GSIS v VILLAVIZA

Facts: PGM Winston Garcia, as President and General Manager of the GSIS,
filed separate formal charges against respondents and eventually found them
guilty for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service and meting out the penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the
accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.
The charges contained that
respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees, marched to or
appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in
a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs. Mario Molina and
Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises.
On appeal, CSC found the respondents guilty of the lesser offense of Violation
of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and reduced the penalty to
reprimand, stating that but there was no substantial evidence to hold them
guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. It found that
that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office wearing red shirts to
witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or mass action
proscribed above. CSC added that their actuations can be deemed an exercise
of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA found no cogent
reason to deviate therefrom.
PGM Garcia filed a petition for review under Rule 45. Petitioners primarily
question the probative value accorded to respondents' letters of explanation in
response to the memorandum of the GSIS-IU Manager. The respondents never
filed their answers to the formal charges. The petitioners argue that there
being no answers, the allegations in the formal charges that they filed should
have been deemed admitted pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court which provides:
SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted.- Material
averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of liquidated
damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations
of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not
denied specifically and under oath.
According to the petitioners, this rule is applicable to the case at bench
pursuant to Rule 1, Section 4 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 4. In what cases not applicable. - These Rules shall not apply to
election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. (underscoring
supplied)

Issue: WoN an administrative tribunal may apply suppletorily the provisions of

the rules of court on the effect of failure to deny the allegations in the
complaint and failure to file answer, where the respondents in the
administrative proceedings did not file any responsive pleading to the formal
charges against them.
Held:
The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners. Petitioners'
own rules, Rule XI, Section 4 of the GSIS' Amended Policy and Procedural
Guidelines No. 178-04, specifically provides:
If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5) working days from
receipt of the Formal Charge for the supporting evidence, when requested, he
shall be considered to have waived his right to file an answer and the PGM or
the Board of Trustees, in proper cases, shall render judgment, as may be
warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution.
A perusal of said section readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to file
an answer merely translates to a waiver of "his right to file an answer." There is
nothing in the rule that says that the charges are deemed admitted. It has not
done away with the burden of the complainant to prove the charges with clear
and convincing evidence.
It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be
applied in a "suppletory character." Suppletory is defined as "supplying
deficiencies."10 It means that the provisions in the Rules of Court will be made
to apply only where there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule. There is,
however, no such deficiency as the rules of the GSIS are explicit in case of
failure to file the required answer. What is clearly stated there is that GSIS may
"render judgment as may be warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by
the prosecution."
Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application in
this case, petitioners must remember that there remain averments that are not
deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them are immaterial
allegations and incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in the
complaint. Thus, even if respondents failed to file their answer, it does not
mean that all averments found in the complaint will be considered as true and
correct in their entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be rendered in
favor of the petitioners. We must not forget that even in administrative
proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the petitioners, who have
the burden of proving, with substantial evidence, the allegations in the
complaint or in the formal charges.1

A perusal of the decisions of the CA and of the CSC will reveal that the case
was resolved against petitioners based, not on the absence of respondents'
evidence, but on the weakness of that of the petitioners. Thus, the CA wrote:
Petitioners correctly submitted the administrative cases for resolution without
the respondents' respective answer to the separate formal charges in
accordance with Section 4, Rule XI of the RPAI. Being in full control of the
administrative proceeding and having effectively prevented respondents from
further submitting their responsive answer and evidence for the defense,
petitioners were in the most advantageous position to prove the merit of their
allegations in the formal charges. When petitioner Winston Garcia issued those
similarly worded decisions in the administrative cases against the respondents,
it is presumed that all evidence in their favor were duly submitted and justly
considered independent of the weakness of respondent's evidence in view of
the principle that ''the burden of proof belongs to the one who alleges and not
the one who denies."
MIGUEL DELA PENA BAREIRO v OP and MST MARINE SERVICES, June
15, 2011
FACTS: Petitioner signed a contract as chief mate of M/T Haruna for 6 months.
after one week he disembarked on ground that his boarding M/T Haruna was a
sea trial only. MST his manning agent, filed case at POEA. POEA suspended
petitioner for one year for breach of contract. On appeal, DOLE reduced
suspension to six months. Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President
(OP). OP dismissed the case on the ground that appeal can be brought to them
only if case involves national security.
ISSUE: WON appeal to OP was proper
HELD: NO. APPEALS TO THE OP IN LABOR CASES HAVE BEEN
ELIMINATED, EXCEPT THOSE INVOLVING NATIONAL INTEREST OVER
WHICH THE PRESIDENT MAY ASSUME JURISDICTION.
Following settled jurisprudence, the proper remedy to question the decisions or
orders of the Secretary of Labor is via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, not
via an appeal to the OP. For appeals to the OP in labor cases have indeed
been eliminated, except those involving national interest over which the
President may assume jurisdiction. The rationale behind this development is
mirrored in the OPs Resolution of June 26, 2009 the pertinent portion of which
reads:
. . . [T] he assailed DOLEs Orders were both issued by Undersecretary
Danilo P. Cruz under the authority of the DOLE Secretary who is the
alter ego of the President. Under the Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency, a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by

Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand

that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions
of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are,
unless
disapproved
or
reprobated
by
the
Chief
Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
It cannot be gainsaid that petitioners case does not involve national interest.
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS v
DESIERTO, G.R. No. 135715
April 13, 2011
FACTS
Respondents Mohammad Ali Dimaporo, Abdullah Dimaporo, and Amer
Dianalan, were stockholders and officers of the Mindanao Coconut Oil Mills
(MINCOCO), while respondents Panfilo O. Domingo, Conrado S. Reyes, Enrique
M. Herboza, and Ricardo Sunga, were then officers of the National Investment
and Development Corporation (NIDC).
On 10 May 1976, MINCOCO applied for a Guarantee Loan Accommodation with
the NIDC for the amount of approximately P30,400,000.00, which the NIDCs
Board of Directors approved on 23 June 1976.
When MINCOCOs mortgage liens were about to be foreclosed by the
government banks due its outstanding obligations, Eduardo Cojuangco issued a
memorandum, bearing the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President
Marcos) marginal note, disallowing the foreclosure of MINCOCOs
properties. The government banks were not able to recover any amount from
MINCOCO and President Marcos marginal note was construed by the NIDC to
have effectively released MINCOCO, including its owners, from all of its
financial liabilities.
The above mentioned transactions, were, however, discovered only in 1992
after then President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos), in an effort to recover
the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his family, and cronies,
issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc FactFinding Committee on Behest Loans (the Committee), with the Chairman of the
Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as the Committees head.
The Committee was directed, inter alia, to inventory all behest loans, and
identify the lenders and borrowers, including the principal officers and
stockholders of the borrowing firms, as well as the persons responsible for the
granting of loans or who influenced the grant thereof/
The Committee found that twenty-one corporations, including MINCOCO,
obtained behest loans. It claimed that the fact that MINCOCO was under-

collateralized and undercapitalized; that its officers were identified as cronies;

that the late President Marcos had marginal note, effectively waiving the
governments right to foreclose MINCOCOs mortgage liens; and, that the
Guarantee Loan Accommodation were approved in an extraordinary speed of
one month, bore badges of behest loans.
Subsequently, the Committee filed with the Ombudsman a sworn complaint
against MINCOCOs Officers and NIDCs Board of Directors for violation of
Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019,as amended.
OMBs Contention:
The Ombudsman motu prorio dismissed the complaint on the grounds that,
first, there was insufficient evidence to warrant the indictment of the
persons charged; and, second, the alleged offenses had prescribed. He
explained,
For the perpetration of the acts being complained of, the respondents are
charged of violations of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019. The
instant case however will no longer prosper for the offenses have already
prescribed. xx
Be it remembered that MINCOCO applied for and was granted loans/guarantees
way back in 1976. Thus, these acts are governed by the law in force at the time
of their commission, which is the old R.A. No. 3019 before its amendment by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 in March 1982. Offenses perpetrated prior to the
enactment of this latter law prescribed ten (10) years later. And since the case
was filed against the respondents only in September 1997, the offenses have
long prescribed in 1986.
Prescription commenced to run in 1976 when the assailed transaction
happened. x x x.
Petitioners Contention:
Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
The petitioner argued that the right of the State to recover behest loans as illgotten wealth is imprescriptible under Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution; and, assuming that the period to file criminal charges herefore is
subject to prescription, the prescriptive period should be counted from the time
of discovery of behest loans or sometime in 1992 when the Committee was
constituted.
ISSUES:
WoN the crimes charged against petitioners have already prescribed-NO
Sub-Issues: When has prescription set in?
WoN Sec 15 Art XI applies to criminal cases- NO

