DRAFT COPY - NOT FOR RELEASE

Analysis and Projections of the

2010 NATO Kandahar Offensive

Presented by Central London Stop The War

May 31, 2010

Central London Stop the War

http://stopwarcentral.wordpress.com/

Contents:

1) Maps
2) Kandahar: Summary
3) History of Afghanistan
4) History of Kandahar
5) Invasion of Marjah
6) Role of Nato
7) International Security Assistance Force
8) Press Clippings: Corruption & Fear
9) Press Clippings: Proposed Schedule of the Offensive
10) Press Clippings: Local Reaction
11) Press Clippings: Propaganda & US Strategy
Maps & Pictures

Source: Google

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Kandahar: Summary

“The inhabitants are estimated at 500 000 and the region is known for its agricultural potential.

The economic basis of Kandahar is made up of agriculture, such as pomegranates, apple, grapes

and mango, which allows for agro-processing products. Also, cotton production plays a

substantial part in the local region. However, Kanadahar is known locally and internationally for its

handicraft, specifically the old tradition of embroidered shirts and scarves, which are already

being exported abroad. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org)1

History of Afghanistan

Early History

The Achaemenid Empire (550 B.C.E. - 330 B.C.E) marks the beginning of the recorded history of

Afghanistan. In 330 BC, Alexander the Great arrived en route to conquering Persia. The land of

Afghanistan began to be known as ‘the Central Asian Roundabout’ since routes converged from

the Tigris-Euphrates Basin via the Iranian Plateau, from India through the passes over the Hindu

Kush, from the Far East via the Tarim Basin, and from the adjacent Eurasian Steppe. Aryans

arriving in Afghanistan brought the languages Pashto and Persian, with the Middle Eastern

influence defining the culture of modern Afghanistan. Heterogeneous groups make up the

Afghan identity: Pashtuns predominant in the southern areas and Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks,

Turkmen in the north. These tribes were united in the mid-18th century by Ahmad Shah Durrani

when forming the last Afghan Empire that became the modern state of Afghanistan. In the

nineteenth century, Afghanistan was in the hands of the Russian and British empires. In 1919, the

state finally declared full independence over its foreign affairs. The attempts of King Amanullah

at reducing power from the country's religious leaders and the increasing freedom of women

provoked opposition that led to his deposition in 1929. Amanullah’s cousin King Nadir Shah took

1
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/kandahar.htm

3
over and pursued cautious modernization efforts until he was assassinated in 1933. His son

Muhammad Zahir Shah succeeded him. Afghanistan was neutral in World War II and it joined the

United Nations in 1946. When British India was partitioned in 1947, Afghanistan wanted the

Pathans of the North-West Frontier Province to be able to choose whether to join Afghanistan,

Pakistan, or be independent. The Pathans were only offered the choice of joining Pakistan or

joining India and they chose the former. In 1955, Afghanistan urged the creation of an

autonomous Pathan state, Pushtunistan (Pakhtunistan), which did not happen.

Cold War

Afghanistan was neutral until the late 1970s, receiving aid from both the United States and the

Soviet Union. In the early 1970s, the country encountered serious economic problems,

particularly a severe long-term drought in the center and north. King Muhammad Zahir Shah

mishandled the economic crisis, a group of young military officers deposed the king and

proclaimed a republic in 1973. Lt. Gen. Sardar Muhammad Daud Khan, the king's cousin,

became president and prime minister. In 1978, Daud was deposed by a group led by Noor

Mohammed Taraki, who instituted Marxist reforms and aligned the country more closely with the

Soviet Union. In Sept., 1979, Taraki was killed and Hafizullah Amin took power. Shortly

thereafter, the USSR sent troops into Afghanistan, Amin was executed, and the Soviet-supported

Babrak Karmal became president. In the late 1970s the government faced increasing popular

opposition to its social policies. By 1979 guerrilla opposition forces, popularly called mujahidin

(i.e. ‘Islamic warriors’), were active in much of the country, fighting both Soviet forces and the

Soviet-backed Afghan government. In 1986, Karmal resigned and was replaced by Mohammad

Najibullah.

