Falun Dafa
Falun Dafa
Falun Dafa
DAVID OWNBY
Abstract. Despite the polarised debate which has raged in the media over
whether the Chinese spiritual movement Falun Gong1 should be seen as
an evil cult or as an innocent cultivation system, there is little doubt
that most objective Western scholars would categorise Falun Gong as a
new religious movement (many of which have also been accused rightly
or wrongly of being cults or sects). Indeed, the controversy surrounding
Falun Gong has attracted considerable media and scholarly attention, so
that the Falun Gong is now undoubtedly the best known of Chinese new
religious movements and, as I argue elsewhere, a key to the reevaluation of
a centuries-old tradition of popular religious practice in China which has
long been condemned and suppressed by Chinese authorities.2 The present
article, based on eldwork in North America, on research in Falun Gong
written sources and on my previous work in the history of Chinese popular
religion traces a portrait of Falun Gong practices both in China and in North
America.
The emergence and growth of the Falun Gong in the 1990s is part
of an explosion of religious activity that has marked Chinese society
since the 198 0s. The religious revival, a product of Chinas post-Mao
spiritual vacuum and the scaling back of the Partys ideological control of society, spans a range of Chinese and foreign, institutionalised
and popular religions and includes the rapid rise of Christian (particularly Protestant) fortunes, the return of Chinese religions to rural life,
and the resurgence of certain heterodox traditions.3 More immediately relevant to Falun Gong is the qigong boom, which began in
Or Falun dafa; the terms are used interchangeably.
See David Ownby, A History for Falun Gong: Popular Religion and the
Chinese State since the Ming Dynasty, Nova Religio, Vol. 6, No. 2 (April 2003): 223
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3 On the rise of Protestantism, see Alan Hunter and Chan Kim-Kwong, Protestantism in Contemporary China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); on religion in rural China, see Helen Siu, Recycling Ritual, in Perry Link, Richard Madsen and Paul Pickowicz (eds.), UnoYcial China: Popular Culture and Thought in the Peoples
Republic of China (Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1 990); and Kenneth Dean, Taoist Popular Ritual and Popular Cults of Southeast China (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1 993); on heterodox groups, see Robin Munro, Syncretic Sects and Secret Societies:
Revival in the 1 98 0s, in Chinese Sociology and Anthropology, No. 21 (summer 1 98 9).
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earnest in the early 198 0s and continued until very recently.4 Qigong
is still little known in the West outside of alternative medicine/new
age circles. Qi means cosmic breath or energy and refers to a
force a practitioner can capture through speci c gestures, exercises
or meditative techniques. Most practitioners seek in qigong cultivation
improved physical and spiritual health. Some, however, claim what
might be called supernatural powers based on their mastery of qi: the
ability to heal illness, to repel objects (including people) by emitting
qi from their bodies and a host of other remarkable talents, many of
which we would call extrasensory perception.
The Chinese government largely created qigong in the 195 0s and
supported its post-Mao resurgence, establishing the Chinese Qigong
Scienti c Research Association in April 198 6.5 Its support in the Deng
era grew in part out of a hope that mass practice might reduce
systemic health care costs (at a time when the government was cutting
back on its support to this sector) and in part out of national pride in
the achievements of Chinese science as manifested by qigong masters,
who claimed to be reviving ancient Chinese wisdom. Among other
things, the Research Association planned to sponsor scienti c research
on qigong, to weed out superstition and systematise qigong knowledge
and practice.
