Pflueger
Pflueger
Pflueger
CAPACITY
Mysticism, Psychology,
and Philosophy
EDITED BY
ROBERT K. C. FORMAN
Discriminating the
Innate Capacity
Salvation Mysticism of
ClassicalSarkhya-Yoga
LLOYD W. PFLUEGER
But when the sun has set, Yajiiavalkya, and the moon
has set, and the fire has gone out, and speech is
hushed, what light does a person here have?
-Brhad AryaTJ,yakaUpani~ad.1
45
46 IN THB RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS
grounds, languages, and cultures, can perhaps agree on at least one aspect of their
enterprise: in dealing with mystical experience, however defined or undefined, we
nre dealing with highly significant events that at the same time transcend ordinary
experience. This transcendence of the limits of what is usual or paradigmatic for
experience makes mysticism particularly valuable. At the limits of the ordinary we
are likely to learn something new about religion and its study and about experience
itself.
In the last ten years a debate about the nature of religious experience, especially
with respect to mysticism, has become increasingly active. At issue is the role of the
mind in mystical experiences. Are the creative activities of the mind, with its cul-
tural shaping, training, and basic presuppositions, responsible for mystical experi-
ences, or is something else responsible? It may depend on which experiences we are
talking about. Katz and his colleagues represented in Mysticism and Philosophical
Analysis, 3 the so-called constructivists, argue that the active building processes of
the intellect, the constructive activities of language use, and the expectations gener-
ated by a life in a religious tradition are responsible. Sallie King, Donald Evans, and
Robert Forman and his colleagues, whom we might call, as Forman does, Perennial
Psychologists as represented in The Problem of Pure Consciousness, have argued
that mystical experiences do not necessarily result from such a conceptual building
process, but rather result from some other sort of process. 4 To wit, PCEs (Pure Con-
sciousness Events), 5 they argue, do not show signs of being so shaped and may re-
sult not from a construction process but from a process of progressively eliminating
conceptual shaping.
It seems like common sense to apply the same kind of analytic tools and perspec-
tives to mystical experiences as we might apply to any other ordinary experience.
The farther the actual experiences are from the ordinary, however, the more dubious
such common sense becomes. Perhaps the farthest extreme from ordinary experi
ence is the mysticism represented by the class of PCEs. In particular, the kaivalya
experience described in the Sarpkhya- Yoga philosophy of Hinduism stands out in
the history of religions as an instructively clear example of a mysticism so beyond
the framework of ordinary experience that, I believe, it has something to say to the
present debate between constructivists and postconstructivists on the nature of
mysticism.
The classical systems of Hindu philosophy known as Srupkhya and Yoga offer an
outline of theory and practice to gain a particular mystical insight, known as "knowl-
edge of the difference" (viveka-khyati), which results in a salvific isolation (kaival ya
of consciousness from all other components of experience and from all suff ring.
The "liberation from suffering" demands the analysis and relinquishment of nothing
Jess than the structure of ordinary experience. It demands the discrimination of ,ill
intellectual, cultural, linguistic, and personal elements of conscious xp ti nee 'from
the consciousness itself. It demands the separation of all that is or cnn b constn1 ted
DISCRIMINATING THE INNATE CAPACITY
47
in experience
. from the simple capacity
. to be conscious at all. . What' smore, s~.mkhya-
Yoga philosophy not only descnbes and analyzes the PCE of kaivalya but also out-
lines methods to achieve it, bridging the conceptual gap between ordinary experi-
ence and salvific mystical experience. To be sure, cultural and linguistic means such
as me~itation are used to achieve kaivalya, but only because, as the Indian proverb
goes, 1t takes a thorn to remove a thom-kaivalya itself transcends constructed
experience of any kind.
Satpkhya-Yoga employs meditative technique to examine progressively more
subtle levels of mind until the full range of mind is experienced and discarded: all
things (including all mental things) are in this analysis material process-both the
process of knowing and the objects known. This insight into the nature of human
experience reveals something else, something totally apart from material process: a
pure innate capacity to know. The difference between the material process and con-
sciousness itself is crucial not only to the dualistic system but also, I argue, to the
correct understanding of our contemporary discussion on the nature and study of
mystical experience. To elucidate the difference, in this essay we explore three main
areas: the structure of reality in Sarp.khya-Yoga philosophy; the significance of
kaivalya, the isolation of the innate capacity of consciousness itself; and an analysis
of a yogic meditation method for isolating consciousness from intellectual, cultural,
and linguistic process.
The evidence suggests that at least in the case of kaivalya mysticism of classical
Sarp.khya-Yoga, the postconstructivists do well in their theory to make allowance
for an experienced capacity of consciousness beyond cultural or linguistic program-
ming (or reprogramming). Salvation experience in Sarp.khya-Yoga assumes an im-
personal and culture-free core of the human being, open to direct experience by all
technically proficient investigators.
The sa,,,khya
Structure
To understand kaivalya, we must first gain an overall grasp of the Sarpkhya-Yoga
structure of reality. 10 Sarpkhya enumerates the component principles that make up
the universe from "inside out" and from subtle to gross. 11 In a view rather similar to
that of modem physics, Sarpkhya notes that reality involves a wide continuum of
experience from subtle to gross, from invisible to visible, from unmanifest to mani-
fest.12All component principles (tattvas) are considered open to perception. Unlike
our modem scientific reliance on indirect perceptions furnished by the instrumenta-
tion of atom smashers, electron microscopes, and other sophisticated technology,
however, Sarpkhya relies on the experiential reports of saints and sages who are
understood to have cultivated their inner perception to directly perceive what is in-
visible to our ordinary faculties. 13 Sarpkhya outlines the perceived structure, from
the most subtle, simple, and abstract components to the most gross, complicated, and
concrete-something like a primordial "periodic table of elements"-twenty-five
in all.
Even with twenty-five basic components, Sarpkhya metaphysics, epistemology,
and psychology posit a firm dualism. There are two irreducible, innate, and indepen-
dent realities in our universe of experience:
uncaused (ah.etumat)
nontemporal (11itya)
nonspatial (vyapin)
stable (akriya)
simple eka
unsupported (aniiirita)
nonmergent aJiliga
without parts anavayava)
ind pendent (apara1antra)
50 IN THE RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS
a witness (siisk#tva)
possessed of isolation or freedom (kaivalya)
indifferent (miidhyasthya)
a spectator (dra~trtva)
incapable of activity (akartrbhiiva)
Puru~~aexists (puru\~o'sti)
For the Srupkhya system, it is not enough to say that matter functions in its vari-
ous levels and forms: the evolutionary manifestation of prakrti into twenty-three
principles and all their comb~nations implies a purpose, a purpose that the material
world, however complex, cannot supply. Matter is not conscious in itself; it has no
sentient light in which to be seen. Without a conscious principle outside itself, it is
blind, unknowing, and unknown. 26 Without puru~a, even mental processes know
nothing. Like the flickering arrays of electrical on and off switches within a com-
puter, mental operations without a conscious principle are just material changes, not
experience. Only the witness who observes the computer screen makes the readout
knowledge. Larson captures the thrust of the arguments for puru~a in SK 17 in this
way:
All of these arguments amount to one basic claim, namely, that the very notion of tri-
partite process itself becomes unintelligible in the absence of a distinct principle of
sentience. In other words, tripartite process although a powerful intellectual synthesis
or conceptualization, cannot stand alone in and of itself, for even the awareness of the
concept presupposes a ground or basis, or perhaps better, a "medium" through which
and for which the concept becomes meaningful. Otherwise what appeared to be a uni-
form, rational, and meaningful world "from Brahma down to a blade of grass" would
finally show itself as an endless mechanical process in which the transactions of ordi-
nary experience would amount to little more than occasional pleasurable respites from
an endlessly unfolding tragedy. Or putting the matter another way, one would come
upon the remarkable paradox that an apparently uniform, rational, and meaningful world
is finally pointless. 27
Puru~ain Patanjali's YS
Patafljali' s Srupkhya formulation, the Yogasutra, emphasizing meditative experience
as the means of salvation, gives important corroboration to our understanding of the
dualism of prakrti and puru~a.
