Hpsacp Datta

Heidelberg Papers
in South Asian
and Comparative Politics
Democratic Decentralization through

Panchayati Raj in Contemporary India: The
Changes and Challenges
by
Prabhat Datta
Working Paper No. 49

September 2009
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Prabhat Datta
Democratic Decentralization through

Panchayati Raj in Contemporary India: The
Changes and Challenges.1
Prabhat Datta2
Keywords: Panchayati Raj, Decentralization, Economic Development
ABSTRACT:
This paper seeks to make a critical review of the current status of the
constitionalised panchayati raj institutions (PRIs) in India as institutions of self
government and as instruments of planning for economic development and social
justice in the light of empirical evidence collected by the researchers and critical
analysis of the some of the actions of state . The background of the rise of the "new"
panchayat system has been narrated in a nut shell to enable the readers to have an
idea of the conceptual and institutional framework of the panchayat system Keeping
the central objective in mind the article focuses on the challenges faced by the third
generation PRIs in India from within and without and attempts to make an
assessment about the future of these institutions. Reference has been made to the
experience of some of the states in order to support the comments and observations.
The article argues that despite the constitutional amendment to regenerate the PRIs
there is still lack of genuine and strong political interest and bureaucratic support
to fuel the institutions. These have been manifested in the actions of the state after
the constitution has been amended. The traditional factors rooted in the socioeconomic structure and political dynamics of the rural society continue to plague
the working of these democratic institutions. It has been contended that there is
need for another round of constitutional amendment coupled with continuous
political and administrative support to ensure steady growth of the PRIs. The
author finds a ray of hope in the rise of civil society organizations which have
started acting as watchdogs in some of the states. They are working not only for
generating awareness among the stakeholders but also for organizing the villagers
to assert their rights and in this respect, the right to information has come as great
boon.
I would like to acknowledge that the comments on the paper by the anonymous referee
have been very useful in re-organising some sections of the paper. Thanks are due to the
members of the Faculty of the Department of Political Science, South Asia Institute,
Heidelberg University for their comments and observations on the presentation I made in
the Institute. I have immensely benefited from the suggestions I received from the editors.
2
The author can be contacted at [email protected]
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Working Paper No. 49, September 2009
Prabhat Datta
INTRODUCTION
The idea of decentralisation is to a certain extent embedded in the democratic ideal
as applied to political organisation. It is a contrivance of human wisdom in order to
promote the democratic ideal. Democracy as a form of political organisation may
be viewed as an attempt at the right ordering of peoples partnership not merely in
the sovereign power of the state but also in the day-to-day working of government.
As J.S.Mill says, the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of
the social state is one in which the whole people participate.
THE RISE OF THE PANCHAYATI RAJ IN POST-COLONIAL INDIA:

THE FIRST AND SECOND GENERATIONS OF PANCHAYATI RAJ
Panchayati raj as a concrete form of democratic decentralisation in rural India, is a
creation of the colonial rulers. The birth of PRIs (Panchayati Raj Institutions) in
independent India, however, owes its origin to the Balvantrai Mehta Committee
Report. The Committee stressed the need to develop a network of three-tiered
elective institutions known as the panchayati raj and gave birth to what can be
called the first generation panchayati raj in India.3 Outlining the concept, the report
observes that PRIs would be representative bodies and vigorous democratic
institutions in order to take charge of all aspects of development work in the
villages. The committee proposed a model of panchayati raj with three tiers
Gram Panchayat at the base, Panchayat Samiti at the intermediate block level and
Zilla Parishad at the apex.
The first generation PRIs encountered potent and widespread distrust from
their very inception. The bureaucracy could not agree to share power with people
but had to accept the panchayati raj system because of the existing political support
for it. The process of bureaucratization gained considerable ground in the 1960s
and more focus was given to production oriented programmes to meet the
increasing demand for food which increased the hold of the bureaucracy and in the
process, the PRIs were bypassed.
Added to this, was a growing centralisation of the Indian polity which reached
its culmination during the days of emergency. The lack of constitutional sanction
and conceptual clarity about the role of PRIs made it possible for policy makers to
accept it either as an agent of government or as institutions of self-government.
This paved the road towards the slow decline of the system and by the end of the
1960s, the PR (Panchayati Raj) system was moribund throughout the country.
The Asok Mehta Committee, which examined the issue in 1978, prepared a blue
print for the second generation panchayats. Having departed from the constitutional
model, the second Mehta Committee conceptualized PRIs as instruments of rural
development. It regarded the revenue district as the first point of decentralization
below the state level and recommended two- tiered PRIs. Only four states namely,
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and West Bengal, began to try out the system
but political changes in all the states except West Bengal stood in the way.
The progress was so slow that the Indian State had to amend the Constitution in
1992 to revitalize the system of Panchayati Raj. Political exigencies seemed to
have played a major role when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi started taking about
the regeneration of Panchayati Raj. In the 1970s and 1980s the nation witnessed a
series of movements across the country (e.g. militant movements in Punjab, the
3
Prabhat Datta (1998) Major Issues in the Development Debate, New Delhi : Kanishka, pp
14-19
Prabhat Datta
Gorkhaland movement in West Bengal, the Jharkhand movement etc.) based on
primordial loyalties like religion, ethnicity, language. It was difficult for the state
governments to handle the issues efficiently, bringing the republic under great
stress. It was then realised that power had to be shared with local communities. The
autonomous local level of self-government was considered to be a safety valve,
capable of preventing the recurrence of such incidents. The Constitution was
therefore amended in 1992 to lay the foundation stone of the third generation of the
Panchayati Raj in India.
RURAL INDIA: SOME BASIC FACTS

Before we analyze the dynamics of how PRIs function in India, it is useful to have
a quick look at the rural, socio-economic scene for, as Gandhiji used to say, India
lives in villages. This is true for India even today despite the second wave of
urbanization which in this new millennium has been fast spreading across
developing countries. India continues to be one of the least urbanized countries in
the world for a little more than 70 per cent of the total population still lives in
villages.
The rural economy of India continues to account for 49 per cent of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). Agriculture is the mainstay of the rural economy and
cultivation of land is conditioned by the varied geo-physical conditions of the
country. Land being the basic asset, a rural Indian without land is reduced to the
status of a seasonal labourer, working and harvesting the lands of others. Land
distribution continues to be very much skewed. The top 5.2 per cent of the rural
households today own 42.8 per cent of the area, and the top 9.5 per cent own 56.6
per cent of the area. The remaining 90.5 per cent of the rural households own just
43.4 per cent of the area. Among them, is 41 .6 per cent of the rural households
who own no land other than their homestead land (10 per cent do not even have
homestead land.)4
It needs to be kept in mind that the socio-economic structure of rural India
varies from region to region, the cause for which lies embedded in colonial rule.
During the colonial period government policy with regard to land settlement and
the extent of commercial penetration in the agrarian economy differed from region
to region depending on various considerations such as the extraction of raw
materials, mobilization of revenues, defence etc. The eastern states were major
contributors to the British exchequer. This extraction of revenue was facilitated by
a large band of revenue collectors who later on became the absentee landlords. The
zamindari system of land tenure was introduced throughout the eastern states. This
led to sub-infeudation and the growth of a parasite class of landlords, merchants
and moneylenders. In contrast, the western region comprising present-day Punjab,
Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and coastal Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu had a tenurial
system based on peasant proprietorship which was conducive to personal initiative
and entrepreneurship.
The Green Revolution added a new dimension to the rural socio-economic
scenario by increasing the degree of inequality between perennially irrigated
regions and those depended mainly on rainfall for cultivation. However, this
benefited the upper middle and richer sections more than the middle and poorer
sections as they have lands. Consequently, socio-economic inequalities have been
4
Vikas Rawal, "Aspects of India's Economy" ,EPW ,No.44-46, 2008
Prabhat Datta
steadily increasing. About two thirds of India's more than one billion people live in
rural areas and almost 170 million of them are poor. Three out of 4 India's rural
poor live in large rural areas and for more than 20 per cent of them poverty is a
chronic condition.
A class of rich peasant is today consolidating itself in different states, thanks
to the support of the state. The technological and infrastructural modernization of
rural India in terms of electrification, provision of artificial irrigation, chemical
inputs, setting up of agricultural and other co-operatives and marketing institutions,
and extensive development of rural banks has meant a consolidation of the rural
rich. This land-based class captures the major benefits of the development
programmes initiated by the state and exercises social and political domination
over the villages through their economic clout and through pre-capitalist
institutions like caste coupled with the tradition of domination.
Almost 50 per cent of the farming households are indebted as per the 59th
round data of the National Sample Survey Organization. Nearly half of rural
households are landless. In 1999-2000 almost 77 per cent of the rural people ate
less than the international daily minimum of 2100 kilo calorie.
The introduction of the first generation grassroots democratic institutions in
this kind of social structure failed to bring about any noticeable change in the life
of the large mass of rural population, as they were captured by the landed gentry
and high caste people. As expected the institutions fell easy prey to the dominant
power groups in the class-caste divided society wherever they worked and
remained dormant in most of the states.
THE THIRD GENERATION PANCHAYATS IN INDIA

