge the scope of the conflict beyond the minimum required to sa
prevent any escalation of the conflict beyond this objective. It will also appear from the
Army Staff, who was the de facto Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, excluded
contingency plan in case Pakistan attacked Kashmir.

In the 1971 National Security Lecture of the United Services Institution of India, Gener

"Now that both Mr Bhutto and Air Marshal Asghar Khan have publicly claimed tha
instigating Pakistan's attack on India in 1965, I think I could interpolate here a fo
revising military plans to defend ourselves in case of an attack from our neighbor
were roughly equivalent to those of Pakistan. Our rapid expansion had meant som
must form the fulcrum of any defensive plan, we were faced with three alternativ
unguarded territory. This seemed unproductive and non -permanent. The second
substantial destruction to a big city. For this there were insufficient troops. Anybo
town, will realise how expensive this operation is in manpower. The resistance pu
defended only by the remnants of a defeated army, against overwhelming odds,
dealing with this alternative, there was also the political view that any substantia
historical centre, would leave a raw wound between two neighbors, delaying und
together. The third alternative was the destruction of equipment, cheaply obtaine
to replace. This third alternative seemed the correct choice. I would submit that
adopted and the ensuing heavy economic and political disturbances in Pakistan, c
Ayub Government and perhaps to the democratisation now pending.

"Incidentally, Pakistan's own plan for 1965 was based on first getting us to panic
the main Punjab theatre to Kutch. Once they had got us there, then the so called
supported by the Pakistan regular army capturing the key point of Akhnur. Thoug
misfired, the originators were so intrigued with the ingenuity of the second part,
Operations by emotion are always incorrect and the second part also failed. It w
pattern of Pakistan's intentions to seize Kashmir before we got too stron
details of how they would do it were not clear at that time, for the initiat
aggressor.

"Previous to 1965, it had always been said by our political leaders that any attac
construed as an attack against India. Consequently India would then be at liberty
own defences. This statement of policy, however, was never incorporated into an
omission was that a decision would only be taken at the time and the military wo
public political statement, the military were always in great doubt as to whether
would really be given. They were also aware that if a positive decision was made
difficult, if not impossible, to finalise the operational plans, make the necessary c
complicated business - brief the commanders at all levels fully about the tactical
operation. The troops were fully convinced that at this last moment, the Governm
and militarily the final result might then be a fiasco.

"After the 5th May 1965, when it appeared that an attack on Kashmir or
possibility, the first matter that needed clearance was this ability to reta
Prime Minister and the Defence Minister after the pros and cons had bee
was obtained. Consequently, we had plenty of time to work out the appr
her regular troops,infantry and armour into the Jammu sector, I was in Kashmir.
the Director of Military Operations, who was in the aircraft with me, started writin
formations concerned. On landing, he went straight off to send them out and I im
who formally confirmed my action. He then informed the Prime Minister and that
discussed a few details and further approved the action taken. The PM might the
colleagues, but this was not my concern.

"As a number of other broad policy points connected with the operations had also
is desirable to mention the mechanics by which these clearances were given. In 1
unplanned way, a series of informal meetings started up between the PM, the DM
on, my very esteemed and valuable colleague, Air Marshal Arjan Singh, joined us
were closely linked together in any defence role. The Naval Chief did not come
being a very big one. At these meetings, there was a free interchange of views
actions which might be taken in a variety of circumstances were discussed in det
it was only a clearing of minds. When however, a certain policy matter was accep
later in a more formal manner. During these meetings, it was intrinsically u
 colleagues, and particularly the Naval Chief, informed of the more impor
similarly keep the appropriate members of the Civil Services informed and, of co
political and Ministerial colleagues informed as they thought fit. As Chief of Army
valuable, for not only was I quite sure of the parameters within which I could wo
political, domestic and economic implications. This saved a lot of time later in mo
discussing plans for the future war with the PSO's and the Army Commanders, I
background information which they, in their turn, found useful. These meetings w
gave me the opportunity to put my view point directly to the two people who wo
the final overall decisions.

"In this particular case, these informal, 'clear the air' meetings seemed to have w
advantageously. There were no personality clashes, while the small numbers con
essentials. Everyone present was fully aware of the security implications and so t
informality and, I might add, good humour allowed a great deal of freedom in sp
confidence was built up which was most important then and later. I am not sayin
could have worked equally well or at all, with another group of people in the sam
consider to be the second important point in organisation for defence. This is the
between the various sections of the decision making authorities concerned and th
within his own sphere with a minimum of interference."

In the 1972 National Security Lecture of the United Service Institution of India, M
from 1962 to 1966, stated:-

"After November 1962 the Defence Committee of the Cabinet was revamped into
change was in the working of the Defence Ministers Committee. This Committee,
except when the Defence Minister was out of Delhi and was effective in ensuring
and in speeding the build up of the forces. But the system underwent a change a
have been various claims about the decisionmaking at that time. One claim is tha
its head, took all decisions and the whole process functioned very smoothly. The
there was unnecessary political interference, with the result that achievement fel

Mr PVR Rao also recalls:-

"The idea that there was no communication between the Chiefs and the Governm
communications can be either oral or in writing. After Mr Chavan became the De
every morning at 9.30 in the Defence Minister's room, attended by the three Chi
Cabinet Secretary used to come sometimes but he was not a regular visitor. Reg
were circulated to all concerned.

"As regards written Directives, the Navy, and particularly the Army, are very fon
directives. I think it is a very ridiculous thing. In my view, decisions were not tak
always taken at the Defence Minister's morning meetings. If the decisions require
they go to the PM and Defence Committee of the Cabinet. So, for operational pur
all three Chiefs were in the picture every day of what was happening in the Gove
Service Chiefs were isolated or insulated and they wanted written orders that we

"Mr Shastri was staying at the relevant time at 4 Motilal Nehru Place and he had
building at 10, Janapath. From about the 6th August 1965, I was asked to go to
on my way home to report to him about the events of the day. As the situation in
unabated and to drift, Shastri was clear that the troops should go across the Cea
bases in POK. This became an issue for regular discussion at the morning meetin
attended. It was Government's policy that if our action across the CFL brought ou
would not confine ourselves to operations in Kashmir but be free to respond whe
Front. In this situation, General Chaudhuri demanded that if operations became n
might of the Indian Armed forces (all the three arms) should be thrown in and as
in this regard. This developed into a tussle of wills between General Chaudhuri on
As things continued to drift, I drafted, on Shri Shastri's instructions, a directive t
about the 10th or 11th August. There was, even then, never any question of exte
When I took the draft directive to 10 Janpath, Shastri took it from me and kept i
11th, 12th and 13th, every evening, I asked for the paper back but he would jus
Fire Line on the 13th, destroyed the infiltrator's bases and in the process, captur
operation was wholly Army; the IAF was not used. On the 14th or 16th August, S
saying that it was no longer necessary. No written directive (apart from the minu
any of the Chiefs of Staff. Incidentally, General Chaudhuri also did not further pu
agreement that the Navy had no role at that stage in the operations and
extended to the Eastern sector.

"The absence of a written directive and the see-saw that went on in this respect
Air Staff had apparently given standing instructions to his field commanders that
spring into action without further orders. As news came out of the Pak attack on
September, attacked Lalmanirhat and other targets in the East and the Pak Air F
near Kharagpur. Evidently, the Chief of Air Staff had not been able to counterma
in the East in time. General Chaudhuri was very upset and protested to CAS/DM.
smoothed over.

"I have no knowledge of the happenings in the meetings between PM/DM and a C
access to the President, the PM and the DM. However, the P.M. and the D.M. wer
required, the material would usually come down for suitable action. The DM woul
action in the morning meeting; or, as in one or two cases, where personalities w
privately. That the Naval Chief remained uninformed at any stage about G

"With regard to the 1965 war, it should be realised that the Government of India
keep the operations at as low a key as possible. Kashmir had to be defended and
trouble there, it had to be faced. But it was the determined policy of Prime Minist
Government not to allow the operations to escalate.

"It is correct that the Navy was told not to approach Pakistan or threate
Shastri or anything of the sort. But the Navy is quite correct in saying th
fighting. They are absolutely correct. And India did not want to escalate
east we did not take any action. In 1965, we wanted to limit the fighting

In the 1973 National Security Lecture of the United Service Institution of India, A
of Air Staff in 1965 ( and subsequently Chief of Air Staff in 1971 ) stated:

"Early in 1965, Pakistan attacked us in Kutch, in Western India. The attack caugh
took the field without any prior planning or preparation. Its reaction was fast but
all that the Air Force could do was to provide logistic support with light aircraft. T
considered after the fighting began. It was then realised that our bases were so
would have to operate at extreme range with reduced weapon loads while Pakist
area from bases close by. Given time, we could also have improvised an airfield o
ended before that. The incident was soon defused but, apparently, not before it h
the time had come to settle the Kashmir dispute by force of arms.

"Then in August and September 1965 came the second Kashmir War. It began w
freedom fighters, in reality agents of Pakistan. These were followed, towards the
Pakistani armour in the Chamb area of Jammu province, with the obvious objecti
Our Army, working under the restrictions of the Cease Fire agreement, was lightl
fought valiantly, its AMX tanks were no match for the more powerful Pakistani Pa
Army holding the Pakistani attack on its own, there was no talk of bringing the A
September, with the Pakistanis pressing forward from Jaurian, General Chaudhur
air support.

"There had been no prior joint planning for such an eventuality. Air Marshal Arjan
the air bases in the Punjab. When the call came, a force of fighter bombers from
Pakistanis within minutes of being ordered to do so. It was a touch-and-go affair
late in the afternoon and the strike had to be mounted in an area with which our
minutes of daylight left, they could have missed the battle zone or attacked the w
and so helped to bring the Pakistani force to a halt.

"At this point it is interesting to consider in somewhat greater detail why there w
even though, as General Chaudhuri said in his 1971 National Security lecture, he
after the Kutch incident. Basically, I think, it was because he and his commander
operations were principally an Army affair and that the other services could only
occasional bonus from the Air Force. This was compounded by a big-brother attit
being treated with a certain amount of indulgence but prevented it being accepte
Matters were further complicated by the belief that if the Indian Air Force took pa
would do likewise, thus increasing the likelihood of a general war between the tw
& K. There was a good deal of truth in this, of course, but this was a possibility fr
was a possibility that could not be ignored for Pakistan had already been warned
would be treated as an attack on India. With a political direction as clear as that
Chiefs of Staff to have their plans ready for such a contingency. The fact that the
time.

"The events in the Chamb-Jaurian sector leading to the call for air support took m
stage the Government had to decide whether to enlarge the area of conflict, and
appeared to be the only way to divert Pakistani forces from the vulnerable Jamm
have jeopardised the defence of the Valley. With the decision to fight Pakistan ou
from peace time stations, some from the Deccan and further south, and formulat

"During the five days that elapsed between the Government decision and the dat
discussion of how the Army and the Air Force should operate. On the Army side,
own, with the Air Force providing an occasional bonus; and in the Air Force, whe
mainly an air war against the PAF and what we considered to be strategic targets
the Army. Separate plans were hastily drawn up by each Service with no joint co
tasks were envisaged for the Navy.

"Please note that in 1965 the higher defence organisation was functioning and th
under the chairmanship of General Chaudhuri. Officers in positions of authority h
procedures for inter-service co-operation. It was not realised, however, that even
particular task still requires a great deal of preparatory work, that the persons ta
supporting facilities have to be arranged for in advance, and this has to be done
Flexibility in battle is gained only through long and arduous preparation.

"That we discovered when we entered Pakistan. Soon the Army found that it cou
was constantly harassing it. The Army needed air defence and tactical support bu
for either. The Air Force was willing to help and it did all it could but in the absen
air cover in the combat zone. Neither did the air operations through which we ho
Pakistan's ability to make war achieve much, for we had no well thought out targ
responsibility for all this, I must confess that the air war became a somewhat hit
finding targets of opportunity for its success. The aircrew performed magnificent
more; had there been a coherent joint war plan, we would have derived much fu

"Our advance into Pakistan caught the Pakistani forces by surprise. I imagine the
and Armed Forces capable of swift decisions and speedy action. The initial succes
resistance, a notable feature of which was the close co-operation between the Pa
had obviously done their homework well, for our jawans reported that the PAF w
ground forces were in difficulties, and gave them most effective support. This wa
set-up, in which all three Service Chiefs and their Headquarters were based at D
Peshawar, the Army Chief at Islamabad, near Rawalpindi, and the Naval Chief at
to work well together speaks well for their mutual understanding, which is more
Furthermore, since Pakistan had been the one to start the fighting in J & K, it is t
given some thought to the possibility of a more widespread conflict and prepared

"Despite its preparations, however, Pakistan failed to make any inroads in J & K
advanced up to the Ichhogil canal, West Pakistan's first line of defence, and towa
Indian territory around Gadra Road in Rajasthan. Except for a single PAF attack o
there was no fighting in the east. Our Navy had no operational tasks but suffered
The fighting was brought to a halt by 22nd September, the Army having been en
half and the Air Force for 22 days. At the turn of the year came the Tashkent agr
Minister, the late Mr Lal Bahadur Shastri.

"In retrospect, it is clear that the 1965 war was successful as a defensive action,
Kashmir, but the operations in the Punjab and Rajasthan were inconclusive. We f
forces, both on the ground and in the air. The Navy being far removed from Kash

"With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see what part the higher defence orga
do not think it made any significant contribution. I say this after careful thought,
Chiefs, General J N Chaudhuri, was then Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committ
must say that he failed to get the organisation working as it should have done. T
meaning to, in the published version of the National Security lectures that he del
those lectures that he saw the Kutch incident as a prelude to an attack by
therefore began the Army's preparations well in advance. He omits to m
 were kept in the dark about this. He goes on to say that he often discussed t
Prime Minister and that, once in a while, he took the Air Chief along with him. Th
upon the impending conflict as an Army affair, in which the use of the Air Force w
an attitude long prevalent in the Army, and only recently dissipated, to the effect
commanding superiority over the other services and invested it with the sole righ
may be reading too much into a single statement, but to me it is axiomatic that e
can grow only out of mutual trust and full understanding of each others capabilit
1965.

"In any case, the Air Force and Navy, not having been alerted about the p
no inter-service contingency plans were drawn up, nor was any course of a
event of its being called out to support the Army. This mental block against cons
through the phase of guerrilla activity and was only partly removed when Pakista
Srinagar highway. It was at that critical stage, on 1st September 1965, that the
gave at short notice. Complaints from our forward troops about the limited exten
well-founded, for in the absence of precise plans the Air Force had simply mainta
Punjab and in Jammu and Kashmir. To do its job properly, some redeployment o
communication facilities should have been effected before the commencement of
to do their work in advance, I am certain more positive results would have been
preserving the status quo in Kashmir, the 1965 war was valuable for the many p
operations from the highest level to combat in the field. In the years that followe

The above excerpts indicate that until early August 1965 the Chief of the Naval Staff, V
things - that information was available to the Chief of Army Staff that Pakistan may att
that the Chief of Army Staff had obtained the Government's approval in principle for th
Pakistan attacked Kashmir.

Why was the Indian Fleet Sent to the Bay of Bengal

Vice Admiral Soman recalls:- (Blueprint to Bluewater Pages 456 et seq)

"After the Indo Chinese conflict in 1962, the defence of the Andaman and Nicoba
refused to send even a platoon there and we had to raise our own land force with
stations in these islands. So far as the Navy was concerned, as soon as Pakistan
my first priority would be these islands because while talking to various people d
Commander a few years earlier, and having been briefed on the developments si
islands. This was because when the Army refused to send any units for their defe
doing so with sailors with no experience in landfighting. But I had also placed MY
very last minute. It was only after the war had started and I was permitted to br
brought the ships across to the Western theater because I wanted to ensure that
start anything at the same time. Whether eventually it proved itself I do not kno
have been keeping an eye on the Bay islands.

"The Fleet, when it reached Bombay, had to be given this thoughtless order from
north of the latitude of Porbandar. Nothing else could be done except to try and
 towards the Andaman and Nicobar islands to hold hands with the Indonesians

"I also had some intelligence on the presence of some Indonesian ships at Karac
by the combined naval forces of Pakistan and Indonesia would neither be against
was most likely to be for the capture of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. I was
Indonesian Navy, knowing full well that only a small force of sailors in khaki unifo
make an attempt to capture the Nicobar Island despite the then pretty poor state

Was there any threat from Indonesia? Air Marshal Asghar Khan, who had been the Chi
of Kutch incident, retired in July 1965. Soon after India crossed the Wagah border on 6
Indonesia, Turkey and Iran to seek aid. In his memoirs, 'The First Round", he recounts
Admiral Martadinata of Indonesia: (Page 43 et seq)

(a) President Soekarno said that India's attack on Pakistan was like an attack on
Pakistan all possible assistance. President Soekarno told him to take away whate
emergency. Two Russian supplied submarines and two Russian supplied missile b
(Note: They reached Karachi only after the cease fire).

(b) Admiral Martadinata asked Air Marshal Asghar Khan "Don't you want us to ta
map will show that the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are an extension of Sumatr
and Indonesia. What right have the Indians to be there? In any case, the Indone
patrols of the approaches to these islands and carry out aerial reconnaissance m

In hindsight, it would appear that the concern voiced to Admiral Soman by the Prime M
Admiral Soman's own concern at that time about the security of the Andaman and Nico
Indeed, as will be seen in the Chapter on Russian Acquisitions 1965 to 1971, it was thi
Indonesian activity that precipitated the decision to acquire Russian ships and submari
reasons for delaying the recall of the Indian Fleet to Bombay till 1 September, when th
border to attack Kashmir.

Another reason for sending the Indian Fleet to the Bay of Bengal seems to have been n
with a submarine, particularly since the Pakistan Navy had received the submarine GH

Vice Admiral Soman recalls: (Blueprint to Bluewater Pages 421 et seq)

"After the fizzle-out of the Kutch affair for which the Fleet ships had been hurried
maintenance, we had the Hobson's choice of either committing them back to the
keep them operational in order to make full use of the (already projected) live an
submarine which was due to arrive in India shortly. It had been our experience in
training on attack teachers in anti submarine training schools ashore can ever m

"It was decided, therefore, that the live target hunting and tracking opportunity w
the period, the ships were not in as good a shape in their material state as they
searching, hunting and attacking equipment and personnel were effective and ef
assessed that we perhaps had time till about November 1965 before things migh

"In the context of this assessment, I must point out that while MYSORE and the
East Coast for anti submarine exercises with the British submarine Astute, VIKRA
 but long overdue periodic maintenance, particularly the repairs to her flight deck
have endangered valuable lives of pilots and caused losses of aircraft. Another co
refit during this period was that the weather and visibility conditions during the m
operational value of such a ship. All ships from the East Coast were due back fro
September 1965 and, after normal maintenance. would have been operational ag
VIKRANT was also scheduled to get ready.

"As it happened, events forestalled our calculations. MYSORE and the first pair of
submarine carried out such normal periodic maintenance as possible with the lim
and were deployed in the Andaman and Nicobar area from where, during the mo
withdrawn. This was in accordance with the normal operational programme of th
been reports of surface and submarine ( of unknown nationality ) activity in this
deployment and before the second group of ships exercising with the submarine
all these ships had to be deployed to the West Coast to cater for any Pakistan na
material state of the ships, so far as their propulsion systems were concerned, w
perhaps could have been had we foregone the anti submarine exercise. I have no
exercises carried out with the submarine ASTUTE stood our ships in very good st

"From intelligence available prior to the end of August, it was known that the Pak
maintenance and various exercises throughout the months of July and August 19
away from their homeport, Bombay, our ships had to continue to do with very m
resources, which had yet to be developed on the East Coast.

"A warning on the worsening situation was sent to the FOCIF on 31 August, but i
1965, that the Fleet ships were ordered to rush back to the West Coast, and ope
Commands were issued two days later."

Why Wasn't the Fleet Recalled to Bombay Earlier

Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh, the Chief of the Air Staff in 1965 recalls:

"Fairly early during August, General Chaudhuri and I went to Kashmir, w

discussed the situation and felt that the Army would be able to handle th
that time that it could result into a bigger, full scale war, mainly because
this situation will not go out of hand. We thought that the Army, assisted
operations, could tackle the situation. And I think it was managed very w
over the situation. There was no danger of it becoming a bigger war."

Vice Admiral N P Datta, then a Commander serving in Naval Headquarters, recalls: (Blu

"Around the middle of August, I had gone to the Naval Chief, with whom I had ea
I gave him my view that if the Fleet was to be recalled, it would take a week or l
after which they would require another week or so to effect necessary repairs an
operational.
 "Admiral Soman said that this was the very point that he had made to th
been overruled by the Army Chief, General Chaudhuri, as the Chairman o
any alterations were made in the disposition of the Indian Fleet, if the sh
Calcutta and sent back to Bombay, it would create a furore in the press a
General Staff of the Indian Armed Forces' knowledge of their plans and h

This remark of Admiral Soman suggests that by mid August, General Chaudhuri had in
the cease fire line and of the need to avoid any action which might forewarn Pakistan.

As regards the ambiguity as to who was the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee
Chief of Army Staff and the Chief of the Naval Staff, Shri PVR Rao, the Defence Secreta

"The Chiefs of Staff committee is presided over by the longest serving service Ch
1966) it was first presided over by Air Marshal Engineer, then by Vice Admiral So
1965 Vice Admiral Soman was its Chairman. The Chief of Army Staff was not the
In any event, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staffs Committee has no authority to
different if one Chief acceded to the view point of another".

In another interview, Admiral Soman stated that when the war began, he was the Cha
the Navy was not given any offensive role, he left the Chairmanship in favour of the Ch

Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh recalls:-

"I do not remember and I do not think there was discussion amongst the
participation. I do not think so. Every time there was a discussion amongst the
you look at the records, I do not think you will find any record of discussions at a
discussion by Admiral Soman with me whether the Navy should participa
Force and if any operation has to be planned, it's got to be a joint operation. And
Gen Chaudhuri and Admiral Soman and myself on the participation of the Air For

"Secondly somehow at that time everybody was talking about one thing,
aircraft carrier was the main weapon against Karachi. They said that the
aircraft carrier actually participating and that the carrier was not availab
a feeling, without any positive proof, that there was not enough pressure
lot depends on the Chief. A Chief can convince the Government to do certain thin
during a war where the services are involved. I remember that everything I reco
Shastri, except our plan to attack the PAF around Dacca. That was probably wron
in favour. He said "why extend the war"?

"So I think there was not enough pressure built up. Perhaps the Government
fully prepared to participate in the operations. And that impression might h
On the Navy side, I really cannot say what happened because there appeared to
the 1965 war.

"We used to meet for long periods in the Chiefs of Staff Committee and I remem
discussed over there. Whether it was raised within the inner structure of the Nav
which I would not know. I think the general impression was that there was no gr
to war. That was the impression I had got, but I do not remember Admiral Soma
 me that he would do this or that".

In an interview the FOCIF Rear Admiral Samson stated:

"A very important limitation in the tasks assigned to the Navy was that any confl
involving all three services but to be limited only to action on the borders. I and
understanding between the two countries was to limit the extent of the war, to a
of one anothers industries etc. So far as the Navy was concerned, this limitation
writing".

From the foregoing, it emerges that:

(a) by end August, after the cease fire line had been crossed, Admiral Soman ha
not to enlarge the scope of conflict beyond that required to restore the status qu
defensive role. The non availability of the aircraft carrier VIKRANT may have bee

(b) In September, immediately after the Government asked the Chief of the Nav
that India was at war with Pakistan, the Ministry of Defence sent the written dire
in a threatening or offensive manner north of Porbandar and forbidding offensive
This formalised the Navy's defensive role.

(c) The Fleet Commander was aware of the Governments reasons for constrainin

Could the Navy Have Done More

Both in the press and within the Navy, there was criticism of the Navy for not going int
had been done by the Air Force's successes in the air battles over Kashmir and by the
supplied Patton tanks in the Punjab. Indeed, in response to a suggestion from Rear Ad
later CNS in the 1971 war) that the Navy's non-participation was affecting the morale
come and speak to them, Admiral Soman came to Bombay and told them "We all have
assuage their frustration. Admiral Soman remained circumspect about the Government
offensive action.

After the 1965 operations, Admiral Soman , addressing the senior officers of the Navy,
seq)

"Notwithstanding our initial disadvantage of the location of the Fleet on the East
the undeclared war, and the material limitations of the ships after three months
the help of the valiant efforts of the Dockyard, took the initiative to seek the ene
was not achieved, I am sure it had placed itself in a position to contain the enem
I know was all that was expected of the Fleet.

"It is indeed a great pity that the role assigned to the Navy was mainly a defensi
again that at sea, more than perhaps on land and in the air, offense is the best f
there was no wireless communication, Nelsons could put their telescopes to their
 top of their respective columns. It indeed took courage to put the telescope to th
equal, if not greater, courage (perhaps of a different kind) to play the tethered ro
force in the greater national interest as claimed by the authorities.

"The implications of a war at sea did not seem to have been fully understood in t
when some of these agencies talked glibly of blockade, contraband control, seizin
enemy warships at sea and their ports without a proper formal declaration of wa
any such action on the high seas without the declaration of war was liable to be b
ships became involved.

"The need for a `rethink' on the question of the operation and control of maritim
Intelligence is vital for the Navy in planning its operations and executing them. W
resources and preoccupations with other commitments, valiantly tried to give the
disconcerting to comprehend the fact that of the 13.5 lakh square miles of cover
by the Fleet, a bare one lakh square miles could actually be covered. This too wa
IAF with its Liberators and Super Constellations, augmented by 60 sorties of 160
the Fleet ships' endurance, limited as it was due to the lack of a replenishment ta
enemy ships, hoping for a chance contact, which was a terrible waste, quite apar
our meagre resources."

As can be seen from the foregoing reconstruction of events, the Navy went beyond the
Although instructions had been received not to seek action at sea outside our territoria
destroy submarines whenever and wherever they were detected. The Seahawk aircraft
Jamnagar on 1 September for its annual armament work up, were specifically tasked t
installation at Badin in Pakistan, which is only 135 nautical miles away from Jamnagar.
offensive spirit was there. The Indian Fleet, despite the restriction of not operating nor
planning the first sweep with Alizes searching well north of Porbandar in the hope that
Flotilla. When this did not happen, FOCIF had no hesitation on subsequent nights of pr
he might catch the enemy.

Given the Government's determination to limit the scope of the conflict as much as pos
offensive operations' and `do not proceed north of Porbandar'), given the Chief of Arm
inkling of the Army's plans (not agreeing to the Fleet being brought back to Bombay ea
when there is no formal declaration of war (trade warfare and contraband control when
see what more the Navy could have done.

Post War Naval Reactions

That the Government was aware of the Navy's frustration at having been restricted to
the letter written to the Navy by Shri Y.B. Chavan, the then Defence Minister:-

"I greatly appreciated the silent but efficient role which the Navy played in the de
islands which were vital to our security, guarded our ports and the long Indian co
ports reached safely and our international trade was not permitted to be interfere
opportunity to emphasise again that the Navy has done and achieved all that the
 and compass allotted to it".

Within the Navy, there were two distinct reactions. One was to decry the Pakistan Navy
determination not to be humiliated again.

In the prologue to his book, 'We Dared", Admiral SN Kohli states:

"During the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, the main task force of the Pak
sneaked out of Karachi harbour in the dead of night and made its way to holy Dw
bombardment lasted half an hour or so. PNS BABUR fired several six-inch shells
safety of their heavily defended harbour of Karachi well before the Indian Navy c
obvious that a sneak raid of this type can be undertaken by any force anywhere,
Government and their countrymen that they are supreme and unchallenged on t
their mercy. The Pakistani naval raid on Dwarka left the officers and men of the I
humiliated. This was particularly true of the senior echelons of our Navy on whom
maritime defence of India. I was then the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (now Vice
that if ever there was another round involving naval forces and I was in any kind
the farthest extremes to teach the enemy a lesson and to avenge this dastardly
when I was Flag Officer Commanding in Chief, Western Naval Command in Bomb

"In 1965, the Indian Navy had gone to war with their hands tied behind their bac
instruction under the signature of a Joint Secretary, Ministry of Defence, laid dow
more than 200 miles beyond Bombay nor north of the parallel of Porbandar. This
The Joint Secretary's communication was given to the then CNS, Admiral BS Som
naturally most upset and told my Chief that if I were in his position, I would prot
and its import and implementation would have a most demoralising effect on the

"Admiral Soman, on being asked by me recently, gave his version of what transp
manner. Here it is in his own words:

"As far as I remember, it was the morning after the start of the war that I got a
Secretary, saying that the Navy is not to operate above the latitude of Porbandar
action. I immediately contacted the Minister, Mr YB Chavan, and asked to see him
against this order and said in any case I cannot accept it from a Joint Secretary i
Chavan initialed the directive and asked me if that would do. I replied that in tha

"Arrangements were made for me to see the Prime Minister, Shastriji, the next m
with him. On his assurance that it was a Cabinet decision - I am not sure whethe
the understanding that should I consider it necessary, I may be allowed to see th
Chief".

"It was often derisively asked by civilians and officers of the other two services w
retaliation against the raid on Dwarka. The question was asked even by those wh
raid on a remote part of it is possible. But it is not surprising that our reputation
carrier VIKRANT was in dry dock undergoing routine maintenance: it was openly
were made about our smart uniforms, foreign jaunts, and the proverbial girl in e
when it came to fighting'. Few knew that all this obloquy was brought on the Nav
 "It was difficult for the Navy to understand the reason for such an order. Maybe
operation against Pakistan, maybe the Government thought that our old ships m
The Pakistan Fleet then consisted of ships of much the same vintage as ours - or
no doubt come out when the official history of the 1965 and 1971 wars is publish

In his memoirs of the 1971 war, 'No Way But Surrender', Vice Admiral Krishnan states

"I thought of the previous round of aggression by Pakistan, the 1965 war, in whi
consternation, the Navy played little or no part. I remember the hurt and humilia
Pakistani frontal attack on one of our ports had not brought forth any retribution
attack by units of the Pakistan fleet on Dwarka on the Saurashtra coast.)"

Afterword

The discerning reader will have sensed that there remain some points which are seriou
clarification. The above account was forwarded to Mr PVR Rao who was the Defence Se
below:

(a) Was there a written directive from the Government/ Ministry of

offensive action?

Mr Rao states:

"There is no dispute that the Government directed, as a matter of policy, th

conflict. Whether there was a written directive from the De-fence Ministry,
from the NHQ records. The least one can do is to publish an extract from th
order of the Defence Ministry".

In the records presently available, no such written directive has yet been lo

(b) Was the Government right in deciding to localise the conflict?

Mr Rao states:

"This was the Government of India's limited objective and it was achieved.
embarked on a wider operation can be debated, but it was not the Prime M

(c) After the Kutch incident, did the Chief of the Army Staff inform
assessment that Pakistan would attempt to seize Kashmir later in t

Mr Rao states:

"After the Kutch cease fire, none in the Government expected trouble until

(d) Had the Chief of Army Staff received the Government's approva
 counterattack in a place of its choice if Pakistan attacked in Kashm

Mr Rao states:

"Rather the Government pressed the Army to attack. The Chief of the Army
participate. In my opinion, he was never serious about this but was trying

In this connection, Mr Pradhan's memoirs state: (Pages 265 et seq)

"(On 4 September) The situation was getting desperate. The loss of Akhnu
decided to go ahead with an operation that had been planned after the Ran
declared before Parliament "If Pakistan continues to disregard reason and p
will defend the country and decide its own strategy and employment of its
deems best." General Chaudhuri, with the approval of the Defence Minister
`Riddle' to launch an offensive action to secure the eastern bank of the Ich
presence of the Indian troops on the canal opposite Lahore would draw Pak
and thus reduce its offensive capabilities in other sectors. Moreover, if Indi
canal, the Pakistan army would be forced to fight there and that would lead
basing the defence line along the canal, India would confine the war to Pak
large chunk of Pakistani territory. Operation `Riddle' was planned to meet
facing on 4 September".

Finally Shri Rao states:

"Notwithstanding Government's directive in the Defence Minister's morning

thereafter, he seems to have embarked on certain actions on his own. The
poor state. This was not the Navy's fault. It had got only measly funds. Wh
for defence was given in 1962 - 1965 to the Army and the Air Force. Going
above, I would consider the decision of the Government to restrict the Nav

Epilogue

In hindsight, three points of the 1965 war bear noting:

The first was the determination of the Governments of both India and Pakistan n

(a) Mr PVR Rao, the Defence Secretary in 1965 has stated that it was the d
Bahadur Shastri and the Indian Government not to allow operations to esca
operations against East Pakistan.

The IAF attack on Lalmanirhat was the result of a communication gap of Ai

The IAF did not retaliate against the PAF's subsequent attacks on Kalaikond
September and on Barrackpore and Agartala on 14 September.

In the Arabian Sea, GHAZI did not attack merchant shipping nor did the In
 on the high seas.

(b) In his book, "The First Round" Air Marshal Asghar Khan has stated:

- "President Ayub Khan said that since East Pakistan had not been at
strikes against enemy airfields in that area. He felt that considering o
to start hostilities on the Eastern front.

- "Our Navy was keen to intercept on the high seas the merchant shi
from doing so by our Foreign Office for fear of international opinion.
then Chairman of the Inland Water Transport Authority in East Pakist
fleet of more than one hundred Indian coastal shipping vessels along

The second point is the maritime recce capability of the Pakistan Navy. In view of Pakis
the approaches to Karachi seem to have been well covered. The Pakistan Air Force's No
SA 16 Albatross aircraft. The History of the Pakistan Air Force states:

"The SA 16's of No 4 Squadron were given the maritime role of detecting and rep
the enemy aircraft carrier VIKRANT.

Within the first 14 days, SA 16's flew 72 hours with only two qualified operationa
the month was 98:35 hours, the maximum flying during any single month. Hund
and helicopters was maintained throughout the month."

The third point is that the raid on Dwarka seems more to have been a reaction to
6 September, than a preplanned action to provoke the Indian Fleet to join battle.
Indian) literature that the Indian Fleet was bottled up for fear of the GHAZI is the
decisions of both Governments to minimize the scope of conflict.

Lessons Learnt

Several lessons were learnt from the 1965 operations. Foremost was the need for a fle
keeping endurance of Fleet ships and the urgent need for more ships to have one Fleet
Bengal. If the Pakistan Navy had deployed one or two of their destroyers to operate fro
our ports and sea lanes in the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Fleet would not have had enou
These and many other important requirements were taken in hand from 1966 onwards
repair facilities and depots at selected bases and reorganising the command and admin
war. These were to stand the Navy in good stead in the 1971 war.

CHAPTER 4

THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITIONS 1965 TO 1

Preamble

Until the early 1950s, Russia found it difficult to understand how India could be indepe
Commonwealth. It viewed India's non alignment as tilted towards the Western "imperi
bloc of Russia and China. When India refused to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty w
separate treaty giving up reparations) Russia began to understand India's independent
exercised its veto in the Security Council, Russia's support of India's stand on Kashmir

Until the early 1950's, all of India's core defence requirements like tanks, artillery, crui
fighter aircraft were being acquired from Britain. In step with the better understanding
making overtures to displace Britain as the prime source for India's defence needs. Mr
to 1967) who was the Deputy High Com missioner in London recalls:

"When the Air Force had come to England in 1952 to negotiate for the Canberra
Attache asking me "why don't you approach us for assistance, rather than appro

"I also recall Prime Minister Nehru's talk to senior Indian High Commission officia
China are making many overtures to us, but with America and Britain also, you n
We should be equally distant from both, just to safeguard all our interests."

Prime Minister Nehru first visited Russia officially in 1955. The Russians offered their la

Air Chief Marshal Moolgavkar recalls:

"Nehru was the first leader of a non communist country to be invited to the Sovie
"You call yourself non-aligned but you buy all military equipment from the West.
except that "Well, nothing has been offered to us". So he was told that "we will g
a cable to New Delhi to say that a top level Air Force team should get ready to co
brief this team on his return from Moscow.

"So the late Air Marshal Mookherjee, then Chief of the Air Staff, Air Cmde Arjan S
couple of others were made to form a team. We were briefed by Nehru before de
during his visit to Moscow he felt a visible, positive change in the governance and
leadership compared to what he had known in the Stalin era. "But", he said, "we
you go there and try whatever they offer you, except no intercontinental bomber

In 1956, Mr Kruschev visited India. His forthright description of Kashmir as "the northe
development of Indian heavy industry and the Rupee-Ruble trade agreement laid the f
economic and technical cooperation. During his visit, he openly suggested that Russia
Rear Admiral (then Cdr) Kirpal Singh was on Mr Krushchev's liaison staff. He recalls:

"During his visit, Krushchev made repeated offers to India to acquire more arms
ships like cruisers were sitting ducks because Russia had developed weapons wh
made a strong plea that India should get its ships from Russia".

The Navy did not respond, partly because it lacked the confidence to shed its dependen
the Russian Navy had yet to develop vessels of the kind the Navy wanted.

In 1957, the Russian Defence Minister, Marshal Zhukov, visited India. In Cochin, Rear
invited him to a banquet on board the flagship. In his memoirs, "A Sailor Remembers"

"From the moment Marshal Zhukov, stepped on board, he virtually impaled me a

 demanded to know why we were acquiring an aircraft-carrier. Resisting the temp
business, I tried to explain to him the reasons which induced us to do so, but he

"The discussion was obviously reaching a point of exasperation to both sides but
provocative observation that we were buying the carrier at the behest of the Brit
to accept, and I was provoked into saying "Marshal Zhukov, you are a renowned
the last war. I, therefore, consider it a great honour that you should have deigne
me. But you must concede that I would advise my Government in a manner that
behest of any foreign power". That, regrettably, brought the conversation to an a
place at the dinner table (the dinner itself was not quite ready to be served). The
silence of tension".

During Mr Krishna Menon's tenure as Defence Minister from 1957 to 1962, a landmark
supply of the latest Russian MIG 21 fighter aircraft to be followed by their progressive

After China's attack in 1962, India urgently needed aircraft, helicopters, tanks, arms an
limited themselves to supplying mainly weapons for the mountain divisions facing Chin
was positive and they agreed to meet India's needs.

Marshal Zhukov was not alone in his views on the Navy acquisition of an aircraft carrie
asked the Russian Defence Minister, Marshal Malinovsky, what sort of defence prepare
threat. He replied that what India needed was a strong, mobile, Army, Navy and Air Fo
Instead of a prestigious, overhauled, old British aircraft carrier (which he called the fift
should go in for a submarine fleet to guard her long coastline. (Stalin to Gorbachov by

The strategic defence review undertaken by India in 1963 viewed China as the primary
China and from Pakistan, the requirements of the Army, Navy and Air Force were quan
of the requirements were sent to America, Britain and Russia in advance of Defence Mi
1964.

Defence Minister Chavan's Delegation to Russia - 1964

In Russia, the Defence Minister's delegation were shown a submarine, a submarine dep
torpedo boat and a patrol boat.

The assessments of the naval members of the delegation were that while the submarin
be suitable during monsoon conditions. As regards missile boats, it was felt that even t
effective for coastal defence of ports, their acquisition should receive lower priority tha

Mr RD Pradhan, IAS, was the Private Secretary of Defence Minister YB Chavan from 19
Minister in 1964. In his memoirs "Debacle to Revival", he states: (Pages 211 et seq).

"The fact that the Defence Minister of India was visiting the Soviet Union, at that
significance. Chavan had already visited the United States and was scheduled to
India had not received the expected aid and assistance from the United States an
 Force was concerned, India would have to depend only on the Soviets. They had
and also help to set up factories to manufacture MIG-21s in India.

"Knowing his closeness to Khrushchev, Chavan was conscious that the success o
with Marshal Malinovsky.

"An unexpected result of the Soviet authorities' offer to meet India's defence req
attitude of our Army and Navy top brass towards Soviet-made equipment and ar

"Until that time, Soviet assistance was envisaged only for the Air Force for which
come under political attack. By the time Chavan visited Moscow, the Indian Navy
requirements outside the United Kingdom, was receptive to a suggestion to at le
assistance. Till that time, right from top to bottom, the Navy appeared to be so s
acquiring anything outside the United Kingdom. It was fortunate that Rear Admir
Chavan's earlier delegation to the United States. He knew where we stood vis-a-
Moscow with an open mind.

"Chavan was looking forward excitedly to visiting the Naval Headquarters in Leni
aboard one of their submarines.

"Just before we entered the submarine, the Naval Commander-in-Chief of the US

Chavan that it was perhaps for the first time in their naval history that foreign civ
Soviet submarine. Soon the submarine was racing away from the coast. Except f
the submarine was being subjected to tremendous pressure on the outside and w
down. After two hours of cruising under water, during which we were given a dem
lethal power of its torpedoes, we returned to the port.

"Chavan's meeting with the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Nikita S
1964. After the usual courtesies, Chavan conveyed Prime Minister Lal Bahadur S
about his impressions of the visit to Leningrad, Volgograd and Yalta. He elaborat
efforts and thanked the Soviet Union for the positive response he had received. H
only issue' that had remained unresolved.

"Khrushchev spoke eloquently of the economic cooperation between the two cou
fruitful Indo-Soviet cooperation that should be further expanded. He renewed the
all the arms and equipment that India needed and added that according to his in
had been offered by the State Committee and what Chavan wanted, regarding th
good arbitrator and divide the difference exactly midway between the Soviet offe

Admiral Nanda recalls:

"There was a farewell party in the Kremlin given by the Soviet Defence Minister M
and the Defence Secretary were discussing the final requirements of what the th
that day they had received instructions from the Government in Delhi to say you
but not any naval equipment at all from Russia.

"Before the party finished, about five or six Russian Admirals got around me and
with our ships ?" Now I didn't know about these instructions from our Governme
 that I was not telling them the truth. So they said "We are signing tommorow for
equipment but not for any naval equipment. You are the Naval member of the te
against the purchase of naval equipment". I had to think very fast as to what cou
happened again. Obviously the Army and Air Force have taken all the money and
sure the same thing happens with you. You too must be finding it difficult to get
against China, our problem is on our land frontier and not at sea. Therefore as fa
priority".

"When we came back, I got to know what had happened. The instructions had co
from our Prime Minister, who had been influenced by the British and the America
Russians. And so in 1964, we did not take the Russian ships and submarines tha

Defence Minister Chavan's Delegation to Britain - 1964

In his book, Mr Pradhan states: (Page 229 et seq).

"On Chavan's return from Moscow in mid September, where he had been assured
if India so desired, there was rethinking in the Navy. Until that time, Britain had

"Lal Bahadur Shastri felt that before making any commitment to the Soviets, the
out the attitude of the British Government. Apparently, the situation had become
Party in 1964 under Prime Minister Harold Wilson. Chavan was not too enthusias
He had witnessed the close coordination between the USA and the UK on the qua
During his discussions in Washington, he had been told that they would not cons
However he reluctantly agreed to visit London and make an effort, especially whe
acquiring naval craft from the USSR would have far-reaching implications for the
the Indian navies.

"The previous Conservative Party government had indicated its willingness to col
class frigates. India wanted Daring class destroyers. Denis Healey, the Defence S
in offering any sizeable assistance since Britain was facing a serious balance of p
was making a fresh assessment of its defence requirements and was not in a pos
the Indian Navy's requirements for the Daring class destroyers were concerned,
an offer of older destroyers which were eventually to be phased out in the British
submarine, Chavan was told not to make even a formal request.

"During our stay in London, Lord Mountbatten monitored the talks closely. I gues
effort to appeal to the old links between UK and India, to see if Harold Wilson an
to India.

"The communique issued at the end of the talks papered over the failure. It emp
the fact that Britain had in the past been the main supplier of military equipment
at India's recent efforts to cast her net further afield for defence supplies was su
communique reaffirmed the importance which they (the Indian and British Minist
cooperation between the services' and expressed the hope that within the spirit o
 liaison would continue to be maintained between them. It was clear that while Br
expected to seek help elsewhere".

There were two basic reasons why Britain was unable meet the Indian Navy's needs fo

(a) The British Navy itself was being down-sized due to cutbacks in their budget.
submarines which India wanted and could not spare any for India.

(b) India's needs were immediate and building new destroyers would take too lon

To meet India's desire to acquire the latest submarines rather than learn on old ones,
they could provide deferred credit to build a new Oberon class submarine in Britain. Til
submarine on loan to meet immediate needs.

Reluctance to Switch to Russian Acquisitions

In his book "The Indian Navy's Submarine Arm", Admiral Chatterji states: (Page 42)

"The Navy was reluctant to go in for Soviet ships/submarines on several counts.

origin. Spares held in ships and depots were for the British ships. There was muc
various ships originating in the same country which minimise the holdings of spa
maintenance facilities were geared up for looking after British ships. All officers a
their technical training, and in many cases initial training also, in the UK and wer
the philosophy and routine for their operation and maintenance. There were no la
personnel in the UK on ships/submarines and in their training establishments".

The basic question now became whether or not to switch over from British to Russian a
overcome. The Navy's entire administrative, training, maintenance, logistic, technical,
systems were wholely based on those of the British Navy. All naval personnel were fam
language. Changing over to the Russian system would entail enormous change. There
Navy would be able to manage so extensive a change.

There was apprehension also of severance of feedback, both technical and tactical, reg

Last but not least, there was the anti Russian mindset of an English speaking naval off
impressions of Russia derived solely from what was published in England and America
Russia.

There were prolonged discussions on all the implications. Even though by early 1965 it
meet the Navy's immediate needs, the Navy remained reluctant to sever connections w

The Decision to Acquire Russian Vessels - 1965

In 1965, Mr K Subrahmanyam was the Deputy Secretary Budget and Planning in the M

"In March 1965, the British told us that they will not be able to give us a credit fo

"In early April, there was a meeting of the Secretary's Committee in which the ac
Andamans and Nicobars were discussed. The Navy stressed the need for maintai
situation. On the basis of that discussion, the Navy prepared a draft paper in whi
the United States, UK and Russia for naval vessels. This paper was passed throu
then it went to the External Affairs Minister and the Finance Minister. It came bac
time the Rann of Kutch operations had started."

"During the Kutch incident, we found that we did not get enough sympathy from
Americans that the use of Patton tanks was a violation of the assurances given to
Secretary Dulles, the Americans remained unmoved".

"When the Navy's original paper was converted into a Cabinet Paper and came b
see it. I went through the file and felt that this was not the right approach. So I w
the Americans, British and Russians was not going to give us any additional bene

(a) The Americans had already told us that they will not give us naval equi

(b) The British had already told us that they couldn't give a credit for the O

Therefore the best course was not to delay any further but to accept the Ru
August 1964.

"Mr Chavan read that note and said that he fully agreed and that is the course In
that decision, the file was sent back to Naval Headquarters asking them to put u
ships and submarines."

With the Navy's primary concern having now become the defence of the Andaman and
voiced by the Indian Delegation in August 1964 regarding the operability in monsoon c
Russian side now offered the larger Petya class anti submarine vessels and Landing Sh

Mr Subrahmanyam accompanied the delegation to Russia in August 1965. He recalls:

"We stayed in Russia for 15 days from Aug 15 to 01 September. We went to Sev
went to Leningrad and went to sea in a F Class submarine.

"The discussions with the Soviets were very tough. Our side put them through rig
end of it, the Russians themselves said that they were now glad that they were g
confident that these ships would get looked after better and would also be more
Indonesians and the Egyptians."

On 1 September 65, the Delegation signed an agreement for:

(a) The acquisition of:

 - Four submarines

- Five Petya Class anti submarine vessels

- A submarine depot ship. It could support submarines at anchorages in th

And until facilities were set up ashore, it could also assist in the maintenan
equipment, recharge submarine propulsion batteries, prepare submarine to
simulators to submarine and Petya sonar operators and to attack teams on

- Two Polish built medium size landing ships of Russian design to carry me

- Five small 90 ton patrol boats for the Custom Department's anti smugglin

(b) A Russian Design Team to visit India and prepare a Project Report for setting
Visakhapatnam, together with a Naval Base, a Submarine Base, a Submarine He
Establishment for the ships and submarines being acquired.

(c) The Russian side to consider the construction in India of 500 ton patrol craft b
the Indian side.

Security of Information Regarding Russian Equipment

In view of the Cold War between the West and Russia, the Russian side was especially
capabilities and limitations of the equipment being supplied to India should not leak to
information had already been conveyed to the Russian side by the other two services.

In 1965, the Russian side desired that no undue publicity be given to the naval acquisi
strict security of information in Visakhapatnam.

Over the years, this unavoidable restriction led to three unforeseen and unfortunate re

(a) The "need to know" criteria effectively prevented the dissemination of knowle
of the Navy.

(b) The annual transfers of officers and men into and out of Russian ships to give
for meaningful understanding of the Russian concepts for operation and mainten
and indenting, and of technical documentation.

(c) Foreign warships and foreign naval visitors were not permitted to visit Visakh
that a Russian naval base was being set up. The presence of Russian guarantee s
In Western naval and military magazines, Visakhapatnam had a red star over it,
Russian naval ships deployed in the Indian Ocean.
 1966

Indian Technical Delegation to Russia

The first Russian acquisitions to arrive in India were the Landing Ships. Both the LSTs
based in Visakhapatnam. They commenced ferrying construction material, equipment a
after arrival.

After seeing the first LST, it was realised that before the construction of the submarine
effort should be made to try and modify them to suit Indian hot and humid climatic con

The outcome of discussions was that the Russian side were unable to make any major
under construction. The Russian side stated that the experience of Russian submarines
dispel Indian apprehensions. However the Russian side would welcome the Indian Nav
help improve design. (Note: Typical of the officer corps mindsets in those early years,
notes and send feedback to the Russian factories of equipment performance in Indian c

Discussions were also held on numerous technical issues like equivalence of fuels, oils,
machinery performance due to tropical conditions, supply of drawings, standardisation
ammunition, manufacturing details of submarine batteries, tropicalisation etc.

Two problem areas became clearly discernible during this first technical interaction in 1
subsequent years. These were the "Indenting of Spares" and the supply of "Repair Tec
Russian side explained in detail how the Russian Navy's system worked and the Indian
spares replenishment procedure could be dovetailed into the British naval procedure pr
outset, these two problem areas - one logistic and the other technical-became vexatiou

1967

Russian Naval Staff Delegation to India

In 1967, a Russian delegation headed by a submariner Admiral visited Visakhapatnam.

setting up the interim facilities for:

(a) A submarine base, submarine headquarters, submarine exercise areas, comm

submarine rescue procedure in case of accident etc.

(b) The maintenance of one submarine and two Petyas until the submarine depo

(c) The storage, preparation, maintenance and practice firing of submarine and P
 (d) The training of subsequent submarine and Petya crews in India.

(e) The annual de-preservation and re-preservation of the growing volume of ma

had already started arriving from Russia.

Interim Repair Facilities.

Since the new Naval Dockyard would take several years to come up, it was decided to
existing Base Repair Workshop.

Commissionings in 1967

The five patrol boats were loaded on to Russian heavy lift merchant ships, off-loaded in
February and March 1967.

The first submarine, KALVARI was commissioned in the Baltic in December 1967. After
had closed. The frigate TALWAR was sent to the Baltic to escort KALVARI back to India
in Visakhapatnam in July 1968.

Revival of Interest in Russian Missile Boats

Russia had given missile boats to the Indonesian and Egyptian navies in the early 1960

The Russian side had first shown the missile boats to the Defence Minister's Delegation
shown no interest in these boats, mainly because no Western Navy had such boats and
rough weather.

After the 1965 war, two major considerations led to the Navy's acquisition of missile bo
was that these boats could deter hit and run raids on the Saurashtra coast of the type
at Dwarka.

In his book Admiral Kohli states: (page 41)

"At one time, intelligence had suggested that the Pakistan Navy was considering
order to forestall the dangers of a missile attack by Pakistan on Bombay, I had, o
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov whether they had a mobile mis
defence of Bombay. He replied in the negative. He was later able to persuade the
and other major ports, the small Osa class of missile boats would be ideal. Their
deterrent to the enemy embarking on an attack."

The second consideration was the pressure from the Navy's young gunnery specialists
supplied missile boats to Indonesia and to Egypt. In June 1967, during the 6 day Arab
Israeli frigate, the EILATH, at a range well beyond the frigate's own guns. Navies all ov
effectiveness of this new Russian weapon - the surface to surface, anti ship, homing m
ship several times its size within a matter of minutes. At one stroke, this new weapon
prolonged gun battles between opposing warships.

The significant characteristics of the boat were an extremely thin skinned 200 ton hull,
give a high speed of 34 knots. Being small, the boat had a very small radar cross secti
advanced than any other known radar - it enabled the missile boat, with its low radar r
the latter was even aware of its presence, to fire its missiles and to speed away faster
architects had deliberately designed these characteristics, so as to give the small boats
American naval ships attempting to attack the Russian coast. Basically, the boats were
only coastal operations.

In December 1967, Vice Adm Krishnan took over from Vice Admiral Kohli as the Vice C
But Surrender", Admiral Krishnan states: (Page 3 et seq)

"To me, the acquisition of these missile boats had become an obsession. The CNS
man and it was easy to convince him that we must, under every circumstance, b

"When Admiral Gorshkov, the five star Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Sov
discussions the question of acquiring the improved version, OSA class, missile bo
was fitted with four missiles instead of two).These discussions gave an indication
that three boats was the minimum for a viable attack unit".

1968

The Visakhapatnam Project

In January 1968, the Navy received the Report prepared by the Russian Design Bureau
Report had been studied, Russian specialists arrived to clarify queries. After detailed di
was signed on setting up a new Naval Dockyard, a Naval Base, a Submarine Base and
for the four submarines, five Petyas, submarine depot ship, landing ships and patrol bo

To maximise indigenous content, it was agreed that a sizeable proportion of the design
that a large proportion of equipment and machinery would be of indigenous origin. Lat
factors which delayed the completion of the project by several years, because technica
always available.

The Missile Boats

In his book Admiral Krishnan states: (ibid)

"We decided that we should press for the purchase of eight such boats. There followed
for selling the idea to the Government. Fortunately, our Defence Minister, Mr Jagjivan R
acquiring these boats. We got Cabinet approval for further negotiations with the Soviet

Submarine Rescue Vessel. In 1968, Government approved the acquisition of a submari

Commissionings in 1968.

Two Petyas, KAMORTA and KADMATT, the submarine KHANDERI and the submarine de
December 1968. The Petyas sailed for home from Vladivostok. KHANDERI and AMBA re

By this time, the Russian Navy had come to realise that the Indians were diligent learn
than the navies they had earlier helped to train.

1969

Acquisition of Missile Boats

In January 1969, a delegation went to Moscow to discuss and finalise the acquisition of
Russian naval base at Baku in the Caspian Sea to go to sea in a missile boat and visit a
signed an agreement for the acquisition of a squadron of missile boats and Technical P
fuelled missiles.

In his book Admiral Krishnan states: (ibid)

"A team consisting of the Additional Secretary, a gunnery specialist (Note: the au
technical officers and myself proceeded to Moscow.We returned from Moscow aft
Headquarters, the operational staff were jubilant and wanted to name this secret
initials.However I vetoed this in favour of `Alpha Kilo', the initials of Admiral AK C
programme of selection of personnel to proceed to the Soviet Union for training a
facilities and the 'Technical Positions' which stored and prepared the missiles."

Training of Crews in India.

As soon as the first two Petyas, KAMORTA and KADMATT arrived in Visakhapatnam, th
classrooms" so as to minimise the duration of training in Russia of the subsequent crew

The crews of KAVARATTI and KATCHALL, the fourth and fifth Petyas, which had been t
Russia for just 6 weeks to take over the ships and sail them back to India. The Russian
professional knowledge, considering that they had neither received any training in Vlad
been set up in Visakhapatnam.

Commissionings in 1969

The last three Petyas KILTAN, KAVARATTI and KATCHALL, and the last two submarines
end 1969.

The last of these commissionings completed the acquisition programme of the ships an

1970

The Induction of the Missile Boats

During 1970 and 1971, extensive infrastructure was set up at Bombay. The headquart
temporarily in INS TRATA in South Bombay as `TRATA II', which was later to become I
set up temporarily in a secluded World War 2 camp known as Cheetah Camp near Man
finalised for locating the permanent Technical Positions.

No consensus could be found on how best to protect the thin skinned hulls from the ra
affected all ships hulls in tropical waters. One view was that they should not be left in t
- they should be hauled up on slipways and stowed on concrete hards. Since these har
consuming to construct, and would also entail dredging, the idea had to be given up. E
Basin of the Naval Dockyard Bombay. And the bottom fouling, which over time had beg
much as 10 knots, was removed just before the commencement of the war in 1971.

Personnel completed their training in Russia in March 1970, and acceptance trials of th
their machinery, the boats were lightened and loaded on to heavy lift merchant ships a
boats required a 200 ton crane and the only such crane in India at that time was in Ca
Calcutta, depreserved and prepared for being towed all the way from Calcutta, around
given to whichever ship was conveniently available for towing at the time that a boat w

Repair and Refit Facilities

In 1968, it had been agreed that till the new Dockyard was ready in the mid 1970s, th
would be expanded to provide the minimum essential facilities for carrying out normal

By mid 1970, an enormous backlog of problems had built up, caused by defects in the
technical documentation and inadequacy of repair facilities ashore. With increasing slip
of the Dockyard and with major periodic refits becoming due from 1970 onwards, conc

In 1970, the Russian side sent a Technical Delegation to resolve the problems caused b
Russian acquisitions, inadequate availability of essential oils and lubricants, non-availa
obtaining vital technical data and drawings, practical difficulty experienced in identifica
construction of the Naval Dockyard. Interim solutions were agreed upon.
 1971

Acquisition of More Petyas and Submarines

In mid 1971, it was decided to acquire five more Petyas and four more submarines bec
in Russia was coming to an end. The Navy wanted these acquisitions to incorporate the
identified for improving their performance. A delegation went to Moscow to discuss the
the major refits of the earlier vessels, since the new Dockyard was delayed.

Technical discussions were held with the designers to increase the endurance of equipm
capacity, improve the performance of equipment and incorporate the improvements co
gained in operating in tropical conditions. The Russian side agreed to supply three Pety
build two new Petyas. In both cases, the modifications suggested by the Indian side wo
possible.

In the case of the submarines, all four would be newly built, be fitted with the latest av
modifications which the Indian side had suggested.

In view of the Petyas and submarines being fitted with new types of equipment, it was
created in the Naval Dockyard, Visakhapatnam would be augmented.

As regards coping with the foreseeable backlog of major periodic refits, the most that c
expediting the completion of the new workshops and phasing out the forthcoming refit

The Induction of the Missile Boats

Until early in 1971, a number of boats were towed, one at a time, by a variety of towin
hawser -anchor cable method of towing large ships at sea. Unfortunately, these time-t
thin skinned boats, whose towing bollards were welded to equally thin decks and whos
weight and where the space on the foxle could not accommodate all the men required
towing gear. The Russians had fitted a necklace, which went all the way around the hu
brackets welded to the hull. This eased the stress on the thin skinned hull, but the cum
towing gear still remained a serious problem.

In early 1971, two training ships, KISTNA and TIR, were nominated for towing duties.
Officer of TIR). TIR, on her way up to Calcutta, encountered KISTNA on her way down
heavy weather and her anchor cable, piled up on the bottom of the sea, was being labo
that some solution had to be found for this seamanship problem. On arrival at Calcutta
chandler market and found that large size nylon hawsers were available, which mercha
Each such nylon hawser cost over Rs one lakh. TIR managed to persuade Headquarter
such hawsers for towing two boats to Bombay.
TIR set off from Calcutta one day, using nylon hawsers to tow the last two of the eight
Fortuitiously, the Squadron Commander of the missile boats was embarked in one of th
magazine Quarterdeck 1996 recounts the subsequent events on passage to Bombay:

The nylon tow from Sandheads to Visakhapatnam was uneventful and trouble fre
floated on water and was therefore easily grappled by the men on the missile bo
increased, the nylon rope stretched and became bar taut like a steel wire rope. L
XO, was able to provide Cdr (later Commodore) BB Yadav and his missile boat cr
supplies by sliding them along the tow ropes to and fro. Soon a telephone line wa
two-way communication. Every morning at 0800 hrs Cdr Yadav would come up o
another incident free night". Both missile boats kept their engines and machinery

"In Visakhapatnam, one boat was detached and the tow was to be continued wit
would be worthwhile determining the maximum safe towing speed with this nylon
taken to pad both ends of the towing nylon which might chafe with the towing fa
the nylon was bar taut, chafing instantly caused individual nylon strands to part
strands. These precautions proved their worth. Ten to twelve knots were made g
watchkeeping officers of TIR were put into an organised watch system on the qu
paid rich dividends as they were able to take timely action to avoid chafing of the

"As a result of the steady confidence now built up in towing by nylon, it was agre
safely. With the confident seamanship and alertness of both towing ship and tow
achieve a towing speed of 16 knots. This speed was nearly the maximum that TI
With repeated drills and good seamanship the boat could be taken in tow and slip
both ships became eager to determine if we could safely achieve even higher spe
of using nylons to tow missile boats during combat were becoming increasingly a
Bombay, TIR doing full power, towed the missile boat at 17 knots without any ad
arrangements of the missile boat.

"After securing alongside, TIR handed over to the C-in-C, a two foot length of six
the towing speed achieved and recommending that, not only that all remaining b
but also that the towing of missile boats using nylong ropes be now accepted as

"Later that year, the missile boats led by Cdr Yadav were to achieve spectacular

All eight boats arrived in Bombay by mid 1971.

The submarine rescue vessel NISTAR arrived in Visakhapatnam in the autumn of

CHAPTER 5

MAZAGON DOCKS AND THE LEANDER FRIGATE

PREAMBLE

Until the 19th century, Mazagon Docks (MDL) used to build wooden hulled warships
frigate "Tigris" and the 6-gun schooner "Shannon" were launched from MDL. As steel h
warship building in Bombay declined. The last warship to be built by MDL was the 80 g
1848.

Meanwhile the British Peninsular and Orient Company, (P&O) started a passenger ship
peninsula, initially to and from Calcutta and later to and from Bombay. This was the fir
others being to the Far East and Australia.

In 1914, P&O acquired the British India Steam Navigation Company (BISN) which was
Calcutta. This `P&O Group' became the main operator for India's coastal passenger tra
Gulf, the Far East and East and South Africa. Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL) at Bombay and
Calcutta were developed by the P&O Group to maintain their ships in Indian waters. Fo
controlling interest in the Mogul Line. After Independence, from the early 1950's onwa
construction yards started meeting the nation's need for small vessels and harbour cra

During the Second World War, an urgent need had arisen to build merchant ships in In
Scindia Steam Navigation company was given a site at Visakhapatnam. The first Indian
In due course this yard was taken over by the Government and renamed Hindustan Sh

ACQUISITION OF MDL AND GRW

In 1956, the P&O group offered to sell MDL to the Government of India. The Planning C
1956 was "the demand for ships of 4000 GRT and below, especially for new ships, and
small that it would not be advantageous for Government to consider taking over Mazag
smaller vessels" (Material from MDL).

In 1957, Mr Krishna Menon became the Defence Minister. He was determined that Indi
requirements like tanks, warships and aircraft. It was clear that HSL would be overload
that only MDL and/or GRW could build large warships. He appointed a committee to loo
with a view to build frigate sized warships in India.

After protracted negotiations under Mr Krishna Menon's forceful leadership, the Govern
MDL and GRW for 12.1 million pounds (approx Rs. 3.85 crores) on 19 April 1960. The p
payment to be adjusted towards repairs of P&O Group ships after take over.

MODERNISATION OF MDL

In November 1960, Government approved in principle that three Leander class frigates
MDL submitted a preliminary report on the facilities required to modernise MDL for bui

MDL was a 35 acre site, needing extensive modernisation and expansion before it could
was Kasara Basin, a low lying, neglected wharf belonging to the Bombay Port Trust, an
rested on mud at low water. On MDL's southern boundary was the jeep assembly plant
the P&O Group since 1949 until 1962. Under Mr Krishna Menon's nudging, Mahindras v
Bombay Port Trust leased Kasara Basin to MDL in 1963.

MDL had two medium size dry docks - one for seagoing ships and one for harbour craf
accommodate coasters and lighters up to 150 tons. Though MDL's primary activity was
berths. Repairs had perforce to be undertaken in Bombay Port Trust berths.

After receiving MDL's preliminary report on its requirement for additional facilities, the
Alexander Gibbs and Partners (who were also consultants for the Expansion Scheme of
prepare plans for expanding MDL's facilities, both for ship repair and ship construction.
of frigates, their major recommendations were:

-Convert the Kasara tidal basin into an impounded wet basin for fitting out three
launched.

- Construction of the first long slipway on the south side of MDL, together with an

- Creation of fitting out berths, fitting out shops, prefabrication shops, etc.

By end 1963, the plan for impounding the Kasara Basin had been approved and the co
slipway in the South Yard. however, since the collaboration for the Frigate Project was
yard and the siting of shops were kept pending the finalisation of the frigate building co

By 1968 most of the civil works for MDL's modernisation had been completed. The Kas
time for NILGIRI, the first frigate launched on 23 October 1968, to be towed into the n
alongside for fitting out.

GOA SHIPYARD

Immediately after Goa was liberated, the Government of India directed MDL to take ov
Goa (Goa Shipyard) on 19 December 1961. In April 1962, Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) was
on 30 September 1967 and GSL made a subsidiary of MDL. GSL undertook ship repair,
with and started building warships in the 1980's.

MDL STARTS WARSHIP REFITS

From 1963 onwards, the Navy started off-loading its ships to MDL for major refits, invo
renewal. By this time, the first Warship Overseeing Teams had been appointed.

SELECTION OF SHIPBUILDERS FOR COLLABORATION

On 25 November 1960, Government approved in principle that three Leander Class Fri
a preliminary report on the civil works, machinery and equipment required to undertak
deputed a team of three senior naval officers to Britain to discuss with the Admiralty, t
armament suppliers, the steps to be taken for building the first modern major war vess
project report and recommendations on the arrangements to be made by NHQ and by
economically. The three officers were Captain (L) KR Ramnath, the Director of Stores P
Director of Naval Construction and Captain (E) CL Bhandari, the Managing Director of M
recommendations laid the foundation of the subsequent negotiations which culminated

The overall framework of collaboration emerged as follows:

(a) The Admiralty, as the owners of the Leander design, would:

- provide guidance drawings to the shipbuilder

- authorise the supply of working drawings to MDL

- vet the line plans produced by the shipbuilder

- keep the shipbuilder and NHQ informed of all modifica tions and Alteratio
for their own Leanders during construction

- inspect all machinery and equipment ordered, on payment of agency cha

- supply armament and Admiralty items on the usual Government to Gover

- advise on the terms of collaboration and the contract with the shipbuilder

- train Indian naval and civilian personnel in overseeing and testing and tu

- provide security clearances

(b) The Shipbuilder's responsibilities would be :-

- supply of working drawings, lists of machinery equipment, copy orders fo

construction of the ship in India and assistance with technical know-how an

- supply of main machinery and boilers. The main engines to be built in Ind
Company

- ordering of special 'B' quality steel and sections required for the Leander

- ordering of auxiliary machinery and equipment required for the ship, subj
multiple tenders where appropriate or proof of economical prices from nom

- assistance to Mazagon Dock with technical personnel, on terms to be neg

according to programme

- assistance in training of personnel from the Mazagon Dock in their yard in

- provision of facilities to the Indian Naval Overseeing Team for training in

 - supply of shipbuilding stores, advice and active collaboration as regards s
indigenously produced stores and equipment to be incorporated in the ship

- to seek and provide the necessary guarantees for machinery and equipm
performance of the ship as a whole

- to arrange for ordering, packing and despatching of all machinery, equipm

programme to fit in with the construction programme in India

(c) The armament supplier would supply the weapons and associated control sys

Summary of the Team's Report and Recommendations

`As a result of our discussions with the various departments of the Admiralty, Me
Ltd. and other parties in the United Kingdom, we have reached the conclusion th
Mazagon Dock in collaboration with Shipbuilder/Shipbuilders is a feasible proposi

`The immediate requirement for undertaking this project is to begin the construc
in Mazagon Dock and to conclude a collaboration agreement, so that the forward
investigations in regard to indigenous materials and the like can proceed. It is es
to provide the additional facilities in Mazagon Dock, but the keel can be laid as so
shop are ready. The cost of the additional facilities is estimated at Rs 2.25 crores
prepared by Sir Alexander Gibbs & Partners.

`The Leander is the most modern warship of its class under construction in the U
and its construction is well established. We consider that the specifications of the
generally conform to the existing Leander. There is no scope for any major altera
and speed. It was stated by the Admiralty that a slight sacrifice of speed has bee
the sea-keeping qualities, put in a much greater amount of sophisticated equipm
endurance, reduce maintenance problems and ensure a longer useful life than a
obvious that to obtain greater speed for the same displacement, the machinery w
space, and this can only be done at the expense of equipment and endurance.

`To complete this project economically, efficiently and in good time and to produ
operation would be necessary between Naval Headquarters, Admiralty, Mazagon
United Kingdom. In this respect, we consider that the co-operative attitude of th
two well established firms, namely Vickers and Yarrows, promises well for the pr
of their world wide repute and appear to be anxious to ensure the success of the

`We consider that there is considerable scope for incorporating indigenously prod
to be built in India. We estimate the Rupee element of the first ship to be about
increase for the second and the subsequent ships. In this respect, we feel that a
of Australia and Canada. Australia has achieved considerable progress in manufa
armament for the Type 12 Frigates being built in Australia.
`In order to ensure the efficient maintenance and operation of the advanced me
these vessels, the Training Schools of the Indian Navy and the Naval Dockyard w
equipment and facilities. Naval Headquarters would also have to take on the prep
provision of Base and Depot spares and make arrangements for the commissioni

`Naval Headquarters would also be required to set up an organisation for undert

vis-a-vis a private shipbuilder in the United Kingdom. These can be summarised
in the United Kingdom. A number of technical personnel, both Naval and civilian,
specialised training in overseeing and fitting out of the equipment.

`The order of cost for the construction of a Leander Class Frigate in the United K
pounds. The estimated cost of building the first ship in Mazagon Dock is Rs 8.5 c
anticipated that the cost of the subsequent ships will decrease. The total cost of
The foreign exchange requirement is estimated at Rs 12.7 crores.

`The extension of facilities at Mazagon Dock by way of Capital improvements e.g

equipment and the like is estimated at Rs 2.25 crores, out of which Rs 65 lacs wi

`Allowing 2 years from end 1961 for completion of work in Mazagon Dock, the fir
1967, the remainder at 18 month intervals. The programme of 3 ships will thus e

`The team recommends:-

- That approval be accorded to the construction of three Leander Class Ships at M

Messrs Yarrow & Co Ltd, and Vickers Armstrong Ltd on terms to be negotiated. M
undertaken to forward technical proposals in collaboration with Messrs Yarrow &

- That the Civil Engineering works, namely the construction of the slipway, pre-fa
works required in Mazagon Dock, Bombay, should be put in hand as soon as pos
at least the slipway and the pre-fabrication shop is completed. It is obvious that
Mazagon Dock will be of great benefit to the Yard and the country, quite apart fr
available in the future for other constructions.

- That subject to the report being accepted by the Government, the next step of
collaborating firms should be tackled in two stages:-

(a) The contract be drawn up by the Ministry of Defence, Finance in consul

Dock &

(b) The draft contract be discussed jointly with the Admiralty and the repre
recommended that for this purpose representatives from Ministry of Defenc
Mazagon Dock visit U.K. to finalise the contract on the spot. The scope of m
requirements should also be finalised during this visit.

- That at every stage of progressing the case through the Governmental machine
in mind. We would like to place it on record that the whole project lasting over se
programme and if there are administrative delays in financing, placing of contrac
personnel, the whole project may be thrown out of gear and its completion date
 unpredictable. In our discussions in U.K, it was made clear to us that in shipbuild
when fitting out begins. If delays occur in fitting out, due to the equipment or pe
appropriate stages of the fitting out, a vicious circle of deterioration of the equipm
while new equipment is being fitted at the other end.

VICKERS/YARROW REPORT ON FACILITIES REQUIRED IN MDL

From the British side, a team of officials from Messrs Vickers Ltd and Messrs Yarrow Lt
facilities available in India and produced, in 1962, their proposal to build Leander class

FINAL TECHNICAL - ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF FRIGATE DESIGN OPTIONS

In mid 1962, a delegation was sent to make a final technical-economic assessment of

collaboration proposals subsequently received from Sweden and Holland. Rear Admiral
Chief of the Naval Staff, led this delegation.

Admiral Nanda recalls:

"The next consideration was the equipment that was going to go into the ships. W
from? The third consideration was what support could we expect for spare parts
we have on the usage of the ships as well as the equipment and weapon systems
who were going to use these ships.

Swedish shipyard was very keen to assist us. However, I was informed that Swe
all because the Swedish Navy's requirements were different - their environment
their area of operations very limited as far as their maritime boundaries were con
interested, it was obvious that we could not depend on Sweden for lifetime suppo
systems that were going to be fitted in the ship. Nor could we have interaction w
problems that may arise in the operation or maintenance of these ships. The cho

"We found that Holland was getting their technical inputs from UK. The Leander,
built under license in Holland with the designs which were going to be acquired fr
make certain changes and they were going to put in radars and associated equip
being fitted in the UK ships. Holland too, was extremely keen to collaborate and

"Then we visited UK and held discussion with Yarrow who were building a large n
Navy. After the Second World War, the Leander was the first standard, frigate-si
and they were going to have several ships of this class. The UK too were very ke

"I came back and I recommended that we should negotiate with the United Kingd
as much as the language problem was not there, which was going to be a proble
Secondly the equipment that was going to be used was British equipment, which
Navy were of British origin. Thirdly that as the Royal Navy was going to acquire a
support for spare parts during the lifetime of the Leanders that we were going to
Navy's interest to collaborate with the UK, with whose Navy we could discuss pro
 maintenance, indigenisation, modernisation and so on. This recommendation wa

"There were a lot of questions raised in Parliament after this recommendation wa

British. I was sent for by Defence Minister Chavan to explain to him the reasons
option and not the Swedish option. The Defence Minister mentioned that there w
were getting our MPs to ask a lot of questions on this particular project and he n
it existed. After I gave him all the reasons, he was satisfied, he was able to answ
British Leander Project was approved in association with Yarrow".

THE CHOICE OF THE FSA 34 LEANDER DESIGN AND

FINALISATION OF AGREEMENTS IN 1964

In their earlier discussions since 1961, it had been agreed that the Admiralty would giv
had already been introduced in the Royal Navy. During the intervening years, whilst di
the Admiralty had decided to introduce for their Navy, a modified design called the "FS
by 2 feet (0.61m). It incorporated the latest equipment modifications and made provis

During the Defence Minister's visit to Britain in November 1964, the discussions on the

(a) The Choice Between the Earlier FSA 29 and Later FSA 34 Design.

The advice of the British MOD (Navy) and Vickers Armstrong (Shipbuilders) was

(i) The FSA 29 Leander design had been superseded by the FSA 34 Leande
latest FSA 34 design.

(ii) The time delay caused by the working drawings having to be redrawn w
could only lay the keel in mid 1966, this delay would get absorbed. The cos
pounds. The FSA 34 design gave both added stability and extra space.

(iii) Adoption of the FSA 34 design would make it easier to obtain the lates
the British Navy's FSA 34 Leanders.

(b) Technical Assistance to be Rendered by the MOD (Navy) UK.

The scope of assistance would be incorporated in an inter-Governmental Memora

design fees of 50,000 pounds per ship for the hull and 20,000 pounds per ship fo
incurred by the Admiralty for research, development and design of new equipme

(c) Technical Aid Fees to be Paid to Vickers Armstrong (Shipbuilders).

This fee was for providing technical assistance to enable Mazagon Docks to const
included elements for "on the job" training of Indian personnel in the UK shipbuil
Organisation (IFPO) to be set up in the UK.
A credit agreement was signed under which the British Government agreed to provide
the external costs, during the first four years of the programme, for expansion of MDL'
Frigates.

By end 1964, all the major aspects of the collaboration had been finalised. In addition
40,000 pounds was to be paid for the Indian Frigate Project Organisation in Newcastle,
Yard, Yarrow (Shipbuilders), who were to provide the basic working drawings for the co

The Memorandum of Agreement for the Leander Frigate Project, known as the "Blue Bo
between the Government of India and Vickers Yarrow. The Blue Book covered three as

- Technical Aid, including the provision of basic technical drawings and the placin
from Senior Managers down to Foremen level, to assist MDL in the project.

- Supplies of major items from Vickers/Yarrows and

- Supplies of material from other United Kingdom suppliers.

This Memorandum became operative on 27 January 1965, when a parallel agreemen

India and the Ministry of Defence (Navy) UK. The agreement authorised Vickers/Yarrow
Book. The parallel agreement related to the payment of design fees of

400,000 pounds to the Ministry of Defence (Navy) UK for the training of Indian personn
Admiralty pattern items of stores and equipment, the scrutiny of quotations and the in
of the Government of India.

The Government of India then placed an order on MDL for the construction of the first
agreement with the MDL were:-

- The work was to be undertaken at cost plus a profit of 5% on the total cost of c
allowed shall not exceed Rs. 140 lakhs.

- A Warship Overseeing Team was given the authority to monitor the work.

- Naval Headquarters was authorised to make deviations from specifications and

- Strict quality control was to be exercised by the Director General Inspection (D

(WOT).

- The provisions of the Official Secrets Act were to be made applicable to safegua

- Force Majeure clause was to be applied for unforeseen or untoward occurrence

- The methodology of accounting and periodic payments for the work executed w
for advance payments.

- Basin Trials, Sea Trials and Repeat Trials for the work performed on the hull, m
equipment were provided for and the onus of rectification placed on MDL.
 - A warranty clause made MDL responsible to make good any defects onboard de
delivery.

POSITIONING OF TOP MANAGEMENT

After the frigate contract was signed, the Government appointed to MDL the two key p
the Frigate Project during the negotiations. Mr HC Sarin ICS was appointed Chairman M
duties at Secretary Defence Production in the Ministry of Defence. Rear Admiral (later A
associated with the project as Chief of Material in 1961/62 and as Deputy Chief of the
Managing Director MDL on 14 December 1964. Mr Sarin remained Chairman MDL for fi
Nanda handed over to Rear Admiral BA Samson on 3 May 1966, who later also became
1973. This close association of the Ministry of Defence Production, NHQ and MDL and t
to prove invaluable for the timely and successful resolution of innumerable teething pro

THE PROBLEMS TO BE OVERCOME

Whilst Naval Headquarters had the satisfaction of having signed for the latest available
Leander of the FSA 34 series was not expected to be commissioned in the Royal Navy
scepticism of whether MDL would be able to build in India a sophisticated warship as m

The sceptics, both in India and abroad, had sound reasons. Those in Britain who had b
complexity of coordinating practically every aspect of naval architecture, marine engine
Those in India knew that the MDL faced several formidable challenges:

- The MDL's expansion scheme would have to be carried out fast enough to meet
construction programme.

- At the same time, MDL's existing activities could not be slowed down. Ship repa
contracted for had to be completed on time.

- MDL's traditional activity had been ship repair and building auxiliary vessels. Th
than that required for warship building. MDL's workforce was not conversant with
programme, both in India and abroad, was inescapable.

- The rigorous specifications of the materials and the equipment required for war
reliability during combat, were much higher than the equivalents commercially a
required for warship building was not available in India. Moreover the small orde
uneconomic for any Indian company to indigenise. Import substitution would the
dependence on imports, with all its attendant delays.

- Though shipbuilding was basically assembly work, the standard of workmanship

restricted space in which work had to be done and the volume of closely inter-re
make time bound completion doubly difficult.
DELAYS IN CONSTRUCTION OF MDL FACILITIES

The basic facilities required to begin the Frigate Project started to fall behind from the
Government, while approving MDL's expansion scheme, had advised postponing the sit
Shop) until the type of warship to be built and the collaborators had been finalised. Thi
The civil works of the P&A Shop were completed only in 1967, well after the keel of the
of machinery and the laying of the services in the P&A Shop continued throughout 196
launched.

The construction of slipways in the South Yard was also delayed due to the unexpected
upset the expansion schedule, which in turn delayed the installation of the cranes. At e
difficulty or the other, resulting in revision of plans and compelling improvisation and in

Admiral Samson, recalls:

"The Platers & Assembly Shop, the very basis for ship-building, was not rea
unable to adhere to any schedule after several revisions. Thus the first plat
in the Machine Shop on May 16, 1966. This was just a simple steel plate on

"When the three slipways in South Yard got ready, there were no cranes. W
to quit, he promptly obtained an injunction against the work being carried
particular judge that we were able to vacate this injunction in an incredibly
contractor be selected and engaged.

"The Platers & Assembly Shop, with all its internal facilities etc, virtually ca
was launched in October 1968. This one instance alone clearly shows how
Yard to adhere to any kind of schedule, much less trying to complete the h
as in a reasonable amount of time.

"As an instance of making-do and improvising with such equipment and ma

the machining of the base plate for the twin 4.5 inch gun mounting is parti
machine was such that we seriously considered importing a very expensive
But its purchase would have meant foregoing import of other equally vital
with an existing machine in the Machine Shop that was over 100 years old.
feet, re-set it, and then machined the circular base plate. It was an extrem
the operator to achieve the required accuracy. But we did it and saved muc
the ingenuity of the officers and men in the Machine Shop".

TRAINING IN BRITAIN FOR CONSTRUCTING FRIGATES

Vickers made the generous gesture of starting the training of Indian personnel from th
contract was signed in October 1964.

The skills required for warship building were vastly different to those for construction o
those needed for ship repairs. There were over 35 warship building trades as against o
complete re-orientation of training was therefore necessary.

MDL deputed a number of its senior and junior officers for training in the shipyards of V
six months to two years. A small body of about 150 workmen of all categories were als
first hand the techniques for building and fitting-out. When these officers and men retu
officers and men while actually building the first frigate.

Lt Cdr (L) (later Captain) S Prabhala was in the first team who went to Vickers fo

"Since Mazagon Dock did not have qualified people in all disciplines, some
Mazagon Docks. On the Construction side we had Cdr AN Thukral, on the E
the Electrical side myself. There was a civilian counterpart to each of us fro
it was Mr Choksi, on the Engineering side it was Mr Dom Menezes and Abra
Kharas.

"Apart from two from each of these three disciplines, we also had people fr
the foreman category of technicians for electrical, shipwright, engineering,

"The fact that Vickers wanted such a large number to come there for traini
was because ship building in the UK in those days was still an art rather th
planned in advance. People went by what they did in the past. There was'n
the way you start building a ship, this is how you plan the procurement or
or the fitting out. We were just left to observe what they did. It we wanted
questions from the people on the berth. What we could learn was entirely o
much willingness to learn we displayed. This was an eye opener.

"It was really what you call `on the job training', you were just thrown into
could. There was no formal training, there was no formal planning system.
education for us because we had to do improvements ourselves. It was not
then we could improve upon that.

"The intention was that we should have people trained in all aspects of ship
inspection. So while we, on behalf of Mazagon Dock, were getting trained i
the Navy headed by Mr Dotiwala for hull construction, engineering and elec
Puri (Engineers) and Cdr Bhatnagar an Electrical Officer, formed the Warsh
any big team in Admiralty's design office in Bath, as far as I recollect, beca
Cdr Mohan Ram, a Constructor and Cdr Bose an Engineer and Cdr Badve ca
there, but it was for a much shorter period compared to the ship building t

"There was no over all coordination of these activities. Basically we were se

Admiralty. The warship inspection people, for instance, were being overall
Being deputationists and being Mazagon Dock personnel, we were in conta

Admiral Samson recalls:

"From my discussions with those who came back from abroad after such tr
Certainly they had the opportunity of watching a warship being constructed
obtaining in an experienced British yard. However, for obvious reasons, no
to work on the warship being built. They could only watch what was happe
value; there is indeed value but it is only by actually doing the job with one

"The three hundred odd personnel sent to the UK for training did not repre
involved in building a warship, which would probably be 1500 to 1800 men
that this nucleus would, on their return from UK, train a selected work forc

"It would seem on the face of it that these would be from those existing pe
the Yard. But there was a snag to this. Firstly most of our labour, except in
enough and would not have been able to either read the intricate working d
were in English. Secondly, psychologically it is always difficult to change th
skills once they have got used to certain ways of thinking and doing things
change such thinking would have been a task fraught with delays, but mor
and we could not afford any delays, and certainly no mistakes.

"We were determined right from the beginning that every man working on
P&A Shop, the Machine Shop or any other shop must do the job in the corr
Sethna and Commander (later Commodore) A.N. Thukral who insisted on t
we were able to ensure the right way of thinking amongst the work force o
no relaxation or deviation.

"In order to ensure this and to overcome the problems mentioned above, w
having the basic knowledge of English and able to read and write. We put t
very successfully.

"It was also essential that Managers, from the topmost down to the juniorm
themselves gain the confidence and knowledge so essential for building a w
deputation to MDL of as many as 60 managers from Vickers and Yarrow fo
disciplines - shipbuilding, designing, P&A Shop, welding, machine shop, eve
personnel, there would have been no objections from Government. But it w
myself that if we really wanted to learn warship building, it was only by hav
authority as well and doing it onself. Without authority and responsibility w
develop the confidence so essential for the future.

"And so it was decided, despite the misgivings in all quarters, including NH

and Yarrow, who had grave doubts about everything, that we would have o
personnel from the UK, and that too only at the Foreman level. It is a matt
never had more than four such personnel on loan from Britain at any one t
years. We owe to these British personnel much gratitude; they worked with
own skilled personnel at all levels. Similarly, there cannot be enough appre
concerned who were willing to shoulder such responsibility.

"In this way, the large majority of the personnel engaged on the Frigate Pr
and in the various shops were very successfully trained `on the job' as the
TRAINING IN BRITAIN IN SHIP DESIGN.

Two officers, Lt Cdr (later Commodore) SC Bose (a marine engineer) and Lt (later Cap
sent to the British Navy's Director General Ship Design Office at Bath to study the desi

Commodore Bose recalls:-

"Naval Headquarters felt that it would not be proper to seek design assista
and then while the ship was under construction in India using indigenous s
restructuring of the administration of the Royal Navy and the introduction o
(unlike old times) reply to signals as before without charging for it quite he

"To establish our own design set up, two officers were sent to work in MOD
how of design and production of Leander class frigates. These two were Lt
myself a Dagger Marine Engineer. Our job was to learn as much as possible
about the various trials of the ship, how to conduct them, the acceptance s
given the know-how of construction, completion, trials of the ship and its o

"Whilst at Bath, I studied the reports of the Yarrow Admiralty Research and
finalisation of the design of the Leander class of ships and also the details o
they subsequently adopted to their ships. I studied the test specifications a
Leander class ships.

"Based on the Inspection and Trial Reports of these ships, I compiled a doc
construction, fitting out and installation of engineering machinery. This doc
valuable to MDL, to our Overseeing Team and the ships officers who were s
eliminating many of these faults.

"Incidentally, the number of installation defects we had in the first and sec
much less than in the Leanders built by British shipyards. We also compiled
post trials analysis of the results. I also attended the sea trials of two Lean
experience which we could never have got otherwise".

Captain Mohan Ram recalls:-

"I think somebody had made a security mistake in Bath. Because however
find out. I had some very unusual experiences. On arrival I was told "You a
Directorate; like a blinkered horse you should not look this way or that way
are not supposed to be, you will be up for the high jump". They were very
the same time. I got the message.

"But when one works in the Leander section of DG (Ships), one cannot but
drawing of the first Ikara conversion of the Leander was done by me becau
his golf. When he found that here is a Indian Naval Constructor who was p
and I did the complete layout of Ikara anti submarine missile. I also worke
deck and in so doing learnt how to design a helicopter deck. I pointed out t
deck very strong. Let's find out which are the landing points of the helicopt
weight. But the British made the whole flight deck of the same strength.
 "In due course I suggested that I should visit all the specialist sections whe
They agreed. I went to the underwater shock section. I was able to study d
would not have had the opportunity to do. I saw the damage stability calcu
warships. I learnt everything which was there connected with ships design
those two years, I was like a sponge taking in information.

"Take a simple thing like galley equipment or laundry equipment. One wou
when you start designing the laundry equipment in a ship, you must know
must know what a press is supposed to do. I went through the files. I went
how many meetings the British had held on laundry equipment. How many
What problems they had with suppliers. In the British system, there is one
ship's laundries. We didn't have a laundry section in Indian Navy. Similarly
the Indian Navy. I made detailed notes and worked out a statement of req
probably had more information on the nitty gritty of the Leander design tha

"I must admit that in one aspect I got brainwashed by the British - that cer
of them was air conditioning. In the Leander class frigate, air conditioning
and the entire Ops Room are dependant on efficient air conditioning. When
conditioning system. I put up a very learned note saying how important air
conditioning system had to be imported. I was sent for by the Secretary De
through my whole note and said, "You are a very clever fellow and a very s
know air conditioning inside out but I don't trust your judgment. If we can
condition ships also. I am not clearing air conditioning for import. More tha
charge for air conditioning the NILGIRI". When I came out, I was very angr
ship.

"After that, I had to sit down and design every single trunking. I learnt a lo
conditioning the NILGIRI. Of course there were a few places where a little m
and we had to put in additional drains, but the system as a whole came ou
there is a wisdom which goes beyond knowledge. Mr Sarin had the wisdom
people in the course of one's career who change one's complete mental thi
that we Indians can do things. That pride of being Indian, I learnt from Mr

CONTROLLER INDIAN FRIGATE PROJECT ORGANISATION(CONIFPO) IN UK

To implement the Frigate Project, a small Frigate Cell consisting of a British Naval Arch
others from MDL, was set up in 1966, initially in Vickers at Newcastle, although Yarrow
FSA 34 Leander in Glasgow. Details were fed from Glasgow to Newcastle, where the ba
forwarded to India in accordance with a predeterminded schedule.

MDL had its own representative, Commodore (later Rear Admiral) HK Kapadia designat
Organisation (CONIFPO,) at Newcastle. He had a team of technical and financial manag
and with Yarrow and negotiate purchase of equipment in Britain and to ensure its time

FRIGATE CELL/SECTION IN MDL

The set-up in MDL was also re-organised to cater to the Frigate Project. In 1966, a Frig
returned from UK after training. Commander(E) YP Batra, as Planning Manager, Comm
Frigate (Hull), Shri J Kharas, as Officer-in-Charge Frigate (Electrical), Shri Dom Meneze
(Engineering). This Cell was later re-designated 'Frigate Section' and was headed by C
Choudhury, Commander (L) (later Captain) S Prabhala, Commander (E) KM Acharya an

The Frigate Section, among other things, was responsible for producing from the basic
working drawings required for practical implementation in the shops and on the slipwa

DELAYS IN STARTING CONSTRUCTION

After a ships hull has been fully fabricated, each compartment in the ship is marked of
of equipment, as also the exact positioning of electrical cables, piping systems, ventila
of all these systems in each and every compartment and after making minor adjustme
instal various systems and equipment.

For the NILGIRI, MDL had to manufacture and install 20 miles of ferrous and non-ferro
systems. 180 miles of electrical cabling of different types and sizes had to be installed.
which were fitted with a forced air supply and exhaust systems, all compartments in th
conditioning. The length of air trunking involved was approximately two miles. Speciali
determinded sequence. This required detailed coordination. If one item or system was
out process was delayed.

By the end of 1966 it became abundantly clear that the information and drawings from
out far too late and without the detailed information that was essential to order the ma
various kinds in adequate time to ensure that they were available when required. This
construction schedule. MDL began falling back at the very outset and by mid 1967 was
of information and drawings from the Frigate Cell in Newcastle. All MDL's complaints an
end June 1967 the situation had become alarming.

Admiral Samson recalls:

"In regard to the delays in provision of data and information from the UK,
back. We fell well behind schedule. In June 1967, together with Chairman M
Harish Sarin, we went to England to have a discussion with the British Adm
about the lack of cooperation from Vickers. A meeting was set up in Vicker
acrimonious. There were very heated discussions and arguments. CONIFPO
and MDL's Shipbuilding Manager Mr Homi Sethna as well. The meeting was

"I had finally to inform Vickers that since we were not making any progress
Government and recommend the cancellation of this project. It was then th
a more cooperative manner.

"It was at this meeting that we decided to move the Frigate Cell from Vicke
where the British Leander was being built and where our personnel were se
 "The scepticism in the British was interesting. When I went to meet Sir Leo
Vickers at Glasgow, to discuss with him the progress in the supply of inform
really expected India's frigate project to ever be completely successfully. H
the Australians for building Battle Class destroyers, they had about 25 man
still trying to build these Battle Class destroyers successfully. If they could
could? He said that Vickers were collaborating with the Spanish and nothin
was going to happen in the Mazagon Docks either. I took strong exception
the first Leander on the 23 October 1968. He said he would come if it took
not consider that we would ever be able complete fitting it out.

"After July 1967 the situation began to improve vastly. As our teams in MD
knowledge, we were able to get things moving satisfactorily, though we we
Looking back, I sometimes feel that because of the tardy information being
and to our representives abroad, we had willy-nilly to put in that much mo
learnt the hard way but it was we who ultimately gained".

AVAILABILITY OF MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR CONSTRUCTING FRIGATES

One of the major bottlenecks in the Frigate Project was the availability of material, ma
standard and quality, at the right time and in the right quantities. In the end 1960's, In
developed to produce the specialised equipment and material required in shipbuilding,
rely largely on imports. Even in the case of imports, there was the problem of ordering
propulsion and auxiliary machinery as much as three years in advance and then have i

As for the steel plates, three types were required namely mild steel, 'B' quality steel an
1965 the Rourkela Division of Hindustan Steel had developed only mild steel. This was
65%. The rest had to be imported. Action was later initiated to manufacture 'B' quality
succeeded in 1967. The stringent tests carried out on the trial plates proved to be high
had also developed steel plates to specification BSS 1501-151. These plates were used
frigate was being built, 95% of the steel plate requirements were met indigenously.

Commodore Acharya recalls:

"I reported to Mazagon Docks in October 1966, to the Frigate Cell or Frigat
office and design office. It was also initiating procurement action, making o
mostly indigenous, because for whatever was needed to be imported, a req
do all the paper work and get the items procured.

"It was a tremendously exciting experience. We were lucky to have a team

tenure later on in Mazagon Docks, this was a period of total interaction and
who was Secretary Defence Production would come to MDL's board room a
who was then the Managing Director. He would know me by name and star
the ground. The team in the Ministry comprised Sarin and Podgy Nadkarni
Mazagon Docks itself, we had quite a few luminaries in addition to Admiral
Sethna was the ship building manager. Partly because it was a new ventur
 partly because there was this interaction, we were able to overcome quite

"The technology transfer from Yarrow and Vickers was very poor. In fact Ya
existent. Admittedly ours was not there either. We had expected some inpu
through. A classic example was that which occurred a few months before la
the under water openings, I could count about 45 underwater valves. The m
who were building the same Leander design ship and were a few months a
own requisitions, what they called copy orders, and that would indicate to u
us, which I would then either order locally or ask CONIFPO to procure. I fo
ordered only 30 odd under water valves. So we sent a telex to Yarrow aski
15 or so valves? They said "Oh yes, we did not order them because we had
consternation, a few months before NILGIRI's launch, that we had not even
required! That is just an example. But basically, as we went along, we foun
which even Yarrow could not teach us.

"We had also to willingly take on the task of indigenising as much as possib
DDIMS, split into DWP and DPI(N). They again took a lot of initiative. Some
it is a matter of record that even in the very first Leander we managed to h
equipments and systems. I remember a gentleman coming from Yarrow an
perception, was still in the bullock cart or cycle stage, would be able to ma
requirements. We did successfully manage to indigenise a lot of medium to
course a very desirable thing in the long run.

"As far as the Mazagon Docks own civilian work force was concerned, once
certain labour union problems and all that. But during my first period of six
way they put their shoulders to the wheel and proved that Mazagon Docks

CREATION OF DIRECTORATE OF LEANDER PROJECT IN NHQ

In 1968, Government sanctioned the new Directorate of Leander Project in NHQ to han
Vickers and with Yarrow, to approve drawings and generally manage all the technical a
end.

Commodore SC Bose recalls:-

"As the Deputy Director Engineering in the Directorate of Leander Project i

was monitoring the first Leander's progress in Mazagon Docks with the help
in Bombay. I was helping in resolving the difficulties being faced, giving the
industries to see the progress and the quality of the equipment being manu
and concessions referred to us by the Production Inspectors. We organised
chairmanship of CNS, and represented NHQ in various coordination meetin
Secretary (Public Sector) in the Department of Defence Production, who wa
Committee. I also looked into the problems we may face during the various
manning and commissioning the ship and the various problems that the sh
maintenance and subsequent operation, availability of fuel, lub oils, and ot
 view to advising timely provisioning action by the various organisations.

"To this end, it was felt that in addition to the various Indian teams engage
be other units like an elaborate Inspection Organisation covering the Indus
developed and produced, an on board Testing and Tuning Team, a Machine
commissioning crew could not be expected to have adequate knowledge of
the Whitby class of ships, the Trishul and Talwar, which were nearest to it.
Defence to send selected officers, sailors and civilians to UK to train in vari
of Naval machinery and equipment in British industries, in on board testing
systems and with a Machinery Trials Unit to conduct harbour and sea trials
officers and sailors of the commissioning crew who would be standing by th
and sea trials themselves without any third party, unlike as in UK. By so do
hand feel of the ship and take her out to sea subsequently on commissionin

"All this was achieved very successfully. I recall a remark by Sir Eric Issac,
invited to be present on board when the first Leander was undergoing sea
Power Trial, followed by the Full Astern Trials, with all machinery being ope
puff of black smoke from the funnel when the engines were moved from Fu
movement, giving a shock to the boilers. Sir Eric expressed surprise at our
Managing Director of Mazagon Docks, who was also on board the ship. He
nominated by the Royal Navy and Vickers/Yarrow and kept ready in UK to
commissioning of the ship on receiving an SOS message, would feel frustra
I thought this was a very significant remark by a traditionally conservative

"We, in the Leander Project, kept in view the operational aspects of the shi
newly introduced stores consequent on the use of indigenous substitutes. W
spares and fittings. Till that time, all steam ships carried turbine lifting gea
of heavy parts which cannot be used when a ship is at sea. With present da
be sent to a ship in a matter of three days, along with Dockyard specialists
the shipboard list and had only four sets, one each for the two Dockyards,
BHEL Bhopal where turbines were made. The PSOs appreciated our propos

Captain Mohan Ram recalls:-

"The Directorate of Leander Project in 1969/1970 was very exciting. I had

there were Commanders Baxi and Ganesh, on the engineering side there w
composite layouts of compartments like the galley, the electronic warfare o
etc. We did the complete air conditioning of the NILGIRI.

"I also did the collapsible hangar, which the Royal Navy did not have. We n
accordion, so that when the helicopter was landing, the hangar would be cl
the hangar would be open. Nobody had done this in a ship of NILGIRI's siz
Aluminum Fabricating Company of Canada to do the collapsible hangar in N

"It was a very interesting time because we were learning on the job. And s
to Mazagon Docks for an inspection of the helicopter landing deck. The Alo
wheel is in the middle. The helicopter guide platforms were welded as per t
Westland Wasp, which was a four wheel helicopter. When I went and asked
 earlier"? I got no reply. To rectify that mistake, we had to change the whol
foolish things. But we were learning all the time.

"In those four of five years, Mazagon Docks and the Navy learnt so much.
Frigate Project. For the first time we were getting into the nitty gritty of bu
when the Navy put the big Seaking helicopter in TARAGIRI with a bigger ex
phenomenal, something to be proud of".

THE FIRST FRIGATE - INS NILGIRI

INS NILGIRI's keel was formally laid on 15 October 1966. Inspite of all the problems, M
launch the NILGIRI on 23 October 1968-barely two months after the Kasara Basin was

Then MDL encountered a problem of another kind - Labour.

Admiral Samson recalls:-

"The Management had been having discussions with the Trade Union Comm
next three years. The Union made major demands and the Management to
hard bargaining and progress was being made.

"Then suddenly, just 15 days before NILGIRI's launching, the Union gave a
on the grounds that the Management was being totally non-cooperative in
October all workmen would proceed on strike.

"The launching of a major vessel is a very delicate affair, the preparation fo

step by step, but the 24 hours before the actual moment of launching are t
had been trained individually and collectively for their specific tasks on the
the exact moment and correctly; any mistake could spell disaster. The strik
heads, knowing full well that the launch might have to be cancelled withou
not be replaced overnight.

"I then asked the MDL Managers whether they could launch the vessel with
unhappy to take such a major risk. Mr. Homi Sethna, Commander Thukral
they would have a try, after I told them that I would bring in as many men
trained during the two weeks remaining prior to the launching.

"I then recalled the Union Committee and informed them that I would give
their decision. They stated that they were not prepared to withdraw their n
the day when the ship was being launched, not one single worker from Maz
Yard to create any problems. This launching involved the defence of the co
permitted to compromise it. I added that any agreements/concessions mad
automatically cancelled.

"A short while later I was asked to rejoin them, when they informed me th
 decided to withdraw their strike notice. It had been a calculated risk but it
off very successfully".

On 23 October 1968 Mrs Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, applied
launched the NILGIRI.

FITTING OUT AND TRIALS

After a ship reaches an advanced stage of fitting-out, the equipment is tried and tested
the ship is thoroughly tested to the satisfaction of the Navy's Warship Overseeing Team
undertaken.

After that the ship is put to sea for 'Builder's Sea Trials', also known as 'Contractor's Se
specific items of machinery are `opened up' for inspection, defects put right and again
everything is satisfactory, after which the machinery is finally `boxed up'.

The Final Acceptance Trials extend over a nine month period. Tests are designed to wit
than what the ship would normally experience at sea. After successful Acceptance Trial

Admiral Samson recalls:-

"The Navy was as pleasantly surprised as we were at the timely completion

It resulted in great relief and joy all round. An interesting feature was that
standing by the ship, operated the vessel during the CSTs but being respon
ship remained with Mazagon Dock till 2 June, 1972".

The time taken from keel laying to launching of the first frigate came to two years, but
trials, the sea trials and up to the commissioning, the period extended to another 3 ye
fitting out is always time consuming. Nevertheless, a total 5 1/2 years from keel-lying
problems.

COMMISSIONING

INS NILGIRI was commissioned on 3 June 1972 by Mrs Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minist
other Navies at the time. NILGIRI was the 36th Leander. Apart from the British Navy, t
Navies also had Leander design frigates.

CHANGES IN SENSORS AND WEAPONS TO IMPROVE CAPABILITY

In the first instance, the Government had ordered only one frigate to be constructed. T
second and third frigates because India was going through a foreign exchange crisis. T
not be stretched to include the foreign exchange requirements beyond the first frigate.
the Government had to resort to annual plans from 1966 to 1969. Eventually in early 1
build two more frigates. This was six months later than the original plan for commence
eventually began in May 1968.

Receiving orders piece-meal was one of the handicaps that MDL had to accept. The adv
on its suppliers had to be sacrificed. The Dutch who built the Leanders in their yards at
ships of the series almost simultaneously, all of which were commissioned between Ma

Naval Headquarters took advantage of the delay in NILGIRI to improve the sensors and

There were several schools of thought at that time about the desirability of changing e
avoiding changes, ships could be delivered quicker and cheaper. NHQ felt that if we co
obsolescent sensors, weapons and equipment, they would not meet the staff requirem
indigenisation, it was not cost effective to indigenise obsolescent technology.

Commodore Acharya recalls:-

"We in MDL fought quite a battle with Naval Headquarters, requesting them
Leanders at a time. But they were already under pressure, perhaps from th
fire control systems. The second frigate in fact was already being contempl
equipment. This was not an easy task of integration. We were still learning
mistakes and filling in gaps in information. Hopefully we would have learnt
working for the second frigate and really become efficient in the modern w
finished the third frigate. That was a better way of going about it rather tha
fire power or capability.

"I remember mentioning this to then Chief of Material, Admiral Kulkarni, "I
ships of the same identical design? This would not only mean that we could
efficiently, but also be more cost effective for operating and maintaining th
and operating experience". But NHQ's imperatives in those days were diffe
as a ship builder, we would have preferred if not six, at least three of them
that in case the balloon goes up, is it not better for the Navy to be able to
no matter how highly sophisticated and full of fire power it might be, becau
were by no means obsolete. I remember Admiral Nanda saying "What will
why are we building these obsolete Leanders?"

Captain Prabhala recalls:-

The British fire control systems in NILGIRI were MRS 3 for the 4.5 inch gun
guns. The search and navigation radars were 993 and 978. Vickers were w
and MRS 3. Around that time, we found that the company SIGNAAL in Holl
equipment and the radars for the Dutch Navy's Leanders, had superior equ
already using digital electronics as opposed to the analogue electronics of t
that if we go in for the indigenous manufacture of the analogue MRS 3 and
next several years. Why should we make outdated analogue systems when
vogue? If we were going to make anything indigenously, we should start w
date than the obsolescent analogue British systems then available.

"Then we found that if we were to fit the Signaal equipment, the ship woul
 in the structure, related only to these equipments and not to a wholesale c
somebody to supply us the modified shipbuilding drawings to enable us to
in a broad beam Leander and for that we tied up with NEVESBU, the Dutch
control and radar equipment were then licensed for manufacture to Bharat
company at that time which had some experience of manufacturing radars
Services".

INTERACTION WITH THE NETHERLAND WARSHIP DESIGN BUREAU (NEVESBU

Two officers were sent to NEVESBU. Commander (L) (later Rear Admiral) JJ Baxi was o

"We were there for 18 months. Cdr (later Rear Admiral) Ranjit Whig of the Const
important thing we learnt was that once the Dutch gave us a commitment on tra
any single little bit of information from us. Secondly, they taught us new method
drawing, the preliminary planning data and final planning data, what is called spa
working drawings. What was most emphasised was that when a ship is built in H
computerised so that the shipyard is given all the ordering material from the Des
because we started with the British tradition of the DG Ships at Bath, we have ne
case, only the preliminary and the concept design are being done in Naval Headq
prepared by the shipyard. Not only does this lead to lack of standardisation but i
expenditure, which could be avoided if we really had a component system of dra

"What the Dutch, the Japanese and the Americans are doing is that after the pre
work on the detailed drawings, installation working drawings and the special draw
lining, detail, fasteners, doors everything, is actually set up in that drawing phas
There is such a perfect system of dovetailing that even three parts of a ship built
connected together in a single shipyard and you will be able to have a ship in on
what we learn, we never do. I regret to say that it is a failure on our part. We ha
Design Organisation. This is the most important thing which we have to mention

Commodore Kulin Lohana (later Director General of Naval Design) recalls:-

"The Navy sent its team to the Netherlands Design Bureau, Nevesbu, to be involv
back and helped Mazagon Docks to modify the workshop drawings. In fact a larg
the Navy's Design Cell with the help of our people. I think that reduced the fear o
task of change over that much easier. Also, this exercise was the first step in bui
take the drawings received from the UK and implement them, but to generate ne
drawings, based on a conceptual detailed design given by somebody else. We sa
of the Project 16, GODAVARI class frigates, where the NHQ's Directorate Genera
design and the MDL translated them into working drawings, consistent with the s

Eventually, HIMGIRI and the subsequent Leanders were fitted with the following Signa

- The VM 45 fire control system for the 4.5" gun.

 - Two VM 44 fire control systems for two sided Seacat anti aircraft guided missile

- Long range Air Warning Radar LW 04, Surface Warning Radar DA 05 and Navig

- DS 22 Display Systems in the Operations Room. This system was still under de
was the first customer for it.

Similarly the British Sonar 184 was replaced by the later Sonar 184 M.

THE SECOND FRIGATE - INS HIMGIRI

HIMGIRI's keel was laid on 4 November 1968. She was launched on 6 May 1970. MDL
keel laying and launch from 25 months to 18 months. The fitting-out however was con
major items, both from abroad and India.

The machinery installation was completed in December 1973, Basin Trials were succes
Contractor's Sea Trials commenced on 6 April 1974. At the preliminary full power trials
was found to be rising above acceptable limits. The gear box was the first to have been
After detailed examination, Naval Headquarters, in consultation with Swiss designers, d
alignment of the turbines. The Repeat Contractor's Sea Trials in September 1974 were
23 November 1974.

On the plus side, HIMGIRI got better radars, sonars, AIO and fire control equipment an
Design changes were also made in the communication systems and the layout of mess
conditions.

Captain Prabhala recalls:-

"As to whether this bold decision that was taken was right, now with hindsight on
being a shipbuilder in those days, was of the strong view that the primary task s
quick and at the lowest cost. And I was advocating the view that if the equipmen
changes would be involved, some proving of the new systems would be involved
programme. It would also add to the maintenance problems. Therefore, at least
equipment package before we think of changing the equipment.

"If the indigenisation programme and the improvements which were taking place
Navy, were to be incorporated in the ship building programme, it was a balance o
I think with hindsight, we can now say that it was a right decision. It enabled us
piece of equipment and put another piece of equipment in its place, what are all
the hull side, from the ship side that we had to take care of. Therefore certain ca
departments, with the result that later on, when we wanted to replace the 4.5 in
electronic warfare equipment and put in some Italian equipment, we were able to

"In other words, if we had not made the changes, we could certainly have built t
learning curve in different aspects of ship design and ship construction then wou
 think the advantage lay, as I said with hindsight, in the course we had taken

THE THIRD FRIGATE - INS UDAYGIRI

Since orders for the second and third frigates had been received together, MDL seized
first frigate. The fabrication work on the third frigate, scheduled to commence in Janua
receipt of steel from Hindustan Steel Ltd.

In 1969-70 there had been an acute shortage of steel. MDL had been able to carry on
earlier orders for steel had materialised. By 1970-71 however, the fall in steel producti
interval between keel laying and launching increased to 25 months. The main machine
the ship's launching in October 1972, was actually received in May 1974, thereby furth
February 1976.

THE FOURTH FRIGATE - INS DUNAGIRI

The fourth Leander was launched on 9 March 1974. She was on the slipway for only 14
the second and third frigates respectively. Fitting out was affected by delays in receipt
equipment. The main engines and gear boxes were received in May 1975. Basin trials w
trials completed satisfactorily in November/December, 1976. The final inspection of hu
systems was completed in early 1977. DUNAGIRI commissioned on 5 May 1977.

The time between keel laying and launching had been reduced to 14 months. The time
reduced to 38 months - the shortest period yet achieved. Nevertheless, the total of 58
long by world standards. On the other hand, the range of equipment being indigenousl
industry was impressive: main boilers, main turbines, main gearing, main circulators, t
alternators, stern tube bushes, heat exchangers, radar and fire control equipment, dat
refrigeration machinery, broadcast equipment, telephone and teleprinter equipment, m
system valves, fire detection sensors and a host of other minor equipment. By the time
considerable confidence had built up at all levels.

IMPROVEMENTS OF ANTI SUBMARINE

CAPABILITY IN THE FIFTH AND SIXTH LEANDERS

In 1972 and 1973, as operating experience was gained with the NILGIRI and the Seak
helicopters, and in view of the continuing acquisition by Pakistan of modern submarine
Leanders would require greater anti submarine capability.

Naval Headquarters initiated studies in early 1973 to improve the anti submarine capa
changes crystallised in mid 1973. The major changes envisaged embarking the heavy S
submarine sonars and weapons.

Seaking Helicopter

In 1966, the Canadian Navy had pioneered the operation of a Seaking helicopter from
a Bear Trap Haul-down and Traversing system for moving the heavy helicopter on the
and strengthening the flight deck to bear the weight of a heavy helicopter. All these ch
stability and seakeeping qualities.

To meet the conflicting requirement of a large hangar and a long clear flight deck, the
flight deck space aft could only be made available by removing the anti submarine Mor

Anti Submarine Sonars and Weapons.

The changes envisaged in the ships sonars and anti submarine weapons were:-

(a) The British Mortar MK 10 anti submarine weapon fitted aft would be replaced
Launcher with its integral magazine and hoist, all fitted forward in the bows.

(b) Two sided twin Torpedo Tube Launchers would be fitted to fire the latest Itali
as successors to the obsolescent British Mk 44 torpedoes.

(c) British Graseby's 184 SS (solid state) search sonar would be fitted in lieu of t
preceding three Leanders.

(d) French Thomson-CSF solid state search and attack sonar Diodon would be fit
Sonar 170 M in the first four Leanders.

(e) British Graseby's Sonar GI 738 Under Water Telephone would be fitted in lieu

(f) India's Electronic Commission would produce the ASW fire control computer t
and the deck launched A 244 torpedoes.

(g) The latest available Italian electronic warfare equipment would be fitted.

All the above design modifications and changes were discussed with individual equipme
Italy in 1974. By 1975, all the changes had been finalised.

Changes in Design

Rear Admiral Baxi recalls:

"When I came back to NHQ in 1973, NHQ had decided that the design of the fifth
DLP. As DDLP, I realised that we really did not have much to do, because if the d
going to be DLP's role? In those days, DGND had come up with a design for a ne
 "In the meanwhile, I went into the technical feasibility of DGND's design to see w
a Seaking could operate from a Leander. I distinctly remember we consulted som
the DGND, who had earlier given an opinion that this was not feasible, to discuss
a limited presumption that the Mortar Mark 10 was required and that it could nev
idea that if the mortar well was covered up, the overhead space would be just en
The anti submarine mortar could be replaced by another type of forward throwin
Then I worked day and night so that no one else would come to know what we w
Choudhary who was in the Directorate of Leander Project and myself, we did all t
flight deck, showing the new helicopter and showing the new weapon package w
creative time of my life as a designer.

"We actually came up with a new design concept. We gave a presentation to the
design. Dr Roy Choudhary was the SA to RM and he also accepted that our desig
by then become the DGND, was gracious enough to accept that operating a Seak
Finally the design was accepted. That is how we in DLP came back into the desig
healthy competition between DGND and DLP. Cdr (later Captain) Mohan Ram and
the two best young naval constructors which the Navy had, joined DGND. They s
design a frigate with one Seaking helicopter, why can't we come up with a larger
helicopters?

"By that time the Directorate of Combat Policy and Tactics had suggested that So
next design. Not only were they cheaper and more cost effective but it would ena
distinctly remember that I was opposed to that idea, thinking that we will not be
ultimately, history and posterity had proved that this was the right decision and
succeed in designing a hybrid ship, the GODAVARI of Project 16, having a mix of
systems".

THE FIFTH FRIGATE - INS TARAGIRI

These design changes delayed the commencement of construction, which should have
the fourth frigate. Production could commence only in April 1975. The keel was laid six
25 October 1976. Thereafter there was a major setback in fitting-out because of a dela
This created its own chain of delays. Contractor's Sea Trials commenced in April 1979.
observed in the main turbines. After the defects were rectified, repeat sea trials were s
and TARAGIRI was commissioned on 16 May 1980. Whilst the time from keel laying to
period so far, the time taken from launching to commissioning was 43 months, much m
predecessors.

THE SIXTH FRIGATE - INS VINDHYAGIRI

VINDHYAGIRI was identical with TARAGIRI. Construction commenced on 5 July 1976. H

she was launched on 12 November 1977 after a period of 12 months, the same time a
commissioned on 8 July 1981, having taken 44 months from launch to delivery.
THE INDIGENISATION OF LEANDER CLASS FRIGATES

In 1955, the Directorate of Stores Production (Navy) had been set up under Naval Hea
transferred to the Ministry of Defence under the Controller General of Defence Producti
Inspection. Its designation was changed to Directorate of Development and Inspection
been able to:-

(a) Develop new items (including modifications to commercially available items).

(b) Establish and purchase indigenous items thereby saving foreign exchange.

The major handicaps that had been encountered were:-

(a) The reluctance of the private sector to manufacture for the Navy the small qu
market in the country.

(b) The failure of the trade to keep up the supply of stores according to agreed s
first one or two supplies were satisfactory, subsequent supplies were of inferior q
specifications.

(c) The procedure by which DGS&D had perforce to obtain supplies from the mos
expense of quality.

By the time the Leander Project got under way in the mid 1960's, the field work of the
for the indigenisation of Leander equipment.

Commodore (E) SC Bose recalls:-

"Systematic indigenisation of naval stores and material started in 1956 wh

(later Rear Admiral) Daya Shanker who was the Controller General Defence
Naval Headquarters started functioning with Capt (later Rear Admiral) CL B
(later Commodore) BC Chatterji, as Deputy Director and other Staff Officer
Calcutta was manned by then Lt (later Commodore) KC Chatterji. The one
tasks. One was to locate sources for the indigenisation of stores items. The
specifications and select the item susceptible for indigenisation. So this wa
Later on, the Inspection Organisation under Director General of Inspection
project which was our basic requirement. There were two branches. The Di
after the engineering items. The Directorate of Production and Inspection,
Naval Store items, Electrical and Electronic items and machinery spares".

As part of the Leander Frigate Project, a Study Group on Indigenisation was set up in D
MDL for locating capacity for indigenous manufacture. In 1966, Commander (later Adm
on Special Duty in the Department of Defence Production.

Admiral Nadkarni recalls :-

"The agreement was for:-

(a) The transfer of the Leander design by the MOD UK (because they were

(b) All the Lead Yard services and other technical help by VICKERS and YAR

(c) Overseeing by the British Ministry of Defence (Navy).

"The agreement stipulated that at least for the first ship, we were obliged t
including the 4.5" gun turret, the boilers, the main turbines and certain oth
at least for the first ship and, if we require, we could buy these for the seco
only for the first ship. This was the general agreement. All this of course ha
1966.

"After I joined, for the next two and half years I was intimately connected
the entire management of Mazagon Docks and the Garden Reach Worksho
revival of the Goa Shipyard which took place in 1967.

"In India we had two very important offices. Along with building warships i
manufacturing a large amount of equipment which went into the Leander.
project, that it should be indigenised. For this we had the office of Commod
(DWP) under the Ministry of Defence, whose main objective was to try and
equipment and be the conduit or the prime mover for bringing about collab
manufacturer and the Indian manufacturer.

"That period, 1966 to 1968, under the very able and dynamic leadership of
periods as far as indigenisation of Leander equipment in India was concern
large number of agreements which have benefited the Indian Navy subseq

"For example an agreement for the manufacture of boilers was brought abo
the Naval Dockyard Bombay. To this date, the Naval Dockyard manufactur

"An agreement for the manufacture of main turbines was brought about be
Mr Sarin incidentally was extremely dynamic and pragmatic about all these
to collaborate or refused to come to India, he had no hesitation in going to

"For example the main switch boards of the Leanders in UK were manufact
collaborate or come to India. There was another manufacturer called Whip
switch boards for other ships of the Royal Navy. We invited them and they
agreement was brought about between Whip and Bourne and AEI of India
here since then.

"Similarly for air conditioning we went to Carrier Air Conditioning who brou
and Voltas.

"The main gearing for example was David Brown's. David Brown refused to
went in search of somebody else. We found a very famous company MAAG
only to come to India and collaborate, but also in designing a totally differe
day we have only NILGIRI with the David Brown main gearing. The frigates
design main gearing for the main turbines.
 "The final culmination of this process was the landmark agreement betwee
Electricals of Bangalore for manufacturing a whole range of radar equipmen
very major step forward and I think we have benefited a great deal from th
have been manufactured by BEL. In this way, it was really a most producti
Leander equipment was concerned.

"I am sorry to say that the same dynamism and the same innovation some
subsequent progressive indigenisation, to my mind, has not been as impre
the Leander project.

"In Naval Headquarters, we set up a cell initially called DDLP. He was a par
He was called Deputy Director (Leander Project). Subsequent to that, a com
the Directorate of Leander Project. In due course that became Directorate
headed by only a Commander. Subsequently a full fledged Director looked
Leander Project.

"The Naval Headquarters part basically consisted of approving various indig

indigenisation process. Of course, the whole thing was like a team. Naval H
the team.

"Another organisation which was setup was the Warship Overseeing Team.
overseers making sure that it was being built to the correct specification an
being built.

"The Government also had formed a Steering Committee for the Indigenisa
the Naval Staff as the Chairman, with representatives from the Departmen
and MDL. Various manufacturers were invited to come and explain and sug
They were encouraged to freely interact in the common endeavor to indige
possible".

Admiral Samson recalls:-

The specifications, the very fine tolerances, the performance ratios and the
proof, were parameters which Indian Industry, by and large, were totally u
Thanks to the inspiration of Mr Krishna Menon, indigenisation was progress
that unless India was self-sufficient in major items of defence equipment, w
further if we were dependent on the West or on anyone else, we would be
'crunch' came. And indeed this was proved time and again, in the conflicts
the UK and the USA imposed embargos.

"Today looking back, it is quite extraordinary the degree to which indigenis

now accepting, without demur, the Main Gearing being manufactured by W
Switzerland. And yet in 1966, when this was first suggested, there was hor
piece of equipment like the main gearing being manufactured, way out in t
outside Poona, in what was originally a sugar factory in a little village, was
succeed.
 "Another item which was the subject of much controversy was the air cond
primarily for the electronic equipment and computers. Voltas offered to do
should install air conditioning manufactured locally. There was much skept
succeeded, even though we had teething problems.

"Fibreglass for lining the ship internally came from Fibreglass Pilkington in
that we got the right kind of fibreglass suitable for Indian sea-air condition

"60 Cycle Generators came from Jyoti in Ahmedabad, the turbines from BH
and later the fire control and surveillance radars from BEL in Bangalore.

"There were enormous problem, aggravated to some extent by doubts and

What is important is that it created the kind of confidence and experience,
Industry who, having succeeded in producing equipment of such high spec
go in for higher technology.

Captain Prabhala recalls:-

So far as the indigenisation programme is concerned, it came about even w

training. In the last six months of our training, it was realised that we woul
equipment procurement, for liaison with the Admiralty for the supply of dra
supply of working drawings and all that. Therefore an office called CONIFPO
established, with Cmde Kapadia as the head of the CONIFPO. We were alre
manufacturers, whether it was David Brown for the gearing, or Yarrows for
turbines, or Vickers for the MRS3 fire control system and so on, with the id
transfer of technology for the indigenous manufacture of the equipment, w
Mazagon Docks.

"In these technology transfers for the equipment, the role of the Admiralty
they would express no objection to it, meaning that if we wanted to make
the design of David Brown, David Brown naturally would not be able to tran
gave the OK to it. So to that extent, we got the no objection certificate from
inform all the major manufacturers that we were interested in local manufa
companies.

"The success of the indigenisation effort in building the Leanders and the m
the organisation of DWP initially and the organisation of the DPI Navy later
ahead more boldly with procurement of equipment from indigenous resour
equipment, ICS 3, for the Leanders was imported from the UK but we were
whether it was the UHF transreceiver or the CCS equipment and the Versat
other two services did not indigenise. The naval constructors also rose to th
designs of the Leanders like the TARAGIRI and the Project 16, GODAVARI c

"This commitment to indigenisation, the willingness to experiment and the

way of delays, by way of equipment still undergoing trials, even though the
with the Navy. Of all the three services, the Navy had this risk taking abilit
mechanisms to initiate major indigenous programs, and it had the ability to
manufacturers to also rise to the occasion. It was a tremendous experience
 "There was only one occasion when, to my mind, the Navy erred. That was
more indigenisation and feeling that Bharat Electronics was not responding
came forward and said that they could develop the Computer Aided Action
without realising that an equipment or a system for shipboard use is not so
office or a laboratory, placed too much faith in that Department. It took so
that.

Commodore Acharya recalls:-

When I was in Mazagon Dock and Capt Paradkar was DWP, the main proble
NHQ to accept any change in design i.e. of a readily available Indian equip
fitted in British Leanders. This reluctance stemmed from the fact that the N
It had not really taken root at that time. There was a fear that the differen
consequences in performance. A typical example was that of 50 or 60 cycle
were not sure what would happen if we simply bought a 50 cycle commerc
made it run on 60 cycles AC. To this day I do not know what the answer is
fast. Some people said it will run too slow. Some people said it will over-he
that point in time, the DGND did not exist. To some extent, one could unde
boldly accept a commercial design or the available design.

"By the time I was appointed DWP, the Directorate had handed over the el
kept for itself the engineering and hull items. I knew how hard Commodore
been his baby. During his time, he had one or two excellent deputies, amo
we were doing in Mazagon Docks, had the enthusiasm and willingness to ta
major projects for indigenisation starting off mainly with the major items ra
auxiliary turbines, air conditioning machinery to underwater valves. All the
tenure as DWP, I had no occasion to improve upon these because by that t
towards indigenisation of radars and weapon systems.

"As regards the design changes in the equipment fit for the later Leanders,
propulsion at that time, so whatever was already set in motion had just to
attention to the inspection at manufacturer's works rather than initiating an

"In my own tenure as DWP, whilst nothing new was initiated by me, there
between NHQ and DWP. NHQ would gladly approve an indigenous design p
could confirm and prove to NHQ that the indigenous design was totally cap
DWP's disposal and with enough time available for installing it, trying it out
explosion or whatever, there was no other way of really satisfying the Navy
forever pleading to have the items cleared by the due date. We found that
Docks were too inflated. This tussle continued for a long time. I remember
"Only DWP seems to be interested in indigenising. Neither Naval Headquar
would rather have a free hand to import everything". In retrospect, this wa
side had its own limitations".

Captain Lohana recalls:-

"There was an agreement with the MOD Navy UK for supplying drawings an
 details of the pattern number stores. These became the basis for DWP and
to motivate them to develop these products and guide them in the develop
large number of these were either evolved to replace the existing ones or i

"Here, I would draw a distinction between indigenisation and indigenous su

identical product is developed to replace the existing imported item, where
piece of equipment performs the same function to the same or higher perfo
equipment without being identical in appearance to the earlier one.

"These two directorates, DWP and DPI(N), who had slowly set up their outf
develop items as well as to inspect them and test them before acceptance,
umbrella of Mr MM Sen the then Secretary Defence Production. Unfortunate
years these became kind of routine jobs and the basic motivation was lost.

Commodore S.C. Bose recalls:-

We had the Department of Defence Production, Ministry of Defence, workin

Mazagon Docks Ltd towards indigenisation. In retrospect, I would say this w
indigenisation effort the Navy ever had. And taking the totality into accoun
that time.

"While the main engines of the first ship were imported, the second ship's
Bhopal, using the same English Electric drawings made in FPS System by c
System, which had been adopted in India and in which Bhopal's machines
version of Allen's steam auxiliaries with Jyoti of Baroda and BHEL Bhopal. A
financed by the Navy, to give these machine a test run under steam before
board.

"A special weldable steel, known as Ship Building Quality Steel or Lloyd's g
were not manufactured in India till then. We had the blessings of the Minis
Rourkela Steel Plant and they did a fairly successful job, though it did not m
was considered acceptable under deviation and used in constructing the se
was found that imported steel was of quicker delivery and cheaper, and wa
source of manufacture of shipbuilding quality steel, we could always revert

"The boilers of the first Leander were erected in the Naval Dockyard Bomba
boilers, with drums, tubes, mountings etc from Babcock and Wilcox of Ren
bulky, these boilers were put on trailers in the Naval Dockyard Bombay and
board.

"The development of the main shafting was attempted at the Heavy Engine
was experiencing serious administrative problems. As such the project did
specifications in 50% of the items. They could have had 100% success had
cropping the ends of the forgings before rolling the shafts. In order to achie
for the Navy and for Power Houses, HEC initiated action for procurement a
and a 6000 ton press. Unfortunately on installation these valuable plants w
rotor forgings were being imported by BHEL and other turbine manufacture
 "The main gear cases, a very critical piece of machinery, were also indigen
David Brown gearing but for the second Leander we went in for ones to be
under collaboration with MAAG Gearwheel Co of Zurich. (Note: Since 1966,
and was working satisfactorily in Canadian Navy frigates which were simila
many problems in conversion of CGS into FPS systems, as the terminals ha
turbines and shafting while the internals imported from MAAG were in CGS
Leander Project(DLP), Directorate of Marine Engineering(DME) and the Dire
Ministry of Defence Production burnt midnight candles in Walchand Nagar i
manufacturing tolerances, meeting both FPS and CGS system of the termin

"We had set up a Test Rig using a redundant cruising turbine of a Khukri cl
steam and give both the gear wheels overspeed and overload runs of the k
maximum exploitation. We believe that such trials were done only in Canad
trials for 72 hours. The trials runs went on as scheduled except for one inci
immediately knew what it was due to. The representative of MAAG Gearwh
trials. We all agreed with the corrective actions and continued with the tria
taken anywhere, to introduce into service a gear case which was never trie
propulsion system with a changed component gave no problem of noise or

"We developed all the gun-metal valves and fittings indigenously. Similar in
found for electrical fittings, items of domestic and hotel services nature etc

REMINISCENCES OF THE LEANDER FRIGATE PROJECT

Captain Prabhala, later Chairman and Managing Director of Bharat Electronics Ltd, reca

"As to overall impressions and overall conclusions from my six and half years wit
provided by Mr HC Sarin, Secretary Defence Production, was of immense value. T
Defence Production, Mr Sarin, Secretary, Mr MM Sen as the Joint Secretary, Mr V
absolutely wonderful. At the start I was only a Lt Cdr, then I became a Command
people, the quick decisions that were taken and the freedom that one had in man
obtain.

"On the question of indigenisation, the amount of freedom I had was unpreceden
shoot off letters to the prospective Indian companies which were operating in sim
have this requirement, we have this British company which is willing to transfer t
come out with a proposal, whether it was the switch boards, whether it was the m
control and the radar. It was an exhilerating period because there was complete
no hurdles were thrown in your way.

"I would also like to mention the generosity of the Admiralty. In the UK, lots of s
by small companies. These companies are so small that they do not have the abi
transfer. In any case, the items are simple and they do not require any elaborate
their personnel coming to India to help initiating manufacture. So we were able t
Admiralty Pattern items, you would have a set of drawings as the AHSP authority
 that we in turn could give these drawings to our manufacturers and get them ma
the construction in Mazagon Docks, a combined delegation of Admiralty and ship
the point which we strongly made. The Admiralty agreed that this was important

"Again I have to say that Mr Sarin played a very important role in this because h
the CONIFPOs help, there were a series of meetings in UK and Mr Sarin made the
means that there will be less that Mazagon Docks will buy from the UK, but pleas
Gyro Compass and similar critical equipment, we have no other option except to
indigenise and therefore afford more ships, you will have more business for the b
to come to you. Therefore in the long run, you will not be a loser". He was able t
result we got a lot of help from the Admiralty, they backed us when we had diffe

Rear Admiral Baxi, also later Chairman and Managing Director of Bharat Electronics Ltd

There were several organic elements which contributed to the success of the Frig

(a) First and foremost, amongst the three services, the Indian Navy has sh
sufficient and self reliant. And this was by a genre of people over generatio

(b) Secondly Naval Headquarters did not renounce its technical responsibil
Warship Projects (DWP) and a DPI (Navy). These two organisations, althou
with the task of developing indigenous manufacturers. The officers who we
Production were seagoing naval officers, who were on deputation. They we
permanent cadre of DGI.

(c) Thirdly, the Directorate of Leander Project (DLP) was created within Na
product management. The design aspects, the coordination with the Lead Y
complete technical activity regarding ship building was handled in-house w

(d) Fourthly, the Directorate General of Naval Design (DGND) was created
Naval Design was being handled by a Deputy Director Naval Design in char
of Naval Construction. By creating DGND, we got an agency, manned by of
modernisation and indigenisation, under the direct control of Naval Headqu
complete design and project management skills in-house, within the Navy.

(e) Fifthly because the civilian Corps of Naval Constructor officers all went
Kingdom, except for three civilians Mr Parmanandan, Mr Dhumal and Mr Do
Navy started inducting naval constructors in uniform. So the uniformed con
capable of handling all aspects of naval architecture, ship design and ship c

"Similarly on the Mazagon Docks side, the Navy sent some of their best officers a
best naval technical officers were placed at the disposal of Mazagon Docks to be

"This total involvement of Naval Headquarters in ship design, ship construction, d

whereby NHQ was itself the vendor and was also the customer, led to a pragmat
with compromises in the design process.

"Unfortunately, in the Army and the Air Force, exactly the reverse happened. Bec
 most of the time they treated these two organisations as if they were the vendor
Headquarters were the customers. Because they themselves did not have any de
tended to treat the designer or Indian industry at that stage at par with their cor
that mindset, if I get an MIG 21 from the world market, I want a MIG 21 from HA
feasible. And because there was no involvement on the part of the service, they

"Whereas in our case, first of all, progressive indigenisation was done. The goal a
made totally from sub systems imported from UK. The second ship had partial in
systems were available within the country or could be developed were utilised. T
on.

"One of the most important things which strengthened the confidence of Naval H
frigate to the second frigate. This was handled with a great degree of success by
Officer in Charge of the Indian Naval Design Team at NEVESBU, the shipyard wh
NHQ end, the Directorate of Leander Project (DLP) was handling this. Somehow a
right partner in NEVESBU, we got the right amount of engineering support, the r
documentation and the right Indian naval constructors, electrical officers and eng
technology within the service. That was the most important thing which created

"Then naturally the next corollary was that we re-designed the fifth Leander, the
Then we went on to the seventh frigate, the GODAVARI which again was designe
helicopters. The Director Combat Policy and Tactics (DCPT), was the one who act
why can't we have two Seaking helicopters on board? Right from top level decisio
Lieutenant in the naval architecture branch, everybody learnt to take technologic
integral, decision making process built up within the confines of NHQ.

"This is the one and only reason why, other than the Atomic Energy Commission
Headquarters is the only service in this country which had truly succeeded in ind
Space and Atomic Energy, it is exactly the same story as Naval Headquarters. Sp
back upon. They were the designers, they were the ones who formulated the con
designs, they ultimately had to see that their rocket fired and so a large amount
developing systems, sub systems, concepts in design. These are the three servic
true indigenisation i.e. Naval Headquarters, ISRO, and Department of Atomic Ene
matter.

"I have always maintained that nothing succeeds like success. The indigenisation
machinery, the auxiliaries, the switchboards, the cables, the fire control systems
by Bharat Electronics under license from SIGNAAL, all gave NHQ a lot of confiden
with a concept and the feeling that we can do it, led to the design of the TARAGI
and then, of Project 25, Project 25 Alpha and Project 16 Alpha, Project 15 and th
ingredients of why NHQ succeeded, which NHQ actually implemented, are not be
country".

THE LEANDER FRIGATE PROJECT IN RETROSPECT

The Leander Frigate Project, which commenced with the construction of the NILGIRI on
commissioning of the VINDHYAGIRI on 8 July 1981. During these fifteen years, six frig
months per ship. By the time of the 6th Leander, the indigenous content of bought out

From every point of view, the Leander Frigate Project was a monumental achievement
the enthusiasm, perseverance and dedication of the implementers in MDL, in the Minis
the assistance by the British Admiralty, by the British shipbuilding collaborators, Vicker
NEVESBU, all of these were essential ingredients of success. Most valuable of all was th
personages as high as the Secretary Defence Production and his team in the Ministry o
bright young naval officers of the Leander Project. The elders trusted the youngsters to
the astounding success of indigenisation was a direct result of the high powered Indige
interaction with Indian Industry through DWP and DPI(N).

The enormous self confidence gained in this project by the Navy's weapon planners, th
the foundation for the more audaciously designed warships that later emerged from In

The table below shows the gradual diversification in combat systems from the first Lea
changes were effected in the engineering and electrical machinery of these six ships.

N
(F
Le

Surface to Air Missile Launchers and Fire Control Fire Control Br

Gun Mounting Br

Ship Launched Anti-Submarine Torpedoes

Anti Submarine Weapon Br

Anti Submarine Helicopter Fr

Al
w
Br
To
Close Range AA Guns 20
O
(e

Radars D

Sonars Br

Action Information system Br

Electronic Warfare Br

CHAPTER 6

INDIGENOUS WARSHIP DESIGN

PREAMBLE

In the post independance Indian Navy, ship design made a modest beginning
in 1962 with the setting up of a small Design Cell within the Directorate of Naval
Construction (DNC). By 1965, this cell had expanded to become the DNC's
"Central Design Organisation (CDO)".

Mr Parmanandan recalls:-

"There was a bid from Mazagon Dock and from the Ministry of
Defence Production to take over the Design Organisation. Some
senior naval officers asked me "Wouldn't you feel more comfortable
working in a Public Sector Enterprise"? My answer was simple. "If the
Navy is not directly involved in ship design, its building and its
commissioning, we will meet the same fate as a Defence Production
Unit, where the hardware is made and the Services are not accepting
it, because the services are not deeply involved right from day one.
The Navy's involvement should be right from the Staff Requirement,
which should be refined by the Material Branch as regards our own
capability. The Staff Branch and the Material Branch should work hand
in hand till the design is frozen and then it can be given for
production.

"The second advantage is that the design period may be four years.
Till the design is frozen, the shipyard does not know what to do. We
can overlap the three year design period plus the production at every
stage and ensure that we get the best out of the ship at the time of
 commissioning".

By 1968, this Design Organisation had successfully designed and handed over to
the Navy numerous auxiliary vessels: 200 ton water boat AMBUDA (1966), 500
HP Tug BALSHIL (1966), Hopper Barges SEVAK and SAHAYAK (1967), Bucket
Dredger NIKARAKSHA (1967), and Victualling Barges PANKAJ and AMRIT
(1967/68).

Under construction were Landing Craft Utility (LCU's Mk1), an Ocean Going Tug
(GAJ), Avcat Tankers (PURAK and POSHAK), HSD Tankers, 150 men Ferry Craft,
Harbour Cargo Boats and diverse types of pontoons.

At the design stage were Oilers, Tugs, Ammunition and Water Barges and Diving
and Water Boats. In 1966, the Design Organisation had also assisted in the
construction of the new Fleet Tanker DEEPAK in Germany.

A list of Naval Yardcraft and by whom they were built during the period 1966 to
1975 is given in the table at the end of this chapter.

THE START OF MAJOR WARSHIP DESIGN

On 23rd October 1968, the Prime Minister, Mrs.Indira Gandhi, launched INS
NILGIRI, the first of the Leander class frigates built at Mazagon Docks in Bombay.
Having herself laid the keel in October 1966, Mrs Gandhi seems to have intuitively
sensed the very long gestation time of naval construction. On her return to Delhi,
the Prime Minister directed that urgent consideration be given to strengthen the
Naval Design Office to work out the designs of future naval construction like
frigates, submarines and smaller fast craft, suggested that all forms of future
marine propulsion be considered, including nuclear propulsion, and stressed the
need for both the ship designers and the ship builders to coordinate closely and in
good time. This remarkable perspicacity of the Prime Minister was to prove
momentous in the ensuing Defence Plan.

BUILDING UP THE CADRE OF NAVAL CONSTRUCTOR OFFICERS

Captain Lohana recalls:-

The Corps of Naval Constructors within the Navy was thought of and
created sometime in 1951-52, when three civilian officers, Mr
Parmanandan, Mr Dotiwala and Mr Dhumal were recruited. The first
uniformed constructor, the late Commodore VP Garg, who was
already in UK to be trained as an Engineer Officer, was asked to stay
behind and convert as a Naval Constructor. This certainly was the
foresight of the Naval planners that one day the Navy will need to
have Naval Architects who understand ship design and would help to
maintain ships better. In the long run, it came as a blessing when we
decided to design and build our own ships.

In the initial stages, there was debate whether constructors should be

a civilian cadre or in uniform. NHQ decided that they should be in
uniform so that the Navy will have a hold over them, whereas civilians
might leave as and when they liked. Secondly, some senior people in
the Ministry did foresee that this small group of 18, which was
sanctioned in the first instance, was not a sufficiently viable cadre in
terms of giving adequate career prospects. So to make sure that
there were adequate career prospects, they were made a part of the
Engineering Branch as far as sanctions were concerned. Thus it
became a kind of a separate fourth specialisation of the Engineering
Branch, like Marine Engineering, Air Engineering, Ordnance
Engineering and Naval Construction. To what extent this proved
beneficial in the long run is a matter of debate.

The Directorate of Naval Construction expanded as the Soviet

acquisitions and the Leander Project came. At the commencement of
the Leander programme, a Frigate Project Cell was also created within
DNC, under a DDFP. Then as the Soviet acquisition programme came,
since the DNC was the single point authority in Naval Headquarters
for dealing with all ship acquisition contracts and new construction
contracts, the Soviet acquisition work was entrusted to me when I
returned from training in the Soviet Union. Since there was no
separate sanction, I was held under the sanction of the DDFP(C) and
tackled both the Frigate Project work, as well as the work connected
with the Soviet Acquisitions which later on went off to other
directorates, DAP, DLP and so on. Thus the DNC was the parent
directorate for the present Directorate of Naval Design, the
Directorate of Leander Project, as well as the Directorate of
Acquisition Project. It is now called the Directorate of the Naval
Architecture, which is the professional directorate in the Material
Branch for Naval Architecture policy.

The training of the naval constructors of the first few batches,

including ours, was carried out in UK. When it was decided to train
them in India, the faculty of Naval Architecture at IIT Kharagpur,
which was the only faculty then in India for this discipline, was
selected and a further two years course was given to these Naval
architecture graduates to become Naval Constructors, by making
them Naval Architects for warships. This was achieved by appointing
two constructor officers trained in UK at IIT Kharagpur in the Naval
Construction Wing set up within the Naval Architecture Department.
 Gradually, with the reduction in the availability of Naval Architect
graduates per se from Kharagpur opting for the Navy, it was decided
to recruit graduates in allied branches of engineering such as
Aeronautical, Mechanical, Metallurgical etc and cross train them as
Naval Constructors, which was again done by the Naval Construction
Wing within the IIT. Naturally, the training load increased, because
not only was it cross-training to adapt them to warships, but to Naval
Architecture and ships as a whole.

At about this time, the faculty at IIT Kharagpur did undergo some
dilution and we felt that the quality of training may be adversely
affected. At the same time, the available expertise within the Naval
Headquarters in terms of the Material Branch as well as Staff who
could be called upon to give lectures to the students and the setting
up of the Design Directorate which could impart some practical
training sessions to the students was the idea behind the proposal to
shift the Naval Construction Wing itself from IIT Kharagpur to IIT
Delhi, where the basic academic faculty in terms of maths and applied
mechanics, which were essential inputs, were certainly of a very high
order. It took a certain amount of persuasion within the Navy as well
as with the IIT authorities and eventually it was successfully brought
about around the mid 70s".

STRENGTHENING OF THE DESIGN ORGANISATION

A major objective of the 1969-74 Defence Plan was self reliance in the field of
warship design and warship production. The aim was to meet the Navy's
requirements through indigenous efforts and conserve foreign exchange.
Accordingly the indigenous construction of frigates, patrol craft, submarines,
minor war vessels and auxiliaries had been accepted in this plan.

