TEAM CODE: E

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT

OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. ___________ Of 2014
UNDER SECTION 109 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908 READ WITH
ORDER XLVII RULE 5 OF THE SUPREME COURT RULES, 1966.

FOREIGN LENDERS APPELLANT

v.
LIFELINE LIMITED .RESPONDENT
AND
LIFELINE LIMITED..APPELLANT
v.
PROMOTERSRESPONDENT
AND
SWASTH LIFE LIMITED......APPELLANT
v.
COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA AND LIFELINE LIMITED.RESPONDENT

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

5TH NLIU-JURIS CORP NATIONAL CORPORATE LAW MOOT COURT

COMPETITION 2014

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES............................................................................IV
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...............................................................VI
STATEMENT OF FACTS..............................................................................VII
STATEMENT OF ISSUES..............................................................................IX
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.......................................................................X
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED.............................................................................1
I.

WHETHER

THE

SCHEME

SANCTIONED BY THE

HONBLE DELHI HIGH COURT

ON

5TH JULY 2013 SHOULD BE SET ASIDE?.................................................................................1

A.

That the foreign lenders have no locus standi to object to the Scheme...................1
i.

That the award is not enforceable under Part II of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996...................................................................................................1

ii.

That the award is not enforceable under Part I of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996...................................................................................................2

iii. That using the correct interpretation of law as laid in the case of BALCO is not
barred.............................................................................................................................4
B.

That foreign lenders do not constitute separate class of creditors...........................5

i.

That by virtue of being foreign lenders they do not constitute separate class.......5

II. WHETHER

THE

THE SUIT FILED BY

A.

HONBLE DELHI

HIGH

COURT

HAS THE JURISDICTION TO HEAR

LIFELINE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT?..............................................6

That the division Bench of Honble Delhi high Court was right in concluding that

there was a valid arbitration agreement..............................................................................6

B.

That the arbitration tribunal is competent to arbitrate the present dispute..............7

2

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

III.

WHETHER THIS COURT SHOULD ENTERTAIN THE APPEAL AGAINST THE DECISION

OF THE

HIGH COURT AND IF THERE HAS BEEN ABUSE OF DOMINANCE BY SWASTH?......9

A.

That this Court should not entertain the appeal against the decision of the High

Court.9
B.

That the relevant market can be established..........................................................10

C.

That the appellant had a dominant position in the relevant market.......................12

D.

That the appellant abused its dominant position in the relevant market................13

PRAYER............................................................................................................15

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996..................................................................................2, 4
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.........................2
INDIAN CASES
Bharat Aluminium Co.v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Service Inc, (2012) 9 SCC 552.......2, 3
Bhatia InterNational v Bulk Trading SA and Anr, AIR 2002 SC 1432......................................3
Bull Machines Pvt Ltd. v. J.C.B India Ltd, Case No. 105 of 2013(CCI).................................14
CCI v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 744..........................................................9
Core Health Care Ltd v. Nirma Ltd, (2007) 138 CompCas 204................................................5
Gwalior Rayons Silk Manufacturers Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat and
another, AIR 1990 SC 1747.......................................................................................................3
Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleum, AIR 2003 SC 2881...........7, 8
I.C Golakh Nath and Ors v. State of Punjab and Anr, AIR 1967 SC 1643................................4
In Re: Arvind Mills Ltd., (2002) 111 CompCas 118 (Guj)........................................................5
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Warehouse and Anr, AIR 1998 SC 74......4
K.K Modi v. K.N.Modi and Ors, (1998) 3 SCC 573.................................................................6
Konkola Copper Mines v. Stewards and Lloyds of India Limited, 2013 (5) BomCR 29..........4
N.Radhakrishnan v. Maestro Engineers and Ors, (2010) 1 SCC 72..........................................8
Namrata Marketing Pvt. Ltd v. CCI, AIR 2014 All 11.........................................................9, 10
NNR Global logistics Co. Ltd v. Aargus Global Logistics Pvt Ltd, O.M.P 61 of 2012.............4
P. Anand Gajapathi Raju & Ors. v. P.V.G. Raju & Ors, AIR 2000 SC 1886..........................7, 8