Afghanistan War (1979–89) and rise of the Taliban

The country was devastated by the Afghanistan War (1979–89), which took an enormous human

and economic toll. After the Soviet withdrawal, the government steadily lost ground to the guerrilla

forces. In early 1992, Kabul was captured and the guerrilla alliance set up a new government

4
consisting of a 50-member ruling council. Burhanuddin Rabbani was named interim president.

The victorious guerrillas proved unable to unite, however, and the forces of guerrilla leader

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar launched attacks on the new government. As fighting among various

factions continued, Afghanistan was in effect divided into several independent zones, each with

its own ruler. Beginning in late 1994 a militia of Pashtun Islamic fundamentalist students, the

Taliban, emerged as an increasingly powerful force. In early 1996, as the Taliban continued its

attempt to gain control of Afghanistan, Rabbani and Hekmatyar signed a power-sharing accord

that made Hekmatyar premier. In September the Taliban captured Kabul and declared

themselves the legitimate government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan; they imposed a

particularly puritanical form of Islamic law in the two thirds of the country they controlled. In 1998

the Taliban appeared on the verge of taking over the whole country. U.S. missiles destroyed what

was described by the Pentagon as an extensive terrorist training complex near Kabul run by

Osama bin Laden, accused of masterminding the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in

Kenya and Tanzania. In 1999, a UN-brokered peace agreement was reached between the

Taliban and their major remaining foe, the forces of the Northern Alliance, led by Ahmed Shah

Massoud, an ethnic Tajik and former mujahidin leader, but fighting broke out again in July. In

November, the United Nations imposed economic sanctions on Afghanistan; this action and the

1998 U.S. missile attacks were related to the Afghani refusal to turn over bin Laden.

Year 2000 and onwards

Additional UN sanctions, including a ban on arms sales to Taliban forces, were imposed in

December 2000. The Taliban controlled some 90% of the country, but their government was not

generally recognized by the international community (the United Nations recognized President

Burhanuddin Rabbani and the Northern Alliance). Continued warfare had caused over a million

deaths, while 3 million Afghans remained in Pakistan and Iran as refugees. Adding to the nation's

woe, a drought in West and Central Asia that began in the late 1990s was most severe in

Afghanistan. In early 2001 the Taliban militia destroyed all statues in the nation, including two

ancient giant Buddhas in Bamian, outside Kabul. The destruction was ordered by religious

5
leaders, who regarded the figures as idolatrous and un-Islamic; the action was met with

widespread international dismay and condemnation, even from other Islamic nations. In

September, in a severe blow to the Northern Alliance, Massoud died as a result of a suicide bomb

attack by assassins posing as Arab journalists. Two days after that attack, devastating terrorist

assaults on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon prompted new demands by U.S. President

Bush for the arrest of Osama bin Laden. When the Taliban refused to hand bin Laden over, the

United States launched in October of 2001 attacks against Taliban and Al Qaeda positions and

forces. The United States also began providing financial aid and other assistance to the Northern

Alliance and other opposition groups. Assisted by U.S. air strikes, opposition forces ousted

Taliban and Al Qaeda forces from Afghanistan's major urban areas in November and December,

often aided by the defection of forces allied with the Taliban. Several thousand U.S. troops began

entering the country in November, mainly to concentrate on the search for bin Laden and Taliban

leader Mullah Muhammad Omar and to deal with the remaining pockets of their forces.

Hamid Karzai

In early December a pan-Afghan conference in Bonn, Germany, appointed Hamid Karzai, a

Pashtun with ties to the former king, as the nation's interim leader, replacing President Rabbani.