In 1969, Naval Headquarters proposed to Government that a full fledged

Directorate of Naval Design (DND) be sanctioned. At that stage, the Navy did not
have either adequate design experience or capability. There was also an acute
shortage of technical officers. Naval Headquarters had envisaged induction of
foreign designers on loan, with assurance of back up from their parent
organisations. However, negotiations with the UK for the deputation of such
designers did not bear fruit.

Meanwhile, soon after the start of the Leander construction programme, a choice
had to be made whether the second and subsequent Leanders were to be
identical to the first Leander (the advantage being standardisation and the
disadvantage being obsolescence) or whether design changes should be effected
from the second Leander onwards to enhance combat capability. It was decided
that indigenous frigates should, as far as possible, have the latest equipment.

In 1970, the Directorate of Naval Design (DND) was approved. It started off with
the design for new classes of Seaward Defence Boats (SDBs MK2), Survey
Vessels, and a Landing Ship Tank (LST). The most noteworthy feature of the DND
was that it was conceived and created as an integral part of the Navy, thereby
enabling close interaction at all levels, while functioning under the scrutiny of the
Naval Staff.

In 1973, a team of designers from the Soviet Union were invited to visit India to
suggest an organisation to design frigates and submarines. They quantified a
requirement of over 170 qualified designers each for tackling the design of the
new frigate and the design of the new submarine. These requirements of
manpower were just not implementable within available resources. The Naval
Staff therefore accepted the revision of the staff requirements and approved a
modified Leander hull with a different weapon package, instead of insisting on an
altogether new frigate design. This decision was to result in the GODAVARI class
frigates of Project 16, which retained all the indigenous propulsion machinery and
other equipment already developed for the six earlier Leanders.

In early 1975, the Design Organisation commenced conceptual design work on

Project 16. By end 1975, the Naval Staff and the Government accepted the
design. Detailed drawing and design work started in 1976.

The Petya class submarine chasers had been acquired from the Soviet Union in
the mid 1960's. They would therefore need replacement in the mid 1980's. Naval
Headquarters decided that their replacement would be indigenously designed and
constructed as "Corvettes" for the defence of the island territories and off shore
oil rigs. In 1975, design work commenced on ships of the Corvette Project, which
eventually culminated in the commissioning of the KHUKRI class corvettes of
Project 25.

Throughout the decade 1965 to 1975, the non availability of sanctioned

manpower constrained the balanced growth of the Design Organisation. The
shortage of service officers was particularly acute. In retrospect, the successful
achievements in warship design during this period can be attributed to two
factors:

(a) Accepting an overlap between the "design" and "production"

phases. This enabled a shorter time frame from the concept design
stage to the completion of the first ship of the class. It minimised the
obsolescence factor. And it ensured lower costs by minimising
escalation.

(b) The team of talented young constructors built up over the

preceding twelve years by the founding fathers of the Design
Organisation, which included Shri S. Parmanandan, Shri Dotiwalla,
 Shri Dhumal, Commodore V P Garg, Captain Thukral and Captain KK
Lohana.

Shri Parmanandan was awarded the PADMASHRI in 1970 in recognition of "his

eminence as the leading naval architect in the country and his dynamism,
dedication and drive in building up the capability of his organisation".

THE CHALLENGES POSED IN WARSHIP DESIGN

Warship design and construction comprise five main stages:-

- The first stage is the Formulation of Preliminary Staff Requirements by the

Naval Staff. These are the requirements that the ship will be required to meet,
based on the evaluation of future threats and the ships' role. These are first
conceived as staff targets, which form the basis of the dialogue between the
Naval Staff and the designers to establish that what is demanded is technically
feasible and conversely, that what is technically feasible will meet the staff
aspirations. A number of feasibility studies are carried out. Eventually the
Preliminary Staff Requirements are generated which spell out the role of the ship,
its weapons, sensors and the other major equipment which the ship is required to
carry. In addition, important parameters like speed, endurance, type of
propulsion, restrictions on dimensions and complement are indicated.

- The second stage is of Concept Design, which is the first interpretation of the
preliminary staff requirements. During this stage, a number of design options are
explored and developed up to a stage which enables comparative evaluation. The
design proceeds on the basis of inputs from similar past ships, empirical relations,
past experience and the designer's judgment. The process is essentially iterative.
At the end of Concept Design, the most promising of the options are compared
and the one likely to best meet the staff requirements is chosen for further
development, in consultation with the Naval Staff.

- The third stage is of Preliminary Design. Various aspects and parameters,

provisionally determined during the concept design stage, are investigated in
detail. Design proceeds along a converging spiral form, investigating various
aspects of dimensions, weights, volumes, stability, speed and powering, until an
acceptable compromise of all the important and often conflicting parameters is
achieved. All design calculations are prepared during this stage. System
schematics are generated to facilitate weight, volume, flotation and stability
calculations. At the end of Preliminary Design, a presentation is made to the
Naval Staff, indicating aspects/areas in which the design may entail a compromise
in Staff Requirements. After the Naval Staff approve the preliminary design, the
preliminary staff requirements, as modified, are promulgated as the final or
frozen Staff Requirements.
- The fourth stage is of Detailed Design. Hydrodynamic model tests are carried
out at the beginning of the Detailed Design stage. These validate the predictions
made through the analytical processes. Shortcomings emerging out of the results
of model tests are rectified by modifying the design features. During this stage,
special studies are undertaken in the critical design areas. Detailed structural
drawings, system details, layout and composite drawings are prepared.
Comprehensive specifications are written out. A dialogue is then initiated with the
ship builder and the detailed specifications and drawings are made available to
him.

- For a typical warship project, nearly 2000 drawings, some running into several
sheets, and over 15 volumes of specifications of nearly 2000 pages, are required
to be generated and over 1000 guidance drawings supplied to the ship builder. In
turn, the shipyard generates over 1500 drawings for submission to the designers
for approval. These then form the basis for the shipyard to prepare its working
drawings, which would number several thousands.

- The fifth stage is of Construction. On the basis of inputs from the designer, the
shipyard orders long lead items and materials and proceeds with activities
preparatory to commencing production in the workshops. These includes faring of
lines, preparation of workshop drawings and assembly of jigs and fixtures. To
minimise the overall period of design and construction, the activities are
telescoped and shipbuilding functions are commenced in the latter half of the
detailed design phase. Throughout the construction stage, a continuous flow of
drawings and information has to be maintained between the designers and the
shipyard.

PROJECT 16 GODAVARI CLASS FRIGATES

The lessons learnt in the 1971 Indo Pakistan War, the detailed discussions with
Russia for the next series of Russian acquisitions and the progress made in the
development of indigenous systems made it possible for the Naval Staff to
consider major improvements in the combat capability of frigates. The Directorate
of Combat Policy and Tactics suggested that the entire missile and gun package of
the Soviet Nanuchka class missile corvette be installed in the frigates which would
follow the VINDHYAGIRI, together with two Seaking anti submarine helicopters,
the latest Indian APSOH Sonar, a mix of Soviet and Indian radars and Italian
CAIO and EW systems. The Directorate of Marine Engineering suggested that
steam propulsion be replaced by gas turbine propulsion.

The Naval Headquarters Technical Team which visited Canada in 1974 saw the
Canadian 4100 ton Destroyer DDH - 280 which had two Seakings embarked.
Naval Headquarters decided to try and embark two Seakings in the smaller
Leander hull.
The Design Directorate was headed by Shri S Parmanandan. The new frigate
design was entrusted to a project team headed by Commander (later Captain) NS
Mohan Ram, a Naval architect, trained in the United Kingdom and who had
worked in the Royal Navy's Leander Design Section. Organisational capability had
to be built up concurrently with the design, as there were not enough trained
draughtsmen or junior designers. Expertise too had to be developed in-house.

Mr Parmanandan who was then the DGND recalls:-

"The Navy was looking around for a cost effective option where
surface to surface, air to surface and anti-air capabilities would be
available from a single ship. This naturally required the ship to have
helicopter launched air to surface missiles, surface to surface missiles,
surface to air missiles, a large stock of anti submarine torpedoes and
two Seaking helicopters, so that at any one time you could keep one
helicopter in the air be it for an anti submarine mission or an anti ship
mission. The staff definitely wanted two Seakings. They were not
happy with only one. With surface to surface missiles, surface to air
missiles and two Seakings, it appeared to be a cost effective ship.
Certainly the Leander hull was in no position to take it.

"The second problem that came up was the economics of it. We had
invested more than 150 crores in the indigenous development of the
steam machinery. This led to a clear decision that the propulsion
package will remain the same, but the ship must have the weapon
package, which meant both the L Band and the S Band radars and, to
accommodate the Soviet design philosophy and their weapons, a
dedicated radar for each weapon. This was too much to go into a
Leander design. This naturally meant that a new frigate had to be
designed from scratch, except for the propulsion package which
should not change.

"Our initial check indicated that we may lose around 2 knots of speed
but could provide 20% longer range, 150% more aviation fuel, all
weapon packages and additional complement to man the weapons
and the helo included. The staff were willing to accept the 2 knot
penalty.

"From there, we proceeded to do a serious design. Half way through,

we realised the ship was getting longer and thinner and if we adopted
the same proportion package, the length advantage may give an edge
and we may be able to do just about half a knot less than the
Leander. From that proposition, we went for a model test. Of course,
we changed the fore part of the ship because the Leander fore part
would have posed a lot of obstruction, both for the missile, the gun
and the surface to air missile. Starting from that point, there was very
little commonality between the Leander and the Project 16.
"There was another technical fineness in ship propulsion and ship
model test. When at maximum speed the cut up under the stern of
the ship happens to be in the trough of the bow wave, the ship loses
speed. If the cut up happens to be on the crest of the bow wave, the
ship gains speed. When Mohan Ram, Subaiah and I had a look at the
model test results, we found that the ship was comfortably sitting on
the crest and we were overwhelmed. It seemed possible that the ship
may go even faster than the Leander at full power. This was amply
proved during trials. Till 60%, 70%, 75% of full power, she was one
and half knots slower than the Leander. But the moment she reached
85% to 90% , her acceleration was higher and she could overtake the
Leander.

"We had a group of engineer and electrical officers working with us.
Mazagon Dock wanted them and I gladly agreed to let them go. When
the ship went out for trials, there were Soviet experts on board. They
had their own misgivings about the ships speed but when they
observed she was doing 29 knots, 29.5 knots and even upto 30 knots,
they were surprised and equally we were surprised. The ship was
keeping up with the gas turbine propelled RAJPUT. When both ships
were asked to do a zig zag manouvre, the GODAVARI could do better
than the RAJPUT.

"The wake of the Project 16 was classic, whereas the RAJPUT was
churning the ocean. Any commanding officer would like to have a ship
which has no wake at all, or at least a partially suppressed wake.

"I do not claim any credit for me or for any of my design officers. Its
one of those things where fortune favours those who are willing to
take the risk. And GODAVARI happened to have ended well".

Captain Mohan Ram recalls:-

"All these changes could only be accommodated in a larger hull, with

increased internal space for weapons and equipment and deck space
for missiles.

"The evolution of the new frigate is a fascinating story of calculated

risk-taking, bold innovation and extrapolation of available knowledge.
The Navy's marine engineers understandably desired to introduce the
latest technology gas turbines in these new frigates. The Naval Staff
had specified surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, larger
helicopters, modern guns and sophisticated command and control
systems.

"Early on, the Design Group decided that they would not change the
proven steam turbine propulsion of the NILGIRI class frigates to gas
 turbines. Major investments had been made on facilities and tooling in
Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited
for the manufacture of steam turbines and auxiliaries. It was felt that
it would be prudent to amortise this investment over a larger number
of vessels.

"Also the new class of frigates already needed a newly designed hull.
The weapon and control systems would be different. If the propulsion
systems were also changed, it would lead to too high an intensity of
change, which the Design Organisation and the Navy might find
difficult to absorb and implement. So a sensible decision was taken to
design a larger hull, using well established, conventional, steam
turbine machinery and auxiliaries.

"The larger vessel would displace twenty percent more than the 3000
tons of the NILGIRI class frigate and would be about fourteen meters
longer. The Naval Staff also wanted the vessel to go at least one knot
faster than the NILGIRI class. As the head and naval architect in the
Design Group, I serendipitously discovered that with the same
capacity of steam turbines as in NILGIRI, the new design ship would
go faster, due to improved hydrodynamic conditions at maximum
speed. There would however, be a small penalty of fuel consumption
at cruising speeds. This surprising discovery was at first pooh-poohed
by many, but was subsequently verified in model tests and confirmed
during sea trials of GODAVARI, the first ship of the class.

"The major change which had to be implemented in the design, was

the decision of the Naval staff to use Soviet weapons and fire control
systems together with Western and Indian weapon systems and
propulsion systems. This entailed the use of two sets of main
electrical power distribution systems, - one 440V, 3 phase, 60 cycles
and the other 380V/3 phase, 50 cycles. This had never been done
before in any warship, but this radical decision was also taken. For
the first time, a hybrid vessel was developed, combining Western and
Soviet systems in one hull.

"The decision to go ahead with the design was a bold act of faith on
the part of the Navy. It reflected the confidence the Navy had in its
young designers and the growing capability of Mazagon Docks. The
go-ahead for the ship was given in 1975. The keel was laid in 1977.
GODAVARI commissioned in December 1983. She fully met the
specifications and exceeded all major performance requirements".

In recognition of this achievement, Commander Mohan Ram was awarded the

Vishist Seva Medal.

Captain Lohana recalls:-

"The Project 16 started with a dialogue with the naval staff on what
all they could have. Many sketch design studies and concept studies
were made. Ultimately what clinched the issue in favour of the Project
coming to DGND was that here was a frigate which held the promise
to house and operate two Seaking helicopters. I think this was the
clinching point which made the Navy decide to go in for this design.
At the concept stage, we were all involved but this idea probably
emanated not from one individual, but instead got evolved as a result
of discussions.

"There was a definite element of selling this concept to the Naval

Staff, so that the Design Organisation could take on this challenge
and progress it. The credit must go to Mr Parmanandan of course,
who was leading the team, but there were people like then
Commander Kapoor and Commander Mohan Ram who played a
prominent part. Commander Mohan Ram of course then became the
project in charge for the rest of the main project.

"I had one other small part to play when we were doing the upper
deck layout. When the missile containers were put on either side of
the superstructure which was protruding out towards the forward end
from the main superstructure, there was not enough space for people
to walk past the containers, after allowing for the minimum distance
between the containers. My main contribution in this area was
suggesting that there should be sponsors on either side of the
weather deck to locally create more width to allow for the extra space
required. This proved to be a successful and distinctive feature of the
ship.

"After this project was finally approved for construction, Mazagon

Dock wanted the Navy to send somebody who would help the
shipyard in translating the Navy's design into workshop drawings. I
was asked to go to Mazagon Dock as the Head of the Warship Design
Section and entrusted with the task of doing that. It was a great
opportunity. As the work progressed, there was constant interaction
between the production side on one hand and the Naval Headquarters
design organisation on the other. It was tight rope walking between
the two, which we managed to do successfully.

"At the same time, the colleague who was in charge of the Merchant
Ship Drawing Office also resigned and left, so I had the opportunity of
heading the entire design organisation of the Mazagon Docks. And by
the time I was called back to Naval Headquarters as DGND, the
GODAVARI, the first ship of the class, had almost proceeded to
completion. I attended her commissioning ceremony as the DGND".
PROJECT 25 KHUKRI CLASS CORVETTES

In the mid 1960's, Government had accepted in principle the Navy's requirements
for 500 ton patrol craft. In subsequent years, various options were considered -
building them in Bombay in the Gun Carriage Basin near INS Kunjali, building
them in the new Naval Dockyard at Visakhapatnam etc. By the early 1970's, two
schools of thought had emerged. One view was that with the cost of ships steadily
increasing, the Navy had no option but to go in for small, fast, missile armed
corvettes. The other view was that in view of foreseeable threats, all the staff
requirements could not be met in a 500 ton patrol craft. The outcome was that
the 500 ton patrol craft got renamed as the Corvette Project, to be built in two
versions - anti aircraft and anti submarine. International tenders were called for
and various weapon packages were considered. Eventually, in 1973 the project
was dropped because of the serious shortage of foreign exchange. NHQ then
decided that the corvettes would be designed and built indigenously.

Mr Parmanandan, the Director General of Naval Design at that time, recalls:-

After five or six years of working with the Petyas, the Naval Staff
wanted a new generation of ships. The Corvette Project had been
going up and down, with French collaboration, with international
tenders and with British private companies putting in a bid. All that
took very nearly three years. But nothing came out of the series of
discussions we had, either with the French or with the British. The
Naval staff then took a decision to go ahead and start work on a
design and construct a Corvette to our own specification, which would
accommodate a helo plus four Soviet surface to surface missiles and a
Soviet gun mounting. After this decision was taken, the normal
process of model testing, powering and general layout were all
finalised as a preliminary design.

There were a lot of discussions whether for anti missile defence we

should go in for the Soviet 30 mm gun mountings or the Bofors 40/70
gun mountings. That took about six to seven months. Ultimately a
clear decision was given that we should have four surface to surface
missiles plus the Soviet guns. It was also decided to fit some of the
Leanders', radars, sonar, communication equipment etc.

The point where the decision got delayed was the propulsion package.
There was discussion as regards a single engine room or two engine
rooms, two engines per shaft or one engine per shaft etc. The gearing
of two diesel engines to one shaft posed problems. Would it be better
to have a single robust engine rather than two, in a small ship of this
size. Should we have a fixed pitch propeller or a CPP. To settle these
 issued, NHQ constituted a group of officers to write a service paper.
The then COM and DME produced a paper based on which the design
proceeded and the final powering calculation was completed. The
choice of propeller was also settled and it was decided to go in for a
controllable pitch propeller (CPP). However that resulted in a slightly
heavier tail shaft and propeller and a higher trim aft. The discussions
ove engines, and the mid course correction which some people
wanted that it should not be a single engine per shaft or two engines
per shaft, did push the project back by about 18 months.

When you are working on a Naval Staff Requirement and when the
total project starts sliding back 18 months, every body gets fresh
ideas. Fresh weapons, fresh helicopters, fresh radars, fresh sonar and
every one wants to pitch in. That has a very deleterious effect.

By the time I left NHQ, the ship had been ordered, the design had
been frozen and the model tests had been completed. But I believe
the Soviets insisted that the bridge structure should go further aft.
And it got shifted. I would not have permitted that to happen. It
caused some trim problem and it got adjusted by other means. In my
opinion, Project 25 was a fairly well thought out design, it had a well
thought out weapon package which I believe is giving good service.

WARSHIP MODIFICATIONS UNDERTAKEN 1965 TO 1975

Major modifications designed and implemented between 1965 and 1975 were:

- The modernisation of and fitment of Soviet surface to surface missiles in

TALWAR and TRISHUL, which had been acquired in the early 1960's.

- The conversion to the training role of the British Type 41 frigates,

BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS and BETWA which had been acquired in the end
1950's.

- Phase One Modernisation of and modifications to the aircraft carrier

VIKRANT.

Fitment of Surface to Surface Missiles in TALWAR and TRISHUL

In 1973, the Naval Staff commenced a study on the half life modernisation of the
two Type 12 British frigates, TALWAR and TRISHUL, which had by then completed
over 11 years in service. In view of the proven efficacy of the Soviet surface to
surface missiles in the 1971 war, the Naval staff directed that the feasibility be
examined of lifting a complete surface to surface missile system from a non
operational Soviet missile boat and fit it on board TALWAR. Concurrently, it was
decided to fir a modern electronic warfare system which would help in identifying
enemy warships from their radar transmissions at ranges compatible with the
range of the missiles.

Mr Parmanandan then the DGND, recalls:-

"The Russians were not at all in favour of putting one of the three
missiles on the centre line. I did not see anything wrong in putting it,
as long as the deflectors were correct and we knew the correct
distances and if the flame should strike the bulkhead, there should be
no damage done. So we decided to have a forward bulkhead with an
air space and also have a walkway for people in case something goes
wrong.

We had a group of scientists in the first firing for which we wrote

down the specifications for firing the missile. That raised the
eyebrows of some officers in the Material Branch, specially in the
DWE. They said "who are these jokers in Ramakrishna Puram to tell
us what to do with the weapon on board?" But we were worried about
an accident, nothing more than that. We had asked for many
measurement gadgets. One of these was to put a series of shoe
strings along the deck and on the bulkhead. We knew what their
charring temperature was. That would immediately indicate how far
the deflectors were effective and how far they were not effective. a
salvo of three missiles was fired successfully."

Captain Lohana recalls:-

It was a very very bold step to remove the P 15 missile containers

from one of the missile boats and fit them in the Type 12 frigates. Not
only that, the Soviets were not particularly enthusiastic about such a
proposal. It was therefore decided that we would do it on our own.
Secondly, the three missile configuration, which was planned for
TALWAR's foxle deck to get maximum benefit out of the deck area
available, was something unique. There were definitely inherent
doubts and risks as to how the flight paths would be affected and
what were the clearances required and what should be the interface
with the rest of the equipment and so on. This assignment became an
article of faith with Mr Parmanandan, the then DGND. In the absence
of clear cut documentation and data, quite a large amount of study
had to be carried out of the existing fittings in the missile boats in
order to decide what equipment was to be removed in addition to the
containers themselves, what was the interface, how the fire control
would work and so on. And I must say that the whole exercise, inspite
of certain technically inspired assumptions, was something which
went off very well and the Navy could well be very very proud of it".
Conversion of BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS and BETWA for Cadets Training.

With the starting up of the Naval Academy in 1971 to increase officer intake, it
became necessary to increase the capacity afloat for training cadets and
midshipmen at sea. The cruiser DELHI was converted to undertake the sea
training of midshipmen. Thereafter the three Type41 frigates which had joined the
fleet in 1958, 1959 and 1960 were converted in the 1970's for undertaking the
sea training of cadets.

Phase One Modernisation of VIKRANT.

After the 1971 war, VIKRANT needed a long refit to replace her cracked boilers.
Since this was expected to be a long refit of about three years, it was decided to
concurrently undertake as much modernisation of weapons, sensors and AIO as
possible.

Mr Parmanandan, the then DGND recalls:-

"There was a serious proposal to put the large Soviet combined

surface warning - height estimating - S band radar on the ship.
Vikrant's masts were already saturated. We were asked to find out
some way of putting the antennae up there. We worked with the IIT
Madras on the structural side and we gave a proposal which was
workable. But the cost factor and the time required was such that the
Staff decided to forego that radar.

"The second thing we spent a lot of money and a lot of time on was that a lot of
DC/AC alternators were put on board Vikrant to create a larger AC power capacity
for dedicated services. There was a proposal to fit Bofors guns and a new type of
laser sensor for anti missile defence. I do not know whether it ended up as a
success or not. The initial proposal was to fit the Soviet 30 mm gun mountings in
lieu of the hand operated Bofors. If we had gone firm on that, probably we would
have achieved it at a much lesser cost and much quicker. While the Soviet
weapon systems had their own deficiencies, they had the advantage that it suited
our culture and way of working and maintainability. Each 30 mm mounting had its
own dedicated radar and its own display which made it autonomous for operation.
So if one mounting did not work, at least the other one would be available. That
philosophy was not accepted half way through. And when they changed over to
the new weapon system, our Directorate was not any further involved.

During this phase of modernisation, VIKRANT was fitted out with:

(a) Signaal LW 04, DA 05, ZW 06 radars and DS 22 AIO system as in

the Leanders.

(b) LIOD Optronic Sights and Bofors 40/70 gun mountings for anti
missile defence.
 (c) The main and auxiliary machinery were refurbished to the
maximum extent feasible.

INDIGENOUS WARSHIP DESIGN IN RETROSPECT

As in the case of the Leander Frigate Project, the Navy's achievements in

Indigenous Warship Design were astounding. The transfer of talented young
officers between the Frigate Project and the Design Organisation generated
enormous synergy. Soviet warship designers and the Soviet weapon system
supply organisations were generous and unstinting in their help. The exchange of
detailed information in the 1970's regarding the new Soviet acquisitions enabled
weapon planners in the Naval Staff to suggest cost effective staff requirements
which would achieve the much mished for standardisation of systems and
economies in weapon inventories. The confidence built up in Mazagon Docks
during the Frigate Project helped to build the ships which earned much praise
from the Navies of the world.

INDIGENOUS NAVAL YARD CRAFT BUILT BETWEEN 1966 AND 1975

Commissioning
Sl.No. Name Type Builders
Ship Date

1. AMBUDA Water Barge 31-3-66 GRSE Calcutta

2. BALSHIL Tug 30-8-66 -do-

Peoples
Victualling
3. AMRIT 23-5-67 Engineering
Barge
works Calcutta

4. PANKAJ -do- 23-5-68 -do-

5. SAHAYAK Hopper Barge 31-12-67 GRSE Calcutta

6. SEVAK -do- 31-12-67 -do-

AFCO Bombay
7. NIRAJ All weather 20-7-67
boat

8 NIKARAKSHA Bucket Dredger March 67 MDL Bombay

9. PURAK Avcat Tanker 05-6-70 -do-

10. POSHAK -do- 03-7-70 -do-

 Andrew Yule
11. - Boat Pontoon 20-5-70
Calcutta

12. - -do- 20-5-70 -do-

13. - -do- 20-5-70 -do-

Berthing
14. - 16-5-70 CIWTC Calcutta
Pontoon

15. - -do- 16-5-70 -do-

Alcock Ashdown
16. LSA-1 100 ton Barge 24-7-70
Calcutta

17. LSA-2 -do- 07-8-70 -do-

18. LSA-3 -do- 21-8-70 -do-

19. ANGAD Tug 03-3-74 MDL Bombay

20. AJRAL -do- 30-10-94 -do-

21. ANJAN -do- 16-11-73 -do-

22. ANUP -do- 29-6-74 -do-

23. ATHAK -do- 30-10-74 -do-

24. KHADAN Grab Dredger 30-4-75 -do-

25.
BucketDredger 01-5-75 -do-
KICHODHARA

CHAPTER 7

THE 1971 INDO-PAKISTAN WAR

THE EVENTS PRIOR TO THE 1971 WAR

THE PAKISTAN NAVY'S DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN 1965 AND 1971

THE PAKISTAN NAVY'S INTERACTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION (1966 TO 1969)

After the Rann of Kutch incident in May 1965, the US had suspended all
military and economic aid both to India and to Pakistan. In July 1965, the Soviet
Union offered economic and other assistance to Pakistan, in an endeavour to
entice Pakistan away from its dependence on the US and on China.

In November 1965, in preparation for the Pakistan Foreign Ministers delegation to

Moscow to prepare for the later discussions at Tashkent, Pak NHQ put in a
requirement for six submarines, eight missile boats, twelve motor torpedo boats,
maritime reconnaissance aircraft, mines and torpedoes.

In June 1966, a Pakistan naval delegation visited the Soviet naval bases in
Odessa and Sevastopol in the Black Sea. They were shown a submarine, an anti
submarine vessel, a missile boat, a Landing Ship Tank (LST) and a motor torpedo
boat. Neither mines nor maritime reconnaissance aircraft were offered or shown.

In May 1968, a two ship Soviet naval squadron visited Karachi. It was the first
ever visit of Soviet warships to Pakistan. Discussions centred on the Soviet side
being able to help modernise the ships of the Pakistan fleet. The Pakistan
Government also formally requested for a feasibly study of fitting Soviet surface
to surface missile on the Pakistan Navy's destroyers.

In July 1968, a high powered Pakistani delegation to Moscow was offered six
missile boats and associated support infrastructure. However the Pakistan Navy's
assessment was that the smallness of the missile boat would denigrate its
effectiveness in rough seas, because the vertical accelerations likely to be
experienced during the monsoon months would exceed the safety limits for
missile firing. They therefore asked the Soviet side to either give a larger 800 ton
missile boat or, if that was not possible, to study the feasibility of fitting missiles
on the existing ships. In early 1969, a Soviet team studied the problem. In due
course, the Soviet side informed the Pakistan Navy that they had no plans for
building larger missile boats nor was it feasible to install the missile boat rockets
in the existing ships of the Pakistan Navy; they advised the Pakistan Navy to go
in for the missile boats which had already been offered.

"The Story of the Pakistan Navy" states: (Page 288)

`After the Russian `verdict', there was much soul searching in NHQ. Lengthy
discussions eventually produced a consensus that it would not be in our interest
to opt for the Osa Class missile boats. Apart from the obvious limitations of
weather, there were other considerations too. Unlike the Indian Navy in time of
war, the Pakistan Navy missile boats would have to look for targets in an area
500 miles or more away from their base. The range, endurance and anti-aircraft
defence of Osa class boats were woefully inadequate for such operations.

`In any future conflict, Pakistan expected the main threat to emanate from Indian
submarines and missile boats. The Osas would be almost irrelevant in countering
the same. At best, they would give a fifty percent chance in a missile boat vs
missile boat encounter, hardly worthwhile when you can destroy such a boat with
impunity and at will from the air. (CNS questioned the validity of this statement
as the Navy had no aircraft). Against submarines, the Osas had no role to play
whatsoever. There was also the over-riding fear that having provided the missile
boats, the Government, strapped for finances as it was, would be unwilling to
approve the replacement of the aging and obsolete destroyers of the PN Fleet. If
that happened, the PN would be reduced to being a coastal navy which would be
effective only at certain times of the year.

`With due regard for all relevant factors, a case was prepared for replacing three
old destroyers with Type 21 frigates to be obtained from the UK without actually
rejecting the offer of the missile boats. The implication was that the Navy's
primary requirement was replacement of its aged surface ships. The missile
boats, if the government wished to buy them, should be in addition and not in
lieu. Admiral Ahsan, while he was the Commander-in-Chief, personally took the
file to President Ayub Khan. "The President," he later said "would agree to missile
boats only and nothing else."

In March 1969 the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Grechko, led a large military
delegation to Pakistan. Admiral Smirnov, the Commander of the Soviet far
Eastern Fleet based at Vladivostok, visited Karachi and held discussions with the
Pakistan Naval Chief. "The Story of the Pakistan Navy" states: (Page 286 et seq)

`Admiral Ahsan's impressions of the Soviet policy objective in regard to Pakistan

at the time were recorded, and some of them were valid for many years
thereafter. Briefly, the main points were:

(a) The Russians aimed to replace Chinese and western influence in

Pakistan.

(b) Normalisation of relations could be encouraged without a serious

attempt to solve the Kashmir dispute to avoid a common Indo-Pak outlook.

(c) The Indo-Soviet interest inhibited Soviet actions to resolve the Kashmir
dispute on terms unfavourable to India.

(d) The stoppage of US military aid had created a problem. A Russian offer
of military assistance could be irresistible if the terms were attractive.

(e) Military aid was the quickest and most effective means of gaining and
developing powerful influence.

(f) The Soviets hoped to gain influence in the formation of Pakistan's foreign
policy by a generous supply of military aid.

(g) The Russians hoped to create within Pakistan's Armed Force, a cadre of
personnel oriented towards Russia.

(h) Gain a secure foothold on the littoral of the Indian Ocean which has a
vast potential for furthering Soviet interests, and in providing enormous
 dispersal for maritime units in war'.

Subsequent discussions culminated in an understanding to supply Soviet military

equipment to Pakistan. In preparation for the Navy acquiring missile boats,
personnel were selected and given Russian language courses. And then suddenly
in July 1969, a shift in policy at the political level altered the whole course of
events. Although some Russian equipment was delivered to the Army and the Air
Force, the chapter on naval assistance from the Soviet Union was abruptly closed.

This brief interaction between the Soviet side and the Pakistan Navy, when
viewed in the context of Indo Soviet naval relations, pinpoints three aspects
relevant to the events in the 1971 war:

(a) In 1966, after their mediation at Tashkent, the Soviet side offered and
showed to the Pakistan Navy the same ships and submarines as they had
done to the Indian Navy in 1964.

(b) Whereas the Indian Navy showed no interest in the Soviet missile boat
offer in 1964 and contracted for their acquisition only in 1969, the Pakistan
Navy's acquaintance with the capabilities of these boats started as early as
October 1965 when due to the distance involved, the Indonesian Navy's
Soviet supplied "missile boats arrived in Pakistan waters after the cease fire
and then stayed on till such time as the chances of hostilities had receded".
The Pakistan Navy then had detailed interaction with the Soviet side
between 1966 and 1969 regarding the capabilities and limitations of the
missile boats. And again in May 1971, Pakistan's C-in-C Navy visited Egypt
where he was given a comprehensive briefing on the Soviet Osa and Komar
Class missile boats acquired by the Egyptian Navy. All this interaction would
have confirmed Pakistan naval assumptions that the missile boats were
meant solely for harbour defence. This would explain the total surprise
achieved during the Indian Navy's first missile action off Karachi on night
4/5 December when three ships were sunk.

(c) During their interaction with the Pakistan Navy, the Soviet side frankly
reiterated that "Indo Soviet interest inhibited Soviet actions to resolve the
Kashmir dispute on terms unfavourable to India". Indeed when India
protested to the Soviet Union about the impending military sales to
Pakistan, the Soviet side told India that weaning Pakistan away from the US
and China was as much in India's interest as that of the Soviet Union.

(d) The further development of a Soviet Pakistan military relationship is

likely to have been constrained as much by US pressure as by the start in
1969 of discussions on the Indo Soviet Treaty of Friendship which was
eventually signed in August 1971.
THE PAKISTAN NAVY'S UNDERWATER FORCES PROGRAMME

In the early 1960's, the Pakistan Navy seems to have decided that in view of its
inability to obtain budgetary priority for warship acquisitions, it was preferable to
concentrate on building up its underwater offensive capability. This started with
the acquisition on lease of an American ocean going submarine. It was to be
followed by the acquisition from France of Daphne class submarines for coastal
operations and from Italy of midget submarines (X craft) and chariots.

The primary targets for the Daphne class submarines were the large units of the
Indian Navy - the aircraft carrier VIKRANT and the cruisers MYSORE and DELHI.
The primary tasks of the X craft and the chariots were to incapacitate ships of the
Indian Navy in harbour.

The GHAZI.

In 1963, the US Government approved the transfer of a submarine to the

Pakistan Navy on a four year lease. The US Navy's 2500 ton submarine DIABLO,
after an extensive overhaul and conversion to "Fleet Snorkel" configuration, was
transferred on 1 June 1964 as part of the US Military Assistance Programme. It
was renamed as PNS GHAZI (SS 479) and arrived in Karachi in September 1964.

In the September 1965 Indo Pakistan war, GHAZI was deployed off Bombay with
specific orders to attack only the heavy units of the Indian Navy. No encounter
occurred. GHAZI's records state that she fired four torpedoes at an Indian frigate
INS BRAHMAPUTRA and scored three hits. However BRAHMAPUTRA suffered no
such hits.

Thereafter GHAZI's primary role was the ASW training of the Pakistani surface
flotilla and the training of submarine personnel to man the new Daphne class
submarines being acquired from France.

In end 1967 the Pakistan Navy applied to the US to renew GHAZI's lease. This
was duly approved.

Between 1966 and 1968, GHAZI's material state deteriorated. She was due for
refit but there were no facilities in Karachi. This was aggravated by the US
embargo on spares for American supplied equipment. Arrangements were made
for GHAZI to be overhauled in Turkey. With the Suez canal having closed in 1967,
a short refit in Karachi made GHAZI seaworthy enough to undertake the long
voyage to Turkey via the Cape of Good Hope. GHAZI sailed for Turkey on 6 March
1968 and arrived back in Karachi on 2 April 1970. Until November 1971, when
her next refit was due, GHAZI was operational.

Daphne Class French Submarines.

In 1963, the French Government agreed in principle to build three Daphne class
submarines for the Pakistan Navy. However it was not until after the 1965 war,
that the French Government agreed to give a loan. The deal for three Daphnes
was signed on 25 February 1966.

The first Daphne, HANGOR, was commissioned on 1 December 1969, the second,
SHUSHUK on 12 January 1970 and the third, MANGRO on 5 August 1970.
HANGOR and SHUSHUK arrived in Karachi on 20 December. MANGRO arrived a
few months later.

X Craft, Chariots and the Special Services Unit (SSU).

In end 1965, a contract was signed with an Italian company for the acquisition of:

(a) Six X craft (midget submarines), armed with a conventional torpedo.

(b) Six chariots armed with limpet mines.

These craft were to be manned by a newly raised, elite frogman commando unit
named the Special Service Unit.

By April 1968 the construction/assembly of these craft for the SSU had reached
an advanced stage. However major problems had already been experienced. The
torpedo contracted for was incompatible with the X craft. Nor did the X craft
design permit it to carry a torpedo. These X craft (midget submarines) were
eventually commissioned without a torpedo capability. The SSU establishment
was commissioned as PNS Iqbal.

Because of its elite status, SSU facilities had been accorded higher priority than
the new Daphne submarine in the allocation of waterfront space for their slipway
jetties, hangars and working spaces.

After March 1971, SSG (Navy) personnel were sent to East Pakistan to support
Army operations. They returned to West Pakistan in September 1971 to man the
X craft and chariots for which they had been trained.

Until the war started in December 1971, the problem of providing a mother ship
for the support and conveyance of these underwater craft had not been solved.

THE PAKISTAN NAVY'S SURFACE SHIPS

The high cost of the Daphne submarine programme and its supporting
infrastructure had seriously depleted the naval budget. The cessation of the US
Navy's supply of spares after the 1965 war affected the material state of the four
US supplied minesweepers and the fleet tanker DACCA.
In 1966,four British, Brooke Marine, fast patrol boats were commissioned
(RAJSHAHI, SYLLHET, JESSORE and COMILLA) and based in East Pakistan.

By 1968, material failures in the ex Royal Navy destroyers led to serious

unreliability. In August 1968 TUGHRIL suffered a boiler explosion and was never
fully operational thereafter. In August 1971, BADR's bows sheared off in rough
monsoon weather in the Arabian Sea. ALAMGIR had serious defects.

Attempts to acquire new frigates from Britain and France to replace the ageing
ships proved fruitless. After March 1971, the urgent need to augment patrol craft
in East Pakistan was met by the transfer of two German built, Royal Saudi
Arabian Navy fast patrol craft to the Pakistan Navy. These were commissioned as
PNS SADAQAT and RIFAQAT. Their modification for riverine service in East
Pakistan completed in May 1971, by which time the monsoon precluded their
passage. They were reconverted to the fast patrol craft role and retained at
Karachi.

THE INDIAN NAVY'S DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN 1965 AND 1971

1969 and 1970 had been busy years for the Navy. The first series of Soviet
acquisitions had arrived. These were :

- Five Petya class submarine chasers (KAMORTA, KADMATT, KILTAN,

KAVARATTI and KATCHALL)

- Four submarines (KALVERI, KHANDERI, KARANJ and KURSURA)

- Submarine depot ship AMBA - Submarine rescue vessel NISTAR

- Two Polish built landing ships LST (M)s (GHARIAL and GULDAR)

- Five Police patrol boats (PANVEL, PULICAT, PANAJI, PAMBAN and PURI)

In the preceding years, several major decisions had been taken which were later
to affect operations in the 1971 War.

To minimise the cost of training in the Soviet Union, the crews of the ships and
the submarines had been split into batches, according to the duration of their
training abroad. Those batches which went for the longest duration came back
well trained in the Soviet practice of austere equipment usage, with first line
maintenance being carried out on board by the operators who used the
equipment. The knowledge of the batches who went abroad for shorter periods
depended on the duration of their training. The shorter their training, the less
they absorbed. After arrival in India, personnel who had undergone the longest
training were the first to be transferred out because they had been longest in the
ship. They took their knowledge with them. This continuous bleeding of the
expertise acquired at high cost in time and money, resulted in the inefficient use
of Soviet weapons.

The West and the Soviet Union had been engaged in a Cold War since 1947. Until
1965, naval acquisitions were primarily from Britain. In 1964, contracts had been
signed for British collaboration in the indigenous construction in Mazagon Docks
Bombay of their latest Leander class frigates. In 1965 contracts had been signed
for naval acquisitions from the Soviet Union. To ensure that India continued to
get the best possible naval equipment from both sources, the Navy had to
reassure each side that it could be trusted to safeguard the other sides naval
technology. Two major decisions had therefore to be taken:

(a) To safeguard the security of information, the knowledge of all Soviet

acquisitions was strictly controlled on a `Need to Know' basis. Soviet
equipment handbooks had security classifications which differed from those
of the Indian Navy. The Navy was chary of downgrading these Soviet
classifications. As a result the Navy as a whole got to know very little about
the new concepts which had arrived in the Soviet acquisitions. Tactically,
operationally and technically, the Navy started over-utilising the Soviet
ships which had been carefully designed only for essential usage. As a
result, considerable wear and tear had taken place in the Soviet acquisitions
by the end of 1971 when the war broke out.

(b) It was decided to physically segregate all the Soviet acquisitions by

basing them on the East coast in Visakhapatnam and set up entirely new
facilities comprising:

(i) A new submarine base together with associated submarine

headquarters, berthing pens, battery charging facilities and shore
accommodation for submarine crews.

(ii) Officers and sailors of all branches who would be manning Soviet
ships and submarines would be given `type training' (training
appropriate to the type of vessel they would be going to) in a new
Integrated Type Training Establishment, the ITTE, (later named INS
Satavahana). The Soviet side would install in the ITTE, as per Soviet
training practice, full suites of working and sectionalised weapons,
systems and machinery, de-partmentwise for all the Soviet ships and
submarines supplied to India.

(iii) A new Naval Dockyard would be built at Visakhapatnam to

maintain, repair and refit all Soviet ships and submarines.

(iv) A new Combined Equipment Depot would be set up to stock the

spare parts and spare machinery of all Soviet acquisitions.
 (v) A Torpedo Preparation Workshop for the new torpedoes in Soviet
ships and submarines.

(vi) An enlarged Naval Armament Depot to stock, maintain and repair

the new Soviet munitions.

The Navy had inherited from the British Navy, the concept of periodic transfer of
officers and sailors between ships and shore establishments. Ever since the
partition of the Navy in 1947, there had been a constant need to increase the
number of officers and sailors and give them sufficient sea time so as to be able
to man the steady inflow of new acquisitions. Whereas this had worked
satisfactorily for the old World War II acquisitions like DELHI, MYSORE, the
RAJPUT class destroyers, the GODAVARI class destroyer escorts and the old
frigates, it proved totally unsuitable for the eight new post war frigates from
Britain which brought entirely new technologies and concepts into service
between 1958 and 1960.

The three new anti aircraft frigates, BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS and BETWA, were
wholly diesel propelled, with controllable pitch propellers, and had the latest
available radars, sonars, fire control systems and weapons. The two new anti
submarine frigates, TRISHUL and TALWAR, (designated first rate because they
had back up systems and machinery to cater for battle damage) also had new
sonars, radars, fire control systems and weapons, some of which were the same
as in the anti aircraft frigates. The three new anti submarine frigates, KHUKRI,
KUTHAR and KIRPAN had anti submarine systems identical to the `first rate'
TRISHUL and TALWAR but were designated second rate because to minimise cost,
they had been fitted with only one of everything and therefore had no back up in
case of battle damage. All these eight frigates operated on 440 volt 60 hertz AC
power generation. There was no source of this shore supply at any port in India
to meet the ships' power requirements when in harbour for maintenance. Ships
generators had to be kept running all the time. This led to deferring their
overhaul routines, which led to breakdowns at critical moments. The
maintenance, repair and refit facilities for these ships had been slow in coming up
in the Bombay Dockyard and had generally lowered the material fitness of these
frigates for war.

In 1970-71, the Navy's latest acquisitions being inducted were:

(a) Eight Soviet missile boats which were at various stages of acceptance
and delivery (NASHAK, NIPAT, NIRGHAT, NIRBHIK, VINASH, VEER, VIJETA
and VIDYUT). These boats were being loaded on board heavy lift merchant
ships in the Black Sea and unloaded in Calcutta which was the only port in
India having a 200 ton crane. To conserve their engine hours, the boats
were then being towed to Bombay, where they were to be based, and
where their surface to surface missile preparation facility called the
Technical Position (later named INS Tunir), was being set up. A large
contingent of officers and sailors were undergoing training in the Soviet
 naval base at Vladivostok.

(b) Six British Seaking anti submarine helicopters, equipped with a dunking
sonar which could be lowered to various depths, and armed with British MK
44 anti submarine homing torpedo. After acceptance trials in UK, these
helicopters were utilised to train Indian aircrew. The first batch returned to
Cochin in Apr 71. On arrival, all access to the Seakings and their
documentation was restricted on a `Need to Know' basis. The second batch,
after tactical training at the British Naval Air Station at Culdrose, reported
directly to Bombay in Oct 71 two months before the war started.

THE DRAMATIS PERSONNAE IN THE 1971 WAR

The Chiefs of Staff were General S H J F Manekshaw, Admiral S M Nanda and Air
Chief Marshal P C Lal.

General Manekshaw was the Chief of the Army Staff and Chairman of the Chiefs
of Staff Committee. Lt Gen JFR Jacob, the Chief of Staff, Eastern Army
Headquarters in 1971, published his memoirs "Birth of a Nation" in 1997.

Admiral Nanda was the Chief of the Naval Staff. Admiral SN Kohli, the Flag Officer
Commanding in Chief, Western Naval Command in 1971, published his memoirs
titled " We Dared - Maritime Operations in the 1971 Indo Pak War". Vice Admiral
N Krishnan, the Flag Officer Commanding in Chief, Eastern Naval Command in
!971, published his memoirs titled " No Way But Surrender - An Account of the
Indo Pakistan War in the Bay of Bengal 1971". Vice Admiral V A Kamath was the
Flag Officer Commanding Southern Naval Area in 1971. Vice Admiral E C Kuruvilla
was the Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet. Vice Admiral S H Sarma was the
Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet.

On the political side, Mrs Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister. Mr Jagjivan Ram
was the Defence Minister. Mr Chavan was the Finance Minister ( he had earlier
been Defence Minister from 1962 to 1969 ). Mr Swaran Singh was the Foreign
Minister. Mr DP Dhar headed the Foreign Policy Planning Committee. Professor PN
Dhar took over as Secretary to the Prime Minister in September 1971 from Mr PN
Haksar.

On the civil service side, Mr K B Lall was the Defence Secretary, Mr Govind Narain
was the Home Secretary (and subsequently Defence Secretary after Mr Lall) and
Mr S K Mukherji was the Additional Defence Secretary.

The recollections of Vice Admiral M K Roy, the Director of Naval Intelligence in

1971 have been published in his book " War in the Indian Ocean " published in
1996.
Air Chief Marshal Lal took over as Chief of the Air Staff in July 1969. His memoirs
" My Years with the I A F " provide invaluable insights into the evolution of plans
in 1971 and the higher direction of war.

THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN EAST PAKISTAN LEADING UP TO THE 1971

WAR

After the partition of India in 1947, the eastern part of Bengal had become East
Pakistan. Its Bengali speaking Muslim people became the majority of the
population of all Pakistan. However it had the smaller land area and, from the
very beginning, always had less political, military and economic clout. The feeling
of neglect by the Urdu speaking Punjabi rulers, more than a thousand miles away
in Karachi and Rawalpindi, led to growing tension between the two parts of
Pakistan. As early as 1969, the Pakistan Navy started preparing plans for East
Pakistan and generally ensure the operational availability of whatever was
available there. Chinese mines, held in stock were also to be transferred to
Chittagong.

General elections in 1970 gave the eastern based Awami League an absolute
majority in the National Assembly and committed it to a programme of autonomy.
The military rulers and political parties in West Pakistan could not countenance
this. After unsuccessful negotiations, the Awami League leader was arrested and
imprisoned. A ruthless military crackdown began on 25 March 1971.

The authorities declared martial law and unleashed severe repression to suppress
the agitation. Within months, the flood of refugees fleeing into India from East
Pakistan swelled to several millions. This massive influx into the border districts of
West Bengal created severe inflammatory complications-communal, demographic
and of revenge. It became impossible for India to cope with such a vast refugee
problem. The Indian Government initiated immediate diplomatic action to apprise
world opinion of the atrocities being perpetrated in East Pakistan, to mobilise
pressure to persuade Pakistan to stop the genocide and to create conditions for
the refugees to go back. Initial responses were tardy. Eventually the international
media's poignant accounts of the genocide awakened the conscience of the world.
But attention focussed more on mobilising humanitarian relief than on creating
the political conditions for the refugees to return. The ensuing months witnessed
considerable diplomatic activity but achieved little to meet India's basic
requirement that the refugees must go back. During this period, three
developments took place gradually.

The first was that groups of refugees coalesced in the refugee camps, thirsting for
revenge against the West Pakistani troops who had despoiled their womenfolk
and destroyed their homes. These groups came to be called the 'Mukti Bahini' -
the freedom fighters - whose aim became to liberate East Bengal from the
tyranny of West Pakistan and declare their homeland, Bangladesh, as an
independant state. The core of the military wing were East Bengali officers and
soldiers who had either deserted or been retrenched from the Pakistan Army for
suspected disloyalty. The core of the naval wing were East Bengali officers and
sailors who had deserted or whose services had been dispensed with. Both wings
operated from their camps in India. In the months prior to December, their
guerrilla activity caused considerable dislocation by damaging power stations,
bridges, communication systems, port facilities and shipping.

The second development was the evolution of contingency plans in the Indian
Armed Forces for countering a military attack by Pakistan and consideration of
whether and when a military operation could be mounted in the East to help the
emergence of Bangladesh and thereby enable the refugees to go back. As regards
the latter, no military activity could be envisaged in East Pakistan until the end of
the year, well after the monsoon wetness had dried out. As regards the former, it
was expected that, as in 1965, Pakistan would initiate hostilities with a
preemptive attack in the West. Pakistan's strategic concept had always been that
the defence of East Pakistan lay not in the East but in posing a threat on India's
border in the west.

The third development was the change in geopolitical alignments. To resolve its
stalemate in Vietnam, the US decided in 1971 to establish links with China.
Pakistan, who was not only a CENTO and SEATO ally of America but also had
close relations with China, helped the US to establish links with China. In
gratitude, the US stance in the latter half of 1971 was pronouncedly pro Pakistan
and anti India. To counter balance this US tilt, India concluded in August 1971, a
Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union which had been under discussion since
1969.

INDIA'S RESPONSE TO THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN EAST

PAKISTAN

After the hijacking and public burning of the Indian Airlines F 27 aircraft in
January 1971, India banned all Pakistan International Airlines flights between
West and East Pakistan from overflying India. Thereafter communications and
military reinforcements were either by sea or, if by air, via Ceylon.

The political crisis in East Pakistan climaxed on the night of 25/26 March 1971
with the imposition of military rule. On 27 March, the Prime Minister met the
Defence Minister and the Chiefs of Staff. The Prime Minister asked for and was
given an appreciation of the military situation in East Pakistan Air Chief Marshal
PC Lal's memoirs state: (Page 152)

"While the military build up in the Eastern Wing was significant, there
 appeared to be no immediate danger to India from that quarter. All we
could do was to wait and see how matters developed".

In April, the refugees started flooding into the border districts of West Bengal,
bringing with them harrowing tales of massacre, rape and plunder. This steadily
increasing influx created a serious risk of communal riots, Air Chief Marshal PC
Lal's memoirs state: (ibid)

"Public opinion in India at that time was divided as to the action to be taken.
While everyone condemned the manner in which the Pakistan Government was
persecuting its own nationals, there were some who thought India should take
advantage of the disturbances in East Pakistan to neutralise that area militarily.
Obviously such a measure would have amounted to interference in the domestic
officers of another country and our Government did not give any support to it.
The official attitude was that the Pakistanis should themselves find a political
solution to their dispute. But that gave way to concern and eventually alarm, with
the increasing persecution of Bengalis, both Hindu and Muslim, who came pouring
into India, seeking sanctuary".

Shri KB Lall, the Defence Secretary in 1971, recalls:

"The basic problem with East Pakistan was the vast flood of refugees
entering India. Both Hindus and Muslims were fleeing from Pakistani
atrocities. The demographic composition of the border districts was getting
altered to the extent of the majority being of foreign origin. This was
viewed as dangerous in the long run for our territorial integrity. The
problem was two fold:

(a) Humanitarian.

(b) Facilitating the repatriation of refugees for safeguarding our

territorial integrity.

"The Prime Minister was under popular pressure to use force to secure the
repatriation of refugees to their country in safety and dignity. The Service
Chiefs and the Ministry of Defence said they were completely unprepared
for military intervention in East Pakistan because their attention had all
along been focussed on the frontier with West Pakistan. If it was felt that
military intervention could become unavoidable, the Defence Forces would
need time to ensure that such intervention was effective and successful. In
any case, no military operations were feasible during the monsoons. Hard
information would also be needed of East Pakistan's rivers, bridges and
roads to ensure the success of military intervention".

Lt Gen Jacob's memoirs state: (Page 35 et seq)

"At the beginning of April, the Army Chief called me on telephone to say
that the Government required Eastern Command to move immediately into
East Pakistan. I protested that this was impractical (because troops who
had earlier been trained for mountain operations would require to be
retrained for riverine operations. There were large, wide, tidal rivers, there
was no bridging equipment and the coming monsoons would make access
to unbridged rivers extremely difficult).

`General Manekshaw then asked by what date we would be ready. Provided

we got bridging and suitable weapons and equipment, I said, we could be
ready earliest by 15 November. This would leave adequate time after the
monsoon for the terrain to become passable. Manekshaw, upset and
impatient, replied that he would get back to me.

`Gen Manekshaw called again the next day, sounding very agitated, to say
that senior bureaucrats in the Government were accusing the Army of being
over cautious, if not cowardly. He said we should reconsider. I reiterated
my views and suggested that he could, if he so wished, tell the Government
that it was Eastern Command who were dragging their feet. This led to an
outburst of invective. Even so, it is to the credit of Gen Manekshaw that he
had the courage to uphold our stand and inform Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi accordingly."

General Manekshaw, in an interview to the naval magazine "Quarterdeck

1996" stated:

"Sometime in April, there was a cabinet meeting to which I was summoned.

Smt Gandhi was terribly angry and terribly upset because refugees were
pouring into West Bengal, into Assam and into Tripura. She said to me
`Look at this - so many are coming in - there is a telegram from the Chief
Minister of Assam, a telegram from ..........., what are you doing about it ?'

I said "Nothing. What has it to do with me ?"

She said `Can't you do something ? Why don't you do something ? I want
you to march in !'

I said `That means war' and she said `I don't mind if it is war'.

So I sat down and I said `Have you read the Bible?'

Sardar Swaran Singh said `What has the Bible got to do with it ?'

`In the first book, the first chapter, the first paragraph of the Bible, God
said "Let there be light and there was light" - so you feel that "Let there be
war and there is war". Are you ready ? I certainly am not ready.'

Then I said, `I will tell you what is happening. It is now the end of April. In
a few days time, 15 to 20 days time, the monsoon will break and in East
Pakistan when it rains, the rivers become like oceans. If you stand on one
side you can't see the other. I would be confined to the roads. The Air Force
would not be able to support me and the Pakistanis would thrash me -
that's one.

`Secondly my armoured division is in the Babina area, another division is in

the Secunderabad area. We are now harvesting. I will require every vehicle,
every truck, all the road space, all the railway space to move my soldiers
and you will not be able to move your crops and I turned to Shri Fakruddin
Ali Ahmed, the Agriculture Minister and said `if there is a famine in India,
they will blame you. I won't be there to take the blame'. Then I turned
around and said `My armoured division which is supposed to be my strike
force has got twelve tanks which are operational out of the whole lot'.

YB Chavan asked, `Sam, why only twelve ?'

`I said `Sir, because you are the Finance Minister. I have been asking,
been pleading, for months. You said you have got no money that's why.'

`Then I said "Prime Minister, if in 1962, your father had asked me as the
Army Chief and not Gen Thapar and your father had said "Throw the
Chinese out", I would have turned around and told him "Look, these are the
problems". Now I am telling you what the problems are. If you still want me
to go ahead, Prime Minister, I guarantee you 100 percent defeat. Now, you
give me your orders.'

Then Jagjivan Ram said `Sam, maan jao na'.

I said `I have given my professional view, now the Government must take
a decision'.

The Prime Minister didn't say anything. She was red in the face and said
"Achccha, cabinet char baje milenge'. Everybody walked out. I being the
juniormost, was the last to leave and I smiled at her.

`Chief, sit down'.

So I said `Prime Minister, before you open your mouth, do you want me to
send in my resignation on the grounds of mental health or physical ?'

She said `Oh, sit down Sam. Everything you told me is true ?'

`Yes. Look its my job to fight. It is my job to fight to win. Are you ready ?
Have you internally got everything ready ? Internationally, have you got
everything ready ? I don't think so. I know what you want, but I must do it
in my own time and I guarantee you 100 percent success. But I want to
 make it quite clear. There must be one Commander. I don't mind, I will
work under the BSF, the CRPF, under anybody you like. But I will not have
a Soviet telling me what to do and I must have one political master who will
give me instructions, I don't want the refugee ministry, home ministry,
defence ministry all telling me. Now, make up your mind'.

She said "All right Sam, nobody will interfere, you will be in command."

`Thank you. I guarantee you accomplishment'.

In response to a query about "the other two Chiefs, where did they come in
?", Gen Manekshaw said'.

`They were not in on the initial meeting. I had to brief them. I had to tell
them about it."

From the foregoing, it emerges that by end April 1971, the political decision had
been taken to prepare for military intervention in East Pakistan in the end of
1971, in case a satisfactory political situation had not been found by then.

Another critical factor in the timing of military operations in East Pakistan was
whether the Chinese would intervene. Most of the Himalayan passes would be
impossible to cross in December and January. Even in 1962, the Chinese had
declared a unilateral cease fire and withdrawn before the passes became
snowbound. As events developed in 1971, the timing of intervention gradually
narrowed down to end November - early December 1971.

THE PAKISTAN NAVY'S PERCEPTIONS AND PLANS

"The Story of the Pakistan Navy" states: (Pages 329 et seq)

`The political deadlock over the transfer of power from the Martial Law
administration to an elected government developed into full fledged insurgency in
East Pakistan in early 1971. The insurgency had India's full moral and material
support from the outset. It was India's strategic aim to exploit Pakistan's
predicament and the growing discontent in the eastern wing to its own
advantage, and cut Pakistan to size.

`In March 1971, the Government directed that all East Pakistan defence
personnel were to be segregated and taken off active duties. The Pakistan Navy
lost a third of its personnel, the worst affected being engine room, electrical and
domestic branches. This led to numerous desertions, including those from the
elite SSG group.

`India made the political decision as early as April 1971 to provide assistance to
the irregulars of the Mukti Bahini who were operating frequently from bases
across the border against the Pakistani forces. India was directly involved both in
providing intensive training to volunteers of Mukti Bahini and in launching a
campaign of sabotage against strategic facilities and installations such as power
stations, communication systems and ships in Chittagong harbour.

`The success of Pakistan's counter-plans hinged largely on reinforcements and

resupply of the eastern theatre of war by sea which could only be accomplished
by a strong Navy capable of breaking India's naval blockade. The possible effects
of a blockade of Pakistan's seaports by the Indian Navy had all along been
vigorously brought to the notice of the Government. However, such a force had
not been developed although plans for a two-flotilla Navy (one each based in the
two wings) had been put up to the Government as early as 1949. The plans
unfortunately had become victim of seemingly endless bureaucratic indifference
and of vague concepts such as "the defence of East Pakistan lies in the West" and
"a short, sharp war" which stood in the way of the Pakistan Navy's expansion and
reorganisation from the early fifties.

`The Navy continued to be accorded a lower priority, and the fleet was allowed to
degenerate into a shrinking force quite incapable of taking on the task of
providing protection to the sea lines of communication between the two wings.
The addition of three Daphne class submarines to the fleet in the late sixties was
the only redeeming feature. However, their limited endurance confined them to
duties in the Arabian Sea. The Navy particularly lacked an air reconnaissance
capability which was to prove a significant factor in the outcome of the 1971 war.

`The mission of the Navy in the event of a war was visualised as a very limited
one:

(a) Seaward defence of the ports of Karachi, Chittagong and Chalna.

(b) Limited protection of the shipping traffic from the Persian Gulf to West
Pakistan.

`The entire sea-going fleet (with the exception of the submarines), under the
command of the Flotilla Commander, was required to maintain maritime
superiority in waters of interest to West Pakistan. The submarines were under the
direct control of NHQ. In the east, only four gun boats were available for
operations against the Indian carrier group in the Bay of Bengal when the war
started. Thus the Indians enjoyed preponderance in the Bay.

`As the crisis deepened, the shortfall in the Pakistan Navy's manpower and
operational capacity could be clearly seen as a major limiting factor. The situation
became critical when Bengali personnel belonging to East Pakistan had to be
assigned duties which would not place the fighting capacity of the Navy in
jeopardy, and the Service was depleted by over 30 percent of its strength to all
intents and purposes. The technical cadres were particularly adversely affected.
`Keeping in view the state of the fleet, even in its limited role, the Pakistan Navy
was confronted with serious handicaps. Firstly, there was the preponderant
strength of the Indian Fleet to reckon with. Secondly, there was virtually no
defence against a possible missile attack from India's Osa boats. Thirdly, heavy
reliance had to be placed on air support which in fact was not available, and in
any case identifying the Osa boats from the air at great height, especially at
night, was an insurmountable proposition. It was envisaged that a conventional
attack on Karachi harbour would draw the fleet out into deeper waters, making it
vulnerable to interception by the enemy.

`About three months before the actual outbreak of hostilities on 15 September

1971, NHQ issued an emergency directive to the fleet placing it at a high level of
operational preparedness. This meant ensuring availability of the maximum
number of fighting units and putting them on high alert to go to war. The
dockyard at Karachi was called upon on to provide round-the-clock refit/repair
facility and mobile repair parties were detailed to provide on-the-spot repair
service to ships in anchorages outside Karachi harbour. The floating dock was
positioned outside Karachi to ure availability of alternative repair facilities'.

THE INDIAN ARMY'S PLAN TO CAPTURE KHULNA AND CHITTAGONG

In his book, Lt Gen Jacob states: (Page 65 et seq)

"At the beginning of August, Gen Manekshaw, accompanied by the Director of

Military Operations, Maj Gen KK Singh, came to Fort William to discuss the draft
operation instruction sent a few days earlier. The aim stated therein was to take
as much territory as possible, with the ports of Khulna and Chittagong as prime
objectives. Dacca was not even mentioned. This implied liberating large enough
areas for setting up a free Bangladesh Government.

"At the meeting, held in the operations room, Manekshaw, KK Singh, Arora and I
were present. Sam Manekshaw let his DMO do all the talking. KK Singh spelt out
the objectives, maintaining that if we captured Khulna and Chittagong, what he
termed the entry ports, the war would come to an end. Further, Khulna was the
key and the 'weight' of our main attack should be directed at Khulna. The
Hardinge bridge was also to be secured. Both Manekshaw and Arora nodded
approvingly but I was flabbergasted. I got up to explain that in the event of
hostilities, we should utilise our naval superiority and have an effective naval
blockade in place. Next, Khulna was only a minor port; the main anchorage lay
several miles downstream, at Mangla/Chalna. Cargoes for Khulna were off-loaded
into light river craft for transportation to Khulna. There were several tidal rivers,
unbridged, between our border and Khulna. The terrain restricted manoeuvre as,
intersected by several subsidiary water channels, it narrowed down considerably.
As far as Chittagong was concerned, it was well east of the main centre of
gravity, almost peripheral.

"I maintained that the geopolitical heart of East Pakistan was Dacca and that if we
wanted to ensure control of East Pakistan, it was imperative that we capture
Dacca. At this stage Gen Manekshaw intervened saying 'Sweetie' (an expression
he used to precede a mild or harsh rebuke), 'don't you see that if we take Khulna
and Chittagong, Dacca will automatically fall?' I said I did not and reiterated that
Dacca should be the key objective. There were further exchanges between the
DMO and myself. Dacca, both Manekshaw and Singh maintained, was not a
priority and no troops were being allotted for its capture. Arora agreed with them
and maintained this view till 30 November. Eventually Manekshaw said he was
prepared to make one change, namely that he would delete the word 'weight' in
connection with the main thrust to Khulna. The meeting then ended."

During my discussions with Lt Gen Jacob, I enquired whether the Army's plan
envisaged any participation by the Navy in the taking of the ports of Khulna and
Chittagong. He said that no naval participation was envisaged - these ports were
to be taken by the Army. In his book, General Jacob stages: (Page 62)

"I had earlier asked the FOC in C Eastern Naval Command, Vice Admiral Krishnan,
whether we could use his landing craft to ferry troops across the River Meghna.
Krishnan and Commander Dabir, who had brought one of them (the GULDAR) to
Calcutta in June, stated that the landing craft, of Russian origin, were unsuitable
because of their draught. The question of crossing the River Meghna had to be
shelved and we shifted our attention to the possibility of obtaining additional
helicopters."

CHAPTER 8

THE EVOLUTION OF THE NAVY'S PLAN OF OPERATIONS

When the military crackdown occurred in East Pakistan on 25 March 1971, the
Eastern Naval Command deployed a few ships on patrol across the sea lane to
Chittagong and Khulna. Soon thereafter, in April 1971, Ceylon requested India's
help to quell an imminent leftist uprising. It was suspected that North Korean
merchant ships were ferrying arms to the insurgents. The Navy reacted swiftly
and silently. Ships of the Western Fleet patrolled Ceylon's west coast remaining
out of sight. A frigate entered Colombo harbour to act as communication link.
Ships from Visakhapatnam patrolled Ceylon's east coast, also remaining out of
sight. After a few weeks, the crisis blew over and ships returned to their base
ports. This was the Navy's first ever deployment in support of foreign policy to
assist neighbours in distress. Its successful outcome made a significant impact in
the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs.

From the naval side however, the ships which had participated in this operation
needed several weeks in harbour to catch up on their maintenance which had
been planned for the first half of 1971. In his book "No Way But Surrender" Vice
Admiral Krishnan states: (Page 17)

"Our ships were in a fairly bad way, as they had to do a considerable

amount of steaming at high speeds in connection with the operations off
Ceylon in response to that Government's appeal for help. To get them all
operational in the time available would need an all out effort".

In May, Naval Headquarters started formulating the tasks to be assigned to the

Western and Eastern Naval Commands and deciding the allocation of forces.
These tasks had to derive from the capabilities and limitations of the ships,
submarines and aircraft at that point in time. The Navy's success in December
1971 was the outcome of the altogether unexpected way in which these tasks
eventually synthesised.

Taking the Offensive

In so far as the Navy's role was concerned, Admiral Nanda recalls that in the
meetings of the Chiefs of Staff with the Prime Minister, discussions mainly centred
on the Army and the Air Force. After each meeting, the Prime Minister would
politely ask the Naval Chief whether he had anything to say and Admiral Nanda
would say no. To him, this was a clear indication that not even the Prime Minister
expected the Navy to make any significant contribution to the forthcoming
operations. Admiral Nanda resolved that the Navy had to prove its mettle this
time.

Admiral Nanda recalls that when he asked his staff in Naval Headquarters what
the Pakistan Navy was likely to do, the reply was that they would not seek action
on the high seas but would remain under Pakistan Air Force air cover for the
defence of Karachi, which was West Pakistan's only sea port. When he asked
them what the Western Fleet should do, the reply was that it should deploy for
the defence of Saurashtra and Bombay to prevent a hit and run raid of the kind
that took place on Dwarka in 1965. In Admiral Nanda's view, such defensive
deployment of our Navy was not acceptable. He was determined that the Navy's
frustration in 1965 at not having achieved anything significant should not recur.

The basic concept that emerged was straightforward: to take the offensive, attack
Karachi, entice the Pakistan fleet to battle - and cut the sea line of communication
between West and East Pakistan.

The Deployment of the VIKRANT

Since June 1970, the aircraft carrier VIKRANT had been lying immobilised in
Bombay due to serious cracks and leaks that had developed in the water drum of
A1 boiler. Subsequent radiographic examination revealed that the water drums of
the remaining three boilers also had a large number of internal fatigue cracks and
fissures at each of the circumferential rivetted joints that were beyond repair by
welding. It was clear that long term repairs to VIKRANT's boilers were not feasible
indigenously. Orders were placed in Britain for the supply of four new water
drums. Naval Headquarters directed that the boilers were not to be used till
further orders. A1 boiler was blanked off.

Eventually, on 26 Feb 71, the ship made a `cold move' from the Ballard Pier
Extension to the anchorage. The objective was to flash up each boiler at reduced
steam pressure and try out the main and flight deck machinery which had been
lying idle for seven months. The boilers were first flashed up on 1 Mar 71 and
`Basin Trials' upto 40 RPM (ahead and astern) were carried out, after securing
the ship to E1 Buoy. Fast pullout catapult trials were also completed on the same
day. The catapult steam supply modification in the forward machinery room was
tried out and found to be fully satisfactory. As events were to prove later in the
1971 war, without this modification the Seahawks could not have been launched
at 160 RPM. The ship proceeded to sea for Preliminary Sea Trials on 18 Mar 71
and returned on 20 Mar 71. She went to sea again on 26 Apr, returning the next
day.

As a result of these sea trials, it was considered technically feasible to operate the
boilers at 400 psi pressure thereby restricting the ships speed to 14 knots,
maximum revolutions 120 ahead and 60 revolutions astern.

In May 1971, when Naval Headquarters started working on the concept of

operations, the first problem that needed deciding was what to do with VIKRANT.
Admiral Nanda recalls:

"When the circumstances became clear that we may have to go to war, there was
a feeling that we should leave VIKRANT in Bombay harbour. I said "No, because
during the 1965 war also, VIKRANT was sitting in Bombay harbour and did not go
out to sea. If in the 1971 war the same thing happens, VIKRANT would be called
a white elephant and Naval Aviation would be written off. VIKRANT has to be seen
as being operational, even if we do not fly the aircraft.

"There has been this fear, and probably rightly so, that if the VIKRANT gets
torpedoed or if VIKRANT sinks, the Navy and India will lose a lot of prestige.
Therefore to send VIKRANT to sea was a difficult decision for anybody to take.
One had to take cognisance of the facts. These were that VIKRANT's boiler had a
crack and therefore the speed of the ship was restricted. That the ship may not
be in a position to fly aircraft or operate the catapult. Then I asked the question
"If we operate on three boilers, what will happen ?" The answer given was that
"we may not be able to catapult the aircraft." So knowing the decision had been
taken not to fly aircraft, I asked "Are we able to at least steam? Not at the speed
required for catapulting aircraft, but at steaming speed ?" And I got the staff to
agree that she could steam. So I said "Alright, let her steam". We sent the
VIKRANT out from Bombay.

In his book, Vice Admiral Krishnan states: (Page 8 et seq)

"There were many in the service, some of them very senior officers, who
considered VIKRANT a liability in any war with Pakistan. They argued that
deployment of the VIKRANT involved certain inherent risks, especially from
underwater threats, so considerable escort effort would be required. Many
doubted her exact role in a war with Pakistan. Some even went to the
extent of suggesting that the VIKRANT should take no part in the war but
should be tucked away inside Cochin. I am not suggesting that the
pessimists did not have sufficient grounds for their misgivings. There was
an overwhelming body of professional opinion that considered that
steaming the VIKRANT in her current state was not a risk worth taking.

"Secondly, in any war at sea, VIKRANT would obviously be the most

worthwhile target for the enemy. The three Daphne class submarines,
newly acquired by Pakistan from France and fully operational, posed a great
potential threat to the carrier. The sophistication of their detection
capability as well as the homing devices of their torpedoes were such that
once the ship was picked up and the screen of escorts pierced, the VIKRANT
would stand in mortal danger. Even as many as six escorts would not
guarantee any complete immunity to the carrier.

"Morale and psychological factors weighed just as heavily in the minds of all
of us. If VIKRANT were to be sunk, it would represent a victory of the first
magnitude to the enemy, just as it would represent a national disaster to
us. VIKRANT was the core round which our Fleet was built and her loss
would be something too terrible to contemplate. Ever since we had acquired
the carrier, she had come in for severe criticism and much controversy,
invariably to her detriment. But we were not concerned at public criticism
alone. Obviously as professional men in positions of responsibility, we would
not send any ship into battle unless we were satisfied that it would be worth
our while to do so."

A characteristic of Admiral Nanda's style of leadership was that whenever he was

confronted with a vexed problem, he would go down to where the ships were, sit
down with those he considered knowledgeable about the problem, listen carefully
to all views, ask basic commonsense questions and gradually evolve workable
solutions, making it clear that the responsibility for the final decision would be
his. He would then go back to Naval Headquarters, discuss the suggested
solutions with the Naval Staff and quantify the risks and the benefits on a
commonsense basis. This helped to arrive at a consensus in the formulation of
which each one felt that his concerns had been considered, that as much care as
possible had to be taken to minimise the risks and that should things go wrong,
then everyone knew that no single individual could be blamed. In May 1971,
Admiral Nanda personally chaired numerous discussions on the VIKRANT
problem.

After careful consideration at all levels, it was decided to auxiliary steam the
remaining three boilers for 500 hours and thereafter take a further set of
radiographs to study the behaviour of the cracks. This trial proved encouraging as
there was no evidence of any deterioration. In June 1971, it was decided to carry
out sea trials. To allay the watchkeepers' fears of the boilers bursting, heavy
safety harnesses of steel were designed and strapped over the water drums of
the remaining three boilers. As a further precautionary measure, observation
windows were fitted to detect traces of steam leaks that could occur in the initial
stages of rupturing. To balance the forcing rates of the forward boiler and
minimise the pressure fluctuations when launching aircraft, a modification had
been carried out on the main steam range that enabled the two boilers aft to be
cross connected to the catapult steam accumulator. By end June, it was clear that
the sea trials had been successful. As a measure of abundant precaution, Naval
Headquarters restricted VIKRANT's speed to 14 knots.

THE EVOLUTION OF PLANS IN EASTERN NAVAL COMMAND

In his book, Admiral Krishnan states: (Page 7)

"On 10 June, Admiral Nanda asked me to meet him at Bangalore where he

was the chief guest at an Air Force ceremonial parade. We talked at length
on the tasks ahead. All our discussions stemmed from one overriding
thought, a firm conviction, bordering on an obsession, that should war
come, the Navy should throw everything it had into battle and our entire
strategy from the very onset of hostilities should be one of bold offensive.
We must scrap, erase and wipe off from our minds any ideas of a defensive
posture, we must seek action, taking any risks that were necessary and
destroy the enemy in his ports and at sea. There was never any difference
of opinion between us over the fact that it would be a calculated risk well
worth taking in putting our only aircraft carrier to fullest use in the war. It
was the pleasantest of surprises when Nanda told me that VIKRANT would
be assigned to the Eastern Naval Command and deployed in the Eastern
theatre, along with two gun ships of the BRAHMAPUTRA class, two ships of
the Petya class and one submarine. With this was conceived the entity of an
`Eastern Fleet."

"The aircraft carrier INS VIKRANT and INS BRAHMAPUTRA and INS BEAS
were transferred from the Western Fleet to the East Coast. The main naval
battles and activity would take place in the North Arabian Sea. At the time,
I felt that this depletion in the Western Command's Fleet strength and fire
 power was not justified and I vehemently protested in writing to my Chief of
the Naval Staff."

In his book, Vice Admiral Krishnan has elaborated the thought process which led
to his concept of operations which Naval Headquarters later approved. In brief, it
was to strangle the Pakistan Army's supply line from West Pakistan to the East
Pakistan ports of Chittagong, Cox's Bazar and the Chalna-Khulna-Mongla river
port complex. This was to be achieved by attacking these ports from seaward,
apprehension/destruction of Pakistan merchant ships and amphibious landings if
required. Any movements out of East Bengal by sea would be prevented.

His detailed analysis was as follows: (Pages 19, 26 et seq)

"The aim is `To destroy the enemy's maritime forces deployed in support of
his military operations in East Bengal and to deny all sustenance from
reaching the enemy from the sea. This aim would involve keeping under the
most careful surveillance the area of a triangle with a base of 270 miles and
two sides of 165 and 225 miles, involving 18,000 square miles. Apart from
actual surveillance, each merchant ship in this area would have to be
challenged, identified and boarded. If neutral and carrying contraband, the
ship would have to be escorted to the nearest Indian port. If Pakistani, she
would be boarded, captured and taken in as a war prize. Ships that refused
to stop would have to be forced to do so. The main task would be the
isolation of Chittagong. This would mean physical attack on this port from
the sea and the air. The responsibility for this, it had been agreed with the
Army and Air Force would be, in the main, that of the Navy".

"The forces allotted to me to carry out the tasks were pitifully limited. The
VIKRANT would naturally be the core, the nucleus round which the Eastern
Fleet (yet to be formed) would revolve. The surface ships allotted to me
were BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS, KAMORTA and KAVARATTI. One fleet
submarine, KHANDERI was also to be mine. I felt that they were quite
inadequate to fulfil the tasks ahead and also that we would be under-
insuring the safety of the VIKRANT.

"The problem of VIKRANT's security was a serious one and brought forth
several headaches. By very careful appreciation of the submarine threat, we
had come to the definite conclusion that the enemy was bound to deploy
the submarine GHAZI against us in the Bay of Bengal with the sole aim of
destroying our aircraft carrier VIKRANT. The threat from the GHAZI was a
considerable one. Apart from the lethal advantage at the pre-emptive
stage, VIKRANT's approximate position would become known once she
commenced operating aircraft in the vicinity of the East Bengal coast. Of
the four surface ships available, one ( the KAVARATTI ) had no sonar and
unless the other three were continually in close company with VIKRANT (
within a radius of 5 to 10 miles ), the carrier would be completely
vulnerable to attack from the GHAZI, which could take up her position
 surreptitiously and, at leisure await her opportunity. Even assuming that no
operational defects developed, it would still be necessary to withdraw ships
from the area of operations for fuelling. The basic problem was that if
reasonable anti submarine protection had to be provided to VIKRANT and
the escort ships had be in close company for this purpose, then how were
18,000 square miles to be kept under surveillance? We had decided to
commit the entire striking power of VIKRANT's aircraft to offensive
operations against enemy ships and installations and could not, therefore,
afford the luxury of aerial surveillance.

"Having appreciated Pakistan's difficulties and having assessed our own, we

decided that in preparing our plan, we would rely much more on deception
and other measures against the GHAZI and ignore the air threat, in the
hope that Pakistani aircraft would be fully committed against our Air Force
and the land battle, and would be chary of operations over the sea."

THE OPERATIONAL PLAN OF EASTERN NAVAL COMMAND

The following tasks emerged from this analysis: (ibid Page 28)

(a) Attack from the sea on Chittagong harbour.

(b) Attack from the sea on harbours at Cox's Bazar, Chalna, Khulna and
Mongla.

(c) Destruction of enemy shipping off the ports and on the seas.

(d) Subsequent and similar offensive actions on opportunity targets.

(e) Diversionary or real amphibious landings.

The submarine, KHANDERI, was planned to be deployed across the shipping lane
from south of Ceylon to Chittagong. It would be tasked to attack Pakistani naval
ships and merchant ships and provide intelligence of Pakistani maritime forces.

The three Landing Ships, the old MAGAR and the two new ones, GHARIAL and
GULDAR from Russia, were formed into a logistic squadron and tasked for general
support duties until required for an amphibious landing.

The old British destroyer, RAJPUT, which had been de-commissioned and sent to
Visakhapatnam for disposal, had been rejuvenated locally to impart basic
seamanship training to newly recruited sailors. She was made seaworthy and
tasked for general patrol duties

Of the three Russian P class patrol boats, INS PANVEL, was fitted with two 40mm
guns and deployed for offensive patrols in the riverine approaches to the Khulna-
Mongla-Chalna river port complex. PULICAT and PANAJI were tasked for local
patrols, together with the seaward defence boat, AKSHAY.

In July, FOCINCEAST proceeded to New Delhi with his analysis and plan for
detailed discussions. By and large, all his submissions found favour. The Chief of
the Naval Staff gave him the go ahead to implement the plan should the need
arise. He was also authorised to commence a dialogue with his opposite numbers
in the Eastern theatre, the GOCINC, Eastern Command and the AOCINC, Eastern
Air Command.

VIKRANT'S PASSAGE TO THE EAST COAST

On 23 July VIKRANT sailed in company with the Western Fleet to Cochin.

Lieutenant Commander (later Vice Admiral) B Bhushan was the Senior Engineer
of VIKRANT. He recalls:

"Even our eventual sailing for Cochin was not without some `hiccups'.
Shortly after leaving harbour, we found that one of our boiler feed water
tanks was contaminated and as a consequence, we were very short of
usable feed water. A `council of war' was held. The Commander (E) asked
me whether we should go on, or ask the Command to go back to harbour. I
reported that our seawater distilling plants were finally producing clear
water and unless something drastic happened, we should be able to build
up our feed water reserves in due course. It was decided to go ahead and
take a final decision after a few hours. The rest, of course, is history."

After an intensive shake down en route, VIKRANT carried out Seaking landing
trials before entering Cochin on 26 July. She sailed on 28 Jul for radar and
communication trials, on completion of which she departed for Madras, escorted
by BRAHMAPUTRA and BEAS.

At the very outset, a short sea trial off Madras proved that a speed of 16 knots at
maximum revolutions 140 could be maintained for short periods, without causing
undue strain on the three boilers. This restored confidence in the ship's
machinery, which was operating under limitations.

Admiral Nanda recalls:-

"Next the question arose, was VIKRANT capable of flying? So I spoke to

Vice Admiral Krishnan and told him I am going to come and see VIKRANT
and I would like him to accompany me on board. We had a long discussion
on board between Captain Parkash the Commanding Officer of the VIKRANT
(Capt S Prakash), FOCINCEAST (Admiral Krishnan) and myself."
Captain (later Vice Admiral) S Parkash recalls:-

"A very serious discussion took place regarding the role of VIKRANT if
hostilities were to take place. I told CNS and the C in C that "My biggest
concern is that we have an aircraft carrier and we cannot fly any aircraft. I
have got the most dedicated aircrew on board. Can you imagine their
morale if I were to just sit in Madras or show off some time at sea. How do
we tackle this situation?" They said "Well, you are restricted in speed. Try
and make the best of it". So I said "I have done that already. Whenever the
fresh breeze in the afternoon starts giving me an extra 10 knots, I do carry
out rollers with Alizes. To start with, what I want is permission for them to
hook on and finally to embark the Alize Squadron, so that at least in a given
period during a day, I can carry out flying which will make all the difference
to the morale of the ship. Can I make a signal to Naval Headquarters asking
approval to hook on an Alize"? I distinctly remember CNS' reply "Parkash,
who in Naval Headquarters is going to give you permission to embark an
Alize with your speed restriction? If you think you can hook an Alize on
board, let me know, then I will give you permission to embark". The
conversation stopped there. He flew back to Delhi.

"At this point of time, it was evident that some semblance of flying
operations was possible only if two factors could be resolved:

(a) Steam the second forward boiler at full load to achieve a higher
speed.

(b) Accept launch and recovery of aircraft under marginal speed

conditions.

"Commander (E) (later Vice Admiral) BR Chowdhury, who had earlier done
two stints on board the VIKRANT, was my Engineer Officer. With his past
experience and professional competence, his contribution to decision-
making at this crucial juncture was important. In his view:

(a) The behaviour of the machinery on passage from Bombay to

Madras had given Engine Room personnel considerable confidence to
steam the three boilers de-unitised. This alone was the deciding factor
to use the remaining three boilers to full load capacity, so as to build
up speed to operate aircraft under marginal conditions.

(b) The second and more important factor was whether flying
operations should be risked under marginal conditions? This would
call for extraordinary skills on the part of the pilots as a matter of
routine.

"The embarked aircrew were well experienced and the willingness of the
pilots, in this instance, was overwhelming and exemplary. Their professional
 excellence and resolution to go to war was indeed contagious and
creditable. Thus the overall risks involved were calculated and a decision
was taken eventually to hook an Alize aircraft on board. This was
successful. In due course, NHQ signalled approval to embark more Alizes
and later the Seahawk squadron".

WORK UP FOR WAR

Between August and October, the Captain of VIKRANT worked up his group of
ships. At first, a few of the slower Alize aircraft landed and were launched. Then
Seahawk fighter aircraft were landed and launched. Slowly but surely all aircraft
were worked up for operational tasks.

In mid September, FOCINCEAST embarked in VIKRANT off Visakhapatnam. His

book states: (Page 31)

"I took the ships out to sea and took them through a gruelling pace
culminating in a simulated fleet attack on Visakhapatnam. But I was far
from satisfied either with the efficiency attained by the fleet working as a
whole or with the defences of Visakhapatnam. There was a lot of leeway to
be made up, so even more intensive programmes were drawn up."

On 24 September, Naval Headquarters issued its Operational Directive giving

FOCINCEAST the following tasks:

-Destruction of enemy forces and shipping

-Strike enemy ports and bases and, where possible, provide support to
ground forces

-Deny access to East Bengal of ships of all nations, by contraband control

and/or blockade when ordered

-Secure own ports and bases, including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Rear Admiral SH Sarma was appointed FOCEF designate and arrived

Visakhapatnam on 14 October.

In mid October, Naval Headquarters signalled that Pakistan may launch a pre-
emptive attack. All ships interrupted their maintenance and came to immediate
readiness. The alarm receded. After further work up in October, ships participated
in the second phase of tactical exercises, culminating in a mock attack on
Visakhapatnam during the night of 26/27 October. VIKRANT returned to Madras
to resume maintenance.
The Eastern Fleet was formally constituted on 1 November 1971. On 6 November,
the Chief of the Naval Staff embarked for a day's exercises. All ships sailed from
Madras on 13 November and assembled in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The
intention was that in the final stages, when hostilities were imminent, the Fleet,
and especially the VIKRANT, would be secreted away at a remote anchorage, with
no means of communication with the outside world, where ships could complete
their readiness. Concurrently, deception messages started being originated to
give everybody the impression that VIKRANT was still operating between Madras
and Visakhapatnam. The submarine, KHANDERI, was sailed for her patrol area in
mid November with orders to return to harbour on 14 December.

The other measures taken to sustain operations in remote waters were:

(a) The ballast tanks of the old World War II landing ship MAGAR were
modified to carry furnace fuel oil to supply to VIKRANT in distant
anchorages.

(b) VIKRANT provided her escorts with fuel, water, bread and workshop
facilities.

On 21 November, Indian and Pakistan troops clashed at Bayra in East Pakistan.

On 22 November, FOC-IN-C EAST proceeded to Delhi, where all the Commanders
in Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force briefed the three Service Chiefs and the
Defence Minister on their Command's plan for war. That night President Yahya
Khan of Pakistan announced that he would be away fighting a war in the next ten
days. On 23 November, a state of Emergency was declared in Pakistan. On 2
December, the Eastern Fleet sailed towards its patrol area in anticipation of
Pakistani preemptive attack.

THE EVOLUTION OF PLANS IN WESTERN NAVAL COMMAND

In his book "We Dared", Admiral Kohli states: (Page 100)

"The objectives of the 1971 action as defined by the Chiefs of Staff and by
each respective Service Chief was to gain as much ground as possible in the
East, to neutralise the Pakistani forces there to the extent we could, and to
establish a base, as it were, for a possible State of Bangladesh. In the West,
the objective was to hold the Pakistani forces. It was realized that the war
could not go on indefinitely, not so much because of limitations of
manpower or aircraft but because the UN Security Council and other
influential bodies were bound to intervene. It was realized that any
territories that might be gained in the West would, most likely, as earlier,
have to be handed back to Pakistan at the end of the fighting."
The assessment of the naval threat in the West was straightforward. It was not
expected that the Pakistan Navy would deploy its destroyers or frigates in East
Pakistan because they would get bottled up. The Pakistan Fleet would therefore
be deployed in defence of Karachi and the Makran coast.It was not expected that
it would venture outside of the air cover provided by the Pakistan Air Force. Of
their four submarines, (the older but recently refitted, American loaned GHAZI
and three new French Daphne class submarines HANGOR, SHUSHUK and
MANGRO), only the bigger GHAZI had the endurance to reach the Bay of Bengal
and operate there. The smaller Daphne class submarines were expected to be
deployed offensively, off Bombay, off the Saurashtra coast and against the Indian
Fleet if they could find it.

Comparative Strengths of Opposing Naval Forces

In his book, Admiral Kohli states: (Page 33)

"On a comparative basis the Pakistani surface units were no more modern
than ours. The fire power of their destroyers could be considered to be
marginally superior to ours.

"Where the Pakistan Navy scored over the Indian Navy was in their
submarine arm. The French Daphne class of submarines are the most
modern conventional submarines with sensors and armament which are far
superior to not only our submarines but also our anti-submarine frigates."

THE OPERATIONAL PLAN OF WESTERN NAVAL COMMAND

The gist of Admiral Kohli's plan, as recoreded in his book was as follows: (Pages
36 et seq)

"The main thrust of the Western Naval Command Plan was to engage and
destroy as many Pakistani main naval units as possible. Their destruction
would deny the Pakistan Navy any chance to interfere with our trade or to
mount any bombardment attacks on our homeland. If the search for their
units meant approaching Karachi where they would be on patrol, we would
have to take the risk.

"The second and complementary aim was to attack Karachi and to carry out
a bombardment of Gwadar and Pasni and along the coast up to Karachi to
create panic in the minds of the coastal populations and weaken confidence
in their Navy and Government. A blockade of Karachi was to be instituted to
prevent petroleum and petroleum products and other essential supplies
needed in war from reaching Karachi.
"The Western Fleet was given a broad directive to seek and destroy enemy
warships, protect our merchant shipping, deny sealanes to enemy shipping
and render ineffective the maritime line of communication between West
Pakistan and East Pakistan to prevent any reinforcements from reaching the
beleaguered Pakistani forces at that end.

"A submarine patrol was to be instituted off Karachi to sink their warships
and merchant ships proceeding to Karachi.

"Elaborate plans were made to deal with the threat from the Pakistani
midget submarines and chariots, which could be carried on board merchant
ships, warships or large dhows and be released in the vicinity of Bombay
harbour. Liaison was established with police, fishermen and port authorities
to report any such activity. The water around our ships in the stream was
floodlit to enable sentries on board to see any approaching underwater craft
carrying limpet mines. To deter chariots, special two-pound charges were
dropped frequently by harbour patrol boats and craft.

"To destroy the enemy's main units and harbour installations, it was
intended to launch an operation to attack Karachi from Bombay on the first
day of a war. The Fleet would then launch their attack with missile boats on
the second day from a south-westerly direction. After observing the
outcome of these attacks, a third attack would be launched from Bombay.

"The plan provided for `War Stations' for different naval forces to which
they were to proceed in time for effective offensive action as and when
hostilities became imminent.

"The Western Fleet comprised the cruiser MYSORE, the 15th Frigate
Squadron TRISHUL and TALWAR, the 14th Frigate Squadron KHUKRI,
KUTHAR and KIRPAN, BETWA (an anti aircraft frigate) KADMATT (a Russian
Petya), RANJIT (an old destroyer) DEEPAK (a tanker), SAGARDEEP (a
requisitioned lighthouse tender) and two missile boats VIJETA and VINASH.

"The special task group for the missile attacks on Karachi comprised KILTAN
and KATCHALL (Russian Petyas) and four missile boats. TIR (a training
frigate), DARSHAK, INVESTIGATOR and SUTLEJ (survey ships) were utilised
for towing missile boats to and from Saurashtra. CAUVERY and KISTNA
(training frigates) were used for coastal patrol.

"All the smaller patrol craft, seaward defence boats and requisitioned dhows
were used for harbour patrols and limited seaward patrol.

"Three Super Constellations were available for maritime reconnaissance.

Surveillance of the coastal belt would be carried out by two IL-14 aircraft
operating from Santa Cruz. The medium-range surveillance would be
carried out by the Navy using Alize aircraft.
Offensive Utilisation of Missile Boats

"For the defence of Bombay and other major ports, the small Russian Osa
class missile boats would by their mere presence deter the enemy from
embarking on an attack. These boats had started arriving from Russia in
Calcutta in early 1971 and had to be towed to Bombay.

"The idea of towing these boats to Karachi first found expression among the
young officers who were involved in towing of these boats to Bombay. An
important aspect which needed experiment and research was the maximum
speed at which then boats could be towed. A new `necklace' and towing
pendant were tried out for towing fully laden boats with full fuel, armament
and personnel. The Dockyard manufactured strengthened elbows on the
rear struts to divide the towing strain over a wider area. Also deeply
discussed was whether the propellers should be free or secured during the
tow and the effect this would have on the engines.

"An advance base with fuelling facilities was set up at Okha, for use before
hostilities commenced, to deter another exploit by Pakistan like the 1965
bombardment of Dwarka. It was accepted however that on commencement
of hostilities, Okha would be bombed and become untenable as an advance
base. A dockyard tanker, POSHAK, was therefore positioned on the
Saurashtra coast near Diu as a mobile fuelling facility.

"Karachi was defended by shore based military aircraft. It was essential

therefore to minimise the possibilities of the boats being attacked from the
air. It was planned that the attacking force would arrive 150 miles from
Karachi at sunset, go in at maximum speed during darkness, carry out the
attack, withdraw at maximum speed and be 150 miles away at dawn.
Darkness would make it difficult for enemy aircraft to see and attack the
force.

"There were grave risks in sending the fragile boats to the heavily defended
port of Karachi. Even if the element of surprise prevented the detection of
these boats on the approach and whilst launching their missiles, they would
most certainly be subjected to air and perhaps surface attack in the
withdrawal phase. One has to imagine the dilemma of the Commander-in-
Chief in Bombay. On the one hand was the tremendous danger to young
naval officers and sailors and to many crores worth of ships; on the other
the Navy had to show its mettle. A calculated risk had to be taken. But
some losses had to be accepted. All these factors were very carefully
weighed."

These apprehensions surfaced during the final presentation of operational plans in

New Delhi.

23 NOVEMBER PRESENTATION IN DELHI OF OPERATIONAL PLANS

On 23 November, all the Commanders in Chief of the three services made a

presentation of their operational plans to the Chiefs of Staff in New Delhi. The
Defence Minister and Defence Secretary were also present. These presentations
enabled each CinC to know what the others were planning to do and tie up the
loose ends.

In his book Admiral Kohli states: (Page 38)

"A special feature of the preparatory stages was that, for the first time ever,
the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services jointly examined in the minutes
detail the plans of the various Commands of the three Services. Like the
other Commanders-in-Chief, I made my presentation which was subjected
to detailed scrutiny, and some very searching questions were asked about
the legal aspects of blockade and contraband control and the effect it would
have on neutral and friendly merchant ships and their countries. Also
discussed at length was the grave risk attached to sending small boats right
into the allegedly impregnable defences of Karachi."

The fallout of this presentation was serious.

In his book "Sailing and Soldiering in Defence of India", Cdr SD Sinha has
reproduced an interview in which the CNS Admiral Nanda states: (Page 229 et
seq)

"We had decided that in the event of a war, we would use the missile boats
for carrying out an attack on Karachi harbour. There were, however, a lot of
misgivings about this plan as it was felt by C-in-C Western Naval Command,
who was assigned this task, that Karachi was a very heavily defended port
with all ships of the Pakistani Navy patrolling outside the harbour, as well as
availability of Pakistan air cover

from the two airfields of Drigh Road and Malir, from where Pakistani aircraft could
attack our forces. They also had 16 inch gun batteries at Manora and Sandspit,
which could blast our ships out of the water. He also felt that Pakistan had
superiority in gun power with their destroyers acquired from the British Navy and
that it would be a suicidal attempt on our part to try and attack Karachi. These
views were expressed by C-in-C West at a presentation of Cs-in-C of all the three
services at Delhi.

"I was taken aback at this performance. After the presentation, I called him
 and my Vice Chief and FOCINCEAST to my office and informed him that I
felt it was unfair on him and the men under his Command to burden them
with this responsibility if he did not believe in the success of this plan. And I
said that I was going to see the Defence Minister and request him to relieve
him of his Command. He replied "I have only given my views and I will of
course carry out the orders given to me". I was a bit uneasy about this and
felt that he was trying to evade responsibility.

"After this meeting in Delhi, I was a bit worried about how things were
going to work out. So I decided to go to Bombay at very short notice and
called a meeting of all Commanding Officers in the Navy Office. I informed
them that in the event of a conflict with Pakistan over Bangladesh, we had
plans to launch an attack on Karachi. I also said that there were some
misgivings in the minds of certain people about the advisability of this
attack. I told them that if any Commanding Officer had any misgivings
about these plans, I would be quite happy to relieve them of their
Command. I told them that I wanted every ship to be ready and out for the
operations, especially in view of the escalation after two of our aircraft were
attacked by Pakistan on the eastern border."

In retrospect, it is to the credit of both Admirals that they let this acrimony
subside. But it did affect the conduct of operations during the war on two
occasions:

- When Naval Headquarters intervened on 6 Dec to cancel a missile attack when

forces were well on their way towards their targets and

- In prodding Western Naval Command to do something about the submarine off

Bombay.

OPERATIONAL PLAN OF SOUTHERN NAVAL AREA

Four tasks were given to the Flag Officer Commanding Southern Naval Area
(FOCSOUTH).

- The destruction of enemy warships encountered in his area.

- The interception of Pakistani merchant shipping transiting his area, either

interwing or bound to and from ports in East Asia and China.

- Contraband Control.

- Defence of the ports of Cochin and Goa.

For these tasks FOCSOUTH was allocated AMBA (submarine depot ship),
GODAVARI and GANGA (old destroyers), CAUVERY (old frigate) KONKAN (an old
coastal minesweeper), HATHI (a tug) and BASSEIN (an inshore minesweeper).

FOCSOUTH's plan was to deploy:

(a) AMBA on patrol east off Ceylon.

(b) GODAVARI and GANGA across the route between Colombo and the 8
and 9 Degree Channels.

(c) CAUVERY and BASSEIN off Goa.

(d) KONKAN and HATHI off Cochin.

When NHQ signalled the likelihood of a pre-emptive Pakistan strike on 14

October, three Alizes anti submarine recce aircraft and four Seaking anti
submarine helicopters were moved up to Bombay.

On 3 December, AMBA, GODAVARI and GANGA sailed for their initial patrol
positions.

THE NAVAL ELEMENT OF THE MUKTI BAHINI

In his book Lt Gen Jacob states:

"On the request of the Provisional Government of Bangladesh, the

Govermment of India directed the Army to provide assistance to the Mukti
Bahini who controlled areas of East Pakistan contiguous to our borders
(Page 90). The decision made at the end of March 1971 to help the Mukti
Bahini was confirmed publicly later by the Minister of External Affairs. On 29
July, in a statement to the Parliament, he said,

"The Parliament had unanimously adopted a resolution pledging sympathy

and support, and we are pursuing that resolution in the best possible
manner and we are doing everything possible to lend support to the
freedom fighters." (Page 42)

"We had visualised training some 8000 guerillas in the border areas.
Recruits were to be given three months training. An additional period of
specialised training would be required for leaders. Once trained, these
guerillas would penetrate deep into East Pakistan to form cells and function
in the manner that guerilla forces throughout history have done." (Page 90)

"Some 400 naval commandos and frogmen were trained. They were
effective in attacking port facilities. Together with a Mukti Bahini gunboat
 mounting a Bofors 40mm gun, they captured, sank or damaged some 15
Pakistani ships, 11 coasters, 7 gunboats, 11 barges, 2 tankers and 19 river
craft. These were, in fact, the most significant achievements of the Mukti
Bahini.

"Since the Mukti Bahini later would need more craft to convert into
gunboats in the event of full scale hostilities, we approached the West
Bengal Government for assistance. They were most helpful and gave us two
craft on loan, MV Palash from the Calcutta Port Trust, and MV Padma. Our
workshops reinforced the decks and mounted Bofors L/60 anti-aircraft guns
on them. Crews for these were to be found from amongst Bengali naval
personnel of the Pakistani Navy. Commander Samant of the Indian Navy,
an outstanding submariner, was assigned to assist. The Task Force was, in
the event of war, to operate directly under the orders of Fort William and
not Eastern Naval Command. Later when operations commenced, these two
gunboats operated with considerable success." (Page 91)

Vice Admiral MK Roy was the Director of Naval Intelligence in 1971. In his book
"War in the Indian Ocean", he has given some details of Mukti Bahini frogmen
and their achievements. (Page 151) The nucleus of riverine frogmen was initially
built around a hard core of Bengali sailors who had deserted from Pakistan's third,
new, French, Daphne class submarine, the MANGRO. They escaped from the
submarine in France, proceeded to Spain and thence to East Bengal. The initial
eight submariners were reinforced by twelve dismissed sailors and three
merchant seamen. This nucleus of twenty four persons having a naval
background was later joined by a large number of university students. Chittagong
provided 130 , the Khulna/Chalna region 100, Narayanganj 40 and 30 each came
from Chandpur and Daudkhandi. These students were highly motivated educated
youth. They were given rigourous training. They were required to swim 12 miles
in complete darkness, breathing through a reed while manoeuvring neutrally
buoyant limpet mines, attach the mines and swim away before the mines
exploded.

The frogmen concentrated on attacking ports, inland harbours, ferries, pontoons,

buoyage and all types of vessels. Their aims were:

- to neutralise the main seaports of Chittagong on the Karnaphuli River and

Chalna, Mangla, Khulna on the Pussur River so as to prevent supplies to
support the Army being brought in by sea.

- to stop traditional exports of jute, tea, coir and

- to disrupt inland waterway systems and the river ports of Narayanganj,

Daudkhandi, Chandpur and Barisal.

It was planned that co-ordinated attacks would be carried every month,

commencing 15 August 1971, depending on the state of tide and moonrise/
moonset. The frogmen carried minimum arms and used bamboo/papaya reeds
when floating downstream under the surface. Their dress was lungis and banians
so as to merge with the local populace near their targets. High quality frogman
equipment like fins, wrist compasses and goggles were provided from abroad by
non resident East Bengalis. The frogmen chosen for each target generally
belonged to that particular area and hence were familiar with the local terrain, the
local people and the estuarine characteristics. They carried out four major attacks
before the operations started in December:

Month Shipping Tonnage Frogmen Targets Damaged

Sunk Damaged
Chittagong, Chalna/Khulna
August 16000 14000 176 Narayanganj, Chandpur,
Barisal
Chittagong, Chalna/Khulna
September 6000 17000 160
Chandpur, Barisal
Chittagong, Narayanganj
October 8000 16000 150
Nagarbari, Barisal
Mining of Pussur River
entrance, Chittagong,
Khulna, Mongla,
November 20000 18000 172 Narayanganj, Alashpur,
Chandpur,Tarorhat,
Mahanpur,Bhadur Ghat,
Barisal

Overall, the frogmen of the Mukti Bahini sank or crippled over one lakh tons of
shipping, immobilised jetties and wharves and blocked navigable channels.

In his book "Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership" written after the 1971 war, Maj Gen
Fazal Muqeem Khan states:

"Ships were attacked in Chittagong and Chalna harbours by trained

frogmen. They were daring attacks. At Chalna, in three consecutive attacks
on alternate nights between September 18 and 22, frogmen armed with
limpet mines damaged or destroyed SS Lightning, SS Teviot Biock, SS AC
Murtaza, SS Imtiaz Baksh, Oil tanker Sibtadinga, one barge and two flats
Barges were set on fire, blocking the export of jute.

"By mid November, the strategic and tactical mobility of the Eastern
Command had been reduced to the minimum due to extensive guerilla
activities in the rear and numerous road bridges, ferries, river-craft and
ships, which were the sole means of transport for shifting troops and
logistics from one place to another and from one geographical compartment
to another across river obstacles".
THE ESCALATION TOWARDS WAR

From June 1971 onwards, Pakistani Army formations started moving up all along
the Indo Pakistan border. In July 1971, it seemed prudent that although
vigourous diplomatic efforts for a political settlement should continue,
preparations should also be made to meet any Pakistani aggression. In August
1971, the President of Pakistan, General Yahya Khan, announced that India and
Pakistan were very close to war.

Until mid 1971, the Mukti Bahini had not been able to prevent the Pakistani Army
from regaining control in East Pakistan. Nor had it been able to establish even a
tenuous authority on the East Pakistan - West Bengal border. During the
monsoon months that followed, however, the Mukti Bahini were able to launch
successful sabotage campaigns directed at strategic facilities like bridges, power
stations, communication systems, and ships in harbour.

In his book Lt Gen Jacob states:

"The Army Headquarters operation instruction, based on the earlier

discussions in Calcutta, was issued on 16 August. Based on this instruction,
additional moves and deployments were ordered with provisional objectives
and thrust lines. Confirmatory orders, based on war games, were to be
issued later. (Page 74)

"By September, the operations of the Mukti Bahini were beginning to have
an effect on the morale of the Pakistan Army. Raids and ambushes were
carried out and culverts and bridges blown up". (Page 87)

The expansion of Mukti Bahini activity alarmed Pakistan that it was a prelude to
Indian military intervention to establish a "liberated zone" in which a Bangladeshi
Government would be established on Bangladeshi soil. In September 1971, the
Pakistani Government ordered mobilisation of reserves. India was uncertain
whether Pakistan intended to attack in the West and brought its armed forces to
immediate readiness.

From October onwards, skirmishes steadily increased. However the Mukti Bahini
forces rarely held their ground when the Pakistani Army counterattacked. On
occasions the Pakistani Army chased the Mukti Bahini into Indian territory to
destroy the Mukti Bahini camps. And on one occasion, the Indian Army chased
the Pakistani Army back across the border and thereafter withdrew. This limited
Indian support of the Mukti Bahini totally perplexed Pakistan about Indian
objectives. Did India have only a limited objective of establishing Mukti Bahini
control over a section of East Pakistan? Or was India's objective to invade East
Pakistan and help establish an independent Bangladesh?

On the Indian side, at that stage, the objective was limited to assisting the Mukti
Bahini to liberate a part of East Pakistan where the refugees could be sent from
India to exist peacefully under a Bangladeshi Government.

In October, Pakistan intensified its preparations for war. The skirmishes between
Indian and Pakistan troops in the East became more serious. Tension rose so high
that a pre-emptive Pakistani attack was thought imminent and both the Western
and Eastern Fleets sailed out of harbour. By end October, Pakistan had
concentrated infantry divisions and tanks on the Jammu border. In the East,
heavy artillery exchanges were taking place in Agartala and Tripura.

The first military engagement between the two armies took place near Kamalpur
on 30/31 October when Indian troops silenced Pakistani guns which had been
shelling across the border. A similar engagement took place near Belonia on 11
November where there were heavy casualties on both sides. The confrontation
reached a new peak of intensity on 21 Nov in the Bayra sector opposite Jessore.

Lt Gen Jacob's book states: (Page 86 et seq)

"At the beginning of October, preparatory moves of the formations

started in accordance with the outline tasks given to them. It was
important that realistic training be given on the type of terrain on
which the formations and units would be fighting. We had a pretty
good idea by now of Pakistani tactics and techniques employed
against the liberation forces. We had also noted the construction of
defences around the main towns and the approaches to them. We
trained the units to bypass the main centres of resistance and to use
subsidiary approaches: movement was to be the key to the conduct of
successful operations.'

"The Pakistan Army's will to fight, particularly of the rank and file,
progressively eroded as the effectiveness of the Mukti Bahini raids
increased. The raids led to reprisals. Pakistan artillery started shelling the
Mukti Bahini. Some of our border posts came under artillery fire. In
November, it was decided to allow our troops to go into East Pakistan up to
a depth of ten miles to silence these guns. We took advantage of these
instructions to secure specific areas to improve our offensive posture.

"On 20 November, our infantry launched a preliminary operation in the area

of Bayra. The Pakistan Air Force reacted but ended up losing three of its
aircraft. Our infantry was supported by tanks. A Pakistani squadron of tanks
charged over open ground to be met by concentrated tank and recoilless
fire. In this battle at Bayra, the Pakistanis lost 14 tanks, 3 aircraft and a
large number of men. (Page 73)

"General Yahya Khan, the President, and General Hamid the Army Chief felt
that India's move on 21 November was a limited action, that had India
wanted an excuse for war, it had already existed for several months, that
Pakistan would not benefit by declaring war and that Pakistani's strategy
 had been to avoid war and contain India diplomatically. The other view held
by the rest of the officer corps was to declare war as a matter of pride,
prudence and necessity".

On 23 November, Pakistan declared a national emergency and the Pakistan Navy

assumed control of Pakistani merchant shipping. Very soon thereafter,
FOCINCWEST was given control of Indian merchant shipping. All Indian ships
were recalled from the Gulf and all merchant shipping directed not to approach
the Pakistan coast.

The Pakistan Navy announced closure of Karachi port and warned merchant
shipping not to approach within 75 miles of Karachi during the dark hours.

In Pakistan, events had acquired their own momentum. The Story of the Pakistan
Navy states (P 334):

"A plan for a counter offensive in the West was presented to the President
of Pakistan on 30 November 1971 and the high command decided to initiate
operations in the West on 3 December. Pre-emptive strikes were carried out
by the Pakistan Air Force at several Indian air bases along the western
border and on 3 December, Pakistan Army units launched operations in
Poonch and Chhamb sectors with the objective of capturing important
tactical features.

The overall objective of Pakistan's offensive plan in the West was three fold:

(a) Take pressure off the beleaguered Pakistani forces in the eastern
theatre.

(b) Occupy sufficient territory in the west for possible bargaining after
cease fire; and

(c) Intensify diplomatic pressure on the United Nations to make a

decisive move in view of the blatant Indian attack in East Pakistan."

In their book "War and Secession", Sissen and Rose state that: (Page 230)

"Pakistan's decision to declare war derived from the military command's

sensitivity to the adverse publicity Pakistan was receiving in the Western press,
the incident in Boyra had not evoked an international response to force India to
desist and the pressure within Pakistan to react forcefully to India's aggression.On
30 November, the D Day for declaring war on India was fixed as 2 Dec. This date
was postponed to 3 December for additional preparations."

There is reason to believe that misinformation by Indian intelligence agencies was

able to precipitate Pakistan's decision to launch a pre-emptive attack on 3
December. This helped the Indian Air Force to minimise damage to aircraft at the
forward airfields and for the Western Fleet to avoid a pre-emptive attack by
midget submarines in Bombay Harbour.

Lt Gen Jaocb's book states: (Page 48)

"Our Signal Intelligence Unit was capable of limited code breaking. Even
though they had only little success with critical Army codes, they were able
to break the Naval code. We intercepted signals from the submarine GHAZI,
off Ceylon and on her entering the Bay of Bengal. These were passed on to
the Navy, both in Delhi and Visakhapatnam.

"On 1 December, we intercepted a message from West to East Pakistan

advising them of the warning sent to all Pakistani merchant shipping not to
enter the Bay of Bengal. We passed this on to the three Service
Headquarters, Army, Navy and Air Force, as also an intercept warning civil
aircraft not to fly near the Indian borders."

When Pakistan initiated the war on 3 December 1971.

(a) Cruiser BABUR and minesweeper MUHAFIZ were at the anchorage.

(b) Tanker DACCA was at Manora anchorage.

(c) Destroyer SHAHJAHAN and two coastal minesweepers were in harbour

preparing for passage to East Pakistan. Arrangements had beeneen made
for them to refuel at Colombo.

(d) Destroyer BADR and the two ex Royal Saudi Navy fast Jaguar class
patrol craft SADAQAT and RIFAQAT were in harbour.

(e) Destroyer ALAMGIR was under repair and frigate TUGHRIL was under
refit.

(f) Destroyer KHAIBAR and frigate TIPPU SULTAN were 80 miles southwest
of Karachi.

(g) Destroyer JAHANGIR was on patrol 60 miles south of Karachi.

(h) Frigate ZULFIQAR was on the inner patrol 30 miles south of Karachi.

CHAPTER 9

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN NAVAL COMMAND

This account of naval operations in the Eastern Naval Command has been
reconstructed from Vice Admiral Krishnan's book "No Way But Surrender", from
the "Story of the Pakistan Navy" and from discussions with the participants.

Four topics have been dealt with in separate sections:

- The Sinking of the GHAZI.

- The Commando Operation at Mongla/Khulna.

- Amphibious Operation Beaver.

- The Enterprise Incident.

The ensuing account deals with the Operation of the Eastern Fleet, VIKRANT's air
strikes, submarine operations and contraband control.

Day to Day Events - 04 to 16 December

04 DECEMBER

Having sailed from the Andaman Islands on 2 December, the Eastern Fleet was
within striking distance of Cox's Bazar on the morning of 4 December. As
previously arranged, the Air Force had carried out strikes on Cox's Bazar and
Chittagong, after which VIKRANT was cleared to strike these ports.

Air Strikes

Time Target Results

AM Cox's Bazar Rocket and strafing attack on airfield
installations. ATC set on fire. Power
house and wireless station damaged.
Fuel tank set on fire.
PM Chittagong
Hangar and control tower damaged.
Fuel

dump set on fire. Two gunboats

immobilised, one on fire. Six Pakistan
merchant ships in outer anchorage
attacked, two damaged heavily.
Medium and heavy AA fire.

Blockade

Blockade was declared but lifted the same evening.

Contraband Control

Contraband Control was declared. Neutral ships were given 48 hours to be

clear of the combat zone. Eight ships were inspected and cleared to proceed
to their destinations.

5 DECEMBER

Throughout the day, there was not enough wind to launch aircraft.
Contraband Control continued. Wind conditions improved at night.

6 DECEMBER

Air Strikes

Time Target Results

Night Mongla/ - Night bombing and rocket attack
Chalna by two Alizes.

- Damaged two ships in Pussur

river.

- Damaged harbour installations at

Chalna.

- Encountered medium AA fire.

Dawn Mongla/ - Hit four gunboats - two destroyed,
Chalna two damaged.

- One tug destroyed, one damaged.

- Encountered heavy AA fire.

Khulna - Damaged one merchant ship
which opened fire.

- Damaged tugs, small craft and

harbour installations.

-Encountered light AA fire.

 Pussur - Strafed and damaged Pak cargo
River ship which River opened fire.

- Pilot W/T station set on fire.

- Merchant ship ONDARDA sunk at

entrance.
Afternoon Chittagong - Damaged merchant ship and
gunboat which opened fire.

- Attacked Harbor installations and

control tower.

- Encountered heavy AA fire over

Chittagong airfield.
Night Chittagong - Runway bombed by Alize.
Airfield
- Encountered AA fire.

Cox's - Runway bombed by two Alizes.

Bazar
Airfield

Contraband Control.

Two ships were apprehended and sent to Sandheads. (Calcutta).

7 DECEMBER

Air Strikes

Time Target Result

Dawn Chittagong - Runway damaged. Hangar and
Airfield vehicles destroyed. Fuel dumps set
on fire.

- Encountered medium AA fire.

Cox's Bazar - Vehicles and W/T station
Airfield destroyed.
 Afternoon- - Recce over Mongla, Chalna,
Barisal.

In the evening, FOCEF signalled FOCINCEAST that air superiority had been
achieved in Eastern Fleet's area and that no enemy aircraft were to be seen in the
ground or in the air. Wind conditions were inadequate to launch Seahawks armed
with bombs and hence Alizes only were being used for bombing sorties at night.

Contraband Control

Six ships were apprehended and sent to Sandheads.

Replenishment. Urgently needed stores, which had been sent in an LST from
Visakhapatnam, were delivered to ships of the Fleet.

Firing on United Nations Aircraft.

On 6 December, NHQ had signalled that a United Nations aircraft would be

transiting the Fleet's area to evacuate foreign nationals from Dacca. This aircraft
was not seen on the 6th. On 7 December however, an aircraft approached to
within 5000 yards. VIKRANT's close range guns fired a burst. The aircraft, which
was later recognised as a United Nations C 130 Hercules, turned round and
departed. Two Seahawks followed the aircraft until it crossed the coast. No prior
intimation had been received of this UN flight on 7 December.

8 DECEMBER

Intercepts of enemy transmissions indicated that Pakistani forces were arranging

escape routes by sea, air and overland. All types of craft were being camouflaged
to carry fleeing Pakistan troops down the rivers. Troop concentrations were
reported at Barisal. VIKRANT was told that a large number of craft were
assembling between Barisal and Narayanganj in a bid to break out and their
means of escape should be destroyed.

There was not enough wind to operate Seahawks. The Alizes continued air strikes
on the night of 8/9 December.

9 DECEMBER

Air Strikes
 Time Target Result
Night Barisal Area - Night bombing by two Alizes.

- No ships or craft sighted.

- No AA fire.
Dawn Barisal/ - No craft or army
Bakarganj concentration sighted.
Patuakhali
- Three cargo barges and an army camp
destroyed.
AM Hatia/ Dakhin - No craft capable of conveying troops
Shahbazpur sighted.

PM Hatia/Dakhin - Two tankers attacked by Alizes and

Shahbazpur damaged.

- One gunboat attacked in Meghna

River.

Chittagong - Seahawks strafed Ordnance Factory

and W/T station.

- Encountered medium to heavy AA fire.

Inadequate wind precluded further Seahawk operations.

Contraband Control

Due to shortage of ships to escort apprehended ships all the way to Sandheads,
an assembly anchorage was established. Apprehended ships were made to anchor
in this area and, when a sizable number had been assembled, one ship would
escort them to Sandheads.

On night 9/10 December, pursuant on a report from Cdr Samant's Commando

Force Alfa which was on its way to attack Chalna-Mongla, Pakistani merchant
ships ANWAR BAKSH and BAQIR were apprehended whilst leaving the Pussur
river. ANWAR BAKSH was masquerading as a Japanese ship and had some
Pakistan troops on board disguised as civilians. In addition, one more ship was
apprehended.
 10 DECEMBER

Air Strikes

Time Target Result

Alizes bombed the runway. Wind
Cox's
AM/PM Conditions continued to be unsuitable for
Bazar
operating Seahawks.

Contraband Control

One ship was apprehended.

Replenishment. Requisitioned tanker DESHDEEP was directed to anchor in the

approaches to the Matla river. Ships refuelled in preparation for the amphibious
landing scheduled for 12 December.

American Intervention. Admiral Krishnan's book states: (Page 52 et seq)

"At about 5.30 PM on Friday 10 December, we intercepted a signal to the

effect that the US Navy was sending ships into the Bay of Bengal, for
possible withdrawal of the Pakistani Army.

"I also spoke to Admiral Nanda regarding the 7th Fleet but he had heard no
more than what was in the signal. We ended our conversation on the note
that we should not be surprised by anything that happened from now
onwards."

11 DECEMBER

Admiral Krishan's book states: (ibid)

"We intercepted a signal of the utmost significance. It was a message from

Commodore Chittagong to the Flag Officer Commanding East Pakistan
Navy:

"Two coasters ready at Gupta Crossing. A/A defence strengthened. All

foreign ships cleared of harbour. Own merchant ships disguised. Naval
personnel deployed in defensive positions and integrated with fortress
defence. Pilot for RK 623 will be ready by 1800 - 1900 in speed boat.
Further mining of approaches will be carried out after RK 623 enters."

"By this time it was also becoming clear that the US Seventh Fleet was in
fact speeding towards the Bay of Bengal and the Fleet was a large one and
included the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS ENTERPRISE. But this
Fleet was still far away and it would be at least 72 to 96 hours before they
could make their presence felt in the Bay. But once the Fleet reached near
enough to the operational area, the situation could well change with a
dramatic suddenness that would make us lose all the initiative in the naval
war.

"So it was of the utmost importance that we evaluate all available

information, reappreciate the situation and take corrective and preventive
action in good time.

"The reappreciation of the situation went something like this. We had

complete mastery of the approaches to Bangladesh ports and nothing could
go in and out of the ports without coming in for very heavy attacks and
almost certain destruction. We had subjected their harbours and
installations at Chittagong, Chalna, Khulna, Mongla, and Cox's Bazar to
round-the-clock attention from the air. The craft that had assembled at
Narayanganj and Barisal which could be used for troop transportation had
been sunk or disabled. Mongla and Chalna had already been evacuated.

"If the Pakistanis wanted to try a "Dunkirk," it would have to be by ships or

air from Chittagong. Cox's Bazar was too far south, could not take any large
ships, her airport runway was in a shambles and in any case we were well
advanced in our plans to carry out a combined operation of landing our own
troops there.

"By a process of elimination, therefore, Chittagong was their only hope for a
getaway. From experience we knew that no harbour can be totally
immobilized. A determined and desperate enemy can always get sufficient
services to use the harbour in a bid to get away. And here, we had evidence
that they had assembled several merchant ships, camouflaged and
obviously ready to break out. Our estimate was that some 5,000 per ship
making a total of 30,000 men could make a getaway. It would have been a
gamble that could possibly succeed under certain circumstances.

"The enemy could easily have guessed what I certainly knew, that we could
not keep VIKRANT in the area of operations much longer as she was
running dangerously low on fuel and she would have to be withdrawn for at
least 48 hours to replenish. The withdrawal of the VIKRANT would mean
releasing the pressure on the enemy. A breakout under these circumstances
had a chance of success. The courses of action before the Pakistani Naval
authorities could be assessed as follows:

(i) Lay minefields to seaward of Chittagong, allowing themselves a

narrow lane, close inshore and along the coast southwards. This lane
would not be known to us and the mines would prove a deterrent to
our own ships as we would not like to blunder into unknown mined
 waters.

(ii) Use the cover of darkness to assemble and embark troops, wait
for some relaxation in the blockade-stranglehold, and slip through the
thinned out patrol lines.

(iii) Use the runways of the airport for lifting senior officers with
helicopters and light aircraft. Make efforts to repair the runway
sufficiently for use of heavier aircraft.

(iv) Use demolition charges and mines extensively as part of the

"scorched earth policy" to make Chittagong untenable for as long as
possible. "The last two of the above, were the key to the mystery of
RK 623. It must be a convoy carrying some senior officers and also
mines and other means of demolition to do a "scorched earth" on
Chittagong. Later we were to learn that the Pakistan name for this
operation was the "Denial Plan."

"Where, in this scheme of things would the Seventh Fleet come in? We
carried out a careful study of the USS ENTERPRISE and her capabilities.
This carrier of 75,000 tons tonnage (as against 16,000 tons of the
VIKRANT) was the world's largest warship.

"Powered by eight atomic reactors, her four geared steam turbines could
work up a speed of 35 knots. In addition to her normal complement of
2,870, she had an additional 2,000 personnel to form the attack air wing
consisting of 100 aircraft of various types.

"In company with her were the amphibious assault ship TRIPOLI, the
guided-missile ship KING and three guided missile destroyers, DECATUR,
PARSONS and TARTAR.

"The TRIPOLI was a large 17,000 ton amphibious assault ship, especially
built to operate up to 24 medium, four heavy and four observation
helicopters, but she did not carry landing craft. She had a sustained speed
of 20 knots. With a complement of 528, she could transport and land a
marine battalion of about 2,100 officers and men with guns, vehicles and
various support personnel.

"The KING, a guided missile frigate was primarily designed to screen a

carrier force and besides sonar, her main armament consisted of surface to
air missiles and torpedoes. Similarly, the destroyers TARTAR and DECATUR,
ships of over 20 years age, were primarily fitted with surface to air missiles,
but with advanced electronic equipment.

"The ENTERPRISE and her escorts posed at first glance a fantastic threat.
And yet, on closer inspection, what exactly could she achieve to tilt the
battle in Pakistan's favour?

"None of us ever fell for the announcement that the Fleet's object was to
evacuate a handful of American subjects from Dacca. Obviously, her
primary intention was to frighten us into withdrawing our forces from the
operational area and let the escape ships break out. Suppose we didn't get
scared that easily and persisted in our stranglehold on Bangladesh?
Evacuation of any but a handful of troops was a possibility, using
helicopters. Clearly the use of heavier and very powerful aircraft was quite
out of the question as however thorough the temporary repairs, the
runways of both Chittagong and Dacca had taken a considerable beating.

"The offensive capabilities of the America task force therefore, consisted of:

(i) Landing up to a marine battalion as an assault group using

helicopters.

(ii) Using the ENTERPRISE's aircraft for ground support role.

(iii) Providing close support against aircraft attacking their fleet and

(iv) Surface and aerial attack on Indian warships.

"We did not know if the marine battalion was carried on board the TRIPOLI
at the time, but even assuming that they were, how were they going to
land them ashore except by helicopters. It was quite obvious that
manpower-wise, landing some 2,000-odd persons was not going to
materially alter the land battle.

"It was unthinkable that they would commit their aircraft on a ground
support role against our army or air force or wantonly attack our naval
forces at sea.

"To my way of thinking, the most effective method of helping the Pakistani's
would be to close Chittagong within range of their air-power, put up a
formidable air umbrella over the merchant ships awaiting escape and
actually provide air escort for them till they reached the waiting fleet. They
knew that our tiny force of aircraft from VIKRANT could never hope to
challenge their air cover.

"Summing up, we came to the following conclusions:

(i) A critical point was being reached in the war and the Pakistanis
were desperate and would try to break out at the earliest opportunity.

(ii) For this purpose, they had at least five merchant ships ready and
camouflaged in Chittagong. They had made desperate attempts to
 make the runway at Chittagong sufficiently serviceable to take light
aircraft and helicopters.

(iii) The safe arrival of the convoy RK 623 would be the starting point
of putting their "Scorched Earth Plan" into action.

(iv) The removal of VIKRANT from the scene of operations would ease
the way to a break-out.

(v) A break-out of ships could be facilitated by the Seventh Fleet

providing an impregnable and continuous air umbrella till they joined
the surface forces of the Seventh Fleet.

"Clearly, everything turned on the merchant ships assembled in Chittagong

for the actual troop carrying. Not an instant must be lost in destroying or so
heavily damaging them as to made them totally immobile. Time was
running out.

"Having spent the whole forenoon of 11 December on the above thoughts

and a series of discussions with the CNS Admiral Nanda as well as my army
colleague Lt Gen Aurora, I signalled the Eastern Fleet at 1.15 PM as follows.

"Appreciate enemy with senior officers including FOCEF planning major breakout
and will try to get away by hugging the coast. Senior officers may try to escape
by air. Approaches to harbour likely to be mined.

"Your mission is:

(a) Put Chittagong airport out of commission.

(b) Attack ships in harbour by air and surface units if they break out.

"This is undoubtedly the most important mission of the war in the East. The
enemy ships must, I repeat, must, be destroyed. Good Luck."

"The important requirement was to locate and destroy the mysterious RK

623 on which the Pakistanis seemed to be setting so much hope. The last
known position of this convoy was the village of Rajapur. At 6 AM on the
11th morning, therefore, a sortie was sent to bomb and flush out the
enemy from their hideout.

"Once the RK 623 realised that their day-time hideout had been discovered
and subjected to attack, they would try to get away from there as quickly
as possible.
"At about 10 AM one of our Alizes looking for this particular quarry saw
what looked like a small island, the tide lapping over its northern shore.
Covered in thick green shrubbery, it was too tiny to bother about. A second
look raised the doubt in the pilot's mind that the "island" was probably
moving and what looked like the tide-wash might well be from propeller
movements. He decided to have a closer look and not wanting to waste
precious ammunition unless sure, made the first attack into a dummy dive.
By the time he straightened out, there was no doubt in his mind that here
was the precious and elusive RK 623! He saw a gun boat, a tug with a
couple of barges all in close formation and within the facade of the
camouflage he cold see the whole "island" bristling with A/A guns. It was
perhaps some forlorn hope or sudden surprise that made them hold their
fire.

"On the second round, now a firing run, the Alize pressed home its attack,
using rocket projectiles for this purpose. The convoy opened furious fire
against the aircraft but in vain and was severely hit in turn by the rockets.
Giving up the fight, the boat abandoned its charges and made for the beach
and grounded herself. A second Alize came on the scene and attacked the
barges which simply disintegrated. This second Alize confirmed the
beaching and abandonment of the tug and the gun boat, both out of the
war forever. So foundered the Pakistani hopes from their much-vaunted RK
623! The gun boat was identified after the war as one of the "Rajshahi"
class PNS JESSORE.

"This action was cause enough for some jubilation, but the main job of
putting the escape fleet out of action still remained. And just as I had
feared, the Wind God was not on our side on the 11th, throughout the day.
As Captain Parkash put it: "Since this appeared to be one of the most
important tasks of these operations, there was a feeling of helplessness in
VIKRANT that the Seahawks could not be flown due to lack of wind and we
had to make do with Alizes only. One could do no more than pray for a little
wind in the near future... Wind conditions continued to remain poor to the
extent that the sea was like a sheet of glass. It was impossible to fly off
Seahawks. Moon conditions were also becoming poor and therefore even
Alize sorties had to be restricted during dark hours and that too only when
absolutely necessary."

"Saturday was a day of utter desolation and heart-break. Would the enemy
break out under cover of darkness and make good their escape towards the
Seventh Fleet speeding into the Bay of Bengal? Were we to fail, after all, in
our mission of bottling up the enemy? Our ships were getting dangerously
low on fuel and the fuelling programme of smaller ships meant thinning out
of the patrol lines, weakening the blockade.

"I decided that if wind conditions did not improve by the morrow, we will
have to send the surface ships BEAS and BRAHMAPUTRA to get within gun
 range of Chittagong harbour and carry out direct bombardment of the
shipping inside."

Air Strikes

Wind conditions remained inadequate for launching Seahawks. Alizes could only
carry out armed recce sorties to keep the movement of shipping off Chittagong,
Cox's Bazar and Pussur river under surveillance.

TimeTarget Result
AM Rajapur - Bombed by one Alize.- Recce'd by
ChittagongAlize. Reported that runway was
Airstrip unusable for flying operations.

- No shipping traffic sighted in Meghna

river.
Cox's - Alize sighted well camouflaged enemy
Bazar, gunboat escorting two small craft full of
troops. Alizes attacked and craft
beached.
Kutubdia - Alizes depth charged two craft with
Island concealed cargo.

PM Coastal - Alizes reported that there was no

Recce movement of troops by road or water in
the Cox's Bazar area. No movement of
craft along the coast and waterway up to
five miles south of Chittagong.
Coastal - Alize homed ships on to small craft
Patrol proceeding south. Ships sank six craft.

Chittagong- Runway bombed by Alize.

Chittagong- Airfield bombed using flare bombs.

- Encountered heavy AA fire.

Contraband Control. One ship was apprehended.

Amphibious Operation: Amphibious Operation was postponed to 14 December.

 12 DECEMBER

Air Strikes

Wind conditions improved considerably after two days of no wind conditions and a
number of air strikes were launched. Admiral Krishnan's book states:

"I owe it to the gallant Captain of the VIKRANT to tell the story of that day
in his own words: (Page 62 et seq).

"VIKRANT steamed north in order to launch a Seahawk strike with optimum

ammunition possible, by reducing aircraft fuel. From 0600 onwards, 29
Seahawk strikes armed with 500 pound bombs and rocket projectiles were
flown against shipping and other targets around Chittagong. The very first
strike made at least six direct hits on the runway and rendered it
unserviceable.

"The second strike of four Seahawks armed with rockets was launched
against the merchant shipping in harbour. They attacked two merchant
ships leaving harbour with 6 to 8 direct hits and another two inside the
harbour with 13 to 15 hits. Moderate to heavy gunfire was still being
experienced from inside the harbour and although one aircraft received a

direct hit on the canopy which was shattered, all aircraft returned to the
carrier safely.

"Flight operations were slightly interrupted at 0945 when VIKRANT had a

breakdown. The defect was however rectified most expeditiously and the
ship was under way again at 1035, resuming flight operations at 1100.

"Two strikes of 4 Seahawks each, armed with bombs were launched again
at 1100 and 1115 respectively. Targets once again were the airfield and
shipping at Chittagong. The first strike consisted of three Seahawks. The
runway was once again bombed and a hit was observed on the intersection
of the runway. Gun positions on the airfield were silenced. The first strike
also carried out photo reconnaissance of the area. The second division
attacked three merchant ships off Gupta Point with rockets scoring direct
hits on the superstructure. Medium AA fire was experienced over the target
area. One Seahawk returned with a shattered wind screen.

"Another strike of four Seahawks was launched at 1315 against shipping at

Chittagong. Aircraft were armed with 500 pound bombs and scored direct
hits on two merchantmen of 10,000 and 15,000 tons each.

"While air strikes over Chittagong airfield and shipping were continuing, a
call for air strike on troops and vehicle concentrations at Kaptai was
received from the Army at about 1300. Four Seahawks were launched at
 1340 for the target area.

"The last strike of four Seahawks on 12 December 1971 was launched at

1530 armed with two 500 pound bombs each. The enemy airfield and
shipping was once again struck causing heavy damages."

The results of the day's work were summed up by FOCEF in a signal to

FOCINCEAST as follows:

"BE PLEASED TO REPORT THAT AT THE END OF TWENTY-FOUR

HOURS OF CONTINUOUS SORTIES COMMENCING 111930
INVOLVING CONSTANT ALIZE RECCE AND BOMBING AND TWENTY
EIGHT HAWK SORTIES, COX'S BAZAR AND CHITTAGONG AIRFIELD
HAVE BEEN RENDERED INOPERATIVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THERE
IS NO MERCHANT SHIP OF ANY SIZE IN THE CHITTAGONG
HARBOUR OR APPROACHES WHICH HAS NOT BEEN STRUCK AND
INCAPACITATED. THERE IS A COMPLETE ABSENCE OF SHIPPING
ALONG THE ENTIRE COAST FROM CHALNA EASTWARD THROUGH
MEGHNA SANDWIP UP TO COX'S BAZAR AND SOUTHWARD."

"In addition to the air strikes, we also decided to carry out a surface
bombardment of Cox's Bazar to obviate even a marginal use of the
airdrome there by any type of aircraft.

The frigates BRAHMAPUTRA and BEAS were cleared for this attack and
commenced the bombardment from 3.50 PM onwards. The airfield
installations were the principal targets". The Air Traffic Control tower got a
direct hit.

13 DECEMBER

Air Strikes

Time Target Results

AM Cox's Bazar - Alize dropped bombs on runway.

- No contacts of shipping or craft.

Chittagong - First Seahawk strike bombed two

merchant ships damaged earlier.

- Second Seahawk strike damaged

one tanker and blew up AA gun
positions.
 PM Chittagong - Third Seahawk strike bombed
runway, damaged a tanker and
sank a merchant ship, set a
warehouse ablaze and attacked the
Ordnance Factory.

- Encountered medium AA fire over

port area.

Replenishment. The Fleet refuelled and prepared for the Amphibious

Operation.

14 DECEMBER

Air Strikes

Time Target Result

- Seahawks attacked the
Cantonment area. Several hits on
AM Chittagong Army Barracks.

- Encountered medium AA fire.

Cox's Bazar - Beach-head area bombed by Alizes.
- Search around Pussur area and
Recce
Cox's Bazar revealed no contacts.

VIKRANT detached to Paradeep for refuelling.

Contraband Control One ship was apprehended.

Amphibious Operation. All forces R/V'd, but due to delays in trans-shipment of

troops from VISHWA VIJAY to the LST's, the operation was postponed to 15
December.

15 DECEMBER

Amphibious landing attempted at Reju Creek. Only one platoon could be landed.
One of the two LSTs was damaged. Due to difficulties experienced, the landing
force moved overnight to Cox's Bazar.

16 DECEMBER

Pakistan's forces in East Pakistan surrendered. Landing of troops and equipment

at Cox's Bazar using local boats continued till 19 December.
 VIKRANT'S AIR OPERATIONS

When asked what were his greatest worries and VIKRANT's close calls during the
1971 war, Captain Parkash recalls:

(a) Operating Seahawk aircraft in marginal wind conditions.

(b) One day, the after lift got stuck because one of the twelve keeps would
not retract. Two Seahawks were waiting to be recovered and were running
low on fuel. A huge hammer had to be used to blunt the nose of the stuck
keep, after which the aft lift unstuck and the aircraft landed just in time.
Had this not seen successful, both Seahawks would have had to ditch.

(c) The flooding of the forward machinery space. One of the turbo
generators had low vacuum because its condenser needed cleaning. In
peacetime, this would only have been attempted in harbour. It was decided
to attempt this at sea. The inlet and outlet valves were 20 feet below the
waterline and operated by rod gearing. The top plate of the turbo generator
suction filter was loosened for cleaning the filter before opening the
condenser door. Within minutes water came gushing in. One of the valves
had not been fully shut and the water was coming past the loosened plate.
The situation was saved by the 1000 ton pump in the machinery space.

Vice Admiral (then Lt Cdr) Bhushan was the Senior Engineer of VIKRANT.
He recalls this incident:

"When I arrived in the Forward Engine Room, I observed nearly a foot

high flow of water emerging from the turbo generator sea water
strainer housing. My senior watchkeeper, Lt KS Bhasin - no
lightweight himself - was actually sitting on the strainer cover in an
effort to make it seat against the flow of water, but without much
success. After unsuccessfully trying all other means of stopping the
flow, I asked for the largest available wheel spanner to be brought.
When it came, we used it to close the seawater suction and discharge
valves and to our immense relief, the flow stopped."

(d) On 11 Dec, Lt Cdr Ramsagar's Alize, whilst attacking a camouflaged

boat carrying troops was hit by small arms fire which caused a total
hydraulic failure. He managed to operate the landing gear manually and
land by the skin of his teeth. His was the heaviest damaged aircraft of the
war.

(e) VIKRANT's fuel state became a cause of worry on 13 and 14 Dec, when
it came below 25%.
 DAMAGE INFLICTED BY VIKRANT'S AIR STRIKES

Admiral Krishnan's book states: (Page 64).

"The following wrecks of large merchant ships sunk, run aground or split
into two were identified:

KARNAPHULI 6876 GRT

SURMA 5890 GRT
AL ABBAS 9142 GRT
ANIS BAKSH 6273 GRT
OCEAN ENTERPRISE 5909 GRT
MATERAN 1198 GRT
UNIDENTIFIED SHIP 1800 GRT
MAIHAR 5938 GRT
RANGAMATI 5888 GRT
TWO UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS
8000 GRT
CAPSIZED - APPROX.
56,914
TOTAL
TONS

In addition to the above 57 thousand tons of merchant ships, PNS JESSORE,

COMILLA and SYLHET were destroyed".

SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

INS KHANDERI was sailed on 28 November 1971 to patrol an area across the
shipping route from Ceylon to Chittagong. Her mission was:

(a) To destroy Pakistani naval ships.

(b) To destroy Pakistani merchant ships.

(c) To provide timely intelligence on Pakistani maritime forces.

Like her sister submarines off the West Coast of India, she was also tied down to
the requirements of positive identification and informed that Pakistani
merchantmen were masquerading as neutrals. Like the others, she also had an
uneventful patrol and returned to harbour on 14 December 1971.
 THE SINKING OF THE GHAZI

The Pakistan Navy's Deployment of Ghazi

in The 1971 Indo Pakistan War

In his book, "Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership", written in 1972 soon after the
war, Maj General Fazal Muqeem Khan states: (Page 153)

"The submarine GHAZI was despatched to the Visakhapatnam Naval Base in

the Bay of Bengal. The GHAZI's task was to carry out offensive mine laying
against Visakhapatnam.

"GHAZI which had sailed towards Visakhapatnam with special instructions,

had to reach its destination on 26 Nov 71. She was to report on arrival but
no word was heard from her. Efforts were made to contact her but to no
avail. The fate of the GHAZI was in jeopardy before 3 Dec. The Indians
made preposterous claims about the sinking of the GHAZI. However, being
loaded with mines, it seems to have met an accident on her passage and
exploded. A few foreign papers at that time also reported that some flotsam
had been picked up by Indian fishermen and handed over to the Indian
Navy, which made up stories about its sinking".

The Story of the Pakistan Navy' published twenty years later in 1991, gives a
slightly different account:- (Pages 337 et seq)

"The Navy ordered the submarines to slip out of harbour quietly on various
dates between 14 and 22 November. They were allocated patrol areas
covering the west coast of India, while GHAZI was despatched to the Bay of
Bengal with the primary objective of locating the Indian aircraft carrier, INS
VIKRANT, which was reported to be operating in the area.

"GHAZI's deployment to the Bay of Bengal must be regarded as a measure

taken to rectify a strategic posture that was getting increasingly out of step
with military realities. Our response to Indian military deployments around
East Pakistan were a series of adhoc measures, taken from time to time, as
a reaction to the Indian build-up. Despatch of GHAZI to India's eastern
seaboard, not part of the original plans, was one such step taken on the
insistence of our Military High Command to reinforce Eastern Command.
Pressure on the Pakistan Navy to extend the sphere of its operations into
the Bay of Bengal increased with the growth of Indian and Indian-inspired
naval activities in and/around East Pakistan.

"The strategic soundness of the decision has never been questioned. GHAZI
was the only ship which had the range and capability to undertake
operations in the distant waters under control of the enemy. The presence
of a lucrative target in the shape of the aircraft carrier VIKRANT, the pride
of the Indian Fleet, in that area was known. The plan had all the ingredients
of daring and surprise which are essential for success in a situation tilted
heavily in favour of the enemy. Indeed, had the GHAZI been able to sink or
even damage the Indian aircraft carrier, the shock effect alone would have
been sufficient to upset Indian Naval plans. The naval situation in the Bay of
Bengal would have undergone a drastic transformation, and carrier-
supported military operations in the coastal areas would have been
affected. So tempting were the prospects of a possible success that the
mission was approved despite several factors which militated against it.

"Against it was the consideration of GHAZI's aging machinery and

equipment. It was difficult to sustain prolonged operations in a distant area,
in the total absence of repair, logistic and recreational facilities in the
vicinity. At this time, submarine repair facilities were totally absent at
Chittagong, the only port in the east. It was on these grounds that the
proposal to deploy GHAZI in the Bay of Bengal was opposed by Captain
Submarines and many others. The objections were later reluctantly dropped
or overruled due to the pressures mentioned earlier.

"On 14 November 1971, PNS GHAZI, under the command of Cdr Zafar
Mohammad Khan, sailed out of harbour on a reconnaissance patrol. Orders
had been issued to the Commanding Officer. A report expected from the
submarine on 26 November was not received. Anxiety grew with every day
that passed after frantic efforts to establish communications with the
submarine failed to produce results. Before hostilities broke out in the West
on 3 December, doubts about the fate of the submarine had already begun
to agitate the minds of submariners and many others at Naval
Headquarters. Several reasons could, however, be attributed to the failure
of the submarine to communicate.

"The first indication of GHAZI's tragic fate came when a message by NHQ
India, claiming sinking of GHAZI on the night of 3 December but issued
strangely enough on 9 December, was intercepted. Both the manner of its
release and the text quoted below clarified very little: "I am pleased to
announce that Pakistan Navy Submarine GHAZI sunk off Visakhapatnam by
our ships on 3/4 December. Dead bodies and other conclusive evidence
floated to surface yesterday - 091101 EF". Their mysterious silence for 6
days between 3 December, when the submarine was claimed to have been
sunk and 9 December, when the message was released could not be easily
explained. It gave rise to speculations that the submarine may well have
been sunk earlier, at a time when the Indians were not ready to accept
their involvement in the war. Failure of the GHAZI to communicate after 26
November strongly supported such a possibility. As it happened, the release
of the message on 9 December also served to divert attention of their public
from the sinking of KHUKRI on this very date even though the claim of
 sinking GHAZI was apparently made a few hours before the loss of
KHUKRI".