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co and Anr, AIR 1985 SC 1156.......................6
Swiss Timing Ltd. v. Organizing Committee, Commonwealth Games, (2014) 6 SCC 677......8
The Tamil Nadu Film Exhibitors Association vs. CCI, New Delhi, (W.P.Nos.12085 and 14411
of 2013)......................................................................................................................................9
World Sports Group Ltd. v. MSM Satellite Pte. Ltd., AIR 2014 SC 968...................................8
FOREIGN CASES
BBI/Boosey and Hawkes, (1988) 4 CMLR 67........................................................................14
Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can v. Commission (1973) ECR 215.......10, 14
Hoffmann la Roche v. Commission, (1979) ECR 461.............................................................13
Hugin v. Commission, (1979) ECR 1869................................................................................13
ITT Promedia v. Commission, (1998) ECR-II 2937................................................................14
Mettler Toledo v. Ackermaan, 908 f. Supp. 240/M.D. PA.(1995)............................................13
Michelin v Commission, (1983) ECR 346...............................................................................12
Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v
Commission of the European Communities, (1989) ECR 1141..............................................13
United Brands v. Commission, (1978) ECR 207.....................................................................13
BOOKS
HALSBURYS LAWS OF ENGLAND ...............................................................................................1
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Law Commission of India, Report No. 246...............................................................................8
Ministry of Law and Justice, Notification Number (S.O. 580) (E) dated 19th March, 2012....1
Report of S.V.S Raghvan Committee on Competition Law...............................................11, 12

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The present matter derives its jurisdiction from Section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure
1908.
Section 109 reads When appeals lie to the Supreme Court Subject to the provisions in
Chapter IV of Part V of the Constitution and such rules as may, from time to time, be made by
the Supreme Court regarding appeals from the Courts of India, and to the provisions
hereinafter contained, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or
final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court, if the High Court certifies-(i) that the case
involves a substantial question of law of general importance; and(ii) that in the opinion of
the High Court the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.
The Honble Supreme Court in the instant case has tagged the following three appeals using
its inherent powers under Order XLVII Rule 5 of The Supreme Court Rules, 1966 at the
requests of the counsel.
Rule 5 reads the Court may at any time either on its own motion or on the application of
any Party, order that the appeals be consolidated
Unless otherwise ordered by this Court the liability of the Parties to pay separate Court fees
shall not be affected by any order for consolidation
Thus, the Court has the jurisdiction to hear the matter and adjudicate accordingly.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

Jeevani Limited is one of the leading market players in the pharmaceutical industry
whereas Lifeline Limited is a popular Company in the Indian market as a major

II.

producer of food products.

Lifeline approached Jeevani for a possible Partnership to venture into the
pharmaceutical sector, thereafter both Companies decided to amalgamate whereby it
was decided that Jeevani would completely merge into Lifeline. Both the Companies
on 30th March 2012 approached the Delhi High Court to get the Scheme approved,
subsequently the Court ordered for a meeting of creditors to be convened and Jeevani
accordingly issued notices for the same. The Scheme was approved by a vote of
majority in the meeting consequently the Delhi High Court also approved the Scheme
on 5th July 2013. It was also decided that the three Promoters of Jeevani who were
also majority stakeholders in the Company would sell their entire promoter
shareholding (18% shares) in Jeevani to Lifeline. This sale of stake was affected by a

III.

separate sale agreement.

Prior to this, certain foreign banks with whom Jeevani had entered into an agreement
to provide financial assistance invoked arbitration proceedings before a foreign
arbitration tribunal constituted in Hong-Kong .The arbitral award was passed in
favour of the banks on 27th July 2012. In early August 2013 the foreign lenders made
an application before the Delhi High Court for recall of the order passed on 5 th July

IV.

and to set aside the Scheme.

The Honble Company Judge as well as the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court

V.

dismissed the application. This order has been challenged before the Supreme Court.
The Sale Agreement required the Parties to make specific representations regarding
disclosure of information which may be vital to the transaction. The agreement
contained a clause that the disputes between the Parties would be referred to an

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

Empowered Committee of three Executives of Lifeline. After the merger, Lifeline

unearthed the fact that a Food and Drug Administration (FDA) investigation on drugs
produced by Jeevani at its plants in India had commenced much before the merger
took place. Accordingly Lifeline filed a suit against the Promoters for damages arising
out of breach of Contract. The Honble Singe Judge held that the clause could not be
regarded as an arbitration clause whereas on appeal by the Promoters, the Division
Bench took a contrary view to this. Aggrieved by this order of the Division Bench,
VI.

Lifeline has approached the Supreme Court of India.

Soon after the merger, to increase its profitability, Lifeline decided to introduce a new
life saving drug by the name of Novel into the market. This drug was published to
be considerably cheaper than other life saving drugs in the market including the drug

VII.

