RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While

ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case
would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our
national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the
1973 Constitution which similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a

Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what

constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It
is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is
also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,

firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or
acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil.
173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work

performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at
law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance
in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc.
v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing

for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in

even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the

profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual
for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing
attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW
312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has
adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I
forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit.
May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by
Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I am
quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of

the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would
like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of
law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the
lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal
talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be
considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman,
of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions

and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is
equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article
on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is
auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And,
therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent
to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others,
that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA)
should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of
auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways
synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are
private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as

commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are
often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm
is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some
firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced
attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as
that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West
Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as
the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to
be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne,
128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a

definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the

most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the
average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating
lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of
the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects
history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander
SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as
a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases
before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed
laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and nonlitigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the
diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed]
that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in
a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills,
legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even
the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform
at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role
such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one
of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the

exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers
find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for
many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that
is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove
from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special
roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in
which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The
most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government
legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted
are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the
traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary

transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an

accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning,"
has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the

sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute

danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow

theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure
must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein
a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting

and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has
received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy
of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary
approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those

trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to
multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling
such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate
degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts
and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would

require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to

as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of

the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their
legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only
for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle
most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the
legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include,
inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate
secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other
adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the
legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from
the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of
the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes
offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a

multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law
field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived
by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to
wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one

who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so
to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code
but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types
of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of
particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of
the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a

shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's
role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's;
strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with
sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with
public entities but with each other often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the

corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis

supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies

toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other
countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate

Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all
kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups
within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in
the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting
team achievements within the organization. In general, such external
activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group
processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer

vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are
apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics

principles more accessible to managers including corporate counsels.

(Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions

involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it
can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio
of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be

used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that

comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ
from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such
legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken

those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be
directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational
fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to
facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general

counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of
the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects
of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations,

managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of

employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex
make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the
basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business
Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more
than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work.
Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the
lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding
and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino

to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the
Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination

of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath
of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the

Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the
bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 197273. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more
than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar,
Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the
World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for
about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to
the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies
as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with
the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in
initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian
reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his
legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial
body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of
the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments
to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp.
128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used
to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and

which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise
during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there
are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an
operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts)
who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays

down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of
any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental
parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of
Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis
supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely

renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation
and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer
may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the

set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a
failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene
mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA
327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by

the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If
he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there
are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative
but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so
would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar,

consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment;
and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v.
Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p.
200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the

nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would

require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three

times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that
in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really
means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what
people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of
law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all
situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on
what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but
we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of
the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming
lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected
President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action
or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is
indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public

hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed
the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by
the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the

instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1)
If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the
President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect
confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2)
In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3)
If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible
that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth
life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of
Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator
placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of
Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to
her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly
replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from
issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A"
and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from
making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other
than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767

LEGAL5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30
am 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The

Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.

Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. 1
Tel.
521-7232; 521-7251;
522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced

are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive
of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar
and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended
by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice
of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with
the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further
argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act
of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly

in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7,
1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues

raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2)
Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4)
U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the
Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter,
their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and
extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes
note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the
services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly
be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we

deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the
respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations
and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar
matter.

1.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx

xxx

xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to

distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal
services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially
without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search,
evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage,
property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance,

passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx

xxx

xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its
position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal
services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to

respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly
advertising the same through newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this

Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly
unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4

xxx

xxx

xxx

A.
The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the
public, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is
offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as
earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first

of all, to the very name being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc."
Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal

services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical
services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements

subject of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all
the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of
the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still
remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal

support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any
lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to
make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as
the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room
for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being
offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

B.
The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance
of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in

question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and
any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one
instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:

Article 26.

...

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as
follows:

Article 1.
Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man
and woman entered into accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix
the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the

message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of
a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam
for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to
induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered
"the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as

that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor
vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address
those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage,"
makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social
institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to
emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement
appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of
immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be

concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the
advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby

Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here

it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply
because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place
where the crime is committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services"

respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood,
the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as
earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging
or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good
customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the
integrity of the Bar.

xxx

xxx

xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing

the publication of the advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be
prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public
in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research,
electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit
the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit
such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by
reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field

cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit
them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of
the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer
using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even
if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or
tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of
members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the
public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged
without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all

of its services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to
members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical
assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in general
and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may
be undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of
the factual considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to

be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce
celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and
void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from
simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required
to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law,
that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer
should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and
that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed

exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer
that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody

should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without
such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any
adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in
a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but
before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's
Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every
provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5

2.

Philippine Bar Association:

xxx

xxx

xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged
in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced
paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines"
(pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts
of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic,
Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the
realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the
Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal
work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement
which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law
belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is
offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has
been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and
ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law,
and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent
lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice
against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to

persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule
138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the
Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons
and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of
law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be
assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to
persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the
persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6

3.

Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated

herein, are wit:

1.

The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2.

Such practice is unauthorized;

3.
The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also
misleading and patently immoral; and

4.
The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the
Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and
for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that
it merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the
general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of
Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show

that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and
Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments
Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid

law, the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices
based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and
experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the
activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7

4.

U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration

should be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of
being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the
practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year

course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and
then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified
to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to

the administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study
and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the
general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish
these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present,

these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court
may decide to make measures to protect the general public from being
exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of
being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the
dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it
appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal
services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public
from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified
to offer such services. 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems

to give the impression that information regarding validity of marriages,
divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of
absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal
matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's
name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the
impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought
to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers
involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic,
when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its

President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the
structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
"Starweek" article." 9

5.

Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases
for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law,
(are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in
this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to

solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal
Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is
not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has
to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling
the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by
officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said
purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the
trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable
people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular
needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of
the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the
illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could
become justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is
not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go
about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be
attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none,
except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also
against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the
public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our
Code of Morals should not be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that
solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is
unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination
from the Bar. 10

6.

Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx

xxx

xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or
not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the
same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it
can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge
of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of
law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective

service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be
careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . .
.clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend, do
not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men
know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance
with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law accurate or
inaccurate moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves,
but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally
possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular
business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar
with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house
statutes, and who draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. This
is not practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that
it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support
of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor
Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not,
provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and
the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a
lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the
like, then an architect who performed this function would probably be
considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys.
Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or
custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But
this is not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations
experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of
them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee
matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge and
skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the defendants have the same service that the
larger employers get from their own specialized staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for

which appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court
should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established
method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of
men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or
that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the
graduates in their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work

for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant
being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's
obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of course,
would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before
me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines.
The law only provides the frame within which he must work, just as the
zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may
give, does not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add
that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services which are
customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For
instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in

the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a

mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for
negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the employment
whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an
exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate
sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the
land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the
opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can
accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men
grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite
likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite
conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative

agencies of the federal government, especially before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government, acting
by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is
without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid representation
before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National
Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th,
1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may
lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely
legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to
Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8
From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful
calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the
practice of law provided that:

(a)
The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem;.

(b)
The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of
the bar; .