WoN the Ombudsmans full discretion to determine whether a criminal case is

to be filed is absolute-NO
HELD:
First Issue: NO.
At the core of the controversy is the Ombudsmans Resolution holding that
prescription had already set-in effectively barring the institution of charges
against the private respondents. The Ombudsman claimed that the alleged
behest loans, transpired in 1976, and, thus, the complaint filed after more than
two decades from the commission thereof or on 8 October 1997, was well
beyond the 10-year prescriptive period provided for under the old Republic Act
No. 3019.
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following shall be considered: (1) the
period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription started to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was
interrupted.
The period of prescription for the crime charged in this petition, committed in
1976 and prior to the amendment of Republic Act No. 3019, is ten (10) years.
Section 1126 of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195,
provides that the offenses committed under Republic Act No. 3019 shall
prescribe in fifteen (15) years; prior to this amendment, however, under the old
Republic Act No. 3019, this prescriptive period was only ten (10) years. In
People v. Pacificador,the Court held that the longer prescriptive period of 15years does not apply in crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on 16 March 1982, because, not being
favorable to the accused, it cannot be given retroactive effect. Considering that
the alleged crime was committed in 1976, and in line with the Courts ruling in
Pacificador, the prescription period should be ten (10) years.
Prescription of crime shall begin to run from the day of its commission, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Second
While we sustain the Ombudsmans contention that the prescriptive period for
the crime charged herein is 10 years and not 15 years, we are not persuaded
that in this specific case, the prescriptive period began to run in 1976, when
the loans were transacted.
The time as to when the prescriptive period starts to run for crimes committed
under Republic Act No. 3019, a special law, is covered by Act No.
3326,28 Section 2 of which provides that:

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed
for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime
is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no
knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does
not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. 29 An exception to this rule is
the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No.
3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery
of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In
other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where
the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the
existence of a cause of action." It was in this accord that the Court confronted
the question on the running of the prescriptive period in People v. Duque which
became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc FactFinding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), 32 and the
subsequent cases which Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the
ground of prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the
violation of the special law was not known at the time of its
commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery
thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act
or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the
crime which is the subject herein, commenced from the date of its
discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive
investigation.35 When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years have
elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this was
succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans,36 that "it was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved
party, to have known these crimes committed prior to the 1986 EDSA
Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved
public officials and the beneficiaries of the loans." 37 In yet another
pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), 38 the Court held that during the
Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the legality of these
transactions.

Second Issue: NO
The provision found in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution that "the
right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be
barred by prescription, laches or estoppels," has already been settled in
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R.
No. 130140), where the Court held that the above cited constitutional provision
"applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not
to criminal cases."
Third Issue; NO
While the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether a
criminal case is to be filed, the Court is not precluded from reviewing
the Ombudsmans action when there is a grave abuse of discretion.
True, the Ombudsman is a constitutionally created body with constitutionally
mandated independence. Despite this, however, the Ombudsman comes within
the purview of the Courts power of judicial review a peculiar concept of
Philippine Ombudsman, embodied in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution which serves as a safety net against its capricious and arbitrary
acts. Thus, in Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio, the Court held that "while the
Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
is to be filed, the Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsmans
action when there is grave abuse of discretion." This is because, "while the
Ombudsman enjoys, as it must, complete independence, it cannot and must
not lose track of the law, which it is bound to uphold and obey."
After reviewing the cases records, the Court finds that the present petition
calls for the exercise of its power of judicial review.
The duty of the Ombudsman in the conduct of a preliminary investigation is to
establish whether there exists probable cause to file information in court
against the accused.64 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not, the accused committed the
crime. Considering the quantum of evidence needed to support a finding of
probable cause, the Court holds that the Ombudsman gravely abused its
discretion when it dismissed the complaint against herein respondents.
Preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display
of the parties evidence.It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a well founded belief that an offense has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof. 67 The validity and merits of a partys
accusation or defense, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are
better ventilated during the trial proper.

