Brown v. Chappelle, 10th Cir. (2016)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________
LESLIE BROWN, JR.,
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 3, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CARLOS CHAPPELLE,
No. 15-5117
(D.C. No. 4:14-CV-00757-GKF-FHM)
(N.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before GORSUCH, BALDOCK, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.**
_________________________________
Plaintiff Leslie Brown, Jr. is a party to a civil action pending in Oklahoma
state court. The initial state-court judge assigned to his case recused. Afterward,
Defendant Carlos Chappelleat the time the Presiding Judge of the county in which
Plaintiff brought his state casereassigned Plaintiffs case to a new state-court
judge. Plaintiff now contends that Defendant lacked the authority to reassign his case
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument.
because Defendant was disqualified by law from participating in any case which
Plaintiff might be involved in because of a previous disqualification by [Defendant]
in civil cases involving Plaintiff. He further laments that (1) Defendant transferred
the case to the new state-court judge knowing that at the time said case was assigned
to [the new judge] there were disqualification proceedings pending against [the new
judge] in another civil case involving Plaintiff, and (2) Defendant refused . . . to
conduct a hearing on Plaintiffs motion to vacate the transfer of his case to the new
judge. Plaintiff consequently brings claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Defendant
in his individual capacity for [d]enial of due process of law and access to the courts
and [c]onspiracy to violate civil rights. He seeks $250,000 worth of damages and
any appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief . . . necessary to prevent undue and
improper harassment and retaliation against Plaintiff for the filing of this lawsuit.
Pursuant to Defendants motion, the district court dismissed Plaintiffs
complaint.1
In a thorough written order, the district court first determined that
At first glance, Plaintiffs claims could plausibly be seen as jurisdictionally

barred under the RookerFeldman doctrine. Although the district court did not
address this doctrine or otherwise consider its jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs claims,
we address RookerFeldmans applicability to this case to clarify why this doctrine
did not prevent the district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction.
Put simply, the RookerFeldman doctrine is a jurisdictional prohibition on
lower federal courts exercising appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments.
Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2012). The Supreme
Court has held that this doctrine is narrow: The RookerFeldman doctrine . . . is
confined to cases . . . brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and
inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The astute reader may think
2
Defendant enjoyed absolute judicial immunity from damages because his

reassignment of the case was a general function[] normally performed by a judge,
and thus performed in his judicial capacity. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27
(1980) ([J]udges defending against 1983 actions enjoy absolute immunity from
damages liability for acts performed in their judicial capacities. (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Further, Defendant had passed away while his motion to dismiss
____________________________
that RookerFeldman should apply in this case: Plaintiff is asserting that he was
injured by a state-court orderthe transfer of his action to another judgethat
occurred before the federal district court proceedings commenced. And because he is
asking a federal court to determine whether Defendant violated his rights when he
ordered the transfer, he is conceivably asking for federal court review and rejection
of that transfer.
But the Supreme Court has also explained that the RookerFeldman doctrine
applies only after the state proceedings [have] ended. Id. at 291 (emphasis added);
see also Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 (10th Cir. 2006) (Under Exxon
Mobil, RookerFeldman applies only to suits filed after state proceedings are final.)
Notably, the state proceedings have not ended when (1) the state court issues only an
interlocutory order (as opposed to a judgment) and (2) the state-court litigation is still
ongoing when a party challenges that interlocutory order in federal court. Cf.
Federacion de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto
Rico, 410 F.3d 17, 24 n.10 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that the state proceedings have
ended for RookerFeldman purposes when (1) the lower state court does not issue a
judgment but merely an interlocutory order . . . and [(2)] the parties then voluntarily
terminate the litigation before challenging the interlocutory order in federal court
(emphasis in original)); see also Guttman, 446 F.3d at 1032 n.2 (citing Federacion de
Maestros with approval regarding its treatment of when state proceedings have ended
for RookerFeldman purposes). This is exactly the situation here: the transfer order
was a non-appealable, administrative interlocutory order, and Plaintiff challenged
this order while his state-court litigation was still pending. See Pierce v. Pierce, 39
P.3d 791, 796 (Okla. 2001) (holding that parties wishing to appeal transfer orders can
only preserve [that] issue for review on appeal from the subsequent judgment
(emphasis added)). As such, RookerFeldman does not apply as a jurisdictional bar.
Cf. Armstrong v. JPMorgan Chase Bank Natl Assn, 633 F. Appx 909, 911 (10th
Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (holding that a state courts non-appealable interlocutory
order denying a partys motion under Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 120 was not
a judgment that falls within the RookerFeldman doctrine).
3
was pending in the district court. The district court accordingly determined that
neither a declaratory judgment nor injunctive relief would serve any purpose in this
case because the claims for injunctive and/or declaratory relief are made against
[Defendant] in his individual capacity when no future conduct can be anticipated
from him. As such, the district court concluded that any declaratory and injunctive
relief was moot.
Plaintiff moved for the district court to reconsider the dismissal of his
complaint, but the district court denied this motion. According to the district court,
Plaintiffs arguments [did] not warrant reconsideration of the courts prior order.
Following his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff also filed a motion to substitute
the late Defendant with the proper party (presumably Defendants estate, although
Plaintiff did not indicate in his motion who the proper party was). But because the
district court had already denied Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration and therefore
extinguished all of Plaintiffs claims, the district court denied the motion to substitute
as moot. Plaintiff now timely appeals.
We need not belabor the point. We have carefully reviewed both parties
briefs and the appellate record in view of the applicable law and the appropriate
standard of review. The district courts analysis of Plaintiffs claims in the first
instance was correct. As the district court ably explained, Defendant is absolutely
immune from damages under 1983 because his transfer of Plaintiffs state-court
case to another judge was an action performed in his judicial capacity. Dennis, 449
U.S. at 27. And while a judge can indeed lose this immunity when he engages in
4
judicial conduct taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction, Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991), there is no indication that Defendant acted in the absence of
jurisdiction in transferring Plaintiffs case to another judge, see Smith v. Bogart, 107
P.2d 173, 174 (Okla. 1940) (The disqualification of a judge to hear and determine a
cause does not prevent him from entering such orders as are merely formal and
necessary to bring the suit to a hearing and determination before a qualified judge.
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Likewise, given that Defendant passed away
after Plaintiff filed his complaint, Plaintiffs request for injunctive and declaratory
relief against Defendant in his individual capacity is moot because Defendant is no
longer able to act. The district court thus properly dismissed all of Plaintiffs claims.
And of course, if no claims remain, the district court also correctly concluded that
Plaintiffs belated motion to substitute a new party for Defendant is moot. Where
the district court accurately analyzes the issues in a case and articulates a cogent
rationale based upon the relevant facts and applicable law, no useful purpose is
served by us writing at length. This is such a case. Lovern v. Dorscheid, 576 F.
Appx 869, 870 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In conclusion, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the district
courts written orders at issue in this appeal.
Disposition is denied as moot.
Defendants Motion for Summary
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

In a thorough written order, the district court first determined that

At first glance, Plaintiffs claims could plausibly be seen as jurisdictionally

Defendant enjoyed absolute judicial immunity from damages because his

Defendants Motion for Summary

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