The 1992 Constitutional amendment seeks to give panchayats a new meaning and a
fresh lease of life. The basic features of the amendment are as follows:
1. Article 243G defines panchayats as institutions of self-government
meaning that they have the autonomy and power to govern in an exclusive
area of jurisdiction.
2. The amendment defines the role of panchayats as instruments of economic
development and social justice. Incidentally, earlier there was confusion
about the role of panchayats. Thus this clarification through constitutional
amendment is significant.
3. The amendment requires States to hold panchayat elections through the
State Election Commission at regular intervals of five years. If a State
Government dissolves a panchayat before the expiry of its full term, it is
mandatory on the part of the State Government concerned, to hold election
within six months from the date of dissolution.
4. The Act provides for the reservation of one-third seats and posts of
chairpersons for women and weaker sections, i.e., Scheduled Caste (SC)
Scheduled Tribe ( ST).
5. According to the provisions of the Constitutional amendment the State
Government shall constitute State Finance Commission, which will review
the financial position and recommend the principles for fund devolution on
PRIs and the distribution of funds between the State Government and the
PRIs.
Prabhat Datta
CHALLENGES TO THE THIRD GENERATION PANCHAYATI RAJ IN

INDIA.
The MP Local Area Development (MPLAD) Scheme
Under this scheme a sum of Rs. 1,580 crores per year is placed at the disposal of
the MPs. The MPs are allowed to spend the money to undertake local area
development schemes outside the purview of panchayats and municipalities. In this
way the constitutionally mandated local government institutions are
bypassed.Under the scheme each MP can suggest to the District Collector works
worth up to Rs. 2 crores in a year. The Ministry releases the funds directly to the
Collectors who get the works done on the advice of the concerned MP.
The Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (2001) showed that the
scheme was plagued not only by the inadequacy of funds but also by the increasing
underutilization, misuse and diversion of money earmarked for the project. Most of
the plans undertaken form part of the 11th and 12th Schedules incorporated in the
73rd and 74th Amendments of the Constitution which clearly refer to the functions
that are to be transferred to the local bodies. The Report noted that out of Rs. 5018
crores only Rs. 3221 i.e. 64 per cent of the released amount could be spent. Also,
the release of funds was not linked to their end-use, with utilization certificates
being received for only 29.78% of the projects taken up and completed by the
implementing agency. While during 1993- 97, 89% of the work sanctioned by the
collector was taken up, only 56.13% of it could actually be completed. The
corresponding percentages further declined to 86.41% and 39.42% respectively
during 1997- 2000. This was due to the fact that the Ministry often released funds
without any co-relation with the end use and it did not insist on the utilization
certificates from the implementing agencies.
Similarly, the findings of the sample study of audit in 106 constituencies
found that out of total expenditure of Rs.265 crores reported by the Collectors, a
sum of Rs. 82 crores, that is, 31 per cent of the total money was, in fact, not spent
at all. The guidelines seem to have been observed more in their breach. In
Nagaland, for example, the money was spent for building roads connecting the
Church, in Orissa temples were built, in Madhya Pradesh money was spent for
building housing complex for the police officials.5
The Centre for Budget and Governance (CBGA), 2004 in its report titled The
Rhetoric and Reality of MPLADS reviews the working of the said scheme in seven
constituencies spread across six Indian states- Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat,
Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand and Orissa. The report holds the members of both the
houses of Indian Parliament responsible for the underutilization of funds. While
Lok Sabha members (till 2003) have used only 77% of their total entitlement, the
amount used by the Rajya Sabha members has not exceeded 50%. The report also
studied the schemes beneficiaries across six states. The overall picture that
emerges is that a lions share of the MPLAD funds is spent in a top- down manner
without taking into consideration peoples actual needs. Beneficiaries also alleged
that they were paid much less than the specified minimum wages in employment
Era Sezhiyan (2002) Development Directions, Frontline, March, 15.

Purnima S.Tripathi (2004), "The Case Against MPLADS" Frontline, November 5
Prabhat Datta
works under the scheme and an overwhelming number (62%) agreed that the
quality of assets created was either bad or very bad.
Even in the face of widespread public criticism of the administrative and
financial mismanagement of funds under MPLADS, continued recommendations
for the abolition of MPLADS even by the Administrative Reforms Committee
(ARC) in its successive reports have failed to produce any positive impact. As
most of the MPs openly expressed their unwillingness on the floor of the
Parliament to give up the scheme, it was finally decided to continue the scheme but
with new and stringent safeguards. As a result, a set of new guidelines was framed
in the middle of November, 2005. Several legal and constitutional experts have
dubbed the new Guidelines as unconstitutional on the ground that they defy and
distort some of the basic features of the constitution such as public audit. For
instance, the attempt to do away with a CAG (Comptroller and Auditor General
)audit of the scheme accounts, as stated in the guidelines, is actually an attempt to
disempower the Parliament in exercising control over public expenditure.
Moreover, the list of permissible works under the scheme still contains items such
as roads, sanitation, drinking water, education and public health that form a part of
the Eleventh and Twelfth schedules of the constitution meant for the PRIs.6
Legislative Inadequacies and Absence of Enabling Rules and Orders

Although the Seventy Third Amendment of the constitution aims primarily at
offering certainty, continuity and strength to the panchayats, inadequacies in the
drafting of legislation have created only a set of paper laws for them. In most of the
cases the laws fail to reflect the spirit of the CAA (Constitutional Amendment Act)
and even where they do, they cannot be effectively implemented for want of
enabling rules and orders. The main lacuna of the CAA, however, is that instead of
clearly specifying the powers and functions of the panchayats, it has left it to the
whim of state governments. It is clearly evident in Article 243(G) which states that
the state legislature may, by law, endow panchayats with such powers and
authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self
government. The repeated usage of the word may in the article fails to make it
mandatory on the part of the state government to implement these provisions, thus
leaving power-sharing with the state government solely at the disposal of the
political leadership at the state level. This explains the varying degrees in the
performance of panchayats across different states.
It is pertinent to note here that the constitution spells out the functions of the
PRIs in very broad terms - in most cases covering the entire possible expanse of a
subject without clearly indicating specific items of responsibility, activities or subactivities under the broad functions.7 In line with the irregularities in the Central
Act, the statutes governing PRIs in the states while devolving functions to the
panchayats continue to word them generally without detailing out functional
responsibilities of each tier of panchayats for each of the subjects.
Mere legal enactments are not enough unless they are backed by enabling
rules and orders. Even in states where conformity legislation has been enacted rules
6
Era Sezhiyan (2006) New Guidelines worsen MPLAD Scheme, Mainstream, April 1420, 2006
7
Report of the Task Force on Devolution of Powers and Functions upon the Panchayati
Raj Institutions, Department of Rural development (Panchayati Raj Division), Ministry of
Rural Development, GoI, 2001
Prabhat Datta
and bye-laws for their day-today functioning are yet to be formulated. In the
absence of necessary operational laws, the states are often found to misinterpret the
provisions of delegated legislation as a device for deferring legislation. In
Rajasthan, for example, the whole range of powers and functions that have been
legally assigned to the PRIs are either made subject to such rules as may be
prescribed or to the extent and in the manner as may be prescribed and since
then no rules have been framed or orders/ guidelines issued to this effect.
Centrally Sponsored Schemes

