Apollo 11

=-.
MSC-00171
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 11 M ISOS[ON REPORT
:Jj
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER

HOUSTON,TEXAS
N OVEMBER 1969
APOLLO SPACECRAFT FLIGHT HISTORY
Mission
S12acecraft
Description
Launch date
Launch site
PA-l
BP-6
First pad abort
Nov. 7, 1963
White Sands
Missile Range,
N. M ex.
A-001
BP-12
Transonic abort
Ma;y 13, 1964
White Sands
Missile Range,
N. Mex.
AS-101
BP-13
Nominal launch and

exit environment
Ma;y 28, 1964
Cape Kennedy,
Fla.
AS-102
BP-15
Nominal launch and

exit environment
Sept. 18, 1964
Cape Kennedy,
Fla.
A-002
BP-23
MaximUIIl dynamic
pressure abort
Dec. 8, 1964
White Sands
Missile Range,
N. Mex.
AS-103
BP-16
Micrometeoroid
experiment
Feb. 16, 1965
Cape Kennedy,
Fla.
A-003
BP-22
L ow-altitude abort
(planned highaltitude abort)
Ma;y 19, 1965
White Sands
Missile Range,
N. Mex.
AS-104
BP-26
Micrometeoroid
experiment and
service module
RCS launch
environment
Ma;y 25 , 1965
Cape Kennedy,
Fla
PA-2
BP-23A
Second pad abort
June 29, 1965
White Sands
Missile Range,
N. Mex.
AS-105
BP-9A
Micrometeoroid
experiment and
service module
RCS launch
environment
July 30, 1965
Cape Kennedy,
Fla.
A-004
SC-002
Power-on tumbling
boundary abort
Jan. 20, 1966
White Sands
Missile Range,
N. Mex.
AS-201
SC-009
Supercircular
entry with high
heat rate
Feb. 26, 1966
Cape Kennedy,
Fla.
AS-202
SC-Oll
Supercircular
entry with high
heat load
Aug. 25, 1966
Cape Kennedy,
Fla.
..;;__
(Continued inside back cover)
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MSC-00171
APOLLO 11 MISSION REPORT
PREPARED BY
Mis s i on Evaluat ion Te am
APPROVED BY
L.c.r--
George M. Low
Manager , Apollo Spacecraft Program
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATI ON

MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
HOUSTON , TEXAS
November 1969
-- --___...
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" H ouston, the Eagle has landed."
iii
CONTENTS
Section
1.0
SUMMARY
1-1
2.0
INTRODUCTION
2-1
3.0
MISSION DESCRIPTION
3-1
4.0
PILOTS' REPORT
4-1
4.1
PRELAUNCH ACTIVITIES
4-1
4.2
LAUNCH
4-1
4.3
EARTH ORBIT COAST AND TRANSLUNAR INJECTION
4-1
4.4
TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING
4- 2
4.5
'TRANSLUNAR COAST
4-2
4.6
LUNAR ORBIT INSERTION
4- 3
4.7
LUNAR MODULE CHECKOUT
4-4
4. 8
DESCENT PREPARATION .
4-4
4.9
UNDOCKING AND SEPARATION
4-7
4 . 10
LUNAR MODULE DESCENT
4-7
4 . 11
COMMAND MODULE SOLO ACTIVITIES
4-9
4 . 12
LUNAR SURFACE OPERATIONS
4-10
4 . 13
LAUNCH PREPARATION
4-16
4 . 14
ASCENT
4-17
4.15
RENDEZVOUS
4-17
4 . 16
COMMAND MODULE DOCKING
4-18
4 . 17
TRANSEARTH INJECTION
4-19
4 . 18
TRANSEARTH COAST
4-19
4 . 19
ENTRY .
4-20
4 . 20
RECOVERY
4-20
LUNAR DESCENT AND ASCENT
5-1
5.1
DESCENT TRAJECTORY LOGIC
5-1
5.2
PREPARATION FOR POWERED DESCEN1
5-2
5.3
POWERED DESCENT .
r .#-
.......
Page
'"
"'
5.0
5 -4
iv
Section
Page
5.4
LANDING DYNAMICS
5.5
POSTLANDING SPACECRAFT OPERATIONS
5-7
5.6
ASCENT
5-8
5.7
RENDEZVOUS
5-10
5-6
6.0
COMMUNICATIONS
6-1
7.0
TRAJECTORY
7-1
7.1
LAUNCH PHASE
7-1
7.2
EARTH PARKING ORBIT
7-1
7.3
TRANSLUNAR INJECTION
7-1
MANEUVER AN ALYSIS .
7-2
COMMAND MODULE ENTRY
7-4
7.6
SERVICE MODULE ENTRY
7-5
7.7
LUNAR ORBIT TARGETING
7-5
7.8
LUNAR ORBIT NAVIGATION
7.4
7.5
8.0
9.0
COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE
----- .
"'--
(o
7-6
8-1
8.1
STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS
8-1
8.2
ELECTRICAL POWER
8-4
8.3
CRYOGENIC STORAGE
8-5
8.4
VHF RANGING .
8-5
8.5
INSTRUMENTATION
8-5
8.6
GUIDANCE , NAVIGATION , AND CONTROL
8-6
8. 7
REACTION CONTROL
8-19
8.8
SERVICE PROPULSION
8-19
8.9
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
8-23
8 . 10
CREW STATION
8-24
8 . 11
CONSUMABLES
8-25
LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE
9- 1
9.1
9-1
9.2
THERMAL CONTROL .
9-1
9.3
ELECTRICAL POWER
9-2
-.
Section
Page
9 .4
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
9-2
9 5
INS TRUMENTATION
9-3
9 .6
GUIDANCE AND CONTROL
9-3
9 .7
REACTION CONTROL
9 -19
9.8
DESCENT PROPULSION
9 -22
9 9
ASCENT PROPULSION .
9 -27
9 . 10
9 -29
9 . 11
RADAR .
9 . 12
CREW STATION
9 -30
9 . 13
CONSUMABLES
9-30
9 -29
10 . 0
EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT PERFORMANCE
11 . 0
THE LUNAR SURFACE .
12 . 0
-.
13 . 0
10-1
11-1
11 . 1
LUNAR GEOLOGY EXPERIMENT
11-3
11 . 2
LUNAR SURFACE MECHANICS EXPERIMENT
11-12
11 . 3
EXAMINATION OF LUNAR SAMPLES
11-14
n.4
PASSIVE SEISMIC EXPERIMENT
11-17
11 . 5
LASER RANGING RETRQ-REFLECTOR EXPERIMENT
11-22
11 . 6
SOLAR WIND COMPOSITION EXPERIMENT
11-23
11 . 7
PHOTOGRAPHY .
11-23
BIOMEDICAL EVALUATION
12-1
12 . 1
BIOINS TRUMENTATION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA
12-1
12 . 2
MEDICAL OBSERVATIONS
12-2
12 . 3
EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY
12-5
12 . 4
PHYSICAL XAMINATIONS
12-5
12 . 5
LUNAR CONTAMINATION AND QUARAN'nNE
12-6
MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE
13-1
13 . 1
FLIGHT CONTROL
13-1
13 . 2
NETWORK PERFORMANCE
13-2
13 . 3
RECOVERY OPERATIONS
13-3
vi
Section
14.0
Page
ASSESSMENT OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
14-1
14.1
LOCATION OF LANDED LUNAR MODULE
14-1
14.2
LUNAR FIELD GEOLOGY
14-2
15.0
LAUNCH VEHICLE SUMMARY
15-1
16.0
ANOMALY SUMMARY .
16-1
17.0
16.1
CO MMAND AND SERVICE MODULES
16-1
16.2
LUNAR MODULE
16-9
16.3
GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED EQUIPMENT
16-21
CONCLUSIONS .
17-1
APPENDIX A - VEHICLE DESCRIPTIONS
A-1
A.1
COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES
A.2
LUNAR MODULE
A.3
EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT
A-5
A.4
EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT
A-8
A.5
LAUNCH VEHICLE
A-10
A.6
MASS PROPERTIES
A-10
A-1
A-1
APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES
B-1
APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING
C-1
APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY
D-1
APPENDIX E - GLOSSARY
E-1
vii
SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ampere
ac
alternating current
AGS
abort guidance system
A-h
ampere-hour
ALDS
Apollo launch data system
arc sec
arc second
ARIA
Apollo range instrumentation aircraft
BDA
Bermuda
Btu
British thermal unit
CAPCOM
capsule communicator
CATS
command and telemetry system
c.d.t.
central daylight time
em
centimeter
CMC
command module computer
CRO
Carnarvon, Australia
csM
command and service modules
CYI
Canary Islands
down
dB
decibel (also used as dBm)
de
direct current
deg
degree
D/T
delayed time
east
e.s.t.
eastern standard time
FM
frequency modulation
f't /sec
feet per second
gravity of earth
G&N
guidance and navigation
GD S
Goldstone, California
G.m. t.
Greenwich mean time
viii
HAW
Haw aii
hr
hour
HSK
Honeysuckle, Australia
Hz
hertz
inertia
in-lb
inch-pound
kpps
kilopulses per second
kW-h
kilowatt-hour
lb /hr
pounds per hour
lb/ft2
pounds per square foot
LGC
lunar module guidance computer
LM
lunar module
mega-
MAD
Madrid, Spain
mERU
milli-earth rate unit
mg
milligram
MILA
Merritt Island Launch Area, Florida
min
minute
mm
millimeter
msec
millisecond
MSFN
Manned Space Flight Network
north
NA
not available
pressure
PAM
pulse amplitude modulation
PCM
pulse code modulation
PM
phase modulation
ppm
parts per million
psf
pounds per square foot
psi
pounds per square inch
dynamic pressure
RED
Redstone tracking ship
( transducer location )
ix
REFSMMAT
REFerence Stable Memb er MATrix
s outh
S-I C , S-II ,
S-IVB
fir s t, se cond , and th ird s tages of S aturn V launch vehi cle
temperature ( tr an s ducer location )
TAN
Tananarive
us
Uni te d States
volt
VAN
Vanguard tracking ship
VHF
very hi gh frequency
vox
voice-operate d transmi tter
wes t
W-h
watt-hour
X, Y,
spacecraft axes
degrees Centigrade
degrees Fahrenheit
a
j.l
angle of attack
micro-
1-1
1.0
SUMMARY
The purpose of the Apollo 11 m i s s i on was to land men on the lunar

surface and t o return them s afely t o e arth . The crew were Nei l A . Arm
stron g , Commander ; Mi chael Collins , Command Module Pi lot ; and Edwin E .
Aldrin , Jr. , Lunar Module Pi lot .
The space vehicle was laun ched from Kennedy Space Cente r , Flori da ,
at 8 : 32 : 00 a . m . , e . s . t . , July 16 , 1969 . The act ivities during e arth
orb i t checkout , t ranslunar inj e ct i on , t ranspos ition and docking , space
craft e j e ct i on , and translun ar coast were s imi lar to those of Apollo 10 .
Only one mi dcourse corre ct i on , performed at ab out 2 7 hours elapsed t ime ,
was required during t rans lunar coas t .
The spacecraft was insert e d into lunar orb i t at ab out 76 hours , and
the circulari z at i on maneuver was performed two revoluti ons later . Ini ti al
checkout of lunar module systems was s at i sfactory , and after a planned
res t peri od , the Commander and Lunar Module Pi lot entered the lunar module
to prepare for des cent .
The two spacecraft were undocked at ab out 100 h ours , followed by
s eparat i on of the comman d and s ervi ce modules from the lunar module .
Des cent orb i t insert i on was performed at approximately 101-l/2 h ours , and
powered des c ent t o the lunar surface b egan about 1 h our lat e r . Operat i on
of the gui dan ce and des cent propulsion systems was nominal . The lunar
module was maneuvered manually approximat ely 1100 feet downrange from the
nominal landing point during the final 2-1/2 minut e s of des cent . The
spacecraft landed in the Sea of Tranquillity at 10 2 : 45:40 . The l anding
coordinates were 0 degrees 41 minutes 15 s e conds north latitude and 23 de
grees 26 minutes e ast longitude referenced t o lunar m ap ORB-II-6 ( 100 ) ,
first edition , December 1967 . During the first 2 h ours on the surface ,
the two crewmen performed a postlanding checkout o f all lunar module sys
tems . A fterwards , they ate their fi rst meal on the moon and elect e d t o
perform the surface operat i ons earlier than planned.
Conside rab le time was deliberately devote d to checkout and donning
of the back-mounte d por t ab le life s upport and oxygen purge systems . The
Commander egressed through the forward hatch and deployed an equipment
module in the de s cent stage . A c amera in thi s module provided live tele
vision coverage of the Comm ander des cending the ladder to the s urface ,
with first contact made at 109:2 4 : 15 ( 9 : 56 : 15 p . m . e . s . t . , July 20 , 1969 ) .
The Lunar Module Pi lot egressed s oon thereafter , and b oth crewmen us ed
the initial peri od on. the surface to be come acclimat e d to the reduced
gravity and unfamili ar s urface c onditions . A contingency sample was t aken
from the surface , and the televis i on camera was deploye d so that most of
the lunar module was include d in its view fi eld. The crew activat ed the
s cient i fi c experiments , whi ch included a s olar wind detect or , a pas sive
l-2
s ei smometer , and a las er retro-refle cto r . The Lun ar Module Pi lot evalu
at ed his ab i lity t o operate and m ove ab out , and was ab le to trans late
rapi dly and with confiden ce . Forty-s even pounds of lunar surface materi al
were collecte d t o b e returned for an alys i s . The surface explorati on was
concluded in the allotte d time of 2-l/2 hours , and the crew reentered the
lunar module at lll-l/2 hours .
Ascent preparat i on was c onducted effi ciently , an d the as cent stage
li fted off the surface at 124-l/4 h ours . A nominal firing of the as cent
engine place d the vehi cle into a 45- by 9-mile orbit . After a rende zvous
s equence similar t o that of Apollo 10 , the two spacecraft were docked at
12 8 hours. Following t ran s fe r of the crew , the ascent stage was jetti
soned , and the command and s ervi ce modules were prepared for trans earth
inje cii=.
The return flight started with a 150 -se c ond firing of the s ervi ce
propuls i on engine during the 31st lun ar revoluti on at 135-l/2 hours . As
in trans lunar flight , only one mi dcours e corre cti on was require d , and
passive thermal control was exerci s ed for most of trans earth coast . In
clement weather nece s s it at e d moving the landing point 215 mi les downrange .
The entry phase was n ormal , and the command module lande d in the P ac i fi c
Ocean at 19 5-l/4 hours . The landing coordinates , as determined from the
onb oard computer, were 13 degrees 19 minutes north lat it ude an d 169 de
grees 09 minutes west longitude .
After landin g , the crew donned b i ologi cal i s ol at i on garment s . They
were then retrieved by heli copter and t aken to the primary recovery ship ,
USS Hornet . The crew and lunar materi al s amples were placed in the
Mob i le Quarantine Facility for t ransport to the Lunar Receiving Lab ora
tory in Houston . The command module was t aken ab oard the Hornet ab out
3 hours after landing .
With the completi on of Apollo 11 , the national object ive of landing
men on the moon and returning them s afe ly to e arth b efore the end of the
de c ade h ad b een accomplished.
2-l
2.0
INTRODUCTION
The Apollo ll mi s s i on was the eleventh i n a s eries of flights using

Apollo flight hardware and was the fi rs t lunar landing mi ssion of the
Apollo Progr am . I t was als o the fi fth manned flight o f the command and
s ervi ce modules and the third manne d flight of the lunar module . The pur
pos e of the mi s s i on was to perform a manned lunar landing and return s afely
to earth .
Becaus e of the excellent performance of the entire space craft, only
the systems performance that s i gnifi cantly differed from that of previ ous
mis s ions i s reported. The ascent, des cent, and landing portions of the
mi ssion are reported in se ction 5, and the lunar surface activities are
reported in section 11 .
A complete analysis of all flight data i s not pos sible within the
time allowed for preparation of this report . Therefore, report s upple
ments will be published for the guidance and control sys tem, propul s i on,
the biomedical evaluation, the lunar surface photography, the lunar s ample
analysis, and the traj ectory analys i s. Other supplements will be publi sh-
ed as need is identifi e d .
I n this report, all actual times are e laps ed time from r ange .zero,
established as the i ntegral s e cond be fore lift-of f . Range zero for thi s
miss ion was 13:32 : 0 0 G .m . t . , July 16 , 1969. All references to mile age
dis tance are in nauti cal miles.
3-l
3.0
MISSION DESCRIPTION
The Apollo 11 mission accomplished the basic mission of the Apollo

Program; that is, to land tw o men on the lunar surface and return them
safely to earth. As a part of this first lunar landing, three basic
experiment packages were deployed, lunar material samples were collected,
and surface photographs were taken. Two of the experiments were a part
of the early Apollo scientific experiment package which was developed for
deployment on the lunar surface. The sequence of events and the flight
plan of the Apollo ll mission are shown in table 3-I and figure 3-l, re
spectively.
The Apollo 11 space vehicle was launched on July 16, 1969, at
8:32 a.m. e.s.t., as planned. The spacecraft and S-IVB were inserted
into a 100.7- by 99.2-mile earth parking orbit. After a 2-1/2-hour
checkout period, the spacecraft/S-IVB combination was injected into the
translunar phase of the mission. Trajectory parameters after the trans
lunar injection firing were nearly perfect, with the velocity within
1.6 ft/sec of that planned. Only one of the four options for midcourse
corrections during the translunar phase was exercised. This correction
was made with the service propulsion system at approximately 26-l/2 hours
and provided a 20.9 ft/sec velocity change. During the remaining periods
of free-attitude flight, passive thermal control was used to maintain
spacecraft temperatures within desired limits. The Commander and Lunar
Module Pilot transferred to the lunar module during the translunar phase
to make an initial inspection and preparations for systems checks shortly
after lunar orbit insertion.
The spacecraft was inserted into a 60- by 169.7-mile lunar orbit at
approximately 76 hours. Four hours later, the lunar orbit circulariza
tion maneuver was performed to place the spacecraft in a 65.7- by
53.8-mile orbit. The Lunar Module Pilot entered the lunar module at
about 81 hours for initial power-up and systems checks. After the plan
ned sleep period was completed at 93-l/2 hours, the crew donned their
suits, transferred to the lunar module, and made final preparations for
descent to the lunar surface. The lunar module was undocked on time at
about 100 hours. After the exterior of the lunar module was inspected
by the Command Module Pilot, a separation maneuver was performed with the
service module reaction control system.
The descent orbit insertion maneuver was performed with the descent
propulsion system at 101-1/2 hours. Trajectory parameters following this
maneuver were as planned, and the powered descent initiation was on time
at 102-l/2 hours. The maneuver lasted approximately 12 minutes, with
engine shutdown occurring almost simultaneously with the lunar landing
in the Sea of Tranquillity. The coordinates of the actual landing point
3-2
were 0 degree 41 minutes 15 seconds north latitude and 23 degrees 26 min

utes east longitude, compared with the planned landing point of 0 degree
43 minutes 53 seconds north latitude and 23 degrees 38 minutes 51 seconds
east longitude. These coordinates are referenced to Lunar Map ORB-II-6
(100), first edition, dated December 1967.
A 2-hour postlanding checkout was completed, followed by a partial
power-down of the spacecraft. A crew rest period was planned to precede
the extravehicular activity to explore the lunar surface. However, the
crew elected to perform the extravehicular portion of the mission prior
to the sleep period because they were not overly tired and were adjusting
easily to the l/6 gravity. After the crew donned their portable life sup
port systems and completed the required checkouts, the Commander egressed
at about 10 9 hours. Prior to descending the ladder, the Commander deployed
the equipment module in the descent stage. The television camera located
in the module operated satisfactorily and provided live television cover
age of the Commander's descent to the lunar surface. The Commander col
lected the contingency lunar material samples, and approximately 20 min
utes later, the Lunar Module Pilot egressed and dual exploration of the
lunar surface began.
During this exploration period, the television camera was deployed
and the American flag was raised on the lunar surface. The solar wind
experiment was also deployed for later retrieval. Both crewmen evalu
ated their mobility on the lunar surface, deployed the passive seismic
and laser retro-reflector experiments, collected about 47 pounds of lunar
material, and obtained photographic documentation of their activities
and the conditions around them. The crewmen reentered the lunar m odule
after about 2 hours 14 minutes of exploration.
After an 8-hour rest period, the crew began preparations for ascent.
Lift-off from the lunar surface occurred on time at 124:22:00.8. The
spacecraft was inserted into a 48.0- by 9.4-mile orbit from which a ren
dezvous sequence similar to that for Apollo 10 was. successfully performed.
Approximately 4-1/2 hours after lunar module ascent, the command
module performed a docking maneuver, and the two spacecraft were docked.
The ascent stage was jettisoned in lunar orbit and the command and
service modules were prepared for transearth injection at 135-l/2 hours.
The activities during transearth coast were similar to those during
translunar flight. The service module was separated from the command
module 15 minutes before reaching the entry interface at 400 000 feet
altitude. After an automatic entry sequence and landing system deploy
ment, the command module landed in the Pacific Ocean at 195-1/2 hours.
The postlanding procedures involving the primary recovery ship, USS Hornet,
included precautions to avoid back-contamination by any lunar organisms,
and the crew and samples were placed in quarantine.
3-3
After reaching the Manned Spacecraft Center, the spacecraft, crew,
and samples entered the Lunar Receiving Laboratory quarantine area for
continuation of the postlanding observation and analyses. The crew and
spacecraft were released from quarantine on August 10 , 1969 , after no
evidence of abnormal medical reactions was observed.
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r
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3-4
TABLE 3-I . - SEQUENCE O F EVENTS
Event
Time ,
hr : mi n : s ec
Range zero - 13 : 32 : 00 G . m . t . , July 16 , 1969

Lift-off
00 : 00 : 00 . 6
S-IC outboard engine cuto ff
00 : 0 2 : 41 . 7
S-II engine ignition ( comman d )
00 : 0 2 : 4 3 . 0
Launch es c ape tower j e ttison
0 0 : 0 3 : 17 . 9
S-II engine cutoff
00 : 09 : 0 8 . 3
S-IVB engine ignition ( command )
00 : 09 : 12 . 2
S -IVB engine cuto ff
00 : 11 : 39 . 3
Trans lunar inj ection maneuver
0 2 : 4 4 : 16 . 2*
Command and s ervi c e module/S-IVB s eparation
0 3 : 17 : 0 4 . 6
First docking
03 :24 : 0 3 . 1
Spacecraft ej ection
0 4 : 16 : 5 9 . 1
Separat ion maneuver ( from S-IVB )
04 : 40 : 0 1 . 8*
First midcour s e correction
26 : 44 : 5 8 . 7*
Lunar orb it ins ertion
75 : 49 : 50 . 4*
Lunar orb it circulari zation
80 : 11 : 36 . 8*
Undocking
100 : 12 : 00
Separation maneuver ( fr om lunar module )
100 : 39 : 5 2 . 9*
Des cent orbit ins ertion
101 : 36 : 14 *
Powered de s cent initiation
102 : 33 : 0 5 . 2*
Lunar landing
102 : 4 5 : 39 . 9
Egres s ( h atch opening )
109 : 07 : 33
Ingress (hatch clo s ing)
111:39 : 13
Lunar lift-off
124 : 2 2 : 0 0 . 8*
Coelliptic s equence initi ation
125 : 19 : 36 *
Cons tant differential height maneuver
126 : 17 : 49 . 6*
Terminal phas e initiation
127 : 0 3 : 51 . 8*
*Engine ignition time .
3-5
TABLE 3-I. - SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - Concluded
Event
Time,
hr:mi n : s e c
Docking
128:03:00
Ascent stage j ett i s on
130:09:31. 2
Separat ion maneuve r ( from ascent stage )
130:30:01*
Trans earth inj ect i on maneuver
135:23:42. 3*
Second midcours e correction
150:29:57. 4*
Command module /service module s eparat i on
194:49:12.7
Ent ry interface
195:03:05. 7
Landing
195:18:35
*Engine ignition time.
3-6
NASAS-693700
Ground elapsed time
US
CYI
Day
Night
L ift-off
Ground elapsed time
11
MSFN
l nsertion
Terminate battery B charge

16 hours charging time)
Systems checks
TAN
Eat
CRO
12
HSK
us
CYI
Extend docking probe
Prepare for translunar injection

maneuver
22
TAN
CRO
Translunar injection maneuver

Eat
23
Initiate battery A charge
CSM/SIllB separation
Docking
MSFN
24
Spacecraft ejection
Terminate passive thermal control
Fuel cell purge
Evasive maneuver
TV !GDSl
Initiate passive thermal control
tal 0 to 25 hours.
25
Fi gure 3!. Flight plan activities.
3-7
NASAS-69-3701
Ground elapsed time
i'
26
Day
Night
MSFN Terminate battery A charge
Ground elapsed time
34 MSFN
Midcourse correction maneuver
Day
Nilil
TV
Fuel cell purge

27
35
Eat
28
t nitiate cabin purge
36
Eat
29
37
Terminate battery A c harge
Sleep
TV IGDSl
Terminate cabin purge
48
31
Initiate battery 8 charge
+
Eat
-.l
/;-Terminate battery 8 charge

34
52
(b) 26 to 52 hOurs.
Figure 3-l.- Continued.
Fuel cell purge
3-8
NASA-S-69-3702
Ground elapsed time
i'
Day
Night
52 MSFN
Ddl'
Ni<Jhl
Ground e lapsed time
i' 59
MSFN
Eat
55
Eat

TV
Commander and Lunar Module

Pilot transfer to LM
60
Sleep
..L
LM inspection
56
11
Fuel cell purge
f
Eat
57
Waste water dump
12
Prepare for lunar orbit insertion
58
Commander and Lunar Module

Pilot transfer to CSM
75
59
76
{c) 52 to 76 hours.
Figure 3-1.- Continued.
First lunar orbit insertion maneuver
3-9
NASA-S-69-3703
Lunar revolution count tCSMl
"'
Ground elapsed time
76
Day
Night
' f
Lunar revolution count tCSMI

ound elap>ed time
81
MSFN
77
MSFN
Lunar Module Pilot transfer to LM
land check systems
83
Lunar Module Pilot transfer to CSM
78
84
Eat
MSFN
TV
79
MSFN
..... <

MSFN
3
81
-1
Eat
Fuel cell purge

Sleep
_::I._
Second lunar orbit insertion

maneuver
.
Termtnate battery A charge
85
,..
80
Waste water dump
t
1
94
(dl 76 to 95 hours.
T
Eat
10
95
Figure 3-l.- Continued.
3-10
NASA-S-69-3704
Lunar revolution count (CSMl
T _r-
Lunar revolution count ICSMl
ound elapsed time
Day
Night
95
MSFN
Commander and Lunar Module Pilot

transfer to LM
LM systems checks
_l
'
Ground elapsed time
liay
Night
... 102
MSFN MSFN
ICSMl ILMl
Powered descent initiation
14
Lunar landing
Postlanding activities
97
103
Lunar Module Pilot transfer to

CSM to don suit
Lunar Module Pilot transfer to LM

LM systems check
98
15
105
Waste water dump

1 nitiate battery B charge
100
106
MSFN
ICSMl
16
MSFN Undock
Separation maneuver
101
109
r '" "'
Prepare for egress to
-Eat
__:(_
Begin extravehicular activity
Commander egresse s from LM
-Lunar Module Pilot

egresses from LM
Descent orbit insertion maneuver
Lunar surface activity

102
18
110
(e) 95 to 110 hours.

3-ll
NASA-S -69-3705

Ground elapsed time
1
T
., . '"""T
MSFN Lunar surface activitie

s
IL
110
,.,. .... ...
18
Day
Night
ll
'
Ground elapsed time
't 122
Day
Night
MSFN MSFN
ICSMl ILMl
Terminate extravehicular
activities
24
Eat
Eat
ILMl
_l_
ICSMl
112
MSFN
iCSMl
Lunar photography
Fuel cell purge
19
113
Fuel cell purge
114
20
__.
,,
__,.-
MSFN
ICSMI
l l
1
+
121
23
Lift-off from lunar surface
Orbit insertion
Eat
ILMI
25
125
Equipment jettison from LM
Coelliptic sequence
initiation maneuver
Sleep
Sleep
126
122
MSFN
26
Constant differential
height maneuver
Eat
ICSMI
24
124 MSFN
ICSMl
127
Ill 110 to 127 hours.
3- 12
NASA-S-69-3706
'

Ground elapsed time
...
127
Terminal phase initiation
Ground elapsed time
Day
Night
... 133
29
First midcourse correction
26
.J
I

Day
Night
Second midcourse correction
Fuel cell purge

30
_L
MSFN
128
Docking
27
MSFN
135
Transearlh injection maneuver
137
Commander transfer to CSM
-1
Eat
MSFN
Lunar Module Pilot transfer to CSM
130
138
LM jettison
CSM separation maneuver
131
29
148
Eat
MSFN
133

Fuel cell purge
lgl 127 to 149 hours.
1
1
Eat
149
Figure 3-l. - Conlin ued.
NASA-S-69-3707
Ground elapsed time
149 MSFN
J::Terminate passive thermal control
Day
Night
Waste water d u m p
Midcourse correction maneuver
!51
fl
3-13
::;
::
ed time
s
Day
Night
!59
Eat
!53
, "'"" ... ,... ".'
.,
!54
."T
160
Eat
S leep
j_
171
Initiate battery B charge
Fuel cell purge
Waste water d u mp
Terminate battery A charge
!55
.r
172
r
l
Eat
Termi nate passive thermal control
TV
!56
L, l
I hi !49 to 175 hours.
3-14
NASA-S-69-3708
Ground elapsed time
't 175
MSFN
Day
Night
Ground elapsed time
'tl90
T
1
Eat
176
Eat
191
Ter minate passive thermal control
TV
1
195
178
Initiate passive ther mal control
CM/SM separation
Entry i nterface
Landing
181
196
Eat
Terminate battery B charge
182
Sleep
t.l
Day
Night
MSFN
j_
lil 175 to 196 hours.
Figure 3-l.- Concluded.
Commander Neil A. Armstrong, Command Module Pilot Michael Collins, and Lunar Module Pilot Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr.
4 -1
4.0
4.1
PILOTS' REPORT
PRELAUNCH ACTIVITIES
All prelaunch systems operations and checks were completed on time

and without difficulty . The configuration of the environmental control
system included operation of the secondary glycol loop and provided com
fortable cockpit temperature condit ions .
4 .2
LAUNCH
Lift-off occurred precisely on time with igniti on accompani ed by a

low rumbling nois e and moderate vibration that increased significantly
at the moment of hold-down releas e . The vibration magnitudes decrease d
appreciably at the time tower clearance was veri fie d . The yaw , pitch ,
and roll guidance-program sequences occurred as expected. No unusual
s ounds or vibrations were noted while pass ing through the region of max
imum dynamic pressure and the angle of attack remained near zero . The
S-IC/S-II staging sequence occurre d smoothly and at the expected time .
The entire S-II stage flight was remarkably smooth and quiet and the
.l aunch es cape tower and boost protective cover were j ettisoned normally .
The mixture ratio shift was accompanied by a noticeable acceleration
decrease . The S-II /S-IVB st aging sequence occurred smoothly and approx
imately at the predicted time . The S-IVB ins ert i on traj ectory was com
pleted without incident and the automatic guidance shut down yielded an
insertion-orbit ephemeris , from the command module computer , of 102 . 1 by
103 . 9 miles . Communicat i on between crew members and the Network were
excellent throughout all stages of launch .
4.3
EARTH ORBIT COAST AND TRANSLUNAR INJECTION
The ins ertion checklist was completed and a series of spacecraft

systems checks disclosed no abnormalit ies . All tests of the navigation
equipment , including alignments and drift checks , were s atis factory .
The service module reacti on control thrusters were fired in the minimum
impuls e mode and verified by telemetry .
No abnormalities were noted during preparation for translunar injec
tion . Initiat i on of trans lunar inj ection was accompanied by the proper
onboard indications and the S-IVB propellant tanks were repres suri zed on
s chedule .
4-2
The S-IVB stage reignited on time at 2:44:16 without ignition or
guidance transients. An apparent 0.5- to 1.5-degree pitch-attitude error
on the attitude indicators was not confirmed by the command module com
puter, which indicated that the attitude and attitude rate duplicated the
reference trajectory precisely (see section 8.6). The guided cutoff
yielded a velocity very close to that expected, as indicated by the on
board computer. The entry monitor system further confirmed that the for
ward velocity error for the translunar injection maneuver was within
3. 3 ft/sec.
4.4
TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING
The digital autopilot was used for the transposition maneuver sched
uled to begin 20 seconds after spacecraft separation from the S-IVB. The
time delay was to allow the command and service modules to drift about
70 feet prior to thrusting back toward the S-IVB. Separation and the be
ginning of transposition were on time. In order to assure a pitch-up
maneuver for better visibility through the hatch window, pitch axis con
trol was retained in a manual mode until after a pitch-up rate of approx
imately 1 deg/sec was attained. Control was then given to the digital
autopilot to continue the combined pitch/roll maneuver. However, the
autopilot stopped pitching up at this point, and it was necessary to re
establish manual control (see section 8.6 for more discussion of this
subject). This cycle was repeated several times before the autopilot
continued the transposition maneuver. Consequently, additional time and
reaction control fuel (18 pounds above preflight nominal) were required,
and the spacecraft reached a maximum separation distance of at least
100 feet from the S-IVB.
The subsequent closing maneuvers were made normally under digital
autopilot control, using a 2-deg/sec rate and 0.5-degree deadband control
mode. Contact was made at an estimated 0.1 ft/sec, without side velocity,
but with a small roll misalignment. Subsequent tunnel inspection revealed
a roll index angle of 2.0 degrees and a contact mark on the drogue 4 inches
long. Lunar module extraction was normal.
4.5
TRANSLUNAR COAST
The S-IVB was targeted to achieve a translunar injection cutoff

velocity 6.5 ft/sec in excess of that required to place it on the desired
free-return trajectory. This overspeed was then cancelled by a service
propulsion correction of 20 ft/sec at 23 minutes after spacecraft ejec
tion.
4-3
Two peri ods of ci s lunar mi dcours e navigat i on, using the command
module compute r program ( P 23 ) , were planne d and execut e d . The first,
at 6 hours, was primarily to estab li sh the apparent horiz on alt itude for
opt i cal marks in the computer. The first determinat i on was begun at a
di stance of approximately 30 000 miles, whi le the s e cond, at 24 h ours,
was designed to accurately determine the opti c al b i as e rrors. Excess
time and fuel were expended during the first peri od becaus e of di ffi culty
in loc at ing the sub stellar poi nt of each st ar. Ground-supplied gimb al
angle s were us ed rathe r than those from the onb oard computer . This t e ch
ni que was devi s e d because c omputer s ol ut i ons are un constrained ab out the
opti cs shaft axi s ; there fore, the comput e r i s unable to predi ct i f lunar
module struct ure might b lock the line of s i ght to the star . The ground
supplied angles prevente d lunar module struct ure from occult i ng the star,
but were not accurat e in loc ating the pre c i s e s ubstellar point, as evi
denced by the fact that the s extant reti cle pattern was n ot parallel to
the horizon . Additi onal maneuve rs were required to achi eve a parallel
reti cle pattern ne ar the point of hori zon-st ar superp osition.
The s econd period of navigat i on me asurements was le s s di ffi cult,
largely b e c ause the e arth appeare d much smaller and trim maneuvers to the
sub stellar point could be made much more qui ckly and economi cally.
The digital aut opi lot was used to initiate the pas sive thermal con
trol mode at a pos it i ve roll rat e of 0 . 3 deg /se c, with the posit ive lon
gitudi nal axis of the space craft pointed toward the e clipti c n orth pole
.during trans lunar coast ( the eclipt i c s outh pole was the di rect i on used
during trans earth coast ) . After the roll rat e was estab lished, thrus ter
firing was prevented by turning off all 16 switches for the s ervi ce mod
ule thrusters . In general, this method was high ly successful in that it
maintained a s ati s factory space craft attitude for very long periods of
time and allowed the crew to s leep without fe ar of either entering gimb al
lock or encountering unacceptab le thermal condit i ons . However, a refine
ment to the procedure in the form of a new c ompute r routine is requ i re d
to make it foolproof from an operat or ' s viewpoint.
[Editor's not e : A
new routine ( rout ine 6 4 ) i s av ai lab le for Apollo 12 .] On s everal occa
s i ons and for s everal di fferent reasons, an incorrect computer-entry
procedure was us ed, resulting in a s li ght waste of react i on control pro
pellant s . Sat i s fact ory plat form alignment s ( program P 5 2, opti on 3 ) using
the opti cs in the res olve d mode and me dium speed were possible whi le ro
t ating at 0 . 3 deg/sec.
4.6
LUNAR ORBIT INSERTION
The space craft was ins ert e d into a 169 . 9 - by 60 . 9-mile orbit b as ed
on the onboard computer with a 6-minute s ervi ce propul s i on maneuver.
Procedurally, thi s firing was the s ame as all the other servi ce propuls ion
4-4
maneuvers, except that it was started using the bank-B propellant valves
instead of bank-A. The steering of the docked spacecraft was exception
ally smooth, and the control of applied velocity change was extremely
accurate, as evidenced by the fact that residuals were only 0.1 ft/sec
in all axes.
The circularization maneuver was targeted for a 66- by 54-mile orbit,
a change from the 60-mile circular orbit which had been executed in pre
vious lunar flights. The firing was normally accomplished using bank-A
propellant valves only, and the onboard solution of the orbit was 66.1 by
54.4 miles. The ellipticity of this orbit was supposed to slowly dis
appear because of irregularities in the lunar gravitational field, such
that the command module would be in a 60-mile circular orbit at the time
of rendezvous. However, the onboard estimate of the orbit during the
rendezvous was 63.2 by 56.8 miles, indicating the ellipticity decay rate
was less than expected. As a result the rendezvous maneuver solutions
differed from preflight estimates.
4. 7
LUNAR MODULE CHECKOUT
Two entries were made into the lunar module prior to the final activ
ation on the day of landing. The first entry was made at about 57 hours,
on the day before lunar orbit insertion. Television and still cameras
were used to document the hatch probe and drogue removal and initial entry
into the lunar module. The command module oxygen hoses were used to pro
vide circulation in the lunar module cabin. A leisurely inspection period
confirmed the proper positioning of all circuit breaker and switch set
tings and stowage items. All cameras were checked for proper operation.
4.8
DESCENT PREPARATION
4.8.1
Lunar Module
The crew was awakened according to the flight plan schedule. The
liquid cooling garment and biomedical harnesses were donned. In antici
pation, these items had been unstowed and prepositioned the evening be
fore. Following a hearty breakfast, the Lunar Module Pilot transferred
into the lunar module to accomplish initial activation before returning
to the command module for suiting. This staggered suiting sequence
served to expedite the final checkout and resulted in only two crew
members in the command module during each suiting operation.
4-5
The sequence of activities was essentially the same as that developed

for Apollo 10, with only minor refinements .
Numerous Network simulations
and training sessions, including suited operations of this mission phase,
insured the comple tion of this exercise within the allotted time .
As in
all previous entries into the lunar module, the repressurization v alve
produced a loud "bang" whenever it was positioned to CLOSE or AUTO with
the cabin regulator off .
Transfer of power from the command module to
the lunar module and electrical power system activation were completed on
schedule.
The primary glycol loo p was activate d about 30 minutes early, with
The activation con
a slow but immediate decrease in glycol temp erature .
tinued to progress smoothly 30 to 40 minutes ahead of schedule .
With the
Commander entering the lunar module early, the Lunar Module Pilot had
more than twice the normally allotted time to don his pressure suit in
the command module .
The early powerup of the lunar module computer and inertial measure
ment unit enabled the ground to calculate the fine gyro torquing angles
for aligning the lunar module platform to the command module platform
before the loss of communications on the lunar far side.
This e arly
alignment added over an ho ur to the planned time available for analyzing
the drift of the lunar module guidance syste m .
After suiting, the Lunar Module Pilot entered the lunar module, the
drogue and probe were installed, and the hatch was closed .
During the
ascent-battery checkout, the variations in voltage produced a noticeable
pitch and intensity variation in the already loud noise of the glycol
Suit-loop pressure integrity and cabin regulator re pressurization
pump.
checks were accomplished without difficulty .
Activation of the abort
guidance system produced only one minor anomaly, An illuminated portion
of one of the data readout numerics failed, and this resulted in some
ambiguity in data readout ( see section 16.2.7).
Following command module landmark tracking, the vehicle was maneu
vered to obtain steerable antenna acquisition and state vectors were up
linked into the primary guidance computer .
The landing gear deployment
The reaction control,
was evidenced by a slight jolt to the vehicle .
descent pro pulsion, and rendezvous radar systems were activated and
checked out .
Each pressurization was confirmed both audibly and by in
strument readout .
The abort guidance system calibration was accomplished at the pre
planned vehicle attitude .
As the command and s ervice modules maneuvered
both vehicles to the undocking attitude, a final switch and circuit break
er configuration check was accomplished, followed by donning of helmets
and gloves .
4-6
4.8.2
Command Module
Activities after lunar orbit circularization were routine, with the

time being used primarily for photographs of the lunar surface. The
activation of the lunar module in preparation for descent was, from the
viewpoint of the Command Module Pilot, a well organized and fairly lei
surely period. During the abort guidance system calibration, the command
module was maintained at a fixed attitude for several minutes without fir
ing thrusters. It was easy to stabilize the spacecraft with minimum im
pulse control prior to the required period so that no thruster firings
were needed for at least 10 minutes.
The probe, drogue, and hatch all functioned perfectly, and the
operation of closing out the tunnel, preloading the probe, and cocking
the latches was done routinely. Previous practice with installation and
removal of the probe and drogue during translunar coast was most helpful.
Two periods of orbital navigation (P22) were scheduled with the lu
nar module attached. The first, at 8 3 hours, consisted of five marks on
the Crater Kamp in the Foaming Sea. The technique used was to approach
the target area in an inertial attitude hold mode, with the X-axis being
roughly horizontal when the spacecraft reached an elevation angle of
35 degrees from the target, at which point a pitch down of approximately
0.3 deg/sec was begun. This technique was necessary to assure a 2-l/2
minute mark period evenly distributed near the zenith and was performed
without difficulty.
The second navigation exercise was performed on the following day
shortly prior to separation from the lunar module. A series of five marks
was taken on a small crater on the inner north wall of crater 130 . The
previously described technique was used, except that two forward firing
thrusters (one yaw and one pitch) were iriliibited to preclude thrust im
pingement on the deployed rendezvous-radar and steerable antennas. The
reduced pitch authority doubled the time required, to approximately
3 seconds when using acceleration command, to achieve a 0 . 3 deg/sec pitch
down rate. In both cases, the pitch rate was achieved without reference
to any onboard rate instrumentation by simply timing the duration of
acceleration-command hand controller inputs, since the Command Module
Pilot was in the lower equipment bay at the time.
To prevent the two vehicles from slipping and hence upsetting the
docked lunar module platform alignment, roll thruster firings were in
hibited after probe preload until the tunnel had been vented to approxi
mately l psi. Only single roll jet authority was used after the l psi
point was reached and until the tunnel pressure was zero.
4 -T
4 .9
UNDOCKING AND SEPARATION
Particular care was exercised in the operation of both vehicles

throughout the undocking and s eparation s equences to insure that the lu
nar module guidance computer maintained an accurate knowledge of position
and velocity .
The undocking action imparte d a velocity to the lunar module of
0 . 4 ft /sec , as measured by the lunar module primary guidance syst em . The
abort guidance system dis agreed with the primary system by approximately
0 . 2 ft /sec , which is well within the preflight limit . The velocity was
nulled , assuming the primary system to be correct . The command module
undocking velocity was maintained until reaching the des ired inspection
distance of 4 0 feet , where it was visually nulled with respect to the
1unar module
A visual inspection by the Command Module Pilot during a lunar module

360-degree yaw maneuver confirmed proper landing gear extens ion . The
lunar module maintained pos ition with respect to the command module at
relative rates believed to be les s than 0 . 1 ft /sec . The 2 . 5-ft /sec , radi
ally downward separation maneuver was performed with the command and s e rv
ice modules at 100 hours to enter the planned equiperiod separation orbit .
4 . 10
LUNAR MODULE DESCENT
The first optical alignment of the inertial platform in preparation

for des cent orbit insertion was accomplished shortly after entering dark
ness following s eparation . The torquing angles were approximately 0 . 3 de
gree , indicating an error in the docked alignment or s ome platform dri ft .
A rendezvous radar lock was achieved manually , and the radar boresight
coincided with that of the crew optical sight . Radar range was substan
t i ated by the VHF ranging in the command module .
4 . 10 . 1
Des cent Orbit Insertion
The des cent orbit ins ertion maneuver was performed with the descent
engine in the manual throttle configuration . Igniti on at the minimum
throttle s etting was smooth , with no nois e or sensation of acceleration .
After 15 s econds , the thrust level was advanced to 4 0 percent , as planned .
Throttle response was smooth an d free o f oscillations . The guided cutoff
left residuals of less than 1 ft /sec in each axis . The X- and Z-axis
res i duals were reduced to zero us ing the react i on control system . The
computer-determined ephemeris was 9 . 1 by 57 . 2 mile s , as compared with the
4-8
predicted value of 8 . 5 by 57 . 2 mile s . The abort guidance system con
firmed th at the magnitude of the maneuver was corre ct . An additional eval
uat ion was performe d us ing the rende zvous radar to check the relat ive ve
locity between the two space craft at 6 and 7 minutes s ub s equent to th e
maneuver . Thes e values corresponded to the predicted dat a within 0 . 5 ft /
sec .
4 . 10 . 2
Alignment an d Navigat ion Checks
Just prior to powere d des cent , the angle b etween the line of s ight
to the sun and a sele cte d axis of the inert i al plat form was compared with
the onboard computer predict ion of that angle and this provi ded a check
on inertial platform dri ft . Three such measurements were all within the
specified toleran ce , but the 0. 08-degree spread between them was somewhat
larger than expect e d .
Visual checks o f downrange and cro s srange pos i tion indi cat e d that
ignition for the powered des cent firing would oc cur at approximatelY the
correct loc at i on over the lunar surface . Bas ed on measurements of the
line-of-sight rate of landmarks , the estimates of alt itudes converged on
a predi cted altitude at ignition of 5 2 000 feet above the surface . These
me asurements were s ligh tly degrade d becaus e of a 10- to 15-degree yaw b i as
maintaine d to improve communications margins .
4 . 10.3
Powere d De s cent
Ign ition for powered des cent oc curred on t ime at the ffil nlmurn thrus t
leve l , and the engine was automat i c ally advanced to the fixe d throttle
point ( maximum thrus t ) after 26 s econds . Vi sual pos ition che cks indi
cat e d the space craft was 2 or 3 s econds early over a known landmark , but
with very little crossrange e rror . A yaw maneuver t o a face-up position
was init iated at an altitude of ab out 45 900 feet approximate lY 4 minutes
after ignition . The landing radar began receiving alti tude dat a immedi
ately . The alt itude difference , as displayed from the radar and the com
put e r , was approximately 2 800 feet .
At 5 minutes 16 s econds after ignition , the first of a s eries of
computer alarms indi c ated a comput er overload condi tion . The se alarms
continued intermitt ently for more than 4 minutes , and although continua
tion of the traj e ctory was permi s s ible , monitoring of the computer infor
mat ion displ ay was occas ionally pre cluded ( s ee s e ct ion 16 . 2 . 5 ) .
Att i tude thrus ter firings were heard during e ach maj or attitude
maneuver and intermittently at other t ime s . Thrus t reduction of the
des cent propuls ion system occurred nearly on t ime ( planned at 6 minutes
24 s econds after ignition ) , contribut ing to the pre di ct i on that the
i.; -9
landing would probably be downrange of the intended point, inasmuch as

the computer had not been corrected for the observed downrange error .
The transfer to the final-approach-phase program (P6 4 ) occurred at
the predicted time. After the pitch maneuver and the radar antenna posi
tion change, the control system was transferred from automatic to the
attitude hold mode and control response checked in pitch and roll. Auto
matic control was restored after zeroing the pitch and yaw errors .
After it became clear that an automatic descent would terminate in a
boulder field surrounding a large sharp-rimmed crater, manual control was
again assumed, and the range was extended to avoid the unsatisfactory land
ing area. The rate-of-descent mode of throttle control (program P66) was
entered in the computer to reduce altitude rate so as to maintain suffi
cient height for landing-site surveillance.
Both the downrange and crossrange positions were adjusted to permit
final descent in a small relatively level area bounded by a boulder field
to the north and sizeable craters to the east and south. Surface obscura
tion caused by blowing dust was apparent at 100 feet and became increas
ingly severe as the altitude decreased. Although visual determination of
horizontal velocity, attitude, and altitude rate were degraded, cues for
these variables were adequate for landing. Landing conditions are esti
mated to have been 1 or 2 ft/sec left, 0 ft/sec forward, and 1 ft/sec
down ; no evidence of vehicle instability at landing was observed.
4.11
COMMAND MODULE SOLO ACTIVITIES
The Command Module Pilot consolidated all known documentation re

quirements for a single volume, known as the Command Module Pilot Solo
Book, which was very useful and took the place of a flight plan, rendez
vous book, updates book, contingency extravehicular checklist, and so
forth. This book was normally anchored to the Command Module Pilot by
a clip attached to the end of his helmet tie-down strap. The sleep period
was timed to coincide with that of the lunar module crew so that radio
silence could be observed . The Command Module Pilot had complete trust
in the various systems experts on duty in the Mission Control Center and
therefore was able to sleep soundly.
The method used for target acquisition (program P22) while the lunar
module was on the surface varied considerably from the docked case. The
optical alignment sight reticle was placed on the horizon image, and the
resulting spacecraft attitude was maintained at the orbital rate manually
in the minimum impulse control mode. Once stabilized, the vehicle main
tained this attitude long enough to allow the Command Module Pilot to
4-10
move to the lower equipment bay and take marks. He could also move from
the equipment bay to the hatch window in a few seconds to cross-check
attitude. This method of operation in general was very satisfactory.
Despite the fact that the Command Module Pilot had several uninter
rupted minutes each time he passed over the lunar module, he could never
see the spacecraft on the surface. He was able to scan an area of approx
imat e ly l square mile on each pass , and ground estimates of lunar module
position varied by several miles from pass to pass . It is doubtful that
the Com mand Module Pilot was ever looking precisely at the lunar module
and more likely was observing an adjacent area. Although it was not pos
sible to assess the ability to see the lunar module from 60 miles, it was
apparent there were no flashes of specular light with which to attract
his attention.
The visibility through the sextant was good enough to allow the
Command Module Pilot to acquire the lunar module ( in flight) at distances
of over 100 miles. However, the lunar module was lost in the sextant
field of view just prior to powered descent initiation ( 120-mile range)
and was not regained until after as cent insertion ( at an approximate range
of 250 miles), when it appeared as a blinking light in the night sky.
In general, more than enough time was available to monitor systems
and perform all necessary functions in a leisurely fashion, except during
the rendezvous phase. During that 3-hour period when hundreds of computer
entries, as well as numerous marks and other manual operations, were re
quired, the Command Module Pilot had little time to devote to analyzing
any off-nominal rendezvous trends as they developed or to cope with any
systems malfunctions. Fortunately, no additional attention to these de
tails was required.
4.12
LUNAR SURFACE OPERATIONS
4. 12. 1
Postlanding Checkout
The postlanding checklist was completed as planned. Venting of the

descent oxidizer tanks was begun almost immediately. When oxidizer pres
sure was vent e d to between 40 and 5 0 psi, fuel was vent e d to the s ame
pressure level . Apparently, the pressure indications received on the
ground were somewhat higher and were increasing with time ( see section
16.2. 2). At ground request, the valves were reopened and the tanks vented
to 15 psi.
4-11
Platform alignment and preparation for early li ft-off were completed

on schedule without significant problems. The mission timer malfunctioned
and displayed an impossi ble number that could not be correlated with any
specific failure time. After several unsuccessful attempts to recycle
this timer , it was turned off for 11 hours to cool. The timer was turned
on for ascent and it operated properly and performed satisfactorily for
the remainder of the mission ( see section 16.2.1).
4.12 . 2
Egress Preparation
The crew had given considerable thought to the advantage of begin

ning the extravehicular activity as soon as possible after landing instead
of following the flight plan schedule of having the surface operations be
tween two rest periods. The initial rest period was planned to allow
flexibility in the event of unexpected difficulty with postlanding activ
ities. These difficulties did not materiali ze , the crew were not overly
tired , and no problem was experienced in adj usting to the 1/6-g environ
ment. Based on these facts, the decisi on was made at 104 : 40 : 00 to pro
ceed with the extravehicular activity prior to the first rest period .
Preparation for extravehicular activity began at 106 : 11 : 00. The es
timate of the preparation time proved to be optimistic. In simulations,
2 hours had been found to be a reasonable allocati on ; however , everything
had also been laid out in an orderly manne r in the cockpit , and only those
items involved in the extravehicular activity were present. In fact ,
there were checkli sts , food packets , monoculars , and other miscellaneous
items that interfered with an orderly preparation. All these items re
uired some thought as to their possible interference or use in the extra
vehicular activity. This interference resulted in exceeding the timeline
estimate by a considerable amount. Preparation for egress was conducted
slowly , carefully , and deliberately , and future missions should be plan
ned and conducted with the same philosophy. The extravehicular activity
preparation checklist was adeuate and was closely followed. However ,
minor items that reuired a decision in real time or had not been con
sidered before flight reuired more time than anticipated.
An electrical connector on the cable that connects the remote con
trol unit to the portable life support system gave some trouble in mating
( see section 16 . 3.2 ) . This problem had been occasionally encountered
using the same euipment before flight. At least 10 minutes were reuired
to connect each unit , and at one point it was thought the connection
would not be successfully completed.
Considerable difficulty was experienced with voice communications

when the extravehicular transceivers were used inside the lunar module.
At times communications were good but at other times were garbled on the
4-12
ground for no obvi ous reas on .