The closest the YS comes to a definition of puru~a comes in chapter 2, which
echoes the salvation scheme of the SK. Having established (parallel to SK I) that the
''totality of experience is nothing but pain" 28 (YS 2.15), there is a logical resolve to
avoid this suffering in the future (2.16). To do this, the cause and mechanics of suf-
fering and liberation are succinctly presented. Although a wealth of synonyms for
puru~a andprakrti are used (such as seer and seen), 29 the basic Satp.khyan theory is
quite recognizable:
2.17 The cause [of future suffering] that should be avoided is the association (stl1J1Yoga)
of the seer (dra~fri) and the seen (drsya).
2.18 The seen, disposed to illumination, activity, or inertia, 30 consists of the elements
and the sense organs and functions for the sake of experience and liberation.
2.20 The seer is simply the seeing, [which] although pure sees the object.
2.21 The essential nature of the seen is to function for the sake of the seer.
2.23 Association is the cause of the apprehension of the essential nature of the owner
(sviimf, i.e., puru~a) and the owned (sva, i.e., prakrti).
2.24 Ignorance (avidyii.) is the cause.
2.25 From an absence of this [ignorance] there is an absence of association-the
deliverance-this is the isolation (kaivalya) of seeing (drsi).
2.26 Undeviating perception of the difference (viveka-khyii.ti) is the means of deliv-
erance.
We see in Yoga philosophy the same Satp.khya structure of reality and the same
concept of salvation. The faculty of consciousness (puru~a), which is simply the see-
ing, is erroneously associated (2.18), misidentified, with what is seen (prak,-ti)-the
thinking process of the mind complete with its contents-that is, what it thinks about.
Both are watched, simply, indifferently watched by something else: pur~a, the ulti-
mate watcher or seer. Consciousness does not think. It only witnesses the thinking
(2.20). Without the presence of pure consciousness, the mechanical play of thought
and sense perception have no meaning. It is only through the seeming conjunction
of two innate and completely independent realities that what humans know as expe-
rience comes to be (2.23). Experience is invariably painful (2.15). Salvation is af-
forded by breaking down the nature of ordinary experience into its dual and eter-
nally distinct components: consciousness and matter, seer and seen, owner and owned
(2.23). Ignorance is the ordinary overlap of the two in what seems to be unified ex-
perience of a person; liberation is the dissolution of personal experience. What is
essentially conscious is separated from what is merely nonconscious (though dynamic)
material. Ordinary experience is distilled, as it were, into its innate components;
ignor?.'lt process is tricked into "deconstructing," dismembering, ignorance. Thec~g-
nitive bubble bursts on inspection; what is conscious is isolated from the matenal
- DISCRIMINATING THE INNATE CAPACITY 53
process it seemed to animate. The result is kaivalya, isolated puru$a, the Pure Con-
sciousness Event (PCE). Anything cultural, linguistic, psychological, intellectual, or
even sensory is eliminated in the final dismemberment of ordinary experience-the
clear distinction between puru,a and pralcrti.31
is the knowing itself. In all human knowledge-events, whatever the object, is the
common factor of knowing. Knowing in this sense does not mean the cognitive pro-
cessing, the analysis and articulation in symbolic or formal structures. Knowing
refers to the fact that contents of whatever kind are present to awareness. The con-
ceptual, cultural, and linguistic frames that shape the contents of knowing from the
Sarpkhya-Yoga viewpoint are-must be-material. This means that any constructivist
claim about mystical experience can only apply in Satpkhyan analysis to the mate-
rial portion of experience. But there is more to experience, says Sarpkhya, than
material constructions.
Whereas prakrti is internally complex, the knowing, the knowing-ness before
which prakrti evolves, 34 involves, 35 or maintains dynamic equalibrium 36 is utterly
still, pure, and simple. This is puru$a, the pure knowing core of the person, of
personhood itself-the pure core of subjectivity.
Indian thought has shown a great interest in the bipolar nature of existence, sub-
jective and objective. Its interest in isolating the pure core of subjectivity is excep-
tional and may leave W estemers, with the exception of a few mystics, behind. 37 The
Sarpkhya idea of consciousness (puru~a, cit, cetana) is as subtle as it is bold. The
question "What is consciousness?" already seems to presuppose that it is a "what"-
something objective, something that ordinary language can deal with, rather than the
immaterial knowing that, beyond language, knows language (though to qualify con-
sciousness in subject/object language also goes too far).
Consider the difficulty. The word know, because it is a verb, may seem to imply
some kind of action, but consciousness is actionless. For example, the verb know
implies a subject/agent, someone who does the act of knowing-but calling conscious-
ness a knower objectifies it, falsifies it. It is nothing, does nothing. Pure knowing no
more requires an active agent/knower than being requires an active agent or a "be-er.''
The Sarpkhya- Yoga puru$a is the knowing, as light is illumination. 38 The process of
knowing something, however, is not the knowing itself but always the object of
puru$a' s illumination. (Puru$a knows mental processes and their products, but rnental
processes and products are not puru$a,) Agency in Sarpkhya is all on the side of the
material knower, the intellect (buddhi), mind, and senses. Intellect, mind, and senses
do something. The knowing (knowingness), puru$a, is changeless consciousness. It
spontaneously knows the material agency, the mechanical process of cognition and
perception, and, through it, the material world.
If it were easy to articulate conceptually and isolate experientially, there would
be no need for the Sarp.khya-Yoga system, for in this philosophy nondiscriminati~n
of pure consciousness is the very definition of the ignorance whose elimination is
the system's only goal. The isolation of the factor of consciousness in human expe-
rience is the way to the salvation, the liberation from all forms of suffering.
The goal is not armchair speculation or knowledge for its own sake. Snqtkhya-
y oga sees itself as the answer to a practical problem. This is important to recallbe-
cause the issue is not speculation but experience. There are those who might say that
DISCRIMINATING THE INNATE CAPACITY
55
ror; neither the light nor the objects it represents are ever really "in" the mirror. The
delicately perspicacious but seriously mistaken "buddhi-mirror'' experiences in igno-
rance not only that it has "light 0 in it but that it is the very source of such illumina-
tion. When this mirror is "yogically polished," its culminating intuition is that the
light is "other" than it. Buddhi is in itself not conscious, not spiritual-not the illu-
minator of "personhood" but only the illuminated "reflector." With respect to this
inner consciousness, the buddhi must now (apologies to St. Paul) think "not me, but
pur~a in me."