(c)

No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client
as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation

concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he
is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding
services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward
marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a
priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem
is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved
is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic,
renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely
giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is
similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the
subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what
courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving

information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular
problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a

legal text which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And
the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted
by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . .
Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and
the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes
the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and
accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no
personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there
exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of
attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common
problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's
publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation
in their publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not
constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment
under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling
to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement
any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition
in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant
having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on
divorce and against his having any personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that for the
change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the
course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise
in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial
cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to)
enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to
the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific
problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation,
annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v.
Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly nondiagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services
"involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of
law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual

inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.

xxx

xxx

xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the
impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage.
With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See
Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second

paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph)
fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support
services", and not legal services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law"

becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by the
petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has
long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts
have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and
scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic
of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any
kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes
legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and
contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may
not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages

in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions

to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for

clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by
ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which
possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property
according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement
of law. 14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer,

he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as
to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the
latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice
for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives
pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in
several cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts
constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It
is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person
is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,

firms, associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears

in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or
acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil.
173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work

performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at
law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No

valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance
in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc.
v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of
court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with
the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations
that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can
neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by
respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by

trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic,
non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern
information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission
and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized
legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering;
locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government
or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like
foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory
to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems,
programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate
legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or
administering legal services. 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely

involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of
computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices,
or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to
justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal

information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is nonadvisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and
so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to
be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of
law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent
corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract
drafting and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in

the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the
Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the
structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given
by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic,
with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in
Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated
as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of
lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it.
The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a
battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the
medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the
services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe
you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the
problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things
like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care
of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can
take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa
hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common
cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir,
and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which
would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for
the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs
contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows
how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to
support the case. 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is
not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law
by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it
within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements
which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said
reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to
serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client
may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation
and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond
the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private
respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals
found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar
from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and
not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent

would wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that
the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and
have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so
provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of
the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the
rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason
of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have been
recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science
entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or
liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation,
operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the
practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of
the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being
advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable
persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the

concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the
law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits,
respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial
rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by

respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer studies and
degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28 As
the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United
States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public.
One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar
Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify
legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States
with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of
Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of

what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some
persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited
representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such
allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the

absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been
admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of
justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue
to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law
in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any

false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair

statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall
he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in
anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to
the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in
connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like selflaudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of

his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession.
advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising
his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that
the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of
Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those
of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to
constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by

the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of
business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among
other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or
skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade.
The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the
practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with
mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be
the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community
has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is
a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his
success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The

canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against
advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be
undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which
are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the
restrictions.

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a

manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of
brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading
and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the
fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of
references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose;
it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal
or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that
reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure

the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card
may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he
is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law
firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the

advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even
includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for
services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is
repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the
fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer,
as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to
publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability
upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be
charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly
or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the
present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule
in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are
"not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general
rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if
and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association

after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after
viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped
significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest

from 65% to 14%

Dignified

from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and
judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used
by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating
public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in
time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair,
criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct
which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem
formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to

disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48
or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that
Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and
proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is
hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of

the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed
upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an
obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters
of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of
course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a
different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and
jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the
practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against
unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called
paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the
concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the
corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual
background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light
of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is
referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under
the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein

respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or
dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or
similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction
proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let
copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,

vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA,

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or
coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate
and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates,
and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the
purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to
the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in
connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya

addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my

intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and
your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA
ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the
grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which
made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith
perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an
Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."

He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic

language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous
sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the
mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically
state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to
resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract
against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent,
hence the need to annul the controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San
Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which
actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand
corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD
26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T.
Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and
asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was
payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among
other things, he said:

" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel,

rescind and voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and
the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales
agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing
loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is
deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my
consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and
abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between
me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he
took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February
21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same
reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and
discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof.a He also
wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal
Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this
Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question,
again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into
entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996,"
and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's)
mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments.

Petitioner's Contention
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia
Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to
which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned
envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that
complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds

through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established
reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the
Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger,

manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations
with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all
concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident
bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular
and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be
dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint.

Conformably with established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from
the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this
case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of
Court.

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" in which he questioned the

authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power
pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court
investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the
Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis;
Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and
ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal
Family **."

Respondent's Contention

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less

aggressive, even obsequious tones, Alauya requested the former to give him
a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon. He stated
that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines
of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by
falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract
entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya
contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from
his salary. He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his
rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave
P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the
mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were
typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment
corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed
and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as
Annex J); and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the
use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed
mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and
because of an honest mistake.

ALAUYA'S DEFENSE IN USING THE TITLE "ATTORNEY"

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is
"lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a
lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney"
because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the
Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor.
Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected

of any man unduly prejudiced and injured." He claims he was manipulated

into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. He was induced to
sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the
completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided
him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where
the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal,
Villarosa & Co. -- is situated; He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from
his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do
so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his
contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent
documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt
of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya
prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of
"fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi
having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the
fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk
of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2)
earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as
"Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use
the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation.

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made
"malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her)
and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters,
Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross

misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts **
** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled
him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with

Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without
** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was

merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of
any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from
his salary.

COURT'S RULING
(Legal Basis)
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a
high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.
Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at
all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary
to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety
and public interest." More than once has this Court emphasized that "the
conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in
the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior
clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their
conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety
and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the
judiciary."

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good
customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch
denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful,
fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent
language.

COURT'S RULING

Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia

Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without
malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent
with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith." Righteous indignation, or vindication of
right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright namecalling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is
subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other
government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is
abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial
employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights
of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation
from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be
excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously
wronged.

(On the use of the title Attorney)

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts.[21] While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who
has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good

standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-atlaw," because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or
it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination,
valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor"
does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking

privilege (the privilege of sending certain matter through the public mails without
payment of postage. In pursuance of a personal or official privilege )., the record
contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the

use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language
unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is
warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will
be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL (SLU-LHS) FACULTY and

STAFF,
- versus ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ,
Respondent.

This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of

the Saint Louis University-Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) against

Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on the

following grounds:

1) Gross Misconduct:
From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending criminal case
for child abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student
filed before the Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; a pending administrative
case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating
Board created by SLU for his alleged unprofessional and unethical acts of
misappropriating money supposedly for the teachers; and the pending labor
case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative
Region, on alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent.

2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:

In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage;

and

3) Malpractice:

In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.

(GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT)

According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita

Rivera on 31 May 1982 at Tuba, Benguet, before the then Honorable Judge
Tomas W. Macaranas. He thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with
one Mary Jane Pascua, before the Honorable Judge Guillermo Purganan. On
4 October 1994, said second marriage was subsequently annulled for being
bigamous.

(MALPRACTICE)

On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent

deliberately subscribed and notarized certain legal documents on different
dates from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of respondents notarial
commission on 31 December 1987. A Certification dated 25 May 1999 was
issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, to the
effect that respondent had not applied for commission as Notary Public for
and in the City of Baguio for the period 1988 to 1997. Respondent performed
acts of notarization, as evidenced by the following documents:

1.
Affidavit of Ownership[2] dated 8 March 1991, executed by
Fernando T. Acosta, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

2.
Affidavit[3] dated 26 September 1992, executed by Maria Cortez
Atos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

3.
Affidavit[4] dated 14 January 1992, executed by Fanolex James
A. Menos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

4.
Affidavit[5] dated 23 December 1993, executed by Ponciano V.
Abalos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

5.
Absolute Date of Sale[6] dated 23 June 1993, executed by
Danilo Gonzales in favor of Senecio C. Marzan, notarized by Rolando Dela
Cruz;

6.
Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties[7] dated 5 March
1994, executed by Evelyn C. Canullas and Pastora C. Tacadena, subscribed
and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

7.
Sworn Statement[8] dated 31 May 1994, executed by Felimon B.
Rimorin, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

8.

Deed of Sale[9] dated 17 August 1994, executed by Woodrow

Apurado in favor of Jacinto Batara, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

9.
Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties[10] dated 1 June
1994, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos and Arsenio C. Sibayan, subscribed and
sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

10.
Absolute Deed of Sale[11] dated 23 March 1995, executed by
Eleanor D.Meridor in favor of Leonardo N. Benter, notarized by Rolando Dela
Cruz;

11.
Deed of Absolute Sale[12] dated 20 December 1996, executed by
Mandapat in favor of Mario R. Mabalot, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

12.
Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties[13] dated 17 April
1996, executed by Villiam C. Ambong and Romeo L. Quiming, subscribed and
sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

13.
Conditional Deed of Sale[14] dated 27 February 1997, executed
by Aurelia Demot Cados in favor of Jose Ma. A. Pangilinan, notarized by
Rolando Dela Cruz;

14.
Memorandum of Agreement[15] dated 19 July 1996, executed by
JARCO represented by Mr. Johnny Teope and AZTEC Construction represented
by Mr. George Cham, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz.