The creation of a large number of programmes (more than 200 schemes currently)
called centrally sponsored schemes (CSSs) sponsored by the Union Ministries has
posed a serious challenge to democratic decentralization by distorting the
multilevel planning process and inter governmental transfer arrangements within
the federal set up. This is mainly because many of the subjects they deal with are
either included in the State list or the local list mentioned in the 11 th and 12th
schedules. The share of the CSSs in the plan budget of the federal government has
shot up to 70 per cent against less than 30 per cent in the early 1980s. Besides the
CSSs there are also 26 sectoral programmes falling under the 29 subjects of the
11th Schedule which the central ministries handle. The schemes are drawn up at the
centre and implemented at the local level. The association of local bodies with the
implementation processes does not really serve the purpose because the
implementing bodies only implement according to the rules laid down elsewhere.
The local government has to accept them because the centre has financial clout.
Undermining Elections
Attempts to undermine elections for panchayats continues. Some of the states have
taken years to hold elections. Postponing elections under one pretext or another has
become a routine matter. The elections to panchayats have been completed in
almost all the states after a series of legal battles and interventions by civil society
organizations. The case of Orissa is interesting. Elections to PRIs were due to be
held before February 2002. The SEC had promptly intimated the state government
its preparedness to conduct elections on time and suggested a delimitation of wards
and reservation of seats beforehand, if required. The district magistrates had in fact
done the work and the state government had ordered a limited delimitation of seats
in consonance with the Orissa Gram Panchayat Act, 1964. To cause further delay
in this regard the state government brought a bill in the monsoon session for the
reservation of seats in favour of the OBCs. The SEC chose to file a case in the
High Court. At this stage the state government decided to hold elections.8
Gujarat has recently set a unique example. The State Government has
announced incentives to the extent of Rs. 1 lakh to those panchayats, which would
be able to hold elections on the basis of consensus. The scheme called samras
gram (harmonious village) is clearly anti-democratic and is regarded as a recipe for
reward-induced guided democracy.
Interestingly, what is happening in some states in the name of achieving
unanimity is a cause of serious concern. During the panchayat elections in
Karnataka in 2000 some of the seats were auctioned. The Election Commission
8
Panchayati Raj Update, August, 2003
Prabhat Datta
could not interfere on the ground that if the voters made an arrangement among
themselves to ensure unanimous election it was beyond the legal competence of the
Commission to intervene. In order to augment the resources some of the seats were
put up for bidding in Andhra Pradesh in 2001. Even the reserved seats were not
spared. The highest amount for the post of the Sarpanch in Velpur village under
Guntur district was 10.10 lakh. Seats are auctioned in Madhya Pradesh and
Rajasthan. In 2005, auctions were held for the post of Sarpanch in at least two
gram panchayats .In Rajasthan it was the caste factor which mattered most. The
panchayat dominated by Gujjars was reserved for the SCs. Disturbed by the sudden
loss of power, some of the influential Gujjar leaders decided to extract a price for
the post. An announcement for open sale was made at the village Chaupal assuring
unanimous election of the highest bidder. The auction took place two weeks before
the day of polling. The reserved price was fixed at Rs.50, 000. One person offered
Rs.2.7 lakh and the seat was allotted to him. However, the effort proved to be
abortive due to intervention by the District Collector who got three of them
arrested.9
There was large scale distribution of gifts and allurements offered by
candidates in the UP elections held in 2005, some of them financed by non-resident
Indian relatives. There was a free flow of money and liquor in many villages. Hand
pumps were installed outside each house in one of the villages and voters in one of
the villages received silver rings and glasses. A candidate in one village called
Pratapgarh promised gold rings to each woman in the GP if he won. In several
constituencies whisky bottles were distributed liberally. There was hardly any
serious candidate who did not exceed the expenditure ceiling fixed by the SEC.
The local newspapers were splashed with advertisements by the well-to-do
candidates.10
It is interesting to note that the holding of elections at regular intervals can
bring about significant change in the socio-political profile of rural India.11 Studies
have shown that the caste system in Tamil Nadu has weakened following the
elections.
Devolution in the Conformity Legislations.

The 73rd Amendment of the Constitution of India stipulates the transfer of powers
and functions to panchayati raj institutions (PRIs) as a part of the decentralization
process. The State Governments were supposed to transfer 29 subjects listed in the
Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution. While the states like Kerala, Karnataka and
West Bengal have carved out a clear path of devolution to PRIs, other states like
Rajasthan, Maharastra, Gujarat and Bihar have variations in their initiatives in this
regard. States like Haryana, Uttar Pradesh have still to set the ball rolling. As per
the information available in November 2006, only eight states and one Union
territory have formally transferred all the 29 functions or subjects to PRIs. 12 The
Working Group on the Decentralised Planning observes, ...... items listed as
responsibilities in the states are couched in vague terms. A glance at the variety of
these items reveals that they are a shopping list of sectors and sub-sectors, broad
9
Panchayati Raj Update, Jan.2005

Panchayati Raj Update, Aug. 2005
11
EPW, July 21, 2001
12
Government of India (2002) The Report of the Working Group on Decentralised
Planning and Panchayati Raj Institutions for the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-2007)
Planning Commission, New Delhi, P.9.
10
Prabhat Datta
activities in a sub-sector and activities, sub-activities/specific responsibilities under
a broad activity, with no role clarity.... In some states the line departments still
exercise the powers of supervision and control over the scheme of subjects
transferred to the panchayats The Parliamentary Committee in its 37th report
submitted in 2003 has expressed concern over the pace at which states are working
in this direction. The Report of the Task Force on the Devolution of Powers and
Functions to the PRIs brought out by the Ministry of Rural Development has
admitted that the mandatory provisions of the 73rd Amendment Act are yet to be
implemented in letter and spirit by most of the states/UTs even eight years after the
said Act came into force in April, 1993. The conformity legislations of most of
the States have not significantly altered the functional domain of gram panchayats
as is shown in the Table No.1. The studies emphasize the need for a uniform
accounting system and a uniform grant structure to ensure transparency in the
functional transfers to the rural local bodies.
Table No.1
Sl. No.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
States/UTs
No. of Departments/subjects Transferred to

Panchayats with
Andhra Pradesh
Arunachal Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Jharkhand
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Himachal Pradesh
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
Manipur
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Sikkim
Tamil Nadu
Tripura
Uttar Pradesh
Uttranchal
West Bengal
A&N Islands
Chandigarh
D&N Haveli
a ) Funds
5
6
15
*
2
29
15
10
10
18
5
24
12
12
6
-
b) Functions
17
29
20
6
15
26
29
26
23
29
18
22
25
7
16
24
29
12
13
11
29
6
3
c) Functionaries
2
15
29
15
9
9
18
4
21
24
9
11
12
6
3
Prabhat Datta
28.
29.
30.
31.
Daman & Diu

NCT Delhi
Pondicherry
Lakshadweep
5
**
-
*
**
***
Almost all the 29 subjects

Panchayati Raj System is yet to be revived.
No functionary has been transferred. However, GPs and ZPs have been
made the appointing authorities with regard to 9 functions on contract basis.
3
***
-
Note: Provisions of the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992 are not
applicable to the States of J&K, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland.
Source: Government of India (2001b)
The preambles of only three conformity legislations viz. those of Bihar, West
Bengal and Tripura unequivocally mention that the objective of the panchayat
legislations is to endow panchayats with functions and powers so as to enable them
to function as vibrant institutions of self government. The Acts of Tamil Nadu,
Kerala, Sikkim, UP and Maharastra make some commitment to self-government.
The Haryana Act spells out that the panchayat system is meant for better
administration of rural areas. Similarly, the MP Act treats janpad panchayat (
middle tier ) only as an agent of the government. Other states like Karnataka,
Punjab, Goa, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur have carefully refrained from making
any specific commitment to self government for their panchayats.
The lack of clarity in functional allocation and absence of disaggregation into
detailed activities, as the Panchayati Raj Development Report 1995 mentions, has
led to considerable overlapping and duality of control in most cases. It has been
argued in the report that functional autonomy is rendered difficult because in
almost all states, the state governments retain the power to assign, amend or
withhold functions which, as per the 73rd Amendment of the Constitution, is a job
only the state governments are authorized to do.
More recently, however, the Government of India decided in favour of
undertaking activity mapping to ensure effective devolution of functions (as listed
in the Schedule XI) to all the three tiers of the PRIs. This is indeed a welcome
move whereby every activity can be attributed to the appropriate level of panchayat
so as to enable a more effective delivery of public services and a better quality of
life for the citizens. Devolution of powers, (as declared in the First Round Table of
Ministers- in- Charge of Panchayati Raj, Kolkata, July 2004) was to be based on
the principle of subsidiarity which means that any task that can be done at the
lower level should not move to a higher level.
10
Prabhat Datta
Table No. 2
State/ UT
Andhra Pradesh
Details of AM (Activity
No. of
Mapping undertaken)
Subjects
transferred
Notes
17
29
Assam
29
29
Bihar
25
Chhattisgarh
29
27*
Executive orders not issued
Goa
18
18 functions devolved to GPs, 6 to ZPs
Gujarat
15
14
Only 5 subjects partially devolved
Haryana
10
Subjects yet to be transferred
Himachal Pradesh
26
Karnataka
29
29
Kerala
26
26
Madhya Pradesh
23
AM prepared by an NGO, Samarthan. Yet to be considered by

government.
Maharashtra
18
No move to undertake AM
Manipur
22
22
Orissa
25
Arunachal Pradesh
AM for critical subjects like housing not done. Only 8 depts. have passed
orders for transfer of funds and functionaries.
15 departments have issued orders delegating powers to panchayats

AM implemented through fiscal devolution in 2005-06 budget with
regard to 26 subjects
119 activities relating to 19 functions devolved. AM has been revised
with complete details.
Fiscal transfer yet to be made
11
Prabhat Datta
Punjab
Draft AM prepared
Rajasthan
29
12
Sikkim
28
Tamil Nadu
29
Tripura
29
21
Uttar Pradesh
12
AM completed in respect of 32 departments. implementation yet to take

place
Uttaranchal
14
Orders for devolution of 3 departments issued
West Bengal
29
15
Orders issued in respect of 15 subjects for which AM has been completed
AM done for agriculture, soil conservation, PHED, elementary and

secondary education, health and family welfare, irrigation, forest,
industry, food, tourism, PWD, energy, technical education
Instructions issued for devolving all subjects to panchayats but no actual

devolution
Orders were issued for the devolution of 21 subjects in 1994
A & N Islands
D & N Haveli
AM completed
Lakshadweep
Chandigarh
* (Except forest and drinking water supply)

