Criminal Law 2 Digests: TREASON

LAUREL V. MISA

FACTS:

A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a Filipino citizen who
adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of treason for the reasons that the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen
thereto were then suspended; and that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon
the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE GOVERNMENT

BECOMES SUSPENDED DURING OCCUPATION

HELD:

No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy
of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation
because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the
occupier. It remains vested in the legitimate government.

What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The
political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and
citizens, are suspended in abeyance during military occupation.

DISSENT:

During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were
suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law
adopted by our Constitution [ Art. II, Sec. 3 ] as part of law of the nation.

The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the
invading power whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of displaced
government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabit
ants such obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces, for the maintenance of the
law and order, and for the proper administration of the country.

PEOPLE V. PEREZ

FACTS:

-Susano Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason and was sentenced to death by
electrocution.

-TC found the accused, together with the other Filipinos, recruited, apprehended and
commandeered numerous girls and women against their will for the purpose of using them, to
satisfy the sexual desire of the Japanese officers.

-The Solicitor General submitted an opposite view stating that the deeds committed by the accused
do not constitute treason. It further discussed that if furnishing women for immoral purposes to the
enemies was treason because womens company kept up their morale, so fraternizing them,
entertaining them at parties, selling them food and drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason .
Any act of hospitality produces the same result.

ISSUE: Whether the acts of the accused constituted the crime of treason.

HELD: NO. The law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political
intercourse between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants. What aid
and comfort constitute treason must depend upon their nature degree and purpose.
 As a general rule, to be treasonous, the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be
to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition, be directly
in furtherance of the enemies hostile designs.

His commandeering of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit.

Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve their
war efforts or to weaken the power of US. Whatever favorable effect the defendants collaboration
with the Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible, and
unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the
absence of admission, may be gathered from the nature and circumstance of each particular case.

But the accused may be punished for the rape as principal by direct participation. Without his
coordination in the manner above stated, these rapes could not have been committed.

PEOPLE V. PRIETO

FACTS:

-The appellant was prosecuted for treason.

-Two witnesses gave evidence but their statements do not coincide in any single detail. The first
witness testified that the accused with other Filipino undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an
American aviator and had the witness carry the American to town on a sled pulled by a carabao.
That on the way, the accused walked behind the sled and asked the prisoner if the sled was faster
than the airplane; that the American was taken to the Kempetai headquarters, after which he did
not know what happened to the flier.

-The next witness, testified that he saw the accused following an American and the accused were
Japanese and other Filipinos.

-The lower court believes that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
treason complexed by murder and physical injuries, with the aggravating circumstances
mentioned above. Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and physical injuries charged in
the information, not only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying circumstances. The
Solicitor General agrees with the decision except as to the technical designation of the crime. In his
opinion, the offense committed by the appellant is a complex crime of treason with homicide.

-Accused being a member of the Japanese Military Police and acting as undercover man for the
Japanese forces with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort feloniously
and treasonably lad, guide and accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers
for the purpose of apprehending guerillas and locating their hideouts.

ISSUES;

1. Whether the two-witness rule was sufficiently complied.

2. Whether the TC erred in ruling that the murders and physical injuries were crimes distinct from
treason.

HELD:

1. NO, it was not sufficiently complied. The witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions.
The two witnesses failed to corroborate each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part
of it.

2. The execution of some of the guerilla suspects mentioned and the infliction of physical injuries on
others are not offenses separate from treason. There must concur both adherence to the enemy
and giving him aid and comfort. One without the other does not make treason.

In the nature of things, the giving aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of
action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.
This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal
statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes
identified with the latter crime and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment.
However, the brutality with the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be taken as an
aggravating circumstances. Thus, the use of torture and other atrocities on the victims instead of
the usual and less painful method of execution will be taken into account to increase the penalty.

PEOPLE V. MANAYAO

FACTS:

-Appellant Pedro Manayao was among those who were charged with the aggravating circumstances
of 1.) the aid of armed men and 2.) the employment or presence of a band in the commission of
the crime, he was sentenced to death.

-The guerrillas raided the Japanese in Angat, Bulacan. In reprised, Japanese soldiers and a number
of Filipinos affiliated with the Makapili, among them the instant appellant, conceived the diabolical
idea of killing the residents. Appellant killed six women.