(Respondent's Contention)
Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child
abuse, illegal deduction of salary and others which are still pending before
the St. Louis University (SLU), National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
and the Prosecutors Office. He did not discuss anything about the allegations
of immorality in contracting a second marriage and malpractice in notarizing
documents despite the expiration of his commission.

After the filing of comment, We referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference.

The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is just a

reiteration of their allegations in their complaint.

(RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION)
Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage despite the
existence of his first marriage, and the subsequent nullification of the former.
He also admitted having notarized certain documents during the period when
his notarial commission had already expired. However, he offered some
extenuating defenses such as good faith, lack of malice and noble intentions
in doing the complained acts.

After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed submitted
for resolution.

(COMMISSIONER'S DECISION)

On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and

recommended that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that

respondent be administratively penalized for the following acts:

a. For contracting a second marriage without taking the appropriate legal

steps to have the first marriage annulled first, he be suspended from the
practice of law for one (1) year, and
b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of the
expiration of his notarial commission, he be suspended from the practice of
law for another one (1) year or for a total of two (2) years.

On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, approved and

adopted the recommendation of Commissioner Pacheco, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,

the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent contracted a
second marriage without taking appropriate legal steps to have the first
marriage annulled, Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year and for notarizing legal documents despite full
knowledge of the expiration of his notarial commission Atty. Rolando C. dela
Cruz is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for another one (1) year, for a
total of two (2) years Suspension from the practice of law.

COURT'S RULING
This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well
taken, except as to the penalty contained therein.

At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but
a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has
the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior, and he can
be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the
court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading
any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be
resolved by a proceeding to suspend, based on conduct rendering him unfit
to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.
It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an
attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has
proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to an office of attorney and, thus, to protect the public and those
charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an attorney.
Elaborating on this, we said on Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting, that the Bar should

maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair

dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A member of
the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in
any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the legal profession. Towards this end, an attorney
may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as
an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad
enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or
private capacity.

Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a
dichotomy of standards among its members. There is no distinction as to
whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity
or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality
so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, not
only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter
may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession
and the courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the
proper authorities.

Requirements for the admission to the Bar

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must
possess good moral character. Possession of such moral character as
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice must be
continuous. Otherwise, membership in the bar may be terminated when a
lawyer ceases to have good moral conduct.

(RESPONDENT PROVED TO HAVE CONTRACTED

SECOND MARRIAGE)

In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita Rivera
contracted marriage on 31 May 1982 before Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. In
less than a year, they parted ways owing to their irreconcilable differences
without seeking judicial recourse. The union bore no offspring. After their
separation in-fact, respondent never knew the whereabouts of Teresita Rivera

since he had lost all forms of communication with her. Seven years thereafter,
respondent became attracted to one Mary Jane Pascua, who was also a
faculty member of SLU-LHS. There is also no dispute over the fact that in
1989, respondent married Mary Jane Pascua in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Baguio City, Branch 68. Respondent even admitted this fact. When the
second marriage was entered into, respondents prior marriage with Teresita
Rivera was still subsisting, no action having been initiated before the court to
obtain a judicial declaration of nullity or annulment of respondents prior
marriage to Teresita Rivera or a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
Teresita Rivera.

Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the

bigamous second marriage in 1989, having been admitted to the Bar in 1985.
As such, he cannot feign ignorance of the mandate of the law that before a
second marriage may be validly contracted, the first and subsisting marriage
must first be annulled by the appropriate court. The second marriage was
annulled only on 4 October 1994 before the RTC of Benguet, Branch 9, or
about five years after respondent contracted his second marriage. The
annulment of respondents second marriage has no bearing to the instant
disbarment proceeding. Firstly, as earlier emphasized, the annulment came
after the respondents second bigamous marriage. Secondly, as we held in In
re: Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis (unique) for it is neither purely
civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the
conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is
not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of
withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then neither will
the judgment of annulment of respondents second marriage also exonerate
him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof clear preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against
members of the Bar is met, then liability attaches.

(LEGAL BASIS FOR DISBARMENT)

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a
ground for disbarment.

(Definition of immoral conduct and grossly immoral

conduct)
The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes

immoral conduct, vis--vis, grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is that

conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community and what is grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree.

Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross

as to warrant his disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he
made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage
was still in place, is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.

(RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT BE DISBARRED/GROUNDS)

However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider
respondents act as grossly immoral. This finds support in the following
recommendation and observation of the IBP Investigator and IBP Board of
Governors, thus:
The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to flaunt
the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession, to wit:

a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a
period of almost seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with
any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for
his wife, whom he described to be very intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with
relation to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when
the mother and child went to Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.

In the case of Terre v. Terre,[27] respondent was disbarred because his moral
character was deeply flawed as shown by the following circumstances, viz: he
convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and
void ab initio and that she was legally single and free to marry him. When
complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went
through law school while being supported by complainant, with some
assistance from respondents parents. After respondent had finished his law
course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the
complainant without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his
own child safely to a hospital.

In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[28] respondent was also disbarred for
his grossly immoral acts such as: first, he abandoned his lawful wife and
three children; second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying him;
third, he mispresented himself as a bachelor so he could contract marriage in
a foreign land; and fourth, he availed himself of complainants resources by
securing a plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry the latters
daughter. He did this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he even
had the temerity to assure complainant that everything is legal.

Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent
himself acknowledged and declared his abject apology for his misstep. He
was humble enough to offer no defense save for his love and declaration of
his commitment to his wife and child.

Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment

upon him to be unduly harsh. The power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could
accomplish the end desired. In line with this philosophy, we find that a
penalty of two years suspension is more appropriate. The penalty of one (1)
year suspension recommended by the IBP is too light and not commensurate
to the act committed by respondent.

As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents

during the years 1988-1997 after his commission as notary public had
expired, respondent humbly admitted having notarized certain documents
despite his knowledge that he no longer had authority to do so. He, however,
alleged that he received no payment in notarizing said documents.

It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty,

meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act
as notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts the document
into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with the
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of
conveyance would be undermined.
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not
be treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyers
act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission to do so as
reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the
crime of falsification of public documents.

(LEGAL BASIS FOR THE VIOLATION OF NOTARY)

The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is
done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no
authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to
disciplinary action or one, performing a notarial act without such commission
is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the
Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned
when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in
deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These
violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By acting as a notary
public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates
Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,[32] a lawyer was suspended for one
year when he notarized five documents after his commission as Notary Public

had expired, to wit: a complaint for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental

affidavit, a deed of sale, and a contract to sell. Guided by the pronouncement
in said case, we find that a suspension of two (2) years is justified under the
circumstances. Herein respondent notarized a total of fourteen (14)
documents[33] without the requisite notarial commission.
Other charges constituting respondents misconduct such as the pending
criminal case for child abuse allegedly committed by him against a high
school student filed before the Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; the pending
administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before
an Investigating Board created by SLU; and the pending labor case filed by
SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged
illegal deduction of salary by respondent, need not be discussed, as they are
still pending before the proper forums. At such stages, the presumption of
innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral

conduct, in disregard of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and
another two (2) years for notarizing documents despite the expiration of his
commission or a total of four (4) years of suspension.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the
Court Administrator, as well as the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
recorded in the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for

Disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on
Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala

(respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the

lawyer's oath."

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) thenfiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who
was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom
he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from
January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone
calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or
"Meet you at Megamall."

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night
or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home
from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept
at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together

on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following
which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration

at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends.
Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately.
Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all
her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household
appliances.

Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card

bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded
contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding

to Irene, reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the
aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what you're
about to do.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting

happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but
then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for the two of us?