By January 2002, the Taliban and Al Qaeda were largely defeated, although most of their leaders

and unknown numbers of their forces remained at large. Fighting continued on a sporadic basis,

with occasional real battles, as occurred near Gardez in March 2002. The country itself largely

reverted to the control of the regional warlords who held power before the Taliban. Britain,

Canada, and other NATO nations provided forces for various military, peacekeeping, and

humanitarian operations. Many other nations also agreed to contribute humanitarian aid; the

United Nations estimated that $15 billion would be needed over the next 10 years to rebuild

Afghanistan. The former king, Muhammad Zahir Shah, returned to the country from exile to

convene in June 2002 a loya jirga (a traditional Afghan grand council) to establish a transitional

government. Karzai was elected president (for a two-year term), and the king was declared the

“father of the nation.” That Karzai and his cabinet faced many challenges was confirmed violently

6
in the following months when one of his vice presidents was assassinated and an attempt was

made on Karzai's life. Nonetheless, by the end of 2002 the country had achieved a measure of

stability. Sporadic, generally small-scale fighting with various guerrillas has continued,

particularly in the southeast, with the Taliban regaining some strength and even control in certain

districts. There was fighting between rival factions in various parts of the country. Reconstruction

has proceeded slowly, and central governmental control outside Kabul remained almost

nonexistent. A return to economic health also was hindered by a persistent drought that

continued through 2004.

NATO

In August 2003 NATO assumed command of the international security force in the Kabul area. A

new constitution was approved in January 2004 by a loya jirga. It provides for a strong executive

presidency and contains some concessions to minorities, but tensions between the dominant

Pashtuns and other ethnic groups were evident during the loya jirga. In early 2004 the United

States and NATO both announced increases in the number of troops deployed in the country.

The U.S. move coincided with new operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, while the NATO

forces were slated to be used to provide security and in reconstruction efforts. By mid-2004 little

of the aid that the United Nations had estimated the country would need had reached

Afghanistan, while a new, Afghani-proposed development plan called for $28.5 billion over seven

years. Although foreign nations pledged to provide substantial monies for three years, sufficient

forces and funding for Afghan security were not included. Karzai was elected to the presidency in

October 2004 in the country's first democratic elections. The vote, which generally split along

ethnic lines, was peaceful, but it was marred by minor difficulties. Several losing candidates

accused Karzai of fraud, but an international review panel said the irregularities that had occurred

were not significant enough to have affected the outcome. Karzai's new cabinet consisted largely

of technocrats and was ethnically balanced, although Pashtuns generally held the more important

posts. The spring of 2005 was marked by an increase in attacks by the Taliban and their allies.

Reports of the possible desecration of the Qur'an by U.S. interregators at Guantanamo, when

7
Afghan prisoners were held by the United States, provoked protests and riots in a number of

Afghan cities and towns in May, 2005. The protests were largely in the country's south and east,

where U.S. forces were operating, and were believed to reflect frustration with the U.S. presence

there as much as anger over the alleged desecration. National and provincial legislative elections

were held in September 2005, in some locales the balloting was marred by fraud. Supporters of

Karzai won a substantial number of seats in the lower house (Wolesi Jirga); religious

conservatives, former mujahidin and Taliban, women, and Pashtuns (which are overlapping

groups) were all elected in significant numbers to the body. Tensions with Pakistan increased in

early 2006, as members of the Afghan government increasingly accused Pakistan of failing to

control Taliban and Al Qaeda camps in areas bordering Afghanistan; by the end of the year

President Karzai had accused elements of the Pakistani government of directly supporting the

Taliban.

