Nagpur Water PPP Final Case
Nagpur Water PPP Final Case
Nagpur Water PPP Final Case
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NMC gets its water supply from three surface sources namely Pench canal, Kanhan river and
Gorewada Tank, with the treatment capacity of Water Treatment Plants (WTPs) at approximately 500-
530 Million Litres per Day (MLD).
Water from these WTPs flow into two master balancing reservoirs at Seminary Hills and at the
Government House, from where it is supplied through a distribution network of approximately 2,100
km organised across three areas namely, (a) parts of North/East/South supplied from Kanhan Head
Works/WTP, (b) parts of North/West/South/Central areas from Pench and from Gorewada and (c)
parts of North/Central parts from Pench and Kanhan.
The distribution network is also organised along ten zones for efficient Operations and Maintenance
(O&M). The storage capacity in the 43 service reservoirs (spread across 31 locations in the city) is
151 Million Litres (ML) which translated to about 29% of daily supply.
Apart from helping in assessing the extent of water losses, the water audit also identified specific
areas for improvement and NRW reduction. It facilitated NMC in taking a structured response in three
steps; firstly, NMC initiated a series of performance improvement measures to tackle real or technical
losses, secondly it initiated a pilot project to demonstrate reduction of NRW and improve supply
standards from intermittent to continuous water supply and finally, it sought to use the experience
from the pilot project to scale-up 24x7 supply on a city-wide scale.
Over 7,500 connections were converted to continuous water supply. The entire zone experienced
improved pressures, eliminating the need for booster pumps deployed by households earlier.
Coverage improved with an incremental 5000 connections being given in slum households in the
zone (although all these connections did not receive continuous supply)
Billed water volume increased from 22 MLD to 33 MLD in the zone (an increase of 50%) although
part of this increase was attributed to leakages at the customer end.
NRW reduced from 50% to 38% and was attributed to reduction in illegal connections and
improved accuracy of meter reading.
Further, it made the following observations on challenges and shortcomings of the pilot project:
Stakeholder communication could have been handled better. Consumers were not adequately
informed of the need to fix internal leakages when they transitioned to metered supply resulting in
higher billed volumes. A tariff hike along with such billed volumes led to spikes in billing (in some
cases, billings went up by two to three times) and caused disquiet among citizens. This triggered
protests from citizens organisations.
Continuous 24x7 supply was achieved only in 7500 connections or 50% of total connections.
While this was partly due to challenges in addressing last-mile connection within consumer
premises and non-replacement of pipelines in 70% of network, this became an additional sore
point that was highlighted by consumer organisations in their protests.
Eventually, NMC was forced to back down from its intended tariff reforms. Yielding to protests, NMC
rolled back tariffs from Rs. 8 per KL (as revised in 2009) to Rs. 5 per KL and capped user charges at
50 units of supply, till such time a detailed assessment of metering was not completed.
Debt + Equity
Top-up by Contract 30% of Approved
NMC in
Escrow
NESL OCWL Project Cost +
Capital Grants Cost Escalation
NESL
expenses
Revenue to
Lenders
Escrow Operator
Consumer
Account
Collections from
NMC Water & Consumers
Sewerage account
Term, Transition Period and Project Scope: The Project is being implemented through a 25-
year Performance Management Contract (extendable by mutual agreement for another 25 years)
between NESL, NMC and OCWPL. The Term included first 5-years as Transition Period during
which OCWPL is responsible for operating and maintaining the existing network and have to
undertake rehabilitation of the network (including replacement of consumer connections and
metering). Post the Transition Period, the operator will carry out O&M of the water supply system
for next 20 years during which the revenue and collection risk is also loaded on to the Operator.
During this period, operators performance will be monitored against a set of performance
parameters and the remuneration is based on metered volume that is billed and collected.
Staffing: Employees of NMCs water works department were deputed to OCWPL at the start of
the contract for three phases covering (i) Mobilisation period of 120 days, (ii) Personnel
Integration Period of 90 days and (iii) Change Consolidation phase of 180 days and (iv)
Revocation period of 60 days. The costs of NMC employees thus deputed would be borne by
OCWPL. At the end of the Change consolidation period, NMCs employees may choose to join
OCWPL and Operator can make offers to NMC employees who wish to join. At the end of the
Revocation period, NMC employees not joining OCWPL would revert back to NMC and will be
redeployed in other departments of NMC. OCWPL will need to mobilise staff replacements during
this period.