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done
everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows .
. . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes
on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your single
life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until
we are together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of
us to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my
mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS
ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY

TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2

Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked
at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime
in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when
his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent
during a concert, she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on
which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS

RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions together. For instance, in or
about the third week of September 2001, the couple attended the launch of
the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of
SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in
Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21.
Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was
captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is
attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION
of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous

relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth
of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to
the immediate members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as
far as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married

to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his
apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross
moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar.
He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of
paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's
bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her
"until we are together again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the

Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts
demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his
membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with
Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his
relationship with his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with
[his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if
Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.

xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the
institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of
paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene]
to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was
merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey
the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution
and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and
the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively
his illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the institution of
marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage,
commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the

Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of
Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile special
relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment
pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene

gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth
as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy
of a Certificate of Live Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming
respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who
was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.

Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14

dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having "personal

knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainant's

Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency
of a civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene,
and a criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was
pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's ComplaintAffidavit and Reply to Answer were adopted as his testimony on direct
examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine complainant.17

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan,

in a 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004,
found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.

The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for

violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring
supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly
dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006
briefly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936

Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET

ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to
APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.20
(Italics and emphasis in the original)

Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant
to Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 of the Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the

Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case
for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word
Resolution shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of

complainant, that there is no evidence against him.24 The contention fails. As
the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and
the news item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken
together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an
adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of
evidence on record which support the accusation of complainant against
respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent

through counsel made the following statements to wit: "Respondent
specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with
Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter
being [that] their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate
members of their respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies
the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under
the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely
personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is

indeed a "special" relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene,
[which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise
Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the
child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be
noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that respondent
was the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his
special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would
lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It
should be underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he
is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an

adulterous relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of
the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman who shall
have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has
carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be
subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is
having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and
known only to the immediate members of their respective families."

In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading

responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of

the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a
form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an
implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial
pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading.
Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words
of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been
held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal

knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of
Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a "lawyer," 38 years
old as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the
desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the
signature attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with her signature on the
Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same
person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted,
respondent never denied being the father of the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his
January 29, 2003 Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand,
declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that
the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old
and a lawyer.31

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has
been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that
evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than
that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32
which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a
lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond

reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or

suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is required.33
(Emphasis supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his
relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, reading:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a

competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where
he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or
suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency

shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.34

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or

suspension uses the phrase "grossly immoral conduct," not "under
scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the
conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous
circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in
any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.

x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual

intercourse with a woman elsewhere.

"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without
the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct'
depends on the surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a
relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his
wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is
the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extramarital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not
"so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We
disagree.

xxxx

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual
relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant
administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to
betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is
considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of
the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent
did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this
administrative case substantiate the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed
respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a
grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the
fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which
his license confers upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission
to practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the

Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation
or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the

Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the

family and shall be protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes
this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help

and support."40

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
"unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7
of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of

the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22,
2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for nullity of his
(complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery
complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of
facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion
of complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting

complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the
petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10
of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that
"notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw
the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed
resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis
supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared
void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the
marriage was declared null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be
aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior
to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and
void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for

an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a

lawyer.

As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ,
respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his
December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had
already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the
dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint
for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary
Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the

fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of
the offense of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on,
respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates
with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her
about Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also
personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions.
Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to
complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another woman.
Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after
complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to
confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all
the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street,
New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church
where she had exchange marital vows with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since
Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits
that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was
where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that
Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed
smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a
residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her
separation from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put short;
their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when
Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center.
What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in
the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was
the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature

of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal

procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for both
respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner, that
Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be

prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant
complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if
respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the
Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been a
bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar
to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are
not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of
x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting
in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying
criminal case47 (Italics in the original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48

held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on

January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral

conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01

and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of

the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court
of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.

What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge

denying a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de
oficio. 1 One of the grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his
appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was
not in a position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The
denial by respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of
the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case." 2 It
was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and that
petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former
category being precisely to protect him in his new position without
prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to
allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the
overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be taken
seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance.
This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance
of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de

oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in his position, his
volume of work is likely to be very much less at present. There is not now the
slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who
expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly
without merit.

According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was

appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros
Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was
counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of
respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did
respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de
oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner
filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio,
premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time
service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which
could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge,
in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion
for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari
proceeding. 3

As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.

1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of

petitioner to withdraw as counsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began with a
reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with
the proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11,
1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which
reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the motion for
postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused
cannot continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the
Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are
two witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the government
would rest, the motion for postponement is denied. When counsel for the
accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew
since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in
order not to prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is
hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense obtained
postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28,
1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964

July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964." 4 Reference was then made to
another order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H.
Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is
hereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is
reminded that at its instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8)
times, and that the government witnesses have to come all the way from
Manapala." 5 After which, it was noted in such order that there was no
incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court
and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on
Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and
requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution
has already rested its case." 6

2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly
mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It could be
that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being
appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such
belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence
welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed
a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is
understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one
so designated. A recent statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban:
7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the
fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a
responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a
trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the
performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of
justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent
defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that
his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a
diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore
that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his
practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of
relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to
neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as
counsel de oficio must be fulfilled." 8

So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, 9 where

respondent was de oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson
making clear: "This Court should exact from its officers and subordinates the

most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when

negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in
the prosecution of criminal cases ...." 10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia
11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that he is a courtappointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as
high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself.
Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and
professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to
render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due
diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a
vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social
conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12

The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.

3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to
the apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and
reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the accused could be
prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its
importance was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v.
Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless
the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be
heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he
may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how
to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who
are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted
by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right
and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough
to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that
the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or
grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The present
Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the
accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel," 15 there
is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other

means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the
defense of an accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for
petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did
betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to
put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election
registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now.
There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant
demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been
set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his
task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase
doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good
standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of
legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to
court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.

After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both
cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client
relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration.

The Case

Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other

disciplinary action against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P.

Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn
Statement alleging the following:

xxxxxxxxx

That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C.

Magulta, sometime in September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta
and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City,
who agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and possible civil case
against certain parties for breach of contract;

That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me

the demand letter and some other legal papers, for which services I have
accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a settlement of
the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint,
which he subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A, the
filing fee whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00);

That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on
January 4, 1999, deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that I
needed the case filed immediately;

That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the
complaint had already been filed in court, and that I should receive notice of
its progress;

That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or
from Atty. Magulta but there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I
frequented his office to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;

That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait
[every time] I asked; and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999,
he said that the court personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my
satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland,
Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the City
Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and told to wait while he
personally follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon,
within the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was absent
on that day;

That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to
go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magultas complaint
to personally verify the progress of my case, and there told that there was no
record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of
the Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;

That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta at his office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he
continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the
court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he
has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the
filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to
reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999,
in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which
are attached as Annexes D and E;

That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I
wish to complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty
and oppressive conduct;

x x x x x x x x x.[1]

On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline,[2] respondent filed his Answer[3] vehemently
denying the allegations of complainant for being totally outrageous and
baseless. The latter had allegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of one of
the formers law partners. After their meeting, complainant requested him to

draft a demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the
former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of
complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that another demand
letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who
reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer, complainant asked
the process server of the formers law office to deliver the letter to the
addressee.

Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour
meeting, respondent drafted a complaint (which was only for the purpose of
compelling the owner to settle the case) and prepared a compromise
agreement. He was also requested by complainant to do the following:

1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan

2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation

3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation

4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainants wife

All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by
complainant.

Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on
withdrew all the files pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no
settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to draft a complaint for
breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had never been paid by
complainant until this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal
fees. When told that these fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill
claim was almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay on installment
basis.

On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondents

secretary and told her that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When
informed of the payment, the lawyer immediately called the attention of
complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay the acceptance and filing
fees before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the
amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should
give the filing fee later.

Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the

meantime the filing of the complaint because the former might be paid by
another company, the First Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered
to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on
for two months, but the parties never arrived at any agreement.

Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest

in filing the complaint. Respondent reminded him once more of the
acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that the complaint be
filed first before payment of respondents acceptance and legal fees. When
respondent refused, complainant demanded the return of the P25,000. The
lawyer returned the amount using his own personal checks because their law
office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their office
personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondents checks were accepted
and encashed by complainant.

Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived

complainant, and if anyone had been shortchanged by the undesirable
events, it was he.

The IBPs Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on

Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:

x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the

Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With
complainants deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a

corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was
to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client,
the complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his
misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover
up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional
damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part,
unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement
by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing
fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said
funds. Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity of his offense, it is
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year.[4]

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the Commissions recommendation.

Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Clients Funds

Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a)
his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation
for himself of the money given for the filing fee.

Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the
Regwill complaint; hence, the formers failure to file the complaint in court.
Also, respondent alleges that the amount delivered by complainant to his
office on January 4, 1999 was for attorneys fees and not for the filing fee.

We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the
prosecution or the defense of the clients cause. They who perform that duty
with diligence and candor not only protect the interests of the client, but also
serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the
respect of the community for the legal profession.[5] Members of the bar
must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the

public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession.[6]

Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship

existed between him and complainant, because the latter never paid him for
services rendered. The former adds that he only drafted the said documents
as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.

We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first

moment complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the
formers business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential
that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous
occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged;
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the
case for which his service had been sought.

If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a

lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the
professional employment is established.[7]

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close

personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the
nonpayment of the formers fees.[8] Hence, despite the fact that complainant
was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed
legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer
was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had
actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the
clients interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.

This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the
cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in them.[9] They owe entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of
the clients rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the
end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law
legally applied.[10]

Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt

issued by his office to complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP
Report correctly noted that it was quite incredible for the office personnel of a
law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt erroneously
indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the
mistake -- if indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken
steps to correct the error. He should have lost no time in calling complainants
attention to the matter and should have issued another receipt indicating the
correct purpose of the payment.

The Practice of Law -- a

Profession, Not a Business

In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law
is a profession and not a business.[11] Lawyering is not primarily meant to be
a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily
yields profits.[12] The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a
secondary consideration.[13] Duty to public service and to the administration
of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The
practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the
highest eminence may be attained without making much money.[14]

In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as

evidenced by the receipt issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter
also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling
money entrusted to them in their professional capacity.[15] Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all
moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.

Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of
professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession.[16] It may be true that they have a lien upon the clients funds,
documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession;
that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have
been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such

fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them

of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure
to do so constitutes professional misconduct.[17] In any event, they must still
exert all effort to protect their clients interest within the bounds of law.

If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege

to practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also
to the court, to the bar, and to the public.[18] Respondent fell short of this
standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him
by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the
former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.

On the other hand, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar

respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised
with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects
the standing and the character of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a
penalty.[19]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01

and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective
upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well as
the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in
respondents file.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant

vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T.

Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension
from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.

On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez

several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on
a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over
the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before
14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of
returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately
P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the
amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the
amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount
of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after
their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank,
Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the
notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank
concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to
settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.

Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed
respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In
due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987
which:

(a)

acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and

(b)
convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases,
and sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the
amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359;

to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of

insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in
Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and

to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of

insolvency, and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in
Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto

the decision of the trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda
from the practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision read as follows:

For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the
conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.

It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the
Bar, and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral
turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall
not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in
accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy
of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by
Section 29 of the same Rule.

SO ORDERED. 1

On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of

Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted
respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of
Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February
1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.

In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action
respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals'
decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration

of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December

1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had lost her right to
appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal
instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period.

In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:

that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful
penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that
accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the
lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is
innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the
herein plaintiff-appellee.

We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not
violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that
when she issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause
damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.

The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the
Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly
ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral
turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal
offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. In Lozano
v. Martinez, 2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 in the following terms:

xxx

xxx

xxx

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain
of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense

against property but an offense against public order.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private

interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful
practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest. 3 (Italics supplied)

Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because
she had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and
28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:

Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what

grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First

Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an
attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding
section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his
profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics
supplied)

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also

import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the
laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not
(as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise
of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the
good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v.
Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:

the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a
person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is
also essential for remaining in the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of

Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law
until further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be
forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and spread on the record of respondent.

NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.

In a sworn complaint 1 dated 25 September 1979, the spouses Erlinda

Dalman and Narciso Melendrez charged Reynerio I. Decena, a member of the
Philippine Bar, with malpractice and breach of trust. The complainant spouses
alleged, among others, that respondent had, by means of fraud and deceit,
taken advantage of their precarious financial situation and his knowledge of
the law to their prejudice, succeeded in divesting them of their only
residential lot in Pagadian City; that respondent, who was their counsel in an
estafa case against one Reynaldo Pineda, had compromised that case without
their authority.

In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied all the charges

levelled against him and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative complaint was referred

to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.

Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of

Pagadian City, Jorge T. Almonte, to conduct the necessary investigation, with
instructions to submit thereafter this report and recommendation thereon.
Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on the administrative case until 15 July
1982, when he requested the Solicitor General to release him from the duty
of investigating the case.

On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's

request and in his stead appointed the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del
Sur, Pedro S. Jamero, who resumed hearings on 15 June 1983.

Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, a motion seeking to inhibit
Fiscal Jamero from hearing the case followed by an urgent motion for
indefinite postponement of the investigation. Both motions were denied by
the Court in a Resolution dated 21 September 1987 with instructions to the
Solicitor General to complete the investigation of the administrative case and
to render his report and recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from
notice.

On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his Report and

Recommendation 2 dated 21 June 1988. In as Report, after setting out the
facts and proceedings held in the present case, the Solicitor General
presented the following:

FINDINGS

Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained from respondent

a loan of P 4,000.00. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage (Annex

C, Complainants' Complaint, p. 16, records).lwph1.t In the said Real

Estate Mortgage document, however, it was made to appear that the amount
borrowed by complainants was P5,000.00. Confronted by this discrepancy,
respondent assured complainants that said document was a mere formality,
and upon such assurance, complainants signed the same. The document was
brought by complainant Narciso Melendres to a Notary Public for notarization.
After the same was notarized, he gave the document to respondent. Despite
the assurance, respondent exacted from complainants P500.00 a month as
payment for what is beyond dispute usurious interest on the P5,000.00 loan.
Complainants religiously paid the obviously usurious interest for three
months: September, October and November, 1975. Then they stopped paying
due to financial reverses. In view of their failure to pay said amounts as
interest, respondent prepared a new document on May 7, 1976, a Real Estate
Mortgage (Annex D, Complaint, p. 18, records) over the same lot 3125-C,
replacing the former real estate mortgage dated August 5, 1975, but this
time the sum indicated in said new contract of mortgage is P 10,000.00,
purportedly with interest at 19% per annum. In this new Real Estate
Mortgage, a special power of attorney in favor of respondent was inserted,
authorizing him to sell the mortgaged property at public auction in the event
complainants fail to pay their obligation on or before May 30, 1976. Without
explaining the provisions of the new contract to complainants, respondent
insisted that complainants sign the same, again upon the assurance that the
document was a mere formality. Unsuspecting of the motive of respondent,
complainants signed the document. Complainants Narciso Melendres again
brought the same document to a Notary Public for notarization. After the
document was notarized, he brought the same to respondent without getting
a copy of it.

Complainants, relying on the assurance of the respondent that the second

Real Estate Mortgage was but a formality, neither bothered to ask from
respondent the status of their lot nor tried to pay their obligation. For their
failure to pay the obligation, the respondent on October 12, 1976, applied for
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16,
Respondent's Position Paper). All the requirements of Act No. 3135, as
amended, re extrajudicial sale of mortgage were ostensibly complied with by
respondent. Hence, finally, title was transferred to him, and on June 20, 1979,
respondent sold the involved property to Trinidad Ylanan for P12,000.00.

When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first week of
March 1979 (see Sworn Statement of complainant Narciso Melendres, p. 6,
Folder No. 2 of case), and not having known the legal implications of the

provisions of the second Real Estate Mortgage which they had executed,
complainants could not believe that title to their lot had already been
transferred to respondent and that respondent had already sold the same to
a third person.

Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979, complainants tried to raise the
amount of P10,000.00 and went to respondent's house on May 30, 1979 to
pay their obligation, hoping that they could redeem their property, although
three years had already lapsed from the date of the mortgage.