Out s ide the vehi cle , there were no appre c i
Upon i ngre s s from the surface , these diffi
ab le communi cat ion problems .
That i s , the voice
cult ies re curre d , but under di fferent condi tions .
dropout s to the ground were not repeatable in the s ame manner .
Depre ssuri zat ion of the lunar module was one aspect of the mi s s ion
In the vari ous
that had never been completely performe d on the ground.
alt itude chamber t e s ts of the spacecraft and the extravehi cular mobility
un i t , a complete s et of auth ent i c conditions was never pres ent .
The de
pressuri zation of the lunar module through the bacteria filter took much
The indi cated cabin pre s sure did not
longer than had been anticipat e d .
go below 0 . 1 psi , and some concern was experienced in opening the forward
The hat ch appeared t o bend on ini
hat ch against thi s res idual pres sure .
t ial opening , and small p art i cles appe ared t o be b lown out around the
hat ch when the seal was broken ( s ee s ection 16 . 2 . 6 ) .
4 . 12 . 3
Lun ar Module Egre s s
Simulat ion work i n both the water immersion fac ility an d the 1/6-g
in an airplane was reasonab ly ac curate in preparing the crew
Body pos i tioning and arching-the-back t e chniques
for lunar n[odule egre s s .
that were requird to exit the hat ch were performe d , and no unexpected
The forward plat form was more than adequat e
problems were experienced.
to allow changing the b ody pos ition from that used in egres sing the hat ch
The first ladder step was
to that required for getting on the ladde r .
In gen
s omewhat di fficult to see and require d caution and forethough t .
eral , the hatch , porch , and ladder ope1at ion was not part icularly diffi
Operat i ons on the plat form could b e
cult and caused little concern .
performe d without los ing b o dy balance , and there was adequate room for
maneuvering .
environmnt
The initial operat ion of the lunar equipment conveyor in lowering

the camera was s at i s factory , but aft er the straps had be come cove red with
lunar surface material , a problem aros e in transporting the equipment b ack
into the lunar module .
Dust from this equipme nt fell back onto the lower
crewmember and into the cabi n and seeme d to bind the conveyor so as t o
require considerable for ce to operate it .
Alternatives in t ransp ort i ng
equepment into the lunar module had been sugge s te d before flight , and
although there was no opport unity to evaluat e these techniques , it i s
believed they might b e an improvement over the conveyor .
4-13
4 . 12 . 4
Surface Exploration
Work in the 1/6-g environment was a pleasant experience . Adaptation

t o movement was not difficult and s eemed to be quite natural . Certain
specific peculi arities , such as the effect of the mass versus the lack of
traction , can be anticipated but complete familiari zation need not be
pursue d .
Th e most effective means o f walking seemed t o be the lope that
evolved naturally . The fact that b oth feet were occasionally off the
ground at the s ame time , plus the fact that the feet did not return to
the surface as rapidly as on earth , required s ome anticipation before at
tempting to stop . Although movement was not diffi cult , there was notice
able resistance provided by the suit .
On future flights , crewmembers may want to consider kneeling in order
to work with their hands . Getting to and from the kneeling position would
be no problem , and being able to do more work with the hands would increase
the productive capability .
Photography with the Hasselblad cameras on the remote control unit
mounts produced no problems . The first panorama was taken while the
camera was hand-held ; however , it was much easier to operate on the mount .
The handle on the camera was adequate , and very few pi ctures were trig
gered inadvertently .
The s olar wind experiment was easily deployed . As with the other
operations involving lunar surface penetration , it was only poss ible to
penetrate the lunar surface material about 4 or 5 inches . The experiment
mount was not quite as stable as desire d , but it stayed erect .
The television system presented no difficulties except that the cord
was continually getting in the way . At first , the white cord showed up
well , but it s oon became c overed with dust and was therefore more diffi
cult to see . The cable had a "set " from being coiled around the reel and
would not lie completely flat on the surface . Even when it was flat ,
however , a foot could still slide under , and the Commander became en
tangled several times ( see s e ction 16 . 3 . 1 ) .
Collecting the bulk s ample required more time than anticipated be
cause the modular equipment stowage assembly table was in deep shadow ,
and collecting s amples in that area was far less desirable than taking
those in the sunlight . It was also desirable to take s amples as far from
the exhaust plume and propellant contamination as pos sible . An attempt
was made to include a hard rock in each s ample , and a total of about
twenty trips were required to fill the box . As in simulations , the dif
ficulty of s cooping up the material without throwing it out as the s coop
4-14
became free creat e d s ome problem. It was almost impos s ible to collect a
full scoop of material , and the task required about double the planned
time .
Several of the operations would have been easier in sunlight . Al
though it was possible to see in the shadows , time must be allowed for
dark adaptation when walking from the sunlight into shadow . On future
mis s i ons , it would be advantageous to conduct a yaw maneuver j ust prior
to landing so that the des cent stage work area is in sunlight .
The s cientific experiment package was easy to deploy manually , and
s ome time was s aved here . The package was easy to manage , but finding
a level area was quit e diffi cult . A good horizon reference was not avail
able , and in the 1/6-g environment , physi cal cues were not as effective
as in one-g . Therefore , the s election of a deployment s ite for the exper
iments cause d s ome problems . The experiments were placed in an area b e
tween shallow craters in surface material o f the s ame consist ency as the
surrounding area and whi ch should b e stable . Considerable e ffort was
required to change the slope of one of the experiments . It was not pos
sible to lower the e quipment by merely forcing it down , and it was nec
essary t o move the experiment back and forth to s crape away the excess
surface material .
No abnormal condit ions were noted during the lunar module inspection .
The insulation on the s econdary struts had been damaged from the heat ,
but the primary struts were only singed or covered with soot . There was
much less damage than on the examples that had been seen before flight .
Obt aining the core tube s amples presented s ome diffi culty . It was
impos s ible to force the tube more than 4 or 5 inches into the surface ma
terial , yet the material provided insufficient resistance to hold the ex
t ens ion handle in the upright pos ition . Since the handle had to be held
upright , this pre cluded using both hands on the hamme r . In addition , the
res istance of the suit made it diffi cult to steady the core tube and still
swing with any great force . The hamme r actually missed several times .
Sufficient force was obtained to make dents in the handle , but the tube
could only be driven to a depth of about 6 inche s . Extraction offered
little or virtually no resistance . Two s amples were taken .
Insufficient time remained to take the documented s ample , although
as wide a variety of rocks was s elected as remaining time permitte d .
The performance of the extravehicular mob ility unit was excellent .
Neither crewman felt any thermal dis comfort . The Commander used the mini
mum cooling mode for most of the surface operation . The Lunar Module
Pilot switched to the maximum diverter valve pos ition immediately after
4-1 5
s ublimat or st artup and operated at maximum pos ition for 42 minutes b e fore
switching to the intermediate position . The switch remained in the inter
mediate position for the durat ion of the extravehicular activity . The
thermal effect of shadowed areas versus those areas in sunlight was not
detectable ins ide the suit .
The crewmen were kept phys i cally cool and comfortable and the ease
of performing in the 1/6-g environment indicate that tasks requiring
greater physi cal exertion m8lf be undertaken on future flights . The Com
mander experienced s ome physi cal exertion while transporting the s ample
return container to the lunar module , but his physi cal limit had not been
approached .
4 . 12 . 5
Lunar Module Ingress
Ingress to the lunar module produced no problems . The capability

to do a ve rt ical j ump was used to an advant age in making the first step
up the ladder . By doing a deep knee bend , then springing up the ladder ,
the Commander was able to guide his feet to the third step . Movements
in the 1/6-g environment were slow enough to allow deliberate foot place
ment after the j ump . The ladder was a bit s lippery from the powdery sur
face material , but not dangerously s o .
As previously stat e d , mobility on the platform was adequate for
developing alternate methods of transferring equipment from the surface .
The hatch opened eas i ly , and the ingress technique developed be fore
flight was s atis factory . A concerted effort to arch the back was required
when about half way through the hatch , to keep the forward end of the port-
able li fe support system low enough to clear the hat ch . There was very
little exertion associated with trans ition to a standing position .
Because of the bulk of the extravehi cular mobility unit , caution had
to be exercised to avoid bumping into switches , circuit breakers , and
other controls while moving around the cockpit . One circuit breaker was
in fact broken as a result of contact ( see section 16 . 2 . 11 ) .
Equipment j ettison was performed as planned , and the time taken before
flight in determining the items not required for lift-off was well spent .
Consi derable weight reduction and increase in space was realized . Dis
carding the equipment through the hatch was not diffi cult , and only one
item remained on the platform . The post-ingress checklist procedures were
performed without difficulty ; the checklist was well planned and was fol
lowed precisely .
4-16
4 . 12 . 6
Lunar Rest Period
The rest period was almos t a complete los s . The helmet and gloves
were worn to relieve any sub concious anxi ety about a los s of cabin pres
sure and pre s ented no problem. But noi s e , lighting , and a lower-than
des ired temperature were annoying . It was uncomfort ab ly cool in the suits ,
even with wat er-flow dis connect e d . Oxygen flow was finally cut off , an d
the helmets were removed , but the noi s e from the glycol pumps was then
loud enough to interrupt sleep . The window shades did not completely
block out light , and the cabin was illuminated by a comb inat i on of light
through the shade s , warning lights , and display lighting . The Commander
was resting on the as cent engine cover and was b othere d by the light enter
ing through the telescop e . The Lunar Module Pilot estimat e d he slept fit
fully for perhaps 2 hours and the Commander did not sleep at all , even
though body positioning was not a prob lem. Becaus e of the re duce d gravi ty ,
the posit ions on the floor and on the engine cover were b oth quite comfort
able .
4 . 13
LAUNCH PREPARATION
Aligning the plat form b e fore lift-off was compli cat e d by the limited
number of stars availab le . Becaus e of sun an d earth interference , only
two detents effect ively remained from which to s elect stars . Ac curacy is
great er for stars clo s e to the center of the field , but none were avail
ab le at this loc at i on . A gravity/one-star alignment was succes s fully per
formed . A manual averaging te chnique was used t o sample five succes sive
cursor readings and then five spiral readings . The re sult was then enter
ed into the computer . This te chni que appeared to be easier than t ak ing
and entering five separate re adings . Torquing angles were clos e to
0 . 7 degree in all three axes and indi cat e d that the platform did drift .
( Editor ' s note : Plat form drift was within specifi cat i on limits . )
Aft er the alignment , the navig ation program was entered . It i s
recommended that future crews update the abort guidance system with the
primary guidance state vector at this point and then use the ab ort guid
ance system to determine the command module lo c ation . The primary guid
ance system cannot be us ed to determine the command module range and range
rate , and the radar will not lock on until the command module is within
400 miles range . The abort guidance system provides good data as this
range is approache d .
A cold-fire reaction control system check and abort guidance system
calibrat ion were performe d , and the as cent pad was taken . About 45 min
utes prior to lift-off , another plat form alignment was p erforme d. The
landing site alignment option at ignition was used for lift-off. The
torquing angles for this alignment were on the order of 0 . 09 degree .
4-17
In accordance with ground instructions, the rendezvous radar was
placed in the antenna SLEW position with the circuit breakers off for
ascent to avoid recurrence of the alarms experienced during descent.
Both crewmembers had forgotten the small helium pressure decrease
indication that the Apollo 10 crew experienced when the ascent tanks
were pressurized and the crew initially believed that only one tank had
pressurized . This oversight was temporary and delayed crew verification
of proper pressurization of both tanks.
4 . 14
ASCENT
The pyrotechnic noises at descent stage s eparation were quite loud,

but ascent-engine ignition was inaudible . The yaw and pitch m aneuvers
were very smooth. The pitch- and roll-attitude limit cycles were as ex
pected and were not accompanied by any physiological difficulties . Both
the primary and abort guidance systems indicated the ascent to be a dupli
cate of the planned trajectory . The guided cutoff yielded residuals of
less than 2 ft/sec ; and the inplane components were nulled to within
0 . 1 ft/sec with the reaction control system . Throughout the trajectory,
the ground track could be visually verified, although a pitch attitude
confirmation by use of the horizon in the overhead window was found to
be quite difficult because of the horizon lighting condition .
4 . 15
At
47 . 3 by
46 . 6 by
Network
RENDEZVOUS
orbital insertion, the primary guidance system showed an orbit of

9 . 5 miles, as compared to the abort guidance system solution of
9 . 5 miles. Since radar range-rate data were not available, the
quickly confirmed that the orbital insertion was satisfactory.
In the preflight planning, stars had been chosen that would be in

the field of view and require a minimum amount of m aneuvering to get
through alignment and back in plane . This m aintenance of a nearly fixed
attitude would permit the radar to be turned on and the acquisition con
ditions designated so that marks for a coelliptic sequence initiation
solution would be immediately available. For some reason during the sim
ulations, these preselected stars had not been correctly located relative
to the horizon, and some time and fuel were was ted in first maneuvering
to these stars, failing to m ark on them, and then m aneuvering to an alter
nate pair. Even with these problems , the alignment was finished about
28 minutes before coelliptic sequence initiation, and it was possible to
proceed with radar lock-on.
4-18
All four sources for the coellipti c sequence initi ation s olution
agree d to within 0 . 2 ft /sec , an accuracy that had never been observed
be fore . The Commander elected to use the primary gui dance solution with
out any out-of-plane thrusting .
The coellipti c sequence init i ation maneuver was accomplishe d using
the plus Z thrusters , and radar lock-on was maint ained throughout the
firing . Continued navigati on tracking by both vehi cles indicated a plane
change maneuver of about 2-l/2 ft /se c , but the crew elected to defer this
small correction until terminal phase initiation . The very small out-of
plane velocities that existed between the spacecraft orbits indicated a
highly accurate lunar surface alignment . As a result of the higher-than
expected ellipticity of the command module orbit , b ackup chart s olutions
were not pos s ible for the first two rendezvous maneuvers , and the con
stant differential height maneuver had a higher-than-expected verti cal
component . The computers in both spacecraft agreed clos ely on the ma
neuver values , and the lunar module primary guidance computer solution
was executed , using the minus X thrusters .
During the coellipt i c phas e , radar tracking data were inserted into
the abort guidance system to obtain an independent intercept guidance
s olut i on . The primary guidance s olution was 6-l/2 minutes later than
planne d . Howeve r , the intercept traj ectory was quite nominal , with only
two small midcourse corrections of 1 . 0 and 1. 5 ft /sec . The line-of
sight rates were low , and the planned braking s chedule was used to reach
a station-keeping position .
In the process of maneuvering the lunar module to the docking atti
tude , while at the s ame time avoiding direct sunlight in the forward win
dows , the platform inadvertently reached gimbal lock . The docking was
completed using the abort guidance system for att itude control .
4 . 16
COMMAND MODULE DOCKING
Pre-docking activities in the command module were normal in all

respect s , as was docking up to the point of probe capture . After the
Command Module Pilot as certained that a succe s s ful capture had occurred ,
as indi cated by "barberpole " indicators , the CMC-FREE switch pos ition
was used and one retract bottle fire d . A right yaw excursion o f apprgx
imately 15 degrees immediately took place for 1 or 2 seconds . The
Command Module Pilot went back to CMC-AUTO and made hand-controller in
put s t o reduce the angle between the two vehi cles to zero . At docking
thruster firings occurred unexpectedly in the lunar module when the
retract mechanism was actuated, and attitude excursi ons of up to 15 de
grees were observe d . The lunar module was manually realigned . While
4-19
this maneuver was in progres s , all twelve docking latches fired and
docking was completed s ucces s fully . ( See section 8 . 6 . 1 for further dis
cussion . )
Following docking , the tunnel was cleared and the probe and drogue
were stowed in the lunar module . The items to be trans ferred t o the
comman d module were cleaned using a vacuum brush attached to the lunar
module suit return hose . The suction was low and made the process
rather tedi ous . The s ample return containers and film magazines were
placed in appropriate b ags to complete the trans fer , and the lunar
module was configured for jettison according to the checklist procedure .
4 . 17
TRANSEARTH INJECTION
The time between docking and transearth injection was more than
adequate to clean all equipment contaminated with lunar surface material
and return it to the command module for stowage so that the necess ary
preparations for transe arth inj e ction could be made . The trans earth in
jection maneuver , the last service propulsion engine firing of the flight ,
was nominal . The only difference between it and previous firings was
that without the docked lunar module the start transient was apparent .
4 . 18
TRANSEARTH COAST
During trans earth coast , faint spots or scintillations of light were

observed within the command module cabin . This phenomonon became apparent
to the Commander and Lunar Module Pilot after they became dark-adapted and
[ Editor ' s note : The s ource or cause of the light s cintillations
relaxed.
is as yet unknown . One explanati on involves primary cosmic rays , with
energies in the range of billions of electron volts , bombarding an obj ect
in outer space . The theory assumes that numerous he avy and high-energy
cosmic particles penetrate the command module structure , c ausing heavy
ioni z ation inside the spacecraft . When liberated electrons recombine
with ions , photons in the visible portion of the spectrum are emitted.
If a sufficient number of photons are emitted, a dark-adapted observer
could detect the photons as a small spot or a streak of light . Two s imple
laboratory experiments were conducted to substantiate the theory , but no
positive results were obtained in a 5-psi pressure environment because a
high enough energy source was not available to create the radiation at
that pressure . This level of radiation does not present a crew hazard. ]
4-20
Only one midcourse correction , a reaction control system firing of
4 . 8 ft /se c , was required during transe arth coast . In general , the trans
earth coast period was characterized by a general relaxation on the part
of the crew , with plenty of time available to s ample the excellent variety
of food packets and to take photographs of the shrinking moon and the
growing earth .
4 . 19
ENTRY
Because of the presence of thunderstorms in the primary recovery

area ( 1285 miles downrange from the entry interface of 400 000 feet ) ,
the targeted landing point was moved to a range of 1500 miles from entry
interface . This change required the use of computer program P65 ( skip
up control routine ) in the computer , in addition to those programs used
for the planned shorter range entry . Thi s change caused the crew s ome
apprehens ion , since such entries had rarely been pract iced in preflight
simulati ons . However , during the entry , these parameters remained within
acceptable limits . The entry was guided automatically and was nominal in
all respects . The first acceleration pulse reached approximately 6 . 5 g
and the se cond 6 . 0g .
4 . 20
RECOVERY
On the landing , the 18-knot surface wind filled the parachutes and
immediately rotated the command module into the apex down ( stable I I )
flotation position prior t o parachute release . Moderate wave-induced
oscillations accelerated the uprighting sequence , which was completed in
less than 8 minutes . No difficulties were encountered in completing the
postlanding checklist .
The b iologic al is olation garments were donned ins i de the spacecraft .
Crew trans fer into the raft was followed by hatch closure and by decon
taminat ion of the spacecraft and crew members by germi cidal s crubdown .
Helicopter pi ckup was performed as planned , but visibility was sub
stantially degraded because of moisture condens ation on the bi ological
i s olation garment faceplate . The helicopter trans fer to the aircraft
carrier was performed as qui ckly as could be expecte d , but the tempera
ture increase ins i de the suit was uncomfortable . Transfer from the heli
copter into the mobile quarantine facility completed the voyage of
Apollo ll .
5-l
5.0
LUNAR DESCENT AND ASCENT
5.1
DESCENT TRAJECTORY LOGIC
The lunar descent traj ectory , shown in figure 5 -l , began with a

des cent orbit ins ert ion maneuver targeted to place the spacecraft i nto
a 60- by 8 . 2-mile orbit , with the peri cynthion longitude lo cat e d about
260 miles uprange from the landing s ite . Powered descent , shown in
figure 5-2 , was initiat e d at peri cynthion and cont inue d down to landing .
The powered descent traj e ctory was designed consi dering such factors
as opt imum propellant us age , navigat i on uncertainties , landing radar p er-
formance , terrain uncertaint ies , and crew visibility restrictions . The
basic premi se during traj ectory des ign was to maintain near-optimum us e
of propellant during initial braking and t o provi de a standard final
approach from which the landing area can be ass es s ed and a desirable
landing locat ion s elected. The onboard guidance capability allows the
crew to re-des ignate the desired landing pos ition in the computer for
automat ic execution or, i:f late in the traj e ct ory , to take over manually
and fly the lunar module to the desired point . To provi de these des cent
characteristics , compat ibility between the automat i c and manually con
trolled trajectories was required , as well as acceptable flying quality
under manual control . Because of guidance dispersions , s ite-select ion
Uncertainties , vi s ibili ty restri ct ion , and unde fined surface i rregulari
ties , adequat e flexibility in the terminal-approach te chnique was pro
vided the crew , with the principal limitation b eing des cent propellant
quantity .
The maj or phases of powered des cent are the braking phase (wh i ch
terminates at 7700 feet alt itude ) , the approach or vis ibility phas e (to
approximat ely 500 feet alt itude ) , and the final landing phas e . Three
separate computer programs , one for each phas e , in the primary gui dance
system execute the desired traj e ctory s uch that the various pos ition ,
velocity , accelerat ion , and vi sibility constraints are satisfied. These
programs provide an automat i c gui dance and control capab ility for the
lunar module from powered des cent initiat ion to landing . The braking
phase program ( P63 ) is initiat ed at approximately 40 minutes be fore de
s cent engine ignition and controls the lunar module until the final ap
proach phas e program ( P64 ) i s automat i c ally entered to provide traj ectory
condit ions and landing site vis ibility .
If des ired during a nominal des cent , the crew may s elect the manual
landing phas e program ( P66 ) prior to the completion of final approach
phase program P64 . If the manual landing phas e program P66 is not entere d ,
the automat ic landing program ( P6 5 ) would b e entered automati c ally when
5 -2
time-to-go equals 12 se conds at an altitude o f about 150 feet . The auto

mat i c landing phase program P65 init i ates an automati c des cent by nulling
the hori zontal velocity relative to the surface and maint aining the rate
of descent at 3 ft /sec . The manual landing phase P66 is initiated when
the c rew changes the pos it i on o f the primary guidance mode control switch
from automati c to attitude-hold and then actuates the rate-of-des cent con
trol swit ch . Vehicle att itude changes are then controlled manually by the
c rew , the des cent engine throttle is under computer control , and the Com
mander c an introduce 1-ft/sec increments in the des c ent rate using the
rate-of-descent swit ch .
Throughout the des cent , maximum use was made onboard , as well as on
the ground , of all dat a , system responses , and cues , bas ed on vehicle
position with respect to des ignated lunar features , to assure proper
operation of the onboard systems . The two onboard guidance systems pro
vided the crew with a continuous check of selected navigation parameters .
Comparis ons were made on the ground between data from each o f the onboard
syst ems and comparable information derived from tracking dat a . A powered
flight proces s or was used to simultaneous ly reduce Doppler tracking data
from three or more ground stations and calculate the required parameters .
A filtering t echnique was use d to compute corrections to the Doppler
tracking data and thereby define an accurate vehicle state vector . The
ground data were use d as a voting s ource in case of a slow divergenc e be
tween the two onboard syst ems .
5 .2
PREPARATION FOR POWERED DESCENT
The crew entered and began activation of the lunar module following
the first s leep period in lunar orbit ( see section 4 . 8 ) . A list ing o f
s igni fic ant events for lunar module descent i s presented i n t able 5-I .
Undocking was acc omplished on s chedule just prior to acquisition o f
s ignal o n lunar revolution 1 3 . After the lunar module inspection by the
Command Module Pilot , a separation maneuver was performed by the command
and service modules , and 20 minutes later , the rendezvous radar and VHF
ranging outputs were compared. The two systems agreed and indicated
0 . 7-mile in range . The inert i al measurement unit was aligned opti cally
for the first time , and the resulting gyro torquing angles were well with
in the platform drift criteria for a s atis factory primary system . Des cent
orbit insertion was per formed on time approximately 8 minutes after loss
of Network line-of-sight . Table 5-II contains the traj ectory informati on
on des cent orbit insertion , as reported by the crew following acquis it i on
o f s ignal on revolution 14. A relatively large Z-axis res idual for the
abort guidanc e system was c ause d by an incorrectly loaded t arget vector .
With this exception , the res iduals were well within the three-sigma dis
persion ( plus or minus 0 . 6 ft /s e c ) predicted be fore flight .
5-3
Following des c ent orbit insertion , rendezvous radar data were recorded
by the Lunar Module Pilot and used to predict that the pericynthion point
would be at approximately 50 000 feet altitude . Initial checks using the
landing point des ignator capability produced close agreement by indi c ating
52 000 feet . The crew also reported that a s olar sighting , performed
following des cent orbit insertion and using the alignment telescope , was
well within the powered des cent initiation go/no-go criterion of 0 . 25 de
gree . The s olar s ighting consisted of acquiring the sun through the tele
s cope and comparing the actual gimbal angles to those theoretically re
quired and computed by the onboard computer for this observation . This
check is an even more accurate indication of platform performance if the
0 . 07-degree bias correction for the teles cope rear detent position is
s ubtracted from the recorded dat a .
The compari s on of velocity residuals between ground tracking data
and the onboard system , as calculated along the earth-moon line-of-s ight ,
provided an additional check on the performance of the primary guidance
system. A res i dual of 2 ft /sec was recorded at acquis ition of signal
and provided confidence that the onboard state vector would have only
small altitude and downrange velocity magnitude errors at powered de
s cent initiation . The Doppler residual was computed by comparing the
velocity measured along the earth-moon line-of-s ight by ground tracking
with the same velocity component computed by the primary system . As the
lunar module approached powered des cent initiation , the Doppler residual
began to increase in magnitude to about 13 ft/s e c . Since the earth-moon
line-of-sight vector was almost normal to the velocity vector at this
point , the res idual indicated that the primary system estimate of its
state vector was approximately 21 000 feet uprange of the actual state
vector . This same error was als o reflected in the real-time comparis ons
made using the powered flight proces s or previously mentioned . Table
5-III is a comparison o f the latitude , longitude , and altitude between
the best-estimated-traj ectory state vector at powered des cent initia
tion , that carried onboard , and the preflight-calculated trajectory .
The onboard state-vector errors at powered des cent initiation resulted
from a combination of the following :
a. Uncoupled thruster firings during the docked landmark tracking
exercise
b . Unaccounted for velocity accrued during undocking and subse
quent inspection and station-keeping activity
c.
Des cent orbit insertion res idual
d.
Propagated errors i n the lunar potential function
e.
Lunar module venting .
5 -4
5.3
POWERED DESCENT
The powered des cent maneuver began with a 26-s e c ond thrusting period
at minimum throttle . Immediately after ignition , S-b and communi cations
were interrupted moment arily but were reestablished when the antenna was
switched from the automati c to the slew pos ition . The des cent maneuver
was initiated in a ace-down attitude to permit the crew to make time
marks on s elected landmarks . A landing-point-designator s i ghting on the
crater Maskelyne W was approximately 3 s e conds early , conirming the sus
pected downrange error . A yaw maneuver to ace-up att it ude was initiated
allowing the landmark s i ghtings at an indicated alt itude o about
4 5 900 eet . The maneuver took longer than expe cted because o an incor
rect setting o a rate displ switch .
Landing radar lock-on occurred beore the end o the yaw maneuver ,
with the spacecraft rotating at approximately 4 deg/s e c . The altitude
difference between that calculate d by the onboard computer and that deter
mined by the landing radar was approximately 2800 feet , which agrees with
the altitude error suspected from the Doppler res i dual comparis on . Radar
altitude updates of the onboard computer were enabled at 102 : 38 : 45 , and
the differences converged within 30 seconds . Velocity updates began auto
matically 4 se conds after enabling the altitude update . Two altitude
difference transients oc curred during computer alarms and were apparently
ass oc i ated with incomplete radar data readout operations ( see s ecti on 16 . 2 . 5 ) .
The reduction in throttle setting was predi cted to occur 384 se conds
after ignition ; actual throttle reduction occurred at 386 se conds , indi
cating nominal performance of the des cent engine .
The first of five computer alarms occurred approximately 5 minutes
after initi ation of the des cent . Occurrences of these alarms are indi
cated in table 5I and are dis cus s e d in det ail in se ction 16 . 2 . 5 . Al
though the alarms did not degrade the performance of any primary guidance
or control function , they did interfere with an early as sessment by the
crew of the landing approach .
Arrival at high gate ( end of braking phas e ) and the automatic switch
to final approach phase program P64 occurred at 7129 feet at a descent rate
o 125 ft /sec . Thes e values are s li ght ly lower than predi cted but within
acceptab le b oundaries . At about 5000 feet , the Commander switched his
control mode from automati c to attitude-hold to check manual control in
anticipation of the final des cent .
After the pit chover at high gate , the landing point des ignator indi
cated that the approach path was leading into a large crater . An unplan
ned redesignation was introduced at this time . To avoid the crater , the
5-5
Commander again swit ched from automat ic to att it ude-hold control an d man
ually incre as e d the flight-path angle by pitching to a nearly verti cal
attitude for range extension .
Manual c ontrol began at an altitude of
approximately 600 feet .
Ten s e conds later , at approximately 400 feet ,
the rate-of-des cent mode was activated to control des cent velocity .
In
this manner , the spacecraft was gui ded approximately 1100 feet downrange
from the initial aim point .
Figure 5-3 c ontains histories of altitude compared with alt itude
rate from the primary and abort guidance syst ems and from the Network
The altitude difference existing between the
powered flight proces s o r .
primary system and the Network at powered descent init i ation can be ob
served in this figure .
All three sources are initialized to the primary
gui dance state ve ctor at powered des cent initiation .
The primary syst em ,
however , is updated by the landing radar , and the abort guidance system
is not . As indicated in the figure , the altitude readouts from both sys
tems gradually diverge so as to indicate a lower altit ude for the primary
system unt i l the ab ort system was manually updated with altitude data
from the primary system .
The powered flight proces s or data refle ct both the altitude and down-
range errors existing in the primary system at powered des cent init i ation .
The radial velocity error is directly proporti onal to the downrange posi
tion error such that a 1000-foot downrange error will cause a 1-ft /s e c
Therefore , the 20 000-foot downrange error exi st
radial velocity error .
- ing at powered des cent initiation was also reflected as a 20-ft/s e c radial
This error is apparent on the figure in the altitude
velocity res i dual .
region near 27 000 feet , where an error o f approximately 20 ft /sec is evi-
dent .
The primary-system altitude error in exi stence at powered des cent
initiation mani fests it s elf at touchdown when the powered fli ght proces
Figure 5-4
s or indicates a landing altit ude below the lunar surface .
c ontains a similar c omparis on of lateral velocity from the three sources .
Again , the divergence noted in the final phas es in the abort gui dance
system data was caus e d by a lack of radar updates .
Figure 5-5 contains a time history of vehicle pitch attitude , as re
corded by the primary and abort guidance syst ems .
The s c ale is set up
s o that a pitch of zero degrees would place the X-axis of the vehicle
vert i cal at the landing s it e .
Two s eparate designations of the landing
Figure 5-6 contains
site are evi dent in the phase after manual takeove r .
comparis ons for the pitch and roll att itude and indicates the lateral
corrections made in the final phas e .
Figure 5-7 is an area photograph , taken from a Lunar Orbiter flight ,
showing the landing s it e ellipse and the ground track flown to the land
ing point .
Fi gure 5-8 is an enlarged photograph of the area adj acent t o
the lunar landing s ite and shows the final portions of the ground track
to landing . Figure 5-9 c ontains a preliminary attempt at reconstructing
the surface terrain viewed during des cent , based upon traj ectory and radar
5-6
data and known surface features . The coordinates o f the landing point ,
as obtained from the various real-time and postflight s ources , are shown
in table 5-IV . The actual landing point is 0 degree 41 minutes 15 sec
onds north latitude and 23 degrees 26 minutes east longitude , as compared
with the targeted landing point of 0 degree 43 minutes 53 seconds north
latitude and 23 degrees 38 minutes 51 s econds east longitude as shown in
figure 5-10. Figure 5-10 is the b as i c reference map for location of the
landing point in this report . As noted , the landing point dispersion was
caus ed primarily by errors in the onboard stat e vector prior to powered
des c ent initiation .
Figure 5-11 is a time history of pertinent vehi cle control parameters
during the entire des cent phase . Evidence of fuel slosh was detected in
the att itude-rate information following the yaw maneuver . The s losh ef
fect increas e d to the point where reaction control thruster firings were
required to damp the rate prior to throttle recovery . The dynamic be
havior at this point and through the remainder o f des cent was comparable
to that observed in simulati ons and indicates nominal control system per
formance .
Approximately 9 5 pounds o f reaction control propellant were us e d
during powered descent , as compared t o the predicted value of 4 0 pounds .
Plots of propellant consumption for the reaction control and des cent pro
puls ion systems are shown in figure 5-12 . The reaction control propellant
consumption while in the manual des cent control mode was 51 pounds , approx
imately 1-1/2 times greater than that for the automati c mode . This in
crease in usage rate is attributed to the requirement for greater attitude
and translation maneuvering in the final stages of des c ent . The des cent
propulsion system propellant usage was greater than predicted because of
the additional time required for the landing s it e redesignation .
5.4
LANDING DYNAMICS
Landing on the surface occurred at 102 : 4 5 : 39 . 9 with negligible for

ward velocity , approximately 2 . 1 ft /sec to the crew ' s left and l . T ft /sec
verti c ally . Body rate trans i ents occurred , as shown in figure 5-13 , and
indic at e that the right and the forward landing gear t ouche d almost s imul
taneous ly , giving a roll-left and a pit ch-up motion to the vehi cle . The
left-directed lateral velocity resulted in a s light yaw right transient
at the point of touchdown . These touchdown conditi ons , obt ained from atti
tude rates and integrat i on of accelerometer dat a , were verified qualita
tively by the at-rest positions of the lunar surface sensing probes and
by surface buildup around the rims of the foot pads . Figure 11-17 shows
the probe boom nearly verti cal on the inboard s i de of the minus Y foot pad ,
indicating a component o f velocity in the minus Y direction . Lunar materi al
5- 7
c an be seen as built up outboard of the pad , whi ch als o indi cates a

lateral velocity in this direction . The probe position and lunar mate
rial disturbance produced by the minus Z gear assembly , shown in the s ame
figure , indicate a lateral velocity in the minus Y direction . Fi gure 11-16
shows in greater detail the surface material disturb ance on the minus Y
side of the minus Z foot pad . The plus Y landing gear ass embly supports
the conclus ion of a minus Y veloc ity , s ince the probe was on the outboard
side and material was piled inboard of the pad .
The c rew reported no sens ation of rockup ( post-contact instability )
during the touchdown phas e . A postflight s imulation of the landing dynam-
i cs indicates that the maximum rockup angle was only about 2 degrees ,
which is indi cative of a stable landing . In the simulation , the maximum
foot pad penetration was 2 . 5 to 3 . 5 inches , with an ass ociated vehicle
slideout ( ski dding ) of 1 to 3 inches . The landing gear struts stroked
less than 1 inch , which represents about 10 percent of the energy abs orp
tion capability of the low-level primary-strut honeycomb cartridge . Ex
amination of photographs indicates agreement with this analyt i c al con
clusion .
5.5
POSTLANDING SPACECRAFT OPERATIONS
Immediately after landing , the lunar module crew began a simuiated

launch countdown in preparation for the pos s ibility of a contingency
lift-off, Two problems arose during this s imulate d countdown . First ,
the mission timer had stopped and could not be restarted ; therefore , the
event timer was started using a mark from the ground . Second , the des cent
stage fuel-helium heat exchanger froze , apparently with fuel trapped be
tween the heat exchanger and the valves , causing the pressure in the line
to increas e . See section 16 . 2 . 1 and 16 . 2 . 2 for further discussion of
these problems .
The inertial measurement unit was aligned three times during this
period using each of the three available lunar surface alignment options .
The alignments were s atis factory , and the results provided confidence in
the technique . The s imulated countdown was terminated at 104-1/2 hours ,
and a partial power-down of the lunar module was initiated.
During the lunar surface st ay , several unsucces s ful attempts were
made by the Command Module Pilot to locate the lunar module through the
sextant using sighting coordinates transmitted from the ground . Estimates
of the landing coordinates were obt ained from the lunar module computer ,
the lunar surface gravity alignment of the platform , and the limited inter
pretation of the geologic al features during des cent . Figure 5-14 shows
the areas that were tracked and the times of closest approach that were
5-8
us ed for the sightings . It can be seen that the actual landing site , as
determined from films taken during the des cent , did not lie near the cen
ter of the sextant field of view for any of the coordinates used ; there
fore , the ability to acquire the lunar module from a 60-mile orbit can
neither be est ablished nor deni e d . The Command Module Pilot reported i t
was pos s ible to s can only one grid square during a single pas s .
Bec ause of the unsuccess ful attempts to sight the lunar module from
the command module , the decision was made to track the command module from
the lunar module using the rendezvous radar . The command module was ac
qui red at a range of 79 . 9 miles and a closing rate of 3236 ft /sec , and
los s of track occurred at 85 . 3 miles with a receding range-rate of
3 5 31 ft /sec ( fig . 5-15 ) .
The inertial meas urement unit was success fully aligned two more times
prior to li ft-off , once to obtain a dri ft check and once to establish the
proper inertial orientation for lift-off . The dri ft check indi c ated nor
mal system operation , as dis cussed in section 9 . 6 . An abort guidance sys
tem alignment was als o performed prior to li ft-off ; however , a procedural
error caus ed an azimuth mis alignment which resulted in the out-of-plane
velocity error di s cus s e d in section 9 . 6 . 2 .
5.6
ASCENT
Preparati ons for as cent began after the end of the crew rest period
at 121 hours . The command module state vector was updated from the ground ,
with coordinates provided for crater 130 , a planned landmark . This cra
ter was tracked using the command module sextant on the revolution prior
to lift-off to establish the t arget orbit plane . During this s ame revo
lution , the rendezvous radar was used to track the command module , as
previ ously menti oned , and the lunar surface navigation program ( P22 ) was
exercised to establish the location of the lunar module relative to the
orbit plane . Crew activities during the preparation for launch were con
ducted as planned , and lift-off occurred on time .
The as cent phase was initiated by a 10-second period of vertical
ri se , which allowed the as cent stage to clear s afely the des cent stage
and surrounding terrain obstacle s , as well as provide for rotation o f
the spacecraft t o the correct launch azimuth . The pit chover maneuver
to a 50-degree attitude with respect to the local vert i c al began when
the as cent velocity reached 40 ft /se c . Powered ascent was targeted to
place the spacecraft in a 10- by 45-mile orbit to establish the correct
initial conditions for the rendezvous . Figure 5-16 shows the planned
ascent traj ectory as compared with the actual as cent traj ectory .
5 -9
The crew reported that the ascent was smooth , with normal reaction
c ontrol thruster activity . The ascent st age appeared to "wallow , " or
travers e the attitude deadbands , as expe cted . Figure 5-17 contains a
time history of s elected control system parameters during the ascent ma
neuve r . A dat a dropout occurred immediately after li ft-off , making it
diffi cult to determine accurately the fire-in-the-hole forces . The body
rates recorded just prior to the dat a dropout were small ( less than 5 deg/
s e c ) , but were increasing in magnitude at the time of the dropout . How
ever , crew reports and ass ociated dynami c information during the data
loss period do not indicate that any rates exceeded the expected ranges .
The predominant disturbance torque during ascent was about the pitch
axis and appe ars to have been caused by thrust vector offs et . Fi gure 5-18
contains an expanded view of control system parameters during a selected
period of the ascent phase . The digital autopilot was designed to con
trol about axes offset approximately 45 degrees from the spacecraft body
axes and normally to fire only plus X thrusters during powered as cent .
There fore , down-firing thrusters 2 and 3 were used almost exclusively
during the early phases of the ascent and were fired alternately to con
trol the pitch disturbance torque . These j ets induce d a roll rate while
counteracting the pitch disturbance ; therefore , the accompanying roll
motion contributed to the wallowing sens ation reported by the crew . As
the maneuver progressed , the center of gravity moved toward the thrust
vector , and the resulting pitch disturbance torque and required thruster
activity decreased until almost no disturbance was present . Near the end
of the maneuver , the center of gravity moved to the opposite side of the
thrust vector , and proper thruster activity to correct for this oppos ite
disturbance torque can be observed in figure 5-17 .
The crew reported that the velocity-to-be-gained display in the
ab ort guidance system indicated differences of 50 to 100 ft /sec with the
primary system near the end of the as cent maneuver . The reason for this
difference appe ars to be unsynchronized dat a displaye d from the two sys
tems ( s ee section 9 . 6 ) .
Table 5-V contains a comparison of insertion conditi ons between
those calculated by various onboard s ources and the planned values , and
satis factory agreement is indicated by all s ources . The powered flight
processor was again used and indicated performance well within ranges
expected for both systems .
5-10
5.7
RENDEZVOUS
Immediately after ascent insertion , the Commander began a platform

alignment using the lunar module telescope. During this time, the ground
relayed the lunar module state vector to the command module computer to
permit execution of navigation updates using the sextant and the VHF rang
ing system . The lunar module platform alignment took somewhat longer than
expected ; consequently , the coelliptic sequence initiation program was
entered into the computer about 7 minutes later than planned. This delay
allowed somewhat less than the nominal 18 radar navigation updates between
insertion and the first rendezvous maneuver . Also, the first range rate
measurement for the backup solution was missed ; however, this loss was
not signi ficant, since both the lunar module and :command module guidance
systems were performing normally. Figure 5-19 shows the ascent and rendez
vous trajectory and their relationship in lunar orbi t .
Prior to coelliptic sequence initiation, the lunar module out-of
plane velocity was computed by the command module to be minus 1 .0 ft/sec,
a value small enough to be deferred until teroinal phase initiation . The
final lunar module solution for coelliptic sequence was a 51.5-ft/sec ma
neuver to be performed with the Z-axis reaction control thrusters, with
a planned ignition time of 125:19 : 34 . 7 .
Following the coelliptic sequence initiation maneuver, the constant
di fferential height program was called up in both vehi cles. Operation
of the guidance systems continued to be normal , and successful navigation
updates were obtained using the sextant , the VHF ranging system, and the
rendezvous radar . It was reported by the Lunar Module Pilot that the
backup range-rate measurement at 36 minutes prior to the constant di ffer
ential height maneuver was outside the limits of the backup chart . Post
flight trajectory analysis has shown that the off-nominal command module
orbit ( 62 by 56 miles) caused the range rate to be approximately 60 ft/sec
below nomi nal at the 36-minute data point . The command module was near
pericynthion and the lunar module was near apocynthion at the measurement
point. These conditions, which decreased the lunar module closure rate
to below the nominal value , are apparent from figure 5-20, a relative
motion plot of the two vehicles between insertion and the constant dif
ferential height maneuver . Figure 5-20 was obtained by forward and back
ward integration of the last available lunar module state vector prior to
loss of signal following insertion and the final constant di fferential
height maneuver vector integrated backward to the coelliptic sequence
initiation point . The dynamic range of the backup charts has been in
creased for future landing missions . The constant di fferential height
maneuver was accomplished at the lunar module primary guidance computer
time of 126 : 17:49 . 6.
5-11
The constant differenti al height maneuver was performed with a total
velocity change of 19 . 9 ft /se c . In a nominal coellipt i c flight plan with
a circular target orbit for the command module , this maneuver would be
zero . However , the ellipticity of the command module orbit required a
real-time change in the rendezvous plan prior to li ft-off to include ap
proximately 5 ft /s e c , applied retrograde , to compens ate for the change in
differential height upon arriving at this maneuver point and approximately
11 ft /sec , applied vertically , to rotate the line of aps i des to the cor
rect angle . Actual execution errors in ascent insertion and coellipt i c
sequence initiation resulted i n an additional velocity change requirement
of about 8 ft /sec , which yielded the actual total of 19 . 9 ft/s e c .
Following the constant differential height maneuver , the computers
in b oth spacecraft were configured for terminal phase init iation . Navi
gation updates were made and several computer recycles were performed to
obtain an early indi c ation of the maneuver time . The final computation
was initiated 12 minutes prior to the maneuver , as planned. Ignition
had b een comput ed to occur at 127 : 03 : 39 , or 6 minutes 39 se conds later
than planned .
Soon after the terminal phase initiation maneuver , the vehi cles
pas s e d behind the moon . At the next acqui s it i on , the vehi cles were fly
ing formation in preparation for docking . The crew reported that the
rendezvous was nominal , with the first midcourse maneuver les s than 1 ft /
s e c and the se cond about 1 . 5 ft /sec . The midcourse maneuvers were per
formed by thrusting the body axis components to zero while the lunar mod
ule plus Z axis remained pointed at the command module . It was als o re
ported that line-of-sight rates were small , and the planned braking was
us ed for the approach to station-keeping . The lunar module and command
module maneuver s oluti ons are summari zed in tables 5-VI and 5-VII , respec
tively .
During the docking maneuver , two unexpe cted events occurred . In the
alignment procedure for docking , the lunar module was maneuvered through
the platform gimbal-lock attitude and the docking had to be completed
using the abort gui dance system for attitude control . The off-nominal
attitude resulted from an added rot ation to avoid sunlight interference
in the forward windows . The sun elevation was about 20 degrees higher
than planned because the angle for initiation of the terminal phase was
reached about 6 minutes late .
The second unexpected event occurred after docking and consisted of
relative vehicle alignment excursions of up to 15 degrees following ini
tiation of the retract sequence . The proper docking sequence consists of
initi al contact , lunar module plus-X thrusting from initial contact to
capture latch , switch the command module control from the automati c ( CMC
AUTO ) to the manual ( CMC FREE ) mode and allow relative motions to be
5-12
damped to within plus or minus 3 degree s , and then initi ate retract to
achieve hard docking . The Commander detected the relatively low velocity
at init i al contact and applied plus X thrusting ; however , the thrusting
was continued unti l after the mis alignment excursi on had developed , since
the Commander had received no indication of the capture event . To further
complicate the dynamics , the Command Module Pilot also noticed the excur
s i ons and reversed the command module control mode from CMC FREE to CMC
AUTO . At this time , both the lunar module and the command module were in
minimum-deadband attitude-hold , thereby causing con s i derable thrust er fir
ing until the lunar module was placed in maximum deadband . The vehicles
were stabi li zed using manual control just prior to achieving a succes s ful
hard dock . The initial observed mis alignment excursion is cons idered to
have been caused by the continued lunar module thrusting following c ap
ture , s ince the thrust vector does not pass through the center of gravity
of the command and service modules .
The rendezvous was succes s ful and similar to that for Apollo 10 ,
with all guidance and control systems operating s atis factorily . The
Command Module Pilot reported that the VHF ranging broke lock about 25
times following as cent insertion ; however , lock-on was reestablished
e ach time , and navigation updates were successful . The lunar module
reaction control propellant us age was nearly nominal .
5 -13
TABLE 5 -I . - LUNAR DESCENT EVENT TIMES
Time ,
hr :min : s ec
102 : 17 : 17
102 : 20 : 5 3
102 : 2 4 : 40
102 : 27 : 32
102 : 32 : 5 5
102 : 32 : 58
102 : 33 : 0 5
102 : 33 : 31
102 : 36 : 57
102 : 37 : 51
102 : 37 : 59
102 : 38 : 22
102 : 38 : 45
102 : 38 : 50
102 : 38 : 50
102 : 39 : 02
102 : 39 : 31
102 : 41 : 32
102 : 41 : 37
102 : 41 : 53
102 : 42 : 03
102 : 42 : 18
10 2 : 42 : 19
102 : 42 : 43
102 : 42 : 58
102 : 43 : 09
102 : 43 : 13
102 : 43 : 20
102 : 43 : 22
102 : 44 : 11
102 : 44 : 21
102 : 44 : 28
102 : 44 : 59
102 : 45 : 03
102 : 45 : 40
102 : 45 : 40
Event
Acuis ition of dat a
Landing radar on
Align ab ort guidance to primary guidance
Yaw maneuver to obtain improved communicat i ons
Alt itude of 5 0 000 feet
Propellant-s ettling firing start
Descent engine ignition
Fixed throttle posit ion ( crew report )
Face-up yaw maneuver i n pro cess
Landing radar dat a good
Face-up maneuver complete
1202 alarm ( computer determined )
Enable radar updat es
Alt itude less than 30 000 feet ( inhibit X-axis override )
Velocity le.s s than 2000 ft / s e c ( start landing radar
velocity updat e )
1202 alarm
Throttle recovery
Enter program P64
Landing radar ant enna to pos ition 2
Att itude-hold ( handling ualities check )
Aut omat i c guidance
1201 alarm ( computer det ermined )
Landing radar low s c ale ( le s s than 2500 feet )
1202 alarm ( computer determine d )
1202 alarm ( computer determined )
Landing point redes ignat ion
Attitude-hold
Updat e ab ort gui dance att itude
Ent er program P66
Landing radar data not good
Landing radar dat a good
Red-line low-level s ensor light
Landing radar dat a not good
Landing radar data good
Landing
Engine off
'i -14
TABLE 5-II . - MANEUVER RESIDUALS - DESCENT ORBIT INSERTION
Veloc i ty res idual , :ft/ s e c

Axi s
Before trirruning
After trirruning
-0 . 1
0.0
-0 . 4
-0 . 4
-0 . 1
0.0
TABLE 5-III . - PO\mRED DESCENT INITIATION STATE VECTORS
Parameter
Operational
traj ectory
Bes t es timate
traj ectory
Primary gui dance

computer
Latitude , deg
0 . 9614
1 . 0 37
1 . 17
Longi tude , deg
39 . 607
39 . 371
39 . 4 8
Alti tude , ft
5 0 000
49 376
49 9 5 5
5-15
TABLE 5 -IV . - LUNAR LANDING COORDINATES
Data source for s olut ion
b
Lat itude ,
deg north
Longi tude ,
deg east
Radius of
Landing Site 2 ,
miles
Primary gui dance onboard

vector
0 . 649
23 . 46
9 37 . 17
Abort gui dance onboard

, vector
0 . 639
2 3 . 44
937 . 56
Powered flight process or

(based on 4-track s olution )
0 . 6 31
23 . 47
936 . 74
Alignment optical teles cope
0 . 523
2 3 . 42
Rendezvous radar
0 . 636
2 3 . 50
937 . 13
Best estimat e traj ectory

accelerometer reconstruct i on
0 . 647
2 3 . 505
9 37 . 14
Lunar module targete d
0 . 691
2 3 . 72
937 . 0 5
23 . 5 05 or
0 . 647 or
Photography
c
041' 15"
2 326 ' 00"
a
Following the Apollo 10 mi ssion , a difference was noted ( from the
landmark tracking result s ) between the t rajectory coordinate system and
the coordinate system on the reference map . In order to re ference tra
j e ctory values to the 1 : 100 000 s cale Lunar Map ORB-II-6 ( 100 ) , dated
December 1967 , correction factors of plus 2 ' 2 5 " in latitude and minus
4 ' 17" in longitude must be applied t o the traj ectory values .
b
All lat itude values are correct e d for the estimated out-of-plane
position error at powered des ce nt initiat ion .
c
These coordinate values are referenced to the map and include the
correction factors .
5-16
TABLE 5 -V . - INSERTION SUMMARY
Alt it ude ,
ft
Radial
velocity ,
ft / s e c
Downrange
velo city ,
ft/sec
Primary guidance
6o 6o2
33
5 537 . 0
Abort guidance
60 019
30
5 537 . 9
Netvork tracking
61 2 4 9
35
5540 . 7
Operat ional traj e ctory
60 085
32
5 536 . 6
fleconstructe d from ac celeromet ers
6o 337
33
5 534 . 9
Actual ( best estimat e traj e ct o ry )
60 300
32
5 53 7 . 0
l'arget value s*
60 000
32
5 534 . 9
Source
*Als o , cross range di splacement of 1 . 7 miles was t o b e corre cted .
The following velocity res iduals were c al c ulat e d by th e primary guidance :
-2 . 1 ft / s e c
X
Y
Z
-0 . 1 ft/ sec
+ 1 . 8 ft/ s e c
The orbit result ing aft e r res iduals were trimmed vas :
Apo cynthion alt itude
Peri cynthion alt itude
4 7 . 3 miles
=
9 . 5 miles
TABLE
Primary guidance
Maneuver
Coelliptic sequence
initiation
Solut ion
Initial
Time,
hr:min:sec
125 ,19,35.48
Teinal phase
correction
Second midcourse
correction
t:t/sec
49.4
posigrade
51 . 5
posigrade
Initial
8.1
1.8
17. 7
retrograde
126 ,17,46 . 36
Final
126 , 17 : 46 . 36
8.1
18.2
Initial
127 , 0 3 , 16 . 12
25 . 2
1.9
0.4
Time ,
hr:min:sec
125 , 19 , 34.70
Final
Final
127 ,03,31.60
127 ,18,30 . 8
127 ,33,30.8
Real-time nominal
25 . 0
2.0
0.7
0.0
0.4
0.9
0.1
1.2
0.5
Time ,
Velocity ,
t:t/sec
51. 3
hr:min:sec
posigrade
125,19:35
Actual
Velocity ,
ft/sec
52 . 9
posigrade
Time ,
hr:min:sec
125 ,19:35
south
up
(a)
(a)
126 : 17,42
total
12 6,57 ,00
5-1
11.0
retrograde
retrograde
up
126,17 ,50
Velocity ,
ft/sec
51.6
0.7
0.1
posigrade
8.0
1.7
18 . 1
retrograde
22 . 9
1. 4
11.0
pos igrade
south
down
south
up
up
forward
Tight
down
127 ,03,39
Final
First m.idcourse
Velocity ,
125 ,19,35.48
c
initiationb ,
LUNAR MODULE MANEUVER SOLlfriONS
Abort guidance
Final
height
5-VI . -
forward
23.4
right
22 . 4
0.2
11.7
posigrade
north
127 :03:52
up
north
up
down
forward
right
down
(a)
(a)
127,12,00
0.0
( d)
( d)
(a)
(a)
127 , 2 7 ,00
0.0
(d)
(d)
forward
right
down
elution not obtained .

bBo-axis reference frame ; all other solutions for locea-vertical reference frame .
For comparing the primary guidance solution for terminal phase initiation with the real-time nominal and actual values , the following components are
equivalent to those listed but with a correction to a local-vertical reference frame :

d
Data not available because of moon occultation.
22 . 7
posigrade ,
1.5
north , and
10.6
up.
\.n
I
.....
-.J
5 -18
TABLE 5-VI I . - COMMAND MODULE SOLUTIONS
S olut ion ,
ft/ s e c
Maneuver
Time ,
hr : mi n : sec
Coellipt i c s equence init i at i on
12 5 : 19 : 34 . 70
5 1 . 3 retrograde
1 . 4 s outh
0 . 0 up/down
Constant di fferent:i al h eight
126 : 17 : 46 . 00
9 . 1 pos igrade
2 . 4 north
1 4 . 6 down
Terminal phase init i at i on
127 : 02 : 34 . 50
b
127 : 0 3 : 30 . 8
a
2 2 . 9 retrograde
1 . 7 south
11 . 9 down
Fir st midcour s e correct i on
127 : 18 : 30 . 8
1 . 3 retrograde
0 . 6 s outh
Second midcourse correction
12 7 : 3 3 : 30 . 8
0 . 1 retrograde
1 . 0 s outh
0 . 6 down
initial comput ed t ime of igni tion using nominal elevat ion angle
of 208 . 3 degree s for terminal phas e initi at ion .
b
Final solution us ing lunar module t ime of igni t i on .
NOTE :
All s olut ions in local hori zontal coordi nat e frame .
NASA-S-69-3 7 09
Descent orbit insertion
Command and service
module orbit (60 m D
Lunar module descent

orbit (60 mi les by
50 000 feet)
Undocking
--a.a.
Sun
Powered
descent
Earth
Figure 5-l .
Lunar descent orbital events .
V1
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5-20
NASA-S-69-lllO
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High gate
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Approxi mate range to landing point, mi
I
14 000
5000
T
260
+Z
26 000
Approxi mate range lo landing point, It
+x
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+X
,z
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f-
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-------
L'!' c\
Landing
+Z
--
fif
400 ft
I
2500
A utomatic landing program

Approxi mate range to landing point, ft
Figure 5-2. - S pacecraft attil udes during powered descent.
5000
Attitude hold
NASA-S-69-3711
90 X 103
Powered descent initiation
I nitiate rotation to windows up
1--Terminate rotation to windows up
Landing radar lock (aitude and velocity!
I.
.
80 f.-- 2
3.
f.-- 4.
!----
Enable radar update

Engine thrott le change
Landing program initiation
Abort guidance update
Automatic landing program
5.
70 f.--
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6.
7.
8.
9.
lr Abort guidance
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---
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t-
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tr 8
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-60
-50
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Mitude rate, It/sec
Figure 5-3. - Comparison of aitude and altitude rate during descent.
-Jl
-20
PL
-
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10
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Approach phase
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1 0 2 :36
102:38
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-10
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1 0 2:42
T ime/ hr:min
F i gure 5-4 . - Comparison of lateral velocity.
1 0 2 :44
I
1 0 2:46
1 0 2:48
5-23
NASA-S-69-3713
14 0
120
10 0
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P-66
102:34
102:36
102:38
1 0 2: 4 0
1 0 2 : 42
T ime , hr:min
F igure 5-5 . - Pitch attitude time h istory during descent.
Landi g
"\t
-
102:44
1 0 2:46
5- 24
NASA-5 -69-3714
30
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102:43:00
43:20
43:40
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44:20
44:40
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ii
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i
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43:20
43:40
44:00
44:20
44:40
45:00
45:20
Time, hr:min:sec
(bl Pitch gimbal angle.
Figure 5-6. - Expanded pitch and roll attitude time histories near landing.
45:40
46:00
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NASA-S -69-3722
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102:45:40
102:45:42
Time, hr: min:sec

Figure 5-13. - Spacecraft dynamics during lunar touchdown.
102:45:44
NASA-S-69-3723
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Figure 5-1 4 . - Command module s ignting hi story during lunar stay .
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Figure 5- 15.- Rendezvous radar tracking of the command

module wh i le LM was on lunar surface .
:24:00
NA SA -5 -69-3725
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124:26
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124:28
Time, hr: m i n
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Figure 5-16. - Trajectory parameters for lunar ascent phase.
124:29
124:30
124:31
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.. . ........ ..... Rendezvous radar tracking
Ground tracking
-------
Command and service

modu le orbit (60 mi)
10
Earth
Event
T i me
L i ft-off
1 2 4 : 2 2 :00 . 8
Lunar mod u l e i n serti on
1 24 :29 : 1 5 . 7
Coell iptic sequence i n itiation
1 2 5 : 19 :3 5 . 0
Constant di fferential height
1 2 6 : 1 7 : 49 . 6
Terminal phase i nitiation
1 2 7 : 03 : 5 1 . 8
F i rst midcourse correction
1 2 7 : 18 :3 0 . 8
Second m idcourse correction
1 2 7 :33 :3 0 . 8
Begin braking
1 2 7 :3 6 :57 . 3
Begin stationkeep i ng
1 27 : 5 2 :0 5 . 3
Docking
1 28 :03 :0 0 . 0
10
Figure 5 - 19 .- Ascent and rendezvous trajectory .
Sun
\Jl
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NASA-S -69-3731
A tual
10
k36 ,;, 57 : 9 ""'\

--
--
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Nominal
k36 = Range rate 36 minutes
prior to constant differential

height maneuver
40
f..--
109 . 8
Constant d ifferential
height maneuver
'-
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Coe l l i ptic sequence

initiation maneuver
[ Nominal trajectory
......
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...
Computed trajectory
....... .......
!'--.... ....._
50
70
80
90
100
110
12 0
130
Displacement, mi
( Lunar module behind)
140
150
Figure 5-2 0 . - Relative s pacecraft motion during rendezvous .
160
170
18 0
6-1
6.0
COMMUNICATIONS
Performance of all communications systems ( see se ctions 8 , 9 , 10 ,

and 13 ) , including those of the command module , lunar module , portable
li fe support system , and Manned Space Flight Network , was generally as
expe cte d . Thi s s e ction presents only those aspects of communicat i on sys
t em performance which were unique to this flight . The performance of
these systems was otherwis e cons istent with that of previous flight s .
The S-band communi cation system provided good quality voi ce , as did the
VHF link within its range capability . The performance of command module
and lunar module up-data links was nominal , and real-time and playback
telemetry performance was excellent . Color television pictures of high
quality were received from the command module . Good quality black-and
white television pi ctures were received and converted to standard format
during lunar surface operations . Excellent quality tracking data were
obtained for both the command and lunar modules . The received uplink
and downlink signal powers corresponded to pre flight predictions . Com
muni cations system management , including antenna switching , was generally
good .
Two-way phase lock with the command module S-band equipment was
maintained by the Merritt Island , Grand Bahama Island , Bermuda , and USNS
Vanguard stations through orbital insertion , except during S-IC /S-II
staging , interst age j ettison , and station-t o-station handovers . A com
plete loss of uplink lock and command capability was encountered between
6 and 6-1/2 minutes after earth li ft-off because the operator of the
ground transmitter at the Grand Bahama Island station terminate d trans
mis s i on 30 seconds early . Full S-band communi cations capability was re
stored at the s cheduled handover time when the Bermuda station established
two-way phase lock . During the Merritt I sland station ' s coverage of the
launch phas e , PM and FM receivers were us ed to demodulate the received
telemetry dat a . ( Normally , only the PM data link is used . ) The purpose
of this configuration was to provide additional data on the pos s ibility
of improving telemetry coverage during S-IC/S-II st aging and interstage
j ettison using the FM receive r . There was no los s o f data through the
FM receiver at staging .
On the other hand , the s ame event cause d a 9second loss of data at the PM receiver output ( see fig . 6-1 ) . However ,
the loss of dat a at interstage j etti s on was approximately the s ame for
b oth types o f receivers .
The television transmission attempte d during the first pass over
the Goldstone station was unsuc ces s ful because of a shorted patch cable
in the ground station television equipment . Als o , the tracking coverage
during this pass was limite d to approximately 3 minutes by terrain ob
structions . All subsequent transmi s s i ons provided high-quality televi s i on .
6-2
The USNS Reds tone and Mercury ships and the Hawai i stat i on provi ded
adequat e coverage of translun ar i nj e ct i on . A late handover of the com
mand module and ins trument unit uplinks from the Redstone to the Mercury
and an early handover of both uplinks from the Mercury to Hawaii were
performed because of command computer problems at the Mercury . Approxi
mat e ly 58 s econds of command module dat a were los t during thes e handovers .
The loss of dat a during the handover from the Mercury to Hawai i was caus ed
by terrai n ob struct i ons .
Communications between the command module and th e ground were lost
during a port ion of transpos ition and docking becaus e the crew failed
to switch omnidirectional antennas during the pitch maneuver . Two-way
phase ' lock was regained when the crew acquired the high gai n antenna i n
the narrow beamwidth . The telemetry dat a recorded onb oard the space craft
during thi s phas e were subs equently played back to the ground. Betwe en
3-l/2 and 4 hours , the downli nk voi ce received at th e Mi s s i on Control Cen
ter was di s torted by equipment failures within the Goldstone s tat i on .
During the fourth lunar orbit revolution , lunar module communications
equipment was activat ed for th e first t ime . Good quality normal and back
up down-voi ce and high and low bit rate telemetry were rece ived through
the 210 -foot Goldstone antenna while the spacecraft was transmitting
through an omnidire ct i onal antenna. As expect e d , t elemetry decommut ation
frame synchroni zat ion could not be maintained in the igh-bit-rate mode
using the 85-foot antenna at Goldstone for recept ion .
Between acquis ition of the lunar module s i gnal at 10 2 : 16 : 30 and the
pit ch-down maneuver during powered des cent , valid s teerable antenna auto
track could not be achieve d , and received uplink and downlink carri er
powers were 4 to 6 dB below nominal . Coinci dently , s everal los ses of
phas e-lock were experi ence d ( fi g . 6-2 ) . Prior to the uns che duled yaw
maneuver initiat e d at 10 2 : 27 : 2 2 , the line of s ight from the lunar module
steerable antenna to earth was obstruct e d by a reacti on control thrus ter
plume deflector ( see s ection 16 . 2 . 4 ) . Therefore , the antenna was more
sus cept ible in thi s att itude to inci dental phas e and amplitude modulation
resulting from mult ipath effects off eith er the lunar module or the lunar
surface . The sharp los s es of phas e lock were probably caus ed by the build
up of os cillations in s teerable antenna moti on as the frequenci es of the
incidental amplitude and phas e modulat ion approached multiples of the an
tenna switching frequency ( 50 hert z ) . After the yaw maneuver , auto-track
with the correct steerable antenna pointing angles was not attempte d un
til 102 : 40 : 12 . Sub s equently , valid auto-track was maintained through
landing .
As shown in figure 6-2 , the performance of the downlink voice and
telemetry channels was cons i stent with the rece ived carr i er power . The
long periods of los s of PCM synchroni zati on on dat a receive d at the 85foot stat ion distinctly illustrate the advantage of s cheduling the de
scent maneuver during coYerage by a 210-foot antenna .
6-3
After landing , the lunar module steerab le antenna was swi tched to
the slew ( manual ) mode and was used for all communi cat i ons during the
lunar surface stay . Als o , the Network was configured to relay voice
communicat i ons between the two space craft .
This configurati on provided good-quality voice while the command
module was t ransmitt ing through the high gain antenna . However , the
lunar module crewmen report e d that the noi s e as sociat e d with random key
ing of the voice-operat e d amp li fi er within the Network relay configura
tion was obj ecti onable when the command module was transmitting through
an omnidirectional antenna . This nois e was expected with operat i on on
an omnidirectional antenna , and us e of the two-way voice relay through
the Network was dis continue d , as planne d , after the noi s e was report e d .
During t h e subs equent ext ravehicular activity , a one-way voi ce relay
through the Network to the command module was uti li zed.
Primary coverage of the extravehicular activity was provided by
210-foot antennas at Golds tone , Californ i a , and Parkes , Australia. Back-
up coverage was provided by 85 -foot antennas at Goldstone , Californi a ,
and Honeysuckle Creek, Australia. Voice communi c at ions during this p eriod
were sat i s factory ; howeve r , voice-operat ed-relay operat ions caus ed breakup
of the voice received at the Network stat i ons ( see s ecti on 13 . 2 an d 16 . 2 .. 8 ) .
This breakup was primarily as soci at e d with the Lunar Module Pilot . Through
out the lunar surface operat ion , an echo was heard .on the ground 2 . 6 s e c-
onds after uplink transmi s sions because uplink voi ce was turne d around
.and transmitt ed on the lunar module S-band downlink ( s ee sect ion 16 . 2 . 9 ) ..
The Parkes receiving station was largely used by the Mission Control Cen
ter as the primary receiving stat ion for real-time television t ransmi s
sions . The telemetry decommut at ion system and the PAM-to-PCM converter
maint ained frame synchronizat ion on the lunar module t elemetry data and
the portable-life-support -system status dat a , respectively , throughout
the lunar surface activities .
An evaluat ion of dat a recorded by the Honeysuckle station during
lunar surface activities was accomplished to determine whether an 85-foot
station could have support ed this mis sion phas e without deployment of
the lunar module erectable antenna . The results were compared with
thos e of a s imilar evaluat ion recorded at the Goldstone stat i on us ing
the 210-foot antenna. A compari s on of s low-s can t elevision signals
received at the two s tat ions shows that , although there was a 4-dB dif
ference in signal-to-noi s e rat ios , there was no appre ci able difference
in picture quality . The differences in downlink voice intelligibility
and telemetry dat a quality were not s ignificant . There is no perceptible
difference in the quality of biomedical dat a rece ive d at the 85- and 210
foot stat ions . Playback of portable-life-support - system status dat a for
the Lunar Module Pilot shows that frame synchroni zation was maintained
88 and 100 percent of the t ime for the 85- and 210-foot stations , respe c-
tively . Bas ed on thes e comparisons , the 85-foot ground stat i on could
6-4
have supported the lunar surface acti viti es without deployment of the
erectable antenna with s li ghtly degraded dat a .
Th e performance of the communicat i on system during the as cent and
rende zvous phases was nominal except for a 15-se cond los s of downlink
phase lock at ascent engine ignition . The dat a indi cate this loss can
be attributed to rapid phas e perturb at i ons caused by transmi s s i on through
the ascent engine plume . During future Apollo missions , a wider carrier
tracking loop bandwidth will be s elected by the Network stations prior t o
powered ascent . This change will minimi ze the poss ibility o f loss o f
lock due to rapi d phase perturbat i ons .
NASA-S-69-3732
S -IC/ S -11 stage separation
No frame
synchron i zation
-o
(/) 1::
....
0
....
....
0
(!)
u
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20
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lnterstage jett ison
co 2i
10
PM TE LE ME T RY PERFOR MANCE
r----r--_,----+----+orn--..-+----+----- ----+---
r----r--_,--+-
FM T E LEMETRY PERFORMANCE
0 0: 0 0
0 0: 0 1
00:02
00:05
00:06
T i me , m i n :sec
F i gure 6 - 1 . - Communicat i ons system performance (down I ink) during launch .
0\
I
V1
6-6
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-60
-70
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E
co
-80
;<
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-90
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"'"
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-120
-130
-140
I I
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I I
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ce-up maneuver
[
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i
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i
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Unscheduled yaw
1
1 0-degree right maneuver_.,_ 1
-100
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A - Steerable antenna automatic mode