THE INDIAN NAVY'S ASSESSMENTS OF GHAZI'S DEPLOYMENT

In his book `No Way But Surrender - An Account of the Indo Pakistan War in the
Bay of Bengal 1971', Vice Admiral N Krishnan, then Flag Officer Commanding-in-
Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, states: (Pages 26 et seq)

"The problem of VIKRANT's security was a serious one and brought forth
several headaches. By very careful appreciation of the submarine threat, by
analyzing data such as endurance, distance factors, base facilities, etc we
had come to the definite conclusion that the enemy was bound to deploy
the submarine GHAZI against us in the Bay of Bengal with the sole aim of
destroying our aircraft carrier VIKRANT. The threat from GHAZI was a
considerable one. Apart from the lethal advantage at the pre-emptive
stage, VIKRANT's approximate position would become known once she
commenced operating aircraft in the vicinity of the East Bengal coast. Of
the four surface ships available, one had no anti-submarine detection device
(sonar) and unless the other three were continually in close company with
VIKRANT (within a radius of 5 to 10 miles), the carrier would be completely
vulnerable to attack from the GHAZI which could take up her position
surreptitiously and at leisure and await her opportunity.

"We decided that in preparing our plan, we would rely much more on
deception and other measures against the GHAZI.

"We had to find some place to crouch in, to spring into action at the
shortest notice. After embarking the remaining aircraft of Seahawks, Alizes
and Alouettes, the Fleet left Madras on Saturday 13 November for an
unknown destination which I shall call "Port X-Ray," for reasons of security.
Port X-Ray was a totally uninhabited place with no means of communication
with the outside world and it was well protected and in the form of a
lagoon.

"Having sailed the Fleet away to safety, the major task was to deceive the
enemy into thinking that the VIKRANT was where she was not and lure the
GHAZI to where we could attack her. I spoke to the Naval Officer-in-
Charge, Madras on the telephone and told him that VIKRANT, now off
Visakhapatnam, would be arriving at Madras and would require an
alongside berth, provisions and other logistic needs. Captain Duckworth
thought I had gone stark raving mad that I should discuss so many
operational matters over the telephone. I told him to alert contractors for
rations, to speak to the Port Trust that we wanted a berth alongside for
 VIKRANT at Madras, etc.

"In Visakhapatnam, we ordered much more rations, especially meat and

fresh vegetables, from our contractors to whom it must have been obvious
that this meant the presence of the Fleet at or off Visakhapatnam. I was
banking on bazaar rumours being picked up by spies and relayed to
Pakistan. I had no doubt that such spies did exist and I hoped that they
would do their duty.

"During the several weeks before the war, we had taken special pains to
contact the various fishing communities in and around Visakhapatnam and
motivate them to act as a sort of visual lookout for anything out of the
ordinary that they may see when out fishing. This meant explaining to them
all about oil slicks, what a submarine looks like, what sort of tell-tale
evidence to look for and so on. They were briefed on exactly what to do
with any information that they gathered.

"We decided to use INS RAJPUT as a decoy to try and deceive the Pakistanis
into believing that VIKRANT was in or around Visakhapatnam. RAJPUT was
sailed to proceed about 160 miles off Visakhapatnam. She was given a large
number of signals with instructions that she should clear the same from
sea. Heavy wireless traffic is one means for the enemy to suspect the
whereabouts of a big ship. We intentionally breached security by making an
unclassified signal in the form of a private telegram, allegedly from one of
VIKRANT's sailors, asking about the welfare of his mother "seriously ill."

"Our deception plan worked only too well! In a secret signal which we
recovered from the sunken GHAZI, Commodore Submarines in Karachi sent
a signal to GHAZI on 25 November informing her that "INTELLIGENCE
INDICATES CARRIER IN PORT" and that she should proceed to
Visakhapatnam with all despatch!"

On the evening of 3 December, Pakistan initiated hostilities. Admiral Krishnan's

book states: (Pages 39 et seq)

"By the time I arrived at the Maritime Operations Room, orders for
commencement of hostilities had been received, the shore defences of
Visakhapatnam were immediately put on alert and the Coast Battery was
brought to First Degree of Readiness. I had already decided that the
RAJPUT should also join the rest of the Eastern Fleet for operations off
Bangladesh.

"I sent for Lt Cdr Inder Singh, the Commanding Officer of the RAJPUT for
detailed briefing; as soon as she completed fuelling she must leave harbour.
I had already ordered all navigational aids to be switched off, so greatest
care in navigation was necessary. Once clear of the harbour, he must
assume that an enemy submarine was in the vicinity. If our deception plan
had worked, the enemy would be prowling about looking for VIKRANT.
Before clearing the outer harbour, he could drop a few charges at random.

"The RAJPUT sailed before midnight of 3/4 December and, on clearing

harbour, proceeded along the narrow channel. Having got clear, the
Commanding Officer saw what he thought was a severe disturbance in the
water, about half a mile ahead. He rightly assumed that this might be a
submarine diving. He closed the spot at speed and dropped at the position
two charges. It has been subsequently established that the position where
the charges were dropped was so close to the position of the wreck of the
GHAZI that some damage to the latter is a very high probability. The
RAJPUT, on completion of her mission, proceeded on her course in order to
carry out her main mission. A little later, a very loud explosion was heard
by the Coast Battery who reported the same to the Maritime Operations
Room. The time of this explosion was 0015 hours. The clock recovered from
the GHAZI showed that it had stopped functioning at the same time.
Several thousand people waiting to hear the Prime Minister's broadcast to
the nation also heard the explosion and many came out thinking that it was
an earthquake.

"As per our arrangement with them, some fishermen reported oil patches
and some flotsam. The Command Diving Team were rushed to the spot and
commenced detailed investigations. The divers established that there was a
definite submerged object some distance out seawards, at a depth of 150
feet of water and that it was a probable submarine. Even though there were
a number of floating objects picked up, there was nothing to indicate the
identity of the submarine. Everything had American markings. I told the
Chief of the Naval Staff that personally I was convinced that we had bagged
the GHAZI. He wanted "ocular proof" that it was the GHAZI, before
authorizing the announcement. This was easier said than done. Diving
operations were extremely difficult and highly hazardous as the sea was
very choppy and the divers were operating some 150 feet below. The boat I
had was not a suitable one to conduct such operations. By Sunday 5
December we were able to establish from the silhouette and other
characteristics that the submarine was in fact the GHAZI. But there was no
means of ingress into the submarine as all entry hatches from the conning
tower aft were tightly screwed down from the inside.

"In the meantime, the Chief of Naval Staff had arranged for an Air Force
aircraft to be positioned in Visakhapatnam so that "the ocular proof" that he
insisted on could be flown to Delhi before the announcement was made.

"On the third day, a diver managed to open the Conning Tower hatch and
one dead body was recovered. As the hatch was opened, it was clogged up
with bloated dead bodies and it was quite a job to clear the same to make
an entrance. The Hydrographic correction book of PNS GHAZI and one sheet
of paper with the official seal of the Commanding Officer of PNS GHAZI
 were also recovered. The aircraft standing by finally took off for Delhi the
next morning with the evidence".

The following four signals recovered from the GHAZI have been reproduced in
Admiral Krishnan's book:

DTG 221720 NOV 71

FM : COMSUBS

TO :SUBRON-5

INFO : PAK NAVY

-----------------------------------------------------

FOLLOWING AREAS OCCUPIED.

1. PAPA ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR.

2. PAPA FIVE, SIX, SEVEN, EIGHT.

3. BRAVO ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR, FIVE, SIX

4. MIKE.

--------------------------------------------------------

DTG 222117 NOV 71.

FROM :COMSUBS

TO GHAZI: MANGRO

INFO :PAK NAVY

-----------------------------------------------

ARM ALL TORPEDOES.

-----------------------------------------------

DTG 231905 NOV 71

 FROM :COMSUBS

TO :SUBRON-5

INFO :PAK NAVY

------------------------------------------------------

ASSUME PRECAUTIONARY STAGE.

------------------------------------------------------

DTG 252307/NOV 71

FROM :COMSUBS

TO :GHAZI

INFO :PAK NAVY

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

OCCUPY ZONE VICTOR WITH ALL DESPATCH INTELLIGENCE INDICATES

CARRIER IN PORT.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Admiral Krishnan's book states: (ibid)

"The GHAZI story, as related below is pieced together from much evidence
that has been collected from the sunken submarine itself, and detailed
analysis of track charts of the attacking ship, INS RAJPUT as well as that of
the GHAZI. From a recovered chart, it is clearly revealed that the GHAZI
sailed from Karachi on 14 November, on her marauding mission. She was
400 miles off Bombay on 16 November, off Ceylon on 19 November and
entered the Bay of Bengal on 20 November. She was looking for VIKRANT
off Madras on 23 November.

"From the position of the rudder of the GHAZI, the extent of damage she
has suffered, and the notations on charts recovered, the situation has been
assessed by naval experts as follows:

"The GHAZI had evidently come up to periscope/or surface depth to

establish her navigational position, an operation which was made
extremely difficult by the blackout and the switching off of all
navigational lights. At this point of time, she probably saw or heard a
destroyer approaching her, almost on a reciprocal course. This is a
 frightening sight at the best of times and she obviously dived in a
tremendous hurry and at the same time put her rudder hard over in
order to get away to seaward. It is possible that in her desperate
crash dive, her nose must have hit the shallow ground hard when she
bottomed. It seems likely that a fire broke out on board for'd where,
in all probability, there were mines, in addition to the torpedoes, fully
armed".

ANALYSIS OF GHAZI'S SINKING

Two points merit analysis:

(a) When did the GHAZI sink?

(b) What caused the GHAZI to sink?

WHEN DID THE GHAZI SINK

According to the `Story of the Pakistan Navy,' GHAZI failed to make its check
report from 26 November onwards.

Lt Cdr (SDG) Inder Singh was the Commanding Officer of INS RAJPUT in 1971. He
recalls:

"At about 1600 hrs on 1st December 1971, I was called by the FOCINCEAST
Vice Admiral Krishnan to his office. He said that a Pakistani submarine had
been sighted off the Ceylon Coast a couple of days back which would be
heading for Madras/Visakhapatnam. He was absolutely certain that now the
submarine was expected to be anywhere between Madras and Vizag and
that she was sent here to attack VIKRANT the moment hostilities were
declared at a time chosen by Pakistan. Till that time, the submarine would
be looking for VIKRANT and shadowing her. So the submarine would have
to be prevented from locating VIKRANT at any cost before hostilities
commenced.

"With this thought in mind, he wanted to hold the Pakistani submarine off
Visakhapatnam till such time hostilities were declared. To achieve this, he
unfolded his plan of action and said that he would like INS RAJPUT to sail
out and act as decoy of VIKRANT. He wanted RAJPUT to proceed towards
Madras and send some misleading signals as from VIKRANT, so that the
submarine mistaking RAJPUT for VIKRANT, would be shadowing her and
VIKRANT would be safe in her hiding place. FOCINC said he knew it was a
suicidal mission for RAJPUT. He was sure that the Pakistani submarine
would make RAJPUT a target the moment hostilities were declared and he
was definite that RAJPUT would not return from this mission and that he
was giving RAJPUT as a bait to Pakistan for the safety of VIKRANT. He was
sorry for the move but he had no other choice. I told him that I considered
myself very lucky that he had selected me for this great cause and that I
was ready to take the challenge.

"On 2nd December 1971, I sailed out of harbour in the afternoon as

VIKRANT and set course for Madras. I sent some telegrams through
Bombay WT seeking confirmation for sickness of parent's etc and other
signals including a LOGREQ signal to NOIC Madras. It was considered
necessary to increase the signal traffic as VIKRANT, being a large ship and
a flagship, naturally was to have heavy signal traffic. Basic code was used
for the signals. I later on came to know that NOIC Madras was baffled by
the quantity of provisions and other items demanded at such short notice in
my LOGREQ signal. He phoned up FOC-in-C, who showed his annoyance
and asked NOIC Madras to supply whatever VIKRANT wanted.

"On 3rd December 1971, RAJPUT was asked to return to harbour, berth at
fuelling jetty, top up and get ready for the next assignment. RAJPUT was
secured alongside by 1900 hours. No sooner had we secured, a despatch
rider came on board and informed that Pakistan had attacked Indian
airfields. Before proceeding to HQENC, I left instructions to speed up
fuelling, collect rations, naval stores and fresh water as required. At
Command Headquarters, the Chief of Staff told me that FOCINC wanted
RAJPUT to sail for Chittagong as soon as possible. I cast off from fuelling
jetty at about 2340 hrs on 3rd December 1971 with a pilot on board. Scare
charges were being thrown overboard whilst the ship was secured at the
jetty and while leaving harbour.

"When the ship was half way in the channel, it suddenly occurred to me
that "what if the Pakistan submarine which I was looking for the last two
days, was waiting outside harbour and it torpedoes RAJPUT while
disembarking pilot at the Outer Channel Buoy." I immediately ordered to
stop engines, and disembarked the pilot. I slowly increased speed and was
doing the maximum speed I could manage by the time I reached Outer
Channel Buoy.

"Shortly after clearing Outer Channel Buoy at about midnight of 3/4

December, when the Prime Minister was addressing the nation, the
starboard lookout reported disturbance of water, fine on the starboard bow.
As the ship was already doing maximum speed and nearing the disturbed
water patch and since the ship was already closed up at action stations,
appropriate depth was set on the depth charges and two depth charges
were dropped at the reported position. The ship got a heavy jolt after the
deafening blasts. Then the ship turned and the area was searched for any
sign of a contact. Satisfied that there was no sign of any contact or
anything on the surface, the ship resumed course.

"There were a few reasons which prompted me to carry out an immediate

attack. First, as stated earlier, I had an intuition while leaving harbour when
 the ship was in mid channel. Secondly knowledge of a Pakistan submarine
in the area, for which RAJPUT had been operating for the last two days to
mislead her. Thirdly plain speaking by the FOCINC to me when he had
called me to his office on 1st December and told me that RAJPUT mistaken
as VIKRANT, would be torpedoed by the Pakistani submarine on outbreak of
hostilities. And lastly the disturbed water patch made me to think that the
submarine had just dived".

Lt (TAS) (later Commodore) KP Mathew recalls:

"I clearly recall that I was on watch in the PDHQ. We were all waiting for
Mrs Gandhi's address to the nation. That was delayed by a few minutes.
During that delay we received a report from the PWSS, which was located
next to the Coast Battery which overlooks Vizag Outer Harbour, that there
had been a very strong explosion which rattled the window panes. When
they looked out, they could see a big plume of water going up quite high
into the sky at a distance from them. Though the report came in very
clearly, nothing much was done about it since everybody was keen to hear
Mrs Gandhi. But I think it was reported by the PDHQ to the MOR that this
report had come in from the PWSS".

Cdr (E) (later Rear Admiral) GC Thadani was the Staff Officer Engineering in
Headquarters Eastern Naval Command in 1971. He recalls:

"I was with the C-in-C in the MOR on the 3rd evening when CO RAJPUT was
being briefed by him. As CO RAJPUT was leaving the MOR, he mentioned to
me that his ship did not have wooden shores for damage control. I instantly
went with him to the Shipwright Shop, gave him some shores and
accompanied him to the jetty where RAJPUT was fuelling. I personally saw
RAJPUT cast off. Thereafter, I went home which was on a hill which
overlooked the sea. The distance from the jetty to my home was a 15
minute drive. After I reached home, whilst I was listening to All India Radio,
an announcement was made that the Prime Minister's speech had been
delayed. It was during this delay period that I heard a massive explosion
and the windows of my house rattled.

"The next morning at 8 o' clock I went to the Jetty. The Commander in
Chief and the Chief of Staff were talking about the GHAZI. The C-in-C went
on board a boat and I went with him. We went to the site of the explosion
where, I remember, Lt Sajjan Kumar was diving. He came up and told the
C-in-C that he had put his hand on the ships side and felt the letters of
GHAZI".

Capt (later Commodore) KS Subra Manian, was the Indian Navy's seniormost
submariner at that time and Captain of the 8th Submarine Squadron (Capt SM 8)
in the Submarine Base at Visakhapatnam. He recalls:
 "The first indication of GHAZI having sunk came in the middle of the night.
A muffled but powerful explosion resembling a deep underwater explosion
(distinctly different from gunfire) was heard in the naval base during the
night of 3/4 Dec. The next morning (4 Dec) fishermen reported finding
flotsam. It was only after this discovery that it was appreciated that
possibly there had been a sinking off Visakhapatnam. The next morning (5
Dec), we went out to the spot and located the wreck. The Clearance Diving
Team from Vizag was ferried across. I was there with them. They found the
GHAZI sunk in fairly shallow water.

"On the day before the hostilities actually broke out, she was already in
position which perhaps we didn't anticipate. She had laid mines. One of her
own may have blown her up and she sank outside Vizag harbour before she
could do any further damage".

Lt (later Lt Cdr) (Diving) Sajjan Kumar was the Officer-in-Charge Command

Clearance Diving Team in 1971. He recalls:

"As far as I can remember, the explosion was in the middle of night of
3rd/4th Dec. I was fast asleep when I heard a very big explosion and my
own window panes rattled loudly. I must have been dead tired because I
fell asleep again. It was definitely on the 3rd/4th night that there was an
explosion. I heard only one explosion, not more than one.

"On 5 December I embarked on board SDB AKSHAY with my Gemini

dinghies. We were accompained by a number of catamaran type fishing
boats to the site of the wreck. Before sailing, I was briefed to go and locate
the object and was told that it may be a submarine.

"So we went and the team dived at the site, using the fishing boats as
diving platforms. I anchored the fishing boats some distance apart and sent
the divers down from the fishing boats. The first diver came up and
reported that it is a submarine. The first message sent to the C-in-C was
that we have located a submarine. I felt the urge to dive myself but had to
postpone it to a more decisive moment because the decompression regime
required we could not dive to that depth more than once in a day. After the
first diver had reported that it was a submarine, I sent another better diver
to find out what type of submarine it was and how big. The second diver
came up and said that it was a big submarine. So a second message was
then sent that it is a big submarine.

"At this stage I decided to dive myself. The visibility underwater was about
10 feet. At the depth of nearly 110 feet, the current was fairly strong, in the
sense that it was not possible to swim against the current. But since a line
had been snagged, we were able to reach the submarine. I first saw the
silhouette from about 10 feet away. I caught hold of the various
projections, the gratings, the railings and went round the entire submarine.
 "Naval Headquarters had earlier provided us documents which included
photos of the GHAZI from various angles, so I knew what GHAZI would look
like. After I swam around and saw the various things, I came to the
conclusion that this was the GHAZI and I came up. The third signal I sent to
C-in-C was that it was GHAZI. After that signal was received in HQENC,
they sent a message back to AKSHAY saying "Do not send any more
signals.

"After about an hour, Capt Subra Manian and Admiral Krishnan came on
board AKSHAY and we had a meeting. I told them what I saw about the
submarine, and that there was massive damage in the portion forward of
the Conning Tower".

The submarine rescue vessel INS NISTAR undocked on the evening of 5

December. On 6 December she anchored on top of the GHAZI and commenced
diving operations.

Commodore Subra Manian recalls:

"The submarine rescue vessel INS NISTAR, which had just gone into dry
dock, was hastily undocked and sent out to the area on 6 Dec. The wreck
was located by sonar in about 55 to 58 metres of water. After the NISTAR
had moored herself over the wreck and attached a line to it, divers who
went down found that the wreck had cracked open at the top forward end of
the submarine, but they couldn't get in. So they had to use plastic explosive
to make an opening and enter. They then identified it as the GHAZI and
recovered documents and bodies. This took about a day and probably
happened on 07 Dec".

Lieutenant (later Commander) Shafi Syed, a submariner, was embarked on board

NISTAR during the diving operations on GHAZI. He recalls:

"I was instructed to embark in INS NISTAR and liaise with the Command
Diving Officer to guide the divers on to the GHAZI, which had sunk off the
northern side of the entrance channel to Vizag. NISTAR positioned herself
on top of the GHAZI, from where we could conduct diving operations. The
alignment of GHAZI, as indicated by the divers, showed that it was lying on
a heading which was at 90 degrees to the entrance channel. This would be
an ideal aspect from which to fire a torpedo salvo at any ship coming in or
going out, which would be sunk in the channel and block it. The depth of
water where she was lying was around 30 meters. She was within torpedo
firing range of the harbour entrance.

"By drawing a sketch of the general construction of the submarine, I

explained to the diver going down, the entry point into the conning tower.
The diver reported that he had gone around the conning tower and saw that
the periscope was in the raised position. He also saw a gyro pelorus, which
 had on top a binocular of very high magnification which could be swivelled
right around. Opening the hatch the next day on 7 December, the diver
entered the conning tower. He reported that there were two fully bloated
bodies which were stuck in the conning tower. These were removed. Divers
were then sent to recover whatever books and equipment could be brought
up from the conning tower. The divers reported that there was a small
plotting table in the forward end of the conning tower with some charts,
GHAZI's flag and some other flags. Most of the material which was inside
the conning tower was recovered".

Cdr (later Rear Admiral PP Sivamani) who was the Eastern Fleet's Navigation
Officer, recalls:

"A few weeks after the hostilities ended I was called to the Headquarters
Eastern Naval Command one day and handed over GHAZI's track charts,
the Navigator's Note Book and the Log recovered from GHAZI during the
diving operation. I was told to analyse the track charts and submit a written
report on GHAZI's movements. The salient points which emerged out of the
analysis of these records indicated that:

(a) GHAZI left Karachi for a post refit trial around November 1971.
She came back after a day, apparently to rectify the defects found in
the post refit trials. Then she left Karachi on the 14th and set course
South for deployment on the East Coast. She stayed between
longitude 64 East and 65 East till she passed west of Mangalore and
then slowly curving in, she made a landfall fix at Minicoy. She passed
close to Minicoy island and gave a wide berth to Colombo. South of
Ceylon she steered East North East and then on a northerly course
fetched up off Madras PM 23 November.

(b) At snort depth, GHAZI was doing 8 to 9 knots and maybe on

surface at night it was building up to 11.5 or 12 knots. That speaks
very highly of GHAZI's performance capabilities at the time. The total
distance from Karachi to Madras via Minicoy and south of Ceylon is
about 2200 miles. To have traversed this distance, alternating day
and night between surface and periscope or snort depth, would mean
that she was averaging 10 knots. She must have been making good
not less than 8 knots. Whatever be the speed made good, with the
current or against the current, the fact remains that GHAZI fetched
up off Madras on PM 23 November.

"Off Madras she did crossover patrols between the 23rd and the 25th. The
tracks were very very clear. She had a series of fixes and she was
concentrating exactly at the entrance to Madras, 10 to 15 miles either side,
at a distance of 12 to 15 miles.

"She then set course for Visakhapatnam where she seems to have arrived
 on 27 November traversing a distance of about 340 miles. She commenced
patrolling off Visakhapatnam on the 27th and did a series of crossover
patrols, put out to sea eastward for a short duration, came back towards
Visakhapatnam to an area 5 to 10 miles from the Entrance Channel Buoy
and hung around there. The last entry made was on the midnight of 2/3
December. The chart was in fairly good condition, but the Log Book and the
Navigators Note Book, written in pencil and in pen were smudged and took
a little time for me to decipher.

"GHAZI's cross over patrol off Visakhapatnam was confined to a very small
area within a radius of about 2 miles centered on a position to the east of
the Entrance Channel Buoy at about three to four miles. If a unit keeps on
doing cross over patrols in such a small area, it will be very difficult to sift
out the fixes or for that matter, translate the entries from the Navigators
Note Book on to the chart and vice versa. Maybe she had put some entries
or since the Navigator's yeoman knew the submarine was in the same
position, he did not keep on repeating the same position over and over
again".

The Sequence of Events.

The sequence of events after 5 Dec, when AKSHAY started diving operations,
appears reasonably clear. As regards events prior to 5 Dec, there are two
recollections which state that the explosion occurred on the night of 2/3
December.

In his book "Surrender at Dacca - Birth of a Nation", Lt Gen JFR Jacob, who was
Chief of Staff Eastern Army Command at Calcutta states:

"We had signal intercepts of the GHAZI, a Pakistani submarine, entering the
Bay of Bengal and we had passed on this information to the Indian Navy.
(Page 49)

"On the morning of 3 December, Admiral Krishnan, Flag Officer

Commanding in Chief of our Eastern Naval Command, telephoned me to say
that the wreckage of a Pakistani submarine had been found by fishermen on
the approaches to the Visakhapatnam port. Krishnan said that the blowing
up of the GHAZI, either on 1 or 2 December whilst laying mines, was an act
of God. He said it would permit the Navy greater freedom of action. Next
morning on 4 December, Krishnan again telephoned asking me whether we
had reported the blowing up of the GHAZI to Delhi. I said that we had not
as I presumed that he had done so. Relieved, he thanked me and asked me
to forget our previous conversation. The official Naval version given out
later was that the GHAZI had been sunk by the ships of the Eastern Fleet
 on 4 December". (ibid Page 104)

According to Lieutenant (later Commander) H Dhingra, who was a qualified Deep

Diver serving on board the NISTAR:

"The explosion was heard a little after midnight between 1st and 2
December i.e. prior to the breaking out of war. During the night of 1/2
December itself, I received a message that an explosion had been heard
and that at dawn I had to go to the jetty and report to the C-in-C. At dawn
on 2 December, I, together with the C-in-C Admiral Krishnan and CO
Virbahu/Captain SM8, Captain Subra Manian, we went out of Vizag harbour
in the Admiral's barge. In the barge itself I saw two life jackets which had
been picked up earlier by fishermen and handed over to the Navy. We
found an oil slick and a lot of flotsam. Immediately thereafter, we were told
to start diving. NISTAR was floated out of dock on the 5th evening and
brought to the site the next day. By that time the Command Clearance
Diving Team's divers had already gone down from AKSHAY and tied a rope
on to the bollard of the sunken submarine".

Two alternatives therefore present themselves:

(a) A loud explosion was heard around midnight 3/4 December just
before the Prime Minister's broadcast to the nation. It was
accompanied by a flash of light. The explosion rattled several window
panes in buildings near the beach. The PWSS/Naval Battery reported
the explosion to the PDHQ who reported it to the Maritime Operations
Room. During the night, fishermen who saw the explosion picked up
two lifejackets and took them to the Navy. At dawn on 4 December,
the FOCINC Admiral Krishnan, the Captain SM 8, Capt Subra Manian
and Lt Dhingra personally went to the site of a wreck after which
clearance Divers went to the scene in a Gemini dinghy on 4 Dec. The
Command Clearance Diving Team dived from the SDB INS AKSHAY on
AM 5 December and identified the GHAZI. INS NISTAR started diving
operations on 6 Dec. On 7 December, divers gained access into the
GHAZI's conning tower and recovered documents. On 8 December,
GHAZI's artefacts were sent to New Delhi. On 9 December, Naval
Headquarters announced that the GHAZI was sunk off Visakhapatnam
on night 3/4 December.

(b) In view of Gen Jacob's recollections about Admiral Krishnan's

phone calls on 3 and 4 December, Cdr Dhingra's recollection that the
explosion occurred on night 2/3 December and Rear Admiral
Sivamani's recollection that the last entry made on GHAZI's track
chart was on midnight 2/3 Dec, an alternative sequence of events
emerges as follows:

(i) That GHAZI exploded at midnight on 2/3 December. Debris

 came to the surface, fisherman picked up and brought
lifejackets to the Naval Base, which reached the C-in-C on 3
December. (On 1 December, the C-in-C was in Calcutta with
General Jacob and made no mention of the GHAZI).

(ii) At dawn on 3 December, the C-in-C, Captain Subra Manian

and Lt Dhingra went to the site of the wreck in the Admiral's
barge. The C-in-C ordered diving operations to start. Clearance
divers went to the site on 3 December. The C-in-C rang up
General Jacob on 3 December. On the evening of 3 December
war broke out.

(iii) On 4 December, everybody was busy coping with the war.

The C-in-C rang up General Jacob for the second time. AKSHAY
embarked the diving team and its equipment during the 4th and
started diving on the 5th. Thereafter the sequence would be the
same as in (a) above.

Rear Admiral Thadani is absolutely certain that he personally sent RAJPUT off as
she sailed from the jetty on night of 3/4 Dec and soon after reaching home heard
the explosion. Available records substantiate INS RAJPUT being sailed out on 2
December, recalled on 3 December and sailed again at midnight 3/4 December.
Quite clearly, if GHAZI had sunk prior to night 3/4 December, there would have
been no need for RAJPUT to masquerade as VIKRANT. It is reasonable to conclude
that GHAZI exploded on night 3/4 December.

WHAT CAUSED THE GHAZI TO SINK

Commodore KS Subra Manian recalls:

"In the course of the diving operation, I interrogated the divers to find out
how exactly the damage had happened to the submarine. From what I
gathered, it looked to me that there had been an internal explosion. The
hull had blown outwards. That could only be attributed to an internal
explosion of a mine which was still in the tubes. Again a hydrogen explosion
inside could also be the cause. At that time, I put down the cause of the
GHAZI's sinking as a case of internal explosion due to her own mines
blowing up or due to hydrogen. Looking back now after the lapse of so
many years, it seems to me that the cause of her blowing up was most
probably a hydrogen explosion. I base this conclusion on the fact that the
hull had blown outwards near the mid section of the submarine and not
right forward near the torpedo tubes. Had a mine exploded in the tube or in
the forward compartment while being handled, the damage would have
been for'd.
 "Moreover, if she had already laid some mines, we would have found some
sooner or later. To date no mines have been found there. Secondly, a mine
is safe until it is laid and arms itself after a twelve hour time delay to enable
the laying vessel to clear the area. But in this case, some malfunction of the
mine may have taken place inside the submarine, either while she was
preparing to lay the mines or, while the mines were lying in the tube,
something happened. I do not know what vintage Ghazi's mines were.
Perhaps due to age, perhaps due to lack of maintenance, a mine could have
gone off inside the submarine, resulting in this sort of damage. The only
reason that I surmised that it was an internal explosion was the fact that
the hull was blown outwards. A mine going off underneath the submarine or
in its vicinity would not create this sort of damage. That led me to think
that due to some malfunction of the safety mechanism, a mine inside had
gone off and sunk the submarine. A hydrogen explosion is, as I have said,
even more probable."

Commander Shafi Sayad, the submariner embarked on board NISTAR during the
diving operations, recalls:

"The diver reported that the pressure hull had been split open and was
jagged. It had opened out into a sharp cut, which ran from right forward
towards the conning tower. He could not progress very far ahead of the
casing for'd of the conning tower.

"Ingress into the Control Room through the lower lid of the conning tower
was also not possible as the diver reported that the whole hatch was a mass
of pipes running right across, with jagged edges. It was very difficult to
push aside any pipe. Keeping the diver's safety in mind, ingress through
this route was impossible.

"Diving effort then shifted to the aft escape hatch. The diver managed to
open it easily and he gained access into the submarine. The compartment
was fully flooded and he found the same jagged set of pipes which he had
encountered under the lower lid of the conning tower.

"The divers found another small hatch. We slid the diver into the provision
room of the GHAZI and the diver sent a good amount of provisions up to
the surface. Although considerable damage to steel pipe lines had been
seen at the for'd control room end and the aft end, not much damage was
noticeable in this compartment probably because of the lagging in the
compartment. But what is surprising is that although the explosion had
destroyed the for'd end of the submarine, the eggs inside the submarine
were totally intact.

"In my view, the likely cause of the explosion which led to the sinking of the
GHAZI appears to be hydrogen accumulation, which takes place during
normal charging and discharging of submarine batteries. A submarine of the
 displacement of GHAZI would have something like 350 tonnes of battery. In
a 1900 ton submarine having 350 tonnes of battery, a hydrogen explosion
can be crippling. The effect on the hull, as described by the diver, was that
the hull had split open. It had jagged ends. The split was longitudinal,
running along the length of the submarine. The entire submarine, fore to
aft, was intact except for the splitting open, for'd of the conning tower. The
explosion did not cause the entire hull to completely break up into portions.
It was fully intact. The diver described that the for'd section of the casing
was unwalkable.

"I rule out the explosion being caused by an external mine because the
intensity of the explosion was such that the entire length of the submarine
was affected internally. There was no external damage to the submarine
casing or the conning tower. If she had gone over a mine, the conning
tower, the periscope, the fin area should have completely buckled or
shattered. We found that the seventh compartment aft, which was almost a
100 meters away, from end to end, was also affected in a similar manner,
all the internal fittings and pipes, everything, had been smashed, ends
distorted and contorted and jagged. The possibility of torpedoes exploding
was also ruled out, because of the inbuilt safety arming devices. A torpedo
does not get fully armed until after it runs out. Torpedoes exploding within
the tubes is unlikely because there are so many in built interlocks. Unless
the forward caps are open, the torpedo cannot be armed. So many
interlocks exist in the configuration of the firing devices, that anything to do
with impact can be ruled out. Sympathetic explosions taking place is also
ruled out. If the 6 or 8 torpedoes she was carrying in the forward tubes or
the torpedoes in the racks had exploded, the entire submarine would have
jumped out of the water, nothing would have remained. But here was an
intact submarine, lying on the seabed. Something internal had taken place.

"I recall that just before the outbreak of hostilities, I heard a BBC news item
of an explosion that had taken place in a British submarine, whilst battery
charging in harbour. If I recall correctly, the submarine was extensively
damaged and she sank within the harbour. In my view, the most likely
reason for the sinking of the GHAZI seems to be the explosion of the
accumulated hydrogen gas from the batteries".

Commander Dhingra, the deep diver from NISTAR, recalls:

"The first thing that we observed was that the hull forward of the conning
tower was in total debris. The entire thing was shattered. There were
jagged ends around the hull. You could walk on the casing up to a certain
point. Beyond that there was no way which you could get into the debris.
Nothing could be seen for'd of the conning tower. It was not safe for any
diver to go down into the debris in case explosives were still there. In fact,
nobody dived on the debris as such. We only saw it from the top. The
remaining part of the outside of the entire hull was intact.
 "I have no doubt that the hull was blown outwards. I think it was due to an
explosion from within the submarine. But I cannot say for sure whether it is
on account of hydrogen from the batteries or from some other kind of
explosion inside the compartments."

Commodore KP Mathew, who also dived on Ghazi's wreck, recalls:

"The first time I went down, I saw the submarine lying upright, as if she
had bottomed there, with no tilt on either side from the normal straight
bottoming position. The submarine was fully intact from the stern right up
to the forward portion. In the forward portion, 10 to 15 ft or maybe upto 20
ft, there was hardly anything to see. The whole place was blasted off. The
next 15 to 16 ft were split open - you could see the various air bottles and
the torpedo launching tubes and all their jagged ends. It was quite clear
that something had happened in the forward portion of the GHAZI, in the
torpedo tube area. It definitely looked like an internal explosion, either of
explosives or maybe caused by an accumulation of hydrogen. I am not sure
of that, but it was definitely in the forward portion and it appeared to be an
explosion which had sent it down.

"If GHAZI had been damaged from an external explosion, the damage
would have been all internal and not of the kind which I saw, of the area
totally split and all ripped apart. This can only happen from an explosion
taking place next to the damaged portions. This leads to the conclusion that
it could only have been an internal explosion that caused the damage to the
GHAZI the way it did".

Lt (later Commodore) Vimal Kumar, also a deep diver embarked in NISTAR during
the diving operations, recalls:

"The explosion had taken place in the forward section. All the projections
were mostly outwards. I clearly remember that when this picture of the
damage to the forward area was being correlated with the mine trials not
having been successful, the inference that emerged was that probably the
mines inside had exploded, either while laying or something had happened
just before ejecting the mines.

"Somehow we were very sure from the GHAZI's signals that there was
something wrong with the mines and therefore we concluded that the
explosion could only be because of the mines.

"As regards to the explosion being caused by hydrogen, it is a very light

gas, it is very soluble in water and it will get dissolved. When hydrogen
explodes, it will explode wherever the hydrogen is. But in this case the
explosion took place only in the forward area. The compartment having the
arrangement for connecting the rescue bell was totally intact and had not
exploded. I therefore believe that the explosion took place because of the
 mines".

Commander (ND) (later Commodore) CVP Sarathy, who was in NHQ's War Room
during the war, recalls analysing the problem:

"A lot of theories were going around at the time and including one that our
own ship had attacked and that it was a delayed action and the GHAZI
ultimately blew up. Everybody was trying to claim a little credit for this
incident. The fact was that the GHAZI was approaching Visakhapatnam with
the intention of attacking any ship coming out of the harbour. If it managed
to sink any ship in the channel, it would take some time before the channel
could be cleared and till then the naval ships which were inside would be
bottled up. If that was the Pakistan Navy's plan, then I think it was a well
conceived plan. The GHAZI came to do that.

"As regards how it blew up, the fact is that she had primed her torpedoes,
and was cruising along just above the surface to the sea bed. There is a
little ridge which runs out along the coast. It is slightly to the North of Vizag
harbour. The theory is that the GHAZI did not know of the existence of this
ridge and that while cruising along, she actually bumped into it and the
collision triggered off the torpedoes which were already armed. One of them
blew up and then subsequently all the others blew up along with it causing
the GHAZI to go down. This seemed to be the theory we all ultimately
believed when we were in NHQ at that time".

Rear Admiral Sivamani recalls:

"My own view is that she must have been apparently trying to shift the
torpedo tubes into a weapon mode of mines or vice versa and an explosion
took place resulting in her sinking. The explosion, if I remember right,
having questioned some of the divers at that point in time, seems to have
been from inside out, not from any external object. It could be that as the
mine was being thrown out of the tube, (as you know, intelligence indicated
that GHAZI was fitted with some sort of facility to spit out mines from one
of her tubes) it must have hit somewhere and then exploded. The other
theory was that it was a battery explosion. If a battery explosion had taken
place, it could have happened only in the forward battery compartment.
This possibility also certainly cannot be ruled out".

Lt Cdr Sajjan Kumar recalls:

"I personally think that the explosion was caused by build up of hydrogen
gas within the submarine. In this, I am supported by a number of signals
that we read in the message logs of GHAZI which said very explicitly that
they have this major problem of hydrogen building up in the submarine.
Probably when the build up of hydrogen was beyond limits, the explosion
took place and at the same time, whatever ordnance she was carrying -
 mines, torpedoes everything - went off all together and that was the big
bang".

Cdr(TAS) Utful Dabir, the Commanding Officer of INS GULDAR which was in
Visakhapatnam in early December, recalls:

"Apparently an explosion was heard by local fishermen just off the beach,
but they were not paid heed to by anyone from the Port Trust and the Coast
Battery. The second explosion, a short while later (probably GHAZI's
blowing up) too was not paid heed to until local fishermen found some
pieces in their nets. It was only then that HQENC realised the possibility of
a submarine having sunk near the channel.

"Both mines and torpedoes have fairly good safety devices to prevent their
getting armed whilst inside the torpedo tubes of a submarine. Since one
explosion is known to have occurred in shallow waters near the beach, the
only correct surmise is that it was caused by a torpedo which missed its
intended target. The approximate positions of the explosion place near
Outer Channel Buoy and the location of the sunken submarine, makes it
appear that the target ship must have just crossed the Outer Channel Buoy
before the torpedo began its run of set range around 3000 to 4000 yards.
The submarine at that point may have just been able to maintain periscope
depth, making it very difficult to avoid any oncoming ship. It is likely that a
second torpedo too was about to be launched and hence on impact with the
sea-bottom, it got launched without the intentional firing taking place or the
launch was made while the submarine was in a steep dive.

"I had heard that GHAZI was carrying eight mines. I also heard that there
were only two torpedoes in the forward tubes. Thus GHAZI hitting her own
mine, launched deliberately or accidentally, is a distinct possibility. If there
were mines or torpedoes in an unarmed state, either on the front recks or
in the rear tubes, these would most probably have remained intact
unexploded. If these could have been counted/inspected by divers, it would
have helped in arriving at a more probable cause.

"From what I remember, available evidence led to a conclusion that one

torpedo from the forward tube was fired and a second one too appeared to
have been launched and it is this second one which appears to have
exploded, either inside the tube or just outside, after completing its set run
without actually running linearly. These two fired tubes could have had
mines instead of torpedoes, but it is highly unlikely for a mine to explode
immediately on launching because of the much longer arming delay
normally set on the clock.

"It is certain that the explosion was inside the GHAZI because the hull was
splayed outward and upward. Apparently the lower side of the hull showed
little damage. Whilst the mines and torpedoes would have been safe in
 stowage, there is the greatest possibility of a mine or a torpedo being
completely readied for launch in the tube and GHAZI hitting the rocky
bottom just as the weapon was about to be launched or actually launched
but could not go out because the outer doors of the tubes had jammed hard
against a cliff like structure. The post-launch safety devices can run out if
the tubes are flooded and the holding lever is released/withdrawn. Such
accidents have been recorded in the past. Torpedoes completing their entire
run in the tube were not uncommon in the older submarines.

"Hydrogen explosion is unlikely to have been the cause, as the bodies and
papers would have been charred badly by the almost instantaneous
combustion of hydrogen and the raising of internal temperatures to charring
level. Also, hydrogen explosion could have affected only one or two
compartments and not the personnel in all other compartments.

"It is not possible to be comprehensive or definitive about what led to the

explosion in the forward section. As far as I know, the incident was not
studied in a comprehensive manner while the required evidence was still
fresh".

AFTERWORD

GHAZI's Mines

Intelligence gained after the war indicated that:

(a) It was unclear whether GHAZI carried the new accoustic influence mines
acquired from France with the Daphne class submarines or the much older
American magnetic/accoustic mines acquired during her refit in Turkey.

(b) Till mid 1971, GHAZI's torpedo tubes had not been modified to carry
French mines and after April 1971, GHAZI was mostly at sea.

(c) Neither GHAZI nor the Daphnes had carried out minelaying exercises
with any degree of success.

(d) If at all GHAZI had mines in her torpedo tubes, they were more likely to
have been the older American mines.

Salvaging the GHAZI

Captain (later Vice Admiral) MK Roy, was the Director Naval Intelligence in 1971.
In his book, "War in the Indian Ocean", he states: (Page 206)

"The Americans offered to raise the submarine to the surface at their own
 expense. The Soviets made a similar offer. The Government of India
however deliberately allowed the submarine to sink into the mud off the
Fairway Buoy of Visakhapatnam and marked the hazard by a buoy (which
has since been removed) and where it still rests buried under the mud".

NAVAL COMMANDO OPERATION AT MONGLA - KHULNA 8 TO 11 DEC

In his book, "Surrender at Dacca", Lt Gen Jacob states: (Page 91 et seq)

"Since the Mukti Bahini later would need more craft to convert into
gunboats in the event of full scale hostilities, we approached the West
Bengal Government for assistance. They were most helpful and gave us two
craft on loan, MV PALASH from the Calcutta Port Trust, and MV PADMA. Our
workshops reinforced the decks and mounted Bofors L/60 anti-aircraft guns
on them. Crews for these were to be found from amongst Bengali Naval
personnel of the Pakistani Navy. Cdr Samant of the Indian Navy, an
outstanding submariner, was assigned to assist. The Task Force was, in the
event of war, to operate directly under the orders of Eastern Command at
Fort William and not Eastern Naval Command. Later, when operations
commenced, these two gunboats operated with considerable success".

In his book "No Way But Surrender", Vice Admiral Krishnan states: (Page 50)

"In addition to the air strikes and the blockade, we decided to mount a
special commando operation on the harbours of Chalna and Khulna. Cdr
Samant was allotted PANVEL and in company with two gunboats PADMA
and PALASH, manned mostly by the Mukti Bahini, they would enter these
harbours and attack the ships and soldiers there. Cdr Samant describes the
sequence of events. This operation took place on 9 and 10 December".

Cdr (later Captain) MN Samant recalls:

"After the war was declared, Lt General Arora and Major General Jacob
ordered me to organise a maritime attack on Chalna and Mongla. This was
because the Indian Army's 41 Brigade was directly locked in combat with its
Pakistani counterpart to take over the Chalna and Khulna area, which was
not falling. So the next best alternative was to mount an attack from
seaward to dislocate the Pakistan troops".

Lt Gen Jacob's book states: (ibid)

"The Task Force was ordered to attack Pakistani shipping at the anchorages
of Chalna-Mongla. Samant wanted to attack Khulna but was told that he
should not proceed beyond Chalna-Mongla as our ground troops would be
 attacking Khulna and there were considerable Pakistani forces at Khulna. He
was also apprised of the bomb line given to the Air Force. Khulna was
included in that bomb line. Advance Headquarters Eastern Air Command
asked me to inform Samant to paint the superstructures yellow as
identification. As soon as this was done, the air squadrons operating there
were informed".

Captain Samant recalls:

"We formed a group called Force Alfa which comprised Mukti Bahini gun
boats PADMA and PALASH, INS PANVEL and the BSF craft CHITRANGADA. I
was Senior Officer of this force. We sailed from Hasnabad on the Indian side
and proceeded through various backwaters of East Pakistan, using Indian
Army Ordnance Maps, and arrived Akram Point which is just off the
entrance to the Pussur River. The force arrived very early in the morning at
about 2'o clock and saw two radar contacts escaping to seaward. My force
could not engage them because they were out of the gun range of our
Bofors 40/60 guns. I sent a flash signal informing FOCINCEAST, VIKRANT
and Headquarters Eastern Command. As a result, both these ships were
captured as soon they came into the open sea. They turned out to be
Pakistan merchant ships BAQIR and ANWAR BAKSH carrying some Baluchi
troops and families to Pakistan.

"After that we turned towards Chalna-Mongla and arrived there by

midnight. One could see that the harbour was ablaze with a couple of
merchant ships. One was NORTH POLE and the other was the OCEAN
ENTERPRISE (which was a Pakistani ship). Both were ablaze because of
Indian Air Force/Fleet Air Arm attacks on the harbour in the previous days.
Next morning when we went alongside a jetty, I found out that the
Pakistanis had already left the harbour, except for a small pocket of
resistance which we managed to clear up.

"The force then proceeded towards Khulna to capture it. We arrived in the
Khulna area by about 11 o clock in the morning and found that the town
was working normally. After passing the Qureshi Steel Mill area, we came
near a small shipyard on the west bank of the Pussur River. There we found
an old merchant ship which had been damaged by the Mukti Bahini
commandos during the first attack on the night of 14th August. The ship's
name was MV LIGHTNING, an Ehiopian ship. When in proximity of the
Khulna Jail, the local population started cheering us and responding to our
shouts of `Jai Bangla'. My intention was to go upto PNS TITUMIR, the
Pakistan Naval establishment in Khulna, capture it and thereby support our
Army from the rear of the defending Pak forces.

"Unfortunately at that time, three Indian Air Force Gnat fighters appeared in
the sky and, despite the fact that we were displaying our pre-arranged
recognition signal of a very large yellow flag, they attacked us in broad
 daylight. We opened fire on these Gnats, not with the intention of hitting
them, because they were our own fighters, but just to put them off.
Unfortunately the Gnats got both the boats, PADMA and PALASH, which
were set ablaze and sunk. INS PANVEL escaped damage by violent evasive
manouvres and the use of engines. CHITRANGADA, fortunately, was not
involved because I had left her back in Chalna-Mongla port because of her
slow speed and her lack of manoeuverability.

"After the Gnats went away, I started picking up the survivors of these two
boats. The total casualties were 4 or 5 Mukti Bahini sailors dead, one BSF
Jawan who was badly injured who subsequently died and quite a few of us
were injured, including myself. I had a grazing bullet wound.

"Then, half an hour later, the second wave of Gnats came and again
swooped down on us. Fortunately for us this time, the Gnats did recognise
that we were a friendly force and peeled off to attack shore targets. At
about this time, the Pakistanis opened fire on us, including on those
survivors who were swimming in the water to save themselves. This was
something which I could not tolerate, so I replied furiously, firing almost all
PANVEL's ammunition to subdue the Pakistani attack. After that, I collected
all the wounded people on board and after hoisting the Bangladesh flag on
Khulna Jail, we returned to Hasnabad to attend to the wounded people."

Lt Cdr JPA Noronha was the CO of PANVEL. He recalls:

"Having been fired upon by Indian aircraft, the Pakistani themselves

thought us to be Pakistani. I made full use of that confusion. I opened fire
against the aircraft to disturb their aim. I thought it preferable if one pilot's
life was lost as against losing my entire ship and its crew. I tried to weave
to avoid being hit. But, finding that I could not outgun or out-manouvre the
aircraft doing such high speeds, I decided to climb up the river bank and
keep my engines at full ahead, so that the smoke could give the
appearance of the ship having been hit. This helped me in the second and
the third sorties when they flew over me and they did not attack me. They
attacked the port and other installations and went away".

"I was very happy that I had managed to fool the aircraft but there was the
ground reality in front of me. The `razakars' were there. They were taking
up positions. I had got my ship abandoned, just in the interest of my crew,
to save their lives. The first time I grounded on the right bank, the second
time on the left channel, which was directly in front of the Razakar's
Headquarters, the railway yard and rest of the town. And now I had to face
this new challenge, because they must have realised, probably having seen
my white ensign, that I was not a Pakistani ship. They took up positions to
apprehend me and capture my crew who had abandoned the ship. I got my
men back, withdrew the ship and opened fire on them, to keep them at
bay.
 "I then went to rescue the people from the other two ships the PALASH and
the PADMA. One of those ships was already destroyed - its davits had flown
past my ship but, fortunately, I was not hit. The ammunition exploded or
the fuel caught fire. I managed to pick up 14 survivors. Then I started the
attack on the shore defences.

"Now some of the Pakistani ships which were hit earlier had been brought
to Khulna for repairs and were being used as fortresses. They were firing at
me through the port holes and from whatever vantage point they could get.
So I used gunfire to silence them".

Lt Gen Jacob's book states: (ibid)

"Cdr Samant in his overe-agerness, decided to attack Khulna.

Unfortunately, the Air Force failed to identify the vessels though they were
clearly painted yellow. The craft were attacked and sunk in what is called in
NATO terminology, `friendly fire'. Samant and the crew were able to swim
ashore. The Mukti Bahini were in control in that area and fortunately there
were no casualties. Even so we at the Eastern Command recommended
Samant for the award of the Mahavir Chakra for his action."

Both Commander Samant and Lieutenant Commander Noronha were awarded the
Maha Vir Chakra for this operation.

THE ENTERPRISE INCIDENT - DEPLOYMENT OF THE AMERICAN

NAVALTASK GROUP 74 INTO THE BAY OF BENGAL

PREAMBLE

By 10 December 1971, the Pakistani offensive in the West had run out of steam.
The Pakistani Army in the East had made its first tentative move to obtain a cease
fire. The United Nations effort to obtain a ceasefire resolution had been stalled by
the Soviet veto. America was concerned how to safeguard West Pakistan from
disaster.

America was faced with a complex situation. There was uncertainty in some
minds whether India intended to transfer her troops from East to West and
decisively defeat Pakistan. Pakistan had invoked the secret clause whereby
America had promised to come to Pakistan's assistance if attacked by India.
There was American determination to avoid being seen as deserting a
CENTO/SEATO ally. And there was the realisation that politically there was no way
of stopping East Pakistan from becoming Bangladesh.

On 10 December, America announced that American Naval Task Group 74,

consisting of the aircraft carrier Enterprise, an amphibious assault ship, four
guided missile destroyers, a guided missile frigate and a landing ship was heading
towards the Bay of Bengal.

From 11 December onwards, the Pakistan Government and Army HQ in

Islamabad started conveying to its Governor and Army commander in East
Pakistan that friendly powers were coming to Pakistan's assistance.

By 12 December, British Royal Air Force aircraft had evacuated 114 US nationals
from Dacca. 47 American nationals had chosen to stay behind. On 13 December,
the American Defence Secretary announced in Washington that the US
Government had contingency plans to evacuate these 47 American citizens. On
14 December, the Enterprise Task Group transited through the Straits of Malacca
and entered the Bay of Bengal. However, instead of proceeding towards East
Pakistan, it altered course away towards Ceylon. On 15 December, it was officially
stated in Washington that after the ceasefire, the Task Group might help to
evacuate Pakistani troops from the East. On 16 December, the Pakistani armed
forces in East Pakistan surrendered.

In India, the spectrum of reactions to the Enterprise Task Group ranged from
public indignation at American gun boat diplomacy, to naval perplexity regarding
American motives, to poise at the highest political level. In January 1972, the
Enterprise Task Group left the Indian Ocean.

The reconstruction of events yields interesting insights of how, in sensitive

situations, naval deployments can convey signals of intent and how these signals
are interpreted differently at different levels, nationally

THE SITUATION ON 10 DECEMBER 71

In the West, the Pakistani land offensive had come to a halt. The Indian advance
in the Shakargarh bulge was drawing Pakistani forces away from Chhamb. In
Punjab, Pakistani pressure across the bridgeheads had been resisted and the
threat to Fazilka warded off. On the Rajasthan front the Indian attack was
penetrating deep into Sind. The Indian Air Force had established its dominance in
the air. At sea, the Western Fleet's blockade was complete. Pakistan's strategy of
relieving the pressure on East Pakistan by attacking India in the West had been
checkmated.

In the East, the Indian advance towards the Meghna River precluded the
evacuation of Pakistani forces. By the 10th, the Indian Army had reached the
banks of the Meghna at three points: at Ashuganj, at Daudkandi - less than 40 air
kilometers from Dacca - and at Chandpur, which dominated the route from Dacca
to the sea. The Indian Air Force had grounded the Pakistan Air Force Sabres in
East Pakistan by putting the Dacca airfields out of action. The Eastern Fleet had
established a total blockade.

Speculation now arose as to how conclusive the Indian victory, on both the
eastern and the western fronts, was going to be. For Pakistan's friends in America
and for China, this question had two aspects: could something be salvaged from
the debacle in East Pakistan; and more important, how to safeguard West
Pakistan from being overwhelmed.

By 10 December, it was clear that the United Nations would not be able to stop
the war. Russia had twice exercised its veto in the Security Council. Before 10
December, the international reaction to the war was focussed on the American
attempts to secure a ceasefire through the United Nations. After the 10th,
America and Russia became more directly involved on how to safeguard West
Pakistan from disaster.

On 10 December, America took two actions. President Nixon ordered a Task

Group of naval ships, headed by the nuclear aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE to
proceed towards the Bay of Bengal. And he sent a letter to the Russian Chairman,
Mr Brezhnev, urging Russia to join America in a joint appeal for a complete cease
fire. He also informed the Russian leadership that America had a treaty
commitment to support Pakistan against Indian aggression and that American
naval forces had started moving towards East Pakistan.

In his book "Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership" Maj Gen Fazal Muqeem Khan states:

"On 11 Dec, it was reported that the USA had ordered the 7th Fleet to move
towards the Bay of Bengal. The news of this move and the adverse Indian
propaganda about it again raised hopes in Pakistan. These however did not
last long. Admiral Sharif advised the Eastern Command that if the American
Fleet had been coming to help them, it would have established contact with
his Headquarters by now.

"On 12 December the CGS sent a telephone message in Pushto informing

Niazi that friends, "yellow from the North and white from the South" were
coming by midday 13 Dec. The next day a message from GHQ indicated
that the friends would be delayed by 48 hours".

SOURCES FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EVENTS

The Washington Special Action Group Minutes

In 1971, whenever an international crisis was brewing, the American Government

used to constitute a Special Action Group comprising senior officials from all
concerned departments. Its task was to examine all the implications for American
policy and to suggest to the President the action that could be taken.

The Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) on India - Pakistan was constituted
in Aug 1971. It held occasional meetings until end November. When hostilities
erupted on 3 December, it met more frequently. The "Secret Sensitive" minutes
of these meetings were made public by an American journalist, Mr Jack Anderson.
These minutes were published in the New York Times Paris Edition on 6 and 15
January 1972.

The Anderson Article on Naval Movements

On 10 January 1972, the Daily Telegraph of London published Mr Jack Anderson's

article regarding the American State Department's apprehensions, as a US Naval
Task Group steamed towards a Soviet Naval Task Group at the height of the Indo
Pakistan War.

Admiral Zumwalt's Memoirs

In his memoirs "On Watch", Admiral Zumwalt, who was the Chief of Naval
Operations of the US Navy in 1971, has recorded his views on the movements of
Task Group 74.

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin's Memoirs

In his memoirs "In Confidence", Mr Anatoly Dobrynin, who was the Soviet
Ambassador in Washington in 1971, has recounted the interaction at the highest
levels of the Soviet and American Governments.

"War and Secession" by Richard Sisson and Leo Rose

Dr Henry Kissinger's Memoirs

Mr Kissinger was the National Security Adviser to American President Nixon. In

his memoirs "The White House Years", he recalls the geopolitical compulsions
which led to the despatch of the American Task Force to the Bay of Bengal.

RECONSTRUCTION OF EVENTS

The WSAG Minutes of 3 December 71 state:

"Dr Kissinger said we need to think about our treaty obligations. I

remember a letter or memo interpreting our existing treaty with a special
India tilt. When I visited Pakistan in January 1962, I was briefed on a secret
document or oral understanding about contingencies arising in other than
 the SEATO context. Perhaps it was a Presidential letter. This was a special
interpretation of the March 1959 bilateral agreement".

The WSAG Minutes of 4 December state:

"Admiral Zumwalt thought that the Paks could hold the line in East Pakistan
for approximately one or two weeks before the logistic problems became
overriding. He expected the Soviets to cement their position in India and to
push for permanent usage of the naval base at Vizag. He anticipated that
the Soviets' immediate short range objective would be to gain military
advantage through their current military relationship with India".

The WSAG Minutes of 6 December state:

"Gen Westmoreland stated there was no means of evacuating West Pak

forces from the East Wing, particularly in view of Indian naval superiority.

"Dr Kissinger asked about a legal position concerning the current Indian
naval `blockade'. Mr Sisco stated that we have protested both incidents in
which American ships have been involved. However, no formal proclamation
apparently has been made in terms of a declaration of war, that it is
essentially still an undeclared war, with the Indians claiming power to
exercise their rights of belligerency. The State Department would, however,
prepare a paper on the legal aspects of the issue. Ambassador Johnson said
that so far as he was concerned, the Indians had no legal position to assert
a blockade.

"Dr Kissinger asked that a draft protest be drawn up. If we considered it

illegal, we will make a formal diplomatic protest. Mr Sisco said that he
would prepare such a protest.

"Dr Kissinger said that it is quite obvious that the President is not inclined to
let the Paks be defeated. Mr Sisco said that from a political point of view,
our efforts would have to be directed at Indians from "extinguishing" West
Pakistan".

The WSAG Minutes of 8 December state:

"Mr Helms (CIA) opened the meeting by briefing the current situation. In
the East, the Indians have broken the line at Comilla. Only major river
crossings prevent them from investing Dacca. The Indians are advancing
rapidly throughout East Pakistan. All major Pak L.O.C.'s in the East are now
vulnerable. In the West, the Paks are now claiming Poonch, inside the
Indian border. However, the Paks are admitting fairly heavy casualties in
the fighting. Tank battles are apparently taking place in the Sind/Rajasthan
area. Mrs Gandhi has indicated that before heeding a UN call for cease-fire,
she intends to straighten out the southern border of Azad Kashmir. It is
reported that, prior to terminating present hostilities, Mrs Gandhi intends to
attempt to eliminate Pakistan's armor and air force capabilities.

"Mr Sisco inquired how long the Paks might be expected to hold out in East
Pakistan, to which Mr Helms replied 48 to 72 hours. The time to reach the
ultimate climax is probably a function of the difficulties encountered in river
crossings.

"Assessing the situation in the West, General Ryan indicated that he did not
see the Indians pushing too hard at this time, rather they seem content
with a holding action.

"Dr Kissinger asked how long it would take to shift Indian forces from East
to West. General Ryan said it might take a reasonably long time to move all
the forces, but that the airborne brigade could be moved quickly, probably
within a matter of five or six days.

"Dr Kissinger suggested that the key issue if the Indians turn on West
Pakistan is Azad Kashmir. If the Indians smash the Pak air force and the
armored forces, we would have a deliberate Indian attempt to force the
disintegration of Pakistan. The elimination of the Pak armored and air forces
would make the Paks defenseless. It would turn West Pakistan into a client
state. The possibility elicits a number of questions. Can we allow a US ally
to go down completely while we participate in a blockade? Can we allow the
Indians to scare us off, believing that if US supplies are needed they will not
be provided?

"Mr Sisco stated that if the situation were to evolve as Dr Kissinger had
indicated then, of course, there was a serious risk to the viability of West
Pakistan.Mr Sisco doubted, however, that the Indians had this as their
objective. He indicated that Foreign Minister Singh told Ambassador Keating
that India had no intention of taking any Pak territory. Mr Sisco said it must
also be kept in mind that Kashmir is really disputed territory.

"Mr Helms then stated that earlier he had omitted mentioning that Madame
Gandhi, when referring to China, expressed the hope that there would be
no Chinese intervention in the West. She said that the Soviets had
cautioned her that the Chinese might rattle the sword in Ladakh but that
the Soviets have promised to take appropriate counter-action if this should
occur. Mr Helms indicated that there was no Chinese build-up at this time
but, nevertheless, even without a build-up they could `make motions and
rattle the sword'.

"Dr Kissinger stated that what we may be witnessing is a situation wherein

a country equipped and supported by the Soviets may be turning half of
Pakistan into an impotent state and the other half into a vassal. We must
consider what other countries may be thinking of our action.
 "Mr Helms asked about our CENTO relationships with Pakistan. Ambassador
Johnson stated we had no legal obligations towards Pakistan in the CENTO
context. Dr Kissinger agreed but added that neither did we have legal
obligations toward India in 1962 when we formulated the air defense
agreement. We must consider what would be the impact of the current
situation in the larger complex of world affairs.

"After discussing various possible commitments to both Pakistan and India,

Mr Packard stated that the overriding consideration is the practical problem
of either doing something effective or doing nothing. If you don't win, don't
get involved. If we were to attempt something it would have to be with a
certainty that it would affect the outcome. Let's not get in if we know we
are going to lose. Find some way to stay out.

"Turning to the question of the blockade, Ambassador Johnson said that

both India and Pakistan have taken blockade action, even though the Pak
blockade is essentially a paper blockade. Dr Kissinger said that we should
also protest to the Paks. Ambassador Johnson indicated we do not have a
legal case to protest the blockade. The belligerent nations have a right to
blockade when a state of war exists. We may think it unwise and we may
question how it is carried out. We have, in fact, normally expressed our
concern. On the other hand we have no problem in protesting the incident
of the SS Buckeye State which had been strafed in a Pakistani port.

"Dr Kissinger said that we are not trying to be even-handed. There can be
no doubt what the President wants. The President does not want to be
even-handed. The President believes that India is the attacker. We are
trying to get across the idea that India has jeopardized relations with the
United States. Dr Kissinger said that we cannot afford to ease India's state
of mind. `The Lady' is cold-blooded and tough and will not turn into a
Soviet satellite merely because of pique. We should not ease her mind. He
invited anyone who objected to this approach to take his case to the
President".

Admiral Zumwalt was Chief of Naval Operations of the American Navy. In his
memoirs "On Watch", he states: (Pages 360 et seq)

"The Naval situation in the Indian Ocean just then was complicated and
confusing. Quite by chance, a large British Navy task group, including two
carriers, the last ships of the British Fleet to remain East of Suez, was on its
way home through the Indian Ocean at the time India marched into East
Bengal. Two days after that invasion, a Soviet destroyer and a minesweeper
came through the Malacca Straits whose mission had been to relieve the
destroyer and minesweeper that had been on station (in the Indian Ocean)
 for 6 months. In view of the war, the relief became a reinforcement; the
original contingent stayed on. Furthermore on 6 or 7 December, the
Russians detached a cruiser armed with cruise missiles, and escorts for it,
from their Pacific Ocean Fleet and sent them towards the Indian Ocean.
They were sighted by the Japanese in the Straits of Tsushima on 9
December. Though these ships did not reach the Malacca Straits until 18
December, we of course knew they were on their way".

Mr Jack Anderson's article states:

"On 7 December a top secret warning was flashed to Washington that three
Soviet naval ships, a seagoing minesweeper and a tanker have begun to
move northeastward into the Bay of Bengal. The units entered the Indian
Ocean from the Malacca Straits on 5 December and were located
approximately 500 nautical miles east of Ceylon on 7 December.

"Urgent huddles in the White House led to a decision on 10 December to

assemble in the Malacca Straits a United States task force, spearheaded by
the aircraft carrier Enterprise, the Navy's most powerful ship. The primary
purpose was to make a `show of force' and to divert Indian planes and
ships from Pakistan.

"As the task force moved into position, Admiral John McCain, our Pacific
commander, inquired on 11 December about `the feasibility of aerial
surveillance of a Soviet task group located approximately 180 nautical miles
south-west of Ceylon'. Authorisation was flashed back the same day `in the
event Task Force 74 is directed to transit the Straits of Malacca, at that
time appropriate screening-surveillance flights are authorised".

Mr Anatoly Dobrynin was the Russian Ambassador in Washington in 1971. In his

memoirs "In Confidence", he states: (Pages 236 et seq)

"On December 10, Nixon asked us to join him in a joint appeal for a
complete ceasefire. In a clear attempt to pressure both the Soviet Union
and India, Nixon made an extraordinary disclosure to the Soviet leadership.
In strict confidence, he had Kissinger inform us that there was a secret
protocol in the agreement between the United States and Pakistan (drafted
under the Kennedy administration and handed to then President, Ayub
Khan, by the US ambassador on 5 November 1962) saying that the
American government would support Pakistan against Indian aggression.

"To build American pressure, Kissinger told Yuli Vorontsov, our able charge
d'affairs during my absence in Moscow for consultations, that the American
military had already been ordered to start preparations for assistance to
 Pakistan under the cover of tactical redeployment of its naval forces,
including the despatch of an aircraft carrier task force from Southeast Asia.
In response, a number of warships from the Soviet Indian Ocean Fleet were
sent northward.

"Kissinger made it clear to us that the United States was mostly concerned
about the western section of the India-Pakistan front which, Washington
feared, would collapse after Pakistan's defeat in the East. As Kissinger later
wrote, he believed Mrs Gandhi was planning to attack the Pakistan-held
portions of Kashmir, recover them for India, and thus precipitate through a
humiliating defeat, the disintegration of what remained of Pakistan in the
West. (In the East, the White House had to accept that the war was as good
as won by India.) As part of his maneuver, Kissinger then asked Vorontsov
to assure Moscow that the White House was not in contact with Beijing over
the conflict, even though Pakistan was close to China. He simultaneously
proposed referring the matter to the United Nations".

Admiral Zumwalt's memoirs state: (ibid)

"On 10 December, a Presidential order that was not discussed with the
Navy in advance, created Task Group 74, consisting of the nuclear carrier
Enterprise and appropriate escorts and supply ships and sent it steaming
from the Gulf of Tonkin, where the ships had been on station, to Singapore.
The order did not specify what TG 74's mission was, nor could anyone,
including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs tell me. I sought to be sure that
these ships either had a mission or were not sent in harms way. The ships
were held off Singapore for two days. On 12 December they were ordered
through the Malacca Straits into the Indian Ocean. Within an hour, that
order was rescinded. Next day it was reissued with the additional proviso
that as much of the passage through the Straits as possible be in daylight,
ie in full view of the world. At the same time "sources" in Washington let it
be known that the object of the exercise was covering the evacuation of
American civilians from Dacca in East Bengal.This clearly was a cover story
since that evacuation, after having been impeded by the fighting for a
week, was successfully completed two days before TG 74 entered the
Indian Ocean".

Mr Jack Anderson's article states:

"As the American warships moved through the Straits and headed into the
Bay of Bengal, even more ominous reports reached Washington from the
Defence Intelligence Agency.

"Recent indicators have been received which suggest the People's Republic
of China may be planning actions regarding the Indo-Pakistan conflict'.

"A top secret message reported tersely: `According to a reliable clandestine

 source, (Pakistan's) President Yahya Khan claimed ... today that the
Chinese Ambassador in Islamabad has assured him that within 72 hours the
Chinese Army will move towards the border.

"And from New Delhi, the CIA reported: `According to a reliable clandestine
source, Prime Minister Gandhi told a leader of her Congress party that she
had some indications that the Chinese intend to intervene along India's
northern border.. Mrs Gandhi said that the Chinese action might be in the
Ladakh area.'

"Russia's Ambassador to India, Nikolai M Pegov, however, promised on 13

December that the Soviets `would open a diversionary action' against the
Chinese and `will not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene.'

"According to Pegov, the movement of the Seventh Fleet is an effort by the

US to bully India, to discourage it from striking against West Pakistan, and
at the same time to boost the morale of the Pakistani forces.

"Pegov noted that a Soviet fleet is now in the Indian Ocean and that the
Soviet Union will not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene".

Mr Anatoly Dobrynin's memoirs state: (ibid)

"The tension was broken upon my return on December 12. Moscow sent a
particularly important message to Nixon: "Our contacts with Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi suggest that the Indian government does not intend to take
any military action against West Pakistan". With noticeable relief, Kissinger
said that was good news. At the same time, he complained that Indian
assurances lacked clarity and called upon us to continue close consultations
in the confidential channel. But what really mattered was that, after taking
Pakistan's side as a payoff for helping open up China, Nixon and Kissinger
had to rely on Moscow's word that India would not attack West Pakistan".

Admiral Zumwalt's memoirs state: (ibid)

"The first orders to TG 74 had been to go on station in the Bay of Bengal,

off the East Bengal coast. I argued against stationing the ships there. I felt
it was taking an unnecessary risk to put a task group without a stated
mission in precisely the place where harm was most likely to befall it. I won
my argument and the group was sent south of Ceylon, where the Russians,
when they arrived, promptly began trailing it. Meanwhile, a second Russian
task group, similar in composition to the first - a cruiser with escorts - was
 sent to the scene, obviously in reaction to TG 74's appearance. What
prompted the despatch of the first Russian group is unclear. The best guess
is that it was the presence, fortuitous though it was, of so many British
ships in troubled waters. In any case, by the first of the year when the
second Russian group arrived, the American ships were put at a
disadvantage by the Russians. While Soviet ships were in close trail of US
ships, the British were no longer on the scene. As soon as Dacca had been
evacuated successfully, they had continued on their homeward journey. For
the first week or so of 1972, the American and Russian ships circled around
each other warily, much as their counterparts had been doing in the
Mediterranean for years. Then on 8 January, TG 74 was ordered out of the
Indian Ocean as mysteriously as it had been ordered in.

"I still do not know exactly what to think about the TG 74 episode.
Obviously it could not have been intended to influence the course of the war
in East Bengal. On the contrary, the task group was not formed until the
outcome in East Bengal was perfectly clear. Perhaps the President and
Kissinger, both of whom quite clearly were frustrated by their inability to
influence events on the subcontinent, impulsively organised TG 74 and sent
it on its way in a final effort to show the world that America was not to be
taken lightly. More likely, they wanted to show China that the US was a
relevant military actor in that part of the world and had the will to deploy
military power in a situation in which a Soviet client was defeating a
Chinese ally. In either case, my hunch is that the gesture was untimely and
futile. But that is just a hunch. Mrs Gandhi may have had designs on West
Pakistan as well as East Pakistan and the arrival of TG 74 may have caused
her to think twice. In other words, the gesture may have been extremely
timely and useful. Until the private papers of the "lady" are made public, no
one will know for sure".

In their book "War and Secession", Richard Sisson and Leo Rose state:

"On 10 December the Enterprise and four escorts were ordered to sail from
their station in the Gulf of Tonkin towards Singapore. On 12 December they
met another naval detachment off the Singapore coast and on 14
December, after two days' unexplained delay, sailed down the Strait of
Malacca during the daylight hours into the northernmost section of the Bay
of Bengal. Task Force 74 then turned south and was operating in the Indian
Ocean to the southeast of Sri Lanka when Dhaka surrendered on 16
December and the war ended the next day with the cease-fire on the
western front. It remained in this general area until 7 January, when it
rejoined the Seventh Fleet off the Vietnam coast.

"A number of explanations and accusations have been made concerning the
 objectives of Task Force 74, none of which are very persuasive. One that
received considerable attention at the time, particularly in India, was the
report that the Enterprise was to be used to rescue Americans trapped in
Dhaka. But as the Americans who wanted to leave Dhaka had already been
flown out on 12 December, two days before the task force left Singapore, a
rescue mission made no sense, and nothing in the orders to the task force
referred to this subject. Indeed, the orders to the Enterprise were
ambiguous and all-inclusive-namely, to conduct "naval, air and surface
operations as directed by higher authority in order to support US interests
in the Indian Ocean area" - not specifically in the Bay of Bengal.

"Kissinger and Nixon have generally tended to explain and justify the
Enterprise episode in broader geopolitical terms, primarily the supposed
impact of this symbolic gesture of support for our Pakistani "ally" on China,
just at the time when the United States was beginning the process of
normalizing relations with the People's Republic. Some others in the State
Department placed greater importance on the impact of American support
of a Muslim state on the international Islamic community. Both were factors
that were considered, but in and of themselves would not have been
decisive.

"Another important consideration for the US government was the presence

of a Soviet naval force in the Indian Ocean. When the war began, the USSR
had only a small force on station-two destroyers, two minesweepers, and
an oiler. But on 6 December a three-ship Soviet naval force, including a
missile cruiser, left Vladivostok, and on 13 December a second task force,
consisting of four ships, including a missile cruiser and missile destroyer,
was dispatched to the Indian Ocean from Vladivostok-under immediate
American surveillance, of course. The first task force entered the Indian
Ocean only on 18 December and the second on 24 December, both after
the war had ended: thus neither served as a deterrent to the Enterprise
during the couple of days Task Force 74 was in the war zone while the war
was going on. This also calls into question the frightening accounts in some
American sources about how close the United States and the Soviet Union
were to a naval confrontation during the war. Whether the Enterprise task
force served any useful purpose is doubtful. But it can be safely assumed
that it was basic American policy that, in any crisis in the Indian Ocean area
in which the Soviet Union had a fleet immediately available (as happened
again in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war), an American naval detachment would
be sent in as well, even if there were no obvious tasks, for it to perform".

In his memoirs "The White House Years", Dr Kissinger states:

"Our paramount concern transcended the subcontinent. The Soviet Union

could have restrained India; it chose not to. It had, in fact, actively
encouraged war by signing the Friendship Treaty, giving diplomatic support
to India's maximum demands, airlifting military supplies, and pledging to
veto inconvenient resolutions in the UN Security Council. The Soviets
encouraged India to exploit Pakistan's travail in part to deliver a blow to our
system of alliances, in even greater measure to demonstrate Chinese
impotence. Since it was a common concern about Soviet power that had
driven Peking and Washington together, a demonstration of American
irrelevance would severely strain our precarious new relationship with
China. Had we followed the advice of our critics - massive public
dissociation from Pakistan and confrontation with it in its moment of
desperation - we would have been operating precisely as the US - Soviet
condominium so dreaded by Peking; this almost surely would have undone
our China initiative.

"Nor were we defending only abstract principles of international conduct.

The victim of the attack was an ally - however reluctant many were to
admit it - to which we had made several explicit promises concerning
precisely this contingency. Clear treaty commitments reinforced by other
undertakings dated back to 1959. One could debate the wisdom of these
undertakings (and much of our bureaucracy was so eager to forget about
them that for a time it proved next to impossible even for the White House
to extract copies of the 1962 communications), but we could not ignore
them. To do so would have disheartened allies like Iran and Turkey, which
sympathized with Pakistan, had the same commitment from us, and looked
to our reaction as a token of American steadiness in potential crises
affecting them. High stakes were therefore involved. On December 5, I told
Nixon that the India-Pakistan conflict would turn into a dress rehearsal for
the Middle East in the spring.

"There was no question of "saving" East Pakistan. Both Nixon and I had
recognized for months that its independence was inevitable; war was not
necessary to accomplish it. We strove to preserve West Pakistan as an
independent state, since we judged India's real aim was to encompass its
disintegration. We sought to prevent a demonstration that Soviet arms and
diplomatic support were inevitably decisive in crises.

"We had to become sufficiently threatening to discourage similar moves by

Soviet friends in other areas, especially the Middle East. And if we acted
with enough daring, we might stop the Indian onslaught before it engulfed
and shattered West Pakistan.

"We were concerned that a Pakistani attack in the West would merely
supply the final pretext for India to complete the disintegration of all of
Pakistan.

"On December 2, Pakistani Ambassador Raza delivered a letter from Yahya

to President Nixon invoking Article I of the 1959 bilateral agreement
between the United States and Pakistan as the basis for US aid to Pakistan.
The American obligation to Pakistan was thus formally raised.

"The treaty with Pakistan was identical to several other bilateral and
multilateral agreements - all of which our pronouncements seemed to cast
into doubt. And it had been buttressed in the case of Pakistan by many
additional assurances of support. The fact was that over the decades of our
relationship with Pakistan, there had grown up a complex body of
communications by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, going
beyond the 1959 pact, some verbal, some in writing, whose plain import
was that the United States would come to Pakistan's assistance if she was
attacked by India. In an aide memoirs of 5 November 1962, the United
States promised assistance to Pakistan in case of Indian aggression.

"Pakistan, moreover, was an ally of other allies - Iran, Turkey - and a friend
of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, then isolated in a still largely radical Middle
East. And it was a friend of China and in close touch with a Peking that was
gingerly feeling its way toward a new relationship with us based on the
hope that we could maintain the global equilibrium. A reputation for
unreliability was not something we could afford.

"Pakistan was an ally to which we had treaty commitments backed up by

private assurances; its fate would thus affect the attitudes of several key
countries that had rested their security on American promises. It would be
watched carefully by China. And those countries in the Middle East eager to
settle the issue by force could easily be tempted to adopt military means.
And if its policy in the sub-continent succeeded too easily, the Soviet Union
might resort to comparable tactics in other volatile areas - as indeed it later
did when Watergate had sapped Executive authority. The dismemberment
of Pakistan by military force and its eventual destruction without any
American reaction thus would have profound international repercussions.

"Because of India's access to Soviet arms and a large arms industry of its
own, India was bound to crush Pakistan's armed forces. Our minimum aim
had to be to demonstrate that we would not compound our weakness by
fatuousness. We had to act in a manner that would give pause to potential
Soviet adventures elsewhere, especially in the Middle East, where Egypt's
President had now proclaimed 1972 as another year of decision.

"In foreign policy, Bismarck once said "courage and success do not stand in
a causal relationship, they are identical". Nixon had many faults, but in
crises he was conspicuously courageous. An aircraft carrier task force that
we had alerted previously was now ordered to move toward the Bay of
Bengal, ostensibly for the evacuation of Americans but in reality to give
emphasis to our warnings against an attack on West Pakistan. We held it
east of the Strait of Malacca, about 24 hours steaming distance from the
 Bay of Bengal, because I wanted to consult the Chinese before we made our
next move. In explaining the purpose of the Fleet movement to Mel Laird
(American Defence Secretary), I pointed out that we recognized the Indian
occupation of East Pakistan as an accomplished fact; our objective was to
scare off an attack on West Pakistan. (I did not add that we also wanted to
have forces in place in case the Soviet Union pressured China.) As always in
crises, Laird was staunch and supportive. When I met Huang Hua, he came
to the real Chinese concern - that a precedent was being set by which other
countries might be dismembered by Indian-Soviet collusion. I told him that
the United States would not be indifferent to further Soviet moves.

"Our Fleet passed through the Strait of Malacca into the Bay of Bengal and
attracted much media attention. Were we threatening India? Were we
seeking to defend East Pakistan? Had we lost our minds? It was in fact
sober calculation. We had some 72 hours to bring the war to a conclusion
before West Pakistan would be swept into the maelstrom. It would take
India that long to shift its forces and mount an assault. Once Pakistan's
Army and Air Force were destroyed, its impotence would guarantee the
country's eventual disintegration. We had to give the Soviets a warning that
matters might get out of control on our side too. We had to be ready to
back up the Chinese if at the last moment they came in after all, UN
initiative having failed. The Kremlin needed an excuse to accelerate the
pressures it claimed it was exerting on India. However unlikely an American
military move against India, the other side could not be sure; it might not
be willing to accept even the minor risk that we might act irrationally. It
was also the best means to split the Soviet Union and India. Moscow was
prepared to harass us; it was in our judgement not prepared to run military
risks. Moving the carrier task force into the Bay of Bengal committed us to
no final act, but it created precisely the margin of uncertainty needed to
force a decision by New Delhi and Moscow".

Mr Anatoly Dobrynin's memoirs state: (ibid)

"The Soviet Union's diplomatic intervention helped prevent the military

conflict from spreading to the point where it would have resulted in a total
defeat and breakup of West Pakistan, not just an amputation of its eastern
province fifteen hundred miles away. I suspect that Pakistan's arrogant
behaviour at the start of the conflict was probably to some degree fostered
by manipulative American diplomacy, which left the impression that the
United States would strongly be on Pakistan's side, but, if so, the Nixon
administration failed to fulfill the Pakistani military regime's great
expectations. Pakistan, actually an American ally, lost half of its territory.

"The final word came in January when we began work with Kissinger on the
 details of the summit. Admitting that he had been unduly nervous about
Soviet intentions during the Indo-Pakistan War, he virtually admitted that
he had taken some "unreasonable steps" at the time. He acknowledged that
our assurance about India's intentions at the critical moment was a
breakthrough in ending the war. For him, that was an extraordinary
confession but not one that he made in public".

INDIAN REACTIONS

Mr Peter Sinai was Director (Bangladesh) in the Ministry of External Affairs in

1971. He recalls:

"On 14th December, the Political Counsellor in the US Embassy in Delhi

sought an urgent meeting in MEA with me and handed over a telex copy of
US Defence Secretary Melvyn Laird's statement that the Carrier Group
ENTERPRISE had been ordered to proceed to the Bay of Bengal "for
evacuation and other contingencies". I pointed out that all US nationals
desiring evacuation had already been evacuated and demanded to know for
whom "evacuation" was intended and what the "other contingencies" might
be. Mr Irwin said that his instructions were only to deliver the Defence
Secretary's statement.

"I rushed the message to Mr DP Dhar, who said he would inform the PM and
that I should meanwhile take a copy of it to NHQ. I took the message to the
South Block War Room. The immediate reaction of the naval personnel
there was one of incredulity and concern. Awareness that the range of the
aircraft on the ENTERPRISE posed a threat to VIKRANT and other naval
vessels operating off Chittagong well before they could be in any position to
retaliate was the main expression of that concern".

Captain (later Vice Admiral) MK Roy, was the Director of Naval Intelligence in
1971. In his book "War in the Indian Ocean", he states: (Page 212 et seq)

"The composition of the US Task Force as seen from satellite photographs

included the nuclear-propelled aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE, the amphibious
assault ship, TRIPOLI with helicopters, and an escort of three guided missile
ships, four destroyers, nuclear attack submarines and tankers. Prime
Minister Gandhi arrived early in the Naval War Room and queried Admiral
Nanda as to the implications of this US move. I was asked to give a quick
appreciation of the capabilities of the US Task Force. I concluded by stating
that it could be any of the undermentioned operations:
 (a) Intervene by invitation as the ENTERPRISE could wrest aerial
supremacy over the skies of East Pakistan. The marines could then be
airlifted ashore by helicopters to assist the Pakistan Army. This was
however thought to be impractical as the Vietnam war was not going
in favour of the US.

(b) Interpose between the coastline and the Indian blockading forces
thus breaking the ring round the East Pakistan coast particularly
involving the ports of Chittagong and Chalna.

(c) The US Task Force possessed the vertical lift capacity to evacuate
at least one Pakistani division with their personal arms to ships in
international waters. It would then be possible to transport them to
West Pakistan by sea to bolster their Army facing the impending
attack by India after the surrender in East Pakistan. Both Pakistan
and US were aware of the restrictions imposed on civilian traffic by
the Indian Railways in order to expeditiously move Indian divisions
from the Eastern to the Western theatre of operations".

In their book "War and Secession" Richard Sisson and Leo Rose state: (Page 217)

"As several responsible Indian officials around the Prime Minister and in the
Defence Ministry noted in comments to the authors, there were no
apprehensions that the US Fleet would intervene in the East Pakistani
campaign or indeed that it could do much in that sector. New Delhi
recognised that the dispatch of the Fleet was a symbolic gesture intended to
impress China and the Islamic states in Southwest Asia as well as to
counter the reinforced Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean".

In his book `No Way But Surrender', Vice Admiral Krishnan states: (ibid)

"At about 5.30 PM on the eighth day of the war, Friday, 10 December, we
intercepted a signal to the effect that the US Navy was sending ships into
the Bay of Bengal, for possible withdrawal of the Pakistani Army.

"I also spoke to Admiral Nanda regarding the 7th Fleet but he had heard no
more than what was in the signal. We ended our conversation on the note
that we should not be surprised by anything that happened from now
onwards.

"None of us ever fell for the gimmick that the Fleet's object was to evacuate
a handful of American subjects from Dacca. You do not require an elephant
gun to shoot at a flea. Obviously, her primary intention was to frighten us
into withdrawing our forces from the operational area and let the escape
ships break out. Suppose we didn't scare that easily and persisted in our
stranglehold on Bangladesh? Evacuation of any but a handful of troops was
a possibility, using helicopters. Clearly the use of heavier and very powerful
aircraft was quite out of the question as, however thorough the temporary
repairs, the runways of both Chittagong and Dacca had taken considerable
beating.

"The offensive capabilities of the Fleet, therefore, consisted of:

(i) Landing up to a marine battalion as an assault group using

helicopters

(ii) Using the ENTERPRISE's aircraft for ground support role

(iii) Providing close support against aircraft attacking their fleet and

(iv) Surface and aerial attack on Indian warships.

"We did not know if the marine battalion was carried on board the TRIPOLI
at the time but even assuming that they were, how were they going to land
them ashore except by helicopters. It was quite obvious that manpower-
wise, landing some 2,000-odd persons was not going to materially alter the
land battle in which some 93,000 soldiers were gasping for breath!

"It was unthinkable that they would commit their aircraft on a ground
support role against our army or air force or want only attack our naval
forces at sea. If they did, it would possibly mean war between the United
States and India and, as I said to my colleagues in the Maritime Operations
Room, "that might mean the end of the world or the Americans would find
in us a Vietnam to end all Vietnams.

"To my way of thinking, the most effective method of helping the Pakistanis
would be to close Chittagong within range of their air power, put up a
formidable air umbrella over the merchant ships awaiting escape and
actually provide air escort for them till they reached the waiting fleet. They
knew that our tiny force of aircraft from VIKRANT could never hope to
challenge the air cover and we could at best watch the trapped animals
getting away from our clutches.

"Summing up the appreciation, we came to the following conclusions:

(i) A critical point was being reached in the war and the Pakistanis
were desperate and would try to break out at the earliest opportunity.

(ii) For this purpose, they had at least five merchant ships ready and
camouflaged in Chittagong. They had made desperate attempts to
make the runway at Chittagong sufficiently serviceable to take light
 aircraft and helicopters.

(iii) The safe arrival of the convoy RK 623 would be the starting point
of putting their "Scorched Earth Plan" into action.

(iv) The removal of VIKRANT from the scene of operations would ease
the way to a break out. The Pakistanis must have hoped that we
would withdraw VIKRANT to "get out of the way of the Seventh Fleet".

(v) A break-out of ships could be facilitated by the Seventh Fleet

providing an impregnable and continuous air umbrella till they joined
the surface forces of the Seventh Fleet.

"Having thought out the various possibilities, it was necessary to plan out
our line of action. Clearly, everything turned on the merchant ships
assembled in Chittagong for the actual troop carrying. Not an instant must
be lost in destroying or so heavily damaging them as to make them totally
immobile. Time was running out.

"Having spent the whole forenoon of 11 December on the above thoughts

and a series of discussions with Admiral Nanda as well as my army
colleague Jagjit Aurora, I signalled the Fleet at 1.15 PM as follows:

(a) Appreciate enemy with senior officers including FOCEF planning

major breakout and will try to get away by hugging the coast. Senior
officers may try to escape by air. Approaches to harbour likely to be
mined.

(b) Your mission:

(i) Put Chittagong airport out of commission;

(ii) Attack ships in harbour by air and surface units if they break
out.

(c) This is undoubtedly the most important mission of the war in the
East. The enemy ships must, I repeat, must, be destroyed. Good
Luck.

"The results of the day's work were summed up by FOCEF in a signal to

FOC-IN-C EAST as follows:-

BE PLEASED TO REPORT THAT AT THE END OF TWENTY-FOUR

HOURS OF CONTINUOUS SORTIES COMMENCING 111930
INVOLVING CONSTANT ALIZE RECCE AND BOMBING AND
TWENTY EIGHT HAWK SORTIES, COX BAZAR AND
CHITTAGONG AIRFIELD HAVE BEEN RENDERED INOPERATIVE
 IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THERE IS NO MERCHANT SHIP OF ANY
SIZE IN THE CHITTAGONG HARBOUR OR APPROACHES WHICH
HAS NOT BEEN STRUCK AND INCAPACITATED. THERE IS A
COMPLETE ABSENCE OF SHIPPING ALONG THE ENTIRE COAST
FROM CHALNA EASTWARD THROUGH MEGHNA SANDWIP UP
TO COX'S BAZAR AND SOUTHWARD.

"In addition to the air strikes, we also decided to carry out a surface
bombardment of Cox's Bazar to obviate even a marginal use of the
aerodrome there by any type of aircraft.

"There could now be no question whatsoever of evacuation of the West

Pakistani Army by sea and General Manekshaw's warning: "Nobody can
reach you from the sea. Chittagong, Chalna, Khulna, Mongla are all totally
blocked," was entirely meaningful.

To make absolutely sure, I thought of a deception and sent this signal to

Naval Headquarters.

"I SUBMIT THAT SHOULD GOVERNMENT DECIDE TO PREVENT

SEVENTH FLEET APPROACHING CHITTAGONG IN ORDER TO
BUY TIME SUGGEST ANNOUNCE THAT MINING OF
APPROACHES HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT. FOR FAVOUR OF
CONSIDERATION".

Lt Gen Jacob who was Chief of Staff, Eastern Army HQ, recalls:

"Admiral Krishnan was very worried. He rang me up on 14 December and

asked "What is this about"? I told him "I am already talking to Lt Gen Niazi
about his surrender. If on the 14th, the Americans are in the Straits of
Malacca and the cease fire is to come on the 15th, how can the American
naval task group move up to the North Bay of Bengal in time to give then
any help? Why then are you worried"? He seemed to be obsessed with the
ENTERPRISE Task Group. I don't know why".

In his book `We Dared' Admiral SN Kohli states:

"On one of my visits to the Soviet Union, Admiral Gorshkov mentioned to

me that he had a "brigada" of submarines following the ENTERPRISE
squadron. It is now known that Gorshkov surfaced all the Soviet nuclear
submarines in the Indian Ocean when the US satellite was overhead the 7th
Fleets incursion into the Bay of Bengal".

Prof PN Dhar, the Secretary to the Prime Minister in 1971, recalls:

 "The impression that the ENTERPRISE was a response to the Soviet move to
help us is just not correct. The ENTERPRISE group was followed by the
Soviets and not the other way round. The Soviets did tell us where the
ENTERPRISE was, they had their own way of checking on ENTERPRISE's
progress and they did keep us informed about that. And that is why the
American Embassy here was a little surprised at the nonchalant attitude of
the Government of India".

ANALYSIS AND COMMENT

The basic issue which precipitated the despatch of the ENTERPRISE Task Group
towards India was America's assessment that after completing operations in East
Pakistan, India would move its forces to regain territory in Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir. In the face of the Indian onslaught, the Pakistan Army and Air Force in
the West would be shattered. The elimination of armoured and air forces would
make West Pakistan defenceless and it would then disintegrate. America was well
aware that Pakistan Occupied Kashmir was disputed territory and not recognised
by India as part of West Pakistan. However, since the disintegration of West
Pakistan, an American ally, was totally unacceptable, America disregarded every
Indian assurance that it had no intention of attacking West Pakistan or taking any
Pakistani territory. Instead America kept on seeking assurances that India would
not try to regain territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

Mr LK Jha was India's ambassador in Washington in 1971. Responding to Mr

Kissingers memoirs, he stated:

"Turning now to the second charge that India was determined to

dismember West Pakistan, Kissinger makes much of the fact that while I
gave the assurance that we had no intention whatever of making any
territorial gains in the West, with respect to portions of Kashmir under
Pakistani occupation I could give no such specific assurance. Kissinger
concedes, what the USA was not prepared to admit at the time, that "on
December 3 he (President Yahya Khan) launched his army into an attack in
the West". Then, the US asked me for assurances from India of a kind
which would reward Pakistan for its attack by our agreeing to treat Pakistan
Occupied Kashmir (POK) on par with the other provinces of Pakistan.
Further Kissinger does not bring on record that, while giving India's answer,
I also asked Under Secretary Irwin whether he was in a position to give
India the counter assurance that if Pakistan succeeded in occupying any
part of Jammu and Kashmir across the cease-fire line it would not annex it
to POK. If not, I asked, how could India possibly give a one-sided assurance
to USA on the subject? Jack Irwin admitted that he had no such assurance
in his pocket and he could not, without asking Pakistan, give it to me. He
was without a positive response from Pakistan till the day on which India
 declared a unilateral cease-fire".

This American uncertainty on India's intentions in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir was

compounded by America's specific treaty commitments to support Pakistan
against Indian aggression. In the context of the global geopolitical considerations
recounted by Mr Kissinger, America's despatch of the ENTERPRISE Naval Task
Group was a symbolic gesture, and Russia's sending its Naval Task Group was an
equally symbolic gesture. India's unilateral offer of a cease fire reassured all
concerned that India had nothing to gain from the disintegration of West
Pakistan.

Dr KB Lall, who was the Defence Secretary in 1971, recalls:

"After Gen Niazi's surrender on 16 Dec, lengthy discussions were held in

New Delhi regarding a unilateral cease fire. There were two schools of
thought. One in favour of an immediate unilateral ceasefire. The other in
favour of consolidating the gains made before declaring a unilateral
ceasefire. I recall a discussion on whether the disintegration of West
Pakistan was at all in India's interest. My view was and is that the
disintegration of West Pakistan would only serve to bring the turmoil of
Central Asia to our doorstep on the Punjab border. It was preferable by far
to keep it further away on Pakistan's Western border".

It is clear from Mr Dobrynin's account that at the highest geopolitical level, both
America and Russia clearly knew each others moves and were acting in concert to
minimise escalation.

Whilst the gesture of sending American and Russian naval task groups towards
the Bay of Bengal evoked public appreciation in Pakistan and India respectively,
there were no risks of any clash between the opposing naval task groups. Indeed,
there is a view that the surfacing of the Soviet submarines when a US satellite
was passing overhead was to enable the American Task Group to know where the
Soviet submarines were and thus avoid incidents due to mistaken identity.

In India, the political level accurately recognised the deployment of the

ENTERPRISE Task Group as a symbolic gesture. At the naval level, there was
considerable concern. Vigorous action was taken by the Eastern Naval Command
to thwart possible attempts to evacuate troops from East Pakistan.

After the war, the ENTERPRISE incident awakened awareness at the higher
decision making levels in India of the finesse with which naval forces could
facilitate diplomacy. This awareness, combined with the public appreciation of the
Navy's other achievements in the 1971 war, helped to reinforce naval proposals
for a stronger Navy.
 THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AT COX'S BAZAR - OPERATION BEAVER

PREAMBLE

The Army's initial plans for military operations did not envisage the need for any
amphibious operation. The Army would help in occupying territory in East
Pakistan from which the Provisional Government of Bangladesh would operate.
With the help of their Mukti Fauj and the Mukti Bahini, the Provisional
Government would gradually enlarge the area under its control until the eventual
liberation of Bangladesh from Pakistan. The ten million refugees in India could
then return to their homes.

The seizure of East Pakistan's Pussur river ports of Khulna- Chalna-Mongla was to
be a purely Army operation. Whilst working out their plan for the occupation of
territory in East Pakistan, Headquarters Eastern Army Command in Calcutta
foresaw the problem of how to ferry large numbers of troops across the River
Meghna. Maj Gen Jacob, was the Chief of Staff in Eastern Command Headquarters
in 1971. In his book "Surrender at Dacca", he has stated: (Page 62)

"I had earlier asked the Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Naval
Command, Vice Admiral Krishnan, whether we could use his landing craft to
ferry troops across the river Meghna. Cdr Dabir, who had brought one of
them to Calcutta in June, stated that landing craft of Russian origin were
unsuitable due to their draught. The question of crossing the Meghna had to
be shelved and we shifted our attention to the possibility of obtaining
additional helicopters".

Vice Admiral N Krishnan was the Flag Officer Commanding in Chief Eastern Naval
Command (FOCINCEAST). In his book "No Way But Surrender" he states: (Page
28)

"Since our aim was on all embracing one of the destruction of enemy
forces, our plan required flexibility wherein several options would be
individually or collectively implemented. Accordingly an omnibus plan was
evolved. One of the courses of action in this omnibus plan was
"Diversionary or real amphibious landings" for which elements of the Naval
Garrison from the Andamans would be trained."

In September 1971, Army and Naval Headquarters studied the implications of

undertaking an amphibious operation in East Pakistan in case this contingency
arose. In his book `Sailing and Soldiering in Defence of India', Cdr SD Sinha, who
was serving in Naval Headquarters in 1971, has stated: (Page 154)

"An operation of landing troops south of Cox's Bazar from ships had been
mooted as early as September 1971. Cdr Vernon F Rebello, along with an
Army Lt Col and myself were formed up as a planning group in Naval/Army
HQ. However, after about a month, the operation was cancelled".
Cdr Rebello recalls:

"One of the options being considered was that an amphibious landing might
be required in East Pakistan. There was concern that the United States
might land an amphibious force in the vicinity of Chittagong and establish a
beachhead so that Pakistan's right to the territory would be maintained.

"But the planners neither had any intelligence of the area, nor the
wherewithal nor proper charts nor gradients of feasible beaches. So it was a
futile exercise to plan an amphibious operation. However, certain forces
were earmarked by the Army in case the eventuality arose".

Though amphibious operations were not specifically listed in the tasks which
Naval Headquarters gave to Eastern Naval Command, the FOCINCEAST's plan
catered for an amphibious assault. The three amphibious ships (LSTs) in the Navy
were the old, Second World War, Landing Ship MAGAR and the two newer,
smaller, Polish built Landing Ships, the GHARIAL and the GULDAR. All three LSTs
were already in Eastern Naval Command and were constituted as the 4th Landing
Craft Squadron. "4th LS."

In the months till December 1971, MAGAR was modified to carry oil for refuelling
VIKRANT. GHARIAL and GULDAR continued to be deployed for logistic duties,
ferrying men, rations, spares and stores to the Eastern Fleet and to the Andaman
Islands.

On 1 December, Naval Headquarters informed Eastern Naval Command at

Visakhapatnam and Eastern Army Command at Calcutta that an amphibious
landing may be required to land a battalion of the Army and an element of the
Naval Garrison at Cox's Bazar.

On 2 December, MAGAR and GULDAR were in the Andamans, and GHARIAL was
enroute to Paradeep from Visakhapatnam.

In response to Pakistan's air attacks on Indian airfields on the evening of 3

December, full scale hostilities against East Pakistan commenced on 4 December.
By 8 December, the Indian troops which had entered from West Bengal had
captured Jessore and arrived at the ferry on the River Madhumati. The Indian
troops which had advanced from eastward in Tripura were within reach of three
key points on the eastern bank of the River Meghna: Ashuganj, Daudkandi and
Chandpur, the capture of which would lay open the approaches to Dacca from the
east. Indian troops were also advancing towards Dacca from the north.

The Eastern Army's rapid advance between 4 and 8 December led to an

assessment that Pakistani troops might attempt to escape southward into Burma
past Cox's Bazar.

Captain (later Admiral) Dawson, was the Director of Naval Operations in 1971. He
recalls:

"At the height of the land battle in East Pakistan, it became evident that the
Pakistan Army, numbering about 90,000 troops would try to retreat from
the area by one of the following means:

- By air through Ceylon if that country permitted the movement or by

cutting across the southern peninsula of India.

- By sea in Pak merchant ships which were at that time berthed in

Chittagong, Khulna and Chalna.

- By the land route into Burma.

It was assessed that it would not be possible for Pakistan to evacuate the
large number of troops by air owing to its inadequate air lift capabilities.
Since the sea lift capability had been neutralised by the air strikes from
VIKRANT, the only other means available to the Pakistani Army was by the
land route from Cox's Bazar to Burma. To prevent this from happening, it
was decided, though at very short notice, to mount an amphibious landing
at Cox's Bazar".

On this very same day, 8 December, an Argentinean resolution in the United

Nations General Assembly, demanding a cease fire and withdrawal of troops, was
passed by an overwhelming majority. The disadvantages of indefinitely defying
the UN's ceasefire resolutions which had been stalled, thanks to the Soviet
Union's veto, combined with the need to conclude military operations in East
Pakistan as swiftly as possible.

OPERATION BEAVER

On 9 December, the Chiefs of Staff decided to launch an amphibious operation to

cut off the escape route into Burma of any Pakistani troops retreating southwards.
NHQ directed the Eastern Naval Command to carry out Operation Beaver "To land
and support a battalion group at dawn on 12 December to capture Cox's Bazar".

In his book, Lt Gen Jacob has stated: (Page 124 et seq)

"Gen Manekshaw telephoned me on 9 December ordering us to send a force

by sea to Cox's Bazar to prevent Pakistani troops escaping from there into
Burma. I told Gen Manekshaw that there was no indication of this, but he
was adamant. I pointed out that we had no troops trained in amphibious
operations, that there were no life belts, scrambling nets or suitable landing
craft and most importantly, the troops he wanted us to send (ie the
Gurkhas) had never been to sea. He cut me short saying that these were
 the orders of the three Chiefs of Staff".

Naval Headquarters immediately deputed two officers to Calcutta. Cdr (later

Commodore) RP Bhalla was nominated the Naval Force Commander. He was
accompanied by Cdr VF Rebello who had recently undergone the Amphibious
Warfare Course in the USA. Cdr Rebello recalls:

"Suddenly, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon of 9 December, the Director of

Naval Operations came to me and said "Pack up and go to Calcutta. You
have to do an amphibious landing. I have fixed up a merchant ship for you.
The two LSTs will meet you at sea, you transfer the troops to the LSTs.
VIKRANT will give you air cover. One of the gun firgates will give you
gunfire support and will give you the communication facilities for air
support.

"When we arrived in Calcutta on 10 December, the Navy was nowhere to be

seen. We met only the Trade Warfare officer who had gone and
requisitioned a coal carrier, Vishwa Vijay, who was carrying bulk coal from
Calcutta to Tuticorin".

On 10 December, Maj Gen Jacob chaired a meeting. Cdrs Bhalla and Rebello were
present. Two decisions were taken. The landing scheduled for 12 December would
have to be postponed since the troops to be embarked were being pulled out from
the front line and had yet to assemble in Calcutta. The second and more
important decision, which changed the nature of the subsequent operations, was
that instead of the force being landed in Cox's Bazar, it would land on a beach
further south near the town of Ukhia. The Army felt that if Pakistani troops were
escaping into Burma, they would first secure Cox's Bazar; a landing there would
therefore meet with opposition. The beach at Reju Creek was closer to Ukhia
town, which was located on the main road to Burma and a landing on the beach
there was unlikely to be opposed.

Commodore Bhalla recalls:

"The place where the amphibious landing was to take place had not been
very clearly spelt out. It was to take place south of Cox's Bazar, in the
vicinity of Reju Creek, where some practice amphibious landings had taken
place during the Second World War. Cox's Bazar was considered to be
heavily mined and therefore unsuitable for landings. It was clear to me that
we did not have any detailed knowledge about the beach conditions and
also that some runnels were present."

Cdr Rebello recalls:

"The beach was selected by Gen Jacob because he had practised on that
beach in the Second World War".
In his book, Lt Gen Jacob has stated: (ibid)

"At the meeting in Eastern Command with the Navy, we discussed the
operation. I had taken part in several amphibious operations and was aware
of the special training and equipment required. I had served in Burma
during the Second World War and had trained for amphibious operations on
the beaches stretching south of Cox's Bazar, I was familiar with the
coastline and beaches there. The beach at Ukhia was gently sloping and
there were a number of runnels on the approaches to the beaches. I
brought this to the notice of the Navy.

As life belts and other necessary equipment were not available and the
troops to be used had not seen the sea, I persuaded the Navy to beach the
landing craft and refloat them at high tide. The troops would then land dry
shod. The Navy agreed, but later changed its plan with disastrous
consequences at sea.

The force was to be transported in a merchant ship that was to sail on 10

December and be in position by 12 December. Two LSTs were to transfer
the troops from the merchant ship at sea and land them dry shod. The
aircraft carrier VIKRANT was to provide air and fire support. The force, code
named `Romeo', was hurriedly assembled. We earmarked Headquarters of
8 Mountain Artillery Brigade commanded by Brig SS Rai, 1/3 Gurkha Rifles,
two companies of 11 Bihar and a detachment of artillery. A naval contingent
of 150, which was to participate, did not arrive. The force sailed from
Calcutta on 12 December, two days behind schedule".

As a result of the Army's delay in embarking troops, Naval Headquarters had to

postpone Operation Beaver by two days from 12 December to 14 December.
Meanwhile on 10 December, America announced the despatch of a Naval Task
Group, headed by the nuclear powered aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE, towards the
Bay of Bengal. This resulted in NHQ ordering the immediate embarkation of
troops so that VISHWA VIJAY, the merchant ship requisitioned for this purpose,
could sail from Calcutta as early as possible and land the troops on 14 December.
VISHWA VIJAY eventually departed from Sandheads, off Calcutta, in the early
hours of 13 December.

The Regimental History of the 1st Battalion Gurkha Rifles states:

"On 10 December, the battalion was ordered back to Fort William to form
part of a Task Force "Romeo" under Brig SS Rai which was allotted the task
of moving up the coast of East Pakistan and cutting off the withdrawal
routes of enemy forces. At 1830, hours that same day orders were received
to moved to Kidderpore Docks immediately for loading into a merchant
 navy ship, `VISHWA VIJAY'.

"Romeo Force' consisted of 1/3 Gorkha Rifles, two Companies 11 Bihar, 881
Light Battery, an Ambulance Platoon and an ASC Detachment.

"Being a cargo vessel, there was much confusion during the loading as
guns, vehicles and supplies had to be loaded by cranes, whilst the men
were to climb a vertical rope gangway up the steep sides of the ship, as
high as a three-storey building. A sad incident occurred when Maj Mastana,
AMC, Officer Commanding the Ambulance Platoon slipped off the ropeway
into the water between the ship and the dock and was drowned. It was an
inauspicious start to the venture.

"As the high tide off Hooghly River is crucial to sailing times, and the
loading could not be completed in time, the ship sailed at 0445 hours
leaving behind most of the supplies of the Battalion. However, Maj HS
Jaswal had the presence of mind to rush the stores to the flood gates of the
Docks and managed to load all stores before the ship entered the Hooghly.

"VISHWA VIJAY with a cargo capacity of 15,000 tons had only limited crew
space for living and cooking for about 50 to 60 men. Cooking and toilet
facilities for 1500 men therefore posed a major problem onboard'

"The Battalion was to establish a beachhead near Nidania Airdrome on

Ukhia Beach at first light on 14 December and thereafter erect blocks at
Remu and Idgaon to prevent the escape of East Pakistan forces into Burma.

"For the initial landing, fire support was available from INS VIKRANT, INS
BEAS and INS BRAHMAPUTRA. After the landing, fire support was to be
given by the Light Battery and own 4.2 inch mortars.

"Sailing across the Bay of Bengal on 13 December, the Task Force reached
the rendezvous with INS VIKRANT and LSTs `GHARIAL' and `GULDAR' on
the night 13/14 December. A submarine alarm postponed the landing to 15
December.

"On night 13/14 December the Battalion was transshipped to the LSTs as
follows:

A and B Companies - INS `GHARIAL'

C and D Companies - INS `GULDAR'
- with Battalion HQ

B Echelon of the Battalion remained on VISHWA VIJAY. Naval divers who had
reconnoitered the beach raised an `All Clear' flag to denote that the beaches were
not mined and no enemy were present".

VISHWA VIJAY was a bulk carrier and urgently needed scrambling nets to assist
disembarkation of troops. These were to have been delivered to her at
Sandheads. The scrambling nets never arrived and this was later to delay the
transfer of troops from VISHWA VIJAY into the LST's. The particulars of
frequencies for communicating with VIKRANT had also been placed on board
VISHWA VIJAY for VIKRANT to collect at Sandheads. This too never took place
because VIKRANT was busy with air strikes. The inability to communicate delayed
VISHWA VIJAY's R/V with VIKRANT.

Meanwhile MAGAR had been sailed from Visakhapatnam on night 9/10 December
with one company of the Andaman Naval Garrison embarked to rendezvous with
VISHWA VIJAY. When VISHWA VIJAY's sailing got delayed from 10 December to
12 December, MAGAR was directed to proceed to Paradeep and await further
instructions. As soon as VISHWA VIJAY sailed from Calcutta, MAGAR was given a
new position to rendezvous VISHWA VIJAY. Enroute to this R/V, MAGAR sighted a
yellow object which looked like a submarine.

Lt (later Commodore) Man Singh was the Navigating Officer of MAGAR. He

recalls:

"It was in the forenoon, on an easterly course that this object was sighted
on the horizon. There was no doubt in anybody's mind at that time that this
was a submarine on surface. A flash signal to this effect was made to all
concerned and the R/V with VISHWA VIJAY was cancelled. When we
approached this object, we found that it was an abandoned boat at anchor.
We suspected that this may be a ploy and that there may be some
explosive charges kept in it. So we fired on this boat. After firing, we sent a
few personnel to the boat. Finally we hoisted this boat on board".

As a result of MAGAR's report, VISHWA VIJAY altered course away from the
submarine's reported position. By the time the confusion had cleared and
VISHWA VIJAY resumed course, precious time had been lost.

Commodore Bhalla recalls:

"When we were about six to seven hours out of Calcutta, we received a

signal that there was a submarine which had been sighted right ahead of us
and that we should avoid this. So we hugged the coastline and retired
towards Calcutta.Some three or four hours later, we received the signal that
the coast is clear. That meant that we could not carry out the landing on 14
December".
Meanwhile the Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet, FOCEF, had assembled the
landing force for refuelling in preparation for the operation. Whilst refuelling, the
Commanding Officers of GHARIAL and GULDAR discussed the forthcoming landing
and agreed that the site selected for the landing was unsuitable. GHARIAL
signalled FOCEF that the LST's required a gradient between 1 to 30 and 1 to 70
and that available information indicated that the beach gradient was not suitable.

VISHWA VIJAY eventually R/V'd the Eastern Fleet on the night of 13/14
December. A meeting was immediately held on board VIKRANT the same night. It
was decided that:

(a) The landing would take place on the 14th morning as planned.

(b) Troops should start transferring from VISHWA VIJAY to the landing
ships GHARIAL and GULDAR as quickly as possible.

(c) BRAHMAPUTRA would land the divers to recce the beach gradients and
place flags at the places where the landing ships were to beach.

(d) VIKRANT's aircraft would provide air support.

(e) MAGAR would go back to Calcutta to bring the petrol and medical stores
which would be required by the troops after landing and which had
inadvertently been left behind. As a result, the Naval Garrison personnel
embarked in MAGAR would be landed later.

Without scrambling nets, the transfer of troops and their stores from VISHWA
VIJAY to the LST's during night 13/14 December took longer than expected.

Cdr Rebello recalls:

"We were very lucky when we transferred the troops from VISHWA VIJAY to
the LSTs. Fortunately, the wind and sea were calm, so we were able to do it
without any serious problem. Even then, we had some dicy moments in
landing the jeeps and ammunition boxes".

It became clear that the landing could not take place at dawn on 14 December.
The Naval Force Commander therefore made a signal on the 14th morning,
postponing the landing to 15 December.

Cdr Dabir, the CO of GULDAR, recalls:

"There was a briefing by Cdr Bhalla at which Cdr Rebello, Lt Cdr AK Sharma
and myself were present on board VISHWA VIJAY. I expressed my anguish
at being forced to undertake an operation which firstly was most likely to be
a failure and secondly could have been done by other means in a surer and
cleaner manner.
 "I had specifically said that instead of carrying out the ill advised landing on
the beach, which had two to five sand bars and a 5 to 6 knot cross current
all the time except for a short period of slack water, it would be easier to
land the troops in the Cox's Bazar directly on the jetty or via local dhows.

"Lt Cdr Martis came in to confirm that he would recce the beach and about
60 to 80 yards seaward of the area. The recce'd area would be marked by a
set of two flags on the beach."

Cdr (later Commodore) AK Sharma, the CO GHARIAL recalls:

"The first time I had an opportunity to discuss the landing with Cdr U Dabir,
who was commanding the GULDAR, was when we were both alongside the
VISHWA VIJAY for embarking troops. He said to me "I don't think this beach
is suitable." I said "Yes. I agree with you, the gradient of 1 in 200 is not
suitable. I am making a signal to FOCEF that we need a gradient of between
1 in 30 and 1 in 70.

"When making the signal to FOCEF that this beach was unsuitable for
beaching because of the gradient, I did not wish to give the impression that
I was chickening out of the operation. I had therefore said "I am ready for
execution in all respects. Request instructions." That meant that the ball is
in your court. I remember the reply came "Go" and I went".

VIKRANT, who had been at sea since 2 December, was scheduled to refuel at
Paradeep on 14 December. The postponement of the landing to 15 December
meant that VIKRANT would not be available on the morning of 15 December. On
the 14th, FOCEF transferred from VIKRANT to BRAHMAPUTRA. VIKRANT's aircraft
attacked and recce'd the landing area before departing for Paradeep.

On the night of 14/15 December BRAHMAPUTRA landed the divers by boat. The
divers carried out the beach recce, sent back information that the beach gradient
of 1 in 40 was suitable for landing and suggested that the landing ships should
beach at 0530 the next morning when it would be slack water at low tide.

Lt Cdr (later Cdr) G Martis was the diving officer in charge of the beach recce. He
recalls:

"We landed on the beach just after 2100 on 14 December. Our instructions
were to recce the gradient and give all the other information necessary for a
successful landing. At the time we were carrying out the recce, it was slack
water at low tide. A similar condition was to prevail the next morning at
dawn. So we had a clear idea regarding the gradients and the sandbars.
Between the beach and the deeper water, there was a bar. We sent a
 message by hand of the boat to FOCEF that the landing ships should come
at dawn, at the time of slack water at low tide in the morning. We stayed
ashore to check whether there was any Pakistani build up and found there
wasn't any".

Based on the report received from Lt Cdr Martis, FOCEF signalled to the landing
force that beach conditions were suitable, that the landing would take place at
0530 on 15 December and that divers would mark the spots where the LST's
should beach.

Cdr Martis recalls:

"Next morning we were eagerly waiting for the GHARIAL and GULDAR to
come. To our horror, we found that both the vessels were almost a
kilometre south of the point which we had recce'd. This took us by surprise.
We were in no position to attract their attention. Afraid that the tide may
turn and ruin the entire operation, we waved at them. Finally they located
us and came to the correct spot around 0730 in the morning, by which time
the tide had turned. There was a heavy swell and the bar on which the
GHARIAL and GULDAR were to have landed as per our previous recce was
fully submerged. Both the LST's could not cross the bar.

"Between the bar and the beach, the water was now deep. The Gurkha
soldiers were asked to land. Not realising that they were heavily weighted
with rifle, helmet, boots, grenades, rations, water etc, one by one they
began to jump. They might have thought that this is how wars were fought.
To my horror, one by one they went down. I shouted to GHARIAL to stop
the operation, but there was loud music and announcements saying
"Bhartiya Jawano, jump into the water" and all sorts of martial songs were
being played on the loudspeaker. Finally our divers literally had to shout
and make desperate signals. Then only they realised that the Gurkhas were
drowning. They were hardly five feet tall. At this stage, GULDAR withdrew
without landing any troops. The landing operation was stopped temporarily.
The Gurkha bodies were recovered. We managed to revive two, but the
other three we could not help.

"Then there was an apprehension that the remaining Gurkhas would not
land because, if they came to know that their comrades were dead, they
would not take part in the war. So we were advised to tell them that they
were unconscious and we would take care of them. Their bodies were
shifted and thereafter we did the landing, passing a rope from the ship to
the beach and the divers assisting the Gurkhas to get to the beach holding
on to the rope".

Cdr Rebello recalls:

"I had given specific instructions to the Battalion Commander and to the
 Company Commander that the Gurkhas should remove all their equipment,
except their pouches of ammunition and small arms, and go across. Their
remaining equipment would be transferred later. But being Gurkhas, they
decided that it was against the law to remove their battle order. They went
with full battle order which means 85 pounds of weight. So what happened
was that though they all had their life jackets on, they drowned with their
life jackets".

Cdr Dabir, the CO of GULDAR recalls:

"Both GHARIAL and GULDAR started the run for beaching in the early hours,
at nearly slack water. GHARIAL went in confidently, let go the rear anchor
when about one cable from the beaching point. The rear anchor wire was
paid off apparently a little too fast, perhaps to avoid straining the anchor
hold during the run in. She put the nose on the last sand bar, which I could
not make out clearly, opened the forward doors and lowered the landing
ramp. This occurred about five minutes before GULDAR made a touch down
about 2 cables to the north of GHARIAL.

"While running in, I had deliberately ordered trimming the ship with the
fore-end down to the maximum extent by flooding the forward ballast
tanks. This would ensure that firstly the fore-end should touch bottom first
and thus leave the rear-end and propellers clear of bottom. Secondly, the
fore-end would thus sit hard in the mud/loose sand and prevent forward
yawing. The rear anchor was dropped at the earliest calculated point to
ensure that the anchor wire stayed at as low an angle as possible. At steep
angles, the wire tends to reduce the ships hold in the fore-and aft direction,
thus allowing the stern to yaw or drift with the cross-current. Also at steep
wire angles, the anchor breaks ground hold easily, whereas at shallow
angles it tends to dig in firmly. The calculations and planning, with possible
alternatives for changing situations, had kept me awakethe whole of the
previous night. Each key officer and sailor, including engine room hands,
was briefed individually to report back to the bridge any changes or
unforeseen occurrences in a specific understandable manner.

"GULDAR's fore-end touched down fairly hard and dug itself in on what
appeared to the third sand bar from seaward, leaving about a 100 yards of
water to be traversed to reach the beach. After lowering the landing ramp,
the depth of water between the ships fore-end and the beach was tested by
two sailors wearing life jackets, held by a line controlled from the foxle.
Their boat hooks showed that the depth of water increased sharply after the
sand bar on which ship's fore-end rested. When it was seen that the entire
boat hook was immersed, the sailors were recalled.

"My estimate was that the depth of water would he six feet or even more at
the deepest point between the sand bar and the beach. In consultation with
the Army officers on board, we decided that it would be foolhardy to land
 the troops, knowing fully well that almost all of them, being short in height,
would be drowned. Accordingly I made a signal to FOCEF who was
embarked on BRAHMAPUTRA and requested permission to unbeach and
anchor off the beach. Whilst awaiting reply, we had to drop both the
forward anchors to prevent too much yawing with the increasing surf after
the slack water period. In the meanwhile, I concentrated on seeing what
GHARIAL was doing, through binoculars and a telescope. I saw that her
stern was sitting on the bottom and rising fully with the surf.

"I immediately requested CO GHARIAL to come on our voice net and told
him of the danger he was in. I explained that with the stern touching the
bottom he may not be able to use the propellers at all because of the
peculiar design of the gearless, high RPM, static clutch propulsion system.
Further, it appeared that the ship was trimmed down aft, which could lead
to the bows loosening from the bottom and tending to swing the ship
abeam to the surf. Lt Cdr AK Sharma told me that he would discuss this
aspect with FOCEF and his staff. A short while later, he came back on the
line to tell me that FOCEF had considered these aspects and ordered him to
land the troops. Very shortly thereafter, I could see commotion on
GHARIAL's foxle, which I came to know later was due to some soldiers
getting swept away by the current. I could barely see these persons. But
from our foxle, some sailors saw the soldiers struggling to hold on to the
line which had been passed from GHARIAL's fore-end to the beach. It
looked as if they were finding it impossible to hold on to the line
simultaneously with trying to hold on to their helmet and rifle.

"In the meanwhile, it was difficult for GULDAR to remain beached safely.
The surf was increasing and the bows were yawing much too much because
they were coming up from the bottom off and on, only to sit again with a
small thud. Any more increase in height of surf could lead to heavy damage
to the fore end. The inadvisability of landing troops made continuing to
remain precariously beached an unacceptable risk to the ship and the men.
I started unbeaching without awaiting FOCEF's reply to my signal. Whilst
withdrawing, until the stern anchor was aweigh, we had considerable
difficulty in remaining perpendicular to the surf and avoid broaching to."

Commodore AK Sharma, the CO of GHARIAL recalls:

"When we beached, we found that we were far away from dry land and the
troops had to wade through water for quite a distance before they could get
on to the beach. And in that wading process, we lost three Gorkhas. They
drowned in spite of the fact that we had rigged nylon ropes from the bows
of the ship. But these heavily loaded Gorkhas went down and were lost".
At this stage, GHARIAL retracted from the beach and anchored. It was decided
that some troops be landed by ships boats. Almost a platoon was landed.

Commodore Bhalla recalls:

"When I fetched up on the LST, I found that she had not been able to land
the troops with equipment, but they had landed a platoon or so ashore, who
were patrolling and guarding the area around the beach. Seeing that we
had lost our opportunity and that surprise had been completely lost, I swam
ashore from the LST to go and find fishing boats in Cox's Bazar which could
ferry the troops ashore".

Commodore Sharma recalls:

"I came off that beach, anchored and informed FOCEF in BRAHMAPUTRA
that the gradient was not suitable. However, I was told by FOCEF that the
troops must be landed and go in. FOCEF was on board for a long time after
my first beaching. I went in again. This time because the tide had started
receding, I beached on another sand bar which was even farther out than
the first sand bar. I got stuck and soon a time came when the ship started
broaching, beam on to swell and wind, and it was becoming more and more
difficult to save the ship. By then I had on board Rear Admiral Sarma
FOCEF, the CO of BEAS Cdr Ramdas and the advisors from NHQ Cdrs Bhalla
and Rebello. Everybody was trying to tell me how to handle my ship. I
remember having to shout "Shut up" and FOCEF saying "Yes, let's leave it
to the young man, he knows what he is doing". And I must say that I had a
lucky break. I told the Chief Engineer that I will give you just one more
order and do what you can. I ordered Full Astern Both Engines and
somehow the swell came along at the right time, the engines went astern at
that time, the ship lifted a little and next thing I knew the ship was receding
astern into deeper water."

Cdr Dabir, the CO of GULDAR, recalls:

"Anchored in deeper water, I was able to look at GHARIAL. What I saw was
horrifying. GHARIAL was bobbing up and down with the surf, in a broached
to condition and coming down heavily on the sea bottom as the troughs
passed her. I saw the life rafts coming off the ship and her mast shudder
heavily. She appeared to be climbing the sandbar with every successive
wave. Her rear anchor seemed to have come off completely. Realising the
tremendous danger she was leading to, we quickly weighed anchor and
proceeded as close as possible to GHARIAL. Several attempts to have a line
passed by Coston Gun proved unsuccesful. Swimmers with life jackets were
unable to take even a heaving line, because of the surf alternately rushing
towards and away from the beach.

"Suddenly I saw a motor whaler coming towards us with Lt Cdr (later Vice
Admiral) KASZ Raju in it. How he managed to steer the whaler and keep it
from capsizing appeared miraculous. What was even a greater miracle, he
was able to take a cordage line from GULDAR's bows to GHARIAL's stern.
Soon we were able to pass a good size wire hawser. GHARIAL appeared to
have connected the hawser to her rear anchor cable wire and paid it out
under power slowly, before applying brakes.

"As soon as I saw that the wire was not being paid out, a cautious tug was
given with only one engine going Dead Slow Astern for a short while.
GHARIAL's stern seemed to come out ever so little in the first tug. A second
tug and then subsequent tugs were applied every time GHARIAL's stern
seemed to be going up with wave action. The tug was stopped immediately
when the stern was seen to be going down. This was being done by using
one engine ahead and one astern, while controlling the line with twin
rudders. This was quite normal for these ships because the engines could
be started only a limited number of times, depending upon the quantity of
compressed air available in the bottles. Each time an engine's direction was
to be changed, it had to be stopped and restarted in the new direction.
There was always a danger of running out of compressed air and thus not
being able to restart the engine till the compressor refilled the air bottles.
Only a complete understanding of this unique system could enable good
maneuverability in difficult situations.

"By increasing the RPM of the engine going astern for a short while as
GHARIAL seemed to rise, and simultaneously neutralizing the turning effect
by rudders, we were able to pull GHARIAL's stern, step by step (or rather
tug by tug) towards deeper waters. The tugs were being applied very
cautiously despite the urgency expressed by GHARIAL, because of two
reasons. Firstly the towing wire could take only a limited strain and pulling
against the surf's action any quicker would have resulted in exceeding that
strain. Secondly, if the tow had parted, it would have been a Herculean task
to pass a hawser again and GHARIAL may have again broached to during
the time required for repassing the tow.

"On reaching slightly deeper waters, GHARIAL started using her propellers.
But I could see that they were not having much effect. I suspected that
much of the propeller blades were damaged or worn out when they were
used against the sand and mud at the sandbar. At this point, the FOCEF
appeared to have become very impatient. He ordered me directly on R/T to
go full astern on both props and pull on a continuous basis. When I
explained to him that this would be dangerous for the tow-line as well as for
GHARIAL, he responded that I must go full astern regardless of the
consequences. I could not disobey this direct order. After a prudent interval
I started increasing the RPM on the astern going engine gradually. Luckily
by the time the tow wire became fully taut, GHARIAL seemed to be in
sufficiently deep water and with enough distance away from the beach. At
that point, the engine which was going ahead was stopped and restarted in
 the astern direction. However, as soon as both engines were going Slow
Astern, the tow wire snapped due to over strain. I had already warned all
hands on our foxle and GHARIAL's quarterdeck to clear the deck before
restarting the second engine astern. There were thus no casualties, despite
the tow wire snapping with a great jerk.

"By then GHARIAL was in deep enough waters and her propellers were
responding just adequately to give her mobility for reaching the anchorage.
She was, however, shipping in water from several leaks and we all provided
whatever pumps were available."

Commodore Sharma, the CO of GHARIAL, recalls:

"My problems did not stop at that. As soon as I came off the sand bar and
anchored about half a cable away, most of the aft mess decks and spaces
were flooded and the machinery spaces were just about six inches away
from the holes. Thereafter the help given by BEAS and the other ships and
the use of all their pumps saved the situation. I was able to repair the
damage quite a bit and go to Calcutta under my own steam".

Cdr Martis, the diver officer, recalls:

"GHARIAL withdrew as the tide was falling, and unfortunately sat on her
own stern anchor. She was high and dry at low water. At that time, the
distance from the highest water level at the time of landing and the lowest
water was almost 50 meters. Had they come at the right time, they would
have been able to land the troops on the bar and withdraw within a matter
of half an hour and not suffer any casualty or damage at all.

"GHARIAL had a very bad stern trim because of shipping a lot of water at
the stern. I carried out an under water inspection and found that the stern
post was damaged, dented inward with a big crack and water was gushing
in. The Engineer Officer carried out emergency shoring and pumped out the
water."

The end position on the evening of 15 December was that:-

- Only a platoon of troops had been landed.

- Carrying out a recce of alternative beaches was not practical.

- Pakistani forces were expected to surrender at any moment

- Cdr Bhalla had already swum ashore and proceeded to Cox's Bazar in local
transport with the platoon already landed.
 - It had therefore been decided that the remaining troops would be landed
at Cox's Bazar itself, using local boats.

On arrival at Cox's Bazar, Cdr Bhalla, with the help of the Mukti Bahini,
commandeered all available mechanised fishing boats to commence disembarking
troops on AM 16 December.

Ships proceeded to Cox's Bazar overnight and anchored eight miles from the
Cox's Bazar jetty, where weather and depth conditions were least likely to delay
the landing of troops.

On 16 December, 600 troops were landed. After disembarking troops, GHARIAL

sailed for Calcutta to effect repairs.

Despite the surrender of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan on PM 16 December,

Naval Headquarters directed that the disembarkation of troops was to continue.
On 17 December, 86 troops, rations, first aid and ammunition were landed.

The remaining 600 troops were landed on 18 and 19 December. VISHWA VIJAY
transferred her troops to GULDAR by 18 December and sailed for Calcutta with
the vehicles, none of which could be landed at Cox's Bazar. At midday on 19
December, GULDAR and BEAS sailed to rejoin FOCEF off Chittagong. This marked
the completion of Operation Beaver.

THE LANDING OPERATION IN RETROSPECT

The Reconstruction of Events

In retrospect, the sequence of events emerges as follows:

(a) The joint planners in Delhi had foreseen the possibility of a US Naval
Group intervening in East Pakistan but concluded that we did not have the
wherewithal to carry out a landing in the face of opposition.

(b) With the collapse of the East Pakistani troops by 8 December, the Chiefs
of Staff decided to cut off their line of retreat into Burma and expedite the
completion of operations in the East. On 9 December, General Manekshaw
overuled Gen Jacob's protestations about the lack of preparation and NHQ
ordered troops to be landed on 12 December to capture Cox's Bazar.

(c) On 10 December, the joint planners in Calcutta, apprehensive that a

landing at Cox's Bazar would meet with opposition, decided to land at Ukhia
a few miles further south, instead of at Cox's Bazar. The date of the landing
had to be postponed to 14 December because the troops were still being
withdrawn from the front line. These troops had never been to sea.
(d) On 10 December, the move became known of the American Naval Task
Group towards the Bay of Bengal. The same evening, the troops in Calcutta
were told to embark VISHWA VIJAY immediately. The embarkation of 1400
troops into a bulk coal carrier was disorderly and a fatal accident occurred.
Embarkation was completed in the early hours of the 12th morning but
some essential stores were left behind.

(e) VISHWA VIJAY reached Sandheads on the 12th afternoon and anchored,
awaiting scrambling nets which did not arrive. The scrambling nets were
essential for the troops to scramble into the LSTs. She sailed from
Sandheads early on the 13th morning, but on receiving MAGAR's submarine
sighting report, had to reverse course for a few hours. She was able to join
up with FOCEF, VIKRANT and the LST's only on night 13/14.

(f) At the conference on board VIKRANT chaired by FOCEF on the night of

13/14, it was decided to try and land at first light on 14 December. Without
scrambling nets, the transfer of troops from VISHWA VIJAY took too long.
The landing had to be postponed to 15 December. MAGAR who carried 1000
tons of fuel to refuel VIKRANT was sent back to Calcutta to bring back the
essential stores which had been left behind.

(g) The CO's of the Landing Ships signalled FOCEF that the landing site was
unsuitable. They took whatever precautions they could and pressed on with
preparations for the landing.

(h) The beach recce carried out by the divers on the evening of 14
December was as seamanlike as could be expected in the time available.
The gradient was found suitable. The approach course for LST's would be
marked, a swimmer would mark the bar on which the bows should rest and
ships would rig ropes to help jawans wade through water on landing. Ships
were told to be ready to lower all available boats and life rafts. Last but not
least, LSTs would beach at 0530, the slack tide at low water so that they
could unbeach on a rising tide. Despite BRAHMAPUTRA, with FOCEF
embarked, leading the LSTs towards the beach at 0400 hours in the
morning, the exact landing point could not be spotted. By the time the
recce'd spot had been reached, it was an hour and a half after slack water,
the tide had started rising, the shallow runnel had become deeper and
strong cross currents had set in.

(j) GULDAR took the precaution of taking manual soundings, found it too
dangerous to land troops and retracted.

(k) GHARIAL beached amid fanfare. The very first section of ten troops
experienced difficulties. Two jawans drowned. GHARIAL pulled off and
anchored. FOCEF embarked GHARIAL. With difficulty, GHARIAL managed to
land some troops by boat. FOCEF decided that both LSTs should rebeach at
1430, further to the North. Cdr Bhalla swam ashore and with the platoon
 already landed proceeded post haste to Cox's Bazar which had reportedly
fallen into the hands of the Mukti Bahini.

(l) GHARIAL beached first. The unfavourable tide and swell caused GHARIAL
to broach to, whereafter GHARIAL's stern anchor holed her stern. GULDAR
which had not yet beached, rushed to help pull GHARIAL off the sandbar.
Thereafter, all the ships helped GHARIAL to pump out the flooded
compartments and effect patch repairs. By this time, the surrender of forces
in East Pakistan was imminent and FOCEF decided that the remaining
troops should be disembarked at Cox's Bazar.

(m) GULDAR, VISHWA VIJAY and BEAS proceeded to Cox's Bazar,

overnight, where the unopposed transfer of troops was effected. Boats
requisitioned from local sources with the help of the Mukti Bahini ferried
troops and stores from the anchorage into the harbour at Cox's Bazar.

(n) GHARIAL escorted by RAJPUT proceeded to Cox's Bazar, disembarked

troops in local craft and proceeded to Calcutta for repairs.

Could the Operation Have Been Better Managed

In the years since the war, this landing operation has been regarded as a fiasco.
Every mishap in this operation was attributed to the lack of detailed planning.
Very little was known of the wider compulsions which precipitated the ordering of
the operation at short notice. Given these compulsions, several factors made it
unlikely that this operation could have been managed better.

There was ambiguity of whether the landing should be effected in the face of
opposition or at a location where there would be little or no opposition. At the
planning stage in September, the planners in Delhi ruled out an opposed landing.
NHQ order of 9 December stated "To land and support a battalion group at dawn
on 12 December to capture Cox's Bazar". At Calcutta, it was concluded that
landing at Cox's Bazar was imprudent - the waters might be mined and the
enemy would have taken the precaution to defend Cox's Bazar as it protected
their escape route to Burma. This led to the decision to land near Ukhia, where
opposition was less likely.

The beach at Ukhia was known to have sandbars. It was concluded that these
sandbars would help in the dry shod landing of troops, who were completely
unfamiliar with the sea.

In spite of all the other difficulties which were encountered, this might have been
successfully achieved if the beaching had taken place at the designated time of
slack water at low tide. The runnels would have been shallow. The LSTs would
have unbeached on a rising tide well before cross currents, wind and swell set in.
The beaching was effected nearly two hours late because the precise area marked
by the divers could not be located in the limited visibility at 0430 in the morning.
Thereafter events followed the sequence that has been described.

MAGAR which had been specially converted to carry 1000 tons of fuel for
VIKRANT was in fact present in the area when VIKRANT's fuel was running low on
14 December. Had MAGAR transferred her fuel to VIKRANT:

- VIKRANT would not have had to return to Paradeep on 15 December for

refuelling.

- MAGAR having been emptied of fuel could have participated in the landing
and the sailors of the Andaman Garrison who were familiar with the sea
could have constituted the first wave.

However, in the rush of events, MAGAR was sent back to Calcutta to fetch stores
which would be needed by the troops after landing.

VISHWA VIJAY, a 15000 ton bulk coal carrier with a crew of only 60 persons, was
totally unsuitable for carrying 1400 troops, who had never been to sea, for
landing on an enemy shore. It can only be presumed that no other vessel was
available for immediate requisitioning.

Finally, there are certain basic realities:

(a) To ensure that the enemy does not come to know when and where we
will land, prior planning has to be highly classified and known to very few
people. In this case, the place of landing was changed, the day of landing
got repeatedly postponed and the time of landing got delayed.

(b) The kind of meticulous planning and extensive training stipulated in the
amphibious warfare manuals, which are based on the experience of
prolonged wars, are unlikely to be achieved in the short sharp wars typical
of our sub- continent. In 1971, despite months of preparation time, no
training whatsoever could be carried out.

In the final analysis, the unpredictable will invariably happen during actual
operations. Only first rate seamanship and professionalism will overcome the
unpredictable.

THE PAKISTAN NAVY'S ACCOUNT OF

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EAST PAKISTAN

"The Story of the Pakistan Navy", states: (Page 341 et seq)

"Starting on 4 December, the aircraft carrier VIKRANT launched a series of
air strikes on a variety of targets along East Pakistan's coast. Using
Seahawks by day and Alizes by night, the pressure was kept up by the
aircraft carrier throughout the war. On the very first day, during raids
carried out over Chittagong harbour, the outer anchorage, and the airfield,
and the airstrip at Cox's Bazar, the Indians succeeded in inflicting
considerable damage to ships and shore installations. The gunboat COMILLA
was sunk and RAJSHAHI severely damaged during an air attack on the
outer anchorage.

"On 5 and 6 December, carrier-borne aircraft carried out attacks on

Chittagong, Khulna, and Mangla harbours, and at ships in the Pussur river.
The oil installations at Chittagong caught fire and the Greek merchant ship
Thetic Charlie was sunk at the outer anchorage. In strikes over Chittagong
on 7 December, the oil installations and the airfield were again hit and
damaged. Troop concentrations in Barisal, Bakarganj and Patuakhali areas
were subjected to attacks by carrier aircraft on 8 and 9 December.
Pounding of Chittagong and Cox's Bazar airfields by carrier-borne aircraft
continued on the request, at least on two occasions, of AOC-in-C Eastern
Command, (the Indian Air Force Commander in the East), who suspected
that these airfields were being used by the PAF for air operations.

"With no opposition from the Pakistan Navy at sea, and by the PAF in the
air, defence against air strikes by carrier-borne aircraft was confined to
anti-aircraft fire by gunboats and shore batteries. The Indians have
acknowledged heavy resistance to most of their air strikes by Pakistan anti-
aircraft defence and accepted the loss of some aircraft. But such a limited
effort was, by itself, insufficient to curb, in any meaningful way, the
onslaught by the Indian naval air arm from seaward. On 12 December,
emboldened by the lack of any serious retaliation, the Indian Navy ships
closed Cox's Bazar and carried out a bombardment of the airfield in broad
daylight. They succeeded in damaging the control tower at the airport
during this operation.

"Fearing a possible amphibious landing, the approaches to Chittagong were

mined by the Pakistan Navy on 7 December. This minefield, laid as a
defensive measure to check the movement of Indian ships towards the
harbour, was subsequently reinforced by more mines on 9 and 12
December. This proved to be a most useful step in that it denied to Indian
forces direct access to Chittagong port for a long time, even after the
instrument of surrender had been signed.

"The Indians therefore decided to carry out an amphibious landing at Cox's

Bazar with the aim of cutting off the line of retreat of Pakistani troops from
this direction. Having embarked a battalion of Gurkhas, the amphibious
force comprising the merchant vessel VISHWA VIJAY and the LSTs GHARIAL
and GULDAR, sailed from Calcutta on 12 December. The landing was carried
 out at the chosen site south of Cox's Bazar on the night of 15/16 December,
after bombardment of the beach a day earlier. Though no opposition was
offered by Pakistani forces the Indians, after experiencing some difficulties,
succeeded in putting troops on the beach. At least two Indian soldiers are
reported to have lost their lives in the operation, which appears to have
served no purpose at this belated stage except to show that it had an
amphibious capability, and that the Indian Navy was free to operate at will
in the Bay of Bengal.

"The Indian Navy Task Force comprising the carrier VIKRANT and her
escorts the BRAHMAPUTRA and BEAS, while maneuvering freely in the Bay
of Bengal, interdicted shipping traffic to and from East Pakistan ports.
Reports from Chittagong indicated that this group sometimes closed the
coast to a range as close as 12 to 15 miles, not surprising in a situation in
which the Pakistan Navy lacked altogether any means to react or retaliate
from Chittagong. Commodore in Charge Chittagong could do no more than
report the approach of these ships. The sinking and capture of several
merchant ships by the carrier group and the diversion to neutral ports by
the Naval Control of Shipping, reduced shipping traffic to East Pakistan to a
trickle within a few days. The unchallenged presence of this force in the
area ruled out possibility of reinforcements from the West in the beginning
of the war, and evacuation of our troops at a later stage when such a need
was felt".

"PNS Rajshahi the sole survivor of the Navy in East Pakistan, escaped
capture and found her way to Penang in Malaysia. The Malaysian
Government and Navy treated her ship's company in a most hospitable
manner and rendered assistance to enable the patrol craft to remain
seaworthy. A number of naval personnel had crossed the border into Burma
at the surrender of East Pakistan".

A RETROSPECT OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

IN THE EASTERN NAVAL COMMAND

The Pakistan Navy did not send any major surface warships to East Pakistan.
There was therefore no surface threat. After the GHAZI sank, there was no
submarine threat. The Indian Air Force attacks on the Dacca airfields made the
runways unusable. The Pakistan Air Force Sabre squadron was grounded. This
removed the air threat. The operations of the Eastern Fleet were therefore
unopposed at sea. Whatever difficulties were experienced were the result of our
own limitations.

In retrospect, the following points bear noting:

 (a) Ambiguity persists about the role of RAJPUT in the sinking of the GHAZI.
Admiral Krishnan's book reproduces a photograph of GHAZI's clock stopped
at 0015. RAJPUT was very much near Visakhapatnam at that time and yet
there is no mention of RAJPUT having heard or having seen the flash of
GHAZI's explosion.

(b) Neither the `Story of the Pakistan Navy' nor the records relating to the
ENTERPRISE incident substantiate FOCINCEAST's assessment that the
ENTERPRISE Task Group's move into the Bay of Bengal was linked with the
intelligence intercepts of Convoy RK 623.

(c) Indian Air Force Gnats sank the PADMA and the PALASH at Khulna
during the Commando Operations on Mongla. Force Alpha was not supposed
to go to Khulna at all - it was an impromptu decision taken when it was
found that Pakistani troops had withdrawn from Mongla. Even if Cdr Samant
had informed his Headquarters of this decision on the morning of the 10
December, it is doubtful whether the information would have reached the
Gnats in the few hours that it took Force Alpha to go up the river from
Mongla to Khulna.

(d) Even though `Diversionary or Real Amphibious landings' were foreseen,

there is no mention of any preliminary rehearsal for the amphibious
landing. Neverthless, despite all the difficulties experienced, it would have
succeeded if only the LST's had beached at the appointed time.