This realization destroys all possibility of suffering and all possibility of taking
phenomenal personhood seriously. 44 Behind the facade of a person knowing is the
reality of a separate knowingness and a material personality known. After this real-
ization there is no longer a personal consciousness around which the results of ac-
tion, karman,45 can collect; there is no one subjected to mental or physical states.
The states come and go, but the real knower of the states is experienced as eternal
and eternally free. Even these states continue only until the karman is exhausted, for,
according to SK 67, the mind/body complex still continues by dint of remaining
karmic impressions (as a potter's wheel continues to spin for a while after the pot is
thrown). Self-conscious individuality is no longer a source of pain. The "toothache"
has been fixed by "x-raying" the phenomenal knower and extracting the phenom-
enal person! In this spiritual dentistry, the tooth remains; the person is pulled.
The point for our discussion of mysticism is this: most mystical experience-for
example, visions, auditions, perceptions or conceptions of unity with nature, and
conversions- from the viewpoint of Sarp.khya-Y oga, belong entirely to the material
side of the equation. In fact, any kind of personal mystical experience would be seen
as just another rearrangement of the material components of the world. As such, any
personal mystical experience from the Satpkhya viewpoint is necessarily a constructed
experience, dependent on the material world of physical and psychological facul-
ties, and all that shape them, including culture, language, and belief. Even so, this
does not preclude the possibility of a nonordinary experience, which, although it may
be described, articulated, and even engineered in a constructed way, in itself as
experience is not personal or in any way constructed. Though nonordinary, kaivalya
in Satpkhya- Yoga is seen as experience and as as real.
of objects of awareness: thoughts, feelings, and sensations. What we call Hfe experi-
ence is but a sequence of such objects on the mind ' s screen. Not only our environ-
ment, our possessions . and our body are objects, but our personalities as well. Our
very existence as distinct persons is also a constructed object. But in all ordinary
experiences of objects there is something else ; according to S!qikhya-Yoga, that
makes the experience possible. Something "Wholly Other" (apologies to Otto), so
other that it is not even a thing, but an ungraspable no-thing, a presence in which and
for which objects appear. It is the mystery of conscious existence; to know it in its
uniqueness is to be it and (in Sarp.khya-Yoga) to be saved.
The text then details and analyzes the various ordinary and nonordinary states of
awareness that lead with disciplined practice to the actual quiesc ence of mental
DISCRIMINATING THE INNATE CA.PA.CJ.TY 59
The consequence of the operations of awareness settling down entirely, the very
goal of yoga, is stated in YS 1.3: .
1.3 Then the seer abides in its essential nature.
(tada dra~tu!J,svarupe 'vasthanam.) .
The innate capacity, the essential innate form (svarupa) of that which really se.es
in all seeing, is all that remains: puru$a. Otherwise, there is the confusion, the appar-
ent mixing of the intellectual process and consciousness itself:
1.4 Otherwise [consciousness, the seer] appears to be identical with the operations
of awareness.
(vrtti-sarupyam itaratra)
This apparent mixing of what is truly separate is the Pandora's Box of Saipkhya-
y oga. From it come ego, personhood, and the various forms of ignorance whose
common cons.equence is pain and frustration.
The prudent conclusion is that
The means of escape is to cultivate the experiential states that result in the dis-
crimination and isolation of the true seer, puru$a,
The first and second chapters of the YS refer to a particular meditation process to
attain the most quiescent state of awareness and to purify the mind of obstacJes along
the way . Its central placement and the discussion at:,out it indicate its importance. On
50
the surface it may be seen, interestingly enough, as a kind of theistic ' devotion
to the "Lord."
Although the same religious commentators elaborate this s~called ~meditatio_n
on the- Lord"-;:
_- , foVara-pra,:zz_ 'dh-na
a , 1nto a. kind of devotion (bhakll) appropnat
. . . e to their..
own time and religious viewpoint, Patafljali's own expressed_descnpllon m th~ YS
seems to focus more on technical practice (abhyasa) than on piety. In fact , the sutra
themselves (apart fromlater commentaries) actually emp~a size me~t ation ~n acre~
sound (rather than emotional worship with loving devotion, _bbakti ) to ~nn g ~bout
- pre 1
(1) the ry stages o f co-herent
1mma ss and (2) the fmal pe~ ct is0Jat1on f
. . awarene
.
60 IN THB RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS
The existence of a sacred seed-sound (bfja) for I~vara (Ofyl) and the sound's use
as an option for inducing and perfecting coherent states of awareness are logically
laid out in chapter 1:
1.23 Or by meditation on (devotion to) the Lord.
(Tsvara-pra,:iidhanadva.)
1.27 The sound which expresses Him is the prai:iava (Ofyl).
(Tasya vacakah pranavah.)
1.28 Meditative repetition of it [results in] the realization of its referent.
(Tajjapas tad-artha-bhavanam.)
1.29 From that the consciousness within is attained, as well as the negation of
obstacles.
(Tatah pratyak-cetanadhigamo 'pi antarayabhavas ca.)
What is the ultimate referent for the pra,:iava 01\1? It is consciousness itself. Puru~a
is referred to as master or owner (svamin, 2.23) and Lord (prabhu, 4.18); the Lord
God (lsvara) is defined in the YS in terms of puru~a (1.24). The YS seems to go out
of its way (unlike the SK) to include God, but only as an impersonal cipher whose
"name" is particularly suited to isolating consciousness itself. 51
This yogic means of isolating consciousness itself is by mentally applying one-
self to52the name, the mantra 0 (calledpra,:iava), which reduces mental activities
to the silence of pure consciousness. To understand this process of using language
within the mind to go beyond both language and mind, we must dig more deeply
into the history and earlier traditions behind this practice.
Meditation on O}rf
derives from the ancient Indian conc~ption of the intrinsic correlation of name (niima)
and form (rupa), language and reahty. Vedic ritual, the earliest stratum of Hindu-
ism, for example, was based on the premise that by manipulating sacred names (ir-
respective even of the will of the gods), the realities they represent would change in
the way desired, since word and referent in magical Vedic language are two forms
of the same thing.
The German lndologist J. W. Hauer links OMto the groups that practiced the
intensive study and recitation of sacred texts (sviidhyiiya). 53 Such absorption in sa-
cred texts through repetition was practiced mentally (manasii) in the village and orally
(viicii) in the forest. It was known from earliest times as japa ("murmuring").54
Repetitive "murmuring" or " humming," which may have been used to aid concen-
trative absorption, was technically called pra,:iava; later, the term pra,:iava became
exclusively identified with the syllable OMitself. Hauer notes that such sviidhyiiya
orjapa of OMprobably brought it to acceptance as a designator of the highest power,
brahman.55
Although the single syllable Ofy.lseems to be the ultimate in simplicity, much is
made of its inner acoustic structure, which is understood to correspond to the struc-
ture of the microcosm and the macrocosm. Ofy.lis understood to be made up of
sequential elements (counted variously as three, four, or, more technically, 3 ele-
ments): "A" and "U" (which elide to make "O"); "M" (anusviira), the nasalization;
and the silence ("") that remains after the hum of nasalization. The three letters
and the dichotomy between sound and silence furnish the basis of much analysis and
analogy for the linguistically minded philosophers of the later Vedic Upani~ads.56
The unfolding sound/silence structure of O:fy1parallels the structure of the mind and
the universe itself.