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Jl
1
r Landing
2 1 0- oot antenna
l
i VV\ '-"""....-ti'ii-i"'"'-"i'
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DOWN L I N K POWER
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m =
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05
Time , hr:min
F igure 6-2 . - Communications system (down link) performance during final descent.
7-l
7.0
TRAJECTORY
The analysis of the traj e ct ory from li ft-off to spacecraft /S-IVB

s eparation was b as ed on Marshall Space Flight Center re sult s ( re f . l )
and tracking dat a from the Manned Space Fli ght Network . After s epara
tion , the actual traj ectory i nformat i on was b as ed on the best estimated
traj e ctory generated after the flight from Network tracking and telemet ry
dat a .
The earth an d moon models us ed for the traj e ctory analysi s are geo
metri c ally described as follows :
( l ) the e arth model is a modi fi e d
seventh-order expan s i on containing ge odet i c an d gravit ati onal constants
repre sentat ive of the Fi s cher ellips oid , and ( 2 ) the moon model i s a
spheri c al harmoni c expan s i on containing the R2 potent i al funct i on , whi ch
i s de fined in reference 2 . Table 7-I defines the traj e ctory and maneu
ver parameters .
7.l
LAUNCH PHASE
The launch traj e ctory was e s s enti ally nominal and was ne arly i dent i
cal to that of Apollo 10 . A maximum dynami c pres sure o f 735 lb / ft 2 was
experi enced. The S-IC center and outboard engines and the S-IVB engine
cut off within l s e c ond of the planned time s , and S-II outboard engine
cutoff was 3 s econds e arly . At S-IVB cutoff , the alt i tude was high by
9 100 feet , the velo city was low by 6 . 0 ft /sec , and the flight-path angle
was high by 0 . 0 1 degre e all of which were within the expected di spersions .
7.2
EARTH PARKING ORBIT
Earth parking orbit insertion o c curred at 0 : 11 : 49 . 3 . The parking

orbit was perturbed by low-level hydrogen vent i ng of the S-IVB stage
until 2 : 34 : 38 , the time of S-IVB restart preparat i on .
7.3
TRANSLUNAR INJECTION
The S-IVB was reignited for the translunar inj e ct i on maneuver at

2 : 44 : 16 . 2 , or within l s e cond of the predict e d time , and cutoff occurred
at 2 : 50 : 0 3 . All parameters were nominal and are shown in fi gure 7-l .
7-2
7.4
MANEUVER ANALYSIS
The p arameters derived from the best estimat e d traj e ctory for e ach
spacecraft maneuver executed during the trans lunar , lunar orbit , and
transearth coast phas e s are presented i n t ab le 7-I I . Tab le s 7-III and
7-IV pres ent the re spective peri cynthion and free-return conditions after
e ach trans lunar maneuver . The free-return results indi c ate conditions at
entry interface produced by e ach maneuver , as suming no additi onal orbit
perturbat i ons . Tab le s 7-V and 7-VI present the respe ctive maneuver sum
maries for the lun ar orbit and the trans earth coast phas e s .
7.4.1
Trans lunar Inj e ct ion
The pericynthion altitude result ing from translunar inject ion was
896 . 3 mi le s , as compared with the pre flight predi ct i on of 718 . 9 miles .
This altitude difference i s repres ent at ive of a 1 . 6 ft /sec accuracy in
the inj e ct i on maneuve r . The as soc i at e d free-return conditi ons show an
e arth capture of the space craft .
7.4.2
Separat i on and Docking
The command and s ervi ce modules s eparated from the S-IVB and suc
cess fully completed the transpositi on and docking sequence . The space
craft were e j e ct e d from the S-IVB at 4 hours 17 minutes . The e ffect of
the 0 . 7-ft /s e c e j e ct i on maneuver was a change in the predi cte d peri cyn
thion alt itude to 827 . 2 miles . The s eparat i on maneuver performed by the
s ervi ce propuls ion system was execut e d pre c i s ely and on time . The re
sult ing t raj e ctory conditions indi cate a peri cynthion altitude re ducti on
to 180 . 0 miles , as compare d to the planned value of 167 . 7 mi les . The
difference indi cates a 0 . 24-ft /s e c executi on error .
7.4.3
Trans lunar Mi dcours e Corre ct ion
The computed midcours e corre cti on for the first option point was
only 17 . 1 ft /se c . A real-time de cision was therefore made t o de lay the
fi rst midcourse corre ction until the s e cond opti on point
at trans lunar
inj e ction plus 24 hours becaus e of the small increase to only 21 . 2 ft / s e c

i n the corrective velocity require d. The first and only trans lunar mi d
cours e corre cti on was init i at e d on time and result e d in a pericynthion
altitude of 61 . 5 miles , as compared with the des ire d value of 60 . 0 mi le s .
Two other opportunities for midcours e corre ction were availab le during
the translunar phase , but the velocity changes require d to s at i s fy plan
ned peri cynthion altitude and nodal positi on targets were well below the
7-3
levels at whi ch normal lunar orbit i ns ert i on can be retargete d . There

fore , no further trans lunar midcours e corrections were required. The
translunar traj ectory was very s imilar t o that of Apollo 10.
7.4 .4
Lunar Orbit Ins ert i on and Circulari zat i on
The lunar orb it ins ert i on and circulari zat i on t argeting philos ophy
for Apollo ll differed from that of Apollo 10 i n two way s . Firs t , t ar
geting for landing site lat itude was b i as ed to account for the orbit
pl ane regres s ion observed in Apollo 10; and s e condly , the circulari zation
maneuver was targeted for a noncircular orbit of 6 5 . 7 by 53 . 7 miles , as
compared with the 60-mi le-circular orb it t argeted for Apollo 10. A di s
cus sion of these considerat i ons is presented in s e ct i on 7 . 7 . The repre
sentat ive ground t rack of the space craft during the lunar orbit phase o f
the mi s sion i s shown in figure 7-2 .
The s equence of events for lunar orbit ins ert ion was initiat e d on
time , and the orbit achieved was 169 . 7 by 60. 0 miles . The firing dura
tion was 4 . 5 seconds les s than predi ct e d becaus e of higher than pre
dict ed thrus t ( see s e ct ion 8 . 8 ) .
The circularizati on maneuver was initiated two revolut ions later
and achieve d the des ired target orbit to within 0 . 1 mile . The spacecraft
was placed into a 6 5 . 7- by 53 . 8-mi le orbit , with pericynthion at approxi
.mat e ly 80 degrees wes t , as planned . The R2 orb it predict ion model pre
dicted a spacecraft orbit at 126 hours ( revolut ion 13 ) of 59 . 9 by 5 9 . 3
miles . However , the orbit did not cir culari ze during this period ( fi g .
7-3 ) . The effe ct s of the lunar potential were suffi c i ent to c aus e thi s
predi ct ion to be in error by ab out 2 . 5 miles . The actual space craft
orbit at 126 hours was 6 2 . 4 by 56 . 6 mi les .
7.4.5
Undocking and Command Module Separat i on
The lunar module was undocked from the command module at ab out 100
hours during lunar revolut ion 13 . The command and s ervi ce modules then
performed a three-impuls e separat ion sequence , with an actual firing
t ime of 9 seconds and a velo city change of 2 . 7 ft / s e c . As report e d by
the crew , the lunar module t raj e ctory perturb at ions resulting from un
docking and stat i on-keeping were uncompensat e d for in the des cent orbit
insertion maneuver one-half revolut ion lat e r . These errors directly af
fe cte d the lunar module state ve ctor accuracy at the initiation o f pow
ered des cent .
7-4
7.4.6
Lunar Module Des cent
The des cent orbit ins ertion maneuver was executed at 101-l/2 hours ,
and about 57 minutes later , the powered des cent s e quence began . The
detailed traj ectory analys i s for the lunar module des cent phase is pre
s ented in s e ction 5 . 1 . The trajectory parameters and maneuver results
are presented in tables 7-II and 7-V .
7.4.7
Lunar Module As cent and Rendezvous
The lunar module as cent stage li fted off the lunar surface at
124 : 22 : 00 . 8 after staying on the surface for 21 hours 36 . 35 minutes .
Lunar orbit insertion and the rendezvous sequence were normal . The
terminal phase was completed by 128 hours . The detailed traj e ctory anal
ysis for as cent and rendezvous is presented in s ections 5 . 6 and 5 . 7 .
Tables 7-I I and 7-V present the traj e ctory parameters and maneuver re
sults for these phases .
7.4.8
Transe arth Inj ection
The transearth inj ection maneuver was initiated on time and achieved
a velocity change of only 1 . 2 ft /sec les s than planned . This maneuver
exceeded the real-time planned duration by 3 . 4 s econds because of a
s lightly lower-than-expe cted thrust ( see s e ction 8 . 8 ) . The trans earth
inj ection would not have achieved acceptable earth entry conditions . The
resulting perigee altitude s olut i on was 69 . 4 miles , as compared with the
nominal value of 20 . 4 miles .
7.4.9
Trans earth Midcourse Corre ction
At the fifth midcourse-correction opt ion point , the first and only
transe arth midcourse correction of 4 . 8 ft /sec was made with the reaction
control system , whi ch corrected the trajectory to the predicted entry
flight-path angle of minus 6 . 51 degrees .
7.5
COMMAND MODULE ENTRY
The best est imated trajectory for the command module during entry
was obt ained from a digital postflight reconstructi on . The onboard te
lemetry recorder was inoperative during entry , and s ince the spacecraft
experienced communicat i ons blackout during the first portion of entry ,
7-5
complete telemetry informat ion was not recorde d . A range ins trumenta
tion aircraft re ceived a small amount of dat a s oon afte r the entry inter
face was re ache d and again approximately 4 mi nutes into the entry . Thes e
dat a , combine d with the best estimat e d traj ect ory , produce d the postflight
dat a presented herein. Tab le 7-VII pres ents the actual conditions at
entry interface .
The flight -path angle at entry was 0 . 0 3-degree shallower than pre
di ct e d at the last mi dcours e corre cti on , c ausing a peak load fact or of
6 . 56g , whi ch was slightly higher than planned.
The spacecraft lande d in the Paci fi c Ocean at 169 . 1 5 degrees west
and 13 . 30 degrees north .
7.6
SERVICE MODULE ENTRY
The s ervi ce module entry was recorded on film by aircraft . Thi s film
shows the s ervi ce module entering the earth ' s atmosphere and di sintegra
ting near the command module . Acc ording to preflight predict i ons , th e
s ervi ce module should have skipped out of the earth ' s atmosphere into a
highly elliptical orbit . The Apollo 11 crew ob served the servi ce module
ab out 5 minutes aft er s eparat i on and indi cat e d that its react i on control
thrusters were firing and the module was rot ating . A more complete di s
cus s ion of this anomaly is contained i n s ecti on 16 . 1 . 11 .
7.7
LUNAR ORBIT TARGETING
The t argeting philos ophy for the lunar orb it ins ertion maneuver di f
fered in two ways from that of Apollo 10 . Firs t , the landing s ite lat i
tude t argeting w as b ias ed in an attempt t o account for the orbit plane
regre s s i on noted in Apollo 10 . During Apollo 10 , the lunar module p as s ed
approximately 5 mi les s outh of the landing site on the low-altitude pas s
following des cent orbit insert i on . The Apollo 11 t arget bias of
minus 0 . 37 degree in latitude was bas ed on the Langley Research Center
13-degree , 13-order lunar gravity mode l . Of all gravi ty models investi
gated , this one came the clos es t to predi cting the orbit inclinat i on and
longitude of as cending node rates ob served from Apollo 10 dat a . During
the lunar landing ph as e in revolution 14 , the lunar module latitude was
0 . 0 78 degree north of the des ire d landing site latitude . A large p art
of thi s error resulte d becaus e the targete d orbit was not achieve d at
lunar orbit ins ertion . The difference b etween the predi cted and actual
values was approximately 0 . 0 5 degree , which repres ent s the predi cti on
error from the 13-degree , 13-order model over 14 revolut i ons . Howeve r ,
7-6
the amount of lunar module plane change required during des cent was re
duced from the 0 . 337 degree that would have been require d for a landing
during Apollo 10 to 0 . 0 7 8 degre e in Apollo 11 by b i asing the lunar orbit
ins ertion t arget ing . A compari s on b etween Apollo 10 and 11 latitude
t arget ing results is presented in t ab le 7-VII I .
The s e cond change from Apollo 10 t argeting was that the circulari z a
tion maneuve r was t argeted for a noncircular orb it of 53 . 7 by 6 5 . 7 mile s .
The R2 lunar potent i al model predi cted this orbit would de cay to a 60-mile
circular orbit at nominal time for rendezvous , thereby conserving as cent
stage propellants . Although the R2 model i s currently the best for pre
dicting in-plane orb it al elements , it cannot predict accurat ely over long
intervals . Figure 7-3 shows that the R2 pre di ct i ons , using the revolu
tion 3 ve ct or , mat che d the ob served altitudes for approximat ely 12 revo
lutions . It should b e not e d that the command and s ervi ce module s epara
t i on maneuver in lunar orbit was t aken into account for b oth the ci rcu
lariz at i on t argeting and the R2 predi ct i on . I f the spacecraft had been
placed into a ne arly circular orbit , as in Apollo 10 , estimat es show that
a degenerated orbit of 5 5 . 7 by 67 . 3 mi les would have result e d by the time
of rendezvous . The velocity penalty at the constant different i al height
maneuver for the Apollo 10 approach would h ave b een at least 23 ft / s e c ,
as compare d to the actual 8 ft /sec result i ng from the executed circular
i z ation t argeting s cheme . A comparis on between Apollo 11 and Apollo 10
circulariz ation result s is presented in t ab le 7-IX .
7. 8
LUNAR ORBIT NAVIGATION
The pre flight plan for lunar orbit navigat i on , b as e d on Apollo 8

and 10 postflight analys es , was t o fit tracking dat a from two near s i de
lunar pas s es with the orbit plane cons trained to the lates t , one-pas s
solut i on . For des cent targeting , it was planne d to us e the landing s ite
coordinates determine d from landmark s ight ings during revolut i on 12 , i f
i t appe are d that the proper l andmark had b een tracked. I f not , the best
preflight estimate of coordinates from Lunar Orb iter dat a and Apollo 10
s i ghtings was to b e us ed. In additi on , these coordinat e s were to be ad
justed to account for a two-revolution propagat i on of radial errors de
termine d in revolut i ons 3 through 10 . The predi ct ed worst -cas e e stimate
of navigation ac curacy was approximately 3000 feet in b oth latitude and
longitude .
Seve ral unant i cipat e d problems s everely affe cted n avigat i on accuracy .
First , there was a gre ater incons istency and large r errors in the one-p as s
orbit plane e stimat e s than had b een ob s erved on any previ ous mi s si on
( fi g . 7-4 ) .
7-7
These errors were the result o f a known defi ciency in the R2 lunar
potent ia]_ model. This condition should not o c cur on future m i s s i ons
bec ause di fferent lunar inclinat i on angles will b e flown .
A second problem , clos ely relat e d to the first , was that the two
revolution prop agat ion errors for cros s track , or latitude , errors were
ext remely incons is tent. The average progagat i on error b as ed on five
samples at the end of revolution 10 was 2900 feet ; b ut the uncertainty
in this estimate was plus or minus 9000 feet. On the other hand , the
propagat ion errors for radial and downtrack , or longitude , errors were
within expect ed limits . No adj ustment was made for either latitude or
longitude propagation errors becaus e of the large uncertainty in the case
o f lat itude and the small corre cti on ( 800 feet ) required in the cas e of
longitude .
The coordinates obtained from the l andmark tracking during revolu

tion 12 devi ated from the best preflight estimate of the center of the
landing site ellips e by 0 . 097 degree north , 0 . 0147 degree eas t , and
0 . 038 mile b elow . These errors are attributed to the R2 potentia]_
model defi ciencies . The large difference in latitude result e d from an
error in the space craft stat e vector estimat e of the orb i t plane ; thes e
were the dat a us ed to generate t h e s ighting angles . The difference i n
longitude could a]_s o have been caus ed by an error i n the estimated stat e
vector or from t racking t h e wrong landmark .
The third problem area was the large number of traj e ctory perturb a
t ion in revolut ions 11 through 1 3 because of uncouple d att itude m aneuvers ,
such as hot firing tests o f the lunar module thrusters , undocking impuls e ,
station-keeping act ivity , sublim at or operat ion and pos sibly t unnel and
cabin venting . The net effect of thes e perturbat i ons was a s i zeable down
r ange miss .
A compar i s on between the lunar landing point coordinates generated
from various dat a sources i s presented in table 5-IV . The difference , or
m i s s di stance , was 0 . 04 4 4 degree south and 0 . 2199 degree east , or approx
imately 4440 and 21 990 feet , respect ively . The miss i n lat itude was
caused by neglect ing the two-revolution orbit plane propagation error ,
and the miss in longitude resulted from the traj e ct ory perturbat i ons
during revolutions 11 through 1 3 .
The coordinat e s us ed for ascent targeting were the best pre flight
estimat e of landing site radius and the onboard-guidance estimate of lat
itude and longitude at touchdown ( corrected for initia]_ state vector errors
from ground tracking ) . The e stimated errors in t argeting coordinates were
a radius 1500 feet less than des ired and a longitude 4400 feet to the wes t .
7- 8
TABLE 7-I . - DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBI TAL PARAMETERS
Trajectory Parameters
Geode t i c latitude
Definition
Spacecraft
the earth ' s
pos i t i on measured north or s outh from

equat o r to the local vert i cal vector ,
deg
Selenographic
lat i tude
Spacecraft pos i t i on measured north or s outh from

the true
lunar e quatorial plane to the
t i c al vector ,
Longitude
local ver
deg
Spac ecraft position measured east or west from the

body ' s prime meri di an to the local vert i cal vec
tor , deg
Perpendi cular distance from the reference body to
Alt itude
the point of orb i t intersect , ft or miles ; alt i

tude ab ove the lunar surface
i s referenced - t o
Landing Site 2
Space -fixed veloc i ty
Magnitude of the i nertial velocity vector refer

enced to the b ody-centered , inertial reference
coordi nat e system,
Space-fixed flight-path angle
ft/sec
Flight-path angle measured positive upward from

the body-centere d , local hori zontal plane to the
inert i al velocity vector ,
Space-fixed heading angle
deg
Angle of the proj e ct i on of the inert i al velocity

vector onto the local body-centere d , hori zontal
plane , measured positive eas tward from north , deg
Apogee
Maximum altitude ab ove the
ob lat e earth model , miles
Perigee
Minimum alt itude ab ove the oblate earth model , miles
Apocynthion
Maximum altitude
ab ove the moon mode l , referenced
to Landing Site 2 , miles

Peri cynth ion
Minimum altitude above the moon model , referenced

to Landing S i te 2 , miles
Time required for space craft to complete
Period
360
de
grees of orbit rotat i on , min

Inclination
Acute angle forme d at the intersection of the orbit

plane
and the re ference body ' s equatorial plane ,
deg
Longitude
node
of the as cending
Longitude where the orb it plane
crosses the ref
erence b ody ' s equatorial plane from below , deg
7-9
TABLE 7-II.- TRAJECTORY PAJW.fETERS
Event
Ref.
body
Time,
hr :min :sec
Latitude ,
deg
Longitude ,
deg
Altitude,
miles
Space-fixed
ve1oci ty,
ft/sec
Space-fixed
flight.path
angle, deg
Space-fixed
deg E of l
heading angle,
Trans1unar Phase
l72 .55E
Earth
2 : 44 : 16 . 2
5 . 038
Earth
2:50:03.2
9.52N
165 .61W
Trans1unar injection
Command module/S-IVB separation
Earth
2:50:13.2
9.98N
3 : 17 :0 4 . 6
;);;>eking
Earth
3:24:03.1
Spacecraft/S-IVB separation (ejection}
Earth
4:16:59.1
Earth
Earth
Earth
Earth
SIVB second ignition
:3-I\l'.O :>econd cutoff
Separat ion maneuver

J:e;ni tion
Cutoff
First nidccurse ccrrection

Igni ti o n
Cu-:;off
Eart h
105 . 8
25 562
0.02
1T 3 . 3
35 567
6.91
59.93
164.84W
180.6
35 546
7. 37
31.16N
88. 76W
4 110 . 9
24 4 5 6 . 8
46 .2i.J
60.07
30.18N
81. TlW
5 317 . 6
22 6 6 2 . 5
44.94
99.57
23.18N
67. 70W
3 506.5
1 6 o6o . 8
62.D1
l1J .90
4 : 110 :01 . 8
4 : 40 : 04 . 7
2l.l6N
21 .16N
68. 46w
68. 46w
16 620 . 8
1 6 627.3
1 4 680 . o
14 663.0
64.30
64.25
26 : 44 : 58. 7
26:45:01.8
5 .99N
6 . 00![
U . 16H
ll.l7W
109 4'(5 . 3
109 4n . 2
5 025.0
5 ClO . 0
77.05
76.88
8 250.0
5 419 . 0
-9.99
- 0 . 20
477.3
57.75
95.10
12C .86
120.87
Lunar Orbit Phase
.:...unar ortit insertion

Ignition
to ff
U!:ar orb:.: c ircularization

lg':lit:'.on
!-loon
lloon
:bon
75 : 4 9 : 5 0 . 4
75 : 5 5 : 4 8 . 0
1 . 5 78
0.16N
0 . 023
-0.49
0 .32
-t.6 . 5 5
338. 3
1)2 . 9
5 333.8
0.16
-89.13
0 .99N
1. 05N
31. 86E
31. 41E
G2. 7
62.5
5 332.7
5 332 . 2
-0.13
-0.16
-106.89
l06.9C
1.125
1.16S
56 . 1;
57.8
5 364.9
5 284.9
0.10
-0.06
-75 . 7C
- 75 . 1 9
102 3 3 : 0 5 .
1 . oa;
140.20W
141. 881-r
5 564 . 9
C.03
-l::l l . . 2 3
o . 73?1
12 .99E
6.4
12)1 : 2 9 : 15
1C . 0
5 531.9
0.28
- 1:)8 . 15
125 : 2 0 : 2 2 . 0
0 . 9 &:3
0 . 918
141 . 12W
149 . 57W
41.4
48.4
376 .6
0.11
0 .09
-76. 95
127 : 0 3 : 5 1 . 8
127 :04:14 . 5
1.178
1 . 118
ll0.28W
lll . 46w
391. 5
413.2
-C.l6
-0.03
339 . 7
0 .42
l .llN
Sefarat i::m
Igniti cr,
C-\:.to:'f
Moon
Moon
100:39 5 2 . 9
100:40 01.9
C:.J.toff
ti,oon
l4oon
101 36 :14 , 0
101 3 6 ; 4!,
Moon
Moon
una!' orbit engine cutoff
12":; : 1 9 : 3 5 . 0
I;,;"iLion
::oe11i"'ti;: sequence initiatio!!.

C-1:0ff
er::tir.a1 Fhase initiation

I;;nLon
Cut of:'
.Q6.89
Gl.6
80:11 : 3 6 . 8
8 0 : 11 : 53 . 5
100:12 : 00 . 0
?moered C.e3;:ent init:'.ation
61.8
-C2 .80
n6.21E
!con
l!oon
;:;ese::t orb:. t ir:sertion

:.;: it i or.
60.1
170. 09E
169 . l6E
:.:ndocl;.ing
Cutoff
B6. 7
0.023
3 9 . 39E
118, 61E
328.l
-66.77
-77. 90
-92 . E s
-93.16
;;oo r::tir.al fhase finalize
/.loon
127 : 46 : 09 . 8
o . &lx
128 : 0 3 : 0 0 . C
l . 18.1r
6 1 . 31E
,'Jo.6
31J: . 5
0 .16
.t,.sce:-.t s:agc je:-:;:.son
Moon
130:09:31.2
1 , 10N
41. 85E
61.6
335 . 9
0.15
97 . 81
.::.r.al :oeparation
:g:-. ::.t:.cn
::\.:.:o:::
Moon
Moon
130 :3::l : O l . C
130 : 30 :08.1
0 .08if
0 , 1 9N
20 . 19W
20 .ssw
5 330.1
5 326.9
-0.05
-0 .02
-52 . 06
-52.73
:Tar.seartf_ nection
:g:-.ition
:;utoff
!>bon
Noon
135:23 42.3
135:26 13.1
0 . 168
0 . 50N
164 . 02E
52.4
58.1
5 376.0
8 589.0
-0.03
5.13
-62.77
-62.00
154.02E
Transearth Coast Phase

Se;:,ond. n::.d;:,ourse correction
Igniti:-
Cutoff
separatir,
::: ::.=and :r:odu1e/ser..-i ;:,e n:.odule
Earth
150:29:57.4
1 5 0 : 3 0 : 07 . 4
13.163
l3.16S
37. 19'
37 . 83W
169 0 8 7 . 2
169 o8o . 6
4 075.0
4 074 . 0
-00 . 34
-8o .41
129.30
129 .3C
Earth
194 : 4 9 : 1 2 . '(
35. 09S
122. 54E
1 778. 3
2 9 615 . 5
-35.26
6 9 . 2'(
Earth
TABLE 7-III . - TRANSLUNAR MANEUVER SUMMARY
Maneuver
Ignition time ,
System
Firing time ,
hr:min:sec
sec
Resultant pericynthion conditions
Velocity
change ,
ft /sec
-.1
I
I-'
0
Altitude ,
Velocity ,
Latitude ,
Longitud e ,
Arrival time
miles
ft/sec
deg
deg
hr:min:sec
Translnnar injection
S-IVB
2 , 44 , 16 . 2
347 . 3
10 441 . 0
896 . 3
6640
O . llS
174.1311
7 5 , 0 5 ,21
Command and service module/S -IVB separation
React ion control
3 ' 17 , 04 . 6
7.1
0.7
827 . 2
6728
0 . 098
174. 89\1
75 , 07 , 4 7
Spa.cecraft /S-IVB
Service propulsion
4 , 4 0 , 01 . 8
2.9
19 . 7
180 . 8
7972
0 . 18N
175 . 97E
75 : 3 9 , 30
Service propulsion
26 , 44 , 58 . 7
3.1
20.9
61. 5
8334
0 . 17N
173 . 5 7E
75 : 5 3 : 35
separation
TABLE 7-IV.- FREE RETURN CONDITIONS FOR TRANSLUNAR MANEUVERS
Entry interface conditions

Vector description
Vector time ,
hr :min :sec
Velocity ,
ft/sec
Flight-path angle ,
deg
Latitude ,
deg
Longitude ,
deg
Arrival t ime ,
hr:mi n : s ec
After translunar injection
2 : 5 0 :0 3 . 0
36 076
-64.06
l . 93N
6 6 . 40E
162,12,04
After command and service mod-
4 : 40 : 0 1 . 0
36 079
-67 . 43
0 . 198
9 8 . 05E
160 : 32 : 27
Ai"ter separat ion maneuver
11 : 2 8 : 0 0 . 0
36 139
-48 . 9 5
37 . 386
5 9 - 95E
146 : 3 9 ,27
After first midcourse correction
26 : 45 : 01 . 5
3 6 147
-10 . 25
18. 468
168. 10E
145 : 0 5 :28
Before lunar orbit insertion
7 0 , 48 , 00
36 147
-9 . 84
17 . 898
169. 0lE
145 , 0 4 : 32
ule/S-IVB separation
TABLE 7-V . - LUNAR ORBI1' MANEUVER SUMMARY
Maneuver
Ignition time ,
System
hr:min:sec
Firing t ime ,
sec
Resultant orbit
Velocity
change ,
ft/sec
Apocynthion ,
Pericynthion ,
miles
miles
60 . 0
Lnnar orbit insertion
Service propulsion
75,49,50. 4
357 . 5
2917 . 5
169 . 7
Lunar orbit circularization
Servi c e propulsion
8o , u , 36 . 8
1G . 8
15 8 . 8
66 . 1
54.5
Command module/lunar mod-
Service module reaction

control
100 , 3 9 , 5 2 . 9
5.2
1.4
63 . 7
56 . o
76 . 4
ule separation
Descent orbi"t insertion
Descent propulsion
101 , 36 , 14 . 0
64 . 3
55.6
Powered descent init iation
Descent propulsion
10 2 , 3 3 , 0 5
756 . 3
6930
58. 5
7.8
Lunar orbit insertion
Ascent propulsion
124 ,22 , 00 . 8
4 34 . 9
6070 . 1
48.0
9 .1
Coelliptic sequence initi-
Lunar module reaction
12 5 : 19 , 3 5 . 5
47 . 0
51.5
49 . 3
45 . 7
126,17 : 49 . 6
17 . 8
19 9
47 . 4
42 . 1
12 7 , 0 3 , 51 . 8
22.7
25.3
61 . 7
43.7
1 2 7, 46 , 0 9 . 8
28.4
31 . 4
63 . 0
56 . 5
130 , 30 : 01 . 0
7.2
2.2
62.7
54.0
at ion
30 . 0
control
height

control
Terminal phas e initiation

control
Terminal phase final i z e

control
Final separation

control
TABLE 7-VI . - TRANSEJ;RTH MANEUVER SUMMARY
Event
System
Ignition time ,
hr:min:sec
Firing
Velocity
time ,
chruoge ,
sec
ft/sec
Resultant entry interface cond:. tions

Flight-path
angl e , deg
Veloc ity ,
Lat i tude ,
Longitude ,
ft/sec
deg
deg
Arrival time ,
hr : m i n : sec
Transearth injection
Service propul sion
135 : 2 3 , 42 . 3
151 . 4
3279 . 0
- 0 . 70
36 195
4 . 29N
180.15E
195 : 0 5 , 5 7
Second midcourse cor-
Service module
150 : 2 9 : 57 . 4
11 . 2
4.8
-6 . 4 6
3 6 194
3 . 178
171. 99E
195 : 0 3 : 0 8
recti on
react i on control
7-12
TABLE 7-VI I . - ENTRY TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS

Entry i nterface ( 400 0 0 0 feet alt itude )
19 5 : 0 3 : 0 5 . 7
Time , hr :min : s ec
Geodeti c lat itude , deg s outh
171 . 96
Longi tude , deg e as t

Alt itude , mile s
3 . 19
65 . 8
Space-fixed velocity , ft /s ec
36 19 4 . 4
Space -fixed flight-path angle , deg
-6 . 48
Space-fixe d heading angle , deg east of north
50 . 1 8
Maximum condit ions

'
Velocity , ft /s e c
Acc elerat i on , g .
Drogue deployment
Time , hr :mi n : s e c
19 5 : 12 : 06 - 9
Geodetic l at itude , deg s outh

Recovery ship report
Onboard guidance
Target .
.
Longitude , deg wes t

Recovery ship report
Onboard guidance
Target
1 3 . 25
1 3 . 30
1 3 . 32
169 . 15
16 9 . 15
169 . 15
7-13
TABLE 7-VI I I . - LATITUDE TARGETING SUMMARY
Landing s ite latitude on the

landing revolut i on s , deg
Apollo 10
Apollo ll
Des ired
0 . 691
0 . 691
Actual
0 . 35 4
0 . 769
0 . 337 s outh
0 . 0 78 north
Error
TABLE 7-IX . - CIRCULARIZATION ALTITUDE TARGETING
Orbit alt itude , miles

Apollo 10
At circulari zat i on
Des ired
60 . 0 by 60 . 0
53 - 7 by 6 5 . 7
Actual
61 . 0 by 62 . 8
5 4 . 5 by 6 6 . 1
1 . 0 by 2 . 8
0 . 8 by 0 . 4
Des ired
6 0 . 0 by 60 . 0
6o . o by 6o . o
Actual
5 8 . 3 by 6 5 . 9
56 . 5 by 62 . 6
-1 . 9 by 5 . 9
-3 . 5 by 2 . 6
Error
At. rendezvous
Apollo ll
Error
NASA-S-69-3734
1 100
10
38
1000
cU
""C
"'
900
<1:
800
700
600
x J. u-
f-
L
1-
5 f.,
Q)
""C
.,
"'
"'
"'
c.
I
..<::
':::;
IJ
.!<'
u.
2 1-
u
0
a;
>
Altitude
28
24
.....
Velocity
,.
2:44
2:45
F l ight-path angle
2:46
:,..""
l/ 17
vv
1/
/
v
./
30
26
Velocity
32
..<::
34
0
QJ
<II
'ejj
v-"""'
/.v
F l ight-path angl
36
2:47
j
2:48
Time , hr:min
F igure 7-1 . - Trajectory parameters during trans lunar injection firing .
2:4 9
..
2:50
; ;;
$
za a
B;;B
g
B ;;B
Y
za
NASA-5-69-3738
1 .2
1.1
1.0
"'
.;
"
:::1
0.9
"-
<D o
- ..
'..0
oo
..... ....
0.8
<P o
0
.....
,.. ,
D
l:J.
0.7
l:J. Premission target
R 2 predicted
QJ
"
k'
/
v
0 Pass solutions
D Optics solutions
On
.... ...
...
oOO
',
10
15
o P
LJ
'
'
'
'
1'.
Landing site _/
0.6
20
25
'
",
'
Langley-model
predicted
',
30
35
Revolution
Figure 7-4 . - Se lenograph ic latitude estimates based on a one pass solution using R2 mode l .
40
8-1
8.0
COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE
Performance of command and service module systems is dis cus s e d in

this s e ction . The s e quential , pyrote chnic , thermal protection , earth
landing , power distribution , and emergency dete ction systems operated
as intended and are not dis cus s e d further . Dis crepancies and anomalies
are generally mentioned in this section but are dis cus s e d in greater de
t ail in section 16 , Anomaly Summary .
8.1
STRUCTURAL AND MECiiANI CAL SYSTEMS
At earth lift-off , measured winds b oth at the 60-foot level and in

the region of maximum dynamic pressure indicate that structural loads
were well below the established limits . During the first stage of flight ,
accelerations measured in the command module were nominal and s imilar
to those measured during Apollo 10 . The predi cted and calculated space
craft loads at lift-off , in the region of maximum dynamic pres sure , at
the end of first st age boost , and during staging are shown in table 8 . 1-I .
Command module accelerometer data indicate that sustained low-fre
quency longitudinal oscillations were limite d to 0 . 15g during S-IC boost .
Structural loads during S-II and S-IVB boost , trans lunar inj ection ; both
docking operations , all s ervice propulsion maneuvers , and entry were well
within design limits .
As with all other mechanical systems , the docking system performed
required for both the translunar and lunar orbit docking events . The
following information concerning the two docking operations at contact
i s based on c rew comments :
as
Contact conditions
Axial velocity , ft /sec
Trans lunar
docking
Lunar orbit
docking
0 . 1 to 0 . 2
0 .1
Lateral velocity , ft /sec
Angular velocity , deg/sec
Angular alignment , deg
Mis s distance , in .
8-2
The probe retract time for both events was between 6 and 8 seconds . Dur
ing the gas retract phase of lunar orbit docking , the crew detected a
relative yaw mis alignment that was estimated to have been as much as
15 degrees . See sections 4 . 15 and 5 . 7 for further discussion . The un
expected vehicle motions were not precipitated by the docking hardware
and did not prevent accomplishment of a success ful hard dock . Computer
simulations of the lunar orbit docking event indicate that the observed
vehicle mis alignments can be caused by lunar module plus X thrusting
after the command module is placed in an attitude-free control mode ( see
section 8 . 6 ) .
TABLE 8 . 1-I . - MAXIMUM SPACECRAFT LOADS DURING LAUNCH PHASE
Maximum qa:
Lift-off
Load
Interface
Launch escape
system/ command
module
Command module/
service module
Servi c e module/
adapter
Calculated
b
Predicted
ment unit
NOTE :
Predicted
a
Calculated
590 000
300 000
140 ooo
-89 600
ll 000
19 0 0 0
173 000
Axial force , lb
-12 100
-34 6DD
Bending moment , in-lb
680 DOD
1 320 000
166 000
470 000
340 000
Axial force , lb
-28 6oo
-36 000
-88 200
-88 000
-81 6oo
36 DDD
696 000
l 620 000
2 000 000
2 790 000
l 220 000
540 000
-193 300
-200 000
-271 000
-296 000
34 000
60 0 0 0
2 263 000
4 620 000
2 600 000
5 060 000
l 400 000
440 000
-297 800
-300 000
-415 000
-441 000
51 000
90 000
Negative axial force indicates compre ssion.
The accelerations at the end of first-stage boost were :
Measured
c
Predicted
89 . 0
87 . 2
Mach no.
2.1
1.9
Dynamic pressure , psf
695
727
1 . 43
1.66
994
1210
Flight time , sec
Angle of attack , deg
Maximum qa, ps f-deg
a
Calculated from flight data.
Acceleration
Predicted Apollo 11 loads based on measured winds aloft.

Apollo 11 loads for b lock II spacecraft design verifi cation conditions .
Predi cted Apollo 11 loads based on AS-506 static test thrust decay data.
Measured
d
Predicted
Longitudinal , g
3 . 88
4.0
Lateral , g
0 . 06
0 . 05
b
Predicted Apollo 11 loads based on wind induced launch vehicle bending moment measured prior t o launch.
8 ODD
110 000
-24 ODD
Condition
redicted
110 0 0 0
310 000
-22 200
e
Predicted
5 DOD
136 000
-11 ODD
Axial forc e , lb
a
Calculated
230 000
l 000 000
The flight conditions at maximum qa were :
d
Predi cted
520 000
Staging
End of first-stage boost

c
Axial for c e , lb
Adapter/instru-
a
Calculated
8-4
8.2
ELECTRICAL POWER
8.2.1
Batteries
The bus voltages of the entry and pyrotechnic batteries were main
tained at normal levels , and battery charging was nominal . All three
entry batteries contained the cellophane separators , whereas only bat
tery B used this type of separator for Apollo 10 . The improved perform
ance of the cellophane separators is evident from voltage/current dat a ,
which show , at a 15-ampere load , that the cellophane type batteries main
tain an output 1 t o 2 volts higher than the Fermion-type batteries .
The only departure from expected performance was when battery A was
placed on main bus A for the translunar midcourse correction . During
this maneuver , normal current supplied by each battery is between 4 and
8 amperes , but current from battery A was initially 25 amperes and grad
ually declined to approximately 10 amperes j us t prior to removal from the
main bus . This occurrence can be explained by cons ideration of two con
ditions : ( 1 ) fuel cell 1 on main bus A had a lower ( 400 F ) than average
skin temperature , causing i"\; to deliver less current than usual ; and ( 2 )
b attery A had been fully charged just prior t o the maneuver . Both these
conditions , combined to result in the higher than usual current deli very
by battery A . Performance was normal thereafter.
The total b attery capacity was continuously maintained above 103 A-h
until separation of the command module from the s ervice module .
8.2.2
Fuel Cells
The fuel cells and radiators performed s atis factorily during the
prelaunch and flight phases . All three fuel cells were activated 68 hours
prior to launch , and after a 3-1/2-hour conditioning load , they were
placed on open-circuit inline heater operation unti l 3 hours prior t o
launch . After that time , the fuel cells provided full spacecraft powe r .
During the 195 hours of the mission , the fuel cells supplied approxi
mately 393 kW-h of energy at an average spacecraft current of 6 8 . 7 amperes
( 22 . 9 amperes per fuel cell ) and an average command module bus voltage of
29 . 4 volt s . The maximum deviation from equal load sharing between indi
vidual fuel cells was an acceptable 4 . 5 amperes .
All thermal parameters , including condenser exit temperature , remained
within normal operating ranges and agreed favorably with predicted flight
values . The condenser exit temperature on fuel cell 2 fluctuated periodi
cally every 3 to 8 minutes throughout the flight . This disturbance was
similar to that noted on all other flights and is discus s e d in more detail
in reference 3 . The periodic disturbance h as been shown t o have no effect
on fuel cell performance .
8-5
8.3
CRYOGENIC STORAGE
The cryogenic storage system s atis factorily s upplied reactants to

the fUel cells and metabolic oxygen to the environmental control system .
At launch , the total oxygen quantity was 615 pounds ( 79 pounds above the
minimum red-line limit ) , and the hydrogen quantity was 5 4 . 1 pounds ( 1 . 0
pound above the minimum red-line limit ) . The overall consumption from
the system was nominal during the flight .
During the flight , it was dis c overed that one heater in oxygen tank 2
was inoperative . Records show that it had failed between the times of the
countdown demonstration test and the actual countdown , and current meas
urements indicate that the element had an open circuit , This anomaly i s
dis cussed i n detail i n section 16 . 1 . 2 .
8.4
VHF RANGING
The operation of the VHF ranging system was nominal during des cent
and from lunar lift-off until orbital insertion . Following insertion ,
a number of tracking dropouts were experience d . These dropouts resulted
from negative circuit margins caused by use of the lunar module aft VHF
antenna instead of the forward antenna . After the antennas were switched ,
VHF ranging operat i on returned to normal . A maximum range of 246 miles
was measured , and a comparis on of the VHF ranging dat a with rendezvous
radar data and the predicted traj e ctory showed very close agreement .
8,5
INSTRUMENTATION
The instrumentation system , including the data storage equipment ,

the central timing equipment , and the s i gnal conditioning equipment , sup
ported the mission .
The data storage equipment did not operate during entry because the
circuit breaker was open . The c ircuit breaker which s upplies ac power to
the recorder also controls operation of the S-band FM transmitter . When
the television camera and as s oc i at e d monitor were to be powered without
transmitting to a ground station , the circuit breaker was opened to dis
able the S-band FM transmitter . This breaker was inadvertently left open
after the last television transmis s ion .
8-6
At approximately 5 hours 20 minutes during a s cheduled cabin oxygen

enri chment ( s ee s e ction 16 . 1 . 8 ) , the oxygen flow-rate transducer indicated
a low oxygen flow rat e . Comparis on o f the oxygen manifold pressure ,
oxygen-flow-restrictor differential pressures , and cryogenic oxygen values
indicated that the flow-rat e-transducer output calibration had shifted
downward. To compens ate for the uncertainties as sociated with the oxygen
flow indications , cabin enri chment procedures were extended from 8 hours
to 9 hours .
8 .6
GUIDANCE , NAVIGATION , AND CONTROL
The command module guidance , navigation , and control system perform

ance was s atis factory throughout the mis s i on . Earth-launch , earth-orbit ,
and translunar-inj ection monitoring functi ons were normal except that the
crew reported a 1 . 5-degree pitch devi ation from the expected flight di
rector attitude indicator reading during the translunar inject ion maneu
ver . The procedure was designed for the crew to align the flight direc
tor attitude indi c ator/orbit-rate drive electroni cs ass embly ( ORDEAL ) at
approximately 4 deg/min while the launch vehi cle was maintaining local
vertical . One error of 0 . 5 degree is attributed t o the movement of the
S-IVB while the flight director attitude indicator and the orbit-rate
drive electroni cs are being aligned . An additional 0 , 2-degree resulted
from an error in orbit-rate drive electronics initiali zation . Further ,
the reading accuracy of the flight director attitude indicator is 0 . 25
degree . An additional source of error for Apollo 11 was a late traj ec
tory modification which changed the ignition attitude by 0 . 4 degree . The
accumulation of errors from these four s ources accounts for the error
reported by the crew . The present procedure is considered adequate ;
therefore , no change is being prepare d for later miss ions .
8.6.1
Transpositi on and Docking
Two unexpected indications reported by the crew later proved t o be

normal operation of the respective systems . The 180-degree pitch trans
pos ition maneuver was to be performed automati cally under digital auto
pilot control with a manually initiated angular rate . The crew reported
that each time the digital autopilot was activated , it stopped the manu
ally induced rate and maintained a constant attitude . The c ause of the
apparent dis crepancy was procedural ; although the digital autopilot was
correctly initialized for the maneuver , in each case the rotational hand
controller was moved out of detent prior to enabling the digital auto
pilot . Normally , when the out-of-detent signal is received by the com
puter , the digital autopilot is switched from an automati c to an attitude
hold function until reenable d . After four attempts , the maneuver was
initiated properly and proceeded according to plan .
8-7
The other dis crepancy concerned the entry monitor system velocity
counter . The crew reported bias ing the counter to minus 100 ft /sec prior
to s eparation , thrust ing forward until the counter indi c ated 100 . 6 , then
thrusting aft unti l the counter indicated 100 . 5 . After the transposition
maneuver , the counter indicated 99 . 1 , rather than the expected 100 . 5 .
The cause of this apparent dis crepancy was also procedural . The trans
position maneuver was made at an average angular velocity of 1 . 7 5 deg/se c .
The entry monitor system i s mounte d approximately 12 feet from the center
of rotation . The resulting centripetal acceleration integrated over the
time necess ary to move 180 degrees yields a 1 . 2-ft /s e c velocity change
and accounts for the error observe d . The docking maneuver following
transpos ition was normal , with only small trans ients .
8.6.2
Inertial Reference System Alignments
The inertial measurement unit was aligned as shown in table 8 . 6-I .

Results were normal and comparable to those of previous mis s i ons .
8.6. 3
Translation Maneuvers
A summary of pertinent parameters for each of the service propulsion

maneuvers is contained in table 8 . 6-II . All maneuvers were as expecte d ,
with very small res iduals . Monit oring o f these maneuvers by the entry
. monitor system was excellent , as shown in table 8 . 6-III . The velocity
initializing the entry monitor velocity counter prior to each firing is
biased by the velocity expected to be accrued during thrust t ail-of f .
When i n control of a maneuver , the entry monitor issues an engine-off
dis crete s ignal when the velocity counter reaches zero to avoi d an over
burn , and the bias includes an allowance for the predicted tail-off .
The crew was concerned with the durati on of the transearth injection
maneuver . When the firing appe ared to be approximately 3 seconds longer
than anticipated, the crew issued a manual engine-off command . Further
discuss ion of this problem is contained in s ection 8 . 8 . The data indi cate
that a computer engine-off dis crete appeared simultaneously with actual
engine shutdown . Therefore , the manual input , whi ch is not instrumented,
was either later than , or simultaneous with , the automati c command .
8.6.4
Attitude Control
All attitude control functions were s atis factorily performed through

out the mis s ion . The passive thermal control roll maneuver was use d dur
ing translunar and transearth coast .
8-8
After entry into lunar orbit , and while still in the docked config
urat ion , the crew report ed a tendency of the space craft to pos ition its elf
along the loc al vert i cal with the lunar module pos itioned down . This ef
fect was apparently a gravity gradient torque , which can be as large as
0 . 86 ft -lb when the longitudinal axis of the vehicle is oriented 45 de
grees from the local vert i cal . A thruster duty cycle o f once every 15
to 18 seconds would b e con s i stent with a disturb ance torque of this mag
nitude .
8.6.5
Midcours e N avigat ion
Midcourse navigat ion us ing star/horizon s ightings was performed dur

ing the trans lunar and transearth coast phas es . The first two groups of
s ightings , at 43 600 and 126 800 miles , were us ed to calibrate the height
of the horizon for updat ing the compute r . Although s everal pro ce dural
problems were encountered during early att empts , the apparent hori zon
altitude was determined to be 35 kilometers . Table 8 . 6-IV contains a
synopsis of the navigat i on s ightings performe d .
8 . 6 .6
Landmark Tracking
Landmark tracking was performe d in lunar orbit as indicated in

t able 8 . 6-V . The obj ect ive of the s ightings was to eliminate part of
the relative uncertainty between the landing s ite and the command module
orbit and thus improve the ac curacy of des cent t argeting . The sightings
also provided an independent check on the overall t argeting s cheme . The
pitch technique provided spacecraft control while the s extant was in us e .
The landmark tracking program was als o us ed to point the optics in seve ral
unsucce s s ful attempts to locate and track the lunar module on the lunar
surface ( see sect i on 5 . 5 ) .
8.6.7
Entry
The entry was performed under automati c control as planned. No telem

etry dat a are available for the period during blackout ; however , all in
dicat ions are that the system performed as intende d .
The onboard calculat ions for inert ial veloc i ty and flight-path angle
at the entry interface were 36 195 ft / s ec and minus 6 . 4 88 degrees , respec
tively , and compare favorably with the 36 19 4 ft / s ec and minus 6 . 483 de
grees determined from tracking . Figure 13-1 shows a s ummary of landing
point dat a . The onboard computer indicat e d a landing at 169 degrees
9 minut e s west longitude and 1 3 degrees 18 minut e s north latitude , or
1 . 69 miles from the des ired target point . Since no telemetry nor radar
8-9
was available during entry , a final evaluation of navigat i on accuracy

cannot be obtaine d . However , a s imulat e d best es timate traj e ctory shows
a landing point l . 03 miles from the t arget and confirms the onb oard solu
tion . Indications are that the entry monitor system performe d as intende d .
8. 6 .8
Inert ial Measurement Unit Performance
Preflight performance of the inert i al c omponents i s summari zed in

table 8 . 6-VI . Thi s t able als o shows the average value of the accelerom
eter b ias measurements and gyro null bias drift meas urements made in
flight and the accompanying updates .
The gyro drift compensation updates were not as succes sful as ex
pect e d , probably because of the change in s ign of the comp ens ati on values .
With the change in the torquing current , a bias difference apparently
occurred as a result o f residual magnet i zat ion in the torquer winding .
The difference was small , however , and had no e ffect on the mis sion .
Figure 8 . 6-1 contains a compari son of velocity measured by the iner
tial measurement unit with that from the launch-vehicle gui dance system
during earth as cent . The s e velocity differences reflect the errors in
the inertial component compens at ion value s . One s et of error terms that
would cause these velo city errors i s shown in table 8 . 6-VI I . The diver
gence between the two systems is well within the expected limits and in
dicates excellent performance , although a momentary s aturat i on of the
launch vehicle guidance system Y-axis accelerometer caus ed an init i al
5 ft / s ec error between the two systems . The remainder of the divergence
in this axis was primarily caus ed by a mis alignment during gyrocompas s ing
of the spacecraft guidance system. The 60-ft /s e c out -of-plane velocity
error at insertion is equivalent t o a mis alignment o f 0 . 11 degree ; this
is corroborated by the Z-axis gyro torquing angle calculat e d during the
initial opti c al alignment in earth orbit .
8.6.9
Computer
The computer performed as intended throughout the mis sion . A number

of alarms occurre d , but all were caus ed by procedural errors or were in
tended to caution the respect ive crewman .
8 . 6 . 10
Optics
The sext ant and the s c anning teles cope performed normally throughout
the mis s ion . After the coelliptic s equence maneuver , the Command Module
Pilot reported that , after s elect ing the rende zvous tracking program ( P20 ) ,
8-10
the optics had to be "zeroed" before automati c tracking of the lunar
module would begin . Data indicate that the opti cs mode switch was in
the "computer" position when the command module was s et up for the con
tingency mirror image coellipti c sequence maneuver . In this maneuver
program , the service propulsion engine gimbals are trimmed by the com
puter through the digital-to-analog converter outputs o f the optics cou
pling data units . These s ame converters are used t o drive the optics
shaft and trunnion when the optics are in "computer" mode . To avoi d
driving the optics with a gimbal drive signal , o r vice vers a , the com
puter issues dis cretes which enable or di s able the appropriate output .
With the optics drive dis engaged , the trunnion in this unit was observed
during preflight testing to drift toward the positive stop . The drift
is caused by an anti-b acklash spring .
A register in the computer tracks trunnion position but is not large
enough to provide an unambiguous value for the full range of allowable
trunnion angles . Therefore , the register is biased to provide unambigu
ous readouts for the normally used range of minus 10 degrees to plus
6 4 . 7 degrees . In this case , the trunnion dri fted beyond 64 . 7 degrees , the
register overflowed , and the computer lost track of actual trunnion posi
tion . When the automatic otics positioning routine was entered after
selection of the rende zvous tracking program ( P20 ) , the computer drive
commands , based on the invalid counter content s , drove the trunnion to
the positive stop . Zeroing the sytem reestablished synchroni z ation and
proper operation .
8 . 6 . 11
Entry Monitor System
Operation of the entry monitor system was normal , although one seg
ment on the electrolumines cent numerical display for the velocity counter
failed to operate during the mis sion ( see section 16 . 1 . 4 ) .
TABLE 8 . 6-I . - PLATFORM ALIGNMENT SUMMARY
Gyro torquing angl e ,

Time ,
Progrf!m
hr :min
option*
Star used
deg
X
Star angle
difference ,
deg
Gyro drift , mERU

X
0 , 48
30 Menkent , 37 Nunki
+ 0 . 018
+ 0 . 033
+0.152
O . G1
--
--
--
5 , 35
17 Reger, 34 Atria
-0 .172
-0.050
-0 .060
0 . 02
+2.4
+0.7
-0 . 8
5 , 39
17 Reger , 34 Atria
-0 .171
-0 . 0 5 2
-0.055
0 . 02
+2.4
+0.7
-0 . 8
9 , 36
30 Menkent , 32 Alphecca
+ 1 . 005
-0 . 368
-0 . 737
0 . 01
--
-0 . 024
0 . 00
+2 . 3
+0.9
--
36 Vega, 37 Nunki
-0.493
-0.191
53 , 00
10 Mirfak, 16 Procyon
+ 0.1 03
+ 0 . 366
-0 . 004
0 . 01
-1.1
-1 . 4
0.0
57,26
31 Arcturus , 35 Rasalhague
+ 0 . 111
+0 .J.28
+ 0 . 014
0 . 01
-1. 7
-1 . 9
-0 . 2
40 Altair, 45 Fomalhaut
+0.285
+0 .281
-0 . 006
0 . 01
-1 . 2
-1 . 2
0.0
-0 . 423
+ 0 . 508
+ 0 . 111
0 . 01
--
7 3 , 08
7 3 , 33
79,10
33 Antares, 41 Dab ih
+ 0 . 100
+0.159
+ 0 . 044
0 . 02
-1.2
-1 . 9
+0 . 5
81,05
37 Nunki , 44 Enif
+ 0 . 046
+ 0 . 051
-0.028
0 . 02
-1 . 6
-1 . 8
-1 . 0
96,55
4 Achernar , 34 Atria
+ 0 . 170
+ 0 . 342
-0 .023
o . oo
-0 . 7
-1 . 5
-0 . 1
1 Alpherat z , 6 Acamar
+0 . 084
+0 .124
-0 . 010
0 . 01
-1. 3
-1.9
-0 . 2
103 , 00
10 Mirfak , 12 Rigel
+ 0 . 032
+0 . 009
+ 0 . 001
0 . 02
-1. 2
-0 . 3
0.0
107,30
43 Deneb , 44 Enif
+ 0 . 057
+ 0 . 166
-0 . 022
0 . 01
-0 . 8
-2 . 4
-0 . 3
112 ,52
33 Ant ares , 41 Dabih
+ 0 . 057
+ 0 . 213
-0 . 081
0 . 00
--
--
--
121,15
25 Acrux , 42 Peacock
+0.165
+ 0 . 186
-0 . 039
0 . 00
-1 . 3
-1. 5
-0 . 3
124 ,41
+0 . 064
+0.100
+ 0 . 021
-1 . 2
-1 . 9
+0.4
134 , 3 4
+0 . 166
+0 . 212
-0 .019
0 . 01
-1.1
-1 . 4
-0.1
Check star 33 Antares
--
101 , 1 5
1 Alpherat z , 11 Aldebaran
Check star 34 Atria

Not torqued
-0.1
24 ,14
6 Acamar , 42 Peacock
Comments
Check star 3 3 Antares
Check star 7 Menkar
Check star 1 Alpherat z
--
136 , 51
1 Alpheratz , 43 Deneb
+0 .469
-0 . 217
+0 . 383
0 . 02
--
149,19
14 Canopus , 16 Procyon
+0 . 265
+ 0 . 268
+ 0 . 012
0 . 01
-1 . 5
-1 . 5
+0.1
171,16
+ 0 . 445
+ 0 .451
+0 . 006
0 . 01
-1 . 4
-1.4
0.0
Check star 12 Rigel
192,12
2 Diphda, 4 Achernar
-1.166
-0 . 690
+0 . 456
0 . 00
--
--
--
Check stars 10 Mirfak, 1 Alpherat z ,
193,35
1 Alpherat z , 4 5 Fomalhaut
+0 . 016
-0 . 040
-0 . 010
0 . 01
-0.8
+1 . 9
-0.5
Check star 11 Aldebaran
45 Fomalhaut , 3 Navi
* 1 - Preferred; 2 - Nominal ; 3 - REFSMMAT .
TABLE 8. 6-II . - MANEUVER SUMMARY
Service propulsion maneuver

Parameter
Separat ion
Lunar orbit
Lunar orbit
insertion
circular! zation
26 :44 : 5 8 . 6 4
75 : 49 : 5 0 . 37
80:11:36 .75
135 : 2 3 : 4 2 . 2 8
26 :45 : 01 . 77
75 : 5 5 :47.90
80:11:53.63
16 . 88
135 : 2 6 : 1 3 . 6 9
First midcourse
correction
Transearth
injection
Time
Ignition hr :min :sec

Cutoff , hr:min:sec
!bration, sec
4 : 40 : 01. 72
4 : 40 :0 4 . 65
2 . 93
3.13
357-53
151.41
Velocity , ft/sec
(actual/desired )
-9.76/-9.74
+14 . 94/+14 . 86
+8. 56/+8. 74
-14 . 19/-14 . 68
+327. 12/+327.09
+92. 53/+92. 51
+13.17/+13.14
+7 . 56/+7.66
+ 9 32 - 77/+932 . 7 4
+2361. 28/+2361 . 29
+118. 18/+118. 52
+51 . 61/+5 1 - 9 3
-2556 . 06/-25 55 .81
+1681 . 85 /+1681 . 79
-1835 . 66/-1834 . 6 0
Velocity residual after trimming , ft/sec
X
y
z
o.o
0.0
+0 . 3
0.0
-Q.1
o.o
+0 . 3
o.o
0.0
+0 . 7
+0.5 .
-0 . 5
+0.1
-0 . 3
-0.1
+0 . 5
-0.7
+0 .1
-2 . 7
Pitch
+0. 93
Yaw
+0. 97
-0.55
-0.15
+0 . 97
-0. 15
+1 . 65
-0.15
+0.4 0
-o.46
+0 . 30
-0.4 2
+0 . 30
-0.38
+ 0 . 31
-0 . 33
+1.55
Pitch
+1.15
Yaw
+1.15
-0 . 06
-0.02
+1.23
- o . o6
+ 1 . 90
-0 . 32
+0.48
Pitch
+1.28
+1.19
+2.03
+1 . 81
Yaw
-0.19
-0.19
-0.33
-0.57
-0.44
-0.94
Pitch
-0.08
Yaw
+0.21
-0.20
+1. 00*
-0.14
+0.07
+0.1 4
-0.04
Roll
+0 . 12
+0 . 16
-0.21
-0.18
-0.13
-1. 00*
-0 . 3
+0 . 2
-0.4
+0 . 5
-0.1
.Entry monitor system

Engine gimbal position , deg
Initial
Maximum excursion
Pitch
Yaw
Steady-state
Cutoff
-0 . 69
+0.69
-1.73
-0.12
Cutoff
Maximum rate excursion, deg/sec

-1. 00*
Maximum attitude error, deg

Pitch
Negligible
Yaw
Roll
Negligible
Negligib1e
Negligible
-0.1
-0 . 3
0.2
0.2
-5 . 0
+2 . 6
*Saturated.
NOTE:
Velocities are in earth- or moon-centered inertial coordinates ; velocity residuals in body coordinates .
5 .o
TABLE 8 . 6-III . - ENTRY MONITOR SYSTEM VELOCITY SUMMARY
Maneuver
Total velocity to be gained

along X-axis , minus residual,
ft/sec
Velocity set into entry

monitor system counter,
ft/sec
Planned
residual,
ft/sec
Actual
res idual,
ft/sec
Corrected entry
monitor error,
ft /sec
Separation
19 . 8
15 . 2
-4.6
-4 . 0
+0 . 6
first midcourse correction
20 . 9
16 . 8
-4 . 1
-3.8
+0.3
2917. 4
2910 . 8
-6 . 6
-6. 8
-0.2
Lunar orbit insertion

Lunar orbit circularization
Transearth inject ion
Second midcourse correct ion
NOTE :
159 . 3
153 - l
-6 . 2
-5 . 2
+1 . 0
3283 . 2
3262 . 5
-20 . 7
-17 . 9
+2 . 8
4.7
4.8
+0 .1
+0 . 2
+0.1
A correction f'actor of 0 . 2 ft / s ec
was
applied to determine the corrected error.
TABLE 8 . 6-IV . - MI DOOURSE NAVIGATION
Group
Set/Marks
1/4
Star
2 Diphda
Horizon
Earth near
Time ,
hr :min
6 : 36
Distance
Jemarks
from earth ,
miles
43 600
Opti cs calibration determined as

-0 .003 deg; was not entered.
2/3 *
40 Altair
Earth far
En countered diffi culty in locating
3/6
45 Fomalhaut
Earth near
*First sighting on star 40 was re-
star because of procedural problems .

jected; had the wrong hor i zon .
4/3
2 Diphda
Earth near
8 : 08
Sightings were misaligned in the
measurement plane , up to 50 deg ;
resulted from improper instructions
from the ground.
1/3
1 Alpherat z
Earth near
24 : 2 0
126 800
Optics
calibration was zero.
entere d .
2/3
2 Diphda
Earth near
Not
Comput ed automat ic maneu-
ver onboard which did not consider

the lunar module ; therefore , diffi-
3/4
45 Fomalhaut
Earth far
25 : 2 0
culty i n locating first star was

encountered as optics pointed at
lunar module .
Ground-computed ma-
neuver was used and sightings proceeded satisfactorily .
8-15
TABLE 8 . 6-V . - LANDMARK TRACKING
Time ,
hr :min : se c
82 : 43 :00
Landmark
i dent i fi cation
Al ( altitude
landmark )
Number of
marks
Opt ics mode
Sext ant , manual - resolved
98 : 4 9 : 00
130
104 : 39 : 00
130
122 : 24 : 00
130
Sextant , manual - resolved
TABLE 8. 6-VI. - INERriAL COMPONENT PREFLIGHT HISTORY - COmAND M ODULE
Sample
mean
Error
Standard
deviation
No. of
samples
Countdown
value
Flight
load
Flight average
before update
Flight average
after update
--
--
Ac celerometers
X - Scale
:factor error,
Bias, em/sec
ppm
y - Scale factor error, ppm

Bias, em/sec
z - Scale factor error, ppm

Bias , em/sec
35
46
50
40
-0. 23
0.0 7
-0.25
-0 . 26
-22
56
-9 8
-Bo
-0. 05
0.11
0 . 04
-43
50
-101
0.20
0.14
0 .15
-0.26
a
-0.13
-30
b
0.14
-0 . 26
--
--
+0.08
+0.08
--
o . oo
-+0.01
Gyroscopes
X - Null bias drift , mERU
-1. 2
1.7
0.4
-1 . 8
Acceleration dri ft , spin reference

axis, mERU/g
.
-5.4
3. 8
-3. 3
-6.0
Acceleration dri ft , input axis,

mERU/g
13 . 7
3. 9
14.4
15 . 0
-1. 5
1.1
-2.4
-o. 6
Acceleration drift , spin reference

axis , mERU/g
1. 7
2. 0
1. 3
3. 0
Acceleration drift , input axi s ,

mERU/g
7.1
5.6
14
9.0
5.0
-0. 9
1.6
-2. 3
-0.2
Acceleration drift , spin reference

axis , mERU/g
8.4
6.6
20.4
5.0
Acceleration drift , input axis ,

mERU/g
0.8
6. 4
-4. 7
1.0
y - Null bias drift , mERU
z - Null bias d.rif't , mERU
pdated to +0. 08 at 31 hours .

b
Updated to +0. 02 at 31 hours.
c
d
Updated to +0. 44 at 31 hours

Updated to +0. 26 at 31 hours.
+2 . 4
-1. 2
+0.7
-1. 4
-o . 6
-0. 1
e
Updated to -0.31 at 31 hours.
8-17
TABLE 8 . 6-VI I . - INERriAL SUBSYSTEM ERRORS DURING LAUNCH
Uncompensat
ed error
Error term
Offs et velocity , ft / sec
2
Bias , em/s ec - X
.
.
-0 . 0 46*
y
z
.
.
. .
0 . 7*
-0 . 8*
-6 . 8
8.0
2.0
8.0
-0 . 7
8.0
5.0
Acceleration drift , spin reference axi s ,

.
.
mERU/g - y .
.
- y
-
-8 . 0
-2 . 3
2 to 5
-0 . 8
2 to 5
. .
-3 . 0
Uncorrelated plat form mi salignment about

.
.
.
X axis , arc sec
. . . .
Uncorrel ated platform mi s alignment about
.
y axi s , arc sec
.
. .
.
*Averaged for entire flight .
2.0
Accelerat ion dri ft , output axis ,

X
.
mERU/g
.
-
0 . 001*
2 . 4*
0.2
. .