The Chinese public enthusiastically embraced qigong. When the
Research Association was founded, its leaders noted that there were
already over 2,000 national level qigong organisations and, one assumes, countless local branches and unorganised groups. Ocial Chinese government sources put total membership at 60 million in 1990;
other sources have put the numbers as high as 200 million, almost
one- fth of Chinas immense population.6 Qigong rapidly became a
social phenomenon of considerable importance. Qigong newspapers
and magazines appeared in profusion to cater to the public interest
in the subject. Qigong masters organised mass rallies in which paying customers experienced trance, possession and a variety of otherworldly states; the original small group, masterdisciple pattern was
4 The best single source on the qigong movement is David Palmer, La vre du
qigong: Gurison, religion, et politique en Chine contemporaine, doctoral dissertation, cole
Pratique des Hautes tudes, Paris, 2002. See also Zhu Xiaoyang and Benjamin Penny
(eds.), The Qigong Boom, Chinese Sociology and Anthropolog y, No. 27 (autumn 1994); and
Nancy N. Chen, Urban Spaces and Experiences of Qigong, in Deborah S. Davis
(ed.), Urban Spaces in Contemporary China (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center
Press, 1995).
5 See Palmer on the history of the qigong movement. Also Zhu and Penny, The
Qigong Boom, p. 4.
6 Nancy Chen, Urban Spaces and Experiences of Qigong.
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transformed into a mass experience. Masters were also quick to capitalise on the phenomenon in the newly vibrant Chinese economy,
selling books, audio and video cassettes, and organising national and
international tours to promote qigong. Practitioners, who could be seen
in public parks and on university campuses, included the old and suffering as well as the young and curious. To my knowledge, no one
has attempted to establish the sociological pro le of qigong practitioners; my impression, based on extensive, if anecdotal, evidence, is
that the pro le would resemble that of the population as a whole. In
other words, practitioners included men and women, rich and poor,
educated and uneducated, powerful and powerless, urban and rural,
Party and non-Party.
Although the boom began at roughly the same time as the religious revival, and for similar reasons, few Chinese thought of qigong
as a religious practice because of the particular meaning of religion
(zongjiao) in China. Historically, there was no Chinese term which corresponded to the general category of religion in Western discourse.
The closest equivalent would probably have been the word jiao, often
translated as teachings, but jiao appeared rarely alone and more
often as a sux (rujiao, Confucianism; daojiao, Daoism; fojiao, Buddhism). Traditional Chinese discourse distinguished between orthodox teachings (zhengjiao) and heterodox teachings (xiejiao, the term
currently used to designate cults or sects), but not between the religious and the secular realms. The word currently employed in China
to designate religion came to China from the West via Japan, and
designates institutional religions having a long history, an imposing
church organisation and a body of doctrine. Indeed, the constitution
of the Peoples Republic acknowledges only ve great religions: Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism. To most Chinese, the very word religion has a vaguely foreign or bureaucratic
sound, and the idea of a new religious movement makes little sense.
Thus qigong practitioners do not believe in a religion (xinjiao) as would
members of a church. Instead, they cultivate (xiuyang), a word that,
even in translation, faithfully renders the connotation of prolonged
physical, meditative, and moral practice.
If we set aside the history of the idea of religion in China, however,
it is obvious that many qigong masters and practitioners drew on
traditional spiritual teachings, which Western observers would call
religious whether the Chinese choose to or not. Moreover, as the
movement developed and masters competed for the attention of
potential followers, some masters began to produce books that sought
not only to provide technical guidelines to proper qigong exercises, but
also to explain why qigong worked. Although some of the explanations
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tive research on the Falun Gong in China became of course impossible. As a result, it is quite dicult to speak with authority about the
nature of Falun Gong organisation and practices in China between
1992 and 1997. I have attempted to interview practitioners in North
America on these subjects, but few nd such details signi cant, and
most prefer to talk about the miracles wrought by Li Hongzhi and
Falun Dafa practices. Consequently, I have done my eldwork among
Falun Gong groups in North America, hoping to get a sense of what
Falun Gong means to practitioners, even as I acknowledge that, for a
host of reasons, Falun Gong outside of China cannot be completely
the same as Falun Gong inside China. Thus in what follows I will
paint a brief portrait of North American practitioners, who they are
and how they practice their cultivation system, based on eldwork
and on surveys circulated at two Falun Gong experience-sharing conferences, one in Montreal in February 2000 and a second at Toronto
in May 2000.10
Let us begin by asking basic questions about Falun Gong practitioners: who are they, where are they geographically, what is their
sociological pro le?