(e) VIKRANT's contribution to naval operations were beyond anyone's

expectations. VIKRANT was steaming on only three boilers instead of four.
Each boiler drum was strapped with steel bands to minimise damage in case
of explosion. To offset the reduction in speed and the low wind conditions at
that time of the year, VIKRANT stretched everything and everybody to the
limit to launch and recover Seahawks aircraft, including accepting the
hazards of aircraft dipping after being catapulted and approaching lower
than normal during recovery.

In addition to the achievements of the air strikes, VIKRANT's assistance in

contraband control was invaluable. Without VIKRANT, the limited number of ships
that constituted the Eastern Fleet could not have coped with the faster merchant
ships.

This contraband control role of an aircraft carrier was not foreseen either by
FOCINCEAST or by VIKRANT herself.
 CHAPTER 10

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN NAVAL COMMAND

The ensuing account of naval operations in the Western Naval Command has
been reconstructed from several sources. Admiral Kohli was the Flag Officer
Commanding in Chief, Western Naval Command in 1971. His book "We Dared -
Maritime Operations in the 1971 Indo Pak War" was published in 1989. The
Pakistan Navy's account is contained in the "The Story of the Pakistan Navy 1947
to 1972" published in 1991. The present account is based on the above sources
and on discussions with the main participants. The thought process which
preceded each major operation has been correlated with what actually transpired
and the reasons for its success or failure. The evolution of the plans which
preceded these operation has been discussed in the chapter on the "Evolution of
the Navy's Plan of Operations." The operations have been discussed under the
following headings.

- The First Missile Attack on Karachi.

- Western Fleet Operations and the Second Missile Attack on Karachi.

- Anti Submarine Hunter Killer Operations and the Loss of the KHUKRI.

- Submarine Operations.

- Loss of Alize 203.

- Trade Warfare.

- Defence of Bombay.

- A Retrospect of Operations in Western Naval Command.

THE FIRST MISSILE ATTACK ON KARACHI

Event Before the Attack

Vice Admiral (later Admiral) Kohli, was the Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
Western Naval Command (FOCINCWEST). In his book "We Dared", he states:
(Page 45 et seq).
 "After Pakistan proclaimed a National Emergency on 23 November, three
missile boats were placed at Okha to carry out patrols. They gained very
valuable experience of the area and the waters around and in the vicinity of
Okha and also proved the facilities provided at the advance base there.

"As the Fleet would be operating not far from Karachi, a demarcating line
was established which neither the ships of the Fleet nor the missile boats
would cross. This would prevent any unfortunate incidents of own forces
engaging each other.

"The Pakistani authorities had warned all merchant ships bound for Karachi
not to approach the harbour to within 75 miles between sunset and dawn.
This meant that any unit picked up on the radar within that distance was
most likely to be a Pakistani naval vessel on patrol.

"The Karachi strike group consisted of two Petyas and four missile boats
armed with four missiles each. One of the four boats was to remain on
patrol off Dwarka in order to provide cover for the force on its way back.
The Petyas were intended to provide communication and control and, with
their better radar, give indication of suitable targets. In the event of an
emergency, they could take a boat in tow and, if necessary give fuel.

"After arriving at a certain point south of Karachi, the Task Group

Commander in the Petya was to release the missile boats to proceed
at maximum speed towards Karachi; the Squadron Commander
embarked in one of the boats would allocate targets and the boats
thereafter would act independently keeping in touch with the
Squadron Commander. The Petyas would follow at a slower speed,
but stay not too far away from the rendezvous. Naval Headquarters
and Headquarters Western Naval Command were to listen in on Pakistani
wireless circuits and pass the relevant intelligence to the force.

"The plan had been to strike Karachi with a composite force on the very day
that Pakistan carried out their first act of war. The Pakistanis attacked our
airfields on the evening of 3 December 1971. Since it was not possible for
our forces to attack Karachi the same evening, it was decided to launch the
operation on the following day, i.e. the night 4/5 December."

THE ATTACK

On the afternoon of 4 December, when the Strike Group was on its way
to Karachi, FOCINCWEST sent a signal directing the Petyas and the
missile boats to remain in company throughout.

The Task Group's approach to Karachi was by and large uneventful. Despite some
confusion, contacts detected en route were eventually analysed as undeserving of
missile attack.
When 70 miles south of Karachi, a target was detected to the northwest at a
range of 45 miles. It was classified as a warship. A second target was detected to
the northeast at a range of 42 miles, heading for Karachi. Both targets were
tracked and missiles prepared for launch.

The contact to the northwest was engaged by missile boat NIRGHAT with two
missiles. The target sank. It was later learnt that this was the Pakistan Navy
destroyer KHAIBAR.

The contact to the northeast was engaged by missile boat NIPAT with two
missiles. The target sank. It was learnt later that this was a merchant ship MV
VENUS CHALLENGER.

A third contact appeared to the North. It was engaged by missile boat VEER with
one missile. The target sank. It was learnt later that this was the Pakistan Navy
coastal minesweeper MUHAFIZ.

At this stage of the attack, when there were no contacts on radar, what should
have happened was that all ships of the Task Group should have continued to
close Karachi and, from the predetermined point promulgated by KILTAN, each
missile boat should have fired one more missile at Karachi. This did not happen.
Missile boat NIRGHAT mistook anti aircraft tracer shells and reported sighting
aircraft. Fear of Pakistani air attack sharply increased. KILTAN's accurate anti
aircraft radar also mistook as aircraft the shells being fired from Karachi's gun
defences. It took some time for this confusion to clear.

Meanwhile K 25, the Commander of the missile boats, told missile boat NIPAT, in
which he was embarked, to fire one of his two remaining missiles towards Karachi
which NIPAT did. K 25 then issued the order for the boats to withdraw. Due to a
fade out in communications, the Commander of the Task Group in KILTAN did not
receive this withdrawal signal. He continued to close Karachi. When he arrived at
the predetermined point, 20 miles south of Karachi he found himself all alone.
Except for missile boat VEER, everybody else had turned round and was headed
back towards Saurashtra at full speed. Due to a machinery problem, VEER had
reduced speed to effect repairs.

When KILTAN turned round to head for home, VEER mistook KILTAN for a
Pakistani warship and almost fired a missile at her. Fortunately communications
and identity were reestablished and a catastrophe averted.

In due course, ships of the Task Group arrived on the Saurashtra Coast in ones
and twos, refuelled on 5 December and arrived in Bombay on 6 December.
EVENTS AFTER THE ATTACK

In Bombay, there was elation at the Task Group's unprecedented achievement. At

the professional level however, there was disquiet as to the reasons for not
bombarding the Karachi installations with missiles. The Commander of the the
Task Group, Cdr (later Commodore) KP Gopal Rao was the Commanding Officer of
the Petya KILTAN. The Commander of the Missile Boat Squadron (K 25) was Cdr
(later Commodore) BB Yadav, embarked in missile boat NIPAT. FOCINCWEST
received differing accounts from them. He directed both of them to put up an
agreed report. They were not able to agree. The disagreement hinged on who was
in command of the attack, particularly after all contacts had been sunk.

K 25's stand was as follows:

- In the process of attacking KHAIBAR, NIRGHAT had fallen back by several miles,
whilst KILTAN, NIPAT and VEER sped towards Karachi. KATCHALL, the second
Petya, was with NIRGHAT to provide protection from air attack.

- NIPAT had raced ahead to attack VENUS CHALLENGER while VEER had
fallen back.

- After VEER had fired at MUHAFIZ, he decided to fire missiles at the

Karachi installations.

- At this stage, he found that NIPAT was closest to Karachi. So he told

NIPAT to fire both his missiles. One missile failed prelaunch checks. NIPAT
fired the other missile towards Karachi.

- NIRGHAT had started reporting that aircraft were visual and KILTAN had
promulgated Air Raid Warning Red.

- Taking into account the likely confusion between friendlies due to the
dispersal of own forces and the possible development of air and surface
threat, K 25 decided to withdraw.

The CO KILTAN's stand was that K 25 was not authorised to order withdrawal.
This was his prerogative as the Commander of the Task Group in KILTAN.

In an article in the Indian Defence Review of July 1990, Commodore Gopal Rao
has described the sequence of events as he saw it. In it he stated:

"The rendezvous with KATCHALL and missile boats NIRGHAT and VEER was
effected off Dwarka on the afternoon of 4 December 1971. Clarifications on
the points raised by the Commanding Officers of the ships were given and
the Task Group sailed from Dwarka PM 4 December to carry out Operation
Trident. KILTAN and KATCHALL were in the vanguard and the three missile
boats stationed slightly in the rear. This formation was maintained
 throughout the approach towards Karachi. At about 1800 hrs, 4 December
1971, when we were 150 miles from Karachi, course was altered northward
to head towards Karachi.

"Three incidents of interest occurred during our approach towards Karachi.

The first one was at about 1810 hrs on 4 December 1971, when KILTAN"s
radar picked up a surface contact on a northwesterly bearing at a range of
45 miles. This contact, which was classified as a warship was doing a speed
of 24 knots and steering a north westerly course, heading towards Cape
Monze, situated to the west of Karachi, oblivious of our presence. The
reason for the presence of this Pak warship in this area was to become clear
only after the war. The second incident occurred at about 1945 hrs when
KILTAN's radar picked up a reconnaissance aircraft and I immediately
altered the course of the Task Group westwards and succeeded in
misleading the aircraft. The reconnaissance aircraft's message to Karachi
"Firm Contact, Course 270. Speed 20" was intercepted by our shore
authorities. At about 1900 hrs, when my radar scan was clear of aircraft
echoes, I altered course northward again. The third incident occurred at
about 2000 hrs, when a surface contact was picked up on KILTAN's radar
on a northeasterly bearing at a range of 25 miles. This contact then
increased its speed to 24 knots and started steering an intercepting course.
I verified from my Navigation and Gunnery radars that this was not a
spurious echo. When the contact closed to 15 miles, I altered course of my
Group to westward and did not permit the contact to close upon us further.
After a while, the contact reduced its speed considerably and its radar echo
started becoming smaller and smaller until it finally disappeared. At about
2014 hrs I altered course again northward and increased the speed of the
formation to 28 knots. Because of the westerly alteration of courses on two
occasions the Pak warship heading northwest towards Cape Monze
increased its distance and the contact was lost on our radar. She was
picked up again only at about 2300 hrs, 4 December 1971 at a range of 40
miles when she was nearing Cape Monze.

The Attack

"The Task Group in formation was heading northward at high speed and
was about 70 miles to the south of Karachi at 2150 hrs. Soon after, KILTAN
detected a target to the northwest at a range of 45 miles, which was
classified as a warship on patrol. A second target was detected to the
northeast, at a range of 42 miles and classified as a large unidentified ship,
proceeding in shallower waters at 16 knots towards Karachi. Pakistan had
issued a warning that no merchant ships should approach closer than 75
miles from the Pakistan coast at night. All the ships of the Task Group were
ordered to switch on their radars and acquire the targets. After the missile
boats confirmed that they had acquired the targets, I designated the enemy
warship to the northwest to NIRGHAT and the unidentified large ship to the
northeast to NIPAT at about 2200 hrs and ordered them to proceed for the
attacks. Both the missile boats hauled out of the formation and proceeded
at higher speeds towards their respective targets.

"The Pak destroyer PNS KHAIBER was patrolling the southwest approaches
to Karachi and only at about 2215 hrs was she able to appreciate that an
enemy force was approaching Karachi. She then altered course and
increased speed to intercept us, the rate of closing was about 60 knots. At
about 2240 hrs when KHAIBER was within range, NIRGHAT fired her first
missile. KHAIBER opened fire with her close range anti-aircraft guns but did
not succeed in preventing the missile from hitting her. Her boiler room was
hit and her speed came down to eight knots.

"I ordered a second missile to be fired at her and after the second hit, her
speed came down to zero and dense smoke started rising from the ship.
She sank after about 45 minutes, approximately 35 miles south-southwest
of Karachi. She had mistaken this to be an air attack and reported
accordingly to Maritime Operations Room (MOR) Karachi, which perhaps
resulted in the anti-aircraft guns in Karachi opening fire for a few minutes.
The trajectories of these tracer shells were seen by us from seaward.
KHAIBER's VHF transmission to Karachi in plain language was picked up by
our shore wireless stations due to anomalous propagation.

"The other large unidentified ship to the northeast was completely darkened
and was proceeding at 16 knots. At about 2300 hrs, NIPAT was able to get
her within range and fired the first missile which scored a hit. A second
missile was fired soon after and when this hit the ship, I saw a huge flash
going up to about twice the height of the ship. My inference at that time
was that ammunition had exploded on board. The ship was seen on radar to
have broken into two and she sank in less than eight minutes, about 26
miles south of Karachi. After the war, it was reliably learnt from merchant
shipping circles and from Pakistan Navy officers who went over to
Bangladesh, as well as from Military Attaches of foreign embassies in
Pakistan that this ship had been carrying a near full load of US ammunition
from Saigon, for the Pak Army and the Pak Air Force. Lloyds Register of
Shipping, London, gave the name of the ship as MV VENUS CHALLENGER, a
ship chartered by Pakistan, which had sailed from Saigon, called at
Singapore en route and was due to arrive at Karachi at 0130 hrs, on 5
December 1971. In addition to the ship's crew, the ship was reported to
have had on board a small number of Pakistan naval officers and sailors for
communication and ordnance duties.

"The Pak warship which I had detected at 1810 hrs on 4 December 1971,
had obviously come down to rendezvous MV VENUS CHALLENGER and after
satisfying herself that all was safe, she headed northwest at high speed
towards Cape Monze.

"During their attacks, the missile boats NIRGHAT and NIPAT had moved
ahead of the force by four to five miles. On completion of the attacks, they
rejoined the force, which took them just about five minutes, as the rate of
closing during the rejoining maneuver was 60 knots. This is the correct
doctrine to be followed to prevent being fired at by ships of the own force.

"PNS SHAHJAHAN, a destroyer, was now ordered by MOR, Karachi, to

proceed to the assistance of KHAIBER. But she regretted her inability to do
so, due to engine problems. Then PNS MUHAFIZ, an ocean going mine
sweeper was detailed and she was approaching my Task Group from right
ahead. I designated this target to missile boat VEER. The speed of advance
of the Task Group was 28 knots and VEER was not able to do more than 29
knots at this time due to a minor engine problem. Since PNS MUHAFIZ had
come well within the missile range, I ordered VEER to fire the missile at the
Pak warship from inside the formation. VEER was just abaft my port beam
when she fired the missile at about 2320 hrs. PNS MUHAFIZ was set on fire
by this missile hit and was seen burning fiercely for over 70 minutes, and
finally sank in that position, about 19 miles to the south of Karachi.

"At about 2325 hrs, NIRGHAT reported sighting a reconnaissance aircraft on

top of her. No contact was seen in my warning radar nor were my visual
lookouts able to spot any aircraft. I informed this to the Task Group and
asked NIRGHAT whether he was still in visual contact with the
reconnaissance aircraft and he replied in the affirmative. I then ordered the
Task Group to assume first degree of anti-aircraft readiness. We had
already been briefed about the lack of capability of Pak Sabre jets to carry
out night attacks by radar as well as considerable decrease in accuracy in
attacks at night by visual aim. This was one of the calculated risks that we
were required to take in the achievement of our aim and this risk was
warranted. Moreover, KILTAN and KATCHALL had excellent anti-aircraft
capability with their fully automatic 76.2 mm guns. I was now required, as
per the Operations Orders, to navigate the Group to a predetermined
position which was a further nine to ten miles ahead. Immediately on arrival
at this position, I was to order the missile boats to fire on shore targets.

"The reported presence of a reconnaissance aircraft in the area caused

undue concern in the mind of the Missile Boat Commander and the
manifestation of this were two serious violations of the Operations Orders.
One was that he fired a missile without orders at about 2330 hrs, towards
the shore from a wrong position and in a wrong direction. I saw this missile
travel to the westward of Karachi and hit the sea. When asked on VHF the
reasons for firing this missile, there was no answer. Just then my navigating
officer, requested me to come over to the display of the navigation radar in
connection with the navigation to the predetermined position.

"It was reported to me that all the other ships of the group had disappeared
from the radar display.
 "I altered the range scale of the navigation radar from 24 miles to 12 miles
scale and noticed four small echoes about seven miles to the south of my
ship. After repeated calls on VHF for about five minutes, the Missile Boat
Commander replied that he was heading for the withdrawal point and at
that moment, they were 12 miles to the south of KILTAN. The rate of
opening between KILTAN and the other four ships was 60 knots i.e. a mile a
minute. KATCHALL had also joined the missile boats in the ignominious
retreat. KILTAN had not kept watch on VHF on the missile boat net as any
spare capacity in communications was required to search and intercept
enemy transmissions. This unauthorised withdrawal was the second and
more serious violation of the Operations Orders by the Missile Boat
Commander. If he was so obsessed by the need to withdraw, the only
legitimate course of action open to him was to suggest that to me as the
Task Group Commander. He had no authority whatsoever to withdraw on
his own.

"Even if the reconnaissance aircraft were present, there was no necessity to

flee from the area, as it would not have made much of a difference to the
strike aircraft whether the ships were 20 miles or 40 miles from the coast,
as the reconnaissance aircraft would be able to home the strike aircraft on
to its target. In actual fact, as shown on KILTAN's warning radar display,
there was no reconnaissance aircraft airborne at all. Major General Fazal
Muqeem Khan states that when the shore authorities in Karachi saw the
glow from the burning MUHAFIZ, they sent a patrol boat to investigate. Had
there been any reconnaissance aircraft airborne, it would have reported the
incidents of dense smoke emanating from KHAIBER and the fiercely burning
MUHAFIZ to MOR Karachi.

Withdrawal Phase

"After arrival in the predetermined position, KILTAN turned around at about

2355 hrs, 4 December 1971, and I saw the near perfect blackout in Karachi
remaining intact.

"The other ships of the group were now about 16 miles to the south of
KILTAN. After having performed the difficult task of transporting the
missiles to the vicinity of Karachi and having sunk the enemy warships
which tried to intercept us, we could have easily fired at least three missiles
on shore targets. This excellent opportunity was wasted. At about 0100 hrs
on 5 December, I sent the message `Angar' to the C-in-C signifying the
completion of Operation Trident.

"Meanwhile, I had ascertained that KATCHALL, NIRGHAT and NIPAT were

together but not in contact with VEER. At about 0045 hrs, 5 December
1971, I gained radar contact with VEER at a range of 12 miles to the south
of myself and established contact with her. VEER was able to do a speed of
only 16 knots and her Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) Withdrawal Point was
0115 hrs. I informed her that I was to her north and my ETA Withdrawal
Point was 0200 hrs. I then passed the information about VEER to KATCHALL
and the other two missile boats and directed them to proceed as per the
withdrawal plan given in the Operations Orders. Due to the panic caused by
the hasty withdrawal, VEER mistook KILTAN for an enemy warship and got
a missile ready to fire at her. Fortunately, at that time VEER's engines were
repaired and she was able to regain her maximum speed. The Commanding
Officer of VEER therefore decided not to fire the missile. This was revealed
to me by the Commanding Officer of VEER, after my return to Bombay.
After she regained her speed, VEER was also directed to proceed as per the
withdrawal plan given in the Operations Orders.

"During the withdrawal phase, one gas turbine engine of KILTAN failed at
about 0045 hrs. The second gas turbine engine also failed at about 0130
hrs. KILTAN was now running on her main diesel engine and her speed
came down to 13 knots. KILTAN finally arrived at Mangrol at about 1800 hrs
on 5 December 1971. All the other ships of the Task Group had already
arrived there.

"After completion of refuelling when I wanted to sail the Task Group to

Bombay, KILTAN's diesel engine failed to start and she became immobile. I
therefore detached KATCHALL and the three missile boats to proceed to
Bombay, where they arrived on the evening of 6 December 1971. KILTAN
stayed overnight at Mangrol and after getting one gas turbine engine
operational by the morning of 6 December 1971 arrived in Bombay on the
night of 7 December 1971.

"I called on the C-in-C on the afternoon of 8 December 1971 narrated the
details of the Operation to him and handed over my report of the Operation.
I also brought to his notice the serious violations of the Operations Order
committed by K 25, due to which an excellent opportunity for attacking
shore targets in Karachi was wasted.

"The Admiral stated that he was pleased that the primary task of sinking
enemy warships had been accomplished. Since this was the first major
operation undertaken by the Indian Navy since Independence, he would
rather condone the lapse of failing to attack shore targets in Karachi; any
inquiry would attract adverse publicity to the Navy."

In his book, Admiral Kohli states: (Page 54).

"It is quite obvious that a serious command and control problem engulfed
the Trident force and could have led to serious difficulties:

(a) The escorts and boats had not worked together as a Task Group.
There was no combined briefing. Understanding of each other by
Commanding Officers which is born out of intimate knowledge of each
 other and their reactions under different conditions of stress was
lacking.

(b) The limited Action Information Organisation facilities in the missile

boats did not allow an adequate picture to be built up for the
Command. This imposes a great burden on control of escorts and
missile boats. The facilities for such command and control on Petyas
were limited. But also the existing facilities were not used to best
advantage.

(c) There were also some communication lapses. Those units who lost
touch on VHF did not automatically come up on H/F resulting in loss
of communication between ships of the force.

(d) Identification Friend or Foe between different types of ships, and

the compatibility of code numbers was not checked prior to
commencement of the operation. It was subsequently established
that they were different. In my opinion, it was just as well that the
attack was broken off by K 25.

(e) Had the command and control by CTG been more close and a plot
maintained of friendlies and enemy contacts, it might have been
possible to achieve an even greater victory than was achieved."

THE PAKISTAN NAVY'S ACCOUNT

The First Missile Attack

"The Story of the Pakistan Navy" has given a detailed account of the first missile
attack on Karachi as seen from their end. (Page 344 et seq).

"On the morning of 4 December, the three ships joined the flotilla and at
0700 KHAIBAR was despatched for the outer patrol. She arrived at the
western edge of the patrol area at 1030 and commenced her patrol; the
day remained uneventful. After darkness had set in, KHAIBAR intercepted
an HF radio transmission at 1905 emanating from a south-easterly
direction. This radio transmission could well have originated from the
missile force.

"The attacking force was first picked up by the surveillance radar on Manora
at 2010, more than two hours before the attack, at the range of 75 miles to
the south (bearing 165 degrees) of Karachi and tracked. Detection of the
missile force more than an hour before it detected KHAIBAR and MUHAFIZ-
which was not until 2130-by our shore radar station was a creditable
performance. No better warning could be expected in the circumstances.
The radar contact obtained by the shore station was reported to Maritime
Headquarters as an unidentified contact approaching Karachi on a northerly
course (345 degrees) at speed 20 knots.

"Another radar contact was detected at 2040 by the tracker radar at a

range of 101 miles south of Karachi on a northerly course. Long ranges are
possible under conditions of anomalous propagation of radio waves
prevalent in winter months in this area. These radar detections led to the
issue of a signal by NHQ at 2158 to ships at sea warning them of the
presence of two groups of surface contacts approaching Karachi from the
south. KHAIBAR was ordered to investigate these contacts but she never
received the message.

"In KHAIBAR, a bright light was observed approaching from her starboard
beam at 2245 when she was on a course of 125 degrees and her speed was
20 knots. Action stations were sounded immediately and the approaching
missile thought to be an aircraft was engaged by Bofor guns. The first
impression of the Commanding Officer, soon after arrival on the bridge, was
that the bright white light was a flare dropped by an aircraft. But observing
the speed of approach, he appreciated it to be an aircraft.

"The deadly missile struck KHAIBAR on the starboard side, below the aft
galley in the Electricians messdeck at about 2245. The ship immediately lost
propulsion and power and was plunged into darkness. A huge flame shot up
in Number One Boiler Room and thick black smoke poured out of the
funnel. When the fire was observed spreading towards the torpedo tubes, a
sailor was sent to train the torpedo tubes and jettison the torpedoes. But
the torpedo tubes were jammed in the fore and aft position and could not
be moved.

"After the ship was hit, a message was immediately sent by hand of the
Yeoman to the Radio Office for transmission to MHQ by means of the
emergency transmitter. The voice pipe between the bridge and the Radio
Office had been damaged and could not be used to pass the message. The
message read: "Enemy aircraft attacked ship in position 020 FF 20. No 1
Boiler hit. Ship stopped". The transmission of this message in total darkness
and prevailing chaos, reflects creditably on the part of the staff. It was
unfortunate that the position of the ship indicated in the message was
incorrect ; this caused considerable hardship to ship's survivors later.

"It was after evaluation of the extensive damage, for the first time
appreciated that the ship was hit by a missile. But no attempt was made to
amend the previous signal to avoid delaying its transmission.

"A few minutes later, another missile was seen approaching the ship at
about 2249 and was engaged by Bofors. The second missile, a few
moments after it was sighted, hit No 2 Boiler Room on the starboard side.
The ship, which till then had been on an even keel, began to list to port.
The ship's boats were shattered by the explosion. At 2300, it was decided to
abandon ship when the list to port had become dangerous and the ship had
become enveloped in uncontrollable fires. By 2315, it had been abandoned
by all those who could leave the ship. More explosions, possibly of bursting
of ammunition, continued to rock the ship as men jumped overboard from
the sinking ship. The ship went down at about 2320 stern first with a heavy
list to port.

"MUHAFIZ had sailed on the evening of 4 December to relieve ZULFIQAR on

the inner patrol in compliance with orders from the Task Force Commander.
She arrived at her patrol area at 2245, just in time to witness the missile
attack on KHAIBAR and to become a victim of the next. The trajectories of
the two missiles fired at KHAIBAR were observed on board from MUHAFIZ
plunging into the outer patrol area to her south. The wavering white lights,
when first observed by the Commanding Officer, were thought to be star
shells but later evaluated as aircraft-impressions which were very similar to
those of Commanding Officer PNS KHAIBAR. It appears that none of those
who saw the missiles that night recognised them as such.

"As MUHAFIZ altered course southward, the glow of light from the burning
wreck of KHAIBAR could be seen on the horizon. Action stations were closed
up as the ship headed towards the scene of action. She was on course 210
degrees, speed 9 knots, when at 2305, the third white light was observed
heading straight for the ship. The fast approaching missile hit MUHAFIZ on
the port side abaft the bridge. Upon being hit, the ship (which was of
wooden construction) disintegrated instantly and some crew members were
thrown into the water. The ship's instantaneous collapse gave no time for
the transmission of a distress message. The ship's debris continued to burn
for quite sometime while the survivors floated around the burning remains.

"The Indian Navy's first missile attack on 4 December code-named Trident,

was apparently planned well in advance and carefully rehearsed. It was
based on the assumption that units of the PN Fleet would be on patrol some
distance from Karachi at the outbreak of hostilities, and the assumption
happened to be correct. The missile attack force consisted of two Petya
class frigates, IN Ships TIR and KILTAN, and three Osa class missile boats,
IN Ships NIPAT, NIRGHAT and VIR. The Trident force operated directly
under the command of Vice Admiral Kohli, FOCINCWEST while the rest of
the Western Fleet was placed separately under the command of FOCWEF.
After topping up with fuel off Diu, the Trident force headed towards Dwarka
keeping close to land in shallow waters to avoid PN submarines. Arriving off
Dwarka, 150 miles from Karachi, the missile boats began their final
approach on a direct route to Karachi at their maximum speed of 32 knots.
A fourth missile boat was left at Dwarka to cover the withdrawal of the
attacking force on its return passage.

"INS NIPAT's radar apparently picked up two contacts, presumably

KHAIBAR and MUHAFIZ, at 2130 at a range of about 40 miles, when the
force was approximately 50 miles south of Karachi. NIPAT fired two missiles
at KHAIBAR. INS NIRGHAT engaged MUHAFIZ from a range of about 20
miles. The missiles fired at Karachi harbour at 2330 were also from NIPAT.
The oil installations had also been subjected to an aerial attack earlier in the
day at 0830 when two oil tanks at Keamari had caught fire. The glow from
the fire helped NIPAT as it approached Karachi harbour. Of the missiles fired
by the Trident force, two hit KHAIBAR and one hit MUHAFIZ.

"Having launched their attacks, the Indian missile boats turned and headed
for the R/V position off the coast of Mangrol where the tanker Poshak was
waiting to refuel them. At this time TIPPU SULTAN, which was about 40
miles ahead of the formation picked up three radar contacts at a range of
49 miles. TIPPU SULTAN was on her Karachi bound passage to effect repairs
to her main evaporator that had developed some defect the preceding day.
FOFPAK on board BABUR on learning of the contacts by TIPPU SULTAN
could do no more than take evasive action and move his force further
inshore.

"Following their attack, two of the missile boats, VIR and NIPAT, suffered
some mechanical failure. VIR was virtually disabled but managed to move
at slow speed after effecting emergency repairs at sea. It is estimated that
she went nearly 100 miles off her intended track in the process and NIPAT
was also forced to reduce speed. By 0130, the latter could not have gone
too far from Karachi and advantage could have been taken of the
vulnerability of the two boats had the information available at MHQ been
more precise.

"The missiles more than once had been mistaken for approaching aircraft.
In fact, the attention of the controlling authorities ashore was distracted
towards the threat of an aerial attack once too often to the extent that all
warnings of a surface attack given by the tracker radar on Manora ware
largely ignored or not given due weightage. Tracker radar was a good radar
set loaned by SUPARCO to the Navy. Its performance was extremely good.
It was installed in PNS Qasim near the entrance of the harbour.

"After the attack INS TIR (actually KATCHALL not TIR) and INS KILTAN, the
two supporting Petyas, had been monitoring our signal traffic and were able
to pick up MHQ message ordering SHAHJAHAN to assist KHAIBAR. This
broadcast in plain language enabled the Indian Navy to announce the
sinking of KHAIBAR the very next day. Fortunately, SHAHJAHAN was
recalled and thus was saved. The Indian estimates of damage to
SHAHJAHAN and sinking of two minesweepers and a merchant ship were
exaggerated versions of the result of their missile attack.
"The rescue operation launched to locate and recover survivors of KHAIBAR
was a somewhat disjointed and haphazard effort. The incorrect position of
KHAIBAR indicated in her last signal also contributed towards the late
recovery of survivors. The search effort was, therefore, centered on a
position which was more than 20 miles away from the location where the
ship had sunk. The location of survivors of MUHAFIZ was by chance.

"The credit for the rescue of survivors of KHAIBAR and MUHAFIZ goes to
the gunboat SADAQAT whose single handed efforts saved many lives. It
would be recalled that this boat, sent from Saudi Arabia and manned by a
PN crew, was operating under the direct control of MHQ and had been
employed on miscellaneous tasks. On the night of 4 December, soon after
the attack on KHAIBAR, COMATRON in SADAQAT was ordered to proceed
and look for KHAIBAR's survivors.

"Soon after leaving harbour at about midnight, the Commanding Officer

observed over the horizon a glow of light to the south-west. The light
emanated from the burning remains of MUHAFIZ, but the fate of MUHAFIZ
was not known to anyone at this time. He thought he had succeeded in
locating KHAIBAR and steered for what he thought was the burning wreck
of KHAIBAR.

"It was upon the recovery of survivors that it was for the first time learnt
that MUHAFIZ had been sunk. The information was passed promptly to
MHQ, and must have come as a shock for those who were busy organising
the search for KHAIBAR and attempting to untangle the confused picture in
the Headquarters. After an unsuccessful attempt to locate KHAIBAR's
survivors, the ship returned to harbour early on the morning of 5
December.

"ZULFIQAR joined the search effort at 0830 on 5 December, when she was
on her way to join the Task Force having completed the inner patrol. At this
time the Commanding Officer, having missed the original message, for the
first time learnt the ship was required to conduct a search, but the message
received merely stated that SHAHJAHAN was to join the Task Force while
MADADGAR and ZULFIQAR were to continue the search. The Commanding
Officer, not knowing the position or the purpose of search, joined
MADADGAR which was seen emerging from the south of Churna Island at
this time. Thus until the afternoon of 5 December, MADADGAR and
ZULFIQAR had made no headway in the search for KHAIBAR's survivors.

"COMATRON was again ordered to proceed out at 1000 to make a second

attempt to locate KHAIBAR and her survivors. A fresh search centre was
chosen by COMATRON and the search bore fruit when one of KHAIBAR's life
rafts with survivors on it was sighted at 1555. By 1745 on the evening of 5
December, the survivors were recovered. When it became dark, the ship set
course for harbour and on the way back picked up 4 more survivors.
 "In the meantime, a concerted search effort was mounted at 1425 when
MHQ ordered COMKAR to `conduct a thorough search for survivors of
KHAIBAR'. A search force under the tactical command of COMMINRON in
MUNSIF was despatch to the area. MADADGAR and ZULFIQAR joined
MUNSIF for this search effort. An expanding square search based on a new
search datum was commenced by the search force on arrival in the area
towards the evening. This attempt was abandoned at 1913, when the
search force was ordered to withdraw towards the coast, as a reaction to a
false alarm of a missile attack. By this time the search had, in any case,
become redundant as KHAIBAR's survivors had been picked up by the
gunboat SADAQAT a few hours earlier.

"With the primacy of the missile threat recognised, a reappraisal of defence

measures against this threat was done. It was obvious that the missile
boats must be tackled at their base or during transit before they could
launch their missiles. It was equally clear that this task could not be
accomplished without the support of the PAF. The Navy had initially found it
difficult to get firm commitments from the Air Force due to their
involvement in Army operations. Once convinced of the necessity, after the
missile attack on 4 December, the PAF responded by carrying out bombing
raids over Okha harbour-the forward base of missile boats. In one such
attack, the fuelling facilities for missile boats at Okha were destroyed. The
strikes would have been more effective had not the Indians, anticipating our
reaction, dispersed the missile boats to less prominent locations along their
coast.

"In the early hours of 6 December, a false alarm of a missile attack

was raised by the circulation of a number of reports indicating the
presence of missile boats in the area west of Cape Monze. MHQ
asked the PAF to carry out an air strike on a ship which had been
identified as a missile boat by Naval observers flown on a Fokker
Friendship aircraft for this specific task. ZULFIQAR was informed by
MHQ that a PAF sortie was on its way to attack a missile boat in the
area. Shortly afterwards, at 0640, an aircraft appeared and strafed
ZULFIQAR. The attack was broken off only when the ship's frantic
efforts to get herself identified as a friendly unit succeeded. There
was a loss of lives and some were injured. The ship sustained minor
damage on the upper deck and returned to harbour to effect repairs
and land casualties."

In RETROSPECT

Viewed in retrospect, it is doubtful whether the first missile attack on Karachi

could have achieved any more than it did because:

(a) The planning for such operations will always be highly classified,
Earmarking forces beforehand and working them up for their tasks is likely
to breach security. It is also not practical. Unforeseeable defects cause
earmarked forces to fall out at the last minute, as happened in the
subsequent attacks on Karachi when TALWAR on 6 December and KADMATT
on 8 December fell out.

(b) The dispersal of friendly forces was unavoidable. When NIRGHAT found
that KHAIBAR was approaching her at high speed, NIRGHAT had to reverse
course to gain time to complete pre launch missile checks. In so doing she
dropped miles astern of the other ships who were racing towards Karachi at
high speed. NIRGHAT could never have caught up and arrived at the
predetermined point during the time available.

Imponderables like these are unavoidable in naval operations. Overcoming them

will depend on the reactions of the man on the spot.

As to who set the oil tanks on fire on 4 December, "The Story of the Pakistan
Navy" clearly states that it was the Indian Air Force.

In its account of the first missile attack on 4 December, it states: (Page 347).

"The oil installations had also been subjected to an aerial

attack earlier in the day at 0830, when two oil tanks at
Keamari had caught fire."

In its account of the second missile attack on 8 December, it states: (Page 352).

"The first missile flew over the ships at the anchorage, crossed Manora
Island and crashed into an oil tank at the Keamari oil farm. There was a
huge explosion and flames shot up so high that Qamar House-a multi-story
building in the city- was clearly visible. The fire caused by the air attack
on 4 December had been put out only a day earlier after three days
of concerted efforts. Fires once again raged in the oil farm after a
short lived respite of a day. A distressing sight no doubt for
everyone, but particularly for those who had risked their lives in a
tenacious battle against the oil farm fires earlier."

WESTERN FLEET OPERATIONS AND THE SECOND MISSILE ATTACK ON

KARACHI
In his book Admiral Kohli states: (Pages 58 et seq).

"The Western Fleet sailed on 2 December 1971 to operate in their assigned

exercise area. For the Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet (FOCWEF) to
have complete freedom of movement to carry out the directive given to him
and with the possibility that a task force from Bombay may be employed on
a special operation, a line was indicated which the Fleet and the Special
Task Force would not cross, to prevent interference with each other.

"Two missile boats had been allotted to the Fleet which were to be in tow by
ships of the Fleet. These boats would be released to carry out their attacks
either on enemy surface units at sea or on ships in or near the harbour of
Karachi, the main port of Pakistan. Any missiles left over after the
destruction of enemy units were to be directed to the neutralization of shore
targets.

"The material state of our ships, including the flagship MYSORE was a
source of some worry to us all. Within 72 hours of sailing on 2 December,
KUTHAR had a major blow-up in the engine room and some personnel were
injured. She had to be taken in tow by KIRPAN to return to Bombay
escorted by KHUKRI. VIJETA, a missile boat with the Fleet, also suffered a
breakdown on the day after sailing from Bombay and had to be towed back
by SAGARDEEP. Throughout the period the Fleet was at sea, there were
machinery breakdowns which reduced the speed of the Fleet. Fortunately,
the ships engine room crews rose magnificently to each occasion and
repairs were expeditiously completed. It can well be imagined that the
material state of ships of the Fleet was uppermost in the mind of FOCWEF
and he had to take this important factor into account when embarking upon
an operation.

"There is no doubt that Pakistani submarines were lurking in the North

Arabian Sea. During the first few days, a number of ships of our Fleet
picked up sonar contacts. They prosecuted these contacts, but were unable
to collect any evidence of actual damage to a submarine, though in at least
two instances, the attacking ships felt very strongly that they were hunting
a confirmed submarine.

"On the afternoon of 3 December, the Fleet observed reconnaissance

aircraft circling around it, taking good care to remain out of gun range.
Whilst the ships were tracking the aircraft, the Fleet received the signal that
hostilities with Pakistan had commenced.

"It was evident that the submarine contacts which had been prosecuted the
previous night and the snooper aircraft reports would give the enemy a
reasonably accurate position of the Fleet. FOCWEF decided to split the force
into two divergent groups under cover of darkness to shake off the snooper.
This was successfully achieved by midnight. As it happened, this split had
 taken the Fleet so far south that the first simultaneous attack on Karachi
and the Makran ports had to be postponed.

"On 5 December, the Fleet regrouped, refuelled and replenished. On the

night of 5/6 December, FOCWEF detached two groups of ships - one group
to attack Karachi and the other group to attack the Makran ports. Due to a
last minute defect TALWAR had to drop out of the Karachi strike group.

"On the afternoon of 6 December, quite inexplicably and for reasons not
known to us in Bombay at that time, Naval Headquarters (NHQ) decided to
assume control of operations. NHQ made a signal at about 1600 hours
cancelling the attack on Karachi scheduled for the night of 6/7 December.
Later the Fleet was ordered to rendezvous (R/V) TIR off Saurashtra to pick
up a second missile boat VIDYUT. The various groups of Fleet ships which
were well on their way to their targets had to continue to steam at high
speed to make this distant R/V in time. Meanwhile TIR repeatedly broke
wireless silence to report her position and Pakistani aircraft. She could well
have become the target of shore based Pakistani fighter bombers."

REASONS FOR CANCELLATION OF THE ATTACK OF NIGHT 6/7 DECEMBER

Even after Admiral Kohli's book was published in 1989, nobody was able to clarify
who in NHQ authorised the cancellation of this attack. The only clarification
available was that it was felt necessary that the Fleet should have an extra
missile boat for the attack. Recently it has been possible to clarify this grey area.

After the first missile attack on night 4/5 December, the Pakistan Navy intensified
its aerial surveillance of the approaches to Karachi. "The Story of the Pakistan
Navy" states: (Page 349).

"After the first missile attack, a mixed bag of a dozen civilian aircraft were lined
up at Karachi civil airport where a Fleet Air Arm was set up immediately, manned
by civilian volunteer crews from PIA and the Flying Club. There was no problem in
operating 3 or 4 light aircraft during the day, in their respective sectors on an arc
200 miles from Karachi, covering the entire area from Jamnagar to the Makran
Coast. At night, two radar fitted aircraft at a time covered the same arc. Thus
from the afternoon of 5 December, it was difficult for a missile boat to approach
within 200 miles of Karachi undetected."

On the morning of 6 December, NHQ had intercepted the Pakistan Navy's signals
of the Pakistan Air Force strafing one of its own warships, the Pakistani frigate
ZULFIQAR. This caused considerable concern in the mind of the Chief of the Naval
Staff, Admiral Nanda. He assessed that it would not be prudent to expose the
Karachi group to such a high probability of attack by an alert enemy. Karachi had
already been attacked on night 4/5 December and could again be attacked later.
He therefore cancelled the attack which the Fleet had already launched on Karachi
and the Makran ports.

The situation on the 7th morning was that the various groups of Fleet ships had
assembled at the R/V. But TIR and VIDYUT had not reached the R/V. Had the
enemy been D/fing the signals made by TIR during the night and had the
Pakistan Air Force launched an air strike to attack the TIR group, there was a
possibility that this strike might by chance find the Fleet and attack it instead of
TIR. Indeed, after intercepting a Pakistani transmission, FOCINCWEST signalled
TIR to "prepare to repel air attack" and the Indian Air Force swiftly sent aircraft to
protect the TIR group from air attack. At this stage, the missile boat VIDYUT,
which TIR was towing to hand over to the Fleet, started reporting defects which
required her to return to Bombay. In Admiral Kohli's words "Things had not gone
too well and NHQ reinstated control of maritime operations on the western
seaboard to FOCINCWEST." (Page 60).

These events confirmed FOCWEF's assessment that after the first missile attack
on night 4/5 December, the Pakistan Navy was keeping the approaches to Karachi
from Saurashtra under close surveillance so as to detect the approach of our
missile boats. He therefore decided to launch the second missile attack from
west-southwest and altered the Fleet's course westward. On the 7th, FOCWEF
had to break wireless silence more than once in an exchange of signals with
FOCINCWEST regarding the second missile attack.

Admiral Kohli's book states: (Page 60).

"FOCINCWEST ordered FOCWEF to execute Operation Python- the attack on

Karachi - during the night 7/8 December if feasible. The forces to be used
were left to the discretion of FOCWEF. In another message, the C-in-C
directed FOCWEF to press home the attack as the enemy forces were in
disarray. FOCWEF reported inability due to weather conditions. The weather
improved on 8 December and the Fleet planned the next attack on Karachi
on the night of 8/9 December."

On 8 December, FOCWEF split his force into three groups:

(a) The fast frigates of the 15th Frigate Squadron, TRISHUL and TALWAR to
escort missile boat VINASH for the second missile attack on Karachi.

(b) The cruiser MYSORE accompanied by BETWA and RANJIT to raid

Makran.

(C) The tanker DEEPAK, accompanied by KADMATT to continue contraband

control. KADMATT had dropped out of the Karachi strike group due to a last
minute defect.
THE SECOND MISSILE ATTACK ON KARACHI

FOCWEF's primary concern now was to distract the Pakistan Navy's attention
towards the MYSORE group so as to reduce the probability of the Karachi group
being detected during approach and withdrawal.

TRISHUL, TALWAR and VINASH set course for Karachi at high speed. En route,
electronic emissions were detected on a Pakistan Naval frequency which was
being monitored. It was appreciated that a vessel was reporting the presence of
the group to Karachi. The vessel was soon sighted. TALWAR was told to sink the
vessel which she did and rejoined.

During the approach to Karachi, TRISHUL's electronic surveillance reported that

the radar at Karachi had stopped rotating and was pointed directly at the group, a
sure sign that the group had been detected. At 2300, the group arrived off
Karachi and on radar detected a group of ships. FOCWEF had already told the CO
of TRISHUL that VINASH should fire all four missiles. VINASH proceeded to do so:

- The first missile homed on to the oil tanks at Keamari and started a huge fire.

- The second and third missiles homed on to merchant ships. It was subsequently
learnt that the British vessel HARMATTON had been damaged and the
Panamanian vessel GULF STAR had sunk.

- The fourth missile homed on to the Pakistan Navy's tanker DACCA which had
been camouflaged and anchored amidst the merchant ships because, laden with
oil, she could not seek safety inside Karachi port as the other Pakistan Naval ships
had done.

It had been pre-arranged that the Indian Air Force would attack Karachi's airfields
at Masroor and Drigh Road at the same time as the second missile attack. It so
happened that the TRISHUL group arrived off Karachi and carried out its attack
before the prearranged time. The air attack commenced soon thereafter. The anti
aircraft guns at Karachi opened fire as the TRISHUL group withdrew unobserved.
Post war intelligence indicated that Karachi's guns set fire to a Greek ship ZOE
which Lloyds List of 10 December stated as "set ablaze and sunk".

During the withdrawal, VINASH reported defects and had to stop. However before
the need arose to take her in tow, VINASH repaired her defect and the group
continued its withdrawal at high speed. They R/V'd the Fleet on 9 December.
THE PAKISTAN NAVY'S ACCOUNT OF THE SECOND MISSILE ATTACK

The Second Missile Attack (Page 350 et seq).

"The second missile attack code named `Python' was planned and executed
under the direction of Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet from his
flagship INS MYSORE. The Western Fleet sailed out of Bombay on 2
December, just one day before the commencement of hostilities and was
detected moving north towards Karachi by the submarine HANGOR. Two
missile boats had been taken in tow. The fleet maneuvered to take up a
position to launch a missile attack.

"The first missile attack having been handled directly by the FOCINCWEST,
the Fleet Commander was tasked to launch the second missile attack on the
following day. But in a bid to shake off our submarines and reconnaissance
aircraft, the Indian Fleet moved so far south that the attack was no longer
feasible on schedule. This shows the extent to which Indian plans were
foiled by our submarines and meagre reconnaissance effort by a few
requisitioned civil aircraft.

"An attack planned for the night of 6 December was also aborted, when
Indian Naval Headquarters cancelled it after assuming direct control over
fleet operations. Weather conditions, which were unsuitable for missile boat
operations, precluded an attack on the night of 7 December. During this
period, when the missile attack was postponed several times, the Pakistan
fleet was at sea. Deeply conscious of the missile threat, FOFPAK continued
to manoeuvre his fleet, mostly in an anti-submarine formation, along the
coast.

"After much discussion and debate, the decision to recall the surface ships
back to harbour was taken sometime on 7 December and by the afternoon
of 8 December, all major surface units except DACCA had entered harbour.
DACCA was at Manora anchorage and remained there as its entry into
harbour was precluded by its deep draft and tidal conditions in harbour. The
men on board watched the ships steam into harbour with a growing feeling
of uneasiness.

"DACCA had performed admirably its basic role of keeping the ships topped
up with fuel, rations and other stores necessary for the sustenance of the
fleet at sea during its operations. She had been out at sea since 10
November carrying out underway replenishment of ships at sea as and
when required. When her services were not required, she lay at anchor.
Having camouflaged herself as a merchant ship a day earlier, the ship
happened to be at Manora anchorage on the fateful night of 8 December.
"This missile attack was carried out by a single missile boat VINASH,
supported by two frigates TRISHUL and TALWAR of the 15th Frigate
Squadron, under the command of F-15 on board TRISHUL. The Indian Fleet
appears to have remained well to the south, while the missile attack unit
was detached to sortie out towards Karachi from a southwesterly direction.

"On the way to Karachi, one of the escorting frigates INS TALWAR engaged
and sank a ship, which was believed to be a Pakistani patrol craft suspected
of having reported the position of the approaching force. Since none of our
patrol craft, or for that matter any other warship, was engaged or sunk that
night, it can be surmised that the victim of this attack must have been a
civilian craft. It appears that the unfortunate vessel was mercilessly
pounded with shells from the frigate's guns until she caught fire and sank.

"The missile boat VINASH closed Karachi to a range of 12 miles and fired
four missiles in succession at four different ships chosen at random by the
Unit Commander from the cluster of about a dozen ships at Manora
anchorage. DACCA was unfortunate enough to be one of them.

"The first missile flew over the ships at the anchorage, crossed Manora
Island and crashed into an oil tank at the Keamari oil farm. There was a
huge explosion and flames shot up so high that Qamar House-a multi-story
building in the city- was clearly visible. The fire caused by the air attack on
4 December had been put out only a day earlier after three days of
concerted efforts. Fires once again raged in the oil farm after a short lived
respite of a day. A distressing sight no doubt for everyone, but particularly
for those who had risked their lives in a tenacious battle against the oil farm
fires earlier.

"The other three missiles homed on ships at Manora anchorage. The British-
owned merchant vessel HARMATTAN, SS GULF STAR flying the Panama
flag, and PNS DACCA were hit by a missile each. The HARMATTAN sank
immediately, but GULF STAR survived. PNS DACCA's miraculous survival
after absorbing a missile hit in an oil tank can be attributed to the courage
and vigilance of the Commanding Officer and crew. Timely operation of the
steam smothering system by engine room personnel after the missile hit
the ship certainly averted a major explosion that could have been fatal for
the ship. A first hand account of this missile attack is given from a special
report submitted by PNS DACCA.

`At about 2245, a pale light was seen travelling towards Manora, parallel to
Manora breakwater and when it was abreast of AA School, it turned right
and directly hit the oil tank which immediately burst into flames. A little
later, another light was seen travelling from the same direction and hit the
ship anchored very close to the breakwater; the ship sank immediately. At
that moment action stations was sounded and in no time the ship had
manned her guns and was ready to engage the target. In the meantime, a
third light was seen travelling towards another ship at the southern corner
of the anchorage, she caught fire immediately. A little later, a bright light
was seen coming up from behind the horizon gaining height on port bow
(ship was lying 280-100 degrees). It appeared stationary for sometime, and
then rushed steeply towards the ship. It was engaged by port guns. It hit
on the port side piercing No 7 port FFO tank just above the water line. It
ripped open the cargo and jungle decks. The motor boat and spare fuel
hoses caught fire immediately. Abandon ship was piped immediately. A
number of officers and men jumped overboard and only eight officers and
37 CPOs and sailors stayed.'

"The Commanding Officer stayed on board and, with the help of those who
had not abandoned ship, brought the fire on the upper deck under control.
He has maintained that the hasty and controversial order to abandon ship,
cancelled soon afterwards, was given without his approval. His presence of
mind in a moment of crisis saved the ship, and deprived the Indian Navy of
the satisfaction of having sunk a warship of the Pakistan Navy in the second
missile attack. As matters stood, their score was only one defenceless
merchant ship sunk and another damaged.

"It is surprising though that while the missile threat was uppermost in
everyone's mind, the missiles when first observed on board DACCA, were
mistaken for aircraft flying with search lights switched on to locate their
targets. The reaction of many others who saw the missiles in the air that
night was no different.

"There was an air strike at Karachi by IAF just about the time the Indian
Navy launched the missile attack; but there is no positive evidence of
damage to the harbour due to the air strike, which was in all probability
directed at PAF air bases in Karachi. There were reports of bombs having
been dropped in Bihar and Agra Taj colonies near Mauripur. The chance
attack by IAF at about the same time as the missile attack had led to a
controversy between the IAF and the Indian Navy for claiming credit for the
damage to oil tanks at Keamari. In all probability this missile had strayed
away from its target and locked on to the strong echo of the oil tank.

"The approaching missile was sighted by lookouts on Manora Island and

reported to COMKAR who passed the information on to Air Defence Sector
Operation Centre, Korangi. Not a single shot was fired as the missile
whizzed past over harbour defenses and plunged into the oil tank.
Perceived, by those who saw it, to be an aircraft, it was not engaged
because of the gun restrictions in force. It was nearly six minutes after the
missile hit the tank that a tremendous barrage of fire was let loose by anti
aircraft guns in harbour at 2248, when air raid warning red was
promulgated and gun restrictions lifted. No aircraft were actually sighted
over the harbour. There were more blasts as other tanks exploded in the
spreading fires. Starshells, which looked liked missiles, fired by PNS
Himalaya at this time further confused the picture. The harbour
reverberated with the sound of guns and blasts as innumerable shells were
pumped into the air.

"On the evening of 8 December at about 1800, a radar-fitted Cessna on

patrol reported sighting Osa boats just leaving Jamnagar and heading
towards Karachi. The C-in-C, PAF was contacted on the direct telephone and
asked to strike the Osas from the air. The C-in-C PN also had a word with
him to emphasis the urgency. The Air Marshal regretted his inability as
according to him "No air effort was available".

"The circumstances surrounding the sudden disappearance of the merchant

vessel VENUS CHALLENGER from the high seas have remained somewhat of
a mystery. It is certain though that the ship was sunk in one of the two
missile attacks at Karachi. The ship, loaded with a cargo of rice, had sailed
for East Pakistan from the United States on 10 September. Arriving off
Chittagong in late November, she was diverted to Karachi where she was
expected in the first week of December. Thereafter, the ship could not be
traced until the identification of her wreck by a team of naval divers 26
miles to the south of Karachi a few days after the war.

"If the objective of the attack, as claimed by the Indian Navy, was to
destroy the Pakistan Navy, not much contribution was made by the second
missile attack towards that goal. True, PNS DACCA was damaged by a
chance hit, but she was repaired in less than a month and continues to
serve the Navy till today. On the other hand, if the objective was to scare
away merchant ships, the unscrupulous method adopted for this purpose is
without precedence.

"The provisions of international law and conventions that forbid attack on

merchant ships without warning were blatantly violated. No effort at
maintaining even a semblance of legal propriety was made by declaration of
a blockade or a war zone before embarking on a callous slaughter of
merchantmen and their crew by those who claim to have taken up arms to
champion the cause of the oppressed. For it was well known to the Indians
that missiles hurled blindly at ships at Manora anchorage were bound to
take a toll of neutral merchant ships.

"MUNSIF which was anchored in the vicinity of DACCA at Manora anchorage

proceeded to assist DACCA and picked up some of her survivors. Other
personnel of DACCA and those of merchant ships were recovered by
auxiliary craft promptly despatched to the scene by COMKAR. MADADGAR
was sent to assist DACCA but by the time she arrived there past midnight,
the fire had been put out and the situation was under control. By the
evening of 9 December, DACCA's power had been restored and she moved
to a position close inshore off Buleji Point, anchored and remained there
until she was towed back to harbour on 19 December.
 "There followed in the wake of the second missile attack yet
another controversial decision: orders were issued at 1400 on 9
December to ships at Karachi to reduce their ammunition outfit.

"After the return of the ships to harbour on 8 December, their vulnerability

in the port remained a topic of continuing debate. In the early hours of 9
December, only a few hours after the missile attack, dockyard
workshops and buildings were severely damaged in a low level
attack - facilitated, no doubt, by the light emitted by the huge
flames of the fire at the oil farm - by an IAF bomber. Under these
circumstances anxiety about the catastrophic consequences of an explosion
in a ship fully loaded with ammunition was only natural.

"The decision to reduce the ammunition outfit, not withstanding the logic
behind it, continues to be questioned by many. The adverse effect on
morale of men, who were inclined to see it as a step to limit the surface
ships operational role, was immediate. Not accepted by most as a
necessary rational step, the decision remained a controversial issue.

"It was perhaps in consideration of the morale factor and to avoid the
impression that the fleet was immobilised that a strategy of high speed
probes was introduced. This required random sorties of short duration to be
carried out at high speed by designated ships. Destroyers and frigates were
employed in this manner until the end of the war."

THE MYSORE GROUP'S RAID ON THE MAKRAN COAST

At the same time that the TRISHUL group had been detached to attack Karachi,
FOCWEF had detached the MYSORE group to bombard Jiwani. On the evening of 8
December, 75 miles south of Jiwani, the MYSORE group, encountered a merchant
ship who, on seeing the MYSORE group reversed course towards Karachi and was
heard calling Karachi on a frequency being monitored. The ship was signalled to
stop but she did not comply. MYSORE fired a broadside ahead of her and she
stopped. RANJIT was sent to investigate and reported that it was the Pakistani
merchant ship MADHUMATI registered in Karachi who had over - painted her
name to read ADAMANT to masquerade as a neutral ship registered in Manila. The
ship was boarded and apprehended.

FOCWEF assessed that the MADHUMATI's call to Karachi would have distracted
attention from the TRISHUL group headed for Karachi. This was confirmed when,
soon after sunset, BETWA reported a slow moving aircraft circling with lights on
but staying out of gun range. FOCWEF told CO MYSORE that there was no need to
bombard Jiwani. The MYSORE group withdrew with MADHUMATI and headed for
the R/V where all groups were to rejoin on 9 December.

All groups rejoined on the 9th evening and were replenished. By the 10th
morning, the Fleet had been steaming at high speed for 8 days and cumulative
defects were beginning to reduce the speeds that ships could sustain. FOCWEF
decided that the Fleet should return to Bombay, effect repairs, pick up two missile
boats and return to the operational area.

To outflank the enemy submarines deployed off Bombay, FOCWEF maintained

absolute wireless silence, made landfall well south of Bombay and proceeded up
the coast inside the 10 fathom line, through waters too shallow for submarines to
operate. The ruse succeeded and the Fleet arrived safely at Bombay on 13
December. By the time the ships were ready to sail again, the Pakistan Army in
the East had surrendered on 16 December and West Pakistan had accepted
India's unilateral offer of ceasefire on 17 December.

AFTER THE WAR

After the war there were differing views about the raid on the Makran Coast. One
view, held by high quarters in NHQ, was that FOCWEF should have let the
MYSORE group bombard Jiwani so as to give ships companies a feeling of having
played a part in the war and the satisfaction of having fired their guns in anger.

Another view has been stated by Admiral Kohli himself in his book:

"The Pakistani naval raid at Dwarka in 1965 left the officers and men of the
Indian Navy infuriated and somewhat humiliated. I was then the Deputy Chief of
the Naval Staff and I vowed to myself that if ever there was another round
involving naval forces and I was in any kind of a position of responsibility, I would
go to the farthest extremes to teach the enemy a lesson and to avenge this
dastardly act.

By not bombarding Gwadar and Makran, the Fleet robbed itself of the glory and
the kudos which would justifiably have been theirs, and denied me the
satisfaction of avenging the bombardment of Dwarka in 1965 by the Pakistan
Task Force."

As regards the first view, Makran would have been bombarded if NHQ had not
cancelled the attack on 6 December because of apprehensions that the Karachi
group would be exposed to too high a risk of air attack.

As regards the second view, FOCWEF had no enthusiasm whatsoever for

bombarding worthless targets on the Makran Coast. Even at the planning stage,
the sole purpose of such bombardments was "to repeatedly provoke the Pakistan
Flotilla to come out and fight." After the success of the first missile attack, the
purpose of bombardment changed "to enhance the success of the second missile
attack by distracting attention towards the bombarding group." In FOCWEF's
view, the capture of the MADHUMATI close off the Makran coast, soon after
MADHUMATI transmitted her message to Karachi, achieved this purpose. Had
there been no MADHUMATI, the MYSORE group would have bombarded Jiwani to
divert attention from the Karachi group but not to avenge Dwarka or to give ships
companies the satisfaction of firing guns in anger.

The second missile attack had unexpected results. As is evident from the Pakistan
Navy's account, the hit on one oil tank set several adjacent oil tanks on fire. The
ships of the Pakistan Flotilla who had withdrawn into harbour the previous day
were told to reduce their outfits of ammunition so as to minimize explosion
damage in case of being hit. Most significant of all, the neutral merchant ships
who had witnessed the two missile attacks started seeking assurance of safe
passage from the Government of India before sailing out of Karachi. Since no
neutral shipping was heading for Karachi either, the Western Fleet, despite its
limited resources, had achieved a de facto blockade without it having been
declared. With the Pakistani Flotilla in harbour, the Western Fleet controlled the
approaches to West Pakistan from 9 December onwards.

SINKING OF THE KHUKRI

PREAMBLE

In his comparative assessment of Naval Forces, FOCINCWEST had accepted that

the Pakistan Navy's latest Daphne class submarines were far superior to not only
our submarines but also our surface ships. Accordingly all naval ships coming to
or departing from Bombay hugged the shallow waters of the coast north and
south of Bombay and altered landwards/seawards at random so that enemy
submarines could never predict where to wait for targets.

Immediately after Pakistan attacked on 3 December, systematic attempts were

commenced to interfere with the Pakistan Navy's shore to submarine broadcast.
This yielded a series of D/F positions of Pakistani submarines transmitting
messages to Karachi. Progressively these D/F positions helped to confirm that one
submarine was moving northwards from off Bombay towards Diu. Since Diu was
the assembly area for ships to be deployed for missile attacks on Karachi, this
submarine threat started causing concern. However all the anti submarine
frigates were away with the Western Fleet and no ships were immediately
available to deal with this submarine.

The 14th Frigate Squadron KHUKRI, KUTHAR and KIRPAN had sailed with the
Western Fleet on 2 December. KUTHAR suffered a boiler explosion on PM 4
December. FOCWEF detached KIRPAN to tow KUTHAR back to Bombay escorted
by Captain F 14 in KHUKRI. Enroute to Bombay, at midday on 5 Dec, KHUKRI
carried out an attack on a submarine, recorded the entire attack and explosions
on tape and signalled that she considered the submarine destroyed. The 14 FS
arrived Bombay on AM 6 December and KUTHAR was taken in hand for repairs.

FOCINCWEST decided to deploy the 14 FS along with the Navy's latest Seaking
anti submarine helicopters operating from Bombay to eliminate the submarine
threat off Diu. The Seaking helicopters were to operate in the southern sector of
the search area closer to Bombay and thereby have longer time on task. The
frigates were to operate in the northern sector of the search area, closer to Diu
Head.

THE HUNTER KILLER OPERATION

In his book, Admiral Kohli states:

"Where the Pakistan Navy scored over the Indian Navy was in their submarine
arm. The French Daphne class submarines were the most modern conventional
submarines, with sensors and armament far superior to not only our submarine
but also our anti submarine frigates. This is how the KHUKRI was detected by a
Daphne much before the frigate became aware of the submarine's presence."
(Page 33).

"It was appreciated that the Pakistan Navy would have deployed at least two
Daphne class submarines to cover focal points on the likely sea lanes used by
Indian ships for passage to and from Bombay port or any attacking force
transiting between Bombay and Karachi. While the destruction of hostile ships
would have been the primary mission of enemy submarines operating off the
West Coast of India, they would also provide early warning of Indian warship
movements. (Page 75).

"As expected there were sonar contacts and reports of occasional sightings of
periscopes by Indian ships and maritime reconnaissance aircraft. There were
subsequently confirmed sighting reports of an enemy submarine in the area west
of Diu Head. D/F bearings obtained of a submarine which had transmitted a
wireless message to Karachi also confirmed the position. This submarine was a
potential threat to our shipping and it was decided by the Western Naval
Command to eliminate this threat. The 14th anti submarine squadron
comprising KHUKRI (F14), KIRPAN and KUTHAR was the only force available for
the task, together with some Seakings." (Page 75).

"Urgent operational orders for a hunt were prepared in consultation with Captain
MN Mulla, Senior Officer of the Squadron, requiring the squadron to sail on 8
December for the last known position of the submarine. KUTHAR's problems were
too serious to permit early readiness of the ship for sea. After considering the
gravity of the situation and in consultation with F 14, who accepted
decreased A/S capability of the two ships, KHUKRI and KIRPAN were
sailed for the hunt."(Page 75).

SINKING OF THE KHUKRI

"The Story of the Pakistan Navy" has recounted the events as seen from the
submarine HANGOR which sank the KHUKRI.

HANGOR had sailed from Karachi on 22 November for a patrol off the Saurashtra
coast. On 1 December, she was ordered to shift to the area off Bombay to relieve
her sister submarine MANGRO who was completing her patrol.

On 2 December, HANGOR sighted the Western Fleet which was on its way to its
patrol area. HANGOR reported this to Karachi and continued her patrol off
Bombay. She was unable to find good warship targets. Thereafter "The Story of
the Pakistan Navy" states: (Page 357 et seq).

"In an effort to locate the evasive enemy, HANGOR extended her patrol
northwards to investigate some radio transmissions that she had intercepted on
her sensors. In the early hours of the morning of 9 December, when she was off
the Kathiawar coast, two contacts were picked up on her

passive sonar on a north-easterly bearing. They were easily identified as warships

by their sonar transmissions; radar indicated a range of 6 to 8 miles. A pursuit of
the enemy began.

"When the first attempt to intercept the ships failed, the submarine began
snorkelling to gain speed. HANGOR, however, failed to attract the attention of the
ships and contact was lost as the range increased. By the evening of 9 December,
she was able to make out the pattern of their movement by tracking them with
the aid of her sensors. The ships were carrying out a rectangular anti-submarine
search.

"Forecasting their movement along this search pattern, the submarine succeeded
by 1900 in taking up a tactically advantageous position on the path of the
patrolling frigates. The range of the ships, which were moving at a speed of 12
knots, began to close. The crucial moment which the submarine had patiently
worked for since the early hours of the morning had arrived. HANGOR was finally
in a position to launch an attack.

"At 1915, she went to action stations. Fifteen minutes later, she came up to
periscope depth, but could see nothing in the dark night when the range of the
ships indicated by her periscope radar was only 9800 meters. The ships were
completely darkened. The Commanding Officer decided to go down to 55 metres
depth and make a sonar approach for the final phase of the attack. Unaware of
the submarine's presence, the frigates continued on their track. At 1957,
HANGOR fired a down-the-throat shot with a homing torpedo at the northerly ship
from a depth of 40 metres. The torpedo was tracked but no explosion was heard.
This was not the time to brood over the situation. The control team sprang into
action and fired a second torpedo. After five tense minutes, a tremendous
explosion was heard at 2019 hours. The torpedo had found its mark. The other
enemy frigate came straight for the submarine. HANGOR fired a third torpedo and
turned away at maximum speed. A distant explosion was heard subsequently.

"Moving west towards deeper waters, where she would be less vulnerable, the
submarine passed very close to the scene of action and heard distinctly the noise
of explosions emanating from the burning wreck. Later she came up to periscope
depth and took a last look. In the dark, nothing could be seen except a faint glow
on the horizon near the scene of action.

"In an extremely vulnerable position in enemy controlled shallow waters where no

help could reach her, the task that lay ahead of HANGOR was to evade her
pursuers in the hunt that followed-the first signs of which came when a number of
underwater explosions were heard just about half an hour after the attack. For
the next four days, HANGOR braved the might of the Western Fleet. All their anti-
submarine assets-frigates, Seaking helicopters and Alize aircraft- were thrown
into the chase that followed. A hunter killer (anti-submarine) operation fully
supported by IAF reconnaissance aircraft based ashore in the area, was put into
effect.

"The first priority of HANGOR after the attack was to get into deeper waters and
put as much distance between her and the position from which the torpedoes
were fired, the datum (reference point) for the search by enemy units. Having
successfully done that, she began her journey back home. For four days and
nights, she was harassed by the enemy. The dimensions of the enemy anti-
submarine effort can be gauged from the fact that about 150 underwater
projectiles were fired in this period. Only on one occasion were the explosions
close enough to shake the submarine.

"The Commanding Officer was naturally keen to pass the information of this
successful attack to Naval Headquarters. The submarine had to come up as it
cannot transmit radio messages while submerged. She took the risk of being fixed
by enemy direction finding stations ashore while transmitting the message.
Enemy aircraft were overhead soon after the message was sent. Intense air
activity throughout the day forced the submarine to run silent and run deep,
reducing her speed of advance to 1.5 knots.

"There were, of course, many close calls during the passage back to Karachi. The
Indian Navy called off the futile hunt on the evening of 13 December. There were
claims by some of their units to have sunk the submarine, but she arrived
unharmed at Karachi on 18 December.

"In this spectacular action which took place about 30 miles south of Diu off the
Indian Kathiawar coast, KHUKRI, the ship of the Squadron Commander of the
14th Frigate Squadron, was sunk within two minutes after receiving a hit in the
magazine where explosives were stowed. 18 officers and 176 sailors including the
Commanding Officer, who deliberately stayed back on the sinking ship, lost their
lives. This came as a shattering blow to the Indian Navy, deflating in one stroke
the exuberance generated by highly exaggerated success stories of the missile
attacks at ships off Karachi."

The Pakistan Naval Historical Review of March 1979 contained an article by a

French naval officer, Cdr Courau. It states:

"At the beginning on the afternoon of the 8th, there had been only two radar
echoes, detected twice in the same formation at an interval of one hour; this was
enough to class them as warships on a south-easterly course. The hunt began.

"Since the sighting, the enemy had continued to change course, which gave the
hunter some problems. On the evening of the 8th the enemy was on a north-
westerly course, then on the morning of the 9th, they changed to a north-easterly
course, then to a south-easterly course about noon.

"HANGOR now realised that the enemy ships had been on a course that described
a rectangle. Then at 1900 the ships set a course to the north west. At 1915 the
CO estimated their mean course and dived to attack. He altered course on the
frigate on the western side (KIRPAN) at very slow speed in order to present the
smallest silhouette to the enemy's sonar. He decided not to hurry the moment of
firing, but to wait for the moment the enemy would be on target judged to be at
2000.

"At 2013, a sharp order broke the silence - "Fire". Everyone was tense. The
torpedo left the tube and was heard moving towards the target, but then they
heard it passing under without exploding.

"There was no time to criticise this failure. The frigate on the eastern side
(KHUKRI) passed in her turn at a range of about 5000 meres. There was just time
to set the range and at 2017 a second torpedo was fired. A loud explosion was
heard.

"KIRPAN returned to pick up survivors and her course brought her in line with the
submarine which promptly fired a third torpedo but the frigate was prepared for
the attack and left at high speed. After 8 or 10 minutes a very clear explosion
was heard followed by the stopping of the KIRPAN's machinery. HANGOR
considered that he had hit the frigate, but he decided to abandon the attack and
made for deep water. KIRPAN had a badly damaged stern and was unable to
steam, she was finally towed into Bombay.

"There followed three days of depth charge attacks by Shackeltons, Alizes and
escorts. The submarine suffered 156 depth charges, most of which were a long
way off. Every time the submarine used the schnorkel, it was spotted by aircraft,
but the escorts led to the position by the aircraft never made contact. Finally the
HANGOR managed to escape and carry on her mission."

In 1997, the Public Relations Directorate of Pakistan Naval Headquarters

published "Sentinels of the Sea - The Pakistan Navy 1947-1997". It contains an
article by Rear Admiral RA Qadri, who was the Electrical Officer of HANGOR. The
following excerpts describe the attack on KHUKRI as seen from HANGOR.

"After having obtained a perfect (fire control) solution, HANGOR commenced the
attack at 1957 by firing one homing torpedo, "down the throat" at the more
northerly target, which was INS KIRPAN. The torpedo ran true and it was tracked
on sonar all the way as it acquired "lock on" to the target and passed under it (as
it was supposed to do). However, the newly acquired torpedoes, whose test
facilities had not yet been set up, failed to explode and kept going. Until the time
that the torpedo was fired, neither of the two frigates had any inkling of being
under attack. However, the moment the torpedo passed under INS KIRPAN, she
suddenly woke up, realised she was under attack and turned away at maximum
speed. HANGOR had struck first, but had failed to hit hard. The new torpedo had
let it down.

"The advantage had now shifted completely in favour of the enemy. If the enemy
had kept their cool, it is difficult to say what would have been the final outcome.
Perhaps, this article would not have been written in such detail. But one thing is
sure - the fate of INS KHUKRI would still have been what it was.

"As KIRPAN turned away and ran, KHUKRI, which was to its south, now knowing
the direction from which the torpedo had come, increased speed and came
straight for an attack on HANGOR.

"It was now HANGOR's turn to keep it's cool and this, the submarine did well. As
KHUKRI came in for the attack, HANGOR's attack team calmly shifted target to
KHUKRI, obtained a quick solution and fired the second torpedo at it. This quick
shot was mostly meant to spoil the attack by KHUKRI. However loss of nerve by
KHUKRI's Commanding Officer on hearing the oncoming torpedo, made him try to
turn away from it. This greatly helped to "pull" the torpedo towards the frigate. As
soon as the torpedo acquired "lock on", it went straight for the target, passed
under it and when it was directly under the keel it exploded, breaking the keel of
INS KHUKRI which sank in a matter of two minutes, with all hands on board.
There were no survivors. There was simply no time for the myth of the "CO
nonchalantly lighting a cigarette as the ship sank under him" to be enacted.
"The sinking of KHUKRI had now made the balance of advantage even between
HANGOR and KIRPAN and the action had not yet finished.

"Seeing its sister ship sink in such a short time must have been a nerve-
shattering experience for the KIRPAN's Commanding Officer, for he came
charging in for an emergency attack, fired off a pattern of depth charges, hoping
to scare HANGOR into breaking off its attack. But when he found that HANGOR
was not intimidated and instead had fired the third torpedo at KIRPAN, he broke
off the attack just as quickly and ran "hell for leather" in panic trying to outrun
the torpedo locked on to the frigate's tail. That was the last seen (actually heard)
of her.

"What followed this action was a massive anti-submarine effort by the Indian
Navy, in the form of Operation Falcon to hunt down and kill just one submarine,
PNS/M HANGOR. The operation continued for four days till the night of 13
December.

"A number of anti submarine charges were fired, on what the HUK groups thought
was HANGOR. In the submarine itself, 24 salvoes (each of three charges) on 10
December and 12 salvoes on 12 December were registered. The latter depth
charging took place after the Indian Navy's shore stations had taken cross
bearings on HANGOR's radio message to Naval Headquarters regarding the
action.

"Throughout these four days, HANGOR remained completely aware of the huge
effort underway (though the details of Operation Falcon as such were known only
after the war). It is a measure of HANGOR's efficiency that in spite of leaving the
action area with a highly depleted battery, and with such a massive hunt for her
in progress, she managed not only to recharge her batteries but was able to
successfully lay a false trail for the HUK groups to follow. How successful the false
trail was, can be judged from the fact that of the more than 36 salvoes fired,
none came anywhere near the submarine; only two slightly shook the submarine.
Most, being far away, could just be heard on sonar."

Admiral Kohli's book states: (Page 76).

"While in the process of hunting, the enemy submarine with her superior sonar
facility, obtained contact of KHUKRI before her own detection by the ship and
struck KHUKRI by a salvo of three torpedoes in quick succession. The ship sank in
a matter of minutes at 2055 on 9 December, taking down with her 18 officers and
176 men including the Commanding Officer, Captain MN Mulla. It was a serious
blow in an encounter in which the superior underwater destruction capability and
its allied weapons systems of a modern submarine turned the scales and thus the
hunter became the victim. A subsequent technical enquiry also revealed certain
failings and non compliance on the part of KHUKRI's A/S Team with the laid down
A/S doctrine."
KIRPAN, who was searching for the submarine together with KHUKRI, reported
detecting torpedoes going past her at the time KHUKRI was torpedoed. She took
vigorous evasive action and fired mortars on the torpedo bearing. After a few
salvos, her mortars went non operational. KIRPAN now faced a dilemma - should
she rescue KHUKRI's survivors - either by going amidst them on a dark night or
should she lower her boats to rescue survivors. Both actions would require
KIRPAN to stop and this would make her an easy target for the submarine, if it
chose to attack KIRPAN. Or should KIRPAN leave the area, repair her mortars and
return to the area with an additional ship to rescue the survivors and start
hunting the submarine? This however would give the submarine time to get away
from the scene of the sinking and consequently greatly enlarge the area to be
searched. The CO of KIRPAN decided to withdraw from the scene and return later.

Admiral Kohli's book states: (Page 77).

"There was some controversy about KIRPAN withdrawing from the scene of the
sinking instead of picking up survivors. She had heard the hydrophonic effect of
more torpedoes and she had defective mortars. In the circumstances she took the
wisest course. After meeting with KATCHALL, she returned to the scene in her
company to carry on with the hunt."

On receiving KIRPAN's signals reporting the sinking of KHUKRI, FOCINCWEST

rushed rescue forces to the scene. By the time KATCHALL and KIRPAN returned
the next morning, only 6 officers and 61 sailors had survived to be rescued.

FOCINCWEST cancelled the third missile attack on Karachi which was to be have
been carried out on the 10th night and deployed forces to hunt the submarine.

ANTI SUBMARINE OPERATION FALCON

Admiral Kohli's book states: (Page 77).

"A massive hunt was launched for the killer submarine with all available A/S
ships, Seakings and Alizes.

"The Alizes laid a barrier of sonobuoys and the Seakings continued to operate
from Diu until the passage became so long that time on the job was much
reduced. The IAF mounted sustained maritime reconnaissance searches in search
of the submarine. For the next four days, all forces were engaged in relentless
and coordinated activity. Ships reported successful attacks on all four days. The
submarine was slowly making its way towards Karachi where air cover would
prevent further attacks and save her. It was evaluated by those taking part in the
hunt that the submarine was certainly severely damaged and that her arrival in
Karachi was problematic. The hunt was terminated reluctantly on the evening of
13 December as our forces were approaching within range of shore based
Pakistani aircraft."

AFTER THE WAR

After the war, there was considerable debate on:

(a) Whether two ships were a viable enough force to send on an anti
Daphne Hunter Killer mission without anti submarine air effort in direct
support.

(b) Whether KHUKRI's doing so low a speed was related to the experimental
Sonar 170 modification.

(c) Whether the Seakings could have been utilised more offensively.

(d) Whether KIRPAN was justified in withdrawing from the scene after
KHUKRI's sinking instead of immediately rescuing KHUKRI's survivors.

(e) Why Operation FALCON was unable to locate the Pakistani submarine.

Since the action of the Commanding Officer of the KHUKRI going down with his
ships had seized the nation's attention, each of these issues bacame sensitive and
controversial, because they called into question:

(a) The very prudence of FOCINCWEST having launched the operation,

moreso as he himself was later to admit in his book "We Dared" that:

(i) "The French Daphne class submarines were the most modern
conventional submarine, with sensors and armament far superior not
only to our submarines but also to our anti submarine frigates.

(ii) "In consultation with F 14, who accepted decreased anti

submarine capability of the two ships, KHUKRI and KIRPAN were
sailed for the hunt."

(b) The imprudent actions of the CO KHUKRI in a known very high

submarine probability area.

(c) The glaring inadequacies in lifesaving equipment.

Notwithstanding these sensitivities, intensive enquiries were initiated.

POST WAR INQUIRIES ON THE LOSS OF THE KHUKRI

Since the Daphne class submarine's anti ship capability was known to be
and accepted to be superior to our anti submarine capability, should the
anti submarine operation have been launched at all?

The consensus was that in war, it is unacceptable to let an enemy submarine

threaten you on your doorstep - it has to be hunted.

Were the two frigates and Seakings deployed on 8 December adequate to

cope with a Daphne class submarine?

It emerged that the Seaking helicopters, which were the Navy's latest and best
anti submarine system, could have been better utilised operating from Diu but
they were considered to be defenceless if attacked by Pakistani aircraft. However,
available Super Connie maritime recce aircraft and Alize anti submarine aircraft
should have been utilised in support of the operation from the moment it started
on 8 December.

Why was KHUKRI doing slow speed when tactical doctrine laid down high
speed?

It emerged that with the assistance of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in
Bombay, a secret but promising experiment had been initiated to increase the
range at which ships sonars could detect submarines. The modification equipment
had been tried at sea, results were promising but further improvements were
needed. These were completed after the Western Fleet sailed on 2 December.
After the 14 FS returned to Bombay, approval was given by Admiral Kohli for the
modification kit to be embarked in KHUKRI when she sailed on 8 December.
Throughout the search on 8 and 9 December, when the modification equipment
was connected up to KHUKRI's sonar, the CO of KHUKRI had detailed discussions
on the pros and cons of doing slow speed to increase detection range vis a vis
doing higher speed and decreasing detection range. A conscious decision was
taken by him to do slow speed. In this connection, Admiral Kohli's book states:
(Page 40).

"It is of the utmost importance that any new sensors which have a direct bearing
and importance on the safety of the ship should not be experimented with during
war, when the ships are engaged in active operations, especially so if this
experimentation would place restrictions on the speed and movement of the
ship."

Why weren't torpedo decoys streamed?

It emerged that this too was a conscious decision. The background noise
generated by the noise maker to distract a torpedo's homing head was so high
that it swamped the sonar which was trying to detect a weak submarine echo.

Could more lives have been saved?

It emerged that in the few minutes that it took the ship to sink, not many could
jump into the sea. Of those that did, not many had lifejackets. Due to the shock
of explosion, neither did all life rafts get released or inflated nor were those that
did inflate made full use of.

Follow up action was initiated on diverse fronts:

(a) An Anti Submarine Warfare Seminar exposed, for the first time in the
Navy's history, the sharp and serious differences in opinion on how to cope
with a modern silent submarine having long range homing torpedoes. The
basic issues were whether to sidestep a submarine or confront it? Whether
to do slow silent speed against passive homing torpedoes? Or whether to do
high speeds to outrun the torpedoes?

(b) The pre 1971, fatalistic acceptance of insuperable hydrological

limitations in anti submarine efficiency was rooted out.

(c) The causes of poor sonar performance in the waters off the Indian coast
were pinpointed and remedies identified.

(d) Longer range sonars and anti submarine weapons were inducted, as
also electrically controlled noise makers which could be remotely switched
on to decoy homing torpedoes.

(e) A Tactics Committee was constituted to formulate tactics for the Navy's
unique mix of Russian, Western and indigenous sensors and weapons.
Systematic effort began to keep up with the rapid advances taking place in
submarine and anti submarine warfare, sonars, anti submarine torpedoes
and rockets, torpedo homing mechanisms and torpedo decoys and integrate
all this into a simple effective anti submarine doctrine.

(f) A new computer aided Tactical Teacher was installed at Bombay. In due
course, this was augmented by a Tactical Evaluation Group.

(g) Major tactical exercises and debriefs were organised under NHQ's direct
supervision to root out the ignorance of anti submarine tactics resulting
from the lack of knowledge of own sonar and weapon capabilities and
annual transfer of ASW officers and sonar operators. These helped to
gradually standardise tactical doctrines and enhance operator efficiency.

The most important lesson that was learnt from the loss of the KHUKRI was that
longer range sonars and longer range weapons had to be inducted if ships were to
have a fighting chance against modern submarines and their long range homing
torpedoes.

Immediate action was taken to improve the anti submarine capability of the
Leander Class frigates then under construction in Mazagon Docks at Bombay. The
significant improvements which were achieved have been described in the chapter
dealing with the Leander Project.

In retrospect, KHUKRI's tragic loss did not go in vain.

SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

Western Naval Command was allocated two submarines KURSURA and KARANJ
operating directly under FOCINCWEST. Since the approaches to Karachi and the
Makran Coast were going to be transited by the Western Fleet and by the
submarines, waiting stations and submarine havens were established. To exclude
any possibility of mistaken identity, two precautions were taken:

(a) Corridors were demarcated which were not to be crossed.

(b) Submarines were required to positively identify a target before attack.

KURSURA's Patrol

Admiral Kohli's book states: (Page 82).

"KURSURA was deployed on patrol during the precautionary stage, before the
outbreak of hostilities. The aims of the patrol were:

(a) To attack and sink all Pakistani warships.

(b) To sink all merchant shipping sighted/detected when specifically

ordered.

(c) Patrol and surveillance.

"A waiting station and two patrol areas were established. The submarine was to
proceed to her waiting station prior to the commencement of hostilities and move
into her patrol area only after receiving a signal `Commence hostilities with
Pakistan'. She sailed from base port on 13 November 1971 and arrived in her
waiting station in the forenoon of 18 November. She stayed on patrol in her
waiting station till 25 November. Thereafter, she was shifted to another area
where she remained till 30 November. On 30 November, she was ordered to R/V
KARANJ at sea to pass necessary information and instructions which she did and
thereafter she entered Bombay on 4 December.

"She encountered a number of tankers in her waiting station, and two or three
commercial aircraft daily on international routes. She had fair weather
throughout."

KARANJ's Patrol

Admiral Kohli's book states: (Page 82).

"KARANJ, with orders similar to KURSURA, sailed on 30 November 1971 for her
patrol. She effected R/V with KURSURA at sea on 2 December 1971 and
thereafter proceeded to her waiting station which she entered at 1600 hrs on 3
December. The same night, she received information that hostilities with Pakistan
had broken out. She was, however, ordered to remain in her waiting station. On 5
December at 0145 hrs she received orders to move to her patrol area which she
entered on the morning of 6 December. On transit she received news of the
Fleet's bombardment of Karachi and the sinking of two PN warships. Morale on
board was high.

"The Commanding Officer, traversed the entire patrol area assigned to the
submarine. His deductions at the end of it were:

(a) Upto 8 December. Ships were using the normal shipping route
traversing the route east of Ormara by night. Air recce was `moderate' east
of Ormara and `slight' west of it. Warship activity was `slight'.

(b) On the night of 8/9 December. Hectic aerial recce and warship activity
to the west, north-west and south-west of Cape Monze. Radio Pakistan
announced a hunt for an Indian submarine off their coast.

(c) 9/10 December and thereafter. All shipping traffic moved inside the 10
to 15 fathom line along the Makran coast. Warship activity frequent in
Sonmiani Bay and off Ormara but close to the coast. Intense aerial recce
east and south of Ormara from Monze and following the same route while
approaching from the south.

(d) 11 to 14 December. No shipping activity west of Ormara. Intense aerial

activity east of Ormara and moderate to the west. Some warship activity
possible near Ormara.

On the evening of 14 December, the submarine was directed to withdraw from

her patrol and she returned to base port on 20 December 1971.

"KARANJ thus became the longest deployed naval unit during the 1971 Indo-Pak
conflict. She had been out from 30 November to 20 December 1971. On four
different occasions during this patrol, the submarine almost released her weapons
on merchantmen. The requirement to positively identify these precluded any
firings."

IN RETROSPECT

In Admiral Kohli's words: (Page 80).

"The stipulation of "positive identification" prior to attacking any enemy ships

deprived our submarines of any real action. The correct line of action would have
been to have declared `War Zones' and sink any ship transiting through these,
after a suitable warning period. Only the submarines could have achieved this
with impunity in enemy waters."

LOSS OF ALIZE 203

Immediately after KHUKRI sank, two Alizes were sent from Santa Cruz at short
notice to operate from Jamnagar on 10 December and assist in anti submarine
operations.

On the afternoon of 10 December, reports were received from Okha of suspicious

warship and air activity near Jakhau on the Indo-Pak border. FOCINCWEST
decided to recce the area. One of the two Alizes at Jamnagar was directed to
carry out a low level recce of the area before returning to Bombay. Air Force
Canberra aircraft were tasked to be ready at Poona to attack whatever the Alize
reported.

The Alize did not arrive at Bombay that evening. Pakistan Radio announced that
an Indian Navy Alize has been shot down "near Karachi." Pakistani records state
that Pakistan Air Force Starfighters returning from a raid on Okha chanced to
encounter the Alize and shot it down with an air to air missile.

TRADE WARFARE

In his book, Admiral Kohli states:

"Towards the third week of November 1971, Pakistan declared a National

Emergency and the Pakistan Navy assumed control of Pakistani merchant
shipping. Very soon thereafter, FOCINCWEST was given control of Indian
merchant shipping. The first action taken was to recall all Indian ships from the
Gulf and direct all merchant shipping not to approach the Pakistan coast.
"The Pakistan Navy also announced the closure of Karachi port and merchant
shipping was warned not to approach within 75 miles of Karachi during the dark
hours". (Page 58).

"During the operations of the Fleet, a number of merchant ships and dhows were
intercepted and examined for contraband. Thus a Swedish ship and a dhow on 6
December and a Panamanian ship on 7 December were sent to Bombay under the
charge of a boarding party. On 9 December, a large dhow was apprehended
carrying Rs 60 lakh worth of gold which was not in the manifest; the crew of the
dhow were all Pakistani nationals. On 9 December, the MYSORE group raiding the
Makran coast apprehended the Pakistani merchant ship MADHUMATI. On 10
December, the ATHENIAN was apprehended." (Page 65).

In Admiral Kohli's words: (Page viii)

"It was very satisfying to note that foreign neutral merchant ships and their
representatives approached the Indian Government and the Navy for grace to
leave Karachi in safety during those three hectic weeks. They had seen the
devastation that had been wrought by the attack of the Indian Fleet. The Indian
Navy was truly in command of the waters in the North Arabian Sea during those
fateful days."

DEFENCE OF BOMBAY

Admiral Kohli's book states: (Page 85).

"Contingency plans were made for the defence of all the major ports on the West
Coast but special emphasis had to be directed towards Bombay harbour because
it was our main port, and the home of the Western Fleet and the premier
dockyard of our Navy. It was appreciated that the enemy would deploy two
submarines off Bombay in order to pick up our main naval units. They would also
employ their Midgets and Chariots to indulge in sabotage inside the harbour.
There was also a possibility that their ships or submarines may lay mines in the
approaches to Bombay harbour. Provision had to be made for all these forms of
threats. Any air raid attacks by the Pakistan Air Force would be dealt with by our
Air Force and by the anti-aircraft fire from our ships and shore batteries located at
different strategic points.

"Patrols were organised by surface ships inside the harbour and upto 20 miles at
sea. Air reconnaissance was instituted upto 60 miles at sea. Missile boats were at
immediate notice to proceed to sea and deal with any attempt by enemy naval
units which approached Bombay harbour to carry out any bombardment. Our 6
inch shore batteries were brought to immediate readiness also.
"Merchant ships were warned not to approach Bombay harbour to within 40 miles
between dusk and dawn; it was hoped that this measure would ensure that any
radar echoes obtained during the night could only be that of an enemy ship.

"The harbour patrols were ordered to explode two-pound charges (especially

made for the occasion) ever so often to scare away any Midgets or Chariots. All
ships anchored in the stream were made to illuminate the water around the ship
so that patrols on board would be able to visually apprehend any danger to their
ship.

"Close liaison was established and maintained with the police and the Home
Guards; they were shown photographs of Midgets and Chariots and frogmen and
given detailed instructions on how to deal with personnel landed by such craft to
carry out sabotage.

"Plans to lay minefields off Bombay harbour and arrangements for swept channels
were progressed and mines prepared for this purpose.

"Fishing boats and vessels were mobilized and their cooperation enlisted. They
were encouraged to go out to sea and report any suspicious movements.
Fishermen were familiarised with silhouettes of Pakistani warships and
submarines and also Midget submarines and frogmen.

"Close and constant liaison was established with the port authorities and the Port
Advisory Committee to undertake necessary measures for important port
installations and merchant ships in harbour to come under the umbrella of the
overall defensive measures instituted by the Navy for the defence of Bombay.

"Additional batteries ashore were installed - two 4" guns at Okha, two 40/60s at
Jamnagar, one 40/60 at Valsura. At Bombay, the existing batteries were
augmented by putting two additional 40/60 guns each at Colaba Point and Worli.
Three additional 40/60 guns were installed at Oyster Rock and Middle Ground.
Four 40/60 guns were installed at critical points in the Naval Dockyard.

"The War Watching Organisation was instituted: suitable temporary telephone

lines were installed so that watchers at lighthouses and other promontory points
would report enemy warships or suspicious vessels as soon as they were sighted.

"We had acquired one dozen fishing trawlers from the trade and these were fitted
out for carrying out harbour patrols and limited seaward patrols. Naval personnel
were appointed to them and the existing crews were signed on for limited naval
service.

"Our seaward resources of ships and crafts were augmented by two Alizes, four
Seakings and two Alouettes. The Alizes were deployed on seaward patrols of 60
miles from Bombay.
Various other security measures were also instituted:

(a) Screening of antecedents of officers and crews of Indian merchant ships

to prevent vital information from leaking out.

(b) Naval publications withheld from coastal vessels.

(c) Adoption of strict security measures against possible use of dhows and
neutral ships for landing of saboteurs and for towing Midgets from Pakistan.

(d) Supervision on the steering of foreign ships in harbours.

(e) Guarding of sensitive points and vital installations in harbours.

(f) Control of W/T and signal stations and lighthouses to avoid their misuse.

(g) Tightening of restrictions on landing of Chinese and Pakistani nationals

from neutral ships calling at Indian ports."

A RETROSPECT OF OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN NAVAL COMMAND

Of the three threats posed by the Pakistan Navy, the surface warship threat was
contained by the missile attacks on Karachi. These confined the Pakistan flotilla
inside Karachi harbour to escape further losses.

The submarine threat was more serious. Despite the known limitations in anti
submarine capability, the question was whether.

- to do something i.e. hunt and kill the submarine or

- do nothinhing i.e. let the submarine look for its targets while ships got on with
other missions.

In retrospect, it is clear that even if all available air effort and three or more ships
had been deployed to hunt the submarine, the submarine torpedoes could not
have missed KHUKRI doing so low a speed. If air effort had been better managed,
it could have driven the submarine away from the Diu area and thereby reduce
the threat to the missile forces assembling at Diu. The loss of the KHUKRI was a
serious blow. But it did lead to extensive improvements in anti submarine
capability.

The air threat too was serious. But no one could have anticipated that the
Pakistan Air Force would be so slow in responding to the requests of the Pakistan
Navy. The chapter on the "Analysis of the Pakistan navy's Accounts of the 1971
War" discusses the causes for this lack of support.

In Admiral Kohli's words: (Page 64).

"Our Fleet was lucky to have got away without any air attacks by shore based
aircraft from Pakistani territory. However enemy attacks on naval shore targets
did take place. From 5 December onwards, Okha received concentrated attention
by the Pakistan Air Force aircraft and was bombed almost every day. Our special
oil fuel tank was blown up in the very early stages of the war and our use of Okha
as an advance base came to an end."

In spite of the material state of ships being so poor, ships companies managed to
achieve almost continuous high speed operations for a full seven days after 2
December.

By 9 December, after the second missile attack on Karachi, the Navy had
achieved maritime dominance of the approaches to Karachi.

CHAPTER 11

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN NAVAL AREA

FOCSOUTH's responsibility was to interdict enemy shipping between the two

wings of Pakistan and thus prevent any seaborne reinforcement of the East
Bengal garrison. When war broke out, AMBA was deployed east of Ceylon whilst
GODAVARI and GANGA were patrolling across the route from Colombo to the 8
and 9 Degree Channels.

On 4 December, GODAVARI captured Pakistani merchant ship PASNI and sent her
under escort to Cochin. Interrogation of the PASNI's crew indicated that Pakistani
merchant ships had been instructed to use the 8 Degree Channel. AMBA was
therefore redeployed to the west of the 9 Degree Channel from which position she
could cover all ships making for either the 8 or 9 Degree Channels.

On midnight of 12 December, AMBA detected two contacts near the 9 Degree

Channel heading southeast at high speed. Air reconnaissance the next day
revealed these to be British warships, one of which was the aircraft carried
ALBION. Since Naval Headquarters were aware of the movements of this force,
further action became unnecessary.

In the course of their patrols during the war AMBA, GODAVARI and GANGA
interrogated a total of 144 neutral merchant ships for contraband and cleared
them as not bound for Pakistan ports.
 CHAPTER 12

ANALYSIS OF THE PAKISTAN NAVY'S ACCOUNTS OF THE 1971 WAR

The perceptions, plans and activities of the Pakistan Navy can be discerned from
the following source documents:

(a) "Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership" by Maj Gen Fazal Muqeem Khan

published in 1972, soon after the war.

(b) "The Story of the Pakistan Navy 1947-1972", compiled by the PN

History Section in 1991, twenty years after the war.

(c) "The History of the Pakistan Air Force" by Syed Shabir Hussain and
Squadron Leader M Tariq Quareshi published in 1982 by the PAF Press.

To present a balanced overview, excerpts which relate to specific naval operations

have already been conjoined with the Indian accounts of these operations eg the
First Missile Attack, the Second Missile Attack, the Sinking of the KHUKRI and
Naval Operations in East Pakistan. The remaining excerpts of relevance have been
presented in this chapter.

To facilitate analysis, the source material has been rearranged under the following
headings :

(a) Pakistan Flotilla Operations

(b) Pakistan Submarine Deployment

(c) Assessment of Pakistan Air Force Performance

(d) Pakistan Navy and Air Force Cooperation

(e) Pakistan Maritime Reconnaissance

The timings in the Pakistan documents are Pakistan Standard Time. 30

minutes should be added to Pakistan Standard Time to bring it to Indian
Standard Time.

PAKISTAN FLOTILLA OPERATIONS

Excerpts from "Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership"

"The naval war plans had last been reviewed in March 1971 and were based on
the limited aim achievable by the available strength and state of weapons and the
equipment that the Navy held. As there had been no changes in the Navy, no
need was felt to review or revise them after that date. While planning, the Navy
had assumed that it would be given a minimum of one weeks' notice before the
war to redeploy and alert its units at sea. It had also expected that the promised
limited air support would be made available within eighty miles of Karachi.

"As for the Indian intentions, the Navy had visualised that with Osa class missile
boats and submarines available to the Indians, together with the threat from
Pakistan submarines, their Navy would not attempt to attack Pakistan ships by
their surface ships unless submarines, missiles and air attacks failed to neutralise
the Pakistan Navy. Therefore its plans were based on the appreciation that it had
no answer to the Indian Navy's missile boats. The surface ships were not to be
exposed to this danger until the missile boat threat had been neutralised. The
ships had to remain at sea within the Air Force fighter cover. The submarines,
however, were to be deployed on offensive patrols off the major Indian ports and
other focal areas.

"Like other major military decisions, the C-in-C Navy had neither been consulted
nor associated with any of the deliberations that resulted in the decision to
counter-attack from West Pakistan. He was merely called up by COS Army, to
Rawalpindi on November 29, 1971, and informed of the President's decision to
open hostilities in the West in a few days. He was not given the actual date and
time, which were to be conveyed to him by C-in-C Air through a mutually agreed
code word at the appropriate time.

"The mutually agreed code word was passed to C-in-C Navy at 1515 hours on
December 3, 1971, personally by the C-in-C Air. The commanders concerned
were hurriedly collected and given their instructions and signals were despatched
to all ships by 1700 hours. The Navy had been deployed in their war stations
earlier, when Indian belligerent intentions had become clear and on subsequent
Indian invasion of East Pakistan on November 21, 1971. Some ships were
patrolling 40 miles off Karachi and others 70 miles off the port. This was done for
monitoring and checking the incoming ships and suspected craft approaching
Karachi.

"On December 3, the PIA Fokker flying along the Kathiawar coast reported the
sighting of India's Western fleet. The Pakistani submarines deployed in the area
were not able to attack it, as they got their orders to commence their operations
late that evening. Indeed the submarines had themselves seen the Indian Fleet
proceeding overhead on December 2 but were unable to attack for the same
reasons. As an alternative, an air strike was requested by the Navy but it was not
available. Thus, by not giving sufficient notice of starting the operations to the
Navy, a good opportunity to attack the Indian Western Fleet was missed.

"The first Indian Naval action took place on December 4, 1971. The Indian Air
Force and the Navy seemed to have first class coordination. They had already
established a Joint Centre in Bombay a few months earlier. Indian Naval attacks
were always covered by the Indian Air Force by keeping Karachi under air
attacks. At 0800 hours, the Indian Air Force started strafing Karachi. Two aircraft
flew very low over the harbour and an oil tank in Keamari was hit by rockets.
Indian aircraft strafed at intervals for the whole of the day on December 4. While
the air raids were going on, the radar picked up a suspect contact at 2100 hours
about 40 miles south of Karachi. It must be mentioned here that the presence of
Osa Missile Boats of Russian origin, which had been taken over by the Indians,
was known and upto the middle of November 1971, Russian naval personnel were
seen on these boats in Bombay harbour. The Russian method of deployment
which was followed by these boats was that they operated with submarines which
acted as watch-dogs and observation posts. The Indian submarines were keeping
60 miles off Karachi and closed up only during the night. The Osa Boats had to
have the submarines as directing platforms for their operations.

"After having been informed about the suspect contact, efforts were made to
identify this contact. While this was being pursued, the attack came. At 2330
hours the Indian Air Force attack was still on, when PNS KHYBER out on patrol 70
miles off Karachi, signalled that it had been hit by an aircraft bomb. The NHQ was
taken aback by this information.They could not believe that an aircraft could do
this in the middle of the night. They asked for further information. No reply came
from the ship as all communications with it had been lost in the meantime.

"About the same time HQ PNS Qasim, at Manora, reported having seen a big fire
glow on the horizon out at sea. A fast patrol boat was at once despatched to
investigate. On arriving at the site, it found mine sweeper PNS MUHAFIZ, 40
miles off Karachi, burning. The first person to be picked up by this boat from the
water was the Captain of the minesweeper. It only came to light through him that
the ship had been hit by missiles. No report of this incident had been received
from this ship. The Indians had hit the two ships simultaneously. Other survivors
were also picked up. On receiving information of the missile hit on PNS KHYBER,
the boat despatched to pick up its survivors returned without success with the
excuse that the weather at sea was very choppy and the survivors picked up from
the minesweeper were in a bad way and needed medical attention immediately.
All efforts were made to locate the KHYBER's survivors and 70 of them were
rescued the next afternoon after about 18 hours of its sinking, although the
search had continued by sea and air for the whole day.

"At midnight on December 4, the local Air Force Commanding Officer was
approached to order an attack on the retreating missile boats. It was calculated
that they would take six hours to reach their nearest sanctuary and thus allow
enough time for the Air Force to attack them early next morning, but no air strike
could be made available. It was known later that after the missile attack, the
Indian boats instead of retreating south, had sailed westward off Gawadar where
they stayed for three days. This fact came to notice by a chance conversation
with someone travelling in a Cessna which had flown over Gawadar on December,
5. After having seen the pictures of the boats, he came out with the information
that he had seen two of them near Gawadar.

"Anyway the Air Force in Karachi did not react to the Navy's request; therefore,
the C-in-C Navy rang up the C-in-C PAF in Rawalpindi at 0400 hours and woke
him up. After all sorts of pleading, the answer he obtained was `Well old boy, this
happens in war. I am sorry your ships have been sunk. We shall try to do
something in the future'.

"After the missile attack, the position of the surface ships at sea became almost
untenable, as they had no defence against missiles. On December 7, the Flag
Officer Commanding the Flotilla, after consulting his sea going Commanders, met
the C-in-C. He acquainted him with the prevailing situation and suggested a
withdrawal of the ships inside the harbour in order to escape a missile attack
which was most likely to occur. The ships would of course be more susceptible to
air attack there, but could also provide a powerful anti-aircraft threat, particularly
against a low flying attack. It was, therefore, decided to withdraw all ships to the
harbour on December 8, except for the fleet oil tanker which was fully loaded. It
had to stay out because of fire hazard within the harbour by its presence and also
that its deep draught restricted her entry into port. The oil tanker DACCA was,
therefore, ordered to anchor with the other merchant ships away from the port.

"The Indian missile boats on their passage from Gawadar to Bombay, attacked
the merchant ships outside the anchorage at night on December 8. Gulf Star,
flying the Panama flag and the US owned ship Venus Challenger were sunk and
Harmatton, a British vessel was severely damaged. DACCA along with three
merchant ships, was also hit. Her company valiantly fought the fire and saved the
ship after heavy damage had been done. One of the missiles fired by the missile
boats flew over Manora and hit the first big steel structure it came cross. That
was one of the oil tanks at Keamari which started huge fires in the oil farm. The
course followed by this missile was strange, perhaps its homing device had failed.

"The withdrawal of the naval surface ships into harbour was thus claimed by NHQ
as a sound tactical move as otherwise, all the naval units would have been
attacked by the missile boats and in all probability most of them would have been
sunk. Some officers of the Navy thought that it was a shameful act for the Navy
to retreat to the harbour. This withdrawal is however a point on which any verdict
is best left to Naval experts who would probably be discussing this as a case
study for years.

"On December 8, air attacks on Karachi had started at 2000 hours. Again the air
attacks were well coordinated with the missile attack at 2300 hours. Karachi was
kept under air attack till 0200 hours on December 9 to give enough time to these
missile boats to get away. The Navy was blamed all along by the public for doing
nothing against the constant air attacks on Karachi. But the public did not know
that the Navy had neither the means nor the responsibility for the air defence of
Karachi. The Navy's presence in the harbour, however, acted as a deterrent to
Indian aircraft. The dockyard was bombed but providentially remained safe. Four
Indian aircraft were brought down by the Navy's anti-aircraft guns that night.

"In the meantime PNS BABUR while operating with other units of the Flotilla off
the Makran coast in the evening on December 5, engaged a submarine.
Destroyers were immediately despatched to carry out anti-submarine operations.
Sonar contact of the submarine was achieved with the submarine which had by
now submerged, and a number of attacks were carried out with anti-submarine
mortars. Later, on basis of the evidence collected, the Navy claimed to have
damaged the Indian submarine".

Excerpts from "Story of the Pakistan Navy"

"On 22 November, the Government of Pakistan issued a proclamation of state of

emergency. The Pakistan Navy took on added precautions on 24 November, and
the fleet came to standby with instructions to avoid creating the impression of an
aggressive posture, as directed by the Government. Harbour defence measures
were advanced and the Pakistan Navy took over control of all merchant shipping.
Sea traffic from the west was diverted to a safe route.

"A critical element in the war at sea was the correct and timely deployment of the
submarines. As tensions with India continued unabated, hostilities were
inevitable. The Navy ordered the submarines to slip out of harbour quietly on
various dates between 14 and 22 November. They were allocated patrol areas
covering the west coast of India while GHAZI was despatched to the Bay of
Bengal with the primary objective of locating the Indian aircraft carrier, INS
VIKRANT, which was reported to be operating in that area. Interdiction of
merchant shipping was, however, not permitted due to lack of Government
approval for this form of warfare. It may be mentioned that the Indians suffered
no such inhibitions.

"On 27 November, NHQ instructed FOFPAK (Rear Admiral MAK Lodi) to

supplement the patrol undertaken by the minesweepers. The minesweepers were
employed on an inner patrol and destroyers on an outer patrol. The object of the
outer and inner patrols was to provide early warning of an enemy attack
developing towards Karachi and to enable the fleet to make a timely interception.
It was mistakenly thought that a missile attack would be neutralised by the PAF.
At one stage commanding officers of ships of the flotilla expressed the view that
greater emphasis should be placed on the possibility of a missile attack, and the
concept of inner and outer patrols was abandoned. This was subsequently
reinstituted.

"A plan for a counter-offensive in the West was presented to the President of
Pakistan on 30 November, 1971 and the high command decided to initiate
military operations in the West on 3 December 1971. Pre-emptive strikes were
carried out by the PAF at several Indian air bases along the western border and 3
December 1971. NHQ announced the outbreak of the war at 1845 on 3
December.

"The operational orders issued to the submarines confined them to attacks

against warships only and interdiction of merchant ships was not permitted. The
Indian naval units operated with no such inhibition; they attacked and captured
several merchant vessels. However, the important point was that the submarines
were at their war stations on 3 December when open hostilities started, poised to
attack Indian naval units.

"The PN reconnaissance aircraft sighted a formation of eight enemy ships when

the war had just started; but the naval observer, being unaware of war having
started, made his contact report hours later after landing. Had the Pakistan Navy
been consulted or at least informed in time, this enemy force would have been
destroyed or seriously damaged by our submarines and PAF effort. The outcome
of naval warfare would then have been completely different than just being able
to draw equal blood.

"On 3 December 1971, most of the Pakistan Navy ships were operational. BABUR
and MUHAFIZ were at anchorage. DACCA was at Manora anchorage for a 5 day
maintenance period with dockyard hands on board. SHAHJAHAN, MUJAHID and
MAHMOOD were in harbour preparing for passage to East Pakistan. The only
other operational destroyer in harbour was BADR.

"ALAMGIR was under repairs scheduled to be completed on 15 December, 1971

and TUGHRIL was under refit. Two gun boats from Saudi Arabia, re-named
SADAQAT and RAFAQAT, were at Karachi under the direct operational control of
MHQ.

"KHAIBAR and TIPPU SULTAN were searching for MV Jhelum about 80 miles
south-west of Karachi on a mission to escort her to Karachi. JAHANGIR was on
patrol about 60 miles south of Karachi. She had been tasked to assist KHAIBAR to
locate MV Jhelum and was to resume patrol thereafter. ZULFIQAR was on the
inner patrol 30 miles south of Karachi.

"On the outbreak of hostilities, BADR and SHAHJAHAN were ordered to join
FOFPAK at Gaddani. The minesweepers were sailed and tasked to carry out check
sweeps outside the harbour and maintain a patrol between Cape Monze and
Manora lighthouse. Within a few hours of the outbreak of war, all operational
Pakistan Navy ships had put to sea and were on their war stations as planned:
the surface fleet operating off the Makran coast and the submarines in their
allocated areas off the Indian coast.

"KHAIBAR, with TIPPU SULTAN and JAHANGIR in company, learnt about the
outbreak of hostilities through Radio Pakistan broadcast at 1800, when she was
searching for MV Jhelum which was to be escorted to Karachi. C-in-C's message
regarding outbreak of hostilities was received by these ships about an hour later
at 1905. Three hours later at 2200, this task unit was alerted to the presence of a
force consisting of two merchant ships screened by 8 warships off Diu Head on
the Kathiawar coast (in position 20 50N, 67 23E at 2140 on 3 December) through
a message transmitted to ships at sea by MHQ. The information in this message
was based on an enemy report made by PN S/M HANGOR on patrol in the area.

"The presence and composition of this force had also been confirmed by a
reconnaissance aircraft on the evening of 3 December. An amplifying report
indicated that the force had moved 30 miles southwards by 0332 on 4 December,
although it was reported on a north-westerly course in the initial message. This
tallies

with the movement of Western Indian Fleet which had sailed out of Bombay on 2
December, and subsequently, suspecting detection by our submarines and
reconnaissance aircraft had split and moved south. Probably this was the MYSORE
group, which had been allocated two Osas for a missile attack on Karachi.

"Although this was not the force which launched the first missile attack off
Karachi on 4 December, MHQ's assessment was substantially correct; for the
ships of this force did, in fact, have missile boats in tow to be released for an
attack which had to be postponed from 5 to 8 December.

"After ordering TIPPU SULTAN to release an Indian dhow which had been taken in
tow by her earlier, the OTC increased the speed of the force to 25 knots and at
2345 signalled his intention to join the flotilla. It will be recalled that the last
orders for this unit were for KHAIBAR and TIPPU SULTAN to take MV Jhelum
under escort and for JAHANGIR to resume outer patrol. With the changed
situation, however, the ships expected new orders, but having received none
decided to join the flotilla".

"As has been related in the section on Naval Operations in the Western Naval
Command, two missile attacks took place. The "Story of the Pakistan Navy"
states:

"There followed in the wake of the second missile attack yet another controversial
decision: orders were issued at 1400 on 9 December to ships at Karachi to reduce
their ammunition outfit.

"After the return of the ships to harbour on 8 December, their vulnerability in the
port remained a topic of continuing debate. In the early hours of 9 December,
only a few hours after the missile attack, dockyard workshops and buildings were
severely damaged in a low level attack - facilitated, no doubt, by the light emitted
by the huge flames of the fire at the oil farm - by an IAF bomber. Under these
circumstances anxiety about the catastrophic consequences of an explosion in a
ship fully loaded with ammunition was only natural.

"The decision to reduce the ammunition outfit, not withstanding the logic behind
it, continues to be questioned by many. The adverse effect on morale of men,
who were inclined to see it as a step to limit the surface ships operational role,
was immediate. Not accepted by most as a necessary rational step, the decision
remained a controversional issue.

"It was perhaps in consideration of the morale factor, and to avoid the impression
that the fleet was immobilised, that a strategy of high speed probes was
introduced. This required random sorties of short duration to be carried out at
high speed by designated ships. Destroyers and frigates were employed in this
manner until the end of the war.

"This speaks much for the mettle of officers and men who readily undertook these
operations with enthusiasm, inspite of the knowledge that the ships had no viable
defence against the surface missiles.

"While evaluating the performance of the surface fleet, it must be noted that in
spite of the tremendous advantage, particularly in weapon range, which the
Indian Navy enjoyed, our actual physical losses amounted to only one destroyer
and a minesweeper sunk. This cannot be construed as the destruction of our fleet
which was the Indian objective. The Indian Navy did succeed in gaining initial
advantage through surprise but failed to fully press home its gains. The second
missile attack cannot be called an unqualified success when evaluated against the
strategic objective of destruction of the Pakistan Navy Fleet. The shock effect
created by the missile attacks was more significant and it was aggravated by the
thought that we would not have air support.

"As far as the Pakistan Fleet is concerned, the psychological impact was far
greater than that warranted by physical losses. Though the surface force
managed to survive, it failed to retain its threat and deterrent value as a Fleet-in-
Being. The obsolescence of its weapons apart, lack of adequate air support
inhibited the success of its operations. It must also be a admitted that our
surveillance capability and command and control facilities were far from
satisfactory. The neglect of the Navy over several decades came through clearly
in the 1971 war."

PAKISTAN SUBMARINE DEPLOYMENT

In Dec 71, the Pakistan Navy had four submarines - the GHAZI on loan from
America since 1964 and three new Daphne class submarines HANGOR, MANGOR
and SHUSHUK acquired in 1970/71.
"Excerpt from Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership"

"With the outmoded surface fleet almost neutralised by the missile threat, the
burden of the Pakistan Navy's entire offensive effort hinged on the small but
effective submarine force.

"The submarines were to be deployed on offensive patrols off the major Indian
ports and other focal areas. Three Daphne submarines were deployed off the
Bombay and Kathiawar coast and the submarine GHAZI was despatched to the
Visakhapatnam Naval Base in the Bay of Bengal. The GHAZI's task was to carry
out offensive mine-laying against Visakhapatnam and the other three submarines
had to attack Indian warships when ordered."

Excerpt from the " Story of the Pakistan Navy"

"The Navy ordered the submarines to slip out of harbour quietly on various dates
between 14 and 22 November. The Daphnes were allocated patrol areas covering
the west coast of India, while GHAZI was despatched to the Bay of Bengal to
locate VIKRANT.

"The operational orders issued to the submarines confined them to attacks

against warships only and interdiction of merchant ships was not permitted."

On 22 November after the skirmish off Boyra in East Pakistan the previous day,
COMSUB signal DTG 221720 to SUBRON 5 stated:

"Following areas occupied.

1. PAPA ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR.

2. PAPA FIVE, SIX, SEVEN, EIGHT.

3. BRAVO ONE, TWO THREE, FOUR, FIVE, SIX.

4. MIKE".

The occupied areas referred to as PAPA ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR, FIVE, SIX,
SEVEN, EIGHT were the inner and outer patrol areas of ships of the Pakistan
Fleet. The BRAVO areas were off Bombay occupied by MANGRO. Area MIKE was
Madras occupied by GHAZI.

On the evening of 22 November, COMSUBS signal DTG 222117 addressed only to

GHAZI and MANGRO directed them to "Arm all torpedoes."
On 23 November, the day Pakistan declared a national emergency, COMSUBS
signal DTG 231905 to SUBRON 5 directed the submarine squadron to "Assume
Precautionary stage".

On 25 November, COMSUBS signal DTG 252307 addressed only to GHAZI stated

"Occupy Zone Victor with all despatch. Intelligence indicates carrier in port". Zone
VICTOR was off Visakhapatnam.

On 1 December, one Daphne class submarine was seen entering Karachi harbour.
This appears to have been SHUSHUK.

Role of Pakistani Submarines

`The Story of the Pakistan Navy' states :

"Interdiction of merchant shipping was not permitted due to lack of Government

approval for this form of warfare.

The operational orders issued to the submarines confined them to attack against
warships only."

HANGOR's Movements Till 9 December

"HANGOR slipped in the early hours of 22 November 1971 for a patrol off the
Indian Kathiawar coast. On 23 November, when a state of emergency was
declared by Pakistan, HANGOR was off Porbandar close to the Indian cost. On 1
December, she received orders directing her to shift to a patrol area off Bombay
vacated by PNS Submarine Mangro on completion of her patrol.

"HANGOR was on the surface on the night of 2 December when, at 2340, a large
formation of ships was detected on her radar on an easterly bearing about 35
miles away. Such abnormal detection ranges are frequently obtained in this area
in the winter months due to anomalous propagation of radio waves, a
phenomenon which results from the trapping of radio waves in ducts formed due
to temperature inversions in the atmosphere. HANGOR closed this formation to a
range of 26 miles at 0049 on 3 December, when she dived to a depth of 40
metres and tracked the ships on her sonar till the early hours of the morning. A
quick sweep by her radar at periscope depth revealed that the formation
consisted of 6 escorts screening a main body of four ships. This was undoubtedly
the Western Fleet comprising the cruiser INS MYSORE with supporting auxiliaries
and her escorts which had sailed from Bombay on 2 December.

"At this time, though an all out war was raging in East Pakistan, hostilities had
not broken out in the West. HANGOR could not attack these ships as she did not
have clearance to do so. It was not until 0820 on the morning of 4 December that
HANGOR learnt about the outbreak of hostilities through C-in-C's message
received on the submarine broadcast. Frustration and disappointment at missing
their prey by such a narrow margin was great for the Commanding Officer and
the crew. But HANGOR's endeavours were not entirely in vain. Location of the
Indian Fleet at this crucial time was by itself a significant accomplishment. In this
case, however, her vigilance also contributed towards the cancellation of a missile
attack which this force was scheduled to launch at Karachi on the night of 5
December. Suspecting detection by the submarine, the Indian Fleet split and
moved so far south that it was no longer in a position to execute its attack plan.

"HANGOR continued her patrol. Occasionally she closed Bombay harbour and
detected some warships operating in waters too shallow for the submarine to
make an approach and launch its torpedoes. At other times, her limited
submerged speed-the main handicap of conventional submarines-prevented
interception of good targets. The officers and men of HANGOR were not deterred
by these disappointments."

ANALYSIS OF PAKISTANI SUBMARINE DEPLOYMENT

Deployment of GHAZI

GHAZI, having the longest distance to go, sailed from Karachi on 14 November.
She was off Madras on 23 November in Area Mike, until she was ordered on night
25/26 November to occupy Zone Victor off Visakhapatnam, where she sank on
night 3/4 December.

Deployment of Daphne Class Submarines

MANGRO.

MANGRO sailed around 14 December to her patrol area off Bombay. COMSUBS
signal DTG 222117 to "Arm all torpedoes" was addressed only to GHAZI (who was
nearing Madras) and to MANGRO who was off Bombay till 1 December, occupying
the areas referred to as BRAVO ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR, FIVE, SIX in COMSUBS
signal DTG 221720. This area stretched from Diu Head to Dabhol on the west
coast of India. MANGRO vacated her patrol area in end November and returned to
Karachi.

HANGOR

HANGOR sailed in the early hours of 22 November for a patrol off the Indian
Kathiawar coast. On 23 November, when Pakistan declared a state of emergency,
HANGOR was off Porbandar.

On 1 Dec, HANGOR shifted from off Porbandar to the patrol area off Bombay
vacated by MANGRO on completion of its patrol. On the night of 2 December,
HANGOR detected the Indian Fleet and tracked it till the early hours of 3
December. News of the outbreak of hostilities reached HANGOR only on the
morning of 4 December.

From 4 Dec to 8 Dec HANGOR operated in the approaches to Bombay. She found
that Indian warships were operating in waters too shallow for her to approach and
attack. She extended her patrol northwards towards Diu. On five occasions, she
transmitted on HF, which enabled her position to be established.

(a) On 4 December at 1004 in position 271 Dabhol Lt 71.

(b) On 4 December at 1745 in position 285 Khanderi Lt 135.

(c) On 7 December at 1538 in position 265 Khanderi Lt 285.

(d) On 9 December at 1045 in position 239 Diu 59.

(e) On 9 December at 1720 in position 220 Okha 60.

By 8 December her identity as HANGOR had been established. In the early hours
of 9 December, she located KHUKRI and KIRPAN, who had been deployed to
locate and attack her.

HANGOR sank the KHUKRI at 2045 on the evening of 9 December, eighteen miles
southwest of Diu and headed for Karachi. Operation FALCON did not succeed in
crippling her and she reached Karachi on 18 December after the ceasefire.

SHUSHUK.

"The Story of Pakistan Navy" makes no mention of SHUSHUK's deployment.

Intelligence reports after the war indicated that SHUSHUK was initially employed
in the approaches to Karachi but had to be withdrawn for emergency docking to
rectify leaks in the stern glands and defects in her torpedo tubes.

Deployment of Midget Submarines

The naval element of the Special Surface Group which manned the midget
submarines were an elite, rigorously trained group. The offensive capability of the
midget submarine had been seriously depleted as early as 1968 when it was
found that it could not carry a torpedo. That reduced its role to carrying frogmen
to enemy harbours, into depths where larger submarines could not penetrate.

In mid 1971, some SSG personnel had to be deployed to East Pakistan to cope
with the Mukti Bahini. They returned to Karachi only in September. Their absence
lowered the combat readiness of the midgets.

Midget crews had been trained to be towed underwater by GHAZI. For sorties
longer than three days, the relief crew took over on passage and the attack crew
took over just before being detached to attack.

During the 1971 war, midgets could not play any role because GHAZI's role was
changed to minelaying and she was deployed to the Bay of Bengal.

Deployment of Chariots

There is no evidence that the chariots were deployed during the war. Reportedly,
a shortage of spare parts affected their operational readiness.

ASSESSMENT OF PAKISTAN AIR FORCE PERFORMANCE

In his book, Pakistan's "Crisis in Leadership", Maj Gen Fazal Muqueem Khan
analysed the Pakistan Air Force's performance during the 1971 war. His
conclusions were:

(a) The PAF plan was based on the war lasting six months.

(b) The PAF C-in-C's main idea was to conserve the Air Force. The PAF
chose to be on the defensive,both tactically and strategically. It was
committed to defending its air bases only and waiting for the enemy to
come and attack them. This kept the aircraft perpetually busy in air patrols
over the defended air bases.

(c) The PAF defensive strategy relied too heavily on the expectation that the
IAF would carry out mass raids on the PAF air bases and would thus suffer
heavily. Confining the PAF to selected airfields away from the border
decreased the effective strike range of PAF aircraft and increased the
reaction time.

(d) The C-in-C PAF over-centralised his command and allowed little
flexibility to his subordinates. Hardly any action could be taken without
clearance from the C-in-C.
 (e) The PAF deployment in airfields a long distance away from the scene of
action affected the ability of the PAF to intervene effectively in the naval
battles in the South.

(f) In East Pakistan, there was only one squadron of 16 Sabres. Two of
these were lost over Boyra on 22 November. Three were lost on 4
December in the air battles over Dacca. Eleven were immobilised by the
PAF itself on the ground in Dacca, to prevent their falling into enemy hands.

(g) The Indian victory was due as much to their careful and patient
planning as it was to the lack of all this in Pakistan.

Excerpts from "History of the Pakistan Air Force"

This document is conspicuously sparse on information regarding sorties in support

of the Pakistan Navy. The only information of naval relevance is :

(a) In November 1971, No 7 Canberra Squadron based at Mauripur

(Masroor)flew six sorties in support of the Pakistan Navy. These were
armed recce missions in search of hostile naval vessels within 180 miles
south and southwest of Karachi.

(b) In December 1971 on 5 December, the Indian Naval base for missile
boats at Okha was set ablaze; the fire continued for full six days. Okha was
attacked again on 10 Dec.

PAKISTAN NAVY - AIR FORCE COOPERATION

Excerpts from "Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership"

"The PAF was not equipped to support naval operations. Maritime reconnaissance
was only provided by the Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) and civil aviation
aircraft which had been pressed into service after the emergency (i.e. on 23
November 1971). In all, 59 sorties by PIA aircraft and 68 sorties by civil aviation
aircraft were provided during the war. In spite of all their limitations and their
pilots' lack of training for this particular task, these aircraft still performed very
well. One Fokker aircraft was lost during these operations.

"The PAF launched a B-57 mission against the Indian missile boat harbour at
Okha and some harbour installations were set on fire, but this was late in the war
and much after the time when the Navy had asked for it, and none of the missile
boats, already out to sea, was affected. Repeat strikes were also launched on
December 9 and 10 and some other installations and two large oil tanks were set
ablaze. The last strike was carried out by a section of F - 104s, which
sighted an anti-submarine Alize aircraft of the Indian Navy and shot it
down.

"After the Indian air attacks on Karachi, the people wondered why the PAF did not
strike at Bombay harbour. It failed to attack Bombay in retaliation to the Indian
attacks on Karachi's civilian targets. This should have been done even for
psychological reasons, but the PAF missed the opportunity. The excuse for not
doing so was that it had night capability only for a strike at Bombay and was not
convinced of gaining any military advantage there. The Indian announcement of a
PAF strike at Bombay and stories of the damages done there, were, therefore,
surprising.

"The air support which the Navy wanted was never catered for. It was vaguely
promised a few reconnaissance sorties and some close support sorties which were
dependent on availability. It never occurred to the C-in-C Navy to ask for the PAF
plan.

"The Pakistan Air Force flew 27 sorties in support of Pakistan Navy Operations.

"The PAF's performance in 1971 did not come up to public expectation. The C-in-
C, PAF failed to provide imaginative leadership to plan and direct the air effort.
Both strategically and tactically the air force was kept on the defensive. It was
deployed in depth but too thinly. Whereas it could undertake its own defence, it
could not generate offensive effort. When the Indians changed their strategy on
or about December 7, after the first three days, the PAF was not prepared to
change over during the short war to meet the new enemy threat, and remained
helpless. In addition, by too much centralized control, it was kept on the leash all
the time. It operated at only about 50 percent of its war time capability. As for
inter-service cooperation, it had not acquired any maritime support capability and
did not provide any meaningful support to the Navy."

PAKISTAN MARITIME RECONNAISSANCE

"Excerpt from Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership"

"The Navy, in the absence of any shore based radar and maritime reconnaissance
aircraft, was virtually blind. Therefore the services of a civilian radar were
requisitioned and Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) willingly provided a Fokker
Friendship flight to operate reconnaissance flights. The PIA plane had its own
limitations for the purpose it was being used. Its radar was a weather radar and it
had only 7 degree decline which could not see downwards. The civil pilots,
however, did an extremely good job of work without any previous training in this
particular field.

"At about the same time on December 3, when Naval HQ was issuing orders and
instructions, the Fokker flying along the Kathiawar coast - PIA air patrols had
been started on November 30 - reported the sighting of India's Western Fleet
consisting of a cruiser, six destroyers and an oil tanker off the Rann of Kutch
coast. It was operating around its forward base at Okha."

"Excerpts from the Story of Pakistan Navy"

"The PN reconnaissance aircraft sighted a formation of eight enemy ships when

the war had just started, but the naval observer, being unaware of war having
started, made his contact report hours later after landing.

"After the first missile attack, Commodore Hanif took over as DCNS(O) on 5
December and contacted the Air Priority Board which provided a mixed bag of a
dozen aircraft including the Governor of Punjab's Cessna, a plant protection
aircraft, an old DC3 Dakota, some Aero Club Austers and two armed Cessnas. We
also obtained two Fokkers and two Twin Otters fitted with radar. All these aircraft
were lined-up at Karachi civil airport where a "Fleet Air Arm" was set up
immediately. The aircraft were controlled by naval officers positioned at the
airport along with a PAF liaison officer provided by MHQ.

"The aircraft were manned by civilian volunteer crews from PIA and the Flying
Club and maintained by PIA and CAA at Karachi in such an efficient manner that
there was no problem in operating 3 or 4 light aircraft at a time during day in
their respective sectors on an arc 200 miles from Karachi covering the entire area
from Jamnagar to the Makran coast. At night, two radar-fitted aircraft at a time
covered the same arc. Thus, from the afternoon of 5 December, it was difficult for
an Osa to approach within 200 miles of Karachi undetected.

ANALYSIS

Indian Naval ships and submarines reported shadowing aircraft on the following
dates. Available records do not indicate whether all the aircraft made detection
reports.

03 Dec - PM - Western Fleet 210 miles south of Karachi

04 Dec - AM - Western fleet southwest of Okha.

- AM - Submarine KURSURA returning to Bombay after R/V with

KARANJ.
 05 Dec - AM - Trident force withdrawing from Karachi.

- PM - TIR and Trident force refuelling at Mangrol.

06 Dec -PM - RANJIT south of Makran Coast.

07 Dec -AM - TIR, KATCHALL,missile boat group west of Okha.

08 Dec -PM - Western Fleet 75 miles south of Jiwani. Submarine KARANJ off
Karachi. TIR off Saurashtra.

09 Dec - AM - Submarine KARANJ east of Ormara. KIRPAN off Diu.

-PM KHUKRI, KIRPAN off Diu.

10 Dec - PM - Submarine KARANJ south of Ormara.

Naval observers were flown in the PIA Fokker recce aircraft which had been
tasked with locating missile boats :

(a) The naval observer correctly recgnised the Western Fleet on 3 Dec and
correctly reported its alteration of course southward.

(b) The naval observer mistook the ZULFIQAR for a missile boat near Cape
Monze on 6 Dec, which led to ZULFIQAR being attacked by the PAF.

CHAPTER 13

RETROSPECT OF THE 1971 WAR

The foregoing accounts and analyses of the major events of 1971 war have
examined why and how certain operations were successful and other operations
less so. As in all wars, many of the outcomes were not foreseen.

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE ARABIAN SEA

The withdrawal of the Pakistan Fleet into the inner harbour of Karachi on 7/8
December yielded maritime supremacy to the Western Fleet within the first six
days of the war. This withdrawal was exactly the opposite of our expectation that
repeated attacks alternately from Saurashtra and the southwest would provoke
the Pakistan Flotilla to react and join in a gun battle with the Indian Fleet, for
which the latter had so assiduously prepared.
The destruction of the oil tanks at Keamari on 8 December was fortuitious. A
radar homing missile can be expected to home on to any shore installation which,
due to its size, shape, location and other characteristics gives the missile's
homing radar a better radar response than its surroundings. Claims that these
tanks were targeted and hit on 4 December are not substantiated by the Pakistani
records.

The Pakistan Navy knew exactly where the Western Fleet was from 2 December
when it sailed from Bombay till the early hours of 4 December. Submarine
HANGOR was the first to report the Western Fleet's position, course and speed on
the night of 2/3 December. Within hours of HANGOR's report being received in
Karachi on AM 3 December, Pakistani requisitioned civil aircraft were circling the
Western Fleet when the war started on the evening of 3 December. The Western
Fleet's southward diversion on night 3/4 December shook off the shadowers in
the early hours of 4 December. Thereafter the Western Fleet remained
undetected. The Pakistan Navy's account gives no indication that it was
particularly concerned where the Indian Fleet was. All available civilian air
reconnaissance effort was concentrated within 200 miles of the approaches to
Karachi to detect the approach of missile boats.

During the second missile attack on Karachi by the Western Fleet, the only major
Pakistani naval ship which was not inside harbour, the tanker DACCA, was
fortuitously hit. The naval ships inside Karachi harbour found themselves in dire
straits. Their predicament was compounded by the Indian Air Force air attacks on
the 8th evening which fortuitously hit workshops in the Naval Dockyard where the
ships were berthed. In an unprecedented but sensible move, Pakistani warships
were ordered to reduce the ammunition they had on board, so as to minimise the
damage that an explosion might cause if they were hit.

The sinking of the KHUKRI on 9 December and the loss of Alize 203 on 10
December were unforeseen consequences of the fortunes of war. Despite specific
mention of Hunter Killer Operations in his pre war plans, the fact that he limited
the duration of the operation from 8 to 10 December shows that FOCINCWEST
had a very limited aim. He wanted to ensure that the Pakistani submarine D/Fd
off Diu would not interfere with the third missile attack which he planned to
launch on 10 December.

FOCINCWEST, when according approval for the Sonar 170 modification to be

embarked in KHUKRI, could not have foreseen that KHUKRI, in trying to increase
sonar detection range would do so low a speed as to become an easy target for
the submarine's torpedoes.

Similarly it could not have been foreseen that a Pakistani F 104 returning
homewards from an evening raid on Okha would make a chance sighting of Alize
203 and shoot it down with an air to air missile.

It could not have been foreseen that the Pakistan Air Force would be tardy in
responding to the Pakistan Navy's calls for air support on the night of 4/5
December. When however, the PAF did respond, it mistakenly struck a Pakistan
naval ship ZULFIQAR on AM 6 December. This was to have an altogether
unforeseen result. The CNS became apprehensive that an alerted PAF might inflict
similar damage on Western fleet ships who were on their way in to attack Karachi
on the night of 6/7 December. NHQ not only intervened to cancel this attack but
assumed control of separated groups of ships of the Western Fleet and Western
Naval Command by ordering R/V's off Saurashtra to give the Western Fleet a
second missile boat to replace the one which had earlier returned to harbour. Not
only could the R/V not be kept, but the TIR group off Saurashtra reported
Pakistani aircraft overhead on several occasions. When this second missile boat
reported defects necessitating return to harbour, Naval Headquarters restored the
control of operations to FOCINCWEST.

It was not foreseen that Pakistan could not deploy its midget submarines and
chariots in a preemptive attack on the Western Fleet in harbour. Indeed the most
elaborate precautions had been taken against this threat. Post war reports
indicated that whereas the crews had been intensively trained in 1968-69,
thereafter they did not take the midgets and chariots out to sea for long enough
to prove the endurance either of the craft or the crews. Spares problems had also
begun to affect their material state. By 1971, the crews were not confident of
sailing the midgets independantly from Karachi to Bombay.

There were also reports that the Pakistani Navy, on their own, fitted two midgets
with external torpedo tubes for firing Mk 44 torpedoes. During the war, these
midgets were deployed 30 miles from Karachi. When one of them tried to fire
against an Indian ship, the fire control system did not work.

An East Bengal sailor, who had been trained on the midgets and chariots and who
deserted the Pakistan Navy joined the Mukti Bahini Naval Commandos in mid
1971. He informed that their prime objective was to put a huge limpet mine
under the VIKRANT.

It was not foreseen that Pakistan submarines would be prohibited from attacking
Indian merchant ships.

On the other hand, several outcomes were foreseen and came to pass.

FOCWEF had foreseen that in an encounter with a Pakistan Daphne Class

submarine, surface warships would be worsted. The sinking of KHUKRI on 9
December, the failure to sink the HANGOR in the intensive anti submarine
Operation FALCON from 10 to 13 December and the consistent lack of debris after
innumerable anti submarine attacks by diverse ships, all reiterated the basic
reality that underwater operations in the Arabian Sea favour the submarine.

It was foreseen that Pakistani merchant ships had to be apprehended in the early
days of the war. Only the PASNI could be seized on 4 December. The MAQBOOL
BAKSH escaped despite being sighted by our reconnaissance aircraft. The seizure
of MADHUMATI south of Jiwani on 8 December was fortuitious.

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE BAY OF BENGAL

It could not have been foreseen that the greatest single threat to VIKRANT, the
submarine GHAZI, would sink outside Visakhapatnam at the commencement of
the war. Had this not occurred, the entire pattern of the Eastern Fleet's
operations would have been different. It would not have been possible to stop
ships at sea for refuelling and transferring stores and personnel, troops and
vehicles whenever convenient. Nor would it have been permissible for the Fleet to
break wireless silence every few hours to make long sitreps to FOCINCEAST and
NHQ.

On the other hand, it was correctly foreseen that after the Air Force had struck
Chittagong and Dacca airfields, the Pakistan Air Force Sabre squadron in East
Pakistan would cease to pose any air threat to the VIKRANT or to offer any
opposition to VIKRANT's air strikes.

It was correctly foreseen that by themselves the ships of the Eastern Fleet were
too few and too slow to enforce contraband control and that help would be
needed from VIKRANT's aircraft. But the extraordinary extent to which VIKRANT's
aircraft actually

succeeded in assisting ships in contraband control and apprehending merchant

ships, over and above their air strikes against East Pakistan, came to be fully
realised only after the war. A new role had crystallised for an aircraft carrier in
limited war.

It was correctly foreseen that an amphibious landing might be required in East

Pakistan prior to western naval intervention. The inescapable need for secrecy
and the inability to spare the already heavily tasked ships of the Eastern Fleet
precluded any prior training for a landing. The ENTERPRISE Task Group came
through the Malacca Straits on the afternoon of 14 December and the forces in
East Pakistan surrendered on the afternoon of 16 December. A successful landing
on the morning of 15 December would still have been timely.

However, it could not have been foreseen that the LST's would beach over an
hour later than scheduled and thereby get seriously affected by the cross currents
of a changing tide and sea and swell.
 SUBMARINE ATTACKS ON MERCHANT SHIPS AT SEA

In the 1971 war, the policy regarding attacks on merchant shipping proved to be
quite complex.

PAKISTAN NAVY'S POLICY ON ATTACKING MERCHANT SHIPS

"The Story of the Pakistan Navy" states:

"The operational orders issued to submarines confined them to attacks

against warships only and interdiction of merchant ships was not permitted.

"The Indian Navy made no effort at maintaining even a semblance of legal

propriety, by declaration of a blockade or a war zone before embarking on a
callous slaughter of merchantmen and their crew by those who claim to
have taken up arms to champion the cause of the oppressed. For it was well
known to the Indians that missiles hurled blindly at ships at Manora
anchorage were bound to take a toll of neutral merchant ships."

INDIAN NAVY'S POLICY ON ATTACKING MERCHANT SHIPS

There were two basic problems to be resolved:

(a) Clearly neutral ships were not to be attacked. But what was one to do
when a Pakistan merchant ship changed identity and masqueraded as a
neutral merchant ship - as MADHUMATI did in the Arabian Sea and ANWAR
BAKSH did in the Bay of Bengal? The only way out was to put the onus for
positive identification on the attacker.

(b) How was a submarine expected to positively identify a warship or a

merchant ship before attack? The Pakistan Navy solved its problem by
restricting its submarines to only attacking Indian warships. The Indian
Navy directed its submarines to attack only positively identified Pakistani
merchant ship and warships. No encounter occurred between Pakistani
warships and KARANJ in the Arabian Sea or with KHANDERI in the Bay of
Bengal. As regards Pakistani merchant ships, the only way a submarine
could positively identify a merchantman by day was to surface and board.
This was unrealistic. By night, it was even more unrealistic to expect a
submarine to effect positive identification. In the event, the Indian
submarines did not carry out a single attack.
Giving submarines carte blanche to fire torpedoes would only have been
legitimate if unrestricted submarine warfare had been resorted to - as between
Germany and Britain in the Second World War. Neither India nor Pakistan had any
such intention. With the large number of neutral ships plying the Arabian Sea,
unrestricted submarine warfare would have had the most serious international
repercussions.

INADVERTENT DAMAGE TO NEUTRAL SHIPS IN HARBOUR

An American merchant ship, SS BUCKEYE STATE was off Chittagong harbour at

the time that Chittagong installations were under attack by VIKRANT's aircraft.
She reported that she had been strafed whilst she was in international waters.
The American Government lodged a protest. Naval Headquarters was able to
prove that the ship was close to a Pakistani merchant ship which was being
attacked and may have suffered inadvertent damage.

A useful insight on the American thought process which led to the American
protest regarding the BUCKEYE STATE can be had from the following excerpts of
the Minutes of the Washington Special Action Group:

(a) 6 Dec 71. "Dr Kissinger asked about a legal position concerning the
current Indian naval blockade. Mr Sisco stated that we have protested both
incidents in which American ships have been involved. However no formal
proclamation apparently has been made in terms of a declaration of war,
that it is still essentially an undeclared war, with the Indians claiming power
to exercise their rights of belligerency. The State Department would
however prepare a paper on the legal aspects of the issue. Ambassador
Johnson said that so far as he was concerned, the Indians had no legal
position to assert a blockade. Dr Kissinger asked that a draft protest be
drawn up. If we considered it illegal, we will make a formal diplomatic
protest."

(b) 8 Dec 71 "Turning to the question of blockade, Ambassador Johnson

said that both India and Pakistan have taken blockade action, even though
the Pak blockade is essentially a paper blockade. Dr Kissinger said that we
should also protest to the Paks. Ambassador Johnson indicated we do not
have a legal case to protest the blockade. The belligerent nations have a
right to blockade when a state of war exists. We may think it unwise and
we may question how it is carried out. We have, in fact, normally expressed
our concern. On the other hand, we have no problem in protesting the
incident of the SS BUCKEYE STATE which had been strafed in a Pakistani
port."
The unambiguous provisions of international law regarding blockade, contraband
control and attacks on merchant ships make it clear that our submarines will
continue to be deprived of the freedom of unrestricted attack on merchant
shipping.

Even when a war zone is declared, as was done by Britain in the Falklands War of
1982, the British Navy's sinking of the Argentinean cruiser BELGRANO outside of
this war zone invited opprobrium even though BELGRANO, being a warship, was a
legitimate target.

A different kind of precedent was set in the Persian Gulf in the Iran - Iraq war of
the mid 1980's. Iraq declared a war zone and freely fired missiles at all tankers
going to or suspected to be going to Iranian ports. In retaliation, Iran responded
by firing missiles at tankers seen to be heading for Iraqi ports. In both cases,
tankers of all nationalities were hit.

In retrospect, a striking contrast can be discerned between trade warfare in the

1965 war and the 1971 war:

(a) In 1965, the Indian Fleet, prohibited from taking offensive action, could
do nothing to prevent merchant ships STEEL VENDOR and STEEL
PROTECTOR from going to Karachi. The Chief of the Naval Staff was
constrained to state:

"When naval officers generally and senior ones in particular, who

ought to know better, talk glibly of blockade, contraband control,
seizing enemy merchant ships and attacking enemy warships at sea
and their ports without a proper and formal declaration of war, one
wonders whether they realise that any such action on the high seas
without the declaration of war is liable to be branded as piracy,
especially if any neutral ships become involved."

(b) In 1971, the second missile attack inadvertently damaged merchant

ships. When diplomatic protests were received, NHQ issued an IG:

DTG 102101

FROM : NHQ

TO : 254 IG

"IN ORDER THAT NO NEUTRAL SHIPS ARE DAMAGED INADVERTENTLY

DURING NAVAL OPERATIONS AGAINST PAKISTAN'S MILITARY TARGETS IN
WEST PAKISTAN PORTS AND TERRITORIAL WATERS, OPERATIONS WILL BE
SO CONDUCTED BY THE INDIAN NAVY THAT NEUTRAL SHIPS MAY LEAVE
THE PORT OF KARACHI BY 1800 HOURS ON 12 DEC."
In 1971, there was near unanimity between the Chief of the Naval Staff, the
Commanders in Chief and the Fleet Commanders that offensive action alone
would carry the day. And so it transpired. Diplomatic protests were handled by
directives to the Fleets to be careful and by genuine expressions of regret. By
then, the war at sea had been won.