Source: Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India
12
Prabhat Datta
Transfer of Funds
The transfer of functions without corresponding transfer of funds does not make
sense but this has nevertheless, happened. Mahi Pal rightly says that before listing
the functions to be performed by the panchayats, the states have introduced certain
qualifying clauses.13 In Andhra Pradesh, Haryana and Tamil Nadu it is within the
limits of its funds. In Punjab it is to the extent its funds allow to perform. In
Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, it is as far as the gram panchayat funds at
its disposal.
A close examination of the provisions in the Acts of the different states
regarding tax assignments, tax sharing, non- tax revenues makes it very clear that
the PRIs at the level of the samiti and parishad do not have independent taxing
powers. Most of the taxes are assigned at the GP levels.A provision for
independent budgeting by the three tiers is another prime requisite to ensure
autonomy. In some states like Andhra Pradesh and Orissa for PS, Punjab for ZP,
Rajasthan for PS and ZP, Tamil Nadu for all tiers, the preparation and presentation
of budgets is left to the executive authority rather than to elected representatives.
The Constitution provides for setting up of the State Finance Commission
(SFCs). By mid 1990s the first SFCs had submitted their reports. Referring to the
role of the SFCs the mid-term appraisal of the Ninth Plan pointed out, more
buoyant taxes like sales tax and excise are kept out of the purview of the PRIs. All
SFCs have put great emphasis on internal revenue mobilisation but none has
suggested any effective mechanism for PRIs to generate their revenue..... Indeed,
the absence of attention to the elementary principle, that expenditure assignment
must precede any tax or revenue assignment, has made most of the SFCs
recommendations suspect14 The State Governments have also been slow and
hesitant in accepting the recommendations where they are useful in terms of
improving the revenue generation capacity of the local bodies. Only two states
Karnataka and Sikkim have devolved funds to the panchayats for the 29 subjects.
In some states several of the basic services which traditionally belonged to the
panchayats like street lighting, provision of drinking water supply, sanitation and
drainage, primary health care etc. have not been entrusted to the GPs. For example,
in Haryana, GPs practically deal with only drinking water and construction and
maintenance of roads to the exclusion of all other basic services.
The balance sheets of panchayats reflect either financial scarcity or a lack of
control over budgeted finance. Except for a few states where the panchayats have
access to some funds, the financial position of the PRIs is in a bad shape.
Panchayat finances are fragile in most states where the total receipts of tax revenue
is only 3.5 per cent from 1997-98 in the 15 select states. It is about 5 per cent in
Orissa, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Haryana and
between 10 per cent and 20 per cent in Assam, Goa and Kerala.15
PRIs across the states do not have any control over their own physical and
human resources. The SFCs have recommended the transfer of those powers,
which are less effective, although there has been emphasis on internal resource
mobilisation. This is a matter of concern because embedded in the question of
financial viability is the issue of self - reliance. The financial autonomy ratio
13
Mahi Pal (2004) Panchayati Raj and Rural Governance, EPW, Vol. XXXIX, January 10.
Nilkanta Rath (2004) Twelfth Finance Commission and Minimum Needs, EPW, June 4
15
The Status of PR Finances in India, PRIA New Delhi, 1999
14
13
Prabhat Datta
(FAR) for the selected Gram Panchayats (GPs) is below 1 per cent, indicating
almost total dependence on the grants from the higher-level governments. Even in
the states like Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Kerala, Karnataka and Maharashtra, the
FAR of the selected GPs is not more than 50 per cent. In Kerala perhaps the best
performing state in terms devolution to local bodies, the own revenue of an average
GP is only 33 per cent.
A study of 15 select states, namely, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Kerala, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Orissa, Punjab, Haryana, Assam, Goa reveals
that where middle or top tiers have been constituted, states have not endowed them
with adequate functional responsibility. Most states have granted a plethora of
functional responsibilities but no executive follow up of granting adequate powers,
staff and financial resources. Except for four major states where the intermediate
and apex bodies have adequate staff, in most other states, either the staff is not
directly relevant or inadequate. A study of panchayats in 15 states done by the
National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, shows that the political
parties are reluctant to devolve powers. Jean Dreze has shown that in most States
the main responsibility of a sarpanch is to oversee the implementation of
development programmes.16
The Kolkata conference of ministers in-charge of the departments of
panchayats and rural developments in different states, held in July 2004, reaffirmed
its commitment to the best traditions of fiscal federalism in which the Union and
the states would co-operate to strengthen local government finances. It was agreed
to develop a framework of co-operation between Union Government and the state
government and to devise a mechanism, but nothing significant has emerged so far.
Transfer of Functionaries
To function effectively as institutions of self government the PRIs need to have the
power to recruit and control staff required for managing its functions. Staff is a
resource that an organization must possess to perform its activities. Strangely, Part
IX and IXA of the Indian constitution remain silent on this vital aspect of
institutional autonomy. Viewed from this perspective the state panchayat
legislations too present a gloomy picture. The state governments still have retained
for themselves the power for inspection, inquiring into the affairs of the
panchayats, the suspension of panchayat resolutions and issuing directions. Besides
in most states the key functionaries, namely, the secretaries and executive officers
at all the three levels of panchayats are state government employees who are
appointed, transferred and controlled by the state government. Being under the
direct control of the state administrative hierarchy they are often reluctant to work
under the administrative control of the elected panchayats. Moreover, provisions
for the deputation of officials from the state government to the panchayats have
been made in the state panchayat acts without consultation with the panchayats.
The tenure, transfer and the promotion of deputationists are also decided by the
state government without consulting the panchayats.
Kerala is the only state which has completely transferred the control of
functionaries to panchayats. More than 100 officials of different line departments
have been devolved to district panchayat which exercise supervisory and
administrative control over these functionaries. Only two states Karnataka and
16
Cited by Richard Mahapatra (2003) Toothless at 10, Down to Earth, January
14
Prabhat Datta
Sikkim have transferred functionaries pertaining to all the 29 subjects to the
panchayats. But in Karnataka too the panchayats have no power of recruitment,
transfer and discipline over their staff. Here, the zilla parishads and the taluka
panchayats are filled with state government officials resulting in dual loyalties and
needless friction in the day-to-day functioning of the panchayats. Although in a
few states the GPs have been given the power to recruit and control their own staff,
this power remains largely unutilized due to the weak financial position of the GPs.
States like Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana,
Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, Andaman and Nicobar Islands,
Chandigarh and Pondicherry have not transferred any functionaries to the
panchayats. The rest of the states and Union Territories have transferred
functionaries of some departments/ subjects to the panchayats ranging from 2 in
Andhra Pradesh and 18 in Maharashtra. But even in states where the process has
just been initiated the efforts seem to be half-hearted. In Maharashtra, for instance,
this has led to role confusion as the transfer has not been made for the entire staff
of respective departments. Instead, they are being shared between the line
departments and the panchayats. Nilkant Rath has pointed out that this has
complicated the role of the Twelfth Finance Commission which has been asked to
recommend measures for the augmentation of the resources of the local bodies in
light of the recommendations of the SFCs.17
Administrative Autonomy of the PRIs

In addition to what has been stated above relating to the lack of control by the PRIs
over their staff, most state Acts arm themselves with omnibus clauses and penal
provisions which make administrative autonomy of the PRIs a mockery. For
example, it has been laid down in the Rajasthan act that the state government shall
be the chief superintendent and controlling authority in respect of all matters to
PRIs. Interestingly, according to the provisions of the Act if a panchayat fails to
perform its duty, it will be given time to do so and, if it fails again the work will be
given to an agency at the cost of the panchayat. In Orissa the collector can direct
any officer to attend any meeting of the GP. If the collector is of the opinion that
the GP is unable to discharge its functions, he may direct the PS to function on
behalf of the GP.
People's Participation: The Gram Sabhas