Inventive which was manufactured by Swasth.

Before lifeline could launch its drug, Swasth filed a suit for infringement of its IPRs
in the Delhi High Court. Hence, Swasth was able to obtain an interim injunction
against Lifeline. After this, Swasth launched a similar cost effective drug and cornered

VIII.

the market and subsequently withdrew the case.

Consequently Lifeline approached Competition Commission of India (CCI) alleging
that Swasth abused its dominance by way of vexatious litigation. The CCI further
passed an order directing the Director General (DG) to investigate. Aggrieved by the
order of the CCI Swasth filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court to establish that
CCIs investigation was bad in law. The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition,
subsequently even the Division Bench dismissed the appeal, and now Swasth has
appealed before the Supreme Court of India.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

WHETHER THE SCHEME SANCTIONED BY THE HONBLE DELHI HIGH

II.

COURT ON 5TH JULY 2013 SHOULD BE SET ASIDE?

WHETHER THE HONBLE DELHI HIGH COURT HAS THE JURISDICTION TO

III.

HEAR THE SUIT FILED BY LIFELINE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT?

WHETHER THIS COURT SHOULD ENTERTAIN THE APPEAL AGAINST THE
DECISION OF THE
DOMINANCE

HIGH COURT AND IF THERE HAS BEEN ABUSE OF

BY SWASTH?

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

WHETHER

SCHEME

THE

SANCTIONED BY THE

HONBLE DELHI HIGH

COURT ON 5TH JULY 2013 SHOULD BE SET ASIDE?

It is humbly submitted by the Respondent that the Honble Delhi High Court was right in
dismissing the application filed by the foreign lenders because they have no locus standi to
object to the Scheme primarily because they have no pecuniary interest in the Company.
Moreover, their claim for a separate meeting is also flawed because they do not constitute a
separate class of creditors vis--vis the Scheme.
II.

WHETHER

THE

HONBLE DELHI

HEAR THE SUIT FILED BY

HIGH

COURT

HAS THE JURISDICTION TO

LIFELINE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT?

It is submitted by the Respondent that the Honble Delhi High Court was right in ruling that
the clause in the Sale Agreement constitutes an arbitration clause and in the light of the recent
Supreme Court judgment regarding arbitrability of fraud and the mandatory nature of the
Section 8. It is the contention of the Respondent that the matter ought to be referred to the
arbitration tribunal.
III.

WHETHER

THIS

COURT

DECISION OF THE

SHOULD ENTERTAIN THE APPEAL AGAINST THE

HIGH COURT

AND IF THERE HAS BEEN ABUSE OF

DOMINANCE BY SWASTH?

It is the contention of the Respondents that the Appellant had no locus-standi to file the writ
petition and the Honble Delhi High Court was right in dismissing it. Further, it is the
contention of the Respondents that Swasth had abused its dominance in the market by way of
vexatious litigation.

10

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I.

WHETHER THE SCHEME SANCTIONED BY THE HONBLE DELHI HIGH

COURT ON 5TH JULY 2013 SHOULD BE SET ASIDE?

A. THAT

THE FOREIGN LENDERS HAVE NO LOCUS STANDI TO OBJECT TO THE

SCHEME.
In order to ascertain that no notice was required to be sent to the foreign lenders it is
essential to establish that they were not the creditors of the Company. The expression creditor
here includes every person having a pecuniary interest, whether actual or contingent, against
the Company.1 The foreign lenders had obtained an award passed by an arbitral tribunal
constituted in Hong-Kong. Though it is disputed on a prima facie basis that these foreign
lenders are creditors, the claim of the Appellant is that they are creditors by virtue of the
award in their favour. The Respondent humbly submits that the foreign lenders are not
creditors as it would be established that an award passed by the arbitration tribunal in HongKong is not enforceable under Part I or Part II of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
i.

That the award is not enforceable under Part II of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996.

It is humbly submitted before the Honble Court that the award which was passed by the
Foreign Arbitral tribunal on 27.7.2010 is not enforceable by virtue of the fact that the
Arbitration Award was passed in Hong-Kong and even though India and Hong-Kong are
signatory to the New York Convention but India has only recognized Hong-Kong as a
reciprocatory Nation vide a notification in the Official Gazette dated 19.03.20122.Hence
1 HALSBURYS LAWS OF ENGLAND, 848 (4 TH EDITION, VOLUME 7).