.
mERU/g - X
-
--
0 . 150*
y
z
4.2
Null bias drift , mERU - X .

-
One-sigma
specifi cation
-13
50
-26
50
a:>
I
1-'
a:>
NASA-S-69-3739
72
64
56
48
......
V"
/ r-
vI--
vv
....v
..
_,.V
v
./
.....
f-""'
"""'
- y
X
z
-a
-16
I-"'"
..-
liD
uo
160
2111
3211
360
520
560
Time, sec
figure 8.6-l. - Velocity tor ison 1111w1:en instrument unil n spaacnft guidance duringascent.
721
8-19
REACTION CONTROL
8.7
8 . 7 .1
Servi ce Module
Performance o f the s ervi ce module react i on control system was normal

throughout the mi s sion . Total propellant consumed up to command module /
s ervi ce module s eparat i on was 560 pounds , 30 pounds les s than predi ct e d .
During all mi s s ion phases , the system pressures and temperatures remai ned
well within their normal operat ing range s .
At the time the c ommand and s ervi ce modules s eparated from the S-IVB ,
the crew reported that the propellant is olat i on valve indi cat ors for
quad B indi c ated the "b arb er-pole " pos ition . This indi c ation corresponds
to at least one primary and one s econdary valve being in the clos ed pos i
tion . Twenty to thirty seconds after closure , the crew reopened the
valves according to checkli s t procedures , and no further problems were
experienced ( s ee section 16 . 1 . 6 ) .
8.7.2
Command Module
After command module /s ervi ce module s eparat i on , the crew reported

that the minus-yaw engine in system l was not re sponding properly to
firing commands through the automati c coils . Postflight dat a confirm
that
this engine produced very low , but dete ct ab le , thrust when the auto
mat i c coils were activated. Als o , the response to direct coi l commands
was normal , which indi c ates that , me chani c ally , the two valves were oper
ating properly and that one of the two valves was operat ing when the
automat i c coils were energized. Post flight tests confirme d that an inter
mittent ci rcuit existed on a terminal b oard in the valve electroni cs .
Se ction 16 . 1 . 3 contains a di s cus sion of this anomaly .
All me as ured system pre ssures and temperatures were normal through
out the mis s i on , and except for the prob lem with the yaw engine , b oth
sys tems operated as expected during entry . Ab out 1 mi nut e after command
module /service module s eparation , system 2 was di s ab led and system l was
us ed for ent ry control , as planned. Forty-one pounds of propellant were
us ed during ent ry .
8. 8
SERVI CE PROPULSION
Servi ce propuls ion system performance was s atis fact ory during e ach
of the five maneuvers , with a total firing time of 5 31 . 9 se conds . The
actual ignition times and firing durat i ons are listed in table 8 . 6-rr .
8-20
Th e longest
engine
firing was
ins erti on maneuve r .
for
357 , 5
s e c onds
during the lunar orb i t
T h e fourth an d fifth s ervi ce propuls i on firings were
preceded by a plus-X reaction control trans l at i on to e ffect prope llant

s ettling ,
an d all firi ngs were
c onduct e d under aut omat i c control .
The s t e ady- st at e performan ce

The s t e ady-st at e pre s s ure
howeve r , the
during all
gaging system dat a indi c at e
1 . 60
than the expect e d
to
s at i s fact ory .
the space cr aft
120
The
s at i s fact ory .
a mixture
1 . 55
rat i o of
1 . 61 .
The engine t r an s i ent pe rforman ce

was
firings was
dat a indi c at e e s s enti ally nomi nal pe rforman ce ;
during all s t art s
ch amber pre s s ure
ove rshoot
s eparat i on maneuver from the
S-IVB
and shut downs
during the s t art
chamb e r pres sure
ove rshoot s were
On s ub s e quent
all le s s than
of
was approximat ely
ps i a , whi ch corresponds t o the upper s p e c i fi cati on limit
using only one b ank o f propellant valves .
rather
120
for s t arts
firings , th e
ps i a .
During the
separat i on firing , minor os ci llat i ons
i n the me as ure d chamb e r pre s s ure
were obs e rved beginning approximat e ly
1.5
s i gnal .
s e c onds
aft e r the i n i t i al firing
oweve r , the magn itude of the os ci llat i ons was l e s s than
( pe ak-to-peak ) ,
ber pres s ure
and b y approximat ely
2.2
s e c onds
30
psi
after i gni t i on , the cham
dat a were indi c at i ng normal s t e ady-state operat i on .
The helium pre s s uri z at i on system funct i oned normally throughout the
mi ss ion .
All system t empe ratures were mai nt ai ned within th eir red-line
limits with out heat e r operat i on .

The propellant ut i li z at i on and gagi ng system operat e d s at i s factori ly
th roughout the mi s s i on .
was
result ,
only the primary system dat a were us e d .
t i on valve was
in the
mi d c ourse firings
t i on
The mode s ele ct i on switch for the
gaging system
s et i n the normal pos iti on for all service propuls i on firi ngs ;
firing .
"normal" pos iti on during the s eparat i on and first
and for the fi rs t
and remai ne d there through the first
76
s e c onds
of the lunar orbit inser
At that time , the valve was move d t o the "i ncre as e " pos i t i on
122
s e c onds
of the t rans e arth i nj e c
The valve posit i on was then . moved t o "normal"
t i on firing .
mat ely
as
The propellant ut i li z a
s e c onds
and then t o "decre as e "
for approxi
for most o f the remainder o f the
t r an s e arth inj e ct i on firing .

Fi gure
8 . 8-l shows the indi c at e d propellant unbal an ce ,
from the dat a.
as
compute d
The i ndi c at e d unb al an ce h i s to ry should reflect the un
balance hi st ory di s pl ayed in the c ab i n , within the ac curacy of the t elem

etry system.
b al an ce
As expe ct e d , b as ed on previ ous
following the s t art
decrease readings .
fligh t s ,
of the lunar orbit
the indi c at e d un
insert i on firing showe d
The init i al decreas e re adings were
c aus ed primarily
by the oxidi zer level in the sump t ank exceeding the maximum gageab le
hei gh t .
Thi s condi t i on oc curs b e c ause
oxidi zer i s transferred from the
storage t ank to the s ump t ank as a res ult o f helium ab s orpti on

sump t ank ullage .
Thi s phenomenon ,
from the
in combinat i on with a known st orage
8-21
t ank oxidi zer gaging error , is known to cause both the initial decrease
readings and a s tep increas e in the unbal an ce at cro s s over . The crew
were briefed on thes e conditions prior to flight and , therefore , expected
both the ini tial decreas e readings and a step increase at cros sover of
150 to 200 pounds . When the unbalance start e d to increase ( approach zero )
prior to cros sove r , the crew , i n anti cipat ion of the increas e , properly
interpreted the unbalance meter movement as an indication of a low mixture
ratio and moved the propellant uti li zat ion valve to the "increas e" pos i
t ion . As shown in figure 8 . 8- 1 , the unbalance then s tarted to decrease
in response to the valve change , and at cros sover the expected s tep in
creas e did oc cur . At the end of the firing , the crew reporte d that the
unbalance was a 50-pound increas e , which agrees well with the telemetered
dat a shown i n figure 8 . 8- 1 . This early re cognition of a lower mixture
rat io and the movement of the propellant uti liti zat ion valve to the "in
creas e " pos ition during lunar orbit ins ert ion resulted in a higher-than
pre di cted average thrust for the firing an d a durat i on of 4 . 5 s econds l e s s
than predicted.
The durat ion of the firing as determined by Mis s i on Control , was de
creas ed to reflect the higher thrust level experience d on the lunar orbit
ins ert ion firing . However , during the t ran searth i nj e ct i on firing , the
propellant utili zation valve was cycled from the normal to the decrease
position two times . This result e d in les s than the exp ected thrust and
consequently res ulted in an overburn of 3 . 4 s econds . ab ove the recalculated
transearth inj ect ion firing prediction .
Preliminary calculat ions , which were b as ed on the telemetered gaging
dat a and the predi ct e d effects of propellant ut ili zat ion valve position ,
yielded mixture ratios for the "normal " valve position of ab out 1 . 5 5 , com
pared to an expecte d range of 1 . 60 to 1 . 61 . Le s s-than-expect e d mixture
rat ios were also experienced during Apollo 9 and 10 , and suffi c ient pre
flight analyses were made prior to this flight to verify that the propel
lant ut ili zation and gaging system was capable of corre ct ing for mixture
rat io shift s of the magnitudes experienced . The reason for the less -than
expect ed .mixture rat ios during the last three flights i s still under i n
vestigat ion .
An abnormal decay in the s econdary ( system B ) nitrogen pres sure was
obs erved during the lunar orb i t insertion s ervi ce propulsion firing , in
dicat ing a leak in the system which operates the engine upper bipropellan :
valve bank . No further leakage was indicat e d during the remainder of the
mis sion . This anomaly is discus sed in greater detail in s ecti on 16 . 1 . 1 .
8-22
NASA-S-69-3740
1
60
c:
"'
"'
0-
50
--
40
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30
12
c:
m
::>
400
"---.,
1 -
"
r-'
'
'
'
"---.,
i
---.f_
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Storage tanks,
primary gages
"-...,
"---.,
--
'
.......
'
.......
......
.....
,-
-'
y f '
' l r""" '
lV I
.l'l
:ll
c 200
::> :,:
:.; o
nJu
,A
-J Y
-.. ,--,
Oxidizer crossover
I
;
Yll
400
.)..
Fuel crossover
Normal f-
se1i
II
600
Decr
Propellant utilization valve position:
800
1000
Sump tanks
primary gages -,
Lunar orbit i nsertion
- -- -
'
<..>
c
<..>
c
m "'
"
--C--1 2 - lunar orbit circularization

3 - Transearth injection
F i ri n g
r-......
I
I
:ll
200
;;;
0
-....._
I'-
I
I
'
I
600
.0!
"0
"-..
'
20
10
.,-
"
.
0 XI,d IZer
-----Fuel
No mal h
Normal
0
40
80
I ncrease
120
160
200
240
280
320
360 0
20
Time from ignition. sec
Figure 8.8-l.- Service propulsion propellant unbalance.
40
80
I1I
120
rease
160
8-2 3
8.9
The environmental c ontrol system performe d s at i s fact ori ly through

out the mis s ion and provi ded a comfort ab le envi ronment for the crew and
adequat e thermal control of spacecraft equipment .
8.9 .1
Oxygen Distribut i on
The c ab in pressure stabilized at 4 . 7 ps i a prior to trans lunar inj e c

t i on an d returned to that value after ini t i al lunar module pre s s uri zat i on .
Two mas ter alarms indi c at ing high oxygen flow oc curred , however , during
lunar module pres s uri zat i on when the oxygen flow rate was de creas ing .
Thi s condition was als o experienced duri ng ground testing . Post flight
analysis has shown that this condition was c aus ed by a malfunct i on of
oxygen flow rate t rans ducer ( see s ect i on 16 . 1 . 5 ) .
8.9.2
Part i culat e Back-Contaminat ion Control
The command module oxygen systems were us ed for parti culat e lunar
surface back-contaminat i on control from final command module docking
unt i l e arth landing .
At about 128 hours , the oxygen flow rate was adj us ted to an indi
cated reading of approximately 0 . 6 lb /hr to estab lish a pos itive differ
ent i al pre s sure between the two vehi cles , caus ing the cabin pre s s ure t o
increas e t o ab out 5 . 4 p s i a . The oxygen purge was terminated at 130 hours
9 minutes following the command module tunnel hat ch leak check .
8.9.3
Thermal Control
The primary coolant system provi ded adequat e thermal control for
crew comfort and spacecraft equipment throughout the mi s s i on . The s e c
ondary c oolant system was activat e d only during redundant component checks
and the earth entry chilldown . The evaporators were not acti vat e d dur
ing lunar orbit coas t , since the radi ators provi de d adequat e tempe rature
cont rol .
At 10 5 hours 19 minutes , the primary evaporator outlet temperature
had dropped to 31 . 5 F . Normally , the temperature is maint ai ned ab ove
42 F by the glyc ol temperature control valve during cold temperat ure
excursions of the radiat or . Thi s dis crepancy is di s cus s e d in s e c
t ion 16 . 1 . 10 .
8-24
8.9 .4
Water Management
Gas in the spacecraft potable water has been a problem on all manned
Apollo flights . On this mi s s ion , a two-membrane water/gas s eparator was
installed on both the wat er gun and the outlet at the food preparation
unit . The s eparat ors allow only gas to pas s through one membrane i nto
the cabin atmo sphere , while the s econd memb rane pas s es only gas-free
water to the outlet port for crew consumption . The crew indi c ated that
performan ce of the s eparators was s at is factory. Water in the food bags
and from the water pis tol was nearly free of gas . Two interface problems
were experienced while using the s eparators . There is no pos itive lock
between the wat er pi stol and the inlet port of the s eparator ; thus , oc
casionally the s eparat or did not remain i n place when use d to fill a food
bag from the water pistol . Also , the crew commented that s ome provis ion
for positively retaining the food bag to the s eparator outlet port would
be highly desirab le . For future spacecraft , a redes ign of the s eparator
will provide pos itive locking b etween the water pis tol and the i nlet port
of the separator . Als o , a change has been made in the s eparator outlet
prob e to provi de an improve d interface with the food bag .
8 . 10
CREW STATION
The di s plays and cont rols were adequat e except the miss ion clock in
the lower equipment bay ran s low , by les s than 10 s econds over a 24-hour
period , as reported by the c rew . The mis si on clo cks have a his tory of
slow operat ion , whi ch has been attributed to electromagnetic interference .
In addit ion , the glas s face was found to be cracked. This has also been
experienced in the past and is caus ed by stress introduced in the glas s
during the as sembly proc e s s .
The lunar module mis s ion clock is i dentical to the command module
clock . Bec ause of the lunar module clock problem dis cus s e d in section
16 . 2 . 1 , an improved-design t imer is b eing procured and will be incorpo
rated in future command modules .
8 . 11
CONSUMABLES
The predictions for consumables usage improved from mis s i on to mis

sion such that for the Apollo l l mis s ion , all o f the command and s ervi ce
module consumable quantities were within 10 percent of th e pre flight e s
timates .
8-25
8 . 11 . 1
Servi ce Propuls ion Propellant
The service propuls ion propellant us age was within 5 percent of the
preflight estimat e for the mis s ion . The deviations which were experienced
have been attributed to the variations in firing times ( see s ect ion 8 . 8 ) .
In the following t able , the loadings were calculat e d from gaging system
readings and measured densities prior to lift-off .
Actual us age , lb
Conditions
Preflight
planned
usage , lb
FUel
Oxi di zer
Loaded
In tanks
In lines
15 6 33
79
2 4 967
124
Total
15 712
25 091
40 803
40 80 3
Consumed
13 754
21 985
35 739
36 296
1 958
3 106
5 064
4 5 07
Remaining at command
module/ service module
separation
8 . 11 . 2
Total
Reaction Control Propellant
Se:rvice module . - Reaction control system propellant us age predi ctior:.s

and flight dat a agree d within 5 percent . Usage was higher than expected
during transpos ition and docking and the initial s et of navigational s ight
ings . This was b alance d by efficient maneuvering of the command and s erv
ice modules during the rende zvous s equence , in which the propellant con
sumpt ion was les s than predict e d . The usages listed in the following
t able were calculated from t elemetere d helium tank pre s sure dat a us ing
the relationship between pres sure , volume , and temperature .
8-26
Condition
Actual us age , lb
Total
Pre flight
planned
us age , lb
900
1340
1342
191
369
5 60
590
249
5 31
780
752
Fuel
Oxidi zer
Loaded
Quad A
Quad B
Quad c
Quad D
110
110
110
110
225
2 25
225
2 25
Total
440
Consumed
Remaining at command module /servi ce module s eparation
Command moduZe . - Command module reaction control system propellant

usage predict i ons agreed with actual us age quantities within 5 p ercent .
The usages li sted in the following table were calculat e d from pres sure ,
volume , and temperature relationships .
Condition
Loaded
System A
System B
Tot al
Consume d
System A
System B
Total
Remaining at main parachute
deployment
System A
System B
Total
Actual us age , lb
Fuel
Oxidizer
44 . 8
44 . 4
78 . 4
78. 3
89 . 2
156 . 7
15 . 0
0.0
26 . 8
0.0
15 . 0
26 . 8
30 . 8
44 . 4
51 . 6
78. 3
75 . 2
129 . 9
Total
Preflight
planne d
us age , lb
245 . 9
245 . 0
40 . 8
39 . 3
205 . 1
20 5 . 7
8-27
8 . 11 . 3
Cryogeni cs
The oxygen and hydrogen usages were within 5 percent of those pre
dicted. This deviat i on was caus e d by the los s of an oxygen tank heater
element , plus a reduced reaction control system heater duty cycle . Us ages
listed in the following t ab le are based on the ele ct ri cal power produced
by the fuel cells .
Conditi on
Available at li ft-off
Tank 1
Tank 2
Hydrogen usage , lb
Actual
27 . 3
26 . 8
T ot al
54 . 1
Consumed
Tank 1
Tank 2
17 . 5
17 . 4
Total
34.9
Remaining at command module I

service module s eparat i on
Tank 1
Tank 2
Total
Planned
8.n.4
Actual
Planned
300 . 5
314 . 5
56.4
615 . 0
634 . 7
174 . 0
18o . o
36 . 6
9 .8
9 .4
19 . 2
Oxygen us age , lb
35 4 . 0
371 . 1
126 . 5
134 . 5
19 . 8
261 . 0
263 . 6
Water
Predi ct ions concerning water consume d in the command and s ervi ce

modules are not generat e d for each mi ssion because the system has an ini
t i al charge of pot ab le water at lift-off , plus addit i onal water is gene
rat e d in the fuel cells in excess of the demand. Als o , water is dumped
overb oard and s ome is consumed . The water quanti ti es loade d , consume d ,
produced , and expelled during the mi ssion are shown i n the following
table .
8-28
Con diti on
Loade d
Pot ab le wat e r t ank
Waste wat e r t ank
Quantity , lb
31 . 7
28
Produce d i nflight
Fuel cells
Lithium hydroxi de , met ab ol i c
315
NA
Dumpe d overboard ( including urine )
325 . 7
Evaporat e d up to command module /servi ce

module s eparat i on
Remaining at command module /s ervice
module s eparat i on
Potable wat er tank
Waste wat e r t ank
8.7
36 . 8
43 . 5
9-1
9 .0
LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE
This s e ction is a discussion of lunar module systems performance .

The significant problems are described in this section and are discussed
in detail in s ection 16 , Anomaly Sumnary .
9.1
No structural instrumentation was installed on the lunar module ;

consequently , the structural performance evaluation was based on lunar
module guidance and control dat a , cabin pres sure dat a , command module
acceleration dat a , photographs , and analytical results .
Based on measured command module accelerations and on s imulations
using measured wind dat a , the lunar module loads are inferred to have
been within structural limits during the S-IC , S-II , and S-IVB launch
phase firings , and the S-IVB translunar inj e ction maneuvers . The loads
during both dockings were also within structural limits .
Command module accelerometer data show minimal structural excitation
during the service propulsion maneuvers , indicating. that the lunar module
loads were well within structural limits .
The structural loading environment during lunar landing was evalu
ated from motion picture film , still photographs , postflight landing simu-
lati ons , and crew comments . The motion picture film from the onboard cam-
era showed no evidence of structural os cillations during landing , and cre1r
comments agree with this assessment . Flight data from the guidance and
propulsion systems were used in conducting the simulations of the landing
( see section 5 . 4 ) . The simulations and photographs indicate that the
landing gear strut stroking was very small and that the external loads
developed during landing were well within design values .
9.2
THERMAL CONTROL
The lunar module internal temperatures at the end of translunar

flight were nominal and within 3 F of the launch temperatures . During
the active periods , temperature response was normal and all antenna tem
peratures were within acceptable limit s .
The crew inspected the descent stage thermal shielding after lunar
landing and observed no significant damage .
9-2
9.3
ELECTRICAL POWER
The electrical power system performed s atis factorily . The de bus

voltage was maintained above 28 . 8 volts throughout the flight . The max
imum observed load was 81 amperes , during powered des cent initiation .
Both inverters per formed as expect e d .
The knob on the as cent engine arm circuit breaker was broken , prob
ably by the aft edge of the oxygen purge system hitting the breaker dur
ing preparations for extravehi cular activity . In any event , this circuit
breaker was closed without diffi culty when required prior t o as cent ( sec
tion J6 . 2 . ll ) .
At staging , the des cent batteries had supplied 105 5 A-h of a nominal
total capacity of 1600 A-h . The di fference in load sharing at staging
was 2 A-h on b atteries 1 and 2 and 23 A-h on batteries 3 and 4 , and both
of these values are acceptable .
At lunar module j etti s on , the two as cent batteries had delivered
336 A-h of a nominal total capacity of 592 A-h . The as cent b atteries
continued to supply power , for a total of 680 A-h at 28 V de or above .
9.4
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
Overall performance of the S-band steerable antenna was s atis factory .

Some difficulties were experience d , however , during des cent of the lunar
module . Prior to the s cheduled 180-degree yaw maneuver , the signal
strength droppe d below the tracking level and the antenna broke lock sev
eral times . After the maneuver was complete d , new look angles were s et
in and the antenna acquired the uplink signal and tracked normally until
landing . The most probable cause of the problem was a combination of
vehi cle blockage and multipath reflections from the lunar surface , as
dis cus s ed in s ection 16 . 2 . 4 .
During the entire extravehi cular activity , the lunar module relay
provided good voice and extravehicular mobility unit dat a . Occas i onal
breakup of the Lunar Module Pilot ' s voice occurred in the extravehicular
communic ations system relay mode . The most prob able cause was that the
sensitivity of the voice-operated relay of the Commander ' s audio center
in the lunar module was inadvertently s et at less than maximum speci fie d .
This anomaly is dis cus s e d i n s e ction 16 . 2 . 8 .
Also during the extravehi cular activity , the Network received an
intermittent echo of the uplink transmi s s ions . This was most likely
caus e d by signal coupling between the headset and microphone . A detaile d
dis cus s i on of this anomaly is in s ection 16 . 2 . 9 .
9-3
After crew ingress into the lunar module , the voi ce link was lost
when the portable li fe support system antennas were stowe d ; however , the
dat a from the ext ravehi cular mobility unit remained good .
Televi s i on transmis s i on was good during the entire extravehi cular
activity , both from the des cent st age stowage tmit and from the tripod
on the lunar surface . Signal-to-noise rat ios of the television link
were very good . The television was turned off after 5 hours 4 minutes
o f continuous operation .
Lunar module voice and data c ommuni cat i ons were normal during the
lift-off from the lunar surface . The steerable antenna maintained lock
and tracked throughout the as cent . Uplink s ignal strength remained
stable at approximate ly minus 88 dBm.
9.5
INSTRUMENTATION
Performance of the operational instrumentation was s atis factory

with the exception o f the data storage electroni c assembly ( onboard voi ce
re corde r ) . When the tape was played , no timing s i gnal was evident and
voice was weak and unreadable , with a 400-hertz hum and wideband noi s e
b ackground. For further dis cus sion o f this anomaly , see se ction 16 . 2 . 10.
9 .6
9.6.1
GUIDANCE AND CONTROL

Power-Up Initi alizat ion
The gui dance and control system power-up sequence was nominal except
that the crew reported an initial di ffi culty in aligning the abort guid
ance system . The abort gui dance system is aligned in flight by trans fer
ring inert i al measurement unit gimbal angles from the primary guidance
system , and from these angles establishing a direction cos ine matrix .
Prior to the first alignment after activat i on , the primary system c ou
pling data unit s and the abort system gimbal angle registers must be
zeroed to insure that the angles accurately reflect the platform atti
tude . Failure to zero could c ause the sympt oms report e d . Another pos
s ible cause is an incorre ct s etting of the orbital rate drive electroni cs
( ORDEAL ) mode swit ch . If this switch is set in the orbital rate position ,
even though the orbital rate drive unit is powered down , the pitch atti
tude displayed on the fli ght director attitude indi cator will be offset
by an amount corresponding to the orbital rate drive res olver . No data
9- 4
are available for the alignment attempt , and no pertinent informati on is
contained in the data be fore and after the occurrence . Because of the
s uccess of all subsequent alignment attempt s , hardware and s o ftware mal
functions are unlikely , and a procedural dis crepancy is the most probable
cause of the diffi culty .
9 .6.2
Attitude Reference System Alignments
Pertinent data concerning each of the inertial measurement unit

alignments are contained in t able 9 . 6-I . The first alignment was per
formed be fore undocking , and the command module plat form was used as a
reference in correcting for the measured 2 . 05 -degree mis alignment of the
docking interface . After undocking , the alignment opt i c al teles cope was
us ed to realign the platform to the s ame reference , and a mis alignment
equivalent to the gyro torquing angles shown in table 9 . 6-I was calculat
e d . Thes e angles were wel l within the go/no-go limits established pre
flight .
After the des cent orbit insertion maneuver , an alignment check was
performed by making three teles cope sightings on the sun . A compari son
was made between the actual pitch angle required for the s un marks and
the angle calculated by the onboard computer . The res ults were well
within the allowable tolerance and again indicated a properly function
ing platform .
The inertial measurement unit was aligned five times while on the
lunar surface . All three alignment options were success fully utili zed ,
including an alignment using a gravity vector calculated by the onboard
accelerometers and a prestored azimuth , one utiliz ing the two vectors
obtained from two different star sightings , and one using the calculated
gravity vector and a s ingle star sighting to determine an azimuth .
The Lunar Module Pilot reported that the optical sightings as s oci
ated with these alignments were bas e d on a te chnique in whi ch the average
of five success ive sightings was calculated by hand and then inserted
into the computer . An analy s i s of thes e s uccess ive sightings indicated
that the random sighting error was very small and that the only signif
icant trend observed in the s uccess ive sightings was lunar rat e .
The plat form remained inerti al during the 17 . 5-hour period between
the third and fourth alignments . Because both of thes e alignments were
to the s ame orientat ion , it is possible to make an est imate of gyro drift
while on the lunar surface . Drift was calculat ed from three s ources :
the gyro t orquing angles , or mis alignment , indicated at the se cond align
ment ; the gimbal angle change hist ory in comparis on to that predicted
9-5
from lunar rate ; and the comparis on of the actual gravity tracking his
tory of the onboard accelerometers with that predicted from lunar rate .
The results ( table 9 . 6-II ) indicat e excellent agreement for the granu
larity of the data utili zed.
The abort guidance system was aligned to the primary system at least
nine times during the mis s i on ( t able 9 . 6-III ) . The alignment accuracy ,
as determined by the Euler angle differences between the primary and
abort systems for the eight alignments available on telemetry , was within
specification tolerances . In addition , the abort guidance system was in
dependently aligned three times on the lunar surface us ing gravity as
determined by the abort system accelerometers and an azimuth derived from
an external s ource . The resulting Euler angles are shown in table 9 . 6-IV .
A valid comparis on following the first alignment cannot be made because
the abort guidance system azimuth was not updated. Primary gui dance align
ments following the s econd alignment were incompatible with the abort . guid
ance system because the inertial measurement unit was not aligned to the
local verti cal . A comparison o f the Euler angles for the third alignment
indicated an azimuth error of 0 . 08 degree . This error resulted from an
incorrect azimuth value received from the ground and loaded in the abort
guidance system manually . The resulting 0 . 08-degree error in azimuth
caus ed an out-of-plane velocity difference between the primary and abort
systems at insertion ( see section 5 . 6 )
9.6.3
Translation Maneuvers
All trans lation maneuvers were performed under primary guidance

system control with the abort guidance system operating in a monitor
mode . Signi ficant parameters are contained in table 9 . 6-V . The dynamic
response of the spacecraft was nominal during descent and as cent engine
maneuvers , although the effect of fuel slosh during powered descent was
greater than expected based on preflight simulati ons . Slosh os cillations
became noticeable after the 180-degree yaw maneuver and gradually in
creased to the extent that thruster firings were required for damping
( fig . 5-11 ) . The effect remained noticeable and significant until after
the end of the braking phase when the engine was throttled down to begin
rate-of-descent control . The slosh response has been reproduced post
flight by making slight variations in the slosh model damping ratio .
The ascent maneuver was nominal with the crew again reporting the
wallowing tendency inherent in the control technique use d . As shown in
table 9 . 6-V , the velocity at insertion was 2 ft/sec higher than planned .
This h as been attributed to a difference i n the predicted an d actual tail
off characterist ics of the engine .
9-6
The abort guidance system , as stat e d , was used to monitor all pri
mary guidance system maneuvers . Performance was excellent except for
s ome isolated procedural problems . The azimuth mis alignment whi ch was
inserted into the abort guidance system prior to lift-off and which con
tributed to the out-of-plane error at insertion is dis cussed in the pre
vious section . During the as c ent firing , the abort guidance system
velocity-to-be-gained was used to compare with and to monitor the primary
system velocity to be gained. The crew reported that near the end o f the
insertion maneuver , the primary and abort system dis plays differed by 50
to 100 ft /sec . A s imilar comparison of the reported parameter differences
has been made postflight and is shown in figure 9 . 6-l . As indi cated , the
velocity di fference was as large as 39 ft /sec and was caused by the time
synchronization between the two sets of data not being precise . The cal
culations are made and displayed independently by the two computers , whi ch
have outputs that are not synchronized. Therefore , the time at which a
given velocity is valid could vary as much as 4 seconds between the two
systems . Both systems appear to have operated properly .
Performance of the abort guidance system while monitoring rendezvous
maneuvers was also s atis factory , although res iduals after the terminal
phase initiation maneuver were s omewhat large . The differences were
caus ed by a 23-second late initiation of the maneuver and relatively
large attitude excursions induced because o f the incorrect selection of
wide deadb and in the primary system . The des ired velocity vector in the
abort guidance system is chosen for a nominal t ime of rendezvous . If the
terminal phase initiation maneuver is begun at other than this time and
the abort system is not retargeted , the maneuver direction and magnitude
will not be correct .
9 .6.4
Attitude Control
The digital autopilot was the primary source of attitude control

during the mis sion and performed as des igne d . One procedural dis crepancy
occurred during the 180-degree yaw maneuver after the start of powered
des cent . This maneuver was performed manually using the proporti onal rate
output of the rotational hand controller . Because a low rate scale was
erroneously selected for display , the maneuver was begun and partially
completed at less than the desired rate of 10 deg/sec . Continuing the
maneuver on the low rate s cale would have delayed landing radar acquisi
tion . After the problem was recognized , the high rate s c ale was selected ,
and the maneuver was completed as planned . The abort guidance system was
used just prior to the second docking . Performance was as expecte d ; how
ever , s ome difficulty was experienced during the docking ( see s e ction 5 . 7 ) .
9 -7
9 .6 . 5
Primary Guidance , Navigation , and Control System Performance
The inertial measurement unit was replaced 12 days before launch and
exhibited excellent performance throughout the mis sion . Table 9 . 6-VI
contains the preflight history of the inertial components for the inertial
measurement unit . The accelerometer bias history is shown in table 9 . 6-VII .
An accelerometer bias update was performed prior to undocking , with results
as shown .
Visibility in orbit and on the lunar surface through the alignment
opti cal teles cope was as expected. Because of the relative position of
the earth , the sun , and reflections off the lunar surfac e , only the left
and right rear teles cope detent positions were usable after touchdown .
Star recognition and visibility through these detents proved to be ade
uate . The sun angle had changed by the time of lift-off , and only the
right rear detent was usable . This detent proved sufficient for pre
lift-off alignments ( see section 5 . 6 ) .
The lunar module guidance computer performed as des i gned , except for
a number of unexpected alarms . The first of these oc curred during the
power-up s equence when the display keyboard circuit breaker was closed
and a 520 alarm (RADAR RliPT ) , which was not expected at this t ime , was
generated. This alarm has been reproduced on the ground and was caus ed
by a random setting of logic gates during the turn-.on seuence . Although
this alarm has a low probability of occurrence , it is neither abnormal
nor indicative of a malfunction .
The Exe cutive overflow al arms that occurred during descent ( s ee s e c
tion 5 . 3 ) are now known to be normal for the existing situation and were
indicative of proper performance of the guidance computer . These alarms
are discussed in det ail in section 16 . 2 . 6 .
9 .6 .6
Abort Guidance System Performance
Except for procedural errors which degraded performance to s ome

extent , all required functions were s atisfactory . Eight known state
vector trans fers from the primary system were performed. The resulting
pos ition and velocity differences for three of the transfers are shown
in table 9 . 6-VIII . With the exception of one whi ch was invalid because
o f an incorrect K-factor used to time-synchronize the system , all state
vector updates were accomplished without difficulty .
The preflight inertial component test history is shown in table 9 . 6-IX .
The inflight calibration results were not recorde d ; however , just prior
to the inflight calibration (before loss of dat a ) , the accelerometer bias es
were calculated from velocity data and the known computer compens ations .
9-8
The shift between the pre-installation calibrat ion dat a and the flight
measurements were as follows . ( The capability estimate limits are b ased
on current 3-s igma capabili ty estimates with exp ected measurement errors
included. )
Ac celerometer bias , ].l g
Accelerometer
Pre-installation
calibrat ion
( June 6 , 196 9 )
Free fall
( July 20 , 1969 )
48-day
shift
Capability
e stimate
-6 5
-66
185
-17
-41
-2 4
185
-66
-84
-18
185
When telemetered dat a were regained after the inflight calibration and
after powered ascent , excellent accelerometer stab ility was indicated as
follows . ( The capability estimate limits are b as ed upon current 3-sigma
capability estimat e s with expected measurement errors . included . )
Accelerometer bias , ]lg
Accelerometer
Before de s cent
After ascent
Shift
Capability
e stimate
-34
-62
-28
60
-27
-31
- 4
60
-41
-62
-21
60
Inflight calibration data on the gyros were reported and two lunar sur
face gyro calibrat ions were performed with the following result s . The
degree of stability of the ins truments was well within the expected
values .
9-9
Gyro drift , deg/hr

X
Pre-inst allation calibration

on June 2 , 1969
+0 . 27
+0 . 03
+0 . 41
Final earth prelaunch c alibration

on June 2 8 , 1968
+0 . 10
-0 . 13
+0 . 35
In flight calibration
on July 20 , 1969
+0 . 33
-0 . 07
+0 . 38
First lunar surface calibration

on July 21 , 1969
+0 . 34
-0 . 08
+0 . 47
Second lunar surface calibration

on July 21 , 1969
+0 . 41
-0 . 0 4
+0 . 50
The only hardware dis crepancy reported in the abort guidance system
was the failure of an electrolumines cent segment in one digit of the data
entry and display assembly . This is discussed in detail in section 16 . 2 . 7 .
'P
TABLE 9 . 6-I . - LUNAR MODULE PLATFORM ALIGNMENT SUMMARY
Time ,
hr :min
Type
aligr..ment
b
Technique
Telescope
detent e /star
used
2/25 ; -/33
Alignment mode
Option
100 : 15
P52
NA
103 : 01
P57
NA
Star angle
difference ,
c.eg
Gyro torquing angle , deg

X
Gyro drift , mERU

X
0 . 03
-0 .292
+0 . 289
-0 . 094
0 . 15
+ 0 . 00 5
-0 .105
-0 . 225
--
--
--
103 : 47
P57
6/12 ; 4/3
0 . 09
-0 .167
+0 .186
+0 . 014
+4 . 5
104 : 16
P57
6/12 ;
0 . 08
+0 . 228
-0 .025
-0 . 284
--
122 : 17
P57
4/13;
0 . 07
-0 . 699
+0 . 695
-0 . 628
+2 .6
-2.6
123 : 49
P57
l/10 ; 4/13
0 . 11
+0 . 089
+0 . 067
-0 . 041
-4.9
-3 . 2
-2 . 0
124 : 5 1
P52
NA
2/12 ; 2/25
0 . 00
-0 .006
+0 . 064
+0 .137
+0 . 4
-2 . 8
+8.1
a
3 - REFSMMAT ; 4 - Landing s ite .
b
l - REFSMMAT plus g ; 2 - Two bodies ; 3 - One body plus g .
c
l - Left front ; 2 - Front ; 4 - Right rear ; 6 - Left rear.
s
Star names :
25
33
l2
3
l3
10
Acrux
Antares
Rigal
Navi
Capella
Mirfak
-5.0
-
+0 . 4
-
-2 . 3
1-'
0
9 -11
TABLE 9 . 6-I I . - LUNAR SURFACE GYRO DRIFT COMPARISON
Gyro drift , deg

Axis
Computer out put ( P 57 )
0 . 699
-0 . 696
0 . 628
Gimbal angle change
Computed from gravity
0 . 707
0 . 413
-0 . 73
-0 . 76
0 . 623
1 . 00
TABLE 9 . 6-III . - GUIDANCE SYSTEM ALIGNMENT COMPARISON
Time ,
hr :mi n : sec
Indi cated difference , gimb al

minus abort electronic s , deg
y
Lunar Surface
10 2 : 52 : 01
-0 . 0081
0 . 0066
0 . 0004
103 : 15 : 2 9
-0 . 0161
-0 . 0271
0 . 0004
103 : 50 : 29
-0 . 0063
-0 . 0015
0 . 0028
122 : 36 : 00
-0 . 0166
-0 . 0025
0 . 0028
122 : 5 3 : 0 0
-0 . 0152
-0 . 0071
-0 . 0012
122 : 54 : 30
-0 . 0071
-0 . 0101
-0 . 0012
Inflight
100 : 56 : 2 0
-0 . 0019
-0 . 0037
0 . 0067
126 : 11 : 5 6
-0 . 0369
0 . 0104
-0 . 0468
9-12
TABLE 9 . 6-IV . - LUNAR SURFACE ALIGNMENT COMPARISON
Angle
Abort guidance
Primary guidance
Difference
13 . 319 4
1 3 . 227 5
0 . 0919
Pitch , deg
4 . 4041
4 . 40 5 5
-0 . 0014
Roll , deg
0 . 5001
0 . 4614
0 . 0387
Yaw , deg
9-13
TABLE 9 . 6-V . - LUNAR MODULE MANEUVER SUMMARY
Maneuver
Condition
Descent orbit
insertion
PGNCS/DPS
Time
Ignition,
hr :min :sec
Cutoff, hr :min : sec

Duration, sec
101:36 :14
101 : 3 6 : 44
30.0
X
y
Coordina-:e system
Ascent
initiation
PGNCS/DPS
PGNCS/APS
102:33:05.01
124:22:00.79
756.39
434.88
102 :45 : 41 . 4 0
124 : 2 9 : 1 5 . 67
Coelliptic se-
quence initiation
ConstWJt differential height
PGNCS/RCS
a
125:19:35
125:20:22
47 .o
Terminal phase
initiation
PGNCS/RCS
PGNCS/RCS
126 : 1 7 : 4 9 . 6
126:18:29.2
127 : 0 3 : 51 . 8
127:04 :14 . 5
22.7
2 . 04/2.05
-20.70/-20.62
1"1 .8
6775
Velocity, ft/sec
(desired/actual)
Powered descent
-75.8/ ( b )
0.0/ (b)
total
971. 27/971 . 3 2
0 . 22/0.18
+9.8/ (b)
Local vertical
5550.05/5551. 57
Stable
platform
51.5/ ( b )
1.0/ ( b )
0/ ( b )
18-99/18.85
6.6/6.17
-13. 81/-14 .10

-4.!9/-4.93
Local vertical
Earth-centered
Earth-centered
-0.2
+0.7
+0.1
-0.2
-1.0
0.0
-0.1
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
-0.8
+1.2
!0.2
:t 0 . 2
inertial
inertial
Velocity residual after

trimming , rt/sec
a
o.o
-0.4
0.0
Gimbal drive actuator, in.

Initial
0.4
Not applicable
+1 . 11
(b)
-0.1
-0.1
0 .0
+0.43
Pitch
Roll
-0.02
laximum excursion
Fi"tch
+0.03
Roll
- 0 . 28
Pitch
+0.59
Steady-state
-0.28
Roll
laxirr.um rate excursion, deg/sec
Fitc::t
Roll
(b)
+0.8
-0.8
-16 . 2
+1.2
+3.2
+1.8
-0.6
Yaw
Pitci1
C-laximun attitude excurs ion, deg

Roll
(b)
Ya;
(b)
-0.6
+2.0
-2.0
-1.6
-2.4
-2 . 0
-l. 6
(b)
!0, 4
+0.8
:tO . 8
-o.l.
-0.4
+ :J . 8
a Reported by crew.
0t;o data available .
l::JTE :
PG!fCS - Primary guidance , navigation, an d control system;
RCS - Reaction control system.
DPS - Descent propulsion system; APS - Ascent propuls ion syste:r:,
!lendezvous maneuvers after terminal phase initiation are reported in section 5 and are based
Ignition and cutoff times are those commanded by the computer.
en
crev reports.
9-14
TABLE 9 . 6-\ . - INERTIAL COMPONENT PREFLIGHT HISTORY - LUNAR MODULE
Error
Sample
mean
Standard
deviation
No . of
samples
COlmtdown
value
Flight
load
Accelerometers
-155
lll
-237
-270
0 . 60
0 . 09
0 . 70
0 . 66
y - Scale factor error , ppm

2
Bi as , em/sec
-1156
ll
-1164
-1150
0 . 08
0 . 04
0 .05
0 .10
z - Scale factor error , ppm
-549
72
-600
-620
0 . 14
0 .12
0 . 22
0 . 20
-1 . 5
1.4
-1 . 3
-1 . 6
5.7
0.0
5.7
6.0
12 . 8
3.5
15 . 2
10 . 0
3.0
1.6
1.3
3.8
Accelerat ion drift ' spin reference

axi s , mERU/g
-4 . 0
1.4
-3 . 1
-5.0

mERU/g
-2 . 3
6.1
2.0
3.0
X - Scale factor error , ppm
Bias , em/sec
Bias , em/sec
Gyros copes
X - Null bias drift ' mERU
Acceleration drift ' spin reference

axis , mERU/g
Acceleration drift ' input axi s ,
mERU/g
y
- Null bias drift , mERU
4.1
0.6
3.5
4.4
Acceleration drift ' spin reference

axi s , mERU/g
-4 . 7
0.4
-4 . 4
-5.0

mERU/g
-9 . 3
7.7
-3 . 8
-3 . 0
z - Null bias drift , mERU
9 - 15
TABLE 9 . 6-VI I . - ACCELEROMETER BIAS FLIGHT HISTORY
Condition
Bias , em/sec
Flight load
+ 0 . 66
+0 . 10
+0.20
Updated value
+ 0 . 66
+0 . 04
+ 0 . 03
Flight average before update
+0.63
+0 . 04
+0.03
Flight average aft er update
+ 0 . 67
+ 0 . 07
-0 . 01
9-16
TABLE 9 . 6-VI I I . - ABORT GUIDANCE STATE VECTOR UPDATES
Time ,
hr :min : sec
Abort minus primary guidance

Pos ition , ft
Ve1o ci ty , ft / s e c
122 : 31 : 02
-137 . 6
0 . 05
124 : 09 : 12
-177 . 6
-0 .15
126 : 10 : 14
-30 1 . 3
-2 . 01
9- 1'7
TABLE 9 . 6-IX . - ABORT GUIDANCE SYSTEM PREINSTALLATION CALIBRATION DATA
S ample
mean ,
g
Standard
deviation ,
g
Number
of
samples
-53
42
15
-22
15
-11
-23 . 7
-79
22
15
-66
-71 . 2
St andard
deviation ,
ppm
Number
of
samples
Final calibrat ion value ,

ppm
14
-430
28
324
299 - 5
12
1483
1453 . 4
Standard
deviation ,
deg/hr
Number
of
samples
Final calibration value ,

deg/hr
Flight load
value ,
deg/hr
-1048
Accelerometer bias
Accelerometer scale factor
Gyro scale factor
Sample
mean ,
deg/hr

g
1
Flight compensation value ,

g
0
Flight compensation value ,

ppm
-463 . 5
-1048
-10
15
-1048
-300
-47
15
-285
-285
3456
16
15
3443
3443
Final calibration value ,

ppm
Flight load
value ,
ppm
Gyro fixed drift
Sample
mean ,
ppm
Standard
deviation ,
ppm
Number
of
samples
0 . 33
0 . 05
15
0 . 27
0 . 27
0 . 04
0 . 05
15
0 . 03
0 . 03
0 . 51
0 . 07
15
0 . 41
0 . 41
Sample
mean ,
deg/hr/g
St andard
deviation ,
deg/hr/g
Number
of
samples

deg/hr/g
Gyro spin axis mass

unbalance
X
-0 . 67
0 . 12
15
-0 . 6 5
Flight load
value ,
deg/hr/g
-0 . 6 5
9-l8
NASA-S-69 -3741
1400
1200
""'
1'.
'
"
1000
"'
(.)
Vl
l:'
(.)
"'
>
800
1- t- A bort g idance
system data loss
1-
1"'-
v """
Primary guidance system -
600
"
F--.'
Abort gu idance system
' I
'
'
"
'
400
200
0
1 24:28:00
:10
:20
:30
:40
:50
'
:29:00
1'\
I'
:10
Time , hr:min:sec
F igure 9 . 6-1 . - Comparison of primary guidance and abort gu idance
system velocities during final phase of ascent.
:20
9-19
9 .7
REACTION CONTROL
Performance of the react i on control system was s at i s factory . The

system pre s suri zat i on sequence was nominal , and th e regul at ors mai ntained
accept able out let pres sures (between 178 and 184 p s i a ) throughout the
mi s s i on .
The crew reporte d thrust chamber ass emb ly warni ng flags for three
engine pairs . The A2 and A4 flags occurre d s imult aneous ly during lun ar
module stat i on-keeping prior to des cent orbit insert i on . The B4 flag
appeared shortly thereafter and als o twice j us t b efore powered des cent
initiation . The crew beli eved these flags were accompanied by mas ter
alarms . The flags were re s et by cycling of the cauti on and warning elec
troni cs circuit breaker . See s e ct i on 16 . 2 . 14 for further di s cus s i on .
The chamber pre ssure switch in react i on control engine BlD failed
close d approximately 8 . 5 minutes aft er powered des cent initi at i on . The
swit ch remained close d for 2 minute s 5 3 s econds , then opened and func
tioned properly for the remainder of the mi s s ion . The failure mode i s
beli eved t o be the s ame as that o f pressure switch failures on Apollo 9
and 10 ; th at i s , parti culate contaminat ion or propellant residue holding
the switch clos ed . The only potenti al consequence of the fai lure would
have been the inability t o detect an engine fai led "off . "
A master alarm was noted at 126 : 44 : 00 when s even consecutive pulses
were commanded on engine A2A without a pressure switch response . Further
di s cus sion of this di s crepancy is cont ai ned in s ect ion 16 . 2 . 12 .
Thermal characte ristics were s at i sfactory and all tempe ratures were
within pre di ct e d values . The maximum quad t emperature was 232 F on
quad l subsequent to t ouchdown . The fuel t ank temperatures ranged from
6 8 to 71 F .
Propellant us age , bas ed on the propellant quantity measuring device ,
was 319 pounds , compared with a predict e d value of 253 pounds and the
tot al propellant load of 549 pounds . About 57 of the 66 pounds ab ove
predictions were us ed during powere d des cent .
Figures 9 . 7-l and 9 . 7-2
include total and indivi dual system propellant consumpti on profi le s , re
spectively .
The reaction control system was used in the as cent interconnect mode
during powere d ascent . The system us e d approximately 69 pounds of pro
pellant from the as cent propuls ion tanks .
\0
I
1\)
0
NASA-S-69-3806
120
::::t- -
100
::!
.,;
"
-o
"
"
System A
80
I
'
1-'
System B
'
,,
--
...
c.
X
"
"
"
--
c.
0
a:
\ :-::----
System B
60
f-1
.. ...
System
'
40
....-
l..
,_ l.
""
' , ,
20
98
100
102
104
122
120
124
Time , hr
Figure 9. 7-1 . - Propellant consumption from each system .
126
128
130
NASA-S-69-3807
360
"'
320
280
24 0
"U
"
"U
"
"
"X
Actual
200
"
"
"
"-
160
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a.
P lanned
....
40
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1_-:;-:
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98
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100
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r
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- _./
120
80
,J-1
..'.:!
t-\
t- I-I
'
,.J
' f- Ac\ual
102
104
122
120
124
126
128
130
Time , hr
F i g ure 9 . 7-2 . - Total prope llant consumption .
\0
I
Pi
9-22
9.8
DESCENT PROPULSION
The des cent propuls i on system operation was s atis factory for the
des cent orbit insertion and des cent maneuvers . The engine transients
and throttle response were normal .
9 . 8 .1
Inflight Performance
The des cent orbit insertion maneuver laste d 30 seconds ; the result
ing velocity change was 76 . 4 ft /se c . The engine was started at the mini
mum throttle setting of 1 3 . 0 percent of full thrust an d , after approxi
mately 15 s econds , was throttled to 40 percent thrust for the remainder
of the firing .
The duration of the powered des cent firing was 756 . 3 seconds , corre
sponding to a velocity change of approximately 6775 ft /sec . The engine
was at the minimum throttle setting ( 13 percent ) at the beginning of the
firing and, after approximately 26 seconds , was advanced to full throttle .
There was about a 45-second data dropout during this period but from crew
reports , the throttle-up condit ions were apparently normal . Figure 9 . 8-1
presents des cent propulsion system pressures and throttle settings as a
function of time . The data have been smoothed and do not reflect the
data dropout , and the throttle fluctuations just before touchdown .
During the powered des c ent maneuver , the oxi di zer interface pres
sure appeared to be oscillating as much as 67 psi peak-to-peak . The s e
oscillations were evident throughout the firing , although of a lower mag
nitude ( fi g . 9 . 8-2 ) , but were most prominent at about 50-percent throttle .
The fact that os cillations o f this magnitude were not observed in the
chamber pressure or the fuel interface pres sure measurements indicates
that they were not real . Engine performance was not affecte d . Oscilla
tions of this type have been observed at the White Sands Test Facility
on numerous . engines , on s imilar pressure measurement ins t allations . The
high magnitude pressure oscillations observed during the White Sands Test
Facility tests were amplifications of much lower pressure os cillati ons
in the system. The phenomenon has been demonstrated in ground tests
where small actual oscillations were amplifi e d by cavity res onance of a
pressure transducer as s embly , which contains a tee capped on one end with
the trans ducer on another leg of the tee . This is similar to the inter
face pressure transducer installation . The resonance conditions will
vary with the amount of helium trapped in the tee and the throttle set
ting .
9-23
9 .8.2
System Pre s suri zat i on
The oxi di zer t ank ullage pressure decayed from 15 8 to 9 5 p s i a during

the period from lift-off to the first activat i on of the system at ab out
8 3 hours . During the period , the fuel t ank ullage pre s sure decre as e d
from 163 t o 139 psia. Thes e de cays result e d from helium abs orption into
the propellant s and were within the expe cte d range .
The me asure d pres sure profile in the super criti c al helium tank was
normal . The preflight and inflight pres sure ri s e rates were 8 . 3 and
6 . 4 ps i /hr , respe ctively .
During propellant vent ing after landing , the fuel interface pressure
increased rapi dly to an off- s c ale reading . The fuel line had frozen dur
ing venting o f the supercrit i c al helium , trapping fuel between the pre
valve and the helium heat exchange r , and this fue l , when heat e d from en
gine soakb ack , c aus ed the pres sure ri se . See s ecti on 16 . 2 . 2 for further
di s cussion .
9.8.3
Gaging System Performance
During the des cent orbit insert i on maneuver and the early portion
of powered des cent , the two oxi di zer propellant gages were i ndi cating
off- s c ale ( greater than the maximum 9 5 -percent indi cat i on ) , as expect e d .
The fuel prob e s on the other hand were indi c at ing approximat ely 9 4 . 5 per
cent instead of re ading off-s cale . The propellant loade d was equi valent
to approximat ely 9/ . 3 and 96 . 4 percent for oxidizer and fuel , re spe ctively .
An initi al low fuel reading also had occurre d on Apollo 10 .
As the firing
cont inued , the propellant gage s began to indi c ate consumption correctly .
The t ank 1 and t ank 2 fuel probe measurements agreed throughout the fir
ing . The t ank 1 and tank 2 oxi di zer prob e measurements agreed initi ally ,
but they began to diverge unt il the difference was approximately 3 per
cent midway through the firing . For the remainder of the firing , the
difference remaine d constant . The divergence was probably c aus ed by oxi
dizer flowing from t ank 2 to t ank 1 through the propellant cros s over line
as a result of an offset in vehicle center of gravity .
The low level light came on at 102 : 44 : 30 . 4 , indi cating approximately
116 seconds of tot al firing time remaining , b ased on the s ensor location .
The propellant remaining t imeline from the low level light indi c ation to
calculated propellant depletion is as follows .
9-24
Propellant
low level
li ght on
116
Engine
cutoff
Landing
go/no-go
de cision
point
20
Calculat e d
propellant
deplet i on
Firing time remaining , s ec
The indi c ated 45 s e c onds to propellant depleti on compares favorab ly

with the post flight calculat e d value of 5 0 s ec onds to oxidi zer t ank 2
depletion . The 5-s econd di fference i s within the me asurement accuracy
of the system . The low level s ignal was triggere d by the point sensor
in either the oxidi zer t ank 2 or fuel t ank 2 .
9- 25
NASA-S-69-3742
120
100
100
t- - t- - t- - t- - - - -
--
80
"E
"'
t'
"'
Q.
60
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.0
E
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.c
u
60
r- - r- -
,_
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.c
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::!
II'
Throttle position __/
80
t-- r--r-- - -
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.,-
.>!
v;
"7
20
C hamber pressure
-
'
40
,'
'
',
20
1-
--
"""'
0
246
242
238
.,
::!
0..
Regu lator outlet pressure
j..../
I -"'>
234
'
f'"
230
' --
--
...=
P"
" Fuel interface pressure
226
lrOxidizer interface pressure
222
218
102:33
#
-
102:34
--
102:35
-- - -
102:36
102:37
102:38
--1-"
102:39
102:40
102:41
102:42
Time, hr:min
Figure 9. 8-1. - Descent propulsion system performance.
102:43
102:44
102:45
NASA-5-69- 3 7 43
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0\.
250
"'
"'
c.
"
"'
"'
c.
200
"
<=
1l
N
-c
X
0
-c
<=
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"
;;
"'
"'
c.
Q;
-"
E
"'
-"'
150
100
50
100
200
300
400
500
600
Firing t i m e , sec
F i gure 9 . 8-2 . - Oxidi zer interface pressure and chamber pressure oscillations.
700
800
9-27
9 .9
ASCENT PROPULSION
The ascent propulsion system was fired for 435 seconds from lunar
lift-off to orbital insertion . All aspects of system performance were
nominal .
The regulator outlet pres sure was 184 psia during the firing and
returned to the nominal lock-up value of 188 . 5 psia after engine cutoff.
Table 9 . 9-I presents a comparison of the actual and predi cted perform
ance . Bas ed on engine flow rate dat a , the engine mixture ratio was esti
mated to be 1 . 595 . The estimated usable propellant remaining at engine
shutdown was 174 pounds oxidizer and 121 pounds fuel ; these quantities
are equivalent to 25 seconds additional firing time to oxidizer depleti on .
After ascent propulsion system cutoff and during lunar orbit , the
fuel and interface pressures increased from their respective flow pres
sures to lock-up , and then continued to increase approximately 3 . 6 psi
for fuel and 11 to 12 ps i for oxidizer . Loss of signal occurred approx
imately 39 minutes after engine shutdown as the vehi cle went behind the
moon . Pressure rises in the system were obs erved during both the Apollo 9
and 10 missions . This in'itial pressure rise after shutdown was c aused by
a number of contibuting factors , such as , regulator lockup , heating of
the ullage gas , and vaporization from the remaining. propellants .
At reacquis ition of signal ( approximately 1 hour 29 minutes after
shutdown ) a drop of approximately 6 psi and 3 . 6 psi had occurred in the
oxi dizer and fuel pressures , respectively . Thereafter , the pressure re
mained at a constant level for the 4 . 5 hours that data were monitore d ,
whi ch rules out leakage . The apparant pressure drops had no effect on
as cent propulsion system performance . The pressure drop was probably
c aused by a combination of ullage gas temperature cooling , pressure trans
ducer dri ft resulting from engine heat s oakback , and instrumentation
resolution . Above 200 F , the accuracy of the pres sure transducer de
grades to 4 percent ( 10 ps ia ) rather than the normal 2 percent . A
permanent shift ma;y als o occur at high temperatures . Thermal analysis
indi cates that the peak s oakback temperatures were 200 to 235 F. Errors
which may be attributed to various s ources include a trans ducer shift of
4 percent , equivalent to 10 psi ; a pulse code modulation res olution of
2 counts , equivalent to 2 psi ; and a 1 psi ullage pressure change which
is effective only on the oxidizer side .
\0
I
1\)
co
TABLE 9 - 9-I . - STEADY-STATE PERFORMANCE
10 s econds after igni tion
Parameter
4oo seconds after ignition
b
Measured
a
Predi cted
b
Measured
184
184 . 5
184
184
70
70 . 4
70
70 . 4
70
71 . 0
70
71 . 0
Oxidizer interface pre s sure , psi a .
170 . 6
170 . 0
169 . 6
169 . 5
Fuel interface pres sure , psia . .
170 . 4
169 . 3
169 . 5
168 . 8
12 2 . 6
122
122 . 5
122
Regulator outlet pressure , psi a
Oxidi zer bulk temperature , OF
Fuel bulk temperature , O F .
Engine chamber pressure , psia