-Appellants counsel contends that appellant was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan, was
subject to military law, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the Peoples Court. Appellant had lost
his Philippine citizenship and was therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of treason.

-He further contends certain provisions of CA 63 states that:

A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events.

-By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country
upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more.

-By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country.

-By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air
Corps in time of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted.

ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty of treason

HELD: Yes, the appellant was found guilty of the crime of treason.

The Makapili, although organized to render military aid to the Japanese Army in the Philippines
during the late war, was not a part of said army. It was an organization of Filipino traitors.

There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution or laes of Japan.

The members of the Makapili could have sworn to help Japan in the war without necessarily
swearing to support her constitution and the laws.

Neither was there any showing too that they have lost their citizenship in connection with the
provisions stated in CA 63. No person even when he has renounced or incurred the loss of his
nationality, shall take up arms against his native country; he shall be held guilty of felony and
treason, of he does not strictly observe this duty.

As to appellants contention that he only acted in obedience to an order issued by a superior and is
therefore exempt from criminal, liability, because he allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty
incidental to his service for Japan as a member of the Makapili. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 11 of
RPC states that compliance with duties to or orders from a foreign sovereign is considered an illegal
order.

The contention that as a member of the Makapili appellant had to obey his Japanese masters under
pain of severe penalty, and that therefore his acts should be considered as committed under the
impulse of an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. Appellant joined
the Makapili with the full knowledge of its avowed purpose of rendering military aid to Japan. He
knew the consequences to be expected- if the alleged irresistible force or uncontrollable fear
subsequently arose, he brought them about himself freely and voluntarily.

PEOPLE V. ADRIANO
FACTS:

-Apolonio Adriano owing allegiance to the US and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation
of aid allegiance, did then and there willfully, criminally and treasonably adhere to the Military
Forces of Japan In the Philippines, against which the Philippines and the United States were then at
war, giving the said enemy aid and comfort.

-The accused is alleged to be a member of the Makapili and alleged to be a member of the Makapili
and alleged to have been bore arms and joined and assisted the Japanese Military Forces and the
Makapili Army in armed conflicts and engagements against the US armed forces and the Guerillas.

-TC found that the accused participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in confiscation
of personal property. The court below, however, said these acts had not been established by the
testimony of two witnesses, and so regarded then merely as evidence of adherence to the enemy.
There is only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the defendant was a Makapili and
was seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms.

ISSUE: Whether being a mere member of Makapili shows overt acts of committing treason.

HELD: Yes. The mere fact of having joined a Makapili is evidence of both adherence to the enemy
and giving him aid and comfort unless forced upon one against his will.

Being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary that the defendant
actually went to battle or committed nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The crime
of treason was committed if he placed himself at the enemys call to fight side by side with him
when the opportune time came even though an opportunity never presented itself. Such
membership by its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived psychological
comfort in the knowledge that he had on his side nationals or the country with which his was at
war.

SC set aside the judgment of the SC.

DISSENT:

Being a member of the Makapili during the Japanese occupation of those areas of the Philippines
referred to in the information, was one single, continuous, and indivisible overt act of the present
accused whereby he gave aid and comfort to the Japanese invaders.

The fact that he was seen on a certain day by one of the state witnesses being a member of the
Makapili, and was seen by another state witness but on a different day being a member of the same
organization, does not mean that his membership on the first day was different or independent
from his membership on the other day.

PIRACY CASES:

PiracyPeople v. Lol-lo and Saraw

Feb. 27, 1922 Ponente: Malcolm

Facts:
-On or about June 30, 1920, two boats carrying Dutch subjects left Matuta
for Peta(both Dutch possessions)
-After a number of days of navigation, at7:00pm, Moro pirates attacked
the second boat.
-The Moros first asked for food and then took for themselves all of the
cargo, attacked the men and brutally violated two of the women.
-All of the persons, except for two young women, on the Dutch boat were
placed on it and holes were made with the idea that it would submerge.
-The Moros then arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession, where the women
were able to escape. Two of the marauders were Lol-lo, who raped one of
the women, and Saraw.
-Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to Tawi-Tawi where they were arrested and
charged by the CFI with the crime of piracy.
-A demurrer was filed based on the grounds that the offense was not
within the jurisdiction of CFI, nor of any court of PI and that facts did not
constitute offense underthe laws in force in PI.
-Demurrer overruled. The two were sentenced to life imprisonment, to
return the stolen goods or to indemnify the offended parties, and to pay
one-half part of the costs.
-The Moros appealed.