Revenue model: During the Transition period, the Operator is compensated on the basis of
Operator Rate (in Rs. Per KL) for a fixed volume of 250 MLD or actual metered volume billed and
collected by Operator on behalf of NMC whichever is higher. Thus there is a minimum guaranteed
offtake and hence assured revenue during this period. After the Transition Period, the revenue
payable to the Operator will be compensated on the basis of the escalated Bid Tariff on the basis
of actual metered volumes that are billed and collected.
Performance standards, linkages with Operator payments and maximum liability: The
Operator is expected to complete the Initial Performance Improvement Program and achieve
continuous water supply during the Transition period. During this period, Contract does not
specify intermediate performance standards. From the fifth year of contract, there are specific
deductions from Operators remuneration for excess raw water consumption and excess
electricity charges vis--vis norms specified. From the sixth year, revenue and collection risk is
also loaded on to the Operator as his remuneration is based on metered volume that is billed and
collected. Refer Exhibit 1.4 for a list of other performance targets specified in the contract. While
there are no specific penalties or incentives against performance indicators other than for
collection efficiency, raw water and electricity charges, the contract allows levy of liquidated
damages for performance non-compliance, which is capped at 5% of annual Operator revenue.
Exhibit 1.4 Performance targets specified in the Contract
Performance Indicator Target as per Contract
Technical Aspects
Treatment Efficiency (%) 97.5%
(Volume delivered/Volume produced)
Water Quality
Bacteriological conformity (%) 96%
Conformity to physical / chemical parameters 95%
(%)
Quality of service
Incidental interruption for repairs > 12 h (%) 100
Operational Efficiency 60% progressively by 60th month
(Volume billed/Volume supplied) Achieve 75% by 120th month, maintain
Bills based on metered consumption 100%
Financial
On-time payment of NMC dues 100%
Collection Rate 75% progressively by 60th month
(Effective collection /billings) 98% by 120th month and maintain
Source: PPP contract agreement between NESL and OCWPL
Operators Rate adjustments: The Contract provides for two kinds of rate adjustments; (i)
Standard Rate adjustment, which is done annually to provide for changes in price inflation, and (ii)
Extraordinary Rate adjustment once every five years or whenever an event deemed to be a
Ground for such extraordinary rate adjustment occurs. Even though the operating risks are borne
by the Operator, the Extraordinary Rate Adjustment clause allows for rate adjustments against
amendments to Operator obligations, Change in Law, availability of grant financing for NESL,
changes in Business plan, increase in Operators cost due to delay / overruns, failure of NESL to
supply water, non-insurable Force Majeure events and additional capital expenditure by Operator.
Escrow mechanisms and Payment Security: The collections from end-consumers by OCWPL
will be routed through NMCs water and sewerage account into an Escrow account maintained by
NESL. This escrow account would be used to make Operator payments. Under the contract,
NESL is required to maintain a minimum amount equivalent to three months of expenses at all
points in time. In case collections fall short of outflows from the account, NMC is required to make
good the shortfall from its general budget. NMC is also responsible for provision of raw water
(from irrigation department) and electricity (from MSEDCL) as both the service providers are
committed to subsidise the services to public utility.
The PPP Agreement addresses bankability concerns effectively through several features: a realistic
5-year transition period, minimum off-take, annual indexation of Operator rate, Re-basing for
extraordinary events, capital grant support and escrow mechanism for payment security. However,
with a relatively high capital grant support, minimum off-take and guaranteed revenues during the
Transition Period, incentives for capital investment efficiency appear somewhat limited.
There has also been some criticism in several quarters, that the performance requirements could
have been more stringent. The relatively long transition period of 5 years, trajectory of NRW reduction
targets, non-inclusion of penalties for 24x7 supply, non-inclusion of intermediate milestones and
performance targets during Transition period, have been questioned in several forums. Yet, given the
information baseline limitations, legacy challenges in rehabilitation and replacement of internal
plumbing in existing water connections, low baseline tariffs and challenges of cost recovery etc., it
seems that NMC took a considered view in favour of conservative yet impactful targets to avoid the
set-up to fail syndrome that has plagued water supply PPPs with unrealistic targets in the past.
Notwithstanding this limitation, Operators revenues after the Transition Period are indeed contingent
on actual water delivery at doorstep, collection efficiency and norms on raw water use and energy
consumption, which if achieved will be path-breaking outcomes on their own.