Mixture rat io
Thrust , lb
. .
.
reflight
b
. .
Spe cific impuls e , s ec . . . .
ance .
. .
Predicted
1 . 60 4
--
1 . 59 5
- -
3464
3439
---
309 . 4
---
308. 8
- -
. . .
predi ction b as ed on acceptance test dat a and assuming nominal system p erform
Actual flight data with known bias es removed .
9-29
9 .10
The environmental control system in the lunar module satisfactorily

supported all lunar operations with only minor exceptions.
Routine water/glycol sampling during prelaunch activities showed the
presence of large numbers of crystals which were identified as benzathiazyl
disulfide. These crystals were being precipitated from a corrosion inhib
itor in the fluid. The system was flushed and filtered repeatedly , but
the crystals continued to be present . The fluid was then replaced with
one containing a previously omitted additive (sodium sulfite) , and crystal:s
were still present but to a much lesser degree . A spacecraft pump pack
age was run on a bench rig with this contaminated fluid , and the pump per
formance was shown to be unaffected , even for long durations. The filter
in the test package did plug and the bypass valve opened during the test .
Pump disassembly revealed no deterioration . It was then demonstrated
that the crystals , while presenting an undesirable contamination , were
not harmful to the system operation . The flight performance of the heat
transport section was nominal . The investigation revealed that recently
the corrosion inhibitor :formulation was slightly modified . For future
spacecraft , water/glycol with the original corrosion inhibitor formula
tion will be used .
Depressurization of the lunar module cabin through the bacteria
filter for the extravehicular activity required more time than predicted .
The data indicate that the cabin pressure transducer was reading high at
the low end of its range ; consequently , the crew could have opened the
hatch sooner if the true pressure had been known .
During the sleep period on the lunar surface , the crew reported that
they were too cold to sleep . Analysis of the conditions experienced in
dicated that once the crew were in a cold condition , there was not enough
heat available in the environmental control system to return them to a
comfortable condition . Ground tests have indicated that in addition to
the required procedural changes which are designed to maintain heat in
the suit circuit , blankets will be provided and the crew will sleep in
hammocks.
Shortly after lunar module ascent , the crew reported that the carbon
dioxide indicator was erratic , so they switched to the secondary car
tridge, Also , the secondary water separator had been selected since one
crewman reported water in his suit.
Evaluation of the erratic carbon dioxide indications determined that
the carbon dioxide sensor had malfunctioned , and the circuit breaker was
pulled . Erratic operation in the past has been caused by free water in
9 -30
the optical section of the s ens or . Further dis cus s ion of both the errat
ic carbon dioxi de readings and water in the crewman ' s suit i s contained
in section 16 . 2 . 3 and 16 . 2 . 1 3 , respectively .
9 . 11
RADAR
Performance of the rende zvous and landing radars was satis factory ,
and antenna temperatures were always within normal limits . Range and
velocity were acquired by the landing radar at s lant ranges of approxi
mately 44 000 and 28 000 feet , respective ly . The tracker was lost brief
ly at alt itudes of 240 and 75 feet ; these los ses were expected and are
attributed to zero-Doppler e ffects as sociated with manual maneuvering .
9 .1 2
9 .12 . 1
CREW STATION
Displays and Controls
The displays and controls sat isfactorily supporte d the mission ,

except that the mis s ion timer stopped during the descent . After being
deenergi zed for 11 hours , the timer was start e d again and operated prop
erly throughout the remainder of the mis s ion . The most probab le cause
of this failure was a cracked solder j oint . This anomaly i s dis cus sed
in greater detail in sect ion 16 . 2 .1 .
9 . 12 . 2
Crew Provis ions
The Commander and Lunar Module Pilot were provide d with communi ca
tions carrier adapter eartubes , having molded earpieces , for use in the
lunar module cabin. The purpose of these earphone adapters is to increase
the audio level to the ear . The Lunar Module Pilot use d adapters through
out the lunar module des cent and landing phase , but after landing , he
found the molded earpieces uncomfortab le and remove d them. The Commander
did not us e adapters s ince hi s preflight experience indicat e d audio volume
levels were adequate ; the us e of the adapters i s based on crew preference .
The Apollo 10 Lunar Module Pilot had used the adapters during his entire
lunar module operat ional period and reported no dis comfort . The Apollo 12
crew will als o be provided adapters for optional us e .
The crew commented that the inflight coverall garments would be more
utilitarian if they were patterned after the standard one-piece summe r
flying sui t . More pockets with a better method of closure , preferab ly
zippers , were re commended an d will be provide d for evaluat ion by future
crews .
9-31
The crew reported repeat ed fogging of the lunar module windows while
the sunshades were installed. They had transferred two of the command
module tis sue di spensers to the lunar module and made use of them in
cleaning the windows rather than using the window heaters for defogging .
Tissue di spensers are being adde d to the lunar module s towage list .
9 .13
CONSUMABLES
On the Apollo 11 mis s ion , the actual usage of only three consumable
quantities for the lunar module deviated by as much as 10 percent from
the preflight predicted amounts . These consumab les were the des cent
s tage oxygen , ascent stage oxygen , and react ion control system propellant .
The actual oxygen requirements were les s than predi cted be cause the leak
age rat e was lower than expected. The actual reaction control propellant
requirement was greater than predi cted becaus e of the increased hover t ime
during the descent phas e .
The electrical power system consumables usage was within 5 percent
of predicted flight requrements . The current usage from the des cent
stage b atteries was approximat ely 8 percent les s than predicted, and the
ascent stage current usage was approximately 3 percent more than predicted ..
The deviat i ons appear to have resulted from uncertainties in the predic
tions of reaction control heater duty cycles . Ele ctri cal power consump
tion is dis cus sed further i n s ecti on 9 . 3 .
9 .13 . 1
Descent Propulsion System Propellant
The higher-than-predi cted propellant usage by the des cent propulsion

system was caused by the maneuvering to avoi d a large crater during the
final stages of des cent . Until that time , propellant usage had been nom
inal . Allowance for manual hover and landing point redes ignat ion was in
the preflight budget but was not cons idered part of the nominal us age .
The quantiti es of des cent propulsion system propellant loading in
the following table were calculat ed from readings and measured densities
prior to lift-off.
9-32
Actual us age , lb
Condition
Loaded
Fuel
Oxidizer
6975
11 209
Tot al
1 8 184
Consumed
Nominal
Redesignat ion
Margin for manual hover
Tot al
Remaining at engine cutoff
Tanks
Manifold
Tot al
9 . 13 . 2
Preflight
planned
usage , lb
1 8 184
17 010
103
ll4
6724
10 690
216
35
458
61
251
5 19
17 414
17 227
770
957
Ascent Propuls ion System Propellant
The actual ascent propuls ion system propellant us age was within .
5 percent of the preflight predictions . The loadings in the following
table were determined from me asured dens ities prior to lift-off and from
weights of off-loaded propellants . A porti on of the propellants was used
by the react ion control system during ascent stage operat i ons .
Actual us age , lb
Condition
Loaded
Consumed
By ascent propulsion systern prior to as cent stage
jett i s on
By react ion control system
Totai
Remaining at as cent stage
j etti son
Fuel
Oxi di zer
2020
3218
1833
2934
23
46
1856
164
Total
Preflight
planned
us age , lb
5 23 8
5 238
2980
4836
4966
238
402
272
9-33
9 .1 3 . 3
Reaction Control System Propellant
The increased hover t ime for lunar landing resulted in a devi at ion
of over 10 percent in the re acti on control system propellant usage , as
compared with the prefl ight predi ct ions . Propellant consumpti on was cal
culated from telemetered helium t ank pre s s ure histories using the rela
t ionships between pres sure , volume , an d temperature . The mixture rat i o
was as sume d t o b e 1 . 9 4 for the calculat i ons .
Condition
Loaded
System A
System B
Actual usage , lb
Fuel
Oxi di zer
108
108
209
209
216
418
46
62
90
121
108
211
62
46
119
88
108
2.07
Total
Consume d
System A
System B
Total
Remaining at lunar module
j ettison
System A
System B
Tot al
9 .13. 4
Total
Preflight
planned
us age , lb
634
633
319
253
315
380
Oxygen
The actual oxygen us age was lower than the preflight predictions
because oxygen le ak rat e from the cabin was less than the specifi cat ion
value . The actual rate was 0 . 0 5 lb /hr , as compared with the speci fi cat i on
rate of 0 . 2 lb /hr . In the following t ab le , the actual quantities loaded
and consumed are bas ed on telemetered dat a .
9-34
Actual
us age ,
lb
Conditi on
Loaded ( at lift-off )
Des cent st age
As cent stage
Tank l
Tank 2
Total
Conswned
Des cent st age
As cent s t age
Tank l
Tank 2
Tot al
Remaining i n des cent s t age at
lunar lift-off
Remaining at as cent stage jetti s on
Tank l
T ank 2
Tot al
9 . 13 . 5
Pre flight
planned
us age , lb
48 . 2
48 . 2
2.5
2.5
2.4
2.4
5 .0
4.8
17 . 2
21 . 7
1.0
0 .1
1.5
0.0
l.l
1. 5
31 . 0
26 . 5
1.5
2.4
0 .9
2.4
3.9
3.3
Wat e r
The actual water us age was within 10 percent of the preflight pre
di ct i ons . In the following tab le , the actual uantities loade d and con
s wne d are b as e d on telemet ered dat a.
9- 3 5
Condition
Loade d ( at li ft-off )
Des cent stage
As cent s t age
Tank 1
Tank 2
Tot al
Consumed
Des cent s t age
As cent st age
Tank 1
Tank 2
Total
Remaining in des cent stage at
lunar lift-off
Remaining at as cent s t age j e tt i s on
Tank 1
Tank 2
Total
Actual
us age ,
lb
Pre flight
planned
us age , lb
217 . 5
217 . 5
42 . 4
42 . 4
42 . 4
42 . 4
84 . 8
84 . 8
147 . 0
15 8 . 6
19 . 2
18 . 1
17 . 3
17 . 3
37 . 3
34 . 6
70 . 5
58.9
23 . 2
24 . 3
25 . 1
25 . 1
46 . 5
50 . 2
9 - 36
9 .13 . 6
Helium
The consumed quantities of helium for the main propuls ion systems
were in close agreement with the predi cted amounts . Helium was stored
ambiently in the as cent s t age and supercriti cally in the des cent stage .
Helium loading was nominal , and the us age quanti ties in the following
t ab le were calculated from telemetered dat a . An addit i onal 1 pound was
stored ambiently in the des cent stage for valve actuat i on and is not re
flecte d in the values report e d .
Condition
Des cent propulsi on
Ascent propulsi on
Actual
value ,
lb
Actual
value ,
lb
Preflight
planned
value , lb
13 . 2
13 . 0
8.8
9.4
4.4
3 .6
Preflight
planned
value , lb
Loaded
48 . 1
48 . 0
Consumed
39 . 5
a8 . 6
38. 4
Remaining
9.6
a
At lunar landing.
b
At as cent stage j ett i s on .
10-1
10 . 0
EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT PERFORMANCE
Extravehicular mobili ty unit p erformance was excellent throughout

both intravehicular and extravehicular lunar surface operations . Crew
mobility was very good during extravehicular act ivi ty , and an analysis
of inflight cooling syst em dat a shows good correlation with ground dat a .
The crew remained comfortable throughout the mos t strenuous surface
operat ions . Because of the lower-than-expect e d metab olic rates , oxygen
and water consumption was always below predi ct e d levels .
The pres sure garment as s embli es , i ncluding h elmet and intravehicular
glove s , were worn during launch . The pressure garment as semblies of the
Commander and Lunar Module Pilot incorporat ed new arm bearings , whi ch
contributed to th e relat ively unrestrict e d mobility demonstrated during
lunar surface operat i ons .
The Command Module Pilot had a prob lem with the fit of the lower
ab domen and crot ch of his pre ssure garment as s emb ly , caus ed by the urine
collect ion and transfe r as sembly flange . Pres sure points resulted from
insuffi c i ent s i ze i n the pres sure garment as s embly . On future flight s ,
fit checks will be performed with the crewman wearing the urine collec
tion and transfe r assembly , fe cal containment system , and liquid cooling
garment , as applicab le . In addition , the fit check . will include a pos i
t ion s imulat ing that which the crewman experiences during the countdown .
All three pres sure garment as s emblies and the li quid cooling garments
for the Commander and Lunar Module Pilot were donned at approximat ely
97 hours in preparat i on for the lunar landing and surface operat i ons .
Donning was ac compli shed normally with help from another crewmen , as
required. The suit integrity check prior to undocking was completed
succes s fully with suit pressures decaying approximat ely 0 . 1 ps i .
Wristlets and comfort gloves were taken ab oard for optional us e by
the Commander and Luriar Module Pilot during the lunar s tay . Be cause of
the quick adaptation to 1/6-g , the light loads handled on this mis sion ,
and the short durati on of the lunar surface activity , both crewmen elected.
to omit the us e of the protective wristlets and comfort glove s . Without
the protect ion of the wristlets , the Lunar Module Pilot ' s wri sts were
rubbed by the wris t rings , and the grasp capability of the Commander was
reduced somewhat without the comfort glove s .
After att achment of the lunar module restraint , a pressure point
developed on the instep of the Lunar Module Pilot ' s right foot because
the restraint tended t o pull him forward and outboard rather than s traight
down . Howeve r , he compens at e d by moving his right foot forward and out
board ; this foot then took the maj ority of the load . The determinat ion
10-2
of whether correct ive acti on is require d will be made after as ses sment of
Apollo 12 .
Extravehi cular act ivity preparat i ons proce ede d smoothly . However ,
t
more ime was required than planned for completing the unstowage of equip
ment and p erforming other minor t asks not normally emphas ized i n training
exerci ses .
The oxygen purge system checkout was p erforme d succes s fully . The
crew encountered two problems during pre-egre s s act ivities :
( 1 ) diffi
culty in mat ing the remote control unit connector and ( 2 ) bumping items
in the cab i n because of the bulk of the portab le life support system and
oxygen purge system ; as a result , one circuit breaker was broken and the
pos itions of two circuit bre akers were changed .
About 10 minutes was required to make each remote control unit con
nect or . Each t ime the crewman thought the conne ctor was aligned , the
lock lever rotation caus ed the connector to cock off to one s ide . The
problem i s dis cus s e d further in s ect ion 16 . 3 . 2 .
While wai ting for the .cab i n t o depressurize , the crew were comfort
ab le even though the inlet t emperature of the liquid-cooling garment
reached about 90 F prior to sublimator s tartup . No thermal changes were
not ed at egres s . The portable life support system and oxygen purge system
were worn quite comfortab ly , and the b ack-support e d mas s was not objec
ti'Onable in 1 /6-g .
Analy s i s of the extr avehicular activity dat a shows a good correla
tion with dat a from previous training conducte d in the Space Environmental
Simulat ion Laboratory facility . As expect e d , the feedwater pres sure dur
ing the mis sion was s l ightly higher than that indicated during s imulations .
The difference results from the lunar gravitat i onal effect on the head of
wat er at the sublimat or and transducer , the high point i n the system. The
only other di s cernible differences were in t emperature readouts which gen
erally indicated better performance ( more cooling ) than expecte d . Comfort
in the liquid cooling garment was alws.ys adequat e , although the dat a indi
cat e a nruch higher temperature for the Commander than for the Lunar Module
Pilot . Thi s ob servat ion correlates vri th previous simulat ion experience ,
which shows that the Commander had a s trong preference for a warmer body
t emperature than that desired by the Lunar Module Pilot . Thi s parameter
is controlled by each crewman to mee t his comfort requirements . Operat ion
of the extravehicular mob i lity unit while i n the extravehi cular mode was
uneventful . There was never a requirement to change any of the control
s ettings for the portable life support sys tem other than the diverter
valve s , which both crewmen changed at their option for comfort .
10-3
Bec aus e of the lower-than-expect e d metab ol i c rat e s for the Lunar
Module Pilot , and especi ally for the Comman de r , the actual oxygen and
fee dwat er quanti ties consumed were lower than pre di ct e d . Consumab le s
dat a are shown i n the following t ab le .
Commander
Lunar Module Pilot
Condi tion
Actual
Pre di ct e d
Actual
800
1360
1100
1265
191
16 0
186
160
l . 26
0 . 54
0 . 72
1 . 26
0 . 68
0 . 58
1 . 26
0 . 60
0 . 66
1 . 26
0 . 63
0 .63
8.6
2.9
5.7
8.5
5 .4
3.1
8.6
4.4
4.2
8. 5
5.1
3.4
2 70
133
13 7
270
130
140
270
1 35
135
270
130
140
Metaboli c rate , Btu/hr

Time , min
Oxygen , lb
Loaded
Consumeda .
Remaining
Fee dwater , lb
Loade d . .
b
Consumed .
Remaining
Power , W-h
c
Init i al charge
.
Consumed
Remaining
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Predi cted
Approximately 0 . 06 pound required for sui t i ntegrity check .

b
Approximat e ly 0 . 6 pound require d for start-up and t rappe d wat e r .
c
Minimum pre launch charge .
Crewman mob ility and b alance i n the ext ravehi cular mob i lity unit
were suffi ci ent to allow stab le movement while p erforming lunar surface
tasks . The Lunar Module Pilot demonstrat e d the capab i li ty to walk , t o
run , to change direct i on while running , and t o stop movement without dif
fi culty . He reporte d a t e ndency to t ip b ackwards in the soft s and and
noted that he had to be careful to compens at e for the different lo c at i on
of the center of mas s . The crewme n were ob served to kneel down and con
tact the lunar surface while retri eving obj e ct s . The crew stated that
getting down on one or both knee s to retri eve s amples and to allow closer
inspection of the lunar surface should b e a normal operat i ng mode . Addi
t i onal wai s t mobility would improve the ab i li ty to get clos er to the
lunar surface and , in addi ti on , would i ncre ase downward v i s ib i lity .
10-4
Each crewman rai s ed his extravehi cular vi sor as s emb ly to various

positions throughout the ext ravehi cular activity and not e d a b ack refle c
tion of h i s face from the vi s or . The reflection was gre atest with the
sun shining approximat ely 90 degrees from the front of the vi s or as sembly .
With thi s reflect ion , it was diffi cult to see i nto shaded areas . In addi
tion , the conti nuous movement from sm1light i nto shadow and b ack to sun
light required extra t ime becaus e of the neces sary wait for adaptation to
changes i n light intens ity . Us e of the blinders on the vis or as s emb ly
could have allevi at e d the reflection and adaptation problem t o s ome extent .
11-1
11 . 0
THE LUNAR SURFACE
Pre flight planning for the Apollo 11 mi s s i on included a lunar s ur

face stay of approximately 22 hours , including 2 hours 40 minutes that
was allotted t o extravehi cular act ivities .
After landing , the crew performed a lun ar module checkout to as ce r
t ain l aunch capab i lity and photograph ed the landing area from the lunar
module . Then , following an extensive checkout of the ext r avehicular mo
b i li ty unit , the crewmen left the lunar module to accomplish the follow
ing activiti es :
a.
Inspe ction of the lunar module exteri or
b . Colle ct ion of a c ontingency s ample , a bulk s ample , and docu

mented s amples of lunar surface materi als
c . Evaluat i on of the physical characteristics o f the lunar surface
and its effects on ext ravehicular act i vity
d . Deployment o f the s olar wind comp osition experiment an d , at the
end of the ext raveh i cular act ivities , retri eval of the experiment for
return to e arth
e . Deployment of the e arly Apollo s ci ent i fi c experiments package,
consi sting of the p as s i ve s eismi c experiment and the las er ranging retro
reflect or.
Throughout the ext ravehi cular activities , the crewmen made detailed
obs ervat i ons and ph ot ographs to document the activities and lunar surface
charact eri s ti cs . A televi s i on came ra provi ded real-time coverage of crew
ext ravehi cular activities .
Except for a port i on of the planned documente d s ample colle ct i on
not complete d , the lunar surface activities were tot ally succes s ful and
all ob j e ctives were accomplished. As h ad been anti cipat e d prior to flight ,
time di d not permit exact pe rformance of the documented s ample colle ct i on .
Two core s amples and seve ral loos e rock s amples were collect ed and re
turned. Ins uffi ci ent time remaine d to fill the environment al and gas
an aly s i s s ample containers , which were a p art of the documented s ampling .
Although the crewmen were operat i ng in a new environment , they were
able to complete the activi ties at a rat e very cl os e to th at predi cted
be fore flight ( see t able 11-I ) .
11-2
Minor equipment malfunctions and operational dis crepancies occurred

during the extravehicular activity , but none prevented acc omplishment of
the respective tasks . Conversely , several operations were enhanced and
equipment performance increase d because of unexpected influences o f the
lunar environment .
The planned time line of maj or surface activiti es compared with the
actual time requi red is shown in t ab le 11-I . The table lists the events
sequenti ally , as presented in the Lunar Surface Operations Plan , and als o
includes s everal maj or unplanned activities . Crew rest periods , system
checks , spontaneous observations , and uns cheduled evaluations not neces
s arily related to the task being accomplished are not listed as separate
activities but are included in the times shown .
During deployment of the televis ion camera , several activities were
accompli she d , including s ome that were unplanne d , The timeline provided
a minimum amount of time for the Commander to remove the thermal blanket
on the eq uipment compartment , change the camera lens , remove the tripod
and camera from the compartment , and move the tripod-mounted camera to
a remote location . This time also included a few minutes for viewing
selected lunar features , pos itioning the camera to cover the s ubsequent
surface activiti es , and returning to the compartment .
Throughout the extravehicular activity , both crewmen made observa
tions and evaluations of the lunar environment , including lighting and
surface features as well as other characteristics of s c ienti fi c or opera
tional interes t . During the ext ravehi cular activity , the sun angle ranged
from 14-1/2 to 16 degrees . Most of the observations and evaluations will
provide valuable informati on for future equipment des ign , crew training ,
and flight planning .
The evaluation o f lunar surface experiments is contained in the fol
lowing paragraphs . Photographi c results , including those related to
specific experiments , are dis cus s e d both in the appropriate se ctions and
in a general des cription of lunar surface photography ( se ction 11 . 6 ) .
NOTE : Definiti ons of s ome s c ient i fi c terms used in this section

are contained in appendix E .
ll-3
11 . 1
LUNAR GEOLOGY EXPERIMENT

ll . 1 . 1
Summary
The Apollo 11 spacecraft lande d in the s outhwes tern p art of Mare

Tranquillitat i s at 0 degree 41 minutes 15 s econds north latitude and
23 degrees 26 minutes east longitude ( fi g . 11-1 ) , approximately 20 kilo
meters southwes t of the crater Sabine D . This part of Mare Tranquilli tatis
i s crossed by relat ively faint , but distinct , north-nort hwest t rending
rays (bright , whit ish lines ) as soc iat e d with the crater Theophilus , which
lies 320 kilometers to th e s outheas t ( re f . 4 ) . The landing s ite is ap
proximat ely 25 kilometers southeast o f Surveyor V and 6 8 kilometers s outh
west of the impact crater formed by Ranger VIII . A fairly prominent
north-northeast trending ray lies 15 kilometers wes t of the landing s ite .
This ray may b e relat e d t o Alfraganus , 160 kilometers t o the s outhwes t ,
or to Tycho , ab out 1500 kilometers t o the s outhwes t . The landing site
lies b etween maj or rays but may contain rare fragments derived from The
ophilus , Alfraganus , Tych o , or other distant crat ers .
About 400 meters east of the landing point is a sharp-rimmed ray
crater , approximat ely 180 meters i n diameter and 30 meters deep , which
was unoffi c i ally named West crat e r . Wes t crater i s s urrounded by a
blocky ejecta ( mat erial e j e ct e d from crat e r ) apron that extends almost
symmetrically outward ab out 250 meters from the rim cre s t . Blo cks as
much as 5 meters across exist from on the rim to as far as approximately
150 met ers , as well as in the interior of the crater . Rays of b locky
e j e ct a , with many fragments 1/2 to 2 meters acros s , extend beyond the
ej e ct a apron west of the landing point . The lunar module lande d between
the s e rays in a path that is relat ively free of extremely coarse blocks .
At the landing site , the lunar surface consists of fragmental debris
ranging in s i z e from part i cles too fine to be res olve d by the naked eye
to blo cks 0 . 8-meter in diameter . This debris forms a layer th at is called
the lunar regolith . At the s urface , the regol:i th ( debris layer ) is porous
and weakly coherent . It grades downward into a s imilar , b ut more densely
packe d , substrat e . The bulk of the debris layer cons ists of fine p ar
t i cles , but many small rock fragments were encountered in the s ubsurface
as well as on the surface .
In the vicinity o f the lunar module , the mare s urface has numerous
small crat ers ranging in diameter from a few centimeters to s everal tens
of meters . Just s outhwest of the lunar module i s a double crat er 1 2 me
ters long , 6 meters wide , and 1 meter dee p , with a sub due d rai s e d rim .
About 50 meters east of the lunar module i s a s teep-walle d , but shallow ,
crater 3 3 meters in diameter and 4 meters deep , which was visited by the
Commander near the end of the extravehicular peri o d .
ll-4
All of the craters in the imme diate vi cinity of the lunar module
h ave rims , walls , and floors of rel at i ve ly fine grai ne d mat eri al , with
s c attered coars er fragments that occur in ab out the s ame abundance as on
the intercrater areas . Thes e crat ers are up to a meter deep and suggest
h aving b een excavat e d ent i re ly in the regolith b e c ause of the lack of
b locky e j e ct a.
At the 33-met er-diameter crat e r e as t of the lunar module , the walls
and rim h ave the s ame texture as the regolith e ls ewhere ; h oweve r , a pi le
of blocks was ob s erve d on the floor of the crat e r . The crat e r floor may
lie close t o the b as e of the regoli th . Several crat ers of ab out the s ame
s i z e , with steep walls and shallow flat floors , or floors with central
humps , occur in the are a around the landing s ite . From the depths of
these crat ers , the thi ckness o f the regolith i s e s timat e d t o range from
3 to 6 meters .
Coarse fragment s are s c attered in the vi cinity of the lunar module
in ab out the s ame abundance as at the Surveyor I landing s ite in the
Ocean of St orms at 2 degrees 2 4 . 6 minutes s outh latitude and 43 degree s
18 minutes west longitude . They are di stinctly more abundant than at the
other Surveyor landing sites on the mari a , i ncluding the landing s i te of
Surveyor V northwest of the lunar module . The Surveyor I landing s ite
was near a fresh b locky rim crat e r , b ut beyond the apron of coars e blocky
e j e ct a , as was the Apollo 11 site . It may b e inferre d that many rock
fragments in the imme di at e vi cinity of the spacecraft , at both the Sur
veyor I and Apollo 11 landing sites , were derived from the ne arby b locky
rim crat e r . Fragments derived from West crat e r may h ave come from depths
as great as 30 meters beneath the mare s urface , and may be di re ct s amples
of the bedrock from whi ch the local regolith was derive d .
Rock fragme nt s at the Apollo 11 landing s ite h ave a wi de vari ety of
shapes and most are emb edde d to varying degree s i n the fine mat rix of
the regolith . A maj ority o f the rocks are rounde d or part i ally rounded
on the i r upper surfaces , but angular fragments of i rregular shape are also
abundant . A few rocks are re ct angular slab s with a faint platy ( p arallel
fractures ) struct ure . Many of the rounde d rocks , when collect e d , were
found t o be flat or of i rre gular angular shape on the b ottom . The expos e d
part of one unusual rock , whi ch was not colle ct e d , was des crib ed b y th e
Commander as res emb ling an automob ile di s tributor c ap . When this rock was
di s lodge d , the s culptured "cap " was foun d to b e the top of a much b i gger
rock , the buri e d p art o f which was larger in lat eral dimens i ons and angu
lar in form.
The evi den ce suggests that proces s es of e ros i on are t aking place on
the lunar surface whi ch lead to the gradual rounding of the expos e d sur
faces of rocks . Several proces s es may b e i nvolve d . On s ome rounde d
rock surfaces , the indi vi dual c lasts ( fr agmented mat eri al ) and grains
11-5
that compos e the rocks and the glassy linings of pits on the surfaces hav'e
been le ft in raised reli e f by general wearing away or ab lat i on of the s ur
face .
This different i al eros ion i s most prominent i n mi crobre c c i a ( rocks
consis ting of small sharp fragme nts emb edded in a fine-grained mat ri x ) .
The ab lat i on may b e caused primarily by small particles b omb arding the
surface .
Some crystalline rocks of me di um grain s i ze have rounded surfaces
that have been produced by the peeling of closely spaced exfoli at i on
( thin , concentric flakes ) shells .
The observed "distributor cap " form
may have developed by exfoli at i on or by spalling of the fre e surfaces of
the rock as a res ult of one or more energeti c impacts on the t op surface .
Minute pits from a fraction of a mi llimeter to ab out 2 millimeters
in diameter and from a fract i on of a millimeter to one millimeter deep ,
As described in a subsequent
o ccur on the rounded surfaces of most rocks .
They are present on
paragraph , many of these pits are lined with glas s .
a specimen of microb re c ci a whi ch has been tentatively i dent i fi ed in pho
tographs t aken on the lunar surface and for which a prelimi nary ori ent a
t ion of the rock at the t ime i t was collected has been obtained ( s ee
fi g . 11-2 ) .
The pits are found primarily on the upper s i de . They clear
ly have been produce d by a process acting on the exposed surface . They
do not res emb le impact crat e rs produce d in the laborat ory ( at colli s i on
velocities of 7 km/se c and below ) , and their ori gin. remai ns to b e ex
plaine d .
11 . 1 . 2
Regional Geologic Setting
Mare Tranquilli t at i s is a mare ( re fs . 5 and 6 ) of i rregular form.

Two charact e risti cs suggest that the mare mat e ri al is relatively thin :
an unusual ri dge ring , name d Lamont , locat e d in the s outhwest part of the
mare , may be locali ze d ove r the shallowly buried rim of a pre -mare crat e r :;
and no large pos itive gravity anomaly , like those over the deep mare
filled ci rcular basins , is as s oc i at e d with Mare Tranqui llitat i s ( re f . 7 ) .
The s outhern part of Mare Tranquilli tat i s i s crossed by relat i vely
faint but di stinct north -northwe s t trending rays and promi nent secondary
craters as s ociat e d with the crat e r Theophi lus .
About 15 kilometers west
of the landing s i te is a fairly prominent north-north east trending ray .
The ray may be relat e d to either of the crate rs Alfraganus or Tych o ,
locat e d 160 and 1500 kilometers , respect i vely , t o the s outhwes t .
A hi ll of highland-like mat e rial prot rudes above the mare surface
Thi s structure suggeste:
the mare material is very thin in this region , pe rh aps no more than a few
hundred meters thi ck .
52 kilometers e ast-southeast of the landing s i te .
ll-6
11 . 1 . 3
Analys is of Transmitt ed Geologic Dat a
Location of the landing site . - The landing s ite was tentat ively i dent
ified during the lunar surface stay on the b as is of ob servat i ons transmit
ted by the crew . The Commander report e d avoi ding a blo cky crater the
s i ze of a football field during landing , and ob s erve d a hill that he es
timated to be from 1/2 to 1 mile wes t of the lunar module . The lunar
module was tilt e d 4 . 5 degrees east ( backward ) on the lunar s urface .
During the firs t command and s ervi ce module pas s after lunar module
landing ( about 1 t o 1-1/2 hours aft er landing ) , the first of s everal dif
ferent landing s ite locations , comput ed from the onboard computer and from
tracking dat a , was transmitt ed t o the Command Module Pilot for visual
s e ar ch ( see section 5 . 5 ) . The first such es timate of the landing s ite
was northwest of the planned landing ellips e . The only site near this
compute d lo c at ion that could have mat ched the report e d des cription was
near North crater at the northwes t boundary of the landing ellips e . How
eve r , thi s region did not mat ch the des cription very closely . Later ,
computed e stimates indicated the landing s ite was cons iderably south of
the earlier determinat i on , and the areas near the West crat e r mos t closely
fit the des cription . Thes e , data were t ransmitt e d t o the Command Module
Pilot on the last pas s be fore lunar module lift-off , but the Command Mod
ule Pilot ' s activities at this t ime did not permit vis ual s earch . The
location j us t west of West crate r was confirmed by rende zvous radar track
ing of the command module by the lunar module near the end of the lunar
stay period and by the descent photography .
The crater that was avoi ded during landing was reporte d by the crew
to be surrounded by ej ect a containing blocks up to 5 meters i n diameter
and whi ch extended 100 to 200 meters from the crater rim , indi c ating a
relatively fresh , sharp-rimme d ray crat e r . The only crater in the 100to 200-meter size range that meets the des cription and is i n the vi cinity
indi c ated by the radar is West crat e r , near the s outhwest edge of the
planned landing ellipse . A des cription by the Commander of a double
crater ab out 6 to 12 meters in s ize and s outh of the lunar module shadow
plus the identi fi c at i on of West crater , the hill to the wes t , and the 21to 24-meter crat er reporte d behind the lunar module , formed a unique pat
tern from which the landing site was determined to within ab out 8 meters .
The 21 to 2 4 meter crater has been s ince identi fi e d by photomet ry as being
33 meters in diamet er . The returned s equence-camera des cent photography
confirmed the landing point lo c at ion . The pos i tion corresponds to coor
dinates 0 degree 41 minutes 15 s econds north lat itude and 23 degre es
26 minutes 0 second east longitude on figure 5-10 .
Geo logy . - The surface of the mare near the landing site i s unusually
rough and of great er geologic interest than expected before flight . Tele
vis i on pi ctures indicat ed a greater abundance of coarse fragmental debris
than at any of the four Surveyor landing s ites on the maria except that
of Surveyor I (ref . 8 ) . It is likely that the obs erve d fragments and the
11-7
s amples returned to e arth had b een derived from varying depths b eneath
the original mare surface and have had wi dely di fferent histori es of ex
posure on the lunar surface .
The maj or t opographic features in the landing are a are large crat e rs
a few hundred me ters acros s , of which four are b road sub dued features and
the fi fth i s Wes t crat e r , located 40 0 meters e as t of the landing point .
Near the lunar module , the surface i s pocked by numerous small crat e rs and
strewn with fragment al debris , part of which may have been generat e d dur
ing the impact formati on of Wes t crater .
Among the smaller crat e rs , both sharp , rai s ed-rim craters and rela
t ively sub dued crat ers are common . They range in s i ze from a few centi
meters to 20 meters . A s li ght ly subdue d , rai s ed-rim crater ( the reported
21- t o 24-meter crat e r ) 33 meters i n diamet e r and 4 meters deep occurs
ab out 5 0 meters e as t of the lunar module , and a doub le crater ( the re
ported doublet crat e r ) ab out 12 meters long and 6 meters wide lies
10 meters wes t of the lunar module at 260 degrees azimuth ( s ee fi g . 5 - 8 ) .
The walls and floors of most of the crat ers are smooth and uninter
rupte d by eithe r out crops or conspi cuous strat i fi cat i on . Rocks pres ent
in the 33-met e r crater are large r than any of thos e s een on the surface
in the vi cinity of the lunar module .
The bulk of the surface layer consists of' fine-grai ned part i cles
.which tended to adhere to the crewmen ' s b oot s and sui t s , as well as equip
ment , and was mol ded int o smooth forms in the footprint s .
The regolith is weak and relatively e as ily t renched to depths of
s everal cent imeters . At an alti tude of approximat e ly 30 meters prior
to landing , the crewmen ob served dust moving away from the center of the
de scent propuls i on b last . The lunar module foot pads penetrat e d to a
maximum depth of 7 or 8 centimeters . The crewmen ' s boots le ft prints
generally from 3 millimeters to 2 or 3 centimeters deep . Surface materi al
was e as i ly di s lodge d by being ki cked , ( see fig . ll-3 ) . The flagpole and
drive tubes were pre s s ed into the surface to a depth of approximately
12 centimeters . At that depth , the regolith was not suffici ently strong
to hold the core tub es upright . A hamme r was us ed to drive them to depths
of 15 to 20 centimete rs . At place s , during s cooping operations , rocks
were en countere d in the s ubsurface .
The crewmen ' s b oot t re ads were sharply pres erve d and angles as large
as 70 degrees were maintained in the print walls ( s ee fig . ll-4 ) . The
surface disturbed by walking tended t o b re ak into slab s , cracking outward
ab out 12 to 15 cent imet ers from the e dge of footprint s .
The fine s t parti cles of the surface had s ome adhe s i on t o boot s ,
gloves , suits , hand t ools , an d rocks on the lunar s urface . On repeated
11-8
contact , the coat ing on the boots thickened to the point that their color
was completely ob s cure d . When the fine parti cles were b rushed off the
suits , a stain remai ne d .
During the televis ion panorama , the Commander pointed out seve ral
rocks west of the televi s i on camera , one of whi ch was t abular and stand
ing on edge , protruding 30 centimeters ab ove the surface . Strewn fields
of angular b locks , many more than 1/2 meter long , occur north and west
of the lunar module . In general , the rocks tended to be rounded on top
and flat or angular on the b ottom.
The cohesive strength of rock fragments varie d , and in s ome cases
the crew had di ffi culty in distinguishing aggregates , or clods of fine
debri s , from rocks .
11 . 1 . 4
Geologi c Photography and Mapping Procedures
Televi s i on and phot ographi c coverage of the lunar surface act ivities
constitute most of the fundamental dat a for the lunar geology experiment
( Refer to s ection 11 . 6
and complement informat i on reported by the crew .
for a discussion of lunar surface phot ography . )
Phot ographi c document ation of the lunar surface was acqui red with
a 16-mm s equence camera, a close-up stereo camera , and two 70-mm sti ll
cameras ( one with an 80 -mm lens and the other with a 60-mm lens ) . The
camera with the 60-mm lens was intended primarily for gathering geologi c al
dat a , and a transparent plate cont aining a 5 by 5 mat rix of crosses was
mounted in front of the fi lm plane to define the coordinate system for
the opt i cal geomet ry .
Photographic procedures . - Photographic proce dures planned for the
lunar geologi c experiment for use with the 70 -mm Hass elblad with 60-mm
lens were the panorama survey , the s ample area survey , and the s ingle
s ample survey .
The panorama survey consists of 12 pi ctures t aken at intervals of

30 degrees in azimuth and aimed at the horizon with the lens focuse d at
22 . 5 meters . The resulting p i cture s , when mat che d together as a mos ai c ,
form a continuous 360-degree view of the landing site from which relative
azimuth angles can be me asured between fe atures of interest . The Com
mander took a parti al panorama from the foot of the ladder immedi ately
after he steppe d t o the lunar surface ( fi g . 11-5 , part a) . Als o , three
panoramas were t aken from the verti ces of an imaginary triangle surround
ing the lunar module ( for example , fi g . 11-5 , parts b and c ) .
11-9
The s ample are a survey con s is t s of five or more pi ctures t aken of
an are a 4 to 6 meters from the c amera. The first pi cture was t aken approx-
imately down sun , and the succeeding three or more pictures were t aken
cross sun , with parallel camera axe s at i ntervals of 1 t o 2 meters .
The s ingle s ample survey was des i gned to record structure s that were
part i cularly s i gni fi c ant to the crew . The are a was photographed from a
distance of 1 . 6 meters . As with the s ample are a survey , the first pi cture
was t aken approximate ly down sun , and the next two were t aken cros s sun .
Ge o logic s tudy from photographs . - The lunar ge ology experiment in
cludes a detailed study and compari s on of phot ographs of the rock s amples
in the Lunar Re ceiving Lab orat ory with photographs t ak en on the lunar s ur
face . The method of study involves the drawing of ge ologi c sket ch maps
of faces that show fe atures of the rock unob s cured by dust and a det ai led
de s cription of the morphologi c ( relating to former s tructure ) , structural ,
and t extural features of the rock , together with an i nterpretat i on of the
as sociat e d geologi c feature s . The photographs and ge ologi c sketches con
stitute a permanent record of the appearance of the specimens before sub
s equent de structive lab oratory work .
A small rock , 2 by 4 by 6 centimeters , whi ch was colle ct e d in the

contingency s ample has been tentat ively lo cated on the lunar-surface pho
tographs . Phot ographs of the rock show a fresh-appearing ve si cular ( small
c avity resulting from vaporiz at i on in a molten mas s ) lava , similar in ve
.si cularity , texture , and cryst allinity t o many terres t ri al basalt s ( s ee
fig . 11-2 ) .
The third larges t rock i n the contingency s ample was collect e d with
in 2 meters of the lunar module . The rock has an ovoi d shape , t apere d at
one end , with broadly rounde d top and ne arly flat bottom ( s ee fig . 11 -6 ) .
It i s ab out 5 . 5 centimeters long , 2 to 3 centimeters wide , and 1-l/2 to
2 centimet ers thi ck . Part of the top and s i de s are cove red with fine dust
but the bottom and lower s i des indi c at e a very fine-grained clast i c rock
with s c attere d subrounded rock fragment s up to 5 millimeters in di ameter .
The rounde d ovoid shape of the top and s i de s of this specimen i s i rregular
in det ail . In the cent ral part , there i s a broad depre s s i on forme d by
many coales cing shallow i rre gular c avit ies and round pits . Adj acent to
thi s , t oward the t apered front end , round deep pits are abundant and s o
closely spaced th at some inters e ct others an d indi c at e more than one gene
rat i on of pittin g . The b ott om is marke d by two parallel flat surfaces ,
separat e d by an i rregular longitudinal s c arp ab out l/2 to l mi llimeter
high . A few small c avit i es are pres ent , but no round pits of the type
found on the top . An irregular fracture pattern occurs on the bottom of
the rock . The fractures are short , di s c ontinuous , and largely filled with
dust . On the top of the rock ne ar the t apere d end , a set of short frac
tures , 3 to 9 millimeters long , i's largely dust-filled and does not appear
11-10
to penetrate far into the rock . On a few s ides and corners , there are
short , curved fractures which may be exfoliation fe atures . This rock is
a brec ci a of small subangular lithic fragments i n a very fine grained
mat rix . It resemb les the materi al of the surface layer as photographed
by the stereo clos eup camera , except that this specimen i s indurat e d.
Photome tric evaluation. - The general photometri c characteri sti cs of
the surface were not noticeably different from thos e ob served at the
Surveyor landing sites . See s e ct i on 11 . 7 for a more detailed evaluation
of the phot ography during lunar orbit and surface operat ions . The albedo
of the lunar surface decreas ed signifi cantly where it was di sturbed or
covered with a spray of fine grained materi al kicked up by the crew . At
low phas e angles , the reflectance of the fine grained material was in
creas ed not iceably , especially where it was compres sed smoothly by the
crewmen ' s boots .
11 . 1 . 5
Surface Traverse and S ampling Logs
The televi sion pi ctures and lunar surface photographs were us ed to

prepare a map showing the location of surface fe atures , emplaced ins tru
ments , and s ample localities ( fi g . 11-7 ) . The most di stant s ingle tra
verse was made to the 33-meter-diameter crater east of the lunar module .
The contingency sample was t aken i n vi ew of the sequence camera j ust
outs ide quad IV of the lunar module . Two s coopfuls filled the s ample bag
with approximately 1 . 03 kilograms of surface mat erial . The areas where
the samples were obtained have been accurately located on a frame
( fi g . 11- 8 ) of the s equence film taken from the lunar module window . Both
scoopfuls included small rock fragments ( figs . 11-9 and 11-10 ) visible on
the surface from the lunar module windows prior to s ampling .
The Commander pushed the handle of the s coop apparatus 15 to 20 cen
timeters into the surface very near the area of the firs t s coop . Collec
tion of the bulk s ample included 17 or 18 s coop motions made in full view
of the televis i on camera and at least five within the field of view of
the sequence camera .
The two core-tube s amples were taken in the vi cinity of the solar
wind compos ition expe riment . The. first core locat i on was documented by
the televis ion camera and by two indivi dual Has s elblad photographs . The
second core-tube locat ion , as report e d by the crew , was in the vi cinity
of the solar wind compos ition experiment .
Approximat ely 20 s elect e d , but unphotographed , grab samples ( ab out
6 kilograms ) were colle ct e d i n the final minutes of the extravehi cular
act ivity . Thes e spe cimens were colle cte d out to a distance of 10 to
15 meters in the area south of the lunar module and near the e ast rim of
the large double crat er .
ll-ll
The sites of three of the cont ingency s ample rocks have - been loc at e d
and thos e of two tent at i vely i dent i fi e d b y comparing thei r shapes and
s i ze s from the lunar module window and surface photographs with photo
graphs t aken of the specimens at the Lunar Re ceiving Lab oratory . Evi dence
for the ident i fi c at i on and ori ent ation of rock A ( fi g . 11-9 ) was obtained
from the pre s en ce of a s addle-shaped notch on its expose d s i de . Rock C
( fi g . 11-10 ) was charact erized by the pitlike depress ion vi sible on the
photogr aphs . Rock B ( fi g . ll-9 ) is only ab out 2 centimeters acros s and
at this time has not b een correlat e d with the spe cimens in the Lunar Re
ceiving Lab orat ory ,
During bulk s amp ling , rock fragments were colle cte d primari ly on the
northeast rim of the large double crat e r s outhwest of the lunar module .
Photographs t aken of the documented s ample locality ( s outh of the
plus Z foot pad ) before and after the ext ravehi cular activity were s earch
ed for evidence of rocks that might h ave been i ncluded in the s ample . Fig
ure s ll-11 and ll-12 i llustrate that three rathe r large rocks ( up to sev
eral tens of centimet ers ) were remove d from their respective positions
shown on the phot ographs t aken before the extravehicular activity . A
closer view of thes e three rocks was obtained during the extravehi cular
act ivity ( fi g . ll-1 3 ) .
11 . 1 . 6
Geologi c Hand Tools
The ge ologi c hand tools ( fi g . A- 5 ) include d the contingency s ample

cont ainer , s coop , h amme r , extens i on handle , two core tubes , tongs , two
large s ample b ags , weighing s cale , two s ample return containers , and the
gnomon , Als o include d were small s ample b ags , numbere d for use in docu
ment at i on . All t ools were us ed except the gnomon . The crew report e d
that , i n general , the t ools worked well .
The large s coop , att ached to the extens i on handle , was us e d primar
ily during bulk s ampling to collect rocks and fine-grained mat erial . The
large s coop was us ed ab out 22 times in colle cting the bulk sample . As
expected from l/6-g s imulat i ons , s ome lunar materi al tende d to fall out
of the s coop at the end of s cooping motion .
The hamme r was us ed t o drive the core tubes att ached to the extens ion
handle . Hard enough b lows could be struck t o dent the top of the exten
sion h andle . The extens ion handle was att ached to the large s coop for
bulk s ampling and to the core t ubes for t aking core s ample s .
Two core tubes were driven and e ach colle cted a s at i s factory s ample .
Each tube had an internally t apere d bit that compre s s e d the s ample 2 . 2 : 1
within the inside of the tub e . One tub e colle cted 10 centimeters of
11-12
s ample and the other 13 centimet ers .
The t ubes were diffi cult to dri ve
Thi s di ffi culty may h ave b e en part i
deeper th an ab out 20 centimete rs .
ally c aus e d by the increas ing den s i ty o f the fine grained mat e ri al with
The
depth or other me ch an i c al charact e ri s ti c s of the lun ar regolith .
di ffi culty of penet rat i on was also a functi on of the t apered b i t , whi ch
One tube was di f
cause d great e r re s i st an ce with incre ased penet rat i on .
fi cult t o att ach t o the extens i on h andle .
When thi s t ub e was detached
from the ext ens i on handle , the b utt end o f the tube un s crewed and was
The tubes were opened aft e r the fli ght and
lost on the lun ar surface .
The
the s plit liners i ns i de b oth were foun d to be offset at the b i t end .
Te flon core follower in one t ub e was origi nally insert e d ups i de down , and
the follower in the other tube was insert e d without the exp an s i on spring
which h olds it s nugly agai nst the ins ide of the spli t t ube .
The t ongs were us e d t o p i ck up the do cument e d s amples and to ri ght
the clos eup stere o c amera when i t fell ove r on the lunar surface .
One of the large s ample bags was us e d for s towage of documented
The other l arge bag , the wei gh bag , was us ed for s towage of
s ample s .
bulk s amp1e s .
The wei ghing s c ale was used only as a h ook to suspend th e bulk s am
ple b ag from the lunar module during the collect i on of bulk s ample s .
11 . 2
LUNAR S OIL MECHANICS EXPERIMENT
The lunar surface at the Apollo 11 landing s i te was s imi lar in ap

pe arance , b ehavi or , and me ch ani c al propert i e s to the surface encountered
at the Surveyor mari a landing s i tes .
Alth ough the lun ar surface mat erial
di ffers c on s i derably in compos iti on and i n range of p art i cle shapes from
a t e rrestrial soil o f the s ame part i cle s i ze distribut i on , it does not
appear t o differ s i gni fi c antly in i t s engineering behavi or .
A variety of dat a was ob tained through detai led crew ob s ervat i ons ,
ph ot ography , telemetere d dynami c dat a , and examinat i on of the returned
lunar surface material and rock s ample s .
Thi s i nformat i on permitte d a
prelimi nary as s es sment of the phys i c al and me chani cal prope rt i es of the
lunar surface mat e ri als .
S imulat i ons b ased on current dat a are planned
to gain further i ns i ght i nt o the physi cal characteri st i cs and me ch an i c al
behavi or of lunar surface materi als .
11 . 2 . 1
Ob served Charact e ri s ti c s
The phys i c al charact e ri st i cs o f lunar surface mat eri als were fi rs t

indi c at e d during the lunar module de s c ent when the crew not i ce d a trans
parent sheet of dust re s emb ling a thin layer of ground fog that move d
radi ally outward and caus e d a gradual de cre as e i n vi s ib i li ty .
11-13
Inspection of the area below the descent stage after landing re

vealed no evidence of an eros ion crater and little change in the apparent
topography . The surface imme diately underneath th e engine skirt had a
singe d appearance and was slightly etched ( fig . 11-14 ) , indicating a
s culpturing effect extending outward from the engine . Visible streaks
of eroded mat erial extended only to a maximum di stance of about 1 meter
beyond the engine skirt .
During ascent , there were no visible s igns of surface erosion . The
insulat i on b lown off the descent stage generally move d outward on extended
flight paths in a manner s imi lar to that of the ero ded surface parti cles
during des cent , although th e crew report e d the insulat i on was , in some
cases , blown for s everal mile s .
The landing gear foot pads had penetrated the surface 2 to 5 centi
meters and there was no di s cernible throwout from the foot pads . Fig
ures 11-15 through 11-18 show the foot pads of the plus Y and minus Z
and Y struts . The same photographs show the postlanding condi tion of
the lunar contact probes , which had dug into and were dragged through
the lunar surface , as well as s ome surface bulldoz ing by the minus Z
foot pad in the direction of the left lateral motion during landi ng .
The bearing pres sure on each foot pad i s 1 or 2 psi .
The upper few centimeters of surface materi al in the vicinity of the
landing s ite are characteri zed by a brownish , medium gray , slightly co he s ive , granular mat erial that is largely compose d of bulky grains in
the s i ze range of s ilt to fine s an d . Angular to s ubrounde d rock frag
ments ranging in s i ze up to 1 meter are di stributed throughout the area .
Some of thes e fragments were obs erve d to lie on the surface , s ome were
part i ally buried , and others were only barely expos ed.
The lunar surface i s relatively s oft to depths of 5 to 2 0 centimet
ers . The surface can be eas i ly s coope d , offers low res istance to penetra
t ion , and provided s light lateral s upport for the staffs , poles , and core
tubes . Beneath this relatively soft surface , res i stance to penetration
increas es considerably . The available dat a s eem to indicate that this in
crease is caus ed by an increas e in the dens ity of material at the surface
rather than the presence of rock fragments or be drock .
Natural clods of fine-grained material crumb led under the crewme n ' s
boot s . This behavior , while not fully understoo d , indicates cementation
and/or natural cohes ion between the grains . Returne d lunar surface s am
ples in nitrogen were als o found to cohere again to some extent after
being separat e d , although to a le s s er degree than ob s erved on the lunar
surface in the vacuum .
The surface mat erial was loos e , powde ry , an d fine-grained and ex
hibited adhes ive charact eristic s . As a result , the surface material
t ended to stick to any obj e ct with which it came i n contact , including
11-14
the crewmen ' s boots and suits , the televi s i on cab le , and the lunar equip
ment conveyor . During operat i on of the lunar equipment conveyor , the
powder adhering to it was carri ed into the spacecraft cabin . Als o , s uf
fici ent fine-graine d mat erial colle cted on the equipment conveyor to
caus e binding .
The thin lalfer of materi al adhering to the crewmen ' s b oot s oles
cause d s ome tenden cy to s lip on the ladde r during ingre s s . Similarly ,
the powdery coating of the rocks on the lunar surface was also s omewhat
s lippery ( s ee s e ction 4 . 0 ) . A fine dust confined betwe en two relatively
h ard surface s , such as a boot s ole and a ladder rung or a rock surface ,
would b e expected t o produce s ome tendency to s lip .
The lunar surface provide d adequate bearing stren gth for standing ,
walking , loping , or jumping , and suffi ci ent tract i on for s t arting , turn
ing , or stopping.
Small , fresh crater walls having s lope angles of up to 15 degrees
could be re adily negot i at e d by the crew . Going straight down or up was
found to t e preferable to travers ing these s lopes s i dewalfs . The foot ing
was not s ecure becaus e the varying thi ckne s s of unstab le lalfer mat erial
tended t o s li de in an unpredi ct able fashi on .
The material on the rim and walls of larger-si ze craters , with wall
s lopes ranging up to 35 degrees appeare d to be more compact and stable
than that on the smaller craters whi ch were trave rs ed.
11 . 2 . 2
Examinat i on of Lunar Material Samples
Preliminary ob servat i ons were made of the general appearance , struc

ture , texture , color , grain-size di stribution , consis tency , compactnes s ,
and me chani cal behavior of the fine-grained mat e ri al s ample d by the core
tubes and collect e d during the contingency , bulk , and do cumented s ampling .
These inve stigat i ons will b e report e d in greater detail in s ubsequent
s ci ence reports .
11 . 3
EXAMINATION OF LUNAR SAMPLES
A t ot al of 22 kilograms of lunar materi al was returned by the

Apollo 11 crew ; 11 ki lograms were rock fragments more than 1 centimet er
in di amete r and 11 ki lograms were smaller part i culat e mat e ri al . Because
the documented s ample cont aine r was filled by pi cking up s e le cted rocks
with t ongs , the cont ainer held a variety of l arge rocks ( t ot al 6 . 0 kilo
grams ) . The tot al bulk s ample was 14 . 6 kilograms .
11-15
The returned lunar material may be divided into the following four
group s :
a. Type A
cles (cavi ties)
b.
fi ne-grained crystalli ne igneous rock containing vesi
Type B - medium-grained vuggy (small cavity) crystalline igneous
rock
c. Type C - breccia (rock consisting of' sharp fragments imbedded
i n a fine grained matrix) consisting of small fragments of gray rocks
and fi ne material
d.
siz es) .
Type D - fines (very small particles in a mixture of various
The major findi ngs of a preliminary examination of the lunar samples

are as follows:
a. Based on the fabric and mineralogy, the rocks can be divided
into two gr oups : ( 1 ) fine and medium grained crystalline r ocks of i gne
ous origi n, probably originally deposited as lava flows, then dismembered
and redeposi ted as impact debris, and ( 2 ) breccias of complex history .
b. The crystalline rocks are different from any terrestri al rock
and from meteori tes, as shown by the bulk chemistry studies and analyses
of mineral concentration in a specified area.
c. Erosion has occur red on the lunar surface , as indicated by the
rounding on most rocks and by the evi dence of exposure to a p rocess
which gives the rocks a surface appearance simi lar to sandblasted r ocks .
No evidence exists of erosion by surface water.
d. The probable presence of the assemblage i ron-troilite-ilmenite
and the absence of any hydrated phas e suggest that the crystalline rocks
were formed under extremely low partial pressures of oxygen , water, and
sulfur (in the range of those i n equilibrium with most meteorites).
e. The absence of secondary hydrated minerals suggests that there
has been no surface water at Tranqui li ty Base at any time since the rocks
were exposed.
f. Evidence of shock or impact metamorphism is common in the rocks
and fines.
g. All the rocks display glass-lined surface pits which may have
been caused by the impact of small particles .
ll-16
h . The fine mat e r i al and the bre c c i a contain large amount s of all
noble gases with e lemental and i s ot op i c abundances that almost cert ainly
were derive d from the s olar wind . The fact that interior s amples of the
b re c ci as c ont ain the s e gases implies that the b re c c i as were formed at
the lunar surface from mat eri al previ ous ly exposed t o the solar win d .
i . The 4 0 K/4 0 Ar me asurement s on i gne ous rock indi c ate that those
rocks crys t alli z e d 3 to 4 b i lli on ye ars ago . Cosmi c-ray-produce d nuclides
indi c at e the rocks h ave been within 1 mete r of the s urface for periods of
2 0 t o 160 million ye ars .
j.
The level of indi genous volat i li z ab le and/or pyrolyz able organi c
materi al appe ars t o be extremely low ( cons i de r ab ly les s than 1 ppm) .
k . The chemi c al analyses of 2 3 lunar s amples show that all rocks

and fines are gene rally s imilar chemi c ally .
1 . The e lemental constituents of lunar s amples are the s ame as
those found in terre s t r i al igneous rocks and meteorites . Howeve r , sev
e ral s i gnifi c ant differences in compos iti on occur : ( 1 ) s ome refractory
e lement s ( such as t i t anium and z i rconium) are not ab ly enri che d , and
( 2 ) the alkalis and s ome volat i le e lement s are deplete d .
m . Elements that are enri che d i n i ron met eorites ( that is , n i ckel ,
cob alt , an d the plat inum group ) were e ither not observed or were low in
abundance .
n . The chemi c al an alys i s of the fines material is in excellent
agreement with the results of the alpha-b ack- s c attering me asurement at
the Surveyor V s it e .
o . Of 12 radio act i ve spe cies i dent i fi e d , two were cosmogen i c radio
nucli de s of short half life , ( 5 2Mn which has a half li fe of 5 . 7 days and
4 8 v whi ch has a h alf li fe of 16 . 1 days .
p . Uranium an d thorium concentrat i ons were ne ar the typ i c al values
for t e rrest r i al b as alt s ; howeve r , the p ot as s i um-t o-uranium r at i o det e r
mined for lunar surface material i s much lowe r than such value s deter
mine d for e ither t e rrest rial rocks or meteorite s .
q . The observe d high concent r at i on o f 2 6 Al i s cons istent with a

long cosmi c-ray exposure age infe rre d from the rare-gas an alys i s .
r . No evidence of bi ologi c al mat eri al h as been found t o date in the
s amples .
s . The lunar surface material at the lunar module landing s ite is
predominantly fine grained , granular , s l i ghtly cohes i ve , and in compre s s ib le .
ll-17
The hardnes s in creases consi de rably at a depth of 6 inches . The s oi l is
s imil ar in appearance and behavior t o the soil at the Surveyor landing
s ites .
11 . 4
PASSIVE SEISMI C EXPERIMENT
The e arly Apollo s cient i fi c experiment package s ei smometer system

met the reQuirements of the expe riment for the fi rst 2 weeks of its oper
at i on . No s i gni fi cant inst rumental defi ciencies were encountere d despite
the fact that maximum operat ing temperatures exceeded those planne d for
the i nstrument by as much as 50 F .
Analysis o f calibrat i on pulses and signals re ceived from various
crew activities indi c at e d that all four seismometers were ope rat i ng
prope rly . Instrument response curves derived from calibrat i on pulses
are shown in figure ll-19 .
During the fi rst lunar day , dat a were acQui red at 11 : 40 : 39 p . m .
e . s . t . , July 20 , and t ransmi s s i on was s topped by command from Mi s s i on Con
t rol Center at 06 : 5 8 : 46 a . m . e . s . t . , August 3 , when the predi ct e d rat e of
s olar panel output power drop oc curred at lun ar suns et . This occurred
approximat ely 4 hours and 40 minutes be fore the sunset time pre di cte d for
a flat surface , indi c at ing an effe ct i ve s lope of 2 degrees 20 minutes up
ward to the west at the deployment s ite .
11 . 4 . 1
Sei smi c Background Noi s e
A histogram o f seismi c b ackground level re corded b y the short-period

s ei smometer is shown in figure ll-20 . The high amplitude s ignal j us t
after turn-on was produced i n part b y crew act i vities and in part b y a
sign al generated withi n the lunar module , presumab ly by venting proces s es .
The levels de cre as ed steadily unti l the b ackground had di s appeared com
pletely by July 29 ( 8 days after turn-on ) . Thus , conti nuous s ei smi c
b ackground s i gn al near l hert z i s le s s than 0 . 3 millimi cron , whi ch cor
responds to system noi s e . Maximum s i gnal levels of 1 . 2 mi crons at fre
QUencies of 7 to 8 hertz were ob served during the period when the crewme n
were on the surface .
Except for th e occas i onal o c currence of t rans i ent s i gnals , the b ack
ground sei smi c s ignal level on the long period vert i cal component seis
mometer is b elow system nois e ; th at i s , b elow 0 . 3 millimi cron over the
period range from l to 10 s econds ( s ee figs . ll-21 and ll-22 ) . Thi s is
between one hundred and ten thousand times les s than the ave rage b ack
ground levels ob s erve d on earth in the normal period range for mi cro
sei sms ( 6 to 8 se conds ) .
11-18
Continuous b ackground mot i ons of relat i vely large amplitude ( 10 to