2 Ministry of Law and Justice, Notification Number (S.O. 580) (E) dated 19th March, 2012.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

awards passed by a foreign tribunal in Hong-Kong only on or after 19.03.2012 are

enforceable under Part II of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996.
Substantiating further, a plain reading of the provisions of New York Convention, 1958 3 and
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19964 would make it clear that awards passed in nonconventional countries are not enforceable under Part II. Hence, it is virtually evident that
there was specific intention of the legislature to exclude awards passed in non-conventional
Country from Part II of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
ii.

That the award is not enforceable under Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996.

Provisions of the Act5 clearly lay down that awards passed only under this Part shall be
considered as a domestic award. A clear interpretation of this has been laid down in
BALCOs6 judgment where the Supreme Court interpreted the above mentioned section and
held that The non-convention award cannot be incorporated into the Arbitration Act, 1996
by process of interpretation.
This interpretation of the Supreme Court clearly flows down from the intention of the
legislature and the statute. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a compilation of
Arbitration Act, 1940 read with 1961 Act, and the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act,
1937. It was never the intention of the legislature to include awards passed by the non3 Section 44, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

4 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Article III.

5 Section 2(7), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

6 Bharat Aluminium Co.v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Service Inc, (2012) 9 SCC 552.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

convention States in any of these legislations and it was never the intent of the legislature
under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to include awards passed in non-convention
States. Further it was observed by the Apex Court that It is said, indeed rightly, that in
seeking legislative intention, judges not only listen to the voice of the legislature but also
listen at tentatively to what the legislature does not say. 7 Thus while interpreting these laws
what needs to be given importance to is the fact that awards passed in non-convention States
were not provided for by the legislature in any of the above mentioned Statues. This clearly
goes to show the specific intent of the legislature in excluding awards passed by nonconventional States.
It would be fair to state that the interpretation made in the case of Bhatia 8 International was
incorrect where the interpretation was made by the Court to specifically fill the lacuna that
was there in the law with respect to non-convention States. However such interpretation does
not reflect the true and specific intent of the legislature and was overruled by BALCO 9 where
it was specifically held that there is no lacunae in the system and even if there is it is job of
the Parliament to fill it. Further the Supreme Court held Where, however, the words were
clear, there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the Legislature is
clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to innovate or take upon itself the task of
amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that Situation the Judges should not
proclaim that they are playing the role of a law-maker merely for an exhibition of judicial

7 Gwalior Rayons Silk Manufacturers Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat and
another, AIR 1990 SC 1747.

8 Bhatia InterNational v Bulk Trading SA and Anr, AIR 2002 SC 1432.

9 Bharat Aluminium Co.v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Service Inc, (2012) 9 SCC 552.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication
from legislation. Where, therefore, the "language" is clear, the intention of the Legislature is
to be gathered from the language used. What is to be borne in mind is as to what has been
said in the Statute as also what has not been said. 10 Hence, where the intent of the
legislature was crystal clear there was no need to interpret it the way it was done in the case
of Bhatia which in turn was invalidated by the interpretation in the case of BALCO.
iii.

That using the correct interpretation of law as laid in the case of BALCO is not
barred.

The doctrine of prospective overruling was laid down in the case of Golakh Nath 11 and the
Apex Court laid down certain rules which were to be adhered to while applying prospective
overruling. It is not a point of dispute that the ratio laid down in BALCO is to be applied
prospectively and since the agreement entered into between the Parties here was pre BALCO
hence, the ratio laid down in BALCO is not applicable. Nevertheless, it does not preclude the
Respondent from using the interpretation of the Statue that was laid down by the Apex Court
in the judgment. Courts12 in India have used the interpretations laid down in BALCO for
correctly understanding the Statue and hence we see no reason in not applying the correct
interpretation of the provisions of the Act13 as laid down in the case of BALCO.

10 Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Warehouse and Anr, AIR 1998 SC 74.

11 I.C Golakh Nath and Ors v. State of Punjab and Anr, AIR 1967 SC 1643.

12 Konkola Copper Mines v. Stewards and Lloyds of India Limited, 2013 (5) BomCR 29;
NNR Global logistics Co. Ltd v. Aargus Global Logistics Pvt Ltd, O.M.P 61 of 2012.