In conclusion, the offenses ascribed to respondents "involve behest loans which

bled white the economy of the country, one of the excesses of the authoritarian
regime that led to the EDSA revolution, a serious evil that the 1987
Constitution aimed to extirpate." It involves nothing less than the interest of
the people whose transgressed rights are supposed to be vindicated by their
protector the Ombudsman. As protector of the people, the Ombudsman
should be pro-active in making use of its vast arsenal of powers to "bring the
lamp of scrutiny to otherwise dark places even over the resistance of those
who would draw the blinds."
OTHER DOCTRINE: The remedy from an adverse resolution of the
Ombudsman is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court;
what was filed with the Court, however, was a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. Nevertheless, the Court will treat this petition as one filed under
Rule 65 since a reading of its contents shows that the Committee imputes
grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman for dismissing the complaint.This
was how we also treated the previous cases marred by the same procedural
lapse, the latest of which is the 2009 Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 135703) ---- BAKA ITO PALA
TALAGA ANG ISSUE
MENDOZA v VILLAS
In the 2007 barangay elections, Mendoza obtained the highest votes for the
position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Balatasan, Bulalacao, Oriental
Mindoro, while respondent Liwanag Herato obtained the highest number of
votes for the position of Barangay Kagawad. Mayor Enrilo Villas was the
incumbent Mayor of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro at the time of
the barangay elections.
After the elections, the COMELEC proclaimed Mendoza as the dulyelected Punong Barangay of Balatasan. Thus, the losing candidate, Thomas
Pajanel, filed a petition for quo warranto with the MTC.
The MTC issued a Decision, disqualifying Mendoza and declaring that Herato
was entitled to succeed him as Punong Barangay with Herato garnering the
highest number of votes as a Barangay Kagawad. Mendoza appealed the MTC
Decision to the COMELEC.
On February 28, 2008, Villas administered the Oath of Office to Herato. Then,
Villas issued Memorandum No. 2008-03-010 dated March 3, 2008, directing all
department heads of the Municipal Government to act only on documents
signed or authorized by Herato.
Meanwhile, Mendoza sought the advice of the DILG as to who should exercise
the powers of Punong Barangay of Balatasan given the prevailing controversy.

In a letter dated April 11, 2008, [7] DILG Undersecretary Austere A. Panadero
responded to Mendozas inquiry informing Villas that Mendoza should occupy
the post of Punong Barangay as there was no Writ of Execution Pending Appeal
of the MTC Decision.
Nevertheless, the Bulalacao Municipal Administrator, Edezer Aceron, by the
authority of Villas, issued a letter dated April 23, 2008 [8] to respondent Marlon
de Castro, Manager, Pinamalayan Branch, Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP),
requesting
that
transactions
entered
into
by Mendoza in
behalf
of Barangay Bulalacao should not be honored. In the same letter, Aceron
dismissed the DILG letter dated April 11, 2008, saying that it is merely advisory
and not binding on the municipal government of Bulalacao and the LBP.
In response, de Castro issued Villas and Mendoza a letter dated April 24, 2008,
[9]
advising both parties that the LBP shall not honor any transaction with
regard the accounts of Barangay Balatasan.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Petition dated May 5, 2008 for Mandamus with
Damages and Prayer for the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, docketed
as Special Civil Action No. 08-10 pending with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
43 in Roxas, Oriental Mindoro. Petitioners prayed that the LBP be directed to
release the funds of Barangay Balatasan to them in order to render necessary,
basic public services to the inhabitants of the barangay.
Thus, Villas and Herato filed an Answer dated May 16, 2008 interposing the
following affirmative defenses: (1) that the petition for mandamus was
defective, being directed against two or more different entities and requiring to
perform different acts; and (2) that Mendoza does not have any clear and legal
right for the writ of mandamus.
On the other hand, the LBP also filed its Answer dated June 5, 2008, stating
that its decision of withholding the barangay funds was a mere act of prudence
given the controversy surrounding the true Punong Barangay of Balatasan
while manifesting that it will release the funds to whom the Court directs it to.
Thereafter, Villas and Herato filed a Motion to Dismiss dated November 7,
2008. In the Motion, a copy of the COMELEC Resolution dated September 8,
2008 in COMELEC Case No. SPA-07-243-BRGY was attached. This case
originated from a disqualification case against Mendoza filed with the COMELEC
by Senen Familara before the conduct of the 2007 barangay elections. In the
Resolution, the COMELEC disqualified Mendoza as a candidate for Punong
Barangay of Barangay Balatasan in the 2007 barangay elections for having
already served three (3) consecutive terms for the same position. In
response, Mendoza presented a Certification dated February 27, 2009[10] from
the COMELEC which stated that COMELEC Case No. SPA-07-243-BRGY is still
pending with the Commission.
In an attempt to clarify the issues on the matter, Mendoza again sought the
opinion of the DILG regarding the controversy. Thus, the DILG issued another
letter, denominated as DILG Opinion No. 5, Series of 2009 dated January 2009,