The foremost challenge relates to continued stakeholder engagement and communication to build
trust and credibility. Pockets of opposition to the project have continued from time of the
demonstration pilot. A project of this nature calls for pro-active stakeholder engagement,
awareness creation and building bridges with all concerned. While NMC and OCWPL will need to
continue to address this aspect, building positive behavioural disposition will require delivering on
service improvements expeditiously.
NMC will need to find ways to deal with sequencing and moving forward on tariff reforms. Though
NMC took a positive step towards revising its Byelaws in 2009, it has not been able to carry
forward with its tariff increases. In addition to the Operators payment, NMC bears the electricity
and raw water costs and therefore user charges at the present levels are unlikely to recover O&M
costs in full. With an annual revision built into Operators Rate, this will imply that additional
resources from NMCs general budget will be needed to bridge the gap between revenue
collection and operator payments, even though NMC has sufficient resources at this stage. NMC
could have greater flexibility when rehabilitation is completed and when service levels improve.
Replacement of consumer connections and addressing last-mile and internal plumbing issues will
need to be tackled head-on as these aspects are critical to consistently deliver 24x7 supply.
Inadequate customer awareness and spike in billings following implementation of 24x7 supply
during the pilot project did contribute to negative vibes for the project. Therefore, it is critical that
lessons learnt in this process are adequately factored during the rehabilitation program. NMCs
recent decision to waive connection charges could potentially help with this and in monetising
erstwhile unauthorised connections.
Given that the initial Improvement program started in 2011, two years after the DPR was
approved under JnNURM, it is likely that there could an escalation in costs of the Initial
Improvement Program. While NESL is vested with the responsibility of contract supervision and
management, it may be important for NESL to ensure that formal mechanisms and build in
capabilities for contract monitoring and information dissemination not just during the Transition
Period but also throughout the duration of the Contract.
1.7. Lessons learnt and insights for replication
Most urban water supply systems in India continue to be stuck in a vicious circle of poor service
quality-low tariffs-weak investment capacity. While conceptually, PPPs could help ULBs break this
vicious circle by separating monitoring and regulation from service provision and bringing in technical
and managerial know-how, structuring and implementation challenges have often led to sub-optimal
outcomes. While a few pilot scale projects notably in Karnataka and in Nagpur have managed to
make an impact, Nagpur is probably among the first few city-scale PPP taking shape. Therefore, even
in its early days of implementation, this Project offers vital lessons and insights for other cities seeking
ways to transform their water supply service delivery including the following:
Implementation of city-scale PPPs will need holistic planning and integrated set of actions.
The genesis of this Project can get traced back to NMCs water audit which highlighted the need
for focus on customer-end distribution infrastructure. Even as NMC continued to invest in bulk
supply augmentation, the results of the water audit triggered NMC taking concrete actions for
reducing NRW and for delivering water to the consumers doorstep in a consistent reliable
manner. As is documented earlier, the PPP project was not a one-off effort. On hindsight, it does
seem that the city wide PPP was only a logical step in the series of actions that NMC had set
sights on, and articulated post its water audit. Cities would be well-advised to not see PPPs as a
panacea to their ills, but as a strategic lever to leapfrog on performance even as they fix other
elements of the water value chain.
Institutional clarity on the public side helps; needs to be backed with building adequate
contract monitoring and administration capacity: Anchoring the PPP contract in an SPV of
NMC provided a good institutional basis for contract management. NMC went an extra step and
ring-fenced its water assets under NESL prior to executing the PPP structure. At the same time,
PPPs are complex agreements with changes that could happen during the course of the contract.
NMCs PPP agreement builds in some flexibility by providing for tariff re-basing and for partly
expanding scope using the Bidders IRR as a benchmark. However, administering complex
contracts requires a very high level of maturity and capability on the ULB side and it is critical that
these capabilities are build as cities move towards implementing PPPs.
Sequencing tariff reform: Average water tariffs in urban India continue to be low relative to
costs, even as affordability concerns often constrain meaningful progress on user charge led cost
recovery. Even though, NMCs early efforts to raise tariffs have been thwarted by protests, it has
had the cushion of other revenue streams and resources to support the project in early stages to
achieve improvements in service delivery, which can hopefully provide it the flexibility with tariff
revision in future. The case suggests that it would be difficult to sequence tariff rationalisation
upfront and cities attempting to structure PPPs will therefore need to find alternative resources at
least in the early stages.