The great source of confusion for any interpreter comes from mixing or not con-
tinually discriminating between two levels:
1. The sound OM,which comprises the levels of relative awareness from most
gross to most subtle
2. The silence to which Ofy.lpoints. This silence correlates with contentless
consciousness itself. (In this perspective, silence itself is not real absence
of sound but the very quietest "pronunciation" of the cosmic O~.)
Though OMhas been associated with the divine in all Hindu religious sects, it is
obviously much more than just a convenient tag for a personal Lord. Names for
divinity in Hinduism are innumerable; OMis unique.
OMis speech par excellence. By linking the mind with the nonlinguistic realities
beyond it, OM,as speech, acts as a bridge, a means of passing over from the word to
the referent. In the case of a referent that is spiritual-that is, entirely immaterial- --
Ofyfalso functions paradoxically to disjoin what in speech is erroneously l~nked- ,
the material intellect and consciousness itself. Here language does not function con ...
structively to shape and mold experience; it functions to deconstruct itself, to remove
62 IN THB RIILIGI.OUll TRADITIONS
1.9 The true and pure essence has been taught there, the knowledge capable of
being grasped through one word, having the form of Prar,ava,and in no wuycon
tradicting the different views.58
Thus, Oty1is understood here as the very essence of the Veda (the co.llectionof
chants that Hindus revere as highest revelation) and as the unitarysyllableofbrahman
from which all thoughts, all dogmas or doctrines arise. In a truly conciliatoryspirit,
the commentary (possibly also by Bartrhari) adds with respect to OM':
The mystic syllable (PraQava)allowsfor all pointsof view,it Jsthe sourc of ull Scrip-
ture, it is the common factor of all originaJcauses, it is the causeof the ris ondfall of
doctrines,it accepts within itself all mutually contradictoryid n of .9rllhmnnor dlsul
lowsall of them.The objectof this allowanceordisnllowo.ncedoes not, ther fore.vary,
Pataiijali's nonsectarian philosophyof meditation, whos prototypeis th re ti
tion of 0~1,seemsto resonate withBartrhari.Althou h Burtrhurifovor8monlsmund
DISCRIMINATING THE INNATE CAPACITY 63
Patafljali dualism, both rely on Ofyt in their parallel quests for universality. Both men
reached for common ground in a period that sought to shore up intellectually what
their rulers hoped to maintain politically in the face of geographical, ethnic, social,
and religious divisions. As meditative discipline, or yoga, appeared as a common
theme in Indian religions, so philosophy of language and the "perfected" medium of
classical Sanskrit could also provide a common foundation for intellectual life. Both
met in the syllable Ofyf.
Bartfhari goes on to link sabda-brahman with yoga by underscoring and support-
ing the supernormal powers (siddhis) of perception of those who have purified their
minds ( 1.37) and cognized the eternal scriptures (Veda) and the science of grammar
that explicates and preserves the scriptural potency (1.35-43). Such discrimination
reveals that language (sabda) is to be differentiated into three levels:
1.42 This Science of Grammar is the supreme and wonderful source of the knowledge
of the threefold word, comprising many paths, of the Vaikhari, (the Elaborated),
the Madhyama (the Middle One), and the Pasyanti (the Seeing One).60
Here the vaikharf level represents the uttered sounds produced by the vocal cords
and heard by the ears, the gross level of speech. Madhyama is the subtle, mental level
of speech, the verbal thinking level that is the source of gross speech. Pasyantf, the
"Seeing One," corresponds to the very finest level of intuitive cognition, where name
and form (word and material referent) are one in seed-form, known in a flash of di-
rect intuition so compact and whole that it is without the usual sequence and distinc-
tion of ordinary thought or articulated speech . This most compact seed-level of speech
for Bart:rhari points to an underlying monism. This is presumably the level of mental
function where the r#s and advanced yogins are said to cognize the impersonal acous-
tic structures of the Veda and the universe as a whole.
The concept of these three distinct, increasingly inward levels of speech is prob-
ably not unrelated to the ancient use of Vedic mantras in the sacrifice, which also
knew of three levels of recitation-the loud chanting of the hotr, the low muttering
of the adhvaryu, and the silent witness and mental recitation of the brahmin priest
during the ritual.
The three levels of speech seem to refer to the material universe. Beyond the thr~e
material levels of speech there is still a fourth level-the speechless, soundless si-
lence. For example, the Upani~ads differentiate the level of sabda-brahman (Brahm~-
as-Word) from asabda-brahman (Wordless Brahman), the lower Brahman of activ-
ity and mental operation, from higher Brahman, a silent, wordless Abs~l~te beyoo d
thought. Tantric thought, recognizing the same distinction, also charactensttcally adds
a fourth level of speech, the para, or transcendental level. We see that the language
speculations upon which Pat~jali could draw spoke of three levels of sound or word
(qumtessentially by three 1eve 1s o f OM)
represented . and beyond
material vibration '
an ultimate level of conscious silence.
64 IN THI! RELIGIOUS TILU>ITIO S
Parallel to these divisions of the basic building blocks of matter and personality,
Patanjali lays out levels of meditative process (samprajnata samlidhi, samlipatti)
( 1.17, 1.42). The levels are progressive levels of discrimination that resu.lt from
increasing focus (coherence) of mind. They are:
DISCRIMINATING THE INNATE CAPACITY 65
hymns, later internalized in Upani~adic meditation, reaches its simplest and most
practical fonn in O}rl-japa of the YS. Just as Pataiijali strips human personality to its
bare core, pure consciousness, he seems to strip down the complicated external para-
phernalia of sacrificial rituals and sectarian devotional worship (such as the religious
praises of the thousand names of God) to the simple and profound repetition of o~.
O~, as we have seen, carries the whole Indian tradition on its back, as well as
certain associated presuppositions about the interrelated nature of language, reality
(nama-rupa), and human awareness. This understanding of Ofyt, admittedly cultural
and linguistic, does not stop there; it is presented, as we have indicated, in order to
transcend itself. As the proverb goes, it takes a thorn to remove a thorn. How exactly
might this work in yogic practice?
1. First, the beginning repetition of OMmixed in the yogin' s mind with idea (some
conception of the personal God, Isvara) and referent (in my contention, puru~a) is
entertained. This is the so-called ordinary thought absorption level. This prelimi-
nary level ofjapa is sometimes even begun with voiced chanting-(vaikhari level)-
and slowly diminished to purely mental (madhyama) repetition. It is only at this gross
and beginning level that OMcan be associated with an ordinary word meaning such
as fsvara. Who or what OMrefers to as the designator of Isvara will become appar-
ent in pure experience as the meditative process deepens. In any case, we must recall
that even this coherence on the level of ordinary thinking must be detached from
the personal or dogmatic Lord, since He is an object "revealed [by scripture]"
(anusravika-vi~aya, 1.15). Thus, the concept of 'fsvara-pra,:iidhana as a kind of
intensification of emotional attachment to the anthropomorphic Lord as the sum of
religious imaging and conceptualization seems to be ruled out. In fact, in Patafijali's
formulation it would restrict one from further progress in experiencing more subtle,
more ignificant levels of apprehension.