The rst part of the answer is that the Falun Gong in North America is a product of recent Chinese immigration. Despite the prominent place enjoyed by images of Western practitioners in Falun Gong
literature, roughly 90 per cent of the North American membership is
ethnically Chinese. Many of the Westerners seem to t the pro le of
what we might call spiritual seekers, a large and apparently growing
category of people who are dissatis ed with the teachings and practices of mainstream churches and try out a variety of new age spiritual practices in the search for answers and meaning. For example, of
the seven Western respondents to the questionnaire circulated at the
Montreal experience-sharing conference in February 2000, all but one
described a previous involvement in alternative spirituality, healing, or
psychotherapy. Further interviews have seemed to con rm that many
Western practitioners are experienced veterans of a series of new religious movements, including several eastern meditation groups. At the
beginning of my research, I found this mixture of Western hippies
and the Chinesewho are extremely straight, in general, as I will
demonstrate belowto be somewhat incongruous, and I have heard
tales of Chinese practitioners who were uncomfortable with the Western practice of mixing and matching, or selectively practicing those
10 Some of the results from the Montreal survey are published in Susan Palmer
and David Ownby, Falun Dafa Practitioners: A Preliminary Research Report, Nova
Religio. Vol. 4, No. 1 (October 2000).
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now, and no one with whom I have spoken mentions the events of
198 9 as important to their personal history or to the history of the
movement.
I suspect that an important common experience shared by this
group is that of having experienced the qigong boom in China in
the 198 0s and 1990s. Some con rmation of this is the fact that Falun
Gong has a considerable following in Taiwan, which was frequently
visited by qigong masters, including Li Hongzhi, during the heyday of
the qigong boom, but which had no direct experience of 198 9 and its
aftermath. Still, only 45 per cent of those responding to my surveys
reported having practiced other forms of qigong prior to taking up
Falun Dafa. In any case, most practitioners responding to my surveys
began cultivation in North America rather than in China.
To continue with our pro le of the Chinese practitioners, they are
found in all major (and many minor) North American cities where
there is a Chinese population. Falun Gong web sites enable one
to get a sense of this geographic distribution by providing contact
information across the continent (indeed, throughout the world) for
anyone interested in taking up cultivation. Local groups do not, so
far as I have been able to tell, attempt to keep up with how many
practitioners there are in their areas. Practitioners are not members
of an organisation and do not ll out a form at any point in
their cultivation process; no central church registry asks for local
statistics. Thus it is very dicult to estimate how many practitioners
there might be continent-wide. The May 2001 experience-sharing
conference in Ottawa, which drew practitioners chie y from Toronto,
New York, and Montreal, was attended by roughly 1000 practitioners,
an impressive number. The Toronto conference of May 2000 was
attended by perhaps 700 and the Montreal conference of February
2000 by perhaps 3 00. These numbers do not of course represent the
totality of Falun Gong practitioners in the regions/cities in question,
not all of whom are willing or able to attend experience-sharing
conferences. On the other hand, my impression is that even major
centres do not have more than a few hundred practitioners, and that
the total number of Falun Gong practitioners in North America, were
we to add them all together, would still be rather small, particularly
in the context of the millions of followers claimed by Li Hongzhi.
The millions areor werein China, and Falun Gong, like other
new religious movements in North America, seems to have made few
inroads as a mass movement.