13 Section 2(7), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

Further substantiating in the case of Konkola 14, it was held by the Court that In our view, it
would not be appropriate, while applying the ratio of the judgment in BALCO to hold that the
reasons which are contained in the judgment would operate with prospective effect. It
would be impermissible to hold that the interpretation which has been placed by the Supreme
Court on the provisions of Section 2(1)(e) would apply only prospectively. The judgment of
the Supreme Court is declaratory of the position of law that the Court having jurisdiction
over the place of arbitration can entertain a proceeding in the exercise of its supervisory
jurisdiction as indeed the Court where the cause of action arises Hence, it goes without
saying that there is no bar for this Court to refrain from using BALCOs correct interpretation
of the law which in turn is the intent of the legislature. Since, the award passed by the
Arbitration tribunal in Hong-Kong is not enforceable in India they are not decree holders in
India. Moreover, their claim that they are creditors by virtue of holding the award is also
negated. Since they were not creditors there was no need for the Company to issue notices to
them with respect to the Scheme of Amalgamation. Section 391 says that it is a statutory
requirement to issue notices to all creditors. After having established that the creditors had no
pecuniary interest in the Company there was no requirement to issue notices to them.
B. THAT FOREIGN LENDERS DO NOT CONSTITUTE SEPARATE CLASS OF CREDITORS.
It is contended by the Appellant that they form a separate class of creditors by virtue of an
arbitration award in their favour. In the light of these contentions, Assuming that their award
is enforceable it does not change the fact that they do not constitute a separate class of
creditors as substantiated below.

14 Konkola Copper Mines v. Stewards and Lloyds of India Limited, 2013 (5) BomCR 29.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

That by virtue of being foreign lenders they do not constitute separate class.

Foreign creditors per se do not constitute separate class of creditors. 15In the present case there
is no dissimilarity of interest vis--vis the Scheme as far the creditors are concerned and
further the Courts have held that the as long as the treatment of the creditors are same under
the Scheme and they do not have conflicting interest, there is no need to constitute a separate
class for them. Foreign lenders perceiving that their interest differs because of having an
award in their favour does not necessarily classify them under separate class of creditors.16

II.

WHETHER THE HONBLE DELHI HIGH COURT HAS THE JURISDICTION

TO HEAR THE SUIT FILED BY

A THAT

THE DIVISION

BENCH

OF

LIFELINE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT?

HONBLE DELHI

HIGH

COURT

WAS RIGHT IN

CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS A VALID ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.

Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 lays down the essentials of a valid
arbitration agreement which was further reiterated by this Court 17, which have been fulfilled
in the present case as follows:
1. The usage of the words Final, binding and conclusive 18 proves beyond all doubts
that the Parties contemplated that the decision of the tribunal would be binding on
them.

15 Core Health Care Ltd v. Nirma Ltd, (2007) 138 CompCas 204.

16 In Re: Arvind Mills Ltd., (2002) 111 CompCas 118 (Guj).

17 K.K Modi v. K.N.Modi and Ors, (1998) 3 SCC 573.

18 Para 9, Page 4, Moot Problem.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

2. The fact that the Parties have agreed upon the same terms implies that the jurisdiction
of the tribunal was derived from the consent of the Parties. There was a clear intention
to arbitrate.
3. The use of the word relating to which has been held by the Courts 19 to have the
widest possible ambit goes to show that the tribunal would determine substantive
rights of the Parties.
4. The Parties have voluntarily agreed to be bound by the decision of an Empowered
Committee consisting three Executives of the Company thereby waving their claims
for any biasness and acquiescing to the fact that the tribunal would be fair in their
adjudicating process.
Apart from these conditions there are other statutory provisions which have also been
complied accordingly. Hence, it is evident that there exist a valid arbitration agreement and
thus the Division Bench of the Honble Delhi High Court was right in its ruling.
C. THAT

THE ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL IS COMPETENT TO ARBITRATE THE PRESENT

DISPUTE.

Further, the only aspect remaining is the competency of the arbitration tribunal to adjudicate
on the particular dispute. Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 clearly lays
down the intent of the legislature that the Courts shall exert minimum intervention in matters
concerning arbitration which come before it. 20 In the matter before us, the arbitration
agreement covers all the disputes between the Parties as is evident from the wide ambit of the
word relating to used in the arbitration clause. The peremptory nature of section 8 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been further recognized by this Court in various

19 Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co and Anr, AIR 1985 SC 1156.