2006-2010

In January, 2006, a U.S. airstrike destroyed several houses in East Pakistan where Al Qaeda

leaders were believed to be meeting. May, 2006, saw the U.S.-led coalition launch its largest

campaign against Taliban forces since 2001; some 11,000 troops undertook a summer offensive

in four South Afghan provinces, where the Taliban had become increasingly stronger and

entrenched. Also in May a deadly traffic accident in Kabul involving a U.S. convoy sparked anti-

American and antigovernment demonstrations and riots in the city. In July, NATO assumed

responsibility for peacekeeping in Southern Afghanistan, taking over from the coalition. NATO

troops subsequently found themselves engaged in significant battles with the Taliban, particularly

in Kandahar province. NATO took command of all peacekeeping forces in the country, including

some 11,000 U.S. troops, in October; some 8,000 U.S. troops remained part of Operation

Enduring Freedom, assigned to fighting Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in mountainous areas

bordering Pakistan. In the second half of 2006, as casualties mounted, NATO commanders

encountered difficulties when their call for reinforcements failed to raise the necessary number of

troops and matériel. NATO leaders also joined Afghan leaders in criticizing Pakistan for failing to

8
end the Taliban's use of areas bordering Afghanistan, especially in Baluchistan, as safe havens.

In March 2007, NATO forces launched a new offensive in Helmand province against the Taliban

and Al Qaeda. The same month the National Assembly passed a law granting many Afghans

amnesty for human-rights violations committed during the past two-and-a-half decades of civil

war. In the spring of 2007, Pakistan's construction of a fence along the border with Afghanistan

led to protests from Afghanistan, and sparked several border clashes between the forces of the

two countries. (Afghanistan does not officially recognize the modern Pakistan-Afghanistan

border.) In May NATO forces killed the top Taliban field commander, Mullah Dadullah, but

Taliban forces mounted some guerrilla attacks on the outskirts of the capital and in the north

during 2007. Significant, if sporadic, fighting with insurgents continued into 2008. Also in 2007,

Afghan civilian casualties during military operations became a source of anger and concern

among Afghans, and those concerns also continued into 2008. In April 2008, President Karzai

escaped an assassination attempt unhurt. In July, Karzai accused Pakistani agents of being

behind insurgent attacks in Afghanistan, among them a suicide bombing of the Indian embassy in

Kabul. Although the majority of the Afghan refugees abroad have repatriated since the overthrow

of the Taliban, at the beginning of 2007 it was estimated that some 2.1 million Afghanis were still

refugees, with most of those in Pakistan and Iran. Afghanistan continues to suffer from a weak

central government and weak economy, which have exacerbated the insurgency and led to an

increase in illegal drug production. The weak government contributed to shortfalls in international

development aid to Afghanistan. By early 2008, some $25 billion had been pledged, and three

fifths of that actually spent. The effectiveness of the aid was greatly reduced by government

corruption, spending on foreign consultants and companies (sometimes required under the terms

of the aid), wasteful spending practices, and sharp imbalances nationally in the distribution of the

aid.

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History of Kandahar

“…during the height of the Cold War, when the former Soviet Union and the United

States were vying for influence in Afghanistan. Kandahar was the scene of the fiercest fighting in

any Afghan city. Virtually every night of 1984-85 saw fighting in and around the city, and the

inhabitants were subjected to almost daily bombing and strafing by Soviet helicopters from the

nearby base, as well as arbitrary arrests and frequent ground combat between Afghan forces and

the guerrillas. Terrence White of the Far Eastern Economic Review spent almost a month in

Qandahar in the 1980s and reported that the guerrillas enjoyed remarkable freedom of movement

in the city. (GlobalSecurity.org)2

The region around Kandahar is one of the oldest human settlements known to man. Early

peasant farming villages came into existence in Afghanistan circa 5000 B.C. Kandahar was

founded in 330 BC by Alexander the Great. Today, following 30 years of destruction and lack of

development, Kandahar is going through a reconstruction period. New modern-style buildings are

slowly replacing the older ones. Major highways were repaired and completed including the

highway to Kabul. Kandahar's residents have access to clean drinking water and 24 hour

electricity. Although not every part of the city may receive it, plans and works are underway to

extend these services to every home. Up to 20,000 single-family homes and associated

infrastructure of roads, water and sewer systems, and community buildings, including schools,

are under construction on empty land in Kandahar.

