CANON 9

GUBALLA VS. CAGUIOA 78 SCRA 207

G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977
PETITIONER: JOSE GUBALLA,
RESPONDENT:THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA, RICARDO G. CARLOS AND
DOMINGO FORTEZA, JR.,

FACTS: Guballa is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved

in an accident resulting to injuries by Domingo Forteza, Jr. As a consequence,
a complaint for damages was filed by Forteza against Guballa with the CFI in
Bulacan. An answer was filed on behalf of Guballa by Irineo W. Vida Jr., of the
law firm Vida, Enriquez, Mercado & Associates.

Because Guballa and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial

conference, despite due notice, Guballa was treated as in default and Forteza
Jr. was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. A decision was thereafter
rendered by the trial court in favor of Forteza Jr. A Motion for Reconsideration
was then filed by Guballa seeking the lifting of the order of default, the
reopening of the case for the presentation of his evidence and the setting
aside of the decision. Said Motion for Reconsideration was signed by
Ponciano Mercado, another member of the law firm. Case was appealed,
although CA affirmed the decision in toto. Motion for Reconsideration was
filed and was denied.

After the motion was denied, Guballa, through Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos
II, filed a petition for Relief from Judgment on ground that Irineo W. Vida, Jr.,
who prepared his Answer to the Complaint in the lower court, is not a
member of the Philippine Bar. Guballa alleged that his rights had not been
adequately protected and his properties are in danger of being confiscated
and/or levied upon without due process of law. Judge Caguioa denied petition
and said that it is a dilatory tactic by Guballa and his counsel.

ISSUE: WON Judge Caguioa properly denied petition for declatory relief of
Guballa

HELD: YES. Judge Caguioa properly denied petition for declatory relief of
Guballa.

Respondent Judge Caguioas forthright denial of the Petition for Relief

to frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition must be
denied for lack of merit. The alleged fact that the person who represented
Guballa at the initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and
the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of the Bar did not
amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. Guballa was duly represented
by bona fide members of the Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for
being contrary to law and jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and
justifiable defenses. Guballa's rights had been amply protected in the
proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently
assisted by counsel. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

CANON 10
CARLET V CA [G.R. NO. 114275. JULY 7, 1997]
PETITIONER: IIGO F. CARLET, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Pablo
Sevillo and Antonia Palisoc
RESPONDENTS: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, VIRGINIA C. ZARATE, JACOBO C.
ZARATE, VICTORIA C. ZARATE, HON. CONRADO DIZON, Acting Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Bian, Laguna, and DEPUTY SHERIFF ROGELIO S.
MOLINA of Bian, Laguna,

FACTS: The present case is between the heirs of Pablo Sevillo to his first wife
Antonia Palisoc and the heirs of Cirila Baylo Carosalan, daughter of Candida
Baylo who is Pablos second wife. The object in question was Lot 981 which
was issued in the name of Jose Sevillo, Pablos father. Pablo later declared Lot
981 for taxation purposes and he also asked the same lot to be
reconstituted in 1965 together with his second wife Candida. In 1980, the
heirs of Cirila, the Zarates filed a case for annulment of deed of sale over Lot
981 and for partition of property among the surviving heirs of Pablo Sevillo
which was then granted by the Court of First Instance of Bian, Laguna. The
Sevillos on the other hand, thereafter filed a case to annul the aforesaid
decision of the trial court but however was dismissed in favor of the Zarates
on the ground of res judicata. Later in 1991, Iigo Carlet, special
administrator of the estate of Pablo and Anotnia Sevillo filed the present
case, an action for reconveyance of property which was then dismissed
through a motion filed by the Zarates on the ground of res judicata stating
that the facts alleged in the complaint had already been decided. Carlet then
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order
of the trial court hence the present petition for review.

ISSUES:
(1) WON the present case for an action for reconveyance of property is
barred by res judicata from a previous decision arising from a civil case of
annulment of deed of sale and partition of property.

(2) WON Atty. Modesto Jimenez ( Counsel for petitioner) should be cited in
contempt of court for forum shopping,

HELD:
(1) Yes, the decision in the present case of reconveyance of property is
barred by res judicata from the decision of the previous case for annulment
of deed of sale and partition of property.