20 P. Anand Gajapathi Raju & Ors. v. P.V.G. Raju & Ors, AIR 2000 SC 1886.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

judgments21. It has been held by the Court22 that: The language of Section 8 is peremptory. It
is therefore, obligatory for the Court to refer the Parties to arbitration in terms of their
arbitration agreement. Nothing remains to be decided in the original action or the appeal
arising there from. There is no question of stay of the proceedings till the arbitration
proceedings conclude and the Award becomes final in terms of the provisions of the new
Act. Hence, it has been recognized that when an application is made under section 8(1) and
all conditions given there under have been satisfied then it is obligatory on the Courts to refer
the matter to arbitration. Lastly, the only issue that might arise in this case is of arbitrability
of fraud. It has been laid down in various judgments passed by this Court that the tribunal is
competent to arbitrate on that matter. It was held by the Court in the case of Swiss-timing 23
that the arbitration tribunal is competent to arbitrate even when there are serious allegations
of fraud and misrepresentation because Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 lays down that the arbitration tribunal is competent to rule on its own jurisdiction.
The Court held that the law laid down in N. Radhakrishnan 24, which would be greatly relied
by the Appellant is bad in law and the Court reasoned it as: 1.The peremptory nature of
section 8 was not addressed by the Court which has been recognized by the Supreme Court in

21 Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleum, AIR 2003 SC 2881.

22 P. Anand Gajapathi Raju & Ors. v. P.V.G. Raju & Ors, AIR 2000 SC 1886.

23 Swiss Timing Ltd. v. Organizing Committee, Commonwealth Games, (2014) 6 SCC 677.

24 N.Radhakrishnan v. Maestro Engineers and Ors, (2010) 1 SCC 72.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

various judgments25. 2. The law laid down in Hindustan Petroleum 26 case was neither
distinguished nor followed. 3. Moreover, provisions under section 16 were not even
considered by the Court. In this judgment the Court lays down a difference between void
and voidable and further states that in cases if voidable contract it would be improper to not
refer the matter for arbitration. Such propositions were also upheld in another case 27 and
although that case was pertaining to Part II of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 yet
the principle laid down could still be applied and in the light of these judgments the dynamic
interpretation of the Statue by the Apex Court is clearly evident.
The intention of the legislature for the same is also reflected in the 246 th law Commissions
Report28 which seeks to amend the Act and insert a new provision under section 16 sub
section 7 which makes fraud arbitrable. It can be rightly concluded that the both the judicial
atmosphere and the legislature have moved towards holding that fraud is an arbitrable issue
and it is humbly pleaded that this Court should also rule accordingly.

25 P. Anand Gajapathi Raju & Ors. v. P.V.G. Raju & Ors, AIR 2000 SC 1886.

26 Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleum, AIR 2003 SC 2881.

27 World Sports Group Ltd. v. MSM Satellite Pte. Ltd., AIR 2014 SC 968.

28 Law Commission of India, Report No. 246, August 2014.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

III.

WHETHER THIS COURT SHOULD ENTERTAIN THE APPEAL AGAINST

THE DECISION OF THE
OF DOMINANCE BY

A THAT

THIS

OF THE

COURT

HIGH COURT AND IF THERE HAS BEEN ABUSE

SWASTH?

SHOULD NOT ENTERTAIN THE APPEAL AGAINST THE DECISION

HIGH COURT.

The foremost question that arises is whether the Delhi High Court was correct in dismissing
the appeal by Swasth. It is the contention of the Respondents that the present Writ Petition
filed in the Delhi High Court was not maintainable and hence this subsequent appeal too has
no basis and further the Delhi High Court was right in its ruling.
It is contend that since the action of CCI to direct an investigation under section 26(1) of The
Competition Act, 2002 was an administrative function in itself out of which no right or
obligation arose, the said action should not be subject to Writs or Appeals in principle.
Reference in this regard should be made to various decisions of the Court.29 of to establish the
same.The Court held that Direction under Section 26(1) of Competition Act, 2002 after
formation of a prima facie opinion is a direction simpliciter to cause an investigation into the
matter and does not effectively determine any right or obligation of the Parties to the lis and
does not entail civil consequences for any person and therefore, is not appealable.Now if
the legislative intent is analyzed, it is apparent that it was the intention of the legislature to
exclude section 26(1) from any appeals purely because of the reason that an order under
26(1) is an administrative direction and no rights or obligations accrue to any third Party as a

29 CCI v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 744; Namrata Marketing Pvt. Ltd v.
CCI, AIR 2014 All 11; The Tamil Nadu Film Exhibitors Association vs. CCI, New Delhi,
(W.P.Nos.12085 and 14411 of 2013).