2
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/kandahar.htm

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The Invasion of Marjah

In February 2010, thousands of US marines pushed into Marjah, a rural Afghan town, in “a

media-friendly invasion of a sparsely populated farming community sold as the “test” for the
3
Kandahar strategy “ . U.S. and Afghan forces ringed the Taliban stronghold of Marjah and

sealed off escape routes. They set the stage for what went on to be described as the biggest

offensive of the nine-year war. NATO officials stated that the goal was to seize the town quickly

and re-establish Afghan government authority, bringing public services in hopes of winning

support of the townspeople once the Taliban were gone.

The Marjah invasion only partially succeeded in clearing insurgents from their strongholds. Afgan

officials admitted that the Taliban have retaken the momentum in the city, killing and beating

those that they believe have sided with the Americans. A Taliban spokesman dismissed the

significance of Marjah, saying the NATO operation was "more propaganda than military

necessity."

Marjah, located in Helmand province, was one of the last areas of Afganistan that the NATO and

US troops had not penetrated prior to February 2010. Marjah has been an opium-growing

paradise in the Helmand River valley where the Taliban reign of fear has created one of southern

Afghanistan’s most notorious insurgent dens. Populated by Pashtun tribes, residents are poor

farm labourers or jobless in an area devoid of development since the 2001 US-led invasion. The

Taliban work in tandem with drug traffickers to force local people to grow poppies. The Taliban

presence increased after US Marines flushed them out of other parts of Helmand more than two

years ago.

3
http://news.antiwar.com/2010/04/25/afghans-may-block-nato-offensive-in-kandahar-over-civilian-deaths/

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Shortages of food and medicine have been reported in Marjah. The international Red Cross

evacuates dozens of sick and injured civilians to clinics outside the area. The U.N. says more

than 3,700 families, or an estimated 22,000 people, from Marjah and surrounding areas have

registered in Helmand’s capital of Lashkar Gah 30 kilometers away. A signifiant number of civilian

casualties have also been reported, with the Afghan troops accusing the Taliban of using civilians

as human shields.

After the invasion of Marjah, Afghans are bracing for a bigger, more comprehensive assault in

neighboring Kandahar province. Kandahar is the birthplace of the Taliban. Officials are talking to

aid organizations about how to handle up to 10,000 people who could be displaced by fighting.

Kandahar is considered militarily, politically and culturally more complex than Marjah. Marjah is a

smal town with widespread rural areas, whereas Kandahar is a proper city with a dens population

making it likely that the number of casualties will be much higher in Kandahar than Marjah.

Sources:

‘Afghans Wary as NATO Rebrands Kandahar Process’, Reurters, 8th May 2010

‘Kandahar braces itself for a bloody summer offensive’ The Guardian, 11th May 2010

‘Marjah battle: Gunfire between Marines, Taliban Foreshadows Major Afganistan Fight’, The

Huffington post, 19th May 2010

‘U.S. Marines, Afghan troops clear last pockets of resistance in Marjah’, Japan Today, 28th

February 2010

‘The Lying Language of Occupation: Murdered Civilians in Marjah are Human Beings, not Human

Shileds’, The World Can’t Wait, 15th February 2010

‘Afghans may block NATO offensive in Kandahar’, All Voices, 27th April 2010

12
The Role of NATO

Nato expects to do some of its heaviest fighting in Kandahar this summer. The Nato-led

operation that is to be launched in Kandahar, the home of the Taliban, in June aims at

freeing the city of Taliban forces before the Holy month of Ramadan.The joint Afghan-Nato

campaign in Kandahar, kwon as Hamkari (meaning co-operation in Dari) will be

predominantly led by US forces with Canadian support, with the British holding their current

role in Helmand.