Issues:
-W/N the accused can be convicted of piracy, considering that the crime
was committed outside Philippine jurisdiction.
-W/N the Spanish Penal Code provisions may still be applied considering
the fact that the Philippines was then already under American ruled

Held:
-Yes, piracy is not a crime against any particular state, but against all
mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country
where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits.
-Yes. Laws subsisting at the time of the transfer, designed to secure good
order and peace in the community, which are strictly municipal in
character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are
altered or repealed. Piracy y the law of nations is the same thing as piracy
by the civil law. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in
tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to concepts of public law. It is
evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the
Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding
provisions in force in the US.

Art. 153 of the Penal Code

The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of
another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty
ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. If the crime be
committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with
Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.

Art. 155 of the Penal Code

With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this
code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any
part of the national territory.

People vs. Rodriguez

March 20, 1985

Facts:
-On or about 3:15am of Aug. 31, 1981,within the territorial waters of Tawi-
Tawi, the above named Jaime Rodriguez and three others, being crew
members of the M/V Noria 767, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another and armed with bladed weapons and high
caliber firearms, with intent to gain and by means of violence and
intimidation upon persons, did then and there willfully and unlawfully,
take, steal and carry away equipment and other personal belongings of
the crew and passengers; that by reason of the said piracy, accused did
then and there, with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation,
treacherously attack, assault, stab and shot the persons.

-The acts of execution produced the death of several persons, and inflicted
several physical injuries of others that could have caused their death, but
did not by reason independent of the will of accused, that is, by timely
and able medical assistance rendered which prevented death.

-The three pleaded guilty and sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of
death.

-The case is now on automatic review.

Issue:
W/N plea of guilty is a mitigating circumstance?

Held: No. PD 532, Anti-Piracy Law, amending Art.134 of RPC provides:

Piracy
- The penalty of RT in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposedIf rape, murder or homicide is
committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders
abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the
seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.

Clearly the lower court committed no error in notconsidering the guilty

plea as a mitigatingcircumstance.

Art. 63 of RPC
Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which
the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the deed.

People vs. Siyoh

Feb. 18, 1986 Ponente: Abad Santos

Facts:
-Julaide Siyoh, Omarkyam Kiram, NamliIndanan and Andaw Jamahali were
accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder.

-Peoples version:
On July 10, 1979, the victims Antonio deGuzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo
de Castro and Anastacio de Guzman, who were traveling merchants, were
on their way to Pilas Island, Basilanto sell the goods they received from
Alberto Aurea. They took their dinner and slept that night in the house of
accused Kiram at Pilas Island. The next two days, the group was
accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh in selling their goods. On the night of
July 12,
they again slept at Kirams house, but Kiram was not there. Kiram claimed
he spent the night at Siyohs house.

On July 13, De Guzmans group went to Baluk-Baluk as suggested by

Kiram and returned to
Kirams house for the night, but Kiram did not sleep with them. The
following day, July 14, the group again went to Baluk-Baluk with Kiram and
Siyoh using Kirams pump
boat. While they were selling their goods, the group saw Kiram and Siyoh
talking with two persons whose faces they could not recognize. After
selling their goods, the group, together with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared to
return to Pilas.

On their way back, De Guzman saw another pumpboat. Shortly after,

Kiram turned off the engine of their pump boat and two shots were fired
from the other pump boat as it moved towards them. DeGuzman
recognized them to be the same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in
Baluk-Baluk. De Guzman and his companions were divested of their
money and their goods by Kiram. Thereafter, the accused ordered the
victims to undress. Siyoh then hacked Hiolen while Kiram hacked De
Castro. De Guzman jumped. He was able to swim away even though his
back was injured.
-This case is on automatic review.

Issue: W/N the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Held: Yes.

1.If accused were culprits, they would have easily robbed their victims at
Kirams house or on any occasion that they were travelling together.
Robbing the victims at Kirams
house would make Kiram and his family immediately suspect and robbing
them before all the goods were sold would be premature.