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result of such an order. In the High Court of Allahabad 30 where the writ petition filed by the
petitioners was dismissed, the Court drew an analogy between Show cause notices and an
order issued by the CCI. It was held that a show cause notice can only be challenged if the
Competent Authority has no jurisdiction to issue the show cause notice otherwise such
challenges were not maintainable. In the present case it is clearly established that the CCI had
jurisdiction to initiate an investigation under 26(1) of the Competition Act 2002 if it felt that a
prima- facie case exists. Moreover, no prejudice would be caused to the petitioner since no
rights and obligations would accrue to him. Hence, it would have his right to challenge the
findings of the DG CCI after the investigation. Moreover, in order to ascertain if such
allegations which on a prima- facie basis seem strong actually hold true, it is very essential
for an investigation to take place. The introduction of the petition is therefore contested.
D. THAT THE RELEVANT MARKET CAN BE ESTABLISHED.
According to section 2(r), section 2(s) and section 2(t) of The Competition Act, 2002 relevant
market, relevant geographic market and relevant product market have been defined
respectively.The relevant market in our case is the life saving drugs market in the
pharmaceutical sector. Although strictly according to the definition of relevant product
market the consumer aspect must be taken into account while determining relevant product
market, in the sense that only demand side substitutability must be taken into account; but in
the European case31, the relevant product market was defined through supply side
substitutability. The Court had held that the three different types of light metal packaging
containers didn't form three different markets but were part of the same market for light metal
packaging containers. From the supply side, it would include all producers who could, with
30 Namrata Marketing Pvt. Ltd v. CCI, AIR 2014 All 11.

31Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can v. Commission (1973) ECR 215.

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their existing facilities, switch to the production of such substitute goods.32 Hence supply side
substitutability has been used to define the market in cases where it was difficult to establish
the market through demand side substitutability. Now to determine interchangeability similar
end use and similar characteristics of the product can be established from the consumer side
since that too is an essential under the provisions of the law. In the present case the concept of
supply side substitutability will also be used to establish the relevant market.
In the current market there were other producers also in the high range that competed with
the drug Inventive. Since Inventive was the premier drug, it can be deduced that there were
other drugs competing in the market too and they had their own consumer base therefore the
end use of all these drugs were similar. Hence, it can be concluded that all such drug
manufacturers possessed the essential facilities to deliver similar end use by virtue of which
they were able to compete in the first place. Considering the above mentioned, if the price of
the cost effective drug of Swasth were to increase there is a significant chance that the other
producers may try to produce similar drugs which would compete with the drug in question
after the increase in price; since all the manufacturers do possess the technology to deliver
similar end use. Considering this it could be safely concluded that supply side substitutability
does exist and inter-changeability between the high range and low range products also exits
which is why it is fair to say that the life saving drugs market is the relevant product market.
So far as the relevant geographic market is concerned it may be pointed out that as per the
provisions of The Competition Act, 2002 it comprises the area in which the conditions of
competition for supply of goods or provision of services or demand of goods or services are
distinctly homogenous and can be distinguished from the conditions prevailing in the
neighbouring areas. As nothing has been brought on record or is otherwise discernible there
from to reflect heterogeneity in the conditions of competition with respect to the relevant
32Report of S.V.S Raghvan Committee on Competition Law, 2000, Paragraph 4.4.7.

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product, it is to be assumed that the conditions of competition for supply of the product in
question are homogenous throughout India. Hence, the relevant geographic market in the
present case may be taken as whole of India.
E. THAT THE APPELLANT HAD A DOMINANT POSITION IN THE RELEVANT MARKET.
The European Court of Justice33 states that dominant position refers to a situation of
economic strength which gives the enterprise power to obstruct the maintenance of an
effective competition in the market concerned because it allows the enterprise to conduct
itself in a way that it is independent of from its competitors, clients and customers.
It is contended that in this case the fact that Swasth had Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) of
certain nature which allowed it to deliver the same end result and also make the drug cost
effective, in itself constitutes dominant position in the market. Even though the market was
cornered by Sawsth later, it still was in a dominant position by virtue of holding the IPR.
Besides, even before it produced the cost effective drug their drug Inventive was still the
premier drug in the market which represents a certain preference which was given to the drug
by consumers which again indicates that it enjoyed the largest share in the high range
products too. An enterprise owning products which are not easily interchangeable with other
products on the market is likely to be in a dominant position. The possession of a technical
advantage to lead a product development, or the ownership of an IPR is an important
contributory factor to establishing dominance.
Even The Raghavan Committee Report34 said entry barriers could result from absolute
advantages such as patents and access to certain inputs. Similar views were held by the