More women than men lled out my questionnaires, by a ratio
of roughly three to two, con rming my impression that there are
more women than men among Chinese Falun Gong practitioners
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http://ceps.statcan.ca/english/pro l
http://ceps.statcan.ca/english/pro l
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time and money (I repeat that contributions appear to be voluntary) to such an all-absorbing cause? According to my surveys, when
asked what attracted them to Falun Gong, respondents namedin
order of popularitythe intellectual content of Li Hongzhis ideas,
followed by the spiritual enlightenment oered by Falun Gong,
health bene ts and Falun Gong exercises. Neither Master Li nor
the Falun Gong communitytwo other choices available on the
questionnaire gured signi cantly. More than one third indicated
that their heavenly eye had opened, indicating considerable interest in supernormal powers. While my survey was not designed to
measure motivation and commitment, general impressions, based on
interviews and time spent with Falun Gong practitioners, are that
many were initially led to Falun Gong for health reasons (this is particularly true for older practitioners), and that the positive eects practitioners experienced on their health served as an important test, for
them, of the ecacy of the practice. They were equally impressed
that they did not have to pay for these bene ts. But if practice
begins with the suering body, it does not end there. Indeed, for
many practitioners, Zhuanfalun genuinely contains the secret of life,
whether life is understood as the physical functioning of the universe,
or the meaning of human life as lived. There is no doubt that practitioners appreciate the global ambitions of Li Hongzhis theology, by
which I mean his eorts to embed human moral practice in a schema
which embraces the universe, both past and present. Practitioners also
appreciate the positive sanction for moral behaviour; in the same way
that many Chinese took socialism to mean being nice to people in
an earlier era, many practitioners take comfort in goodness, truth and
forbearance. For some, the fact that cultivation leads to supernormal
abilities is important, but this does not come up often in many of the
conversations I have had (of course, media-savvy practitioners may lter what they say, knowing that they are dealing with a non-practicing,
sceptical academic).
Of my original hypotheses concerning Falun Gong practice there is
one at least that I have not found to be con rmed. I had thought that
Falun Gong adhesion in North America might represent a response
to the marginalisation which often accompanies the immigrant experience, that participation in Falun Gong might be a way to remain
culturally Chinese in the face of cultural loss. This hypothesis might
be supported by the datum that the majority of Falun Gong practitioners who responded to my surveys began cultivation in North
America rather than in China. However, as I spent time with practitioners, I got no sense whatsoever that they had felt marginalised.
The Toronto Chinese community numbers some 3 3 5 ,000, accord-
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ing to the 1996 census, and these numbers, plus the sense of cultural
con dence which many Chineseeven sojourning Chinesepossess
seems to mean that even if Chinese are marginal as a minority in
some objective sense of the term, this does not seem to be an important feature of their mental landscape. Or if it is, I have yet to nd its
expression.
Concluding Remarks
My overall impression, from having spent considerable time with
Chinese-Canadian and Chinese-American practitioners, is one of
innocence. These are people who have discovered what is to them
the truth of the universe. They have arrived freely at this discovery,
and if they change their mind, they are free to go on to something
else. The Falun Gong community seems to be supportive, but not
constraining, at least not beyond the peer pressure which exists in
many group situations; there is no visible power structure which
might chastise a misbehaving practitioner, nor do practitioners tell
one another what to do, or what to believe. Falun Gong spirituality in
North America seems to be an individual rather than a group aair,
mediated by Li Hongzhis scriptures. Were Li present in the everyday
lives of practitioners, this could well change, as they accord him a
devotion which would make many Westerners uncomfortable. But Li
has not been physically present in their lives with the exception of rare
appearances at experience-sharing conferences, and as a result, most
practitioners seem to have taken responsibility for themselves.
This essay has not examined the political aspects of the Falun
Gong experience, in part because these aspects have perhaps been
over-emphasised in much of the media attention to Falun Gong.
Instead, my goal has been to illustrate the larger contextthe qigong
boomin which Falun Gong emerged and developed in China,
suggesting implicitly that whatever has been made of Falun Gong
in the media, it was in fact in the beginning no more nor less
than one among many organised movements which attracted large
numbers of participants and earned the initially positive sanction of
the state. Fieldwork among practitioners in North America suggests
in general that the movement is largely what practitioners declare it
to be. This does not of course mean that troubled people may not
be drawn to the movement, nor even that certain groups in what
is an extremely decentralised, under-organised phenomenon might not
conceivably engage in certain abusive practices. Nor does this mean
that Falun Gong has not become extremely politicised, even if this
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