2. As the mind settles with the detached repetition of the Oryt,the more laboriou
and more energy-consuming association chains of scattered thoughts, d finition ,
68 IN THB RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS
impressions, and memories drop away. Eventually, as the coherent impressions grow
stronger, a new level of coherent absorption arises that is completely free of ordi-
nary mixed thinking and presents the object of awareness without verbal associa-
tion, judgments, or reasoning. In this nirvitarka level the object alone, the sound o~
in this case, appears in its svarupa, its innate essence, as the subtle element of sound
(.fabda-tanmatra). There is no sense that someone is seeing something through the
process of perception, only complete identification of awareness with the subtle ele-
mental level. This is subtle thought absorption, the second level of coherent mental
functioning. As detached repetition of this level of OMcontinues, awareness even-
tually slips to an even more subtle and more simple level.
3. The third level involves the dropping away of even the subtle sound element
itself-without losing awareness. This leaves the yogin absorbed in the bliss (iinanda)
of the substrate of subtle experience, the asmitii or aha,r,.kara level of awareness. Here
the previous blending of intellect, egoity, and OM-sound, now stripped of the subtle
sound, leaves only intellect (buddhi) absorbed in its ownamness (asmitii) as the object
or content of meditation. This level is very rarified, of course. It would seem to
correspond to the extreme limit, the very "bottom" of what Barqhari termed the
madhyamii level of viik.
Identification with the bliss of the aha,r,.kara loosens with detachment. The bliss
is relinquished for the even more tranquil absorption in the intellect (buddhi) alone.
In Saipkhya- Yoga the faculty of intellect is the most transparent, most pure, and most
radiantly desirable material faculty. It is the first manifestation of matter, the most
delicate and primal. Here all knowledge is available-the yogin is absorbed in the
faculty of knowing in its unhindered clarity and perfection. Impressions on this level
are said to be truthful and to block all other impressions (1.48-150.) In a real sense
this, too, is a level of OM; it is the subtlest level where speech emerges from the
unmanifest, or, in Bartrhari' s terms, the "Seeing One," pasyantf. 72 This may corre-
spond symbolically to the abstract but completely unified resonant nasalization (niida)
of OM. From the viewpoint of Sarpkhya-Y oga, however, even this most subtle and
luminous level is relative, conditioned, and material. This is not yet the ultimate nature
of the yogin; this is actually understood as the root of all ignorance. Intellect (some-
times also calledmahat, "great one"), the most transparent and perfect level of aware-
ness, is matter that, due to its transparent purity, mistakenly identifies itself with
consciousness itself, an act that creates personal suffering and the need for imper-
sonal salvation.
4. With supreme detachment, this most subtle object or seed of awareness, the
nada of OM, reduced to a brilliant point (bindu), drops as well, leaving the yogin,
bereft of operational intellect, at the goal. 73 Speech has returned to its source in con-
scious silence (para). The levels of the mind have been progressively stripped away,
merging each effect into its cause, until the awareness (citta) itself is dissolved into
the unmanifest prakrti. The final act ofrenunciation(paravairagya, t.16, 3.50) leaves
the mind dissolved in its unmanifest state, while at the same time isolating the inner-
DISCRIMINATING THE INNATE CAPACITY 69
most core, the knower, of human personality, puru~a, consciousness itself. This is
the para level of speech, the ultimate referent of OM,the conscious silence to which
it points. This totally silent, totally inactive witness to all levels of buddhi is now
isolated in its own unthinkable but conscious luminosity. The layers of human per-
sonality have been peeled away by following a reducing sound beyond its material
source to conscious silence, quiescent and seedless samiidhi, called kaivalya (3.55,
4.34).
Conclusion
What is clear from our detailed example of yogic meditation on the sound OMis that
Patafijali' s mysticism intentionally goes beyond intentionality and language by
using language to transcend itself. In so doing the yogin not only reduces language
from word to sound to conscious silence but also eliminates any possible cultural or
conceptual building blocks. The yogic meditator transcends not only concepts and
thought itself (even the concepts of his own Sarp.khya system) but also the very
innate intentional structures of the mind. In the final analysis, the yogin gains every-
thing (salvation) by losing every thing, deconstructing oneself as a person in favor
of the nonlinguistic experience of puru$a, an "impersonhood" beyond any possibil-
ity of suffering, beyond any possibility of conception or construction. All the
meditator' s doing is undone: in the conscious silence apart from all objects of thought
or perception, the meditator finds his or her innate nature to be simply conscious-
ness itself. This innate capacity to be conscious, this puru$a, is familiar in a sense, as
it has been the background and precondition for all previous material experiences;
yet it is novel, too, as it has never previously been discriminated from the various
constructed levels of experience it has enabled.
However this event may be described later-in poetry or prose, in Sanskrit or
English, theistically or atheistically-the experience per se is not that of a yogin, or
a Hindu, or a South Asian. 74 The experience belongs to no conceptual identity-no
religious, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or conceptual image. All such things are ob-
jects of consciousness. The experience of isolation belongs to the capacity to be con-
scious, pure consciousness, alone.
The conclusion for the study of mysticism is that Sarp.khya-Yoga philosophy en-
shrines in kaivalya a nonordinary experience that transcends not only Sarp.khya-Yoga
philosophy as a conceptual or cultural scheme but any possible conceptual, linguis-
tic, or cultural structure. The assertion that all mystical experience is necessarily
constructed seems incompatible with the evidence. Are the creative activities of the
mind, with its cultural shaping, training, and basic presuppositions, responsible for
all mystical experiences as the constructivists assert, or is something else responsible?
In the case of Sarp.khya-yoga, it is the inherent structure of reality that is responsible
for mystical experiences. The ultimate mystical experience in Sarpkhya~ Yoga results
from the final elimination of all concepts, all thinking, all words, all feeling, all
70 IN THE RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS
memory, and all perception. What is le~ properly termed innate, is consciousness.
It is not self-conscious and not symbolically conscious-just consciousness itself.
While its description, analysis, elevation, and method of attainment are constructed
material processes, the experience of kaivalya is something else, something simple'
which even in a constructed world puts the mystery back into mysticism. '
Notes
Translations are those of the author except where otherwise noted.
1. Brhad AryQ1Jyaka Upani1ad 4. 3. 6, Hume, tr. p. 133.
2. W. James (1958), The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature.
Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion 1901-1902 (New York: New American Libraryof World
Literature), p. 295. James reveals that this revelation was in a letter from Tennyson to B. P.
Blood, who further recalled that Tennyson said of this experience: "By God Almighty!there
is no delusion in the matter! It is no nebulous ecstasy, but a state of transcendent wonder
'
associated with absolute clarity of mind."
3. S. T. Katz (1978), Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press).
4. See, for example, S. T. Katz (1978) and (1983), Mysticism and Religious Traditions
(New York: Oxford University Press), with special regard to Katz's own essays. See also
Wayne Proudfoot (1984), Religious Experience (Berkeley: University of California Press),
and W. Wainwright (1981), Mysticism: A Study of Its Nature, Cognitive Value and Moral
Implications (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press).