As an institution of direct democracy, it may be recalled that Rajni Kothari has
visualized the role of the Gram Sabhas in the following words:
"Representative bodies have their inherent dynamics of power politics and
willy-nilly end up vesting effective authority in the politician-bureaucracy
nexus. The only way of making this nexus responsible and accountable is to
provide larger citizen involvement in new variants of old institutions like the
Gram Sabha which can combine older forms of informal consensus- making
mechanisms with the more formal, institutionalized and legal forms decreed
by legislations. With the new awakening in rural areas these bodies have the
potential to oversee the working of elected bodies and over time, with the
17
Nilkanta Rath (2004), op. cit
15
Prabhat Datta
growing confidence that they cannot be brow-beaten by dominant individuals
or castes, they become a force to reckon with."18
The Ashok Mehta committee observed that "the gram sabha has an important
role in activating the democratic process at the grassroot level, in inculcating
community spirit, in increasing political awareness and enabling the weaker
sections to progressively assert their point of view" Gram sabha is useful not only
as vigilance mechanism in the hands of the people but also as a tool to restore the
lost credibility of the panchayat in India.
Gram Sabha literally means village meeting a meeting of the villagers to
discuss their common problems. In many ways, it is comparable to a citizens
forum, a forum of direct democracy, which existed in Greek city states.19
While the constitution makes it mandatory to establish Gram Sabha at the village
level, it does not stipulate any details regarding the structure, powers, and functions
of this institution. In terms of Article 243G these details are to be spelt out in the
panchayati raj legislations passed in each state in compliance with the 73rd
amendment of the Constitution. Accordingly, all the state governments have
provided for the institution of gram sabha in their respective panchayat legislations.
There are variations across the states with regard to composition, functions and
other matters. In Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka the Gram Sabha has been defined
in relation to revenue village, whereas in Maharashtra and Rajasthan the unit is
much larger and coterminous with the village panchayat. In Kerala there is Gram
Sabha for every ward.
None of the State Acts empowers the GS to have control over the GP and to
take final decisions in matters of village development. Its role is only advisory. The
accountability of the GP to this body has also not been clearly spelt out in most of
the state legislations. In Kerala, however, it is obligatory on the part of the head of
the GP to explain to the GS why a particular decision or a set of decisions could
not be implemented.
In most of the states the functional domain of the GS is limited to discussions
of annual statement of accounts, administration report, and selection of
beneficiaries for anti-poverty programmes. Only in a few states like Haryana,
Punjab and Tamil Nadu the GSs enjoy the powers to approve budgets. The Gram
Sabhas are yet to take off in almost all the states.20 Reports from the states indicate
that Gram Sabha meetings are not being held regularly. The Institute of Social
Sciences team found in a village in Madhya Pradesh (MP) that by December
1995,only three meetings were held as against the legal requirement of six
meetings.
Nirmala Buch conducted a study of Gram Sabhas in 11 Gram Panchayats in
MP in December 1997 and found that far from an adequate number of GS
18
Rajni Kothari, State Against Democracy: In Search of Human Governance, Ajanta

Publications, Delhi
19
J.M. Cohen and N.T. Uphoff " Participation's place in Rural Development: Seeking
Clarity through Specificity, World development, Vol8, pp.213-235
20
Prabhat Datta, (2003), Towards Good Governance and Sustainable Development, Das
Gupta & Co. Kolkata.
16
Prabhat Datta
members attending the meetings not even all the panchs were present.21 To cap it
all, there was no quorum of more than 50 per cent in the GS meetings. There is a
provision for mandatory attendance of one-tenth members in the Gram Sabha.
Women find it difficult to attend as the timing is sometime in the forenoon i.e.
between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m. Most of the women are not aware even of the
rudiments of the Gram Sabha. The issues discussed do not seem to interest a large
number of the villagers and hence, except careful and knowledgeable stakeholders,
others shy away from the Gram Sabha.
A study conducted in two Panchayats in Kerala has shown that the people are in
favour of expanding the role of the Gram Sabhas.22.They want the Gram Sabhas to
give the final seal of approval to the activities of the Gram Panchayat. The people
interviewed have suggested that the Gram Sabha will perform its duties in time
provided people are made aware of its role in development activities. Once their
felt needs are taken into consideration, they will automatically attend the meetings
in large numbers and participate effectively in the activities of the Gram
Panchayats.
In some of the States Gram Sabha meetings are generating a new atmosphere
in the countryside. Social auditing at the Gram Sabha meetings has also started
yielding desirable results. The Gram Sabha meeting in Karnataka successfully
combated the time-honoured Devdasi system, which prevailed in 167 villages of
Belgaun district.23 The UMA Research team of Bangalore had witnessed a Gram
Sabha meeting at Indore Gram Panchayat in Uttar Kanada district.24 The Sabha
witnessed uproarious scene when the people demanded an explanation from the
secretary about the activities. Only a handful of members were familiar with the
Act. The presence of the women members was very insignificant and those who
did come were passive observers. Many were hesitant to confront the elected
representatives. Most of the questions were raised by the youth. The elders hardly
opened their lips.
The Participatory Research in Asia team studied the working of the Gram
Sabhas in Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh.25 The
team has noticed that although meetings are being held almost regularly, a quorum
is hardly achieved. Surprisingly, despite the lack of quorum, the proceedings are
prepared. The team is generally of the opinion that there is a lack of awareness on
the part of the members not only about the time and venue of the meetings but also
about the usefulness of such meetings.
The team points out that except in Kerala and Madhya Pradesh, the advice and
suggestions of the Gram Sabha are not even binding to the Gram Panchayat. In
reality, Gram Sabha meetings do not serve the purpose of either establishing
village priorities and overall policy framework for Gram Panchayat or regular
monitoring and accountability of the resources and the decisions of the Gram
Panchayats.
21
Cited by K. Jayalakshi in her paper Role of Gram Sabhas in Betul district in MP

presented at the national conference on Gram Sabha held at NIRD, Hyderabad during July
28-29, 1999
22
John Oommen, Gram Sabhas : The Live Wire in the Planning Process in Kerala
Journal of Rural Vo Development l. 18, No.2
23
P.Menon (1996) Sex Slaves no more : Devdasis of Belgaum District break
free,Frontline, February, 9
24
See, Uma Prachar (1997) Janurary-March.
25
PRIA, ibid.
17
Prabhat Datta
The scholars observe that most of the heads of the panchayats lack skills in
conducting meetings in a manner that could promote wider participation and
discussion of the issues affecting the village. Issues of social justice and internal
dynamics of the village have rarely been agenda items in the Gram Sabha
meetings.
An authoritative survey of panchayati raj by NIRD reports follows: almost all
the State Acts have provided for Gram Sabha but its functions have not been spelt
out in detail. Consequently, these institutions by and large continue to function
ineffectively, though the meetings are generally held as prescribed. The purpose is
hardly served in the absence of a clear and direct mandate. More often, there is a
tendency to conduct the meetings in a formal manner and finalize the proceedings
in haste. The prescribed quorum is also not given due importance. The absence of
women folk in the meetings has been a common feature. The participation of the
people belonging to the weaker section has been marginal.
In West Bengal, the Gram Sabha created by an amendment of the West
Bengal Panchayat Act in 1992, started working well. Websters research
demonstrated that apart from the compulsory meetings of the Gram Sabha, the
informal mighty discussions in some localities, regular public meetings were other
forms of participation.26 Lieten remarked that although the boktrita culture was not
altogether absent in the Gram Sabha meetings, participation used to take place.27
In other words although the leaders used to deliver long speeches, they did not
stand in the way of active participation of the villagers in the meetings. Around
one- fourth of the males he spoke to, stated that they had participated in meetings.
In West Bengal, there is another body called Gram Sansad the geographical
location of which is the electoral constituency of the members of the GP.
According to the available information and the findings of the studies the Gram
Sansad meetings are attended by people of all age groups. In most of the meetings,
the Gram Panchayats publish the reports. There had been many occasions when the
meetings generated lot of heat. The author himself witnessed a situation where a
group of members walked out when the Pradhan refused to concede their demand.
The formation of the beneficiary committee had been more often than not an issue
of debate and discussion. This body is now replaced by the Gram Unnayan samity.
There is still a lack of awareness on the part of the Pradhan and the members about
the legal provisions relating to the Gram Sansad and Gram Sabha meetings. This
has been the finding of another study done in Gujarat.28 The officials present in the
meeting have to correct them.
The study done by the author reveals that more than one third of the villagers
are not aware of the Gram Sansad.29 The reactions of the respondents tend to show
26
N. Webster (1992) Panchayati Raj and Decentralisation of Development Planning in