If one takes an overview of the Navy's successful operations in the 1971 war, the
following stand out:

(a) In the West, the missile attacks on Karachi achieved maritime

supremacy and the Fleet remained "in being." The Pakistan Navy's surface
threat was bottled up. The air threat did not materialize. The submarine
threat proved its deadliness; the midget submarines and chariots were not
seen

(b) In the East, VIKRANT's air superiority over the sea achieved maritime
supremacy and the Eastern Fleet remained "in being." The Pakistan Navy
had not deployed any major units in the East, so there was no surface
threat. The GHAZI's sinking removed the sub surface threat. The Indian Air
Force strikes grounded the Pakistan air threat.

(c) In the South, the few ships keeping vigil on inter-wing Pakistani traffic
helped capture one Pakistani merchant ship and alert NHQ on the
movement of western naval ships.

(d) Given the density of neutral shipping and the imprudence of mistakenly
attacking innocent merchant ships in what was already an internationally
sensitive political situation, there was no option but to insist that
submarines positively identify targets as enemy vessels. On the one hand,
positively identified enemy warships were legitimate targets for submarines
to attack but they were not to be found at sea. On the other hand,
positively identified enemy merchant ships could only be apprehended if
submarines had boarding parties, for which submarine do not have space.
Under international law, enemy merchant ships could only be sunk after all
crew and passengers had been removed to a place of safety - submarines
have no space to accommodate merchant ship crews. For all practical
purposes the submarines remained a force in being. It remains in the realm
of speculation whether the declaration of war zones could have sidestepped
the stipulations of international law.

(e) The Navy achieved what it did despite the considerable limitations
described in the section on "Events Prior to the War" and despite the
material state of ships before and during the war being so poor.

Lest the lay reader feel that the war was won just by the missile boats and the
VIKRANT, it is essential to remember that both these elements were entirely
supported by ships, submarines and aircraft in all three dimensions of naval
warfare - on the sea, below the sea and above the sea.

Afterword

There were many significant spinoffs after the 1971 war. Within India, for the first
time since independence, there was public jubilation at the Navy's startling
contribution to victory. There was the Government's realisation of the
effectiveness of seapower. Both of these dispelled the doubts about the
"relevance of a Navy for a peace - loving country like India which had no vital
interests overseas". The maritime world accepted India's naval predominance in
the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal.

Within the Navy, there was an upsurge of self confidence to overcome problems.
In its wake, there followed a remarkable synergy of events. The success of the
Leander frigate programme. The admiration of Russian and Western navies for
the Indian Navy's professionalism and innovativeness. The remarkable interaction
which helped in integrating the latest weapon systems from Russian, Western and
indigenous sources into Indian hulls. All these combined to propel the Indian Navy
upwards to the seventh rank in the world's navies.
 CHAPTER14

NAVAL ASSISTANCE TO BANGLADESH AFTER THE 1971 WAR

PREAMBLE

Before the war started, the Mukti Bahini had laid mines across the
entrance to the Pussur river. Three merchant ships and a Pakistani
gunboat had sunk or run aground as a result of mine explosions. Shipping
traffic to the river ports of Mangla/Chalna and Khulna came to a stop.

Prior to surrendering, the Pakistan Navy had laid a large minefield in the
approach to Chittagong harbour and shipping traffic ceased.

During the war, air attacks by Indian naval aircraft operating from the
aircraft carrier VIKRANT had sunk several ships and damaged several
facilities in the Mongla/Chalna port complex and in Chittagong port.

By 16 December, when Pakistani forces surrendered at Dacca, all shipping

activity in East Pakistan had ceased.

To help restore maritime activity in Bangladesh as early as possible, Naval

Headquarters established Naval Advisory Groups (NAGs) to work in close
collaboration with Army Eastern Command and the Civil Affairs Group
established by Army Headquarters in Bangladesh. Their tasks were:

(a) Re-opening of Bangladesh ports for resumption of sea borne

traffic.

(b) Taking control of erstwhile Pakistani naval craft, units and

installations in the area with a view to getting them operational as
early as possible.

(c) Minesweeping and mine clearance.

(d) Clearance of wrecks in harbours, restoration of navigational aids

and rehabilitation of port facilities.

NAGs were positioned in Khulna and in Chittagong under the overall

control of the Commodore in Charge of NAGs (COMNAG) in Dacca. A total
of 34 officers and 410 sailors were deployed :

(a) COM NAG Dacca had 11 officers and 100 sailors.

(b) NAG Chittagong had 13 officers and 210 sailors.

 (c) NAG Khulna had 10 officers and 100 sailors.

REOPENING THE PORT OF CHITTAGONG

Immediately after the surrender on 16 December 1971, the Flag Officer

Commanding Eastern Fleet took charge of the activities to reactivate the
port of Chittagong. By 3 January 1972, a swept channel had been
established skirting the minefield and basic port facilities had been
restored. The enormous effort involved in this achievement can be
glimpsed from the sequence of events.

Establishing a Swept Channel

(a) Interrogation of the prisoners of war revealed that the Pakistan

Navy, using coastal craft, had laid about 94 moored contact type
mines in an area of 450 square miles (30 miles long by 15 miles
wide). During laying, one mine had exploded and sunk the coaster
involved in laying it. The perimeter of the minefield having been
broadly established, a channel was marked by 23 December
through which ships up to a draft of 14 feet could skirt the minefield
and enter Chittagong port at high water.

(b) On 23 and 24 December, Alize aircraft from the aircraft carrier

VIKRANT bombed the minefield to explode as many mines as
possible.

(c) Since minesweepers were not likely to be available immediately,

intensive efforts commenced to locate trawlers and coasters and
their crews (who had fled to their villages) so as to press them into
service for improvised minesweeping. By 27 December, four
trawlers had been selected and smaller boats had been earmarked
to mark the swept channel till suitable marker buoys could be
found. From 28 December onwards, trawlers and coasters started
wire sweeping for mines.

(d) By 2 January, a deeper safe channel, marked by channel buoys,

had been established for ships up to 21 feet draft.

Restoring Port Facilities

By 3 January, the state of Chittagong port was as follows:

(a) Of the total of 28 cranes, 26 cranes had been made operational.

 (b) The 125 ton floating crane had been made functional.

(c) Of the total of 17 jetties, ten had been made fully usable and
wrecks were being removed from four more usable jetties to the
three old, unusable jetties.

(d) Water supply had been restored to 3 out of 7 jetties.

(e) All coastal navigational aids, and such aids as existed in the
Karnaphuli River in mid November 1971, had been restored.

(f) Coastal traffic carrying oil and essential food supplies from
Chittagong to inland ports had been restored and fishing boats were
proceeding to sea again.

(g) Chittagong Port Commercial Radio had been manned and

reoriented to maritime use.

REOPENING THE PUSSUR RIVER PORTS

Khulna

After visiting the ports of Khulna and the Mongla/Chalna complex, the
Officer-in-Charge NAG Khulna reported that:

(a) The jetties and warehouses at Khulna had suffered only

negligible damage.

(b) Ships at Mongla had suffered considerable damage during the

Navy's air attacks. The pilot vessel and mooring vessel had been
damaged and were non operational. Of the six heavily damaged and
abandoned ships in port, four were Pakistani (OCEAN ENTERPRISE,
MUSTALI, MAKRAN and SHAPTA DINGA), one was Danish (NEDE
COLE) and one Greek, (MASTRO STELIOS).

(c) The clearance of wrecks was beyond the Indian Navy's

capability. A United Nations agency had already approached the
Bangladesh Government to undertake this task.

With the assistance of the NAG, the port of Khulna was declared open on
7 January and the first ship entered on 17 January. The NAG Khulna was
withdrawn on 20 January 1972.
Minesweeping the Entrance to the Pussur River

The Indian Navy's minesweepers CANNANORE and BULSAR sailed from

Visakhapatnam on 16 January 1972 and arrived at the entrance to the
Pussur River on 18 January. Minesweeping commenced the same night
and completed by the evening of 21 January. The minesweepers then
sailed for Chittagong to commence minesweeping there.

Lt (later Rear Admiral) A Tewari was the Commanding Officer of BULSAR.

He recalls:

"Immediately after the surrender, Indian Naval minesweepers were

ordered to proceed to Bangladesh to clear mines. The ships involved
in this operation were CANNANORE, a coastal minesweeper, and
BULSAR, an inshore minesweeper. They were later joined by
another inshore minesweeper, BHATKAL.

"We had been on our toes since August 1971 and the wear and tear
was showing on men and machinery - both needed rest. But with
the latest orders, that had to wait as a lot of preparations had to be
done to get ready for operational minesweeping. The Navy's 18th
Minesweeping Squadron comprised four coastal and four inshore
minesweepers. The two best ships finally selected were BULSAR and
CANNANORE. The Senior Officer of the 18th Minesweeping
Squadron, M 18, was embarked in CANNANORE.

"CANNANORE and BULSAR anchored off the Pussur River entrance

at 0400 on 18 January 1972.

"M 18 was of the view that it was too risky for CANNANORE to
sweep and therefore BULSAR had to carry out the actual
minesweeping by itself. The best M 18 was prepared to do was to
standby to render assistance from his anchorage position nearly
four miles away.

"So off we went with our biggest ensign and commissioning pennant
to commence sweeping at 0500 hrs, just one hour after arrival at
the Pussur river.

"When the ship made its first pass over the minefield, we were
expecting the mines to explode at any moment - nobody really
believed that the degaussing done at Cochin was effective. Either it
was that or the mines were no longer active. At that moment
neither mattered as we were already committed. The ship crossed
the "Danger" line with our hearts beating in resonance with the
propellers. We were still afloat and moving! The mine-hit wrecks
were now behind us on the port quarter as a reminder of what lay
below. With this baptism, the ship's company soon got down to the
 business of serious minesweeping. We completed seven runs that
day and on completion secured alongside CANNANORE at 2200 to
take water and then anchor for the night.

"Only those who have served in minesweepers can really

understand the difficulties of minesweeping and how tedious, hard
and demanding it can be. Handling the heavy sweep gear, cables,
floats and wires requires seamanship and professional competence
of the highest order. With the limited complement, all hands have
to contribute their mite - there is no exception to this rule. There
are no watches, no special duty men and no time for rest. An
engineering mechanic comes out of the engine room, joins hands
with the seamen in pulling the wires and cables as the sweeps are
streamed and recovered and then goes back to the engine room
freshened. There are no breaks for meals and the work goes on
uninterrupted and takes priority over everything else.

"This routine was maintained continuously for four days, starting

from 0400 till 2400 hours each day and ended with almost every
one exhausted and dog-tired after being on deck for 20 hours at a
stretch, followed by less than 4 hours of sleep.

"Carrying out magnetic sweeping involved streaming a 250 to 300

meter long and heavy cable behind the ship alongwith associated
floats, kites and depressors. Normally this sweep should be
streamed in waters where depths are in excess of 10 fathoms (18
meters). The mines had however been laid in about 4 to 5 fathoms
(9 meters) of water. This caused considerable problems because the
cable was found to be dragging on the bottom of the sea especially
during turns, which resulted in it getting cut. It, therefore, had to
be repaired repeatedly in order to improve its insulation.

"As compared to an inshore minesweeper, a coastal minesweeper

like CANNANORE was better suited for shallow water tasks because
of her higher superstructure, which enabled lessor sag when towing
the cable. There were therefore, no technical limitations in the
participation of CANNANORE if she had so desired.

"The minesweeping task at Pussur river was unique because no

Indian Naval ship had ever done operational sweeping of influence
mines in the past."

SWEEPING THE MINEFIELD AT CHITTAGONG

CANNANORE and BULSAR arrived at Chittagong on 25 January. They were
joined by inshore minesweeper BHATKAL on 27 January.

Minesweeping commenced on 25 January. A number of mines were cut.

Initially a shallow channel was swept to allow ships of 24 foot draft to
enter Chittagong. This channel was marked with buoys. By 12 February, a
deep draft channel, one mile wide and 26 miles long had been
established.

DAMAGE CAUSED BY DRIFTING MINES AFTER THEY HAD BEEN

SWEPT

The Hague Convention requires that on being cut or on coming adrift,

mines should render themselves safe. It soon became evident that the
mines laid in Chittagong did not comply with this requirement.

The drifting mines were seen to be behaving in a random and

unpredictable manner:

(a) They were found to drag with the tidal stream, shifting their
position while still underwater, thus requiring periodical check
sweeps of the areas which had already been cleared.

(b) While some of the cut mines rose to the surface, others tended
to remain below and drift underwater. As the mines were small,
even on the surface, it was very difficult to see them.

In effect, once they were cut, these drifting mines became a danger to
ships transiting the area.

On 5 February, the Shipping Corporation of India's ship MV VISHWA

KUSUM was struck by a drifting mine. She flooded and ran aground. She
was refloated and brought to off Chittagong by 12 February, where,
however, she sank on 13 February.

On 11 February, the tanker ESSO ARK was struck by a drifting mine

whilst alongside. She broke into two and sank.

On 13 February, inshore minesweeper BULSAR was hit by a submerged

drifting mine. Both propellers were damaged. Fortunately, the mine did
not explode on contact but surfaced. It was promptly sunk by gunfire.
BULSAR had to be towed by DARSHAK to Calcutta on 27 February to
effect repairs.
The Commanding Officer INS BULSAR, Lt (later Rear Admiral) Tewari
recalls the minesweeping operation off Chittagong:

"Based on the intelligence obtained from the interrogation of the

Pakistani naval officers and the masters of the Bangladeshi coastal
vessels which had been employed for laying the mines, we were
able to make a fairly reasonable assessment of the location of the
minefields, the lines along which they were laid and the likely depth
to which they were placed. Based on our assessment of the
situation, the following decisions were taken:-

- An area of 25 miles by 13 miles was taken as the "Danger"

area. A swept channel of 25 miles had to be established
through this.

- Out of this, another area of 9 miles by 13 miles was the

"hard core" area confirmed to be having mines.

- 15 danbuoys were to be laid at a distance of 1.5 miles apart.

- The danbuoys were to be laid on bearing 185 degrees - 005

degree through the deepest water to allow deep draft vessels
to approach Chittagong port.

- The Bangladesh gunboat SAHAYAK was to lay danbuoys

through the "hard core" area, as her draft was 4 feet.

- BULSAR was to standby to rescue the Bangladesh gunboat if

struck by a mine.

- BULSAR had to lay the first six danbuoys, through the "soft
core" area and the later ones beyond the "hard core" area.

"We also knew that the mines had been laid by the Pakistan Navy in
a hurry just before surrender and therefore they may not have had
adequate time to prepare the mines and arm them properly. The
chances of encountering dud mines were therefore a possibility, but
this could not be pre-judged at that juncture. Based on M 18's
advice, BULSAR was once again nominated for the task. Once again,
M-18 kept CANNANORE well clear of any involvement, except for
behind the scene activities.

"The laying of danbuoys for a minesweeping operation is a very

precise evolution and a number of factors have to be kept in mind.
Foremost amongst them is that each danbuoy should be anchored
firmly at the bottom, to prevent it from drifting, especially off
Chittagong where the currents were known to be up to 5 knots. The
next important factor was that they should be laid in the exact
positions given in the chart, because they were to be the datum for
all further minesweeping tasks.

"On the first day, the danbuoy laying task went as per plan. The
first five danbuoys were laid by BULSAR in the "soft core" area, with
the Bangladesh gun boat SAHAYAK following behind. When
SAHAYAK's turn came to lay the danbuoys through the "hard core"
area, she turned around and headed back to Chittagong as fast as
her engines could take her! In the process of doing this and
probably by design, her Captain decided that it was safer to be a
derelict than an underwater wreck. She ran aground at the entrance
of the Karnaphuli River. That ended the first and the only
contribution of the emerging Bangladesh Navy.

"As a consequence to this unexpected turn of events, I realised that

there was no alternative but for BULSAR to complete the job, as
CANNANORE was unlikely to do so under any circumstances.
Intuitively, she had also developed a defect in her diesel
generators. Realising the gravity of the situation and the fact that
the work had to go on, I volunteered even before being asked, to
continue laying the remaining danbuoys through the "hard core"
area and beyond.

"Since it was unlikely that a ship of BULSAR's size could have

survived a mine explosion, the ship's company was briefed in detail
about the risks and the safety precautions required. To minimise
injury, all personnel were told to remain on the upper deck.

"By now, BHATKAL had joined CANNANORE and BULSAR at

Chittagong and was deputed to keep an eye on BULSAR. This she
did very faithfully even through the "hard core" area, although her
orders were to wait outside the area and remain in communication.
The Commanding Officer BHATKAL's reason for doing so was simple
- "We are sister ships, wherever BULSAR goes, I too will go.

"Till now, the laying of danbuoys had progressed smoothly and as

per schedule. The last group of danbuoys was finally laid on the
third day but on this occasion, BHATKAL had not sailed out with
BULSAR. This was the first time that I had a major emergency.
While entering harbour on completion of the task, in the Karnaphuli
river, my port diesel generator (DG) exhaust caught fire due to
under loading and the smoke spread quickly in the entire Engine
Room. There was a danger that the reserve fuel tank, located just
below the DG, might catch fire. The engines had to be stopped and
fuel shut off to fight the fire. As the ship had by now lost way, the
only anchor available in the ship was let go to hold the ship in the
channel.
 "The Karnaphuli river is well known for its very strong ebb tide
which sometimes reaches speeds of 10 to 12 knots. On that
particular day, it must have been around 5 to 6 knots, which was
too strong for BULSAR's weak, non-ferrous chain cable to hold. As
the ship had also gained a certain amount of stern way before the
decision to let go the anchor was taken, the chain cable had even
lesser chance of holding the ship. Thus, on letting go, it ran out and
snapped. I helplessly watched the ship being carried down rapidly.
By some stroke of luck, the ship remained in the centre of the
channel and did not drift towards the shore. In the meantime, the
Chief ERA, appreciating the danger, entered the smoke filled engine
room, stopped the DG and shut its fuel supply. Soon the fire was
also extinguished. In the process of carrying out all this, the Chief
ETA collapsed due to smoke. This act of the Chief ERA allowed us to
start one engine and get underway again. For this act of bravery
and presence of mind, the Chief ERA was later decorated with a Nao
Sena Medal.

"On arrival at the naval jetty we had something to cheer about.

Captain Bawa was fully aware of the importance of the task carried
out by BULSAR. He paid his compliment with this signal.

FROM : NAG CHITTAGONG

TO : BULSAR

NOT ONLY HAVE YOU THE DISTINCTION OF BEING THE FIRST

WARSHIP TO SAIL THROUGH THE MINEFIELD BUT YOU HAVE
ALSO LAID THE FOUNDATION FOR SUBSEQUENT MINE SWEEPING.
WELL DONE.

"It took only one day to repair BULSAR's port DG as neither water
nor foam had been used indiscriminately to put out the fire. The lost
anchor was replaced with an old metallic anchor and chain found in
the former Pakistan naval stores. With no threat from influence
mines, we could safely disregard magnetic discipline. The ship was
made ready for sea again, as we did not want to miss out from the
inaugural minesweeping run.

"BULSAR sailed out of CHittagong on 1 February 1972 to join

CANNANORE and BHATKAL who were waiting for her to commence
the first-ever operational sweeping of contact mines in the history
of the Indian Navy. The inshore minesweepers were positioned on
either side of the danbuoy line. BHATKAL on the west and BULSAR
 on the east of the line. Two runs were made on the first day, which
passed off without any incident.

"Unknown and unnoticed by us was the fact that this time we were
right on target and mines had already been cut. One such mine got
caught in a fishing net. This was taken ashore by an unsuspecting
fisherman, who probably thought it contained some treasure and
tried tinkering with its horns. The mine soon exploded killing 15
persons and burning down 10 huts of that village. This incident was
the last straw that broke M 18's nerves which were already on edge
- he suffered a heart attack. He had to be evacuated back to
Calcutta by Red Cross aircraft. He was brave enough to walk out of
his ship on his own two legs.

"To us now it was amply clear that:

- Mines were definitely there - live and properly laid.

- They did not have much positive buoyancy and therefore,

unlike other buoyant mines, they did not rise to the surface
immediately on being cut. This made them more dangerous,
as they were inconspicuous.

- They were live even after being cut.

"Undaunted by the tragedy, we were on task the next day, this time
with more watchful lookouts and sharpshooters. During our second
run CANNANORE, which was stationed behind BULSAR's swept path,
was the first to sight a mine ahead of us. This was probably cut by
us during the run earlier in the day. It was ahead of my ship and
was fired at by the 20mm Hispano gun and hit after a few attempts.
It slowly sank but did not explode.

FROM : CANNANORE

TO : NAG CHITTAGONG

HAVE CUT ONE MINE MRN I IN POSITION 21 51.4' N, 91 41.5'E.

ALL SHIPS OPENED FIRE. MINE SUNK BY BULSARs 20MM.

"Two days later, 3 more mines were sighted in the same area and
destroyed, two by BHATKAL and one by BULSAR. By now every one
knew his duty, no one had to be told what to do. By 12 February,
we had succeeded in establishing a swept channel 25 miles long and
one mile wide. Our first mission of minesweeping having been
completed, the next mission was to maintain the swept channel free
of mines.
"By this time, we had been operational and away from home port
continuously for about two months. By itself, this was no mean
achievement for a small ship like an inshore minesweeper with little
shore support. But this was not the end of our problems.

"The minesweepers had probably cut many more mines than were
accounted for, some of which were adrift. These mines were small
and had low buoyancy, which made them difficult to locate and
distinguish. NAG Chittagong's problem was that if he promulgated
this fact then it could have led to the stoppage of all shipping, which
we were trying to revive. Before we could make up our minds, the
mine struck its next victim. This was the SCI ship VISHWA KUSUM
which was leaving harbour, when it was not in the channel swept by
the minesweepers.

"CANNANORE, which was at anchorage and 2 to 3 miles away

rushed to the site to help the stricken ship. BULSAR, which was
inside the harbour repairing the main engine megator pump, was
ordered to sail out at night to R/V CANNANORE to bring the
survivors back to Chittagong. BULSAR reached the area at about
0001 hrs and brought the survivors back to the harbour the same
night, as there was no place for them on board either CANNANORE
or BULSAR.

"On interrogation of VISHWA KUSUM's crew, it came to light that

they had indeed seen the mine floating towards them but they had
mistaken it to be a submarine. When the mine exploded, they
thought that they had been attacked by a submarine and
abandoned the ship in a state of panic without attempting any
damage control action, as they anticipated another attack from the
same submarine. Finally, VISHWA KUSUM sank on 13 February
despite all the efforts of the Navy and the SCI to save her.

"On the same day that VISHWA KUSUM sank off Chittagong
harbour, a merchant ship COSMOS PIONEER, reported sighting a
mine while leaving harbour at 3.15 p.m.. I was ordered to sail with
dispatch and destroy the errant mine.

"On plotting the position and the likely drift due to current, I
appreciated that we would be able to reach mine only by sunset and
thus may not be in a position to see a drifting mine. Prudence
dictated that I should sail the next morning since COSMOS PIONEER
had safely sailed out and no other sailing was scheduled until the
next day. Despite this, NAG Chittagong wanted me to search for the
mine and anchor for the night if necessary. We sailed out and by
dusk, the ship was slightly short of the estimated position of the
mine.
 "The entire ship's company was on the upper deck keeping a sharp
look out. All pairs of eyes were needed to see a single drifting mine.
Suddenly, when the ship was in the process of turning and under
helm, there was a loud `thud' and a strong jerk as if something was
pulling the ship back. Due to the list caused by the turn, it appeared
as if the ship was taking in water. The initial panic disappeared
when the ship was found to be on even keel, with a mine rolling
behind the wake. We had struck a moored mine and cut it with our
propellers. It was our good fortune that for some reason this mine
had not exploded. Finding ourselves safe, we wasted no time in
sinking this mine. That ended our minesweeping deployment.

FROM : NAG CHITTAGONG

TO : NHQ

BULSAR HIT A SUBMERGED DRIFTING MINE AT 131740F IN

POSITION 22 07.8 N, 91 40.6 E. MINE DID NOT REPEAT DID NOT
EXPLODE ON CONTACT BUT SURFACED AND SUNK BY GUNFIRE.

SUSPECT DAMAGE TO PROPELLERS OR SHAFTS AS CONSIDERABLE

VIBRATION EXPERIENCED ON RETURN PASSAGE TO HARBOUR.
FURTHER ASSESSMENT AFTER DIVER INSPECTIONS.

HAVE POSTPONED DEPARTURE OF MV HOOGHLY WITH CAPTURED

AMMUNITION SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW MONDAY.

INTEND ADVISING PORT TO SUSPEND TRAFFIC THROUGH

PRESENT CHANNEL AFTER CONSULTATION WITH COMNAG."

"The damage to BULSAR's propellers ended her participation in

minesweeping operations. Soon thereafter, BULSAR was towed by
DARSHAK to Calcutta for repairs in Garden Reach Workshops".

CHECK SWEEPING OF THE SWEPT CHANNEL

The danger posed by drifting mines made it clear that continuous check
sweeps would be necessary to keep the swept channel clear of mines.
Meanwhile, to avoid any Bangladesh suspicions that the Indian Armed
Forces were an "occupying force", the Government of India had directed
that all Indian Armed Forces were to be withdrawn by 25 March 1972.

The Navy had informed the Government that it did not have the capability
either to clear wrecks or to clear the entire minefield at Chittagong. The
Bangladesh Government then requested that Indian minesweepers
continue check sweeps. Concurrently, it sought the Russian Navy's
assistance to clear the wrecks in the rivers of Bangladesh and the
minefield at Chittagong.

Coastal minesweepers KAKINADA and KARWAR arrived at Chittagong on

17 March and started carrying out regular check sweeps of the swept
channel.

Starting early April 1972, a flotilla of Russian ships (naval minesweepers,

salvage ships and their supporting vessels) arrived in Chittagong. By end
May, they had widened the swept channel to 2 miles.

Meanwhile the Indian naval minesweepers who had been carrying out
check sweeps from mid March onwards without a break began to report
major defects. This led to their withdrawal to Calcutta and Visakhapatnam
to effect repairs. M 18 therefore recommended that the responsibility for
carrying out check sweeps be formally taken over by the Russian
minesweeping force.

In May 1972, the Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet, Rear Admiral
(later Vice Admiral) Sarma flew to Chittagong to discuss the coordination
of the Indian and Russian naval minesweeping effort. It was agreed that
in view of the need for Indian minesweepers to undertake long overdue
maintenance and repairs, only one Indian minesweeper was likely to be
available in the foreseeable future. It was agreed that the responsibility
for check minesweeping would be taken over by Russian minesweepers.

Minesweeping operations at Chittagong were suspended in July 72 with

the advent of the monsoons. By then, the swept channel had been
widened to 3 miles and a total of 24 mines had been swept.

In July 1972, Russia and Bangladesh signed a bilateral protocol for

salvage and minesweeping, which envisaged the complete clearance of all
mines off Chittagong by end 1972 and check sweeping till the end of
1973.

When minesweeping operations were resumed in October, Indian

minesweepers had not yet completed maintenance and repair. Moreover
minesweeping operations with the Russian minesweepers had revealed
that it was not possible to marry British origin minesweeping equipment
with the Russian minesweeping equipment. Naval Headquarters therefore
withdrew the remaining minesweeper in November 1972. This brought to
a close the Indian Navy's minesweeping assistance to Bangladesh. The
Russian Navy also withdrew most of its vessels, leaving only two
minesweepers to carry out check sweeping till December 1973.
RETROSPECT

The minesweeping operation off Chittagong was the Indian Navy's first
real encounter with live mines. For nearly twelve months, these small,
over-aged minesweepers operated 2500 miles from their home base in
Bombay and 600 miles from the nearest naval base in Visakhapatnam,
without proper logistic support, in extremely hazardous conditions, in a
port ravaged by war. Both officers and men came through the arduous
experience well and with confidence. The minesweepers however needed
extensive repairs for several months before their operational capability
could be restored.

Of the 94 mines believed to have been laid off Chittagong, 18 mines were
cut by Indian minesweepers and 2 by Russian minesweepers. 6 mines
were washed ashore and destroyed.

DIVING OPERATIONS IN CHITTAGONG

A few hours before the surrender, the Pakistan Navy had reportedly
dumped into the river, Rupees 22 lakhs of coins, a large quantity of
looted gold and silver ornaments and six large trunks of gold taken from
the National Bank. Diving operations at Chittagong were undertaken at
the request of the Bangladesh Navy and the Bangladesh Bank.

Diving operations commenced on 3 July 72 and completed on 24 October

72. To avoid any suspicion of misappropriation, the procedure followed
was:

(a) Diving operations were conducted in the presence of two officers

of the Bangladesh Bank and one officer of the Bangladesh Navy.

(b) The items recovered were handed over to the Bangladesh Bank
representatives in the presence of Bangladesh naval officer after the
necessary supply and receipt vouchers had been signed by the
Bangladesh officials and the Officer in-Charge of the Diving
team/Commanding Officer of the Indian naval ship supporting the
diving operation.

The total recovery was 52.75 tolas of gold, 70.05 kgs of silver and large
quantities of coins.

TRANSFER OF SEAWARD DEFENCE BOATS

At the request of the Bangladesh Navy, Seaward Defence Boats AKSHAY
and AJAY were transferred in April 73 and July 74 and recommissioned as
BNS PADMA and SURMA respectively. Concurrently, Bangladesh naval
personnel started undergoing training in India.

TRANSFER OF CAPTURED PAKISTANI MERCHANT SHIPS TO

BANGLADESH

Of the four Pakistani merchant ships seized in the 1971 war:

(a) On 17 Apr 72, BAQIR was renamed MV HOOGHLY and manned

by the Shipping Corporation of India for transporting troops and
stores from Bangladesh to India. Thereafter, she transported the
Army Garrison to Port Blair. Later in 1972, she was commissioned
as INS ADHAR and used for the transportation of stores and
material between the mainland and the A&N Islands and between
the naval ports. In January 1974, ADHAR was chartered to the
Mogul Line for four years at Rs 75,000 per month and renamed as
LOK ADHAR. She was used for coastal service. On completion of the
charter, LOK ADHAR was disposed of by the Navy.

(b) In June 72, the Government of India decided that ANWAR

BAKSH, MADHUMATI and PASNI would be handed over to the SCI
who would run these ships and pay the Navy an agreed amount.
Later, as a gesture of goodwill, these ships were handed over to
Bangladesh, MADHUMATI and PASNI in April 73 and ANWAR BAKSH
in November 74.

CHAPTER 15

THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITIONS 1972 TO 1975

PREAMBLE

Indo Russian naval interaction between 1972 and 1975 centred on a

number of key issues:

(a) In view of the delay in setting up repair and refit facilities at

Visakhapatnam, how to solve the growing backlog of biennial refits
of submarines and Petyas which had become due from 1970
onwards and for six-yearly refits which would become due from
1973 onwards. Ships and submarines had developed major defects
which needed immediate attention. A stage had been reached when
 the new equipment received for the Training Complex was being
used to replace defective equipment on board ships.

(b) Consequent on the decision, immediately after the 1971 War, to

base some Petyas and submarines at Bombay and some missile
boats at Visakhapatnam, the maintenance and repair facilities at
Bombay and Visakhapatnam had to be augmented.

(c) In the light of the experience gained of operating Russian ships

and submarines in Indian conditions and of their performance in the
1971 War, the acquisition of better ships, submarines and missile
boats with better sensors and longer range weapons.

(d) The acquisition for the Air Arm of maritime reconnaissance

aircraft and, if possible, of vertical-take-off-and land aircraft to
replace VIKRANT's aging Seahawks.

(e) The fitment of surface to surface missiles in existing ships and

coast batteries.

(f) The feasibility of `Design Collaboration' for building future

warships in India.

(g) Finding ways and means to resolve the mounting problems of

spares and Repair Technical Documentation.

(h) Resolving the difficulties being experienced as a result of the

Russian side's restriction that only use of lubricants supplied by
them or of the brand approved by them was permissible during the
guarantee period. In effect, this prohibited use of other available
lubricants of identical specification on occasions when Russian
specified lubricant was not available.

(i) Providing advanced tactical and technical training for officers.

1972

Basing of Russian Acquisitions in Bombay

As soon as the war ended in 1971, the Navy considered it essential that a
certain number of operational Petyas and submarines should always be
available on the West Coast. This would minimise the using up of engine
hours in long transits from coast to coast and make ships and submarines
available for longer periods for operations and training. Some new
acquisition ships would also have to be based on the West Coast as
replacement for the older ships being paid off. The Navy therefore
decided to base in Bombay the five newer Petyas and the four newer
submarines for which the agreement had been signed in 1971. The main
repair facilities however would remain concentrated at Visakhapatnam
and only facilities up to annual refit level would require to be set up at
Bombay.

Requirements Forwarded to the Russian Side in 1972

After the 1971 war, the Navy forwarded a comprehensive list of

requirements to the Russian side. This list included Hunter Killer
submarines, anti submarine aircraft, missile boats, landing ships, guided
missile destroyers, a fleet tanker, aircraft for VIKRANT, torpedo recovery
vessels, minesweepers, solid propellant missiles, anti missile defence
systems, harbour defence systems, training of technical personnel in
Russia and setting up a Design Organisation in India.

ACQUISITION OF IMPROVED MISSILE BOATS

An agreement was signed for the acquisition of a second squadron of

longer range missile boats. These new boats would have better
tropicalisation, extra air conditioning and more powerful engines. They
would also have anti missile gunfire control systems instead of visual
sights as in the earlier boats. An agreement was also signed for the
supply of these systems for retrofitting in the earlier boats.

RUSSIAN TECHNICAL DELEGATION TO INDIA

The Indian delegations to Moscow in 1971 had requested the Russian side
to depute a high level team to India to help resolve major pending
problems. These were:

(a) Ships and submarines were overdue biennial refits. The new
workshop facilities at Visakhapatnam were not expected to be ready
for years. The Visakhapatnam Project needed to be reviewed to
investigate the feasibility of setting up the critical workshops on a
priority basis so that biennial refits of ships and submarines could
commence as early as possible.

(b) Indian technical personnel needed to be trained in Russia to

acquire the expertise to carry out the six-yearly and ten-yearly
overhaul of equipment and machinery. The services of Russian
specialists would also be required to assist in the biennial refits of
the first Petya and submarine in India.

(c) The scope of biennial refits, the necessary technical

documentation and the standard work lists for ships and
submarines, all needed to be known before the first refits were
undertaken in India.
These problems were discussed with the Russian Technical Delegation
which visited India and workable solutions were agreed upon.

Commissioning in 1972

Three Petyas, ARNALA, ANDROTH and ANJADIP commissioned in 1972.

1973

ACQUISITION OF IMPROVED LANDING SHIPS FROM POLAND

Pursuant to Russian advice that landing ships be acquired directly from

the shipbuilders, an agreement was signed with Poland for the supply of
four improved landing ships.

Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft

By 1973, the Indian Navy had evaluated three types of aircraft the French
Atlantic, the British Nimrod and the Russian Beriev 12. The Beriev 12 did
not meet the Navy's requirement. The Atlantic and the Nimrod would
have to be paid for in foreign exchange which was scarce. The Navy had
therefore pressed for the Russian IL 38. The Russian Navy was unable to
spare any because they did not have sufficient aircraft for their own
needs. Production had stopped and a new model was being developed.
The Russian side agreed however to ask their industry of they could
produce a few IL 38s for India.

Six-yearly Refits of Submarines

Due to delays in the Visakhapatnam Dockyard Project, the earliest that

six-yearly submarine refits could be undertaken in India was end 1978.
The existing `interim' facilities were already fully stretched coping with
the annual and biennial refits. The Navy therefore suggested that the
Russian side accept one submarine per year for six-yearly refit in Russia,
with effect from 1975, for the first three submarines. The fourth
submarine could be considered for refit in Visakhapatnam depending on
the progress of setting up refit facilities.

Commissionings in 1973

Two submarines VELA and VAGIR and the Petya ANDAMAN commissioned
in 1973.
 1974

RUSSIAN TECHNICAL DELEGATION TO INDIA

The 1972 Russian Technical Delegation had concluded that if certain

essential facilities could be set up in Visakhapatnam on a priority basis,
the biennial refits of Petyas and submarines could commence in 1974.
Target dates had been agreed for the completion of buildings and the
installation of Russian supplied equipment and indigenous machinery.

By 1973, it had become clear that the target dates could not be met. A
Steering Committee was therefore set up in the Ministry of Defence to
direct and take decisions on the progress of the Visakhapatnam Project.
The revised target dates approved by the Steering Committee showed
that the dry dock, the alongside refitting berth, workshops, services, test
facilities, manpower and know-how were not likely to be ready before
1977.

The six-yearly refit of the first submarine was due in end 1973, beyond
which it would have to be laid up as unsafe for operations. The Navy had
suggested that at least three submarines would need to do their six-
yearly refits in Russia, one per year commencing 1974.

When this had been suggested to the Russian side, they felt that it was
better to expedite the work in Visakhapatnam. The Russian side therefore
sent a Technical Delegation to India to find ways and means to do the
refits in India.

From the outset of the discussions, it became clear that the Technical
Delegation was in the awkward position of:

(a) Not wanting to the six-yearly refits in Russia.

(b) Knowing that in the Visakhapatnam Dockyard, neither buildings

nor equipment were ready to undertake these refits in India.

(c) Nevertheless, trying to find ways and means to do the refits in

India to avoid their going to Russia.

After discussion, the general picture that emerged was that the Russian
side might reluctantly accept only the first submarine for refit in 1975 but
that the refits of the remaining submarines should be done in India.

Meanwhile, in view of the steep increase in the estimated cost of the

Visakhapatnam Project, the Steering Committee decided that the
remaining work should be planned in phases. In the immediate phase,
only those core items were to be provided which were essential for
undertaking the major refits of submarines and Petyas.
ACQUISITION OF NEWER LARGER SHIPS

Since 1972, discussions had been in progress about the acquisition of

larger newer ships. As regard frigates, the Navy preferred that they be
fitted with surface to surface missiles, surface to air missiles, medium and
short range gunfire systems long range sonars, long range anti submarine
rockets and torpedoes and an anti submarine helicopter. At that point in
time, the Russian Navy's frigates were being equipped either for the anti
submarine role or the anti ship role because combining the two roles in
one ship resulted in an unacceptable increase in ship size. The Indian
Navy's reasoning however was that since it could afford only a limited
number of frigates, it was preferable to have multi role frigates. In 1973,
the first APEX Committee approved the Navy's proposals for acquiring
multi role frigates, ocean going rocket boats, minesweepers and anti
submarine aircraft. By then, the Russian side had veered round to the
view that a multi role frigate might be possible. During 1974, discussions
were held to finalise the weapons and systems to be fitted in the new
acquisitions.

IL 38 MR-ASW Aircraft

In 1974, the Russian side intimated that it would be possible to give three
IL 38 MRASW aircraft.

Six-yearly Refit of Submarine in Russia

In end 1974, an agreement was signed for the first submarine KALVARI to
be refitted in Russia.

Commissioning in 1974

Two submarines VAGIR and VAGSHEER and the Petya AMINI

commissioned in 1974. In the same year, the Integrated Type Training
Establishment in Visakhapatnam was commissioned as SATAVAHANA and
the Missile Boat Technical Position in Bombay was commissioned as
TUNIR.

1975

INTER GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT FOR THE NEW ACQUISITIONS

In February 1975, an Inter Governmental Agreement was signed for the
Navy's largest acquisition of Russian ships and aircraft and their
supporting infrastructure. The agreement was for:

- 3 multi-role guided missile frigates frigates with KAMOV anti

submarine helicopters.

- 3 ocean going rocket boats with surface to surface and surface to

air missiles.

- 6 coastal minesweepers.

- 3 IL 38 MRASW aircraft.

- Ammunition and support equipment for all the above acquisitions.

- Technical Positions for each of the new missiles and torpedoes.

- Spares for the submarines.

PROFESSIONAL DELEGATION TO RUSSIA-1975

To minimise the kind of difficulties which had been experienced with the
earlier Russian acquisitions, the Navy had prepared a detailed
questionnaire regarding the new acquisitions and forwarded it to the
Russian side.

The Russian side's answers to this questionnaire provided the basis for
further detailed discussions. A Professional Delegation went to Russia in
mid 1975. Its aim was to obtain detailed information:

(a) On the characteristics, performance data and exploitation of

machinery and equipment of the ships and aircraft being acquired.

(b) For the timely establishment of support facilities for their refits,
maintenance, logistics and training.

(c) On the feasibility of fitting indigenous communication equipment

in the frigates.

(d) On the technical documentation and spares and the time frame
for their supply.

(e) On the content and duration of training courses, availability of

training equipment and simulators.
 (f) On whether the Russian weapons and systems being acquired
could be retrofitted in our older ships or into the frigates being
constructed in India.

The delegations discussions proved extremely useful in the subsequent

management of the new acquisitions.

Missile Coast Battery at Bombay

During 1974, a missile launcher and a fire control system had been
removed from a non operational missile boat and fitted on a rotating
platform cannibalised from an obsolete gun mounting. It was successfully
test fired in 1975. Installation then commenced of a second similar
launcher.

Fitment of Surface to Surface Missile System in TALWAR

In 1975, work commenced on the fitment in TALWAR of surface to surface

missile launchers and a fire control system which had been removed from
a non operational missile boat.

Commissioning in 1975

Three Landing Ships GHORPAD, KESARI and SHARDUL commissioned in

1975. The fourth and last of this class commissioned in January 1976.

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1975

Surface -Eight new improved missile boats arrived in 1976.

Vessels: -The three 800 ton rocket boats arrived between 1976
and 1978.
-The six coastal minesweepers arrived between 1977
and 1980.
-The three guided missile frigates arrived between 1980
and 1983.
Aircraft : -The three IL 38 MR-ASW arrived in 1977.
-The Kamov 25 helicopters arrived with their respective
frigates.
Infrastructure: -The new Naval Dockyard continued to expand till the
1980s.
Visakhapatnam:-The South Dry Dock was completed in 1978.
-The Technical Position for the missile boats based in
Visakhapatnam was commissioned as KALINGA in 1985.
Bombay : The repair facility for missile boat engines was
completed in 1980.
 A RETROSPECT OF THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITION PROGRAMME

Could the Acquisition Have Been Managed Better

In the light of hindsight, there is force in the view that the Russian
acquisition programme between 1965 and 1975 could have been
managed better. There were strong pressures from the Material Branch to
slow down the pace of acquisitions because the shortage of technical
artificers and lack of repair facilities could not keep the acquisitions going.
There were, also, other underlying causes.

To start with, there was the relaxed ambience of the early 1960's into
which the Russian acquisitions were suddenly injected. Until 1966, the
Navy's ships were entirely of British origin. Steam driven machinery and
auxiliaries permitted virtually unlimited usage. Their machinery, weapons,
sensors and other equipment were of almost the same technological
vintage as ships in the British Navy. British naval feedback kept the Navy
up to date with the problems encountered in the fields of operations,
maintenance and logistics. Spares were readily available off the shelf,
often through direct sourcing from the British Navy.

This picture changed after 1966. The vessels of various types procured
from Russia were densely packed with equipment whose maintenance
was governed by hours of usage. The Russian operating - maintenance -
logistic procedures were designed to keep vessels ready for instant
combat. This required strictly regulated usage backed up by an extensive
maintenance infrastructure ashore. The repair and refit cycles were more
closely spaced. All this required timely logistic support.

After the vessels arrived in India, it was found that the procurement of
spares from Russia required strict conformance with an inflexible, time-
consuming process which the Navy was neither used to nor could it
comply with because of the paucity of spare part reference numbers,
difficulties in preparing indents in the Russian language etc.

The submarines, when inducted, required stricter technical monitoring

and stronger logistic support. They had their own unique maintenance
and logistic requirements. Soon thereafter, the thin skinned, high speed
missile boats arrived. They too had a novel support philosophy involving
special to type base support and training complexes for the boats and
their missiles.

In a very short space of time, all the existing maintenance and logistic
facilities came under pressure. The number of items handled by the
Logistics Organisation doubled and the rupee value of material used in the
Naval Dockyard Bombay trebled. Cumulatively, the induction of large
numbers of new types of ships and weapons and the new procedures
requiring intensive usage-hour-based maintenance and instant logistics
strained the prevailing system to its limits.

These stresses and strains were compounded by the inability of the Navy
to perceive that the only way it could overcome the constraints of austere
usage for which the equipment had been designed, was by indenting
substantially more spares than what even the Russian side had
recommended. As a result, the interaction between operational and
technical compulsions, which should have been positive, became
negative.

THE OPERATIONAL COMPULSION

As mentioned earlier, a major compulsion was the need to give sea time
to every officer and sailor by rotating ships crews every year.

From the very outset, the Navy which was used to unrestricted usage of
steam propelled ships blithely ignored the repercussions of not adhering
to the limitations laid down regarding the operating hours of critical
machinery like diesel engines and diesel generators. There is substance in
the Russian view, which was stated to every Indian delegation which
complained about the non availability of critical operational spares, that
the shortage derived more from what, by Russian norms, was "excessive
usage" and "beyond what the equipment was designed to do". The Indian
Navy's dilemma was that it just could not countenance not giving every
officer and sailor sea time. It was a mandatory prerequisite for their next
promotion. The annual compulsion of taking new crews to sea and the
inability to accept that Russian equipment would break down as soon as
its design limits were exceeded led directly to "over exploitation".
Subsequently, rather ironically, the Navy had to accept that time spent in
ships which barely went to sea would have to be treated as sea time.

THE TECHNICAL COMPULSIONS

From the very outset, it was known that:

(a) The new Dockyard at Visakhapatnam would take several years to

come up.

(b) The rudimentary Base Repair Organisation at Visakhapatnam was not,

and could not be, equipped to cope with the day to day maintenance,
annual refit, biennial refit and six yearly refit workload of four
submarines, five Petyas, two landing ships etc.

The only salvation was to concentrate the experience of the officers and
men trained in Russia, utilise the workshop facilities in the submarine
depot ship and avail of the expertise of the Russian guarantee specialists
which came with each new acquisition. In the event, for diverse reasons,
none of these resources were effectively dovetailed. To save on training
costs, the experienced personnel of the first few vessels were sent back to
Russia to commission the subsequent vessels, much to the detriment of
vessels so deprived. The submarine depot ship was deployed to support
the submarines operating from Bombay. Since Bombay did not have the
appropriate shore supply, the depot ship's generators soon ran out of
operating hours. Efforts focussed on getting the depot ship itself back into
shape, so that it could be used to help maintain the Petyas and
submarines. And as regards utilising the services of the Russian
guarantee specialists, the difficulties of interacting in the Russian
language and the fierce pride in "not being technically dependent on the
Russians" constrained meaningful interaction.

RETROSPECT

Despite all these vexatious problems, the transition from British to

Russian acquisitions did manage to succeed, slowly and tortuously to
begin with and eventually beyond everybody's expectations. Indeed,
there is substance in the view that it was in these painful years that the
solid foundations were laid for future interaction. After the initial
resentment at the temerity of Indian crews to decline the weekly political
lectures and the persistent questions of Indian officers and artificers
seeking to know more and more about their equipment, the Russian
Training Centres realised that they were dealing with persons who were
not only intelligent and professional but also diligent and innovative.

This professional respect began to over-arch the complex mindsets and

inhibitions of each side, firstly at the Training Centre level and then at the
Soviet Fleet level, when the Russians saw how confidently and
competently the crews they had trained sailed their vessels back to India,
which none of the previous Navies trained by them had done. On the
Indian side, as soon as the crews commissioned their ships and
submarines, they realised how invaluable the thoroughness of their
Russian training had been.

As mutual respect increased at the local fleet level, it percolated upwards

to Moscow and got reflected in the greater candour, width and depth of
interaction with naval delegations to Moscow.
A remarkable achievement of these high level interactions in Moscow was
that each successive acquisition was an improvement on its predecessor -
the second lot of VELA class submarines were better than the KALVARI
class; the second lot of Petyas were better than the KAMORTA class; the
second lot of extended range missile boats were better than the earlier lot
and the second lot of GHORPAD class LSTs were better than the earlier
GHARIAL class.

Much of the credit for this achievement must go to the tenacity and
dexterity with which successive CNS', VCNS' and COMs pursued the briefs
prepared for them by the eager Commanders in NHQ's professional
directorates. The latter were keeping abreast of the latest developments
in the Western navies via the Leander and Corvette Projects and also of
the latest developments in the Russian Navy via the international naval
compendium known as Jane's Fighting Ships. The Russians realised this
and were good humoured enough to occasionally remark in jest that
"India should acquire one from the West and give it to us and very soon
Russia would give India something better."

A substantial share of the credit for the success of Indo Russian naval
cooperation must go to the State Committee for Foreign Economic
Relations and its much maligned departments - the General Engineering
Department (GED) and the General Technical Department (GTD). Their
enormous patience and tolerance was able to bridge the Indian side's
inability to understand the inertia of the centrally planned, totally
Government owned and controlled, Russian industrial system.

An equally great, if not greater, share of credit must go to the Indian

Ministries of Defence and Finance (Defence). Their agility in negotiations
and the painstaking discussions with their counterparts in the State
Committee for Foreign Economic Relations belies the widespread naval
belief that the Navy was treated like a stepchild. The Navy's incredible
technological leap frog in just ten years after 1965 would not have been
possible without the whole-hearted support of these two institutions.

But the largest share of credit for laying a sound foundation for Indo -
Russian naval cooperation belongs to Admiral Gorshkov. He intervened
adroitly at every impasse. His calibrated release of larger, better and
more modern ships, submarines and aircraft were not only in step with
the larger objectives of Indo - Russian political, economic and defence
cooperation but also in step with his growing confidence that the Indian
Navy would confidently cope with whatever Russia gave. His confidence,
and indeed that of the entire Russian establishment, soared after the
spectacular success of the missile boat attacks on Karachi harbour during
the 1971 war. These attacks not only brought glory to the efficacy of
Russian weapons when properly exploited; they also validated Russian
confidence in Indian professional competence.
It was this confidence and mutual respect which flowered in the years
that followed to produce the elegant guided missile corvettes of the
KHUKRI class and sleek destroyers like DELHI and MYSORE.

In retrospect, despite all the procedural limitations of each side, the

absorption of the Russian acquisitions was as monumental an
achievement as the Leander Programme and the 1971 war.

CHAPTER 16

THE SUBMARINE ARM

DEVELOPMENTS UNTIL 1965

The Navy's very first plan formulated after Independence in 1947

proposed to the Government the acquisition of four submarines. The plan
did not specify in which year of the plan the submarines should be
acquired. This was because of uncertainty in the source of supply and the
difficulties anticipated in starting to operate submarines.

In 1948, due to budgetary constraints, the Navy was asked to recast its
requirements. The Navy's 10 year plan 1948 - 1958 gave lesser priority to
the Submarine Arm because it could not be created by 1958. In 1951,
since large scale naval expansion could not be afforded, the Navy
proposed a ship replacement programme instead of a ship acquisition
programme. Submarines found no mention in this plan.

By 1956, Pakistan had joined CENTO and SEATO and was going to be
given extensive naval assistance by America and Britain. The Navy had to
propose the acquisition of ships to match Pakistan's acquisitions. No
mention was made of submarines.

During all these years, there had been no progress on the acquisition of
submarines. There were several weighty reasons:

(a) Until 1956, the Navy itself was fully stretched, personnelwise
and budgetwise, in remedying the after-effects of the partition of
the Royal Indian Navy. Ships and aircraft were being acquired and
training, repair and logistic facilities were being set up ashore.
 (b) After 1956, the Navy's efforts were primarily focussed on
acquiring ships and aircraft to cope with the increased threat from
Pakistan.

(c) The Navy found it exceedingly difficult to carry conviction, either

in India or in Britain, that the Submarine Arm was a priority
requirement. In the context of a non- violent, peace-loving member
of the British Commonwealth whose over-riding priority was
economic development, nobody was prepared to accept that India
at all needed a patently offensive Submarine Arm.

However, the Navy kept a close watch on the design and development of
post war submarines. France had developed the Daphne class. Holland
had developed the Dolphin class. Britain had first developed the Porpoise
class which had evolved into the Oberon class. The British Navy had
increased the submerged endurance of some of its earlier World War II
submarines by cutting the hull in two and inserting a midships section to
provide an additional propulsion battery compartment. The American
Navy had improved their conventional submarines by giving them
"Greater Underwater Propulsion Power", which came to be known as the
GUPPY conversion.

The Navy also kept a watch on the development of the Submarine Arms
by the Commonwealth Navies. Both the Canadian and Australian Navies
had taken British manned A and T class submarines on loan in which their
personnel received on job training under British submariners. Both
Canada and Australia were awaiting the finalising of the Oberon design
before purchasing them.

By 1956, the feed back from the annual Commonwealth JET exercises
indicated that the arrangements for participating Navies to share anti
submarine exercise time with available British submarines were becoming
inadequate for our ships. Defence Minister KrKrishna Menon wrote to the
First Sea Lord, Admiral Mountbatten in May 1957 for "acquiring a target
submarine service comprising the oldest and cheapest submarines, since
it was not envisaged that India would need to employ them in war". (Roy
Choudhary Page 37)

Because of the British Navy's extended commitments, reduced strength,

procedural difficulties in loaning British naval personnel etc, the loan of a
training submarine did not find favour. The Navy then accepted the British
Navy's suggestion for providing India with increased anti submarine
exercise time in Indian waters.

In 1958, the eight new British frigates of the naval replacement plan
started arriving in India and the second hand British aircraft carrier had
been purchased. The Navy re-started its case for a Submarine Arm.
In his book "Indian Navy's Submarine Arm," Admiral Chatterji states:
(Page 36)

"A paper was submitted to the Government in 1959 for the

acquisition of three operational submarines which would also
naturally be available as target submarines for the anti submarine
ships. Protracted discussions took place with the Government at
various levels over years without much progress.

"The British were adamant in their views that submarines were

sophisticated weapon systems which were difficult to operate, that
the Indian Navy was still too young to venture into the submarine
field, that submarines were accident prone, that the loss of a
submarine at sea would lead to the loss of confidence in the Navy at
Governmental and national level which would gravely impair the
Navy's further development.

"Examples were quoted of the Australian and Canadian Navies

which operated submarines on loan from the British Navy, manned
by British personnel with a few junior officers and sailors as
trainees.

"Having just attained independance, the thought of adding any

warship to the Indian Navy commanded by a British officer and
manned by British sailors was repugnant to Indian sentiments."

The Navy refined its line of argument. It impressed on the Government

that every Navy worth its name had to have submarines. It took several
years to train an officer in the operation of a submarine and give him
sufficient experience to ensure that he would be competent to assume
command of a submarine. The Navy urged that the Government accept
the creation of the Submarine Arm in principle and allow the Navy to
depute a few officers to Britain for training in submarines.

Early in 1962, the Government agreed to the deputation of personnel to

Britain. The training of junior officers was accepted on the premise that
intimate knowledge of submarines would help to increase the efficiency of
our anti submarine ships. Since submarines were still viewed as
"offensive" vessels, the Government made it clear that the approval to
depute officers for submarine training did not in any way commit the
Government to the acquisition of submarines.

Submarine Training With the British Navy

Commodore KS Subra Manian (then Lt Cdr) and later Commanding Officer
of the Navy's first submarine KALVARI, recalls:

"We were trained along with British officers. After classroom

training, we were attached to various British submarines for six
months. During afloat training, we had to qualify practically as
watchkeeping officers in a submarine. I started in HMS Porpoise
then went to other submarines of the Porpoise class. Overall, the
period of training was just under a year".

Captain MN Samant (then Lt Cdr) and later Commanding Officer of the

Navy's third submarine KARANJ, recalls:

"There was no holding back on anything, except for classified

matters such as their latest submarine sonars.

"Trainingwise, it was very much more instructive from the practical

point of view, than later in Russia. In Russia they placed
tremendous emphasis on the theoretical aspect, including the
mathematical basis, but our actual sea time in Russian submarines
was very very low as compared to the British Navy. The British
Navy did not emphasise so much on the mathematical or theoretical
aspects, but they made up for it by giving you 6 months of actual
seatime in submarines. In addition, during our shore training, we
went to sea in submarines almost 40% of the time".

Admiral VS Shekhawat (then Lt) and later Commanding Officer of

submarine KARANJ in the 1971 War, recalls:

"Training started with an intensive three and a half month

theoretical course in which all the technical aspects of submarine
construction, engineering and electrical systems, diving and
surfacing systems, submarine control, ventilation, salt water, fuel,
fresh water, distilled water and other systems were covered.
Practical instructions consisted of visits to old submarines secured
alongside the jetty. There were instructional visits to the works of
the suppliers of submarine batteries and to hyperbaric research
laboratories to understand the effects of sea water pressure and
underwater explosions on the human body.

"The training imparted was of a high order, compressed into a very

short time frame and entailing long hours of study and practical
work. Perhaps it did not go into as much detail as was to be our
subsequent experience with Soviet training, but it was adequate for
the trainees to form crews of British submarines and learn on the
job.
"Our officers deputed to British submarines formed part of their
crews for all practical purposes, kept watch independently, and
gained invaluable experience and self confidence which was to
stand them in good stead indeed when they later commissioned the
Russian submarines.

"The attachments of our personnel was to all the classes of

submarine then operating in the Royal Navy. Thus in a short period
of time, Indian submarine personnel were exposed to several
different types of submarines, with concepts of machinery design
spanning more than twenty five years. This further helped in
widening their perspective and experience.

"Indian officers and sailors, were always welcome as their presence

relieved the strain of constant watch keeping at sea and in harbour.
With our close familiarity with the Royal Navy at that time and the
British origin of our surface ships, equipment, documentation and
administrative set up, it was easy for our people to assimilate and
absorb the training imparted and in general they were treated as
equals, though with some restrictions on security matters.

"Indian personnel were particularly welcome because of their quick

learning and special skills which enabled them to rectify difficult
machinery defects and render the submarine operational. Brought
up as they were in the older Indian ships with inadequate base
support, shortage of spares and tools, the Indian sailor had
developed fine skills in the art of improvisation and in making-do,
allied with native ingenuity. No wonder they were popular on board
with the masses of complex machinery in the highly confined spaces
of the submarines."

Rear Admiral JMS Sodhi (then Lt) recalls:

"Submarine training in Britain was to the point. Even the escape

training was only of three days duration. We used to do six weeks
of sailing, followed by two weeks of rest and recreation. During sea
training, in view of the shortage of RN officers on board, we were
given maximum opportunity to do everything we could. In fact we
got our independent watch keeping at sea very very quickly and to
that extent we learnt a lot. The British Navy officers, being
disinterested, gave us the opportunity to learn as much as we
could.

"Even in their system of assessing officers, they were very free and
frank. When we sailed in HMS Astute, the Captain SM came on
board and told our Commanding Officer, who was aspiring to
become a Commander, "In the next exercise, if you catch the other
submarine, you will become a Commander. Otherwise you will not".
 For nearly 72 hours, we sat on watch on the sonar, trying to locate
the other submarine but unfortunately we were caught by that
submarine. The Captain SM very nicely came to the Wardroom and
said "Sorry, Tim, you have to retire as a Lt Cdr". That was the end
of the story. There was no heartburn".

Utilisation of British Trained Personnel Pending the Acquisition of

Submarines from Russia

To ensure that the batches returning from Britain did not forget what they
had learnt, arrangements were made for officers to be attached to British
submarines during the JET exercise of 1964.

Approval to Commence Negotiations for Acquiring Submarines

After the military reverses in the border war with China in October 1962,
a major defence review was initiated to remedy the inadequacies. This
gave the Navy the opportunity to resubmit its case for the acquisition of
submarines. In addition to the arguments used earlier, it was emphasised
that China possessed submarines, some of which had sufficient range to
operate in the Bay of Bengal. The Navy therefore needed to acquire
submarines, not only for the earlier reasons, but also for employment in
the Hunter-Killer role against Chinese submarines.

The new proposal put up in November 1962 asked for three submarines.
The justification given was that to keep one submarine continuously on
patrol in an area about 1500 miles from India, such as the Malacca
Straits, three submarines would be required: one would be undergoing
repairs or refit or resting the crew, the second in transit to and from the
patrol area and the third actually on patrol.

Vice Admiral BS Soman was the Chief of the Naval Staff in 1963. Writing
in the naval magazine Quarterdeck 1997, he recalled:

"A serious bone of contention with the Government was the

acquisition of submarines. I was convinced that these were crucial
for a balanced force, but Prime Minister Nehru and Admiral
Mountbatten thought otherwise.

"After a lot of discussion, I was allowed to raise the matter with the
Admiralty when I went to Britain in 1963. As expected, they turned
it down - it was clear that the British would only sell us vessels
which conformed to their Commonwealth Indian Ocean Defence
Plan. This was not acceptable to the Navy and I recommended that
 we look elsewhere, suggesting that Russia might be a likely
substitute.

"We found the Russians not only ready to sell, but to accept part of
the payment in rupees. Thus it came about that the Russians got
our custom and remained our major and reliable suppliers over the
years."

During 1963 and 1964, in the expectation of assistance from Britain and
America, there was considerable discussion to crystallise the requirements
for what eventually became the 1964-1969 Defence Plan. As regards
submarines, the Navy had four options before it:

(a) The older British submarines which the Admiralty had earlier
offered. They were already 20 years old. Their remaining life was
too short to make purchase worthwhile.

(b) Older American Fleet class submarines which after

modernisation would have five years operational life. Politically,
however, it was unlikely that America would give submarines to
India.

(c) New British submarines of the Porpoise/Oberon class.

(d) New Russian F class submarines whose specifications were

similar to those of the British Porpoise class and the American Fleet
class. (Note : The Air Force had already turned to Russia in 1962 for
the manufacture of the latest Russian MIG 21 fighter aircraft in
India).

In view of the Navy's lack of familiarity with Russian naval hardware, the
Navy recommended the acquisition of three Porpoise class submarines
from Britain. Government accepted the Navy's recommendations in
principle. Negotiations were started with the British Government for the
acquisition of one second hand Porpoise class submarine to start with.

Discussions with Britain in 1963

In 1963, the British were experiencing economic difficulties and were

considering reduction in their naval forces. The British Navy was not
willing to spare one of their own Porpoise class submarines. However,
British shipbuilders were willing and eager to build an Oberon class
submarine for India. The Navy was agreeable to buy one new Oberon but
sought deferred credit terms to cover the cost of the submarine, which at
1963 prices was working out to about Rs five crores - three crores for the
submarine and two crores for the infrastructure. The British were
unwilling to extend soft credit and India could not spare the foreign
exchange.
By early 1964, the 1964-1969 Defence Plan had taken shape and the
requirements therein had been indicated to America, Britain and Russia in
preparation for the visit to these countries of delegations led by the
Defence Minister. Commodore (later Admiral) SM Nanda was the Deputy
Chief of the Naval Staff at that time and represented the Navy in all three
delegations.

Discussions in America-May 1964.

Admiral Nanda recalls:

"During these discussions, Mr Mc Namara reiterated that in the

context of our problem with China, the Army and Air Force will have
priority. He said "Your threat is from China. All your ships up to now
have been from Britain. So you will have to go to Britain. As far as
the US is concerned, the Navy has no priority." We came back
empty handed."

Mr PVR Rao was the Defence Secretary from after the Chinese war in
1962 till after the Pakistan war of 1965 and accompanied the Defence
Minister's delegation to America. He recalls:

"At the Ministry level, we did not broach naval supplies with the US
at all. We knew it would be futile, because the US could not supply
any naval ships without Congressional approval. We were extremely
doubtful whether that approval would be forthcoming. The US was
committed to Pakistan and under the law of the time, only Congress
could approve the transfer of naval vessels. In fact even the
transfer of the submarine GHAZI on loan to Pakistan was illegal
under US law.

"We also had a very low priority for the Navy in 1965. After the
1962 battle, the first problem facing Indian defence planning was
with regard to Pakistan and China, and China's Navy had a low role
to play against India. The Army primarily, and to back up the Army,
the Air Force, had priority."

American records are not yet available which could throw light on
precisely why America declined India's request for submarines. The
reasoning of "traditional supplier" appears odd because in that very same
year 1964, Pakistan was given the submarine GHAZI on loan for a period
of three years to start with. It is more likely that Congress would not have
agreed to loan submarines to India because India was not a
CENTO/SEATO ally of America, whereas Pakistan was. The American
Administration may also have reconciled themselves to the Indian Navy
turning to Russia as the Indian Air Force had done, in case the West was
unable to meet its needs.

On the eve of the Defence Minister's delegation to Russia in September

1964, the position was:

- The British were not willing to spare a Porpoise class submarine.

The shipbuilders were keen to build on Oberon but the British
Government could not extend a soft credit of five million pounds for
its construction.

- India was unable to spare this huge amount in foreign exchange

for purchasing a submarine.

Under the circumstances, the delegation's task was to explore the

availability of the Navy's requirements from Russia and the financial
implications of doing so.

Discussions in Russia - September 1964

In Russia, the response to the Navy's requirements was positive. The

Russians offered four of their new F class submarines, a submarine depot
ship and other vessels.

Admiral Nanda recalls:

"Russia was keen to meet our requirements for ships and

submarines. In Leningrad, we were taken to sea in a submarine and
were quite impressed with what we saw. But Delhi had sent
instructions not to sign for any naval equipment from Russia.

"When we came back, I got to know what had happened. It

appeared that the instructions had come from the Government, who
had been influenced by the British and the American Governments,
that the Navy should not go in for Russian acquisitions. And so in
1964, we did not take the Russian submarines that were being
offered to us."

Mr RD Pradhan, IAS, was the Private Secretary of Defence Minister YB

Chavan from 1962 to 1965. He accompanied the Defence Minister in
1964. In his memoirs "Debacle to Revival", he states: (Pages 229 et seq).

"Lal Bahadur Shastri felt that before making any commitment to the
Soviets, the Defence Minister should visit Britain to find out the
attitude of the Britain Government. Apparently, the situation had
become favourable with the advent of the Labour Party in 1964
under Prime Minister Harold Wilson".
Discussions in Britain-November 1964

Admiral Nanda recalls:

"In the UK, the Labour Government had just taken over and
Mountbatten was the Chief of Defence Staff. A lot of discussion took
place. Eventually the First Sea Lord, Sir Michael Pollock asked me
over for a session at the Admiralty. He felt that the Labour
Government may be more sympathetic to India and he might be
forced to give us the Oberon class submarine and the Daring class
destroyers we were asking for. So he said "The Royal Navy is being
run down. I cannot give you Daring class destroyers. Please do not
press for them. A 'T' class submarine is being returned to UK from
Australia to be scrapped. Please accept this submarine".

"I had to say "Sorry, Sir, I cannot recommend this to my Defence

Minister. You have got the infrastructure for the maintenance of
your submarines. If you feel that this 'T' class submarine cannot be
maintained by you, how do you expect us to maintain this T class
submarine in India?" Then he said "Look the whole thing is that you
have no experience of running submarines and if you want to learn
driving, you don't go and buy a new car. You learn driving on an old
car". So I said "Sir, I accept that also, that when you want to learn
driving, you learn driving on an old car. But you don't go and buy
an old car to learn driving. We have, as you know, been offered four
brand new submarines from Russia. How do you expect my Defence
Minister to stand up in Parliament and say that we have refused
four brand new submarines from Russia, but we are going to take
from Britain a submarine which is going to be scrapped? What I am
prepared to recommend to my Minister is that we sign for an
Oberon class submarine and that you agree to it. It will take you
two to three years to build it. During that period you can loan us the
old 'T' Class submarine on which we will train our crew and return
the submarine back to you as soon as you give us the Oberon class
submarine". But even to that he would not agree.

"As the First Sea Lord, he felt that his job was to see that the British
Navy did not lose any ships and submarines. His job was to see that
it remained strong. He did not want his Navy to be cut down by
handing over ships and submarines to India which he, at that time,
felt he could ill afford to give".

Mr PVR Rao, the Defence Secretary, accompanied Mr Chavan's delegation

to Britain. He recalls:
 "In England, our main effort was to get some money - deferred
credit - on soft terms. The difference between India's naval
demands and what the British were prepared to give was
substantial. Even Lord Mountbatten, who was Chief of Defence Staff
at that time, could not prevail with the Admiralty, though he
pleaded India's cause better than even India did. He even told the
First Sea Lord that India may be driven to seek help from the USSR.
But the First Sea Lord was adamant that he could not spare an
Oberon submarine.

"Our Navy was still keen on the Oberon class submarine and the
probability of obtaining it was hard to die. The Admiralty were
building this new class of submarines. They had just given an order
for three submarines and India wanted one of those submarines.
The British Admiralty said "No, we have got only three submarines
on order, they are absolutely necessary for us, we cannot release
any of them". They were prepared to give us older submarines,
which our Navy refused to take.

"The British Prime Minister Harold Wilson remarked, half

humorously, to Mr Chavan; "I did not know that submarines could
climb the Himalayas".

To avoid a distruption in the naval relationship, the British agreed to

reconsider whether they could find ways and means to give India deferred
credit for building a new Oberon class submarine in a British shipyard.

Developments in Early 1965

Indonesian Bellicosity

After the conference in Bandung in Indonesia in 1955, when the principles

of Panchsheel were formally accepted, relations between India and
Indonesia had steadily deteriorated. The predominant Communist Party of
Indonesia had close links with Communist China and the Soviet Union.
Between 1958 and 1965, the Soviet Union gave Indonesia a substantial
naval fleet. Indonesia wanted to rename the Indian Ocean as the
Indonesian Ocean and intrusions were observed in the Nicobar Islands,
the nearest of which was only 90 nautical miles from the northern tip of
Sumatra.

Mr K Subrahmanyam was Deputy Secretary Budget and Planning in the

Ministry of Defence in 1964 and 1965. He recalls:

"In March 1965, the British told us that they will not be able to give
us deferred credit for building an Oberon class submarine.
 "In early April, there was a meeting of the Secretaries Committee in
which the activities of the Indonesian Navy around the Andaman
and Nicobar Islands were discussed. The Navy stressed the need for
maintaining a naval presence there to deal with the situation. On
the basis of that discussion, the Navy prepared a draft paper in
which it described the situation around the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands and recommended that we again approach the United
States, Britain and Russia for naval vessels.

"I felt this was not the right approach. I pointed out that going back
to the Americans, British and Russians was not going to give us any
additional benefits because:

(a) The Americans had told us that they will not give us naval
equipment and

(b) The British had already told us they couldn't give us credit
for building the Oberon class submarine.

"Therefore the best course was not to delay any further, but
to accept the Russian offer which had been pending since
August 1964. Mr Chavan agreed. Naval Headquarters were
asked to put up definite proposals for acquisition of Russian
ships and submarines."

The Navy's Hesitance to Switch Over to Russian Acquisitions

There is no doubt that Naval Headquarters had grave reservations about

going in for Russian acquisitions. Indeed, the Navy appears to have been
almost apologetic. Admiral Kohli, who was the Deputy Chief of the Naval
Staff in 1965, states in his book:

"Having tried both the USA and UK and drawn a blank from both
countries, we had no alternative but to go to the Soviet Union. This
decision was taken after the most careful consideration as it would
mean going to the Communist camp for the first time. We are often
blamed by spokesmen from Western countries, more particularly
the USA, for going to Russia - but they are not aware that a first
approach to their country had drawn a blank."

In 1965, the agreement was signed for the acquisition of Russian ships
and submarines. Admiral Kohli, then Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff,
headed the Naval team of this delegation. In his book, he states :
 "The first submarine was to be ready at the end of 1967. The
Soviets undertook to train two complete submarine crews in their
naval base at Vladivostok on the Pacific Coast. Our crews began
their training in July 1966. Credits were made available by the
Soviet Union and the payments were to be made in Rupees. The
price of each submarine was around 3 crores."

Admiral Mountbatten, visited the National Defence College after he retired

as the British Chief of the Defence Staff. He deplored "The short
sightedness of the British Government who, by declining a deferred credit
of a measly five million pounds for building an Oberon class submarine,
forced the Indian Navy to acquire its requirements from Russia, thereby
limiting the British warship industry's market to meeting the needs only of
the Leander Frigate Project."

DEVELOPMENTS 1966 TO 1975

Selection of Crew and Pre Deputation Russian Language Training

Captain MN Samant recalls:

"Selection of a submarine crew is critical in that it requires high

medical and psychological fitness standards. In those days we had
to screen 7 to 8 volunteers before we had one man. Then we
wanted to get experienced persons, who would stay longer in the
service and yet we wanted to induct junior persons, so that they
could be trained to gradually take the place of the experienced
ones".

All personnel selected to undergo training in Russia were given three

months of Russian language training in Bombay.

Submarine Training in Russia

Commodore KS Subra Manian recalls:

"The USSR Navy at that time consisted mainly of conscripts who

spent three years in service and then went out, unless they were
retained for any reason. They were all raw recruits and they were
trained for a specific job. Our sailors and officers who went there
had been in the service for a number of years, about eight to ten
years. They were all experienced in their particular trades. Now the
trade structures of the Soviet Navy and of our Navy were not quite
compatible. They trained each sailor for a specific job and he only
concentrated on that. Our sailor was trained to do multifarious
duties.

"One of my first headaches on arrival there was to draw up a

syllabus for training our sailors and to convince the Soviets that
their system is not compatible with ours and cannot work. I had a
lot of problems on this subject. However we managed to draw up a
syllabus, not only for ourselves but for subsequent batches also. We
did evolve some sort of a compromise to make sure that our sailors
got the right sort of training.

"As far as comparing the two systems of training is concerned,

there is good in both systems. We adopted the best of both".

Capt MN Samant recalls:

"We tried to make the Soviets understand that none of our crew
had come directly from universities and schools. We were career
officers and crew having 12 to 15 years of service, including almost
one year's practical experience in submarines and three months
training with British Navy. We told them that what we wanted was a
concept of type training, as against the basic training which they
were trying to impart. That had the desired effect. From the second
batch onwards, we were able to reduce the training time from 18
months to 15 months. And for the third and fourth, we were able to
reduce it further.

"Another point noticed was the Soviet's pride. To try out a

submarine's weapon systems, especially after a new submarine is
commissioned, we require a target vessel. The Soviets felt very
awkward. They said that "After the Second World War, we feel very
hurt if any foreign ship fires at a Soviet vessel!" It actually took
time to convince them that unless they proved the weapon system,
it will not be possible for us to accept their vessels. That too had the
desired effect".

Admiral VS Shekhawat recalls:

"The Russians believed in a lot of class room instruction and it was

very very thorough. I felt that for us the best was a combination of
the two, not the very short duration that the British did, nor the
prolonged duration that the Russians believed in. Eventually we
arrived at our own training duration somewhat between the two,
but leaning more towards the Russian side in thoroughness of class
room instructions, diagrams and so on. I think that has suited us
better than the British system might have done. Of course the
British system probably is more cost effective because of less time
spent on training. But the safety aspect has also to be borne in
 mind as well as the educational background and aptitude of the
trainees. We have been fortunate in being able to operate in
considerable safety over all these very many years as a result of the
practices that we followed".

Vice Admiral (then Lt) RN Ganesh had joined the Submarine Arm after
training in Britain had ceased. He was later to be the first Commanding
Officer of the nuclear propelled submarine CHAKRA. His recollections of
training in Russia were, in some respects, different from those who had
earlier been trained in Britain:

"Our instructors impressed us with their technical knowledge and

we did benefit greatly from the training. We developed the habit of
learning our equipment thoroughly, of being able to run and
maintain our own equipment, irrespective of branch. This technical
knowledge of one's own equipment stood us in very good stead. On
the more general front, the Soviets were not generally very
forthcoming on tactical doctrine.

"There was undoubtedly a kind of cultural divide among the Indians

themselves. Those who had undergone training with the British
Navy, were more reluctant to accept the Soviet instructors in that
role and very often assumed a kind of superior attitude. By and
large, they were slightly derisive in their approach to the Soviets.
This was largely a spin off of our totally Western reading habits. The
Western perception of the Soviets had somehow got grafted on our
way of thinking.

"The training, in my view, was excellent for the type of sailor that
the Indian is. He likes to be told in detail, he likes to know exactly
what he was to do. Methodical, systematic and thorough that is the
essence of Soviet training. Perhaps it did not leave too much room
for initiative in the sense that everyone carried a notebook
indicating what he was supposed to do when there was a fire, when
there was flooding and so on. But all these things did help in
maintaining a very strict organisation. This was happily blended, I
think with those of British experience. In the end, we did get a
happy blend of thorough Soviet basic training but with the
experience of those who had been trained in Britain.

Rear Admiral JMS Sodhi recalls:

"The training was slow but it was absolutely thorough, it was very
good and the practical training was excellent. It was far better than
the British training. The Russians told us that the many orders and
procedures might seem very silly to you, but please remember that
"It is written in the blood of comrades gone by". So please do not
ignore them. I found their advice to be very correct.
 "We found that because of the Russian system of conscript training,
they had many safety features on their submarine. That meant that
no single fault could create a crisis in a submarine. There had to be
a series of faults, only then could an accident occur. In fact, even in
the propulsion system, there were seven alternative modes of
propulsion. So six or seven modes had to break down before the
submarine was completely immobilised".

Rear Admiral (then Lt) SC Anand underwent his initial submarine training
in Russia. He recalls:

"It was only when we were finishing the training that we realised
how valuable the training was. Because as we went along, we found
our knowledge of specific actions to be carried out on board a
submarine, specific activities, drills, procedures became that much
more thorough. We realised how important it was to know the
specifics of any action rather than knowing it only theoretically. The
only reason we did not know very much about this type of training
was that in our surface navy, emphasis on this kind of practical
training was not to be found.

"We were also impressed with the knowledge of the Russian

Instructors, as well as the other sailors who guided us during our
first steps in the submarine. We wanted to emulate the example
being set by those instructors, the thoroughness of their knowledge,
and their total command over the subject they were teaching."

Submarine Infrastructure Facilities

The 1965 agreement with Russia not only covered the delivery of ships
and submarines, but also the creation of a modern Dockyard at
Visakhapatnam, along with a submarine base and training school.

The basic infrastructure required for the Submarine Arm was a submarine
base, a submarine training establishment, submarine maintenance and
repair workshops, facilities to charge the submarine propulsion batteries
and the high pressure air bottles and facilities for blowing the ballast
tanks and preparing submarine torpedoes.

Since the new Dockyard would take several years to come up, interim
arrangements were made for the Base Repair Workshop in
Visakhapatnam to be expanded.

The Induction of the Submarines

After commissioning, each submarine did a three month combat work up
in the Baltic before departing for India. Since the Suez Canal was closed,
the maiden voyages were around the Cape of Good Hope. The first two
submarines were escorted by Indian naval ships, the latter two came on
their own. The first four submarines arrived between July 1968 and May
1970 and were based in Visakhapatnam .

After arrival, the submarines:

(a) Participated in anti submarine exercises with ships, Alizes and

Seakings and helped them to evaluate anti submarine sonars and
sonobuoys.

(b) Undertook operational patrols.

(c) Helped train the fresh inductees into the submarine service.

In 1971, an agreement was signed for four improved Russian submarines

of the same class. The improvements were the result of experience
gained by us in operating the submarines in Indian tropical conditions:

(a) Design of equipment and machinery to cater for higher ambient

air temperature, sea water temperature and relative humidity
parameters.

(b) Improved active and passive sonar sets and the requirement of
a long range passive sonar.

(c) Improved version of radar with better power output and an

extra PPI to be fitted in the Chart House.

(d) Improved version of SHF/DF set with better presentation.

(e) Improvements in the layout of the control room.

(f) Improved arrangements on equipment and machinery to ensure

a higher degree of silence.

(g) Improvements to Main diesels, HP air compressors,

Refrigeration plant, Ventilation system, etc.

(h) Provisioning of a frequency analyser and a cavitation meter.

The 1971 Indo Pakistan War

During the 1971 war KURSURA and KARANJ operated in the Arabian Sea.
KHANDERI operated in the Boy of Bengal. Their activities have been
described in the chapters on the 1971 war.

KALVARI remained in Visakhapatnam to continue training of fresh

inductees for the next lot of four submarines.

Basing of Submarines in Bombay

After the 1971 war, it was decided to base the four new submarines in
Bombay and create the minimum essential support, maintenance and
repair facilities.

These four submarines arrived in Bombay between January 1974 and May
1975. Until their shore facilities were set up, they were supported by the
submarine depot ship AMBA, which had been moved from Visakhapatnam
to Bombay.

After arrival, these submarines participated in anti submarine exercises,

evaluations and operational patrols as the earlier submarines had done.
They were saved however from having to expend precious motoring hours
in transits between the East and West coasts, which had been
unavoidable for the earlier four submarines based in Visakhapatnam.

PERSONNEL ASPECTS

From the outset, the tight delivery schedule of the submarines created
problems. By 1969, personnel shortages began to cause concern. Several
measures were taken to remedy these shortages.

Reducing the Rejection Rate

Analysis indicated that a major cause of the shortage in intake was the
large number of rejects in the psychological tests and the general lack of
confidence in the procedures for selection. It was decided:

(a) To do away with psychological and mechanical response test;

only the recompression chamber (RCC) test was to continue.

(b) Sailors rejected in the earlier psychological tests were to be

retested for suitability in the RCC test at Submarine Headquarters.

(c) The incentives and benefits of service in submarine were to be

widely disseminated and followed up by liaison visits of submarine
officers to ships and establishments.
Monetary Incentives

To make service in the Submarine Cadre attractive, special benefits were

sanctioned. These were Submarine Allowance, Submarine Pay, Submarine
Rations, Special Submarine Clothing and Hardlying Money at full rates.

Special Rations

(a) Government sanctioned a special scale of rations for sailors

serving on board submarines. This included special items of pre-
cooked foods for issue when submerged when normal cooking
would not be possible.

(b) Ready to Eat Meals. Large scale trials of ready-to-eat meals,

manufactured at the Defence Food Research Laboratory Mysore and
the Accelerated Freeze Dried Unit Delhi, were undertaken on board
KALVARI. The trials were found to be quite satisfactory. After
effecting further improvements, the DFRL Mysore commenced bulk
production. These meals, however, never became popular.

(c) Special Rations. The special scale of rations, which was earlier
admissible to sailors when submarines were submerged, was now
authorised for both officers and sailors, both when submerged and
on surface, except when they were not messed on board.

(d) Emergency Ration Scales for Submarines. Government

authorised an emergency ration scale for personnel on board
submarines, comprising boiled sweets/milk toffees, fruit bar, mango
flakes, pumpkin halwa, refined seedless dates and sweet biscuits.

Standard Submarine Ration Scale

(e) Based on the recommendations of the Defence Institute of

Physiology and Allied Sciences (DIPAS), a revised standard ration
scale for submarine personnel was promulgated. The scale provided
a greater variety of substitutes for issue in lieu of basic items. It
also provided for issue of ready-to-eat meals whenever, either for
operational or other reasons, cooking on board was not possible.
However, since colorific value of the revised scale was much lower,
it directly impinged on the variety of the menus and caused
consternation amongst submarine personnel.

Catering Units

(f) To overcome the limited facilities and space on board

submarines, an experimental Catering Unit was established ashore
to issue cleaned, chopped and ready to cook provisions to
submarines prior to their sailing.
Submarine Depot Ship - AMBA

The Submarine Depot Ship AMBA had commissioned in 1968 and had
been based in Visakhapatnam. Between 1969 and 1971, AMBA supported
the submarines operating on the West Coast. In the 1971 war, AMBA was
deployed to patrol off the Lakshadweep Islands, across the sea lane
between East and West Pakistan.

With the arrival of VELA at Bombay in early 74, AMBA's base was changed
from Visakhapatnam to Bombay. From early 1974 onwards, AMBA was
commanded by a CO who had commissioned a submarine in Russia. He
was well aware of what submariners expected from their depot ship. In
the following months, AMBA ably fulfilled her designed role as a Depot
Ship:

(a) The submarines used to berth alongside and the crews were
billeted on board AMBA.

(b) Operational and technical needs were met by AMBA's Heads of

Department who were experienced submariners.

(c) Since the Torpedo Preparation Shop had not yet been set up in
Bombay, the periodic preparation and change round of torpedoes
was done by AMBA, just as she was designed to do.

(d) To conserve submarine engine/machinery hours, AMBA provided

all the power supplies.

Submarine Rescue Vessel - NISTAR

The submarine Rescue Vessel NISTAR commissioned in 1971 and was

based at Visakhapatnam. She conducted the diving operation on the
Pakistan Navy submarine GHAZI, which sank outside Visakhapatnam
harbour in December 1971.

From 1972 onwards, NISTAR helped train divers to meet the Navy's
urgent need for Deep Divers and Clearance Divers.

Submarine Training School - SATAVAHANA

The Submarine Training School, which formed part of the Integrated Type
Training Establishment for the Russian acquisitions, was commissioned as
INS SATAVAHANA in December 1974.
Six Yearly Refits of Submarines

The delays in the completion of the Naval Dockyard at Visakhapatnam

began to delay the commencement of six-yearly refits of submarines. To
ensure that the safety of submarines was not prejudiced, detailed
discussions were held with the Russian side. It was decided that the refit
of the first submarine KALVARI would be carried out in Russia and that of
the second submarine KHANDERI in Visakhapatnam. Dockyard personnel
proceeded to Russia to acquire first hand experience of how these repairs
were done.

Indigenous Submarine Batteries

In 1973, Standard Batteries of Bombay went into collaboration with

Tudor, the Swedish battery manufacturers, to produce submarine
batteries indigenously. After the initial teething troubles had been
overcome, these batteries proved far superior in Indian conditions than
the performance of the imported batteries.

Other Activities

In 1975:

(a) Sanction was accorded for submarine battery charging facilities

at Bombay.

(b) The Escape Training Facility was commissioned as part of INS

SATAVAHANA in Visakhapatnam.

(c) A full fledged medical organisation was sanctioned to provide

cover for submarine rescue operations.

(d) A new scale of Submarine Pay was sanctioned.

(e) The Third Symposium on Underwater Medicine was held at

Bombay. It focussed on the problems associated with underwater
medicine that had come to notice since 1969.

(f) Ready-to-eat pack rations were supplied to the Base Victualling

Yards for supply to submarines.

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1975

Six-Yearly Refits of Submarines

KALVARI returned to Visakhapatnam in 1976 with no defects. Her

guarantee specialists returned to Russia earlier than scheduled. It
provided a benchmark of a high quality refit to the personnel in
Visakhapatnam who had commenced the six yearly repairs of the second
submarine KHANDERI in mid 1976.

The actual experience with KHANDERI was beset with delays due to lack
of expertise, shortage of spares and the low productivity of the Dockyard.
Progressively, as expertise built up and the Dockyard facilities developed,
it became possible to become self sufficient for submarine refits. Spares
however always remained a problem.

In subsequent years, six yearly refits were carried out both in

Visakhapatnam and in Russia. This helped to mitigate the problems of
bunching which was a result of four submarine being acquired in 1968-
1969 and another four in 1973-1974.

Indigenous Submarine Construction

In 1981, almost fourteen years after the initial dialogue with HDW of
Germany, Kockums of Sweden, Vickers of Britain, DCN of France and
Nevesbu of Holland, a contract was signed with HDW of Germany for four
submarines - two to be built in Germany and two in Mazagon Docks,
Bombay. These four submarines, called SSKs, entered service between
1986 and 1994.

Acquisition of Improved Russian Submarines

Between 1986 and 1990, eight improved Russian submarines of the Kilo
class were acquired. These submarines were quieter, had better sonar
and used indigenously produced submarine propulsion batteries.

Nuclear Propulsion

The Submarine Arm Pictorial History, published in 1992, states:

"Seeing the advent of nuclear propulsion in submarines of other

navies, a study was undertaken by BARC to study a nuclear
propulsion package for naval ships and submarines. A stage arose
when it became necessary to train serving personnel in this very
important area of propulsion technology.

"An agreement was concluded with the Soviet Union and a team of
officers under the supervision of Vice Admiral MK Roy was formed to
steer the project. After a rigorous selection procedure, the first
batch of the nuclear submarine crews, under the command of
Captain S Daniel commenced their training in the USSR. The
training was, perhaps, the most thorough and taxing course that
 any of the Indian submariners, most of whom had over a decade of
submarining behind them, had ever undergone. They absorbed the
new technology with professional aplomb."

Vice Admiral Roy's book, "War in the Indian Ocean", states: (Page 114 et
seq)

"Nuclear propulsion in India was first mooted in 1967 when a naval

officer and a BARC scientist prepared a feasibility report. A more
detailed report was prepared in 1971 as the Committee of
Secretaries felt that R&D on nuclear propulsion technology was
inescapable if India was not to be left too far behind by the end of
the century, when atomic energy would be a major source for both
propulsion and energy requirements. A small nucleus of engineers
were located in BARC as early as 1978.

"The offer by the Soviet authorities of a `nuclear-powered

submarine fleet' for the Indian Navy was made by Marshal Ogarkov
during his visit to India in April 1981. The Soviets offered to arrange
a two years' training programme for Indian naval personnel, lease
one nuclear submarine for five years for practical training and to
render technical assistance for creating maintenance facilities in
India for nuclear powered submarines. He added that the sale as
also assistance for designing and constructing nuclear-powered
submarines could be taken up later. This offer was reiterated by the
Defence Minister, Marshal Ustinov.

"It was in this context that the former President, R Venkataraman,

stated in his book "My Presidential Years" that: (Pages 74, 75)

"On September 14, Admiral Roy, Vice Chief of the Eastern Naval
Command conveyed to me the pleasant news that the Government
had finally decided to take the first nuclear propelled submarine
from the Soviet Union on lease, as purchase would entail
acceptance of NPT conditions. The idea of acquiring a nuclear-
propelled submarine was floated by me as Defence Minister and
after months of bargaining the Soviets agreed. A training
programme was arranged for Indian sailors. I had visited the
trainees in Leningrad and Riga. I was also happy that the lease
amount charged by the Soviet Union was fairly reasonable. The
nuclear propelled submarine had the advantage of remaining under
water which was not possible for the conventional submarines. It
was also proposed at that time that a second nuclear propelled
submarine would be built in India. The Atomic Energy were
confident of producing an atomic power pack for the submarine".
Lease of Russian Nuclear Submarine

In 1988, a nuclear submarine was leased from the Russian Navy. It was
commanded and manned by Indian naval personnel and commissioned as
CHAKRA. She was returned to Russia in 1991.

During this three year lease period, the Navy was able to better
understand:

(a) Nuclear submarine culture and the practical aspects of handling

nuclear power plants afloat.

(b) The tactical benefits of underwater launched anti-ship missiles.

(c) Anti submarine operations against nuclear submarines.

Very Low Frequency Communications with Submarines at Sea

Whereas a submarine on the surface can transmit and receive wireless

messages just like a ship can, submerged submarines can only receive
wireless messages on Very Low Frequency (VLF). VLF transmitters require
huge antennae suspended high above the ground.

The initial discussions were solely with the Russian side, from whom the
submarines had been acquired. Inquiries with western manufacturers
indicated that better technology might be available from America. Parallel
discussions were therefore pursued, both with Russia and with America.

Between 1979 and 1984, modalities were worked out for American
company in collaboration with an Indian company to assume
responsibility for the detailed design, manufacture, site installation and
commissioning of the VLF transmitting station.

During the same period, the Defence Research and Development

Organisation designed the antennae to be fitted in the submarine for
receiving VLF transmissions.

Installation of the VLF Transmitter commenced in 1987. Trials completed

in 1989. On 20 Oct 90, the VLF Transmitting Station was commissioned
as INS KATTABOMAN.

RETROSPECT

If one corelates the justifications for setting up the Submarine Arm with
events as they transpired during the decade 1965-1975, it becomes
evident, as is usually the case with most new acquisitions, that either it
takes considerable time for expectations to become reality or that
expectations mutate as experience is gained. The following examples are
illustrative.

Examples of Expectations that Did Not Materialise

The first expectation was that acquiring submarines would enhance the
anti submarine effectiveness of our surface ships. Commodore KS Subra
Manian recalls:

"As far as the anti submarine CASEXs and interaction with the
surface forces were concerned, my experience has been that there
has not been enough interaction. There was a feeling of smugness
in our sursurface Navy as far as submarines were concerned. They
had not really realised what exactly submarines are capable of, in
spite of umpteen exercises, major and minor, proving that
practically on every occasion a submarine can operate practically
undetected in the face of combined opposition, in the face of
unbroken sonar fronts, random patrolling and what have you. They
still haven't realised. So I would say, very regretfully, that there has
been insufficient interaction or appreciation of the potential of a
submarine by the surfacface Navy."

The second expectation was that in a war, submarines could be used

offensively. The section on submarine operations during the 1971 Indo-
Pakistan war clearly indicates why this expectatiation did not translate
into reality.

Examples of Utilisation Not Foreseen But Which Proved Invaluable

If submarines had not been available, it would not have been possible to
undertake the following evaluations in the unusual hydrological conditions
which prevail in Indian waters:

(a) Carry out comparative evaluations of the MRASW Atlantic

aircraft in 1969.

(b) Systematically pinpoint and rectify the shortcomings in the

Seakings dunking sonar after the 1971 war.

(c) Evaluate, modify and progressively improve the indigenously

designed and produced sonars for ships.

(d) Carry out comparative evaluations of American and French

dunking sonars for the later Seakings.
 (e) Evolve anti submarine tactics appropriate to our own
hydrological conditions and our unique mix of Russian and Western
anti submarine ships, submarines, aircraft and helicopters.

Under Utilisation of Submarine Depot Ship AMBA

In hindsight, it is interesting to note that some of the facilities which the

submarine depot ship had could not be utilised. These were stated to be:

(a) "Cater for the annual refits for four submarines and limited
repairs for the Petyas. Workshops are provided for electrical,
electronic, torpedo, weapon and machinery repairs. Fitted with a
150 ton bow lift crane for lifting the stern of a submarine for
effecting underwater repairs to the propeller or the rudder."

Since AMBA was supporting the submarines on the West Coast from
1969 onwards, she could not help in the annual refits of the Patyas.

(b) "Training facilities are provided for torpedo firing, sonar,

communications etc."

Most of these facilities were similar to those which were later to be

installed in SATAVAHANA. Yet both submarines and Petya pre-
occupations prevented the full utilisation of these trainers.

One reason for the under-utilisation of the submarine depot ship was the
difference in perceptions. The Submarine Arm felt that the submarine
depot ship should be exclusively earmarked for the submarines. The Navy
felt that the depot ship's capabilities could be better utilised in general
fleet ship functions, in addition to providing technical support to the
submarines. These perceptions never reconciled. AMBA did however fully
justify its role when from 1974 onwards it extended support to the VELA
class submarines in Bombay.

In retrospect, the growth of the Navy's Submarine Arm was phenomenal.

Very few navies have acquired four submarines in three years after the
start of a Submarine Arm. Even fewer navies have successfully built their
own submarines in twenty five years after starting a Submarine Arm.

In the short span of 30 years from the time that submarine training first
started in Britain in 1962, till the time CHAKRA was returned to Russia in
1991, the Navy saw the submarine fleet grow to 20 submarines - 16
Russian conventional ocean going submarines, 4 German conventional
Hunter Killer SSK submarines (of which two were under construction in
India).
This unprecedented achievement was only possible because of:

(a) The enthusiasm, dedication and professionalism of the young

officers and sailors who started the Submarine Arm.

(b) The thorough and rigorous submarine training imparted by the

British and Russian Navies and the assistance extended by their
Governments.

(c) The determination and tenacity of the officers and men in the
technical organisations to somehow keep the submarines going until
the maintenance and refit facilities were set up in the new Naval
Dockyard in Visakhakhakhapatnam.

(d) The genernerous and forthright technical assistance extended by

the Russian and German Navies.

(e) The sagacious handling of all the Submarine Arm acquisitions by

the Ministries of Defence and Finance Defence despite the Navy's
over-stretched budget.

CHAPTER-17

THE NAVAL AIR ARM

THE GROWTH OF THE AIR ARM TILL 1965

Even though the need for a naval air arm and an aircraft carrier had been
accepted in principle before, and again, after Independence in 1947,
negotiations for the acquisition of the first carrier from Britain concluded
only in 1957. Apart from the lack of resources for so large a project, this
ten year delay was also caused by the outbreak of the Korean War, which
prevented the British Navy from releasing to India a British aircraft carrier
with British fighter aircraft. This delay was fortuitous for it enabled the
acquisition from Britain of a surface fleet and the creation ashore of
Training Schools to remedy the dislocation caused by the partition of the
Navy in 1947.

It was decided to go ahead only with shore based aircraft. The Directorate
of Naval Aviation started functioning in Naval Headquarters in 1948. From
1948 onwards, officers and sailors started going to Britain for training as
pilots, as observers and for technical training in aircraft maintenance.
FRU and INS GARUDA

In 1951, the Fleet Requirement Unit (FRU) was formed to meet the Fleet's
requirement of aircraft targets for gunnery and radar tracking practices,
for radar and communication calibrations and for aircrew training.

The airfield at Cochin was taken over from the Directorate General of Civil
Aviation on 1 January 1953. From that date, the Navy assumed
responsibility of the operation from Cochin airfield of all aircraft, civilian
and naval.

Ten amphibian Sealand aircraft were acquired in 1953 and were based in
Cochin.

The FRU was commissioned on 11 March 1953 and the Navy's first Naval
Air Station, INS GARUDA, commissioned on 11 May 1953.

Since the Sealands were not suitable for anti aircraft firing practices,
between February 1955 and December 1958, ten target towing British
naval Firefly aircraft were inducted. They were fitted with target - towing
winches to tow drogue/sleeve targets. The last five of these Firefly aircraft
were equipped with 20 mm cannon and were capable of carrying rockets
and bombs. They marked the advent of weapon capability in the Air Arm.

From 1952 onwards, basic flying training had been imparted by the Air
Force. To facilitate continuation flying training at Cochin, three Hindustan
Trainer 2 (HT 2) aircraft, made by Hindustan Aircraft Ltd (HAL), joined the
FRU in October 1956.

INAS 550

On 17 January 1959, the FRU became the first unit to be commissioned

as Indian Naval Air Squadron (INAS) 550. It had ten amphibian Sealands,
ten target towing Fireflies and three HT 2 trainer aircraft.

Acquisition of VIKRANT

Until 1955, the British Navy had not been able to spare a light fleet
carrier. Nor could the naval budget have been able to afford one. In 1955,
Admiral Mountbatten succeeded in convincing Prime Minister Nehru that
the Navy should have a carrier. Formal approval was accorded soon
thereafter.
By 1957, the Navy was able to finalise the acquisition of the aircraft
carrier VIKRANT along with two aircraft squadrons. In April 1957,
VIKRANT commenced an extensive refit cum modernisation in Britain,
scheduled for completion in 1961. Almost all the electronic and electrical
equipment was to be replaced. The ship was to be fitted with an angled
deck, a steam catapult and a mirror landing sight. Essential spaces were
to be air conditioned. Additional accomodation and facilities were to be
provided to enable VIKRANT to function as the Fleet Commander's flag-
ship.

Naval Jet Flight

Since VIKRANT was going to operate jet aircraft, pilots had to undergo
conversion. Three Vampire jet aircraft were acquired from HAL and one
Vampire trainer was transferred from the Air Force. GARUDA's runway
was not long enough to operate the Vampires. From September 1957
onwards, a `Naval Jet Flight' started operating from the longer airfield at
Sulur near Coimbatore.

In 1960, the Naval Jet Flight at Sulur was designated as INAS 550`A'
Flight and tasked with the training of pilots for VIKRANT's Seahawk
squadron. The FRU at Cochin was designated as INAS 550`B' Flight.

INAS 550, 551 and INS HANSA Sulur

On 1 September 1961, the aviation unit at Coimbatore was commissioned

as INAS 551. On 5 September 1961, the Naval Jet Flight was merged with
the Naval Rifle Range Detachment Coimbatore and commissioned as INS
HANSA. The B Flight at Cochin became INAS 550.

Establishment of Training and Maintenance Facilities at Cochin

Airmen Training. The School for Naval Airmen (SFNA) started in August
1956. The Observer School started in March 1960.

Air Technical Training. The Naval Air Technical School (NATS) started in
June 1957.

Aircraft Repair. The Naval Aircraft Repair Organisation (NARO) started in

February 1960. Its task was to repair and overhaul airframes and major
components. Overhauls of engines would be undertaken by HAL and the
Air Force.

Naval Aircraft Inspection Service. The Naval Aircraft Inspection Service

(NAIS) started in November 1960.
Before VIKRANT arrived the basic support infrastructure for the Air Arm
had been established ashore in Cochin.

VIKRANT, Seahawks and Alizes

VIKRANT commissioned in March 1961. After an intensive six week work

up in Malta, she arrived in India in November 1961 with two air squadrons
embarked:

(a) INAS 300, the first operational squadron of the Navy comprising
Seahawk `Fighters Ground Attack' (FGA). The first flight of
Seahawks had been constituted in end 1959 and the squadron had
commissioned in Britain on 7 July 1960. The Seahawk was a well
proven jet aircraft, having been in operation with the British Navy
since 1953 and also in the German and Netherland Navies. A total
of 74 Seahawks were eventually acquired, 46 from Britain between
1960 and 1964 and 28 from Germany in 1966.

(b) INAS 310 comprising Alize anti submarine aircraft had

commissioned in France on 21 March 1961. The Alize too was a well
proven turbo-prop aircraft, having been in operation with the
French Navy since 1959. A total of 14 Alizes were eventually
acquired, 12 in 1961 and 2 in 1969.

The Goa Operation in December 1961

Within a month of her arrival in India, VIKRANT was deployed for the Goa
Operation. On patrol 75 miles seaward of Goa, her task was to counter
any action by the Portuguese Air Force F - 86 Sabres (which according to
intelligence reports were operating from Dabolim) and to forestall any
interference by Western NATO allies of Portugal. VIKRANT steamed up
and down at high speed for two days on 18 and 19 December, with
Seahawk combat air patrols airborne from dawn to dusk. No Portuguese
Sabre aircraft or any other intrusive air or naval activity was observed.

Lt Cdr (later Admiral) RH Tahiliani, flew the Seahawks from VIKRANT in

1961. He recalls:

"Early on the morning of 18 December, we were briefed that the

Portuguese had Sabres in Goa and that they would possibly be
coming out to sea to attack us. I was the leader of the first combat
air patrol to get airborne at first light. I positioned myself between
the ship and Goa and followed this routine throughout the day. We
 did not sight any enemy at all. After the operation, it transpired that
the Portuguese did not have a single aircraft at Goa. It was faulty
intelligence. As far as VIKRANT was concerned, we had a fully
worked up ship and air squadrons and would have given a very
good account of ourselves if we had been assigned any targets or if
there had been some inter-services coordinated planning."

Captain (late Vice Admiral) N Krishnan was the Commanding Officer of

the cruiser INS DELHI. He stated:

"Incredibly, VIKRANT, our latest and newest acquisition, was not

taking part in the operation but was going to be deployed
somewhere in the middle of the ocean where she would be `safe'.
After giving distant support to the Army at Diu, I was to join
VIKRANT and DELHI was to give her close support". (Note:
Blueprint to Bluewater Page 395)

INS HANSA, Shift to Dabolim

After the liberation of Goa in December 1961, the Portuguese airfield at

Dabolim was taken over by the Navy in April 1962. In June 1964, INS
HANSA and INAS 551 relocated from Sulur in Coimbatore to Dabolim. In
July 1964, sanction was accorded for INS HANSA to be a full fledged
Naval Air Station, to be equipped with a Ground Controlled Approach
(GCA) radar. In November 1964, the Seahawk Squadron INAS 300
disembarked from VIKRANT directly to HANSA.

Helicopters

Helicopters first entered naval service with the VIKRANT's Sea Air Rescue
(SAR) Flight whose primary role was to rescue ditched pilots. Helicopter
pilots received their initial training with the Air Force and later in France.
The two French Alouette helicopters obtained on loan for VIKRANT's work
up in Malta were returned to France. Three Alouettes had been ordered
from France for VIKRANT's SAR Flight but their delivery was expected
only in 1964. To bridge the gap between 1961 and 1964, two American
Sikorsky helicopters were obtained on loan from the Air Force. When the
Navy's Alouettes arrived from France in early 1964, the Air Force had an
urgent need of Alouettes for their high altitude operations. The Navy's
Alouettes were therefore diverted to the Air Force. The Sikorskys
continued to fly in VIKRANT till mid 1964 when more Alouettes arrived
from France.

Thumba
In 1964, the firing of weather rockets commenced from the launch range
at Thumba near Trivandrum. The Navy undertook to operate and maintain
the Russian MI 4 helicopter belonging to the Indian Committee for Space
Research's Thumba Rocket Project till such time as their own personnel
became available. The task involved range clearance and rocket recovery.

Helicopter Maintenance Unit in Bombay at INS KUNJALI

In 1964, INS DARSHAK, the first indigenously built survey ship was
commissioned. She was designed to embark an Alouette helicopter. A
small helicopter maintenance unit was therefore set up in Bombay in INS
KUNJALI to support the Alouette helicopters in VIKRANT and DARSHAK.

NAVAL AIR OPERATIONS IN THE 1965 INDO PAKISTAN WAR

In April 1965, VIKRANT commenced her refit. When the Rann of Kutch
incident started, an Alize was deployed at Jamnagar for electronic
reconnaissance. VIKRANT was quickly boxed up, the air squadrons were
re-embarked and VIKRANT patrolled between Bombay and Goa. After the
cease fire in Kutch, the squadrons disembarked and VIKRANT resumed
her refit which was rescheduled so as to complete in November 1965.
When the Pakistani intrusions into Jammu and Kashmir started in August
1965, VIKRANT was still under refit, INAS 300 and 551 were at Goa and
INAS 310 and INAS 550 were at Cochin.

INAS 300 had been programmed for its usual annual armament work up.
Eight Seahawks arrived at Jamnagar as planned on 1 September 1965.
The same morning, the Pakistan Army crossed the international border
between West Pakistan and India. War appeared imminent.

Cdr (later Rear Admiral) RV Singh was the Commanding Officer of the
Seahawk Squadron. He recalls:

"We were placed under the operational control of the Air Force and
ordered to prepare for air defence and air strike missions. Badin
was specially assigned to us as a target if the need arose.

"We set about obtaining live weapons from the Armament Depot
Bombay or, where there was compatibility, from the Air Force. Air
Force rockets were found to be suitable for the Seahawks and we
equipped the Seahawks with them. The bombs had to be brought
from Bombay and arrived after 4 days. There was some problem
with regard to the fuzes. We were keen to have a fuze appropriate
to low level attack. These were not available. Therefore we were
restricted to dive bombing attacks.
 "With the local Air Force authorities, it was worked out that
Seahawks would carry out the dawn air patrols and Air Force would
carry out the dusk air patrols. These were instituted by 2
September.

"On the evening of 6 September, soon after the dusk air patrol
landed, Pakistan Air Force B-57 bombers appeared overhead.
Initially, even the Air Force thought they were our own bombers but
as soon they started bombing, it was clear that they were Pakistani
B-57's. After this initial raid, a single B-57 continued bombing
throughout the night to keep the air station on its toes.

"Fairly early on the evening of 6 September, we were informed by

the OC Flying that we had been cleared to carry out the dawn strike
on Badin airfield.

"At about 0400 on 7 September, whether as a result of these

attacks or whatever, we were told by the Air Force that orders had
been received for us to go back to Bombay.

"The Jamnagar airfield had been damaged quite heavily during the
night. The dawn inspection of the runway indicated however that
the Western half of the main runway was fairly clear. We used that
portion to take off for Bombay.

The Pakistan Air Force air attack on Jamnagar on the evening of 6

December was a response to the Indian Army's thrust towards Lahore in
the early hours of 6 December. Loaded for a strike as they were, the
Seahawks were helpless in the fading light. Fortunately, the bombers
failed to notice the Seahawks parked in the dispersal.

On 7 September, after the Seahawks withdrew to Bombay to operate

from Santa Cruz, they were tasked with the air defence of Bombay since
the Air Force resources at Poona had become fully committed in the air
battles in the North. One hundred dawn and dusk patrols were flown but
without contact.

Meanwhile the Alizes had moved up from Cochin to Bombay for anti
submarine and reconnaissance patrols. Their activities have been
described in the Chapter on the 1965 War. In addition, an Alize was
deployed for electronic surveillance duties on the border with West
Pakistan. Commander (O) (then Lieutenant) Dilip Choudhary, who flew in
these sorties recalls:

"We were briefed to carry out a radar recce of enemy territory for
our Air Force. During the war we flew low level sorties below 100
feet all along the Pakistan Border starting from the Kashmir sector,
then the Punjab sector, Rajasthan sector and by the time we had
 come down to Jodhpur, the war had ended. The Alize's direction
finding system detected a number of Pakistani radar stations. We
pin-pointed each one with a three point fix and gave the positions to
the Air Force. The Air Force of course did not have any such
capability and they did not take our positions or our information
very seriously.

"Even though we gathered a lot of information, I don't think the Air

Force authorities ever used it. We got into trouble with the Air Force
a couple of times, when we picked up a radar station like Sargodha
and others which were still operating, because the Air Force had
declared that they had destroyed these radars. We were jumped by
our own Air Force aircraft every time, even though our silhouettes
were available to them. We were even fired upon every time by the
AA batteries on our border and we had to zig zag to avoid them.
Throughout this operation, we survived on our wits and on secrecy.
We were unarmed and we could only survive by operating on our
own. We had a small detachment of our maintenance staff following
us in a Dakota."

DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 1966 AND 1971

The Aircraft Carrier.

By 1966, VIKRANT had been in commission for five years and had
undergone major refits in 1963 and 1965. Between 1966 and 1971,
VIKRANT participated in flying exercises whenever she was not afflicted
with defects:

(a) Despite her refit in 1965, VIKRANT experienced problems on the

catapult, the arrestor gear and the boilers in 1966.

(b) Throughout 1967, problems continued to recur on the catapult

and the arrestor gear. In mid 1967, she suffered a burst boiler and
underwent a long refit from end 1967 till early 1969.

(c) In mid 1970, cracks were detected in the water drum of one of
her four boilers and she was laid up in Bombay.

(d) By mid 1971, both short and long term remedial measures had
been instituted and VIKRANT was made operational to steam on
only three boilers at lower speeds.
 Seahawks

Additional Seahawk Fighter Aircraft

In addition to the initial order of 23 Seahawks acquired with the VIKRANT.

23 more reconditioned Seahawks had been purchased from Britain -
seven in 1962, ten in 1963 and six in 1964.

In 1965, an agreement was signed for the purchase of 28 more Seahawks

which were being phased out by the Federal German Navy. These aircraft
arrived in 1966. Ten were day fighter bombers (MK 100) and eighteen
were all weather aircraft (MK 101).

In 1968, Seahawks carried out DART target towing trials and the first
ever live firing sorties at towed banner targets.

Material State of Seahawks

From 1963 onwards, the Seahawks had started suffering the

consequences of the temperatures in India being higher than in Britain.
The rear fuel tank fire warnings started operating with greater frequency.
In 1966 and 1967, there were a large number of fire warning light
incidents.

In 1968, a large number of short service Commission entry officers

started joining the Air Arm. They were keen to become fighter pilots and
often the material state of the Seahawks could not withstand the
demands the enthusiastic pilots placed on the aging aircraft.

Between 1966 and 1970, Lt Cdr (later Commodore) DJ Shahane was the
Deputy Air Engineer Officer of 300 Squadron then Air Engineer officer of
the 551 Squadron and then Air Engineer Officer of 300 Squadron. He
recalls :

"In 1966, the availability of the Seahawks was better from the
carrier, not so much from ashore. On the carrier also, there were
frequent problems of non-availability of hot ends and frequent
hydraulic leaks, the canopy flying away or canopy being loose or
inoperative etc. There was also the problem of shortage of
maintenance personnel, which resolved somewhat after two to
three years.

"Regarding the hot ends, the audio indication of the rear tank fire
warning lights had not come into being. When that was introduced,
within an year or so we found that the aircrew developed
considerable confidence in the rear tank fire warning light system.
"Another experience was that when the Seahawks operated from
the carrier, there were fewer instances of either rear tank fire
warning light or high JPT or saddle tank burst. When the Seahawks
were operating from ashore, and particularly during the practice
MADDL sorties, we had saddle tank bursts coming up very often.
(Footnote: When practising repeated dummy deck landings on
shore airfield, pilots needed to use higher engine power for
sustained periods).

"The saddle tank was a small tank of 40 gallons capacity which sort
of straddled the hottest part of the Seahawk. During the MADDLs,
we found that this area got heated up considerably and we had a
few cases of saddle tanks bursting, causing structural damage. This
could also lead to fuel leaks and fire in the rear tank area. Actually
the saddle tank, having a capacity of only 40 gallons, used to get
consumed within say the first ten minutes of the sortie. So a
conscious decision was taken to remove the saddle tanks
completely and make up for this 40 gallon shortfall of fuel by
fuelling the drop tanks with 20 gallons each. Thereafter this
problem reduced considerably, though there were a few cases when
the saddle tank bay itself showed some sign of explosion.

"Over the next few years, while operating from ashore, the
operating procedures were changed. The max engine RPM for
operating from ashore was reduced from 12700 to 12400. From the
carrier of course they continued to operate at 12700. This appears
to have reduced the problem considerably.

"In early 67, the German Seahawks MK 100 and MK 101 joined the
Seahawk fleet. Apart from the Seahawks themselves, we got a very
large number of spares from the German Navy. Thereafter, with the
improved spares position and with German Seahawks, the
availability of the Seahawks went up considerabily.

"The period 1968 to 1970 was one of the finest periods of Seahawk
operations. When I joined in November 1968, we had almost 20
Seahawks in the squadron. In February 1969, we embarked in
VIKRANT after a gap of over a year, since VIKRANT had been under
refit. We embarked with 18 Seahawks and the availability was
extremely good. This was the time when we had Mark 100s and
101s joining the earlier Mark 6s . This was also the time when the
manpower position had improved considerably. We had a fairly
good and adequate maintenance crowd in the squadron.
Throughout my one and a half years, we were able to keep the
operational and material state of the Seahawks extremely high.

"We had two fatal accidents during the period, but only one of them
could have been due to a material failure. The other one was most
 likely due to pilot disorientation. We undertook daring operations in
flying. Somehow I felt that the air crew and the pilots were more
confident in flying Seahawks at that time than I had seen them at
any other time".

Replacements for the Seahawk Aircraft

With Seahawks having been phased out from the Royal Navy in the early
1960s, the Indian Navy was constantly on the look out for their
replacements. The American Navy's A-4 Skyhawk appeared to be the
most suitable, but political considerations precluded their acquisition from
the USA. In view of the design limitations of VIKRANT's catapult, a study
had been carried out whether the British GNAT fighter aircraft, which was
being indigenously produced by HAL for the Air Force, could be
`navalised'. It was not found cost effective.

In 1966, after a major Defence Review, the British Government decided

to disband fixed wing naval aviation and its Navy's aircraft carriers. The
British Navy managed however to safeguard its air arm by obtaining
sanction for the "Through Deck Cruiser". This was basically a flat topped
ship, without catapult or arrestor gear which would operate the
short/vertical take off and land (STOL/VTOL) Harrier aircraft which were
then under development. The subsequent addition of a ski-jump in the
bows enhanced the aircraft operating potential of the ship.

The ground version of the Harrier entered service in the Royal Air Force in
1969. The US Marine Corps ordered the Harriers for their amphibious
assault ships. The Royal Navy then asked British Aerospace to develop a
maritime version of the Harrier (to be called Sea Harrier) for the roles of
shipborne air defence and strike, with a specific requirement that it be
able

to withstand the corrosive marine environment. The Indian Navy decided

to await the developments of the Sea Harrier.

Alize Anti Submarine and Reconnaissance Aircraft

Twelve Alize aircraft had been acquired with VIKRANT. As in the case of
the Seahawks, difficulties were experienced in obtaining additional Alize's,
because the French Navy was phasing them out. Eventually, in 1966/67
the French Navy agreed to release two Alizes.
In the anti submarine role, the Alizes were fitted with radar to detect
submarine periscopes/snorts and a direction finding system to detect
submarine radar transmissions. For attacking a submarine the Alizes used
sonobuoys to track the submarine and depth charges to damage the
submarine. The two key elements were the availabilty of submarines to
exercise with and the availability of large numbers of sonobuoys to
achieve proficiency in tracking. Until, Indian submarines arrived in 1968,
the Alizes did not have enough opportunities to exercise with submarines.

In 1965, the Alizes exercised with the British Submarine ASTUTE off
Madras. In 1967, the Alizes exercised with the British submarine
ONSLAUGHT off Cochin. After the submarines acquired from Russia
arrived from 1968 onwards, the tempo of Alize anti submarine exercise
steadily increased and made possible the sea trials of the sonobuoys
which had been by then been developed indigeneously.

From 1965 onwards, attention focussed on carrying out trials on

indigenous air dropped mines and on improving the anti submarine
capability of the Alizes by fitting a sonobuoys recording system. The
latter required:

(a) Comparitive evaluation of the sonobuoy recorders developed by

INPL on French Julie recorders.

(b) Obtaining the latest JULIE sonobuoy recorders to be fitted in the

two Alizes being acquired from France.

(c) Obtaining JULIE systems for retrofitting in all the earlier Alizes.

(d) Importing the minimum essential requirements of the latest

sonobuoys from France.

(e) Developing and producing indigenous sonobuoys, which could

cope with India's hot and humid tropical conditions, as well as
minimise the outflow of precious foreign exchange on these
expensive expendable items.

In August 1968, the two Julie fitted Alizes arrived from France, just in
time for exercises with the submarine KALVARI which had arrived from
Russia.

To increase their effectiveness in the reconnaissance role, the Alizes

started carrying out the following exercises from 1966 onwards:

(a) Joint tactical exercises with Air Force Liberator MR aircraft,

Canberra bombers, Hunters and HF 24 fighters in which Alizes
homed these aircraft on to their targets.
 (b) Trials with the newly acquired Swedish LEPUS flare bombs to
illuminate targets at night for attack by Seahawks.

During this period, Alizes carried out electronic surveillance missions

whenever and wherever required.

By 1970, the Alizes were getting older and defects were becoming
chronic.

Helicopters

The period 1966 to 1971 saw a phenomenal increase in the variety and
capability of helicopters entering service :

a) Seakings. The acquisition of the new French Daphne class

submarines by the Pakistan Navy increased the urgency of acquiring
anti submarine helicopters. In 1968, a proposal was made for
acquiring 12 Seakings. Sanction for the acquisition of 6 Seakings
was accorded in 1969 and in 1970 an order was placed for their
delivery in 1971. Concurrently an order was also placed for the
acquisition of the MK 44 anti submarine homing torpedoes. On 17
Apr 1971, the Seakings Squadron was commissioned as INAS 330.
Between May 1971 and 1971, the Seakings were involved in the
following activities:

- Conversion flying

- Maintenance courses at NATS

- Evaluation by Tactical School of Seaking capabilities and

limitations and promulgation of preliminary Tactical
Instructions

The preliminary evaluation was to prove misleading. The first group who
had returned from UK had only done familiarisation flying. At Indian
insistence, the British Navy was giving the second group tactical flying
experience but this group only arrived in India in October 1971 and were
deployed in Bombay. Meanwhile NHQ had based its assessment of
Seaking utilisation on the limited information that had been given to the
first group and tasked the Seakings for anti submarine patrols off Bombay
harbour. To cap it all, the Tactical School's Seaking dockets were given
high security classification. Consequently, the people who mattered re-
mained in ignorance of Seaking performance and potential. The defensive
utilisation of the Seaking helicopters in the 1971 War was the cumulative
result of all these factors).
Seaking availability was low during May, June and July 1971. In August,
NHQ lifted the ban on lowering Sonar 195 and the evaluation of Seaking's
dunking Sonar 195 commenced in earnest. Since the MK 44 torpedoes
were not yet available, flight trials were started for using depth charges.
In end August, the Squadron started night flying. By October, two
Seakings were based at Bombay. In November, this had increased to four
Seakings. The remaining two were at Cochin.

MATCH Alouettes. The Leander Class frigates were designed to

embark Multi-role Anti Submarine Torpedo Carrying Helicopters,
whose acronym became `MATCH' helicopters. After the decision had
been taken for the Army, Navy and Air Force to have a common
helicopter, the French Alouette was chosen for indigenous
manufacture at HAL. The Navy's first three helicopters were
imported from France. The remainder were supplied by HAL.

SAR Alouettes. The Search and Rescue (SAR) Alouette helicopter

had entered the service with VIKRANT in 1961. The survey ship
DARSHAK, which had been designed to embark a helicopter and had
entered service in 1964, first embarked an Alouette in 1970 to help
survey the Gulf of Kutch. The tanker DEEPAK, which was
commissioned in 1967, was designed to embark an Alouette. By
March 1969, `Logistic Support' had been added to the Alouette's
`Search and Rescue' role. On 15 March 1969, the Helicopter
Squadron was commissioned as INAS 321. It comprised the SAR
flights of VIKRANT, HANSA, GARUDA and DEEPAK.

Helicopter Training School

On 15 September 1971, the Helicopter Training School was commissioned

as INAS 561 to provide basic training on Hughes 300 helicopters acquired
from the USA and provide advanced training on the MATCH and SAR role
Alouttes produced by HAL.

INAS 551

As the Vampires became older and less available, the squadron started
using Seahawks. Since the Seahawks were themselves ageing, seven
indigenous "Kiran" jet trainer aircraft (HJT-16) were ordered from HAL. By
mid 1971, all seven Kirans had been delivered. As Kirans joined, the
Seahawks were returned to INAS 300 reserve stock.

NAVAL AIR OPERATIONS IN THE 1971 INDO PAKISTAN WAR

Bay of Bengal
The achievements of VIKRANT and her air squadrons have been described
in the Chapter on the 1971 War. The squadrons embarked VIKRANT in
August, senior experienced pilots were inducted and aircraft holdings
raised to 18 Seahawks and 5 Alizes. They worked up in the Bay of Bengal
and were ready for operations by November.

Between 4 and 14 December, the Seahawks by day and the Alizes by day
and by night struck targets at Cox's Bazar, Chittagong, Khulna, Chalna,
Mongla, Barisal, Do Hazari, Chiringa and Bakarganj. Using 500 lb bombs,
rockets and guns, they struck airfields, harbours, ammunition dumps,
gunboats, armed merchant ships and troop positions. Despite damage by
small arms fire, all aircraft were kept airworthy. The Alizes proved most
useful in assisting ships of the Eastern Fleet in contraband control.

Lt Cdr (later Rear Admiral) SK Gupta, was the Commanding Officer of the
Seahawk squadron on board VIKRANT. He recalls:

"VIKRANT with her squadrons was ready for action since November,
having learnt to operate aircraft at marginal conditions of wind and
low speeds and with the most experienced Seahawk pilots
embarked on board.

"The initial Seahawk attacks were by eight aircraft with two aircraft
providing air defence cover. The attacks knocked out the ATC and
other airfield installations at Cox's Bazar. Similarly, Chittagong
harbour and gunboats in the vicinity were sucessfully attacked.

"Thereafter, for the next 10 days, over 300 sorties were flown
between the Seahawks and Alizes destroying pre-planned and
opportunity targets. Enemy ground fire began to get more accurate
and several aircraft were damaged, some requiring emergency
landings on board, with the ship about 90 to 100 miles away. The
Alizes were busy doing recce sorties by day and bombing the
runways at Cox's Bazar at night. The Seahawks were very accurate
in destroying small targets in the city, merchant ships in harbour
and those that tried to sail out".

OPERATIONAL SORTIES FLOWN IN DECEMBER 1971

Contra
Anti Mongla Hothazari
band
Sub- Cox's Chitta Chalna Dohazari/ Night Arme
Date CAP Khulna Control
marine Bazar gong Pussur Barisal/ Strike Recc
Patrols River Bakarganj

4
4 5 AZ 8 HK 8 HK - - - - - -
HK
5 - 3 AZ 2 AZ 4AZ -
 3 4 HK 4 HK -
6 - - 4 HK 7 HK - 1AZ -
HK 1HK 3AZ 1AZ
-
2 - -
7 - 2 HK 4 HK - 2 - -
HK 2AZ 2AZ
AZ
8 - - - 4HK - 3AZ
9 - - - - 1AZ 7HK 2AZ 3HK
10 - - 5AZ - 2AZ 1AZ
11 - - 2AZ - 1AZ 1AZ 1AZ 2AZ
12 - 1 AZ - 25HK -
13 - - - 16HK 1AZ 1AZ
2HK 5HK 3AZ
14 - - - 1AZ 2AZ
1AZ 1AZ 1AZ

Hours
Total Sorties
Flown
Seahawk 128 108
Alize 63 158
The vertical positioning need to be adjusted
downwards.

The Seahawk Squadron won one Maha Vir Chakra, five Vir Chakras, one
Nao Sena Medal and three Mentions in Despatches.

The Alize Squadron won six Vir Chakras, six Nao Sena Medals and three
Mentions in Despatches.

Arabian Sea

On the West Coast of India:

(a) Alizes operating from Bombay and Jamnagar carried out anti
submarine and reconnaissance patrols. On 10 December, a Pakistan
Air Force Starfighter, returning homeward, happened to sight an
Alize and shot it down with a Sidewinder missile. All three crew
were lost.

(b) Seakings operating from Santacruz Bombay carried out anti

submarine patrols of the approaches to Bombay harbour. After
 KHUKRI was sunk on 9 December, the Seakings carried out a few
anti submarine searches staging from the disused airfield at Diu.

(c) Alouettes, operating from INS KUNJALI in Bombay, provided air

surveillance of the inner harbour to deter/detect clandestine
underwater attacks by chariots and frogmen.

(d) Aircraft of the training squadrons INAS 551 and 550 carried out
coastal surveillance off Goa and Cochin respectively.

(e) Requisitioned civilian flying club aircraft assisted coastal

surveillance in their local areas.

Prior to the war, two naval pilots, Lieutenant (later Vice Admiral) Arun
Prakash and Lieutenant (later Rear Admiral) P Debrass had been deputed
to the Air Force as part of an ongoing exchange programme. During the
war, the former flew Hunter aircraft in front line sorties while the latter
unfortunately was hospitalised for a serious illness. Lt Arun Prakash won
the Vir Chakra during these operations. He destroyed two C 130's.

DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 1972 AND 1975

The Aircraft Carrier.

After the war ended, VIKRANT undertook three crucial requirements

before starting her long refit to attend to her boiler problems :

(a) Complete the training of the new aircrews which had been
interrupted in September 1971, when senior experienced aircrew
had been inducted.

(b) Carry out Seaking flying trials to finalise what was required to
be done during the forthcoming refit to enable Seakings to operate
from VIKRANT.

(c) Carry out Harrier trials to establish, "prima facie", its ability to
operate from VIKRANT's fight deck.

In Aug 72, VIKRANT started a three year refit during which

(a) The boilers were refurbished.

(b) Seaking operating and maintenance facilities were installed.

 (c) The communication systems were modernised and indigeneous
communication equipment installed.

(d) All electronic compartments and test rooms were air

conditioned.

VIKRANT become operational in May 1975. Seahawks, Alizes and

Seakings resumed flying from VIKRANT and participating in Fleet
exercises.

Aircraft

The Seahawks

Between 1972 and 1974, the Seahawks, operating from ashore suffered a
number of fatal accidents. The problems were similar to those
experienced earlier with fire warning lights, but the aircrew were new
entrants. It took some time for them to gain experience. By 1974,
Seahawk spares become available in abundance. The firewalls were
changed on almost all aircraft and Seahawks serviceability improved.

Harrier Trials on Board VIKRANT in 1972.

In July 1972, British Aerospace, sent their demonstrator G-VTOL Harrier

to India for landing trials on board the VIKRANT. The trials showed that
VIKRANT would be able to operate VTOL type aircraft.

Alizes.

In March 1973, a French team visited the squadron regarding

refurbishment of the Alizes. The production line for Alizes had stopped
long ago and the French Navy had resorted to "refurbishing" their Alizes.
It was decided that the Indian Alizes should be similarly refurbished to
stretch their life into the mid 1980s. Refurbishment commenced in 1975
and completed in 1978.

Seakings

As a result of their extensive flying and limited maintenance in the 1971

war, the availability of Seakings fell sharply. It took nearly two years for
the situation to get better. Specialists came from Britain to improve
detection capability of the Seaking sonars. It took them over a year to
isolate the causes and implement the remedies. The numerous other
problems that accompany the induction of a technologically sophisticated
new helicopter also took time to resolve.
In 1973, three new Seakings arrived, followed by three more in 1974,
enabling the commisioning of the second Seaking squadron INAS 336.

Thereafter, Seaking availabilty and efficiency improved considerably. With

a larger number of submarines also available on both coasts, the
Seakings were able to coordinate their anti submarine search and attack
tactics and procedures with those of the Russian Petyas and the British
Leanders.

The following table gives an overview of the delays that had to be

suffered in the induction of this potent new weapon platform:

Seaking Performance Flying

Period
Serviceability of Role Equipment Hours
January 1972
Low Poor Limited
to July 1972
Commenced Sea trials
of Sonar. Performance
August 1972 to
Low poor (Note: No Limited
October 1972
workshop facilities, no
spares)
November
1972 to July Improved Poor Limited
1973
-Three new Seakings -Commenced trials
August 1973 to Improved
arrived and evaluations
November
-Serviceability -Workshops and test
1973
improved equipment set up
-Intensive anti
Good
December submarine exercises
Good
1973 onwards -MK 44
torpedo evaluation
- Three new Seakings - Depth
July 1974 Very Good
arrived charge practices
-INAS 336
commissioned -Evaluations of
- Seakings embarked tactical antisubmarine
in VIKRANT cooperation between:-
- First Flyex from -Seaking and
September
offshore rig SAGAR Petyas - Seaking Very Good
1974-1975
SAMRAT and Leanders
- Seakings operated - Seaking and Alizes
from Advance - Seaking and
Landing Ground in Seahawks
Saurashtra
Alouettes/Chetaks

INAS 331. The MATCH flight for the first Leander class frigate, NILGIRI,
was commissioned as INAS 331 on 15 May 1972.

In the light of experienced gained in the 1971 war of how useful the light
Alouette helicopter could be, Alouette flights were sanctioned for a
number of ships. Apart from the first four Leanders and the frigates
TRISHUL and TALWAR, which embarked the MATCH Alouettes, SAR
Alouettes were sanctioned for the frigates BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS, BETWA,
the new training ship TIR and the new survey ships.

Kirans

The Kirans started flying from HANSA in 1972. As experience was

consolidated in operating and maintaining Kirans, their serviceability
improved considerably.

MARITIME RECONNAISSANCE

Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) was two facets:

(a) In earlier days, the role of MR was to search large sea areas by
day and by night to locate and track enemy warships and merchant
ships and home air strikes and naval ships against them.

(b) With the increase in the number of submarines, the MR role

evolved into MRASW to search, locate, track and attack enemy
submarines on surface and submerged, and co-operate with own
surface forces in anti submarine warfare operations.

The system inherited from the British, was that the Air Force operated MR
aircraft for naval tasks.

The MR arm of the Indian Air Force was formed from World War II
Liberator aircraft. The first Liberator Squadron (No 5) was raised in
November 1948. Though old and inadequately equipped for the task,
Liberators did useful work as a MR squadron as well as Air Sea rescue. In
1961, the IAF acquired seven Super Constellation (Super Connie) aircraft
from Air India for conversion to the MR role.

During the hostilities with Pakistan in 1965, the inadequacy of MR become

very apparent. During the Kutch operations in April-May 1965, every
available MR aircraft was deployed to search for Pakistan naval forces but
without result. During the war in September 1965, the MR effort available
was barely able to cover the approaches to Bombay and that too only in
conjunction with VIKRANT's carrier based aircraft flown from Santa Cruz.
Despite the IAF's best efforts, the maximum that could be provided during
the operations in May and September 1965 was about 10 hours per day
as against a requirement of 80 hours per day in the Arabian Sea alone.

In 1966, the Navy recommended to the Government that the

responsibility for MR and the command and control of shore based MR
aircraft be transferred from the Air Force to the Navy. The Air Force was
not agreeable and preferred status quo. The reasons advanced for and
against this proposal were as follows:

- The Navy's position was that enemy ship recognition at sea and
subsequent co-ordination of tactical action with co-operating surface
forces required such extensive training that it was most cost
effective for MR aircrews to be naval officers familiar with the sea. It
was for this reason that in all the major navies of the world (USA,
Russia, Japan, China, France, Germany and Holland), MR aircraft
were controlled and operated solely by the Navy. The only excep-
tions were Britain, India and Australia. In the early years of the
British Royal Air Force, MR had been solely the responsibility of the
Air Force. After the First World War, the Coastal Command of the
Royal Air Force had been formed from the Royal Naval Air Service
and was largely manned by naval aviators who were transferred en
bloc to the RAF Coastal Command at birth. Naval experience had
therefore been available to the RAF and it was on this foundation
that the RAF Coastal Command evolved. The Commonwealth
countries had unquestioningly adopted the British model. There was
no reason for its continuance.

- The Air Force position was that in the British Manual of Joint
Operations, MR was a joint responsibility, that this system had
stood the test in Britain and Australia, that there would be greater
flexibility in aircraft utilisation if MR remained with the Air Force,
(since the aircraft could be used for other roles as well) and that in
the 1965 operations, the Air Force had met the Navy's MR
requirement to the extent possible within the inadequate resources
available.

After prolonged discussions, it was decided to maintain the status quo.

The Air Force was to remain responsible for MR as long as the existing
Super Constellation aircraft were in service. The question of command
and control of MR would be reviewed when considering the induction of
new MR aircraft.

In subsequent years:
 (a) The IAF continued to operate the Liberators and the Super
Constellations from Poona and Bangalore.

(b) The Joint Sea Air Warfare Committee kept the augmentation of
the MR squadrons under continuous consideration.

(c) Every major Fleet exercise repeatedly highlighted the number of

air attacks that were wasted, time and again, because of mistaken
identity.

It became unmistakably clear that the correct identification of ships at sea

required extremely high skills of aircrews to distinguish between and
positively identify own, enemy and neutral ships.

Evaluation of the French Atlantic MRASW Aircraft

In October 1968, an Atlantic gave a flight demonstration in Dabolim. In

August 1969, a joint Navy Air Force team evaluated the French Navy
Atlantic anti submarine reconnaissance aircraft. The Atlantic operated
from the Air Force station at Poona and the evaluation was carried out
with submarine KALVARI. The Atlantic was found to be suitable. A special
study group was appointed to further examine the matter, after which a
decision could be taken whether the Navy or the Air Force would operate
MRASW aircraft.

Decision for Navy to Acquire MRASW Aircraft

After the 1971 war, in which KHUKRI was sunk by a Pakistan Navy
submarine, the Navy pressed the requirement for a versatile MRASW
aircraft which, with a good radar, could rapidly search a required area and
be capable of attacking and sinking a submarine located by it. In addition
to its primary role of anti submarine warfare, such a maritime aircraft
would also meet the surveillance needs of the Navy over large ocean
areas and thus act as the eyes of the Fleet over the horizon. In an anti
submarine operation, MRASW aircraft, anti submarine helicopters and anti
submarine ships had to act as a single weapon system. This required a
high degree of coordination and similar mental response to submarine
evasive action. This could only be done if MRASW aircraft were operated
by the Navy. The Navy therefore urged the Government for an early
decision to acquire a suitable MRASW aircraft to be operated by the Navy.

In May 1973, the Government accepted the Navy's reasoning and

approved in principle the acquisition of four shore based MRASW aircraft.
In September 1973, a Naval team evaluated the British Nimrod aircraft in
Britain. However the serious financial situation after the oil crisis of
October 1973 ruled out the purchase in foreign exchange of either the
Atlantic or the Nimrod.

Subsequent efforts focussed on ascertaining whether IL 38 MRASW

aircraft could be obtained from Russia. The Russian Navy was reluctant to
spare these aircraft from their inventory because they needed these for
their own Navy. After persuasion, the Russian side agreed to spare a few
aircraft.

In February 1975, the agreement was signed for the acquisition of three
IL 38s from Russia.

In June 1975 Government took the decision to vest the command, control
and operation of the MRASW IL 38's with the Navy.

Shri Govind Narain, then Defence Secretary recalls:

"The control of the air reconnaissance system over the sea was in
the hands of the Air Force. The Navy wanted this control to be
transferred to itself. This matter had been pending with the
Government for nearly 10 years and it could not get resolved. In
the 1971 war, all the three wings of the defence Forces played a
very significant part and all concerned could observe their
respective roles. The performance of the Navy in Karachi was
brilliant and the whole country was very impressed.

"Pressure continued to mount from the naval side that they would
do even better if their operators felt more confident, if the air recce
system was also within their own control. On the other hand, the Air
Force pleaded that they had all the airfield arrangements, they had
all the know how, they knew which aircraft from which country
could be best for what purpose, they had the maintenance facilities.
All these were very strong points.

"When this matter came repeatedly to the Defence Ministry, what

we did was to send the whole problem to the Committee of the
three Chiefs of Staff and told them to deliberate afresh on these
problems. We gave them two months time to come back to the
Defence Ministry with an agreed solution. Whatever agreed solution
was found would be acceptable to the Defence Ministry.

"At the end of the two months, no solution was forthcoming. In

individual discussions, the three Chiefs expressed their helplessness
that no agreement could be reached. We gave them another two
months time to reconsider this matter as it was very urgent, very
important and required their considered views. But again the matter
 remained with them for two more months and there was no solution
forthcoming. Then we discussed with the three Chiefs that if they
could not reach any conclusion, would they like the Defence Ministry
to consider the whole matter objectively and find a solution. All the
three Chiefs agreed that this should be done.

Thus the matter came to be considered in the Defence Ministry. We

collected the necessary information from the various countries of
the world which had developed a system of maritime
reconnaissance. Then we analysed our own position. We went into
great details of the points of view of the Navy. We went into great
details of the points of view of the Air Force. Then we in the
Defence Ministry prepared an elaborate note of 20 or 25 pages,
putting down all points of view and reached the conclusion that it
would be more prudent if maritime reconnaissance was put under
the control of the Navy but the maintenance of the aircraft could be
left with the Air Force. Naturally the Navy was jubilant and the Air
Force was unhappy, but this solution was accepted by the Defence
Minister, by the Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet and finally
by the Prime Minister and was enforced as a Government order."

Transfer of the Super Constellations to the Navy.

In early 1976, the Air Force wrote to the Navy offering to immediately
hand over the Super Constellation MR aircraft. The offer had a proviso
that should the Navy find that they could not cope with the Super
Constellations, then the IL 38's should revert to the Air Force.

Admiral Tahiliani recalls:

"On the 5th of April 1976, at the Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting
in Delhi, an offer was made by the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief
Marshal Moolgavkar, to Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Cursetji,
that with the Government having decided that the Navy will operate
the IL 38s, (which were not due to arrive till the middle of 1977),
the Navy should now take over the Super Connies.

"After a certain amount of discussion within the Navy, we naturally

decided that we were going to do so. I first came to know about it
on the day after, that is the 6th of April, when then General Raina,
who was Chairman Chiefs of Staff, came and spent a day with us at
sea on board VIKRANT. At lunch he said "What would be your
reaction if I was to tell you that the Air Force has said that you can
take over the Super Connies?" I said "Sir, there must be some catch
in it". Then he related to me the discussion at the Chiefs of Staff
 Committee meeting. I said "We must take them over. There is not
the slightest doubt in my mind." He said "How would you manage
the maintenance and the flying part?" I said "We will give our
aircrew conversions. In three months they will be flying the aircraft.
Major maintenance is done by Air India and that is no hassle for us.

"I must pay tribute to the first team led by the late Cdr Ravi Dhir
who did a magnificent job, because the loaned Air Force aircrews
and ground crew were all withdrawn, after their initial loan period of
six months. We had requested the Air Force to let them stay with us
a little longer, because our aircrew had not acquired enough cloud
flying, or experience in adverse conditions for which they were not
rated. However the Air Force withdrew every single person of theirs
at the end of six months. This first team got themselves rated,
gained all the experience very quickly and we were flying the Super
Connies as well, if not better than our Air Force friends. Purely in
passing, I will mention that when the Super Connies were
transferred from Air India to the Air Force, Air India crews had been
loaned to the Air Force for a period of 20 months.

"So, although our Air Force friends might have thought that they
were going to frighten the Navy into accepting a commitment we
would not be able to cope with, in the bargain they gave us an
opportunity, by grabbing which we were able, once and for all, to
put this question of the operation of long range maritime ASW
aircraft behind us".

Air Chief Marshal Moolgavkar, then Chief of the Air Staff recalls:

"The control of Maritime Operations had been with the Air Force
ever since Independence. Successive Air Chiefs were able to keep it
with the Air Force, because they felt that air effort should be a
single point responsibility. During the time of my predecessor, Air
Chief Marshal OP Mehra, the question came up again very strongly
and it was decided that when the new IL-38 Russian MRASW
aircraft came, then these would be handed over to the Navy and
put under their control. At that time, we were operating the Super
Constellation aircraft in this role.

"At the beginning of my tenure, I felt that it would be the right and
correct thing to do, that the Navy should be given Super Connies
now, a year and a half in advance, so that they could familiarise to
operate heavy aircraft. Any mistakes the Navy made or any
accidents would be on these old aircraft and not on the new IL 38's.
Surely this is reasonable thinking.

"In this context, I made the offer to hand over the Super
Constellations to the Naval Chief, if I recall right, in the Defence
 Secretary Banerjee's office. The CNS, Jal Cursetji, was in fact taken
aback, asked me if I was feeling alright. I said "Yes, I am making
this offer because I feel this is the correct thing to do". He did not
quite believe it, so I said "Shall I put it down in writing ?. I will send
a note to Defence Secretary with a copy to you, saying that we are
prepared to hand over the Super Connies immediately to the Navy.
In fact, I suggest you take these aircraft now and we will send
training teams, pilots and technicians for this.

"But I also mentioned to CNS that "If you find you cannot cope the
Super Connies and you have a problem, then the same should be
returned to the Air Force. This would be surely be in the national
interest." Jal was a gentleman and he agreed. He said "You have
my word". I said "Fine. The battle is closed".

"That is how the whole thing was done. Naturally, the IL 38 got
reflected in the Naval budget because the Navy were going to get it.
The Air Force would not want to pay for these then.

"Certainly some of us, and certainly myself, realised that the Navy
had a point that MRASW should come under naval control and
should be operated by navy pilots and maintained by naval
personnel. If I may be utterly frank, I think what the Air Force
feared was that after acquiring MR aircraft, the Navy would want to
expand their carrier fleet and get more and more aircraft and
perhaps try to take on some of the Air Force roles like the air
defence of Bombay. The Air Force felt that their budget would be
slashed and the Navy would get another carrier and more modern
aircraft.