2. Accused immediately reported incident to the PC. The records do not

support his assertion.

3. Wife of the deceased victims stated in affidavits that De Guzman

informed them shortly after the incident that the companions of Siyoh and
Kiram killed their husbands.

4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with

the rest because his remains were never recovered. There is no reason to
suppose that he is still alive or that he died in a manner different from his
companions. The number of persons killed is not material. PD
532considers qualified piracy as a special complex crime punishable by
death regardless of the number of victims.

5. The death certificates are vague as to the nature of injuries sustained;

were they hacked or gunshot wounds? The cause is consistent with
testimony of De Guzman.
ARBITRARY DETENTION CASES

Umil vs. Ramos

FACTS: This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the
validity of the arrests and searches made by the military on the
petitioners. The arrests relied on the confidential information that the
authorities received. Except for one case where inciting to sedition was
charged, the rest are charged with subversion for being a member of the
New Peoples Army.

RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the
arrests were legal since subversion is a form of a continuing crime
together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith. On the inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal
since an information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the arrests were
not fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe
houses pinpointed by none other than members of the NPA.
The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender
as soon as possible. Otherwise, it would be considered as impliedly waived
and the filing of information can proceed. This sort of irregularity is not
sufficient to set aside a valid judgment upon a sufficient complaint and
after a trial free from error.

DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The confidential information was nothing but

hearsay. The searches and arrests made were bereft of probable cause
and that the petitioners were not caught in flagrante delicto or in any
overt act. Utmost, the authorities was lucky in their fishing expeditions.

2. The Bill of Rights can only be invoked only against the state. People vs.
Marti -- Marti and his wife went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders" carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages.
Marti informed the owner that the packages simply contained books,
cigars and gloves as gifts to his friends in Zurich and refused to allow the
owner to examine and inspect the packages. However, before the delivery
of the box to the Bureau of Customs, the owner's husband inspected the
package and found marijuana which was later turned over to the NBI. A
case was filed against Marti. Marti invoked his right against illegal
searches and seizure. Held: The constitutional proscription against
unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed
only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to
whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power
is imposed.

Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure

may only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced
by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act
of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be
construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal
complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986

Facts: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in

furtherance of subversion (tasks such as recruiting members to the NPA
and collection of contributions from its members) and found guilty by the
RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. From the information filed by the police
authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man
defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrest
defendant and had his house searched. Subsequently, certain NPA-related
documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr.
Pol of the NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any
subversive activities and claims that he has been tortured in order to
accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial
statements have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on
his person and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done
without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the search
warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial court erred in
holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in
relation to GOs 6and 7.

Issue: If defendants arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent
confiscation of a firearm and several NPA-related documents are lawful.

Held: Records disclose that when the police went to defendants house to
arrest him upon the information given by Masamlok, they had neither
search nor arrest warrant with themin wanton violation of ArtIV, Sec 3
(now Art III, sec 2). As the Court held in Villanueva vs Querubin, the state,
however powerful, doesnt have access to a mans home, his haven of
refuge where his individuality can assert itself in his choice of welcome
and in the kind of objects he wants around him. In the traditional
formulation, a mans house, however humble, is his castle, and thus is
outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by the government.

The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the
RoC:

a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another

and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
the offense.

However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless
arrest is under the ambit of aforementioned RoC. At the time of
defendants arrest, he wasnt in actual possession of any firearm or
subversive document, and was not committing any subversive acthe
was plowing his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime in a
warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have
beenin fact or actually have been committed first; it isnt enough to
suspect a crime may have been committed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. The Court also finds no
compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to
arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the
process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is
no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on
the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the
whereabouts of the accused were unknown.

In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive

documents, assuming they were really illegal, the defendant was never
informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest; thus the
admissions obtained are in violation of the constitutional right against self-
incrimination under Sec 20 Art IV (now Sec 12, Art III) and thus
inadmissible as evidence.

Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional right to be

assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogation. His extra-judicial
confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents are all
inadmissible as evidence. In light of the aforementioned, defendant is
acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt of the crime with which he has
been charged. Subject firearm and alleged subversive documents have
been disposed of in accordance with law.