Respondent did not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but instead gave
complainants a sheet of paper (Annex B, Complainants' Position Paper), which
indicated that the total indebtedness had soared to P20,400.00. The
computation was made in respondent's own handwriting. Complainants went
home with shattered hopes and with grief in their hearts. Hence, the instant
competent for disbarment against respondent filed on October 5, 1979.

Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He maintains that

what appears on the two documents allegedly executed by complainants, i.e.,
that they obtained a loan of P5,000.00 on August 5, 1975 and another
P10,000.00 on May 7,1976, is allegedly the truth, and claims that he in truth
delivered the alleged amount of P5,000.00 to complainants and not
P4,000.00. With respect to the second loan, respondent claims that he
delivered to complainants P8,000.00, plus the P2,000.00 loan previously
extended [to] complainants [by] one Regino Villanueva, which loan had been
indorsed to respondent for collection, thus making a total of P10,000.00, as
appearing on said document. Respondent denies that he exacted usurious
interest of 10% a month or P500.00 from complainants. He asserts that the
fact that complainants were able to secure a loan from the Insular Bank of
Asia and America (IBAA) only proves the truth of his allegation that the title of
the property, at the time complainants obtained a loan from IBAA on April
1976, was clear of any encumbrance, since complainants had already paid
the original loan of P5,000.00 obtained from respondent; that complainants
knew fully well all the conditions of said mortgage; and that his acquisition of
the property in question was in accordance with their contract and the law on
the matter. Thus, he denies that he has violated any right of the
complainants.

After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent, we find

against respondent.

While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually obtained an
actual cash of P4,000.00, they are only partly correct in the claim that out of
the P10,000.00 appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00 was
applied to interest considering that not all the P6,000.00 but only P4,000.00
was applied to interest, computed as follows: the first loan of P5,000.00 was
supposedly due on August 31, 1975. Complainants paid 10% monthly interest
or P500.00 on September 30, 1975, October 31, 1975 and November 30,
1975. Consequently, beginning December 31, 1975 up to May 31, 1976 (the
date of the execution of the second Real Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6)
months lapsed. Six (6) months at P500.00 equals P 3,000.00, which amount
plus the P2,000.00 complainants' loan to one Engr. Villanueva (indorsed to
respondent for collection) totals P5,000.00. Adding this amount to the
previous P5,000.00 indicated loan secured by the first mortgage results in
P10,000.00, the amount appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage.
Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement

have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as complaining all such
terms, and, therefore, there can be, as between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than
the contents of the writing, except in the following cases:

(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express

the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement
is put in issue by the pleadings;

(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term "agreement"
includes wills.

There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate

Mortgages covering the supposed original loan of P5,000.00 and the inflated
P10,000.00, respectively, were voluntarily signed by the complainants. The
general rule is that when the parties have reduced their agreement to
writing, it is presumed that they have made the writing the only repository

and memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be
understood to have been waived and abandoned.

However, the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions, as

aforequoted. One of the exceptions, that is, failure to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties, applies in this case. From the facts obtaining in
the case, it is clear that the complainants were induced to sign the Real
Estate Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent representations of
respondent that each of the successive documents was a are formality.

While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent,
being a lawyer, should have at least explained to complainants the legal
implications of the provisions of the real estate mortgage, particularly the
provision appointing him as the complainants' attorney-in-fact in the event of
default in payments on the part of complainants. While it may be conceded
that it is presumed that in practice the notary public apprises complainants of
the legal implications of the contract, it is of common knowledge that most
notaries public do not go through the desired practice. Respondent at least
could have informed the complainants by sending a demand letter to them to
pay their obligation as otherwise he would proceed to sell the lot at public
auction as per their contract. This respondent failed to do, despite the fact
that he knew fully wen that complainants were trying their best to raise
money to be able to pay their obligation to him, as shown by the loan
obtained by complainants from the IBAA on April 8, 1976. In this connection,
it may be stated that complainants, per advice of respondent himself,
returned the proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank immediately on April 30,
1976, considering that the net proceeds of the loan from said bank was only
P4,300.00 and not enough to pay the indicated loan from respondent of
P5,000.00, which per computation of respondent would already have earned
interest of P2,500.00 for five (5) months (December 1975 to April, 1976).

Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan of
P5,000.00, and that this was the reason why complainants were able to
mortgage the lot to the bank free from any encumbrance. This claim is
incorrect. The reason why the title (T-2684) was free from any encumbrance
was simply because of the fact that the first Real Estate Mortgage for the
indicated loan of P5,000.00 (the actual amount was only P 4,000.00) had not
been annotated at the back of the title (see Annex B, p. 14, rec.).

Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount of

Pl0,000. 00 as payment of the loan, alleging that if the offer were true, he
could have readily accepted the same since he sold the lot for almost the
same amount, for only P12,000.00, a difference of a few thousand pesos.
Respondent's denial is spacious.

Indeed, complainants made the offer, but respondent refused the same for
the simple reason that the offer was made on May 30,1979, three (3) years
after the execution of the mortgage on May 31, 1976. With its lapse of time,
respondent demanded obviously the payment of the accumulated substantial
interest for three years, as shown by his own computation in as own
handwriting on a sheet of paper (Annex C, Complainants' Position Paper,
Folder No. 2).lwph1.t

In view of all the foregoing, the observation made by the Hearing Officer is
worth quoting:

In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with respect to
this particular charge is whose version is to be believed. Is it the version of
the complainants or the version of the respondent.

In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the complainants in
filing the present complaint against the respondent must be carefully
examined and considered. At the beginning there was a harmonious
relationship between the complainants and the respondent so much so that
respondent was even engaged as counsel of the complainants and it is but
human nature that when respondent extended a loan to the complainants the
latter would be grateful to the former. However, in the case at bar,
complainants filed a complaint against the respondent in spite of the great
disparity between the status of the complainants and the respondent.
Admittedly, respondent is in a better position financially, socially and
intellectually. To the mind of the undersigned, complainants were only
compelled to file the above entitled complaint against the respondent
because they felt that they are so aggrieved of what the respondent has done
to them. It is for this reason therefore that the undersigned is inclined to
believe the version of the complainants rather than of the respondent. In
addition thereto, the respondent as a lawyer could really see to it that the
transaction between the complainants and himself on papers appear legal

and in order. Besides, there is ample evidence in the records of its case that
respondent is actually engaged in lending money at least in a limited way
and that the interest at the rate of ten per cent a month is but common
among money lenders during the time of the transactions in question'

Going now into the second charge, complainants alleged that respondent,
who was their counsel (private prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. 734, for
estafa, against accused Reynaldo Pineda, compromised the case with the
accused without their consent and received the amount of P500.00 as
advance payment for the amicable settlement, without however, giving to
the complainants the Id amount nor informing them of said settlement and
payment.

Again, respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable
settlement was with the consent of complainant wife Erlinda Dalman
Melendre[z].

We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants.

It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the accused

Reynaldo Pineda to jail but rather in merely recovering their money of
P2,000.00. At this stage, relationship between complainants and respondent
was not yet strained, and respondent, as counsel of the complainants in this
case, knew that complainants were merely interested in said recovery.
Knowing this, respondent on his own volition talked to accused and tried to
settle the case amicably for P2,000.00. He accepted the amount of P500.00
as advance payment, being then the only amount carried by the accused
Pineda. A receipt was signed by both respondent and accused Pineda (Annex
M, p. 34, record). However, respondent did not inform complainants about
this advance payment, perhaps because he was still waiting for the
completion of the payment of P2,000.00 before turning over the whole
amount to complainants.

At any rate, complainants saw accused Pineda give the abovementioned

P500.00 to respondent, but they were ashamed then to ask directly of
respondent what the money was all about.

On June 27, 1979, barely a month after May 30, 1979, when the complainants
had already lost their trust and respect and/or confidence in respondent upon
knowing what happened to their lot and, more so, upon respondent's refusal
to accept the Pl0,000.00 offered by complainants to redeem the same,
Narciso Melendre[z] saw the accused Pineda on his way home and confronted
him on the P500.00 that had been given to respondent. Accused then showed
complainant Melendres the receipt (Annex M, Id.) showing that the P500.00
was an advance payment for the supposed settlement/dismissal of the case
filed by complainants against him.

Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them, complainants then filed
a motion before the court which was trying the criminal case and relieved
respondent as their counsel.

The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the case and saw the demeanor of the
witnesses in testifying, had this to say:

With respect to the second charge, the fact that respondent received P500.00
from Reynaldo Pineda is duly established. Both the complainants and the
respondent agreed that the said amount was given to the respondent in
connection with a criminal case wherein the complainants were the private
offended parties: that Reynaldo Pineda is the accused and that the
respondent is the private prosecutor of the said case. The pivotal issue in this
particular charge is whether the respondent received the amount of P500.00
from Reynaldo Pineda as an advance payment of an amicable settlement
entered into by the complainants and the accused or the respondent received
said amount from the accused without the knowledge and consent of the
complainants. If it is true as alleged by the respondent that he only received
it for and in behalf of the complainants as advance payment of an amicable
settlement why is it that the same was questioned by the complainants? Why
is it that it was not the complainants who signed the receipt for the said
amount? How come that as soon as complainants knew that the said amount
was given to the respondent, the former filed a motion in court to relieve
respondent as their counsel on the ground that they have lost faith and
confidence on him? If it is really true that complainants have knowledge and
have consented to this amicable settlement they should be grateful to the
efforts of their private prosecutor yet the fact is that they resented the same
and went to the extent of disqualifying the respondent as their private

prosecutor. Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an affidavit belying the claim

of the respondent.'

Clearly, the complained acts as described and levelled against respondent

Decena are contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals for which
he may be suspended. The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be
disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or nonprofessional attitude (Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). The complained acts of
respondent imply something immoral in themselves, regardless of the fact
whether they are punishable by law. The doing of the act itself, and not its
prohibition by statute, fixes the moral turpitude (Bartos vs. U.S. Dist. Court for
District of Nebraska C.C.C. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722).

A parting comment.

All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are faultless.

Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent too

much. They did not bother to keep a copy of the documents they executed
and considering that they admitted they did not understand the contents of
the documents, they did not bother to have them explained by another
lawyer or by any knowledgeable person in their locality. Likewise, for a period
of three years, they did not bother to ask for respondent the status of their lot
and/or their obligation to him. Their complacency or apathy amounting
almost to negligence contributed to the expedient loss of their property thru
the legal manuevers employed by respondent. Hence, respondent's liability
merits mitigation. (Emphasis supplied)

and made the following recommendation:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Reynerio I. Decena be

suspended from the practice of law for a period of five (5) years. 3

The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero, held

several hearings during the investigation of the present administrative case:

City Fiscal Jorge T. Almonte was able to hold six (6) actual hearings out of
twenty-five (25) resettings 4 While only five (5) actual hearings, out of forty
(40) resettings 5 were held under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero. In those
hearings, the complainants presented a number of witnesses who, after their
direct testimony, were cross-examined by the counsel for respondent;
complainant Narciso Melendrez also testified and was accordingly crossexamined. Considering the long delay incurred in the investigation of the
administrative case and having been pressed by the Solicitor General
immediately to complete the investigation, Fiscal Jamero posed a change of
procedure, from trial type proceedings to requiring the parties to submit their
respective position papers. The complainants immediately filed their position
paper which consisted of their separate sworn statements, (that of Narciso
Melendrez was in a question and answer form), their documentary exhibits
and an affidavit of one Jeorge G. Santos. Respondent also filed his counteraffidavit and affidavits of his witnesses, with several annexes in support
thereof In the healing of 28 October 1987, which had been set for the cross
examination of the complainants and their witnesses by respondent, the
complainants refused to submit themselves to cross-examination on the
ground that the order of the hearing officer dated 17 December 1986
declaring respondent's right of cross examination as having been waived, had
become final and executory. Respondent questions now the evidentiary value
of the complainants' position paper, not having passed through any crossexamination and argues that the non-submission of the complainants and
their witnesses to cross-examination constitutes a denial of his right to due
process.

We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their

witnesses against him has been violated, Respondent in fact cross-examined
complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the witnesses which
complainants had presented earlier. As pointed out by the Solicitor General,
the record of the proceedings shows that respondent had all the opportunity
to cross-examine the other witnesses of the complainants (those whose
affidavits were attached to complainants' position paper) had he wanted to,
but had forfeited such opportunity by asking for numerous continuances
which indicated a clear attempt on his part to delay the investigation
proceedings. Respondent had in fact requested a total of twenty three (23)
resettings during the investigation proceedings: he had eight (8) under Fiscal
Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. There were also instances
where respondent asked for postponement and at the same time reset the
hearing to a specific date of his choice on which neither he nor as counsel
would appear. That attitude of respondent eventually led the hearing officer

to declare his (respondent's) right to cross-examine the complainants and

their witnesses as having been waived in his order of 17 December 1986.
Respondent can not now claim that he had been deprived below of the
opportunity to confront the complainants and their witnesses.

After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the
evidence presented by both parties, we agree with the findings and
conclusions of the Solicitor General.

The following acts of respondent:

1.
making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the
amount loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of P4,000.00;

2.

exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest;

3.
making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976
that the loan extended to complainants had escalated to P10,000.00;

4.
failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage
documents and inducing them to sign those documents with assurances that
they were merely for purposes of "formality";

5.
failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from
complainants before effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged
property; and

6.
failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real
estate mortgage had already been foreclosed and that complainants had a
right to redeem the foreclosed property within a certain period of time.

constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of

the Bar. We agree with the Solicitor General that the acts of respondent
"imply something immoral in themselves regardless of whether they are
punishable by law" and that these acts constitute moral turpitude, being
"contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals." The standard
required from members of the Bar is not, of course, satisfied by conduct
which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. Even so, respondent's
conduct, in fact, may be penalizable under at least one penal statute the
anti-usury law.

The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional
capacity, that is, done at a time when he was counsel for the complainants in
a criminal case for estafa against accused Reynaldo Pineda. There are two (2)
aspects to this charge: the first is that respondent Decena effected a
compromise agreement concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo
Pineda without the consent and approval of the complainants; the second is
that, having received the amount of P500.00 as an advance payment on this
"settlement," he failed to inform complainants of that advance payment and
moreover, did not turn over the P500.00 to the complainants. The facts show
that respondent "settled" the estafa case amicably for P2,000.00 without the
knowledge and consent of complainants. Respondent informed complainants
of the amicable "settlement" and of the P500.00 advance payment only after
petitioner Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about these matters. And
respondent never did turn over to complainants the P500.00. Respondent is
presumed to be aware of the rule that lawyers cannot "without special
authority, compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge
of a client's claim, but the full amount in cash. 6 Respondent's failure to turn
over to complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as partial
"settlement" of the estafa case underscores his lack of honesty and candor in
dealing with his clients.

Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct

committed in his personal or non-professional capacity. Where however,
misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes so patent and so gross
as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession, the Court
must suspend or strike out the lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys. 7
The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a
person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of
members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not

related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of the Bar, which

puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law. 8

In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent

attorney upon the complainants in his private transactions with them, and the
exacting of unconscionable rates of interest, considered together with the
acts of professional misconduct committed by respondent attorney, compel
this Court to the conviction that he has lost that good moral character which
is indispensable for continued membership in the Bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his

name shall be stricken from the Rollo of Attorneys. Let a copy of this
Resolution be FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the
personal records of respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON

S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY
ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,

ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of
which is ripe while the other has been rendered moot by a supervening
event.

The antecedents follow.

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition[1] to disqualify Haron S. Meling
(Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the
appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to
take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely:
Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and
Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May

21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez
and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also
purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries
to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney
in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite
the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an
indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears
on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Courts Resolution[2] dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed

his Answer with the OBC.