"I think the approach in the past had been that we should nip naval
suggestions in the bud and say no to everything including the MR. I
felt that "Let us handle each role by itself. Let the Navy have the MR
and we will see in the future regarding the air defence of Bombay,
whether the Navy can control it or do it better than we can." So that
is how the decision about the immediate transfer of MR was taken. I
think it was the right decision. All the Air Force crew, the pilots, the
technicians, etc were briefed and told very clearly that everything
possible should be done to train the Navy personnel quickly and
seriously with the intention of early transfer of the Super Connies."

Vice Admiral (then Lt Cdr) Arun Prakash recalls:

"The Navy had been pecking away at the Government with its claim
to take over MR and we had more than adequate justification. The
Air Chief decided that he would by a "coup de main", once and for
all, put an end to the Navy's claims to MR. He suddenly turned
round and said "All right, I will hand over aircraft belonging to No 6
Squadron Air Force. You have six months to prove that you can fly
and maintain that machine. If the Navy cannot do this, then the
whole thing falls back to the Air Force". It was something like
"double or quits". It could mean that the Navy would also lose the
Ilyushin 38 MR/ASW aircraft.

"It was quite a challenge, because all our experience as far as flying
and maintenance was concerned was confined to relatively small
turbo prop or jet aircraft which were single engined. Now the Super
Constellation was a giant (144,000 pound) machine with four piston
engines. She had started off life as an airliner with Air-India, and
when the aircraft were superseded by Boeing 707s they were
handed over to the Indian Air Force for maritime reconnaissance.

"So the Air Chief did take a very calculated gamble. No naval
aircrew had any experience of flying anything more than medium
sized twin engine aircraft, and that too was way back in the days of
the Sealand in the early 1950s. Most of us were single engine pilots,
most of our observers had only experience of flying over the sea
where they were more tactically oriented in terms of anti-submarine
warfare and so on. Whereas flying these four-engined behemoths
required skills, both of piloting as well as of navigation, of an
entirely different kind. For example, if you had to go and land at an
international airfield, the procedures and the holding patterns, the
R/T natter and the circuits etc were so complicated, that we really
had no experience of this. So it was not without a fair amount of
trepidation that all of us gathered in Goa in early 1976 and we were
deputed from there to proceed to No 2 Wing at Poona.

"The Squadron Commander (Designate) was Cdr Ravi Dhir, the

Senior Pilot was Lt Cdr Bhide and there were two more pilots, I
being one of them. Similarly, there were four co-pilots and about 6
to 8 observers. We all gathered in Goa and proceeded to No 2 Wing,
Poona, where we were given a short course by the Air Force under
the aegis of No 6 Squadron in basic flying procedures, the technical
details of the aircraft and so on. The maintenance crew started their
class room and practical training at the same time. After that, on
completion of this brief course, all of us naval aircrew plus some Air
Force flying instructors, navigation instructors and a core team of
Air Force maintenance personnel were bundled off to Goa. Here we
gathered once again into an "ad hoc" squadron which was given the
designation INAS 312, although not yet commissioned. We gathered
all our sailors who had any experience at all of piston engined
aircraft and multi engined aircraft and put them in the hands of the
IAF technical crew.

"Now we were quite clear in our minds that we had a short lease of
time to show that we could handle this aircraft, both from the flying
 angle as well as the maintenance aspects. Fortunately, the Air Force
crew who came along with us as a training team had no qualms or
reservations at all. They were totally dedicated to their task, which
was to train the naval personnel to take over, regardless of what
the higher Air Force authorities had in mind. So we got down to our
work with a will, and within about six weeks, the first Naval pilot
flew solo and that was Lt Cdr Bhide who had jumped from single
engine jets to a four engined aircraft. That I think was quite an
achievement. Slowly and progressively, all four pilots went solo.
Similarly our observers managed to master the art of navigation
over land and of procedures and let down into busy international
airports, which was quite an achievement. One fine day, we found
that we had virtually taken over the squadron. A formal
commissioning ceremony was then organised where both Air Chief
Marshal Moolgavkar and Admiral Jal Cursetji came down to Goa and
the squadron was commissioned as INAS 312.

"We gathered from informal conversation and discussions with our

Air Force colleagues who had worked with us that this was not as
per the Air Force game plan. Actually, they had anticipated that
with our background and our levels of experience, we would find it
extremely difficult to get on top of this aircraft; certainly so in six
months. They had estimated that 12 to 18 months was the
minimum that the Navy would need to be able to fly this aircraft
and handle all the maintenance operations that were involved. So I
presume, this came as an unpleasant surprise to the Air Force that
we were ready, willing and able to take on this task."

Commodore Shahane (then Cdr) was the Squadron Air Engineer Officer in
HANSA from 1976 to 1978. He recalls:

"A large contingent had gone away to Russia for training and
induction of the IL 38s. Technical manpower was minimal at HANSA
and in the squadrons and in VIKRANT. Then we were suddenly
faced with the problem of sending personnel for training and
inducting a huge MR aircraft like the Super Constellation.

"At HANSA there were tremendous challenges for developing the

infrastructure facilities for the Super Constellations, which were
quite different from those which were already in hand for the IL
38s. I remember being on 10 boards at a time for developing all
these facilities. We were also very apprehensive about how we
would be able to operate the Super Constellations because the Air
Force was not in a position to give us things like aircraft jacks and
other support equipment. While dealing with the Air Force however,
we found them very helpful at the squadron level. And the Air Force
technical and operational staff and the pilots and the aircrew who
had come to Goa were extremely co-operative in helping us with
 the maintenance of the Super Constellations. By and large, after the
initial teething problems were resolved, not much difficulty was
experienced."

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1975

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

VIKRANT underwent two modernisation refits:

(a) 1979 to 1981 In the first phase of her modernisation, her boilers
were renewed, new radars were fitted, facilities were installed to
operate the Sea Harriers, new anti aircraft guns were fitted, the
communication systems were modernised, the air conditioning was
extended, and the cata-pult and arrestor gear were overhauled
since Alizes would continue to operate.

(b) 1987 to 1989 In the second phase of modernisation the

catapault and arrestor gear were removed, a ski jump was fitted in
the bows to assist the Sea Harriers to take off, facilities were
installed to operate the newer technologically advanced Seaking
helicopters and their new missiles and torpedoes.

VIKRANT continued to operate till 1994, after which she was laid up and
eventually decommisioned in 1997.

The Second Aircraft Carrier

In 1985, the second hand, 1953 vintage, British aircraft carrier HMS
HERMES, became available for acquisition. It had already been operating
Sea Harriers. After Government approved its acquisition and refit, it was
commissioned as INS VIRAAT on 12 May 1987.

FIXED WING AIRCRAFT

INAS 300

Phasing out of Seahawks

The Seahawks disembarked from VIKRANT for the last time on 8 May
1978. Even ashore, their availability could not be sustained. By end 1978,
the Seahawks phased out. The last Seahawk flight was on 16 Dec 1983,
to escort the first three Sea Harriers as they arrived over Naval Air
Station Dabolim.
Induction of Sea Harriers

In 1977, Government approved the acquisition of 8 Sea Harriers,

including 2 trainers. The first British Sea Harrier flew in 1978. By mid
1979, it was undergoing intensive flying trials. In 1979, NHQ placed an
order for 6 Sea Harriers and 2 Harrier Trainers for delivery in 1983. The
Sea Harrier entered service with the British Navy in 1980. In 1982, it
proved its capability in the British operations against Argentina in the
Falkland Islands.

The training in Britain of Indian Sea Harrier pilots started in 1982. The
first three Sea Harriers landed at Dabolim on 16 December 1983. The first
Sea Harrier landed on VIKRANT's deck on 20 Dec 83.

Sea Harriers were acquired in three batches.

Sea
Batch Trainers
Harriers
First 6 2
Second 7 1
Third 10 1

The Sea Harriers carried a variety of weapons; air to air and air to surface
missiles; conventional and cluster bombs and runway denial weapons;
rockets and guns. All weapon release modes were calculated by weapon
aiming computers and displayed on the head-up symbology.

INAS 310

Phasing Out of Alizes

The Alizes were refurbished by 1978. The last launch of Alizes from
VIKRANT took place on 2 April 1987. Thereafter Alizes operated only from
ashore.

From February 1988 to October 1989, during Operation Pawan to assist

the Government of Sri Lanka, the Alizes operated from Madurai in support
of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. They flew 1800 hours and the crew
won three Nao Sena Medals and four Mentions in Despatches.

During the operation to assist the Government of the Maldives, in

suppressing an insurrection, an Alize spotted the rebel's escape vessel MV
Progress Light and fired at it, forcing it to stop and be apprehended.
The Alizes stopped flying on 12 April 1991 and the Squadron was
decommissioned in Aug 91. Seven aircraft were left of the total of 14
acquired. During the 30 years of the squadron's existence, the Alizes had
flown 35,912 hours and done 7,144 deck landings.

Induction of Dornier 228

On 24 August 1991, the first naval Dornier arrived to replace the Alizes in
INAS 310. Thereafter additional Dorniers joined: one in 1991, two in 1992
and one in 1993, making a total induction of five Dorniers.

The Dorniers were progressively fitted with the latest radar, electronic
and sonobuoy systems for the surveillance and EW roles.

INAS 312

Super Constellations

Five Super Constellation aircraft of the Air Force's No 6 Squadron at Pune

were taken over from the Air Force on 18 November 76 and designated
INAS 312.

The Super Connies phased out in 1983 and in due course were replaced
by the Russian TU 142s which arrived in 1988.

TU 142s for Long Range Maritime Patrol

On 30 March 1988, the first three TU 142 M aircraft landed at HANSA

after a non stop flight from Russia. Two more aircraft arrived on 13 April.
The squadron was commissioned at HANSA on 16 April and designated
INAS 312. The remaining three aircraft arrived between August and
October 1988.

INAS 315

Maritime Reconnaissance Anti Submarine Aircraft IL 38s.

Three IL 38's arrived in Goa in October 1977. Later, two more IL 38's
joined the squadron in 1983.

INAS 550

Islanders
The proposal to acquire Islanders for Pilot and Observer Training and
Fleet requirements had been initiated in 1972. The first two Islanders
arrived in Cochin on 18 May 76. The remaining three arrived by end 76.

In 1981, two Islanders of INAS 550 were based at Port Blair. In 1984,
these were commissioned as INAS 318 and the naval air station at Port
Blair was commissioned as INS UTKROSH.

INAS 551

Training Aircraft

The Vampires were phased out by 1976. In 1978, the last of the
Seahawks was returned to INAS 300 and the armed versions of the Kirans
joined the squadron for training jet pilots for the frontline squadron and
for FRU tasks. In 1987 and 1988, 8 Kiran MK II's joined the squadron.

HELICOPTERS

Helicopters in Frigates and Destroyers

The embarkation of helicopters in ships, which had started with the light
Alouette IIIs in VIKRANT, DARSHAK and DEEPAK in the 1960's followed
by the MATCH Alouettes in the first four Leander frigates in the 1970's,
accelerated in the 1980s.

- all new front line frigates and destroyers were designed to embark
heavy helicopters. TARAGIRI and VINDHYAGIRI had one Seaking each.
The RAJPUT class frigates from Russia had one Kamov each. The
GODAVARI class frigates of Project 16 had two Seakings each, as do the
DELHI class destroyers of Project 15. The LST(L)'s were designed to
embark the commando variant Seakings.

- all other frigate sized ships had the lighter Alouette IIIs (Chetaks) -
TRISHUL and TALWAR after conversion, BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS and
BETWA after conversion to the training role, the new training ship TIR,
the new survey ships and the new KHUKRI class corvettes of Project 25.

Induction of Russian KAMOV 25 Single Package Anti Submarine

Helicopters

With the commissioning of the new guided missile frigate INS RAJPUT in
Russia in March 80, the first KA 25 helicopter entered service. On 11 Dec
80, the twin engined KA 25 helicopter squadron was commissioned at
HANSA and designated INAS 333. In subsequent years, the KA 28s
replaced the obsolescent KA 85s.
 INAS 321

On 1 Aug 80, INAS 321 relocated to Bombay in INS KUNJALI.

INAS 330/336 AND SEAKING VARIANTS

On 19 Jul 79, the Seaking Flight and Tactical Simulator (FATs) was
commissioned in Cochin.

In addition to the ASW Seakings MK 42 acquired in 1971, other variants

of Seakings were acquired in subsequent years:

1979/80 Seakings ASW Helicopters designed for being

Mk 42 A hauled down on the decks of the 5th
and 6th Leanders, TARAGIRI and
VINDHYAGIRI using the Recovery
Assist Traverse system (RAST).

1987 to Seakings ASW Helicopters for embarkation in

1989 Mk 42 B the aircraft carriers VIKRANT and
VIRAAT, the GODAVARI class missile
frigates. In the anti ship role, the MK
42B's were capable of firing air to
surface Sea Eagle missiles.
Seakings Commando/Troop Carrying
Mk 42C Helicopters for the Marine
Commandos and for the indigenous
Landing Ships MAGAR and GHARIAL.

NEW NAVAL AIR STATIONS

The third naval air station, on the east coast of India, commissioned in
1992 as INS RAJALI.

With the increasing number of helicopters on board the ships based in

Bombay, it became necessary to have a helipad area from where
helicopters could continue flying when ships were alongside. In view of its
proximate location, INS KUNJALI became the Navy's helicopter base in
Bombay.

For similar reasons, a naval air station was commissioned at

Visakhapatnam as INS DEGA in 21 October 1991.
 CHAPTER 18

WEAPONS

PREAMBLE

The variety and technology of the new weapons that entered service
between 1965 and 1975 significantly raised the Navy's weapon capability.
This chapter describes weapon developments under five headings:

- The New Weapons

- Weapon Maintenance

- Naval Armament Service

- Naval Armament Inspection

- Weapon Acceptance Trials and Work Up

THE NEW WEAPONS

Surface Warfare

Until 1967, the Navy's mindset regarding surface warfare was totally
"gun" oriented. The effectiveness of Russian anti-ship missiles surprised
the world with the sinking of an Israeli frigate during the 1967 Arab Israel
War. This led to the Navy's acquiring missile boats from Russia.

Acquaintance with the capabilities of Russian missiles, combined with the

damage that the missile boats caused during their attacks on Karachi
harbour in the 1971 Indo Pakistan War, led to a review of future weapon
fitment for surface warfare.

It was clear that heavy guns had been superceded by anti-ship missiles.
It was equally clear that small missile boats could not decide a battle in
mid-ocean, where operations at long distances from shore required not
only endurance and sea keeping qualities, but also a multi role
configuration to counter submarines. The future seemed to lie in
retrofitting anti- ship missiles in existing ships, having anti-ship missiles
in new warships and, wherever possible, have anti aircraft missiles and
high rate of fire small calibre guns to provide defensive capability against
incoming enemy missiles.

By 1975:
 (a) Discussions with the Russian side had clarified the grey
areas regarding the feasibility of fitting a missile boat system
in the British anti submarine frigates TALWAR and TRISHUL.
An entire missile launcher-fire control suite had been removed
from a non-operational missile boat and was being installed in
TALWAR. TRISHUL was to be similarly fitted in her next
modernisation refit.

(b) Likewise, an entire missile launcher-fire control suite had

been removed from another non-operational missile boat,
installed at the Naval Coast Battery Bombay and successfully
test fired.

(c) Agreements had been signed for the acquisition from

Russia of frigates and ocean-going rocket boats having anti
ship and anti aircraft missiles and high rate of fire, small
calibre guns for anti aircraft and anti missile defence.

(d) The design of the indigenous Project 16 GODAVARI class

frigates, which would follow the sixth Leander, featured anti
ship and anti aircraft missiles and high rate of fire guns,
similar to those in the new guided missile frigates and ocean
going rocket boats being acquired from Russia.

(e) A second squadron of longer endurance, improved missile

boats had been acquired from Russia for coastal defence.

Anti Aircraft Warfare

From 1966 onwards, the Russian acquisitions brought in 25 mm, 30 mm

and 76 mm high rate of fire, anti aircraft guns.

In 1972, the British Seacat, short range, anti aircraft missile entered
service in the first Leander frigate, the NILGIRI. In 1973, it demonstrated
its capability to shoot down a towed target. In 1974, the second frigate,
HIMGIRI, demonstrated its capability to shoot down a pilotless target
aircraft (PTA).

The Seacat missile soon presented the Gunnery world with a problem.
Sailors who had already proved their proficiency as "Gun Layers", having
good "hand-eye" coordination, were the obvious field from which to select
Seacat aimers. During practice runs on the simulator and during Seacat
firing practices, however, it soon became evident that this was not so.
The Seacat was a radio command guided missile whose control was
achieved by using the right thumb on a ball, moving it - up/down and
left/right - to send commands to the missile and optically guide it on to
the target in the aimers sight. What was actually required was "thumb-
eye" coordination. It took time for the Gunnery branch to shed its elitist
possessiveness of this new weapon and accept that "thumb-eye"
coordination was an aptitude which had to be culled after testing sailors of
all branches. Thereafter, they had to be given a Seacat Aimers badge and
an allowance as an incentive to hone this skill.

Anti Submarine Warfare

The arrival by 1961 of the British anti submarine frigates TRISHUL,

TALWAR, KHUKRI, KUTHAR and KIRPAN had increased the maximum
sonar detection range from the earlier few hundred metres, to a few
thousand metres; the range of their anti submarine weapons had
increased from a few dozen metres to a few hundred meters.

The Pakistan Navy's acquisition of "silent" Daphne class submarines made

it unlikely that they could be detected on passive sonars. The vagaries of
hydrology in the Arabian Sea favoured the submarine because the
temperature layers in the sea refracted a ship's sonar transmissions. The
range of the Daphne's class submarine's latest homing torpedoes
exceeded by far the maximum detection range and the weapon range of
the Navy's anti submarine frigates. There was, therefore, a pressing need
for longer range sonars, longer range homing torpedoes, and variable
depth/dunking sonar which could overcome hydrological constraints.

The Russian Petyas which started arriving from 1968 onwards greatly
increased anti submarine capability. Their medium range sonars had a
maximum detection range of several thousand metres; their anti
submarine rockets had a range of a few thousand metres and the range
of their heavy, anti submarine, homing torpedoes matched that of their
medium range sonars.

The arrival of the Seaking helicopters in 1971, with their dunking sonar
and lightweight air dropped homing torpedoes further increased the
Navy's anti submarine capability.

The first Leander frigate the NILGIRI was being fitted with a variable
Depth Sonar and her propellers would have the Agouti system to
minimise cavitation noise.

PROBLEM AREAS
The induction of this large number of technologically advanced fire control
radars, sonars and weapons raised two problems areas regarding the
overall responsibility for their combat readiness:

- Should the overall responsibility of the ships weapon system

continue to be with the "user" department as in the past or should it
be shared with the Electrical Department's maintenance personnel?

- Should the responsibility for a complete weapon like a missile or a

torpedo continue to be with the armament supply organisation as in
the past or shared with the Electrical Branch?

Since both fire control systems and weapons now had considerable
electronic content, the Navy's Weapon Maintenance Policy and the
Division of Responsibilities had to be revised.

Another problem area was the need to reduce the proliferation of gun
calibres in service. By 1975, the position was expected to be:

Calibres Calibres Still in New

Phasing Out Service Calibres
British two Oerlikon/Hispano20 mm Russian 25
pounder mm
Pom-poms Bofors 40/60 Russian 30
mm mm
British twelve British 4 inch Russian 57
pounders British 4.5 mm Russian
British inch 76 mm
British 4.7
inch
6 inch

WEAPON MAINTENANCE

EVOLUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES FOR WEAPON MAINTENANCE

From 1939 onwards, gun mountings on board used to be maintained by

ordnance engineer officers and ordnance artificers who formed part of the
Ships Engineering Department. The repair of radars, sonars, gyros,
communication equipment and electrical instruments were the
responsibility of the Electrical Department. The remaining parts of guns
like barrels, breech blocks and recoil cylinders were maintained and
repaired by the Armament Supply Organisation. Torpedoes were the
responsibility of the Armament Supply Organisation, which had a Torpedo
Engineering Shop located in the Naval Dockyard.
Until 1958, the Navy's weapons had been entirely of Second World War
vintage :

- For surface action, ships had manually operated, hand loaded, 12

pounder, 4 inch, 4.7 inch and 6 inch calibre guns.

- For defence against aircraft, ships had manually operated, hand

loaded, two pounder pom poms, Bofors 40/60 and Oerlikon 20 mm
guns.

- For anti submarine action, ships had short range anti submarine
weapons like depth charges and hedgehogs, compatible with their
short range sonars.

From 1958 onwards, the eight new British frigates of post war design
ushered in analogue computers and gyro stabilised fire control systems,
together with remotely controlled, semi-automatic, longer range weapons.
On board ships, things were manageable when everything worked
efficiently. When things did not work properly, the problem arose as to
who was responsible. The statutary regulations unambiguously stipulated
that single point responsibility and accountability for battle readiness
vested in the Gunnery and the Torpedo Anti Submarine (TAS) officers.
They were responsible to the Commanding Officer for the efficient
performance of both men and equipment in battle. Officers and artificers
trained in ordnance engineering and gun mounting hydraulics formed part
of these departments. Now, with the increase in electronics and power
electrics, responsibility and accountability became unclear. How could the
Gunnery and TAS

Departments be accountable for problems in the electronic and electrical

equipment of their weapon systems?

It was clear that major changes were necessary in sailors' trades and
departmental responsibilities. Could the seaman user also do the electrical
maintenance - if so, could seaman sailors be trained to understand
electronics? Or was it better that the electrical maintainer become the
user? If so, was it cost effected for electrical sailors to perform seamen
duties? The 1967 Committee for the Reorganisation of the Sailors
Structure (CROSS Committee) examined these issues. No satisfactory via
media could be found to evolve a User-Maintainer concept.

In 1968, the responsibility for the "functional efficiency" of weapons was

transferred to the Electrical Branch and a new designation of Weapon
Maintenance Officer was introduced:

(a) The ships Electrical Officer, as the weapon maintainer, was

made responsible to the Commanding Officer for the efficient
functioning of weapon equipment. The Weapon Maintenance Officer,
 where provided, was made responsible to the Electrical Officer for
the efficient upkeep of weapon systems and the custody of spare
gear and test equipment required for the maintenance of Gunnery
and TAS equipment. The Weapon Maintenance Officer was to keep
the Gunnery and TAS Officers informed of the state of serviceability
of their respective weapon systems for operation and firing.

(b) The Gunnery and TAS officers, as the users of the weapons,
remained responsible for the custody and accounting of the
Gunnery and TAS equipment fitted on board, naval armament
stores, diving equipment and minesweeps, as applicable.

This division of responsibility was recognised to be fragile but no better

solution could be found.

The arrival of the Russian acquisitions from 1968 onwards imposed

unforeseen strains on the Weapon Maintenance Policy which had just
been promulgated:

- The design and technology of Russian electronics and power

electrics differred from that of the British. Russian weapons had
greater automation, longer ranges and higher rates of fire.

- Russian ships were crammed with electronic and electric

equipment. The cramped spaces imposed limits on the maintenance
and repair that could be done on board.

- Russian ships did not have enough bunks to accomodate the

Indian Navy's separate Seaman Branch weapon users and separate
Electrical Branch weapon maintainers.

These difficulties were compounded by the lack of Russian maintenance

and repair facilities in Visakhapatnam which took time to be set up. When
all this combined with the compulsions mentioned elsewhere, like "Need
to Know", rotation of personnel, and lack of spare parts, the shortfalls in
the "functional efficiency" of Russian weapon systems became a cause for
serious concern.

In contrast, the weapon spaces in the Leander class frigates were more
spacious and enough bunks had been provided to meet the needs of the
Navy's sailor trade structure of seperate users and separate maintainers.
Moreover, Bombay being the main base of the Navy, the development of
weapon maintenance facilities in Bombay had kept abreast of the
inductions.
EVOLUTION OF WEAPON MAINTENANCE FACILITIES IN BOMBAY

In 1959, the Weapon Control Repair Shop (WECORS) was sanctioned for
the repair of the gunnery and anti submarine fire control systems.
WECORS developed in phases:

- Phase 1 was completed in 1966 and enabled the repair of fire

control equipment and gyros of all weapon systems in the new
British frigates.

- Phase 2 was completed in 1971 and enabled the repair of the

heavy mountings in these frigates.

In 1965, it was decided that except for those functions looked after by the
Armament Supply Organisation, all the repair work carried out by the
different departments of the Dockyard on weapon systems and associated
gunnery and electronic equipment should be combined. A separate
Weapons Department was formed as part of the Industrial Manager's
Department. Like the Constructor, Engineer and Electrical departments,
the Weapon Department was headed by the Assistant Industrial Manager
Weapons (AIMW) to administer the WECORS (then under construction),
and the Gun Mounting Depot and the Torpedo Engineering Workshops. In
August 1968, the Gun Mounting and Torpedo Depots at Bombay were
combined and redesignated as the Weapons Equipment Depot (WED)
Bombay under the AIM(W).

Apart from the maintenance of weapons system on board ships, the

Weapons department of the Electrical Branch was involved in the
following activities:

(a) The development and laying of deep and shallow degaussing

ranges. Degaussing helped to minimize the magnetic influence of
ships hulls and thereby decrease the likelihood of their triggering
magnetic mines.

(b) The repair, in conjunction with INPL Cochin, of sonar

transducers.

(c) Setting up calibration ranges for anti submarine mortars and

carrying out calibrations.

(d) Testing and repairing buoyant minesweeping cables.

(e) Indigenous manufacture by Indian agencies of Leander gun

mountings and anti submarine mortars in collaboration with the
principals in Britain.

(f) Development of an underwater noise range.

 (g) Repair of diving equipment.

(h) Modification of sonar domes.

(j) The half-life "strip and rebuild" of electronic weapon systems

after approximately twelve years of service.

THE NAVAL ARMAMENT SERVICE

The Naval Armament Service had its beginning in 1932 with the formation
of the Royal Indian Marine. A small Royal Naval Armament Depot was
started in Bombay at Butcher Island, manned entirely by British civilians.
In 1933, the entire British staff were transferred to the British naval base
at Trincomalee in Ceylon. The needs of the Indian Navy were met by the
Indian Army Ordnance Corps, who established a small group in the Naval
Dockyard and at Butcher Island.

Developments During the Second World War 1939 to 1947

In 1940, the Admiralty deputed a senior Royal Naval Armament Service

officer to India, to advise on the possibility of setting up a Naval
Armament Supply (NAS) organisation in India. In September 1941, the
first NASO (India) was appointed in Bombay.

After the British surrender at Singapore in February 1942 and the British
Navy's withdrawal from Trincomalee, a large number of Indian
subordinate officers and senior supervisors from the Naval Armament
Depots (NADs) at Singapore and Trincomalee moved to Bombay. With
this experienced staff and the storage accomodation readily available in
Butcher Island, the NAD Bombay expanded overnight. NASO Bombay
operated directly under the Admiralty in Britain to meet the needs of the
British Eastern and Pacific Fleets. In addition to the NAD at Butcher
Island, mine issuing and armament store issuing ships were based in
Bombay. The first Indian NASO was appointed in 1944, but for all
practical purposes, the NAD was run by the Director of Armament Supply
(DAS) at the Admiralty and under the Deputy DAS in Colombo.

In preparation for the offensive against Japan, small armament depots

were opened at Karachi, Cochin, Madras, Visakhapatnam, Calcutta and
Chittagong. Bulk naval armament stores were kept at the inland Army
Depot at Phulgaon. A Director of Armament Supply (India) was appointed
in 1945. After the end of the war, all the small depots were closed down
in 1946, except for Visakhapatnam where the Navy moved into the
Transit Depot vacated by the Army. The British Navy's Torpedo Depot in
Bombay was handed over to the RIN's Armament Supply Organisation in
1946.

The main problem during 1946 had been the closure of armament depots
and the disposal and redistribution of surplus ammunition. To this was
added, in 1947, the problem of division of assets at the time of partition.

DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1948 to 1965

By 1948, the Navy's expansion plans had crystallised. From 1949

onwards, the development of the NAS organisation concentrated on three
main activities:

- Building up the NAS cadres of officers and supervisory staff.

- Building new NADs to accomodate the war reserves and practice

requirements of ammunition for the ships being acquired from
Britain.

- Building up in the NADs the capability and capacity to refurbish

explosive items and conserve foreign exchange.

BUILDING UP THE NASO CADRES

From 1949 onwards, batches of officers and senior supervisors started

being sent to Britain for training. By 1951, they were able to relieve most
of the Admiralty's British staff in India. The last British DAS left in 1955.

In the 1950's, the first batch of NASOs having mechanical and electrical
engineering degrees was recruited to man the NADs. On joining, they
underwent a year's technical training on naval armament activities. In
1966, to attract better talent, NASOs started being inducted through the
Union Public Service Commission's annual Engineering Service
Examination. The response was short of expectations. In 1975, approval
was accorded to constitute a separate service for NASOs as a recognised
cadre known as the Indian Naval Armament Service.

BUILDING THE NEW NAVAL ARMAMENT DEPOTS (NADs)

BOMBAY

In 1952, the old NAD at Butcher Island had to be vacated to make way
for the construction of an oil terminal jetty. Tankers bringing crude oil to
feed the new oil refineries being established near Trombay would secure
to this jetty.

Karanja was selected as the site for the new NAD. Since it would take
time for it to come up, an interim NAD needed to be found. The vacation
by the Army of its Transit Ammunition Sub Depot at Trombay was
fortuitious. Trombay was connected by rail and road with Kurla and the
disused Coastal Forces pier at Cheetah Camp was revived. The movement
of stores to Trombay started in 1952 and was completed by 1953,
whereafter it became NAD Bombay.

During these years, the NAS Organisation had two wings. The NAD
Bombay, stored the ammunition and mines. The NASO's section, located
inside the Naval Dockyard, looked after the Torpedo Depot, took wear
measurements of barrels, replaced weapon barrels when necessary and
maintained and repaired weapon parts like breach blocks and recoil
cylinders. It also served as the front office for liaising with ships regarding
ammunitioning and de- ammunitioning.

The construction of the NAD Karanja was implemented in phases. It

started being occupied in 1959 and continued expanding thereafter to
store the ammunition of the new British frigates.

In 1961, the arrival of the aircraft carrier VIKRANT brought with it large
holdings of bombs, rocket and gun ammunition. All these were stowed in
the NAD Karanja and older holdings were distributed to the NAD's at
Trombay, Alwaye and Visakhapatnam.

It was intended that ships go alongside a new jetty at Karanja which

would have sufficient depth for ships to secure alongside and
embark/disembark ammunition. During its construction, however, the
jetty was afflicted by such severe siltation that its dredging became
prohibitive in cost. Various schemes were examined to make the jetty
usable but to no avail. Ships anchored in ammunitioning berths in the
vicinity of the jetty and barges ferried the ammunition between the jetty
and these berths.

Visakhapatnam

Until the Russian acquisitions started arriving in 1966, there were no

combatant ships based in Visakhapatnam. The Transit Depot which had
been taken over in 1946 had been converted into a NAD and was being
used as a storage depot.

After China's attack in 1962, there was a major drive for self reliance in
the production of components required to repair and refurbish
ammunition. Since anti aircraft, time mechanical fuzes had to be
refurbished every seven years, a Fuze Reconditioning Shop was
established to recondition these fuzes. This shop also manufactured and
assembled the fuzes for anti submarine mortars.

Cochin/Alwaye

The construction of the NAD Alwaye commenced in 1953. With the build
up of the training schools at Cochin, there was a steady increase in
musketry and small arms firing. In 1957, a detachment of the NAD was
established inside the naval base to repair small arms. A full fledged NAD
with magazines and armament workshops was inaugurated in 1958.
Thereafter:

- it supplied the Gunnery School's Naval Battery at Fort Cochin with

ammunition for seaward firing practices and

- it was made responsible for meeting the needs of all Naval NCC
Units for small arms and small arms practice ammunitiion.

Goa

The NAD at Goa started in 1963. After INS HANSA and the Seahawks
moved to Goa in 1964, the NAD was expanded in phases.

BUILDING UP SELF RELIANCE

From 1952 onwards, emphasis had been laid on attaining self sufficiency
in the indigenisation of naval armament stores. The Navy's bulk
requirements of cartridge cases, shells, cordite and shell fillings were
projected to the Ordnance Factory Board for inclusion in the annual
production plans. It took some time for the Naval Armament Inspection
Organisation to establish itself and for the Ordnance factories to become
familiar with the Navy's special requirements. By 1965, production had
been established for the Navy's bulk requirements.

A vexed problem however was the non-availability of components for

repairing ammunition. The requirements were too small to make their
production economically worthwhile, either for the Ordnance Factories or
for private firms. The armament workshops being set up in the new NADs
were therefore provided the wherewithal to undertake the production of
such components.

After 1962, when even greater emphasis was placed on self reliance, the
NAD workshops were further augmented to undertake the manufacture of
a larger number of components for subsequent assembly and filling.
By 1969, the indigenous manufacture of the older conventional
armaments had been established and production was being farmed out to
the civil sector. This enabled the NAD workshops to concentrate on the
proof and evaluation of older ammunition to extend its life.

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1965

From 1966 onwards, homing torpedoes, anti submarine rockets and gun
ammunition for the Russian acquisitions started arriving at the NAD
Visakhapatnam. From 1970 onwards, anti ship missiles and gun
ammunition started arriving in Bombay for the Russian missile boats. In
1971, homing torpedoes arrived in Bombay for the Seaking helicopters. In
1972, Seacat surface to air missiles entered service with the frigates of
the Leander project. Within a short space of five years, the technology
level of naval armaments rose sharply. In its wake, there followed the
problem of division of responsibility for homing torpedoes and guided
missiles.

Homing Torpedoes

The responsibility for the preparation for firing of Russian torpedoes was
entrusted to the Weapons Department. The remaining activities remained
with the Armament Supply Organisation. In the case of the British MK 44
torpedoes, the entire responsibility was that of DAS. However, in 1974,
the responsibility for the preparation of Russian torpedoes was handed
over to the Armament Supply Organisation.

Guided Missiles

In the case of the Russian missiles, the responsibility for non-integrated

missiles was given to the Weapons department of the Electrical Branch,
except for the warhead and the explosive components which remained
with DAS. Integrated Russian missiles and Seacat missiles were made the
responsibility of DAS.

Responsibility for Explosive Handling in Commercial Ports

The Navy's Armament Supply Organisation has the sole responsibility for
supervising all defence and commercial explosive handling activity in the
ports of India.

NAVAL ARMAMENT INSPECTION

DEVELOPMENTS UNTIL 1965

Prior to the formation of the Naval Armament Inspection (NAI)

Organisation in India, the naval armament stores received from Britain
used to be inspected by local Army Ordnance authorities on behalf of the
Navy.

In 1949, when it was decided to set up a Naval Armament Stores

Organisation, it was decided also to set up an NAI organisation. In 1950,
a British Army Ordnance officer came on deputation from Britain to head
the NAI Department. Along with him came British civilian technical
officers.

Between 1949 and 1960, there were four British naval Captains who came
on deputation as Directors of Naval Armament Inspection (DNAI). During
the same period, thirteen Indian NAI officers underwent the Assistant
Inspector of Naval Ordnance course in Britain. After 1960, Indian officers
became DNAIs and the initial training of NAI officers was conducted at the
Institute of Armament Technology (IAT) near Pune, conjoined with the
Army's Technical Staff Course.

The duties of NAIOs, in conjunction with NASOs where appropriate, were

to:

(a) Inspect all new ammunition and armament stores manufactured

by the Ordnance Factories and by private trade for compliance with
acceptance standards and conformance to specifications.

(b) Periodically inspect all ammunition and armament stores in

service stored in the NADs and select representative samples for
proof firing to confirm that they remained safe and fit for
operational use.

(c) Investigate misfires/failures and initiate/promulgate remedial

action.

(d) Inspect modifications to existing weapons and ammunition.

(e) Periodically inspect all gun barrels and launcher tubes on board
ships to ensure their accurate and reliable functioning.

Senior Inspectors of Naval Armament were positioned at Bombay and

Visakhapatnam. As indigenous production picked up, Naval Armament
Inspectorates were established at places wherever naval ammunition was
being manufactured. In addition, NAI wings were posted at the IAT Pune
and the proof firing establishment at Balasore.

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1965

With the induction of guided missiles and homing torpedoes in the
Russian acquisitions and the Leander Frigate Project, it became necessary
to enhance the technical knowledge of NAIOs. In 1968, a separate post
graduate Naval Technical Staff Course commenced at the IAT Pune. In
1978, the shortage of volunteers from the Executive Branch led to the
introduction of the Direct Entry Scheme for the NAI Cadre. The
educational qualifications prescribed were a degree in
mechanical/electrical/electronic/ engineering or a post graduate degree in
physics or electronics.

The responsibilities of NAIOs also diversified:

- Indigenisation Cells were set up in Visakhapatnam and Bombay to

prepare the drawings and specifications for and to inspect the
indigenous manufacture of perishable and critical components of
Russian and Western weapons.

- Calibration Labs were set up in Visakhapatnam and Bombay to

calibrate imported, special to type, measuring equipment.

- Special targets were produced to test and evaluate imported and

indigenous proximity fuzes at the Proof and Experimental
Establishment at Balasore.

- Inspections were undertaken of all repaired/refurbished guided

missiles, homing torpedoes and mines.

NAIOs were also associated with the R&D and the indigenisation
programmes to:

- Improve the capabilities of homing torpedoes and refurbish

homing torpedoes in stock.

- Indigenise anti submarine rockets.

- Improve the capabilities of mines.

- Indigenise practice missile warheads.

- Inspect and test imported weapons at their place of manufacture

before despatch to India.

WEAPON ACCEPTANCE TRIALS AND WORK UP

WEAPON ACCEPTANCE TRIALS

By the end 1960s/early 1970s, it was clear that given the pace at which
new weapons were being inducted and the inescapable lag in setting up
the maintenance facilities ashore, some way had to be found of ensuring
that weapon systems were combat worthy. It was decided to adopt the
British Navy's system, whereby the weapon systems of refitted ships were
systematically checked by an Acceptance Trials Team, independent of the
Dockyard and the ship. There was opposition. The reasoning was that
since the organisational constraints were known, nothing was going to be
achieved by harping on the maintenance/repair shortcomings in weapon
systems. The opposite point of view was that user personnel had no hope
of acquiring any practical firing experience on their weapon systems if the
systems were not working properly.

The acceptance trials of the NILGIRI showed how imperative the trials
were. Eventually, by end 1975, the first elements of the much debated
Harbour Acceptance Trial (HATS), Sea Acceptance Trials (SATS), Warship
Acceptance Trial Team (WATT) and Warship Workup Organisation (WWO)
were in place. The procedure was:

- During HATS, critical parameters were checked against laid down

schedules and parameters.

- During SATS, the weapon system accuracy was checked in firing

practices. Air target requirements were met by the Target Towing
Dakotas based in Cochin. Surface target requirements were met by
local ships (tugs/LSTs/coastal minesweepers) towing Pattern II
targets and the heavier Battle Practice Targets (BPTs). Moored
triplane targets were used to check sonar accuracy. Mortars were
calibrated on a special range. On completion of Acceptance Trials,
shortcomings were rectified before commencing workup.

WORKUP

The concept of Workup was that on the satisfactory completion of all

weapon, radar and communication Sea Acceptance Trials by the Warship
Acceptance Trials Team, the systematic work up of every ship for combat
readiness should follow a progressive, logical sequence:

- After a refit, a ship should shakedown off her base port. This
shakedown was to be conducted by the Commanding Officer,
assisted by Squadron/Fleet staff.

- After shakedown, the ship should commence basic work up with

suitable targets under the supervision of the Warship Workup Team.

- After basic workup, the ship should participate in multi unit

tactical work up with other ships, submarines and helicopters under
 the supervision of the Fleet Commander and assisted by the
Warship Workup Team.

- On successful completion, each ship would carry out weapon firing

practices as laid down in the relevant manuals and participate in
tactical and Fleet exercises.

It took several years for the concept to take root.

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1975

NEW WEAPONS

Air to surface missiles entered service with the Sea Harrier aircraft and
the improved Seaking helicopters.

Longer range anti ship and anti aircraft missiles entered service with the
guided missile frigates and the ocean going rocket boats.

Longer range anti submarine rockets and better long range homing
torpedoes entered service with the new guided missile frigates.

Better short range homing torpedoes entered service with the new Kamov
and Seaking helicopters.

Better long range homing torpedoes entered service with the new Russian
and German submarines.

WEAPON MAINTENANCE

- Designations. In 1976, the designation of Assistant Industrial

Manager (Weapons) was changed to Manager Weapons. In 1981,
the designation changed to General Manager Weapons.

- WECORS Bombay. Phase 1, commissioned in 1966 had been

established to repair the fire control systems of the British frigates.
Phase 2, commissioned in 1970 had been established to repair their
gun mountings. Phase 3 was established in the mid 1970s to repair
British and Dutch fire control systems of the Leander class frigates.
Phase 4 was established in the 1980s to repair the fire control
systems of the Russian Petyas, submarines and missile boats based
in Bombay. In due course, Phase 4 was augmented to cater for the
Russian guided missiles frigates, ocean going rocket boats and
minesweepers, and the German SSK submarines.
 - Weapon Repair Shop Visakhapatnam. Phase 1 commissioned
by 1972. The shop was augmented in phases to cater for the new
Russian acquisitions.

NAVAL ARMAMENT DEPOTS

Bombay. Over the years, the NAD Karanja concentrated on the

preparation of sophisticated torpedoes and missiles. Torpedo repair
activity was shared with Trombay.

Goa. The NAD expanded to accomodate the weapon needs of the Sea
Harrier fighters, the TU 142 and IL 38 reconnaissance aircraft and the
Kamov helicopters.

Visakhapatnam. The NAD expanded to accomodate the torpedoes of the

new submarines. The repair activities of torpedoes were shared with
Bombay.

Sunabeda. This new bulk storage NAD was established on the East Coast
in 1988.

NAVAL ARMAMENT INSPECTION

After 1975, financial stringency compelled greater emphasis on extending

the life of ammunition and expediting indigenisation. This necessitated the
setting up of in-house test and evaluation facilities. Rubber test facilities
came up at NAI Visakhapatnam. At NAI Karanja, sophisticated facilities
were set up for testing the dynamic parameters of rocket motors and
undertaking simulated sea trials of torpedo batteries.

In addition to its normal responsibilities, the NAI organisation

(a) diversified into research, design and development projects of

armaments and explosives

(b) increased its involvement in developing indigenous equivalents

of unavailable explosive items.

WEAPON ACCEPTANCE TRIALS AND WORK UP

The concept of Weapon Acceptance Trials gradually extended to

machinery, particularly diesel engines and gas turbines. When the Naval
Dockyard Visakhapatnam started undertaking major refits, Weapon
Acceptance and Work Up Teams were established in Visakhapatnam on
the same lines as in Bombay.

In the 1990's, Flag Officer Sea Training was established in Cochin to

conduct the work up of all ships after major refit and identify the
shortcomings in weapon and combat readiness for remedial action before
they joined the respective Fleets.

CHAPTER 19

FLEET ACTIVITIES

THE PATTERN OF FLEET ACTIVITY PRIOR TO 1965

Until 1965, there used to be two well defined exercise periods-Spring

Exercises (SPRINGEX) and Summer Exercises (SUMMEREX).

The annual cycle was:

April/May Transfers of personnel in and

out of ships to coincide
with the end of children school
year.
June/July/August Summer Exercises.

September CNS' Tactical Exercises.

October/November/December Maintenance and leave period.

January/February/March Spring Exercises.

Several factors had combined to coalesce into this pattern. The critical
determinant was that there were not enough alongside berths in Bombay,
as a result of which ships usually remained at the anchorage. This was
not possible during the rough weather of the monsoon months and ships
had either to be brought alongside or sent away from Bombay. The
general practice was for the non operational ships to go alongside for
repairs/refit and for operational ships to sail for the Bay of Bengal where
maximum value could be derived from sea training in areas not seriously
affected by the southwest monsoon. This also enabled joint exercises with
Commonwealth navies at Trincomolee.

On completion of exercises, ships paid goodwill and flag-showing visits to

neighbouring friendly countries.

The final phase of the summer exercise period was the CNS' Tactical
Exercises held on the Fleet's return passage from Cochin to Bombay in
September each year. The CNS usually invited Ministers of the Central
Government and Governments of the maritime states, as well as senior
officials from the Ministries of Defence and Finance (Defence) and Army
and Air Force Headquarters to witness these exercises. The National
Defence College also embarked during this period.

On arrival in Bombay in end September, ships commenced maintenance

and defect rectification in preparation for Spring Exercises. During
October, November and December, ships companies availed of annual
leave and personnel were transferred in and out if necessary.

Spring Exercises from January to March were carried out off both the East
and West coasts. As in the case of the Summer Exercises, ships
participated in joint exercises with Commonwealth Navies, paid goodwill
visits to neighbouring friendly countries and ended up with the Staff
College students embarking fleet ships for witnessing exercise between
Cochin and Bombay.

On arrival in Bombay in end March, block drafts/transfers were effected to

coincide with end of children's school year. Maintenance and defect
rectification were carried out in preparation for the Summer Exercises
whilst personnel availed of annual leave.

This annual cycle comfortably met several requirements:

(a) Giving officers and men sea-time for promotion and experience
of exercising with other navies.

(b) Dovetailing the completion of courses in the Annual Training

Programme with block transfers in and out of ships.

(c) Sharing the maintenance and defect rectification load between

ships staff and the Dockyard. Any ship which did not cope with its
defects and depended too much on the Dockyard, missed out on the
exercises and the foreign cruises.

(d) The Staff College, the National Defence College and visiting
dignitaries witnessed fleet exercises when ships companies were at
peak efficiency.

(e) Whenever cadets from the National Defence Academy and the
National Cadet Corps could not be embarked during these exercises,
individual ships or groups of ships took them to sea for short
durations.

JET Exercises with Commonwealth Navies

JET (Joint Exercises at Trincomalee) started in 1949 and were organised
at Trincomalee on the east coast of Ceylon. Initially, JETs were held in the
spring. Later, JETs were held during the height of the southwest monsoon
when the west coast of India became unsuitable for naval exercises due
to rain and rough seas. Trincomalee and the exercise areas in the vicinity
were sheltered from the monsoon and provided calm seas.

Ships of Commonwealth navies participated in JET, which were held under

the general guidance and control of the British Commander in Chief far
East Fleet, using the facilities available at Trincomalee.

The pattern was for individual ships to shake down, followed by each
Commonwealth Navy working up its ships and culminating in
Combined/Joint Exercises in the Bay of Bengal. The combined exercises
lasted for a period of two weeks during which a variety of exercises were
carried out, including gunnery firing practices at surface and aerial
targets, anti submarine exercises with British submarines as targets,
replenishment at sea with British tankers, ship manoeuvres and
culminating in large scale tactical exercises. The basic advantage of these
exercises was the exposure to contemporary tactics and cross-operating
with other navies.

Until 1958, all exercises were held at Trincomalee:

Month/Year Participating Commonwealth Navies

March-April 1951 Britain, India, Pakistan

March-April 1952 Britain, India, Pakistan
April 1953 Britain, India, Pakistan
August 1953 Britain, India
August 1954 Britain, India, Pakistan, Ceylon
August-September 1955 Britain, India, Pakistan, Ceylon
August-September 1956 Britain, India, Pakistan, Ceylon
August-September 1957 Britain, India, Pakistan, Ceylon
June 1958 Britain, India, Pakistan

In September 1958, the British Navy's East India Station at Trincomalee

closed down. From 1959 onwards, JET exercises started being conducted
in phases:

(a) Phase 1, individual ship work up, was held at Cochin with a
British submarine and aircraft of the naval air arm.

(b) Phase 2 consisted of sea exercises enroute to join the other

Commonwealth Navies in the Bay of Bengal.
 (c) Phases 3 and 4 were the Combined Fleet Exercises in the Bay of
Bengal followed by post exercise debriefs.

In 1959, 1960 and 1961, a British submarine was made available every
year for anti submarine exercises during Phase 1 off Cochin, particularly
with the new British frigates which had started arriving from 1958
onwards.

In December 1964, exercises were conducted with the submarine

AMBUSH off Bombay and in July 1965 with the submarine ASTUTE off
Madras and Visakhapatnam.

THE PATTERN OF FLEET ACTIVITY 1965 TO 1975

Until 1965, the Navy's operational cycle was determined primarily by the
fact that the Bombay Dockyard was unable to provide sheltered alongside
berths during the monsoon months. After the Indo Pakistan War of 1965,
the operational cycle was governed by the decision that 60% of the Fleet
was to be operational in the Arabian Sea throughout the year.

Between 1965 and mid 1971, the Petyas and submarines arrived from
Russia. They used to transit from their base in Visakhapatnam to exercise
with the Fleet in the Arabian Sea. With submarines now available, there
was a marked increase in anti submarine exercises in the Arabian Sea.
Not many exercises were carried out in the Bay of Bengal.

After the Indo Pakistan War of December 1971, it took nearly two years
for the Eastern Fleet (which had been formed in November 1971) to
commence meaningful exercises. The basic reason was that the earlier
Petyas and submarines were undergoing repairs and refit after their
prolonged utilisation in 1971. Such ships and submarines as were
available had very limited motoring hours left. The maintenance, repair
and refit facilities had yet to come up in Visakhapatnam. Moreover, in
view of the unpredictability of Pakistan's intentions after the surrender of
its forces in East Pakistan, the Navy had decided to base the five new
Petyas and the four new submarines in Bombay. Overall, the Eastern
Fleet had very few ships it could call operational. By 1974, the position
improved and both Fleets started exercising in their respective waters.

The Fleets activities between 1965 and 1975 marked a transformation

from the pre 1965 Springex/Summerex pattern to the 1975 era of
practice missile firings (PMFs), amphibious exercises (AMPHEXs),
individual fleet Tactical Exercises (TACEXs) and Combined Fleet TACEXs,
whilst still meeting the training requirements of the NDA, the DSSC and
the NDC and essential requirements like Joint Exercise with other navies
and goodwill visits.
TACTICAL EVALUATIONS

A significant feature of exercises from 1973 onwards was the emphasis on

the tactical evaluations of the new weapon platforms. By then, the
lessons of the 1971 War had been analysed and digested. The nature of
surface warfare had changed with the induction of surface to surface
missiles. The nature of anti air warfare had changed with the induction of
Seacat anti aircraft missiles in the Leanders and high rate of fire guns in
the Petyas and the missile boats. The nature of anti submarine warfare
had changed with the induction of medium range sonars in the Leanders
and the Petyas, variable depth sonar in NILGIRI, dunking sonars in the
Seakings and anti submarine homing torpedoes in the Petyas, the
Seakings and the MATCH helicopters in the Leanders.

Not only had the capabilities and limitations of each of these systems to
be determined, but also their utilisation dovetailed into Fleet Operating
and Tactical Instructions. It became timely for the Navy to start
formulating its own tactical doctrines, appropriate to its unique mix of
Western and Russian sensors and weapons.

In 1974, a Tactics Committee was formed in Naval Headquarters, with

analogous Committees in each Fleet and Command. Intensive interaction
and evaluations progressively led to multi- system evaluations and
culminated in structured Joint Fleet Exercises conducted by Naval
Headquarters to evaluate and validate Fleet tactical doctrines before they
were promulgated.

THE PATTERN OF FLEET ACTIVITY AFTER 1975

The momentum built up by 1975 in tactical evaluations of individual types

of ships, submarines, helicopters and aircraft, followed by Fleet exercise
to validate evolving tactical doctrine, continued after 1975. This
procedure was to stand the Navy in good stead when the new Russian
guided missile frigates, ocean going rocket boats and IL 38 MRASW
aircraft were inducted along with the improved Leander class frigates
TARAGIRI and VINDHYAGIRI.

The distance from the mainland at which Fleet exercises were held was
also steadily increased, to establish the Fleets' endurance for sustained
mid-ocean operations.
GOODWILL VISITS TO FRIENDLY COUNTRIES

Goodwill and flag showing visits by naval ships have traditionally been
one of the important peacetime functions of the Navy. These visits
fulfilled several worthwhile objectives.

(a) They enabled officers and sailors to visit the ships and
establishments of the host navies, interact and imbibe new concepts
and ideas.

(b) The enormous sense of pride which Indian communities settled

abroad felt on seeing warships flying the Indian flag enhanced their
self-worth in their local community and revitalised their bonds with
India. The warmth and hospitality which Indian communities settled
abroad have extended to visiting Navy ships is legendary.

(c) One of the attractions of volunteering for naval service has

always been "Join the Navy and see the world". Visits to friendly
countries help to recruit the talent the Navy seeks to attract.

(d) The exemplary behaviour of Indian naval personnel during visits

to foreign ports is usually in sharp contrast to those from other
navies and this makes them very welcome as visitors. Indian
personnel do not tend to alchoholic intoxication and the ensuing
brawls. Their main interest is to spend their limited foreign
exchange in buying mementos to take home to their families.
Without exception, host countries have commented how lucky India
is to have such a well behaved Navy in such clean, smart ships. All
this helps to dispel the persistent Kiplingesque images of India -
flying carpets, snake charmers, elephants and tigers - and project
the image of a confident, modern India.

In the case of foreign cruises by training ships, long cruises to distant

ports are essential for cadets and midshipmen to acquire their sea legs
and acquire the skills of seamanship and navigation in fair and foul
weather. When they mix with cadets and midshipmen of other navies,
they form the acquaintances which mature into friendships in later years.

Captain (later Vice Admiral) VEC Barboza was the Commanding Officer of
the training cruiser INS DELHI in 1969. Admiral Barboza's recollections of
this cruise convey the flavour of goodwill visits:
"In the second half of 1969, our cruiser DELHI visited ports in
Australia, New Zealand and Fiji in response to long-standing
invitations from those countries.

"We set out from Cochin on the 9th September and made for
Fremantle, our first port of call in Australia.

"Imagine friendly and inquisitive University students (some doing

post-graduate courses) quite seriously asking us if we had
automobiles and motor cycles in India, or wide-eyed school children
telling us that they had learnt in class that "Indians live in tree
tops", or astonished farmers saying: "We thought that Indians were
like our aboriginals.

"All this was foreseen and, when I briefed my men, I had explained
to them that none of these remarks would be made in malice. There
was no cause for taking umbrage at them. Only the need to
gracefully present the real India of today.

"One evening, as the last group of visitors to the ship left, a police
officer walked on board and told the Officer of the Day that he had
been on quayside duty and had observed the way the visitors were
received and conducted on board. He had seen this happen before,
during the visits of other foreign ships, but he had been so struck
by the friendliness and smartness of the crew that he wished to
demonstrate his appreciation tangibly. He had a free Sunday and
had planned to spend it in the countryside with his family. He
invited any two of my sailors to join in the outing, promising to
deliver them back safely on Monday morning. The offer was willingly
accepted and the two sailors returned from their outing brimming
with gratitude and exuberance.

"On another occasion two well-dressed ladies visiting the ship

requested to see the galley, where they were introduced to the
Chief Petty Officer Cook. He was a particularly engaging personality,
apart from being a very proficient chef. The ladies invited him to
spend a day at their residence and arranged for transport to carry
him to its location. At the appointed hour an elegant, chauffeur
driven limousine arrived to collect him and, as he told us later, he
was taken to a palatial building where he was entertained right
royally. The meals he was served in their mansion were "haute
cuisine", and he reciprocated in the only way he could - by
demonstrating the cooking of some choice Indian dishes in their
very modern and well-appointed kitchen. They showed him round
the city and met him again when the ship visited Sydney, where
they renewed their hospitality most generously.
 "All over Australia, in shop windows, clubs, schools and other
institutions, we saw posters asking for contributions to India's
famine. Most of them bore the graphic image of a sad-eyed, skinny,
naked Indian child with a distended abdomen and a look of utter
wretchedness. We had got over the famine by then and our
Government was at pains to thank well-meaning friends for their
contributions and to politely inform them that the crisis had passed.
But since the stark appeals and exhortations still stared everyone in
the face everywhere, the `idee fixe' continued. Indeed one
Australian newspaper, comparing the lean (but wiry) build of our
quite well-fed sailors with the natural burliness of the average
Australian, reported that "the Indian sailors looked under-
nourished.

"In general, this widespread projection of India as a mendicant

country was disturbing and we tried hard to dispel this concept".

CHAPTER 20

MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND REFIT FACILITIES

When the Navy was partitioned in 1947, its only Dockyard was at
Bombay. It provided all the maintenance, repair, docking and refit
support that ships needed. The only other ports where rudimentary
facilities existed were at Cochin and at Visakhapatnam, each of which had
minuscule Repair Shops, having a few machine tools, carpentry facilities
for minor repairs of wooden boats, a small slipway and a blacksmith's
shop.

In the decades that followed, there were enormous developments:

- The Naval Dockyard Bombay was expanded and modernised.

- Asia's newest Naval Dockyard was constructed in Visakhapatnam.

- The repair workshop at Cochin grew into a Base Repair

Organisation and eventually into the Naval Ship Repair Yard
(NSRY).

- The small Portuguese Navy workshop in Goa grew into a Base

Repair Workshop.

- And in Port Blair, a NSRY came up alongside a newly constructed

naval jetty and a floating dock.
This chapter describes the developments during the decade 1965-1975.

BOMBAY DOCKYARD

NAVAL DOCKYARD EXPANSION SCHEME

The expansion of the Bombay Naval Dockyard was undertaken in two

stages. The dates of commencement and completion of works in each
stage are shown below:

STAGE ONE

Works Involved CommencedCompleted

(a) Dredging of the Inner Tidal 1954 1967 to
Basin 1970
(b) Reclamation of 27 acres in 1954 1962 to
front of Castle Barracks, 1970
between the old breakwater
and the Ballard Pier
(c) Construction of 2300 feet of 1954 1962 to
wharfage on the reclaimed 1970
land for the Barracks and
Destroyer wharves.
(d) Construction of a Cruiser 1954 1962
Dry Dock on the reclaimed
land.
(e) Extension of the Ballard 1963 1966
Pier by 750 feet and
incorporation into the
Dockyard Extension of the
inner face of Ballard Pier.
(f) Provision of ship support 1954 1966 to
services for the Barracks, 1970
Destroyer and Ballard Pier
wharves (namely electrical
power supplies, fresh water,
sea water, compressed air,
traveling cranes etc)
STAGE TWO
(a) Construction of Rubble 1967
Mound Breakwater and
1974
South Breakwater (Deep
Water Wharf)
 (b) Capital Dredging of the 1972
Outer Tidal Basin enclosed
by the South Breakwater
and reclamation of 39 acres
of land in the area enclosed 1977
by this new breakwater, to
provide space for a new Dry
Dock and an additional 2000
feet of wharf age
(c) Enlarging the old 1975
breakwater to construct a 1977
Fitting Out Wharf
(d) Provision of ship support 1976
services at South Breakwater
and Fitting Out Wharfs
(namely electric power supplies, 1981 to
fresh water, sea water, fuel storage, 1984
compressed air, mobile rectifiers,
steam supply, travelling cranes,
capstans etc)

MODERNISATION OF THE BOMBAY DOCKYARD

In 1969, the National Industrial Development Corporation (NIDC) was

selected as the official consultant to prepare a Master Plan for the
modernisation of the Dockyard and to prepare a project report for repair
facilities required to meet the demands of a rapidly growing fleet. The
intention was that all future expansion of the Dockyard would be based on
their recommendations.

The NIDC study would:

(a) Evaluate and analyse present and future workload.

(b) Assess existing and required capacity.

(c) Prepare an Overall Master Plan indicating the location of each

department, shop, road, storage area, canteen, toilet, office and
shore facility for ships under maintenance.

NIDC submitted their report in 1971 and recommended the expansion of

the Dockyard in three phases, catering for Immediate, Intermediate and
Future requirements. This report has formed the basis for
modernising/expansion of the Dockyard.
 OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT - 1965-1975

(Note: "The History of the Naval Dockyard Bombay" by Rear Admiral K

Sridharan provides the full details of developments during this period).

The development of the Bombay Dockyard during this decade can be seen
from the overview given below:

Year Improvements in Additional Modernisation Sanctioned/Implemented

Organisation Facilities
Sanctioned/
Established
1964(a) The National
Productivity Council
(NPC) conducted a
survey of the Naval
Dockyard to suggest
ways and means for
improving
productivity and
higher degree of
motivation and
training for Dockyard
personnel.
(b) The NPC studied
the stores inventory
system of the Naval
Stores Organisation
(NSO), of the Spare
Parts Distribution
Centre (SPDC) and of
Naval Headquarters
(c) A Planning and
Production Control
(PPC) Department
was set up with NPC
assistance.
1965The PPC Department -Life Raft Repair Cell
started set up
yielding good results -Joiner shop
completed
1966 -Weapon Control Commenced phased replacement of old
and Repair Shop machinery, equipment and machine tools
(WECORS) Phase 1
completed and
Phase II sanctioned
1967 -WECORS Phase 2 - do -
commenced -Workshop facilities augmented

1968 60 Hz power supply - do -

extended to Duncan
Dry Dock and Wet
Basin
1969 - Boiler Erection - do -
Shop set up for - Sanction accorded for multi storied ICE
Leander boilers Repair Shop and two parallel workshops for
- Steam Test House plate and fabrication work
sanctioned to - Augmentation of Power Supply and Joiner
test indigenously Shop Sanctioned
manufactured
Leander auxi- liary - The National Industrial Development
machinery and Corporation (NIDC) was appointed to prepare
other ships a Master Plan for the Naval Dockyard to
machinery repaired/ provide a basis for augmen-tation of
overhauled in the workshops and allied facilities
Dockyard

- SPDC Repair
Workshop
Sanctioned
for repairing spare
gear stocked by
SPDC
- Boat Repair
Workshop
sanctioned
- Electric Test House
for AC generator
load test sanctioned
- Base Maintenance
Unit sanctioned
- Service standards
Room and
Calibration Facilities
established in
WECORS
1970 - Test House
established at Kurla
for coastal
minesweeper Deltic
diesel engines

- Computer sanction
for PPC
Department and
inventory control of
naval stores and
SPDC spares

1971Naval Stores - -
Organisation and
SPDC merged as a
result of the
recommendations
of the Administrative
Staff College of India
1972- - -
1973Computer - Interim Auto NIDC Phase 1 Report under consideration
commenced working Control Bay
in double shifts for established
production and for repair of Leander
inventory control control equipment

- WECORS Phase
IIcompleted

1974 - Mobile diesel

alternators provided
to conserve running
hours of ships
diesel generators

- Light ICE Shop

completed
1975Multiple docking -Sanction accorded -NIDC recommendations on Modernisation of
achieved for Dockyard Naval Dockyard approved
for the first time workshops to be
when four augmented for -Joiner Shop augmentation completed
ships, (two Petyas, Russian acquisitions
an ocean going based in Bombay
rocket boat and a - Steam Test House
Leander class frigate) commissioned
were docked in the - Light Diesel Shop,
Cruiser Dock Boat Repair Shop
and WECORS Phase
II commissioned

VISAKHAPATNAM DOCKYARD

PREAMBLE

In 1953, the Boat Repair Shop expanded into a Base Repair Organisation
(BRO) and shifted to the location at the mouth of the northwest channel.

In 1958, the progress of Bombay Dockyard's expansion scheme was

behind schedule. With the arrival between 1958 and 1961 of the eight
new frigates and the aircraft carrier, Bombay Dockyard would not be able
to berth these ships alongside. Naval Headquarters therefore proposed
that a major naval base be established at Visakhapatnam, starting with a
new 1120 foot jetty and a repair workshop. In 1962, sanction was
accorded for the construction of the new jetty and the workshop building.
Sanction was also accorded for the acquisition of 550 acres of land from
the Port Trust.
In 1963, survey ships were temporarily based in Visakhapatnam. The
decision was taken to set up a Naval Base and a Dockyard. Machinery and
equipment was procured for setting up repair facilities. For the first time,
the annual refit of a survey ship was undertaken by the BRO
Visakhapatnam making use of the dry docks of Hindustan Shipyard and
the Port Trust.

By 1964, plans were in hand for establishing a modern dockyard at

Visakhapatnam, capable of undertaking the normal refit and dry docking
of one modern frigate and four small craft. In 1965, two survey ships
JUMNA and INVESTIGATOR were permanently rebased at Visakhapatnam.

The 1965 Agreement on the Russian acquisitions included the preparation

of a Project Report for the Visakhapatnam Project comprising facilities for
a naval base and ship support facilities, a submarine base and submarine
support facilities, torpedo preparation and repair facilities, a training
school for the Russian acquisitions and a modern Naval Dockyard to repair
and refit ships and submarines. The Project Report was approved in 1968.

The Visakhapatnam Dockyard evolved in five phases:

Maintenance, Repair and

Phases
Refit
I Petyas, submarines, landing
ships, patrol boats, submarine
depot ship, submarine rescue
vessel
II Augmentation of Phase I
III of guided missile frigates
IV Marine Gas Turbine Overhaul
Centre
V of new submarines, missile craft
and minesweepers

OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT - 1965 TO 1975

The development of the Visakhapatnam Dockyard during this decade can

be seen from the overview given below:

Year Naval Base & Training Submarine Naval Dockyard

Complex Facilities
1966 Machine tools
sanctioned for
augmenting the
workshop facilities
of BRO
Visakhapatnam

1967 - Land acquired - Construction - Land acquired for

commenced of the new Dockyard
single and
married - Construction
accommodation commenced of
for submarine additional bays for
crews BRO

- Capital dredging
of existing channel
commenced to
create additional
berthing facilities
1968 - Construction commenced as
soon as the Russian Report on
the Visakhapatnam. Project
was accepted. In the draft
contracts, it was agreed that :

(i) Sizeable designing

effort would be
undertaken in India

(ii) Large proportion of

equipment and
machinery would be of
indigenous origin.

(iii) Russian drawings

for the Dockyard, and
Russian equipment and
machinery for the Naval
Base, Armament Repair
Workshop and Training
Complex, would arrive
within six months of
signing each contract.

(iv) The development of

the Naval Base and the
Dockyard, to provide full
 logistic support, would
be spread out over ten
years

- New 1120 foot wharf - Single and - Dredging of

completed. married northwest arm
Equipment indented for accommodation commenced
converted power supplies for submarine - Construction
- Construction of Torpedo crews commenced of
Preparation Complex completed Civilian Dockyard
commenced - Construction Workers Colony. 49
of Submarine quarters completed
Headquarters
building
commenced
1969 - Construction of wharves and - Phase 1 of
jetties commenced dredging north
- Torpedo Preparation west arm
Complex delayed completed-
- Construction of Torpedo Construction
Repair Workshop commenced commenced of
in NAD Energy Block
- Training equipment started (charging
arriving. submarine batteries
-Training Complex buildings and Dock-yard
delayed. Interim power supply)
arrangements made for - Construction
stowage of training equipment commenced of
Weapon Repair
Shop- Design of
South Dry Dock
commenced

-Civilian Dockyard
workers colony: 98
quarters
completed. EDC
502 more quarters
1973

1970 - Construction of wharves and - Submarine - Equipment being

jetties in Headquarters installed in Energy
progress - Torpedo building Block
Preparation Complex completed and - Additional land
completed commissioned as being acquired for
INS VIRBAHU Dockyard
- Torpedo Repair Complex in workshops and to
NAD cater for adequate
nearing completion waterway for
manoeuvering ships
and submarines
1971 - Wharves and jetties - Energy Block
completed completed
- Slipway wharf completed - Equipment being
- Torpedo Repair Workshop in installed in Weapon
NAD completed Repair Shop-
Dockyard
Apprentice School
and Hostel
completed

- Design of South
Dry Dock
completed

- Piling work
commenced of the
Main Fitting Shop,
the Machine Shop
and the Store Block

1972 - Construction
commenced of
South Dry Dock
(EDC 1976). When
ready, it would be
the largest dry dock
in India, with
facilities for docking
ships in
compartments and
more than one
abreast
1973 - High level
Steering Committee
constituted to
monitor execution
and completion of
essential repair
facilities by 1977-
78

- Phase 1 Weapon
Repair Shop
completed

- Dockyard
Apprentice School
commissioned

- Training
commenced of ex
ITI apprentices to
build up Dockyard
technical manpower

1974 - Training Complex - In view of steep

commissioned as INS increase in costs,
SATAVAHANA- Mobile diesel the construction
alternators provided to schedule of various
conserve running hours of facilities was
shipsdiesel generators- reviewed and it was
Construction commenced of decided to
Sailors Institute progress the works
in phases. In the
immediate phase,
only those items
essential
for undertaking six
yearly refits of
submarines and
Petyas to be
provided

- Construction
schedule of South
Dry Dock delayed
due to redesign of
dock floor to cater
for local soil condi-
 tions.

1975 - Construction commenced of - Interim

Eastern Naval Command facilities for three
Officers Mess- INCS Complex yearly re-fits of
commissioned Russian ships
completed

- Workshops to be
augmented for
major refits of new
Russian acquisitions

BRO COCHIN
By 1963, plans had crystallised to augment the BRO at Cochin and build a
new naval jetty on the Willingdon Island foreshore.

In 1963, the Ministry of Shipbuilding decided to set up the Cochin

Shipyard which would have an 1800 foot jetty on the Ernakulam side of
the channel. It became necessary to shift the site of the proposed naval
jetty on the Willingdon Island foreshore closer to the Ernakulam bridge.

In 1965, the three Hunt class destroyers GODAVARI, GOMATI and GANGA
were rebased at Cochin and proposals were put up in 1966 for additional
workshop facilities. However, between 1965 and 1975, the large
expenditure on the Bombay and Visakhapatnam Dockyards precluded any
substantial funds being available for augmenting BRO Cochin.

In 1972, the Training Squadron comprising the cruiser DELHI and the
frigate KISTNA was based at Cochin.

In 1975, approval was eventually accorded for the construction of the

new naval jetty.

THE DEVELOPMENTS OF MAINTENANCE FACILITIES AT PORT

BLAIR

After China's attack in October-November 1962, the responsibility for the

seaward defence of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands was assigned to the
Navy. The first Resident Naval Officer arrived Port Blair in November
1962. In mid 1963, the first Naval Garrison of five officers and one
hundred and fifty six sailors arrived in Port Blair. Until the Navy's Seaward
Defence Boats arrived, sea patrols and inter-island transportation were
supported by craft of the Central Board of Revenue. Soon, the need was
felt for a maintenance and repair facility to sustain these small craft which
were operating so far away from the nearest BRO at Visakhapatnam.

In 1964, INS JARAWA was commissioned as the parent establishment at

Port Blair. In 1965, the detailed, phased requirements of machinery,
personnel, buildings and shore supply facilities for setting up a BRO were
included in the overall plan for setting up an advance naval base at Port
Blair. This plan envisaged the construction of a 1200 foot wharf, half of
which would be for naval use.

After the 1965 war, Landing ship MAGAR started being deployed in the
A&N Islands.
In 1966, approval in principle was accorded for setting up a BRO and
berthing facilities in three phases. From 1966 onwards, when the newly
arrived Russian patrol boats and the Landing ships started operating in
the islands, the urgency increased for providing some kind of repair
facility at Port Blair. From 1967 onwards, MAGAR took over the role of
logistic support for these Russian vessels.

In 1967, sanction was accorded for the construction of the new wharf.
Construction commenced in 1968.

In 1969, the old stores ship, DHARINI, which had earlier been converted
into a repair ship by equipping her with a workshop, machine tools and
repair materials to support the coastal minesweepers, was positioned in
Port Blair as an afloat maintenance facility. The arrangement did not
prove satisfactory and DHARINI returned to Bombay.

By 1973, it was found that intrusions were occurring mainly in the

southern group of the Nicobar Islands and were easier to deal with when
ships operated from the island of Kamorta. In 1973, a forward operating
base was commissioned as INS KARDIP on the island of Kamorta and
patrol craft started operating from there. Soon, it became necessary to
set up a SMU in Kamorta.

In 1974, sanction was accorded for establishing a BRO to provide

comprehensive repair facilities to ships operating in the A&N islands. This
organisation was subsequently commissioned in 1979. As an interim
measure, a small Base Maintenance Unit (Electrical) was established
separately. This was unable to meet all the requirements of the Landing
Ships. A ship maintenance unit was therefore set up.

By 1975, the BRO at Port Blair was able to increase the operational
availability of the landing ships and the patrol boats.

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1975

BOMBAY DOCKYARD

Commenced Completed
Fitting Out Wharf 1975 1977
Missile Boat Engine
1972 1979
Workshop
Auxiliary Machinery
1977 1980
Shop
South Breakwater 1976 1981
 Services
Fitting Out Wharf
1976 1984
Services
Controls
1982 1984
Engineering Shop
Hull Assembly
andSteel 1981 1985
Preparation Shop
Electrical Shop 1982 1985
Submarine Battery
Commissioning 1984 1988
Facility
Heavy Diesel Engine
1985 1990
Workshop
Air Conditioning
1986 1993
Shop
New Dry Dock and Under
1995
Additional Wharves construction

VISAKHAPATNAM DOCKYARD

CommencedCompleted
- South Dry Dock 1972 1977
- New workshop for Hull,
Engineering, Electrical and 1972 1978
Submarine auxiliaries
- Capital dredging to
create space for the new
1979 1980
Armament Jetty and the
Degaussing Basin
- Captive power
1976 1983
generation facilities
- Augmentation of
1983 1986
Weapon Repair Shop
- Degaussing Basin 1979 1989
- North Dry Dock 1980 1990
- Marine Gas Turbine
1984 1990
Repair Workshop
- New jetty on the eastern
1987 1991
bank
- Ammunition jetty 1987 1993

NSRY AT COCHIN
By the end 1970's, the old ships of the Training Squadron had been
phased out and replaced by BRAHMAPUTRA, BETWA and BEAS which had
been converted to the training role.

In 1982, the six new Russian inshore minesweepers were based in

Cochin. They were joined in 1985 by four new srvey craft and the new
training ship TIR.

With the number of ships based in Cochin steadily increasing, it became

timely to modernise the BRO's facilities. Taking advantage of the special
to type equipment being supplied for the maintenance, repair and refit of
the Russian inshore minesweepers, new workshops were set up on land
adjacent to the old BRO, in such a way that the workshops could
maintain, repair and refit larger ships as well, with docking being done in
Cochin Shipyard.

The new 1200 foot jetty was commissioned in 1987 and when the new
workshops were ready, the BRO Cochin were re-designated as a Naval
Ship Repair Yard.

NSRY AT PORT BLAIR

- The new workshops were sanctioned in 1975, completed in 1977, and

commissioned as a BRO in 1979.

- A Floating Dock was acquired and commissioned in 1987. This saved

ships from having to go to Visakhapatnam for annual docking.

- In 1993, the BRO was redesignated as a Naval Ship Repair Yard.

RETROSPECT

There persists a widespread misperception that the reason why the

operational availability of ships was unsatisfactory in the 1960's and
1970's was because the Navy acquired too many ships too quickly and
funnelled the budget to acquisitions, thereby delaying the setting up of
repair and refit facilities. The reality was different. Basically, two factors
are unavoidable:

- There will always be a time lag between the induction of

vessels and the setting up of their special to type
maintenance, repair, refit and logistic support facilities.

- When vessels are acquired from abroad, it is economical to

acquire them in sufficient numbers, rather than one at a time.
Inescapably, the bunching at the time of their acquisition
leads, years later, to the bunching of their major refits. Since
refit facilities always lag, operational availability diminishes.
In the Indian Navy's case, unusual civil engineering difficulties retarded
the timely completion of the facilities at Bombay, Visakhapatnam and Port
Blair:

- In Bombay, the lack of a suitable rock breaker and

prolonged litigation by a defaulting contractor delayed the
Naval Dockyard Expansion Scheme.

- In Visakhapatnam, the soil conditions were unable to bear

the weight of the heavy floors of critical priority workshops.
Their floors sank, entailing extensive rework. Later, work on
the new South Dry Dock had to be stopped to enable the dock
floor to be redesigned because of poor soil conditions.

- In Port Blair, all construction machinery and material had to

be ferried from the mainland. This could only gather
momentum after the arrival of the first two landing ships in
1966. Moreover, since Port Blair was also being developed on
the civil side, the preparation of a Master Plan, the zoning of
areas, land acquisition, the funding for water supplies and
electricity generation etc all had their own gestation times,
because it entailed interaction between several ministries.

Taking all these factors into account, including our insistance on

maximum indigenisation, the momentum achieved in the setting up
maintenance, repair and refit facilities during the decade 1965-1975 was
more than commendable.

UNCLASSIFIED HISTORY

CHAPTER

MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND REFIT FACILITIES

PREAMBLE

When the Navy was partitioned in 1947, its only Dockyard was at
Bombay. It provided all the maintenance, repair, docking and refit
support that ships needed. The only other ports where rudimentary
facilities existed were at Cochin and at Visakhapatnam, each of which had
minuscule Repair Shops, having a few machine tools, carpentry facilities
for minor repairs of wooden boats, a small slipway and a blacksmith's
shop.

In the decades that followed, there were enormous developments:

 - The Naval Dockyard Bombay was expanded and
modernised.

- Asia's newest Naval Dockyard was constructed in

Visakhapatnam.

- The repair workshop at Cochin grew into a Base Repair

Organisation and eventually into the Naval Ship Repair Yard
(NSRY).

- The small Portuguese Navy workshop in Goa grew into a

Base Repair Workshop.

- And in Port Blair, a NSRY came up alongside a newly

constructed naval jetty and a floating dock.

This chapter describes the developments during the decade 1965-1975.

BOMBAY DOCKYARD

NAVAL DOCKYARD EXPANSION SCHEME

The expansion of the Bombay Naval Dockyard was undertaken in two

stages. The dates of commencement and completion of works in each
stage are shown below:

STAGE ONE

Works Involved Commenced Completed

(a) Dredging of the Inner Tidal Basin 1954 1967 to 1970
(b) Reclamation of 27 acres in front of
Castle Barracks, between the old 1954 1962 to 1970
breakwater and the Ballard Pier
(c) Construction of 2300 feet of
wharfage on the reclaimed land for the 1954 1962 to 1970
Barracks and Destroyer wharves.
(d) Construction of a Cruiser Dry Dock
1954 1962
on the reclaimed land.
(e) Extension of the Ballard Pier by
750 feet and incorporation into the
1963 1966
Dockyard Extension of the inner face of
Ballard Pier.
(f) Provision of ship support
services for the Barracks, Destroyer
and Ballard Pier wharves (namely
1954 1966 to 1970
electrical power supplies, fresh water,
sea water, compressed air, traveling
cranes etc)
STAGE TWO
(a) Construction of Rubble
Mound Breakwater and South 1967 1974
Breakwater (Deep Water Wharf)
(b) Capital Dredging of the
Outer Tidal Basin enclosed by the
South Breakwater and reclamation of 39
acres of land in the area enclosed by 1972 1977
this new break-water, to provide space
for a new Dry Dock and an additional
2000 feet of wharf age
(c) Enlarging the old breakwater to
1975 1977
construct a Fitting Out Wharf
(d) Provision of ship support services at South
Breakwater and Fitting Out Wharfs
(namely electric power supplies, fresh water, sea
1976 1981 to 1984
water, fuel storage, compressed air, mobile
rectifiers, steam supply, travelling cranes,capstans
etc)

MODERNISATION OF THE BOMBAY DOCKYARD

In 1969, the National Industrial Development Corporation (NIDC) was

selected as the official consultant to prepare a Master Plan for the
modernisation of the Dockyard and to prepare a project report for repair
facilities required to meet the demands of a rapidly growing fleet. The
intention was that all future expansion of the Dockyard would be based on
their recommendations.

The NIDC study would:

(a) Evaluate and analyse present and future workload.

(b) Assess existing and required capacity.

(c) Prepare an Overall Master Plan indicating the location of

each department, shop, road, storage area, canteen, toilet,
office and shore facility for ships under maintenance.
NIDC submitted their report in 1971 and recommended the expansion of
the Dockyard in three phases, catering for Immediate, Intermediate and
Future requirements. This report has formed the basis for
modernising/expansion of the Dockyard.

OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT - 1965-1975

(Note: "The History of the Naval Dockyard Bombay" by Rear Admiral K

Sridharan provides the full details of developments during this period).

The development of the Bombay Dockyard during this decade can be seen
from the overview given below:

Improvements in Additional Facilities

Year Modernisation Sanctioned/Impl
Organisation Sanctioned/Established
a) The National
Productivity Council
(NPC) conducted a
survey of the Naval
Dockyard to suggest
ways and means for
improving
productivity and
higher degree of
motivation and
training for Dockyard
personnel. b) The
1964 NPC studied the
stores inventory
system of the Naval
Stores Organisation
(NSO), of the Spare
Parts Distribution
Centre (SPDC) and of
Naval Headquarters c)
A Planning and
Production Control
(PPC) Department
was set up with NPC
assistance.

1965 The PPC Department started -Life Raft Repair Cell

yielding good results set up

-Joiner shop completed

1966 -Weapon Control and Commenced phased replace

Repair Shop(WECORS) ment of old machinery,

Phase 1 completed equipment and machine tools

and Phase II sanctioned

1967 -WECORS Phase 2 - do -

commenced

-Workshop facilities

augmented

1968 60 Hz power supply - do -

extended to Duncan Dry

Dock and Wet Basin

1969 - Boiler Erection Shop - do -

set up for Leander

boilers

- Steam Test House - Sanction accorded for multi

sanctioned to test storeyed ICE Repair Shop and

indigenously manu- two parallel workshops for

factured Leander auxi- plate and fabrication work

liary machinery and

other ships machinery

repaired/overhauled in - Augmentation of Power

the Dockyard Supply and Joiner Shop

Sanctioned

- SPDC Repair Workshop

Sanctioned for repairing - The National Industrial

spare gear stocked Development Corporation

by SPDC (NIDC) was appointed to

prepare a Master Plan for

- Boat Repair Workshop the Naval Dockyard to

sanctioned provide a basis for augmen-

tation of workshops and

- Electric Test House allied facilities

for AC generator load

test sanctioned

- Base Maintenance Unit

sanctioned

- Service standards

Room and Calibration

Facilities established

in WECORS

1970 - Test House established

at Kurla for coastal

minesweeper Deltic

diesel engines

- Computer sanction

for PPC Department and inventory control of

naval stores and SPDC

spares
1971 Naval Stores Organisation

and SPDC merged as a result

of the recommendations of

the Administrative Staff

College of India

1972

1973 Computer commenced NIDC Phase 1 Report under

working in double shifts consideration

for production and in-

ventory control

- Interim Auto Control

Bay established for

repair of Leander

control equipment

- WECORS Phase II

completed

1974 - Mobile diesel alter-

nators provided to

conserve running hours

of ships diesel

generators

- Light ICE Shop

completed

1975 Multiple docking achieved Sanction accorded for NIDC

recommendations on
for the first time when Dockyard workshops Modernisation of Naval

four ships, (two Petyas, an to be augmented for Dockyard approved

ocean going rocket boat Russian acquisitions

and a Leander class based in Bombay

frigate) were docked

in the Cruiser Dock - Steam Test House Joiner Shop augmentation

commissioned completed

- Light Diesel Shop,

Boat Repair Shop and

WECORS Phase II

commissioned

VISAKHAPATNAM DOCKYARD

PREAMBLE

In 1953, the Boat Repair Shop expanded into a Base Repair Organisation
(BRO) and shifted to the location at the mouth of the northwest channel.

In 1958, the progress of Bombay Dockyard's expansion scheme was

behind schedule. With the arrival between 1958 and 1961 of the eight
new frigates and the aircraft carrier, Bombay Dockyard would not be able
to berth these ships alongside. Naval Headquarters therefore proposed
that a major naval base be established at Visakhapatnam, starting with a
new 1120 foot jetty and a repair workshop. In 1962, sanction was
accorded for the construction of the new jetty and the workshop building.
Sanction was also accorded for the acquisition of 550 acres of land from
the Port Trust.

In 1963, survey ships were temporarily based in Visakhapatnam. The

decision was taken to set up a Naval Base and a Dockyard. Machinery and
equipment was procured for setting up repair facilities. For the first time,
the annual refit of a survey ship was undertaken by the BRO
Visakhapatnam making use of the dry docks of Hindustan Shipyard and
the Port Trust.

By 1964, plans were in hand for establishing a modern dockyard at

Visakhapatnam, capable of undertaking the normal refit and dry docking
of one modern frigate and four small craft. In 1965, two survey ships
JUMNA and INVESTIGATOR were permanently rebased at Visakhapatnam.

The 1965 Agreement on the Russian acquisitions included the preparation

of a Project Report for the Visakhapatnam Project comprising facilities for
a naval base and ship support facilities, a submarine base and submarine
support facilities, torpedo preparation and repair facilities, a training
school for the Russian acquisitions and a modern Naval Dockyard to repair
and refit ships and submarines. The Project Report was approved in 1968.

The Visakhapatnam Dockyard evolved in five phases:

Phases Maintenance, Repair and Refit

I of Petyas, submarines, landing ships, patrol boats,

submarine depot ship, submarine rescue vessel

II Augmentation of Phase I

III of guided missile frigates

IV Marine Gas Turbine Overhaul Centre

V of new submarines, missile craft and minesweepers

OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT - 1965 TO 1975

The development of the Visakhapatnam Dockyard during this decade can

be seen from the overview given below:

Year Naval Base & Training Submarine Facilities Naval Dockyard

Complex

1966 Machine tools sanctioned

for augmenting the workshop

facilities of BRO

Visakhapatnam

1967 - Land acquired - Construction commenced - Land acquired for the

new

of single and married Dockyard

accomodation for submarine

crews - Construction commenced of

additional bays for BRO

- Capital dredging of exis-

ting channel commenced to

create additional berthing

facilities

1968 - Construction commenced as soon as the Russian Report on the

Visakhapatnam

Project was accepted. In the draft contracts, it was agreed that :

i) Sizeable designing effort would be undertaken in India

ii) Large proportion of equipment and machinery would be of indigenous

origin.

iii) Russian drawings for the Dockyard, and Russian equipment and

machinery for the Naval Base, Armament Repair Workshop and

Training Complex, would arrive within six months of signing each

contract.

iv) The development of the Naval Base and the Dockyard, to provide full

logistic support, would be spread out over ten years

- New 1120 foot wharf - Single and married acco- - Dredging of northwest

completed. Equipment modation for submarine arm commenced

indented for converted crews completed

power supplies - Construction commenced of

- Construction of Civilian Dockyard Workers

- Construction of Submarine Headquarters Colony. 49 quarters

Torpedo Preparation building commenced completed

Complex commenced

1969 - Construction of - Phase 1 of dredging north

wharves and jetties west arm completed

commenced

- Construction commenced of

- Torpedo Preparation Energy Block(charging sub-

Complex delayed marine batteries and Dock-

yard power supply)

- Construction of

Torpedo Repair Work- - Construction commenced of

shop commenced in NAD Weapon Repair Shop

- Training equipment - Design of South Dry Dock

started arriving. commenced

Training Complex

buildings delayed. - Civilian Dockyard workers Interim arrangements

colony: 98 quarters comple-

made for stowage of ted. EDC 502 more quarters

training equipment 1973

1970 - Construction of - Submarine Headquarters - Equipment being

installed

wharves and jetties building completed and in Energy Block

in progress commissioned as INS

VIRBAHU - Additional land being

- Torpedo Preparation acquired for Dockyard

Complex completed workshops and to cater for

adequate waterway for

manoeuvering ships and

- Torpedo Repair submarines

Complex in NAD

nearing completion

1971 - Wharves and jetties - Energy Block completed

completed

- Equipment being installed

- Slipway wharf in Weapon Repair Shop

completed

- Dockyard Apprentice

- Torpedo Repair School and Hostel completed

Workshop in NAD

completed - Design of South Dry Dock

completed

- Piling work commenced of

the Main Fitting Shop, the

Machine Shop and the Store

Block

1972 - Construction commenced of

South Dry Dock (EDC 1976).

When ready, it would be the

largest dry dock in India,

with facilities for docking

ships in compartments and

more than one abreast

1973 - High level Steering Commit

tee constituted to monitor

execution and completion of

essential repair facilities

by 1977-78

- Phase 1 Weapon Repair Shop

completed

- Dockyard Apprentice

School commissioned

- Training commenced of ex

ITI apprentices to build up

Dockyard technical manpower

1974 - Training Complex commi- - In view of steep increase

ssioned as INS SATAVAHANA in costs, the construction

schedule of various faci-

- Mobile diesel alterna- lities was reviewed and it

tors provided to conserve was decided to progress

running hours of ships the works in phases. In

diesel generators the immediate phase, only

those items essential for

- Construction commenced undertaking six yearly re-

of Sailors Institute fits of submarines and

Petyas to be provided

- Construction schedule of

South Dry Dock delayed due

to redesign of dock floor to

cater for local soil condi-

tions.

1975 - Construction commenced - Interim facilities

of Eastern Naval Command for three yearly re-

Officers Mess fits of Russian ships

completed

- INCS Complex commi- - Workshops to be augmented

ssioned for major refits of new

Russian acquisitions

BRO COCHIN

By 1963, plans had crystallised to augment the BRO at Cochin and build a
new naval jetty on the Willingdon Island foreshore.

In 1963, the Ministry of Shipbuilding decided to set up the Cochin

Shipyard which would have an 1800 foot jetty on the Ernakulam side of
the channel. It became necessary to shift the site of the proposed naval
jetty on the Willingdon Island foreshore closer to the Ernakulam bridge.

In 1965, the three Hunt class destroyers GODAVARI, GOMATI and GANGA
were rebased at Cochin and proposals were put up in 1966 for additional
workshop facilities. However, between 1965 and 1975, the large
expenditure on the Bombay and Visakhapatnam Dockyards precluded any
substantial funds being available for augmenting BRO Cochin.

In 1972, the Training Squadron comprising the cruiser DELHI and the
frigate KISTNA was based at Cochin.
In 1975, approval was eventually accorded for the construction of the
new naval jetty.

THE DEVELOPMENTS OF MAINTENANCE FACILITIES AT PORT

BLAIR

After China's attack in October-November 1962, the responsibility for the

seaward defence of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands was assigned to the
Navy. The first Resident Naval Officer arrived Port Blair in November
1962. In mid 1963, the first Naval Garrison of five officers and one
hundred and fifty six sailors arrived in Port Blair. Until the Navy's Seaward
Defence Boats arrived, sea patrols and inter-island transportation were
supported by craft of the Central Board of Revenue. Soon, the need was
felt for a maintenance and repair facility to sustain these small craft which
were operating so far away from the nearest BRO at Visakhapatnam.

In 1964, INS JARAWA was commissioned as the parent establishment at

Port Blair. In 1965, the detailed, phased requirements of machinery,
personnel, buildings and shore supply facilities for setting up a BRO were
included in the overall plan for setting up an advance naval base at Port
Blair. This plan envisaged the construction of a 1200 foot wharf, half of
which would be for naval use.

After the 1965 war, Landing ship MAGAR started being deployed in the
A&N Islands.

In 1966, approval in principle was accorded for setting up a BRO and

berthing facilities in three phases. From 1966 onwards, when the newly
arrived Russian patrol boats and the Landing ships started operating in
the islands, the urgency increased for providing some kind of repair
facility at Port Blair. From 1967 onwards, MAGAR took over the role of
logistic support for these Russian vessels.

In 1967, sanction was accorded for the construction of the new wharf.
Construction commenced in 1968.

In 1969, the old stores ship, DHARINI, which had earlier been converted
into a repair ship by equipping her with a workshop, machine tools and
repair materials to support the coastal minesweepers, was positioned in
Port Blair as an afloat maintenance facility. The arrangement did not
prove satisfactory and DHARINI returned to Bombay.

By 1973, it was found that intrusions were occurring mainly in the

southern group of the Nicobar Islands and were easier to deal with when
ships operated from the island of Kamorta. In 1973, a forward operating
base was commissioned as INS KARDIP on the island of Kamorta and
patrol craft started operating from there. Soon, it became necessary to
set up a SMU in Kamorta.
In 1974, sanction was accorded for establishing a BRO to provide
comprehensive repair facilities to ships operating in the A&N islands. This
organisation was subsequently commissioned in 1979. As an interim
measure, a small Base Maintenance Unit (Electrical) was established
separately. This was unable to meet all the requirements of the Landing
Ships. A ship maintenance unit was therefore set up.

By 1975, the BRO at Port Blair was able to increase the operational
availability of the landing ships and the patrol boats.

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1975

BOMBAY DOCKYARD

Commenced Completed

Fitting Out Wharf 1975 1977

Missile Boat Engine Workshop 1972 1979

Auxiliary Machinery Shop 1977 1980

South Breakwater Services 1976 1981

Fitting Out Wharf Services 1976 1984

Controls Engineering Shop 1982 1984

Hull Assembly and 1981 1985

Steel Preparation Shop

Electrical Shop 1982 1985

Submarine Battery Commissioning 1984 1988

Facility

Heavy Diesel Engine Workshop 1985 1990

Air Conditioning Shop 1986 1993

New Dry Dock and Additional Wharves 1995 Under

construction

VISAKHAPATNAM DOCKYARD
Commenced Completed

- South Dry Dock 1972 1977

- New workshop for Hull, Engineering, 1972 1978

Electrical and Submarine auxiliaries

- Capital dredging to create space for the 1979 1980

new Armament Jetty and the Degaussing Basin

- Captive power generation facilities 1976 1983

- Augmentation of Weapon Repair Shop 1983 1986

- Degaussing Basin 1979 1989

- North Dry Dock 1980 1990

- Marine Gas Turbine Repair Workshop 1984 1990

- New jetty on the eastern bank 1987 1991

- Ammunition jetty 1987 1993

NSRY AT COCHIN

By the end 1970's, the old ships of the Training Squadron had been
phased out and replaced by BRAHMAPUTRA, BETWA and BEAS which had
been converted to the training role.

In 1982, the six new Russian inshore minesweepers were based in

Cochin. They were joined in 1985 by four new srvey craft and the new
training ship TIR.

With the number of ships based in Cochin steadily increasing, it became

timely to modernise the BRO's facilities. Taking advantage of the special
to type equipment being supplied for the maintenance, repair and refit of
the Russian inshore minesweepers, new workshops were set up on land
adjacent to the old BRO, in such a way that the workshops could
maintain, repair and refit larger ships as well, with docking being done in
Cochin Shipyard.

The new 1200 foot jetty was commissioned in 1987 and when the new
workshops were ready, the BRO Cochin were re-designated as a Naval
Ship Repair Yard.
NSRY AT PORT BLAIR

- The new workshops were sanctioned in 1975, completed in 1977, and

commissioned as a BRO in 1979.

- A Floating Dock was acquired and commissioned in 1987. This saved

ships from having to go to Visakhapatnam for annual docking.

- In 1993, the BRO was redesignated as a Naval Ship Repair Yard.

RETROSPECT

There persists a widespread misperception that the reason why the

operational availability of ships was unsatisfactory in the 1960's and
1970's was because the Navy acquired too many ships too quickly and
funnelled the budget to acquisitions, thereby delaying the setting up of
repair and refit facilities. The reality was different. Basically, two factors
are unavoidable:

- There will always be a time lag between the induction of

vessels and the setting up of their special to type
maintenance, repair, refit and logistic support facilities.

- When vessels are acquired from abroad, it is economical to

acquire them in sufficient numbers, rather than one at a time.
Inescapably, the bunching at the time of their acquisition
leads, years later, to the bunching of their major refits. Since
refit facilities always lag, operational availability diminishes.

In the Indian Navy's case, unusual civil engineering difficulties retarded

the timely completion of the facilities at Bombay, Visakhapatnam and Port
Blair:

- In Bombay, the lack of a suitable rock breaker and

prolonged litigation by a defaulting contractor delayed the
Naval Dockyard Expansion Scheme.

- In Visakhapatnam, the soil conditions were unable to bear

the weight of the heavy floors of critical priority workshops.
Their floors sank, entailing extensive rework. Later, work on
the new South Dry Dock had to be stopped to enable the dock
floor to be redesigned because of poor soil conditions.

- In Port Blair, all construction machinery and material had to

be ferried from the mainland. This could only gather
momentum after the arrival of the first two landing ships in
1966. Moreover, since Port Blair was also being developed on
the civil side, the preparation of a Master Plan, the zoning of
 areas, land acquisition, the funding for water supplies and
electricity generation etc all had their own gestation times,
because it entailed interaction between several ministries.

Taking all these factors into account, including our insistance on

maximum indigenisation, the momentum achieved in the setting up
maintenance, repair and refit facilities during the decade 1965-1975 was
more than commendable.

CHAPTER 21

PERSONNEL

PREAMBLE

The evolution and management of the Navy's personnel policies have

been turbulent since 1939. During the Second World War, the Royal
Indian Navy had expanded from 114 officers and 1732 ratings in 1939 to
3014 officers and 27,433 ratings in 1945. After the demobilisation of 1945
and 1946 and the partition of the Navy in 1947, the Navy had shrunk to
672 officers and 5508 ratings.

After 1947, the demands for manpower steadily increased. Ever since
then, personnel policies have been driven by several considerations, of
which the more basic ones have been:

(a) To overcome shortages by constantly innovating the schemes of

intake.

(b) To raise the educational standards of intake so that personnel

can cope with the rising technological levels of naval equipment.

(c) To minimise the durations of courses, so as to release

manpower for manning new acquisitions.

(d) To minimise the exodus of trained and experienced technical

manpower to the Merchant Navy and the civil sector by offering
longer careers, better emoluments, more domestic accomodation,
more schools for children, canteen facilities, loans from the Indian
Naval Benevolent Association (INBA), Group Insurance Schemes etc
to induce personnel to remain in service for as long as possible.

(e) These considerations have had to be juggled within the over-

riding constraint of maintaining parity with the Army and the Air
Force in physical and medical recruitment standards, pay scales,
 length of colour service, pensionary benefits, equivalence with
civilian trades etc.

(f) Within the above framework, to devise allowances and

perquisites like hardlying money, flying bounty, submarine pay,
diving money etc to attract talent into the appropriate
specialisations of the Navy.

(g) On board ships to maintain parity between the departments, the

branches of the Navy and the specialisations/trades within each
Branch, in terms of workload, responsibilities, career prospects and
particularly the less liked duties like cleanship and ship husbandry.

The reconciliation of these conflicting considerations was not easy. During

the decade 1965 to 1975, unrest and dissatisfaction manifested in diverse
forms. The Navy pulled through. Shortages reduced gradually. Reforms
were attempted in the procedures for recruitment, training and manning.
Some reforms succeeded. Some reforms like fixed commissions and pre
commissioning training (PCT) took time to take root. Some reforms like
user-maintainer failed to gain acceptance.

As regards training, except for the advanced "dagger" specialisation

courses and other highly specialised courses, the entire training of officers
and sailors was being undertaken in India by 1965.

The parent schools, by and large, had the equipment they needed to
impart training for the older ships. For every new acquisition, however, a
balance had to be struck between the cost of setting up new training
facilities ashore or making the maximum use of equipment aboard the
new ships. The main constraint was that the wear and tear caused by
"learning on the job at sea" degraded the life of equipment on board
operational ships.

This chapter discusses the "Personnel" developments between 1965 and

1975 under the following headings:

- Officers Intake, Training, Progression and Promotion

- Sailors Intake, Training and Transfers

- Artificers

- Changes in the Navy's Sailor Structure and Branch Responsibilities

- Fixed Commissions

- The Training Reforms of 1974

 - Discipline and Morale

- Accomodation

- The Navy's Civilian Personnel

- General

-Allotment of Personal Numbers to Officers

-Naval Standing Establishment Committee

-Changes in Regulations Regarding Moustaches and Beards

-Changes in Uniform

- Increase in the Navy's Borne Strength Between 1965 and 1975

- Changes in Sailors' Conditions of Service after 1975

- Retrospect

OFFICERS

INTAKE AND SCHEMES TO REDUCE SHORTAGES

In September 1939, when the Second World War started, the Royal
Indian Navy had 114 officers. By the time, the war ended in 1945, the
number of officers had risen to 3014. After the demobilisation of 1945
and 1946 and the partition of the Navy in 1947, the Navy had 672
officers.

The anticipated expansion of the Navy necessitated recourse to increased

recruitment of direct entry officers, as also increasing the intake of
regular entry officers. By 1964, the strength had risen to 1870 officers.

The position, in end 1965, was that the Navy was still 26% short and for
the next five years a large number would be required to man the Russian
acquisitions. A series of steps were taken to meet this looming shortage
of officers:

- From 1965 onwards, Direct Entry recruitment was increased: 23 in

1965, 88 in 1966 and 216 in 1967.
 - In 1965, the University Entry Scheme, which till then was
applicable only to commissions in the Electrical Branch, was
extended to the Engineering Branch.

- In 1968, a new Revised Special Entry Scheme (RSES) was

introduced for cadets who had reached the Intermediate standard in
education.

- In 1969, a Naval Academy was temporarily established at Cochin

to train 80 RSES cadet entry officers annually.

- In 1971, shortages continued to persist in the Executive, Electrical

and Engineering cadres. To overcome the shortages:

- Intake was increased through the Revised Special Entry

Scheme.

- The Direct Entry Scheme was made more attractive by

offering selected candidates permanent commissions instead
of short service commissions.

- In 1974, the educational level of the Naval Academy's intake

was raised. Science graduates were taken in for the Executive
Branch under the Graduate special Entry Scheme (GSES), so
as to maintain parity between the NDA graduate cadets and
the Naval Academy's graduate cadets.

By 1975, though the overall shortage persisted, intake had improved.

GSES for Executive Branch candidates and the Direct Entry Scheme of
offering permanent commissions to Engineering and Electrical candidates
had received good response. Both schemes were continued.

The residual shortages were made up through the Union Public Service
Commission's Combined Defence Services (CDS) Examination, which had
been introduced in 1974 to replace the separate examinations which used
to be held for cadets to join the Indian Military Academy, the Naval
Academy's GSES entry and the Air Force Academy.

MANNING PLAN FOR OFFICERS

In end 1975, shortages persisted in the technical branches, albeit at a

reduced level. The shortage was particularly acute in the rank of Lt Cdr
because of the new acquisitions, Long courses, Staff courses and
appointment in the new units like Acceptance Trial Teams, Testing and
Tuning Teams, Work Up Teams, Weapon Analysis Teams etc. The
shortage of seaman weapon specialist officers had become so acute that
these important teams, the sanctions for which had taken years of effort
to obtain, were left unfilled. An Officers Manning Plan became
inescapable:

- The requirements which would be fully met were those of

operational ships, courses and junior officer's sea time.

- The shortages would be shared between shore establishments,

Command Headquarters and Naval Headquarters.

- Special Duty List officers would increasingly fill General List billets
ashore and also some Instructor billets in the specialist schools.

- Greater responsibilities were to be entrusted to MCPOs.

TRAINING OF OFFICERS

CHANGES IN TRAINING AT THE NATIONAL DEFENCE ACADEMY

(NDA)

Until 1965, the NDA's three year syllabus had a common content for the
first two years and an Army/Navy/Air Force syllabus for the third year.
The drawback of this syllabus was that cadets who did not have
knowledge of science and mathematics retarded the progress of the
others, for whom the syllabus remained elementary.

In 1965, the Chiefs of Staff Committee directed the NDA to introduce a

diversified syllabus - one for the Humanities - Social Science stream and
one for the Science stream. The Chiefs of Staff also recommended that
cadets be awarded a degree on passing out of the NDA.

A Syllabus Revision Comittee was appointed in 1968 whose terms of

reference were to:

(a) Revise the NDA syllabus to a three year degree course in

Science and in Humanities.

(b) Ensure that the revised syllabus was both broad based and need
based.

(c) Consider measures for the award of a degree, by affiliation to a

university.
 (d) Suggest how the concomitant factors like age limit and
minimum education standard on entry would have to be changed.

(e) Recommend the additional instructional and administrative staff

and equipment that would become necessary.

The Committee comprised eminent educationists and service

representatives. The Committee also sought suggestions from a wide
spectrum of experts. All agreed that better educated officer material was
highly necessary and that the award of a degree would also help in the
post-service rehabilitation of officers. The Chairman of the University
Grants Commission felt, however, that cadets who were good in service
subjects and marginal in academics should have the option to pass out
without a degree, because the overall development of a cadet's
personality as a potential officer would suffer if acquisition of a degree
became the primary aim.

The Committee's major recommendations were:

(a) The age limit and educational qualification at entry should be 16

to 18 years and Higher Secondary respectively.

(b) The NDA should be affiliated to the Jawaharlal Nehru University

(JNU) in Delhi.

(c) The two streams, Science and Social Sciences, roughly equal in
strength, should continue.

The Committee's Report was approved and the three year Degree Course
was started in July 1971. The NDA was affiliated to the JNU on 31 August
1973. The 46th NDA course was the first batch of cadets to pass out of
NDA as graduates in June 1974.

THE NAVAL ACADEMY AND THE REVISED SPECIAL ENTRY SCHEME

By 1968, the shortage of General List officers had started to become a

constraint on the Navy's expansion. The anticipated strength of 3500
officers by 1975 required an annual intake of at least 150 cadets. Since
the NDA could not take more than 65 naval cadets every year, it became
necessary to start a "Revised Special Entry Scheme" and set up a
separate Naval Academy. It was decided that the sailor's Basic &
Divisional (B&D) Training School would have to move from Cochin to Goa
and a Naval Academy set up temporarily at Cochin to meet immediate
needs until the Academy's permanent location was chosen.

In 1969, approval was accorded for the institution of the Revised Special
Entry Scheme (RSES). Under this scheme, naval cadets in the age group
17 to 20 years who had passed the Intermediate examination could be
recruited in the Executive Branch. This scheme was identical to the NDA's
"Special Entry Scheme" except that the initial training of one year would
have to be conducted at Cochin in the Naval Academy.

RSES training commenced in January 1970 and the first batch of 36

executive cadets passed out of the Naval Academy on 14 December 1970.
They joined the NDA's 39th batch of regular cadets for sea training on
board the training ships TIR and CAUVERY.

GRADUATE SPECIAL ENTRY SCHEME(GSES)

In 1973, when the NDA got affiliated to the JNU in Delhi, all NDA cadets,
on successfully passing their final examinations, received a bachelors
degree of the JNU. As a result, the RSES candidate of the Naval Academy
was out of phase with his NDA counterpart. It was decided that instead of
taking in pre-graduate candidates, it would be more cost effective to
recruit Science graduates only and thereby reduce the duration of their
training at the Naval Academy.

In July 1974, the first batch of GSES cadets entered the Naval Academy
for an initial training period of only 6 months. Whereas the original
sanction was for a total of 80 cadets to be trained every year, the Naval
Academy now trained 80 cadets every 6 months.

AFLOAT TRAINING AND TRAINING SHIPS

THE SCOPE AND CURRICULUM OF AFLOAT TRAINING

Afloat training is structured to train each subordinate officer in

seamanship, navigation and man management, so that he will be able to:

(a) Perform the duties of an Officer of the Watch involving the

safety and navigation of his ship.

(b) Supervise the control of his ship's radars, sonars and weapons.

(c) Take charge of sailors carrying out deck duties involving anchor
work, boat work, rigging and ships husbandry.

(d) Effectively organise, command and look after the sailors in their
respective divisions/part of ship.
The training programme for achieving these objectives is time intensive
and imparted largely `on the job' and by performing `live' tasks.

The curriculum broadly consists of :-

(a) Harbour training, practical/classroom instructions, harbour

watches and organised visits to naval/service/harbour/shore
installations.

(b) Sea training comprising exercises, sea watches, attachments to

each department of the ship, organised classroom instructions and
practical training in navigation and seamanship.

(c) Man-management in case study/role play modes.

This training curriculum requires individual attention to be given to each

trainee for him to be assessed at short intervals throughout the training
period. Ships have therefore to be exclusively earmarked and suitably
staffed, solely for training purposes.

TRAINING SHIPS

Since the 1950's, the sea training of officer cadets had been undertaken
in the Second World War frigates KISTNA, CAUVERY and TIR. The primary
requirement was the endurance to undertake long cruises at sea.

By the end 1960's, these three ships had begun to age. The Navy
examined whether the three old Second World War destroyers RAJPUT,
RANA and RANJIT could be converted to the training role. It was found
that their remaining life did not justify the cost of conversion.

It was therefore decided to convert the ageing cruiser DELHI to the

training role. DELHI underwent a major refit from May 1971 to August
1972. DELHI, KISTNA, CAUVERY and TIR comprised the Training
Squadron till the end 1970s.

In the mid 1970's, it was decided to convert the three diesel engined
frigates BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS and BETWA to the training role to take
over from the older training ships.
 DURATION OF INITIAL TRAINING

Cadet Entry Officers

The duration of initial training of Cadet Entry Officers was reduced in

1975:

After
Until 1975
1975
Cadets Training Ship 6 months 6 months
Midshipmen Training 12 months 6 months
Sub Lts Courses 12 months 40 weeks
Sea attachment for watch 3 to 6
6 months
keeping certificate months

Direct Entry Officers

The duration of training for Direct Entry Executive Officers was different
from that of Cadet Entry Executive officers. It was reviewed constantly,
depending on the feedback received from ships of the Fleet. The training
duration was increased in 1968:

Until 1968 After 1968

Naval
9 weeks Naval Orientation 5 weeks
Orientation
Sea Training (INS 15
Sea Training 8 weeks
Delhi) weeks
Sub Lt's 30
34 weeks Sub Lt's Courses
Courses weeks
Leave 4 weeks
Sea Training (INS 15
Cauvery) weeks
69
Total 51 weeksTotal
weeks

On completion, DE officers were attached to Fleet ships for obtaining their

watch keeping certificate.

CHANGES IN TRAINING AT THE NAVAL ACADEMY IN 1974

The Naval Academy continued with the training of Revised Special Entry
Scheme Cadets until January 1974.
In the beginning of 1974, it was decided to close down the B & D School
in Cochin. All the officer courses conducted by this School were taken
over by the Naval Academy. As a result, the Naval Academy, apart from
running the basic courses for cadets, commenced conducting the following
courses:-

(a) Initial Training for Direct. Entry officers of the Engineering and
Electrical branches.

(b) Naval Science Orientation Course. for officers of the Supply

Branch and officers from foreign navies.

(c) Special Duties (SD) List Post Promotion Course. for sailors
promoted to officers in the rank of Ag Sub Lts in the SD Cadre.

(d) Divisional & Management Course. The B&D course done by all
Executive Sub Lts during their technical courses was re-designated
as the D & M Course when it was transferred from the B & D School
to the Naval Academy.

(e) Lieutenants War Course. The B & D School used to conduct a

War Course of four weeks duration for Ag Sub Lts of the Executive
branch. In 1974, it was decided that this course was better suited to
a Lieutenant. The course was re-designated as a Lieutenants War
Course and conducted bi-annually at the Naval Academy.

(f) Upper Yardmen Course. Sailors who showed early promise at sea
of being officer material were designated "Upper Yardmen" and
given special assignments to test their potential. In end 1974,
Upper Yardmen of all branches started being sent to the Naval
Academy for their initial training.

(g) Commanding Officers and Junior Commanders Course. In end

1974, two new courses were instituted: the Junior Commanders
course and the Commanding Officers Course. These courses were
conducted at the Naval Academy in 1974, 1975 and 1976.

By 1976, it was found that it was not practical to carry out the initial
training of cadets and of Ag Sub Lts of various branches separately. It
was therefore decided that all initial training for cadets of the Executive
Branch and Ag Sub Lts of all technical branches should be of the same
duration, should have a common syllabus and should run concurrently.
This was implemented from January 1976 onwards.
COMMAND EXAMINATION

Commencing 1974, the Command Examination was introduced for

Executive officers. All officers who aspired to command ships had to
qualify in this examination. Its aim was to promote self study and to
acquire professional competence to fill Command appointments at sea.
Officers who failed in this examination would not be appointed in
command.

Officers of the Submarine Arm who had qualified in the Submarine

Commanding Officers Course were exempted from appearing in that part
of the Command Examination which had questions on submarines.

LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT EXAMINATION

Commencing 1975, this examination was instituted for Supply Branch

Officers. It was analogous to the Command Examination for Executive
officers. Its aim was to promote self study of professional subjects and
ensure professional competence to fill higher appointments.

TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT EXAMINATION

Commencing 1975, this examination was instituted for officers of the

Engineering and Electrical branches to promote self study of professional
and technical management practices and ensure professional competence
to fill important assignments both afloat and ashore.

THE SELECT LIST SYSTEM OF PROMOTION

In 1969, NHQ promulgated the working principles on the selection of

officers for promotion to the ranks of Commander, Captain and Rear
Admiral.

Selection Procedure

The Promotion Committee would consider the officers branchwise, batch

by batch, for promotion to higher rank, once a year, depending on the
likelihood of fresh vacancies during the ensuing year.
The Select List comprised officers who were considered fit for
acting/substantive promotion to the next higher rank.

Grading

The Selection Committee would grade each officer as follows:-

A - An officer who was "head and shoulders above" his

contemporaries.

B - An officer fit for promotion in his turn.

D - Deferred for consideration without loss of seniority

R - Not yet fit for promotion

U - Unfit for promotion - having been considered three times and

not found fit for promotion.

An officer graded A would move to the top of his batch in the Select List.
In exceptional cases, an officer graded A could be considered for
promotion with the batch immediately above his batch.

SAILORS

INTAKE AND SCHEMES TO REDUCE SHORTAGES

The Navy's procedure for the intake and initial training of ratings had
been adopted from the British Navy. Its basic premise was that ratings
should be inducted when young and given long periods of initial training
to indoctrinate naval discipline and to familiarise them with life at sea.
Accordingly, ratings were inducted as `boys' and trained in the Boys
Training Establishment for two years before going to sea. Artificers were
inducted as artificer apprentices and trained for four years before going to
sea. The only way of meeting surges in demand was to resort to direct
entry intake, curtail the long duration of initial training and accept the
attendant consequence of lesser discipline.

In September 1939, when the Second World War started, the Royal
Indian Navy had 1732 ratings. When the war ended in 1945, the number
of ratings had risen to 27,433. After the demobilisation of 1945 and 1946,
and partition of the Navy in 1947, the Navy had 5508 ratings.
The division of personnel between the two Navies necessitated a heavy
recruitment drive in 1948, both of direct entry artificers and direct entry
ratings as well as regular entry artificer apprentices and boys. This helped
to ease the shortage. A decade later in 1958, contrary to expectations,
70% of the 1948 sailor entrants declined to sign on for further service
after their initial contract. This shortage was aggravated by the need to
find additional personnel for the new frigates and VIKRANT being acquired
from Britain.

By 1962, another recruitment drive reduced the shortages. However, the

anticipated advantage was offset by new commitments ashore and in the
inter services organisations like NCC together with the demands for the
Naval Garrison in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

In 1965, the shortage in the sailor cadre stood at 17% and a large
requirement was looming to man the Russian acquisitions. It was
anticipated that the same situation, as in 1948 and 1958, might arise in
1968 also.

The solutions clearly lay in increasing the Navy's capacity to train new
entrants, increase the period of initial engagement and offer greater
incentives to induce sailors to stay on in service.

Increasing the Period of Engagement

In 1965, a sailor's initial period of engagement was ten years. On

completion, he could re-engage for five years and for two year thereafter
i.e. up to a total of seventeen years. The authority for re-engagement
beyond seventeen years vested in NHQ.

Normally all sailors were re-engaged upto twenty years of service if

recommended by their Commanding Officer. Reengagement beyond
twenty years was on a selective basis.

In 1966, to cope with the increased need for sailors, subject to the
Commanding Officer's recommendation, all sailors could be re-engaged
up to a total period of twenty five years or age of superannuation,
whichever was earlier. The aim was to promote a greater sense of
security of employment amongst sailors and ensure a longer career for
those who volunteered for further service.

In 1973, re-engagement was permitted for five years at a time up to the

compulsory age of retirement of fifty five years for all.
In 1976, the initial engagement was increased from ten to fifteen years.
And, instead of promotion awaiting vacancies, time scale advancement to
Leading rate was approved for sailors otherwise qualified.

TRAINING OF SAILORS

BOYS TRAINING ESTABLISHMENT (BTE)

Before the partition of the Navy in 1947, the only BTE of the Royal Indian
Navy was located in Karachi. After partition, a temporary BTE was set up
in Visakhapatnam. Training was carried out in a New Entry Camp and a
Main Camp, both of which were located in temporary barracks in INS
CIRCARS.

In 1954, the sanction for the BTE envisaged the training in seamanship of
1645 boy sailors for the seaman, stoker and electrical trades.

In 1962, the BTE started getting congested. Sanction was obtained to

expand the BTE and acquire land from the Visakhapatnam Port Trust and
from private owners.

In 1965, when the decision was taken to base the Russian acquisitions in
Visakhapatnam and build a major naval base with a new Dockyard, it was
decided to shift the BTE to Paradeep port in Orissa. This could not be
pursued because the vacant multi-storey buildings which were to house
the BTE, got occupied by the personnel of Paradeep port. The Navy then
started investigating alternative sites, the primary requirement being
proximity to the sea so that boy sailors could be taught boatwork, sailing
and basic seamanship.

In 1969, after visiting Chandbali port and Ganjam port, the Navy chose a
1600 acre site on the bank of the Chilka Lake in Orissa, where 1200 boys
could be trained at a time.

Chilka Lake was a sanctuary for migratory birds. The environmentslists

sought, and the Navy willingly gave and has meticulously observed, the
commitment to safeguard the environment of this bird sanctuary. The
Prime Minister laid the foundation stone of the BTE. Construction
commenced in 1973 and it was commissioned as INS CHILKA in
1980.
SEAMAN TRAINING ESTABLISHMENT (STE)

In the 1950's, direct entry sailors started being trained at the Basic and
Divisional School at Cochin. As the Navy expanded, the numbers
increased and the search started for alternative locations. Here too, the
primary requirement was proximity to the sea where young sailors could
be taught boat-work, sailing and basic seamanship.

In 1968, the Navy's proposal was accepted to site the new STE at Goa. In
1969, approval was accorded for the construction of the STE on a 230
acre site on a hill at Reis Magos, five miles north of Panaji, close to the
northern bank of the River Mandovi. The STE was envisaged to train 500
direct entry sailors at a time.

On 9 Oct 69, the Prime Minister laid the foundation stone of the STE. The
STE was formally commissioned as INS MANDOVI in 1976.

BRANCH TRAINING SCHOOLS

By 1965, branch/specialist schools had been established for imparting

professional training in their respective specialisations. These schools
conducted the courses in which sailors had to qualify before they could be
promoted to higher rank:

Branch Specialisation Parent Location

School
Seaman Gunnery Gunnery Cochin
School
Torpedo & Anti TAS School Cochin
Submarine
Communications Signal School Cochin
& Electronic
Warfare
Navigation & ND School Cochin
Direction
EngineeringArtificers & INS SHIVAJI Lonavla
Engineering
Mechanics
Electrical Artificers INS SHIVAJI Lonavla
(Initial
training)
INS VALSURA Jamnagar
(Electrical
training)
 Electrical INS VALSURA Jamnagar
Mechanics
Supply & Writers, Stores INS HAMLA Marve(Bombay)
Secretariat Assistants,
Cooks &
Stewards
Shipwright Artificers INS SHIVAJI Lonavla
(Initial
training)
Shipwright INS ANGRE,
School Bombay

Provost Regulating INS KUNJALI,

School Bombay

Musicians School of INS KUNJALI,

Music Bombay

Air Arm Observers Observer Cochin

School
Artificers INS SHIVAJI Lonavla
(Initial
training)
Naval Air
Technical
School Cochin
Airmen Technical Naval Air Cochin
Technical
School
Airmen Non School for Cochin
Technical Naval Airmen

Whenever new acquisitions were inducted, every effort was made to

install the analogous training equipment in the respective schools, subject
to cost considerations.

PETTY OFFICERS LEADERSHIP SCHOOL

In 1959, to ease the congestion in Cochin, the PO Leadership School was

shifted to Calicut. In 1965, when HANSA relocated from Coimbatore to
Dabolim in Goa, the Leadership School shifted from Calicut to Coimbatore,
into the premises vacated by HANSA. The School was named INS
AGRANI.
POLICY FOR TRANSFERRING SAILORS INTO AND OUT OF SHIPS

The driving wheel of the Navy's management of its sailor cadres was its
"drafting" policy. The Annual Training Programme for higher rank courses
and the annual programme of Fleet Exercises during which sailors got
"sea time" were offshoots of this policy.

On the one hand, the promotion regulations required sailors to qualify in

higher rate professional courses and to be given adequate sea time. On
the other hand, this policy of continuously transferring sailors into and out
of ships prevented the consolidation of expertise. The difficult task of
providing equal opportunity and of balancing these conflicting
requirements was delegated to the Drafting Office.

The Drafting Office took the following factors into consideration when
effecting drafts:-

(a) Sufficient opportunity to all sailors to gain the requisite

experience for advancement to higher rates.

(b) Adequate sea time, ensuring alternate tenures at sea and

ashore, except in those categories where, due to shortages,
alternate tenures at sea and ashore could not be provided.

(c) Opportunity for all sailors, otherwise qualified, to undergo higher

rate professional courses in time.

For optimal deployment of available manpower, the Drafting Office

promulgated a "Manning Plan" every year, indicating the allocation of
sailors to each ship and establishment. It took into account the shortage
in each category of sailors and judiciously distributed whatever was
available.

Drafting was divided into two main categories:-

(a) Planned Drafting: This included:

(i) Block drafts to rotate between ship and shore billets and to
implement the Manning Plan figures.

(ii) Drafts for higher rate professional courses.

(iii) Rotation drafts of sailors, ex-basic and specialist courses,

for sea time.

(iv) Drafts to newly commissioned ships and from ships paid

off.
 (b) Un-planned Drafting: This included:

(i) Compassionate drafts.

(ii) Incidental drafts to make up shortages due to unforeseen

incidents such as death, illness, premature release, etc.

(iii) Sports drafts

(iv) Emergency drafts in case of hostilities, strikes, national

calamities and civil disturbances.

In all cases of planned drafting, the Drafting Office gave approximately

three months notice to enable the affected sailors to attend to their
domestic affairs. Pleas for deferment or cancellation of drafts on account
of sickness, financial hardship or domestic reasons were usually not
considered. Where, however, the Commanding Officer was personally of
the opinion that the circumstances warranted a deferment or cancellation
of a draft, the Drafting Office examined the case on merits. To avoid a
chain reaction, the Drafting office rarely acceded to last minute requests
for deferment or cancellation of drafts:

- Inter Ship Drafts: When time did not permit a prior reference to
be made to the Drafting Office, the senior officer of a squadron or
Fleet could order inter-ship drafts within his squadron and Fleet in
cases of :-

(a) Admission into hospital of a sailor holding a key rate in a

ship about to sail independently.

(b) Temporary transfer of an experienced sailor to assist in

attending to immediate technical defects in a ship.

(c) Grant of leave on urgent compassionate grounds to a

sailor holding a key billet.

The Drafting Office was, however, to be kept informed of the

probable duration.

- Drafts for Instructional Duties: The Drafting Office was

required to give sufficient notice to the training establishments
before sailors employed on instructional duties were drafted.

- Drafts for Courses: Commanding officers were enjoined to

ensure that sailors drafted to attend courses of instruction reached
the training establishment in time, as directed.
 - Compassionate Drafts: Drafts were sometimes considered on
compassionate grounds. Since such drafts upset the manning
structure, it was essential to keep them to a minimum.
Commanding Officers, after satisfying themselves that genuine
hardship existed, were exhorted to explore other possibilities such
as grant of annual leave, before recommending compassionate
drafts.

- Grant of Leave Prior to Drafting: If by the grant of leave, the

reporting date in the new ship or establishment was affected, prior
concurrence of the commanding officer concerned was to be
obtained.

ARTIFICERS

The shortages were most worrisome in the case of artificers. Since much
better emoluments and perquisites were offered by private industry and
the Merchant Navy, most senior technical artificers left the Navy after
having served the minimum time. With the new technology entering
service with the Russian acquisitions, the shortage of artificers became a
cause of serious concern.

Several proposals were considered to overcome the shortage. One was to

recruit holders of diplomas from polytechnics as direct entry artificers.
Whilst this would help to meet the immediate need by avoiding the long
four year initial period of training that artificer apprentices normally
underwent, it had the disadvantage of insufficient naval indoctrination.
Another proposal was to create a new rate of Master Chief Petty Officer as
an incentive to sign on for longer periods after their initial engagement as
also to improve the career prospects of highly trained senior sailors.

In 1966, recruitment commenced of diploma holders as artificers to be

trained for 1 1/2 years instead of the 4 years training given to regular
entry artificer apprentices.

In 1967, Direct Entry Artificer intake was increased to 120. By 1971, the
deficiency in the artificer cadre had reduced from 30% to 10%. From
1972 onwards, the artificer shortage persisted at 10%.

In 1970, the shortage of artificers in the submarine cadre led to the

induction of Direct Entry Artificers Acting IVth class of three or four year
diplomas in mechanical, electrical and aeronautical engineering.
Simultaneously, this entry was permitted for engineering and electrical
artificers.
INTRODUCTION OF THE MCPO CADRE

In 1968, as an incentive to re-engagement for longer service, the MCPO

cadre was created as the equivalent to JCO's of the Army and
Warrant/Master Warrant officers of the Air Force.

The MCPO Cadre was sanctioned as a percentage of the sanctioned cadre

of CPO's. These percentages were:

Non
Technical
Technical
MCPO Class
15% 12 1/2 %
I
MCPO Class
25% 25%
II

CHANGES IN THE NAVY'S SAILOR STRUCTURE

Within a few years of the arrival from Britain of the MYSORE in 1957, the
eight new frigates between 1958 and 1961 and the VIKRANT in 1961, it
became clear that the increase in sophistication of ships and equipment
called for a comprehensive relook at the existing ranks, rates and trades
of the Navy's sailors. A high-powered committee was appointed to review
the sailors structure.

By the time this committee convened in 1966, the first of the Russian
acquisitions, the Landing Ships, had arrived. It was abundantly clear that
there was going to be a severe shortage of bunks. At this very same time,
sailors were being selected to undergo training in Russia to man the
submarines, the Petyas and the Submarine Depot Ship and problems had
arisen on how to accomodate the Navy's numerous trades in the fewer
bunks.

THE CROSS COMMITTEE

The Committee for the Reorganisation of the Sailors Structure (called the
CROSS Committee) started its deliberations in 1966. It was headed by
Commodore SS Sodhi. He recalls:

"The basic point that we made in our Report was that user and
maintainer should be interlinked. It was no use saying that a
maintainer was responsible for total maintenance from A to Z and
the user was only to be an operator. The two had to be linked. That
basically meant that the educational and the technical input into the
user had to be enhanced and the maintainer had to have faith in the
user's capability to handle the sophistication of the equipment. That
was basically the recommendation which we made. The educational
level of the seamen had to come up. Their training had to be
modified to take on at least the first line maintenance of the
equipment that they were operating.

"We also felt that the Topass trade could be abolished. Our
experience showed that our own sailors, when they were operating
with other navies, had no inhibitions about cleaning their toilets,
and generally being responsible for the hygiene of the
surroundings".

Commander VF Rebello was the Deputy Director of Personnel (Manpower

Planning) in Naval Headquarters from 1967 to 1969 when the
recommendations of the CROSS Committee were examined. He recalls:

"The Cross Committee went into the whole manning problem of the
Navy with great thoroughness. They also examined the manning
structure in the American and other Western navies and came up
with very good suggestions on how to reorganise the manpower of
our Navy. It was operator-maintainer and vertical specialisation.
Unfortunately the training requirements for such a scheme were so
very expensive and extensive that it was beyond the scope of the
Navy of that time to implement. We would require a large number
of schools and a very big training schedule. It was estimated that at
any one time about 1/3rd of the sailors would be undergoing
training and conversion and this the Government simply could not
afford to have. Therefore the recommendations of the Cross
Committee were kept in abeyance.

"The abolition of Topasses was the only recommendation of the

Cross Committee which was taken up".

CHANGES IN NOMENCLATURE OF JUNIOR SAILORS

With effect from December 1967, the terminology in use to signify junior
rates of sailors of the various branches were standardised in "second
class" and "first class". For example:

Earlier Standardised
Nomenclature Nomenclature
Ordinary Seaman Seaman Second Class
(OD) (Sea II)
Able Seaman (AB) Seaman First Class
Stoker (Sea I)
Engineering Mechanic
Second/First Class ME
II/ ME I

CHANGES IN BRANCH RESPONSIBILITIES

When the first three Petyas arrived in India, the Navy was able to see, at
first hand, the seriousness of the problem which the CROSS Committee
had tried to solve:

- The Petyas were very densely packed with electronic equipment.

- The division of responsibilities inherited from the British Navy was

well established in the Navy's trade structure. The seaman branch
"user" used the equipment and the elctrical branch "maintainer"
maintained the equipment. Since a Petya had such a lot of
electronic equipment, it needed more electronic maintainers. Since
a Petya had so many more weapons, it also needed more users.

- Since a Petya had fewer bunks than were needed even for a
normal Indian ships company, it could not accomodate the
increased numbers of users and electrical maintainers.

- How then was a Petya to be manned?

Various options were considered like reduce the number of cooks and
stewards, abolish topasses, adopt two watch steaming at sea instead of
the usual three watches, convert all maintainers into users, teach users
the basic maintenance so as to reduce the number of maintainers on
board, transfer the less complicated power electric duties of the junior
electrical sailors to the Engineering Department and so on. After detailed
consideration, the following directives were issued in 1969:
Re-Allocation of Branch Responsibilities and Duties.

"Taking a broad perspective, it is important that the various

branches of the Navy develop with equitable distribution of
workload and responsibility. With increasing sophistication of
weapon systems, sensors and data processing, it is imperative that
the electrical branch concentrate their energies to master these new
fields. Other branches must be made capable of dealing with the
diagnosis of faults and the maintenance of less complicated items of
systems and equipment. This entails the engineering branch
shouldering more responsibilities with regard to the generation,
distribution of electric power and allied equipment, the seaman
branch being entrusted with the non-artificer care and maintenance
of the weapons, radar, and AIO equipment and the communication
branch looking after the W/T, R/T and V/S equipment. In addition,
the seaman and communication branches must substitute the lower
levels of power and radio electrical sailors in assisting the artificers.
The Electrical Officer will, however, continue to be the expert
technical adviser to the Commanding Officer on electrical and
electronic matters. In the initial stages, there may be no saving in
manpower, but as experience is gained and personnel become more
confident, the complement of modern ships will show a reducing
trend, which will be an added advantage.

"Consequent on this review, detailed instructions will issue from

time to time on the measures necessary for the revised training
schemes and programme of assumption of new responsibilities. As a
first step, the new measures will be applicable only in the "Petya
cadre" and, based on the experience gained, will be extended in
steps to cover the rest of the service. A start has been made by
cross-training a number of engine room personnel of two Petya
class ships in looking after certain electrical equipment of these
ships.

"It cannot be over-emphasised that the success of this measure will

depend largely on the spirit in which this change is undertaken, and
the ready cooperation and willingness on the part of all concerned
to work to the ultimate goal which will result in added efficiency and
well being in the service.

"Commanding Officers are to ensure that every opportunity is taken

by them and their heads of departments to explain the implications
of these revised responsibilities to their ship's companies."
Branch Responsibilites - Transfer of Power Electrical Duties From
Electrical to Engine Room Branch Sailors in "PETYA" Class of Ships

"It has been decided to cross-train all the Engineering Mechanic

sailors of the Petya class of ships in power electrical duties upto the
rate of LME. For the present, sailors of the rate of POEL(P), will be
provided to the Engineering Branch in the above class of ships from
the existing cadre of electrical sailors. It is not intended to cross-
train POMEs in electrical duties. POMEs for power electrical duties
will be found, in due course, from amongst the LMEs who have
already been converted to power electrical duties.

Electrical Equipment to be Maintained by the Engineering Branch in the

Petya Class of Ships.

"Power electrics will be transferred to the Engineering branch, in

two phases:

- Phase I: Lighting, ventilation motors and starters and sound

powered telephones.

- Phase II: Pump motors and starters, except those directly

associated with weapons, compressor motors and starters,
Cold Room and Air-conditioning machinery motors, Domestic
Equipment, Capstans and Controllers, Motor Boat Equipment
and Batteries, excepting those used with weapons, including
charging sets and panels."

"The transfer of responsibilities for power electrics from the

Electrical to the Engine Room branch will be implemented in stages.

Pre Commissioning Training (PCT) (Engineering) - Eight Weeks

"On joining the Petya Training School, all Engine Room sailors of
LME and ME rates are to undergo a PCT for engineering duties. The
duration will be eight weeks.

Harbour Training (Engineering) - Four Weeks

"After the PCT (Engineering) sailors will be given four weeks of

harbour training to enable them to operate and maintain
engineering equipment.

Basic Training in Electrical Engineering - Sixteen Weeks

"On completion of the above training, sailors will be trained in the

basic elements of electricity for a period of sixteen weeks.
 Familiarisation and Pre-Commissioning Training (Electrical) - Twenty
Weeks

"On completion of the basic training in electrical engineering, these

sailors will undergo familiarisation training and PCT in electrical
duties for a period of twenty weeks. During this period, they are to
be instructed by the electrical department of the Petya Training
School, to enable them to carry out the maintenance and operation
of electrical machinery covered by Phase I and Phase II of the
scheme, on board a Petya class of ship.

"At the end of this period, they are to be examined as to their

competence to undertake the responsibilities to be entrusted to
them".

Task I and II Training

"The first two weeks of each phase will be devoted to Task I training
and the next two weeks to Task 2 training pertaining to the
equipment relating to the particular phase.

"At the end of this period, the Engineer Officer is to satisfy himself
that the sailors are capable of undertaking the maintenance
functions relating to the particular phase.

"Thereafter, the equipment is to be taken over by the Engine Room

Branch.

Phase I

"During this phase, the equipment referred to in phase I will be

taken over.

"During Phase I, sailors are to be given dog watch instructions in

equipment for Phase II and may be utilised to assist the Electrical
Branch sailors on maintenance of Phase II equipment, as mutually
convenient to the two departments.

Phase II

"During this period, sailors will continue to be responsible for the

Phase I equipment. On completion of Task I and Task II training,
sailors are to take over the responsibilities in respect of the
remaining equipment."

The Electrical Branch did not take kindly to these directives. Views still
differ on whether all the junior Engine Room sailors who underwent
training in compliance with the above directives were deliberately failed in
the examination conducted after twenty weeks familiarisation training or
whether the non matriculate Engine Room sailors lacked the ability to
comprehend electrics. To avoid disrupting the acquisition programme, it
was decided to maintain status quo.

The apprehensions about the User-Maintainer Concept centred on three

issues:

a) Erosion of the responsibilities of the Electrical Branch.

b) Demarcation of responsibilities between Executive and Electrical

Officers/Weapon Maintenance Officers and between seaman "user"
sailors and electrical "maintainer" sailors.

c) Possible diminution in the career prospects of electrical officers.

FIXED COMMISSIONS IN SHIPS

In the British Navy, a ship commissioned for two years and could be
deployed to one of Britain's Fleets anywhere in the world. On completion
of two years, the ship returned to her home port in Britain,
decommissioned, underwent a thorough refit and the recommissioned for
another fixed commission. The two greatest advantages of the fixed
commission were that officers and men remained together for the full
commission, got to know each others strengths and weaknesses and got
to know the capabilities and limitations of their ship's equipment.

The Indian Navy neither had worldwide commitments, nor the number of
ships, nor sufficient manpower to adopt Fixed Commissions. Ship
remained permanently "in commission" until they were "decommissioned"
and for the reasons already discussed, officers and men changed round
every twelve to eighteen months.

Successive Fleet Commanders repeatedly recommended the adoption of a

Fixed Commission, at least for operational ships. As the following excerpt
shows, there were difficulties:

"FOCIF furnished statistics to show that a large number of transfers

of officers and sailors from ships continued throughout the year.
Transfer of key personnel after the work-up of the ships deprived
them of the benefit of the work-up, which had virtually to start
again with the arrival of new personnel.
 "While the difficulties of the Fleet were appreciated, it was generally
realised that so long as the present shortages continued, it was not
possible to plan fixed commissions in ships. The appointment of a
new ship's company after every refit presupposed the availability of
a sufficient number of officers and sailors in the service, which,
unfortunately, was not the case.

"Common agreement, however, was found to a suggestion that in

spite of the present difficulties, a fixed commission for one of the
ships of the Fleet be tried as an experiment. No change in the ship's
company was thereafter to be made at least for a year".

GENERAL

ALLOTMENT OF PERSONAL NUMBERS TO OFFICERS

In 1972, the officers in service on 31 December 1971 and those joining

thereafter were allotted five digit personal numbers, suffixed by a
computer letter.

Blocks of numbers were allotted to each branch in such a manner that the
left hand digit would denote the officer's Branch.

General
Branch Blocks Allotted
List
Executive 00001 to 39,999
Engineering 40,000 to 49,999
Electrical 50,000 to 59,999
Supply & 60,000 to
Secretariat 69,999
Education 70,000 to 74,999
Medical 75,000 to 78,999
Dental officers 79,000 to 79,999
SD List Specialists
Seaman 80,000 to 84,999
Engineering 85,000 to86,299
Shipwright 86,300 to 86,799
Electrical 86,800 to 88,499
Supply &
88,500 to 89,699
Secretariat
Medical 89,700 to 89,999
 NAVAL STANDING ESTABLISHMENT COMMITTEE (NSEC)

In 1969, NSEC was set up in the Ministry of Defence, on the same lines as
the Army's ASEC and the Air Force's AFSEC.

The three member Committee was chaired by a Deputy Secretary of the

Ministry of Defence. The members were a naval Captain and an Assistant
Financial Adviser from the Ministry of Finance (Defence).

The Committee's Terms of Reference were to :

(a) Analyse the extent to which ships' complements and staff of

shore and other establishments of the Navy could be cut down and
the tail to teeth ratio reduced.

(b) Examine and approve the temporary and permanent

complements of naval ships and establishments, including Naval
Headquarters.

(c) Evolve suitable scales and yardsticks for assessing the

complements of various categories of units on a standardised basis.

(d) Explore practical avenues of economy and make

recommendations for organisational or other changes considered
desirable.

(e) Examine the requirement of naval establishments in regard to

motor transport and MT staff and evolve yardsticks for sanctioning
it.

CHANGES IN REGULATIONS REGARDING MOUSTACHES AND

BEARDS

The Navy's Regulations on the subject of moustaches and beards had

adopted, verbatim, the regulations of the British Navy. These required
that a naval officer or sailor :-

(a) had either to have both beard and moustache or neither.

 (b) had to obtain the approval of his Commanding Officer to
"discontinue shaving" or to "continue shaving".

As in the case of smartness of uniform, the spirit of these regulations was

to ensure that control could be exercised on the tidiness of facial
appearance so that personnel did not bring discredit to the Navy by
looking untidy.

In 1970 and 1971, the Navy began to be exposed to several influences:

(a) One of them was the American Navy. As a result of lack of

enthusiasm for the Vietnam War, the American Navy allowed
relaxations in dress and personal appearance which, they
considered, were acting as a disincentive to service in Vietnam.

(b) The fashions prevalent in America at the time were long

sideburns, moustaches with or without beards, flared trousers etc.
These fashions were being imitated by Indian youth in the ports
where naval ships were based. The Navy's youngsters found
themselves being considered as oddities by their civilian peer group.
Pressures began to grow to relax the Navy's regulations.

(c) In mid 1970, the tendency of sailors' to resort to agitation

manifested in the Topass incident. This triggered widespread
demands for change, the response to which was a series of welfare
measures to help cool things down.

(d) Last, but not the least, was a genuine Indian problem. In India,
since time immemorial, the moustache has been a sign of manhood
and valour. Many sailors, well before going on leave, sought
permission to `discontinue shaving', so that by the time they
reached their homes, they could sport a moustache. On return from
leave, they would seek permission to `continue shaving'. The
irksomeness of this procedure found expression after the Topass
incident.

Admiral Nanda was the CNS from 1970 to 1973. He recalls:

"One day I was having a cup of tea with the sailors. A Rajasthani
sailor came up to me and said, "Sir, it is a great hardship that
beards and a moustache must go together. When I go home, if I
don't have moustaches, people ask me "Is your father dead ?"
Because the tradition in Rajasthan is that if you shave off your
moustaches, it is a sign that your father has died and you are in
mourning. It is also a tradition that to show your manliness, you
have to have a moustache. Therefore to go home, I have to request
to grow a beard and only then can I grow moustaches also. Then
we cannot go out from the ship on liberty until the beard has
 grown. The day my leave starts, the first thing I do is to go to a
barber and shave off my beard so that I can go home with a
moustache and show that I am a man. The day I have to come back
to duty, I have to go to a barber again and tell him to shave my
moustache now, because I have got to go to duty and without a
beard I cannot have a moustache. So, sir, this is a great hardship. I
come to the ship, without a beard, without a moustache and then I
have to start growing beard and moustache again two months
before I start my next leave." Things like this started me thinking as
to what is the validity of the naval tradition we adopted from the
British Navy. Should this be pushed down the throats of people who
don't like it, who are not with it?"

In early 1971 the regulations were amended to read:

"The following provisions shall govern wearing of moustaches and

beards:

(a) The Captain may permit officers and men to wear

moustaches and beards or shave them off, if they so desire.
Moustaches and beard shall be worn with or without the beard
and moustaches respectively. Side whiskers shall be
permitted down to the level of the lobe of the ear. The
priviledge may be withdrawn in cases of untidy growth.

(b) Moustaches, beard and whiskers shall be neatly cut and

trimmed".

CHANGES IN UNIFORMS 1965 TO 1975

The same pressures for relaxation which led to changes in the regulations
for moustaches and beards also led to changes in uniforms, "to bring
outdated traditional British uniforms in line with modern trends".

Admiral Nanda recalls:

"Other Navies had moved ahead and modernised their uniforms. I

felt that if the American Navy can do it and go along with the times
and it works successfully, why should we try to push something
down the throats of our own sailors or our own officers.

"We had changed officers uniforms. We had brought in various rigs,

different from what the British used to do, because it was
convenient for the officers. But we refused to do it with the sailors.
 How can you convince the sailor that changing uniforms is good
enough for you but not for him? When he meets sailors of other
Navies and sees that they have changed from the British tradition,
he wonders why the British tradition is so sacrosanct with us".