The Court reiterates the principle of res judicata wherein facts or

questions which have already been admitted or judicially determined and
was then settled by a judgment after, such facts or questions become res
judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action. Additionally,
the Court reiterated the four requisites in order to invoke res judicata: (1)
finality of the former judgment; (2) the court which rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second
actions identity of the parties, subject matter and cause of action. The
petitioner herein does not dispute the presence of the first three elements
for the application of res judicata, however what needs to be determined is
the existence of all aspects of the last element. Respondent court correctly
concluded that the identities of the herein parties were properly established,
Carlet representing the heirs of Pablo Sevillo and then the heirs of Cirilia.
Next, the Court found no dispute regarding the identity of subject matter
since the instant case is about Lot No. 981 of the Bian Estate. As to the last
aspect which is on the identity of causes of action, the Court finds that
inasmuch as the same evidence was needed in prosecuting the previous civil
case, both cases have identical causes of action. Hence, since all these
aspects are established, the present case indeed is barred by res judicata
and could not therefore be litigated again.

(2) With respect to the issue of forum-shopping for which the trial court
ordered counsel for petitioners, Atty. Modesto Jimenez, to explain why he
should not be cited in contempt, this applies only when the two (or more)
cases are still pending.
Clearly, despite knowledge of final judgments in Civil Case No. B-1656,
CA-G.R. CV No. 07657 and SC-G.R. No. 74505, as well as in G.R. No. 94382
(the ejectment case), counsel persisted in filing the case at bar for
reconveyance. Since this case is barred by the judgment in Civil Case No. B-
1656, there was no other pending case to speak of when it was filed in July
1991.Thus, the non-forum-shopping rule is not violated.
What counsel for petitioners did, however, in filing this present action to
relitigate the title to and partition over Lot No. 981, violates Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers which states that a lawyer
owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 of the same
Canon states that (a) lawyer shall not do any falsehood x x x nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Counsels act of filing
a new case involving essentially the same cause of action is likewise abusive
of the courts processes and may be viewed as improper conduct tending to
directly impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated January 11, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED. Treble costs against
petitioner.

CANON 11
IN RE: ALMACEN, 31 SCRA 562

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE
RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.

FACTS: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a Petition to Surrender the Lawyers
Certificate of Title to the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as against
what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by
this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal
"peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore
without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who
was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of
the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that
he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this
Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to
argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may
know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be
repeated.
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case.
They lost in said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He
notified the opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time
and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then
appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the
trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen
filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court which outrightly
denied his appeal in a minute resolution.
This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as
unconstitutional. He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to
surrender his lawyers certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to
continue practicing his profession when members of the high court are men
who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client was
made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and that he became
one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy. He also stated
that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court
is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacens petition as
the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to actually surrender his certificate.
Almacen did not surrender his lawyers certificate though as he now argues
that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be permitted to give
reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against
him . . . in an open and public hearing. He said he preferred this considering
that the Supreme Court is the complainant, prosecutor and Judge. Almacen
was however unapologetic.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.

HELD: YES. Indefinite suspension imposed.

It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is no one to
blame but Atty. Almacen himself because of his negligence. Even if the
intentions of his accusations are so noble, in speaking of the truth and
alleged injustices,so as not to condemn the sinners but the sin, it has already
caused enough damage and disrepute to the judiciary. Since this particular
case is sui generis in its nature, a number of foreign and local jurisprudence
in analogous cases were cited as benchmarks and references. Between
disbarment and suspension, the latter was imposed. Indefinite suspension
may only be lifted until further orders, after Atty. Almacen may be able to
prove that he is again fit to resume the practice of law.

The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed
because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for
every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to
effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme
Court is to decide only those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and
parties involved. It should be remembered that a petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the courts denial. For one
thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals
opinion.
On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court
regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous,
grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an
officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair
and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the
judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal
condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer,
he should have known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify
the opposing party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and
will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is
the reason why his client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.

A lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, may criticize

in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the act of
courts and judges. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism
that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls
of decency and propriety.
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality
so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.
Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in
insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the lawyer to disciplinary action.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a
suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one
of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense
a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question
for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar
to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members
who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office
of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak
of a complainant or a prosecutor.
 Indefinite suspension may be ordered.Where the demonstrated
persistence of the misconduct of the lawyer leaves the court unable to
assess or determine how long that suspension should last and that
disbarment should not be decreed where a lesser sanction would
accomplish the end desired, the erring lawyer was merely suspended
indefinitely. In such a case at any time after the suspension becomes
effective, the lawyer may prove to the Court that he is once again fit to
resume the practice of law.