In his Answer,[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases
filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their
former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez.
Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge
has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the
College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a
single incident and involving the same parties as closed and terminated.
Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do
not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his
communications really contained the word Attorney as they were, according
to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated December 8, 2003, the OBC

disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in
his petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known
that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired
judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already
dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain
his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made
under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What
matters is his act of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained
of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not
satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty
of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes
him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly
making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with
his application for admission to the bar.[5]

As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters, the
explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the
Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as attorney whoever may have
typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law,

the fact is, he is signing his communications as Atty. Haron S. Meling knowing
fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter
1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation attorney may render a person
liable for indirect contempt of court.[6]

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the
Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the
Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Melings membership in the
Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court.[7]

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling,
however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition,
insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and
signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose
the appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for
resolution and has to be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter
of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only
learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.
[8] The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law.[9]

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002
Bar Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she has not been
charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before
a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or

convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral
turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her. Despite
the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three
pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done
under oath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether

there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant.[10]
The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the
Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness
demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the
applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately
proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral
character of the applicant.

Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal
cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character
and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member
of the Sharia Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is not
entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,[11] the Court had
the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title Attorney by
members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine
Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial
Sharia District in Marawi City, used the title Attorney in several
correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into
by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:

persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Sharia courts. While one
who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to
the Philippine Bar, may both be considered counselors, in the sense that they
give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
attorney. The title attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are

authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.[12]

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling
in this case. The solemn task of administering justice demands that those
who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest official to
the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but
likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short
of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and
constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public
trust.

In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in
his application to take the Bar examinations and made conflicting
submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly
unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him
therefrom until further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of

appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine
Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine
Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the
suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent
Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for
having become moot and academic.

Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues

Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP

Administrative Case No. MDD-1)

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the

Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short)
Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri,
submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,
pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP,
which reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the
Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be
sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the
resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on
February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due
from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of
Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted
a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing,
the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral
arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would

show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to
particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court
Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated
and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
(hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme

Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys
is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas
the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10
of the Court Rule, which reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of

Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of
the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated

in these words of the Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national

body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all
persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of

the Court Rule:

SEC. 9.
Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions

constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and
that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his
name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not
among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to
constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface
whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the
conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of
the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous
case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of
the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et
al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that
case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous
pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the

arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials

and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must

belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar
is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which
all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the
rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding

considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more
than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration
imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual
lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the
integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a
valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice
of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client,
but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and
takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the
administration of justice as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law
being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to
a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has
created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained,

the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to

the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the
Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to
"raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining
the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9,
1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the
IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4,
1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and
motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and
regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property
may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as
the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is
the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an
undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom,
and all individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and

validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant
of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the
1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

xxx

xxx

(5)
Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under
such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling
Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the
provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that
this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in
all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his
practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the
society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to
require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering
with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such
reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public
with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal

with them seriatim.

1.
The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without
power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in
order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program the lawyers. 9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to

be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2.
The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the
Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in
the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and
duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution) which power the respondent acknowledges from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration. 11

3.
The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty
provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process
and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice
of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder
of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at
length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be
and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to
enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment,
is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right
but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory
power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.

4.
Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient
to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and
are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities,
and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the
Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and
disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky,
said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does
not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is
inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed necessary, to the
proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary
power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative
likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real
because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a
brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are
disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination
to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect

the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a
guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when
it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the
fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is
indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and
of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are
neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court

that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred,
and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the
Court.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA1, defendant-appellant.

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged

Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief (willful destruction of
another person's property for vicious, wanton, or mischievous purposes)
before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was
represented by counsel de officio(public attorney) but later on replaced by
counsel de parte (private attorney). The complainant in the same case was
represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered
his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the
Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every
time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on
official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his

services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was

questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al.
vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been
appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and
therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law
practice."
Counsel then argued that the JP (Justice of the Peace) Court in entertaining
the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above
ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of
the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Petitioner's Contention

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion
to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time
invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules
of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that
City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation.
The JP (Justice of the Peace) Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right
of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually
enagaged in private law practice.

This Order was appealed to the CFI (Court of First Insance) of Laguna,
presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on
December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:

The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by
the offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the
right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel because
of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice
of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an

attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace
Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear
that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a
professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no
control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in
the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal
cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict
in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San
Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as
already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be
represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action
which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Fule is engage in private practice

which is prohibited under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court
NO

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D.
Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as
private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the
offended party.

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of
Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private
prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore

reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of

defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127
(now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give
professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing
as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We
believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of
the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within
the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment
for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The
appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The
following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been
given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from

should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against
appellant..

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial

Court, Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.

In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga,

Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133,
requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority
to appear as pro bono (represent him without salary) counsel of his cousin,
Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled People vs.
Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga for Falsification of Public Document pending before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40. While respondents
letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private
complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court
Administrator, dated September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification with
regard to respondents authority to appear as counsel for the accused in the
said criminal case. On September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court
Administrator referred the matter to respondent for comment.

(RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE)
In his Comment, dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he
had appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He
reasoned out that the factual circumstances surrounding the criminal case
compelled him to handle the defense of his cousin who did not have enough
resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand,
private complainant was a member of a powerful family who was out to get
even with his cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the
criminal case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of the public since
he did not take advantage of his position. In any case, his appearances in
court were covered by leave application approved by the presiding judge.

On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a resolution denying respondents

request for authorization to appear as counsel and directing the Office of the
Court Administrator to file formal charges against him for appearing in court
without the required authorization from the Court.

On January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed the instant

administrative complaint against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of
Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and

Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which provides:

Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of

public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any
public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.- Public officials
and employees during their incumbency shall not:
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions;

In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to

comment on the administrative complaint.

(RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE)

In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are close
blood cousins who belong to a powerless family from the impoverished town
of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he finished his law
degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported and guided him while he looked up
to her as a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms.
Ladaga sought respondents help and advice when she was charged in
Criminal Case No. 84885 for falsification by the private complainant, Lisa
Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said criminal case was to
seek vengeance on her cousin. He explained that his cousins discord with Ms.
Andres started when the latters husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the
conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit
affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth
certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against
Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only lawyer in their
family, he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms. Ladagas plea to be her counsel
since she did not have enough funds to pay for the services of a lawyer.
Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7) years of untainted
government service, initially with the Commission on Human Rights and now
with the judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and
that it was only in this particular case that he had been administratively

charged for extending a helping hand to a close relative by giving a free legal
assistance for humanitarian purpose. He never took advantage of his position
as branch clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding
office. He stressed that during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on
leave as shown by his approved leave applications attached to his comment.

In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondents comment and
referred the administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report
and recommendation.

In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following
findings and recommendation:

INVESTIGATING JUDGE'S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in
behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No.
84-885 for Falsification of Public Documents before the METC of Quezon City.
It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was
without the previous permission of the Court.

An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the
respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he
was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge
Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the
respondent appeared as pro bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His
cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared that the respondent
did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and
respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her
out of his compassion and high regard for her.

It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever

handled a case for a member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He
appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably.
Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for
his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in government
service, he has maintained his integrity and independence.

RECOMMENDATION

In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as

counsel for his cousin without first securing permission from the court, and
considering that this is his first time to do it coupled with the fact that said
appearance was not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his Presiding
Judge, it is hereby respectfully recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with
a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more
severely.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ladaga engaged into private

practice as prohibited by Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court and Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
(NO)

COURT'S RULING
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.

Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants
from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition
is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows
certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession.
The said section reads:

SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice.- No judge or other official or

employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall
engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advise
to clients.

However, it should be clarified that private practice of a profession,

specifically the law profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not
pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.

In the case of People vs. Villanueva,[7] we explained the meaning of the term
private practice prohibited by the said section, to wit:

We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the
Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent
or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it
is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
N.S. 768) Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as
a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not
conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The
following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been
given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when

respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No.
84885 does not constitute the private practice of the law profession
contemplated by law.

Nonetheless, while respondents isolated court appearances did not amount to

a private practice of law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor
from the head of the Department, which is this Court as required by Section
12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission
from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be
absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to
engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be
fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency
of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which
do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and
public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and
he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an
officer of the board of directors.

RESPONDENT'S APPEARANCES

Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on

numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and
August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is true that he filed
leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. However,
he failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The
presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head
of the Department contemplated by law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is

hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act
would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.