5. A PCE is an event in which experience is reduced to its pure subjective component,
consciousness itself, without content, intention or any kind of object. Its nature is discussed
from many viewpoints in R. K. C. Forman (1990) The Problem of Pure Consciousness (New
York: Oxford University Press), and in this essay.
6. By orthodox I mean astika-the Hindu systems that accept in their own way the au-
thority of the Vedic revelation. This excludes Buddhism and Jainism, even though suchnastika
systems have much in common with many Sarpkhya-Yoga-positions.
7. The SK is understood to be roughly contemporaneous with its philosophical sister,the
Yogasutra of Patanjali (ca. 400-500 CE).Dates are very approximate, but these are the most
recent estimations. The SK represents the chief known text of Sarpkhya, which is likely to
have been influential on the final formulation of the YS and its main commentaries. See J. G.
Larson and R. S. Bhattacharya (1987), Siilflkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy,
Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 4 (Princeton: Princeton University Press), P IS.
8. By suffering and frustration I am attempting to render the Sanskrit term dul,ik~,
(SK 1), which implies that there is an inevitable and unsatisfactory flaw in ordinary expen-
ence-the escape from this ill is the main thrust of South Asian philosophy and religion.
9. Major differences between SK and YS arethat the YS includes a concept of God,iJvara,
whose mantra, OM, is a chief, even perhaps the exemplary medium of meditation (japa); a
i~!
unitary term, citta, for the relative, object-related, awareness divided in Sa.rpkhya 0 ~e
threefold inner instrument of buddhi (intellect), ahamkiira (ego), and manas;composauonan
sutras (dense aphorisms) rather than verses (kiirikiis) as in the SK; and, as noted earlier,.8:0
emphasis on practice- the SK aJia text seems to be bereft of specific guidelines for any spin..
t.md practice or meditation. The YS supplies these.
IO. The analysis i.s epistemo1ogically grounded on three sources of reliable knowledge:
direct: perception(including what we mjgbt can supernormal perception), logkal inference,,
;md authoritative scripture (testimony). (These pramm:ias,or sources of reliable knowledge,
DISCRIMINATING THE INNATE CAPACITY 71
are the same in ~th systems, though different terms are used: in SK 4 dr$tam anumiinam
aptavlicanam ca; m YS 1.7 pratyak$a-anumilna-ligamiiJ:i.) The worldview is essentially logical
and empirical. since even scriptural evidence is understood to represent the record of the di-
rect perceptions of great seers.
11. Saipkhyan analysis begins with objective material elements which we would tend to
see as inner and subjective-the first manifest principle of creation is not the atom, or elec-
tron, or photon, but the intellectual capacity (buddhi, mahat); from that evolves the ego fac-
ulty, thence the mind and senses, and so on.
12. Our physics today clearly recognizes and discriminates many "layers" of reality, from
the gross material objects to their less obvious and subtler components, such as chemical
compounds, molecules, atoms, subatomic particles, and quantum ground states. The impor-
tance of ordinarily invisible components of matter is fundamental, even down to "unmanifest"
virtual particles, whose fluctuations exert measurable influence on real matter.
13. Yogi-pratyak~a, the direct but supernormally acute perception of the trained meditator.
14. SK 22-41.
15. I use the term "nonconscious" as a gloss for Sanskrit acetana, as in SK 11.
16. J. G. Larson ( 1979), Classical Sa,khya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning
(Santa Barbara: Rose/Erikson), translation of SK 59, p. 273:
rangasya darsayitva nivartate
nartakz yathii nrtyat,
puru$asya tatha 'tmanam
prakiisya vinivartate prakrtih
As a dancer ceases from the dance after having been seen by the audience; so also
prakrti ceases after having manifested herself to puru~a.
The whole purpose of the evolution and activity of material processes is to be observed by
another-the consciousness function. When the material intellect discriminates the fact that
it is in itself unconscious matter and that its activity is for "something" immaterial quite be-
yond itself, something conscious, it dissolves-mission accomplished. This observation, again,
is not the deliberative or analytical observation of a critic-critical faculties ore material pro-
cesses in Sarpkhya. The observation alluded to is one of pure unjudgmental, uncritical aware-
ness. This is difficult because it is so at variance with the usual way we conceptualize the
process of experience.
17. Larson, and Bhattacharya, Sarrzkhya, pp. 77-78, SK 3 text:
(I) mulaprakrtir avikrtir
(II) mahadiidyiil;z prakrtivikrtayal;z sapta
{III) $Odasaka,s tu vikiiro
(IV) na prakrtir na vikritih purusah.
The seven referred to are intellect, ego, and the five subtle elements; the sixteen are the ten
indriyas plus the mind and the five gross elements. .
18. The term.atrigu,;r.a,translated by Larson and Bhattacharya, Siirrzkhya,as ..w!~~out t~,:
Partite process," refers to puruia being entirely different and separate from the three strands
(gu~s) or components of prakrti .
.19. Ibid, p. 78.
20. I.e., SK anta~karafJ.a, YS citta. . . .
21. The actual term most used is "association,'' safTl,yoga.To make the association 1s to
be confused, ignorant of the essential independence and separation of the two wholly other
elements.
72 IN THE RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS
an~ represents the mistake~ i~entification of the material intellect with immaterial pure con-
sciousness. Take the term m its more general English sense, not in any technical psychoana-
lytic way.
Although the relationship between Freudian psychoanalysis and other similar Western
approaches and Srupkhya- Yoga philosophy is potentially rich and illuminating, it deserves a
detailed examination on its own.
33. This may sound impossible. Yet Sarkhya would agree with our ordinary experience-
the intellect does seem to be conscious. The truth, however, is that it merely seems to be
conscious-upon examination the intellect can actually sort out the difference between itself
and the Other whose consciousness it "borrows." The final stage of intellect, its sharpest and
clearest level is this distinction between itself and consciousness. Having made that distinc-
tion, it is free to dissolve into its source, unmanifest prakrti, mission accomplished.
34. Prakrti's evolution is technically called pari1Jiima.
35. Involution (pratiprasava) refers to the opposite process of dissolving into unmanifest
root-materiality when the material evolution has reached its goal, the knowledge of the dif-
ference between intellect and consciousness.
36. The dynamic equalibrium (pralii,ya) is the "original" state of prakrti when the three
strands (gu,:ias) balance each other-in this state matter is unmanifest. The universe is under-
stood to rest in such a state between cyclic creations.
37. Western philosophers who have taken an interest in consciousness, such as William
James or David Hume, have actually asserted that no such thing exists. See W. James ([1904],
1976, "Does Consciousness Exist?" in The Writings of William James, ed. J. J. McDermott
(New York: Random House), p. 190, and D. Hume (1898),A Treatise on Human Nature, ed.
T. H. Green and T. H. Gross (London: Longmans Green), p. 533.
38. The metaphor of light is inescapable. Light needs no external second light to illumi-
nate it, it is self-luminous. Thus, light is the central metaphor, either with reference to visual
perception with terms like "seer" or "seeing"-2.20 The seer is simply the seeing, [which]
although pure sees the object. (dra$fii drsimiitra}:i suddho'pi pratyayiinupasya}:i.)-or by ref-
erence to its radiant or "self-luminous" (svabhiisa) property as opposed to that of prakrti (see
4.19 in note 12 above).