[11]

reiterating its stance that the MTC Decision dated February 23, 2008 has not
yet become final and executory.
Nevertheless, the RTC issued the assailed order dated February 2, 2009
dismissing the petition on the strength of the COMELEC Resolution dated
September 8, 2008 disqualifying Mendoza from running in the 2007 elections.
As stated, petitioners motion for reconsideration of the Order dated February 2,
2009 was denied in an Order dated March 17, 2009.
From such orders the petitioners went directly to this Court.
The instant petition is a direct recourse to this Court from the assailed
orders of the RTC. Notably, petitioners did not cite the rule under the Rules of
Court by which the petition was filed. If the petition is to be treated as a
petition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petition must be
dismissed outright for having been filed prematurely.
In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[12] a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 was
dismissed for having been filed directly with the Court, violating the principle of
hierarchy of courts, to wit:
Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,
citing People
v.
Cuaresma,
this
Court
made
the
following
pronouncements:
This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with
the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of
the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will be directed. There is
after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the
Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an]
established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted

to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent

further over-crowding of the Courts docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, there are no special and important reasons that petitioners cite
to justify their direct recourse to this Court under Rule 65.
On the other hand, direct recourse to this Court has been allowed for
petitions filed under Rule 45 when only questions of law are raised, as in this
case. Thus, the Court ruled in Barcenas v. Tomas:[13]
Section 1 of Rule 45 clearly states that the following may be
appealed to the Supreme Court through a petition for review by
certiorari: 1) judgments; 2) final orders; or 3) resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or similar courts,
whenever authorized by law. The appeal must involve only questions of
law, not of fact.
This Court has, time and time again, pointed out that it is not a trier
of facts; and that, save for a few exceptional instances, its function is not
to analyze or weigh all over again the factual findings of the lower courts.
There is a question of law when doubts or differences arise as to what
law pertains to a certain state of facts, and a question of fact when the
doubt pertains to the truth or falsity of alleged facts.
Under the principle of the hierarchy of courts, decisions, final
orders or resolutions of an MTC should be appealed to the RTC exercising
territorial jurisdiction over the former. On the other hand, RTC judgments,
final orders or resolutions are appealable to the CA through either of the
following: an ordinary appeal if the case was originally decided by the
RTC; or a petition for review under Rule 42, if the case was decided under
the RTC's appellate jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, a direct recourse to this Court can be taken for a
review of the decisions, final orders or resolutions of the RTC, but only on
questions of law. Under Section 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has the power to
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
xxxx
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
This kind of direct appeal to this Court of RTC judgments, final
orders or resolutions is provided for in Section 2(c) of Rule 41, which
reads:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.