West Bengal,
Calcutta : K.P. Bagchi p.99.
27
G.K.Lieten (1998), Rural Development in West Bengal : Views From Below, Journal
of Contemporary Asia Vo. 24, No.4, p 328. See his book Development, Devolution and
Democracy : Village Discourse in West Bengal 1998, Sage, India.
28
See Dr. Kartar Singh The Role of the Gram Sabha in Village Development,
Kurukshetra, October, 1999.
29
Prabhat Datta (19996) Politicising Rural Development :m Lessons from Indias West
Bengal, Asia Pacific Journal for Rural Development, December, 1997 and (1997)
Politics at Blade and Grassroot, The Telegraph, July, 10. Prabhat Datta (2000)
Panchayats, Rural Development and Local Autonomy :the West Bengal Experience,
Dasgupta & Co., Kolkata.
18
Prabhat Datta
that there are three reasons for the low attendance of the members in the meetings,
namely, lack of time, the general impression that the decisions are not taken in the
meetings and the reluctance on the part of a section of the Gram Panchayat
members to listen to the suggestions generated during the meetings. The studies
done by the author indicate that the meetings have been more successful in places
where the GPs and the parties have taken an initiative in synchronising them with
the cultural programmes in tune with local traditions. It is clear from the
experience of functioning of the Gram Sansads that the modern institutional
assemblies like Gram Sabhas and Gram Sansads in traditional societies like India
need to be tuned with the natural rhythm of the rural life.
A study of the functioning of Gram Sansad in a cross-section of 20 villages in
May 1999 brings out certain important issues.30 The study shows that in analysing
the occupational category of the voters who attended the meetings, the largest
single category was agricultural labourers followed by farmers with less than two
acres of land. Those with more land or with non-farming sources of income
constituted about 16 per cent of those present. The analysis of the studys findings
tends to show that the meetings were centred upon very practical and concrete
problems within the village or cluster of villages. Proposals for road repair, where
should a tube well be installed, who should receive loan are more common issues
as opposed to broader themes which political parties, trade unions or peasant
organizations in West Bengal are concerned with, such as, economic liberalisation,
privatisation of public sector. In quite a few meetings, though not in all, the
accounts of the previous year and the budgets for the next year for the entire Gram
Sansad area were also placed. The researchers have noticed that the participants
actively voice demands for new projects, suggest how allocated funds should be
spent and debate how projects should be designed. The Pradhans and the local
representatives are not spared. They have to answer a lot of questions and often
face allegations about the misuse of funds and selection of beneficiaries. The
responses of the panchayat leaders to the criticisms indicate that they could not
take the voters present in the meetings for granted. There had been occasions when
they had to make frank admission about their errors.
Women Empowerment
In order to add a new dimension to the process of democratic decentralization,
namely, gender justice, the 73rd amendment of the Constitution provides for the
reservation of seats and the posts of chairpersons for women. All the state Acts
have incorporated this provision and elections are being held accordingly. But the
studies indicate that women elected to PRIs are yet to play their roles properly. 31
Conceptually it indicates a shift of attitude of the state towards women. Earlier
women were generally viewed as objects of development. The amendment seeks to
make women, actors in development.
This is a historic step, a sharp break from the previous practice. As many as 50
countries world over have quotas for women for their legislative bodies. Of the 20
countries with the largest number of women in parliament, 17 are using quotas in
some form or other. However, following this amendment the number of elected
30
M. Ghatak and M. Ghatak (2000) Recent Reforms in the Panchayat System in West
Bengal EPW, January 5.
31
Prabhat Datta with Panchali Sen

Kolkata.
(2003) Women in Panchayats, Dasgupta & Co.,
19
Prabhat Datta
women at the GP level has gone up to 35.92 per cent of the total numbers of the
elected representatives. At the taluk panchayat level the figure is 40.14 per cent.
Again at the ZP level, the total number of women members elected is 39.37 per
cent. Some states elect more women than the one third mandated by the
amendment. For example, Maharashtra and Karnataka have 43.7 per cent and 43
per cent women respectively in their village councils. In 2004 there were at least
nine states where there was more than 33 per cent women in PRIs, Andhra Pradesh
( 33.04) Assam ( 50.38) , Chattisgarh ( 33.75) , Gujarat ( 49.30 ), Kerala ( 57.24 ),
Karnataka ( 43.06) Tamil Nadu ( 36.73), Uttar Pradesh ( 37.85), West Bengal
35.15) Bihar has made a provision for 50 per cent reservation. Women are getting
elected from general seats as well.
Findings from Some Cross-State Studies

Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA) studied women leadership in Panchayats in
six states.32 The profile of the elected women leaders as brought out by the studies
is given below:
Majority of them are in the age-group of 35-45 years
The proportion of unmarried women is negligible
Only 20 to 40 per cent of the women are literate
Incidence of joint and nuclear families is almost equal
Less than 20 per cent of them are heads of the domestic households
About 40 per cent of the members work in the field
The educational and economic background of the chairpersons are better
than those of ordinary members
More than 20 per cent come from the families of past Panchayati Raj
members
About 40 per cent stood for elections on the insistence of their husbands
and 20 per cent on that of the community (caste) etc.
25 per cent notice change in their status in the family after having elected
About 60 per cent would like to encourage women to contest elections
About 60 of these elected would contest next elections
Gram Panchayat meetings in the cases where women Pradhans are effective, have a
presence of women members and a higher-level participation of members.
Concerns of women in Gram Sabha meetings get discussed and more schemes and
programmes related to women find their way into the Panchayats. These trends are
visible in all the states.
The women Pradhans have been able to establish linkages with the block level
government functionaries as well as the Panchayat Samiti. Initially they had some
problems due to lack of proper exposure. Later on, their confidence increased as
they continued to interact with them.
Several significant facts have emerged from a nation-wide study on elected
women representatives conducted by ORG-Marg for the Union Ministry of
panchayati raj. It is found that elected women members are generally younger than
their male counterparts. Educationally, women lag behind men. Reservations have
been found to be an important motivator for contesting the first elections. 43 per
cent of the representatives did not receive any training. Interaction with local
bureaucracy, officials in the line departments and police was found to be less
32
PRIA , op.cit
20
Prabhat Datta
among the female representatives. A sizeable section of the female representatives
perceive enhancement in their self-esteem, confidence and decision-making ability.
Becoming a member or Pradhan augments respect within the four walls of families
well as in the community at large. They also report an increased voice in decisions
on economic matters as well as other issues in their families.33
Nirmala Buch did a study on womens experience in Panchayats in three
states, namely, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.34 The study has
indicated that the level of participation of women is very high, though not similar
to that of men. Womens attendance in the panchayat meetings ranged from 55.5
per cent to 74.4 per cent as against the mens average attendance range of 68.7 per
cent. A majority of the respondents showed good level of awareness and
knowledge about the working of the Panchayats. In order to argue their case in the
meetings many of them take others into confidence and hold informal discussions.
Empirical studies bring out both narratives of courage and narratives of
dislocation that disrupt the presumed outcomes of womens political
representation in PRIs. A field study in the five districts of MP covering 94 out of
188 sarpanches belonging to SC from the districts of Ujjain, Dewas, Ratlam,
Shajahanpur and Mandsuar show that women were elected from families who were
opinion leaders and continued to play their roles from behind the scenes. SC
members face both caste domination and male domination.
It has been argued by Kumud Sharma that that the language of state politics,
procedures of political parties for recruitment and nominations and political
socialization of men and women reflect a conflictual relationship between
womens representation and political leadership. Most of the political parties
remain institutionalized sites of patriarchal power. Women have to adjust
themselves to the imperatives of party structures if they are to survive and in doing
so some of them get co-opted in the process rather than influencing party structures
and processes.
The issues get further complicated when they are understood within the
framework of identity politics Women come in with their social and economic
disadvantages, poverty, illiteracy and dependence on wage labour.35 Women
sarpanches are prevented from completing their terms in office by using noconfidence motions. Sarkar says that whereas there are rules as to how no
confidence motions have to be handled, there is no requirement that the reasons
for seeking a no-confidence motion have to be stated in clear terms .36
Dalit Women
As we have seen above in the state-specific case studies, dalit women are facing
greater difficulties as they are targeted by the upper castes apart from other odds. It
has been difficult in states like Tamil Nadu to fill the posts of panchayats
presidents reserved for dalits for three decades. Dalits were prevented from filing
33
Panchayati Raj Update, May, 2008