39. It is an interesting paradox. Matter, though eternally in motion, is essentially dead;
consciousness, though eternally unchanging, is life itself, eternal life-not eternal life for
someone, but the elimination of the phenomenal person, in favor of the impersonal core of
life as consciousness.
40. SK 19 describes puru~a with the term siik#tva, the state of being a witness fsiiqin).
41. Perhaps, if the point still seems obscure, a more mechanical analogy might help. The
toothache phenomenon is no more the suffering of a conscious entity than is the needle of a
taxi's temperature gauge, moving into the red. Neither the needle, the gauge, nor the radiator
knows anything; nor do they suffer. Cars don't feel pain: they are not conscious. Th~ con-
sciousness "belongs to" another who is radically different and separate. The passenger i~ the
car may notice the gauge, but he also does notfeel the car's pain. The car is not a ~onsc_ious
being; it has a gauge and a radiator, but no pain, because _noconsciousness. ~f this taxi/car
analogy seems far-fetched or excessively modem, the Vedic fondness for chanots should be
remembered. Katha Upani~ad 3.3 ff, Svetasvatara Upa~i!~ 2.9. Maitri Upaniiad .1.3; 2.6,
4.22 all explain puru~a or atman with reference to a s1mtlar analogy of the chanot (sans
radiator); today's natural parallel is the automobile. . . .
42. Whether this .is true or not need not concern us here. It is enough that m Saqlkhya this
understanding was understood to be rationally established, and I believe. ~o.re significan~
that (from the viewpoint of Yoga) this doctrine was ~~der~to~ .to be empm~ally. expen-
rnentalJy verifiable. Because yogins trained in the reqwsate d1sc1plme tmd techmcaJ pra tl e~.
74 IN THE RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS
awareness, when the first three levels are essentially excluded in this statement and its logica
1
extension. Vncaspati gives persuasive reasons as to why the first three levels are not _tobe
th
considered yoga but never clears up why they were mcluded in the sweeping statement m e
first place. Their inclusion may be more significant than their exclusion.
DISCRIMINATING THB INNATB CAPACITY
75
What do these states have in common? Nothing but awareness 1tself Th . . . .
-dh ) h e imp11cat1on1s
th at coherence (sama , , a co erent, extremely orderly form of awaren . th.
. . ess, 1s no mg less
than inherent m ordinary levels of restless, dull, and distracted awareness p . h . . th
- ) f . . er aps 1t 1s e
essential form (svarupa o awareness, underlymg the disorderly forms and 1
" d ". , c ear 1y apparent
only when they are a IIowe d to qmet own mto a focused or quiescent stat Wh
h . e. en aware-
ness of any kmd 1s present, co erence 1s an mherent potential. That is to say h h .
h , w en t ere 1s
any kind of perception or cogmt10n, t ere must be some orderliness, even if mini I Th"
. .nh h E . "bl . . ma. is
order is the . erent co erence. ve~ m a oommg, buzzmg confusion," there is a sort of
order. There 1s a structure of perce~~on, there are differentiations, even if incomplete.
Perhaps the analogy of a telev1s1on screen might help the modem reader relate t th
. ld . 1 0 IS
concept. Sheer static wou. ~ot m:o ve any of these five levels. A flickering, fuzzy, or con-
stantly interrupted transmtss10_n~1ght correspond to the first three levels, respectively, while
8 stable, clear, foc~~ed trans~ss1on appearing on th~ screen would correspond to the highest
potential for telev1s10n receptton--coherent perception-a precise representation of the ob-
ject televised. The last state of extinction would correspond to a bright, clear screen without
an image. Here the screen is perfectly coherent; yet there is no image, just the essential under-
lying nature of the screen itself. No image is projected or perceived; yet the set is on: there is
coherence, purity, not the utter chaos of static or the "nonexistence" of a dark screen when
the set is off. All five states, then, have an underlying coherence that is either obscured to
some degree or clearly evident. For knowledge of the screen or knowledge of the program-
ming, only states four or five really apply.
Seen from this angle, the teaching of yoga has a basis in the structure of ordinary aware-
ness, and ordinary humans might thus hope (with proper training and practice) to attain it,
just as anyone with a television set might hope to obtain a clear, focused picture. Even so, by
comparison with ordinary awareness, coherent awareness (samiidhi of either kind) is
nonordinary. Perceptive coherence is a state of awareness (citta); quiescent coherence is not
even a state-it is pure consciousness isolated from the material awareness and all its states.
It is beyond states and thereby salvific. Our true identity, pure consciousness, is beyond all
states.
50. The term pra,:iidhana itself has many meanings. It derives from verb i/dha (place,
put)+ pra (before, in front of)+ ni (down) (Pa1.1ini8.4.17). The simple sense seems to be
to place down and/or in front of. From this a variety of uses are noted by Monier-William s,
including: deposit, place in, bring in, set (a gem) in, apply, touch, turn or di~ect eyes
or thoughts upon, with mind (manas)-to give whole attention to, reflect, con s1der. Se.e
M. Monnier-Williams ([1899], 1979), A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, new ed. (Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass)
Buddhists use pra~idhiina in the classical period to refer to the "vow, or aspirati~n". of a
new Bodhisattva, subsequent to his accepting the thought of enlightenment (bodhi-citta),
strengthening his resolve to attain enlightenment and free all creatures. See _H.Da~al
([l 932], 1978), The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature (Delhi: Mottlal
Banarsidass)
S ddhartha s
For example, the La,ZitaVistara, the famous biography of the Bu~dha. s_tat;s ibodh" and
1
early pranidhana in this way "I will attain the immortal, undecaymg. pain- ree '
free the world from all pain." 161.19; 163.16; 175.13; 361.3 etc. e _ . Th vow becomes more
_ h
I b . - d the Dasa-bhum,ka-sutra, w ere
e a orate m some texts such as the Sukhiivatf-vyuha, an ID
it is tenfold '
. . . t the Buddha as Lord than to be-
This resolve might be seen as a kind of devotion. 1ess O t the sense
. . . Th B0 ddhist usage 1sc 1oser o .
~ommg liberated and liberating, a devotion to d~ty. is . of Buddhist bhakti, meditation
m the YS than to that of sectarian Hindu bhaktt. In the midSt
and imper. onal liberation are still in the foreground.
76 IN THE RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS
Perhaps L. Freer' s explanation of the Buddhist usage comes closest also to the sense of
the term in the YS: Praf)idhana signifle "disposition particuliere d'esprit, application del
l 'esprit a un objet determine . ... " H. Dayal ( 1978), The Bodhisattva, p. 64. Dayal quotes
Freer in the Journal Asiatique, Paris (1881), p. 476. This puts prar,zidhiina clearly parallel to
the old sense of yoga and meditation as a harnessing or disciplining of the spirit for a particu-
lar task, especially the task of liberation. Indeed, the meditative sense of praQidhiina is the
strongest possibility .Kalidasa uses the term as "profound religious meditation" or in com-
pounds as "abstract contemplation of" in Raghuval'fl,sa; see M. Monier-Williams (1979), A
Sanskrit-English Dictionary, new ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass), p. 660.