xxxx
(c) Appeal by certiorari.In all cases where only questions of law
are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
Procedurally then, petitioners could have appealed the RTC
Decision affirming the MTC (1) to this Court on questions of law
only; or (2) if there are factual questions involved, to the CA -- as they in
fact did. Unfortunately for petitioners, the CA properly dismissed their
petition for review because of serious procedural defects. This action
foreclosed their only available avenue for the review of the factual
findings of the RTC. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the Court shall exercise liberality and consider the instant petition
as one filed under Rule 45. In Artistica Ceramica, Inc. v. Ciudad Del Carmen
Homeowners Association, Inc.,[14] citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,[15]the
Court noted that it has the discretion to determine whether a petition was filed
under Rule 45 or 65 of the Rules of Court:
Admittedly, this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit
pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, has the
discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule
45, especially if filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition
for review.
Nevertheless, even providing that the petition was not filed prematurely,
it must still be dismissed for having become moot and academic.
In Gunsi, Sr. v. Commissioners, The Commission on Elections,[16] the Court
defined a moot and academic case as follows:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
With the conduct of the 2010 barangay elections, a supervening event
has transpired that has rendered this case moot and academic and subject to
dismissal. This is because, as stated in Fernandez v. Commission on Elections,
[17]
whatever judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any practical
legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced. Mendozas
term of office has expired with the conduct of last years local elections. As
such, Special Civil Action No. 08-10, where the assailed Orders were issued, can
no longer prosper. Mendoza no longer has any legal standing to further pursue
the case, rendering the instant petition moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED

UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOC of NEA v NEA
G.R. No. 187107
January 31, 2012
Petitioners are former employees of NEA
On August 28, 2002, former President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 119 directing the NEA Board to submit a reorganization
plan. Thus, the NEA Board issued the assailed Resolution Nos. 46 and 59, dated
July 10, 2003 and September 3, 2003, respectively,otherwise known as the
National Electrification Administration (NEA) Termination Pay Plan, issued by
respondent NEA Board of Administrators (NEA Board).
On September 17, 2003, the Department of Budget and Management approved
the NEA Termination Pay Plan.
Thereafter, the NEA implemented an early retirement program denominated as
the "Early Leavers Program," giving incentives to those who availed of it and
left NEA before the effectivity of the reorganization plan. The other employees
of NEA were terminated effective December 31, 2003. . Petitioners were
terminated from their employment with the implementation of the assailed
resolutions.
Petitioners Contention:
1. The NEA Board has no power to terminate all the NEA employees;
2. Executive Order No. 119 did not grant the NEA Board the power to terminate
all NEA employees; and
3. Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 were carried out in bad faith.
Respondents Contention:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction over the petition;
2. Injunction is improper in this case given that the assailed resolutions of the
NEA Board have long been implemented; and
3. The assailed NEA Board resolutions were issued in good faith.
Petitioners filed an original action for Injunction to restrain and/or prevent the
implementation of Resolution Nos. 46 and 59, dated July 10, 2003 and
September 3, 2003, respectively.
ISSUES: WON court has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: YES. Respondents essentially argue that petitioners violated the
principle of hierarchy of courts, pursuant to which the instant petition should
have been filed with the Regional Trial Court first rather than with this Court
directly.
We explained
Villas, stating:

the

principle

of

hierarchy

of

courts

in

Mendoza

v.

In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v. Secretary

of Agrarian Reform, a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 was dismissed

for having been filed directly with the Court, violating the principle of hierarchy
of courts, to wit:
Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence
does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. In
Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, this Court made
the following pronouncements:
This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is
shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals.
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of
the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals,
and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions
for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against
first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically
set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Courts docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC.
However, as an exception to this general rule, the principle of
hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important
reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case involving as it does
the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700
employees all told, who were effectively dismissed from employment
in one swift stroke. This to the mind of the Court entails its attention.
Moreover, the Court has made a similar ruling in National Power Corporation
Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC-DAMA) v. National Power Corporation
(NPC).2 In that case, the NPC-DAMA also filed a petition for injunction directly
with this Court assailing NPC Board Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125,
both dated November 18, 2002, directing the termination of all employees of
the NPC on January 31, 2003. Despite such apparent disregard of the principle
of hierarchy of courts, the petition was given due course. We perceive no
compelling reason to treat the instant case differently.