The operation titled as the Kandahar Offensive will involve at least 23,000 Nato and

Afghan troops. The operation will come at a time when Nato will have the maximum troop

numbers due to the recent US troop surge.

Nato claims that the aim of the operation is to solve the area’s political and socia l

problems. Nato offic ials say that the operation will protect the population of Kandahar and

change the political culture and perceptions of people residing there. Nato has justifies the

offensive with claims that the biggest problem of Afganistan is not the Taliban but a lack of

strong governance and the delivery of services.

Nato intends to create ‘a ring of security’ around Kandahar to replace ‘the fear and panic’

that the Taliban is creating. Nato officials play down the possibility of heavy fighting in the

city.

94% of people living in Kandahar don’t want NATO to start a new operation. [according to

who?] The collapse in security and increase in US military patrols have frightened locals

who used to regard the city as a sanctuary from more dangerous outlying districts. ‘’The

people only want peace and security; they don’t care if its provided by Isaf or the

Taliban’’said Haji Abdul Haq, a tribal elder from Arghandab district.

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Foreign officials worry that operation in surrounding districts will displace fighters into the

city itself. Urban warfare on the streets of Kandahar is a disaster for the Nato strategy of

trying to create security in areas where the population is most dense. A senior Nato officia l

has admitted that street to street fighting is a possibility.

Nato was hoping that public ising the operation well in advance will encourage Taliban

fighters to withdraw. Rather, this has given time for the Taliban prepare bombs and mines,

whilst terrifying the people living in Kandahar.

Sources:

‘Kandahar braces itself for a bloody summer offensive’ The Guardian, 11th May 2010

‘Afghan Offensive in Kandahar due in June, offic ials say’, BBC, 19th March, 2010

‘Afghans Wary as NATO Rebrands Kandahar Process’, Reurters, 8th May 2010

‘Nato Offensive aims to tackle bribery and corruption in Kandahar’ The Guardian 18th April

2010

International Security Assistance Force

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is a Nato-led mission in Afganistan. It

was established by the United Nations Security Council in 2001 and supported by the Bonn

Agreement. The initial objective of ISAF was to secure Kabul and its surrounding areas

from the Taliban. The troops of ISAF number around 55,100, with military personnel from

26 Nato countries, 10 partner countries and 2 non-Nato and non-partner countries. These

countries include: Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany,

the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Turkey, Poland and most members of the European

14
Union and NATO also inc luding Australia, New Zealand, Azerbaijan and Singapore.

ISAF soon expanded the area it worked on and the number of its teams began growing. The

expansion of ISAF, during October 2006, to all provinces of the country brought the total

number of teams to twenty-four. The teams are led by different members of the NATO-ISAF

mission.

ISAF will participate in the Kandahar Offensive in the summer. They are likely to provide

thousands of troops that fight alongside the Afgan army. In fact, joint operation between the

two armies are already underway as they target militants in Kandahar.

Sources:

www.wikipedia.org

http://www.isaf.nato.int/

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Press Clippings: Corruption & Fear

“…Ahmed Wali Karzai, the Afghan president’s brother and head of the Kandahar

provincial council, whose suspected links with drug dealers and insurgents have prompted some

Western officials to say that corruption and governance problems have led locals to be more
4
accepting of the Taliban. (The New York Times)

“If we speak out and if we tell you the truth of what’s happening here, we will not last the

night,” said one elder. “We will be assassinated. Everyone is scared.” --On the corruption of

government officials, said during a shura with Afghan President Hamid Karzai (The Times of
5
London)

“….The operation, involving at least 23,000 NATO and Afghan troops, is the central

objective of U.S. and NATO commander General Stanley McChrystal's counter-insurgency plan

to turn the tide using reinforcements pledged by Obama in December… Ominously, there has

been a surge in attacks and political assassinations in Kandahar city recently. Residents fear

more bloodshed as some 10,000 troops move into their neighborhoods. Most of the troops will

stay in rural areas trying to cut off access routes into the city while a 3,500-strong U.S. army

brigade will aim to push into Kandahar city, accompanied by almost 7,000 Afghan police.