The changes in uniform between 1965 and 1975 are summarised below:

YearOfficers Sailors
1965-Action rig for
officers to be light
blue shirt and dark
blue trousers, as
for sailors Dress
No 10
1967-Dress No 8A,
white shirt, white
trousers, white belt
and medal ribbons
introduced

-Miniature ribbons
authorised to be
worn with evening
Dress 6B (Red Sea
Rig) (white shirt,
black trousers and
cummerbund)
1969-Terycot permitted (Since sailors were
for white uniforms- issued uniforms at Government
Name tallies expense, terycot was too
introduced expensive to replace cotton
uniforms)

-Name tallies introduced

 1972-Black trousers, -Square rig (Jumper, square
black jersey, white collar, duck cap) abolished.
shirt
and black tie -Junior sailors permitted to wear
introduced as jackets/tunics/shirts/trousers/peak
winter working caps etc analogous to petty
rig officers uniforms, with appropriate
insignia of rank and trade
-Berets permitted
with action working - Black trousers, black jersey,
rig white shirt, black tie introduced as
and overalls winter working rig

-Berets permitted with action

working rig and overalls

THE TRAINING REFORMS OF 1974 AND 1975

To man the new acquisitions, the Navy had to resort to several

unavoidable and undesirable measures like perpetual increases in the
number of trainees, curtailment in the durations of courses and denying
schools of high quality instructors because the best men were needed to
man the newest ships. Over the years, this had demotivated the schools;
the methods of teaching and training had settled into a rut.

As a result of the lessons learnt in the 1971 war and to cope with the new
Russian acquisitions likely to enter service from 1977 onwards, a major
reformation of training was undertaken to remedy the ennui that had
enveloped naval training. Between 1973 and 1975, the Director of Naval
Training and the Director of Combat Policy and Tactics, under the direct
guidance of the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff and four flag officers effected
what, by 1975, became a revolution in the Navy's training practices.
Expectedly, there was resistance to change, mainly by the mediocre,
because they would have to work too hard. Some reforms had to be
abandoned and restarted in the mid 1980's, when the responsibility for
training the entire Navy was entrusted to FOC-IN-C SOUTH.

Training Ashore

The first step was a Training Technology Seminar at Cochin. Many lessons
were learnt and promulgated. Schools were directed to select those
lessons that pertained to them and show results. In parallel with this, a
Status Report on Training was prepared by the Directorate of Naval
Training and processed by the Committee of Flag Officers. Three long-
ranging schemes approved: Organisational, Training Schemes and
Training Aids.
Organisational - Stream Training

With the induction of the Russian ships, the variety of equipment became
so wide that it became necessary to have separate streams for training.
The three basic streams were:

(a) "A" stream for the latest equipment in the Leander class
frigates.

(b) "B" stream for the equipment in the old ships.

(c) "C" stream for the latest equipment in the Russian acquisitions.

Officers and sailors would be assigned to one of the streams and be

trained for selected equipment in that stream. Cross training was allowed
at certain senior levels to safeguard career prospects.

There were variations in streams and sub-streams as applicable to

branches. For example:-

(a) Engineering branch sailors were streamed into "Internal

Combusion Engines (ICE)" and "steam" and sub-streamed into
BRAHMAPUTRA ICE or Petya ICE, since the diesel engines in these
two types of ships were entirely different.

(b) Electrical branch sailors were streamed into "power", "radio" and
"control" and sub-streamed into specific equipment systems.

The aim was to gradually usher in an era of vertical specialisation and

consolidate expertise, ensuring that career prospects were not adversely
affected.

Sub-streamed syllabi for the seamen and communication branches led in

most cases to changes in duration of courses leading to a general
economy in effort. Streamed syllabi in the Engineering and Electrical
Branches started being implemented during 1975.

At Cochin,

- All officer training was taken away from the B&D School in
preparation for its shift to STE Goa. The NAVAC was reorganised
into two wings: Cadets and Other Officers.

- To minimise bureaucratic delays in "chain of command", as a trial

measure, the parent schools were allowed to correspond direct with
outside authorities on routine matters. Responsibilities were placed
on their shoulders by issue of a charter of duties.
 - A work study of the Signal School and the TAS School was ordered
to improve internal management of training.

- Naval Psychological Research Unit (NPRU) Aptitude Tests were

commenced to help select Executive Officers for the different
specializations, as was being done for sailors.

- In the Gunnery Branch, with diminishing utilisation of visual

aiming, Gun Layer (GL) and Radar Control (RC) trades were
merged.

To keep abreast with the latest developments in technology and exercise

quality control, intensive short courses, at about five years interval, were
introduced for officers and sailors. These were the Lieutenants War
Course, the Junior Commanders Course for officers and revised leadership
courses for CPO's and POs and MCPO (Q).

The career and training pattern of Executive officers from midshipman to

the rank of Captain was recast with a twelve week post-Long Course
training period and a five week Junior Commanders course as well as a
five week Commanding Officers Course.

The gain and loss of seniority rules for all branches were standardized. In
the case of cadets and midshipmen, the training period afloat was
reduced from 18 months to 12 months. Midshipman's time was reduced
to 6 months.

Training Schemes

- Job specialisations were enunciated for all branches.

- A trial, low activity-cum-closed period was started for schools, so

as to overcome the problems of shortage of staff and calibre of
staff.

- New sub-streamed syllabi were promulgated for executive officers'

specialist courses, for war course etc. The first Executive and
Supply command examinations were held in August 1975.

- For foreign officers, separate Gunnery, Communication, TAS,

Navigation and Direction Long Courses and Sub LTs Technical
Courses were run. Other officer and sailor courses, owing to the
small numbers involved, were conjoined with classes for Indian
personnel.

- New syllabi were implemented for MCPO(Q) and Leadership

courses. All these courses were run at AGRANI. Examinations were
introduced in these courses to inject quality control.
 - On the analogy of Electrical and Supply Branch sailors,
seamanship courses were started for L/S (Q) and PO (Q) at the
Technical Schools. The examinations were conducted by an external
agency, the Basic and Divisional School.

- A 2000-word basic English vocabulary started being taught at the

basic sailor schools. The problem was to get the instructors to limit
their vocabulary to the 2000 odd words readily understood by
sailors. Vocabularies of technical words for various branches were
compiled by schools.

- To analyse the syllabi and the quality of material available, quality

control agencies were set up in schools. A system of obtaining feed
back and evaluation was introduced. In consultation with schools, a
feedback proforma was made to gauge efficacy of training in
professional courses. Ships were directed to feedback expeditiously
so that training methods or syllabi could be adjusted.

Equipment, Training Aids and Methods

The equipment in most training schools was of 1950 vintage and required
replacement. In view of the difficult financial situation, it was decided to
replace only essential items and improvise the remaining with indigenous
models.

To overcome the language problem and disparity in educational levels,

training programmes were revised. Overhead projectors were sanctioned
and issued to the schools.

The Annual Training Grant was enhanced to enable schools to procure

more training aids. In 1975, a new Technical Training Grant was instituted
and the Artificer Apprentice and Mechanicians Training Grant increased.

A start for the G,C, TAS, ND Schools was made by forming a Training Aid
Team which, under direction from NHQ, visited BEL and ships, and made
a plan to deliver Leander training aids.

Cameras, films and projectors already available at most schools, were to

be used to make our own films.

Training management and methods were revitalised by organising

courses, seminars and instructional technique programmes.

Review of Educational Policy

The Navy's educational policy was reviewed. It was decided to:

 (a) Set up an Institute of Educational and Training Technology at
Cochin for imparting instructions to officers and sailors in Training
Technology and Methods.

(b) Set up a Syllabus Evaluation/Formation Cell in each training

school/establishment. A Standing Committee at Naval Headquarters
would analyse and approve the recommendations of these cells.

(c) Set up Language Laboratories for teaching English and Hindi in

the establishments conducting initial training.

(d) Review the HET syllabus to make it more job oriented and to
bring it on par with the new higher secondary (10+2) syllabus
which was being introduced throughout India.

(e) Raise the entry qualifications for Education Officers to M Sc/MA

in Physics/Mathematics. The duration of their initial training was
increased to 36 weeks to provide for a Methods Course and a Naval
Scientific Orientation Course.

Assessment of Training Load: To systematise the requirements of

officer and sailor instructors, a detailed assessment of Training Loads was
commenced. By 1975:

- The training loads of AGRANI and the Naval Academy had been
approved and augmentation of their complement was under way.

- The training loads of SATAVAHANA and the NATS were under

finalisation.

- The cases for other training schools were under preparation.

CONTROLLING MANPOWER COSTS

By 1974, manpower costs began to cause serious concern. Earlier, the

emphasis had been on recruiting manpower as swiftly as possible to meet
the new commitments. The Dearness Allowance instalments resulting
from the galloping inflation after the 1973 oil crisis, combined with the
implementation of the Third Pay Commission's recommendations,
necessitated drastic measures. To keep manpower growth under control
and ensure the strictest utilisation of available manpower, every single
proposal for increase or decrease of service or civilian manpower had to
be approved by the concerned Principal Staff Officer in Naval
Headquarters before it went to the Ministry.
 DISCIPLINE AND MORALE

The rapid expansion of personnel depleted the Navy's officer leadership

and particularly that of the CPO and PO cadres. Curtailed training
programmes to fill technical officer and artificer shortages eroded basic
leadership techniques. Training and discipline suffered.

Between 1965 and 1975, the Navy's personnel were also affected by the
turbulence which was affecting the country as a whole. There were
several reasons:-

(a) Efforts by extremist political elements to seek a foothold

in the armed forces.

(b) The increasing recourse, across the entire country, to

agitational methods to redress grievances.

(c) The anxiety resulting from the rising prices of daily

necessities, combined with the disappointment with the
outcome of the Third Pay Commission.

(d) The combination of these factors with certain well

intentioned but culturally unimplementable reforms like the
abolition of the Topass Branch.

(e) The repugnance felt by increasingly better educated

sailors to perform the traditional cleanship duties which their
predecessors used to do.

OFFICERS

During this period, officers were not immune to this general turbulence.
Their misdemeanour manifested in incidents of smuggling and misusing
canteen facilities by selling items ashore. A wholely unfortunate and
undesirable result was the enfeebling of the officer-man relationship on
which discipline and morale depended.

The changing socio-economic climate in the country had a particularly

adverse effect on young naval officers. Some junior officers were taking
to hallucinatory drugs like charas, bhang, ganja, LSD etc.
The possible reasons for this malaise were attributed to lack of proper
guidance, unwillingness on the part of seniors to delegate responsibility
which generated lack of job satisfaction, over-complementing of junior
officers on board ships, thereby rendering most of them non-effective,
communication gap between more senior and junior officers, etc. The
non-availability of adequate and proper accommodation and escalating
costs of living were also considered to be causes aggravating the
situation.

The result was a fall in the professional standards of young naval officers.
It was felt that they were not being kept fully occupied, both mentally and
physically. Young officers were not participating in games and other
activities.

SAILORS: CLEAN-SHIP DUTIES AND THE TOPASS INCIDENT

There were several and diverse incidents in ships and establishment

during this period. The Topass Incident is significant enough to merit
mention, since it was a result of a change in personnel policy.

For socio-cultural reasons, Indian merchant ships and naval ships always
had topasses to clean the bathrooms and toilets. Topasses used to be
sanctioned as part of ships complement. When ships commissioned in
Britain, topasses used to go as part of the commissioning crew.

For similar socio-cultural reasons, there had always been resentment

amongst some sailors at having to carry out "cleanship duties". The
Inquiry into the Causes of the Naval Mutiny in 1946 had listed this as one
of the sailor's grievances.

The Navy used to periodically promulgate its policy on Cleanship Duties.

The position in 1965 can be seen from the following directive:

"Cleanship duties comprise the following:

(a) Holystoning, sweeping and scrubbing of decks, mess

decks and flats with any of the approved appliances used in
the service for such purpose.

(b) Cleaning and painting of ship from truck to keel.

(c) Cleaning of brass work, mess tables and benches, ship's

machinery, armament and technical equipment, store rooms,
tanks, double bottoms, boats, masts and rigging, cold rooms,
 cool rooms and various other parts of the ship not mentioned
herein.

(d) Duties of "cook of mess" which entail carrying of food,

cleaning of mess utensils, washing of plates of chiefs and
petty officers, etc.

(e) Cleaning of galleys by cooks or other sailors when

required.

(f) Cleaning of officers' cabins by stewards or other sailors

when required.

(g) Cleaning of heads, bathrooms and other wash places,

normally by sailors of Topass Branch.

(h) Disposal of sweepings.

(i) Cleaning of such other parts of ship as the Commanding

Officer of the ship may deem fit.

"It is to be brought home to all concerned that ships' companies are

required to perform cleanship duties as part of their normal routine. In
the interests of health and hygiene, it is incumbent on all sailors to assist
cleaning any part of the ship as may be required. The erroneous
impression that such duties are in any way derogatory is to be dispelled
and it is to be pointed out that these duties are performed by all navies
throughout the world, and further that the cleanliness of their ship is a
matter of pride to all, in which each man plays his part.

"The various pleas and objections generally put forward from time to time
by certain sailors for their reluctance to carry out "cleanship" duties are
neither tenable nor justified on either strictly religious or any other
grounds.

"Failure to comply with the instructions on "cleanship" duties will result in

disciplinary action being taken against the offenders".

1966/1967 was going to be celebrated as Mahatma Gandhi's Centenary

Year. There was a view that the Navy should cease having topasses on
board ships. Not only would it be a fitting tribute to the Father of the
Nation, it would also mitigate to some extent the shortage of bunks in
Russian vessels. It was decided to start by not having topasses in the
Russian ships and submarines. In due course, to avoid disparity between
Russian and Western origin ships, it was intended to withdraw topasses
from British built ships also.
This decision to withdraw topasses from ships was by no means
unanimous. Rear Admiral KR Nair was the Chief of Personnel. He recalls:

"I was the Chief of Personnel. Unfortunately Admiral Chatterji

never asked me anything about removing topasses from ships
before the point was put up in the Senior Officers Conference.
So I have only got what he said at the Conference to go by.
He told us that "I have already talked to the Prime Minister,
this is the year of the Harijan and our contribution will be that
we will abolish the Topass Branch. That will be a big boost for
the Harijans and I have told the Prime Minister that". Having
said all that and having said that he had briefed the Prime
Minister, he turned around and asked each one of us our
opinion, one by one. You know in a case like this, what used
to happen was that everybody said "Yes, yes, this is a very
good thing. We should have done it long ago". There was not
a single voice of protest.

"Then I thought it my duty to speak up. I said "Look, this will

not be a good thing because first of all in the year of the
Harijans, all we are doing is to deprive the topasses of one
avenue of employment. Let us be thankful that the topasses
do their job very well without a grouse. In every ship, the
topasses are a happy set of people. They are quite happy to
go on with their task. So while we have got topasses, it is an
advantage that we have got. Why throw it away? If topasses
do not do it, someone else has got to do it. In the lower deck
even now, our sailors resent having to sweep up decks. This
sort of thing is thought to be infra dig, especially by the
Rajputs and people of that class. For them, it is one of the
things that makes the Navy an unhappy service. We know it
from the days of the RIN Mutiny, that sailors do not like
cleanship. If on top of that we abolish the topasses, that is
going to have very bad repurcussions". There was a dead
silence. Admiral Chatterji got a bit annoyed and said "In that
case, I think I will have to insist that you try it out on the East
Coast. I am going to withdraw all the topasses from the ships
in Vishakapatnam." That is how it started.

"In retrospect, I suspect the CNS, Admiral Chatterji, was

trying to please the Prime Minister, Mrs Gandhi. 1966 had
been declared as the "Year of the Harijan". CNS told her he
would abolish topasses from the Navy within a year. This led
to the discussions at the Senior Officers Conference, my
abrupt transfer as CinC East and the withdrawal of topasses
from Eastern Naval Command".
In 1968, the directive on Cleanship Duties was modified to omit any
reference to the Topass Branch. It read:

"Cleanship is an important duty in the Navy. A clean ship, besides

providing hygienic working and living conditions, is a source of pride
to her ship's company and a credit to the service.

"It is incumbent on all sailors to keep the ship clean and to

participate in cleanship. The erroneous impression that cleanship
duties are in any way derogatory is to be dispelled. Various pleas
and objections put forward from time to time by certain sailors
against carrying out these duties are neither tenable nor justified on
strictly religious or other grounds.

"Cleanship duties in the Navy comprise:

(a) Sweeping, scrubbing, swabbing, polishing, holy stoning,

scraping, brushing, oiling and painting of any surface in the
ship.

(b) Wiping and cleaning of equipment and machinery.

(c) Cleaning of all office and living spaces, store rooms,

machinery compartments, oil and water tanks, double
bottoms, ventilation trunkings, galleys, bathrooms, wash
places, heads, alleyways and passages.

(d) Cleaning of officers' cabins, CPOs' and POs' messes,

pantries and washing of mess utensils and plates.

(e) Cleaning of upper decks, masts and rigging, aerials, boats

and other gear fitted in or carried in or forming part of the
ship.

(f) Disposal of sweepings.

(g) Any other cleaning duty as the Commanding Officer of the

ship may deem fit.

"Failure to comply with the instructions on "cleanship" duties as

defined in this order will result in disciplinary action being taken
against the offenders".

Whilst in Russia, there were incidents of resentment at having to clean

toilets and bathrooms. Commodore, (then Cdr) KS Subra Manian, the
Commanding Officer of the first submarine to commission in Russia,
recalls:
 "There was a problem. A submarine does not have the luxury of
having topases. Now we had only one toilet for the entire crew,
used both by officers and by sailors. At times, this toilet, which
normally drains into a sewerage tank to be later blown out to sea,
gets clogged up. It becomes our job to clear it up. We can't call any
topasses to tackle this sort of messy business.

"At one stage, we had just such a clogging. To clear it up, there was
some reluctance on the part of some of the sailors, not all. So my
Engineer Officer and I, we decided to set an example. We said we
will do it ourselves. When the sailors saw us doing it, then of course
the problem immediately vanished. They all came and said "No Sir,
we will do it". From then onwards, I had no problem of any sort due
to lack of topasses on board. In fact, I did talk to them later also,
saying "It is our job to look after our submarine. If anything
happens to it, we have to clear it up. We will be following the
example set by the greatest Indian of our age, Mahatma Gandhi
who made no bones about doing such menial jobs".

By and large, these resentments were contained by Commanding Officers

and officers setting a public example of cleaning their own toilets and
bathrooms. However, on arrival in India from 1969 onwards, the
resentment on board became more vigorous. To cool the issue, the
authorities in Visakhapatnam discreetly sent topasses from the shore
establishments to ships whenever they were in harbour.

The resentment soon spread to the other shore establishments in the

Navy. Vice Admiral (then Lt Cdr) KASZ Raju, who was serving in the
Naval Air Station GARUDA in 1969, recalls:

"Soon after an indication was given from Naval Headquarters that it

was intended to abolish topasses, we had several requests from
sailors to say that "I would not like to remain in the Navy any more
because when I go back home and if it becomes known in my
village that I had been employed on latrine duties, I would be
treated as an outcast." We were able to promptly get this matter
across to the COMSOUTH at that time, who in turn contacted Delhi
and before anything could happen in Cochin, I think we were able to
nip in the bud anything that might have come about. In this we
learnt a good lesson, that it is better to discuss and dialogue with
our men, who today are fairly well educated and very
knowledgeable, before taking any decisions within the Navy related
to social prejudices".

In Bombay, things took a more serious turn when word spread that in
early 1970, topasses were to be withdrawn from ships. Sailors in some
ships started desisting from taking meals. This form of protest spread to
other ships. There were a few ugly incidents. Firm action was taken and
normalcy was restored, when it was made known that the decision to
remove/abolish topasses

would be reconsidered. Since then, status quo has been maintained.

Admiral Nanda took over from Admiral Chatterji as CNS in 1970. He

recalls:

"I inherited the topass problem when I became CNS. Topasses were
still there in ships. We had not abolished them. When the question
of removal came, the thing blew up.

"A lot of people felt that topasses were an antiquated system and
that when Mahatma Gandhi and others were trying to do away with
untouchability, we should not have an untouchable in our
organisation. Now the concept was alright, but in practice, the social
systems in our country and the thinking of people were different.

"In the Navy, we have people brought up in a social system which

does not ask them do these things in their own homes. Even
topasses, when they go back to their homes, do not clean their own
bathrooms and toilets, even though they have been doing so at sea.
The social system is totally different. Therefore in the social
environment in which we are living, to impose something which is
considered against the way you have been brought up, when you
tell a man who is educated, who has been brought up in a particular
way of life, in a particular way of thinking, that he has got to clean
the latrines, he revolts against it. He says I never knew that I have
to do this and this is something which is being imposed on me.
Does the Army do it ? - the answer is no. Does the Air Force to do it
? the answer is no. Only the Navy wants to introduce this.

"We all knew it, the officers knew it, that the topass thing would not
work out. But they did not have the courage to say that this is not
going to work. Eventually we had to accept the inevitable, and bring
topasses back".

ACCOMODATION

The fundamental difference between the Navy and the sister services has
always been that the majority of the Navy's personnel perforce have to be
stationed in major ports where the cost of living is high and civil
accomodation is not available within their means.
After China's attack in 1962, a concerted effort was made to better the
situation. The capital expenditure for 1964-65 on building accomodation
went up to Rs 450 lakhs as compared to about Rs 128 lakhs in 1961-62.
Even then, a lot of leeway had to be made up. In 1964, an officer or sailor
in Bombay or Cochin had to wait six months to a year before he got some
sort of accomodation. By the time he got accomodation, it was time for
him to be transferred.

In 1965, the overall shortage in married and single permanent

accomodation at major naval ports was:

% Shortages in Accommodation

Single Single
Location Married Officers Married Sailors
Officers Sailors
Bombay 28% 47% 10% 72%
Goa 99% 100% 76% 100%
Cochin 30% 18% 95% 12%
Visakhapatnam 75% 100% 80% 100%

Some headway had been made at Bombay and Cochin. Shortages at

other ports had to be made up by hiring houses and using old, temporary,
wartime buildings and sheds for houses. Unfortunately, the Navy's
proposals for building accommodation usually got bogged down over
where and how much was to be built.

After the 1965 War, a comprehensive review had been carried out of the
shortages of family accomodation in the Army, Navy and Air Force. The
deficiencies were found to be so large that it was decided that the aim
should be to remove them over a period of 20 to 25 years.

The problem of providing accomodation to married personnel was more

vexed for the Navy, than for the Army and the Air Force:

(a) Whilst the Army and the Air Force could start seeking sanctions
to meet their shortages from 1963 onwards (when funds became
available after China's attack in 1962), the Navy could only start
seeking sanctions in 1966, after the Russian acquisitions increased
the Authorised Married Establishment (AME).

(b) Until 1969, ships were based mainly at Bombay. Constructing

married accomodation in suburban Bombay where the Navy had
land at Mankhurd, Trombay and Thane would entail lengthy transit
times to and from the place of work in the Naval Dockyard.
Constructing married accomodation in South Bombay, which was
closest to the Dockyard, would further strain scarce civic services
 like water supply. Moreover, the limited amount of land in what is
now Navy Nagar compelled high rise buildings which required larger
allocations of budget than building barracks.

(d) The Navy's limited budget perforce compelled higher allocation

to acquisitions, repair facilities and logistics than to married
accomodation. The latter could be hired and Compensation in Lieu
of Quarters (CILQ) could be paid to mitigate individual financial
burden.

(e) Whilst the above reasons applied mainly to Bombay and to a

limited extent in Goa and Cochin, the local situation in
Visakhapatnam and in Port Blair was totally different in regard to
availability/acquisition of land, water supply etc. Indeed, for Port
Blair, all construction material had to be ferried from mainland India
and this could only be organised after the two new Landing ships
arrived from Russia in 1966. Similarly the construction of married
accomodation in Visakhapatnam had to await the finalisation in
1969 of the Zoning Plan of the entire Visakhapatnam Project.

As a result of all the above factors, the shortage of married

accomodation, particularly for sailors, understandably affected their
morale. As the following excerpts show, the administration was seized of
this pressing need. It was not until 1975 that the shortfall in married
accomodation was on its way to being resolved.

Situation in Mid 1968

"The recent increase in authorisation of married accommodation for

Leading Rates and below will entitle sailors to draw CILQ and
facilities for family passage. This increased authorisation does not,
for the time being, permit us to construct additional married
accommodation. This restriction has been accepted by the three
Service Headquarters as we are already lagging behind in the
construction of deficient married accommodation.

Although large number of officers and sailors are living in hired

accommodation or are drawing CILQ, the total shortages of
accommodation for building purposes are 940 quarters for officers
and 2050 quarters for sailors. This is based on current sanctions
and future forecast of likely sanctions. Government approval has
been obtained to make good these shortages within 15 years and a
sum of Rs 18 crores has been sanctioned for construction of married
accommodation for the Navy. Naval Headquarters intend to spend
more than the authorised 1.2 crores per year as funds are likely to
be available from other sources.

Augmentation of Water Supply at Colaba

 Against a requirement of 12.5 lakh gallons of water, the Naval
residential area in Colaba is receiving only 5.5 lakh gallons per day.
At the instance of Naval Headquarters, this supply has been
increased to 6.5 to 7 lakh gallons per day by carrying out certain
modifications to the existing mains.

The Government have now sanctioned a sum of Rs 20 lakhs for the

Municipal Corporation, Bombay to lay an independent main from the
Malabar Hill Reservoir to Colaba exclusively for the use of Defence
Service personnel. This proposal is likely to be linked with the
Vaitarna scheme and may take two to three years before the
scheme becomes effective.

Land Requirement at Goa

Land required for building married accommodation for officers and

sailors and other amenities at Goa (except for two small plots) has
now been acquired after prolonged litigation. Tenders are being
called during May/June 1968 for contract action to commence the
building work."

Situation in Mid 1969

"Administrative approval for provision of married accommodation

for afloat personnel at Visakhapatnam was issued last year. This
accommodation is to be constructed for 122 officers and 406 sailors
at a cost of Rs 153.64 lakhs. According to the planning programme,
accommodation for 24 officers and 25 sailors will be ready by 31
Jan 70; for 50 officers and 200 sailors by 30 Sep 70 and for 48
officers and 181 sailors by 15 Oct 71.

Considering the difficulties experienced in hiring a suitable house for

Defence Services at Bombay on normal terms, Government have
sanctioned that accommodation at Bombay may be hired on Leave
and Licence basis with effect from 16 Oct 68 for a period of 2 years.
Under the scheme, 16 flats have been hired so far and 100
additional flats are under negotiation. It is hoped that this initial
sanction of two years will be further extended".

Situation in Mid 1970

"The proposal for the inclusion of Visakhapatnam in the list of

difficult stations for the purpose of providing accommodation to
defence civilians to the extent of 15% of their authorised strength
has been approved by the Government.
 Orders have been issued by the Government approving the
retention of married accommodation by sailors on grounds of their
children's education at the last duty station in the event of transfer.

Government have accepted the requirement of additional married

accommodation in Bombay for 152 officers and 246 sailors.
Necessary action for issue of administrative approval is in hand.

Dhani Khari Scheme. The Dhani Khari Water Scheme at Port Blair is
expected to be completed by end 1972. This scheme will meet all
civilian needs as well as those of the Defence Services and costs will
be shared on a 1/3 - 2/3 basis, between Navy and Home Ministry".

Situation in Mid 1971

"Scale of Accommodation for Officers. Government have

sanctioned the revised scale of plinth area of 2100 sq ft for married
officers of the rank of Commander to Commodore against the
earlier authorisation of 1500 sq ft.

Deficiency at Cochin. The deficiency of married accommodation

for 47 Officers and 141 sailors at Cochin has been accepted by the
Government. The case for issue of administrative approval is being
progressed.

The construction of 60 `G' Type Quarters at Cochin in a multi-

storeyed building has been sanctioned by the Government at an
estimated cost of Rs 25.68 lakhs.

Provision of Accommodation for Civilians at Cochin. On the analogy

of Bombay and Visakhapatnam, a case for the acceptance of Cochin
as a difficult station for provision of married accommodation for
Defence civilian employees has been taken up with the
Government.

Situation in Mid 1972

"The existing deficiencies are:

Permament Accomodation Deficiency

Rank EntitlementAccomodation Under
Available Construction
Officers 1791 632 308 851

Sailors 4713 2508 892 1315

There is a distinct improvement in the provision of married accomodation

at Goa, VALSURA and Visakhapatnam. The construction of 246 married
quarters for sailors at Bombay, 64 at VALSURA and 140 at Cochin will
provide considerable relief."

Situation in 1973

Due to financial stringency, Government banned all sanctions of new

married and single accomodation.

Situation in Mid 1975

"Our efforts to improve the domestic accommodation situation in the

Navy have met with considerable success. The following projects have
been sanctioned recently:

(a) Single Accommodation

(i) 168 Sailors at KARANJA

(ii) 210 Sailors in ANGRE

(iii) 250 Trainees in SHIVAJI

(iv) 44 Officers and 429 Sailors at Goa

(v) 27 Sailors at W/T Station Goa

(vi) 70 DSC Personnel at Goa

(vii) 42 Officers and 325 Sailors in Visakhapatnam

(viii) 240 Sailors in Cochin

(b) Married Accommodation

(i) 152 Officers, 65 CPOs and 116 Junior Sailors in Colaba

Bombay.

(ii) 10 Officers and 24 Sailors at Karanja

(iii) 2 Officers and 28 Sailors in Thana

(iv) 82 Sailors in Visakhapatnam

(v) 29 CPOs in Cochin"

By 1975, it had been possible to make good some of the shortages in

Bombay, Goa, Cochin, Visakhapatnam, SHIVAJI and VALSURA.
THE NAVY'S CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

The basic advantage of civilian personnel has always been their continuity
in shore based assignments, as opposed to uniformed personnel whose
assignments afloat and ashore change ever so often.

By and large, the Navy's civilian personnel were governed by the same
structure as that prevalent in the Army and the Air Force. The
administration of civilian cadres was that:

(a) Groups C and Group D were administered by the Command

Headquaters.

(b) Groups A and Group B were administered by Naval

Headquarters.

The recruitment of civilian officers was done initially by direct entry and
subsequently through the UPSC.

From the functional point of view, the Navy's dependence on civilian

manpower lay principally in the following fields:

(a) In Naval Dockyards and BROs for the maintenance, repair and
refit of ships and submarines, and manning yard craft.

(b) In the Aircraft Repair Yard - for the maintenance, repair and
refit of aircraft.

(c) In Naval technical functions like Draftsmen, Naval technical

specialists in DRDO, laboratories etc.

(d) In Naval Store Depots, Naval Armament Depots and Weapon

Equipment Depots - for the storage, upkeep, accounting, repair and
indenting of their respective stores.

(e) In offices for secretarial and clerical duties.

(f) In the Naval shore establishments for motor transport drivers

and general conservancy duties.

In the case of the civilian personnel performing store keeping duties, not
enough systematic career progression training had been organised to
better their productivity. The results of this neglect began to show from
the 1960's onwards. The induction of new technologies in the Russian
 acquisitions and the Leander class frigates greatly enhanced the
importance of the duties entrusted to civilian personnel. It did not take
long for the infirmities in the civilian cadres to affect the operational
availability of ships, particularly in the field of spare parts. This helped to
identify the measures which, in subsequent years, helped to increase
productivity in the depots.

As can be seen from the table below, the increase in the numbers of
civilian personnel kept pace with the increase in the number of naval
personnel.

INCREASE IN THE NAVY'S BORNE STRENGTH BETWEEN 1965 AND

1975

In round figures, the increase in the Navy's borne strength between 1965
and 1975 was as follow:

NAVAL PERSONNEL CIVILIANS

AS
ON Total in Non-Gazetted Total
Officers Sailors Gazetted Non- Industrial
31 Uniform Industrial Civilians
DEC
General SD
List List
1965 1520 410 16,900 18,830 300 12,390 10,550 23,240
1966 1600 430 18,400 20,430 320 13,340 10,900 24,560
1967 1660 460 20,500 22,620 320 13,820 11,300 25,440
1968 1740 490 22,800 25,030 310 13,990 11,730 25,730
1969 1850 530 25,100 27,480 330 14,000 11,890 26,220
1970 1970 540 26,200 28,710 410 14,040 12,250 26,700
1971 2250 580 26,900 29,730 - - - 28,450
1972 2470 600 26,400 29,470 - - - -
1973 2550 600 26,300 29,450 510 16,430 13,130 30,070
1974 2700 600 26,900 30,200 510 29,860 - 30,370

1975 2880 600 27,300 30,780 510 29,860 - 30,370

 CHANGES IN SAILORS CONDITIONS OF SERVICE AFTER 1975

In July 1976, in consonance with the recommendations of the Third Pay

Commission, the following changes were implemented in sailors'
conditions of service:

- The initial period of enrolment was increased from ten to fifteen

years.

- The educational qualification for entry was raised to Matriculation

for Boy Entry Sailors of all branches and for Direct Entry Seaman
and Engineering branch sailors. As a result:

- Direct Entry Seamen and Communication sailors, Engineering

Mechanics, Electrical Mechanics, Writers, Stores Assistants and
Medical Atendents all came on par, educationally and pay wise. Only
Direct Entry Stewards, Cooks, Musicians and Topasses could join,
without being matriculates, on Group C scale of pay.

- All future entrants would receive Group B scale of pay.

- Serving sailors who were already matriculates would re-muster

into Group B and those who qualified subsequently would also re-
muster into Group B.

- The age of entry for Boys was revised to 16 - 18 years and that
for Direct Entry sailors to 18 - 20 years.

- The compulsory age of retirement for sailors of all ranks was

raised to 50 years and that for MCPO's maintained at 55 years.

- Time scale promotion was introduced whereby Seaman First class

and equivalents would be promoted to Leading rank on completion
of five years service in man's rank, subject to having qualified in the
prescribed examinations.

In 1976, the Boy Entry was proposed for abolition. In due course only
Direct Entry matriculate sailors were recruited and trained at INS
CHILKA.

RETROSPECT

Given the limits within which Personnel policy must operate, the
achievements in the field of personnel management were impressive.
Despite the constraints listed in the Preamble to this chapter, the Navy
was able to man the Russian acquisitions and the Leander's, man the
Submarine and Air Arms and take on new responsibilities ashore like
those of coastal defence, garrisons for the A&N islands, expanding the
training schools and the NCC.

There is a view that the dilution of expertise could have been avoided. As
has been discussed, the endeavor to make the Navy accept concepts like
vertical specialisation, fixed commissions and pre-commission training
took time. Many believed that with the Navy already fully stretched in
inducting and coping with new acquisitions, personnel policies should not
be tinkered with. Many believed that the reforms required manpower in
such numbers that the shortages would only be aggravated. Many
believed that the reforms were filibustered by inter-branch tussles.

There was some truth in each of these points of view. No satisfactory

solution could be found. The very same issues raised their ugly heads in
the mid 1970's, when the complements of the guided missile frigates,
ocean going rocket boats and minesweepers had to be decided. As in the
earlier cases, the same unsatisfactory compromises had to be
resorted to. The basic issues still remain unresolved.

CHAPTER 22

THE GROWTH OF THE NAVY BETWEEN 1965 AND 1975

Preamble

If one takes a bird's eye view of thirty years of naval planning from 1947
to 1977, three landmarks stand out very prominently. These are:

(a) 1957 to 1959 when the Navy took several measures to

cope with American aid to the Pakistan Navy

(b) 1963 to 1965 when the Defence Plan 1964 - 1969 was
formulated after the Chinese attack in 1962 and the Navy
turned to Russia for its acquisitions.

(c) 1973 to 1975 when the Defence Plan 1974 - 1979 was
formulated after the 1971 Indo - Pak war and Indo Russian
naval cooperation moved to a higher threshold.

Both the 1964 - 1969 and the 1974 - 1979 Defence Plans were approved
after detailed consideration of the threats, the inter service priorities, the
scarcity of foreign exchange, the likelihood of deferred credit being
available for the requirements which had to be imported and the
capabilities and limitations of Defence R & D and Defence Production.

From the outset, three realities affected Defence budgets generally and
the Navy's budget in particular:

(a) The resources required for national development neces-

sarily receive higher priority than the resources required for
defence.

(b) The paucity of Free Foreign Exchange (FFE).

(c) Until 1962, defence preparedness was mainly against

attack by Pakistan. After 1962, defence had to cater for
threats both from China and from Pakistan.

HIGHLIGHTS OF DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 1965 AND 1975

The details of the major developments during the period 1965 to 1975
have been discussed in the respective chapters on:

(a) The Russian Acquisitions 1965 to 1971 and 1972 to 1975.

(b) The Leander Frigate Project and Indigenous Warship Design.

(c) The creation of Submarine Arm in 1968.

(d) The augmentation of the Air Arm with additional aircraft and
helicopters.

The highlights are summarised below.

The Submarines

The arrival of the submarines from mid 1968 onwards gave the anti
submarine frigates and the anti submarine Alize aircraft their long awaited
exercise time with submarines. The increase in anti submarine
effectiveness was however short of expectations. There were several
reasons:

- For the first time, the Navy came face to face with the unusual
hydrological conditions in Indian waters. These conditions favoured
the submarines, who could lurk in shadow zones below sea layers
where ships sonars could not penetrate. This highlighted the need
 for ships to have variable depth sonars and for helicopters to have
dunking sonars.

- The submariners were eager not only to demonstrate their

offensive potential in pro-sub exercises but also to work out their
capabilities and limitations for operational patrols during war.
Submarine time had therefore to be shared between anti submarine
exercises, pro-sub exercises and training more submarine personnel
to enable the fledgling Submarine Arm to grow.

- The annual rotation of ships crews meant that personnel who had
acquired precious anti submarine proficiency had to be replaced by
others who needed to acquire this proficiency. This retarded the
build up of anti submarine expertise.

- The time lag in the setting up of specialised workshops and test

facilities resulted in the sonars themselves not being in top
condition.

All these factors contributed to the sinking of the KHUKRI in the 1971
War. KHUKRI's disastrous loss awakened the Navy at large to the lethality
of the modern submarine and led to extensive measures to increase anti
submarine capability.

Meanwhile, four new improved submarines entered service from mid 1973
onwards. These helped sustain the numerous evaluations to improve anti
submarine effectiveness.

The Seaking Anti Submarine Helicopters

The Pakistan Navy's acquisition from America of their first submarine

GHAZI and its subsequent programme for acquiring Daphne class
submarines from France made it clear by 1968 that it intended to
concentrate its offensive potential in submarines and use its surface fleet
defensively. At this time, Western navies were developing anti submarine
helicopters equipped with a sonar which could be lowered into the sea
while hovering and armed with an air-dropped, anti-submarine homing
torpedo. This innovation was meant to overcome two of the major
handicaps which afflicted surface ships. The helicopter, being airborne,
could not be hit by the submarines lethal torpedoes. Secondly, by having
a sonar whose depth could be adjusted, the helicopter deprived the
submarine of its ability to hide below the temperature layers of the sea.
The latest Seaking helicopters were being developed for the British Navy.
In 1969, orders were placed for six helicopters and their homing
torpedoes. These arrived just in time before war broke out in December
1971.

Due to their newness and shortages of technical equipment, they were

not utilised to their full potential during the 1971 War. It took another two
years for the Seakings potential to be fully realised. By 1975, six new
improved Seakings arrived and it become possible to combine the
Seaking's potential with that of new anti submarine ships that had
entered service.

The Advent of Anti Ship Missiles

The Pakistan Navy's bombardment of Dwarka in 1965 and the

International Court's award in 1967, which gave Pakistan a portion of the
territory it claimed in Kutch, led the Navy to propose a plan for the
Defence of Kutch. In 1969, an agreement was signed for the acquisition
of the Russian missile boats which had first been offered in 1964 and
whose efficacy had been demonstrated in the 1967 Arab Israel war when
an Egyptian missile boat summarily sank an Israeli frigate. By end 1971,
the missile boats had arrived and their support facilities had been located
in and around Bombay.

The effectiveness of the missile attacks on Karachi led to withdrawal of

the Pakistan Navy's ships into Karachi harbour and to merchant ships
seeking from the Government of India in New Delhi assurance of safe
passage. This triggered the Navy's efforts to increase the number of
vessels fitted with anti ship missiles. To start with, a squadron of new
improved missile boats were acquired from Russia. Missile launchers and
their fire control systems were cannibalised from the older boats which
were non operational, and transplanted into two frigates and a missile
coast battery. The frigates which followed the Leanders and the corvettes
all had anti ship missiles. In due course, the new improved Seakings and
the new Sea Harriers were equipped with anti ship missiles.

The Russian Acquisitions

By 1971, four submarines, a submarine depot ship, a submarine rescue

vessel, two landing ships, five submarine chasers and four patrol boats
had arrived and were based in Visakhapatnam. Though they had been
acquired for the Bay of Bengal and the A&N Islands, they had started
being utilised in the Arabian Sea as well.

To support these acquisitions, work had commenced in Visakhapatnam on

the construction of a new Dockyard, of submarine support facilities, of
torpedo preparation facilities and of training facilities. The progress of
Dockyard construction was seriously retarded however by the sinking of
the floors of the new workshops, due to the inability of the local soil to
bear their heavy weight. These delays in setting up maintenance and refit
facilities progressively afflicted the operational availability of the Russian
acquisitions.

The Leander Frigate Project

The construction of the first three frigates had commenced but was
behind schedule due to the teething problems of start up, the changes in
radars, fire control systems and AIO from the second frigate onwards and
the problems of indigenising major items like the propulsion and auxiliary
machinery systems.

Aircraft for VIKRANT

The only aircraft which could replace the ageing Seahawks were the
American naval A4 Skyhawks. Efforts to acquire the A4's had not been
successful. It was decided therefore to avail of the opportunity to acquire
the Seahawks being disposed of by the German Navy. These aircraft
arrived in 1968 and were to prove very useful in 1971.

VIKRANT underwent a refit from 1972 to 1975 during which facilities were
installed for operating the Seaking helicopters.

The Seahawks phased out in the late 1970s and the Alizes were
refurbished to extend their life into the 1980s.

The Defence Reviews of 1973 and 1975

In 1973, a national security analysis was completed by a high level APEX
committee. In view of the prevailing maritime situation, the Committee
recommended special consideration for naval development and cleared
the Navy's proposals for replacing old ships and the development of
support facilities.

Unfortunately, the sharp rise in international oil prices after the Arab
Israel war of October 1973 seriously dislocated national budgeting and
decelerated almost all defence projects. The Navy's discussions with
Russia however continued and it was possible to finalise the programme
for the next series of Russian acquisitions.

The debilitating impact of spiraling inflation on the non Russian defence

projects made it necessary to appoint another high level APEX Committee
in 1975. It reviewed defence needs in the light of the strategic
developments which had taken place after 1973 and the compulsions of
the economic situation. It recommended enhanced allocation of funds to
support core naval schemes which otherwise would have languished.

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1975

The Government's acceptance of the recommendations of the APEX

Committees of 1973 and 1975 enabled the Navy to progress the following
major schemes in the years after 1975.

Ships
Russian Guided missile frigates, ocean going rocket boats
Acquisitions and coastal minesweepers.
Indigenous Improvements to the 5th Leander (TARAGIRI) and
Construction 6th Leander (VINDHYAGIRI). Missile frigates of the
GODAVARI class. Missile Corvettes of the KHUKRI
Class. Survey Ships. Seaward Defence Boats.
Landing Craft.
Modernisations TALWAR and TRISHUL were fitted with surface to
surface missiles. VIKRANT was fitted with new
radars, AIO and facilities to operate the Seaking
helicopters and Sea Harrier aircraft.
Conversions The anti aircraft frigates BRAHMAPUTRA, BETWA and
BEAS were converted to the Training Role to replace
CAUVERY, KRISHNA and TIR.
Submarines
 Acquisitions Improved submarines from Russia and Germany.
Modernisations The improvements in the VELA class were retrofitted
in the earlier submarines.
Air Arm

Acquisitions Second aircraft carrier VIRAAT from Britain. Russian

IL 38 MRASW aircraft. Transferfrom the Air Force of
Super Constellation MR aircraft. British Sea Harriers
to replace the Seahawks. British Islander and
indigenous Kiran aircraft for training aircrew. TU
142s from Russia for LRMP
Modernisation Refurbishment of Alizes.

Helicopters Acquisition of British Seakings, Russian Kamovs and

indigenous MATCH and SAR Chetak helicopters.

Overview of Ships and Submarines Acquired Between 1965 and

1975

The following table provides an overview of the ships and submarines

acquired by the Navy between 1965 and 1975:

ACQUISITION STANDARD NAME VINTAGE YEAR YEAR SUPPLIER

DISPLACEMENT ORDERED DELIVERED
(Tons)
Landing Ship 730 GHARIAL NewW 1965 1966 Russia
Tank (Medium) GULDAR

Inshore Mine 170 BHATKAL New 1961 1968-70 MDL

sweepers BULSAR

Coastal Mine 360 KARWAR New 1952 1956 Britain

sweepers CANNANORE
CUDDALORE
KAKINADA

Leander 2950 NILGIRI New 1966 1972 MDL

Class Frigates
Anti Submarine 1000 KAMOTRA New 1965 1968 to RUSSIA
Vessels KADMATT 1969
KAVARATTI
KILTAN
KATCHHAN
Submarine 1975 KALVARI New 1965 1967 to RUSSIA
KHANDERI 1969
KARANJ
KURSURA

Submarine 5900 AMBA New 1965 1968 RUSSIA

Depot Ship

Seaward 150 AMAR New 1963 1969 GRW

Defence Boats AJIT
ATUL

Fleet Tanker 12600 DEEPAK New 1964 1967 Germany

Patrol Boats 80 PAMBAN New 1965 1967 RUSSIA

PANAJI PURI PANVEL
PULICAT

Missile Boats 180 VINASH New 1969 1971 Russia

VIDYUT VIJETA
VEER NIRGHAT
NIRBHIK
NASHAK NIPAT

Submarine 800 NISTAR Reserve 1969 1971 RUSSIA

Rescue Vessels Stock

Anti Submarine 1000 ARNALA Reserve 1971 1972 RUSSIA

Vessels ANDROTH Stock
ANJAJIP 1968/69

Fleet Tug 700 GAJ New 1968 1973 GRW

Anti Submarine 1000 ANDAMAN New 1971 1973-74 RUSSIA

Vessels AMINI

Submarine 1975 VELA VAGIR New 1971 1973-74 RUSSIA

VAGLI Improved
VAGHSHEER

Leander 2950 HIMGIRI New 1968 1974 MDL

Class Frigates Improved

Landing Ship 1120 GHORPAD New 1972 1975-76 Poland

Tank (Medium) KESARI Improved
SHARDUL
SHARABH
 CHAPTER 23

EPILOGUE

The volume of the Navy's history 1965 to 1975 was made possible by
the unstinted help extended by each of the participants interviewed. It is
clear from their recollections that there were successes and reverses,
tensions and disagreements. Factions lobbied for their positions and
sometimes went too far in one direction. The right solution had to evolve
through experimentation. Yet there is no doubt that these were only
arguments over ways and means to reach the same end - a strong and
modern Navy. This end was achieved by the combined efforts of several
people.

The Leander Frigate Project was the achievement of Defence Minister

Krishna Menon, exceptional civil servants like Mr HC Sarin and Mr NM Sen
and Admirals Nanda and Samson - the first two Managing Directors of
Mazagaon Docks. The notable progress in achieving indigenisation in
these frigates was the achievement of Commodore Paradkar and his
team.

The bold decision to replace the obsolescent British radars and fire control
systems by modern Dutch equivalents from the second Leander onwards,
well before the first Leander had even been completed, was a result of
the forceful advocacy of Admiral Ramnath. It gave Bharat Electronics the
opportunity to leapfrog into the indigenous production of digital electronic
systems. And it built up the confidence of the Navy's constructors like Shri
Parmanandan and Captain Mohan Ram and electronic specialists like
Admiral Baxi to innovate the interfaces in future frigates and corvettes for
the Indian Navy's unique mix of Russian, western and indigenous
systems.

In the 1971 war, the Navy's achievements in the Bay of Bengal sprung
from Admiral Nanda's insistence that VIKRANT be seen out at sea and
Captain Parkash's courage in letting his eager pilots push to the extreme,
the safety limits for launching and recovering aircraft in the low wind
conditions in the northern part of the Bay of Bengal. To Admiral Sarma
and his Eastern Fleet, and the Navy's intrepid minesweepers, belongs the
credit of fulfilling so many tasks with so few ships, culminating in the
reopening of the port of Chitgong within weeks of the cease fire.

The Navy's achievements in the Arabian Sea evolved from the initial
decision to acquire the missile boats, the credit for which belongs to
Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram. Admiral Krishnan and Additional Secretary
DR Kohli. The success of the missile boat attacks on Karachi, which
played such a decisive role in the Navy's victory in 1971 evolved from
Admiral Kuruvila's acceptance of the advice to use missile boats
offensively. The tactic to use these frail, essentially defensive, small boats
as part of the Fleet's spearhead was entirely unconventional, not believed
possible and therefore doubly effective. In this part of the epilogue, I can
share my feeling of fulfillment at having helped to mutate these fragile
but lethal craft into offensive vessels.

As Captain of TIR in April 1971, jointly with Commander Yadav, the

Senior Officer of the Missile Boat Squadron, we conducted trials when
towing a missile boat from Visakhapatnam to Bombay using large nylon
tow ropes at speeds of 14 knots in moderately rough sea conditions.

I was eager to prove that this could be done because their fragile hulls
and limited endurance made it impossible for missile boats to sail in
distant waters on their own. Towing missile boats safely and successfully
was crucial to being able to get them within striking distance of enemy
targets. By the time TIR and NASHAK arrived in Bombay, we had
mastered the procedures for towing these boats for long hours, sliding hot
food and refreshments to them over the tow ropes since their engines
were switched off to conserve fuel and engine hours, releasing the missile
boats within minutes to motor independently and take them quickly back
in tow when required.

In May 1971, I was appointed as the Fleet Operations Officer on the staff
of Admiral Kuruvila who was Commanding the Western Fleet. The need to
prepare for hostilities was being discussed. I told Admiral Kuruvila of how
we had towed a missile boat from Visakhapatnam to Bombay and
suggested that taking missile boats in tow with the Fleet would decisively
tilt the scales in any encounter between the opposing Fleets. The analogy
I used to explain the concept was that this would be similar to a falcon
being released to pounce on its prey. He directed Commander Yadav and
me to put up a proposal in writing. Given below is an excerpt from that
proposal which he forwarded to Admiral Kohli, the FOCINC WEST in June
1971:

"I have no doubt whatsoever that the correct utilisation of the

missile boats is to use them offensively, two at a time, in company
with the Fleet. If I have these boats with me at sea, as your Fleet
Commander I can guarantee total victory once contact has been
made with enemy surface units, regard less of his superiority in
speed and gun power".

Admiral Kohli responded enthusiastically and immediately ordered a series

of trials to ascertain the effects of towing on the boats' hull and
machinery. In Naval Headquarters, Admiral Nanda who had already
resolved that the Navy should take the offensive. also responded
positively to the offensive utilisation of missile boats. In the ensuing
months, plans crystallised for the deployment of missile boats. Some
boats were to be deployed off Saurashtra to deter hit and run raids and,
when ordered, to launch attacks towards Karachi escorted by fast ships of
the Fleet. Some boats were to be taken in tow by the Fleet. The end
result was that during the war, missile attacks were successfully launched
towards Karachi from two widely separated directions, the first from south
and the other from the south west. During both missile attacks, the
timing and precision of the air attacks by the Air Force was impeccable
and splendid. By sheer chance, on both occasions the naval group arrived
off Karachi a little earlier than the pre-arranged time for the coordinated
attack. This left the Pakistan side completely perplexed whether the havoc
was being wrought by the Indian Navy or the Indian Air Force.

The achievement of Admiral Kuruvila and his Western Fleet in dominating

the approaches to Karachi within a week of hostilities, despite the poor
material state of his ships and repeated breakdowns at sea, is well
known. I would like to place on record my appreciation of this big heated
and courageous man who took the advice of his young advisers and
implemented it so successfully.

The success of the first series of Russian acquisitions was the result of the
detailed discussions held by Additional Secretary Sheth's Delegation in
1965 and the painstaking resolution of problems by Additional Secretary
Mukherjee's Delegation in 1971. The second series of Russian acquisitions
owes its success to the prodigious efforts of Admiral Barboza and his
professional Delegation of 1975.

Admiral Bindra's far reaching Reorganisation of Naval Training in 1974

succeeded because of the whole-heated support, it received from
Admirals Kamath and Kohli.

Captain (later Admiral) Dawson's single minded dedication to successfully

demonstrate during his command of NILGIRI, the great potential of her
electronic warfare equipment became the spring board for the Navy's leap
frog into this intricate area of naval warfare.

The transfer to the Navy of the control of Maritime Reconnaissance was

the outcome of the sustained efforts of Admiral Tahiliani and Captain Puri.

The sound foundations of the Submarine Arm were laid by the highly
capable young submariners who manned the first eight submarines, some
of whom like Admirals Auditto and Sodhi became Flag Officers
Submarines, and Admirals Shekhawat and Ganesh who rose to became
Fleet Commanders and Commanders in Chief. Admiral Shekhawat became
Chief of the Naval Staff in 1993.
The decade 1965-1975 was a crucial one in that it not only established
the Navy's credibility in the eyes of the nation but also sowed the seeds
for the transition to a deep sea Navy. The foundations built in these ten
years have been considerably augmented in the ensuing years. Future
volumes will record the acquisition of the kashin class guided missile
frigates, the strengthening of the GRSE as the outcome of the Navy's
commitment to DRDO's Integrated Guided Missile Development
programme.

All these achievements were sustained by the commitment with which the
Navy's officers and sailors carried out their duties. Most of them were too
young then to know what inspired the vision of their elders. It is my
hope that this volume has helped them to know what was done and
why.

CHAPTER 24

THE NAVAL HYDROGRAPHIC DEPARTMENT

DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO 1965

General

On account of the seasonal monsoons, the survey year was divided into
the Survey Season - November to April - and the Drawing Season - May
to September.

Survey at sea used to be done by Survey Groups. Drawing was done by

the Drawing office established in Dunmore House in Coonoor since 1900.

The results of hydrographic surveys used to be forwarded to the British

Hydrographic Department for publication. These charts were then sent to
Bombay. Charts were issued to ships by the Naval Chart Depot located in
a corner of the sail loft of the Bombay Dockyard.

Marine Survey was part of the office of the Surveyor General of India.

1947-1948

When the Royal Indian Navy was partitioned in August 1947, its only
survey vessel, INVESTIGATOR, was allocated to the Marine Survey of
India. In 1947 and 1948, its very first tasks were to survey the
approaches to the berths for naval ships in Bombay and Cochin. By mid
1948 however, it became clear that this ship had reached the end of her
life and needed to be replaced.
 1949-1950

Survey Vessels. In 1949, the Second World War frigate KUKRI was
placed under refit to undergo large alterations for conversion to a survey
vessel. She was commissioned as a survey ship on 31 October 50.

Surveys carried out. Whilst KUKRI was still under refit, the minesweeper
ROHILKHAND, two Seaward Defence Motor Launches (SDMLs) and survey
boats carried out in 1949 and completed by 1950, a detailed survey of
Kandla and its approaches as part of the project for the development of
Kandla as a major port.

Hydrographic Office. Concurrently with this activity, the Navy's

seniormost survey officer, Cdr J Cursetji, was deputed to Britain in April
1949 to study the British Navy's Hydrographic Office and prepare a
project report on the establishment of a Hydrographic Office in India. He
returned to India early in 1950. After visiting all the other survey
organisations and facilities in India, he submitted his report in August
1950.

1951-1953

Survey Vessels. KUKRI commenced surveying in December 1950. In

July 1951, KUKRI was renamed INVESTIGATOR. She was the fourth
consecutive INVESTIGATOR in the Marine Survey of India to bear that
name, the first being a twin paddle steamer constructed in Bombay
Dockyard in 1881.

The two SDMLs continued to be employed on survey duties. In view of

earlier experience that a single survey ship could not cope with survey
commitments, the ROHILKHAND was given a temporary conversion for
the survey role. She joined the survey fleet in October 1952.

Surveys Carried Out. During 1951 and 1952, surveys were carried out
in the Gulf of Kutch, the Andaman islands, the Mahanadi River entrance
and Bombay Harbour.

Hydrographic Office. In 1951 Commander Cursetji was appointed as

Surveyor-in-Charge, Marine Survey of India. Based on the project report
he had submitted, the Government approved the establishment of a
Hydrographic Office in phases.

1953-1954

Survey Vessels. Experience with the minesweeper ROHILKHAND showed

that she was unsuitable as a self - supporting survey vessel. The sloop
SUTLEJ was therefore converted to the survey role. The survey fleet now
comprised INVESTIGATOR, SUTLEJ, two SDMLs and new survey boats
constructed by the Naval Dockyard Bombay. In addition, plans were
crystallizing for the construction in India of a new modern survey ship.

Surveys Carried Out. During 1953 and 1954, surveys continued in the
Gulf of Kutch, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the Mahanadi River
entrance and Bombay Harbour.

Survey Personnel. During the preceding years, a number of officers had

been under basic training and had also undergone training in Britain. The
manning of three separate surveying units in 1953 was made possible by
the availability of these qualified officers who had previously been under
training. The shortage of survey recorder sailors however continued to
persist.

Hydrographic Office. Having decided to establish a Hydrographic Office

in India for the production of navigational charts and auxiliary
publications, the services were obtained on loan of the Assistant
Hydrographer of the British Navy to advise and assist in setting up the
office. He arrived in India in the capacity of the Surveyor-in-Charge of the
Marine Survey of India. After considering alternative sites, it was decided
to establish the Hydrographic Office at Dehra Dun, where the printing
facilities of the nearby Survey of India could be utilised and close liaison
maintained between these two Survey Organisations.

1954-1958

Survey Vessels. In 1954, survey commitments began to mount. It was

assessed that at least four ships needed to be continuously employed on
survey duties. During these four years:-

(a) In 1954, Government sanctioned a new 2500 ton survey ship to

be built in collaboration with a French firm at Hindustan Shipyard
Ltd (HSL) at Visakhapatnam. Its keel was laid in 1957.

(b) The Ministry of Transport and Communication, on whose request

most of the project surveys were being carried out, bore the entire
cost of converting the sloop JAMUNA for the survey role. JAMUNA
was commissioned as a survey vessel in November 1956.

(c) SUTLEJ had been doing survey temporarily since 1953. During
her 1957 annual refit, her hull and machinery state were so poor as
to require a major refit. It was decided to convert her for
permanent employment as a survey ship during her D2 refit at MDL.

Surveys Carried Out. Between 1954 and 1958, surveys continued to be

carried out in the Gulf of Kutch, the Gulf of Cambay, the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands and ports on the east and west coasts.
Survey Personnel. The shortage of survey officers and sailors continued
to persist.

Hydrographic Office. The Hydrographic Office was established in

temporary accommodation at Dehra Dun in June 1954.

On 15 August 1954, the name of the Marine Survey of India was changed
to Hydrographic Branch of the Navy . The designation of the Surveyor in
Charge was changed to Chief Hydrographer. Captain J Cursetji took over
as Chief Hydrographer in 1956. The office shifted into its new buildings in
1957.

From the outset, it proved difficult to get trained civilian technical

personnel for the Hydrographic Office. Surveyors had to be obtained on
loan from the Survey of India and draftsman and hydrographic assistants
had to be trained on the job. This expedient continued for several years.

Publications. From 15 February 1958 onwards, Indian Notices to

Mariners started being published from the Naval Hydrograhic office.

Navigational warnings continued to be issued from the Naval Chart Depot

in Bombay.

In 1956, India became a member of the International Hydrographic

Bureau. From 1957 onwards, the Chief Hydrographer started representing
India at the International Hydrographic Conferences in Monaco.

1959 - 1964

Expansion of the Hydrographic Branch

In 1959, the Navy forwarded to the Ministry its proposals for the
expansion of the Hydrographic Branch. Discussion continued till 1963 with
no tangible results. In 1963, the Navy put up revised and updated
proposals, pointing out that adequate charting of Indian waters was a
prime necessity for the maritime defence of India and therefore was the
sole responsibility of the Ministry of Defence. The 1963 paper envisaged
the requirement of 4 ships for seaward survey and 4 smaller survey craft
for inshore coastal survey, phased over a period of 5 years.

On 25 March 1965, the Chief Hydrographer was re-designated as Chief

Hydrographer to the Government of India. This gave official recognition to
the advice he gave to the various maritime agencies.

Survey Vessels. From 1959 onwards, the survey fleet consisted of

JAMUNA and INVESTIGATOR. SUTLEJ rejoined in 1960 after her
permanent conversion for survey duties.
The new survey ship being constructed in HSL to a French design was
inordinately delayed. Ten years after it had been sanctioned, she was
commissioned as DARSHAK on 28 December 1964. She had a helicopter
to assist in survey duties; her living and working spaces were air
conditioned; she had fluorescent lighting throughout, automatic
telephones and two 35 foot survey launches.

Surveys Carried Out. Between 1959 and 1964, surveys continued of

both coasts, the Laccadive Islands and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Survey Personnel. Various steps were tried to overcome the persistent

shortage of volunteers for survey duties:

(a) Officers found unsuitable for the Air Arm were selected for the
Hydrographic Branch. These officers however declined to volunteer
to stay on as survey officers.

(b) Junior officers started being attached to surveys ships for

periods of 2 to 3 years.

(c) Officers of the survey branch started being transferred to

general service appointments for experience.

Hydrograhic Training School

Until 1959, no proper facilities existed for training personnel in

Hydrography. Officers and sailors joined the branch on recommendation
by their Commanding Officers. Their skill and dedication was rewarded in
accordance with General Instructions for Hydrographic Surveyors.

The first attempt at providing systematic training began in 1959 with the
establishment of a Hydrographic Training Unit at the Naval Chart Depot
Bombay. It conducted short duration course for quartermaster sailors.
Progressively, the shortage of junior recorders eased but the shortage of
senior recorders was unavoidable until the junior recorders acquired the
qualifications and experience to be promoted.

Due to constraints of space, this unit was shifted to Cochin in 1961. It

was temporarily located in a wing of the ND School and named as the
Naval Hydrographic School.

Publications. Apart from the publications of new charts, Sailing

Directions and Indian Notices to Mariners, the Indian List of Lights was
published in 1961.
 DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 1965 AND 1975

Survey Ships. From 1965 to 1974, the survey fleet consisted of

DARSHAK, INVESTIGATOR, SUTLEJ and JAMUNA. INVESTIGATOR was
decommissioned on 30 Sep 74.

In 1970, Government sanctioned the replacement of INVESTIGATOR,

SUTLEJ and JAMUNA in a phased programme. Orders could not be placed,
however, because MDL was fully stretched with the Leander frigate
project and GRW was not geared up to construct large ships.

In 1972, when considering the distribution of ship construction work

between MDL and GRW, Government decided that new survey ships
would be constructed at GRW. The first of the three replacement ships
was ordered on GRW in 1972. The ship was to be fitted with modern
survey, navigation and manoeuvering equipment, indigenous propulsion
machinery with a Pleuger rudder and be fully airconditioned.

In 1973, Government approved the indigenous construction of four survey

craft for inshore survey work.

In 1975, due to financial constraints, NHQ rescheduled the placement of

orders:

(a) Survey ships 2 and 3 were deferred to the 1974-79 plan. NHQ
timed the orders for these two survey ships to be delivered in 1978
and 1979.

(b) The four survey craft were deferred to the 1980-84 plan.

Surveys Carried out Normal surveys continued to be carried out on both

coasts, and the Andaman, Nicobar and Laccadive Islands.

Other Survey Activities :-

In 1967,

(a) SUTLEJ carried out the survey in connection with the

establishment of the DG Range at Goa.

(b) INVESTIGATOR carried out surveys in Visakhapatnam harbour in

connection with the new Dockyard Project.

In 1968 DARSHAK continued the surveys in connection with the DG Range

at Goa.

In 1969 JAMUNA carried out surveys of the Submarine Exercise Area off
Visakhapatnam.
During the 1968-69 season:-

(a) DARSHAK carried out oceanographic surveys from Bombay to

the Gulf of Cambay with scientists from Naval Physical &
Oceanographic Laboratory (NPOL) and National Institute of
Oceanography (NIO). National Geophysical Research Institute
(NGRI) scientists, embarked on board. Observations were made
pertaining to physical and chemical properties of sea water, marine
biology, bathymetry, geology and magnetic profiles.

(b) SUTLEJ, carried out oceanographic observations with a team of

scientists from NPOL. Magnetic profiles upto 35 miles offshore were
obtained.

During the 1973-74 season, DARSHAK was employed on Defence

Oceanography and Marine Resource Surveys, in which all maritime
research agencies of the nation participated. This was the first venture of
its kind and yielded valuable data.

Survey of the Gulf of Kutch. Survey of the Northern portion of the Gulf
had begun in 1948. During the 1974-75 season, the Ministry of Transport
placed the lighthouse tender MV SAGARDEEP at the disposal of the Chief
Hydrographer. Using two Side Scan Sonars provided by the Indian Oil
Corporation, DARSHAK and SAGARDEEP surveyed most of the Gulf of
Kutch. The results of these surveys enabled delineation of the deep water
channel to the off-shore oil terminal at Salaya for use by the Very Large
Crude Oil Carriers (VLCCs) which brought crude oil from the Persian Gulf
to the refineries in Gujarat.

Electronic Surveying Equipment In 1966-67, the Ministry of Transport

provided DARSHAK with a medium range position fixing system, the Hi-
Fix chain, to progress surveys in the Gulf of Cambay. Prior to the
introduction of Hi-Fix, surveys in mid- ocean used to be done
painstakingly by laying beacons and fixing with sextants or taut wire. Hi-
Fix was a major milestone in the modernisation of surveying equipment.

Surveys in Bangladesh After the 1971 war, DARSHAK carried out

surveys in Bangladesh till March 1972.

Survey Personnel

Direct Entry Survey Officers The intake of officers into the

Hydrographic Branch used to be from General Service volunteers. Since
far too many officers reverted to General Service after a short stint of
surveying, Survey Officers started being directly recruited from 1965
onwards.
Survey Allowance and Survey Bounty In 1968, to attract more
volunteers for survey duty, both these allowances were revised upward.

(a) Survey Bounty for Sailors Employed on Survey Duties

Rs per year
Survey Recorder 1 - CPO Rs 450
Survey Recorder 1 - PO and
Rs 390
below
Survey Recorder 2 Rs 330
Survey Recorder 3 Rs 240

(b) Survey Allowance/Survey Bounty for officers

Survey
Survey
Bounty
Category Allowance
Rs
Rs p.m.
p.m.
Minus Survey
Asst Surveyor Allowance received
50 850
Class 4 during the period
involved
" " " 3 60 950 - do -
" " " 2 85 1350 - do -
" " " 1 100 1850 - do -
Charge Allowance
Lt Cdr 100 1800 - do -
Commander 100 1800 - do -
Captain Nil 1800 - do -
In 1969, Survey Bounty was sanctioned for MCPO's
MCPO 1 Rs 570 per year
MCPO 2 Rs 510 per year

Modernisation of the Naval Hydrographic Office Dehra Dun

To cope with the growing volume of chart production, the complement of

officers and technical and administrative civilian staff was increased in
December 1966. A `Morusawa' Photo Typesetting Machine was installed
in 1967. All `letter' and `figure' work, which previously used to be fair
drawn manually, was photographed in original on the photo typesetting
machine and the prints were then mounted on the fair-drawing original.

In March 1971, the printing of charts commenced on the new lithographic

and letter-press machines.

In 1975, the printing complex was augmented by a double colour, rotary

offset machine and allied printing equipment.
The Environmental Data Unit

The Environment Data Unit was established at the Hydro- graphic Office
in 1974. During 1975, this unit processed, analysed and intercepted the
data received from :

(a) DARSHAK's Oceanographic Expedition of 1973-74.

(b) The USA's National Oceanographic Data Centre.

(c) The International India Ocean Expedition.

In 1975, the Naval Hydrographic Office was nominated by the

Government of India as the National Centre for archiving and
dissemination of Bathythermograph (BT) data. The Government directed
that BT data collected by all vessels of national agencies be forwarded to
the Naval Hydrographic Office.

International Co-operation

The International Hydrographic Bureau (IHB) assigned to the Naval

Hydrographic Office the responsibility of preparing nine bathymetric
plotting sheets, based on source material received from data centres the
world over. These were incorporated in the General Bathymetric Chart of
the Oceans (GEBCO).

Naval Hydrographic School

Sanction for establishing a permanent Hydrographic School at Cochin was

first issued in April 1965. Later it was decided to locate the school at
Visakhapatnam. Eventually, in 1975, sanction was accorded to establish
the School at Goa.

Publications

Lattice Charts. The production of Decca Lattice navigation charts was

taken up in 1967. The first of the series covering the approaches to
Paradeep Port was published in April 1968.

Coastal Charts and Indian Sailing Directions. The publication of the

coastal series of charts for the West Coast of India started in 1968. The
publication of Indian Sailing Directions for this area commenced in 1970.

Extension of Coverage of Notices to Mariners. Commencing March 1972,

the coverage of Notices to Mariners was enlarged to include the entire
North Indian Ocean area. This ensured that important information relating
to the safety of navigation was available to ships expeditiously .
Bathymetric Chart of the Northern Indian Ocean. This chart was
published in July 1973.

Indian Nautical Almanac. In September 1974, the Naval Hydrographic

office published the Indian edition of the 1974 Nautical Almanac. It was
identical to the Almanac being jointly produced by Britain and the USA
and was produced under arrangements with them.

International Arrangements for Exchange of Reproduction

Materials Three charts of the Persian Gulf area and the chart of Malacca
Straits, were published in 1973, from reproduction material received from
the British Hydrographic Department under a charting arrangement.
Publication of the Nautical Almanac, identical to that produced by the UK
and the USA, was commenced in 1975 under arrangements with these
countries.

Goodwill Cruise

In April - May 1970, DARSHAK undertook a goodwill cruise to Southeast

Asia. This was the first time that an Indian built survey ship visited
countries in this region.

President's Review of the Fleet.

DARSHAK, JAMUNA and SUTLEJ took part in the President's Review of the
Fleet at Bombay on 28 December 1969.

International Hydrographic Bureau

Chief Hydrographers have had the distinction of being elected to the

International Hydrographic Bureau in Monte Carlo.

Commodore DC Kapoor was the first Chief Hydrographer to be elected to

the Directing Committee in April 1972. He then served as a Director in the
Bureau till 1982, having been re-elected for two successive terms.

Rear Admiral FL Fraser served from 1982 to 1987 as the President of the
Directing Committee.

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1975

Re-Scheduling of the Survey Season

As a result of refit programmes and employment on other naval duties, it

was found that survey ships and craft were not always available in the
survey season. Deployments therefore started being made in locations
where survey work was feasible even during the monsoon season.

Survey Vessels

DARSHAK, SUTLEJ and JAMUNA continued on survey duties until the new
survey vessels commissioned.

In 1977, DARSHAK was fitted with all the new survey equipment which
was being fitted in the new survey ships under construction.

In 1977, sanction was accorded for the construction of four 185 ton,
survey craft which would not only work in conjunction with survey ships in
coastal waters, but also independently carry out surveys of all ports,
harbours and their approaches.

New Survey Vessels Commissioned

Survey
Sandhyak Ship 26 Feb 81
(GRW)
Survey
Nirdehak Ship 04 Oct 83
(GRW)
Survey
Makar 31 Jan 84
Ship (GSL)
Survey
Mithun 31 Mar 84
Ship (GSL)
Survey
Meen 23 Jun 84
Ship (GSL)
Survey
Mesh 31 Oct 84
Ship (GSL)
Survey
Nirupak Ship 14 Aug 85
(GRW)
Survey
InvestigatorShip 11 Jan 90
(GRW)
Survey
Jamuna Ship 31 Aug 91
(GRW)
Survey
Sutlej Ship 19 Feb 93
(GRW)
Old Survey Ship Decommissioned
Sutlej 01 Dec 78
Jamuna 31 Dec 80
 Darshak 15 Jan 90

All six survey ships of the SANDHAYAK class were equipped with the
latest available electronic equipment and facilities for Hydrographic work.

The Survey craft were not found to be stable enough for survey work
when the weather was not calm.

Naval Hydrographic School Goa

The new school at Goa was constructed within INS GOMANTAK and
commissioned in three phases between 1978 and 1987. Meanwhile
courses for Direct Entry officers and sailors, and for Civilian Field
Assistants including some from foreign countries, continued to be
conducted on facilities borrowed from other Naval units at Cochin.

In 1980, the Hydrographic School was given UNDP aid of 3.5 million US
Dollars for acquiring modern surveying training equipment. Thereafter, it
was awarded Category A certification by the International Hydrographic
Organisation and recognition as the Regional Training Centre for the Asia
Pacific region.

The present role of the Naval Hydrographic School is:

(a) To train Indian Naval officers and sailors in the field of

Hydrography and allied instrumentation.

(b) To conduct courses for Civilian Hydrographic personnel from

ports and other Central Marine Agencies.

(c) As the Regional Hydrographic Training Centre, to conduct

courses for civilian and service personnel of South East Asian
countries.

In 1997, the Naval Hydrographic Office and the Naval Hydrographic

School were re-designated as the National Hydrographic Office and
National Hydrographic School.

CHAPTER 25

NAVAL SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO 1965

 In 1949, the Government invited Dr JE Keyston of the British Royal
Naval Scientific Service to advise on the establishment of a scientific
organisation to assist the Navy. In his report on "The Requirements of the
Indian Navy for Scientific Assistance", he recommended the setting of an
Underwater Science Establishment and a Dockyard Laboratory. He also
recommended the immediate appointment of a Chief Scientific Officer at
Naval Headquarters. The Government accepted these recommendations

The services were obtained on loan for a period of two years of Dr GE

Gale, a Principal Chief Scientific Officer of the Royal Naval Scientific
Service. He took over as Scientific Adviser (Navy) in March 1951. Ex
officio, he was also the Chief Scientific Officer (Navy) in the Defence
Science Organisation of the Ministry of Defence. Three major thrust area
were identified: the INPL, the NCML and the indigeneous production and
inspection of Naval Stores. Both laboratories were to function directly
under the Naval Research Cell in Naval Headquarters. An Indian scientist
was appointed to work alongside Dr Gale and take over from him when he
left.

The INPL

A Physical laboratory was set up on Willingdon Island in Cochin to deal

with the scientific aspect of undersea warfare including submarine
detection, minesweeping, degaussing and harbour defence. The first
priority was to be given to work on degaussing, ship noise and magnetic
sweeping, development of detector loops, study of thermoclines
(bathythermograph data), underwater acoustics, indigeneous production
of sonar oscillators and fire control equipment. Oceanographical
investigations were also planned.

In March 1952, the Indian Naval Physical Laboratory(INPL) was

established in the wartime barracks of one of the Training Schools of INS
Venduruthy in Cochin.

The NCML

The Naval Chemical and Metallurgical Laboratory was established in

Bombay Dockyard. The laboratory was intended to undertake R & D work
related to all materials used in the Navy, other than explosive or
foodstuff. The first priority was to be investigations in connection with
hull, non-ferrous and boiler corrosion, antifouling composition and
methods of hull protection. In due course, the laboratory would be
equipped to carry out the mechanical testing of metals, gamma
radiography and spectrographic analysis.

By end 1952, an old building in the Dockyard had been converted into a
laboratory and a large raft had been constructed to be moored in Bombay
Harbour for conducting experiments on anti-fouling and protective
compositions for underwater hulls.

The Scientific Aspects of the Indigeneous Production of Naval

Stores

The first priority was how to make the technical inspection of naval stores
more effective and how to attain industrial standardistation. The Scientific
Adviser (Navy) was the convenor of the Naval Stores Production
Committee at NHQ and his staff represented NHQ on nearly twenty
committees, sub committees and panels of the Indian Standards
Institution.

Inter-service activity was planned in the fields of:

(a) Radar Research : In due course, this culminated in the

establishment of the Electronics Research and Development
Establishment (LRDE) in Bangalore.

(b) Physiological Research : To clarify future lines of research, an

extensive study was carried out in 1952 of habitability conditions on
board naval ships, obtaining data on personnel working under heat
stress in boiler rooms and engine rooms, physiological stress
experienced by divers and the question of survival rations.

1952-1953

In their early years, both INPL and NCML functioned as in-house

laboratories for the Navy, solving day to day technical problems and
undertaking studies and investigations as required by the Navy. INPL was
controlled by the Commodore in Charge Cochin and obtained its funds
from the naval budget.

1954-1964

Between 1954 and 1964 there was considerable progress in the activities
of both the laboratories as well as productive interactions with the
National Laboratories.

The National Physical Laboratory helped in the development of barium

titanate for sonar transducers. The Institute of Science Bombay helped in
the work of fouling and marine borers. The Indian Institute of Science
Bangalore helped in setting an anechoic tank in Cochin.

During this period, responsibilities for the production and inspection of

stores, advice regarding materials for naval construction and matters
regarding Gunnery and TAS matters were transferred to new Directorates
established at NHQ. The Naval Applied Psychology Research Unit (NPRU)
was started at Cochin for job analysis and optimal categorisation of
seaman sailors.

Between 1954 and 1964, the INPL had:

(a) Developed a sonar range recorder, an electronic sea wave

recorder, minesweeper degaussing equipment, a portable
magnetometer for magnetic survey, a wave current meter for
measuring water currents, underwater sound transducers,
underwater sound telephony, mine firing circuits, tables for
calculating sonar ranges.

(b) Completed studies of fluctuation of underwater sound, collation

of bathythermograms and origin of micro-seisms, design of
hydrophones and active filters, linear arrays, directional sonobuoys.

(c) A scientist visited Singapore to study the Portable Degaussing

Range and observe the degaussing of several minesweepers.

Between 1954 and 1964, the NCML had:

(a) Developed catholic protection for ships hulls, anti fouling paint,
spectrographic analysis of contaminants in lubricants, solventless
epoxy coating for prevention of excessive corrosion taking place at
the stern areas of ships.

(b) Completed studies of marine fouling organisms in Bombay

Harbour, laboratory formulation of superior anti corrosive and anti
fouling paints, corrosion rates of metals and alloys in seawater in
Bombay and Cochin harbour, turbine lubricating oils.

The Scientific Adviser (Navy)'s Research Cell at NHQ was renamed as the
Office of Scientific Research and Development. Their theoretical studies
covered radar clutter, super refraction, diffraction of sound in underwater
shadow zones and inventory control problems.

In 1958, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)

was formed by amalgamating all laboratories and scientific establishments
working in the Defence Science Organisation. The two Naval Laboratories
were brought under DRDO.

By 1965, Naval R & D was being carried out in three basic fields:

(a) The Naval Research Cell of the Defence Science Laboratory in

Delhi, was involved in the theoretical study of radar clutter, super
refraction, theory of search etc.
 (b) The INPL Cochin was researching problems connected with
oceanography, micro-seisms, accoustics etc. Scientists from INPL
were participating in all oceanographic research cruises.

(c) The NCML Bombay was doing research on hull corrosion of

ships, doing structural examination of the Dockyard's steel castings
and investigating fatigue failures of ships machinery.

HIGHLIGHTS OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 1965 TO 1975

THE INPL/NPOL

In 1969, the INPL's name was changed to Naval Physical and

Oceanography Laboratory, NPOL. Its main functions were :-

(a) R & D in the fields of Physics and Oceanography, with special

reference to underwater detection and underwater weapons.

(b) To carry out modifications to naval equipment to suit local

conditions and to establish their indigenous manufacture.

By 1973, the NPOL's charter of duties had expanded to:-

(a) Development of underwater submarine detection systems like

sonar, sonobuoys, explosive echo ranging, etc.

(b) Underwater torpedo decoys

(c) Development of anti submarine training aids and simulators.

(d) Oceanographic studies and design and development of

oceanographic equipment.

(e) Underwater accoustic propagation studies.

(f) Scientific support to ships and establishments at Cochin.

The NPOL's achievements from 1965 to 1975 were as follows:-

(a) Development of a passive non-directional sonobuoy, a prototype

transmitter pressure transducer for pressure mines, diver held
sonar for detection of metal objects submerged in mud, corner
reflectors for use with towed targets for surface gunnery firings,
injectors of echoes similar to a submarine in ship borne sonar
systems, modified search plans for use against submarines, proton
 precession magnetometers to measure magnetic anomaly,
pneumatic and electronic wave recorders for collecting wave and
swell data in coastal areas.

(b) Studies on ASW aircraft and submarine force for specific tasks,
task forces for anti smuggling measures, escort forces for protection
of convoys.

THE NCML

The NCML's main functions became:-

(a) R & D in the fields of marine corrosion, marine paints, marine

biology and metallurgy.

(b) To investigate service failure of equipment and stores on board

ships and suggest remedial measures.

(c) To conduct acceptance testing of underwater ship bottom

compositions, metals, alloys, fuels, lubricants and general chemicals
and assist in their indigenous development.

(d) To provide scientific support to the Naval Dockyard and the

Fleet.

The NCML's main achievements from 1965 to 1975 were as follows:-

Development of shop primer for ship plates, compositions for

internal cleaning of boilers, anti-skid paint for VIKRANT's flight
deck, vinyl based underwater paints to replace conventional paints
so as to increase the period between dockings.

NSTL

In 1968, it became clear to the Navy and to the DRDO that NPOL and
NCML could not meet the Navy's entire requirements and that there was
need to create a third major laboratory at Visakhapatnam called the Naval
Science and Technology Laboratory, NSTL. Government sanction issued in
Feb 69.

NSTL came into existence on 20 Aug 1969 and initially started functioning
in the POL Lubricants store of the Naval Dockyard. In September 1969, it
shifted into a two room war barrack at Andhra University.

The R & D mandate assigned to the Laboratory at the time of its creation
was:
 (a) Underwater detection equipment (including equipment/sets
deployed both for detection and attack), mines, torpedoes and
other ship/submarine based under water weapons, counter
measures against all types of underwater attack including those
against magnetic, accoustic and pressure type of mines.

(b) Marine biology, stores, materials and alloys for marine use,
corrosion and associated problems.

(c) Marine and electrical engineering problems pertaining to the

Navy, studies on Hydrodynamics and Hydroballistics, cavitation etc
with a view to aid the design of ships, submarines, propellors,
hydrofoil boats, underwater missiles etc.

(d) Other important R & D work of particular interest to Navy.

In order to carry out work in the above fields, the Laboratory was
originally organised into three divisions : Underwater Weapons, Materials
and Marine Biology, and Engineering.

Establishing Equivalents for Russian Oils and Lubricants

The one year guarantee clause for the Russian acquisitions was valid
subject to the stipulation that only specified oils and lubricants should
have been used. After the Russian ships and submarines started arriving
from 1968 onwards, it became increasingly clear that:

(a) Perpetual dependance on Russian oils and lubricants was

impractical.

(b) Indigenous equivalents needed to be identified and validated by

the Russian side for safe exploitation under Indian tropical
conditions.

NSTL's priority task from 1969 onwards became the identification of

international/Indian equivalents for Russian oils and lubricants.

Initial R & D Studies:

R & D work also started in the following areas:

(a) Material science and marine biology studies with emphasis

on corrosion studies, industrial pollutants and their effect on
underwater corrosion, chemical cleaning of exhaust systems
and toxic gases in submarines and their elimination.

(b) Studies on the natural deterioration of timber in sea

water, rearing of barnacles, toxicants and their inhibition on
 marine growth and development of dual purpose systems for
inhibition of corrosion and fouling.

In 1972, the initial charter of duties was modified:

(a) Underwater detection studies were deleted since these were

already being carried out by NPOL.

(b) The Material and Marine Biology division was shifted to the
NCML, Bombay. However, in view of the importance of establishing
indigenous equivalents for Russian the oils and lubricants, a full
fledged laboratory was established under the direct control of the
Naval Dockyard at Visakhapatnam. In subsequent years, this
laboratory grew into a laboratory of repute and met the Navy's
requirements in the field of material sciences and studies on
vibration in ships etc.

In 1973, the NSTL's charter was revised again and became:-

(a) Underwater weapons

(b) Underwater test ranges

(c) Noise and vibration studies

(d) Studies on underwater explosion

(e) Electrical and mechanical machinery

(f) Other major R & D problems pertaining to the Navy. The

Laboratory was equipped with facilities for evaluation of data
required for warship design, hydro dynamic and hydro ballistic
studies and hydrofoils.

(g) Study on performance of wear of marine propulsion engines

under fuels and lubricants of different specifications.

(h) Scientific support to the Eastern Naval Command.

The major studies carried out by the NSTL between 1969 and 1975 were
as follows:-

NOISE RANGING AND SELF NOISE MEASUREMENT STUDIES

The need had increasingly been felt to undertake noise ranging of the
newly inducted ships and submarines. The aim was to measure their
underwater radiated noise, pinpoint the sources of this noise and reduce
the level so as to minimise the probability of their detection by enemy
sonars. Likewise, the self noise level of vessels also needed to be
measured and reduced so as to enhance the performance of own sonars.
Since no facilities existed in the country for noise ranging and self-noise
measurements, NSTL took up a project in 1970 to design and develop the
instrumentation system to carry out noise measurements and analyse the
self noise of ships.

Noise ranging, self-noise measurements and airborne noise

measurements were carried out on the Petyas, the Leanders and the
earlier Brahmaputra class frigates:

(a) The airborne noise measurements gave an indication of the

habitability conditions in ships compartments and accordingly,
noise-dosage recommendations were given.

(b) The radiated noise and self noise measurements were recorded
and analysed and recommendations made to improve maintenance
routines and machinery operating regimes and to adopt noise
reduction techniques.

(c) Performance evaluations were undertaken of noise reduction

systems like the Leander's Agouti system and the Brahmaputra
Class controlled Pitch Propellors(CPP).

(d) A committee was appointed to recommend the site for a

permanent noise range.

VIBRATION MEASUREMENTS OF MACHINERY ON BOARD SHIPS

The vibration signatures of Petyas and Leanders were measured. Analysis

of these measurements enabled:

(a) Preparation of a data bank of base-line vibration signatures.

(b) Formulation of criteria for acceptance of machinery on new

construction ships.

(c) Life extensions for main propulsion gas turbines.

(d) Fault diagnosis on machinery having specific problems.

(e) Recording on the shop floor of base-line levels of new

machinery.
 (f) Initiation of techniques for condition monitoring of machinery.

These studies helped not only to pin-point faults but also to assess the
health of machinery and thereby forestall failures. This project became a
fore-runner to later vibration measurement studies.

DEGAUSSING RANGE FOR MINE SWEEPERS

All the instrumentation and structural frame-work for the minesweeper

degaussing range was designed and developed indigenously. The range
was installed off Middle Ground at Bombay and a trial ship, INS
KAKINADA, was ranged. However, due to ocean engineering problems
and shortcomings in underwater cable technology, the structure of the
range got damaged and water ingressed into the cable connections. The
project yielded important lessons for the setting up of future DG ranges
and the DG ranging of ships.

UNDERWATER SHOCK STUDIES

The protection of the hulls of own ships and submarines against enemy
underwater weapons and the effectiveness of own underwater weapons
against the hulls of enemy ships and submarines require knowledge of
underwater explosions and their damage potential. Being sensitive and
classified, no data was available. NSTL took up this study in 1972.

The laboratory study established the experimental facilities to create

scaled explosions, the instrumentation to record and analyse shock data
and understand the damage likely to be caused to hulls, machinery and
equipment by underwater shock propagation. This study laid the
foundation for establishing the extensive facilities for subsequent studies.

IMPROVEMENTS TO TORPEDOES

In the early 1970's, neither expertise nor infrastructure was available

either to redesign or develop torpedoes. NSTL concentrated therefore on
improving the capability of the existing British MK 44 and Russian
torpedoes.

Initial effort focussed on developing the instrumentation for testing critical

parameters. To test the external pressure, NSTL fabricated an autoclave
chamber to test sub-systems/shells upto 60 kg/cm sq.

Projects successfully completed included:

(a) Increasing torpedo range by introducing additional bottles.

(b) Substituting an oil hydraulic system in place of the pneumatic

system.
 (c) the development of indigenous torpedo batteries. To test these
indigenous batteries, a Drag Disc test facility was set up to test a
torpedo in the static condition. This facility proved invaluable for
testing batteries and contra-rotating motors.

A breakthrough was achieved by successfully instrumenting a torpedo for

evaluating the torpedo decoy developed by the NPOL, Cochin. The towed
decoy was a "Controllable Noise Maker"(CNM). To determine its
effectiveness to seduce a torpedo, it was necessary to record the
torpedo's underwater track. NSTL scientists designed a digital recorder
which optically picked off the track information from the torpedo's course-
keeping gyro, converting it into digital data and recording it on a tape
recorder. The data, when played back, enabled a complete evaluation, not
only of the torpedo but also of the CNM. With this track recorder, it
became possible to understand all aspects of torpedo dynamics and the
performance parameters of torpedo sub-systems.

This marked the beginning of a multipronged-multidisciplinary approach.

Artificial targets were successfully developed to evaluate torpedo firing
practices.

What started in 1973 as a project to develop a simple track recorder for

recording a torpedo's track eventually enabled scientists to confidently
take up projects to enhance the capability of torpedoes in naval
inventory.

GENERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

In 1969, the Director of Scientific Research (Navy) was redesignated as

the Scientific Adviser to the CNS. The technical and administrative control
of NPOL and NCML was transferred to the newly appointed Director of
Naval Science and Technology, DNST, in DRDO.

With the creation of DRDO in 1958, the interaction with other laboratories
synergised and several projects were successfully completed.

Year Project
(a) Development of Day and Night Distress
1968
Signal.
(b) Development of 6 inch gun shells for practice
firing, which on explosion threw up coloured
splashes.
(c) Maintenance particulars for Russian
armaments.
(d) Development of reduced charge propellant for
 4 inch guns.
(a) Temperature indicating lacquer to avoid "cook
1969
off" in rapid fire Russian guns
(b) Techniques for reconditioning radio proximity
(VT) fuzes held in stock thereby extending the
service life of large quantities of these expensive
fuzes.
(c) Modification of a proof cradle for fitting a
4.5" gun in a 4.7" gun mounting for use at the
new VT fuze range at Balasore, thereby avoiding
the import of a complete 4.5" gun and mounting.
(d) Engineer-in-Chief's branch. Design and
construction of a VT fuze range at Balasore with
the assistance of DRDO laboratories.
(e) Design and development of a naval VT fuze in
coordination with DRDO Laboratories.
(a) Design and production of Russian 76.2 mm
1970
ammunition.
(b) Design and production Russian anti submarine
rockets.
(c) Design of chaff rockets and their launchers
(d) Design of radio proximity VT fuzes for anti
aircraft gun ammunition
(e) Design of accoustic proximity fuzes for anti
submarine rockets.
(a) Improved antenna design to provide high
1973
radiation effi.lm6 efficiency.
(b) Improved amplifiers to increase the range
performance of radars.
(c) A coal-tar epoxy composition as protective
coating for bilges of ships.
(d) Rigid PVC piping for sea-water on board ships
was found to withstand mechanical deformation,
degradation and thermal shocks within limits. The
piping was recommended for use in small craft.
(e) Indigenously developed anodes for cathodic
protection to ships and submerged structures were
found to give protection for a longer period than
the imported zinc anodes.
(a) Anti-cockroach lacquers/paints for use against
cock.lm6 roaches in galleys, pantries and living
1974 spaces on board ships. User trials indicated that
these lacquers/paints were very effective against
cockroaches for six months.
 (b) NCML developed a shop primer for application
on the steel plates used for construction of ships.
The composition gave satisfactory performance on
ship hulls.
(c) Aeromedical Cell, Bangalore developed:
(i) A light weight stretcher which could be
installed in all types of aircraft, helicopters
and motor ambulances.
(ii) Protective helmets donned by aircrew for
protection against shock and penetration
during aircraft accidents.
(a) The Defence Food Research Laboratory,
1975
Mysore developed.
(i) An indigenous container for Accelerated
Freeze Dried Meat, which gave a shelf life of
9 months.
(ii) An automatic chapati making machine
which rolled out fully baked chapaties at the
rate of 20 per minute. The machine
consisted of two units, one for dough making
and kneading and the other for rolling,
baking and puffing.
(b) The NCML Bombay developed.
(i) Paints based on sodium silicate which
used water as solvent and did not create fire
hazards. These paints replaced the epoxy
based compositions being used by ships for
the painting fuel tanks. (ii) Aluminium alloy
anodes based on indigenous high purity
aluminium. These anodes, in various
designs, were fitted in ships for cathodic
protection. Cathodic protection to ships and
submerged structures in the Navy brought
about an annual saving of Rs 25 lacs.
(iii) A solventless epoxy compound for
protection of piling and off-shore
structures. The coating dried quickly and
was found to withstand the most rigorous
conditions of splash and adhere firmly on
wet surfaces.
(c) The Textile and Stores Research and
Development Establishment, Kanpur developed
waterproof smocks and trousers from indigenous
materials. These were found suitable on board
submarines.
 (d) The Defence Institute of Fire Research, New
Delhi, developed indigenous foam liquid to replace
the imported foam liquid. It was successfully tried
out in a submarine.
(e) The Research and Development Establishment
(Engineers), Pune, designed a single-compartment
surface-type recompression chamber for divers.
The chamber could accommodate 8 men at a time
and had a working pressure upto 100 psi.

1975

By 1975, NHQ had formulated its long term requirements in the form of a
Missile Plan, a Radar Plan, a Sonar Plan, and an EW Plan to enable these
to be dovetailed wherever possible with the long term plans of the other
services.

The ASW computer for the 5th and 6th Leanders and the development of
on-board simulators were entrusted to the Department of Electronics.

By end 1975:

(a) Indigenous Sonobuoys, sonic ray plotters and expendable bathy

theirographs (XBTs) were entering service.

(b) Trials of controllable noisemaker torpedo decoys and the

modified Sonar 170 were in progress.

PROJECTS STARTED IN 1965-75 BUT COMPLETED AFTER 1975

Operational Projects StartedCompleted

Indigenous Expendable Bathy
1971 1977
Thermographs (XBT)
Diver Held Sonar 1965 1976
Towed Torpedo Decoy
1965 1977
Controllable Noise Maker
Sonic Ray Plotter 1969 1976
Medium Range Sonar for Frigates 1974 1977
Pilot Production of Sonobuoys 1967 1977
Support for Naval Operations:
DG Range for Minesweepers 1968 1977
High Pressure Underwater Testing
1969 1977
Equipment
Repair and Calibration of
1970 1976
Magnetostrictive Transducers
Training Project

Echo Injector Procedure Teacher 1967 1976

Submarine Echo Classifier 1967 1976
Electronic Uniselector of ASTT
1970 1976
Radar PPI Display
Ocean Studies
Reverberation and Propagation
1972 1984
studies

OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH

1953

Oceanographic research commenced in 1953 by :-

(a) Systematising the accumulation of bathythermograph data

(b) Survey ship INVESTIGATOR taking samples at depths as

far down as 1000 fathoms.

(c) Naval ships taking naval scientific personnel and Andhra

University personnel and students to sea on a number of
oceanographical cruises.

In 1960, the flag ship of Soviet Oceanographic Research, the VITIAZ,

visited Cochin. INPL scientists visited the ships' 13 laboratories and one
scientist participated in an oceanographic cruise.

1962
International Indian Ocean Expedition

In recognition of the importance of Oceanographic Research in the Indian

Ocean, it was decided that the Indian Navy will take part as a major
participant in the International Oceanographic Expedition in Indian Ocean
scheduled for 1962-64.

The main tasks allocated to India within the framework of this expedition
were:

(a) Participation by INS KISTNA, a frigate specially fitted for

Oceanic Research to the extent of 6 months in each year in 1962
and 1963.

(b) Provide assistance for radio communication to the vessels taking

part in this expedition in the Indian Ocean Area.

(c) Provide assistance with shore facilities to oceanographic vessels

within Indian ports.

(d) Provide facilities in Naval Laboratories at Bombay and Cochin.

(e) Make available Naval Scientists for participation in research

work both ashore and afloat.

(f) Provide assistance for the training of scientists as required for

the expedition.

Indian responsibilities within the overall framework lay in the waters near
the coast of India, both East and West, and intensive investigations on
the continental shelf and super-jacent waters. The maximum limits of the
area of Indian responsibility were the Arabian Sea above the Equator with
6 degrees longitude as the western boundary and the Sumatra Coast
along with the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as the eastern boundary.
Some cruises were made to south of the Equator up to 12 degrees south.
Similarly, cruises were undertaken to the east coast of Africa where
important oceanic currents originate and which have a bearing on the
coastal circulation on the northwest coast of India.

The Indian programme included observations and calculations of energy

flux between the ocean and the atmosphere. Studies were also to be
made of sun, sky and atmospheric radiations; air pressure, temperature
and humidity at deck level; surface temperature of the sun; near surface
current; waves; swells; tide; rainfall; evaporation profiles of wet and dry
bulbs and wind above sea surface.

India was represented in the expedition by four vessels:

 (a) INS KISTNA. The ship was fitted out with the requisite scientific
instruments and equipment to cope with the requirements of the
various tasks allocated to India.

(b) RV VARUNA. She was the survey vessel of the Indo-Norwegian

Fisheries Project, Kerala.

(c) Bangada. She was a fisheries vessel.

(d) Conch. She was a research vessel of the Kerala University.

A total of 20 ships from the following countries participated in the

expedition:

Australia, France, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Norway, Portugal,

Pakistan, South Africa, Britain, Russia, Zanzibar and West Germany. The
USA and Russia between them had the largest contingents of ships.

From these cruises, the Navy hoped to obtain:

(a) Up to date seasonal sonar charts of our seas.

(b) Data on sea/swell in the open ocean.

(c) Bottom contour charts of the ocean for submarine navigation.

In the 1962 cruise, valuable data was collected relating to the

propagation of sound through sea water, measurement of tides, waves
and currents, the morphology of the sea bed etc.

1963

KISTNA, commenced study cruises in accordance with the programme for

the International Indian Ocean Expedition. Eleven cruises covering 251
stations were completed and oceanographic data collected at various
depths.

1964

KISTNA participated in six oceanographic cruises. Ten submarine canyons

were located on the east coast of India.

1965

KISTNA participated in six cruises for collecting hydrographic and

bathymetric data. In 2 cruises, she collaborated with the German
Research Vessel METEOR in seismic refraction experiments in the Gulfs of
Cambay and Kutch.
 1966

In 1966, the oceanographic data collected during the 1965 expedition was
compiled. The data from the seismic surveys carried out by KISTNA and
METEOR was processed.

The National Institute of Oceanography was established in 1966.

1972

A committee under the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister

recommended the formation of a national body for oceanography.
Thereafter the Department of Science and Technology was to prepare a
paper for Cabinet approval. It took several years to sort out the details.
Their proposal for the formation of an Ocean Science and Technology
Agency eventually ended up being the present Department of Ocean
Development in 1981.

1973

MONEX 73. In collaboration with Russia, the India Meteorological

Department organised Monsoon Experiment 1973.

OCEANOGRAPHIC EXPEDITION DEC 73

A major step taken for the exploitation of the country's resources in the
continental shelf was the commencement of the multi disciplinary
Oceanographic Expedition in Dec 73. The institutions which took part in
the expedition were:

(a) National Geophysical Research Institute, Hyderabad.

(b) National Institute of Oceanography, Panaji.

(c) Zoological Survey of India, Calcutta.

(d) Geological Survey of India, Calcutta.

(e) Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Dehradun.

(f) Indian Meteorological Department, New Delhi.

(g) Atomic Energy Department, New Delhi.

(h) Gujarat Fisheries Department, Ahmedabad.

Naval Oceanographic Programme

Between Oct 73 and Jun 74, Survey Ship DARSHAK undertook an
extensive oceanographic expedition from Goa to the Gulf of Oman,
covering a coastal belt up to a distance of 200 miles offshore. Several
hundred bethythermograph observations were obtained on a 15 mile grid
supported by temperature, salinity and depth probes as well as reversing
water bottle observations of the entire water column. This enabled
construction of the sound velocity structure model of this area and
provided basic data for planning future time-series studies of selected
stations essential for the purposes of predicting the behaviour pattern of
thermal layers.

Indian Ocean data received from the National Oceanographic Data Centre,
Washington, as well as data held by the NIO, supplemented the Naval
Oceanographic Programme. The data collected was processed by the
Environmental Data Processing and Forecasting Cell in the Hydrographic
Office at Dehradun and became available in 1975.

Oceanographic Equipment for Survey Ships

Naval Headquarters proposed to the Government the provision of

oceanographic equipment for the two existing survey ships. This would
help them in carrying out bathymetric, geological and geophysical
surveys, measurement of ocean currents, the compilation of temperature,
salinity and meteorological data, and a limited study of marine biology, all
of which had deep operational implications.

1975

Oceanographic Forecasting

In 1975, Oceanographic forecasting was made the responsibility of the

Meteorological officers in the Navy. To begin with, one meteorological
officer was trained in th the basic principles of oceanographic forecasting
and data processing.

CHAPTER 26

THE INDIGENISATION OF NAVAL STORES AND EQUIPMENT

EVOLUTION OF DQA(N) AND DQA (WP)

At the time of Independence in 1947, all ships of the Indian Navy were
of British origin. Almost all the machinery, equipment, spares and even
common user stores were imported from Britain. Meanwhile, after the
Second World War, the workload of the Indian Ordnance Factories had
reduced drastically and they had substantial idle capacity.

In 1953, a small cell was created under the then Captain Superintendent
Naval Dockyard (Bombay) to identify the items which could be produced
in the Ordnance Factories or by Indian industry.

In 1955, to boost the indigenisation effort, an independent Directorate of

Stores Production (DSP) was created, with cells at Bombay and Calcutta.
The DSP functioned under NHQ.

In 1959, the administrative control of the DSP was passed to the

Controller General of Defence Production (CGDP).

After China's attack in 1962, a Department of Defence Production &

Supplies was created in the Ministry of Defence. The CGDP's functions
were divided between the Director General of Inspection (DGI), the
Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the
Ordnance Factories. The DSP was placed under the DGI.

In 1964, the DSP was redesignated as Directorate of Development &

Inspection, Marine Stores (DDI(MS)). In addition to indigenisation, its role
was expanded to include:-

(a) Authority Holding Sealed Particulars (AHSP) activities,

(b) Vetting of Annual Review Demands (ARDs) and

(c) Inspection of indigenised stores.

Prior to this, the inspection of indigenous stores was being done by the
Surveyor of Stores under the Commodore Superintendent, Naval
Dockyard, Bombay.

The indigenisation of equipment and stores received a major impetus

when, along with the decision to build Leander class frigates in Mazagon
Docks, the decision was also taken to progressively indigenise all
equipment to be fitted in the frigates. This rapidly increased the
indigenisation workload and led to the creation of a separate Directorate
for the indigenisation and inspection of equipment for warship production.
In 1968, the DDI(MS) was bifurcated into:

(a) Directorate of Production and Inspection, Navy (DPI(N)) - for

existing ships

(b) Directorate of Warship Production(DWP) - for new construction

ships.
It soon became evident that these two Directorates were handling similar
items, resulting in duplication of effort. In 1975, it was decided to
reorganise the DWP and DPI(N) into the Engineering and Electrical
disciplines. During the first phase of this reorganisation, only Western
origin equipment was taken up and the role of the two directorates was
redefined as follows:

DWP - To deal with Marine Engineering and Hull equipment, including

associated electrical machinery

DPI(N) - To deal with Electrical/Electronic/Weapon equipment, their

spares and Naval Stores:

(a) The indigenisation of Russian origin equipment was bifurcated

on the above lines.

(b) The inspection establishments were similarly repositioned under

DWP and DPI(N).

(c) It was intended to place DWP and DPI(N) under one head, the
Addl DGI (Navy) and rationalise the field units.

This could not however be implemented.

In 1987, the DGI was redesignated as the Director General Quality

Assurance (DGQA). The DPI(N) and DWP were redesignated as
Directorate of Quality Assurance (Naval) DQA(N), and Directorate of
Quality Assurance (Warship Production) DQA(WP), respectively, under the
Ministry of Defence.

CHAPTER 27

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA AND INDIAN MARITIME

LEGISLATION

DEVELOPMENTS TILL 1965

Over the centuries the international law of the sea had come to be based
on the basic principle of "freedom of the seas". Beyond the narrow coastal
strip of territorial waters, the seas could be freely used by all nations for
fishing and for navigation. Coastal states used to be content with
exclusive rights in their narrow belt of territorial waters.
The discovery of petroleum and natural gas in the shallow waters of the
continental shelf led the United States to issue the Truman Proclamation
in 1945, which claimed sovereign rights over the resources of the
continental shelf adjacent to its coast. Around the same time, coastal
states found that the fishing areas near their coasts were being poached
by larger and better equipped fishing ships of distant foreign states. Both
these developments, combined with the emergence of newly independent
states after the decolonisation of Asia and Africe, led to a spate of
unilateral claims by the coastal states to extend national jurisdiction over
large adjacent sea areas to protect their fishery resources.

On attaining independence in 1947, India had been content to proclaim

the traditional territorial sea of three miles. In view of the above
developments, India issued four presidential notifications to safeguard its
interests:

(a) On 30 August 1955, India claimed full and exclusive sovereign

rights over the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf adjoining
the coast but beyond territorial waters. Neither the depth nor the
distance from the coastline was indicated.

(b) On 22 March 1956, India claimed Territorial Waters of six miles

from appropriate baselines.

(c) On 29 November 1956, India claimed a Conservation Zone for

fisheries up to a distance of one hundered miles from the outer limit
of territorial waters.

(d) On 3 December 1956, India claimed a Contiguous Zone.

<

Several other developments were also taking place. The USA and the
Soviet Union were unable to agree on the width of territorial waters - the
Soviet Union wanted twelve miles whilst the USA wanted only three miles.
Technological developments in the industrialised West began to make it
possible to extract oil and gas from the seabed. The newly independent
nations of Asia and Africa began to feel that the International Law of the
Sea would be exploited to their disadvantage. To sort out all these
matters, the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS-1) was convened in 1958.

UNCLOS 1 - 1958

UNCLOS 1 was able to codify the traditional law. It adopted what came to
be known as the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea. The four
Conventions were:-
 - the freedom of the seas as long conveived.

- the sovereignty of coastal states in the territorial sea.

- the ancillary physical, custons, sanitary and immigration rights of

coastal states in a Contiguous Zone.

The acceptance by UNCLOS 1 of the Continental Shelf convention enabled

the countries bordering the North Sea to divide the sea area for extracting
oil and gas.

The UNCLOS 1 participants remained divided on several issues:

- The rights of coalitions of coastal states, land locked states and

archipelagic states.

- Certain states contested the rights of passage through straits used

for international navigation like the Straits of Gibraltar, Hormuz and
Malacca.

- Land based mineral producers tried to carve out for themselves as

much as they could of the newly found seabed mineral resources.

UNCLOS 1 completely failed to agree on:-

- The precise width of the Territorial Sea (three miles or twelve

miles) and the extent of the Exclusive Fisheries Zone.

- The prior authorisation and/or notification of the passage of

foreign warships through the territorial sea of a coastal state.

The Second Conference, UNCLOS 2, was therefore convened in 1960 to

resolve these issues.

UNCLOS 2 - 1960.

UNCLOS-2 attempted to extend the jurisdiction of coastal states over

territorial waters to six miles, with an additional six miles as an Exclusive
Fishing Zone. This failed to gain the required two thirds majority for its
acceptance.

After UNCLOS 2 failed to achieve agreement on the width of the territorial

sea, many countries unilaterally extended their offshore jurisdiction. The
South American countries reaffirmed their earlier claim of their territorial
waters extending two hundred miles from the coast. African states like
Nigeria, Congo, Mauritus and Ghana also extended their territorial sea to
distances much beyond 12 miles.
Passage of Warships Through the Territorial Sea.

At UNCLOS 1, India has proposed that the passage of foreign warships

through the territorial sea of a coastal state should be subject to prior
authoritisation and notification to the coastal state. As this requirement
was not accepted and therefore not included in the 1958 conventions on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, India declined to retify all
four Geneva Conventions. In subsequent years, India resiled from this
position. As a growing maritime nation interested in the freedom of
navigation both for itself and the international community, India sought
only prior notification for the innocent passage of foreign warships
through territorial waters.

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1965

India's Extension of territorial Waters.

On 12 September, 1967, India extended its territorial waters to twelve

miles. This was largely a reaction to Pakistan's extension of her territorial
waters from three to twelve miles, rather than an act of maritime policy.

The Seabed Committee.

During the 1960s political, technological, exonomic and naval

developments began to change the situation. Advances in seabed
exploitation technology made it possible to exploit the seabed much
beyond a depth of two hundred metres, thereby rendering the 1958
Conventions outmoded. The deployment of submarine launched ballistic
missiles and worldwide apprehensions of a competitive scramble to
achieve predominant control over the seabed led the United Nations to
discuss the need to evolve means for the peaceful use of the oceans. In
1968, the UN General Assembly constituted a 42 member "Seabed
Committee" on the peaceful use of the seabed.

In December 1970, the General Assembly adopted the "Declaration of

Principles" governing the Seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof,
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The Declaration stated that
these areas and their resources are the common heritage of mankind and
shall be subject to an international regime as established by an
international treaty.

Seabed Mining.

India's interest in the mining of polymetalic nodules from the seabed

derived from its long term strategy for metals like nickel, cobalt, copper
and manganese. In the early 1970, the Indian Government had initiated a
programme of scientific investigation and evaluation of the manganese
nodule resources in the Indian Ocean.

Offshore Oil and Gas.

By the early 1970's, India had discovered oil and gas in Bombay High and
promising fields were being forecast in the Godavari, Krishna and Palk
Bay basins, as also gas in the Andaman Offshore.

With a view to establish and equitable international regime for the

exploitation of seabed resources, the UN General Assembly convened the
third conference, UNCLOS 3 in 1973.

UNCLOS 3 - 1973 TO 1982.

It took UNCLOS 3 nine years of discussions to adopt the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea on 30 April 1982. Thereafter this
convention took twelve years to formally come into force on 16 November
1984.

UNCLOS 3 aimed to define an agreed set of rules to govern the use of the
seas which would strike a fair balance between:

(a) those who considered that a coastal state should have no right
whatsoever over the living resources of the seas beyond a territorial
sea of twelve miles and

(b) others who maintained that a coastal state should have full or
limited sovereignty over the sea and its resources out to an
Exclusive Exonomic Zone of two hundred nautical miles.

The acceptance of this concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was
a landmark contribution of UNCLOS 3.

At UNCLOS 3, India's stand at was that as a developing country centrally

located in the Indian Ocean, with a coastline of over 64000 kilometers, its
basic national interests were:-

(a) To obtain assurance of smooth and free navigation though

traditionally used waters and straits used for international
nabigation.

(b) To achieve archipelagic status for the Andaman and Nicobar

island group and the Lakshadweep island group which between
them, comprised over 1280 islands and islets.
 (c) To protect essential strategic and security interests in the waters
around its coast.

(d) To secure the free mobility of naval war ships.

(e) To preserve the marine environment in the sea areas adjacent

to its coast, because the channels of navigation passed near its long
coastline.

(f) To regulate within its EEZ, the conduct of marine scientific

research by foreign research agencies.

India advocated from the baselines, a territorial sea of twelve miles, an

EEZ of two hundred miles and a continental shelf to the outer edge of the
geological continental margin. India also made specific proposals on the
requirement of prior notification for warships passing through the
territorial sea, enlargement of safety zones around offshore oil rigs,
designation of special areas for the protection of the resources located
therein (as for example the coral lagoons in the Lakshadweep where
tankers could run aground) and several other proposals.

The outcome of UNCLOS 3 - The 1982 Convention on the Law of

the Sea.

The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea met most of India's interests.
It adopted:

- Twelve miles as the uniform limit for the width of the territorial
sea.

- a two hundred miles EEZ, within which the coastal state exercises
sovereign rights and jurisdiction for certain specified economic
activities.

- a Continental Shelf extending to the outer edge of the continental

margin, to be delimited with reference to either three hundred and
fifty miles from the baselines of territorial waters or one hundred
miles from the 2500 - meter isobath.

- regimes for the abatement and control of marine pollution, for

marine scientific research, for the international seabed area and for
unimpeded transit passage through straits used for international
navigation.

- The 1982 Convention included India as one of the four states

named as "pioneer investor' for seabed mining. On 17 August 1987,
India became the first state to be so registered, after having fulfilled
the criteria stipulated in the Convention.
There were several areas where India's stand was not accepted. The
major ones were:

(a) Passage of Warships Through the Territorial Sea.

There was vehement opposition from the USA and the Soviet Union
to prior notification before warships transited through territorial
waters, on the grounds that it would seriously jeopardise their
strategic and security interests. There is therefore no provision in
the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea requiring prior
notification or authorisation for the passage of foreign warships
through the territorial waters of a coastal state. But by 1977,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Burma (Myanmar) had all
unilaterally promulgated that prior authorisation and notification
was required for the passage of foreign warships through their
respective territorial seas.

India's Maritime Zones Act 1976 also requires foreign warships to

give prior notification for passing through India's territorial waters
and enjoins all submarines and other underwater vehicles to
navigate on the surface and show their flag while passing through
these waters.

(b) Archipelagic Status for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

The Convention granted the status of an archipelago only to those

groups of islands that were political entities by themselves as for
example Indonesia, the Philippines and the Maldives. This was
because of fear of interference with the freedom of navigation
through archipelagic waters that might be created if the off-lying
islands of continental coastal states were to be granted archipelagic
status. For example, the distance between the Andaman group and
the Nicobar group of islands is 76 miles. If archipelagic status had
been granted to these groups of islands, India would have had full
regulatory control over the navigation of ships passing through the
Ten Degree Channel, which would then have been part of India's
archipelagic waters, and therefore subject to the restricted regimes
of archipelagic sealanes passage.

(c) Enlarged Safety Zones for Offshore Installations.

The UNCLOS 1 Continental Shelf Convention had provided for a

safety zone of 500 meters around artificial islands, installations or
structures on the continental shelf. India's view at UNCLOS 3 was
that this zone was inadequate, considering the time that a huge
supertanker takes to come to a stop. India therefore advocated
Enlarged Safely Zones. The suggestion did not receive adequate
support. A provision was howver incorporated in the 1982
 Convention that if authorised by generally accepted international
standards or as recommended by the competent international
organisation, then a coastal state may promulgate safely zones
larger then 500 metres.

India's Gains After the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea.

Apart from the benefits of an agreed Law of the Sea, India gained in
two significant areas:- (a) India's EEZ became the twelfth largest in
the world. The extension of the EEZ to 350 miles or 100 miles
beyond the 2500-metre isobath added 2 million square kilometers
to India's jurisdiction.

(b) Pursuant to the `pioneer investor' status, the International

Seabed Authority allotted to India a 150,000 square kilometer mine
site in the central Indian Ocean for the seabed mining of
polymetalic nodules. The richest area at this site has a density of 21
kilograms of nodules per square metre.

The Genesis of the Coast Guard.

While UNCLOS 3 was still in the early phase of discussing the EEZ and
well before India had enacted the Maritime Zones Act of 1976, discussions
had commenced in India on how the EEZ was going to be sageguarded. In
1974, Naval Headquarters had suggested to the Government to have an
armed force on the lines of the US Coast Guard and stressed the
importance of inter-ministerial coordination while selecting Coast Guard
vessels, recruiting experienced personnel, setting up communication
netweks, using naval repair facilities, indigenisation etc. Such integrated
Navy-Coast Guard development would avoid duplication and economise
effort.

On 25 August 1976 India passed the Maritime Zones Act which claimed a
12 mile territorial sea, a 24 mile contiguous zone, a 200 mile EEZ and a
continental shelf up to 200 miles or the outer edge of the continental
margin, whichever is greater.

Soon after this Act, a committee was set up to consider the type of force
that should be created to enforce compliance with its provisions. Three
options emerged:

(a) To entrust this responsibility to the marine wing of the Ministry

of Finance, which already had a number Cental Board of Revenue
(CBR) anti smuggling vessels. This option was not pursued as the
functions were too onerous.

(b) To set up a separate Coastal Command, as a part of the Navy,

to oversee these functions. This option was seriously considered
 since it would avoid the expenditure of raising and maintaining a
separate armed force. the Ministry of External Affairs however felt
that patrolling of the EEZ and protection of national assets was a
peace time role for which defence assets should not be used.

(c) To set up a separate armed force of the Union, along the lines of
the US Coast Guard. This option was finally chosen, as it avoided
the Navy being distracted from its primary role of preparing for
hostilities.

An interim Coast Guard was constituted on 1 February 1977, which

operated under the aegis of the Navy until 18 August 1978. A permanent
Coast Guard was constituted as an armed force of the Union on 19 August
1978. The Coast Guard Act 1978 requires the Coast Guard to:-

(a) Ensure the safety and protection of offshore terminals,

installations and other structures and devices.

(b) Provide protection to fishermen, including assisting them when

in distress at sea.

(c) Protect the marine environment by preventing and controlling

marine polution.

(d) Assist the customs in anti smuggling activities when patrolling

the seas beyond Indian customs waters.

(e) Enforce the Maritime Zones Act of 1976.

(f) Take measures for the safety of life and property at sea.

(g) Collect scientific data.

The Coast Guard thus became the principal agency for enforcing all
national legislation in the Maritime Zones of India, working in close liaison
with other Government authorities to avoid duplication of effort.

During hostilities, India's Coast Guard would function under the overall
operational command of the Navy as is done by other Coast Guards of the
world.

MARITIME BOUNDARIES
India has maritime boundaries with five opposite states (Sri Lanka, the
Maldives, Myanmar, Indonesia, Thiland) and two adjacent States
(Pakistan and Bangladesh).

Maritime boundary agreements were amicably concluded with:-

(a) Sri Lanka in 1974 and 1976.

(b) Indonesia in 1974.

(c) The Maldives in 1976.

(d) Thailand and Indonesia, on the trijunction point, in 1977.

(e) Myanmar in 1982.

Maritime boundary agreements with the adjacent states of Pakistan and

Bangladesh have yet to be concluded. Meetings have been held with
Bangladesh since 1976 and with Pakistan since 1986.

CHAPTER 28

UNIFIED CODE FOR THE THREE SERVICES

In November 1955, whilst the Navy Act was still under consideration,
the Government decided that after the passing of the Navy Act, the Army
and Air Force Acts should also be amended to:

(a) Achieve uniformity in punishments for similar offences in the

three services.

(b) Achieve uniformity in restrictions on fundamental rights and

(c) Conform to naval court martial procedure, under which an

acquittal by a court martial could not be set aside.

Difficulties were encountered in implementing uniformity of punishments

for similar offences under the three Acts. A Special Committee comprising
the Joint Secretaries of the Ministries of Defence and Law and the Judge
Advocates General of the three services was set up in Jun 1965 with the
following terms of reference:-
 (a) To study thoroughly the historical background of disciplinary
cases of the three services, the difficulties encountered, the codes
of other democratic developed countries, their experiences, etc.

(b) To draft a Unified Code in order to rationalise the three service

Acts, taking into consideration the developments in criminology and
penology and also the fact that members of the Armed Forces
would, in due course, come from more educated and politically
conscious classes.

To assist in drafting the unified code, a Sub Committee was set up,
consisting of the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy and Air
Force. The Sub Committee held 178 meetings and the Special Committee
held 35 meetings to consider various sections of the draft. In Feb 1970 a
draft Unified Code was finalised and sent to the Law Ministry for vetting.

In view of the divergence of opinion between the three services in respect

of certain controversial provisions of the draft Unified Code, the matter
was placed before the Chiefs of Staff Committee. An ad-hoc Armed Force
Unified Code Cell was established in 1972 to redraft the Code. The
redrafted Unified Code was completed by January 1978.

When this draft was considered by the three Service Headquarters, the
following criticisms were raised:-

(a) The Code was not really unified. It was more a compendium of
the existing service laws.

(b) The Code was not really progressive. The progressive features
of the Codes of other democratic countries did not find place in the
draft code.

(c) About 13 years had been taken in drafting the Code and a
further delay of of 8 to 10 years could be envisaged.

(d) The Code was more complicated than the existing Army, Navy
and Air Force Acts and may not be understandable by lay service
personnel for whom it was really meant.

(e) The revision of the existing Service Acts was being delayed on
account for the Code which was meant to replace the Acts.

After considering these aspects, it was recommended to the Chiefs of

Staff Committee that:-

(a) The three service Acts should be suitably amended so as to

make them as progressive and uniform as possible, considering the
Government directive of 1955.
 (b) The decision whether to progress the Draft Unified Code or
abandon it be considered after the work of modernising the three
service Acts had been completed.

The Chiefs of Staff agreed that the three service Acts and the statutory
rules should be amended before a decision was taken on the Draft Unified
Code.

CHAPTER 29

THE THIRD PAY COMMISSION

Introduction. Since the Army has been the largest service, the
remuneration structure of naval personnel has always been linked with
that of the Army. Army rank structure and conditions of service were
taken as the datum and Navy's differences in structure and service
conditions had to be reconciled thereafter.

When the Third Pay Commission was constituted in 1970, the

remuneration structure for naval personnel was the outcome of
successive reviews carried out by three Departmental Committees and
the earlier Pay Commissions. The framework evolved by these
committees, especially the earliest, largely remained intact. Some of the
concepts introduced then had almost become "fixations" and constrained
the approach of earlier Pay Commissions.

THE POST WAR PAY COMMITTEE OF 1946

The first attempt at rationalisation and simplification of the

remuneration structure was made by the Post War Committee in 1946. It
was given the mandate to produce pay scales related exclusively to Indian
conditions, to simplify the pay system and achieve the maximum degree
of harmony within each Service and between the three Services. The
Government also took a decision that "the future pays of the Armed
Forces should be linked with civil pays as determined following the report
of the First Central Pay Commission." Based on these parameters and
guided by the Post War Pay Code of the British Armed Forces, the Post
War Committee recommended a remuneration system based on the
following equations:-

(a) Service officers should broadly receive equal treatment with

police officers.
 (b) A fully trained infantry soldier with three years service was
equated with a semi-skilled worker who in turn was equated with an
Able Seaman of the Navy and the juniormost Leading Aircraftman of
the Air Force. Whilst fixing the pay however, a higher differential
was given to the Naval and Air Force equivalents due to the lack of
popularity of these two Services, their higher educational
qualification on entry and inherent hardships of life at sea in the
Navy.

Officers. The closest comparator to Defence Services officers was

identified as the Police for the simple reason that they both wore a
uniform. This relativity had no other logic, especially with regard to job
content. It continues till today, much to the detriment of the Service
officers pay scales. In establishing this relativity, the PWPC deliberated at
length as to what should be the linkage points. It was first agreed that
the end of the Lieutenant Commanders scale should not exceed the end
of the Senior Time Scale of the Police in which the SP was placed, thereby
establishing a linkage between the two. The next link in the Police then
was the DIG. The Service representatives sought a linkage of the DIG
with the naval rank of Commander. However, it was finally accepted that
the DIG should be placed between the naval ranks of Commander and
Captain. One of the factors in establishing this linkage was that the three
pillars of administration, namely the DIG of a Range, the Commissioner of
a Division and the Commander of a Military District (of the rank of
colonel) had near identical years of service, were of approximately the
same age and required to socially interact with each other. There should
therefore, be some relativity in their pay scales.

On the plea of 'all inclusive' pay and to achieve simplicity, almost all the
allowances of officers were withdrawn. No such withdrawal was effected,
however, for the Police and the Civil Services. The New Pay Code resulted
in considerable reduction in the then existing pay scales of naval officers.
Within a year of its implementation, the Government realised that there
were inequities and drawbacks in the New Pay Code and sanctioned
certain benefits in 1948 and 1950. In practice, the 'all inclusive' concept
of pay was found unworkable.

Sailors. The Navy had initially projected a two group structure for sailors
namely Artificers and Non-artificers. Amongst the Non-artificers it was
seen that in some trades like Writers, Electrical, Sick berth Assistant,
Stores Assistant and Communications sailors were matriculates. In 1946,
matriculation was a relatively high educational qualification, it needed to
be recognised in the pay structure and so a separate pay group was
created for matriculates, below the Artificer. The Navy therefore emerged
with a three group trade and pay structure as compared to the Army's
eight groups and the Air Force's five groups. Another feature recognised
by the Post War Pay Committee was the "All of a Company" concept. This
was unique to the Navy. It was accepted that since sailors served onboard
ships in close proximity with one another and were all combatants, there
should not be wide disparity in their pay scales. Accordingly the pay
scales of the non-matric 'C' Group merged with those of the matriculate
'B" Group from the rank of Petty Officer upwards.

In the case of sailors, their updated pay was depressed by 33 1/3 percent
on account of 'Home Saving Element' for concessions provided in kind.
Since certain allowances were admissible as percentage of pay, this
resulted in a double depression. However, an addition of Rs 5 was made,
which worked out to 12 1/2 percent, to compensate sailors for the
hazards and hardships of naval life.

While this amounted to a formal recognition of the need for such a

compensation, this rationale was not extended to cover all ranks. Thus,
officers received no consideration for the peculiar conditions of naval
service involving hazards, turbulence and prolonged separations from
family. This was possibly due to the perception at that time that in an
independent India the Armed Forces were somewhat of a luxury.

Admiral Soman recalls:

"In December 1946, I became Naval Member of the Services Pay

Commission in the rank of Acting Captain - the first Indian to have
reached that rank. I was 33 years old and had never before served
in the madhouse that was NHQ.

"The Government had directed and Naval Headquarters had

unprotestingly accepted that the Services pay scales be related to
the Police pay scales. I appended a dissenting note strongly
recommending that the equation be with the Indian Civil Service
scales of pay. I was roundly ticked off and informed that I was there
to represent NHQ's views not my own. I immediately asked to be
relieved of my job but nothing happened and my dissenting note
remained on file".

The Raghuramaiah and Kamath Committees

Consequent to the Second Pay Commission's Report in 1960, a

Departmental Committee, headed by Shri Raghuramaiah, examined the
pay and allowances of the Armed Forces. It stated that:-

"The Service representatives felt that pay scales approximating to

the scales prevalent on the civil side were preferable to the existing
pay structure, but that a revision would be such a complex and
 lengthy process that it was not practicable at the present juncture.
In view of these practical difficulties, we decided that the present
pay structure might be retained until such time as the Government
finds it convenient to carry out a detailed review".

Another Departmental Committee under Shri Kamath was set up in 1967

to examine the adequacy or otherwise of various allowances and
concessions. The recommendations made by this Committee resulted in
an increase in some allowances and concessions, but left the pay
structure intact.

Not having had the benefit of a review of their conditions of service and
pay scales, the Armed Forces emerged into the post second Pay
Commission scene with a mere arithmetical revision of their pay and
allowances. At this stage the Civil Services, especially the IAS and IPS,
initiated major changes in their cadre structure. A Selection Grade was
introduced in the IPS, between the SP and DIG. This grade was equated
to the naval rank of Commander and pressure built up for revision on the
DIG's pay scale. By 1969, the DIG had overtaken the naval rank of
Captain, and started drawing relativity with the ranks of Commodore and
Brigadier, thereby lowering the status and relativity of the Armed Service
Officer vis a vis the Police.

The Third Pay Commission

In April 1970, the Government announced the formation of the 3rd Pay
Commission and, for the first time, decided to entrust the task of
reviewing the pay and allowances of the Armed Forces to a Pay
Commission and not to a Departmental Committee. However, there was a
major difference between the terms of reference as applicable to the
Armed Forces and those applicable to civilians. In the case of the Armed
Forces, the Commission was not asked to make recommendations on the
conditions of service but take them as given. This difference was
prominently highlighted by the Commission in their report. Even on the
question of the presentation of the Services case,the Commission was
keen that the service personnel also should have the liberty to represent
their case directly before them like civilian employees. However, their
request to the Ministry of Defence to that effect was turned down on the
grounds that the requirement of Armed Forces discipline would not permit
such an approach. Thus the three Services could not explain their case
directly to the Pay Commission. As a result, many of the anomalies
injected by earlier Committees remained uncorrected.
In their approach to the formulation of Armed Forces pay, the Third Pay
Commission adopted the following broad principles for determining
remuneration:

(a) Implementation of the Post War Pay Committee's

recommendation that future pay should be linked with civil pay and
comparable to those of Class I Central Services and Indian Police
Service officers.

(b) An infantry soldier with three years service to be equated with a

worker classified as between semi-skilled and skilled.

(c) Regain the "all inclusive" character of military pay as

recommended by the Post War Pay Committee, which had got
diluted over a period of time by the grant by the Government of a
number of additional allowances.

(d) Any element of Service life which was a relatively constant

factor for the bulk of the service, should be compensated in the pay
itself. Allowances were only to be granted in such cases where the
conditions did not have uniform applicability, viz service in field
areas, at high altitude or at sea. Special allowances were also
recommended for the performance of hazardous duties.

Officers. The main thrust of the services was to seek parity in pay scales
with the IAS. The Third Pay Commission was of the view however that the
officer cadre of the Armed Forces was an omnibus group of individuals of
varying disciplines, status and job responsibilities. Whilst there would
certainly be some categories, though difficult to identify, who could claim
parity with the IAS, the 60,000 strong Armed Forces officercadre could at
best be compared with the Class I officers cadre which had a similar
disparate composition. Parity with IAS was therefore not accepted and the
existing relativities were retained.

Expert Cell. The Ministry of Defence created an Expert Cell comprising

the Chairmen of the three Services Pay Cells, a Joint Secretary and an
Additional Financial Adviser. The Expert Cell was mandated to scrutinise
the Memorandum of each Service and give their own views to the Pay
Commission. Unfortunately no agreement could be reached between the
Service Members on the one side and the Ministry of Defence on the
other. Eventually the Expert Committee Report was submitted only by the
Service Members. The impact of their report was lost and the Third Pay
Commission had to seek the views separately from the Ministry of
Defence.

Job Evaluation of Sailors. A comprehensive job evaluation was carried

out of the sailors cadre. The Pay Commission however did not accept their
recommendations on the grounds that the evaluation had not been done
by professional job evaluators. The sailors job description sheets
remained in the archives of Naval Headquarters and were eventually used
after the Fifth Pay Commission when at short notice, trade rationalisation
was required by the Ministry of Defence.

Sailors Trade Structure. The advent of the Air Arm led to the creation
of a separate pay group for aviation sailors on scales identical to their
counterparts in the Air Force. When the Submarine Arm was formed,
submarine sailors were also placed in this group. These measures were
ratified by the Third Pay Commission and this new "Special Group" was
placed between the Artificers Group and the Matric Group.

Compensation for 'X' Factor. In the British Armed Forces Pay

Structure, the 'X' factor compensated for the uniqueness and distinct
disadvantages of service life. Service Headquarters sought the extension
of the 'X' factor to the Indian Armed Forces. The Third Pay Commission
examined the advantages and disadvantages of Service life, considered
that the former outweighed the latter and concluded that there was no
justification for the 'X' factor. One of the advantages of naval life taken
into consideration was the opportunity for naval personnel to visit distant
foreign countries at Government expense.

Pension. The Third Pay Commission also equated military pension with
the civil pension. Eligibility for pension was related to the civil service
requirement of 33 years service. This was despite the fact that in the
Defence Services very few individuals could achieve so many years of
service. The earlier inbuilt monetary compensation for a truncated career
was dispensed with and in lieu a weightage in years of service was
introduced. These measures effectively neutralised the prevailing edge
that military pension had.

Commodore RC Bhatnagar who served in the Navy's Third Pay

Commission Cell and interacted with the Army and Air Force Pay Cells,
recalls:

"A very important rider that the Ministry of Defence put down
before agreeing to Service Headquarters making their projections to
the Pay Commission was that there would be a Ministry of Defence
Pay Cell. This cell would receive and examine the proposals of the
three Services Headquarters, vet them and project final coordinated
proposals to the Pay Commission. Thus we had another body to
examine our proposals before these were sent to the Pay
Commission in a consolidated form.

"We were formed as a "Pay Commission and Job Evaluations Cell"

and we took upon ourselves to carry out a total job evaluation of
every single trade at each sailor level that is as an Able Seaman, as
a Leading, as a Petty Officer and as a Chief Petty Officer. For each
level, we carried out an evaluation of the job content, that is the
training, work content and experience requirement of each
individual rate and trade. This was all recorded in a Job Evaluation
Report. Some of the officers of the Cell were sent to Bombay to the
Labour Institute to understand the civilian system of job-skill
corelation and on that basis we carried out job evaluation. The
Army and the Air Force also did the same exercise. This helped us
to project to the Pay Commission, the corelated job content of
every single rate in the Service including artificer sailors.

"This job evaluation exercise undertaken by us was somewhat on

the pattern of an exercise done by the British Armed Forces just a
few months earlier. Despite the fact that all the three British
services were using quite sophisticated equipment, their findings
were that Naval trades had a broader job content than their
counterparts in the other two Services. Thus the Royal Navy's
sailors were placed in three higher pay scales as against four scales
for Royal Army and Royal Air Force personnel. It was Naval
Headquarter's view at that time that we too should try to group our
trades likewise, as all sailors on board are actively involved in the
actual fighting of a ship vis-a-vis the many trades of the Army and
the Air Force. That was the basis of our projections.

"As regards officers, we found that the Pay Commission was

recommending a pay scale of an Indian Police Officer in his sixth
year of service which would be higher than what was being
recommended for a Captain in the Army having six years of service.
A very strong representation was made by Naval Headquarters and
the anomaly was rectified. A Captain of the Army and equivalents in
the Navy and the Air Force in their sixth year of service not only got
what the Police officer got, but also got 50 rupees more, which was
a part of Special Disturbance Allowance which the Pay Commission
had agreed to extend to Service officers.

"We had another peculiar situation. The rank of Captain in the Navy
spanned the ranks of Colonel and Brigadier in the Army and Group
Captain and Air Commodore in the Air Force. The problem was to
devise a pay scale which would cover these two Army scales of
Colonel and Brigadier. At one stage this was not readily accepted by
the Pay Commission nor by the other two Services and the Ministry
of Defence. However, we managed to convince not only the Ministry
of Defence but also the Ministry of Finance (Defence) and were able
to obtain approval for a combined scale for Captains in the Navy,
covering both the ranks of the other two Services".
 Developments After 1975.

The parameters under which the Third Pay Commission had structured
their recommendations envisaged that they would be valid for the next
ten years. The oil crisis of the mid seventies and the high inflation
thereafter neutralised these parameters. The Government therefore
introduced a series of adhoc measures. These did not alleviate matters
especially for officers. The economic position of officers worsened,
affecting morale and the quality of intake. By the late seventies, remedial
measures became essential. In 1982, the Chiefs of Staff Committee
forwarded to Government their paper on "Quality and Morale" whose
major recommendation was the extension of free rations to peace areas
for officers upto the naval rank of Captain. The Government was inclined
to grant this in cash. Admiral RL Periera, the Chairman COSC, was able to
persuade Government to sanction free rations in kind.

Re-mustering of Seaman and Engineering Mechanics. In 1977 the

Ministry of Defence accepted Naval Headquarters recommendation that to
keep abreast with the growth of technology in the Service, the
educational qualification of Seamen and Engineering Mechanics be raised
to matriculation. The Government not only approved this up gradation in
educational qualification, but also directed that they be paid metric rates
of pay. Seamen and Engineering Mechanics were remustered from Group
`C' to Group `B'. This linkage between pay scales and educational
qualification eventually became the keystone for the rationalisation of the
sailors trade and pay group structure after the Fifth Pay Commission.

Cadre Reviews. The Armed Services instituted two cadre reviews

between 1979 and 1982. These helped quicken promotions of officers and
sailors.

CHAPTER 30

THE NAVY'S EDUCATION BRANCH

THE EVOLUTION OF THE BRANCH

Developments Until 1965

The Boy Entry constituted the main intake into the sailor cadre of the
Royal Indian Navy (RIN). Since their educational standard was well short
of what the Navy required, boys were imparted educational training after
joining the Navy. Educational attainment was also a mandatory
prerequisite for sailors to be promoted. Educational training was therefore
provided, for sailors to avail of on a voluntary basis, to help them to
qualify educationally for promotion. Two educational tests were
prescribed. Educational Test One (ET1) was for boys of all branches. The
Higher Educational Test (HET) was for sailors who aspired to be
commissioned as as an officer. The Education Branch was made
responsible for organising and imparting all this educational training.

The Branch started in 1928 and, in its early days, was called the
Schoolmaster Cadre. By 1935, this cadre consisted of nine Chief Petty
Officer (CPO)/Petty Officer (PO) Schoolmasters, all of whom had a college
degree; they were positioned at the Seamen, Stoker and Signals Boys
Training Establishments at Karachi and Bombay. In 1938, Headmaster
Lieutenant Smith was appointed to head the Schoolmaster Cadre and
raise the standard of education in the Navy.

After the Second World War started in 1939, there was a large increase in
sailor intake. It was realised that the expansion of the Navy in an
environment of changing technology would require greater attention to
raising educational standards. By 1941, the Schoolmaster Cadre had
increased to one officer, ten Warrant Schoolmasters and fourteen CPO/PO
Schoolmasters. Headmaster Lt Cdr Smith had by then revised the HET
and ET1 syllabi and recast the general educational syllabi for all naval
ships and establishments.

To attract better talent, it became necessary to raise the status and the
pay of the cadre. In 1943, Schoolmaster pay scales were raised and a
degree in Mathematics or Physics was made an essential qualification for
entry into the Schoolmaster Cadre. In Naval Headquarters, a composite
Directorate of Training and Education was constituted to plan and
coordinate all training and educational activities.

In 1944, Headmaster Commander Smith was appointed to Naval

Headquarters in the Directorate of Training and Education as the Deputy
Director Education. In the same year, an Instructor Branch was created to
broaden the base of educational training and training methodology. The
intake into the ranks of Instructor Lieutenant Commander
(RINVR)/Instructor Lieutenant (RINVR) was from candidates between
thirty and forty years of age, who had an Honours degree in
Mathematics/Physics or Mechanical/Electrical Engineering and who had
experience of imparting training in a recognised university. This new
Instructor Branch was added on to the existing Schoolmaster Cadre.

The strength of the combined Instructor Branch - Schoolmaster Cadre

increased to one Headmaster Cdr as Deputy Director of Education, one
Headmaster Lt (SP) as Assistant Deputy Director at NHQ, one Headmaster
Lt at HMIS BAHADUR in Karachi, four Headmaster Lieutenants (RINVR),
forty Commissioned Warrant Schoolmasters and one hundred and eighty
CPO Schoolmasters. By then, schoolmasters were borne in all training and
base establishments, recruiting centres and in ten sea-going
appointments.

In 1948, the Schoolmaster Branch/Cadre was first merged into a new

Education Branch and a little later, the Education Branch was renamed as
the Instructor Branch. The intake into the Instructor Branch was at two
levels. Direct Entry Instructor Sub Lieutenants were required to have an
Honours degree in Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry. Warrant Instructor
Officers were required to be graduates in these subjects.

Also in 1948, at Naval Headquarters, the Directorate of Naval Training

and Education split into two directorates - Directorate of Weapon Training
and Directorate of Naval Education. The last of the British naval Instructor
Officers on deputation left in 1950. With the formation of the Naval Air
Arms's Fleet Requirement Unit in 1951, Education Officers were made
responsible for providing meteorological services.

In 1955, the Instructor Branch was reorganised:

(a) All entries into the Branch were made either in the rank of
Commissioned Instructor Officers (CIOs) or as civilians. An
Engineering degree was included as an entry qualification. The
promotion ladder was CIO - Senior CIO - Instructor Lieutenant and
upwards.

(b) Civilian Education Instructors (CEI's) were posted mainly in the

basic training establishments for boy entry sailors.

Many of the direct entry, honours degree Instructor Officers who were
inducted from 1955 onwards underwent specialisation courses in the
British Navy, in Radar, Radio, Thermodynamics, Advanced Meteorology,
Gunnery, Torpedo and Anti Submarine Warfare, Navigation and Direction,
Communications and Electronic Warfare. In later years, some of them
achieved eminence in the Defence Research and Development
Organisation.

The CIO Branch List entry scheme was not well received by the Instructor
Branch. In 1963, the Branch List entry was abolished and a limited
number of Civilian Education Instructors (CEIs) were inducted. Entry was
restarted in the rank of Sub Lieutenant and seniorities of all serving
Branch List Instructor Officers were readjusted.

Over time, the responsibilities of the Branch were enlarged to include the
conduct of sailors' recruitment tests in shore establishments, organising
activities to enhance general knowledge and organising welfare activities
at Unit and Command level.
Developments Between 1965 and 1975

In 1968, in Naval Headquarters, the Directorate of Naval Education was

redesignated as Directorate of Naval Education and Meteorology.

In 1971, the Instructor Branch was redesignated as the Education Branch.

In 1974, as part of the comprehensive Reorganisation of Naval Training

carried out by Naval Headquarters, the major changes implemented were:

(a) To cope with the increasing level of technology of weapons,

sensors and equipment entering service, the minimum educational
qualification of Education Officers on entry was raised to a Masters
degree in Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry or English with Physics
up to graduate level and degree in Electrical/Mechanical
Engineering.

(b) To ensure better understanding and for more effective

utilisation, the initial training of Education Officers was increased
from 16 to 36 weeks to include Naval Orientation, Navigation and
Naval Scientific Orientation courses.

(c) Oceanographic Forecasting was included in the responsibilities of

the Education Branch.

Deputation of Education Officers To Enhance Promotion Prospects

The restricted nature of duties constrained the promotion prospects of

Education Branch officers. This constraint was overcome to some extent
by deputing them to, and facilitating their secondment to, organisations
like Defence Laboratories under DRDO, Sainik Schools, Army Recruitment
Organisation, Electronic Data Processing, etc.

Two Education officers attained Flag rank:

- Rear Admiral KN Ramanarasiah became Director of the Naval

Science and Technology Laboratory in Visakhapatnam where he did
pioneering work on the development of torpedoes.

- Rear Admiral SR Mohan became the Project Officer for the

development of the Navy's indigenous Surface to Air Missile
TRISHUL, which was a segment of DRDO's Integrated Guided
Missile Development Programme.
Education Officers also made significant contributions to the development
of the academic faculties of the Ethiopian Navy's Naval Academy and
Nigeria's Inter Services Academy.

EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITY

Developments Until 1965

In 1944:

(a) An Examination Office was established in Bombay to conduct

HET and ET1 tests and assess sailors' educational attainments
before promotion.

(b) Lectures on training techniques were arranged for CPO and PO

Schoolmasters.

(c) Reference libraries and unit libraries were set up in ships and
establishments and provided with publications, both local and from
Britain.

(d) The Inter-Universities Board (India) recommended to all the

universities in India that the Navy's HET examination be recognised
as equivalent to Matriculation.