OTHERS: Petitioners Failed to Prove that the NEA Board Acted in Bad Faith
PETITION is DISMISSED. Resolution Nos. 46 and 59, dated July 10, 2003 and
September 3, 2003, respectively, issued by the NEA Board of Directors are
hereby UPHELD.
LUCAS v LUCAS
FACTS:Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion
for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC.
Respondent Jesus Lucas was not served with a copy of the petition.
Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His
counsel therefore went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and obtained a
copy of the petition.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case.
Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in
form and substance, issued the Order3 setting the case for hearing and urging
anyone who has any objection to the petition to file his opposition. The court
also directed that the Order be published once a week for three consecutive
weeks in any newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and that the
Solicitor General be furnished with copies of the Order and the petition in order
that he may appear and represent the State in the case.
Unaware of the issuance of the September 3, 2007 Order, Jesus filed a Special
Appearance and Comment. He manifested inter alia that: (1) he did not receive
the summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was adversarial in
nature and therefore summons should be served on him as respondent; (3)
should the court agree that summons was required, he was waiving service of
summons and making a voluntary appearance; and (4) notice by publication of
the petition and the hearing was improper because of the confidentiality of the
subject matter.
Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found
to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion
for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a
mere allegation pointing to him as Jesses father.
Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and
held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects
for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely,
a prima faciecase, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted.
A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds

relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that
a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it
noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional
paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed
when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.
Petitioners Contention: Court of appeals erred when it resolved the issue of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of herein respondent albeit the same was
never raised in the petition for certiorari

ISSUE:
WoN failure to serve summons deprives the court of its jurisdiction to try and
decide the case
HELD: NO
We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction was raised
before the CA, whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent, or whether respondent waived his right to the service of summons.
We find that the primordial issue here is actually whether it was necessary, in
the first place, to serve summons on respondent for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the case. In other words, was the service of summons
jurisdictional? The answer to this question depends on the nature of
petitioners action, that is, whether it is an action in personam, in rem, or quasi
in rem.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability;
an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while
an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject
that person's interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A
petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status
of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of
entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on
the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over
the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the
law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the
power of the court is recognized and made effective.

The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in

rem. By the simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate
filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction
over the case. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for
its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of
any sort to the right sought to be established.Through publication, all
interested parties are deemed notified of the petition.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is
not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely
for satisfying the due process requirements.This is but proper in order to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so
chooses. Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its
jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons
may be excused where it is determined that the adverse party had, in fact, the
opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We find that the due process
requirement with respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he
has participated in the proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to
file his opposition to the petition to establish filiation.
AGRA V COA
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989) took effect, Section 12 of which granted rice
allowance to employees of the National Electrification Administration (NEA).
A group of NEA employees who were hired after October 31, 1989 claimed that
they did not receive meal, rice, and childrens allowances. Thus, on July 23,
1999, they filed a special civil action for mandamus against NEA and its Board
of Administrators before the RTC, alleging violation of their right to the equal
protection clause under the Constitution. RTC rendered decision in their favour
and ordering the implementation of a writ of execution against funds of NEA.
NEA questioned before the Court of Appeals the Orders of the lower court. CA
rendered a Decision declaring null and void the Order of the RTC.
Meanwhile, the RTC held in abeyance the execution of its December 15, 1999
Decision pending resolution of this Court of the review on certiorari in National
Electrification Administration v. Morales, to allow the parties recourse to the
processes of the COA
COA denied the grant of rice allowance to employees of the National
Electrification Administration (NEA) who were hired after June 30,
1989 (petitioners)