30 millimi crons peak to peak ) were ob s erve d on the records from b oth
hori z ontal component sei smometers . The ampli tude of these mot i ons de
cre as ed b elow the leve l of the 5 4- second os ci llat i on for a 2- to 3-day
i nt e rval centere d near lunar noon when the rate of change of external
tempe rature with time would be at a minimum . The s i gnals are of very
low frequency ( period i s on the order of 20 s econds to 2 minut es ) . It
is as s ume d that these s ignals correspond to t i lting of the ins trument s
c aused by a comb in at i on of thermal di sto rt i ons of the metal pallet which
serves as th e instrument base and a rocking moti on of the pallet produced
by thermal e ffe cts in the lunar surface mat e ri al . However , the hori zontal
component of true lunar b ackground sei smi c b ackground level at short er
periods ( le s s than 10 s econds ) als o appears to be le s s than 0 . 3 mi llimi
cron .
11 . 4 . 2
Near Sei smi c Events
Four types of high frequency s i gnals produced by local s ources

( within 10 to 20 kilometers of the s ei smi c experiment package ) have been
tent at i vely i dent i fi e d .
Sign als produced b y crew act i vities were promi nent on the short
period s eismomet er from initial turn-on unti l lunar module as cent . S uch
s ignals were part i cularly large when the crewmen were i n phys i cal contact
with the lun ar module . The s i gn al produce d when the Commander as cended
the ladde r to reent e r the lunar module is shown in fi gure ll-2 3 .
The pre domi nant frequency o f all o f thes e sign als i s 7 . 2 to 7 . 3 hert z .
The spe ct rum of the s i gnal produced by the Commander on the lunar module
ladde r , shown i n fi gure ll-23 , contains this prominent peak . This fre
quency is approximate ly equal to the fundamental res on ant mode of vibra
tion of the lunar module structure . The spectrum of the s i gnal generated
when one of the port ab le li fe s upport systems , weighing 75 p ounds , struck
the ground after b eing e j e ct e d from the lunar module is shown in figure
ll-24 for compari s on . The spectrum again shows the 7 . 2 hert z pe ak ; how
eve r , it is import ant to note that the two peaks at 11 . 3 and 12 . 3 hert z
would b e dominant i f the spectrum were corre cte d for instrume nt respons e .
The s i gn al at 7 . 2 hertz was presumab ly generat e d becaus e the portab le life
support system struck the lunar module porch and the ladder as it fell
to the surface .
The 7 . 2 hertz pe ak i s shift e d to 8 . 0 hert z in the spectra of s ignals
generated aft er depart ure of the lunar module ascent stage . Re s onances
in the remaining des cent stage struct ure would be expect e d to shi ft to
higher frequencies when the mas s of the as cent stage was remove d .
11-19
S ome of the s i gn als ob s erve d had the s ame charact eri s ti c s as di d

lands li des on e arth . The s i gn als h ave emergent ons et s and last up to
7 minutes for the larges t t rains . Low frequencies ( l/10 to l/15 hert z )
as s ociated with the largest of these t rains are also ob serve d on the
s ei smograms from the long peri od , ve rti cal component s ei smome te r . As
shown i n figure ll-25 , these event s began on J uly 25 ( 2 days be fore lunar
noon ) , sub side d during the lunar noon peri od , and c ontinued after lunar
noon with more frequent and much smaller event s . The act ivity is believed
to be relat e d in s ome way to thermal e ffect s . More than 200 of these
events were i dent i fi e d in tot al .
High frequency s ignals were ob s erved from an undetermi ned s ource .
These signals began with large amplitudes on the short period s eismo
meter and gradually decreased over a period of 8 days unti l they dis ap
peared completely on July 30 . During the final stages of this act i vi ty ,
the s i gn als became very repet itive with nearly i denti c al structure from
train to t rai n . As mentioned previ ous ly , the pre domi nant frequency o f
these s i gnals was approximat ely 7 . 2 hert z be fore lun ar module as cent and
8 . 0 hertz after lunar module as cent . The complete di s appearan ce of these
s i gnals and their ne arly i dent i c al form h ave led to the tentat i ve con c lu
s i on that they were produced by the lunar module its elf , pres umab ly by
venting proce s s es .
S ome of the ob served high frequency s i gnals might pos sib ly have been
from ne arby meteoroi d impact s . An analysis i s being made of s everal high
frequen cy s i gnals whi ch may correspond to meteoroid impacts at ranges of
a few kilometers , or le ss , from the pas sive s ei smi c experiment package .
Substantive remarks on these event s cannot be made until spect ra of the
s i gnals are comput e d .
11 . 4 . 3
Distant Sei smi c Event s
During the pe ri od from July 22 through 24 , three of the recorded

signals appear to be surface wave s , that i s , s ei smi c waves whi ch t rave l
along the s urface of the moon i n contrast to b ody waves whi ch would t rav
el through the interior of the moon . Body wave s ( compres s i onal and shear
waves ) produced by a given s ei smi c source normally travel at higher ve
locit ies than surface wave s and , hence , are ob s erve d on the record before
the surface waves . No b ody waves were ob s e rve d for these events . The
wave trains b egin with short period os ci llat i ons ( 2 to 4 s econds ) whi ch
gradually i ncreas e i n period t o 16 to 1 8 s e conds , when the t rain di s
pers ed.
A wave t rain having s imilar characteristics has been ob s erve d on
the long period ve rti cal channel i n as s oci at i on with a s eries of di s
crete pulses on the short period ve rti c al channe l . I n this c as e , the
11-20
long period wave train ob s erve d on the re c ord is simply the s ummat ion of
t ransi ents corresponding t o these pulses and , hence , is of instrumental
orlgln . A di sper s i on of this type i s commonly ob served on earth in var
ious types of surface wave s and is well unde rs to o d . The dispers ion , or
gradual t rans format ion of an ini t i al impuls ive s ource to an extende d
oscillat ory t rai n o f waves , is produced by propagat i on through a wave
guide of s ome type . The events ob s e rve d appear only on the hori zontal
component s ei smometers . Such hori zont ally polari zed waves , when ob serve d
on e arth , would b e called Love wave s . On e arth , surface waves which have
a ve rt i c al component of mot ion ( Rayleigh wave s ) are usually the mos t prom
inent waves on the rec ord from a di stant event . Several pos sib i lities
are pre s ently under study to explain these waves .
11 . 4 . 4
Engineering Evaluat i on
From acquis ition of initial dat a to turn-off , the pass ive s ei smi c
experiment package operated a t ot al of 319 hours 18 minutes . The power
and dat a sub systems pe rforme d ext remely well , parti cularly in view of
the abnormally high operati ng t emperatures . The output of the s olar cell
array was within l to 2 wat t s of the expect e d value and was always higher
than the 27-watt minimum des ign spe c i fi cat i on .
About 9 9 . 8 percent of the dat a from the pas s ive s e i smi c experiment
package are pres e rved on t ape . Several oc currence s of dat a dropout were
determined to be c aus ed by other than the s e i smi c experiment system .
The pas sive s ei smi c experiment showed good respons e , detecting the
crewmen ' s foot steps , port ab le life s upport sys tem e j e ction from the lunar
module , and movement s by the crew in the lunar module prior to li ft -off .
Dat a from th e dus t and thermal radi at i on engineering me asurement
were ob tained continuous ly except for bri ef turn-off peri ods as s oci ated
with power/thermal management .
A total of 9 16 commands were t ransmitte d and accept e d by the pas s i ve
seismic experiment package . Most of these commands were us ed to leve l
the equipment , thereby correcting for the thermal di stort i ons o f the sup
porting primary structure .
The downlink s ignal s trength re cei ve d from the pas sive s ei smi c ex
periment package agree with the pre di ct i ons and for the 30-foot antennas
ranged from minus 135 to minus 139 dBm and for the 85-foot antennas
ranged from minus 12 5 to minus 127 dBm .
Normal operat i on was initiat e d on the s econd lunar day by comman d
from Mi s s i on Cont rol Center at 1 : 00 a . m . e . s . t . , August 19 , approximat ely
20 hours aft er sunri s e at Tranqui lity Bas e . Transmi s s i on s topped at
ll-21
6 : 08 a . m . e . s . t . , Septemb er l , with the los s of s olar panel output power
at lunar sunset . The loss of transmi s s i on was dis appoint ing , however ,
at the time of the l os s , the pas s ive sei smi c expe riment package had ex
ceeded the des i gn obj e ctives .
Dat a re ceive d , i ncluding sei smometer me as urements , were consi stent
with those re corde d at corresponding sun elevat i on angles on the first
lunar day . Operat i on continued unti l the dat a system di d not respond t o
a t ransmitted command at 3 : 50 a . m. e . s . t . , August 25 ( approximat e ly noon
of the s econd lun ar day ) . No command was accepted by the pas s i ve sei smi c
experiment package afte r that time , de spite repeated attempts under a
wide variety of c ondit i ons .
The i nitial impact of the los s of command capab i lity was the in
abi lity to re-level the long peri od s eismi c s ens ors . As a result , all
three axes became s o unbal anced that the dat a were me aningles s ; howeve r ,
me aningful dat a cont i nue d t o b e received from the short period s ens or.
Valid short peri od s ei smi c s ensor and telemetry dat a continued to be
received and rec orde d during the remainder of the day . Component tempe ra
tures and power levels continued t o be nominal , corresponding with values
re corde d at the s ame sun angles on the first lunar day . The pas s ive
s ei smi c experime nt was aut omat i c ally switched to the s tandby mode of op
erati on when the power droppe d at sunset .
Downlink transmi s s i on was acQui re d during the third lunar day at
5 : 27 p . m . e . s . t . , September 16 . Transmi s s i on stoppe d at 6 : 31 a . m . ,
e . s . t . , Oct ob er l , with the los s of power at lunar sunset . Efforts t o
res tore command commun i c at i ons were unsuc ce s s ful . The pas s i ve s eismi c
experiment remai ne d i n the standby mode of operat i on , with no s ei smi c
dat a output . Dat a from the dus t and thermal radi at i on engineering me a
surement went off- s c ale low at 10 : 00 p . m . e . s .t . , September 16 , and re
mained off- s c ale throughout the day . The downli nk s ignal s t rength , com
ponent temperatures , and power levels conti nue d to be nominal , correspond
ing with values re c orde d at the s ame sun angles on previous days .
11 . 4 . 5
Con clus ions
Tent at ive conclus i ons b as e d on a prelimi nary an aly s i s of dat a ob

t ained during the first re c ording period ( July 21 to August 3 ) are as
follows :
a . The s ei smi c background s ignal on the moon i s le s s than the
threshold s ensitivity of the ins trument ( 0 . 3 mi llimi cron ) . Seismometers
are ab le to operat e on the lunar surface at 10 to 100 times higher s ens i
t ivity than i s pos s ib le on earth .
11-22
b.
Allowing for the difference i n s i ze between the e arth and the
moon , the oc currence of s e i smi c event s ( moonquak es or impact s ) is much
le s s frequent for the moon than the oc curre nce of e arthquakes on the
e arth .
Despite the puzzling features of the p os s ib le surface wave
c.
t rain s , an attempt i s being made t o find lunar models c omp at ible with
A detailed di s cus s i on of the s urface wave trains will be con
the dat a .
t ained in a s ubsequent s ci ence report .
d.
Eros i onal proces s e s corresponding to lands lides along crat e r
walls may b e ope rat ive within one or more relat ive ly young craters lo
c ated within a few ki lometers of the pas sive s e i smi c experiment pack age .
11 . 5
LASER RAN GING RETRO-REFLECTOR EXPERIMENT
The las er ranging retro-re fle ctor was deployed approximat ely 14 meters
s outh-s outhwe s t of the lun ar module in a relat i ve ly smooth are a ( s ee fi g .
The bubble was not pre ci s ely in the center of the leveling devi ce
11-26 ) .
but was between the cent e r and the innermost divi s ion i n the s outhwe st
dire c t i on , indi c at i n g an off-level condit i on o f le s s than 30 mi nutes of
The shadow lines and sun compas s marki ngs were clearly vi s ible , and
ar c .
the crew report e d that these devi c e s showed that the alignment was pre ci s e .
On August 1 , 19 6 9 , the Li ck Ob servat ory ob tained refle cte d s i gnals
from th e laser refle ct o r .
The s i gnal continued to appe ar for the remain
de r of the night .
Between 5 and 8 j oule s per pul s e were t ransmitted at
69 4 3 angstroms .
Us ing the 120-inch teles cope , each returned s i gnal con
t ained , on the ave rage , more th an one phot o -electron , a value that indi
cat e s that the conditi on o f the refle ctor on the surface i s entirely s at
i s fact ory .
On August 20 , 19 6 9 , the McDonald Ob s ervat ory obt ained refle ct e d s ig
The round t rip s i gnal t ime was found t o be
nals from the refle cto r .
2 . 4 9 59 6 311 ( 0 . 00000003 ) s e conds , an un ce rt ainty equi valent t o a di st an ce
variat i on of 4 . 5 meters .
The s e ob servat i ons , made a few days b efore lunar sunset and a few
days aft e r lunar sunri s e , show that the thermal de s i gn of the refle ctor
permit s operat i on during s un i llumi nat e d peri ods and that the refle ctor
survived the lunar night s at i s fact ori ly .
They als o i ndi cate no seri ous
degradat i on of opti cal per forman ce from fl aked insulat i on , debri s , dust ,
or rocket e xh aust product s which s c at t e re d duri ng lun ar module li ft -off .
11- 2 3
The s c i ent i fi c ob j e ct i ves o f the las e r ranging expe riment -- s tudi es
of gravitat i on , relat i vity , and e arth and lun ar physics -- can be achieved
only by successfully moni taring the changes in the di stances from stat i ons
on e arth to the las er beam re fle ctor on the moon with an uncert ainty of
ab out 15 centimeters ove r a period of many years . The McDonald Observat ory
i s b ei ng instrumented to make dai ly ob servat i ons with this accuracy , and
it i s expe cte d that s everal other stat i ons c apab le of thi s ranging pre
cis ion will b e e s t ab li shed .
11 . 6
SOLAR WIND COMPOSITION EXPERIMENT
The s olar wind compos i t i on experiment was designed to me asure the

abundance and the i s ot opi c compositi ons of the noble gas es in the s olar
wind ( He 3 , He 4 , Ne 2 0 , Ne 2 1 , Ne 2 2 , Ar 3 6 , and Ar 3 8 ) . The experiment con
s i sted of a spe ci ally prepared aluminum foi l with an e ffective are a of
0 . 4 s quare meter ( s ee fi g . ll-27 ) . When exposed t o the s olar wind at the
lunar surface , s olar wind part i cles which arrive d with velocities of a
few hundred ki lometers per s econd would penetrat e the foil to a depth of
s everal millionths o f a centimet e r and become firmly trapped . Parti cle
me asurements would be accompli shed by heating the returned foi l in an
ultra high vacuum system . The evolving at oms would then be analy zed in
stat i cally operat e d mas s spect rometers , and the ab s olute and i s ot op i c
quanti ties o f the part i cles determi ned .
The experiment was deployed approximat ely 6 me ters from the lunar
module . The s t aff of the experiment penetrated 1 3 . 5 centimeters into the
surface .
The foi l was retreived after 77 mi nutes exposure t o the lunar en
vironment . The return unit was place d into a special Te flon b ag and re
turned to e arth in the lunar s ample return containe r . A port i on of the
foil was cut out , placed int o a metal gasket vacuum container , and heat
steri li zed at 125 C for 39 hours . The s ection of foi l has been released
for analysi s , and results will be reported in s ci ence reports .
11 . 7
PHOTOGRAPHY
A preliminary analys i s of the Apollo ll photographi c activities i s

di s cus s ed i n t h e following paragr aphs . During the mi s si on , all nine of
the 70 -mm and all 13 of the 16 -mm fi lm magazines carri ed onb oard the
space craft were expos ed. Approximat ely 9 0 percent of the photographi c
obj e ct ives were accompli shed , including ab out 85 percent of the requested
lunar photography and ab out 46 percent of the t arget s of opport uni ty .
11-2 4
11 . 7 . 1
Phot ograph i c Obj e ctive s
The lunar surface phot ogr aphic ob j e ctives were :

a.
Long di stan ce coverage from the command module
b.
Lunar mapping photography from orbit
c.
Landed lunar module loc at i on
d.
SeQuence phot ography during de cent , lun ar stay , and as cent
e.
Still phot ograph s through the lunar module window
f.
St i ll phot ographs on the lunar surface
g.
Clos eup stere o photo graphy
11 . 7 . 2
Fi lm De s cript i on and Proce s s i ng
Spe c i al care was t aken in the s elect i on , preparat i on , calibrat i on ,

and proce s s ing of film t o maximi ze returned i nformat i on .
The types of
film include d and expos e d are li st e d in the following t ab le .
Re s olut i on , lines /mm

Film type
SO- 3 6 8 , color
S 0-16 8 , color
3 40 0 , black
and white
Film s i ze , mm
Magaz ines
16
70
35
16
5
2
1
8
70
70
2
5
ABA
spee d
High
c ontrast
Low
cont ras t
64
80
35
63
32
40
no
70
*Expos ed and developed at ASA 1000 for interior ph ot ography and

ASA 16 0 for lunar surface phot ography .
ll . 7 . 3
Phot ograph i c Re sult s
Lun ar photography from the comman d module cons i s t e d mainly of spe ci

fied t arge ts of opportunity t ogether with a s hort s t rip of ve rt i c al s till
phot ography from ab out 170 t o 120 de grees e as t longitude .
Most of the
other 70-mm command module phot ography of the surface cons i s t e d of fea
tures s elected by the crew .
ll-25
The 16-mm s equence camera photography was generally excellent . The
descent film was us ed to determine the locat i on o f the landed lunar mod
ule . One sequence of 16 -mm coverage t aken from the lunar module window
shows the lunar surface change from a light to a very dark color wherever
the crew walke d .
The quantity and quality o f s ti ll photographs taken through the lunar
module window and on the lunar surface were very goo d . On some sequences ,
to insure good photography the crew vari ed the expos ures one s top i n either
direct ion from the exposure i ndic at e d . The still photography on the sur
face indi cat e s that the landing s i te lo cat i on de termine d by us e of the 16mm descent film is corre ct .
The clos eup stereo photography provides good quali ty imagery of
17 areas , each 3 by 3 inches . Thes e areas i ncJ.ude d vari ous ro cks , s ome
ground surface cracks , and s ome rock which appears to have been parti ally
melted or splattered with molten glas s .
11 . 7 . 4
Photographic Lighting and Color Effe cts
When the lunar surface was vi ewed from the command module window ,
the color was report e d to vary with the viewing angle . A high sun angle
caus ed the surface to appear brown , and a low sun angle caused the sur
face to appear slat e gra;y . At this distance from the moon , distinct
- color variat ions were s ee n i n the maria and are very pronounced on the
proces s ed film . Acc ording to the crew , the 16-mm photographs are more
repres entat ive of the true s urface color than are the 70-mm photographs .
However , print s from both film types have shown t ints of green and other
shades which are not realist i c . Underexposure contributes to the green
t int , and the printing process can increas e this effe ct . Each generation
awa;y from the original copy will cause a further increase in thi s t int
ing . On the original film , the greenish t int in the dark , or underex
pos e d , areas is a funct i on of space craft windmv transmi s s i on character
i st i cs and low sun angles . For Apollo 12 , the master film copies will
be color corre cte d , whi ch should greatly minimize unreal i st i c t inting .
A 16-mm film s equence from the lunar module window shows crew activ
ities in both gray and light brown areas . As the crewmen move d , the gray
area , which i s apparently s ofter , deeper material , t urned almost b lack .
The crewmen ' s feet vis ibly sank i n this gray materi al as they ki cked mod
erat e quant it ies . The light brown are a did not appre c i ably change color
with crewmen ' s movement .
The color pictures i n which the fine grained parts of the lunar
surface appear gray are properly exposed , while those pictures i n which
the lunar surface i s light brown to light tan are generally overexp os e d .
ll-26
The rocks appear light gray to brownish gray in pi ctures that are pro
perly exposed for the rocks and vary from light t an to an off-white where
overexpos ed . The crew reporte d that fine grained lunar mat e ri al and rocks
appeared to be gray to dark gray . Thes e materi als appeared s lightly
brownish gray when ob s erve d near zero phas e angle . Small brownish , t an ,
and golden re fle ctions were ob s erve d from rock surfaces .
The targets and as sociat e d exposure values for e ach frame of the
lunar surface film magazines were carefully planned before flight . Nearly
all of the photographs were t aken at the re commende d expos ure s ettings .
Preflight s imulat i ons and training photography indi c at e d that at
shutter speeds of l/125 s econd or longer , a suite d crewman could i nduce
exces s ive image motion during exposure . A shutte r spee d of l / 2 50 s e cond
was there fore chosen to re duce the unwanted mot ion to an acceptable leve l .
Corresponding f-stops were then determined which would provide correct
exposure under predi ct e d lunar lighting conditions . At the completion
of the training program , the crew was profi ci ent at photographing dif
ferent subj ects under varying lighting conditions .
To simplify camera operat ions , f-s tops of 5 . 6 and ll were cho s en
for exposures in the cros s-sun and down-sun dire ct ions , respect ively .
Thi s exposure informat ion was provided on de cals att ached to the film
magazines and was us ed succe s s fully .
The crewmen chose exposures for unusual lighting conditions . For
example , the phot ographs of the Lunar Module Pilot des cending the ladder
were t aken at an f-stop of 5 . 6 and a speed of l/60 s econd , and the best
photograph of the landing-leg plaque was taken at an exposure of 5 . 6 and
l/30 s econd. When a high depth of field was require d , exposures were
made with smaller apertures and correspondingly s lower shutter speeds t o
maintain equivalent exposure values . The crewmen usually s te adied the
camera against the remote -control-unit bracket on the suit during thes e
slower-speed exposures .
A preliminary analysis of all lunar surface exposures indi cates that
the nominal shutter speed of l/250 s econd appears t o be a good compromise
between depth of field and crew-induced image mot ion . In those specific
instances where a s lower shutter speed was require d , either be caus e of
depth-of-field or lighting considerat ions , the crew was able t o minimiz e
image mot ion by steadying the camera . However , the select i on of the
l/250-se cond speed will be re-evaluated for continued general phot ography .
Figure s ll-3 , ll-4 , ll-1 8 , and ll-28 are representative of lunar
surface photography .
TABLE 11-I . - COMPARATIVE TIMES FOR PLANNED LUNAR SURFACE EVENTS
Event
Final preparation for egress
Planne d time
Actual time ,
min : s e c
min : sec
10 : 00
20 : 45
Difference ,
Remarks
min : se c
+10 ; 4 5
Approximately 8 min 30 s e c spent

from cabin pressure reading of
0 . 2 psia until hatch opening

10 : 00
8 : 00
-2:00
5 : 00
2 : 05
-2 :00
Contingency sample collection
4 : 30
3 : 36
-0 : 55
Preliminary spacecraft checks
6 : 30
6 : 35
+0 . 0 5
Lunar Module Pilot egress to
7 : 00
7 : 00
0 : 00
Commander egress to surface

Commander environmental famil
iarization
surface
Performed out of sequence with
planned timel n:
Out of sequence
Approximately 2 min 10 s e c for

portable life support system
checks
Commander photography and ob
2 : 40
+2 : 40
4 : 50
+0 . 5 0
servation
Television camera deployment
4 : 00
( partial)
Ltmar Module Pilot environ
Deployment interrupted for ac

tivity with plaque
6 : 00
15 : 00
+9:00
mental fami liarization
Includes assisting Commander

with plaque and television
camera deployment
Television canera deployment
7 : 00
11 : 50
( complete)
+ 4 : 50
Includes photography of solar

composit:Lon experiment and com
ments on lunar surface
charac
teristics
Solar wind composition experi
4 : 00
6 : 20
+2 : 20
14 : 30
18 : 45
+4 :15
14 :00
18 :15
+4 : 15
15 : 30
17 :10
+1 : 40
ment deployment
Bulk s ample and extravehicular
mobility unit evaluation ( com
plet e )
Lunar module inspection by
Lunar Module Pilot
Lunar Module inspection by Com
mander
Includes closeup camera photo

graphs
Off-load experiment package
7 : 00
5 : 20
-1:40
Deploy experiment package
9 : 00
1 3 : 00
+4 :00
From door open to door closed

From s e lection of site to com
pletion of photography ; trouble
leveling the equipment
Documented sample collection

Lunar Module Pilot ingress
Transfer sample return conCommander ingress
34 : 00
17 ; 50
-16:10
4 : 00
4 : 00
0 : 00
1 4 : 00
9 : 00
-5 :00
9 : 30
6 : 14
- 3 : 16
Partially completed
Includes cabin repres s urization
f-'
f-'
I
1\)
())
NASA-S -69-3744
A l franganus
10
20
30
40
Long i tude , deg E ast
F i gure 1 1 - l . - Land ing location re lative to Surveyor 1l and R anger 1ZDI.
ll-29
NASA - S -6 9 - 3 7 45
; ......_
......
0
I
Approxi mate surface

'-.... contac t
..
1
I
.......
. .
.
--
Approximately
.
. . .. . .
..
. ..
F i gure 1 1- 2 . - Lunar sample and re lative pos it ion on lu nar surface .
ll-30
NASA-S-69-3746
F igure 1 1-3 . - Surface characteristics around footpr ints .
2 / 5/ 5 !`wPw

@
nwnwb" `
'
'
$"'

!" ' % &# '
$"'
' ; O; IA i
11-33
NASA- S -6 9 -.3 7 49
Front
end
0
Sub-angular Imbedded rock fragments showing
lath-shaped white ..crystals11
White "crystals" and cleavage fragments in
the matrix
Circular pits, many with raised rims; some with
thin wllite halos
Irregular cavities
.....
Fractures
Vertical irregularity hachures indicate down side
./'.... Faint layering visible on lower sides tf specimen

and locally on top
Shadow
(a) Top and s i de v i ew .

F i gure 1 1-6 . - Detai led v i ew of lunar rock .
11-34
NASA-S-6 9-3 7 5 0
Front
end
1
Sub-angular imbedded rock fragments showing
lath-s!Yped white crystals11
White "crystals1' and cleavage fragments in
Fractures
Vertical irregularity hachures indicate down side
the matrix
thin white halos
Circular pits, many with raised rims; some with
Faint layering visible on lower sides of specimen

and locally on top
Irregular cavities
Shadow
(b) Bottom and part ial s ide v iew .

F i gure 1 1 - 6 . - Conc luded .
ll- 35
NASA-S -69-3751
Television
\-
e;_........- -.
'
.1
\.
_
_
,
.
.
I
-
/ / A rea from which core 2
sample was taken
B u l k sample
a rea
52 meters to
33-meter
dia meter crater
""'-
...____ .
. - - ------
Contingency
_ _ _ sample a rea
.- j
k"
i..
r.
/"'\_j
./
">,..,
:.
.
-
-:
"-
j
j 7-(. ... . .
.
_J1.-- _ x:_ _--D/'
(
.... ........
"'-
OD
...
(" >,..
:_
',
)
\
10 '
.'
Gl
.... . ..
_ _
/ t"f",
retro reflector _/ '
''?K
Laser ranging
- - - Very subdued crater

-.- - -.- S ubdued crater
--,- - --,- Relatively sharp crater
/""!
"'-.../
'- Documented
: sample area
''-JJ._
'
Lest crater.--.....
:-
\
J
j ---;-
400 meters to/
+?. -
1
I
I
'
F-"
of view
of view
Rock
Figure 11-7 . - D iagram of lunar s u rface activity areas.
11-36
NASA-S-69-3 7 5 2
F i gure 1 1- 8 . - Location o f two conti ngency s ample scoops .
NASA- S - 6 9 - 3 7 5 3
F i gure 1 1 - 9 . - Rocks col lected during fi rst

cont i ngency sample scoo p .
F i gure 1 1 - 1 0 . - Rock col lected during second

contingency sample scoo p .
ll-37
ll-38
NA SA -5 -69-3754
Figure 1 1 -1 1 . - P h otograph taken prior to extravehicular activity,

showing rocks col l ected (see figure 11-10).
--
Figure 1 1 -12. - P hotograph of a rea shown i n figure 11-9 after

extraveh i c u la r activity.
NASA-S-69-3755
F igure
1 1-13 . -
Photograph of area shown in figures
11-11 and 1 1 - 1 2 ,
taken during extravehicu lar activity.
u-4o
F i gure 1 1 - 1 4 . - Lunar surface under descent stage engine .
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11- 47
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11-48
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11-49
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11-5 2
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11- 53
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11-54
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_-
12-l
12 . 0
BIOMEDICAL EVALUATION
This s ection is a summary of the Apollo ll quarantine procedures

and medical findings , b as e d upon a preliminary analysis of biomedical
dat a . More comprehens ive evaluations will be published in separate med
i cal report s .
The three crewmen ac cumulate d 585 man-hours of space flight experi
ence during the lunar landing mis sion including 2 hours 14 minutes and
l hour 42 minutes on the lunar surface for the Commander and the Lunar
Module Pilot , respectively .
The crew ' s health and performance were excellent throughout the
flight and the 18-day post flight quarantine period. There were no s ig
ni fi c ant physiological changes observed after this miss ion as has been
the cas e on - all previous miss ions , and no effects attributable to lunar
surface exposure have been obs erve d .
12 . 1
BIOINSTRUMENTATION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA
The biomedical data were of very good quality . Only two minor prob
lems occurred , both late in the flight . Data from the Command Module
Pilot ' s impedance pneumogram became unreadable and the Lunar Module Pilot ' B
electrocardiogram s ignal degraded because of drying of the electrode paste
under the sens ors . The Lunar Module Pilot replaced the electrocardiogram
leads in his bioinstrumentation harnes s with the spare set from the medi
cal kit , and proper readings were restore d . No attempt was made t o cor
rect the Command Module Pilot ' s respiration signal because of entry prep
arations .
Physi ological parameters were always within expected ranges , and
s leep data were obtained on all three crewmen during most of the mis s i on .
The average heart rates during the entire mis s ion were 71 , 60 , and
67 beats /min for the Commander , Command Module Pilot , and Lunar Module
Pilot , respectively . During the powered des cent and ascent phases , the
only data planned to be available were the Commander ' s heart rates , which
ranged from 100 to 150 beats /min during descent and from 68 to 120 during
as cent , as shown in figures 12-l and 12-2 , respectively .
Plots of he art rates during lunar surface exploration are shown in
figure 12- 3 . The average heart rates were 110 beats /min for the Com
mander and 88 beats /min for the Lunar Module Pilot . The increase in the
12-2
Commander ' s heart rat e during the last phas e s of this activity is indi ca
tive of an increas ed work load and body heat s torage . The me taboli c pro
duct ion of each crewman during the extravehi cular activity is reported
in s ection 12 . 3 .
12 . 2
12 . 2 . 1
MEDICAL OBSERVATIONS
Adaptat ion to Weightlessne s s
The Commander reporte d that h e felt le s s zero-gravity effect , such

as fullnes s of the head , than he had exp erienced on his previous flight .
All three crewmen commented that the lack of a gravi tational pull caus ed
a puffines s underneath their eyes and this caus ed them to s quint s omewhat ,
but none felt any ill effects as soci at e d with this puffines s . In donning
and doffing the suits , they had no feeling of tumb ling or the disori enta
tion which had been des cribed by the Apollo 9 crew .
During the first 2 days of the flight , the Command Module Pilot re
port ed that half a meal was more than enough to sat is fy his hunge r , but
his appetite subsequently returne d .
12 . 2 . 2
Medicat ions
The Commander and the Lunar Module Pilot each took one Lomotil tablet
prior to the sleep period to retard bowel movements before the lunar mod
ule activity . They each carried extra Lomotil tablets into the lunar mod
ule but did not take them. At 4 hours b e fore entry and again after splash
down , the three crewmen each took anti-naus eant tablets containing 0 . 3 mg
Hyos cine and 5 . 0 mg Dexedrine . Aspirin t ab lets were also taken by the
crewmen , but the number of t ab lets per individual was not recorded. The
Lunar Module Pilot recalled that he had t ak en two aspirin t ab lets almost
every night to aid his s leep .
12 . 2 . 3
Sleep
It is int eresting to not e that the crewme n ' s sub j e ctive e stimat es
of amount of sleep were les s than those b as e d upon t elemetered biome di
cal dat a , as shown in table 12-I . By either count , the crewmen s lept
well in the command module . The s imult aneous s leep periods during the
trans lunar coast were carefully monitore d , and the crew arrived on the
lunar surface well rested. Therefore , it was not nece s s ary to wait until
after the first planned 4-hour s leep period before conduct ing the extra
vehicular act ivity . The crewmen slept very little in the lunar module
12-3
following the lunar surface activity ( s ee section 4 . 12 . 6 ) . However , the
crewmen slept well during all three transearth s leep periods .
12 . 2 . 4
Radi ation
The personal radi ation dos imeters were read at approximately 12-hour
intervals , as planned. The total integrated , but uncorrect e d , dos es were
0 . 25 , 0 . 26 , and 0 . 2 8 rad for the Commder , Command Module Pilot , and
Lunar Module Pilot , respectively . The Van Allen Belt dosimeter indicated
tot al integrated doses of 0 . 11 rad for the skin and of 0 . 08 rad for the
depth reading during the ent ire mis s ion . Thus , the total dose for each
crewman is estimated to have been less than 0 . 2 rad , whi ch is well below
the medically s ignificant level . Results of the radio-chemi cal as s ays of
feces and urine and an analysis of the onboard nuclear emulsi on dosimeters
will be presented in a separate medical report .
The crewmen were examined with a total body gamma radioactivity
counter on August 10 , 1969 , after release from quarantine . No induced
radioactivity was detecte d , as bas e d on criti c al measurements and an in
t egration of the total body gamma spectrum. The examination for natural
radioactivity revealed the levels of potassium 40 and cesium 137 t o be
within the normal range .
12 . 2 . 5
Inflight Exercise
The planned exercise program included i s ometric and isotonic exer

cises and the use of an exerciser . As in previous Apollo mis s ions , a
calibrated exerci s e program was not planned . The inflight exerciser was
used primarily for crew relaxation . During transearth coast , the Lunar
Module Pilot exercised vigorously for two 10-minute periods . His heart
rate reached 170 and 177 beat s /min , and the partial pressure of carbon
dioxide increased approximately 0 . 6 mm Hg during these periods . The
heart rates and the carbon dioxide readings rapidly returned t o normal
levels when exercise ceas e d .
12 . 2 . 6
Drug Packaging
Several problems concerning drug packaging developed during the

flight . All the medi c ations in t ablet and capsule form were packaged
in individually sealed plastic or foil containers . When the medi cal
kit was unst owed in the command module , the packages were blown up like
balloons because insufficient air had been evacuated during packaging .
This b allooning increas e d the volume of the medical-kit contents after
it was opened and thus prevente d restowage unti l a flap was cut away from
12-4
the kit . Venting of each of the plastic or foil containers will be accom
plished for future flights and should prevent this problem from recurring .
The Afrin nasal spray bubbled out when the c ap was removed and was there
fore unus able . The use of cotton in the spray bottle is expected to re
s olve this problem on fut ure flight s .
12 . 2 . 7
Water
The eight inflight chlorinations of the command module water system

were ac complished normally and es s ent i ally as s che dule d . Analysis of the
potable water samples obtained about 30 hours after the last inflight
chlorination showed a free-chlorine res idual of 0 . 8 mg from the drinking
dispenser port and of 0 . 0 5 mg from the hot water port . The iodine level
in the lunar module tanks , based on preflight s ampling , was adequate for
b acterial protection throughout the flight .
Chemi cal and mi crobiologic al analyses of the preflight water s amples
for both space craft showed no signi ficant contaminants . Tests for coli
form and anaerobi c bacteri a , as well as for yeasts and molds , were found
negative during the post flight water analysis , which was delayed because
of quarantine restrictions .
A new gas /water s eparator was used with s atis factory results . The
palatability of the drinking water was greatly improved over that of pre
vious flights because of the abs ence of gas bubbles , which can cause
gastro-intestinal dis c omfort .
12 . 2 . 8
Food
The food supply for the command module included rehydratable foods
and beverages , wet-packed foods , foods contained in spoon-bowl packages ,
dried fruit , and bread . The new food items for this mis s i on were c andy
sti cks and j ellied fruit c andy ; spreads of ham , chicken , and tuna s alad
packaged in lightweight aluminum , easy-open cans ; and cheddar cheese
spread and frankfurters packaged in flexible foil as wet-packed foods .
A new pantry-type food system allowed real-time s e lection of food items
b as ed upon indivi dual preference and appetite .
Four meal periods on the lunar surface were s cheduled , and extra
optional items were included with the normal meal packages .
Prior to flight , each crewman evaluated the available food items and
s elected his flight menus . The menus provided approximately 2300 kilo
calories per man per day and included 1 gram of calci um , 0 . 5 gram of
phosphorus , and 80 grams of protein . The crewmen were well s at i s fied
with the quality and variety of the flight foods . They reported that
their food intake met their appetite and energy requirements .
12-5
The preparation and eating of s andwiches presented no problems .

Criticisms of the food systems were only that the coffee was not parti cu
larly good and that the fruit-flavored beverages tasted too sweet . The
new gas /water separator was e ffective in reducing the amount of gas in
the water and greatly improved the taste of the rehydratable foods .
12 . 3
EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY
The integrated rates of Btu production and the accumulated Btu pro
duction during the intervals of planned activities are listed in table
12-II . The actual average metaboli c production per hour was estimated
to be 900 Btu for the Commander and 1200 Btu for the Lunar Module Pilot .
These values are les s than the preflight estimates of 1350 and 1275 Btu
for the respective crewmen .
12 . 4
PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS
Comprehensive medical evaluations were conducted on each crewman at

29 , 15 , and 5 days prior to the day of launch . Brief physi cal examina
tions were then conducted each day until launch .
The post flight medi cal evaluation included the following : mi crobi
ology studies , blood studies , physical examinations , orthostatic toler
ance tests , exercise response test s , and chest X-rays .
The recovery day examination revealed that all three crewmen were
in good health and appeared well rested. They showed no fever and had
lost no more than the expected amount of body weight . Each crewman had
taken anti-motion si ckne s s medication 4 hours prior to entry and again
after landing , and no seas i cknes s or adverse symptoms were experi enced.
Data from chest X-rays and electrocardiograms were within normal
limits . The only positive findings were small papules beneath the
axillary sensors on both the Commander and the Lunar Module Pilot . The
Commander had a mild serous otit i s media of the right ear , but could
clear his ears without diffi culty . No treatment was necessary .
The orthostatic tolerance test showed s igni fi cant increases in the
immedi ate post flight heart rate respons e s , but the s e increases were les s
than the changes s een in previous Apollo crewmembers . In spite of this
apparent improvement , their return to preflight values was slower than
had been ob s erve d i n previous Apollo crewme n . The reasons for this s lower
recovery are not clear at this time ; but in general , these crew members
exhibited les s dec rement in oxygen consumption and work performed than
was obs e rved in exerc i s e respon s e t e s ts after previous Apollo flights .
Follow-up evaluat ions were conduct e d dai ly duri ng the quarantine
peri od in the Lunar Receivi ng Laborat ory , and the immunohematology and
microbiology reve ale d no changes att ributable to exposure to the lunar
surface material .
12 . 5
LUNAR CONTAMINATION AND QUARANTINE
The two fundamental responsibilities of the lunar s ample program

were to pres erve the i ntegri ty of the returned lunar s amples in the
original or near-origi nal s tat e and to make pract i cal provi sions to pro
t e ct the earth ' s ecology from pos sible contaminat i on by lunar s ubstances
that might be infe ct ious , toxi c , or otherwi se harmful to man , animals ,
or plants .
The Pub lic Laws and Federal Regulat ions concerning contaminat ion
control for lunar s ample return mi s s i ons are des cribed in reference 9 .
An interagency agreement between the N ational Aeronaut i cs and Space Ad
mi ni s trat i on ; the Department of Agri culture ; the Department of Health ,
Educat i on and Welfare ; the Department of the Interi o r ; and the Nat i onal
Academy of S ci ences ( ref. 10 ) confirmed the exi sting arrangements for the
protection of the earth ' s biosphere and defined the Interagency Committee
on Back Contami nat i on . The quaranti ne s chemes for manned lunar mis s ions
were estab li shed by the Interagency Committee on Back Contaminat i on
( re f . 11 ) .
The planned 21-day crew quarantine represented the p eriod required
to preclude the development of infect i ous diseas e conditions that could
generate volatile epi demi c events . In addition , early s igns of latent
infect i ous di seas es with longer incub at i on periods would probab ly be de
tected through ext ens ive medi cal and clinical pathologi cal examinat i ons .
However , to provide addi ti onal as surance that no infect i ous di sease of
lunar origin is pres ent in the Apollo ll crewmembers , an extens ive epi
demological program will conti nue for l year after their release from
quarantine .
12-7
12 . 5 . 1
Lunar Exposure
Although each crewman att empt e d to clean himself and the equipment
be fore ingres s , a fairly large amount of dust and grains of lunar s ur face
mat e ri al was brought into the cabin .
When the crewmen remove d their hel
mets , they not i ce d a di st inct , pungent odor emanat ing from the lunar mate
The texture of the dust was like powdered graphit e , and both crew
rial .
men were very dirty after they removed the i r helmet s , overshoes , and
glove s .
The crewmen cleaned their hands and fac es with t i s sues and with
t owels that had been s oaked in hot water .
The Commander removed his
liquid-cooling garment in order t o clean his body .
One grain of material
got into the Commande r ' s eye , but was e as i ly removed and caused no prob
lem.
The dust -like mat e rial c ould not be removed c ompletely from bene ath
their fingernai ls .
The cabin cleaning procedure i nvolved the use o f a vacuum-brush de
vi ce and posit ive air pre s s ure from the suit supply hos e s to blow remote
parti cles into the atmosphere for collection in the lithium hydroxide
filters in the environmental control system .
The concern that part i cles remaining in the lunar module would float
in the cab in atmosphere at zero-g aft e r as cent caus e d the crew to remain
helmet e d to prevent eye and bre athing contaminat ion .
However , float ing
part i cles were not a problem .
The cabin and equipment were further
cleaned with the vacuum brush .
The equipment from the surface and the
pres s ure garment as s emblies were placed in bags for transfer to the com
mand module .
Before transfer to the command module , the spacecraft sys
tems were configured t o cause a posit ive gas flow from the c ommand mod
ule through the hatch dump / rel i e f valve in the lunar module .
The c ommand module was cleaned during the return to earth at 2 4 -hour
intervals using the vacuum brush and towels .
In addit ion , the c irculat i on
of the cabin atmosphere through the lithium hydroxide filters continued
to remove traces of part i culate material .
12 . 5 . 2
Rec overy Procedures
The recovery proc edures were s uc c e s s fully c onduct ed with no c ompro

mis e s o f the planned quarant ine techniques .
The times o f maj or post
landing event s are listed i n s e c t i on 13 . 3 , Rec overy Operations .
After the c ommand module was upright e d , four b i olog i c al i s olation
garments and the decontaminat i on gear were lowered to one of two li fe
rafts .
One of the four swimmers donne d a b i ological i s olation garment .
The s e cond li fe raft was then move d to the spac e craft .
The protected
12-8
swimmer ret ired wi th the s econd life raft to the origi nal upwind pos i
t i on . The hatch was opene d , the crew ' s biologi cal i solat i on garments
were ins e rt ed into th e command module , and the hat ch was clos e d .
Afte r donning t h e biologi cal i solation garment s , the crew egre s se d .
The protected swimmer sprayed t h e upper deck an d hatch are as with Beta
dine , a wat e r-solub le i o d i ne solut ion , as planned in the quarantine pro
cedure . Aft e r t he four men and the life r aft were wiped wi th a solut i on
of sodium hypochlorite , the three swimmers returned to the vi c i nity o f
the spacecraft t o stand b y duri ng t h e heli copter pi ckup of t h e flight
crew .
The crewmen were brought up i nto the heli copter without i nc i dent
and remained in the aft compartme nt . As exp e ct e d , a moderate amount of
wat e r was pres ent on the floor aft er retri eval , and the wat e r was wiped
up with towels . The helicopter crewmen were als o prot e ct e d from pos s ible
contaminat i on .
The heli c opter was move d to the Mobile Quarantine Faci lity on the
lower deck of the re covery ves s el . The crewmen walked acro s s the de ck ,
entered the Mobile Quarantine Facility , and remove d their biological
i s ol at i on garments . The de s ce nt s teps and the de ck area between the
heli copter and the Mobile Quarantine Facil i ty were sprayed with glut aral
dehyde solution , which was moppe d up afte r a 30-minut e contact t ime . .
After the crewmen were p i cked up , the prot e cted swimme r s crubbed the
upper deck around the postlanding vents , the hat ch are a , and the flotat i on
collar near the hat ch with Betadine . The remaining Betadine was emptied
into the bottom of the recovery raft . The swimmer removed h i s biologi cal
i solat i on garment and pl ace d i t i n the Betadine i n the life raft . The
di sinfectant sprayers were di smantled and sunk . Afte r a 30-minute contact
time , the l i fe raft and remai ning equipment were sunk .
Following egres s of the flight crews and a re covery surgeon from
the helicopt e r , its hatch was clo s e d and the vehicle was towed to the
flight deck for de contaminat ion with formaldehyde .
The crew became uncomfort ab ly warm while they were enclos e d in the
bi ological i s olat ion garme nts in the environment ( 90 F ) of the heli
copter cabin . On two of the garme nts the vi s or fogged up b e c aus e o f im
proper fit of the nos e and mouth cup . To alleviate this di s comfort on
future mi s s ions , con s i derat i on i s b e i ng given to :
( l ) replacing the
pres ent b iologi cal i solat i on garment with a lightweight coverall , s imilar
to whi teroom clothi ng , wi th respirator mask , cap , gloves , and b oot i es ;
and ( 2 ) wearing a liquid cooling garment under the biologi cal i s olation
garment .
12-9
The command module was taken ab oard the USS Hornet ab out 3 hours
aft e r landing an d att ached to the Mob i le Quarantine Fac i li ty through a
The removal of lunar surface s ample s , film, dat a t ap e ,
flexible tunnel .
and medical s amples went well , with one exception .
Two of the medical
s ample cont ainers leaked within the inner b i ologi cal i s olation container .
Corre ct ive me asures were promptly exe cut e d , and the quarantine pro c e dure
was not vi olat e d .
Tran s fer o f t h e Mob ile Quarantine Facility from the re covery ship t o
a C-14 1 air craft and from the aircraft t o the Lunar Receiving Lab oratory
at the Manne d Spacecraft Center was ac c omplished without any ques tion of
a quarantine violat i on .
The transfer o f the lunar surface s amples and
the command module into the Lunar Re c e iving Laboratory was al s o accom
pli shed as planne d .
12 . 5 . 3
Quarantine
A tot al of 20 pers ons on the medi cal support teams were expos ed ,
directly or indirectly , to lunar material for periods ranging from 5 t o
Daily medical ob s ervat i ons and periodic lab oratory examinat i ons
1 8 days .
showed no s igns or symptoms of infecti ous di s ease related to lunar ex
posure .
No microbial growth was obs erve d from the prime lunar samples aft er
No micro
15 6 hours of i ncubat i on on all types of differe nti al me di a .
organisms whi ch could be attribut e d to an ext rat e rrestrial s ource were
recovered from the crewmen or the space craft .
None of the 2 4 mi ce i nj e ct e d i ntraperitoneally with lunar material
showed vi s ib le shock reaction following i nj e ction , and all remained alive
and healthy duri ng the fir s t 10 days of a 5 0-day toxi city te s t .
During
the firs t 7 days of t e s t i ng of the prime lunar samples i n germ-fre e mi ce ,
all fi ndings were cons is tent with the de c i s ion to releas e the crew from
quarant ine .
S amples from the crewmen were i nj e ct e d i nto t i s sue culture s , s uck
ling mi ce , mycoplasma medi a , and 6 - and 10-day old emb ryonated eggs .
There was no evidence of viral repli c at i on in any of the host sys tems at
the end of 2 weeks .
During the firs t 8 days of t e s t i ng the lunar mat e
rial , all findings were compat ible with crew releas e from quarantine .
No s igni f i c ant trends were noted in any bioch emi cal , immunologi c al ,
or hematologi c al parameters in either the flight crew or the medi cal sup
port pers onnel .
12-10
The personnel in quarant ine and in the crew re c ept i on area of the
Lunar Receiving Lab oratory were approved for release from quarant ine on
August 10 , 1969 .
Following decontamination using formaldehyde , the interior of the
command module and the ground servicing equipment uti l i z e d in the decon
t amination procedures were approve d for release from quarant ine on
August 10 , 1969 .
The s amples of lunar material and other it ems st ored in the bi olog
i c al i s olat i on containers in the Lunar Receiving Laboratory are s cheduled
for release to principal s cient i fi c invest i gators in S ept ember 1969 .
'
TABLE 12 -I . - ESTIMATED S LEEP D URATIONS
Es timat e d amount of s le ep , hr :min

Time of
crew report ,
hr :min
Crew report
Telemetry
Commander
Command Module
Pilot
Lunar Module
Pilot
Comman der
Comman d Module
Pilot
Lunar Module
Pilot
23 : 0 0
10 : 2 5
10 : 10
8 : 30
7 :00
7 : 00
5 : 30
48 : 15
9 : 40
10 : 10
9 : 15
8 :00
9 :00
8 :00
71 : 2 4
9 : 35
(a)
9 : 20
7 : 30
7 : 30
6 : 30
95 : 25
6 : 30
6 : 30
5 : 30
6 : 30
6 : 30
5 : 30
32 : 3 5
29 :00
30 : 0 0
2 5 : 30
Totals
36 : 10
a
No dat a available .
--
12-12
TABLE 12-II . - METABOLIC RATES DURING LUNAR SURFACE EXPLORATION
Start ing
time ,
Event
hr :min
Durat ion,
min
Rate ,
Btu/hr
Estimated
Cwnulative
vork ,
work ,
Btu
Btu
Commander
Initial extravehicular activity
109 : 13
11
900
165
165
Environmental fami liarization
109:24
800
40
205
Photography
109:27
875
102
307
Contingency sample collection
109:34
675
56
363
Monitor and photograph Lunar Module Pilot
109 : 39
850
57
420
Deploy television camera on surace
109 : 4 3
23
750
288
708
Flag and President ' s message
110 : 06
12
825
165
873
Bulk sample collection
110 : 18
23
850
326
1199
1402
Lunar Dodule inspection
110:41
18
675
203
Experiment package deployment
110 : 5 9
12
775
155
1557
Documented sample collection
111:11
19
1250
396
1953
Transfer sample return containers
111 :30
1450
169
2122
Terminate extravehicular activity
111 : 37
1400
48
2170
mrAL
146
2170
Lunar Module Pilot

26
Assist and monitor Comman der
109 : 1 3
520
520
109 : 39
1200
Initial extravehicular activity
1950
163
683
Environment al familiarizat ion ; deploy televis ion
109 : 4 4
14
1200
280
963
cable
Deploy solar wind experiment
109:58
1275
128
1091
Flag and President s message
110 : 0 4
14
1350
315
1406
Evaluat ion of extravehicular mobility nnit
110 : 1 8
16
850
227
1633
Lunar module inspection
110 : 3 4
19
875
277
1910
110 : 5 3
18
1200
360
2270
Documented sample collect i o n ; recovery of solar
lll : 11
12
1450
290
2560
111 : 2 3
14
1650
385
2945
1100
37
2982
wind experiment
Terminat e extraveh icular activity , ingre s s , and
transfer sample return containers
Assist and monitor Commander
T0rAL
HOTE :
111 :37
146
2982
Value s are from the integration of' three independent determinations of metabolic rate based on
heart rat e , decay of oxygen supply pressure , and thermodynami cs of the liquid cooling garment.
,'
' '
NASA-S-69-377 1
180
1 0 0 0 fee d
altitude
i
160
<::
'<II
"'
ClJ
..c
140
a;
1U
2 0 0 0 feed
altitude i
Powered descent
in itiation
lil
ClJ
:I:
12 0
/
100
80
1 0 2:33
1\
1 0 2:35
1 02:37
1 0 2:39
102:41
Land ing
"Go" for stay
v '\\_
1 0 2 : 43
1\
I '-.
1 0 2:45
1 02:47
Time, hr:min
F igure 1 2 - 1 . - Heart rates of the Commander during lunar descent.
1 02:49
102:51
NASA-S -69-3 7 7 2
140
" G o " for orbit
120
" G o " for
l i ft-off
t:
E
......
Ascent engine!
cutoff
Ascent eng ine

ignition
Q)
! i
C/)
....
l1l
Q)
100
1U
....
l1l
Q)
:::c
80
60
124:14
1 24: 1 6
1 2 4: 1 8
1 2 4: 2 0
124:22
1 2 4: 2 4
124:26
T ime , hr:m i n
F i gure 1 2 - 2 . - Heart rates o f the Commander during ascent .
124:28
1 2 4: 3 0
12-15
NASA-S-69-3 773
- Initial extravehicular activity
Environmental familiarization
- Photography
Contingency sample col lection
Mon itor and photograph Lunar Modu le P i lot
I Deploy television camera on surface
- F lag and President ' s message
lp le col lection
Lunar module inspection
Experiment package deployment Documented sample col lection
Transfer sample return containers Terminate extravehicu lar activity I
160 r------.------,------,------,------r------r------r-
=Bulksa:m
-----++-+4L
---r--+----
140 r-----;;;
QJ
1 2 0 r-----frt-T-+-------f--4
1 0 0 r----t-tr--r\rf-Hr--rn-t---r----1
ffi
8 0 -----L-------L-----------------------L-- _L
1 1 1:00 1 1 1: 2 0
109:00 1 0 9 : 2 0 109:40 1 1 0: 0 0 1 1 0:20 1 1 0:40
__
__J
__
__
1 1 1:40
Time, hr:min
(a) Commander (CD R l .
Assist and monitor Commander

Initial extravehicu lar activity
-Environmental fami liari zation; deploy television cable
- Deploy solar wind experiment
F lag and President's message
Evaluation of extraveh i cu lar mobi lity unit
Lunar mod u le inspection
Documented sample col lection; recovery of solar wind experiment
Terminate extravehicu lar activity, ingress, and
. transfer sample return containersAssist and monitor Commander
12 0 r-----.------,------,------,-------r-----,,---,
VI
-----,HnT
--+------1---.-r-] 1 0 0 ----2
ffi
QJ
::t:
80
60
1 09 : 0 0
109:20
109:40
1 1 0:00
1 10:20
1 1 0:40
1 1 1:00
1 1 1:20
T ime, hr:min
(b) Lunar Module Pi lot (LMPl .
F i gure 1 2-3 . - Heart rates during extravehicu lar activities .
1 1 1:40
13-l
13 . 0
MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE

13 . 1
FLIGHT CONTROL
Preflight s imulat i ons provided adequate flight control t raining for

all mi s sion ph as es . Als o , the flight controllers on the des cent team
supplement ed this t raining by conduct ing des cent s imulati ons with the
Apollo 12 crew . Interfaces b etween Mis s i on Control team members and the
flight crew were effective , and no maj or operat i onal prob lems were en
countere d . The two-way flow of informat i on b etween the flight crew and
the flight controllers was effective . The overloading of the lunar mod
ule gui dance computer during powered des cent was accurately as s es s ed , and
the informat ion provided to the flight crew pe rmitted conti nuation of
des cent .
The flight control respons e to thos e prob lems identified during the
mis s i on was bas e d on real-time dat a . Sect i ons 8 , 9 , and 1 6 should be
consulted for the post flight analyses of th es e problems . Three of the
more pertinent real-time de cisions are dis cus s ed in the following para
graphs .
At acqui sition of signal after hmar orbit ins ert i on , dat a showe d
that the indi cated t ank-B nitrogen pres sure was about 300 ps i lower than
expect e d and that the pre s s ure had started to decrease at 80 seconds into
the maneuve r ( s ee section 16 . 1 . 1 ) . To cons erve nitrogen and to maximi ze
system reliability for t rans earth inj e ct i on , it was re commended that the
circularization maneuver be pe rforme d using bank A only . No further leak
was apparent , and b oth banks were us ed normallY for t ransearth inj e ction .
Five comput er program alarms o c curred b etween 5 and 10 minutes after
initiation of powere d des cent . These alarms are symptoms of pos s ib le
computer ove rloadi ng . However , it has been de cide d before flight that
b ailout-type alarms such as th ese would not prevent continuing the flight ,
even though they could caus e violat i ons of other mis s i on rules , such as
velocity differences . The alarms were not continually occurring , and
proper computer navi gation fun ct i ons were being performe d ; there fore ,
a de cision was given to continue the des cent .
During the crew rest period on the lunar s urface , two checkli st
changes were re commende d , b as ed on the events of the previ ous 20 hours :
( l ) the rende zvous radar would remain off duri ng the ascent fi ring , and
( 2 ) the mode-s ele ct switch would not b e place d in the primary gui dance
pos ition , thus preventing th e computer from generating alt itude and al
titude rate for th e telemetry display . The reas on for these changes was
to prevent computer ove rload during ascent , as had occurred during des cent .
13-2
13 . 2
NETWORK PERFORMANCE
The Mi s s ion Control Center and the Manned Space Fli ght Network were
placed on mis s i on s t atus on July 7 , 19 6 9 , and s at i s factorily s upport e d
the lunar landing mi s s i on .
Hardware , communi cations , and computer s upport in the Mis s i on Con
trol Center was excellent .
No maj or data los s e s were attributed to the s e
systems , an d the few failures that did occur had minimal impact o n s upport
operations .
Air-to-ground communi cations were generally good during the
mi s s i on ; however , a number of s i gnificant problems were experi enced as a
res ult o f proce dural errors .
The s upport provi ded by the real-time c omputer complex was generally
excellent , and only one maj or problem was experi enc e d .
During trans lunar
coast , a problem in updat ing di gital-to-televi s ion display s by the primary
computer res ulted in the loss of all real-time televi s i on displays for ap
The problem was is olated t o the interface between
proximately an hour .
the compl:ter and the display equipment .
Operations by the communi c at i ons proc e s s ors were excellent , and the
few prob lems caus e d only minor los s e s o f mis s i on dat a .
Air-to-ground voice communi cations were generally good , although a
numb er o f ground problems caus e d t emporary los s or degradat i on of commun
Shortly after landing on the lunar surfac e , the crew complained
i c ati ons .
ab out the noise level on the S-band voi c e uplinked from Goldst one .
This
problem oc curred while Goldstone was configured in the Network-relay mode .
The s ource of the noi s e was is olated to a breaking of squelch control
c aus e d by high noi s e on the command module downlink being subsequently
The noi s e was eliminat e d
uplinked to the lunar module via the relay mode .
b y di s abling the relay mode .
On several o c c as i ons during the mis s i on ,
spacecraft voice on the Goddard conference loop was degraded by the voi ce
operated gain-adj ust ampl i fi ers .
In most cas e s the problem was cleared
by di s abling this unit at the remote s it e .
O f the approxi
Command operat i ons were good throughout the mi s s i on .
mat ely 3 4 50 execut i on commands transmitted during the mis s i on , only 2 4
were rej e ct ed by remote-site command computers and 21 were lost for un
known reas ons .
Approximat ely 4 5 0 command loads were generated and suc
c e s s fully t rans ferred t o Network stat i ons , and 5 8 o f thes e were uplinked
to the space vehi cle .
Both C - and S-b and tracking support was very good.
Los s o f tracking
coverage was experienced during trans lunar injection when the Mercury ship
was unable t o provide high-speed traj e c t ory dat a be c aus e of a temporary
13-3
problem in the central dat a proce s s or . Some stat i ons als o experienced
t emporary S-band power ampli fier failures during the mi ssion .
Network s upport of the s ci enti fi c experiment package from deployment
through e arth landing was goo d . A few h ardware and procedural problems
were encounte re d ; however , the only s ignifi c ant dat a loss was when the
S-band parametric ampli fier at the Canary I s land stat i on failed j us t s ec
onds b efore lunar module ascent . Cons equently , all s ei smi c package dat a
were lost during thi s phas e , since no backup stat i ons were avai lable for
support .
Televi sion support provi ded by Network and Jet Propuls ion Lab oratory
facilities was good through out the mi s s ion , part i cularly the s upport by
the 2 10-foot stat i ons at Parkes and Goldstone .
13 . 3
RECOVERY OPERATIONS
The Department of Defense provi ded re covery support commensurat e

with the prob ability of landing within a spe c i fi e d area and with any
special problems as s ociat e d with such a landing . Re covery force deploy
ment was ne arly i dent i c al to that for Apollo 8 and 10 .
Support for tqe primary landing are a in the Paci fic Oce an was pro
vided by the USS Hornet . Air s upport cons isted of four SH-3D heli copters
from the Hornet , three E-lB aircraft , three Apollo range ins trument at i on
aircraft , and two HC-130 res cue aircraft staged from Hickam Air Force
Base , Hawaii . Two of the E-lB aircraft were de s ignat e d as "Air Bos s " and
the third as a communi c at i ons relay air craft . Two of the SH-3D heli cop
ters carri ed the swimmers and requi red rec overy equipment . The th ird
heli copte r was us ed as a phot ograph i c plat form , and the fourth c arri ed
the decont aminat i on swimmer and the flight s urgeon and was us e d for crew
retrieval .
13 . 3 . 1
Command Module Locat i on and Retri eval
Fi gure 13-1 depi ct s the Hornet and as soc i at e d aircraft positions at

the time of comman d module l anding at 195 : 18 : 35 ( 1650 G . m. t . ) . The com
mand module landed at a point calculated by re covery forces to be 13 de
gree s 19 minut e s north lat itude an d 169 degrees 9 minutes we st longitude .
The command module imme diately went t o the stab le II ( apex down )
flot ation attitude after landing . The upri ghting system returne d the
spacecraft to the s t ab le I attitude 7 minutes 40 seconds later . One or
13-4
two quart s o f wat e r entere d the space craft while i n s t ab le I I .