33 Michelin v Commission, (1983) ECR 346.

34 Report of S.V.S Raghvan Committee on Competition Law, 2000, Paragraph 4.4.7.

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European Court of Justice in various cases.35Technical advancement made Swasth the

dominant player since even though the capacity of producers existed to produce similar
drugs, the responsiveness would be considerably slower considering such advancement by
way of Research & Development and Swasth's patent on the same. The IPR gave Swasth
monopoly in cost effectiveness but considering the use of the drug there still was competition
in that regard. Hence, Swasth is a dominant player but does not hold monopoly. In Metter
Toledo36, the Court distinguished between trade secrets and patents to say:The owner of a
trade secret, unlike the owner of a patent, does not have a monopoly over the process or
formula. which obviously means that the producer by way of patent has monopoly of certain
process or formula and in our case the potential monopoly Swasth had monopoly over such
process which helped the drug to be cost effective later makes the firm dominant. Also in
another case37 the European Court of Justice seems to have accepted that the appellant was
dominant in the market for spare parts for its cash registers because other firms could not
produce spares for fear of being sued by the appellant in the UK under the design copyright
act. In another case38 similar observations were made. Considering the above mentioned cases
it would be fair to say that Swasth had dominance in the relevant market of life saving drugs
by virtue of holding certain patent rights.
35 Hoffmann la Roche v. Commission, (1979) ECR 461; United Brands v. Commission,
(1978) ECR 207.

36 Mettler Toledo v. Ackermaan, 908 f. Supp. 240/M.D. PA.(1995).

37 Hugin v. Commission, (1979) ECR 1869.

38 Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v
Commission of the European Communities, (1989) ECR 1141.

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F. THAT

THE APPELLANT ABUSED ITS DOMINANT POSITION IN THE RELEVANT

MARKET.

In this case the abuse of dominance took place by way of vexatious litigation. It must be
considered how the concept of abuse under Indian law is strikingly similar to the position
existing in the European law which was laid down in the Continental Can 39Case. The position
of law with regards to abuse effectively establishes that even if the attempts of abuse dont
directly affect the consumers it is still under the purview of Section 4 of the Competition Act,
2002 if it fetters competition to a considerable extent. The Respondents contend that the
Competition was affected in the instant case by way of vexatious litigation. Dealing with
vexatious litigation we must refer to the grounds laid down in the Promedia 40 case which are
regarded as essentials to prove vexatious litigation in a situation. It could be abuse of
dominance if: 1) Action which cannot be reasonably be considered as an attempt to establish
its rights and hence can therefore only serve to harass the opposite Party. 2) Which is
conceived in the framework of the plan whose goal is to eliminate competition.
It is imperative to realise that such intention in cases of vexatious litigation can only be
analysed from the consequences of such litigation. In the present case if Swasth really wanted
to establish its rights it would have never withdrawn the case and vacated the injunction, in
normal course it would have wanted the injunction to continue so as to establish its rights
regarding the patent and its infringement as such. It is fairly obvious hence that the first
essential laid down above stands true for this situation since the action cannot be reasonably
considered as an attempt to establish rights. The second principle also stands true since as
soon as Swasth had captured the market after obtaining the injunction and hence effectively
39 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can v. Commission (1973) ECR 215.

40 ITT Promedia v. Commission, (1998) ECR-II 2937.

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driving out competition it withdrew the case. Also in other cases 41 the CCI seems to have
regarded it as an aspect of abusive behavior to have bought vexatious litigation against an
undertaking for slavish imitation of its products. The CCI took similar view in another case42.

41 BBI/Boosey and Hawkes, (1988) 4 CMLR 67.

42 Bull Machines Pvt Ltd. v. J.C.B India Ltd, Case No. 105 of 2013(CCI).

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PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and
authorities cited, it is most humbly and respectfully prayed before this Honble Court that it
may be pleased to:

To dismiss the appeal filed by the Foreign Lenders and uphold the ruling of

the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.

To Rule that the Delhi High Court has no jurisdiction to hear the suit filed by

Lifeline for breach of contract and uphold the Division Benchs decision.
To uphold the decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court
dismissing the appeal arising out of the decision of the single judge Bench
which too initially dismissed the writ petition filed by Swasth.

And pass any other order or grant any other relief in favor of the Respondent, which this
Learned Court may deem fit in the ends of Justice.

All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.

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