Meanwhile, in an Indorsement, the Commission on Audit (COA) advised NEA

against making further payments in settlement of the claims of Morales, et al.
Apparently, COA had already passed upon claims similar to those of
Morales, et al. xxx
Thus, employees hired after the extended date of October 31, 1989,
pursuant to the above COA decision cannot defy that decision by filing
a petition for mandamus in the lower court. Presidential Decree No.
1445 and the 1987 Constitution prescribe that the only mode for
appeal from decisions of this Commission is on certiorari to the
Supreme Court in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court.
Clearly, the lower court had no jurisdiction when it entertained the
subject case of mandamus. And void decisions of the lower court can
never attain finality, much less be executed. Moreover, COA was not
made a party thereto, hence, it cannot be compelled to allow the
payment of claims on the basis of the questioned decision.
CA reversed the RTC and directed immediate implementation of the writ of
execution through garnishment of the funds of petitioners. Court held that it
was grave error for the CA to reverse the RTC and direct immediate
implementation of the writ of execution through garnishment of the funds of
petitioners.
Petitioners, in their Reply,anchor their petition on their allegation that the RTC
Decision had already become final and executory, could no longer be
disturbed, and must be respected by the parties. To support their claim, they
cite Arcenas v. Court of Appeals41 wherein this Court held:
For, it is a fundamental rule that when a final judgment becomes executory, it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or
by the highest Court of the land. The only recognized exceptions are the
correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is
void. Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and
executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose.42 (Emphasis ours.)
Petitioners likewise cite Panado v. Court of Appeals 43 wherein the Court held
that "[i]t is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer be
attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the
highest court of the land."44 From the foregoing jurisprudence, petitioners
conclude that the acts of COA in disallowing the claims and ordering refund of

benefits already received clearly constitute grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack of jurisdiction inasmuch as said acts frustrated the final and
executory decision of the trial court.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the immutability of final decision doctrine must prevail over
the exclusive jurisdiction of [the COA] to audit and settle disbursements of
funds; and
2. Whether or not the NEA employees hired after June 30, 1989 are entitled to
rice allowance.
HELD:
1. As to the first issue, the immutability rule applies only when the decision is
promulgated by a court possessed of jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
Undoubtedly, the petition in the guise of a case for mandamus is a money
claim falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of this Commission.
Noting the propensity of the lower courts in taking cognizance of cases filed by
claimants in violation of such primary jurisdiction, the Supreme Court issued
Administrative Circular 10-2000 dated October 23, 2000 enjoining judges of
lower courts to exercise caution in order to prevent "possible circumvention of
the rules and procedures of the Commission on Audit" and reiterating the basic
rule that: "All money claims against the Government must be filed with the
Commission on Audit which shall act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the
claim will authorize the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on
certiorari and in effect sue the State thereby."
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, when an administrative body is
clothed with original and exclusive jurisdiction, courts are utterly without power
and authority to exercise concurrently such jurisdiction. Accordingly, all the
proceedings of the court in violation of that doctrine and all orders and
decisions reached thereby are null and void. It will be noted in the cited
Supreme Court Circular that money claims are cognizable by the COA and its
decision is appealable only to the Supreme Court. The lower courts have
nothing to do with such genus of transactions.
Anent the issue of entitlement to rice allowance by employees hired after June
30, 1989, this Commission is left with no option but to affirm the disallowance
in the face of the explicit provisions of DBM-CCC No. 10. After its publication on
March 9, 1999 in the Official Gazette, rice allowance was allowed only for
incumbents as of July 1, 1989. Obviously, there is no violation of the equal
protection clause as cited in the PITC case, supra, because whatever
increments the incumbents are enjoying over those of non-incumbents are
transitory, for the same law provides that such difference shall be deducted
from the salary increase the former should receive under Section 17. Thus, the

equalization or standardization of what the two categories of employees will be

receiving in terms of benefits is ensured.
2. We agree with the findings of the COA.
In National Electrification Administration v. Morales, the order of garnishment
against the NEA funds to implement the RTC Decision was in issue, and we said
that the COA had exclusive jurisdiction to decide on the allowance or
disallowance of money claims arising from the implementation of Republic Act
No. 6758. We observed therein that "the RTC acted prudently in halting
implementation of the writ of execution to allow the parties recourse to the
processes of the COA."47 In fact, we even stated there that "it is not for this
Court to preempt the action of the COA on the post-audit to be conducted by it
per its Indorsement dated March 23, 2000."48
We find that the COA had ruled in accordance with law and jurisprudence, and
we see no reason to reverse its decision.
Stare Decisis
The doctrine "stare decisis et non quieta movere (Stand by the decisions and
disturb not what is settled)" is firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence. Once this
Court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it
would adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts
are substantially the same as in the earlier controversy.