The Court also maintains that violations of human rights do not help in
overcoming a rebellion. Reiterating Morales vs Enrile, while the
government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives,
the rebels, and the lawless with the means at its command, it should
always be remembered that whatever action is taken must always be
within the framework of our Constitution and our laws.

MILO VS SALANGA
G.R. No. L-37007

July 20, 1987

FACTS
An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against herein private
respondent (accused Barrio Captain Tuvera, Sr.) and some other private
persons for maltreating petitioner Valdez by hitting him with butts of their
guns and fist blows. Immediately thereafter, without legal grounds and
with deliberate intent to deprive the latter of his constitutional liberty,
accused respondent and two members of the police force of Mangsat
conspired and helped one another in lodging and locking petitioner inside
the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.

Accused-respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on the

ground that the facts charged do not constitute the elements of said crime
and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to
support the filing of the information. Petitioner Asst. Provincial Fiscal Milo
filed an opposition thereto. Consequently, averring that accused-
respondent was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary
Detention, respondent Judge Salanga granted the motion to quash in an
order. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not accused-respondent, being a Barrio Captain, can be liable

for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.

HELD

Yes. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with
authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime.
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary
Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors,
who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. A
perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they
are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the
latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of
maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to
detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private
respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he
as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.

Stonehill v. Diokno Digest

Stonehill v. Diokno
20 SCRA 283 (1967)
Concepcion, CJ

Facts:
1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search
warrants against the petitioner and the corporation to search persons and
premises of several personal properties due to an alleged violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and
the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. As a results, search and
seizures were conducted in the both the residence of the petitioner and in
the corporation's premises.
2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as
their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being
general warrants. Thus,he filed a petition with the Supreme Court for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized
effects from being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases
against the petitioner. The court issued the writ only for those effects
found in the petitioner's residence.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the
search and seizure in both premises

RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but
not those done in the corporation's premises. The petitioner has no cause
of action in the second situation since a corporation has a personality
separate and distinct from the personality of its officers or herein
petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each
in the said corporation, and whatever office they hold therein. Only the
party whose rights has been impaired can validly object the legality of a
seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third party.
The right to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of
documents, papers, and things seized from the offices and the premises).

Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against

petitioners personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers
directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises
of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal
properties books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for
violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
Code, and Revised Penal Code.

Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned

corporations and on the respective residences of the petitioners, there
seized documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners then
were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to
question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the
admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.

On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and

partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents
and papers.

Held:

Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules,
thus, illegal or being general warrants. There is no probable cause and
warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of
the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims,
caprice or passion of peace officers.
Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court
as a fruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except
if warranted by the circumstances.
Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of
those taken from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they
are treated as personality different from that of the corporation.

Burgos vs. Chief of Staff (G.R. No. L-64261)

Facts:
On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao, Executive Judge of the then
CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at
19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the Metropolitan
Mail and We Forum newspapers, respectively, were searched, and
office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles
and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the
said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and
other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the We Forum newspaper, were seized. A
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months following
the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin the
Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al.
from using the articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of
the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).

Issue:
Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials
may be the basis of the issuance of search warrants.

Held:
Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. In mandating that no warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the
Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant
or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant
may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos is in
possession or has in his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used
and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense
of subversion punishable under PD 885, as amended is a mere conclusion
of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of
such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable
cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant. Further, when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of
subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must
contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization
will not suffice.

OFFENDING RELIGIOUS FEELINGS

People vs. Mandoriao, Jr.

C.A., 51 O.G. 4619

FACTS: The Iglesia ni Cristo held a religious rally at a public place in

Baguio. About 200 people attended the meeting, about 50 of whom were
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo but the rest were outsiders and curious
listeners. While Salvio, a minister of Iglesia ni Cristo, was expounding on
his topic to the effect that Christ is not God, but only man, the crowd
became unruly. Some people urged Mandoriao to go up the stage and
have a debate with Salvio. Mandoriao however, was not able to speak
before the microphone because the wire connecting it was abruptly
disconnected.
ISSUE: Whether or not the meeting was a religious ceremony.
HELD: The meeting here was not a religious ceremony. A religious
meeting is an assemblage of people meeting for the purpose of
performing acts of adoration to the Supreme Being, or to perform religious
services in recognition of God as an object of worship The meeting here
was not limited to the members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The supposed
prayers and singing of hymns were merely incidental because the
principal object of the rally was to persuade new converts to their religion.
Assuming that the rally was a religious ceremony, the appellant cannot be
said to have performed acts or uttered words offensive to the feelings of
the faithful. The act complained of must be directed against a dogma or
ritual, or upon an object of veneration. There was no object of veneration
at the meeting.