(Reuters) 6

“…30,000 U.S. reinforcements President Barack Obama dispatched to the war head to

the country. About 4,500 have deployed, with another 18,000 due to arrive by late spring and the
7
rest by early fall. (AP)

4
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/world/asia/26kandahar.html?ref=world
5
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7094217.ece
6
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6464HS20100507
7
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hvWEqwq3CrRvaQCmt21MfoYhjZJQD9FIPGGG0

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Press Clippings: Proposed Schedule of the Offensive

“…military officials warn that securing the city could take months. Military commanders

say their goal is to show concrete results by late summer or early fall, in advance of Ramadan

and national parliamentary elections” (New York Times)8

“…Nato’s plans envisage political manoeuvres, from a purge of provincial leadership to

the creation of precinct councils, to tackle the roots of the Taliban rebellion. The aim is to wrest

power from so-called warlords — including the president’s own brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai.”

(Source: The Times of London) 9

“…As the military pace increases, the centerpiece of the offensive’s political effort will be

a series of “shuras” — Afghan-style town hall meetings between tribal leaders and government

officials to try to convince locals that they will get a better deal from the government than from

Taliban administration. The aim of the shuras, said Mark Sedwill, the senior NATO civilian in

Afghanistan, will be “firstly to get their support for security operations to go ahead, and secondly,

to identify their needs for security, governance and development.” Source: New York Times 10

Press Clippings: Local Reaction

“….many locals view Afghan and NATO checkpoints and convoys as great a danger on

the roads as Taliban bombs and checkpoints….“Instead of bringing people close to the

government,” cautioned Haji Mukhtar, a Kandahar Provincial Council member, more combat “will

8
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/world/asia/26kandahar.html?ref=world
9
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7094217.ece
10
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/world/asia/26kandahar.html

17
cause people to stay further from the government and hate the foreigners more.” (New York

Times) 11

“….At a popular coffee shop in the city centre, Khaled, a medical student from Kabul, said

the influence of the Taliban was creeping back into the area. “A Nato offensive here will not

help,” he added. “We know what they do. They arrive in great numbers and provide security for

two weeks and then they go and the insecurity returns.”” (The Times) 12

“….Others say that nothing will change until a solution is found for Kandahar's underlying

problems of official corruption and tribes who feel excluded from power, which they say is

controlled by a small oligarchy of businessmen-politicians. Several Kandaharis I interviewed saw

the Taliban insurgency in terms of rivalry between members of the largely excluded Gilzai tribe,

which has always been heavily represented within the Taliban, and the traditional elite Durrani

tribe to which Hamid Karzai belongs.” (The Guardian) 13

“…Mohammad Karim, a farmer from Ashgo, said: "The Taliban publicly executed a man

in our village by hanging him from a tree and then shooting him. He was accused of passing

information to the foreigners. Both sides are creating problems for us and we try to remain

neutral." (The Guardian) 14

“…Haji Abdul Haq, a tribal elder from Arghandab district, said people in his area were

only interested in avoiding the fight. "The people only want peace and security; they don't care if

it's provided by Isaf [the international security assistance force led by Nato] or the Taliban," he

said. (The Guardian) 15

11 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/world/asia/26kandahar.html
12
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7094217.ece
13
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/09/afghanistan-taliban-nato-kandahar-fighting
14
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/09/afghanistan-taliban-nato-kandahar-fighting
15
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/09/afghanistan-taliban-nato-kandahar-fighting

18
 “…"We are just in absolute despair," said one man from Arghandab district who had

come into the city to shop. "People used to move their families into the city when there was

fighting in the districts, but now that's not safe either. We really don't know where to go." (The
16
Guardian)