51. So far in the specialized vocabulary of the YS, the term fsvara has been equated to
pure consciousness (1.23) in which there is transcendental knowledge (1.25), described as
the timeless source (guru) of traditional wisdom (1.26). The only specific appellation ofthis
isvara has not been by personal or individual name, Vi~i:iu, or Siva, but by the "significant
sound" (vlicaka) 01\1 (the pra,:iava). If Patafijali had a specific personal deity in mind or an
anthropomorphic image, it is not indicated in the YS. In fact, given the significant focus on
isvara, it would seem that the YS is intentionally going out of the way not to personalize the
Lord.
Elsewhere I have argued at length that Patafijali ' s view ofisvara taken from the YS alone,
in contrast with that of most of his commentators, seems to support the wholesale equation of
isvara with pure consciousness, shorn of any personal attribute. Clearly, the concept of a
personal Lord has no place in the strict dualism of the Sarpkhya and Yoga. Everything said of
Isvara in the YS itself can be fruitfully applied as well to impersonal pure consciousness. I
argue that Pataiijali actually demythologizes the prevalent devotional understanding of a
personal God in favor of pure meditative experience-a deep, universal, innate capacity of
consciousness. For detailed arguments see L. Pflueger, God, Consciousness, and Meditation.
This is soon to be published in revised form by SUNY Press as The God Within: The Lord of
Worship and the Lord of Meditation in Ancient India.
52. Indeed, Indian medical texts such as Caraka and Susruta used the term pra1J,idhana
in the sense of applying a remedy for a disease, such as mantras for snakebite. See A. Padoux
(1989), "Mantras-What Are They?" in Understanding Mantras, ed. H.P. Alper, SUNY Se-
ries in Religious Studies (Albany: State University of New York Press).
53. See YS 2.1, 32, 34.
54. Japa in conjunction with svlidhyliya and tapas (purification practices) appears in the
YS. J. W. Hauer (1958), Der Yoga: Ein indischer Weg zum Selbst Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer
Verlag), p. 22.
55. Hauer, Der Yoga, p. 25: Das Summen dieser Silbe nannte man prar,zava, "das Hervor-
brummen oder Vorausbrummen" (als Einleitung zum Gesang). Bald bedeutete dieses Wort
auch die gesummte Silbe selber.
56. The PU, the MU, and the MAU are among the latest of the classical Upani~ads con-
nected with the Veda and are generally dated in the period of classical Sanskrit literature ca.
200 BCE to 200 CE. See J. N. Farquhar ((1920] 1967), An Outline of the Religious Literature
of India (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass), p. 79, and M. Winternitz (1960-62), A History 0 l~-f
dian Literature, trans. S. Ketkar (Calcutta: University of Calcutta) and include more thetSUC
references. Their thinking is, of course, closest of all to the YS.
57.
l. The Brahman who is without beginning or end, whose very essence is the Word,
who is the cause of the manifested phonemes [ak~ara]. who appears as the object s,
from whom the creation of the world proceeds, .
2. Who has been taught as the one appearing as many due to the multipli city of bis
powers, who, though not different fromhis powers [saktis], seems to be so,
DISCRIMINATING
THE INNATE CAPACITY 77
67. Bartrhari philosophy of speech as brahman recognized a method for practically usi
& I thi ng
speech to bring awareness back to its unman11est source. n s process the meditator relies
on Grammar (the "door to salvation") for the correct form of speech, and Grammar relies 00
yogic perception and experience to "purify" speech by reducing it within the mind to its source.
The Vrttion VP 1.14 states:
One, who, with previous knowledge of the corr~ct fo?11s o~ w~rds, reali~es the unity
of the real wo'.rd, goes beyond sequence and attams urn on with 1t. By acquiring special
merit through the use of the correct word, he is united with the great Word and attains
freedom from the senses. After having reached the undifferentiated state of the word
he comes to the source of all differentiation: Intuition (pratibha). From that intuitio~
in which all Being is latent and which, due to the repetition of the union (mentioned
above) tends to produce its result, he reaches the Supreme Source in which all differ-
entiation is completely lost.
See Iyer, The Viikyapadiya (1965), p. 21.
68. Called ekatattviibhyiisa, YS 1.32.
69. According to the Indian medical science of the time, Ayurveda, mantras were key
components in healing rituals and well known, even to the present day, for their reputed abil-
ity to neutralize such concentrated poisons as snake venom. Even later, more "rational" medical
methods in later times were recommended to be used "mantravat," "like mantras." See K. G.
Zysk (1989), "A Study of the Use ofMagico-Religious Speech in Ancient Indian Medicine."
In Understanding Mantras, ed. H. P. Alper, SUNY Series in Religious Studies (Albany: State
University of New York Press).
70. The dramatically increasing power of quieter, more internal levels of sound, reflect-
ing the quieter, more powerful levels of the awareness in which they are entertained, is rec-
ognized even in Manu Smrti:
An offering consisting of muttered prayers is ten times more efficacious than a sacri-
fice performed according to the rules (of the Veda); a (prayer) which is inaudible (to
others) surpasses it a hundred times, and the mental (recitation of sacred texts) a thou-
sand times. Translation from G. Buhler ([ 1886] 1964), The Laws of Manu, Sacred Books
of the East Series, 25 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass ), p. 4 7.
71. I.e., parir,iiima.
72. For Bartrhari the paiyantz is the highest, most subtle level of viik; yet it admits of
variation-i.e., forms and formlessness. The formless level, called the supreme (para) and
characterized as both formless and immortal, might best be thought of due to these differ-
ences as a fourth level of speech, para, transcending paiyantz. This, in any case, is bow tbe
Tantric elaborations of the doctrine have conceptualized speech. See, for example, S. G~pta
( 1989), "The Paiiaratra Attitude to Mantra" in S. Gupta, D. J. Hoens, and T. Gouclriaan,H,ntiu
Tantrism, Handbuch der Orientalistik, 2.4.2 (Leiden: E. J. Brill) or J. Woodroffe (1963), The
Garland of Letters (Val'f)amiilii.):Studies in Mantra-Siistra, 4th ed. (Madras: Ganesh and Co.).
73. Woodroffe' s explication of the mantrasiistra reverses this understanding of bindu as
the transition point to para. He explains the Tantric understanding of The Garland of Letters
to mean that bindu is rather the second emanative state of niida, identical with sabdabrahman,
giving rise to the third level of tribindu or kiimakalii. My interpretation of bindu is offered as
a possible, logical view makes sense in the. overall scheme I am introducing. The Yoga
Upani~ads use niida and bindu in various ways, showing a not unusual lack of unani~ity on
technical terminology between and sometimes within te~ts. In all cases, the main ~~t , ~t.
th
the tradition correlates levels of OMwith levels of speech and levels of mind/medttauon is
supported.
DISCRIMINATING THE INNATE CAPACITY
79
74. The existence of a type of mystical experience that tran els th . . . .
I I h seen e 1uruts of ordmary
experience so comp ete Y as important consequences for the questton f I ra1 &
f
least Ill this one type o expenence
th
ere could be no difference & th
o P u . ism, 1 or at
110 r e expenencer at the
me
t1 ' regardless of his or her adherence to a particular reli01ous or cultural tradi .
b'" non. As Forman
(1990), p. 39, notes:
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