(e) The Inter-Universities Board (India) accepted Naval

Headquarters suggestion that Navigation and Meteorology be
introduced as a degree subject in Indian Universities.

In 1954, Naval Headquarters introduced the Educational Test One

(Modified), ie ET1(M), for Cook and Steward sailors whose educational
standards on entry were lower than those of other sailors.

To help improve their level of scientific and technical knowledge and

increase their comprehension of professional training, officers and sailors
were imparted training in Electronics, Mathematics, Thermodynamics etc.
By 1965, the Instructor Branch was responsible for all scientific and
mathematical instruction, including instruction in the theoretical aspects
of technical subjects.

Developments Between 1965 and 1975

In 1966, Education Officers were given the responsibility of imparting

Russian language training to the personnel being deputed for the Russian
acquisitions. Education Officers started being deputed to the School of
Foreign Languages in Delhi.

Training Establishments

In the basic training establishments, the Education Department prepared

instructional handouts in simple English to help sailors whose knowledge
of English was inadequate.

When preparing for the ET 1 and ET 1(M) tests, sailors had to depend on
standard text books on Mathematics and English. These text books could
not provide standardised subject material to sailors serving in the various
naval establishments all over India. The problem was overcome in 1974
by preparing one standard publication each for Mathematics, English
language and General Knowledge for the ET 1 test.

Examination Office

Over the years, the Examination Office's responsibility expanded to cover

the following additional tests:

Annual
Frequency
(a) Recruitment Tests
(i) Direct Entry (Matriculate Entry MER)
and Twice
Artificer Apprentices
(ii) Direct Entry (Non-Matriculate Entry
Twice
NMER)
(iii) Direct Entry (MER/NMER) Sports
Twice
Entry
(b) Educational Tests
(i) HET/ET1/ET1 (M)
(ii) Navy Entry Artificer Scheme Twice
(iii) Commission Worthy (CW) Scheme Twice
for sailors Once Twice
(iv) In-service Hindi Examinations -
(Uchh,
Madhyamik and Prarambhik Pariksha) Twice
(v) Higher Rank (Technical)
(c) Command/Professional Management
and Staff
Once
College Entrance (C/PM & SCE)
Examinations for officers
Naval Institute of Educational and Training Technology (NIETT)

Education officers used to be trained in "training technology" during

their initial training. Later, it was considered necessary that all instructors
in training establishments should be acquainted with "training methods".
Discussions were held with the Technical Teachers Training Institute at
Madras. In 1971, a Naval Institute of Education was set up at Cochin. In
1974, the scope of the Institute was expanded to include "Training
Technology" and it was renamed as the Naval Institute of Educational and
Training Technology (NIETT). The Institute conducted in-service training
for officers and sailors in Teaching Methods and Training Technology.

Reference Libraries and Maintenance Grants

The need for books for self-study whilst preparing for ET1 and HET,
and for magazines for enhancing general awareness used to be met by
libraries in shore establishments and ships. Due to limited funds,
however, they could not be adequately equipped. In 1965, the
Government sanctioned Rs 50,000 together with a recurring grant of Rs
10,000 for the next three years for setting up Reference Libraries in the
training establishments. In due course, the following reference libraries
were established:-

(a) The Central Reference Library in Bombay.

(b) Command Reference Libraries in Visakhapatnam and Cochin.

(c) Reference Library in Goa.

(d) Reference Libraries in major training establishments at AGRANI,

CIRCARS, HAMLA, SHIVAJI and VALSURA.

The Central Reference Library at Bomay was established to

- maintain reference libraries in ships and non-training

establishments by issuing books on temporary loan and

- to issue on permanent loan books of general interest to ships and

establishments, to meet the needs of officers and sailors in
Bombay.

Similarly, the Command Reference Libraries at Vishakhapatnam and

Cochin and the Reference Library in Goa met the requirements of training
establishments in their respective stations who were not in receipt of
reference library grants.
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1975

In 1982, "Meteorology" was made the responsibility of a separate

Directorate of Naval Oceanology & Meteorology (DNOM).

In 1988, the qualifications for entry into the Education Branch were
further broadened to include a post graduate degree in
Computers/graduate degree in Computer Engineering.

In 1988, NIETT was augmented with a Centre for Training Aids Production
to produce quality training aids for the Navy. Since then, the Institute has
grown into the Navy's pioneer organisation for conducting courses on
Training Management and providing guidance in the fabrication and
effective utilisation of training aids. It conducts Instructional Technique
Courses for junior officer instructors and Training Management Courses
for middle level officers. It also conducts professional specialist courses
for education officers, sailor-instructors and photo sailors. The Institute
has earned the ISO 9001 certification for quality training. It also acts as
the apex body for standardisation of syllabi, lesson planning and all
aspects of Training Design and Evaluation.

In 1990, the Examinations Office shifted from Bombay to Delhi, under the
Directorate of Naval Education. In 1991, it was decided that women
officers could join the Navy in the Education Branch and the Logistic and
Law cadres. The first batch of nine women Education officers joined the
Branch in July 1992 on a seven-year short service commission,
extendable to ten years.

In addition to the three Command Reference Libraries, there are today

thirty eight Naval/Met Reference Libraries in the Navy, apart from unit run
libraries.

Future of the Education Branch

With the general rise in the educational standard of officer and sailor
intake, the basic function of the Education Branch became diluted. The
requirement of the Navy became to train its personnel rather than to
educate them. Additional responsibilities like EDP, recruitment,
appointments in NCC and resettlement, which could have been done by
officers of any other branch, got added on, so that the Education Branch
could have enough to do. This did not contribute either towards aspiration
for qualification of a level higher than what Education officers possessed
at the time of their commissioning or towards job satisfaction vis-a-vis
the qualifications they possessed.

Since Education Officers possess high academic qualifications in Science

and Engineering, numerous proposals have been considered to optimally
utilise their services. The current thinking is to continue with the Branch
and induct only Short Service Commission Education Officers to meet the
Navy's needs.

CHAPTER 31

NAVAL METEOROLOGY AND OCEANOLOGY

PREAMBLE

The Second World War highlighted the tactical importance of accurately

forecasting the meteorological conditions on, above and below the surface
of the sea:

-Anomolous propagation conditions affected radars and wireless

communications.

- Hydrological conditions affected sonars.

- Humidity, temperature and pressure conditions affected the

accuracy of naval gunfire and

- Wind conditions affected naval flying operations.

DEVELOPMENT TILL 1975

METEOROLOGY

Meteorological training in the Navy began in 1949 when an Education

officer was deputed to the British Navy for a course in naval meteorology.
He in turn imparted meteorological training to four officers of the
Education Branch and four sailors in 1952. They were taught to keep a
continuous weather-watch and record and disseminate meteorological
observations to air traffic controllers, aircrew and ships, to code and
decode weather messages and to issue weather warnings.

With the advent of the Naval Air Arm, a regular meteorological service
started in 1952. Naval air arm sailors were trained as "meteorological
observers". They were required to take surface and upper air met
observations, do their coding and decoding, receive and transmit
observations on teleprinter, and chart and plot the data on met charts.
This enabled the "weather forecaster" to analyse the charts and issue
forecasts. A teleprinter circuit with the India Met Department enabled met
observations to be obtained from all over India and adjoining countries.
Since Education officers usually possessed sound knowledge of
mathematics and physics, they were trained as "weather forecasters" by
the India Met Department at Poona.

Meteorological offices were established in the Naval Air Station INS

GARUDA and onboard the flagship INS DELHI to provide weather and
meteorological information to the fleet. In due course, meteorological
offices were established in the second cruiser INS MYSORE (1957), the
aircraft carrier INS VIKRANT (1961) the second Naval Air Station INS
HANSA (1962) and in Port Blair (1969).

At Naval Headquarters, the post of Staff Officer Meteorology was created

in 1957 to assist the Director of Naval Education in administering the
Meteorological service. In 1966, this post was upgraded to Deputy
Director Meteorology in the rank of Commander (Education). In 1968, the
Directorate of Naval Education was redesignated as the Directorate of
Naval Education and Meteorology.

In 1970, the Naval Met offices at Bombay and Cochin were provided with
dedicated meteorological teleprinter channels. This helped to provide
uninterrupted meteorological data of the region for briefing aircrew and
issuing weather warnings.

In 1973, Automatic Picture Transmission (APT) reception facilities were

provided to the meteorological offices at Cochin, Port Blair and onboard
INS VIKRANT. APT enabled satellite pictures of the prevailing weather to
actually be seen in real time, by day and by night. In due course APT
facilities were extended to all naval met offices and the Met Training
School.

The Met Training Cell, which had started in the INS GARUDA in 1952,
grew in due course into a full fledged Met Training Section by 1968 and
was eventually redesignated as the Meteorological Training School in
1974.

in 1977, fascimile (FAX) weather chart recorders were installed in the

Naval Met offices at Cochin, Visakhapatnam, Bombay, Goa, Port Blair and
on board MYSORE and VIKRANT. This equipment enabled met offices to
receive analysed surface and upper air charts from the India Met
Department.

OCEANOGRAPHY

In the early 1970's, a met officer was sent to the Royal Naval School of
Meteorology and Oceanography (RNSOMO) in Britain for training in
oceanography. On return, he was appointed to the Naval Hydrographic
Office in Dehradun where he helped to produce a document on
oceanography and sonar range prediction. Soon thereafter, a second
officer was deputed to the US Naval Oceanographic Office in Washington
DC for training in oceanography. On return, he was appointed to INS
GARUDA where the Seaking anti submarine helicopters were based.

In 1974:

- Oceanography was introduced as a topic for study in Met sailors'

specialist courses and in Observers and Sub Lieutenant courses.

- Oceanographic forecasting was made the responsibility of met

officers.

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1975

In December 1980, an Oceanographic Forecasting Cell (OFC) was

established at Cochin under the operational control of the FOCINCSOUTH.
This marked the beginning of oceanographic studies and forecasting in
the Navy. The OFC was located in the premises of the Met School and
headed by the officer who had been trained by the American Navy. The
OFC's terms of reference were to liaise with the National Physical and
Oceanographic Laboratory (NPOL) located in Cochin and

(a) Provide a general description of the major oceanographic and

acoustic factors affecting a specified area of operation for a
specified forecast period, the sea state at the beginning of the
forecast period and significant changes expected during the forecast
period.

(b) Collect and store processed oceanographic data in the form of

atlases, charts and reports issued by the NPOL and the Chief
Hydrographer.

(c) Collect oceanographic information, records and research outputs

from agencies like the National Institute of Oceanography, OSTA
and ONGC.

(d) Provide forecasts of thermal structure and salinity profiles based

on the available past data and current oceanographic observations
received from fleet ships during exercises.

(e) Devise and standardise codes for transmission of oceanic data

and forecasts.
 (f) Undertake selective studies in oceanography to update and
validate the forecasting techniques developed by NPOL.

(g) Undertake studies on air-sea interaction in collaboration with

NPOL and other agencies.

(h) Assist the Met Training School in the training of naval personnel
in oceanography.

Although met officers studied "introductory oceanography" as a topic

during their Advanced Weather Forecaster's training, it was realised that
they needed to be trained in oceanographic forecasting. The first capsule
course in Oceanography was conducted in April 1981 by the Cochin
University. The second Oceanography capsule course was conducted by
IIT Delhi in March 1982.

In 1981, sanction was received for three digital electronic systems to be

installed at Naval Air Stations GARUDA and HANSA to enhance safety
during landing and take off:

(a) The Ceilograph which gave digital printouts of the heights of

lowest cloud over an air station.

(b) The Skopograph which gave digital printouts of runway visibility

and

(c) The Current Weather Instrument System (CWIS) which gave

digital printouts of weather parameters like humidity, tem-perature,
wind direction and speed.

Formation of the Directorate of Naval Oceanology and

Meteorology (DNOM)

In 1982, the need was felt for the establishment of a dedicated

Directorate of Oceanology. The rationale was:

(a) Oceanographic forcasting was vitally important for anti

submarine warfare.

(b) It was necessary to safeguard the security aspects arising out of

the increased oceanographic activity in Indian waters.

(c) The Navy's existing arrangements to plan, co-ordinate and

progress oceanographic tasks were inadequate.

(d) The Navy should assist in ocean development.

A new Directorate of Naval Oceanology and Meteorology was therefore
established and the met component of the Directorate of Naval Education
and Meteorology was transferred to the new Directorate. Thereafter, this
directorate became the single nodal agency dealing with all aspects of
naval oceanology and meteorology.

Since its inception the directorate has contributed/undertaken the

following:

(a) Co-ordination of the Navy's help for Second Indian Scientific

Antarctica Expedition in 1982-83.

(b) Rendering consultancy about design of polar research vessels

for Department of Ocean Development.

(c) Monitoring the progress of oceanographic research undertaken

by the DRDO and by CSIR's scientific organisations.

(d) Participation in UNESCO's Inter Governmental Oceanographic

Commission at Paris.

(e) Organisation of the oceanographic course in the Centre for

Advance Studies in Atmospheric and Fluid Sciences at IIT, New
Delhi.

(f) Functioned as a think-tank for oceanographic data collection, its

utilisation and application for Naval activities.

(g) Interacted with India Met Department in Conferences of

Forecasting Officers.

In 1985, the Meteorology Training School in INS Garuda was renamed as

the School for Naval Oceanology and Meteorology.

CHAPTER 32

WELFARE

INDIAN NAVAL BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION

The Indian Naval Benevolent Association was established in 1942 as a

registered charitable organisation. Its object is to relieve financial
hardship/distress amongst serving and ex-naval personnel and their
dependents. Its sources of income are:-

(a) Subscriptions from serving naval personnel.

 (b) Donations.

(c) Interest on Investments.

(d) Contribution from the Armed Forces Benevolent Fund.

(e) Flag Day Fund.

(f) Allocations from the IN Amenities Fund for the welfare of ex

servicemen and their families from 1988-89 onwards.

In January 1963, membership of the Association was made compulsory

for all serving naval personnel. In April 1967, the monthly subscription
was raised. The scale ranged from Rs 3.50 for the seniormost officer to Rs
1.50 for the juniormost sailor.

Loans. The Association sanctions loans to officers and sailors for house
repairs and marriages of daughter/sister and to sailors only for medical
expenses and higher education. Between 1965 and 1975, the following
changes took place:-

(a) Interest was waived on loans for marriage.

(b) Loans were increased for the marriage of a sailor's

sister/daughter.

(c) Benefits were increased to the next of kin of personnel

who died in service .

(d) In 1972, loans were increased for house repairs. Loans for
sisters marriage were discontinued.

Grants. Grants are sanctioned only in exceptional cases to serving

personnel based on the merits of each case. Sailors having handicapped
children can apply for grant for education and special equipment. Sailors
can apply for house repair grants after a natural calamity. Grants are
normally paid only to retired naval personnel on death, and for economic
activity venture. Between 1965 and 1975, the following changes took
place:-

(a) Grants were increased to the next of kin on death whilst in

service.

(b) After the 1971 war, an ad-hoc grant was given to the bereaved
families.

Command Benevolent Funds.

The Association places funds at the disposal of the three Commands and
INS India to meet extreme emergent requirements.

Family Assistance Scheme 1969.

The Family Assistance Scheme was introduced in January 1969 to provide

regular income in the form of a monthly allowance to bereaved families.

The membership of the Scheme was compulsory for all serving naval
personnel. Every quarter the Naval Pay Office recovered a contribution of
Rs 30 from all serving officers and midshipmen and Rs 6 from sailors.

Officers Family Assistance Scheme

The Officers Family Assistance Scheme provided the following assistance:-

(a) On Retirement. A resettlement grant depending on the period

the officer was a member of the scheme.

(b) In the Event of Death Whilst Serving. A lump sum grant of

Rs 750/- on death and a grant of Rs 150/- per month upto a
maximum of 10 years or till successful rehabilitation of the
family/dependent whichever was earlier, as per a sliding scale.

(c) On Death Within Five Years After Retirement. A monthly

allowance of Rs 100/- per month for the balance of the period of 5
years to those who had contributed to the fund for 10 years or
more. For others the benefit period was reduced, as per a sliding
scale.

Sailors Family Assistance Scheme.

The Sailors Family Assistance Scheme provided the following assistance:-

New Entrants.

On Retirement/Release/Discharge from Service. A

resettlement grant not less than the total contribution.

On Death Whilst in Service. A grant of Rs 50/- per month

for a number of years depending on date of admission into
the scheme.

On Death Within 5 Years of Retirement/Release/

Discharge from Service. A monthly allowance of Rs 50/- per
month for the balance of the period of 5 years to those who
had contributed to the scheme for 15 years or more.
 Existing Sailors.

On Retirement/Release/Discharge from Service. A

resettlement grant not less than the total contribution.

On Death Whilst in Service. Grants as per a sliding scale.

On Death Within 5 Years of Release/Discharge from

Service. Same as for new entrants.

Naval Group Insurance Scheme 1975.

In December 1975, the Officers and Sailors Family Assistance Schemes

were changed into the Group Insurance Scheme. The scheme was initially
run under aegis of the INBA and in association with the Life Insurance
Corporation. From October 1976 onwards, Government accorded approval
for Naval Headquarters to run the scheme departmentally as a self run
scheme.

Instead of the quarterly subscription of the Family Assistance Scheme,

the monthly contributions for Group Insurance were Rs 30 for officers and
midshipmen and Rs 10 for sailors.

Benefits of the Group Insurance Scheme.

On Retirement. Personnel were paid a survival benefit depending

on the quantum of interest/profit earned and the length of service.

Death Benefit. A lump sum grant to the next of kin/dependent of

Rs 30,000 for officers and Rs 15,000 for sailors.

SCHOLARSHIP SCHEME 1972

The Scheme was introduced from the academic year 1971-72 to award
scholarships for:

(a) Undertaking post 10+2 courses. Scholarships were made

available for the children of serving sailors and the children of
officers and sailors killed in action or who died whilst in Service. In
1971, the annual scholarships for a maximum period of five years
were Rs 300 for day scholars and Rs 700 for boarders.

(b) Undertaking Graduation/Post Graduation degree Courses

without imposing any criteria of merit. Scholarships were made
available for the daughters of serving and deceased sailors. The
 number of scholarships is limited to only two daughters of a sailor
throughout his entire service career.

(c) Availing of coaching through correspondence courses for joint

Entrance Examinations through authorised institutions.
Reimbursement was made available for the children of serving
sailors of Rs 2000 for a maximum of two children.

INDIAN NAVAL AMENITIES FUND

The IN Amenities Fund was established in 1946 to provide welfare and

amenities for serving and retired personnel and their families.

The INAF's sources of income are:

(a) Armed Forces Reconstruction Fund.

(b) Flag Day Fund.

(c) Profits from Canteen Stores Department (India).

(d) Profits from Indian Naval Canteen Service.

(e) Monthly subscription from officers & sailors.

(f) Any income derived or donations received from other sources for
purposes of amenities.

In 1968, the quarterly rate of contribution was fixed at a maximum of Rs

36 for the seniormost officer and 75 paise for the juniormost sailor.

Developments After 1975

INBA's Naval Group Insurance Scheme

The Group Insurance Scheme has been improved from 1978 onwards to
provide higher insurance cover:-

(a) The disability cover was introduced for the first time in 1980.

(b) Additional group insurance schemes for Aviation, Submarine and

IMSF personnel were introduced at the behest of the Government
 from 1 September 1981 to provide additional cover for these high
risk groups.

(c) The Post Retirement Death Insurance Scheme was introduced in

1982.

Being risk cum saving schemes, Group Insurance Schemes are intended
to provide a meaningful amount to bereaved families and to those
invalided out of Service. To facilitate smooth rehabilitation in civil life, the
avowed objective is also to give a reasonable amount to Naval personnel
on their retirement/discharge from Service. Major improvements in the
scheme were effected after the first comprehensive actuarial review in
1988. The salient features of the revised scheme, introduced from
January 1989, were:

(a) Higher insurance cover with a relatively lesser increase in

monthly premium.

(b) Parity in insurance cover for death in peace and in war time.

(c) Payment of saving element in addition to the insurance cover for

death and invalidment.

Since over 99.8% of Naval officers and sailors retire hale and hearty, the
thrust of the schemes has been to improve the saving element
substantially.

After the award of the Fifth Pay Commission and taking into consideration
the erosion in the purchasing power of the rupee:-

(a) The insurance cover has been increased to Rs 7 lacs for officers
and Rs 3.5 lacs for sailors with a monthly contribution of Rs 500 and
Rs 250 respectively.

(b) The Post Retirement Death Insurance Scheme, which provides

insurance cover for death upto 15 years after retirement or 70
years of age whichever is earlier, has been enhanced to Rs 2.5 lacs
for officers and Rs 1.5 lacs for sailors with a one-time term
premium of Rs 8000 and Rs 2700 respectively.

INBA Housing-loan-Scheme.

To meet the essential requirement of a dwelling unit, a Housing loan

Scheme, directly financed from NGIF, was introduced in 1988 after the
Government had expressed its inability to extend the benefit of a housing
loan of Rs 2.5 lacs to Service personnel as was being given to Civilian
Central Government employees. In November 1997, the quantum of
housing loan was increased to Rs 7 lacs for officers and Rs 3.5 lacs for
sailors, subject to repayment capacity.

INBA's Subsidiary Fund

In 1988, a separate INBA Subsidiary Fund was instituted for the welfare
of ex-Naval personnel and their families. It started with an initial corpus
of Rs 1 crore from the IN Amenities Fund and marked a watershed in the
history of the INBA to alleviate financial distress and provided succour to
Naval pensioners in distress.

The fund is given an annual allocation from the INAF to augment its
resources. Existing schemes have been improved and new schemes
introduced:

(a) Introduction of the Octogenarian Grant and its subsequent

enhancement from Rs 18000 to Rs 25000.

(b) The enhancement of financial assistance for specialised medical

treatment from Rs 10,000 to Rs 1 lac each for member and spouse
towards surgery and treatment for Cardio-Vascular diseases,
Cancer, Renal transplant and complete Hip/Knee joint replacement.

(c) Enhancement of the ex-gratia grant on death to the next of kin

to Rs 10,000 for officers and Rs 5000 for sailors.

(d) Introduction of ex-gratia grant for the marriage of children of

widows of naval personnel who die in service or as pensioners.

(e) Enhancement in the annual scholarship for higher education to

the children of Naval pensioners to Rs 3000 for day scholars and Rs
6000 for boarders.

Indian Naval Amenities fund

The contribution rates have been progressively revised. The present rates
of contribution effective September 97 are Rs 60 per quarter by officers
and Rs 18 per quarter by sailors.

The major welfare projects presently financed from INAF are:

(a) Augmentation of Kindergarten and Naval Public Schools.

(b) Modernisation of service hospitals.

(c) Augmentation of MI Room and Dental Centres for ex-servicemen

and their families.
 (d) Promotion of sports and adventure activities.

STATISTICS OF DISBURSEMENTS

INBA Family Assistance IN

Amenities Naval Group
Allowances Fund Insurance
Year Loans Grants Schemes Scheme wef
wef 1.4.69 1.12.75
1964 5,64,150 21,610 32,500 4,83,300
1965 4,85,900 37,060 45,534 3,39,720
1966 6,23,920 28,864 26,234 3,10,485
1967 12,13,890 51,878 - 5,08,060
1968 15,52,455 77,054 - 6,27,320
1969 18,15,086 68,404 13,250 9,88,763
1970 18,24,760 54,934 40,000 10,72,239
1971 12,79,318 78,257 64,050 6,96,259
1972 22,69,551 8,37,175 2,08,800 16,47,815
1973 34,78,991 3,28,590 2,32,250 30,80,889
1974 21,21,074 2,05,009 2,30,000 30,53,592
1975 23,45,285 1,87,808 5,67,326 42,53,000
1976 32,22,210 2,00,558 6,74,720 32,84,806

The major projects financed were:

- KG Schools at HAMLA, SHIVAJI, Cochin and New Delhi

- Loans for Purchase of buses

- INCS Complex at Cochin and Improvements in Canteen Facilities

in ships and establishments.

- Furniture and furnishings in messes.

EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES FOR CHILDREN OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

Kendriya Vidyalayas in the Navy

One of the colateral responsibilities of the Education Branch was to plan

and organise the availability of educational facilities for the children of
naval personnel. Naval "Children's Schools" were started at Bombay,
Cochin, Goa, Karanja, Lonavala and Visakhapatnam on naval land.

Concurrently, the Central Government's Ministry of Education established

a chain of higher secondary schools all over the country under the Kendra
Vidyalaya Scheme to prepare students for the All India Higher Secondary
Examination of the CBSE. The objective of the KVs was to provide
subsidised educational facilities and hostel accommodation for children of
Armed Forces personnel, civilians paid from the Defence Services
Estimates and other categories of Central Government employees who
were liable to frequent transfers. In due course, the naval Children's
Schools were taken over by the Ministry of Education and administered as
Kendriya Vidyalayas.

By following common text books and a common syllabus, KVs ensure

continuity when children move from one KV to another. The medium of
instruction is Hindi/English. The KVs charge no tuition fee upto class VIII
and the rates of tuition fees for classes IX, X and XI are nominal. The
priorities for admission to KV's, as laid down by the Central Schools
Organisation, are:

(a) Children of transferable defence personnel.

(b) Children of transferable Central Government employees.

(c) Children of officers of All India Services, autonomous

bodies/projects (fully financed by the Government) and public
undertakings/corporations whose services may be transferable.

(d) Children of non-transferable defence personnel and Central

Government employees.

(e) Other floating population which includes the civilian population

desirous of joining the pattern of studies adopted in the KVs.

(f) Children of the staff of KVs and the KV Organisation, and

children of the employees of IITs for KVs located in their campuses,
are bracketed with category (a) above.

Naval Public Schools

When the children of Central Government employees became eligible for

admission to Kendriya Vidyalayas, problems arose for the admission of
naval children in stations where the KVs were not sited within the campus
of naval establishments. To overcome this problem, the Navy opened
Naval Public Schools, funded from the Navy's Non-Public Funds and
affiliated to the Central Board of Secondary Education. Initially, these
schools were started in stations which did not have a major naval
establishment. Later, Naval Public Schools were also set up at those
stations which had KVs located within the campus of naval
establishments. At present, there are Naval Public Schools at Delhi, Kochi,
Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Goa, Port Blair, Arrakonam and Lonavala.

Navy Education Society

The Navy Education Society was formed in October 1986. Its objective is
to promote education, science, culture and fine arts amongst the children
and families of naval personnel. The Society governs the Naval Public
Schools and the KG Schools at various naval stations, including reportedly
the biggest KG School in Asia at Bombay. It is also responsible for the
formulation of broad policies, standardisation of curricula and
administration/setting up of educational institutions at naval stations.

Military Schools

Military Schools are located at Ajmer, Bangalore, Belgaum, Chail and

Dholpur. These are residential institutions run on public school lines and
prepare students for the All India Higher Secondary Examinations
conducted by the CBSE and the entrance examination to the NDA. These
schools conduct classes from standards V to XI with English as the
medium of instruction. The maximum strength of each school is 300
boarders and 30 day scholars except at Ajmer and Dholpur whose boarder
strengths are 230 and 200 respectively. 60% of the vacancies of boarders
in these schools are reserved for serving JCOs and ORs, NCs(E), civilian
clerks etc. 50 seats are reserved for sons of JCOs and ORs and their
equivalents in the Navy and Air Force, killed in action. The remaining 40%
vacancies are earmarked for the sons of officers and civilians. For the
reserved vacancies, boys are admitted in the V class on the basis of an all
India admission test conducted by Army Headquarters. They must have
reached the age of 9 years and should not be more than 10 1/2 years on
01 Jul of the year of admission. Some boys can be admitted to higher
classes, subject to availability of vacancies.

Sainik Schools

These are residential schools for boys, providing a public school education
with a military bias. A chain of Sainik Schools has been established in the
various states in the country, primarily to serve as feeder institutions to
train boys to enter the NDA. The schools are administered by an
autonomous board of governors under the chairmanship of the Minister of
Defence. These schools prepare students for the All India Higher
Secondary Examination of the Central Board of Secondary Education, and
the Entrance Examination of the NDA conducted by the UPSC.

Admission to Sainik Schools is made in Standard V and is restricted to

boys between the ages of 9 and 10 years. Boys between the ages of 10
and 11 are also considered for admission to class VI in the few schools
which have vacancies in that class, which however is restricted to boys
from the state in which the school is located.

67% of the seats in each school are reserved for boys belonging to the
state in which the school is situated. A number of vacancies are reserved
for the sons of defence service personnel and ex-servicemen. Boys are
admitted to the schools on the basis of an all India entrance examination
held at various centres in the country in February each year.

CHAPTER 33

CHANGES IN NAVAL HEADQUARTERS ORGANISATION

Soon after independence in 1947, the staff at Naval Headquarters was

grouped under five Principal Staff Officers (PSO's). These were the Chief
of Staff, Chief of Personnel, Chief of Material, Chief of Administration and
Chief of Naval Aviation.

THE 1955 REORGANISATION

The first major re-organisation of NHQ after independence took place in

1955. The Chief of Staff/Deputy C-in-C was re-designated Deputy Chief of
Naval Staff. The Chief of Administration was abolished and its
Directorates redistributed between the Staff, Personnel and Material
Branches.

In 1959, DCNS was upgraded to Rear Admiral. This functioned

satisfactorily until 1961, when the combined impact began to be felt of
growth, modernisation and self sufficiency.

THE 1962 REORGANISATION

The 1962 Naval Headquarter was re-organisation into the following

structure., which included the newly formed Directorate of Leander
Project placed under the COM:

_____ DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE NAVAL

STAFF : (Rear Admiral)
| | |
Operations Plans Chief
Intelligence Weapons Hydrographer
Signals Policy & Civil
Tactics Engineering
 _____ CHIEF OF THE NAVAL AVIATION (
Commodore)
| |
Air Staff Air Material

____ CHIEF OF PERSONNEL :

(Commodore)
| | |
Personnel Training Supply
Services. Education Branch
Medical Civilian
Service Personnel
Judge Clothing and
Advocate Victualling.
General
_____ CHIEF OF MATERIAL :
(Commodore)
| | |
Fleet Marine Stores
Maintenance EngineeringArmament
Naval Electrical Supply
ConstructionEngineering
Armament Weapons &
Inspection Equipment
Scientific
Research
_____ NAVAL SECRETARY : (Captain)

CHANGES FROM 1965 TO 1968

In 1965, the Chief of Personnel and the Chief of Material were upgraded
in rank to Rear Admiral.

The Defence Plan 1966-71 had accepted in principle the Navy's expansion
programme at an estimated total cost of Rs. 440 Crores and increase in
manpower from 21,000 to 31,000. With greater emphasis on self
sufficiency in the indigenous production of ships, weapons and
ammunition, the nature and scope of the workload in Naval Headquarters
changed substantially.

In 1966, the Director of the Submarine Arm was sanctioned and placed
under the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff.
In 1967, the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff was re-designated as Vice Chief
of the Naval Staff, and the Chief of Naval Aviation was redesignated as
Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff.

In 1968, the Chief of the Naval Staff was upgraded in rank to Admiral.
Also in 1968, two new Directorates were sanctioned. The Director of
Acquisition Project, dealing with the acquisitions from the Soviet Union
and elsewhere was placed under the Vice Chief of Naval Staff. The
Director of Leander Project dealing with the indigenous construction of the
Leander class frigates was placed under the Chief of Material.

By mid 1968, it became clear that there was need to further rationalise
the division of responsibilities and the workload. Some of the anomalies
sought to be remedied were:

- The imbalance in distribution of responsibilities between the Vice Chief

of the Naval Staff, the Chief of Personnel, the Chief of Material, and the
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff and the increasing overload on all of them
as a result of the Navy's development.

- The need for the appointment of Vice Chief of the Naval Staff to be
tenable by a Vice Admiral so as to better supervise and coordinate work in
Naval Headquarters and to enable Government to have a choice between
two Vice Admirals (FOCINCWEST and VCNS) when considering a
successor to a retiring CNS.

- The need for a new Logistics Branch under a Chief of Logistics in the
rank of Rear Admiral to deal with all matters concerning stores, clothing,
victualling, supply and civilian personnel.

- The need to re-designate the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff as Deputy

Chief of the Naval Staff in the rank of Rear Admiral.

- To relieve the overload of the Directorate of Personnel Services, by

splitting it into two directorates.

THE 1969 REORGANISATION

In 1969, Naval Headquarters was re-organised into the following

structure, which included the newly formed Directorate of Leander Project
placed under the COM:

_____ DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF :

(Rear Admiral)
| | |
 Operations Plans Chief-
Intelligence Weapons Policy &Hydrographer
Signals Tactics Civil
Engineering
_____ ASSISTANT CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF(
Commodore)
| | | |
Air Staff SubmarinesAcquisition Meteorology
Air Material Project

____ CHIEF OF PERSONNEL : (Rear Admiral)

| | |
Personnel Training Medical
Services. Education Service
Judge
Advocate
General
_____ CHIEF OF MATERIAL : (Rear Admiral)
| | |
-Fleet Marine Engineering Stores
Maintenance Electrical Engineering Armament
-Naval Weapons&Equipment Supply
Construction
-Armament
Inspection
-Scientific
Research

_____ CHIEF OF LOGISTICS : (Rear Admiral)

| | |
Stores
Supply Branch Civil
Armament
Civilian Personnel Engineering
Supply,
Clothing &
Victualling

CHANGES FROM 1970 TO 1972

In 1970, a deep examination was launched to reorganise Naval

Headquarters on functional lines. Some of the areas examined were:-
 Whether the Staff Branch should be comprised of Executive officers
only or should Technical officers also participate in taking staff
decisions.

Should the Air and Submarine Arms be separate branches.

Should Engineering and other specialist directorates look after

"Training" in their respective fields or should these branches be
represented in the Directorate of Naval Training.

Extensive discussions followed. The organisational lessons learnt during

the conflict with Pakistan in December 1971 were incorporated and the
revised organisation was implemented in 1972.

THE 1972 REORGANISATION

The 1972 Reorganisation took numerous factors into account:

The need to strengthen the policy making apparatus to respond

quickly to situations and also allow larger initiative to the
Commands.

The growth and diversification of sea going forces and the doubling
of manpower since 1962.

The expansion and modernisation of maintenance facilities.

The updating and enlarging of training complexes.

The establishment of the Submarine Arm.

The large variety of weapons and missiles, computerised fire control

systems, communication and electronic warfare systems.

The acquisition of very sophisticated naval aircraft.

The induction of gas turbine propulsion.

The acquisition of vessels from Russia with their new philosophies

and practices in the fields of maintenance, logistics and training,
which were substantially different and distinct and irreconcilable
with extant practices.

The march towards self sufficiency and the indigenous construction

programme ranging from 200 ton Seaward Defence Boats, and
 Landing Craft to 3000 ton LST's, 2000 ton Survey Vessels and the
Leander class frigates.

The salient features of the 1972 reorganisation were:

The creation of the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff (DCNS) in the
rank of Rear Admiral, responsible for "Operations" and the
associated disciplines of intelligence and signals, leaving VCNS to
concentrate on the policy and planning functions of the Staff
Branch.

The upgradation in rank of Chief of Personnel and Chief of Material

to Vice Admiral.

The creation of three Assistant Principal Staff Officers (APSOs) in

the rank of Rear Admiral viz Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff
(Policy and Plans) (ACNS P&P) Assistant Chief of Personnel (ACOP)
and Assistant Chief of Material (ACOM).

The creation of the new Directorate of Naval Design under COM and
renaming the Director of Stores as Director of Logistic Support.

The distribution and organisation of Directorates was rationalised eg

separating wherever necessary the problems of Russian and
Western acquisitions.

The resultant structure of Naval Headquarters was as follows:

_____ VICE CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF : (Vice Admiral)

| | |
ACNS(P&P)(RA) Combat Policy & Chief Hydrographer
Tactics Staff Duties Scientific
PLANS Research
WORKS
Acquisitions
_____ DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF( Rear Admiral)
| | |
Air Staff Operations Submarines
Air Material Intelligence
Signals

____ CHIEF OF PERSONNEL : (Rear Admiral)

| | |
ACOP (RA) Training Training
Education & Education &
Meteorology Meteorology
Personnel
 Personal Services
CivilianPersonnel

_____ CHIEF OF MATERIAL : (Rear Admiral)

| | |
ACOM (RA) Dockyards & Fleet Leander Project
Maintenance Naval Design
Marine
Engineering
Electrical
Engineering
Weapons &
Equipment
Naval
Construction.
_____ CHIEF OF LOGISTICS : (Rear Admiral)
| | |
Logistic Support Supply Branch Armament Supply
Clothing & Armament
Victualling Inspection.

CHANGES FROM 1972 TO 1975

In 1973/74 the Directorate of Management Services (DOMS) was created

and placed under ACNS (P&P).

In 1974/75 DOMS was placed directly under VCNS.

CHANGES AFTER 1975

The next major reorganisation of Naval Headquarters took place in Jan

1978. It was necessitated by substantial changes in the pattern of support
and maintenance of the large number of new ships.

The General List Cadres of the Executive and Supply Branches were
merged.

The post of Chief of Logistics was abolished.

The Directorates of Logistic Support and Armament Supply were

placed under the Chief of Material for better coordination of all
aspects of stores and machinery under one branch.
 The Directorates of Clothing and Victualling were merged into the
Director of Supplies and placed under the Chief of Personnel as both
functions were related to personnel.

The Director of Naval Armament Inspection was placed under the

Vice Chief of Naval Staff for closer supervision of munitions.

The Director of Staff Duties was re-designated as Director of

Administration.

CHAPTER 34

CHANGES IN COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE 1965 TO 1975

In January 1966, proposals were initiated to redesignate the

nomenclature of the four Naval Operational and Administrative
Authorities. In war, these operational authorities would be responsible for
the conduct of maritime operations and operational control of maritime
forces in their respective sea areas. After harmonisation with other
concurrent proposals for rationalisation and upgradation, the following
major reorganisation came into effect on 1 March 1968:

- The Flag Officer Bombay (FOB) who had hitherto been junior to
the Flag Officer Commanding Indian Fleet (FOCIF) was re-
designated as Flag Officer Commanding in Chief Western Naval
Command (FOCINCWEST) and upgraded in rank to Vice Admiral.

- The Flag Officer Commanding Indian Fleet (FOCIF) was

subordinated to the Flag Officer Commanding in Chief Western
Naval Command (FOCINCWEST). Instead of "all front line ships,"
including those undergoing refit being under FOCIF "only
operational ships" as alloted by FOCINCWEST would be under the
Flag Officer Commanding the Western Fleet (FOCWEF). The non
operational Fleet ships undergoing refit in Bombay Dockyard would
be administered directly by FOCINCWEST.

- In anticipation of the formation of the Eastern Fleet under the Flag

Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet (FOCEF) after the arrival of the
Petyas and submarines from Russia, the Commodore East Coast
(COMEAST) at Visakhapatnam was re-designated as Flag Officer
Commanding in Chief Eastern Naval Command (FOCINCEAST) in
the rank of Read Admiral.
 - Commodore in Charge Cochin (COMCHIN) was re-designated as
Commodore Commanding Southern Naval Area (COMSOUTH).

- All ships, aircraft, dockyard and logistics support facilities were

placed directly under the respective administrative and operational
control of FOCINCWEST, FOCINCEAST and COMSOUTH.

- In 1970 COMSOUTH was upgraded to the rank of Rear Admiral

and re-designated as Flag Officer Commanding Southern Naval Area
(FOCSOUTH).

- In 1971, Eastern Fleet was constituted under FOCEF.

SOON AFTER 1975

In 1977:

(a) FOCSOUTH was upgraded to the rank of Vice Admiral and re-
designated as Flag Officer Commanding in Chief Southern Naval
Command (FOCINCSOUTH).

(b) Naval Officer in Charge, Goa (NOIC GOA) was upgraded to the
rank of Rear Admiral and re-designated as Flag Officer Commanding
Goa Area (FOGA).

CHAPTER 35

VISIT OF FLEET SHIPS AND SUBMARINES TO FOREIGN PORTS :

1965 to 1975

SHIP(S) PORTS VISITED YEAR REMARKS

AMAR (a) PORT LOUIS MAR-APR 74 On transfer to Mauritius

AMBA (a) ISTANBUL, CASABLANCA, MAR-MAY 69 Homeward after

MATADI, MAURITIUS Commissioning
MAY-JUN 72
(b) COLOMBO
Southeast Asia Sailing
Regatta
AMINI (a) KOBE, MANILA, SINGAPORE DEC 74-JAN Homeward after
75 Commissioning
ANDAMAN (a) NAGASAKI, HONG-KONG, JAN 74 Homeward after
SINGAPORE Commissioning
ANJADIP (a) GDYNIA, GOTEBORG, MAY 73 Homeward after
ANTWERP LE HAVRE, LAS Commissioning
PALMAS, LAGOS, MATADI,
MAURITIUS
BEAS (a) PORT SUDAN, MASSAWA, FEB - MAR 71
ADEN
APR - MAY 71
(b) COLOMBO
BETWA (a) ABU DHABI,MUSCAT, MAY-JUN 72
BAHRAIN, BASRA, BANDAR
SHAHPUR, KUWAIT, DUBAI, FEB 73
RAS-AL-KHAIMA

(b) COLOMBO,MALE
BRAHMA- (a) MUSCAT, BASRA MAR 65
PUTRA
(b) DJIBOUTI, MAY-AUG 67 EXPO 67 at Montreal,
TARANTO,MALTA, ALGIERS, Canada
HALIFAX, MONTREAL, POINTE
AU PIERE, QUEBEC,
SUMMERSIDE, FREETOWN,
MAURITIUS.
MAR-APR 70
(c) MAURITIUS Mauritius Independence
Day
DARSHAK a) PORT SWETTENHAM, APR-MAY 70
BANGKOK AKARTA, SINGAPORE

DEEPAK (a) SINGAPORE MAR 68

(b) JAN 69
SINGAPORE,NAGASAKI,MANILA
MAR-APR 73
(c) MOMBASA, ZANZIBAR,
DAR-ES-SALAM
OCT 73
(d) PENANG, COLOMBO
MAR-APR 74 Mauritius Independence
(e) MAURITIUS Day
SEP 74
(f) BANDAR ABBAS
JAN 75
(g) MALE, COLOMBO
MAR 75
(h) MAURITIUS Mauritius Independence
Day
DELHI (a) MAURITIUS MAR 68 Mauritius Independence
Day
(b) FREMANTLE, MELBOURNE, SEP-NOV 69
SYDNEY, BRISBANE,
AUCKLAND, WELLINGTON, FIJI,
LATUKA, PORT DARWIN,
SINGAPORE
GANGA (a) MALE FEB 71

GHARIAL (a) PORT SAID, DJIBOUTI FEB 66 Homeward after

(b) SABANG, BELAWAN MAR 70 Commissioning
(c) COLOMBO SEP 75
GHORPAD (a) LE HAVRE, CASABLANCA, FEB-APR 75 Homeward after
DAKAR, TAKORADI, POINT Commissioning
NOIRE,MAURITIUS
GODAVARI (a) COLOMBO, MALE, GAN FEB 69

(b) COLOMBO FEB 71

GOMATI (a) COLOMBO, MALE, GAN FEB 69

GULDAR (a) PORT SAID SEP 66 Homeward after

Commissioning
(b) SABANG, BELAWAN MAR 70

(c) TRINCOMALEE OCT 70

HIMGIRI (a) BASRA, BAHREIN NOV 75

KADMATT (a) NAGASAKI, MANILA, JAN 69 Homeward after

SINGAPORE Commissioning

KALVARI (a) LE HAVRE, LAS PALMAS, APR-JUN 68 Homeward after

CONAKRY, MAURITIUS Commissioning

(b) PORT SWETTENHAM, NOV-DEC 74

HONGKONG To Vladivostok for Medium
AUG-SEP 76 Repairs
(c) MANILA, PORT
SWETTENHAM Homeward after Medium
Repairs.
KAMORTA (a) NAGASAKI, MANILA, JAN 69 Homeward after
SINGAPORE Commissioning

KARANJ (a) LA PALLICE LAS PALMAS, DEC 69-JAN Homeward after

LAGOS, DIEGO SUAREZ 70 Commissioning

KATCHALL (a) HONGKONG, SINGAPORE FEB 70 Homeward after

Commissioning
(b) COLOMBO FEB-MAR 74
KAVARATTI (a) HONGKONG, SINGAPORE FEB 70 Homeward after
Commissioning
(b) COLOMBO FEB-MAR 74

KESARI (a) LE HAVRE,TUNIS, SEP-OCT 75 Homeward after

ALEXANDRIA, ADEN Commissioning
KHANDERI (a) ANTWERP, CASABLANCA, MAR-MAY 69 Homeward after
MATADI, MAURITIUS Commissioning

KHUKRI (a) PENANG MAR 68

(b) ABU DHABI, MUSCAT, FEB 71

SALALAH, BAHREIN, ADEN
KILTAN (a) HONGKONG, SINGAPORE DEC 69 Homeward after
Commissioning

KIRPAN (a) PENANG MAR 68

(b) ADEN FEB 71

(c) DUBAI, DOHA, NOV 75

KURSURA (a) GOTEBORG, LA CORUNNA, FEB-APR 70 Homeward after
TAKORADI, MAURITIUS Commissioning

KUTHAR (a) KUWAIT MAR 65

(b) BAHREIN, KUWAIT MAR-APR 67

(c) SINGAPORE MAR 68

(d) ADEN FEB 71

(e) COLOMBO APR 71

(f) BANDAR ABBAS SEP 74

(g) COLOMBO AUG 75

MYSORE (a) MALE, COLOMBO MAY 66

(b) SIHANOUKVILLE FEB 68

(c) COLOMBO, MALE, GAN FEB 69

(d) ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MAY-JUN 72

MUSCAT, BAHREIN, BASRA,
KUWAIT,BANDAR ABBAS,
SHARJAH
JAN-FEB 73 Ethiopian Navy Day
(e) DJIBOUTI, JEDDAH,
MASSAWA
JAN 75

(f) MALE
NILGIRI (a) JAKARTA, BALI, BANGKOK, JUN-JUL Flag showing goodwill visit
SINGAPORE, COLOMBO after commissioning
 (b) BANDAR ABBAS 73SEP 74

(c) MAURITIUS MAR 75

Mauritius Independence
Day
NISTAR (a) TUNIS, TANGIER, LAS AUG-OCT 71 Homeward after
PALMAS, DAKAR, POINT Commissioning
NOIRE, MAURITIUS
RAJPUT (a) BANGKOK FEB 68

RANA (a) MALE APR 67

(b) KUWAIT, DUBAI, BU DHABI JAN-FEB 69

RANJIT (a) MALE APR 67

(b) SOURABAYA, SINGAPORE, MAR 68

PORT SWETTENHAM
SHARDUL (a) LE HAVRE, TUNIS DEC 75 Homeward after
Commissioning

TALWAR (a) MUSCAT, BASRA MAR 65

(b) ABADAN, BASRA MAR-APR 67

(c) MAURITIUS, TEMA, FEB-APR 68 To Riga to escort Kalvari

TAKORADI, DAKAR, home
GIBRALTAR, CADIZ, ANTWERP,
RIGA
APR-JUL 68
(d) LE HAVRE, GIBRALTAR,
CASABLANCA, LAS PALMAS, Escorting Kalvari
DAKAR,CONAKRY, TAKORADI, homeward
MAURITIUS
JAN-MAR 71
(e) BAHREIN, PORT SUDAN,
MASSAWA, ADEN, ABU DHABI, Ethiopian Navy Day
MUSCAT, SALALAH
APR-MAY 71
(f) COLOMBO
SEP 74
(g) COLOMBO
TRISHUL (a) ABADAN, BASRA MAR-APR 67 EXPO 70 at Tokyo, Japan.

(b) KUWAIT, BAHREIN, JAN-FEB 69

SHARJAH
APR-MAY 70
(c) MANILA, TOKYO,
KOBE, HONG-KONG, PENANG MAY 71

(d) COLOMBO MAR 75

 (e) GAN NOV 75

(f) BUSHIRE, ABU DHABI

VAGHSHEER LE HAVRE, DAKAR, TAKORAD MAR 75 Homeward after
IMAURITIUS, LE HAVRE, Commissioning
VAGIR LAS PALMAS, TAKORADI, MAR-APR 74
MAURITIUSLE HAVRE, Homeward after
VAGLI POINTE NOIRE, MAURITIUS, NOV-DEC 74 Commissioning
LE HAVRE, LAS PALMAS,
TAKORADI, MAURITIUS Homeward after
VELA NOV-DEC 73
Commissioning

Homeward after
Commissioning
VIKRANT (a) KUWAIT MAR 65

(b) BAHREIN,KUWAIT MAR-APR 67

(c) COLOMBO AUG 75

(d) BANDAR ABBAS, KUWAIT NOV 75

VISIT OF TRAINING SHIPS TO FOREIGN PORTS

: 1965 to 1975

SHIP PORTS VISITED YEAR REMARKS

TIR (a) MOMBASA, SEYCHELLES JAN-FEB 65

(b) COLOMBO OCT 65

(c) ADEN, MASSAWA, JAN-MAR 67

ALEXANDRIA, PORT SUDAN

(d) MOMBASA,DAR-ES- AUG-SEP 67

SALAAM, DIEGO
SUAREZ,SEYCHELLES
FEB-MAR 68
e) MASSAWA, ADEN,
BAHREIN, KUWAIT

FEB 69
f) PENANG, PORT
SWETTENHAM, SINGAPORE

g) JAKARTA, SEP-OCT 70
FREMANTLE, Captain Cook
Centenary BUNBURY,
SOURABAYA SEP 74

h) SABANG, BELAWAN, MAR-APR 75

 PENANG

j) HODEIDA, ADEN
CAUVERY (a) PORT SWETTENHAM, SEP-OCT 66
COLOMBO
AUG-SEP 68
(b) DAR-ES-SALAAM, DIEGO
SUAREZ, SEYCHELLES
FEB-MAR 69
(c) PENANG, PORT
SWETTENHAM, SINGAPORE
JAN-FEB 70
(d) DUBAI, KUWAIT, ABU
DHABI, ADEN, MASSAWA
SEP-OCT 70 Captain Cook
(e) JAKARTA, FREMANTLE, Centenary
BUNBURY, SOURABAYA
MAY-71
(f) COLOMBO
MAR-APR 73
(g) MOMBASA, ZANZIBAR,
DAR-ES- SALAAM
OCT 73
(h) PENANG, COLOMBO
SEP 74
(j) SABANG, BELAWAN,
MAR-APR 74
PENANG Tow of AMAR to
Mauritius
MAR-APR 75
(k) PORT LOUIS

(l) HODEIDA, ADEN

KRISHNA (a) DAR-ES-SALAAM, DIEGO AUG-SEP 68
SUAREZ, SEYCHELLES

(b) BANDAR ABBAS, BAHREIN, JAN-FEB 70

BASRA, MUSCAT, ADEN,
MASSAWA
MAR-APR 73
(c) MOMBASA, ZANZIBAR,
DAR-ES- SALAAM
OCT 73
(d) PENANG, COLOMBO
MAR-APR 74 Tow of AMAR to
(e) PORT LOUIS Mauritius
DELHI (a) MOMBASA, ZANZIBAR, MAR-APR 73
DAR-ES-SALAAM

(b) PENANG, COLOMBO OCT 73

(c) ADDU ATOLL, PORT LOUIS MAR-APR 74 Handing over AMAR

to Mauritius
(d) SABANG, BELAWAN,
 PENANG SEP 74

(e) HODEIDA, ADEN MAR-APR 75

CHAPTER 36

COMMISSIONINGS AND DECOMMISSIONINGS

COMMISSIONING OF INDIAN NAVAL SHIPS : 1965 to 1975

NAME DATE SHIP TYPE

GHARIAL 17 FEB 66 Landing Ships Tank

(Medium)
GULDAR 13 SEP 66
PAMBAN 18 FEB 67
PANVEL 18 FEB 67
PANAJI 16 MAR 67 Patrol Boats
PURI 16 MAR 67
PULICAT 16 MAR 67
DEEPAK 20 NOV 67 Fleet Tanker
BHATKAL 08 JUN 68 Inshore
Minesweeper
KAMORTA 21 NOV 68 Petya class
submarine chaser
KADMATT 23 DEC 68 Petya class
submarine chaser
AMBA 28 DEC 68 Submarine Depot
Ship
AMAR 11 JUL 69 Seaward Defence
Boat MK I
KILTAN 30 OCT 69 Petya Class
Submarine chaser
AJIT 09 DEC 69 Seaward Defence
Boat MK I
KATCHALL 23 DEC 69 Petya Class
Submarine Chaser
KAVARATTI 23 DEC 69 Petya Class
Submarine Chaser
ATUL 11 JUN 70 Seaward Defence
Boat MK I
 BULSAR 19 JUN 70 Inshore
Minesweeper
VINASH 20 JAN 71
NIRGHAT 29 JAN 71
VIDYUT 16 FEB 71 Missile boats
NIRBHIK 20 FEB 71
NASHAK 19 MAR 71
VIJETA 27 MAR 71
NISTAR 29 MAR 71 Submarine Rescue
Vessel
VEER 02 APR 71 Missile boats
NIPAT 26 APR 71
NILGIRI 03 JUN 72 Leander Class
Frigate
ARNALA 29 JUN 72
ANDROTH 30 JUN 72 Petya Class
Submarine Chasers
ANJADIP 23 DEC 72
GAJ 20 SEP 73 Fleet Tug
ANDAMAN 28 DEC 73 Petya Class
Submarine Chaser
HIMGIRI 23 NOV 74 Leander Class
Frigate
AMINI 12 DEC 74 Petya Class
Submarine Chaser
GHORPAD 16 JAN 75
KESARI 15 AUG 75 Landing Ships Tank
(Medium)
SHARDUL 24 NOV 75
SHARABH 27 JAN 76

COMMISSIONING OF SUBMARINE 1965 - 75

NAME DATE
KALVARI 08 DEC 67
KHANDERI 06 DEC 68
KARANJ 04 SEP 69
KURSURA 18 DEC 69
VELA 31 AUG 73
VAGIR 03 NOV 73
VAGLI 10 AUG 74
 VAGSHEER 26 DEC 74

COMMISSIONING OF NAVAL AIR SQUADRONS :

1965-1975

SQUADRONDATE AIRCRAFT TYPE ROLE

INAS 321 15 MAR 1969ALOUETTE Search &
and Logistic Support
INAS 330 17 APR 1971SEAKING ALOUETTE Anti Submarine
INAS 561 15 SEP 1971HUGHES 300Helicopter Training
SAR
ALOUETTE
INAS 331 15 MAY 1972MATCH Role Frigate borne Helicopter
INAS 336 20 DEC 1974SEAKING Anti Submarine
SOON AFTER 1975
INAS 312 18 NOV 1976Super Constellation ex IAF
Maritime Reconnaissance
INAS 315 07 OCT 1977IL 38 Maritime Reconnaissance
and Anti Submarine
Warfare (MRASW

COMMISSIONING OF SHORE ESTABLISHMENTS : 1965 to 1975

STABLISHMENT DATE LOCATION ROLE

INS AGRANI 18 SEP 65 COIMBATORE Petty Officers
Leadership School
INHS JEEVANTI 18 APR 66 GOA Naval Hospital
INS VIRBAHU 19 MAY 71 VISAKHAPATNAM Submarine
Headquarters
INS DWARKA 26 NOV 72 OKHA Advance
Base
INS AGNIBAHU 09 JAN 73 BOMBAY Missile Boat
(Colaba) Headquarters
INS KARDIP 28 SEP 73 NICOBARS Advance Base
Kamorta)
INS TUNIR 07 JUN 74 BOMBAY Missile
(Karanja) Preparation
Facility
INS NETAJI 05 JUL 74 CALCUTTA Naval
SUBHASH Establishment
INHS 07 OCT 74 PORT BLAIR Naval Hospital
DHANVANTARI
INS 21 DEC 74 VISAKHAPATNAM Integrated Type
SATAVAHANA Training School
for Russian
Acquisitions
INS MANDOVI 05 JAN 76 GOA Naval Academy

DECOMMISSIONING OF INDIAN NAVAL SHIPS : 1965 to 1975

SL.NO SHIPS DATE SHIP TYPE

1. SHAKTI 31 DEC 67 Tanker
2. RANA 30 SEP 71 Fleet Destroyer
3 GOMATI 31 MAY 72 Escort Destroyer
(Hunt Class)
4. GANGA 31 JUL 72 Escort Destroyer
(Hunt Class)
5. KONKAN 31 JUL 72 Minesweeper/Diving
Tender
6. HATHI 30 SEP 72 Fleet Tug
7. BIMLIPATNAM 31 DEC 72 Inshore
minesweeper
8. RAJPUT 30 JUN 73 Fleet Destroyer
9. SAVITRI 15 JUN 74 Central Board of
10. SARAYU 15 JUN 74 Revenue Patrol
11. SUVARNA 15 JUN 74 Craft
12. SUBHADRA 15 JUN 74
13. INVESTIGATOR 30 SEP 74 Survey Ship
14. RANJIT 30 SEP 75 Fleet Destroyer
15. DHARINI 31 DEC 75 Store Ship

CHAPTER 37

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEWS OF THE FLEET

In this tradition inherited from the British Navy, the Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces reviews the Navy as if on Parade. Traditionally, the
President of India reviews the Indian Fleet once during his tenure in
office. There have, however, been two occasions when reviews were done
by other personages- by the Shah of Iran in 1956 and by Defence
Minister YB Chavan in 1964 on behalf of President Radhakrishnan who
was indisposed.

The Presidential Review is an impressive ceremony, second only to the

Republic Day Parade. Naval ships and ships from maritime organisations
like the Coast Guard, the Merchant Navy, the National Institute of
Oceanography, the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Training Ship
Rajendra and Naval Yardcraft are anchored precisely in neat lines and
dressed overall.
The President embarks in a naval ship nominated as the Presidential
Yacht which flies the President's Colour. After receiving a 21 gun salute,
the President reviews the Fleet by cruising past each line of ships. Each
ship's side is manned by her ships company in white ceremonial uniform.
As the President passes by, each ships company, in unison, `take off'
their caps in salutation and give three resounding `Jais'.

At sunset, all ships at the anchorage participate in a fireworks display.

With the ships covering a wide expanse, the entire harbour appears to be
aflame. As darkness descends, all ships, in unison, switch on their
garlands of lights which accentuate their silhouettes.

To date, all reviews have been held in Bombay Harbour.

No Fleet Reviews were held for

a) President Zakir Hussain during his tenure from 13 May 1967 to 03 May
1969.

b) President N Sanjiva Reddy during his tenure from 25 July 1977 to 24

Jul 1982.

As a prelude to the Presidents Review in 1969, naval aircraft gave an

aerial fire power demonstration and aerobatic display off Marine Drive in
Bombay, from where thousands watched the aircraft decimating anchored
targets.

On the day of the Review in 1969, 20 Seahawks, 6 Alizes, 4 Vampires and

7 Alouette helicopters flew past in two formations - one depicting an
anchor and the other depicting the letters "IN".

Date Naval Submarines Aircraft & Coast Yard Mercantile Reviewed b

Ships Helicopters Guard Ships Ships
of
Craft
10 Oct 25 - 6 Sealands 7 - 1 President Dr
1953 Rajendra
Prasad
06 Mar 12 - - - - - The Shah of
1956 Iran
20 Apr 31 - 12 - 9 - Defence Minis
1964 YB Chavan
because Presid
Radha krishnan
was indisposed
10 Feb 10 at - - - - - PresidentS
1966 sea Radhakrishn
28 Dec 45 1 33 Navy 5 - 8 President VV
1969 Giri
11 Jan 43 5 5 Navy - - 6 President
1976 Fakhrudin A
Ahmed
12 Feb 45 3 32 Navy 2 7 9 President
1984 Giani Zail
5 CG Singh

15 48 8 29 Navy 2 4 10 President R
Feb1989 Venkataram
8 CG

THE PRESIDENTS COLOUR

Since ancient times, in all countries, armies and navies, the monarch
used to fly his flag to visually indicate his location to his dispersed forces.
In India, this flag was called the "dhwaj". The Romans carried flags called
"standards" on tall poles topped by eagles. In battle those flags served as
a central point of reference. If the flag ceased to be visible, it indicated
that the personage had either been defeated or had fled. The flag
therefore was a rallying point, well defended in battle. In peacetime, it
was a focus for pageantry because it was a personal symbol of the
monarch.

In the British Navy when the monarch embarked in a naval ship, the
`Royal Standard' was flown at the highest mast. When admirals were
embarked in large sailing fleets, they flew their personal flags at the
highest points of their respective flagships. These fleets of sailing
warships were usually organised in three segments- the van, the centre
and the rear, with the seniormost admiral in the centre. The Vice Admiral
in the Van (ie front) and the Rear Admiral in the rear. The Rear Admiral's
flag had two red roundels on a white flag with red strips dividing it into
four quadrants. The Vice Admiral's flag had only one red roundel and the
Admiral's flag had just the quadrantal red strips and no roundels. In battle
at sea, these personal flags fulfilled the same function of a rallying point,
much as a "Standard" did in a battles land.

In Britain, the monarch used to present "colours" to the Navy, Army and
Airforce as well as to the Commanders in Chief of the forces. This "Kings
Colour" was paraded ashore on very special ceremonial occasions. In
1924, King George presented his colours to the British Navy. In the
following years, Kings Colours were presented to the Commanders in
Chief of the main naval ports at Portsmouth, Plymouth and Chatham and
to the Commanders in Chief of the British Fleets in Britain and abroad. In
1935, the Kings Colours were presented to the Royal Indian Navy.

India became a republic on 26 January 1950. One day earlier, on 25

January, all 33 of the Kings Colours which had been presented to the
Royal Indian Navy, Royal Indian Army and Royal Indian Air Force and
their respective Commands were "laid up" at the Indian Military Academy
at Dehradun. From 26 January 1950 onwards, the use of the prefix
`Royal' was discontinued.

On 27 February 1951, the British Commander in Chief of the Indian Navy,

Vice Admiral Sir Edward Parry, wrote to the Defence Minister

"As you know, before India became a Republic the Naval custom
was to parade the Kings Colours ashore on special ceremonial
occasions. On and after January 26th, 1950, however, this practice
ceased and the ordinary Indian Naval ensign has been paraded
instead. It would be a privilege of which the service would be
extremely proud if the President would honour the Indian Navy by
presenting to it a special flag which would be paraded on important
occasions in the same manner as the King's Colours used to be.

"I am attaching a drawing which shows the Indian Naval White

ensign with the Asoka Lion, the emblem of India, in the centre, and
an elephant in the lower right quarter. The shape of the elephant is
the same as the one which appears in outline in the top right
quarter of the President's flag. The elephant symbolises "strength
and stability" and has been chosen in lieu of the vase and lotus
flower which appears in the lower right quarter of the President's
flag. I feel that the lotus emblem representing "peace and plenty"
would not be appropriate if shown in a flag belonging to a fighting
force.

"If you agree with the proposal for a President's Colour to be

presented to the Indian Navy, I should be grateful if you would
submit the design to the President, and request him if he would be
gracious enough to present the flag when made."

Following the British tradition of the Navy being the senior of the three
armed services, the Indian Navy was the first to be presented with the
President's Colours on 27 May 1951. In the years that followed, as the
navy grew in size and function, Presidents Colours were presented to the
Naval Commands and the Fleet.
 Presented to the By President On (Date)
Indian Navy Dr Rajendra Prasad 27 May 1951
Southern Naval Giani Zail Singh 26 November
Command 1984
Eastern Naval Giani Zail Singh 25 March 1987
Command
Western Naval Shri R Venkataraman 22 February
Command 1990
Western Fleet Dr Shankar Dayal 09 March 1997
Sharma

From 15 Aug 71, the use of `Personal Standards' by the President,

Governors and Lieutenant Governors was discontinued. Instead the
National flag was to be flown when these standards used to be
displayed.

NAVY DAY

On 21 October 1944, the Indian Navy celebrated Navy Day for the first
time. This met with considerable success and aroused enthusiasm not
only in the ports where parades were held but also in inland centres
where public meetings were organised. Seeing its success, it was decided
to organise similar functions every year on a larger scale and later in the
season when the weather was cooler. Accordingly, Navy Day 1945 was
celebrated in Bombay and Karachi on 1 December.

In due course and until 1972, Navy Day came to be celebrated on 15

December and the week in which 15 December fell was observed as the
Navy Week.

At the Senior Naval Officers Conference in May 72, it was decided that :

(a) Navy Day would be celebrated on 4 December to commemorate

the very successful naval actions in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of
Bengal during the Indo Pakistan War of December 1971.

(b) Navy Week would be observed from 1 to 7 December.

CHAPTER 38
 DIVING CADRE AND THE CHARIOT PROJECT

THE DIVING CADRE

PREAMBLE

The Navy's Diving Cadre was modeled entirely on that of the British
Navy. There were two categories - deep divers and shallow divers. The
years till 1965 witnessed a steady rise in the demand for naval diving
assistance. The main constraint was the acute shortage of divers, the lack
of a diving tender and the lack of diving boats.

DEVELOPMENTS 1966 TO 1975

The 1964-69 Plan accepted the need for Clearance Diving teams for the
major ports and the Fleet.

In 1965, approval was accorded in principle to the formation of three

clearance diving teams with additional instructors and the necessary
equipment. The cadre of clearance divers and the allowances and dip
moneys payable to them was also agreed upon.

In June 1966, sanction was accorded for the setting up of a Clearance

Diving Cadre comprising 5 officers and 44 sailors, to form three Clearance
Diving Teams, one each for Bombay, Visakhapatnam and the Fleet. These
teams could be quickly deployed to render diving assistance to the
organisation who sought their assistance.

Diving Tenders

The Defence Plan 1966-71 had provided for two tugs. The sanction for the
first Ocean Going Tug, GAJ had provided for it to have a large
Recompression Chamber and a Portable One-Man Recompression
Chamber.

In 1967, it was learnt that the Pakistan Navy had acquired midget
submarines and chariots for clandestine underwater attack by
frogmen/commandos on ships when in harbour. Till then, only one
Clearance Diving Team had been raised in Bombay. Immediately, the
urgency increased to expand the Diving Cadre and improve its
effectiveness and its capability.

In 1968, to attract volunteers for diving duties, the rates of Sailors

Retaining Sea and Diving Pay (dip money) were revised upward.

Until 1968, there had been no central organisation responsible either for
the repair of diving equipment or to certify its serviceability. In 1968, this
responsibility was entrusted to the Weapons Department of the Bombay
Dockyard and its staff augmented by experienced clearance divers.

Till 1970, the acute shortage of divers persisted.

In 1971, with the induction of the Submarine Resue Vessel NISTAR and
its Deep Diving capability, the Navy's proposal was accepted that the
Diving Cadre be reorganised into five categories:-

(a) Clearance Rs. 75 Monthly

Diving Officers Allowance
(b) Deep Diving
Rs. 75
Officers
(c) Ship Diving
Rs. 40
Officers
(d) Deep Divers Rs. 60
(e) Ship Divers Rs. 35

The personnel of the erstwhile Deep Diver and Shallow Diver categories
were given the option to convert to Clearance/Deep Divers and Ship
Divers respectively or retain their existing qualifications till they retired. It
was hoped that the monthly allowance for ship divers would encourage
volunteers to fill the large Diving Cadre which Government was going to
sanction.

In October 1971, sanction was accorded for a revised Diving Cadre of 661
Diving Specialist officers, Clearance Divers and Ship Divers, as against the
original total sanction of only 150.

The acute shortage of divers manifested itself during the 1971 war, when
ships bottoms had to be searched repeatedly to counter the threat of
enemy frogmen.

In May 1972, only 200 divers were borne. The crash diver training
programme, prepared to complete the training of over 400 divers by
1977, envisaged;-

(a) Training of 350 divers in Cochin by end 74.

(b) Preponing the commissioning of the Submarine Escape Training

Tower/Naval Diving School at Vishakapatnam.

(c) Withdrawing experienced divers to act as instructors.

In early 1972, the Submarine Rescue Vessel NISTAR was positioned in

Cochin to train Deep Sea divers and other trainees from the Diving
School, Cochin. Practical training was carried out in the deep waters off
Kovalam, near Trivandrum.
The biggest difficulty in sustaining the momentum of the crash
programme to increase the number of divers was the lack of a diving
tender. KONKAN, who had been doing diving tender duties since 1963,
had reached the end of its life. On the one hand, the long awaited new
ocean going tug, GAJ, had yet to be delivered. In the absence of GAJ, the
only other vessel available for diving tender duties was NISTAR. On the
other hand, the deployment of NISTAR to Cochin had resulted in her
maintenance routines becoming overdue. NISTAR was also due for her
guarantee closing refit in March 1972, which, if delayed, would affect the
terms of her one year guarantee. A decision had therefore been taken
that the old destroyer RANJIT was to be converted for diving duties during
her next refit. However the cost of Ranjit's refit was found to be
prohibitive. It was therefore decided to make the maximum possible use
of NISTAR until GAJ commissioned in end 73.

In 1973, special boards were constituted for the medical examination of

divers.

In end 1973, approval was accorded for revised scales of diving

equipment for all ships and diving teams, which would provide for the
bottom searches of ships against underwater sabotage.

In 1974, one officer and four sailors qualified as Deep Sea Divers from
NISTAR in the first such course conducted by the Navy.

In 1975, NISTAR, for the first time, carried out extensive deep sea diving
up to a depth of 100 meters.

In 1975, orders were placed for import of the latest diving equipment.
Equipment shortages were expected to be made good by 1977.

In end 1975, the borne strength of naval divers still remained well short
of what had been sanctioned:

Category Sanctioned Borne

Clearance Diver Officer 30(20 + 50%
17
(CDO) Reserve)
Ships Diver Officer 94(47 +
90
(SDO) 100% " )
Clearance Diver 1st 39(26 +
20
Class(CD1) 50% " )
Clearance Diver 2nd 53(37 +
22
Class (CD2) 50% " )
Clearance Diver 3rd 103(69 +
48
Class(CD3) 50% " )
470(235 +
Ships Diver (SD) 227
100% " )
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1975

The Naval Dockyard Bombay delivered four 45 foot diving boats. The
Diving equipment ordered in 1975 started arriving from 1976
onwards.

THE CHARIOT PROJECT

In September 1972, a team was sent to Italy to finalise the acquisition of

midget submarines and chariots from the same Italian firm which had
earlier supplied midgets and chariots to the Pakistan Navy in 1967. The
team was tasked to evaluate, negotiate and contract for midget
submarines and chariots.

The team did not consider it worthwhile to acquire midget submarines

because of :

(a) Their unsuitability for long range operations in tropical waters.

(b) The difficult problems of manning these craft.

(c) The uncertainty of their continued maintain- ability.

Chariots could however be used for commando operations even without

midget submarines.

The team signed a contract for the acquisition of six chariots along with
supporting equipment, spares and explosives.

Acceptance trials were carried out in 1974. The chariots arrived in 1975
and were based in Bombay. The first replacement crew was trained by
1976. On 1 May 80, the newly built chariot complex was commissioned as
INS ABHIMANYU.

The basic role of the chariot complex was to determine the defensive
measures to be instituted to defend Bombay against possible attack by
Pakistan's midget submarine's and chariots. In addition, on an ongoing
basis, the chariots were to exercise ships in harbour in Operation
AWKWARD procedures. When required, the chariots could also be
deployed operationally.

Initially, considerable difficulties were experienced in identifying and

earmarking a ship to embark the chariots, take them well out to sea and
then lower them safely into the water to go in and carry out dummy
attacks on ships in Bombay Harbour. Eventually, AMBA, who had by then
been re-based in Bombay to support the VELA Class submarines on the
West Coast, was found to be most suitable as a chariot launching
platform. In tactical exercises, both AMBA and the chariots performed
efficiently and successfully.

CHAPTER 39

TRANSFER OF NAVAL SHIPS TO FOREIGN NAVIES

BANGLADESH

After the 1971 Indo Pakistan war, the erstwhile East Pakistan became
an independant state called Bangladesh. Bangladesh sought the
assistance of the Indian Navy to help start the Bangladesh Navy. In April
1973 and July 1974, Seaward Defence Boats INS AKSHAY and AJAY were
transferred to the Bangladesh Navy, who renamed them as BNS PADMA
and SURMA respectively.

MAURITIUS

In the early 1970s, the Government of Mauritius was in need of a

vessel which could help protect maritime and fishing rights, help in
air/sea rescue, rescue fishermen in distress and check smuggling and
other illegal traffic. The Government of India offered to gift the Seaward
Defence Boat INS AMAR. The Government of Mauritius accepted the offer.
Mauritian officers and sailors were trained in India. AMAR was towed to
Mauritius by the Training Squadron and handed over in March 74 to
become MNS AMAR to start with and later CGS AMAR.

In 1989, the Mauritius Coast Guard was formed. A marine training

establishment was set up and a Dornier surveillance aircraft was acquired
from India.

In the early 1990's, the Mauritius Coast Guard expanded. It acquired

another Seaward Defence Boat from India and its second Coast Guard
aircraft from Britain.

Indian Naval Officers have helped to set up the Mauritian Coast Guard, to
man and maintain its vessels, to train Coast Guard personnel to operate
the Dornier aircraft, to train Mauritian personnel for the mercantile marine
and to render technical assistance whenever requested.

UTILISATION OF PAKISTAN MERCHANT SHIPS SEIZED DURING

THE 1971 WAR
Four Pakistani merchant ships were seized - PASNI (GRT 1203) ANWAR
BAKSH (GRT 7235), BAQIR (GRT 9326) and MADHUMATI (GRT 3311).

As per international law and practice, these vessels were treated as the
property of the Government of India. They were utilised as follows:

(a) On 17 Apr 72, BAQIR was renamed MV HOOGHLY and manned

by the Shipping Corporation of India for transporting troops and
stores from Bangladesh to India. Thereafter, she transported the
Army Garrison to Port Blair. Later in 1972, she was commissioned
as INS ADHAR and used for the transportation of stores and
material between the mainland and the A&N Islands and between
the naval ports. In January 74, ADHAR was chartered to the Mogul
Line for four years at Rs 75000 per month, renamed as LOK ADHAR
and used for coastal service. On completion of the charter periods,
LOK ADHAR was disposed of by the Navy.

(b) In June 72, Government decided that ANWAR BAKSH,

MADHUMATI and PASNI would be handed over to the SCI who
would run these ships and pay the Navy an agreed amount. Later,
as a gesture of goodwill, these three ships were handed over to
Bangladesh-MADHUMATI and PASNI in April 73 and ANWAR BAKSH
in November 74.

CHAPTER 40

ASSISTANCE RENDERED BY THE NAVY IN PEACE TIME 1965 - 1975

Naval Assistance to Ships In Distress At Sea

Month & Assistance Nature of Assistance Location By IN ships

Year Rendered to
Jul 65 SS Avra Rescue of crew before Between DHARINI,
ship sank. Bombay BEAS
and Madras

Jul 65 SS Marviki Rescue of crew Kola Bay near KARWAR

beached Goa
Aug 65 Customs Rescue in distress Between Port SHARDA
Launch Novo and
Cuddalore

Sep 66 Ceylonese Rescue of fishermen Bay of Bengal DELHI

fishing boat
Sep 66 Fishing Vessel Search and Rescue. Off Quilon RAJPUT,RANA and
`Kerala 15' Vessel located Naval aircraft
and brought to
Cochin

Apr 67 Dhow Rescue of 13 crew Off Janjira SUTLEJ

Digvijaya harbour
Sagar on fire
Feb 68 Fishing Rescue of 40 fishermen Off Kakinada PAMBAN & PANAJI
Vessels
Mar 68 Canadian Sail Location of Canadian Off Kardip -
Boat crew Island
May 68 SS Bharat Rescue of entire crew (A & N
Ratna Islands)BEAS
grounded off
Gopinath Port

May 68 INS Sukanya Salvage Off Madras GHARIAL, GULDAR

aground
Jul 68 SS Vardhini Assistance for DARSHAK
emergency Off
Bombay repairs to
boilers and pumping
out flooded engine
room
May 69 SS Shujaat Towing of distressed From off GANGA
ship Cannanore to
Cochin

May 70 SS Damodar Towing of ship 320 km NW of KHUKRI

Zuari disabled by leak in Bombay
engine room
Jul 70 SS Bergehaus Evacuation of stretcher Off Goa Naval helicopter
patients
Aug 70 SS Ampuria Salvage of 15,552 tons Saurashtra DEEPAK,DARSHAK,
grounded off of crude oil INVESTIGATOR, Yard
Porbander Craft DHRUVAK

Nov 70 SS Search for missing ship Off East Bengal TIR

Mahajagmitra after cyclone Coast
Jul 71 INS Ajit Search and rescue of Bay of Bengal CAUVERY
foundered survivors after sinking
Feb 72 MV Vishwa Rescue of crew after Off Chittagong CANANORE,
Kusum ship hit by drifting BULSAR, BHATKAL
mine
Apr 72 Tugs and Salvage of grounded Off Great Coco MAGAR,AJAY
Barges of vessels Island
Shipping
Corporation of
India

Sep 72 SS Sanjeevani Towing From off GODAVARI

Mangalore to
Goa
Jun 73 SS Cosmos Assistance to grounded Saurashtra BETWA
Pioneer ship
grounded off
Porbandar

Aug 73 MT Sea Song Medical Assistance High seas KIRPAN

Sep 73 Fishing Search for missing Between Naval ships and IAF
Trawler Akshi vessel Madras and aircraft
Maru Calcutta
Dec 73 Fishing Search and rescue 200 miles Naval aircraft
Trawler southwest of
Iswary Cochin

Dec 73 MV Sonavati Search and rescue of Off KAMORTA

survivors after cyclone Visakhapatnam
Sep 74 Fishing Vessel Search,location and Off Quilon Naval helicopter
Lady of Snow provision of food and
water for crew

Sep 74 SS Rescue of crew from Lakshadweep GAJ

Transhuron, grounded tanker,
(American unloading of fuel oil
tanker) and diving assistance
grounded off
Kiltan island

1974 SS State of Medical assistance 600 miles TALWAR

Haryana southwest of
Bombay
Feb - Mar Two canoes Rescue Bay of Bengal Naval ships
75 carrying 45
Nicobarese
bound for
Chowra

Apr 75 Alouette heli Salvage Off Bombay NILGIRI

copter ditched
off Oil Rig
Sagar Samrat

Apr 75 MT Evit Evacuation of sick - KUTHAR

crew for hospitalisation
Aug 75 SS Bravery Escorting broken down Off Bombay AMINI
ship
Sep 75 SS Gulf Assistance - AMINI

Naval Aid to Civil Authorities

1965 Andaman & Nicobar Towing of Bombay to Port BEAS

Administration Passenger Blair
Ferry Yamuna
May 65 Garden Reach Work Towing of Tug Calcutta to AKSHAY,shops
Balwan Madras
Oct- Nov Mazagon Docks Towing of Madras to KISTNA
65 Ferry Ganga Bombay
Bombay to Port
Blair

Apr 66 Shri Mihir Sen's Coordination swim across the KONKAN, SHARDA,
of medical, communication SUKANYA
Palk Strait and diving
support

Apr 67 Swimming Federation Assistance to across Palk GANGA,SHARDA

of India swimmers strait Pamban
and Talaimanar
to Mannar to
Dhanushkodi

Apr- May Customs Department, carrying Calicut Off CANNANORE&

67 Apprehending craft contraband Cannanore GODAVARI

Sep 67 Bhabha Atomic Dumping of Off Bombay MAGAR

Research Centre low lying
radio-active waste harbour
Mar 69 Explorer's Club of Escort of From Calcutta Eastern Naval
India, Kanhoji Angre to Port Blair Command
Calcutta Rowing
Expedition to Port
Blair
Mar 70 Andaman & Nicobar Firefighting Port Blair NOIC Port Blair
Administration assistance
Mar 70 Gujarat Government Conveyance of Broach BULSAR
surgical team
for earthquake
victims

Jun 70 Karjat Civil Firefighting Karjat Town SHIVAJI

Authorities assistance
Dec 70 Customs Department Salvage and Off Goa NOIC GOA
Goa towing of large
abandoned
dhow

Nov 71 Paradip Port Trust Assistance in Paradip KAVARATTI

restoring
normalcy after
cyclone

72 Sep Government of Escorted of Visakhapatnam KAVARATTI

Bangladesh Bangladesh to Chittagong
Naval Ship
Padma

Nov 73 Customs Department Apprehending Andaman & PAMBAN

A&N contra band Nicobar islands
goods
Nov 73 Customs Department Apprehended a West Coast
dhow
engengaged in
smuggling

Jan 74 Andaman & Nicobar Firefighting Port Blair NOIC (A&N)

Administration assistance Market
Jun 74 Andaman & Nicobar Evacuation of Narkondam PANVEL
Administration seriously Island
injured
policeman
Jul 74 Bombay Municipal Supply of food Railway JAMUNA
Corporation by naval boats Hospital
to inundated
areas near
Bombay
Central

Aug 75 Oil and Natural Gas Towing Bombay High BRAHMAPUTRA

Commission drilling
platform To
Haken Magnus
1975 Oil and Natural Gas Ferry of Off Bombay Two Seakings of INAS
Commission Bombay personnel & 336
High oil drilling rigs stores to and
from

Sep 75 Bombay Port Trust Firefighting Hughes Dock VIKRANT

assistance
1975 Andaman & Nicobar Medical Car Nicobar FORTAN
Administration assistance
during
epidemic
Sep 75 Andaman & Nicobar Apprehension Off North GHORPAD
Administration of Thai fishing Sentinel Island
trawler

1975 Andaman & Nicobar Providing met Port Blair NOIC (A&N)
Administration data to Port
Blair airport to
enable
bi-weekly
air- service.

Sea Transportation

Month & Organisation Items/ Transported From To By IN Ships

Year Assisted Personnel
Apr 66 Military Service Engineering Heavy equipment Mainland Car GHARIAL
stores Nicobar&
Port Blair
Sep and Indian Navy Oil HSD Oil for Visakha Port Blair SHAKTI
Nov 66 Corporation filling patnam
Oct and Andaman & Football team Port Blair Visakha GHARIAL,
Nov 66 Nicobar patnam GULDAR
Administration and back
Nov 66 Military Service Engineering MES Stores and Visakha Port Blair GULDAR
explosives CPWD patnam
Apr 67 NCC NCC Cadets Cochin Amini & DHARINI
back
Jul 67 Ministry of From Rescue of 122 Lakshadweep Mainland DELHI
Home Affairs Minicoy, stranded
Kavaratti, personnel
Amini,
Kiltan,Chetlat
and Androth
Islands
Oct - Nov NCC 200 NCC Mainland Port Blair MAGAR
67 Cadets
Nov 67 Andaman & Football team Port Blair Calcutta -
Nicobar
Administration
Mar 68 Singapore Navy Sea Training of Singapore Cochin DEEPAK
naval officers
and cadets
May 68 Indian Air Force IAF stores Calcutta Port Blair MAGAR
May 68 Military Service Engineering Heavy Nicobar Port Blair MAGAR
stores equipment &
Car
Oct 68 National Defence 10 officers Visakhapatnam A&N MAGAR
College
Oct 68 Indian Army Personnel and Calcutta Port Blair MAGAR
stores
Apr & Ministry of Heavy Bhtpur Hut Bay GHARIAL
Nov 68 Rehabilitation machinery and
stores
Nov & Andaman & Football team Car Nicobar Visakha MAGAR
Dec 68 Nicobar patnam&back
Administration
Feb- Mar Indian Army Corps of Providing SAR Madras Port Blair
70 Engineers to and
sailing boats communication
and crew. cover

Apr 70 NCC NCC Cadets Kavaratti and Cochin GODAVARI,

back GANGA
AND
GOMATI
1975 Andaman & Two Visakha Campbell MAGAR
Nicobar consignments patnam Bay
Administration of buffaloes

Naval Assistance During Strikes/Bandhs

Month Organisation Assisted Nature of Assistance
& Year
Jan 65 Calcutta Port Trust Piloting and berthing of
ships during strike by
Assistant Harbour
Masters
Apr 66 Cochin Port Trust Maintenance of essential
services during strike by
Harbour craft crew.
Apr 66 Kandla Port Trust Operation of cranes to unload
essential cargo during strike
by crane drivers.
Nov 66 Civil Administration Visakhapatnam Guarding of Visakhapatnam
Steel Plant during agitation
Jul 67 Bombay Port Trust Movement of ships during
strike by Flotilla crew
Jan 73 Civil Administration Visakhapatnam Security of vital points in city
during Andhra disturbances
Sep 73 Civil Administration Cochin Manning of power generating
stations/ sub stations during
threatened strike by Kerala
State Electricity Board
Employees
Feb- Mar Calcutta Port Trust Undocking of ships and dry
74 docking of contractor's
dredger during Dry Dock Port
Worker's strike.
May 74 Central and Western Railways During strike of
employees:

(a) Servicing of
electric
locomotives,rakes,
traction motors
and electric
fittings.
(b) Repairs and
maintenance of
boilers
and generators in
power houses and
repairs of air
compressors
(c) Watchkeeping
and maintenance
at power
substations
Jan 75 Port Trusts Maintenance of essential
 at Calcutta,Visakhapatnam and services during All India Port
Madras and Dock Workers strike.

Diving Assistance

Month Assistance Rendered Place/Organisation Nature of Assistance

& to
Year
1965 Bhakra Nangal State Governments Diving assistance
Dam,
Tungabhadra
Dam and Mettur
Dam
1966 Hirakud Dam Orissa Government Diving assistance
1966 Bhakra Nangal Dam Punjab Government Diving assistance
1966 Central Excise Bombay Diving assistance
Department
1967 Nagarjuna Sagar State Governments Diving assistance
Dam, Bhakra Nangal
Dam, Dhakkam and
Dhanpur Dams
Jan 68 Hirakud Dam Orissa Government Underwater
sealing & cleaning
work
Apr- Dhakrani & Uttar Pradesh Modification of
May Dhalipur Power State Electricity trash racks
68 Stations Board
Apr- Chandbali Port Port Officer Salvage of 30 ton boat
Jun 68
May- King Georges Calcutta Port Trust Demolition of
Jun 68 Dock Extension underwater culverts
Jun- Gandhi Sagar Madhya Pradesh Underwater
Jul 68 Dam Government cutting/welding of
gates & pneumatic
removal of reinforced
concrete
Aug 69 Western Railway Bulsar (Gujarat) Assessment of
damage to five
railway bridges
between Bulsar
and Atul.
Jan 70 SS Eagle Mazagon Docks Repair to ship's hull
Mar 70 Rajasthan Atomic Atomic Energy Inspection and
Power Project Commission clearance of
ANUSHAKTI underwater debris
Apr 70 Cambata Aviation Bombay Recovery of crashed
helicopter
Apr 70 Tug Relume Mazagon Docks Clearance of fouled
(British) propellers
Aug 70 SS Tarreen Mazagon Docks Repairs to ships hull
Jan Oil and Natural Offshore Project, Inspection of legs
and Gas Commission Bhavnagar platform of drilling
Sep
70
1973 Burmah Shell Oil Bombay oil Underwater repair on
Company pipelines submarine
1973 Rihand Dam Uttar Pradesh Clearing the obstacles
Hydro electric State Electricity in the inlets to the
Station Board turbines
1973 Kidderpore Dock Calcutta Port Search for likely
Extension Trust sabotage
1973 Chambal Road Rajastan PWD Survey and
Bridge near Agra establishing cause
and extent of
damage to bridge.
1973 Indian Air Force Brahmaputra Recovery of
River crashed helicopter
and crew
1973 MV Robert Caltex oil Inspection of hull
Wattmiller Refineries (India at Vishakhapatnam
Ltd)
1974 Kakinada Port Port Officer Demolition of wreck
Kakinada
1974 MV Agios Port Officer, Salvaging 300 tons of
Antonios Karwar fuel oil
1974 Kerala Near Trichur Recovery of dead
Government bodies from bus fallen
into river
1974 MV Jagdoot & Hindustan Diving assistance
MOT Tug Shipyard
Visakhapatnam
1974 Badarpur Thermal Delhi Electric Clearance of
Power Project Supply underwater sump
Undertaking
Feb 75 Cochin Port Trust Cochin Salvage of three
submerged pontoons
Jun 75 Pullar Dam, Tamil Nadu State Shifting of sluice gates
Coimbatore Electricity Board
1975 Badarpur Thermal Delhi Electric Clearance of
Power Project Supply underwater
Undertaking obstructions in the
basin
1975 Bhavnagar Port Port Officer, Clearance of channels
Bhavnagar shipping for
1975 Mercantile Marine Cochin Inspection of SS
Dept. Amindivi's bottom
1975 Ramaswamy Kerala State Clearance of
Water Headworks Electricity Board underwater
Munnar obstructions
preventing
opening/ closing of
shutter
1975 Maini Shipping Co - Survey of SS
Nityanand's wreck
1975 M/S JM Baxi, Ship Visakhapatnam Underwater hull
Chandlers inspection of the
MV AJP Priya
1975 Customs Bombay Salvage of Custom
Department Craft Shakti
1975 Paradeep Port Paradeep Recovery of dredger's
Trust suction pump from the
sand
1975 Ramganga Kalagarh Placing of trash rack on
Project the intake shaft of
underground tunnel
1975 Rana Pratap Rajastan Underwater inspection
Sagar Dam and clearance of
stilling basin.

VIP Transportation

Month/Year VIP From To In Indian Naval Ships

May 1966 Indian High Colombo Male MYSORE
Commissioner in
Ceylon/Ambassador
to Maldives
Apr 1967 Defence Minister Bombay Goa VIKRANT
Feb 1968 Prime Minister Madras Port Blair MYSORE,RAJPUT,RANA, Khukri
and Kuthar
Feb 1969 Indian High Colombo Male MYSORE, GODAVARI
Commissioner in GOMATI
Ceylon/Ambassador
to Maldives
Apr 1969 Cabinet Secretary Madras A&N Islands GODAVARI,GOMATI
Defence Secretary
Home Secretary
Oct 1969 Prime Minister Goa LMA Islands VIKRANT,DEEPAK,
TRISHUL,KUTHAR
Mar 1970 Prime Minister shore Oil ONGC's DARSHAK and Naval helicopters
off- platform
 at Alibet
1970 President, Vice Kanyakumari Vivekananda Naval helicopters
President and Prime Rock
Minister Memorial
Nov 1970 Vice President Goa LMA Islands DEEPAK
Jan 1973 Vice President Port Blair Great DEEPAK, AMBA, KAMORTA,
Nicobar KATCHALL, KILTAN
Apr 1974 Up Raksha Mantri Cochin Kavaratti DELHI
Jan 1975 Prime Minister Cochin Male MYSORE, DEEPAK

CHAPTER-41

BATTLE CASUALTIES INDO PAKISTAN WAR (1971)

SUMMARY

Officers Sailors Total

INS KHUKRI 18 176 194
Alize 203 2 1 3
BANGLADESH
1 - 1
OPERATIONS
INS KILTAN 1 - 1
Total 22 177 199

INS KHUKRI (SUNK BY PAKISTAN NAVY SUBMARINE HANGOR ON 09 DEC

71)

Rank Name Rank Name

Ag Mahendra Nath Mulla Cdr(E) Mukadavil Ommen
Capt(X) Ommen
Lt Cdr(X) Joginder Krishan Suri Lt Cdr(L) Prabhat Kumar
Lt Cdr(S) Rajat Kumar Sen LtSD/TAS Manbar Singh
Lt(X) Suresh Hiranand Lt(L) Vinod Kumar Jain
Kundanmal
Lt Davinder Kumar Sharma Surg Lt Sudhanshu Sekhar Panda
Lt Madabhushi Sampath Sub Lt Satyedra Pal Singh
Kumar Kushwaha
Sub Lt Samvel Abraham Sub Lt Sushil Kumar
Sub Lt Shashi Prakash Sub Lt Guru Qal Singh Sandhu
Sub Lt Subhash Chander Sapra Midshipman Ashok Gulab Rao Patil
MCPO 2 Bansilal MCELP II OP Kohli
MAA KG Nair SCPO A Singh
CHME N Singh CHYS MA Prosperian
ERA 2 MK Unnikrishnan EAP 2 JS Harike
ERA 3 BN Singh ERA 3 S Mohan
ERA 3 P Balachandran EAP 3 TR Raju
EAP 3 SK Pathak SWA 3 SK Verma
WM 3 KS Mankotia MECH 3 AP Rana
PO SN Ram PO A Latif
PO Thottapura Chathunni PO CD Mandiri
Sidharthan
PO NS Kathait PO Wtr R Singh
PO Wtr HK Singh SPO R Piara
POME M Singh POME C Kachchap
POME MRC Nair POME R Singh
POEL(P) J Raj POEL(P) R Singh
PO Tel KS John PO Tel WP Manuel
ERA IV LS Sharma ERA IV GP Singh
EAP IV S Singh EAP IV Inderjit
EAP IV PR Krishnan EAP IV A Singh
EAP IV B Singh EAR IV KB Sadhies
EAP IV SC Chauhan AG ERAIV K Mukhopadya
LS Dhiman PO Std K Singh
PO Std HR Sharma POCK(S) Jabharden
LS Sridhar LS Desondhi Mal
LS M Singh LS MG Pandey
LS R Singh AG LS(TY) B Sasidharan
AG LS KR Joshi LME SS Malhan
LME Rameshwar LME JB Patil
LME B Malesappar LME YS Bhardwaj
LME RS Nimon LME SBS Chauhan
LMA P Singh Shekhawat L Wtr H Singh
L Wtr K Singh L Tel RS Parmar
L Tel Prakash Kulkarni L Tel A Sebastian
L Tel BD Manna LSIG PR Lokiaah
L Sig SS Yadav LMER Salg Ram
LEMP KM Kuria LEMP S Lal
EAR 5 E John EAR 5 Karam Chand Nandh
EAR 5 M Sharma EAR 5 K Chand
ERA 5 P Singh L STD TO Verghese
LCK (O) PK Sen LCK (S) S Shinde
LCK M Chand L Top Om Prakash
Sea I MS Negi Sea I AK Tripathi
Sea I BS Tangniya Sea I AK Sarkar
Sea I SK Das Sea I N Samanta
Sea I R Sankar Sea I SP Dutta
Sea I AK Jha Sea I Raj Kumar
Sea I I Singh Sea I Mohinder Pal
Sea I LG Werulkar Sea 1 Tilochan Samanta
 Sea I G Ravindranathan Nair Sea I VK Ramadavan Pillai
Sea I MV Somraj Sea 1 NS Gopalkrishnan Nair
Sea I John Thomas Sea I K Gurudas
Sea I RN Sahadevan Sea I Zainuddin
Sea I EP Verghese Sea I P Chand
Sea I CP Kurian Sea I SB Sami
Sea I A Kabilan Tel I HK Mehta
Tel I Parma Nand Tel I W Ray
Tel I S Thomas Sig I KK Sud
Sig I H Singh SA 1 KG Daniel
SA I A Ram ME I SN Pathak
ME I V Singh ME I SK Biswas
ME 1 TR Salunke ME I Hari Lal
ME 1 K Kabbur ME I KB Singh Guleria
ME I B Singh ME I VN Narayana
ME I G Venkatesan ME I R Gurumurthy
EMR I AK Khanna EMR I PL Sheemar
STD 1 VR More STD I P Ram
STD 1 S Dass CK I BK Mandal
CK (S) 1 TNS Shetty CK1 GB Singh
Wtr I M Halim Top I A Lal
Top I P Singh Sea II B Singh
Sea II V Venugopal Sea II RB Singh
Sea II Om Prakash Tyagi Sea II Raghbir Singh Yadav
Sea II SS Nirwal Sea II M Ram
Sea II R Singh Sea II N Chand
Sea II PL Devassy Emp II SN Krishnan
ME II KP Moideen ME II PC Maity
ME II Banshi Lal ME II HR Jat
ME II R Srinivasan ME II JNK Nair
EMP II Ram Anju EMP II KS Thakur
EMP II AP Mahanan Tel V Deshmukh
Tel AG Rajamani Tel B Singh
Tel KP Bhaskaran Tel N Balan
Sig B Das Sig P Chand
EMR II Hiralal Jat EMR II Hari Mitter
STD II Jagdish Chand STD II R Mahto
CK (S) H Singh CK (S) B Ram
CK(O) PS Rawat CK (O) A Raju
Top II Nandu Bhai APP UC Pandey

ALIZE 203 SHOT DOWN BY PAKISTAN

AIR FORCE F 104 AIRCRAFT ON 10 DEC 71
 Rank Name
Lt
Ashok Roy
Cdr(X)(P)
Harbir Singh
Lt(X)(O)
Sirohi
MCPOII MK Vijayan

BANGLADESH OPERATIONS

Lt (X) NM Samir Das

INS KILTAN

Lt Suresh Gajanan
(X) Samant

CHAPTER 42

AWARD WINNERS 1971 INDO PAKISTAN WAR

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

NHQ Naval CO Commanding (X) Executive Branch

Headquarters Officer
WNC Western Naval XO Executive Officer (E) Engineering
Command Branch
ENC Eastern Naval EO Engineer Officer (L) Electrical Branch
Command
SNA Southern Naval LO Electrical Officer (S) Supply Branch
Area
WF Western Fleet SO Supply Officer (P) Pilot
EF Eastern Fleet MO Medical Officer (O) Observer
BRO Base Repair SEO Senior Engineer (S/M) Submariner
Organisation Officer
BMU Base Maintenance AEO Air Engineer (H) Hydrographer
Unit Officer
Naval Aircraft ALO Air Electrical
Repair Officer
Organisation
NARO NO Navigating Officer
RANK/NAME PERSONAL APPOINTMENT/WHERE
NUMBER SERVING
PADMA VIBHUSHAN
Adm SM Nanda(X), PVSM 00001A CNS NHQ

PADMA BHUSHAN

VAdm SN Kohli (X), PVSM 00002B FOCINC WEST HQWNC

VAdm N Krishnan(X),PVSM DSC 00003B FOCINC EAST HQENC
PARAM VISHISHT SEVA
MEDAL
RAdm BR Singh (L), PVSM ADMIRAL
SUPERINTENDANT,
BOMBAY DOCKYARD
RAdm VA Kamath (X) 00007R FOCSOUTH HQSNA
RAdm EC Kuruvila(X), AVSM 00009W FOCWEF WESTERN
FLEET
RAdm SH Sarma (X) 00016K FOCEF EASTERN FLEET
Cmde DR Mehta (X) ACNS NHQ
Cmde JTG Pereira(E), AVSM CSO (TECH) HQ WNC
Cmde BN Thapar (X) 00030T CHIEF OF STAFF HQ
WNC
Capt MS Grewal (X), AVSM 00031W CHIEF OF STAFF HQ ENC

MAHAVIR CHAKRA

Capt S Parkash (X) 00022Z CO VIKRANT (EF)

Ag Capt MN Mulla(X) (Posthumous) CO KHUKRI (WF)
Cdr KP Gopal Rao (X) 00079B CO KILTAN (WF)
KARACHI OPERATION
4/5 DEC
Cdr BB Yadav (X) 00101B IN COMMAND MISSILE
BOATS 4/5 DEC
Cdr MN Samant (X) 00124F IN COMMAND KHULNA
OPERATION 10 DEC
LCdr SK Gupta (X) (P) NM 00311F CO SEAHAWK
SQUADRON VIKRANT
LCdr JPA Noronha (X) 00422H CO PANVEL KHULNA
OPERATION 10 DEC
C Singh, LS CD 2(Diver) 87600 UNDERWATER
COMMANDO, KHULNA
OPERATION 10 DEC

ATI VISHISHT SEVA MEDAL

Cmde Gautam Singh (X) 00013B DIR SUBMARINE ARM
NHQ
Cmde EJ Debu (X 00023A NOIC BOMBAY HQWNC
Cmde TJ Kunnenkeril (X 00027K NOIC
VISHAKHAPATNAM
Cmde GM Shea (X), AVSM 00029R DIR OF PERSONNEL NHQ
Cmde VEC Barboza (X),AVSM 00033Z DIR OF NAVAL PLANS
NHQ
Cmde IK Malhotra (E) 40004T DIR OF MARINE
ENGINEERING NHQ
Capt PK Sinha (L) 50004W DIR OF WEAPONS
EQUIPMENT NHQ
Capt OS Dawson (X) 00035B DIR OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS NHQ
Capt DS Paintal (X) 00038K DIR OF WEAPON POLICY
& TACTICS NHQ
Capt MK Roy (X) 00040R DIR OF NAVAL
INTELLIGENCE NHQ
Capt RB Mukherjee (X) 00041T DIR OF NAVAL SIGNALS
NHQ
Capt FL Fraser (X) (H) 00046B CONTROLLER OF
MERCHANT SHIPPING
HQWNC
Capt BG Mudholkar (L) 50008B CAPT MISSILE
PREPATION FACILITY
Capt C Srinivasagopal(AE 40009B DIR OF NAVAL AIR
MATERIAL NHQ
Capt N Bhalla (E) 40010F AME NAVAL
DOCKYARD BOMBAY
Capt RP Khanna (X) 00062R NOIC CALCUTTA
Capt ANP Pillai (L) 50012N AML NAVAL
DOCKYARD BOMBAY
Capt KR Menon (L), VSM 50014T DIR OF FLEET
MAINTENANCE NHQ
Capt SK Sinha (S) 60009H CD SUPPLY OFFICER
HQWNC
Capt PJ Barron (X) 00071K DTE OF SIGNAL
INTELLIGENCE NHQ
Capt JP Syal (X) 00078A NAVAL ADVISER
PAKISTAN
Capt JJR Martin (S), VSM 40022H PRO NAVY NHQ
Cdr NP Mukundan (E), 60025W OI/C BRO
VISAKHAPATNAM
LCdr N Geeverghese (X) 00239T OI/C WIRELESS
DETACHMENT Bombay
VIR CHAKRA

Capt RKS Ghandhi (X) 00021Y CO MYSORE (WF)

Capt MP Awati (X) 00037H CO KAMORTA (EF)
Capt PC Andrews (X) 00045A CO DEEPAK (WF)
Capt KMV Nair (X) 00051R CO TRISHUL (WF)
Capt JC Puri (X) 00073R CO BRAHMAPUTRA (EF
Cdr SS Kumar (X) 00084R CO TALWAR (WF)
Cdr BR Chowdhury (E) 40027W EO VIKRANT (EF)
Cdr Subir Paul (X) 00127N CO KAVARATTI (EF)
Cdr L Ramdas (X), 00132Z CO BEAS (EF)
Cdr RS Grewal (X) (P) 00146F CDR AIR VIKRANT
Cdr KN Zadu (X) 00150R CO KATCHALL (WF)
Cdr RR Sood (X) 00157F CO KIRPAN (WF)
Cdr RJ Millan (X) (S/M) 00168F CO KHANDERI (ENC)
Cdr MO Ommen (E), (Posthumous) EO KHUKRI (WF)
Cdr VS Shekhawat (X) (S/M) 00189B CO KARANJ (WNC)
LCdr AK Mehra (X) (P) 00310H SEAHAWK PILOT
VIKRANT
LCdr RD Dhir (X) (P) 00319Z CO ALIZE SQUADRON
VIKRANT
LCdr JK Suri (X) (Posthumous) XO KHUKRI (WF)
LCdr RK Sen (S) (Posthumous) SO KHUKRI (WF)
LCdr SP Ghosh (X) (O) 00370R ALIZE OBSERVER
VIKRANT
LCdr P Kumar (L) (Posthumous) LO KHUKRI (WF)
LCdr S Ramsagar (X) (P) 00379K SENIOR PILOT ALIZE
SQUADRON VIKRANT
LCdr JK Roy Choudhury(X) 00406Y OI/C PADMA, KHULNA
OPERATION 10 DEC
LCdr Vijai Jerath (X) 00409B CO VINASH (Missile Boat)
KARACHI OPERATION
8/9 DEC
LCdr BN Kavina (X) 00416W CO NIPAT (Missile Boat)
KARACHI OPERATION
4/5 DEC
LCdr Inderjit Sharma (X) 00435N CO NIRGHAT(Missile
Boat) KARACHI
OPERATION 4/5 DEC
LCdr OP Mehta (X) 00442B CO VEER (Missile Boat)
KARACHI OPERATION
4/5 DEC
LCdr George C 00445H UNDERWATER
Martis(X),NM(Diver) COMMANDO
LCdr Ashok Roy (X),(P) NM (Posthumous) ALIZE PILOT WNC
Lt RS Sodhi(X) (P) 00540A SEAHAWK PILOT
VIKRANT
LCdr (SDB) Inder Singh(X) 83151B CO RAJPUT (EF
Lt BB Bhagwat (X) (O) 00566K ALIZE OBSERVER
VIKRANT
Surg Lt SS Panda Posthumous) MO KHUKRI
Lt Arun Prakash (X) (P) 00590R WITH IAF HUNTER
SQUADRON
Lt VP Kapil (X) (Diver) 00667R UNDERWATER
COMMANDO & KHULNA
OPERATION 10 DEC
Lt SG Samant (X) Posthumous NO KILTAN(WF)
Lt KS Panwar (X) (O) 00685F OBSERVER VIKRANT
ALIZE
Lt SK Mitter (X) 00723T OI/C PALASH KHULNA
OPERATION 10 DEC
Lt VK Datta (X) (P) 00838B SEAHAWK PILOT
VIKRANT
Lt Prem Kumar (X) (P) 00717B SEAHAWK PILOT
VIKRANT
SLt Ashok Kumar (X) 01036B PANVEL KHULNA
OPERATION 10 DEC
MN Sangal, MC (EAP) II No. 50896 NIRGHAT(Missile Boat)
KARACHI OPERATION
4/5 DEC
LK Chakarvarty, MECH3 No. 48830 MISSILE BOAT KARACHI
OPERATION 4/5 DEC
MO Thomachan, PO(PRI) No. 46337 MISSILE BOAT KARACHI
OPERATION 4/5 DEC
RN Sharma, POTEL No.8830 MISSILE BOAT KARACHI
OPERATION 4/5 DEC
KS Raju, LEMP 89148 PANVEL, KHULNA
OPERATION 10 DEC
SHAURYA CHAKRA
Lt Cdr Sajjan Kumar (X) (Diver) 00413N CCDT Visakhapatnam
DIVING ON GHAZI
BC Mahapatra, MCPOII, NM(Diver) 60128 CCDT Visakhapatnam
DIVING ON GHAZI
MB Patel, LME KUTHAR (WF)
NA Marad, LME 56163 KUTHAR (WF)
AJ Baby, LMA 80298 GHARIAL (EF

NAO SENA MEDAL

Capt VA Dhareshwar (X) 00036F CO AMBA (SNA)
Cdr RP Bhalla (X) 00070H AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION(EF)
Cdr CG Francis (X) (H) 00074T CO DESHDEEP (EF)
Cdr Jogendra Khanna(X) 00090B CO SUTLEJ (WNC)
(H)
Cdr HML Saxena (X) 00093K XO VIKRANT (EF)
Cdr RR Sood(E) VSM 40026T EO MYSORE (WF)
Cdr CM Vyas (X) 00097W FLEET OPERATIONS OFFICER
EASTERN FLEET
Cdr TN Singhal (X) 00115M CO MAGAR (EF)
Surg Cdr GP Christian 75035H MO VIKRANT (EF)
Cdr GM Hiranandani (X) 00123B FLEET OPERATIONS OFFICER
WESTERN FLEET
Cdr Sukhmal Jain (X 00130W CO KADMATT (WF)
Cdr TS Khurana (X) 00133A FLEET NAVIGATING OFFICER
WESTERN FLEET
Cdr RK Chaudhury (X) 00134B CO BETWA (WF)
VSM
Cdr Hardev Singh (X) 00143Z CO GODAVARI (SNA)
Cdr UC Tripathi (X) 00145B CO KUTHAR (WF)
Cdr GT Wadhwani(X) 00147H XO MYSORE (WF)
Cdr VF Rebello(X) 00153Y AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION (EF)
Cdr SP Kaprawan (X) CO SAGARDEEP (WF)
Cdr RN Singh (X)(P) 00159K CO RANJIT (WF)
Cdr MP Wadhawan 00181K CO SEAKING SQUADRON
(X(P)VSM (WNC)
Cdr RS Huja (E 40101N EO BRAHMAPUTRA (EF)
Cdr PP Iyer Sivamani (X) 00279H FLEET NAVINGATING OFFICER
EASTERN FLEET
LCdr Bharat Bhushan (E) 40069R SEO VIKRANT (EF)
LCdr MB Ghosh (E) 40070T EO TALWAR (WF)
LCdr NN Anand (X) 00195T XO TRISHUL (WF)
LCdr YK Satija (AE) 40088H AEO VIKRANT
LCdr SK Kulsrestha (X) 00285Y CO GANGA (SNA)
LCdr AK Sharma (X) 00288B CO GHARIAL (EF)
LCdr KASZ Raju(X) (P) 00304R XO BRAHMAPUTRA (EF)
LCdr Utful Dabir (X) 00348R CO GULDAR (EF)
LCdr JW Daniel (X 00394W CO POSHAK (Dockyard Oiler)
(WNC)
LCdr Janardan Deo (X) 00431B XO KATCHALL KARACHI 4/5
DEC(WF)
LCdr VK Raizada (L) 50101R SUPPORT OF MUKTI BAHINI
OPERATIONS
LCdr SN Jha (E) 40146R EO EASTERN FLEET SHIP
LCdr Suresh Soota (E) 40147T FLIGHT DECK EO VIKRANT
(EF)
LCdr M Sharma (X) 00461Y SIGNALS OFFICER KHUKRI
(WF)
LCdr JS Cheema (E) 40166K EO KADMATT (WF)
Lt PK Jindal (L 50143K DEPUTY LO MYSORE (WF)
Lt SH Kundanmal (X) Posthumous NO KHUKRI (WF)
Lt (SDB) Darshan Lal 83160Z VIKRANT (EF)
Lt VK Chaudhry (E) 40181W EO KARANJ (WNC)
(S/M)
Lt JV Natu (E) 40203W SUPPORT OF MUKTI BAHINI
OPERATIONS
Lt VK Jain (L) Posthumous KHUKRI (WF)
IMPROVEMENTS TO SONAR
Lt GAD Duke (X) (Diver) 00621K CCDT BOMBAY
Lt Gurnam Singh (AE) 40211N AEO SEAHAWK SQDN
VIKRANT
Lt PK Puri (E) 40229B EO VEER (Missile Boat)
Lt Anthony De Sam 00672A XO NIRGHAT( " )
Lazaro (X)
Lt (SDR) Kashmira Singh 87514W ASSISTANT LO VIKRANT
Lt RK Narad (E) 40244N EO VINASH (Missile Boat)
Lt SR Sampath Gopal (X) 00691W XO NIPAT ( " )
Lt Arvind Lochan (E) 40273B SEO KUTHAR (WF)
Lt MV Paul (AL) 50196F ALO ALIZE SQUADRON
VIKRANT
Sub Lt KR Girwalkar (E) 40334T WK EO KIRPAN
Sub Lt BS Thakur 00949F BEACH RECCE AMPHIBIOUS
(X)(Diver) LANDING(EF)
Sub Lt AK 00961H UNDERWATER COMMANDO
Bandhopadhyay (X) & KHULNA OPERATION 10
DEC
Sub Lt MS Ahluwalia (X) 0100Z KHUKRI (WF)
Sub Lt (SDME) RP Singh 85041Z EASTERN FLEET - SALVAGE
OF MINI LABOUR
Sub Lt Samirakanti 01054W KHUKRI (WF)
Basu(X)
Shiv Singh MCPO I 31804 DEEPAK (WF)
MK Vijayan CPO Posthumous 44971
SL Gupta MCEARI 47023 MISSILE BOATS (WNC)
NB Thapa MCERAI 50529 KILTAN KARACHI
OPERATION 4/5 DEC
TVR Nambiar MCPO II 61284 CAPTAIN FLIGHT DECK
(AH) VIKRANT
Abdul Hameed MCPO II 12402 KIRPAN (WF)
(TASI)
SK Sen MCERA II 50831 DEEPAK (WF)
MK Khandpal MCME II 46958 MYSORE (WF)
KS Salaria MCPO(AH) II 35584 HANGAR CONTROL CHIEF
VSM VIKRANT
J Singh MECH II 64721 BMU BOMBAY
T Singh ECH(P)II 64843 BMU BOMBAY
CK Tiwari CPO (GI) 44510 KATCHALL (WF) KARACHI
OPERATION 4/5 DEC
J Kumar CPO 45473 NBCD INSTRUCTOR
VIKRANT
BS Sandhu CHEAP 50916 MISSILE BOATS (WNC)
T Michael CHERA 49796 ATUL (WNC)
Devi Prasad Mech III 49411 KAMORTA (EF)
R Singh Mech III 64220 AMBA (SNA)
PV Lonappan Mech 3 67488 PANVEL KHULNA
OPERATION
Randhir Singh Mech 3 66233 VINASH (Missile Boat)
KARACHI OPERATION 8/9
DEC
RP Singh Mech 3 67488 VIKRANT (EF)
KK Goyal EAR 3 51198 NIPAT (Missile Boat)
KARACHI OPERATION 4/5
DEC
Ishwar Prakash ERA 3 51096 INS HOOGHLY Calcutta
Sukhdarshan Singh ERA 3 52566 KADMATT (WF)
PK Dhole PO 49148 UNDERWATER COMMANDO
AP Ravindran PO Tel 49018 TRISHUL (WF)
JN Sharma PO PTI 86186 KHUKRI (WF)
KP Singh PO Tel 48729 KHUKRI (WF)
CS Tyagi PO (GI) 48039 VIKRANT (EF)
S Kumar ERA 4 69135 TALWAR (WF)
Abbas Ali Khan SWA 4 51437 TALWAR (WF)
LS Mishra LS Diver 61782 RANJIT (WF)
Lal Singh LS Diver 80352 UNDER WATER COMMANDO
Mahipal Singh LS Diver 86514 CCDT Visakhapatnam
Karan Singh LS 86625 UNDERWATER COMMANDO
Sant Ram LS 82060 PANVEL KHULNA
OPERATION 10 DEC
EJ Princhan LS Diver 2811 UNDERWATER COMMANDO
MS Gupta LS (CD 1) 64915 UNDERWATER COMMANDO
L Prasad L CK(O) 66441 -DO-
RS Yadav Sea I 83406 -DO-
PK Bhattacharya Sea I 88900 -DO-
I Singh Sea I 92675 -DO-
SC Prabhakar Sea I 84388 RESCUE OPERATION NOIC
KATHIAWAR
Capt Inder Mohan MASTER AMPHIBIOUS
Narang(Merchant Nav MV OPERATION(EF)
 VISHWA
VIJAY

VISHISTA SEVA MEDAL

Capt RJ Duckworth (X) 00060K NOIC MADRAS

Cdr MV Agarkar (X) 00080F COPO HQ WNC
Cdr N Rajagopal (X) 00075W DRAFTING CDR Bombay
Cdr J Ram Rao (L) 50020F SLO HQ ENC
Cdr JA Fernandes (S) 60022N SECY VCNS NHQ
Cdr MS Ratra (X) 00116N COPO HQ ENC
Cdr CS Narayana Raju 40040Z OI/C NARO Cochin
(AE)
Cdr GC Thadani (E) 40042B SEO HQ ENC
Cdr SK Moorthy (L) 50035R WECORS NAVAL DOCKYARD
Bombay
Cdr Amrik Singh(X) 00141B CO INS INDIA New Delhi
Cdr SD Sinha (X) 00144A DEPUTY DIR NAVAL
SIGNALS NHQ
Cdr NR Khambatta (X) 00154Z NOIC KATHIAWAR
Cdr JS Pantle (X) 00161R DTE OF ARMAMENT
INSPECTION NHQ
Cdr Arun Rao (X) 00174W DDNAS (AIR ORGN & TRG)
NHQ
Cdr KC Gairola (X) 00183R DDOP(X) NHQ
Cdr RK Deshpande (X) 00185W CAVO HQ WNC
Cdr SW Lakkhar (X) 00191H DDNO WAR ROOM NHQ
Cdr V Ravindranath 0194R SENIOR PILOT SEAKING
(X)(P) SQUADRON
Cdr MP Ballal (X) SI DIRECTORATE
LCdr (SDME) James 85000F BRO Visakhapatnam
Soares
LCdr PV Damodaran (E) 40109F
LCdr Mehar Singh (X) 00233F ADNO TRADE WARFARE
NHQ
LCdr Kandaswamy 9800 F -DO-
Chelliah (X) INR
Surg LCdr (Mrs) 75084W ANAESTHETIST ARMY HOSP
Jagmohan Sood Delhi
LCdr LK Sharma (X) 00294T NAVAL SIGNAL CENTRE HQ
WNC
LCdr (SDC) PAJ Bento 81853B COMCEN DELHI NHQ
LCdr Bal Subramaniam 00363Z DTE OF ARMAMENT
(X) INSPECTION NHQ
LCdr GD Mukerji (X) 00388F PLANNING STAFF HQ
NM EASTERN ARMY
LCdr NK Mukherjee (X) 00397A
LCdr Suresh Bhandoola 00401K SI DIRECTORATE NHQ
(X)
LCdr Teck Sharma (X) 00433H
LCdr PP Nandi (X) (H) 00468N
LCdr Pirthi Singh (S) 60092Y BASE VICTUALLING OFFICER
Bombay
LCdr D Shahane (AE) 40155K AEO SEAKING SQUADRON
Bombay
Lt (SDAE) PN Suri 86002H
Lt (SDC) Mark D'Souza 81862Z WIRELESS DETACHMENT
Bombay
Lt PC Bhasin (L) 50155N MISSILE TECHNICAL
POSITION Bombay
Lt (SDC) MN Raghavan 81864B WIRELESS DETACHMENT
Calcutta
Lt (SDC) NP Nair 81870T NAVAL SIGNAL CENTRE
Cochin
Lt (SDC) YKP Charles 81874A ENC NAVAL SIGNAL CENTRE
Visakhapatnam
Lt (SDME) Madan Lal 85029Y
Surg Lt DK Bose 75131A
Lt Samir Das (X) NM Posthumous UNDERWATER COMMANDO
Lt (SDC) Mohan Singh WAR ROOM COMCEN NHQ
Sub Lt (SDAR) ER
Menon
KC Vasandan 33805 MYSORE (WF)
MCPO(Tel) II
UP Madhavan 41084 NAVAL SIGNAL CENTRE
MCPO(Tel) II Visakhapatnam
VB Pathak MCPO(AOF) 46284 INS HANSA Goa
II
CS Matiyani MCERA II 49640 KUTHAR (WF)
TN Chakravorty SCPO 64516 INS HOOGHLY Calcutta
Gurmail Singh CPO (CD 4546 CCDT Bombay
1)(Diver)
Narinder Singh AA3 51233 NARO Cochin
J Mathew AA3 51173 ALIZE DETACHMENT Bombay
Om Parkash POAF 66083 ALIZE DETACHMENT Bombay
Amin Chand Chauhan 46196 CCDT Bombay
PO (CD 1)
Sukumaran George PO 49667 WIRELESS DETACHMENT
Tel Visakhapatnam
Harish Chandra Pandey 65378 WIRELESS DETACHMENT
PO Tel Calcutta
RK Dinesan YS 49495 NAVAL SIGNAL CENTRE
Cochin
Ajit Singh POAH 48905 NAVAL SIGNAL
DETACHMENT Bombay
LCdr MM Kaila (L) MISSILE TECHNICAL
POSITION

MENTION IN DESPATCHES

Cdr IK Erry (X) CO CAUVERY

Cdr KL Chopra (X) 00068B
(H)
Cdr TK Sachdev (X) 00102B CO CANNANORE
MINESWEEPING IN
BANGLADESH
Cdr JN Sukul (L) LO TRISHUL (WF)
Cdr Benoy Bhushan CO INVESTIGATOR (WNC)
(X) (H)
Cdr Raj Anderson (X) CO KISTNA (WNC)
VSM
Cdr M Pratap (X) CO TIR (WNC
Cdr AR Parti (X) CO VIJETA (Missile Boat)
(WNC)
Lt Cdr V Chakraverty 00222B
(X) (P)
Lt Cdr LV Reddy (E) EO SAGARDEEP (WF)
Lt Cdr MPS Bhinder 40098F
(E)
Lt Cdr RV Kanakrajan 00322F XO KAVARATTI (EF)
(X)
Lt Cdr Inderjit Bedi 00327T FCO WESTERN FLEET
(X)
Lt Cdr AKS Chitre 00330Z
(X)
Lt Cdr BR Ghosh (X) 00336N
Lt Cdr BK Malik (X) 00337R
(P)
Lt Cdr SK Parulekar 40113R EO KAVARATTI
(E)
Lt Cdr DK Nandi (X) 00358N
NM
Lt Cdr Gulab Israni SEAHAWK PILOT VIKRANT
(X) (P)
Lt Cdr RB Suri (X) CO NASHAK (Missile Boat)
(WNC)
Lt Cdr Rajvir Singh(L) 50081W LO BEAS (EF)
Lt Cdr(SDB) KL 83152F
Dogra
Lt Cdr RN Sharma (X) 00389H FCO EASTERN FLEET
Lt Cdr Ashok Sinha 00392R SEAHAWK PILOT VIKRANT
(X) (P)
Lt Cdr Keki Pestonji 00398B XO TALWAR (WF)
(X) (G)
Lt Cdr Bakshish Singh 00399F t Cdr BB Singh
(X) (X) 00404T CO VIDYUT
(Missile Boat) (WNC)
Lt Cdr SC Isssacs (X) 00414Z CO NIRBHIK( " ) (WNC)
Lt Cdr PD Sharma (X) 00429Z SEAHAWK PILOT VIKRANT
(P)
Lt Cdr SS Chaudhri
(X)
Lt Cdr SP Singh (X) 00443F CO KARWAR MINESWEEPING
BANGLADESH
Lt Cdr Y Bhide (X) 00446N SEAHAWK PILOT VIKRANT
(P)
Lt Cdr Daljit Singh 00456N MYSORE (WF)
(X)
Lt Cdr RS Gill (E) 40167N EO KHANDERI (Submarine)
ENC
Lt KN Govindan Nair 00493W BRAHMAPUTRA (EF)
(X)
Lt HS Sirohi (X) (O) Posthumous ALIZE OBSERVER (WNC)
Lt BD Vachha(X) 00503T
Lt Ranjit Attri (X) 00534N KATCHALL (WF)
Lt PBS Gujral (X) 00539Z VIKRANT (EF)
Lt SP Vyas (X) 00595A CO BIMLIPATAM
MINESWEEPING IN
BANGLADESH
Lt (SDB) Charanjit 83163F
Singh
Lt C Narayan (X) 00568R TASO KILTAN (WF)
Lt Raman Puri (X) 00604R GO KILTAN (WF)
Lt CVS Naidu (X) 00582Y ALIZE PILOT VIKRANT
Lt AN Karve (X) 00593Y
Lt R Paralikar (E) 40210K KILTAN (WF)
Lt VS Shukla (X) 00647W
Lt SC Dua (E) 40238Z EO NIRGHAT (Missile Boat)
Lt SK Gupta (X) 00665K
Lt Kasho Ram (X) 00669W
Lt SD More (X) 00674F CO AKSHAY (SDB) (ENC)
Lt SA Bhende (X) 00680W
Lt AM Gokhale (X) 00686H XO VINASH (Missile Boat)
Lt CR Jayaraman (X) 00697H
Lt Shantonu Sen (X) 00714Y
Lt SC Suresh Bangara 00726Z XO VEER (Missile Boat)
(X)
Lt SC Ghildiyal (X) 00746W MGO VINASH( " )
Lt KB Khanna (X) 00756T
Lt KM Rao (X) MGO NIRGHAT ( " )
Lt Prakash Chandra
(X)
Lt Ratan Singh (X)
Lt AD Rao (X) MGO VEER ( " )
Lt RPK Pillai (E) EO NIPAT ( " )
Lt RC Shahdapuri (L)
Lt SR Dhareshwar (X)
Lt TB Ray (X)
Lt TI Punnen (E)
Lt SS Byce (X) 00883F CO SUBADHRA (SDB)
Lt Ajit Tiwari (X) 00904B CO BULSAR MINESWEEPING
IN BANGLADESH
Lt NP Singh (X) 00849B
Sub Lt Osmond Titus 00934Y NO KATCHAL
(X)
Sub lt (SDP) Jasbir 86823Z MYSORE (WF)
Singh
PA Nair MCPO I 35327 VIKRANT (EF)
Jagmail Singh 50119 VIKRANT (EF)
MC(EAR)I
KT Chami MC(Mech) 22216 RAJPUT (EF)
I
Tarlok Nath MC 86550 KHANDERI (Submarine) (ENC)
(ERA)
David D'Souza 13562 BRAHMAPUTRA (EF)
MCPOCK I
PKR Pillai MCPOTEL 23079 CHIEF TEL FOCWEF STAFF
II
RN Pandey MCPO II 44133 KAVARATTI (EF)
(G1)
BR Samptah Kumar 50766
MCPO II
SEAHAWK
SQUADRON
VIKRANT
SS Shukla MCPO II 35424 SAGARDEEP (WF)
K Bhaskaran MCEAP 50821 BETWA (WF)
II
Ram Singh Kathait 46444 BEAS (EF)
CPO QMI
Nasib Singh CPO 43789 MAGAR (EF)
Shrikant Singh CPO 64079 DEEPAK (WF)
BB Lal CH YS 61757 CHIEF YEOMAN FOCWEF
STAFF
BR Roul CH YS 62510 KADMATT (WF)
NL Batra CPO 26359 VIKRANT (EF)
Tel(WI)
CT John CPO Tel 36004 KHUKRI (WF)
GA Nair CHELR 47236 KAVARATTI (EF)
Jagmal Singh CHME 45798 TIR (WNC)
JS Sikarwal CHME 45953 RANJIT (WF)
Sudama Tripathi 49858 DEEPAK (WF)
CHEAP
Jog Raj CHEAP 50847 NIPAT (Missile Boat) KARACHI
OPERATION 4/5 DEC
Rup Chand CPO WTR 62411 HQENC
KL Malhotra CPO 64957 KHUKRI (WF)
WTR
Lekh Raj MECH(W) 3 67196 TALWAR (WF)
AG Balan EAR 3 88342 TALWAR (WF)
PS Gaudu EAR 3 87798 KHUKRI (WF)
MD Mandal ERA 3 52583 BETWA (WF)
Bakhshish Singh EAR 51115 KADMATT (WF)
3
VP Gopalkrishnan 51265 KADMATT (WF)
ERA3
Rai Singh Mech (R)3 63930 ATCHALL (WF)
SN Prasad Mech3 49150 KAVARATTI (EF)
DS Jaswal Mech3 49405 CANNANORE
MINESWEEPING IN
BANGLADESH
Om Prakash Singh 88809 VINASH (Missile Boat)
EAR3 KARACHI OPERATION 8/9
DEC
Sikandar Tasildar 52571 KILTAN (WF)
ERA3
HM Sharma ERA3 88731 VIKRANT (EF)
Harbans Singh EAP 51305 VINASH (Missile Boat)
(C)3 KARACHI OPERATION 8/9
DEC
Sarwan Singh PO Tel 49551 DEEPAK (WF)
RS Pannu YS 48903 KIRPAN (WF)
NP Biswas YS 45083 NAVAL SIGNAL CENTRE
Bombay
LC Khatri YS 49921 KHUKRI (WF)
US Yadav YS 49609 KHUKRI (WF)
Papat Lal Chijaliya PO 45482 MYSORE (WF)
(QA1)
GD Goirala PO 86948 BRAHMAPUTRA (EF)
(TASI)
BR Jaskalyan PO 49373 KHUKRI (WF)
(UW1)
PM Subbaiah PO Tel 48471 BEAS (EF)
PS Diwana PO 86086 KATCHALL (WF)
Ram Adhar Singh 46341 BETWA (WF)
PO(GI)
MVR Murty PO Tel 46048 HQENC
VEB Nambiar Mech 87529 BRAHMAPUTRA (EF)
(R)4
KV Vijayaraghavan 90638 RANJIT (WF)
EAR4
CS Chhetri SPO 80252 MYSORE (WF)
Badrinath EAR4 52882 GODAVARI (SNA)
Babu Singh Ag. 90594 BEAS (EF)
SWA4
MR Subramanyam 49712 RAJPUT (EF)
Mech4
P Gangadharan ERA4 51452 KIRPAN (WF)
PK Bagichi POELP 69099 (WNC (Submarine KARANJ
ND Katakshyam 65953 KHANDERI (Submarine) (ENC)
POELP
DP Dash POELP 87621 SAGARDEEP (WF)
JN Dass POME 66368 MYSORE (WF)
Ivan Lowe POME 44452 RAJPUT (EF)
RK Nair PO Wtr 92399 FOCWEF STAFF
PT Varghese LS (UCI) 83170 KAMORTA (EF)
Amarjit Singh LS 82095 KAVARATTI (EF)
(QA1)
MS Gupta LS(CD1) 64915 UNDERWATER COMMANDO
(Diver)
RS Yadav LS(CD2) 83406 UNDERWATER COMMANDO
(Diver)
SB Singh LS 83842
MG Prabhu LTel 89797
T Sudhakaran LEMP 90893 MYSORE (WF)
RVN Gillet LEMR 91148 PANVEL
KHULNA
OPERATION 10 DEC
V Patankar LME 88306 RANJIT (WF)
P Singh LME 69501 KHUKRI (WF)
S Shankar ERA5 51641 GANGA (SNA)
N Mathews ERA5 51617 KAMORTA (EF)
RS Sidhu EAR5 51681 KIRPAN (WF)
S Husain SIG I 55497 BEAS (EF)
PK Dagar TEL I 91849 TRISHUL (WF)
VM Singha TEL I 84649 PANVEL KHULNA
OPERATION 10 DEC
Yogendra Jha Sea I 86268 TRISHUL (WF)
(GL3)
MG Vasupillai 84343 KILTAN (WF)
SEAI(RP3)
RK Dogra SEA I 82617 INS HANSA Goa
BN Soman EMR I 56449 BEAS (EF)
SC Sharma SEA I 90586 TRISHUL (WF)
(RP2)
KV Bhava Dasan ME 68262 INS CIRCARS Visakhapatnam
I
GP Haldhar ME I 99562
Nathu Singh SEA II 94715 PULICAT (Patrol Boat) ENC
Dinesh Dubey EMP2 57636 KATCHALL (WF)
GV Thumbunkel Master MV HOOGHLY
RD Hajarnavis Chief Officer VISHWA VIJAY
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION
(EF)
AK Bhattacharjee Chief Engineer MV HOOGHLY

COMMENDATION BY THE CNS

Cdr SC Bindra (S
Cdr MML Saxena (X)
Lt Cdr CS Menon (X)
Lt Cdr SJ Contractor (X) NOIC Bombay Staff
Lt Cdr K Suresh (X)
Lt Cdr B Nag (X)
Lt Cdr (SDG) KN Divekar
Sqd Leader GPU Nair 7287 IAF
Lt Kulwant Singh Bhasin VIKRANT (EF)
(E)
Lt PJ Jacob (X) DIRECTION OFFICER
VIKRANT (EF)
Lt RS Pujji (X)
Lt PS Nelson (X)
Lt HC Medha (X)
Lt SS Kumar (E
Lt K Kamak (E)
Lt VK Bhatia (E)
Lt P Jaitly (L)
Lt (SDG) Ravinder Singh
Lt (SDG) Avtar Singh
Lt (SDAE) VS Chitale SUPPORT OF MUKTI BAHINI
OPERATIONS
Lt (SDPR) Karnail Singh
Lt (SDR) Kewal Krishan
Lt (SDR) CP Xavier
Sub LT RK Sharma (X)
Sub LT KM Nair (X)
Sub LT Guru Raj (X)
Sub LT Ranbir Talwar (X)
Sub LT CR Kutty (X)
Sub LT EG Govindan (E)
Sub LT N Subbarao (E)
Sub LT UP Misra (L)
Sub LT (SDTAS) Wasi
Ahmed Warsi
Sub LT (SDS) SR Malik
Sub LT (SDAE) RK Sur
De Stephan MCPO II(TAS 25774 INS VIRBAHU Visakhapatnam
I)
Lakhan Lal MC SWA II 50711 INS ANGRE Bombay
KP Masilamani MC ER1 50749 INS ANGRE Bombay
K Ramkrishnan MC ERA
II
C Arvindakshan Nair Mech 64413 HATHI (Tug)
II
GL Narayan AM II
M Arvindakshan CYS 43579 INS INDIA New Delhi
Jug Lal CPO (G1) 45526 INS TRATA Bombay
SK Choudhary CPO Wtr 63302 INS HOOGHLY Calcutta
PN Khanna Ch ERA
LN Sharma CPO CK(S) 60740 MYSORE (WF)
JC Dutta CYS
RK Pandey CPO 44523 INS VALSURA Jamnagar
SK Ghandhi CH(ME) 45585
SK Bhardwaj CHEL(R) 48074 INS CIRCARS Visakhapatnam
VS Nair CH(ME) 63922 HATHI (Tug)
BM Tiwari Ch ELA 48841 VIKRANT (EF)
MPG Pillai Mech III 87168 NIPAT (Missile Boat)
NV Varughese ERA III 52578 DARSHAK (Survey Ship)
(WNC)
BK Vashisht EAA III 51209 NARO Cochin
P Dass ERA III 51239 MYSORE (WF)
GD Singh AM (W) III 88049 ALIZE SQUADRON
HC Chandel AM III 49277 VIKRANT (EF)
VK Sharma AA III 51291 VIKRANT (EF)
AM Thyagarajan AM (W) 87961 VIKRANT (EF)
III
KM Nair AA III 88343 VIKRANT (EF)
EV Narayanan EAR III 88451 VIKRANT (EF)
PVV Rao Mech (R) III 47300 KATCHALL (WF)
M Mahmood PO EL (A) 48890 SEAHAWK SQUADRON
SK Chakraborty Mech (W) 66062 INS JARAWA Port Blair
III
Mohinder Singh PO Tel 86113 INS INDIA New Delhi
SB Thomas PO Tel 86234 INS ADYAR Madras
TM Vagnan PO (QM 1) 66838 VEER (Missile Boat)
Vasudeb Nag PO Wtr 81296 TALWAR (WF)
PV Alexander PO EL (P) 67350 KUTHAR (WF)
P Periera PO 48257 INS HOOGHLY Calcutta
CJ Joseph PO (ME) 82406 VIDYUT (Missile Boat)
KN Venugopalan Nair PO 67214 GODAVARI (SNA)
(ME)
BP Shahi Ag PO (ME) 87238 GODAVARI (SNA)
S Bandopadhya SWA IV 51367 INS ANGRE Bombay
KCN Krishnan EAP IV 51449 VIKRANT (EF)
S Reddy L/Tel 88630 INS HOOGHLY Calcutta
KD Varghese LEM 68931 KUTHAR (WF)
KL Sebastian LEM 90279 DEEPAK (WF)
B Ram LS 82962
VK Ghatge LS (QM) 86851 INS ANGRE Bombay
Sulekhan Singh LME 88513 KHANDERI (Submarine) (ENC)
VP
Balakrishnan ME I 57165 TALWAR (WF)
AS Thathola Sea I 83624 DEEPAK (WF)
JKH Varky Sea I
AS Dahiya Sea I 92977 DEEPAK (WF)
K Damodaran ME I 56060 KATCHALL (WF)
Hari Palei Sea I 53148 INS VENDURUTHY Cochin
Vidhyadhar Singh Sea I 54201 INS CIRCARS Visakhapatnam
 In my interaction with the innumerable officers, senior and retired, middle aged and
serving, naval and civilian, who shared their perceptions on the developments and events in
the Navy during the decade 1965 to 1975, they invariably suggested that the Navy was now
mature enough to know the truth. This feeling that there is something to hide is the result of
the conspicuous non-availability of authentic, factual information.

Well before the attempt is made to resolve contentious issues like whether or not the
Official Secrets Act should be relaxed or whether India should have the equivalent of the
American Freedom of Information procedure, there is need to resolve some of the difficulties
which lie at a much lower level.

For any system of filing to be of value for historical purposes, there has to be a Public
Records Office and there has to be an annual scrutiny of old files by knowledgeable scholars
having a historical bent of mind. Those files considered to be sensitive should be
systematically indexed, preserved and so stored as to be available for reference when
required. The remainder should be transferred to a Public Records Office who can follow
well established archival procedures for indexing, preservation, referral and retrieval.

What actually happens is that to minimise the demand for acquiring more and more
filing cabinets and cupboards and for more office space to keep them, there is a directive that
all files are to be "weeded out" every seven years. Being a dull task, and in view of the
perpetual shortage of officers, weeding out gets delegated to the juniormost available officer,
who, being young and inexperienced, is most unlikely to be sensitive to the historical
relevance of what is being "weeded out". When this task becomes too tiresome, files are
bundled into trunks and stowed in "some basement". Since everybody is transferred period-
ically, nobody knows (or cares) what is where.

For a Navy steaming smartly into the next millennium, a better system needs to be
devised to enable scholars of naval affairs, both Indian or foreign, to access authentic,
declassified Indian naval archives. By making them depend primarily on British and
American naval archives (which are extremely well organised), scholars perforce derive
one-sided constructs of what drives the Indian Navy's development. Contemporary literature
on Indian naval affairs does not do justice, either to India or to her Navy.

This volume of the Navy's history 1965 to 1975 was made possible by the unstinted
help extended by each of the participants interviewed. It is clear from their recollections that
there were successes and reverses, tensions and disagreements. Factions lobbied for their
positions and sometimes went too far in one direction. The right solution had to evolve
through experimentation. Yet there is no doubt that these were only arguments over ways and
means to reach the same end - a strong and modern Navy. This end was achieved by the
combined efforts of several people.
The Leander Frigate Project was the achievement of Defence Minister Krishna
Menon, exceptional civil servants like Mr HC Sarin and Mr MM Sen and Admirals Nanda
and Samson - the first two Managing Directors of Mazagon Docks. The notable progress in
achieving indigenisation in these frigates was the achievement of Commodore Paradkar and
his team.

The bold decision to replace the obsolescent British radars and fire control systems by
modern Dutch equivalents from the second Leander onwards, well before the first Leander
had even been completed, was a result of the forceful advocacy of Admirals Ramnath and
Bhatia. It gave Bharat Electronics the opportunity to leapfrog into the indigenous production
of digital electronic systems. And it built up the confidence of the Navy's constructors and
electronic specialists like Admiral Baxi to innovate the interfaces in future frigates and
corvettes for the Indian Navy's unique mix of Russian, western and indigenous systems.

In the 1971 War, the Navy's achievements in the Bay of Bengal sprung from Admiral
Nanda's insistence that VIKRANT be seen out at sea and Captain Parkash's courage in letting
his eager pilots push to the extreme, the safety limits for launching and recovering aircraft in
the low wind conditions in the northern part of the Bay of Bengal. To Admiral Sarma and his
Fleet, and the Navy's intrepid minesweepers, belongs the credit of fulfilling so many tasks
with so few ships, culminating in the reopening of the port of Chittagong within weeks of the
cease fire.

The Navy's achievements in the Arabian Sea sprang from the decision to acquire the
missile boats, the credit for which belongs to Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram, Admiral
Krishnan and Additional Secretary DR Kohli. The success of the missile boat attacks on
Karachi, which played such a decisive role in the 1971 victory was made possible by Admiral
Kuruvila's acceptance of the advice to use missile boats offensively. The tactic to use these
frail, essentially defensive, small boats as part of the Fleet's spearhead was entirely
unconventional, not believed possible and therefore doubly effective. My role in this has not
been mentioned anywhere in this book as it is hardly proper for an author to appropriate
credit to himself. However, in this part of the afterword, I can say that I am justifiably proud
of having conceived the solution of how to mutate these fragile but lethal craft into offensive
vessels.

As Captain of TIR in April 1971, jointly with Commander Yadav, the Senior Officer
of the Missile Boat Squadron, we conducted trials when towing a missile boat from
Visakhapatnam to Bombay using large nylon tow ropes at speeds upto 14 knots in moderately
rough sea conditions.

I was anxious to prove that this could be done because their

fragile hulls and limited enurance made it impossible for them to sail in distant waters on
their own. Towing missile boats safely and successfully was crucial to being able to get them
within striking distance of enemy targets. By the time TIR and NASHAK arrived in Bombay,
we had mastered the concept of towing these boats, releasing them within minutes to carry
out an attack and taking them in tow again. Just like a falcon is released to pounce on its prey.

In May 1971, I was transferred to Admiral Kuruvila's staff as Fleet Operations

Officer. It was already evident that war was a possibility. I convinced Admiral Kuruvila that
the use of missile boats could be a big factor in a successful attack on Karachi. He directed
Commander Yadav and me to put up a note. Given below is an excerpt of the note which we
prepared for him and which he forwarded to Admiral Kohli the FOCINCWEST in June 1971:
 "I have no doubt whatsoever that the correct utilisation of the missile boats is to
use them offensively, two at a time, in company with the Fleet. If I have these boats
with me at sea, as your Fleet Commander I can guarantee total victory once contact has
been made with enemy surface units, regardless of his superiority in speed and gun
power".

The achievement of Admiral Kuruvila and his Fleet in dominating the approaches to
Karachi within a week of hostilities, despite the poor material state of his ships and repeated
breakdowns at sea, is well known. I would like to place on record my appreciation of this big
hearted and courageous man who took the advice of his young advisor and implemented it so
successfully.

The success of the first series of Russian acquisitions was the result of the detailed
discussions held by Additional Secretary Sheth's Delegation in 1965 and the painstaking
resolution of problems by Additional Secretary Mukherjee's Delegations in 1971. The second
series of Russian acquisitions owes its success to the prodigious efforts of Admiral Barboza
and his Professional Delegation of 1975.

Admiral Bindra's far reaching Reorganisation of Naval Training in 1974 succeeded

because of the whole-hearted support it received from Admirals Kamath and Kohli.

The transfer to the Navy of the control of Maritime Reconnaissance was the outcome
of the sustained efforts of Admiral Tahiliani and Captain Puri.

The sound foundations of the Submarine Arm were laid by the highly capable young
submariners who manned the first eight submarines, some of whom like Admirals Auditto
and Sodhi became Flag Officers Submarines, and Admiral Shekhawat and Ganesh who rose
to became Fleet Commanders and Commanders in Chief. Admiral Shekhawat became Chief
of the Naval Staff in 1993.

All these achievements were sustained by the commitment with which the Navy's
officers and sailors carried out their duties. Most of them were too young then to know what
inspired the vision of their elders. It is my hope that this volume has helped them to know
what was done and why.