The swim
me rs were then deployed to ins t all the flot at i on collar , and the de c on
t aminat i on swimme r pas s ed the b i ologi c al i s ol at i on garments t o the flight
crew , ai ded the crew i nt o the li fe raft , and decontaminat e d th e exterior
surface of the command module ( s ee s e ct i on 12 . 5 . 2 ) .
Aft e r the command
module h at ch was clos ed and de contaminat e d , the flight crew an d de cont am
inat i on swimmer washed e ach other with the decontami nat e s olut i on prior
to being t aken ab oard the re covery heli copt e r .
The crew arrived onb oard
the Hornet at 1753 G . m . t . and ent e re d the Mob i le Quarant ine Faci lity
5 minutes l at e r . The first lunar s amples t o b e returned were flown t o
Johnston I s land , placed ab oard a C-141 ai rcraft , an d flown to Houston .
The s ec ond s ample shipment was flown from the Hornet directly t o Hickam
Air Force Bas e , H awai i , approximate ly 6-l/2 hours lat e r and placed ab oard
a range ins t rument at i on aircraft for t rans fer to Hous t on .
The command module and Mob i le Quaranti ne Facility were offloaded in
Hawaii on July 27 , 196 9 .
The Mob i le Quarant ine Facility was loaded
ab oard a C-141 aircraft and flown to Hous ton , where a bri ef ce remony was
held.
The flight crew arrive d at the Lunar Re ceiving Lab orat o ry at
1000 G . m . t . on July 2 8 , 1969 .
The command module was t aken to Ford Is land for deact ivat i on .
Upon
comple t i on of de act ivat i on , the command module was shipped t o H i ckam Air
Force B as e , Hawaii an d flown on a C-133 ai rcraft to Hous ton .
A postrecovery i nspection showed no s i gni fi c ant di s crepancies with
the space craft .
The following i s a chronologi c al li sting of events during the re
cove ry and quar antine operat i ons .
13-5
Event
Time , G . m . t .
July 24
Vis ual contact by aircraft

Radar contact by USS Hornet
VHF voi ce and recovery-beacon contact
Command module landing ( 19 5 : 18 : 35 )
Flotation collar inflated
Command module hatch open
Crew egres s in biological is olation garments
Crew aboard Hornet
Crew in Mobile Quarantine Facility
Command module lifted from water
Command module secured to Mobile Quarantine Faci lity
trans fer tunnel
Command module hatch reopened
Sample return containers 1 and 2 removed from command
module
Container 1 removed from Mobile Quarantine Facility
1639
1640
1646
1650
1704
1721
1729
17 5 3
1758
1950
195 8
2005
2200
2332
July 25
Container 2 removed from Mobi le Quarantine Facility

Container 2 and film launch to Johnston Is land
Container 1 , film , and biological s amples launched to
Hickam Air Force Base , Hawaii
Container 2 and film arrived in Houston
Container 1 , film , and biological s amples arrived in
Houston
000 5
0515
1145
1615
2313
July 26
Command module decontaminated and hatch secured

Mobile Quarantine Facility s e cured
Mobile Quarantine Facility and command module
offloaded
Safing of command module pyrote chnics completed
0300
0435
July 27
0015
0205
July 28
Mobile Quarantine Facility arrived at Houston

Flight crew in Lunar Receiving Lab oratory
Command module delivered to Lunar Receiving Laboratory
0600
1000
July 30
2317
13-6
NASA-S-69-3774
134 5 '
Swim 2
-"' 1330 '

;;:
"'
0
2
Relay 1
Photo 1
""llliJP .. Air Boss 2
Recovery 1
,....,
....
U S S Hornet
Target point
......
Swim 1
1315'
16915 '
Onboard computer landing point
Landing point (recovery forces)

16900 '
West longitude
F i gure 13-1 . - Landing and recovery data .
.,.
" Air Boss 1

16845 '
14-1
14 . 0
ASSESSMENT OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
The single primary mi s s i on obj ective for the Apollo 11 mis s i on , as

defined in reference 12 , was to perform a manned lunar landing and re
In addition to the single primary obj ective ,
turn s afely t o e arth .
11 s e condary ob j e ct ives were delineated from the following two general
categories :
a.
Perform selenolog i c al inspection and s ampling

'
b.
Obtain dat a to as s e s s the capability and limitati ons of a man
and his equipment in the lunar environment .
The 11 secondary obj e ctives are li sted in table 14-I and are described
in detail in reference 13 .
The following experiments were as s i gned to the Apollo 11 mis s i on :
a.
Pas s i ve seismic experiment ( S-031 )
b.
Lunar field geology ( S-059 )
c.
Laser ranging retro-reflector ( S-07 8 )
d.
Solar wind c omposition ( S-080 )
e.
Cosmic ray det ection ( S-15 1 )
The s ingle primary obj e ctive was met .

All secondary obj e ctives and
experiment s were fully s atis fied except for the following :
Location o f landed lunar module .
a.
Ob j e ctive G :
b.
Experiment S-05 9 :
Lunar field geology
These two items were not completely s at i s fied in the manner planned pre
fli ght and a discussion of the deficiencies appear in the following para
graphs . A full as ses sment of the Apollo 11 det ailed obj e ctives and ex
periments will be presented in separate report s .
14 . 1
LOCATION OF LANDED LUNAR MODULE
It was planned to make a near real-t ime determinat i on of the loca

tion of the landed lunar module based on crew observat i ons .
Observat i ons
by the lunar module crew during des cent and after landing were to provide
14-2
informat i on for locat ing the landing point using onb oard maps . In addi
tion , thi s informat i on was t o b e t ransmi tt e d t o the Command Module Pi lot ,
who was t o us e the s ext ant in an attempt to locate the landed lunar mod
ule . Further , i f it were not pos sible for the Command Module Pilot to
resolve the lunar module in the s extant , then h e was t o t rack a ne arby
landmark that had a known location relative to the landed lunar module
( as determined by the lunar module crew or the ground team ) .
This near-re al-time determinat i on of the landed lunar module locat i on
by the lunar module crew was not accompli shed becaus e their attent i on was
confined to the c abin during most of the vi s ib i lity phase of the des cent .
Cons equent ly , their ob servation s of the lunar features during descent were
not suffi cient to allow them to judge their position . Their obs e rvat i on
of the large crater ne ar the landing point di d provi de an important clue
to their location but was not suffici ent in itself to locat e the landing
point with c onfiden ce .
On s everal orbital pas se s , the Command Module Pi lot us ed the s extant
in an attempt to locat e the lunar module . His observations were di re ct e d
t o various are as where the lunar module could h ave lande d , b as e d on ground
dat a . The s e attempts t o locat e the lunar module were unsuc ces s ful , and
it is doubt ful that the Comman d Module Pi lot ' s ob servat i ons were ever di
rected to the are a whe re the lun ar module was actually lo cat e d .
Toward the end o f the lunar surface stay , the locat i on o f the lande d
lunar module was determine d from the lunar module rende zvous radar track
ing dat a ( confirme d post flight using de s cent photographi c dat a ) . However ,
the Command Module Pilot ' s activiti es di d not permit his attempting another
tracking pas s after the lunar module loc at i on had b een determined accu
rat ely .
Thi s obj e ctive will b e repeat e d for the Apollo 12 mi ssion .
14 . 2
LUNAR FIELD GEOLOGY
For the Apollo 11 mi s s i on , the documente d s ample colle cti on ( S-059 ,

Lunar Field Geology ) was as s igned the lowe s t priority of any of the
s cient i fi c obj e ct i ves and was planne d as one of the last act ivities dur
ing the extravehi cular act ivity period. Two core tube s amples were col
le cted as planne d , and ab out 15 pounds of additi onal lunar s ample s were
obtained as part of this obj e ct i ve . Howeve r , time constraints on the
extravehi cular activity pre clude d collection of these s ample s with the
degree of document ati on originally planne d .
14-3
In additi on , t ime did not permit the collection of a lunar environ
ment s ample or a gas analysis s ample in the two special containers pro
vided . Although these samples were not obt ained in their special con
tainers , it was poss ible to obtain the desired results using other s amples
contained in the regular s ample return containers .
1 4- 4
TABLE 14 - I . - DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS
Des cription
Completed
Contingency s ample collect i on
Yes
Lunar surface ext ravehi cular operat ions
Yes
Lunar surface operat ions with extravehi cular

mob ility uni t
Yes
Landing effe ct s on lun ar module
Yes
Lunar surface charact er i s ti c s
Yes
Bulk s ample colle ct i on
Yes
Locat i on of landed lunar module
Lunar environment vi s ibility
Ye s
As s e s sment of contami nat i on by lunar mat eri al
Yes
Televi sion coverage
Yes
Phot ographi c coverage
Yes
S -031
P as s ive s ei smi c experiment
Yes
S-0 59
Lunar field geology
S -07 8
Las er rangi ng retro-reflector experiment
Yes
S -0 80
S ol ar wind compos ition
Yes
S -151
Cosmic ray dete c t i on
Yes
T-029
Pilot describing funct i on
Yes
Part i al
Part i al
15-1
15 . 0
LAUNCH VEHICLE SUMMARY
The traj ectory parameters of the AS-50 6 launch vehicle from launch
to translunar inj e ction were all close to expected values . The vehi cle
was launched on an azimuth 90 degrees east of north . A roll maneuver was
initiated at 13 . 2 seconds to place the vehi cle on the planned flight azi
muth of 72 . 0 5 8 degrees east of north .
Following lunar module ejection , the S-IVB/inst rument unit maneu
vered to a s ling-shot attitude that was fixed relative to local hori z on
tal . The retrograde velocity to perform the lunar sling-shot maneuver
was accomplished by a liquid oxygen dump , an auxiliary propuls i on system
firing , and liqui d hydrogen venting . The vehicle ' s closest approach of
1 8 25 miles above the lunar surface occurred at 7 8 : 42 : 00 .
Additional data on the launch vehi cle performance are contained in
reference 1 .
16-1
16 . 0
ANOMALY SUMMARY
This s ect ion contains a di s cus s i on of the s i gn i fi c ant problems or

dis crepancies noted during the Apollo 11 mi s s ion .
16 . 1
16 . 1 . 1

Servi ce Propuls ion Nitrogen Leak
During the lunar orbit insertion firing , the gas eous nitrogen in
the re dundant s ervi ce propuls ion engine actuat i on system decayed from
2307 t o 1883 psia ( s ee fig . 16-1 ) , indi cating a leak downstream of the
inj e ct or pre -valve . The normal pres sure de c ay as experienced by the
primary system i s approximately 50 ps i a for e ach firing . Only the one
system was affe ct e d , and no performance degradat i on result e d . This actu
at i on system was used during the t ransearth inj ection firing , and no leak
age was dete ct e d .
The fue l an d oxi di zer valves are cont rolled by actuators driven by
nitrogen pres sure . Fi gure 16-2 i s repre s entat i ve of b oth nitrogen con
trol systems . When power is appli ed to the service propulsion system in
preparation for a maneuve r , the inj ector pre-valve is opened ; howeve r ,
p res sure i s not applied to the actuat ors becaus e the s olenoid control
valve s are clos ed. When the engine is commanded on , the s olenoi d control
valves are opene d , pre s s ure is applie d to the actuat o r , and the rack on
the actuator shaft drives a pini on gear t o open the fuel and oxidi zer
valves . When the engine is commanded off , the solenoi d control valve
vents the actuator and clos es the fuel and oxi di zer valves .
The mos t likely c ause of the problem was . cont aminat i on in one of the
components downstre am of the inj e ctor pre -valve , whi ch i s olates the nitro
gen supply during nonfi ring periods . The injector pre-valve was not con
s idered a problem s ource becaus e it was opened 2 minutes before i gnition
and no leakage oc curred during that peri od . The pos sibility that the
regulator and relief valve were leaking was als o eliminat e d s ince pres
sure was appli ed to these components when the pre-valve was opened .
The s olenoid control valves have a hi story of leakage , whi ch has
occurred either becaus e of improper internal air gap adj us tment or b e
caus e of s eal damage caus ed by contaminat i on . The air gap adj ustme nt
could not have caus ed the leakage becaus e an improper air gap with the
pre-valves open would have cause d the leak to remain constant .
16-2
Both of the s olenoi d control valves in the leaking system had been
found to be contaminated before flight and were removed from the system ,
rebuilt , and suc ce s s fully retested during the acceptance test cycle .
It i s concluded that the leakage was due to a contamination-induced
failure of a s olenoi d control valve . The s ource of contaminat i on i s un
known ; however , i t was apparently remove d from the sealing s urface during
the valve closure for the first lunar orbit i nsert i on maneuver ( fig . 16-2 ) .
A highly suspect source i s a contaminat e d facility manifold at the vendor ' s
plant . Although an inve s tigat ion of the prior failure i ndi cated the
flight valve was not contaminat e d , the facility manifold i s still consid
ered a pos s ible source of the contaminants .
Space craft for Apollo 12 and sub s equent mi ssions have integral fi l
ters installed , and the facility manifolds are more clos ely controlle d ;
therefore , n o further corrective action will b e t aken .
This anomaly i s clos e d .
16 . 1 . 2
Cryogenic Heater Failure
The performan ce of the automat i c pres sure control system indi cated
that one of the two heater elements in oxygen t ank 2 was inoperative .
Dat a showing heater currents for prelaun ch checkout veri fied that b oth
he.at er elements were operati onal through the countdown demonstration
test . However , the current readings recorded during the tank pressur i za
tion in the launch count down showed that one heater in oxygen t ank 2 had
failed. This informat i on was not made known to proper channels for di s
pos iti on prior to the flight , s ince n o specifi c at ion limits were called
out in the t e st procedure .
Manufacturing records for all blo ck I I oxygen tanks s howed that
there have been no thermal - switch nor electrical-continuity failures i n
the program; two failures occurred during the insulat i on re s i stance t e sts .
One failure was attributed to moisture i n the conne ctor . After this unit
was dri e d , it pas sed all acceptance tests . The other failure was i den
t ifi ed in the heater as semb ly prior to installat i on in a t ank . This was
also an insulat ion problem and' would not have prevented the heater from
funct i oning normally .
The caus e of the flight failure was probab ly an intermittent contact
on a t erminal board in the heater circui t . The 16-gage wiring at the
b oard has exhibited intermi ttenci es several t imes in the pas t . This i s
the s ame type terminal b oard that was found to b e the caus e o f the con
trol engine problem in this flight ( see s e ct i on 1 6 . 1 . 3 ) .
16-3
S ince the oxygen t ank heaters are redundant , no constraints to the

mi s s i on were cre at e d , other than a requirement f'or more frequent quantity
b alancing.
The laun ch-site test requirements have b een ch anged to spe c i fy the
amperage level to verify that b oth t ank heaters are operati onal . Addi
ti onally , all launch-s ite procedures are being reviewed to determine
whether spe ci fi c at i on limits are required in other are as .
This anomaly is closed.
16 . 1 . 3
Fai lure of' Automat i c Coil in One Thruster
The minus -yaw engine in command module react i on control system 1

produce d low and e rrat i c thrust in response to f'iring commands through
the automati c coils of' the engine valves . The spacecraft rates verify
that the engine performed normally when f'ired using the direct coils .
Elect ri c al continuity through at le as t one of' the parallel aut omat i c
coils in the engine was evi denced by the f'act th at th e stab il i zat i on and
control system driver s i gnals were normal . Thi s , along with the f'act
that at le ast s ome thrust was produce d , indi c at e s that one of' the two
valve s was working normally .
At the launch s ite , another engine undergoing checkout had f'ailed to
respond to commands during the valve s ignat ure tests . The prob lem was
i s olated t o a f'aulty terminal b oard conne ctor . Thi s terminal board was
replaced , and the systems were retested s at i s fact orily . Because of' this
incident and becaus e of' the previ ous history of' prob lems with the ter
minal b oards , these conne ctors were a prime suspect .
Post fli ght tests showed th at two pins in the terminal b oard ( f'i g .
16-3 ) were loose and c aused intermittent continuity t o the automat i c coils
of' the engine valve . Thi s type f'ai lure has previously been noted on ter
minal b oards manufacture d prior to November 1967 . This b oard was ma.riuf'ac
tured in 1966 .
The intermittent cont act was caus ed by improper clip position rela
tive to the bus b ar counterb ore . The improper pos itioning results in los s
o f' s ome s i de f'orce an d pre cludes proper cont act pre s sure against the bus
b ar . A des i gn change t o the base gasket was made t o insure pos it ively
that the bus b ar is correctly pos itione d.
The loc at i on of' pre-November 1967 terminal b oards has been deter
mined f'rom inst allat i on re cords , and it has been determined that none are
in circuits whi ch would jeopardize crew s af'ety . No act ion will b e t aken
f'or Apollo 12 .
This anomaly i s clos ed.
16-4
16 . 1 . 4
Loss o f Ele ctrolumines cent Se gment i n Entry Monitor System
An ele ct rolumi nes cent s egment on the nume ri c display of the entry
monitor system velocity c ount er would not i lluminate .
The s e gment i s in
dependently swit ch ed through a logi c network whi ch activat e s a s ili con
The
controlled re cti fi er to bypas s the li ght when not i lluminat e d .
power s ource i s 115 volt s , 400 hert z .
Four c as es of s imilar malfun ct i ons have been recorde d .

One i nvolve d
a s egment whi ch would not illuminat e , and three involve d segments whi ch
would not turn o ff .
In e ach case , the c aus e was ident i fi ed as mi srouting
of logi c wire s i n the ci rcuit controlling the re cti fiers .
The mi srout i ng
b ent the wires acros s t e rminal strips c ont aining sharp wire ends .
The s e
sh arp ends punctured t h e insulat i on an d c aus e d short s t o ground o r t o
plus 4 volt s , turning the segment o f f or on , respe ct ively .
A rework of the affe ct e d ci rcuits took place in the process of s ol
An inspe ction to
dering crimp j oints i nvolved i n an Ap ollo 7 anomaly .
det e ct misrout ing was c onduct e d at this t ime ; howeve r , be caus e of pot
t ing re s t ri ct i ons , the inspe ct i on was limi t e d .
A number of other failure
me chanisms exi st in circuit e lement s and leads ; howeve r , there i s no as
s o c i at e d failure hist ory .
A ge neri c or de s ign problem i s cons idered un
lik ely b e caus e of the number of s at i s factory activat i ons sus t ai ne d t o
date .
The preflight che ckout program i s being examined to identity pos s i
bilities for improvement i n as suring proper operat i on o f all s egments
over all ope rat i ng conditi ons .
Thi s anomaly is c l os ed .
16 . 1 . 5
Oxygen Flow Mas ter Alarms
During the initial lunar module pre s sur i z at i on , two mas ter alarms
were act i vat e d when the oxygen flow rate was decre asing from full-s cale .
The s ame condi ti on h ad b een ob served s everal times during alt it ude
The cause of the
chamber tests and during s ubse q_uent troub leshoot i ng .
prob lem could not be i dent i fi e d b e fore launch , but the only c ons eq_uence
Fi gure 16-4 shows the b as i c ele
of the alarms was the nui s ance factor .
ments of the oxygen flow s ens ing circui t .
Note i n figure 16-4 that i n order for a mas ter alarm to o ccur , relay
Kl mus t hold in for 16 s econds , after which t ime relays K2 and K3 wi ll
clos e , activat ing a mas ter alarm .
16-5
The c apacitor shown i s act ually a part of an elect romagneti c inter

ference filter and is required to prevent fluctuat i on of the ampli fi er
output to the volt age dete ct o r . Without the c ap acitor , a slow change in
flow rate in the vi cinity of the threshold voltage of relalf Kl will cause
this relalf to conti nuous ly open and clos e ( ch atter ) .
Relalf K2 has a s lower dropout time than relalf Kl ; therefore , i f re
lalf Kl is chattering , relay K2 may not be affect e d , so that the 16-second
time delay continues to time out . Cons equently , mas ter alarms c an be
init i ated with out resetting the 16-second time r .
The filter c apacitor was open during postflight tests , an d the mas ter
alarms were dupl i c at e d with s low , de cre as ing flow rates .
There has been no previous fai lure h i story of these metali zed MYlar
capacitors as sociated with th e flow s ens ors . No corre ctive act i on i s
requi re d.
16 . 1 . 6
Indi c ated Closure o f Propellant I s ol at i on Valve s
The propellant i s olat i on valve s on quad B of the s ervi ce module

reaction cont rol system clos e d during command and s ervi ce module s epara
t i on from the S-IVB . A s imilar problem was encountered on the Apollo 9
mis sion ( s ee the Anomaly Summary in ref . 14 ) . Tests after Apollo 9 indi
cated that a valve with normal magneti c lat ch forces would clos e at
shock levels as low as 87g with an 11-milli s e cond durat i on ; howeve r , with
durat i ons in the expe cte d range of 0 . 2 to 0 . 5 milli s e conds , shock levels
as high as 670g would not clos e the valves . 1e expe ct e d range of shock
is 180g to 260g .
Two valves having the nominal lat ching force of 7 pounds were sele cte<i
for shock testing . It was found that shocks of 80g for 10 milli s econds
to shocks of lOOg for 1 mi lli second would close the valve s . The latching
forces for the valve s were reduced to 5 pounds , and the valves were
shock tested again . The shock require d to close the valve s at this re
duced lat ching force was 54g for 10 milli s econds and 75g for 1 mi lli s ec
ond. After completi on of the shock testing , the valves were exami ned and
teste d , and no degr adat i on was not e d . Higher shock levels malf h ave been
experienced in fli ght , and further tests will be c onducted .
A review o f the checkout procedures indi cat e s that the lat ching
force can be degrade d only if the procedures are not prope rly implemented ,
such as the appl i c at i on of reverse current or ac to the circui t . On
Apollo 12 a special test has indi c at e d that the valve lat ching force has
not b een degr ade d .
16-6
Since there is no valve degradat i on when the valve is shocked clo s e d

an d t h e crew checkli st contains pre c auti onary i nformat i on c oncerning
th ese valve s , no further act i on is ne ces s ary .
Thi s anomaly i s clos ed .
16 . 1 . 7
Odor i n Docking Tunnel
An odor s imi lar to burned wire insul at i on was detect e d in the tunnel
when the h at ch was first opene d . There was no evi den ce of di s colorat i on
nor indi c at i ons of overheating of the ele ctrical ci rcuits when examined
by the crew during the flight . Several other s ources o f the odor were
invest igated , including burned part icles from t ower j et t i s on , out gas s ing
of a s i l i c one lub ri c ant us ed on the hatch s e al , and outgas s ing of other
components use d in the tunnel are a . Odors from these s ources were re
produced for the crew to compare with the odors dete cted during flight .
The c rew st ated that the odor from a s ample of the docking h at ch abl at or
was very s imi lar t o that dete cted in flight . Apparent ly , removal of the
outer insulat i on ( TG-15000 ) from the h at ch of Apollo 11 ( an d s ubsequent )
resulted in h i gher ablator t emperatures and , there fore , a larger amount
of outgas s ing odor than on previ ous fli ght s .
This anomaly i s close d .
16 . 1 . 8
Low Oxygen Flow Rat e
Shortly after launch , t h e oxygen flow me asurement was at the lower

limit of the instrumentat i on rather than indi c at i ng the nominal met ab ol i c
rat e o f 0 . 3 lb /h r . Als o , during wat e r separator cycli c accumulat or cycles ,
the flow indi cat i on was le ss than the expe ct ed full meas urement output of
1 . 0 lb /hr .
An alysis of as s oc i ated dat a indi cat e d that the oxygen flow was norm
al , but that the indi c at e d flow rate was negat i vely b i as e d by approximately
l . 5 lb /hr . Postflight tests of the t rans duce r confi rme d this b i as , and
the cause was as s oc i at e d with a change in the heater winding resi stance
within the flow s ens or bri dge ( fi g . 16-5 ) . The re s i stan ce of the heater
had incre as e d from 1000 ohms to 1600 ohms , changing the temperature of the
hot wire e lement whi ch s upplies the reference volt age for the b alan ce of
the bri dge . Further testing to determine the c ause of the res is t ance
change is not pract i cal because of the minute s i ze of the potted res istive
element . Depotting of the element would destroy avai lab le evidence of
the cause of failure . Normally , heater re s i st an ce changes h ave occurred
early in the 100 -hour burn-in peri od when heater stability is achieve d .
.-
16-7
A de s ign problem is not indi c at e d ; therefore , no action will be
taken .
This anomaly i s closed.
16 . 1 . 9
Forward Heat Shield Mortar Lanyard Untied
An apparent ins tallation error on the forward heat shield mortar

umbili cal lanyard was found duri ng postflight exami nation of Apollo 11
i n that all but one of the t i e-wrap knot s were unti ed. Thi s s eries o f
knots secures the t i e-wrap s around t h e electrical bundle and functions
to break the wraps duri ng heat shield j ett i s on .
The knots should be two closely t i ed half-hitches which s ecure the

ti e-wrap to the lanyard ( fig . 16-6 ) . Exami nat i on of the Apollo 10 lanyard
indicates that these knots were not two half-hi tches but a clove hitch
( see figure ) . After the lanyard breaks the t i e-wraps , i f the fragment of
t i e wrap pulls out of the knot , the clove hitch knot c an untie , thus
lengthening the lanyard . Lengthening this lanyard as the umb i li cal cable
pays out can allow t rans fer of s ome loading i nto the umb i li c al di s connects .
Should a suffic i ent load be t r ans ferred to the di s connect fitt ing to
c aus e shear pins to fail , a di sconnect of the forward heat shi e ld mort ar
umbilical could result prior to the mort ar firing . This would prevent
deployment of the forward heat shield s eparat i on augme ntation parachut e ,
an d there would be a pos s ibility of forward heat shield recontact with
the command module . Exami nat ion of the forward heat shield recovered
from Apollo 10 confirmed that the mortar had fired and the parachute was
prope rly deploy ed.
Spacecraft 110 and lll were exami ned , and it was found that a clove
hitch was erroneous ly us ed on thos e vehicles als o .
A s tep-by-step procedure for correct lanyard knot tying and instal
lation has been developed for space craft 112 . Apollo 12 and 13 will be
reworked ac cordi ngly .
This anomaly i s closed.
16 . 1 . 10
Glycol Temperature Control Valve
An apparent anomaly exi sts with the glycol temperature control v alve
or the relat e d temperature control system. Temp erature of the water/
glycol enteri ng the evaporator i s normally maintai ned above 42 F by the
glycol temperature control valve , which mixes hot water/glycol with water/
glyc ol returning from the radiators ( s ee fig . 16-7 ) . As the radi ator out
let t emperature de creas es , the temperature control valve opens to allow
16-8
more hot glycol to mix wit.h the cold fluid returning from the radi ator
to maintain the evaporator inlet temperature at 42 to 48 F . The con
trol valve starts to close as the radiator outlet temperature increas e s
and closes completely at evaporator inlet temperatures above 4 8 F . I f
the automati c temperature control system i s lost , manual operation o f
the temperature control valve i s available by deactivating the automati c
mode . This is accompli shed by pos itioning the glycol evaporator tempera
ture inlet switch from AUTO to MANUAL , whi ch removes power from the con
trol circuit .
Two problems occurred on Apollo 11 , primarily during lunar orbit
operations . First , as the temperature of the water/glycol returning from
the radiators increas e d , the temperature control valve did not close fast
enough , thus producing an early ri se in evaporator outlet temperature .
Second , the evaporator outlet temperature decreas e d to 31 F during
revolution 15 as the radiator outlet temperature was rapidly decreasing
( see fig . 16-8 ) . The figure als o shows normal operat ion of the valve
and control system after the problem . Both anomalies dis appeared about
the time the glycol evaporator temperature inlet swit ch was cycled by the
crew during revolution 1 5 . The temperature control valve and related con
trol system continued to operate s atis factorily for the remainder of the
mis sion .
The control valve was remove d from the spacecraft , dis as s embled , and
inspecte d . A bearing within the gear train was found to have its retainer
dis engaged from the rac e . The ret ainer was interfering with the worm gear
trave l . The caus e of the failure of the retainer is under investigation .
This anomaly is open .
16 . 1 . 11
Service Module Entry
Photographic dat a were obt ained of the service module entering the
earth ' s atmosphere and dis integrating near the command module . Pre flight
predictions indicated the s ervice module should have skipped out of the
earth ' s atmosphere and entered a highly ellipti cal orbit . The crew ob
s erved the s ervi ce module about 5 minutes after separation and indi cated
the reaction control thrusters were firing and the module was rotating
about the X plane .
Bas e d on the film , crew observation of the s ervi ce module , and data
from previous mis s i ons , it appears that the s ervice module did not per
form as a stable vehicle following command module /service module separa
tion . Calculations using Apollo 10 data show that it is poss ible for the
remaining propellant s to move axially at frequencies approximately equal
to the pre cess ional rate of the service module spin axis about the X body
16-9
axis . This effect causes the movement to res onate , and the energy trans
fer between the rotating vehicle and the propellants may be sufficient to
cause the s ervi ce module to go into a flat spin about the Y or Z axis and
become unst able .
Six-degree-of-freedom calculations , with a spring-mass propellant
movement model , have been performed , and they do indi cate that a trend
toward instability is caused by propellant movement . Certain trends
exist now which indicate that the s ervi ce module could flip over as a
result of propell!mt movement and attain a retrograde component of re
action control thrusting before going unstable . Servi ce module separa
tion instability is being reas s e s s e d to determine any change in the s ep
aration maneuver vrhich may be des irable to better control the traj ectory
of the service module .
Additional rutalysis is continuing to determine the cause of the
apparent instability .
This anomaly is open .
16 . 2
16 . 2 . 1
LUNAR MODULE
Mis s ion Timer Stopped
The crew reported shortly after lunar landing that the mis s ion timer
had stopped . They could not restart the clock at that time , an d the power
'to the timer was turned off to allow it to cool . Eleven hours later ,
the timer was restarted and functioned normally for the remainder of the
mis s ion .
Bas ed on the characteristic behavior of this timer and the s imilar
ity to previous timer failures , the most probable cause of failure is a
cracked s older j oint . A cracked s older j oint is the result of cordwood
construction , where electrical components ( resistors , capacitors , diodes ,
etc . ) are s oldered b etween two circuit boards , and the void between the
b oards is filled >rith potting compound ( fig . 16-9 ) . The di fferential ex
pansi on between the potting compound and the component leads caus es the
s older j oints to c:rack , breaking electri cal contact . Presumably , the
11-hour period the timer was off allowed it to cool sufficiently for the
cracked j oint to make electrical contact , and then the timer operated
normally .
There is no practical s olution to the problem for units which are
installed for the Apollo 12 mis s ion . However , a s creening ( vibration and
thermal tests and 50 hours of operation ) has been used to select timers
for vehi cle installation to decrease the probability of failure . The
Apollo 11 t imer was expos ed to vibration and thermal tests and 36 hours
of operation prior to installation .
16-10
New mis sion timers and event timers which will be mechanically and
electrically interchangeable with present timers are being developed.
These new timers will use integrated circuits welded on printed circuit
boards instead of the cordwood construction and include design changes
as s ociated with the other timer problems , s uch as cracked glass and elec
tromagneti c interference sus ceptibility . The new t imers will be incorpo
rated into the spacecraft when qualifi c ation testing is complete .
This anomaly is clos e d .
16 . 2 . 2
High Fuel Interface Pressure After Landing
During simultaneous venting of the des cent propellant and supercrit

ical helium tanks , fuel in the fuel/helium heat exchanger was frozen by
the helium flowing through the heat exchanger . Subsequent heat soakback
from the descent engine caused expans ion of the fuel trapped in the sec
tion of line between the heat exchanger and the engine shutoff valve
( fig . 16-10 ) . The result was a pressure rise in this secti on of line .
The highest press ure in the line was probably in the range of 700 to
800 psia ( interface pressure transducer range is 0 to 300 ps i a ) . The weak
point in the system is the bellows links , which yield above 650 psia and
fail at approximately 800 to 900 psi a . Failure of the links would allow
the bellows to expand and relieve the pressure without external leakage .
The heat exchanger , which is located in the engine compartment , thawed
within about l/2 hour and allowed the line pressure to dec .
On future mis s i ons , the s olenoid valve ( fig . 16-10 ) will be closed
prior to fuel venting and opened s ome time prior to lift-off . This will
prevent freezing of fuel in the heat exchanger and will allow the s uper
critical helium tank to vent later. The helium pres sure rise rate after
landing is approximately 3 to 4 psi /hr and constitutes no constraint to
presently planned miss ions . Appropriate changes to operational procedures
will be made .
16 . 2 . 3
Indication of High Carbon Dioxide Partial Pres sure
Shortly after the lunar module as cent , the crew reported that the
measurement of c arbon dioxide partial pressure was high and erratic . The
secondary lithium hydroxide canister was selected, with no effect on the
indication . The primary canister was then reselected , and a c aution and
warning alarm was activated .
1 6 ll
-
Prior to extravehicular activity , the environmental control system

had been deactivated. This stopped the water separator and allowed the
condensate that had collected in the separator to drain into a t ank
( fig . 16-11 ) . The drain tank contains a honeycomb materi al designed to
retain the condens ate . I f the amount of condensate exceeded the effec
tive surface of the honeycomb , water could have been leaked through the
vent line and into the system j ust upstream of the sens or . ( Be fore the
sensor became errati c , the Commander had noted water in his suit . ) Any
free water in the opti c al section of the sensor will cause errat i c per
formance . The carbon dioxide content is sensed by measuring the light
transmiss ion across a stream of suit-loop gas . Any liquid in the element
affects the light transmission , thus giving improper readings .
To preclude water being introduced into the sensor from the drain
tank , the vent line will be relocated to an exi sting boss upstream of the
fans , effective on Apollo 13 ( see fig . 16-11 ) .
This anomaly :is clos e d .
16 . 2 . 4
Steerable Antenna Acquisition
When the steerable antenna was s elected after acquisition on revolu

tion 14 , di fficulty was encountered in maintaining communications . The
downlink signal strength was lower than predi cted and several times de
creased to the level at whi ch lock was lost . Errors were di scovered in
the antenna coverage restriction diagrams in the Spacecraft Operational
bat a Book for the pointing angles use d . In addition , the diagram failed
to include the thruster plume deflectors , whi ch were added to the lunar
module at the launch site . Figure 16-12 shows the correct blockage dia
gram and the one that was use d in the Spacecraft Operational Data Book
prior to flight . rhe pointing angles of the antenna were in an area of
blockage or s uffi ciently close to blockage to af"fect the coverage pattern .
As the antenna boresight approaches vehi cle structure , the on-bore
sight gain is reduc e d , the selectivity to incoming signals is reduced ,
and s ide-lobe interference i s increas e d .
Further , a preflight analysis showed that the multipath signal , or
re flected ray ( fi g . 16-13 ) , from the lunar surface to the vehicle flight
traj ectory alone would be sufficient to cause some of the antenna track
ing losses . Als o , the reduction in antenna selectivity caus ed by vehi c le
b lockage increases the probability of multipath interferences in the an
tenna tracking circuit s .
In conclusion , both the vehicle blockage and the multipath s ignals
probably contributed to the reduced measured signal .
16-12
The nominal performance of the steerable antenna be fore and after
the time in question indicates that the antenna hardware operated proper
ly .
For future missions , the correct vehicle blockage and multipath con
ditions will be determined for the predicted flight traj ectory . Opera
tional measures can be employed to reduce the probability of this problem
recurring by selecting vehicle attitudes to orient the antenna away from
vehicle blockages and by selecting vehicle attitude hold with the antenna
track mode switch in the SLEW or manual position through the time periods
when this problem may occur .
16 . 2 . 5
Computer Alarms During Des cent
Five computer program alarms occurred during des cent prior to the
low-gate phase of the traj ectory . The performance of guidance and control functions was not affected.
The alarms were of the Executive overflow type , which s ignify that
the guidance computer cannot accomplish all of the dat a processing re
quested in a computation cycle . The al arms indi c ated that more than
10 percent of the computational c apacity of the computer was preempted
by unexpected counter interrupts of the type generated by the coupling
data units that interface with the rendezvous radar shaft and trunnion
res olvers ( s ee fig . 16-14 ) .
The computer is organi zed such that input /output interfaces are
servi ced by a central proces s or on a time-shared basis with other pro
cessing functions . High-frequency dat a , such as accelerometer and cou
pling data unit inputs , are processed as counter interrupts , which are
as signed the highest priority in the time-sharing sequence . Whenever
one of these pulse inputs is receive d , any lower priority computati onal
task being performed by the computer is temporarily suspended or inter
rupted for 11 . 72 mi croseconds while the pulse is processed, then control
is returned to the Executive program for resumption of routine operations .
The Executive program is the j ob-scheduling and j ob-supervising
routine which allocates the required eraseable memory storage for each
j ob request and decides whi ch j ob is given control of the central pro
ces s o r . It s chedules the various repetitive routines or j obs ( such as
Servicer , the navigation and guidance j ob which is done every 2 seconds )
on an open-loop basis with respect to whether the j ob s cheduled on the
previous cycle was completed. Should the completion of a j ob be slowed
because high-frequency counter interrupts usurp excessive central pro
cess or time , the Executive program will s chedule the s ame j ob again and
16-13
res erve another memory storage area for its use . When the Executive
program is requeBte d to s chedule a j ob and all loc ations are as signed ,
a program alarm i s displayed and a software rest art i s initiated. A
review of the j obs that can run during des cent leads to the conclus ion
that multiple s cheduling of the s ame j ob produced the program alarms .
The cause for the multiple s cheduling of j obs has been i dent i fied by
analyses and s imulations to b e primarily counter interrupts from the
rendezvous radar coupling dat a unit .
--
The interrupts during the powered des cent resulted from the con
figuration of the rendezvous radar I coupling data unit I computer inter
face . A s chematic of the interface is shown in figure 16-14 . When the
rendezvous radar mode switch is in the AUTO or SLEW position , the excit
ation for the radar shaft and trunnion res olvers is supplied by a 28-volt ,
800-hertz signal from the att itude and trans lation control assembly .
When the switch is in the LGC pos ition , the positi oning of the radar
antenna is controlled by the guidance computer , and the res olver exci tat ion is suppli e d by a 28-volt , 800-hertz s ource in the primary gui dance
and navigation system . The output s i gnals of the shaft and trunnion
res olvers interface with the coupling dat a unit s regardles s of the excit
ation s ource . The attitude and translation control as s embly voltage is
locked in frequency with the primary guidance and navigation syst em
voltage through the system ' s control of the PCM and timing electroni cs
frequency , but it is not locked in phas e . When the mode swi tell is not
in LGC , the attitude and translation control ass embly voltage is the
s ource for the res olver output signals to the coupling data units while
the primary gui d!mce and navigation system 800-hertz voltage is us ed as
a reference voltage in the analog-to-digital convers ion portion of the
coupling data unit . Any di fference in phase or amplitude between the
two 800-hertz voltages will cause the coupling data unit to recognize a
change in shaft or trunni on position , and the coupling dat a unit will
"slew" ( digit ally ) . The "slewing" of the data unit results in the un
des irable and cont inuous transmi s s i on of pulses representing incremental
angular changes to the computer . The maximum rate for the pulses is
6 . 4 kpps , and they are processed as counter interrupts . Each pulse re
ceived by the computer requires one memory cycle time ( 11 . 7 micros econds )
to proces s . I f a maximum of 12 . 8 kpps are received ( two radar coupling
data units ) , 15 percent of the available computer time will be spent in
process ing the radar interrupts . ( The computer normally operates at
approximately 90 percent of capacity during peak activity of powered
des cent . ) When the capacity of the computer is exceeded , s ome repeti
tively scheduled routines will not be completed prior to the st art of
the next computation cycle . The computer then generates a s oftware re
start and displs an Executive overflow alarm .
16-14
The me aningle s s counter interrupts from the rende zvous radar coupl
ing data unit will not b e proces s e d by the Luminary lB program us ed on
future mi s sions . When the radar i s not powered up or the mode swi t ch i s
not i n t h e LGC pos ition , the dat a units will b e zeroe d , preventing counter
interrupts from being generat e d by the radar coupling dat a units . An
additional change will permit the crew to monitor the des cent without
requiring as much computer time as was require d in Luminary lA .
This
anomaly
i s clos ed.
16 . 2 . 6
Slow Cabin Decompres si on
The decompres s ion of the cabin prior to extravehi cular activity

required longer than had been acti cipat e d .
The crew cannot damage the hat ch by trying to open it prematurely .
Stat i c tests show that a handle force of 78 pounds at 0 . 25 psid and 118
pounds at 0 . 35 ps id is required to p ermi t air flow past the s eal . The
hat ch defle cted only in the are a of the handle . A handle pull of 300
pounds at 2 psid did not damage e ither the handle or the hat ch . In addi
tion , neutral buoyancy tests showed that suited subj ects in 1/6-g could
pull 102 pounds maximum .
On Apollo 12 and sub sequent vehicles , the b acteria filter will not
be use d , thus reducing the t ime for decompres sion from about 5 minutes to
less than 2 minut e s . In addition , the alt itude chamber test for Apollo 1 3
included a parti al cab in vent pro cedure whi ch verifi ed sat i s factory valve
as s embly operat ion without the bacteria filt er ins talled.
16 . 2 . 7
Elect rolumines cent Segment on Display Inoperative
An ele ctrolumine scent s egment on the numeri c display of the ab ort

guidance system dat a entry and display as semb ly was report ed inop erative .
The affe cte d digit i s shown in figure 16-15 . With this s egment inopera
t ive , it was not pos s ible to differentiate between the numerals 3 and 9 .
The crew was sti ll able to us e the part icular digit ; however , there was
s ome amb iguity of' the re adout .
Each of the s egments on the display is switched independently through

a logic network which activates a s i licon-controlle d re ctifier placed in
s eries with the s egments . The control circuit i s different from that us ed
in the entry monitor system velocity counter in this respect ( see s ection
16 . 1 . 4 ) , although both units are made by the s ame manufacturer . The power
source is ll5 volt s , 400 hert z , and can be varied for intens ity control .
16-15
One similar failure occurred on a delta quali fication unit . The

cause was a faulty epoxy process which resulted in a cracked and open
electrode in the light emitting element .
Circuit anaysis shows a number of component and wiring failures
that could account for the failure ; howeve r , there is no history of these
types of failure . The number of s atis factory activations of all the s eg
ments does not indi cate the existence of a generic problem .
In order to ens ure proper operation under all conditions , for future
mi s s i ons a prelawch test will activate all segments , then the intensity
will be varied through the full range while the display is obs e rved for
faults .
16 . 2 . 8
Voice Breakup During Extravehi cular Activity
Voice-operated relay operation during extravehicular activity caused

breakup of voi ce received by the Network . This breakup was as s ociated
with both crewmen but primarily with the Lunar Module Pilot .
In ground tests , the conditi ons experienced during the extravehi c
ular activity were duplicated by decreasing the s ens itivity of the lunar
module downlink voice-operated keying control from 9 ( maximum ) to 8 , a
decrease of about 7 dB . During chamber tests , lunar module keying by
the extravehi cular communicati ons system was demonstrated when the s ensi
tivity control was s et at 9 . The crew indi cated that the pre-extravehicular
activity adjustment should have been set in accordance with the onboard
checklist ( maximum increas e ) . The crew als o veri fie d that they did not
experience any voice breakup between each other or from the Network ,
indicating that the breakup was probably caused by marginal keying of
the voice-operated keying circuits of the lunar module downlink rel .
-.
Voice tapes obtained of the Apollo 11 crew during altitude chamber

tests were us ed in an att empt to duplicate the problem by s imulating
voice modulation characteristics and levels being fed into the lunar
module communications system during the extravehicular activity . Thes e
voice t apes modula.ted a signal generator whi ch was received by an d relayed
through a breadboa.rd ( mockup ) of the lunar module communi cation system .
There was no dis cernible breakup of the relayed voice with the sensit ivity
control set at 9 .
All analysi s and laboratory testing to date indi c ates that the voice
breakup experienced during the extravehi cular activity was not an inherent
system design problem . Testing has shown that any voice which will key
the extravehicular communic ation system will also key the lunar module
relay i f the s ensitivity control is s et at 9 .
16-16
The most probable caus e of the problem i s an inadvertent low s etting
of the Commander ' s sens itivity control . During ext ravehicular activity ,
both crewmen use the Commander ' s lunar module VOX circuit when talking
to the groun d . Other les s likely causes are degrade d modulation from
the extravehicular communi cat i ons system or degradati on of the lunar mod
ule circuit gain between the VHF receiver an d the Commander ' s ampli fie r .
Howeve r , there are n o known previous failures which resulted i n degraded
ext ravehicular communication modulation levels or degrade d lunar module
keying performance .
16 . 2 . 9
Echo During Ext ravehi cular Activity
A voice turnaround ( e cho ) was heard during extravehi cular activity .

At that t ime , the lunar module was operating in a relay mode . Uplink
voice from the S-band was pro ces s e d an d retransmitt e d to the two extra
vehicular crewmen via the lunar module VHF transmitte r . Crew voi ce and
dat a were received by the lunar module VHF re ce iver and relayed to the
earth via the lunar module S-band transmitter ( s ee fig . 16-16 ) . The echo
was duplicat e d in the labor'atory and result e d from me chanical acousti cal
coupling between the communic ations carri er earphone and microphone ( fig .
16-17 ) . The crew indicat e d that their volume controls were set at maxi
mum during the extravehicular activity . This s etting would provide a
level of approximately plus 16 dBm into e ach crewman ' s e arphones . Isola
tion between earphones and microphones , exclusive of air path coupling ,
is approximately 48 dB . The ground voi ce s ignal would therefore appear ,
at the microphone output , at a level of approximately minus 32 dBm . As
suming ext ravehi cular communi cat ion keying i s enable d , thi s signal would
be proces sed and transmitte d by the ext ravehicular communicat i ons system
and would provide a level of approximat ely minus 12 dBm at the output of
the lunar module VHF receive r . If the lunar module relay i s enab le d ,
this s ignal would be amplified and relayed t o earth vi a S-band at a no
minal output leve l .
When the lunar module voi ce-operat e d keying circuit i s properly ad
juste d , any s ignal that keys the extravehi cular communi cations system
will al s o key the lunar module relay . There are indications that the
lunar module voi ce keying s ensitivity was s et below maximum , as evidenced
by the relayed voi ce breakup experi enced by the Lunar Module Pilot ( s ee
s ection 16 . 2 . 8 ) . Therefore , it would have been pos sible for the extra
vehicular communi cat ions system to be keyed by breathing or by suit air
flow without this b ackground noi s e b eing relaye d by the lunar module .
Howeve r , the uplink turnaround voi ce could provide the additional lunar
module received audio s ignal level to operate the voice -operated keying
circuits , permitting the s ignal to be returned to the earth . The crew
indi c at e d that the voice-operated keying circuits in the extravehi cular
16-17
c ommuni cations system were activated by suit air flow for s ome p os it i ons
of the head in the helmet .
Both voi ce-operated keying circuits were als o
keyed by bumping or rubbing of the communi cati ons carrier against the
The random echo problem is inherent in the communi cation system
helmet .
design , and there does not appear to be any practical w to eliminate
random voice keying or significantly reduce acoustical coupling in the
c ommuni cations carrie r .
A procedure t o inhibit the remoting of downlink voice during peri ods
of uplink voi ce transmi s s i ons will be accompli shed to eliminate the echo .
The c aps ule communi cator ' s console will be modi fied to allow CAPCOM s im
plex operation ( uplink only , downlink disable d ) during uplink transmis
s i ons as a backup mode of operation i f the echo becomes obj ecti onable .
The ground system , however , will still have the echo of CAPCOM when using
the s implex mode .
16 . 2 . 10
Onboard Recorder Failure
The dat a storage electronics as sembly did not record properly in

Post flight plback of the tape revealed that the reference
flight .
tone was recorded properly ; however , the voi ce s i gnal was very low and
O c c as i on
recorded with a 400-hertz t one and strong background noi s e .
ally , the voi ce level was normal for short peri ods ,
In addit ion , only
the 4 . 6-kilohertz timing signal was recorde d .
This signal should have
switched between 4 . 2 and 4 . 6 kilohertz t o record the timing code .
During post flight tests , the recorder functioned properly for the
first 2 hours of operation .
Then , the voi c e channel failed and recorded
no voice or background nois e , although timing and reference tones were
recorded properly .
This failure does not duplicate the flight results ,
indicating that it di d not exist in flight .
Tests with the recorder installed in a lunar module were performed
to determine the vehicle wiring failures that could cause the s i gnals
found on the flight tape . An open in b oth the timing s ignal return line
and the voice signal line would duplicate the problem .
Similar broken
wires were found in LTA-8 during thermal/vacuum tests .
The most likely
cause of the failure was two broken wires ( 26 gage ) in the vehicle har
ness to the recorder .
For Apollo 12 through 15 , the wire harnes s at the
recorder conne ctor will be wrapped with tape to sti ffen it and provide
protection against flexure damage .
For Apollo 16 and s ubs equent , a sheet
metal cover will be added to protect the harne s s .
16-18
Preflight data from the launch s it e che ckout procedure show that
b oth the timing inputs and the internally generated reference frequency
were not within speci fi c at ion tolerances and may be indicative of a pre
flight problem with the system .
The procedure did not spe c i fy acceptable
limits but has now been c orre cte d .
16 . 2 . 11
Broken Circuit Breaker Knob
The crew reported after complet i on of extravehi cular activity that

the knob on the engine arm circuit breaker was broken and two other cir
The engine arm ci rcuit breaker was succes s
cuit breakers were clos e d .
fully closed when it was required for as cent , but loss of the knob would
not allow manual opening of the breake r .
The most probable cause of the damage w as impact of the oxygen purge
system ( aft edge ) during preparat i on for extravehi cular activities ; s uch
impact was demonstrated in s imulati ons in a lunar module .
Ci rcuit breaker guards will be installed on Apollo 12 and subsequent
vehicles t o prevent the oxygen purge system from impacting the ci rcuit
breakers .
16 . 2 . 12
Thrust Chamber Pres sure Switches
The switch used to monitor the quad 2 aft-firing engine ( A2A) exhib
ited s low response to j et driver commands during most of the mis s i on .
During an 18-minut e period just prior t o terminal phase init i ation , the
switch fai led to respond to seven cons ecutive minimum impulse commands .
This resulted in a master alarm and a thruster warning flag , which were
reset by the crew .
The engine operated normally , and the switch failure
The crew did not attempt any inves t iga
had no effect on the mis s i on .
tive procedures to determine whether the engine had actually faile d . A
section drawing of the switch i s shown in figure 16-18 .
This failure was the first of its type to be observed in flight or
in ground testing .
The switch closing response ( time of j et driver "on"
command to switch closure ) appeared to increase from an average of about
15 t o 20 milliseconds during station-keeping to 25 to 30 milli seconds at
Normal switch closing response is 10 to 12 milli
the t ime of failure .
s econds based on ground test results .
The closing response remained at
the 25- to 3D-millise c ond level following the failure , and the switch
16-19
continued to fail to respond to s ome !lll.nmum. impulse commands . The switch
opening time ( time from j et driver "off" command to switch opening ) ap
peared to be normal throughout the mis s i on . In view o f these result s ,
it appears that the most probable cause of the switch failure was part i c
ulate contamination in the inlet pass age of the switch . Contamination in
this area would reduce the flow rate of chamber gases into the diaphragm
cavity , thereby reducing the switch closing response . Howeve r , the contam
ination would not neces s arily affect switch opening response since normal
chamber pressure tailoff requires about 30 to 40 milliseconds to decrease
from about 30 ps ia to the normal switch opening pressure of about 4 psi a .
The 30- t o 40-millisecond time would probably b e sufficient to allow the
gases in the diaphragm cavity to vent s uch that the switch would open
normally .
The crews for future mis s i ons will be briefed to recognize and
handle similar situations .
This anomaly is close d .
16 . 2 . 13
Water i n One Suit
After the l1mar module achieved orbit , water began to enter the
Commander ' s suit in spurts ( estimated to be 1 tablespoonful ) at about
1-minute intervru.s . The Commander immediately selected the secondary
water separator , and the spurts stopped after 15 to 20 minutes . The
spurts entered the suit through the suit half vent duct when the crewmen
were not wearing their helmets . The pressures in all liquid systems
which interface ;rith the suit loop were normal , indicating no leakage .
The possible sources of free water in the suit loop are the water
separator drain tank , an inoperative water separator , local condensation
in the suit loop ,. and leakage through the water separator selector valve .
( s ee fig . 16-11 ) .. An evaluation of each of these poss ible s ources indi
cated that leakage through the water separator selector valve was the
most probable s ource of the free water .
The flapper type valve is located in a Y-duct arrangement and is
used to select one of two water separat ors . Leakage of this valve would
allow free water to bypass through the idle water separator and subse
quently enter the suit hose . This leakage most probably resulted from
a mis alignment and binding in the s lot of the selector valve actuation
linkage ( see fig . 16-19 ) . The allowable actuation force after linkage
rigging was 15 pounds . The usual actuati on forces have been 7 to 8 pounds ,
but 12 . 5 pounds was required on Apollo 11 . The allowable actuation force
has been lowered to 10 pounds , and inspections for linkage binding have
been incorporatecl into procedures at the factory and the launch s ite .
This anomaly is close d .
16-20
16 . 2 . 14
Reaction C ontrol System Warning Flags
The crew reported thrust chamber as sembly warning flags for three
engine pairs . Quad 2 and quad 4 warning flags for system A occurred
s imultaneously during lunar module station-keeping prior to descent
orbit insertion . Quad 4 flag for system B appeared shortly thereafter
and als o twice just be fore powered des cent initiation . The crew believed
these flags were accompanied by master alarms . The flags were reset by
cycling of the cauti on and warning electroni cs circuit breake r . Suffi
cient data are not available to confirm any of the reported conditions .
One of the following may have caused the flag indications :
a . Failure of the thrust chamber pres sure swit ch to respond to
thruster firings .
b . Firing of opposing thrusters may have caused a thrust chamber
on failure indication .
c.
Erroneous cauti on and warning system or display flag operation .
The first two possible causes are highly unlikely because simultane
ous multiple failures would have to occur and s ubsequently be corrected.
The third poss ible cause is the most likely to have occurred where a
single point failure exists . Ten o f the s ixteen engine pressure switch
outputs are conditioned by the ten buffers in one module in the signal
conditioner electronics as sembly ( fig. 16-20 ) . This module is supplied
with +28 V de through one wire . In addition , the module contains an
os cillator which provides an ac voltage to each of the ten buffers . If
either the +28 V de is interrupted or the os cillator fails , none of the
ten buffers will respond to pres sure switch closures . If engines mon
itored by these buffers are then commanded on , the corresponding warning
flags will come up and a master alarm will occur .
I f +X translation were commanded ( fig . 16-21 ) , the down-firing en
gines in quads 2 and 4 of system A could fire , giving flags 2A and 4A.
A s ubsequent minus X rotation could fire the forward-firing thruster in
quad 4 of system B and the aft-firing thruster in quad 2 of system A ,
giving flag 4B . The aft-firing engine in quad 2 o f system A (A2A) is
not monitored by one of the ten buffers postulated fai le d . The failure
then could have cleared its elf . The respons e of the vehicle to thruster
firings would have been normal under these conditions . There is no
history of similar failures either at package o module level in the
signal conditioner electronics assembly . No corrective action will be
taken .
This anomaly is -close d .
16-21
16 . 3
16 . 3 . 1
GOVERNMENT-FURNI SHED EQUIPMENT
Televis ion Cable Retained Coiled Shape
The cable for the lunar s urface televis ion camera retained its coiled
shape after being deployed on the lunar surface . Loops result ing from
the coils repres ented a potent i al tripping hazard to the crew .
All the changes that have been investigated relative t o changes in
cable mat erial and in stowage and deployment hardware have indicated only
minimal improvement in deployed cable form , together with a weight penalty
for the change . No hardware changes are planned.
Thi s anomaly is closed.
16 . 3 . 2
Mat ing of Remote Control Uni t to Portable Life Support System
During preparation for extravehi cular activity , the crew experienced

cons iderable difficulty in mating the electrical connectors from the re
mote control unit to the . portable life support system. For rot at ional
polariz ation alignment , it was necessary to grasp the cable insulation
because the coupling lock ring was free for unlimited rot at ion on the
conne ctor shell ( see fig . 16-22 ) .
For future mi s sions , the male half of the connector has been replaced
with one whi ch has a coupling lock ring with a positive rot at ional posi
t ion with the connector shell and can b e grasped for firm alignment of
the two halves . The ring is then rotated 90 degrees to capture and lock .
In additi on , e as ier insertion has been att ained with coni cal t ipped con
t act pins in place of hemi spherical tipped pins .
This anomaly is clos ed.
16 . 3 . 3
Diffi culty in Closing Sample Return Containers
The force required to clo s e the s ample return containers was much
higher than expecte d . This high clos ing force , coupled with the inst
ability of the des cent stage work t able and the lack of adequate reten
tion provisions , made clos ing the containers very diffi cult .
Because of the cont ainer s eal , the force required to close the cover
reduces with each closure . The crew had extens ive training with a s ample
return container which had been opened and closed many times , res ulting
in clos ing forces lower than the maximum limi t of 32 pounds .
16-22
The container used for the flight had not been exercised as had the
container used for training . In addition , the cleaning procedures us ed
by the contractor prior to delivery removed all lubri cant from the latch
linkage sliding surfaces . Tests with similar containers have shown that
the cleaning procedure caused an increas e i n the clos ing force by as much
as 2 4 pounds .
A technique for burnishing on the lubri c ant after cleaning has been
incorporat e d . As a result , containers now being delivered have closing
forces no greater than 25 pounds .
Over-center locking me chanisms for retaining the containers on the
work table will be installed on a mock-up tab le and will be evaluated
for possible incorporat ion on Apollo 13 and sub sequent .
I ,
NASA-S-69-3 7 7 5
24 00
I
I
I
2000
1600
-loo...
:
I
Secondary
Eng ine OFF ;
Eng ine ON t
I
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1 20 0
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800
400
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75:48
75:50
75:52
75:54
75:56
75:58
76:00
76:02
T ime , hr:m i n
F igure 1 6 - 1 . - N i trogen pressure dur i ng i n itial lunar orbit i n sertion firing .
I-'
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NASA-S-69-3776
I-'
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Fuel
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Injector
pre-valve
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Outlet
'"""'ti\\ [\ ,II;%1--
Actuator and position pots
liJ
Oxidizer
Fuel
Gaseous
nitrogen
Figure 16-2 . - Control for service propu lsion propel lants .
Seals
(most probable
leak source)
16-25
NASA-S-69-3 7 7 7
Terminal
board 9 19
( 1 6 gage pins)
+ 2 8 V de
..-..
+ 2 8 v dc I ntermittent p m s
Oxid i zer
D irect c o i l s
Em
'/ En
-
:
:
:
r
:
Fuel :
:
Fuel :
Oxid i zer
:. to
: operate
Failed
Automati c coi ls
F i gure 1 6 - 3 . - Term inal board schematic for m inus-yaw eng ine,

command modu le reaction control system 1 .
NASA-S- 69-.3 7 7 8
Oxygen
flow
1-'
0\
I
1\)
0\
Set
Reset
To
master
alarm
28 V de
1 6-second
de lay
Oxy gen
flow
sensor
1----f
t---""'"'"'
K2
Vo ltage
Out put 1---.....---t leve l
amp l ifier
detector
E lectromagnet ic
interference
fi lter capac ;tor
Relay
driver
4 . 9 -vo It threshold
1 . 0 I b/ hr
F i gure 16-4 . - Oxygen flow sens ing circu i t .
'
'
'
'
' r
'
N ASA-S- 69 -37 79
Oxygen
flow
Sensor probe
U..-.:o
Heating e lement
I
I
_ J
To te lemetry and
on board d i s p lay
F i gure 16-5 . - Oxygen flow sensor .
16-28
NASA-S-69-3 7 8 0
Proper
Improper
F igure 16-6 . - T i e -wraps on lanyards .
'
'
NASA- S -69-3 78 1
Rad i ator outlet
temperature sensor
r-C=old----{I_.J--11 F
Primary evaporator
temperature sensor
Warm
t
Hot
..
,_
0g{
Evaporator in let
temperature
sensor
Primary
radiators
Tem perature
control va lve
r\..
Primary
evaporator
Cold plates and

heat exchangers
Temperature
contro l ler
Pump
Hot
F i gure 16-7 . - Pri mary water g l ycol coo lant loo p .
1-'
0\
I
1\)
\0
NASA -S -69-3782
Lag in temperat ure
70
control valve mod u lation
--
60 1--+-----1-1---1 -- --'1
50 1--t--Hi-+-----1
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Radiator out l et
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104:30
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105:00
105:30
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101:45
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outlet
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Temperat ure control

valve unders hoot
' I J f/-f- Expected temperatu re

to norma l temperat ure
V:+/ due
control valve modu lation
40
30
114:00
1 14:30
Time, hr: m i n
Figure 16-8. - Comparison of radiator and evaporator outlet temperatures.
115:00
115:30
16- 31
NASA-S -69-.378.3
Typical crack
C i rcuit board
Typical so lder joi nts

wh i c h crack under stress
Potting
mater ial
F i gure 16-9 . - Typ ical modu lar constructi on .
So lder
16 -32
NASA-S-69-3 7 84
To vent
To oxi d i zer tank
_. ======
Heat
exchanger
S o lenoid valve
Pressure r i se due to heat

soakback from engine
Eng ine valves
F ig ure 1 6 - 1 0 . - S u percr itical he l i u m flow for descent propu ls ion system .
'
'
NASA-S-6 9 -3 785
Oxygen
--
To water
system
c====::1 -;:::;-- 1 3E========;-;==
-- c=.=-::4
Water out
::;
.
F:lL
Carbon
====::J
..
d i oxide
Heat
exchanger 1----..
Lunar
Modu le--o..
__. Commander's
' s u it
P i lot ' s
su it
c::==::::;--;::==1--.
1======1
Lith i u m
hydroxide
can i ster
--
F i gure 1 6 - 1 1 . - S i m p l i fied s u i t loop schemat i c .
16-34
NASA-S-69-3786
250
230
:;:;:::
:\ :\:(:;.:t,: :::;: :;::::