Reyes Book II, page 80:

When the application of the Iglesia ni Cristo was to hold the meeting at a
public place and the permit expressly stated that the purpose was to hold
a religious rally, what was held on that occasion was not a religious
ceremony, even if a minister was then preaching (that Jesus Christ was
not God but only a man). The rally was attended by persons who are not
members of the sect.
Reyes Book II, page 81:
Remarks that those who believed that Christ is God are anti-Christ, that all
the members of the Roman Catholic Church are marked by the demon,
and that the Pope is the Commander of Satan are notoriously offensive to
the feelings of the faithful.
People vs. Baes
68 Phil. 203

FACTS:
Baes, the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna,
charged the accused with an offense against religion for causing the
funeral of a member of the Church of Christ to pass through the
churchyard fronting the Roman Catholic Church, belonging to said church
and devoted to the religious worship thereof. The parish priest opposed
this, but through force and threats of physical violence by the accused,
was compelled to allow the funeral to pass through the said churchyard.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act complained of is notoriously offensive to the
religious feelings of the Catholics, thereby violating Article 133 of the RPC.

HELD:
The facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and
penalized in article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, and should the fiscal
file an information alleging the said facts and a trial be thereafter held at
which the said facts should be conclusively established, the court may find
the accused guilty of the offense complained of, or that of coercion, or
that of trespass under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code.

Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings

of the Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged only according
to the feelings of the Catholic and not those of other faithful ones. Laurel
dissent: Offense to religious feelings should not be made to depend upon
the more or less broad or narrow conception of any given particular
religion, but should be gauged having in view the nature of the acts
committed and after scrutiny of all the facts and circumstance which
should be viewed through the mirror of an unbiased judicial criterion.
Otherwise, the gravity or leniency of the offense would hinge on the
subjective characterization of the act from the point of view of a given
religious denomination or sect, and in such a case, the application of the
law would be partial and arbitrary, withal, dangerous, especially in a
country said to be "once the scene of religious intolerance and
persecution.

PEOPLE VS NANOY
SHORT STORY : Nanoy, who was allegedly drunk, entered into the chapel
of the congregation of the Assembly of God while it was having its
afternoon services and attempted to grab the song leader. As a result,
everyone ran out of the church and the religious services were
discontinued. He was charged with the crime of offending religious
feelings. After appeal, the court held that he was only guilty of unjust
vexation.

FACTS:

While the congregation of the Assembly of God was having its afternoon
services in its chapel, accused Epifanio Nanoy, who was drunk, entered
with uplifted hands, approached Levita Lapura, the song leader, and
attempted to grab her.

Levita Lepura ran away from Nanoy. Romeo Zafra, also a member of said
congregation, held the accused and ledhim outside the church.

The other members of the sect also ran out of the church and the religious
services were discontinued.

Accused was charged with the crime of offending religious feelings

penalized under Art. 133 of the RPC. The complaint alleged that he had
the intention of stopping the said rite in an unholy manner.

Trial court found Nanoy guilty of disturbance or interruption of a religious

ceremony, penalized under A153 of the RPC and sentenced him to 10
months and 21 days of imprisonment, plus a fine of Php50 with subsidiary
imprisonment in the case of insolvency.

Accused appealed, arguing that the offense, if any is unjust vexation.

ISSUE/S
1.WON the TC erred in convicting Nanoy of disturbance or interruption of a
religious ceremony.

WON the offense was unjust vexation.

RULES

Art. 133. Offending the religious feelings

.
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a place
devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious
ceremony, shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the
faithful.

There must be deliberate intent to hurt the feelings of the faithful.

ANALYSIS

1.
YES The appellant did NOT perform acts notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful. Neither did he cause such a serious disturbance as
to interrupt or disturb the services of the said congregation.