Nirmala Buch, Womens Experience in New Panchayats: The Emerging Leadership of
Rural Women, Occasional Paper no. 35, Centre for Womens Development Studies, New
Delhi, 2000.
35
Poornima Vyasulu & Vinod Vyasulu, Women in PRIs: Grassroots Democracy in
Malgudi, EPW, Dec 25, 1999
36
Lolita Sarkar, Annual Survey of Indian law, the Indian law Institute, 1997-98
34
21
Prabhat Datta
nominations. The caste Hindu standpoint is that dalits cannot be panchayat
presidents because if they get elected they have to show respect to them.37
In Tamil Nadu, for example, till August, 2000 as many 96 village panchayat
Presidents were removed by district collectors, 66 of whom are women. A study
conducted by the Human Rights Advocacy and Research Foundation has revealed
that dalit women Presidents are forced to act under the control of the dominant
caste of the area. Women panchayat members are treated as non- entities. In most
cases, the Panchayat clerk proves to be a major obstacle. He is invariably male and
refuses to hand over keys for the panchayat and withholds crucial information.
There is discrimination in the seating arrangements for dalit women. For example,
in one panchayat in Haryana, all members sit in chairs while the female dalit
Sarpanch is made to sit on the floor because she belongs to the lower caste. In a
village called Gundaibhai in Madhya Pradesh the poor of the Panchayat who
belongs to the lower caste and poor agricultural labourer was not allowed to unfurl
the national flag. She was beaten up by men for polluting the sacred national
flag.38 In some election campaigns the name of the husband is displayed more
prominently than the wife's, even if she is a candidate. In one case when the wife
won the elections her husband was paraded in the victory procession and she was
nowhere to be seen.
A woman Panchayat President rarely gets the male vice-president to
countersign the cheque without some resistance from the latter. When the roles are
reversed, women vice presidents are forced to sign the cheque even if they disagree
with the expense. The socio-political dynamics in villages hamper the gender
equity in governance. The following is a case of harassment in a tribal sarpanch.
Mishri Devi of Thikri village in Dausas district in Rajasthan was elected to the post
of sarpanch. The upper class male villagers were unhappy. On August she was
stopped from saluting the national flag in a public place. The upper caste males
tried to strip her. In Rajasthan again, a women sarpanch her husband and two other
family members were abused and injured in an attack by 12 persons.
No-Confidence Motions
Ramilaben from Gujarat faced numerous no-confidence motions. She holds
masters degree in history and was advised by a state minister to join politics. She
contested the district panchayat elections. She won and became the president of the
district panchayat and as a result became an object of attack from the very
beginning because of her being female. The Vice President told her that if she
would refuse to work under his instructions he would force her to resign within 15
days. Ramilaben took it as challenge. They then initiated a series of no-confidence
motions. Each time she emerged victorious. Ultimately the High Court issued a
ruling that only one noconfidence motion could be brought against the President
during her tenure. In 1996 as many as 16 writ petitions were filed against her in the
court and she was suspended on grounds of incompetence. She moved the High
Court and was re-instated by it.
Parties are yet to accept the role of reservation as a tool of empowerment. The
interesting case of Adiamma from Karnataka is well known. She was the only
37
38
Panchayati Raj Update, May ,2005

Outlook, October 11, 2004
22
Prabhat Datta
woman of the 18 SC members GP in Madya district. The Congress (I) decided to
back her for the post of President. She got elected. Before the elections she used to
earn her livelihood by cleaning toilets of the Police Stations and worked as an
agricultural labourer. But after being elected she began to implement her agenda.
All encroachments near the local bus stand were cleared and the issue of ration
cards simplified. Many of the males were alarmed at the performance and tried to
find fault with her. They conspired against her to make her resign and resorted to
boycotting panchayat meetings. Three consecutive meetings had to be postponed
due to a lack of quorum. When nothing worked they moved a no-confidence
motion. The motion was passed with the support of Congress and Janata Dal.
Two Child Norm

Only in eight states viz. Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh (HP),
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan and Maharashtra the two child
norm was seen as a way to regulate family size and thereby contain population
growth. But this legislative measure has been causing serious concern. Very often
it is being implemented in an environment of non-equal opportunity.
A study conducted in Andhra Pradesh (AP), Haryana, Madhya Pradesh (MP),
Orissa and Rajasthan by the Bhopal-based Mahila Chetna Manch in 2002-2003
revealed that proper information dissemination about the norm was not in place.
Economically and socially vulnerable sections were the worst affected. 78 per cent
of all cases studied belong to the scheduled, castes, and Other Backward Classes.39
Also, the rule was seen as a potential tool for misuse, with women facing a doubleedged challenge.
It should however be pointed out that the political space provided to women in
panchayats has started to bring about change, though slowly. The findings of a
study of the working of panchayats in six states conducted by PRIA reveals that
.......... 25 per cent woman notice change in their status within their family after
they have been elected........... about 60 per cent of women said that they would
encourage women to stand for election. The same percentage (60 per cent) is
contemplating to contest PRI election again.40
Decentralised Planning: the District Planning Committees

Another important area where the State Governments have shown scant regard for
constitutional provision is the area of district planning. The Constitutional
Amendment requires State Governments to constitute District Planning
Committees (DPCs) in order to facilitate decentralised planning. A decade has
passed and progress is alarmingly slow as is evident from the table below:
39
40
Panchayati Raj Update, Feb. 2003

PRIA , op.cit.
23
Prabhat Datta
Table No. 2
SI. No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
State/Uts
Andhra Pradesh
Arunachal Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Chhattisgarh
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana (No. of Districts :
19)
Himachal Pradesh (No. of
Districts-12)
16
17
Jammu & Kashmir

Jharkhand
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Manipur (No. of districts :
4)
Meghalaya
18
19
20
21
Mizoram
Nagtaland
Orissa
Punjab
Whether DPCs have been constituted

Not constituted
Not constituted
Not constituted
Not constituted
Constituted
Not constituted
Not constituted
If yes, who is the Chairperson
Constituted (Only in 16 Districts)
Deputy Commissioner
Constituted (Only in 6 Districts.

Yet to adopt the provision of 73rd
Amendment Act.
Not constituted
Constituted
constituted
constituted
Not constituted
Minister)
constituted only in 2 districts

73rd and 74th Amendments
applicable
constituted
Not constituted
Minister
Zilla panchayat president

Minister-in-charge of district
Zilla parishad ,president

not applicable
not
not applicable
not applicable
Minister
24
Prabhat Datta
22
Rajasthan
constituted
23
Sikkim
constituted
24
Tamil Nadu
constituted
25
Tripura
Not constituted
26
Uttar Pradesh
constituted
27
Uttaranchal
constituted
28
West Bengal
constituted
No DPC in Darjeeling district. Metro Planning committee in Kolkata District.
29
A & N Islands
constituted
Government has decided not to constitute
DPCs as 90% of population is covered by
30
Chandigarh
municipalities
31
D & N Haveli
constituted
32
Daman & Diu
constituted
33
NCT of Delhi
34
Lakshadweep
constituted
35
Pondichery
Not constituted

Minister-in-charge of districts
Minister
Zilla parishad president

Development Commissioner
Source: ISS Documentation and Information Centre Panchayati Raj Update July, 2003
In some states, the District Planning Committees (DPCs) are chaired by the minister of the State Government as in Madhya Pradesh,
whereas in other states, the officials head the DPC, as in Tamil Nadu where the collector is the chairman. All these practices are
inconsistent with the very spirit of the constitutional amendments on democratic decentralisation. The table below shows the composition
of the DPCs in different states:
25
Prabhat Datta
Composition of District Planning Committees in various States
Table No. 3
State
Total
Members
15
15-25
Nominated
Members
03
One-fifth
Chairperson
Secretary
President of the Zilla Parishad

Minister nominated by the State Govt.
District Collector
District Collector
One-fifth
District Collector
10-100
depending
on size of
the district
25
20
20-40
Fourfifths
One-fifth
District Magistrate
5
One-fifth

Karnataka
Fourfifths
One-fifth
Tamil Nadu
Fourfifths
One-fifth
Kerala
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra 30-50
West
Bengal
Rajasthan
Uttar
Pradesh
Elected
Members
12
Fourfifths
Fourfifths
Fourfifths
Chief Planning Officer of ZP

Chief
Development Officer of the
District
President of the Zilla Parishad Mayor/ CEO of ZP
Municipal President of District Hq. Vice
Chairman
Chairman - ZP President,
CEO of District Panchayat
Vice Chairman Collector.
Doubts have also been expressed about whether it would be possible on the part of retired or serving officials associated with the work of
the government to play their roles properly. Interestingly, the Eleventh Finance Commission observed that the appointment of serving
officers as chairman or members put a limitation on the SFC to act as an autonomous body to make recommendations in a free and
independent manner.
26
Prabhat Datta
The Rise of Parallel Bodies
Table No. 4
Added to the above is the emergence of a series of parallel bodies in different states as shown in the chart below.
No. State
1. Uttar
Pradesh
2.
Haryana
3.
Andhra
Pradesh
4.
Gujarat
5.
6.
7.
Parallel Body
Areas of overlap/substitution
Institutional Linkage with PRIs.
Water User Group (WUG)/Site
Formulating,
developing
and Village Pradhan may be the ex-officio chairperson of the
Implementation
Committee
approving plans of the area covered SIC.
(SIC)
by the WUG
Selection of beneficiaries (farmers)
Construction,
maintenance
and
management of link and main drains
Policy decisions like decision on
rates of water charges.
Gram Vikas Samity
Supervision of construction of work out of The samity consist of 4 members of gram panchayat
the funds released by HRDF Board, Chairperson Sarpanch Elected Members one panch each
decentralised planning or any other state from SC community, BC community and a woman panch
government scheme.
Janmabhoomi
Planning and implementation of development Sarpanch and the concerned ward member finds
programmes at the local level
representation in the Habitation Level Committee of
Janmabhoomi.
Cultivation, collection and sale of