.: :; ;: -:. . ;::,::
.
, ::
..
'{.; ':"" :
..
: :}
: l : ':
':>:'::Jf:
""'\.,..;;:::::: :::;:;j:;:;:;:::=:r::;;;.
'-- S pacecraft operational

data book boundary
l-l--+-----l--4l
C;i2
8$Mc__.J--_+--- --1 prior to flight
/
I
blocking diagram I .
(inc ludes 1 0-degree band of
marg inal operation)
tr Antenna
1+--+-'l---A-- pointing +--+--f--+1
an le
\
\/
30
10 0 -10
-30 -50
ing
-70
-90
Yaw gimbal ang le, deg

F igure 16- 1 2 . - 5-band steerable antenna coverage restrictions .
' .
' '
NASA- S-69-3 787
D irect path
M u lti path
(reflected from
lunar surface)
-
Moon
F i gure 16-13 . - E xample of multi path .
......
0'.
I
w
Vl
NASA-S-69-3788
Attitude and trans lation

contro l assemb ly
Frequency
sync
1--;..._
--1
( 1 . 6 kpps)
-
Frequency
PCM and
sync
timing
e lectron ics ( 1 . 0 2 4 M H z)
2 8-vo lt, 8 0 0 H z
S EW
J-
Primary
g
u i dance and
e--G-:---------t-----------1 nav igati on
L
C
s ystem
Mode switch
AUTO
2 8-vo lt, 8 0 0 H z reference
, - - - -- - r- - - - ,
'\
,....
S ine
------_ _ _ _ _1
Ang le pu lses
(6 . 4 kpps or
1
_t 4 0 0 p ps)
Ana log/ d i g i tal

!I Cos i ne
i
converter
1
;
1I
1 (800 Hz) I
I
I
L_ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _J
1 S haft
Coup l ing
(trunn
i on s im i lar)
I
data
unit
L _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ..J
1
Resolver
Rendezvous radar
antenna
F igure 16- 1 4 . - I nterfaces from rendezvous radar antenna to primary g u idance system .
1-'
0\
I
w
0\
16 - 3 7
NASA-S-69-3 7 8 9
Inoperat i ve segment
,'
--
-0
.. . .
'
- -===================- '
F igure 1 6 - 1 5 . - Inoperative segment i n one d i g it of data

entry and d i splay assembly .
16- 3 8
NASA-S-69-37 9 0
Lunar Module Pi lot
Figure 16-16 . - Communications relays during extravehicu lar activity .
.-
16 -39
NASA- S -69-3 7 9 1
Acoustical
tube . . .. . . . . . .
Earpiece with
microphone and
earphone dri vers
mo lded in
..
_,
___
Commu n i cat ion system conne
--
F i gure 1 6 - 1 7 . - Commun i cat ions carrier .
NASA-S -69-3 7 9 2
I
Sense por
i 11
I
Contacts
Pressure
sw itch
Passage b locked
by contam ination
F i gure 16- 1 8 . - Chamber pres sure switch .
Prope l lant
va l ves
16-41
NASA-S- 69-379 3
'
/)
I
\
'- "\
\
--
---
Pu sh -pu l l rod
- Hand le
- -
F igure 16- 1 9 . - Water separator selector va lve .
NASA -S-69-3794
Reset
A2D firing
command
Chamber
8 uffer
module
A2D chamber
pressure switch
A2A firing
command
To malfunction
logic circuits
A2A chamber
pressure switch
2A isolation
valve closed
Reset
-+==;---]++2i2Bi'VV"dc
"dt
!function
Solid logic circuits

postulated
at this
! Buffers 1 through 9) '------1 state
switch
point
Buffer
1A
18
28
3A
3B
4A
4B
1
::-
Figure 16-20. - Reaction control system malfunction detection circuits (caution and warning systemI.
'
'
'
N ASA-S-69-3795
f:J
i
S ystem A
System B
+X
1 left
3 ri ght
4 down
F i gure 16- 2 1 . - Reaction contro l system geometry .
I-'
0\
I
.,...
NASA-S-69-37 96
Male half mounted on
cable to remote control
unit
F langed fema le half

mounted on portable
l i fe su pport system
Po lar i zation
mating keys
Cou p l ing lock ring
F i gure 16- 22 . - Connector between remote control un it and portable l i fe su pport system .
'
'
17-l
17 . 0
CONCLUSIONS
The Apollo ll mis sion , including a manned lunar landing and surface
exploration , was eonducted with skill , pre cision , and relat ive ease . The
excellent performance of the spacecraft in the preceding four flight s and
the thorough planning in all aspects of the program permitted the safe and
efficient execution of this mis s ion . The following conclus ions are drawn
from the information contained in this report .
1 . The effectiveness of preflight training was refle cted in the
skill and precision with which the crew executed the lunar landing . Man
ual control while maneuvering to the desired landing point was s atis fac
torily exercised.
2 . The planned techniques involved in the guidance , navigation ,
and control of the des cent trajectory were good. Performance of the land
ing radar met all expectations in providing the information required for
des cent .
3 . The extravehi cular mobility units were adequately designed to
enable the crew to conduct the planned activities . Adaptation to 1/6-g
was relatively qu:t ck , and mobility on the lunar surface was easy .
4 . The two--man prelai.mch checkout and countdown for ascent from

the lunar surface were well planned and executed .
5 . The timeline activities for all phases of the lunar landing
mission were well within the crew ' s c apability to perform the required
t asks .
6 . The quarantine operation from spacecraft landing until release
of the crew , spacecraft , and lunar s amples from the Lunar Receiving Labora
tory was accompliBhed suc cess fully and without any violation of the quar
antine .
7 . No mi croorganisms from extraterrestrial source were recovered
from either the crew or the spacecraft .
8 . The hardware problems experienced on this mission , as on pre
vious manned missions , were of a nature which did not unduly hamper the
crew or result in the compromise of s afety or mis s ion obj e ctives .
9 . The Misuion Cont rol Center and the Manned Space Flight Network
proved to be adequate for controlling and monitoring all phases of the
flight , including the des cent , surface activities , and ascent phases o f
the mission .
A-1
APPENDIX A - VEHICLE DESCRIPTIONS
Very few change s were made to the Apollo 11 space vehicle from the
Apollo 10 con figurat ion . The launch e s c ape system and the spacecraft /
launch vehi cle adapter were i dent i cal to thos e for Apollo 10 . The few
minor changes t o the command and service modules , the lunar module , and
the Saturn V lam1ch vehicle are di s cus s ed i n the following paragraphs .
A de s cripti on of the ext ravehi cular mobi li ty unit , the lunar surface ex
periment equipment , and a li sting of spacecraft mass properties are also
pre sent e d .
A.l
The insulation in the are a of the command module forward hat ch was
modi fied t o prevent the flaking which oc curre d during the Apollo 10 lunar
module pre s suriz at i on . The fee dback circuit i n the high gain antenna was
s lightly changed to re duce s ervo dither. In Apollo 10 , one of the three
ent ry b atteries was modi fi ed t o make us e of cellophane s eparators . The
flight results prove d thi s materi al superior to the Fermion-type previ
ously used an d for Apollo 11 all three entry b atteries had the cellophane
s eparat ors . The b at tery chargers were modified to produce a higher charg
ing capacity . The s econdary bypass valve s for the fuel cell coolant loop
were changed from an angle-cone s e at de sign ( b lo ck II ) to a s ingle-angle
s e at (block I ) to re duce the possibility of parti culate cont aminat i on .
As a replacement for the wat er/gas s eparat i on b ag which proved ineffect ive
during Apollo 10 , an in-line dual membrane s eparat i on devi ce was added t o
b oth the water gun and the food preparat i on unit .
A.2
A.2.1
LUNAR MODULE
Structures
The most s i gnifi cant structural change was the adde d provi s i ons for
the functi on e e arly Apollo s ci ent i fi c experiment package and the modular
equipment s towage as semb ly , b oth of which hous ed the experiments and tools
used during the lunar surface activities . Another change was the addition
of the react i on control system plume de fle ctors .
Change s to the landing ge ar included removing the lunar surface sen
s ing probe on the plus Z ge ar and lengthening the remai ning probes and
increasing the s li ding clearance of the landing ge ar struts to permit
full stroke at extreme temperat ure conditions .
A-2
A. 2 . 2
Thermal
A change from Kapton to Kel-F was made to the des cent stage b as e
heat shield t o preclude the possibility o f inte rference with the landing
radar . Als o , i nsulat i on was adde d to the landing gear and probes to ac
commodate the requirement for des cent engine firing unti l touchdown .
A.2 . 3
Communicat i on s
The maj or modi fi cat i on s t o the communi cat i ons syst ems included the
addition of an extravehi cular activity antenna for lunar communicat i ons
between the crew , and the lunar module , an d an S-band erect ab le antenna
to permit communicat i ons through the lunar module communi cat i ons system
( fig . 16-16 ) while the crew was on the surface .
A televi si on camera, as us ed on the Apollo 9 mi s s i on , was stowed in
the des cent s t age t o provi de televi s i on coverage of the lunar surface
act ivities .
A.2 4
Gui dance and Cont rol
The maj or di fference in the guidance and control system was the re
design of the gimb al drive actuator to a constant damping system rather
than a brak e . This was re des igned as a result o f the brake failing i n
b oth the disengage d an d engage d positi on . This change also requi re d mod
i fi c at i on of the des cent engine control as s emb ly and the phas e corre cting
network t o e liminat e the possibility of inadve rtent caut i on and warning
alarms .
The exterior tracking light had improvements in the flash head and
in the puls e-forming network .
The pushbut t ons for the dat a entry and display as sembly were re
wired to pre clude the e rroneous cauti on and warning alarms that had
oc curred on the Apollo 10 flight .
The gui dance and n avigat i on optics system was modifi ed by the addi
tion of Teflon locking rings t o the s extant and the s canning teles cope
to prevent the rot at i on of eye guards under zero-g conditions .
The deletion of unmanned cont rol capability permitted removal of
the as cent engine arming as semb ly .
A-3
A.2 . 5
Ascent Propulsion
The inj ector filter for the as cent propuls ion system was modified
because the fine mesh in the original filter was causing a change in the
mixture ratio . An additional change was the incorporation of a light
weight thrust chamber .
A.2.6
Environmental Control
In the environmental control system , a suit cooling assembly and water

hose umbilicals were added to the air revitalization section to provide
additional crew cooling capability . As a resllit , the cabin air recircu
lation assembly , the cabin temperature control valve , and the regenera
t ive heat exchanger were deleted. Als o , a redundant water regulator was
added to the secondary coolant loop in the water management section .
In the environmental control system relay box in the oxygen and cabin
pressure control section , a pressure transducer was replaced by a suit
pressure switch to improve reliability .
A.2 .7
Radar
The landing radar electronic s assembly was reconfigured to protect

against a computer strobing pulse that was providing what appeared. to be
two pulses to the radar . Another modification permitted the crew to
break tracker lock and to start a search for the main beam in the event
the radar pulse locked onto the structure or onto a side lobe . The lunar
reflectivity attenuation characteristics were updated in the radar elec
tronics to account for the updated Surveyor data and landing radar flight
tests . To permit correlation between the inertial measurement unit of
the primary guidance system and the Network , a logic change permitted the
lateral velocity to be an output signal of the landing radar . A further
design change was made to prevent the landing radar from accepting noise
spikes as a pulse in the velocity bias error signal train .
The rendezvous radar design changes included a new self-test segment
to provide low temperature stability with the low-frequency and mid
frequency composite signal . In addition , heaters were added to the gyro
as sembly and the cable wrap to ac commodate the lunar stay temperature
requirements . A. manual voting override switch permitted the crew to
s elect either the primary or secondary gyro inputs .
A- 4
'""'-.
A. 2 . 8
Displays and Controls
Circuit breakers were adde d for the ab ort electroni cs as sembly and
the uti lity light . A circuit breaker was adde d for the ab ort electronics
as sembly to prote ct the de bus , and another circuit breaker was adde d to
accommodate the t rans fe r of the uti lity light to the de bus to provi de
redundant light .
The circuit breaker for the environmental control system suit and
cabin repre s sur i z at i on functi on was delete d i n conjunct i on with the modi
fi cat i on of the suit cooling as sembly . In addition , a low-level caution
and warning indi c at i on on the s e condary water glycol accumulator has been
provi ded .
Changes to the cauti on and warning electronics as s emb ly included the
inhibiting of the landing radar tempe rature alarm and the prevention of a
master alarm during i nverter s elect i on and master alarm switching.
Mas ter alarm funct i ons which were eliminat e d include the des cent
helium regulator warning prior t o pre ssuri z at i on with the de s cent engine
control as semb ly ; the re acti on cont rol system thrust chamber as semb ly
warning with quad circuit breakers open ; the rendezvous radar caut i on when
placing the mode s ele ct swit ch in the auto-track posit i on ; and the deleti on
of the react i on control system quad temperature alarm.
Cauti on and warning funct ions which were deleted include the landing
radar velocity " dat a no-good" and the de s cent propellant low-level quantity
which was change d to a low-leve l quantity indi c at i on light only .
A further change included the added capab i lity of b eing ab le to reset
the ab ort electronics as se mb ly caution and warning channel with the water
quantity test swit ch .
A modi fi cat i on was made to the engine stop swit ch lat ching me chanism
to insure posit ive lat ching of the swit ch .
A.2 . 9
Crew Provi s ions
The waste management system was changed to a one-large and five-small

urine cont ainer confi gurat i on .
Additional stowage i ncluded provs ons for a s e cond Hass elb lad
camera , a t ot al o f two port ab le life support systems and remot e control
unit s , two pairs of lunar ove rshoe s , and a feedwater collect i on b ag . The
C omman der had an attitude controller as sembly lock me chani sm adde d.
A-5
A.3
EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILI'rY UNIT
The extravehicular mobility unit provi des life support in a press ur

ized or unpressurized cabin and up to 4 hours of extravehicular life s up
port .
In its extravehicular configuration the extravehicular mobility unit
was a closed-circuit pressure vessel that enveloped the crewman . The en
vironment inside the pres sure vessel cons isted of 100-percent oxygen at a
nominal pressure of 3 . 75 ps ia . The oxygen w provi ded at a flow rate of
6 cubic feet per minute . The extravehi cular life support equipment con
figuration is shown in figure A-1 .
A.3.1
Liquid Cooling Garment
The liquid cooling garment was worn by the crewmen whi le in the lunar
module and during all extravehicular activity . It provi ded cooling during
extravehicular and intravehi cular activity by abs orbing body heat and trans
ferring excessive heat to the sublimator in the portable life support sys
tem. The liquid cooling garment was a one piece , long sleeved, integrated
stocking undergarment of netting material . It consisted of an inner liner
of nylon chiffon , to facilitate donning , and an outer layer of nylon Span
dex into which a network of Tygon tubing was woven . Cooled water , supplied
from the portable life support system or from the environmental control
:;>ystem , was pumped through the tubing .
A.3.2
Pressure Garment Assembly
The pressure garment assembly was the basic pres sure vessel of the
extravehi cular mobility unit . It would have provided a mobile life sup
port chamber if cabin pressure had been lost due to leaks or puncture of
the vehicle . The pres s ure garment ass embly cons isted of a helmet , tors o
and limb suit , intravehi cular gloves , and various controls and instrumen
tation to provide the crewman with a controlled environment .
A.3.3
Torso and Limb Suit
The torso and limb suit was a flexible pressure garment that encom
passed the entire body , except the head and hands . It had four gas con
nectors , a multiple water receptacle , an electrical connector , and a urine
transfer connector . The connectors had positive locking devices and could
b e connected and dis connected without assistance . The gas connectors com
prised an oxygen inlet and outlet connector , on each side of the suit front
tors o . Each oxygen inlet connector had an integral ventilation diverter
A-6
valve . The multiple water receptacle , mounte d on the suit tors o , s erved
as the i nterface b etween the liquid cooling garment multiple water conne c
t o r an d port ab le li fe s upport system multiple wat e r conne ctor and the en
vironmental control system water supply . The pres sure garment as semb ly
electri c al connect or , mat e d with the vehi cle or port ab le li fe s upport
system elect ri cal umbi li cal , provide d a commun i cat ions , instrument at i on ,
and power interface to the pre s sure garment as semb ly . The urine trans fer
connector was us ed to transfe r urine from the urine colle ct i on trans fe r
as sembly to the waste management system.
The urine tran s fer conne ctor on the suit right leg , permitted dumping
the urine colle ct ion bag without depre s suri zing the pres sure garment as
s embly . A pres sure garment as s emb ly pre ssure relie f valve on the suit
s leeve , ne ar the wrist ring , vent e d the suit in the event of overpressuri
z at i on . The valve opened at approximat ely 4 . 6 psig and re seat e d at 4 . 3
psig. I f the valve di d not open , it could have been manually overri dden .
A pres sure gage on the othe r s le eve indi cated suit pre s s ure .
A. 3 . 4
Helmet
The helmet was a Lexan ( polycarbonate ) shell with a bubble type visor ,
a vent pad as s emb ly , an d a helmet att aching ring . The vent pad assemb ly
permitted a constant flow of oxygen over the inner front surface of the
helmet . The crewman could turn hi s head within the helmet neck ring are a .
The helmet di d . not turn independently o f the torso and limb suit . The
helmet had provis ions on e ach s i de for mounting an extravehi cular vi s or
assemb ly .
A.3.5
Commun i c at i ons Carrie r
The communi cat i on s carri er was a polyurethane foam headpi ece with
two independent e arphone s and mi crophones whi ch were connected to the
suit 21-pin communi cat i ons electri cal conne ct or . The communi cat i ons c ar
rie r could be worn with or without the helmet during intravehi cular opera
tions . It was worn with the helmet during ext ravehi cular operations .
A. 3 .6
Integrated Thermal Mi crometeoroid G arment
The integrat e d thermal mi cromete oroid garment was worn over the pre s
sure garment assemb ly , an d prot e cted the crewman from harmful radi at i on ,
heat t rans fe r , and mi cromete oroi d activity. The i ntegr ated thermal mi c
rometeoroid garment was a one piece , form fitting multi layere d garment
that was lace d over the pres sure garment as semb ly and remained with it .
The extravehi cular vi s or as s embly , glove s , and boots were donne d s epar
ately . From the outer layer in , the integrat e d thermal micrometeoroid
A-7
garment consi sted of a prot e ctive cover , a micromet eoroi d-shielding laye r ,
a thermal-barri er blanket ( multiple layers of aluminized Mylar ) , and a
prot e ct ive liner .. A zipper on the integrated thermal micromet eoroi d gar
ment permitte d conne cting or dis conne cting umbi li c al hoses . For extra
vehi cular activity , the pressure garment as semb ly gloves were replaced
with the extravehicular glove s . The extravehi cular gloves were made of
the s ame material as the integrated thermal mi crometeoroid garment to per
mit handling intens ely hot or cold obj e ct s out si de the cabin and for pro
tect i on against lunar temperature s . The extravehicular boots were worn
over the pre s sure garment as semb ly boots for extravehicular act ivity .
They were made of the s ame materi al as the integrat e d thermal mi cromet eo
roid garment . ['he s oles had additional insulat i on for prote ction agai ns t
intens e t emperature s .
A. 3 . 7
Extravehi cular Vi sor As sembly
The extravehi cular vi sor assembly provided prot e ct i on against s olar

heat , space part i cle s , and radi at i on , and helped to maint ain thermal b al
ence . The two pivotal vis ors of the ext ravehi cular vi sor as sembly could
b e att ached t o a pivot mounting on the pre ssure garment assembly helmet .
The lightly t i nted ( inner) vi s or reduced fogging in the helmet . The outer
vi s or had a vacuum deposite d , gold-film refle ctive s urface , whi ch pro
vided prot e ct i on against s olar radi at i on and space parti cles . The extra
vehicular visor as semb ly was held snug to the pres sure garment as s embly
helmet by a t ab --and-strap arrangement that allowed the vi sors to be ro
t ated approximately 9 0 up or down , as desire d .
A.3.8
Port ab le Life Support System
The portable life support system ( s ee figure A-2 ) contained the ex

pendable materi als and the communi c at i on and telemetry equipment requi red
for extravehi cular operat i on . The system s upplied oxygen to the pressure
garment as semb ly and cooling water to the liqui d cooling garment and re
moved s olid and gas cont aminant s from returning ox:rge n . The port ab le
life support system , att ached with a harnes s , was worn on the b ack of
the sui ted crewman . The tot al system cont ained an oxygen ventilat ing
circuit , water J;eed and liqui d transport loops , a primary oxygen supply ,
a main power supply , communi cation systems , di splays and related s ensors ,
switches , and controls . A cover encompas sed the as semb led unit and the
top portion supported the oxygen purge syst em .
The remote control unit was a display and control unit chest -mounted
for e asy ac ce s s . The controls and displays consi sted of a fan swit ch ,
pump switch , space-suit communi c at ion-mode switch , volume control , oxy
gen quantity indi cator , and oxygen purge system actuator .
A-8
The oxygen purge system provided oxygen and pres sure control for
certain extravehicular emergencies and was mounted on top of the portable
life support system . The system was self-contained , independently pow
ered , and non-rechargeable . It was capable of 30 minutes of regulated
( 3 . 7 0 . 3 psid) oxygen flow at 8 lb /hr to prevent excessive carbon di
oxide buildup and to provide limited cooling . The system cons isted of
two interconnected spherical 2-pound oxygen bottles , an automatic temper
ature control module , a pressure regulator assembly , a battery , oxygen
conne ctors , and the necess ary checkout instrumentation . The oxygen purge
system provided the hard mount for the VHF ant enna.
A.4
A.4.1
EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT
Solar Wind Composition
The purpose of the solar wind composition experiment was to deter

mine the elemental and isotopic composition of noble gases and other
selected elements present in the solar wind . This was to be accomplished
by trappig particles of the solar wind on a sheet of aluminum foil ex
pose d on the lunar surfac e .
Physically , the experiment cons isted o f a met allic telescoping pole
approximately 1-1/2 inches in diameter and approximately 16 inches in
length when collapse d . When extended , the pole was about 5 feet long
In the stowed position , the foil was enclosed in one end o f the tubing
and rolled up on a spring-driven roller . Only the foil portion was re
covered at the end of the lunar exposure period , rolled on the spring
driven roller , and stowed in the s ample return container for return to
earth .
A.4.2
Laser Ranging Retro-Reflector
The laser ranging retro-reflector experiment ( fig . A-3 ) was a retro

reflector array of fused silica cubes . A folding support structure was
used for aiming and aligning the array toward earth . The purpose of the
experiment was to eflect laser ranging beams from earth to their point
of origin for precise measurement of earth-moon distances , center of
moon ' s mas s motion , lunar radius , earth geophysi cal information , and de
velopment of space commun ication technology .
Earth stations that can beam lasers to the experiment include the
McDonald Observatory at Fort Davis , Texas ; the Lick Observatory in Mount
Hamilton , Cali fornia ; and the Catalina Station of the Univers ity of Ari
zona. Scientists in other countries also plan to bounce laser beams off
the experiment
A-9
A.4 .3
Passive Seismic Experiment Package
The passive seismic experiment ( fig . A-4 ) consisted of three long

period seismometers and one short-period vertical seismometer for measur
ing meteoroid impacts and moonquakes and to gather information on the
moon ' s interior ; for example , to investi gate for the existence of a core
and mantle . The pass ive seismic experiment package had four basic sub
systems : the structure/thermal subsystem to provide shock , vibration ,
and thermal protection ; the electrical power subsystem to generate 34 to
46 watts by sola:r panel array ; the data s ubsystem to receive and decode
Network uplink commands and downlink experiment data and to handle power
switching tasks ; and the passive seismic experiment subsystem to measure
lunar seismic activity with long-period and short-period seismomet ers
which could deteet inertial mass displacement . Also included in the pack
age were 15-watt radiois otope heaters to maintain the electronic package
at a minimum of 60 F during the lunar night .
A solar panel array of 2520 s olar cells provided approximately
40 watts to operate the instrument and the electronic components , includ
ing the telemetry data subsystem . Scientific and engineering data were
tu be telemetered downlink while ground c ommands initiated from the
Mission Control Center were to be transmitted uplink utili zing Network
remote sites .
A.4.4
Lunar Field Geology
The primary aim of the Apollo lunar field geology experiment was to
collect lunar s runples , and the tools described in the following para
graphs and shown in figure A-5 were provided for this purpose .
A calibrated Hasselblad camera and a gnomon were to be used to
obt ain the geometric data required to reconstruct the geology of the
s ite , in the fonn of geologic maps , and to recover the orientation of
the s amples for erosion and radiation studies . The s ample bags and
camera frame numbers would aid in identifying the s amples and relating
them to the crew ' s description .
--
Core tubes ,. in conjunction with hrunmers , were to provide a s ample

in which the stratigraphy of the uppermost portion of the regolith would
be pres erved for return to earth .
A sample s coop was provided for collecting particulate material and
individual rock fragment s and for digging shallow trenches for inspecti on
of the regolith . The tongs were provided for collecting rock fragments
and for retrieving tools that might have been dropped .
A-10
Lunar environment and gas analysis s amples were to be collected ,
sealed in special containers , and returned for analysis .
A.5
LAUNCH VEHICLE
Launch vehicle AS-506 was the sixth in the Apollo Saturn V series
and was the fourth manned Apollo Saturn V vehi cle . The AS-506 launch
vehicle was configured the s ame as AS-505 , used for the Apollo 10 mis
sion , except as des cribed in the following paragraphs .
In the S-IC st age , the prevalve accumulator bottles were removed
from the control pres sure system , and various components of the research
and development instrumentation system were removed or modified,
In the S-II st age , the components of the research and development
instrumentation were remove d , and excess weld doublers were removed from
the liquid oxygen tank aft bulkhead.
In the S-IVB stage , five additional measurements were used to define
the low-frequency vibration that had occurred during the Apollo 10 mis s i on .
In the propulsion system , a liner was added to the liquid hydrogen feed
duct , an oxygen/hydrogen inj ector was changed , the shutoff valve on the
pneumatic power control module was modified by the addition of a block
point , and new configuration cold helium shutoff and dump valves and a
pneumatic shutoff valve s olenoid were installed.
In the instrument unit , the FM/FM telemetry system was modified to
accommodate the five added S-IVB structural vibration measurements . Tee
s ections , clamps , and thermal switch settings were minor modificati ons
in the environmental control system . The flight program was changed to
accommodate the requirement s of the Apollo 11 mission .
A.6
MASS PROPERTIES
Spacecraft mass properties for the Apollo 11 miss ion are summari zed
in t able A-I . These data represent the conditions as determined from
post flight analyses of expendable loadings and usage during the flight .
Variations in spacecraft mass properties are determined for each signifi
cant mis s i on phase from lift-off through landing . Expendables usage is
based on reported real-time and postflight dat a as presented in other
s ections of this report . The weights and centers of gravity of the indi
vidual command and service modules and of the lunar module as cent and de
s cent stages were measured prior to flight , and the inertia values were
calculated , All changes incorporated after the actual weighing were
monitore d , and the spacecraft mass properties were updated.
A-ll
TABLE
Weigh t ,
Event
A-I . - MASS PROPE!i'I'U:S
Center of gravity , i n .
Moment ot inertia, slug-ft 2
1b
X
A
Y
A
Z
A
xx
lyy
1z
Product of inertia,
slug-ft2
I
XY
1x
z
ry
Lif't-off
109 666 . 6
847 . o
2.4
3.9
6 7 960
1 164 828
1 167 323
2586
8 956
333 5
Earth orbit insertion
100 7 5 6 . 4
8o7 . 2
2.6
4.1
67 108
713 136
715 672
4745
ll 34_1.
3318
63 4 7 3 . 0
33 2 9 4 . 5
934 . 0
1236 .2
4. 0
0.2
6.5
0.1
3 4 445
2 2 299
76 781
24 826
79 530
24 966
-1789
-508
-126
27
3148
Total docked
96 767 . 5
1038.0
2.7
4.3
5 7 006
532 219
534 981
-7672
-9 240
3300
Separat ion maneuver
96 566 . 6
1038.1
2.7
4.3
5 6 902
531 918
534 766
-7670
-9 219
3270
96 418 . 2
96 204.2
1038 . 3
1038.4
2.7
2.7
4.2
4.2
5 6 770
5 6 667
531 482
531 148
534 354
534 ll3
-7Tll
-7709
-9 170
-9 147
3305
3274
96 061 . 6
72 037 . 6
1038.6
1079 . 1
2.7
1.7
4.2
2.9
5 6 564
4 4 117
530 636
412 855
533 613
419 920
-7785
-5737
-9 063
- 5 166
3310
382
Cutoff
72 019 . 9
70 905 . 9
1079 . 2
1081 . 5
1.8
1.6
2.9
2.9
4 4 102
4 3 539
412 733
407 341
419 798
413 864
-5745
-5403
- 5 160
- 5 208
366
316
Separat ion
70 760 . 3
1082 . 4
1.8
2.8
4 4 762
407 599
414 172
-5040
-5 4o4
286
36 847 . 4
5 7 38 . 0
943.6
1168 . 3
2.8
4.9
5.5
-2 . 4
2 0 747
3 369
57 181
2 34[
63 687
2 8[3
-2094
-129
833
54
321
-354
42 585 .4
42 563 . 0
973.9
972 . 6
3.1
2.9
4.5
4.5
2 4 189
2 4 081
ll3 70'i
110 884
120 67'i
-1720
117 8o4
-2163
-1 018
37 100.5
943.9
2.9
5. 4
20 807
56 919
63 4l'i
36 96 5 . 7
26 'i9 2 . 7
943.8
961 . 4
3.0
-0 . 1
5.3
6.8
2 0 681
1 5 495
56 775
49 843
26 65 6 . 5
961 . 6
o.o
6 .7
15 4o6
14 549 . l
12 107 . 4
896 . 1
1040 . 4
0.1
-0.2
7.2
6.0
ll 603 . 7
-0 . 2
Drogue deployment
1039 . 2
-0 . 2
Main parachute
ll 3 1 8 . 9
1039 . 1
Landing
10 873 . 0
Lunar module at launch

Separation
Transposition and docking
Command & service modules
Lunar module
37

Ignition
Cutoff
LW1ar orbit insertion
Ignition
Cutoff
Circularization
Ignition
Docking
Command & service modules
As cent stage
Total after docking

Ascent stage manned
-811
-50
-28
-2003
7 30
305
63 303
51 454
-1979
-824
709
180
336
-232
49 739
51 338
-854
228
-200
9 143
6 260
14 540
5 470
16 616
4 995
-83'i
55
885
-4o3
-153
-47
5.9
6 253
5 463
4 994
6 066
5 133
4 690
55
5.9
-0.1
5.2
5 933
4 947
1037.1
-0.1
5 .1
5 866
4 670
33 297 . 2
185.7
0.2
0.2
2 2 304
25 019
25 018
33 683 . 5
186 . 5
0.2
0.7
2 3 658
26 065
25 922
33 669.6
33 401 . 6
186 . 5
186 . 5
0.2
0.2
0.8
o.B
23 649
2 3 480
25 899
25 871
224
224
Lunar landing
16 1 5 3 . 2
213.5
0.4
1.6
l2 582
26 045
25 978
13 667
16 204
182
Lunar lift-off
10 776 .6
Ascent stage unmanned

After ascent
stage
jettison
Transearth injection
Ignition
Cutoff
Command & service module

separat ion
Before
After
Service module
Command module
Entry
l2 095 . 5
1040 . 5
-400
- 37 5
-4 7
56
4 631
50
-312
-28
4 336
45
-322
-2 7
228
454
77
225
705
73
704
704
7l
deployment
-48
Lunar Module
Descent orbit insertion

Ignition
Cutoff
Orbit insertion
5 928.6
Coelliptic sequence initi at ion
5 881 . 5
24 3 . 5
255 . 3
255 . 0
555
7l
r 4
0.2
2.9
6 BoB
3 475
5 971
20
214
0.4
5.3
3 457
3 082
2 273
17
135
43
0.4
5.3
3 437
3 069
2 246
l7
137
44
45
Docking
5 738.0
254 . 4
0.4
5.4
3 369
3 044
2 167
18
141
50
Jettison
5 462 . 5
255 . 0
0.1
3.1
3 226
3 039
2 216
28
119
35
A-12
NASA-S - 6 9 -3 7 9 7
Extravehicu lar
v i sor assembly
Oxygen purge system
Remote control u n i t
S u n g lasses pocket
Oxygen purge
system actuator
S u pport straps
Pen l i ght pocket
Portable l i fe
s u pport system
Connector cover
Oxygen purge system
umb i l i cal
Commun ication s ,
ventilation and l i q u i d
coo ling umb i l icals
Cabin restraint ring

E xtraveh i c u lar g love
I ntegral thermal
and meteoro i d
garmet
Uti l ity pocket
U r i ne col lection and transfer

connector/ b i omed i cal injector/
dosimeter access flap and
donn ing lanyard pocket
F i gure A - 1 . - Extraveh icu lar mobi l i ty u n i t .
Pouch
" t '
NASA-S-6 9- 3 7 9 8
VHF antenna
-(stowed)
"-
Actuat i ng cable
(stowed position}
----
Heater status
Pressure gage
Regu lator
Oxygen
purge system
'actuator
__
Stowage p late
Water and oxygen

quantity indicator
(behind flap}
Thermal meteo;o id
Portable l ife support system
F i gure A-2 - Portab le i ife su pport system .

.
F i gure A-3
. -
Laser reflector experiment dep loyment .
, ?
! '
NASA-S-69-3 8 0 0
Passive seismic experiment
Astronaut handle
West
N ickel thermometer
dust detector
East
F i gure A-4 . - Passive seismic experiment package deployed configuration
showing dust detector g eometry .
NASA-S -69-3 8 0 1
Scoop
Tongs
Gnomon
H ammer
F i g ure A-5 . - Geological sam p l in g too l s .
B-1
APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES
The hi story of command and service module ( CSM 107 ) operat i on s at

the manufacturer ' s facility , Downey , California , i s shown in figure B -1 ,
and the operat ions at Kennedy Space Center , Florida , in figure B-2 .
The history of the lunar module ( LM-5 ) at the manufacturer ' s facility ,
Bethpage , New York , i s shown in figure B-3 , and the operations at Kennedy
Space Center , Florida, in figure B-4 .
NASA-S-69 -3802
f\)
1968
December
1969
January
Individual systems checkout, modification

and retest
March
Integrated systems test

I I I Data review
I Demate
I Pressure vessel leak check
I Aft heatshield installation
Command modu le
I Weight and balance
Preshipment inspection
I Prepare for shipment and ship
1 1 1 1 Service propu lsion system test
I Thermal coating
Service module
Preshi pment inspection
I Prepare for shipment and ship
F i gure B-1 . - Factory checkout flow for command and service modules at contractor faci lity .
t .,
I '
I , '
NASA-S-69-3803
1969
September
S pacecraft/ launch vehicle assembly
Note: Command and service modules

delivered to Kennedy S pace Center
on January 2 3 , 1 969
I Move space vehicle to launch complex

I Mate umbi l ical tower to pad
I Data link hookup
Q-ball installation
- S pacecraft pad tests
- Propel lant loading and leak checks
Countdown demonstration test
Countdown
F igure B-2 . - Spacecraft checkout history at Kennedy Space Center .
Launch
NASA-S-69-3804
b:J
I
-!="
1968
1969
January
I November J December
J February I March
- - F inal hardware instal lation and checkout
Plugs-in test
I I I I Install and test radar
I I I P lugs-out test
- Final factory rework and test
Install thermal shielding
I I Weight and balance
I I Final inspection
- Install base heat shield
I I Prepare for shipment and sh i p
I I Landing gear functional test
September
October
F igure B-3 . - Factory checkout flow for lunar module at contractor facility .
. ...
' , '
NASA-S-69-3805
1968
December
1969
August
January
- F l ight s imulation tests

... Docking test
Lunar module arrived at

Kennedy Space Center on
January 8 , 1969
S ystem verification tests
Radar alignment
Land ing gear installation

Install in spacecraft/ launch vehicle adapter
Final system tests
I M ission. s imu lation tests
Countdown
I Launch
F igure B-4 . - Lunar module checkout hi story at Kennedy Space Center .
C-1
APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING

The command module arrive d at the Lunar Receiving Lab orat ory , Houston ,
Texas , on July 30 , 1969 , after reacti on control system deactivation and
pyrote chnic s afing i n Hawaii . After de contaminat i on and at the end of the
quarantine peri od , the command module was shipped to the contract or ' s fa
cility in Downey , Californ i a , on Augus t 14 . Postflight te sting and in
spection of the command module for evaluat i on of the inflight performance
and investigation of the flight irregularities were conducted at the con
tractor ' s and vendor ' s facilities and at the Manne d Space craft Center i n
accordance with approve d Apollo Space craft Hardware Utili zati on Requests
( ASHUR ' s ) . The tests performed as a result of in flight problems are de
s cribed in t ab le G-I and di s cus s ed in the appropriate systems performance
s ections of thi s report . Tests being conduct ed for other purpos es i n ac
cordance with other ASHUR ' s and the b asi c contract are not included.
TABLE C-I . - POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUMMARY
ASHUR no.
Purpose
Results
Tests performe d
Environmental Control
107001
To determine the cause of the down-
End-to-end resis tance and contin-
A capacitor in the electromagnetic inter-
shift in oxygen flow reading and
ui ty check of the flow rat e trans-
ference filter was open and the res i s -
i t s remaining at the lower _limit
ducer calibration; calibrat ion
tance of the heater element on one o f
except
check and failure analysis
the two air stream probes was
for periods of high flow
600 ohms
above the requirement.
107019
Leak t e s t o n the primary water/
System was found to be t ight and well
crease in the primary glycol ac-
glycol system ; leak t e s t on the
within specification .
cumulator quantity
glycol reservoir valves
that the glycol res ervoir inlet valve
To determine the cause for the
de-
Indication was
was not fully closed during flight and

allowed leakage into the res ervo ir .
107503
To determine the caus e for high and
Measure the glycol temperature con-
All resi stances and deadband prope r .
low water/glycol temperatures
troller deadband and determine re-
Control valve bound closed.
sensed at the evaporat or outlet
sponse to a s imulated glycol temper-
during mixing mode operat i on in
at ure sensor
lunar orOit
107039
To determine the cause for high and
Remove control valve from space-
Broken bearing found interfering with
low water/glycol temperatures
craft and perform electrical and
gear t rain ass embly.
sensed at the evaporator out let
mechanical acceptanee tests.
during mixing mode operation in
ass emble control valve .
Analysis incomplete.
Dis-
lunar orbit
Reaction Control
107014
107016
To determine the caus e of the mal-
Circuit continuity verification
Continuity test determined that an inter-
function of the command module
mi ttent existed on a terminal board.
negative yaw thruster
Wiring was found to be prope r .
To verifY command module circuit
Circuit continuity verification
Control circuit for s ervice module reac-
associated with service module
tion control quad B propellant isolation
propellant isolation valves for
valves and indicators was proper through
g_uad B
the command module to the circuit interrupter interface .
' '
t
.
'If
.
TABLE C-I . - POSTFLIGHT TESTING SUM!I.ARY - Concluded
ASHUR no .
Purpos e
Tests performed
Results
Crew Equipment
107028
To determine the cause of high clos- Examine the seal for comparison
ing forces on the sample return con- with ground test. Re-roll seal and
tainers
measure latching forces .
Vacuum seal satisfactory . Latching force

above maximum specification limits because
of lubrication removal . Appli c ation of
lubri cation on s imi lar latches us i ng
Apollo 12 procedures , resulted in closing
forces below maximum specifi cation limits .
107030
To investigate the loose handle on

the medical kit and overpressuri za
tion of pill containers
Visual inspect ion . Determine

whether pin holes will prevent
overpressuri zation
The handle was not attached to right end;

on]y bare]y attached to left end. lin
vented pill packages expand about
300 percent at 5 psia from ambient.
Vented packages (two needle holes in
film) do not expand at 5 psia from am
bi ent .
107034
To investigate the voice turnaround

problem durjng extravehicular ac
tivity
Turnarmmd test with extravehicular

coEunications system packs and
Commander and Lunar Module Pilot
headsets in all possible connectors .
No defect ive circuits or components in

either carrier . Up-voice turnaround was
present in both headsets but always ac
quired with the Lunar Module Pilot car
rier, regardless of position of connec
tion . Turnaround was cause d by audio/
mechanical coupling , and could be ac
quired or eliminated by control of mech
anical isolation of headset and earphone
output level .
107038
Investigate leak in riser of

liquid cooling garment .
X-ray and visually inspect hose and

manifold. Verify corrective action .
During preflight adjustment o f the liquid

cooling garment , the spring reinforced
riser hose was improperly drawn over the
manifold nipple , cutting the inner wall
of the hose between the spring and the
nippl e . Water/glycol leaked through the
inner wall hole and ruptured the outer
wall of the Lunar Module Pilot ' s garment
during postflight tests at the qualifica
tion level of 31 psig. No le akage was
found in the Commander ' s garment because
the inner wall was sealed against the
nipple by the spring behind the cut .
Proper installation with the necessary
between the nipple and spring will pre
clude cuts in the inner wall .
..______.._______________.____________
0
I
\.)J
D-1
APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY
Tables D-I and D-II are summaries of the dat a made availab le for
systems performance analyses and anomaly inve s tigat ion s . Tab le D-I li sts
the dat a from the command and s ervic e modul es , and table D-I I , the lunar
module . Although the t ables re flect only data processed from Network
magnet ic tapes , Network data tabulations and comput er words were avail
able during the mis sion with approximately a 4-hour delay . For additi onal
informat ion regarding dat a avai lability , the status listing of all mi s sion
data in the Central Metri c Dat a File , building 12 , MS C , should be consult
ed.
D- 2
TABLE D-I . - COMMAND MODULE DATA AVAILABILITY
Time, hr : min
From
To
-04 : 30
+00 : 00
00 : 02
00 : 0 6
00 : 09
00 : 16
00 : 28
00 : 52
00 : 59
01 : 28
01 : 3 3
01 : 42
0 1 : 50
01 : 54
02:25
02 : 40
02 : 44
02 : 45
0 2 : 49
0 3 : 10
0 3 : 15
03:25
04 : 0 2
04 : 5 5
0 5 : 24
0 6 : 00
0 6 : 35
0 6 : 42
08 : 04
09 : 22
10 : 39
12 : 35
14 : 45
16 : 19
17 : 23
19 : 01
2 4 : 00
2 4 : 28
2 5 : 06
26 : 24
2 6 : 48
27 : 06
27 : 15
28:17
29 : 14
34 : 24
3 5 : 39
36: 35
38 : 34
42 : 2 3
4 4 : 23
47 : 00
47 : 19
52 : 50
5 3 : 49
54 : 52
+00 : 23
00 : 12
00 : 13
04 : 18
00 : 15
00 : 23
01 : 30
00 : 58
01 : 0 5
01 : 35
01 : 4 5
01 : 49
01 : 55
02 : 25
02 : 32
02 : 46
0 3 : 25
02 : 54
0 3 : 15
0 3 : 16
0 3 : 25
0 3 : 37
04 : 57
0 5 : 05
05 : 43
06 : 42
07 : 45
08 : 38
11 : 38
09 : 39
10 : 57
12 : 42
16 : 19
19 : 01
1 7 : 34
2 5 : 06
24 : 19
2 5 : 50
27:05
26 : 49
27 : 00
38 : 34
27:35
28 : 50
30 : 50
34 : 30
36 : 01
38 : 00
4 2 : 23
47 : 19
4 4 : 33
48 : 00
5 3 : 49
5 3 : 06
56 : 50
5 5 : 17
Range
station
Event
ALDS
'Standard
bandpas s
Special
bandpass
Comput er
words
MILA
BDA
CATS
VAN
CRO
HSK
GDS
MILA
VAN
CYI
D /T
RED
D /T
MER
HAW
HAW
D/T
GDS
GDS
X
X
GDS
GDS
X
X
X
X
CATS
GDS
X
X
CATS
X
X
X
GDS
GDS
CATS
CATS
D/ T
CATS
X
X
MAD
X
X
CATS
X
MAD
X
X
CATS
MAD
X
X
GDS
GDS
GDS
GDS
CATS
CATS
HSK
X
X
MAD
X
CATS
MAD
CATS
GDS
X
X
GDS
or tabs
MAD
plots
recordings
CRO
MAD
Special
or Brush
D/T
GDS
programs
O ' graphs
CYI
GDS
Special
X
X
D-3
TABLE D-I . - COMMAND MODULE DATA AVAILABILITY - Continued
Time , hr :min
From
To
5 6 : 50
5 7 : 15
57 : 30
5 8 : 10
73:15
7 3 : 48
7 5 : 48
7 5 : 57
77 : 39
78 : 24
7 8 : 41
79 : 07
79 : 5 4
80 : 10
80 : 22
81 : 40
83 : 43
85 : 00
85 : 41
85 : 42
87 : 39
88 : 32
89 : 37
90 : 2 5
90 : 29
91 : 36
92 : 30
9 3 : 26
9 3 : 34
9 4 : 22
9 5 : 32
96 : 30
97 : 3 0
98 : 20
98 : 50
99 : 29
100 : 3 5
100 : 44
100 : 5 5
101 : 15
101 : 27
102:15
102 : 49
103 : 25
105 : 23
106 : 28
107 : 21
109 : 17
110:31
111 : 1 8
112 : 0 6
113 : 11
113 : 18
115 : 17
117 : 13
118 : 00
58 : 10
5 7 : 30
5 7 : 45
7 3 : 09
7 3 : 48
75 : 48
7 5 : 57
76:15
78 : 24
79 : 09
80 : 2 2
79 : 47
80 : 37
80 : 43
85 : 41
83 : 11
84 : 30
85 : 30
86 : 32
89 : 11
88 : 27
89 : 41
90 : 25
93:07
91 : 39
92 : 29
92: 40
99:07
94 : 31
94 : 34
96:20
98 : 20
98 : 5 2
100 : 00
99 : 00
100 : 32
100 : 45
101 : 19
102 : 45
101 : 27
102:14
102 : 48
106 : 48
104 : 19
106:11
110 : 21
108 : 10
110 : 09
113 : 16
112 : 3 8
113 : 00
117 : 02
114 : 04
116 : 02
118 : 01
122 : 06
Range
station
Event
Standard Special
bandpass
CATa
GDS
CATS
bandpass
Computer
words
Special
programs
X
X
MSFII
X
X
X
X
MSFII
D/T
D/T
MSFII
D/T
HSK
D/T
MSFII
HSK
X
X
D/T
HSK
MSFN
D/T
MAD
X
X
D/T
MSFN
X
X
D/T
MSFII
X
X
D/T
X
X
X
MSFII
X
X
MAD
MAD
D/T
D/T
GDS
MSFII
GDS
MAD
GDS
MAD
D/T
D/T
or tabs
MAD
GDS
plots
recordings
MAD
GDS
Special
GDS
D/T
O ' graphs
or Brush
X
X
X
X
MSFI
D/T
D/T
MSFI
D/T
D/T
MSFI
D/T
MSFI
MSFI
X
X
D/T
D/T
D/T
MSFN
D- 4
TABLE D-I . - COMMAND MODULE DATA AVAILABILITY - Concluded
Time , hr :min
From
To
119 : 11
121 : 09
122 : 12
122 : 26
12 3 : 0 6
124 : 20
125 : 06
126 : 29
126 : 37
127 : 01
127 : 52
129 : 01
130 : 00
130 : 2 2
130 : 23
131 : 00
132 : 58
134 : 2 6
134 : 27
134 : 58
135 : 22
135 : 38
136 : 45
137 : 42
137 : 50
142 : 20
149 : 12
150 : 16
150 : 20
151 : 40
1 51 : 45
152 : 31
170 : 29
170 : 40
172 : 22
177 : 00
186 : 24
189 : 5 5
192 : 04
194 : 09
194 : 40
19 5 : 0 3
119 : 58
121 : 57
124 : 37
126 : 26
124 : 20
125 : 06
125 : 53
130 : 2 3
127 : 07
127 : 59
128 : 10
129 : 50
130 : 12
130 : 40
134 : 26
131 : 48
133 : 46
137 : 42
134 : 58
135 : 3 5
135 : 28
135 : 49
137 : 00
142 : 20
138 : 50
150 : 16
149 : 24
151 : 45
150 : 30
152 : 31
170 : 29
152 : 50
174 : 19
171 : 39
173 : 40
177 : 40
194 : 26
190 : 30
192 : 30
194 : 34
195 : 09
19 5 : 11
Range
station
D/T
D/T
MSFN
MSFN
D/T
MSFN
D/T
MSFN
GDS
D/T
GDS
D/T
GDS
GDS
MSFN
D/T
D/T
MSFN
MSFN
D/T
D/T
HSK
MSFN
MSFN
MSFN
MSFN
MSFN
MSFN
MAD
GDS
MSFN
GDS
MSFN
MAD
Event
Standard
bandpass
Special
bandpass
Special
programs
O ' graphs
or Brush
recordings
Special
plots
or tabs
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
MAD
GDS
MSFN
HSK
MSFN
HSK
HSK
ARIA
Computer
words
X
X
X
X
D-5
TABLE D-II . - LUNAR MODULE DATA AVAILABILITY
Time, hr :min
From
To
-04 : 30
95:55
9 6 : 17
9 6 : 37
96 : 46
98 : 16
98 : 5 5
99 : 07
99 : 08
99 : 18
99 : 3 0
100 : 12
100 : 1 5
100 : 20
100 : 43
100 : 52
100 : 5 3
101 : 30
102 : 13
102 : 45
102 : 52
103:03
103 : 57
104 : 0 2
104 : 10
106 : 28
107 : 49
108 : 14
108 : 25
110 : 31
113:11
113 : 30
113 : 59
114 : 08
114 : 20
118 :00
121 : 3 5
122 : 00
122 : 18
122 : 22
122 : 33
123 : 08
124 : 07
124 : 20
125 : 07
125 : 51
126 : 00
126 : 15
126 : 27
126 : 28
126 : 29
126 : 37
127 : 51
128 : 19
129 : 48
130 : 00
-02 : 30
99 : 07
96 : 38
9 6 : 48
9 7 : 33
99 :08
99 : 10
99 : 20
100 : 5 5
99 :32
99 : 48
100 : 17
100 : 44
100 : 25
100 : 53
101 : 30
102 : 16
102 : 13
102 : 53
106 : 28
103 : 0 3
10 3 : 59
104 : 0 4
104 : 10
104 : 57
110 : 31
108 : 13
108 : 27
109 : 24
113 : 16
117 : 48
114 : 00
114 : 10
114 : 21
115 : 20
122 : 0 6
121 : 45
123 : 08
122 : 2 5
126 : 26
122 : 45
124:08
125 : 09
124 : 35
125 : 13
126 : 29
126 : 15
126 : 29
126 : 3 5
126 : 40
130 : 2 3
127 : 0 7
128 :20
129 : 0 4
130 : 47
130 : 2 5
Range
station
ALDS
MSFN
MAD
MAD
MAD
MAD
MAD
MAD
MSFN
MAD
D/T
D/T
MAD
MAD
MAD
MAD
MSFN
D/T
GDS
MSFN
GDS
GDS
MAD
MAD
GDS
MSFN
GDS
GDS
GDS
MSFN
MSFN
HSK
MSFN
HSK
HSK
MSFN
MAD
MAD
MAD
MSFN
MAD
MAD
MAD
MAD
MAD
MAD
MAD
GDS
MAD
GDS
MSFN
GDS
GDS
GDS
GDS
GDS
Event
Standard
bandpass
X
X
Special
bandpass
Computer
words
Special
programs
Special
plots
or tabs
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
O ' graphs
or Brush
recordings
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
D- 6
TABLE D-II . - LUNAR MODULE DATA AVAILABILITY - Concluded
Time, hr :min
From
To
130 : 23
1 30 : 46
132 : 43
133 : 46
134 : 24
134 : 44
135 : 33
135 : 44
135 : 57
137 : 48
134 : 24
131 : 0 3
133 : 02
134 : 45
137 : 42
135 : 01
135 : 48
135 : 58
136 : 58
137 : 5 4
Range
station
MSFN
GDS
GDS
GDS
MSFN
GDS
GDS
GDS
GDS
MSFN
Drent
Standard
band:pass
X
Special
bandpass
CoiiiJluter
words
S:pecial
programs
O ' gra:phs
or Brush
recordings
Special
:plots
or tabs
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
..
E-1
APPENDIX E - GLOSSARY
The following definitions apply to terms use d in se ction 10 .
ablation
removal ; wearing away
albedo
ratio of light reflected to light incident on a surface
b as alt
generally . any fine-grained dark-colored igneous rock
breccia
see microbreccia
clast
rock compos e d of fragmental materi al of specified types
diab as e
a fine-grained , igneous rock of the composition of a

ga"bbro , but having lath-shaped plagioclase crystals en
close d wholly or in part in later formed augite
e j ecta
material thrown out as from a volcano
euhedral
having crystals whose growth has not been interfered with
exfoliation
the process of breaking loose thin concentric shells or

flakes from a rock surface
.feldspar
an;r of a group of white , nearly white , flesh-red , bluish ,

or greenish minerals that are aluminum silicates with
potas s ium , s odium , calcium , or b arium
feldspathi c
pertaining to feldspar
gabbro
a medium or coarse-grained bas i c igneous rock-forming in

trusive bodies of medium or large size and cons ist ing
chiefly of plagioclase and pyroxene
gal
unit of acceleration equivalent to 1 centimeter per second

per second
gnomon
im1trument use d for size and color comparison with known

standards
igneous
formed by solidification from a molten or partially molten

state
induration
hardening
E-2
lithic
stone-like
microbre c c i a
rock cons i sting of small sharp fragments embedded in any

fine-grained matrix
mophologic
study of form and structure in phys i c al geography
olivine
mineral ; a magnes ium-iron s i l i c at e c ommonly found in bas i c

igneous rocks
peridot ites
any of a group of granitoid igne ous rocks compos e d of

olivine and usually other ferromagne s i an minerals but
with little or no feldspar
plagioclase
a triclini c feldspar
platy
cons i sting of plates or flaky layers
pyroxene
a family of import ant rock-forming s i li c ates
pyroxenites
an igneous rock , free from olivine , compos e d ess entially

of pyroxene
ray
any of the bright , whitish lines seen on the moon and

appearing to radiate from lunar craters
reg.olith
surface soil
terra
earth
ves i cle
small cavity in a mineral or rock , ordinarily produced by

expansion of vapor in the molten mass
REFERENCES
1.
Marshall Space Flight Center : S aturn V Laun ch Vehicle Fli t Eval

uation Report AS-506 Apollo ll Mis s i on publicat i on numb e r and date
not as s i gne d ) .
2.
Boeing Company , Se attle , Washington :

ys is for Apollo . December 5 , 196 8 .
3.
Manned Spacecraft Center : Apollo 10 Mis s i on Report .

Anomaly S. MSC-00126 . August 1969 .
4.
U . S . Geologi cal Survey : Geologi c Map of Theophilus Quadrangle of

the Moon ; Geologic Atlas of the Moon , Scale 1 : 1 ,000 ,000 . I - 546
( LAC 7 8 ) . 1968
.5 .
Californ i a Ins titute of Technology , Jet Propuls ion Lab oratory :

Range r VII , Ft . I I , Experimenters Analys i s and Interpretat i ons .
32-700 . 196 5 .
6.
Journal Geophys ics : Color Differences on the Lunar Surface by

T . B . McCord. V . 74 , n . l2 , pp 3131-3142 . 1969 .
7.
Science : Mas cons : Lunar Mas s Concentrat i ons by P . M . Muller and

W. L. Sj ogren . V . l61 , pp 680-684 . 1968 .
.8 .
Cali forni a Insti tute o f Te chnol ogy , Jet Propuls i on Laborat ory :
1968 Surveyor Proj e ct Final Report Pt II B ci ence Results , Sect i on I I I
Televis ion Obs ervat i ons from Surveyor .
9.
Government Printing Offi ce : Interagency Committee on Back Contamin

ation : Excerpts of Federal Regulat i on Pertinent to Cont aminat i on
Control for Lunar S ample Return Mis s i ons . GPO 9 27-742 .
Lunar Gravitati onal Model Anal

Sect i on 15 . 0
10 .
NASA Headquarters : Prot e ction of the Earth ' s Biosph ere from Lunar
Sources of Contaminat i on ; An Interagency Agreement Between the
National Aeronauti cs and Space Admi ni strat i on ; the Department of
Agriculture ; the Department of Health , Educat i on , and Welfare ; the
Department .of the Interior ; and the Nati onal Academ[ of S ci ences .
August 2 4 , 196 7 .
11 .
NASA He adquarters : Interagen cy Commi ttee on Back Cont aminat i on ;

Quarant ine S chemes for Manned Lunar Mis s i ons .
12 .
NASA He adquarte rs :
Apollo Flight Mis s i on As signments .

July 11 , 1969 .
MA 500-11 ( S E: 0 10 -000-1 ) .
OMSF M-D
13.
NASA He adquarters : Mis s i on Requirements , G-type Mis s i on ( Lunar

Landing) . SPD 9-R-0 39 . April 17 , 19 69 .
14 .
Manned Spacecraft Center :

May 1969 .
Apollo 9 Miss i on Report .
MSC-PA-R-69-2 .
APOLLO SPACECRAFT FLIGHT HSTORY

( Continued from inside front cove r )
Mission
l!acecraft
Apollo 4
SC-017
LTA-lOR
Apollo 5
I.M-1
Apollo 6
Super ci rcular
Launch date
Nov. 9 , 1967
entry at lunar
return velocity
First lunar
Jan. 2 2 , 1968
module flight
SC-020
LTA-2R
Description
Verification of
closed-loop
April 4,
Launch site
Kennedy Space
Center , Fla .
Cape Kennedy,
Fla.
1968
Kennedy Space
Center, Fla .
emergency detection
system
Apollo 7
CSM 101
First manned flight ;

earth-orbital
Oct.
ll ' 1968
Cape Kennedy ,
Fla .
Apollo 8
CSM 103
First manned lunar

orbital flight ; first
Dec . 21 , 1968
Kennedy Space
First manned lunar
Msr.
3 , 1969
Kennedy Space
First lunar orbit
Me 18 , 1969
Kennedy Space
Center, Fla .
Ju:cy 16 , 1969
Kennedy Space
Nov. 14 , 1969
Kelllledy Space
manned Saturn V launch

Apollo 9
CSM 104
I.M-3
Apollo 10
,'
CSM 106
LM-4
Apollo 11
CSM 107
Apollo 12
CSM 108
I.M-6
module flight ; earth

orb it rendezvous ; EVA
rendezvous ; low pass
Center, Fla.
over lunar surface
First lunar landing
LM-5
Second lunar landing
Center , Fla.
Center, Fla.
----

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=-.

APOLLO 11 M ISOS[ON REPORT

MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER

APOLLO SPACECRAFT FLIGHT HISTORY

First pad abort

Ma;y 13, 1964

Nominal launch and

Ma;y 28, 1964

Nominal launch and

Sept. 18, 1964

Feb. 16, 1965

Ma;y 19, 1965

Second pad abort

June 29, 1965

July 30, 1965

Jan. 20, 1966

Feb. 26, 1966

Aug. 25, 1966

(Continued inside back cover)

APOLLO 11 MISSION REPORT

Mis s i on Evaluat ion Te am

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATI ON

" H ouston, the Eagle has landed."

EARTH ORBIT COAST AND TRANSLUNAR INJECTION

TRANSPOSITION AND DOCKING

LUNAR ORBIT INSERTION

LUNAR MODULE CHECKOUT

UNDOCKING AND SEPARATION

LUNAR MODULE DESCENT

COMMAND MODULE SOLO ACTIVITIES

LUNAR SURFACE OPERATIONS

COMMAND MODULE DOCKING

LUNAR DESCENT AND ASCENT

DESCENT TRAJECTORY LOGIC

PREPARATION FOR POWERED DESCEN1

POSTLANDING SPACECRAFT OPERATIONS

EARTH PARKING ORBIT

COMMAND MODULE ENTRY

SERVICE MODULE ENTRY

LUNAR ORBIT TARGETING

LUNAR ORBIT NAVIGATION

COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE

STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS

GUIDANCE , NAVIGATION , AND CONTROL

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM

LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE

STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS

GUIDANCE AND CONTROL

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT PERFORMANCE

THE LUNAR SURFACE .

LUNAR GEOLOGY EXPERIMENT

LUNAR SURFACE MECHANICS EXPERIMENT

EXAMINATION OF LUNAR SAMPLES

PASSIVE SEISMIC EXPERIMENT

LASER RANGING RETRQ-REFLECTOR EXPERIMENT

SOLAR WIND COMPOSITION EXPERIMENT

BIOINS TRUMENTATION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA

LUNAR CONTAMINATION AND QUARAN'nNE

MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE