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Operation Pointblank 1944: Defeating the Luftwaffe
Operation Pointblank 1944: Defeating the Luftwaffe
Operation Pointblank 1944: Defeating the Luftwaffe
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Operation Pointblank 1944: Defeating the Luftwaffe

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A thorough examination of one of the most controversial operations in World War 2

Operation Pointblank was the code name for the United States Army Air Force's attempt to destroy German fighter capability through the use of daylight strategic bombing in advance of the D-Day landings. Launched in 1943, the operation immediately met with severe problems, most notably the horrible attrition experienced by the US bomber forces. However, with the arrival of the P-51 Mustang, the United States was able to equip the fighters to fly on long-range-bomber escort missions and take the fight to the Luftwaffe in the skies over Germany.

Complete with maps, illustrations and photographs, this book examines the entire operation from both the Allied and the German perspectives, covering all the main decisions and technological innovations made by both sides in this epic struggle.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateJul 20, 2011
ISBN9781849088206
Operation Pointblank 1944: Defeating the Luftwaffe
Author

Steven J. Zaloga

Steven J. Zaloga received his BA in History from Union College and his MA from Columbia University. He has worked as an analyst in the aerospace industry for three decades, covering missile systems and the international arms trade, and has served with the Institute for Defense Analyses, a federal think tank. He is the author of numerous books on military technology and history, including NVG 294 Allied Tanks in Normandy 1944 and NVG 283 American Guided Missiles of World War II. He currently lives in Maryland, USA.

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    Operation Pointblank 1944 - Steven J. Zaloga

    THE STRATEGIC SETTING

    The USAAF’s Eighth Air Force began daytime heavy-bomber operations from England on August 17, 1942, with a raid by 12 B-17 bombers against Rouen, France. The scale of American bomber attacks in 1942 was small and experimental until the force could be built up enough to confront more stiffly defended targets deeper into Europe. Through the end of 1942 its operational strength averaged only about 100 bombers, and it was assigned only a single US fighter group for escort. Its build-up was slowed by the need to divert aircraft and personnel to the Twelfth Air Force to conduct combat operations in North Africa and Italy. The focus of the bomber attacks in early 1943 was the German submarine force, including submarine bases at Lorient and St Nazaire as well as submarine yards on Germany’s North Sea coast such as at Bremen and Wilhelmshaven. By April 1943 the Eighth Air Force had only 264 heavy bombers and 172 escort fighters in England. The first mission against a German aircraft factory was conducted on April 5, 1943, against the Erla plant in Antwerp in Belgium and the first mission against an aircraft factory in Germany itself was conducted on April 17, 1943, against the Fw-190 plant in Bremen.

    B-24D Liberators of the 2nd Bombardment Wing attack shipyards in the Dunkirk area on February 15, 1943. French harbors and German targets along the North Sea coast were the most common targets in the first Eighth Air Force missions. (NARA)

    Escort-fighter ranges

    The Eighth Air Force in 1943 suffered a frequent dilution of strength because of frequent transfer of its bomber squadrons to the Mediterranean theater to support operations in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. Jerk’s Natural, a B-24D-1 of the 93rd Bombardment Group is seen here in England in 1943 after having returned from Mediterranean missions. It was lost over Austria on October 1, 1943. (NARA)

    The short-range bomber missions from the autumn of 1942 through the spring of 1943 could be only partly protected by USAAF and RAF fighter escorts, which lacked the range of the heavy bombers. Missions into Germany could be escorted part of the way to the target area, and then during the return leg of the trip. Although losses during this initial period were sometimes costly, they were not heavy enough to cause US commanders to doubt the core idea of USAAF tactical doctrine: the viability of the self-defending bomber in daytime precision bombing. Losses in 1942 averaged 4.5 percent per mission, climbing to 7.1 percent in the first quarter of 1943 and 7.6 percent in the second quarter. Grossly exaggerated kill claims by the bombers’ gunners led to the mistaken belief that the attacks were causing severe losses to the German fighter force.

    B-17F heavy bombers of 324th Squadron, 91st Bombardment Group, head out from their base at Bassingbourne to targets toward Rouen on March 17, 1943. The bomber in the center of this photo is the best-known aircraft of the early campaign, Memphis Belle. Piloted by Captain Robert Morgan, its crew was the first in the Eighth Air Force to survive their 25-mission tour, on May 17, 1943. (NARA)

    A core element of USAAF doctrine was the belief that heavy bombers had adequate defensive armament to fend off fighter attacks during daytime missions. This is the waist position of a B-17 showing Staff Sergeant Robert L. Taylor manning the .50-cal heavy machine gun. He is wearing electrically heated gloves and boots for high-altitude operations as well as a flak apron. (NARA)

    As the pace of USAAF daytime attacks began to expand, the Luftwaffe responded by increasing the size of its day-fighter force. Much of the defense against the early USAAF bomber strikes came from forward-deployed fighter units of Luftflotte 3 (Air Fleet 3) in France and fighter units based in the Netherlands. The Luftwaffe’s heavy combat losses in the spring and summer of 1943 on the Russian and Mediterranean fronts made it difficult to form enough new fighter units, and much of the increase in Luftwaffe fighter strength in Germany came at the expense of the other theaters, with fighter units being drawn back into the Reich to deal with the American threat. The Luftwaffe day-fighter force for Reich defense continued to grow through 1943, though there was a spirited debate over whether day fighters, night fighters, or flak should receive priority.

    In the summer of 1943 Allied leaders authorized the initiation of the Combined Bomber Offensive, also known as Operation Pointblank. In fact, the name papered over the fundamental disagreement between the RAF and USAAF over the conduct of the strategic-bombing campaign. Air Marshal Arthur Harris of RAF Bomber Command insisted that night area attacks on German cities would lead to a collapse of German civilian morale and destroy enough housing to seriously impact German industry. The USAAF was convinced that daytime precision bombing of German industry was a more effective approach. Operation Pointblank tried to reorient the focus of the strategic-bombing campaign toward the intermediate goal of defeating the Luftwaffe fighter force. The USAAF took up the Pointblank mission with enthusiasm since US doctrine considered the defeat of the Luftwaffe an essential prelude to a broader campaign against German war industries. The senior Allied army commanders wanted the Luftwaffe suppressed prior to the start of Operation Overlord, scheduled for the late spring of 1944, and so supported the Pointblank plan. Harris continued to insist on his indirect night-bombing approach, and so the burden of Pointblank‘s initial goal against the Luftwaffe fell on the USAAF.

    One of the iconic images of the air war over Germany was taken during Mission 104 to Emden on September 27, 1943. In the center is B-17F Skippy of the 570th Squadron, 390th Bombardment Group, which was later lost on a mission over France on February 5, 1944. Overhead are the contrails of P-47 fighters conducting their usual weaving maneuver to keep pace with the bombers. (NARA)

    A pair of B-17Fs of 322nd Squadron, 91st Bombardment Group, over England in 1943. The bomber in the foreground, Mizpah/The Bearded Lady, was lost over Schweinfurt during the first raid on August 17, 1943. (NARA)

    By the summer of 1943 the USAAF had become confident enough to begin missions into central Germany, even without fighter escort on the main leg of the mission. The prime targets were aircraft-assembly plants and the ballbearing industry around Schweinfurt. Ball bearings had been selected for special attention since they were widely used in many military weapons, including aircraft engines, and the German industry was geographically concentrated. Since the USAAF bomber force was still small, there was a special interest in finding these bottlenecks in German industry, an approach that Harris derided as panacea targets. On August 17, 1943, the Eighth Air Force staged its largest and deepest-penetrating mission so far, a combined attack against the ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt and the Bf-109 plant at Regensburg using 367 B-17 bombers. The force lost 60 bombers - 19 percent of those that reached the drop zone - which was an unsustainable rate of loss.

    DAY OF THE ROCKET GUNS: SCHWEINFURT, OCTOBER 14, 1943

    By the autumn of 1943, the rocket-armed Bf-110 fighters of Zerstörergeschwader 26 and Zerstörergeschwader 76 had become one of the most effective tools to shatter the Viermot Pulk, the B-17 combat box (1). Viermot was the German pilots’ nickname for the American heavy bombers, a slang contraction of the words for a four-engine bomber. The term Pulk means a throng in German but has long had a military meaning as a group; in the Slavic languages it means a regiment. The heavily armed Bf-110G-2/R3 seen here (2)was nicknamed the Pulkzerstörer (Group Destroyer) for its intended mission of breaking up the bomber combat boxes. The Bf-110G-2/R-3 was armed with four launch tubes for the 21cm WGr. 42 (3)air-to-air rocket. Derived from the Army’s 210mm Nebelwerfer artillery rocket, this projectile weighed 110kg (240lb) on launch and contained 10kg (22lb) of Amatol high explosive. Its time fuse was set to detonate at a predetermined range between 500–1,200m, and it also had an impact fuse in case of a direct hit. These weapons were nicknamed rocket guns by American bomber crews, who were not aware of their actual

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