A representative of village panchayat will serve as
minor forest produce
one of the members of the mandal or committee
Conservation and maintenance of
Village panchayat itself may become a mandal or
common property resources
committee for the purpose of JFM.
Rajasthan Watershed
Minor Irrigation
Panchayats can become Project Implementing Agency
(PIA) for watershed projects on priority basis.
Himachal Vigilance Committee
Supervision
of
gram
panchayat Supervisory body within gram panchayat of the works,
Pradesh
works/schemes costing upto Rs.50,000/schemes and other activities of Gram Panchayat.
West
District
Primary
Education Overlapping with Standing Committee on
Bengal
Council
Education at District and Intermediate level.
Source:
Joint Forest Management
Participatory
Research
in
Asia
(2002)
Parallel
Bodies
and
Panchayati
Raj
Institutions:
Experiences
from
the
States.
27
Prabhat Datta
Broadly speaking, the functions performed by the parallel bodies can be classified
as ensuring user\beneficiary participation, convergence of programmes and
promoting\ensuring efficiency. While these are the basic functions of the PRIs, the
matters like irrigation, watershed management and development and minor forest
produce come under the purview of the Eleventh Schedule which lays down the
functions of the PRIs .The Gram Vikas Samity in Haryana and the Vigilance
Committee in Himachal Pradesh encroach upon the statutory functions of the
panchayat bodies as spelt out in the Panchayat Acts of the respective states. The
Janmabhoomi (JB) programme tends to mobilize local people, the entire state
administrative machinery and draws upon all existing central and state government
schemes as resource for development work, thus substituting the functions of the
Gram Panchayat. Although the Sarpanch is to preside over the JB Gram Sabha, the
real player is the officer which has created another problem. The Gram Sabha
meetings convened by the Gram Panchayat have become less important because of
the realization on the part of the people that fewer benefits are available through
panchayats.
There is another set of parallel bodies in states like Maharastra where
traditional panchayats exist with different legitimising sources. In Maharastra, for
example, there exist village collectives called Gavki. The 'Gavki' is constituted
by the elite upper castes, the rich and undoubtedly, only the patriarchs of the
village, women are excluded. Before the amendment of the constitution these
bodies functioned alongside the elected panchayats. Unfortunately, they continue
till today. Lele narrates an interesting case of how a Gavki defied the panchayat.
The 'Gavki' decided to auction the sand from the riverbed and the money earned
was to be a contribution to its own fund. The GP raised objections to it and a
conflict arose. The persons, who raised objection to this issue, were the more
informed active villagers, some dalits and women, associated with a local NGO
who were in favour of the panchayats. However, in the long run they failed to go
against the Gavki. The Gavki has been found to be more effective in areas
where women or dalits are in power. Thus, as Lele rightly observes reservations
which intended to empower both these marginalised sections in rural governance
are being made ineffective by the established powers in the rural areas41
The general reaction against the parallel bodies is that they represent processes
external to the constitutionally mandated role of panchayats and enable
bureaucracies to override democratic bodies. Thus they pose serious threats to the
effective functioning of local self- governing institutions.
Actions of Some of the State Governments

Legislative actions and decisions of some of the State Governments are
undermining the process of democratic decentralisation. For example, the
Chhattisgarh government has passed an order prescribing basic literacy as the
minimum educational qualification for contesting a panchayat seat. This provision
has dangerous implications as it will reduce the democratic space for ordinary
people particularly poor women, minorities and the dalits, many of whom do not
have basic literacy. It seems repugnant to the spirit of the constitutional mandate of
panchayats as instruments of planning for economic development and social
41
Medha kotwal Lele, Local Government, Conflict of Interests and Issues of

Legetimation EPW, December, 22, 2001
28
Prabhat Datta
justice. It will thus impede the process of empowerment for a large mass of
population in view of the fact there is still a chunk of population without basic
literacy.42
Another interesting case of similar nature is the constitution of the Third State
Finance Commission by the Government of Kerala under the chairmanship of a
retired IAS officer who was Chief Secretary earlier and is currently involved with
the work of the Government of Kerala. The other two members are serving officers
Secretary, Expenditure and Secretary, Local Administration. The SFCs are
modelled on the Union Finance Commission. It is intended to take an objective,
enlightened and independent view in making recommendations in order to enable
local government institutions as institutions of self government as envisaged in the
73rd and 74th Amendments of the constitution. The SFCs are required to fix the size
of the divisible pool and to design methods for inter se distribution of the share of
the local bodies on an equitable and efficient basis. It also has to evaluate the
critical gap at various levels, taking into account the tax assignment, on the one
hand and financial responsibilities on the other. It has been argued that the
appointment of serving officers as chairperson or members might make it difficult
for members to play the desired role.
The District Rural Development Agencies (DRDAs), which handle crores of
rupees, should have disappeared from the scene following the 73rd amendment of
the Constitution. However there is no such sign of this. The battle continues in
some states. The DRDAs have been constituted as late as in 2002. Some State
Governments have refused to comply with the Central Government guidelines to
ensure that DRDAs are merged with the ZPs. The Central Government has failed
to enforce this.
Transparency: Right to Information

One of the objectives of democratic decentralization is to make governance
transparent. For that purpose a few state governments like Rajasthan and Madhya
Pradesh have taken legal initiatives, such as, granting the right to information.
What is happening in the field is a matter of really grave concern. The Majdoor
Kishan Shakti Sanghatan (MKSS) in Rajasthan led by Ms. Aruna Roy sought all
records pertaining to the five year development activities in the Janpad Panchayat
in February, 2002.43 The Gram Sevak refused to give information for 10 months.
Later on, the Gram Sabha passed a resolution that the information asked for could
not be provided because it would create tension in the area. The district officials
took the plea of the resolution and expressed their helplessness. It was argued that
the panchayat is a constitutional body. It is, therefore, not possible for officials to
intervene in order to compel the panchayat to furnish information. The MKSS met
the Chief Minister and the Panchayati Raj Minister without any effective results.
42
Rafi Ahmed A Retrograde Move by the Chhatishgarh Government, Panchayati Raj

Update, Sept.2004
43
Panchayati Raj Update (2001), March
29
Prabhat Datta
Concluding Observations
Democratic decentralisation in rural India today faces a lot of challenges from
within and without. These are strong enough to derail the engine of rural
decentralization, if suitable steps are not taken in time by the central government
and the union parliament, the state government and the legislature, the bureaucracy
and the social structure.44 Given this background, one has reasons to express doubts
about the future of constitutionally ordained PR bodies as institutions of selfgovernment and instruments of economic development and social justice.
There is nevertheless a certain silver lining. It has been realized by the Indian
State that another round of Constitutional amendment is necessary to strengthen
PRIs and for this purpose a high-powered committee consisting of selected Chief
Ministers has already been constituted. Second, there has been an increasing
interest of the people and the press in panchayati raj. Third, civil society
organizations across the country have started taking an active interest in the
promotion of democratic decentralization. These silver linings offer a ray of hope
and, if they work well, one may envisage PRIs emerging as institutions of
democratic power and governance with some strength and vigour in the days to
come.
44
G. Mathew (2000) Threats to Grassroots Democracy, The Hindu ; Feb.17
30
Prabhat Datta
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Centrally Sponsored Schemes

Panchayati Raj Update, August, 2003

HEIDELBERG PAPERS IN SOUTH ASIAN AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Devolution in the Conformity Legislations.

Panchayati Raj Update, Jan.2005

HEIDELBERG PAPERS IN SOUTH ASIAN AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

No. of Departments/subjects Transferred to

HEIDELBERG PAPERS IN SOUTH ASIAN AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Daman & Diu

Almost all the 29 subjects

HEIDELBERG PAPERS IN SOUTH ASIAN AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Executive orders not issued

18 functions devolved to GPs, 6 to ZPs

Only 5 subjects partially devolved

Subjects yet to be transferred

AM prepared by an NGO, Samarthan. Yet to be considered by

15 departments have issued orders delegating powers to panchayats

Fiscal transfer yet to be made

HEIDELBERG PAPERS IN SOUTH ASIAN AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

AM completed in respect of 32 departments. implementation yet to take

Orders for devolution of 3 departments issued

Orders issued in respect of 15 subjects for which AM has been completed

AM done for agriculture, soil conservation, PHED, elementary and

Instructions issued for devolving all subjects to panchayats but no actual

* (Except forest and drinking water supply)

HEIDELBERG PAPERS IN SOUTH ASIAN AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

HEIDELBERG PAPERS IN SOUTH ASIAN AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Cited by Richard Mahapatra (2003) Toothless at 10, Down to Earth, January

HEIDELBERG PAPERS IN SOUTH ASIAN AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Administrative Autonomy of the PRIs

People's Participation: The Gram Sabhas

Nilkanta Rath (2004), op. cit

HEIDELBERG PAPERS IN SOUTH ASIAN AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Rajni Kothari, State Against Democracy: In Search of Human Governance, Ajanta

Cited by K. Jayalakshi in her paper Role of Gram Sabhas in Betul district in MP

N. Webster (1992) Panchayati Raj and Decentralisation of Development Planning in

Prabhat Datta with Panchali Sen

(2003) Women in Panchayats, Dasgupta & Co.,

HEIDELBERG PAPERS IN SOUTH ASIAN AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Findings from Some Cross-State Studies

HEIDELBERG PAPERS IN SOUTH ASIAN AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Panchayati Raj Update, May, 2008