“…Despite the dire state of security in the city and its surrounding areas, there is

widespread opposition among locals to a major military offensive, which, like the February

operation in Marjah, has been well publicised in advance. (The Guardian) 17

“…U.S. soldiers from a Stryker Brigade set up a checkpoint outside Moshak village, a

Taliban "frontline," on a recent patrol in Maiwand district, west of Kandahar city. "What do the

Taliban say to you?" U.S. Captain Drew Schaub asked a man on a motorcycle. "They ask the

same things as you: 'What do you do? Where are you going?'," replied the man, who did not want

to be named for fear of Taliban retribution. "After you leave, at night, the Taliban will come and

set up their own checkpoint, accusing us of being spies for the Americans," he said. (Reuters) 18

Press Clippings: Propaganda & US Strategy

“…"We don't know if this operation brings any advantages, but something we know for

sure is innocent people will be killed, harmed and displaced," said Kaka Shirin, a Kandahar

shopkeeper. Commanders are playing down the possibility of heavy fighting in the city, stressing

the political aims of extending the reach of the Afghan state into an area of growing Taliban

influence. Even the language adopted by military officials has changed, with words like

"operation" or "offensive" no longer used. "We would like to call it a process that is

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http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/09/afghanistan-taliban-nato-kandahar-fighting
17
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/09/afghanistan-taliban-nato-kandahar-fighting
18
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6464HS20100507

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encompassing military and non-military instruments," Brigadier General Josef Blotz, the

spokesman for NATO forces, told reporters this week. (Reuters) 19

“…In Pakistan on Saturday, a spokesman for the Taliban claimed they were set to launch

new attacks and had dispatched suicide bombers to the United States. Azam Tariq, a spokesman

for the Pakistani Taliban, told The Associated Press that the attacks would avenge U.S. drone

bombings in tribal areas close to the Afghan border. (AP) 20

“….Progress in Afghanistan has been slower than the Obama administration had

expected, undermining the US timetable for the transfer of responsibility for security to Afghan

forces and allowing withdrawal of US troops to begin. US officials predict a large American and

Nato military presence in the country for a long time after July next year. David Sedney, a US

deputy assistant secretary of defence, told the Senate foreign relations committee this month that

there were not nearly enough trained Afghan forces to take over Taliban-controlled areas such as

Marja, in Helmand, even after it was cleared by Nato forces. (Guardian) 21

19
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6464HS20100507
20
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hvWEqwq3CrRvaQCmt21MfoYhjZJQD9FIPGGG0
21
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/11/afghanistan-hamid-karzai-hillary-clinton

20
 This summer, twenty-three thousand NATO and
Afghan troops will descend onto the city of
Kandahar to fight Taliban Forces.
Central London Stop the War urges you to
oppose this operation.
Listen to what people in Kandahar are saying:

Khaled, a medical student: “A Nato offensive here will not help. We know what
they do. They arrive in great numbers and provide security for two weeks and
then they go and the insecurity returns.” (The Sunday Times)

Kaka Shirin, a Kandahar shopkeeper: "We don't know if this operation brings any
advantages, but something we know for sure is innocent people will be killed,
harmed and displaced” (Reuters)

“We are just in absolute despair. People used to move their families into the city
when there was fighting in the districts, but now that's not safe either. We really
don't know where to go." (The Guardian)

“If we speak out and if we tell you the truth of what’s happening here, we will not
last the night. We will be assassinated. Everyone is scared.” (The Sunday
Times)

Five ways you can help

stop the war in Afghanistan:
1) Speak up. Let it be known you oppose the war.

2) Take a position. Ask yourself what you believe in.

3) Support military families of the UK armed services. Outside of

Afghanistan, they will bear the brunt of this war.

4) Get educated. Take the time to find out what is really happening.

5) Participate with groups such as Central London Stop the War.

Central London Stop the War

http://stopwarcentral.wordpress.com/

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