Rutti v. Wyoming Attorney General, 10th Cir. (2010)
Rutti v. Wyoming Attorney General, 10th Cir. (2010)
Rutti v. Wyoming Attorney General, 10th Cir. (2010)
September 3, 2010
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
No. 10-8002
v.
(D. Wyoming)
RespondentsAppellees.
ORDER *
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
before the applicable one-year statute of limitations was set to expire, see 28
U.S.C. 2244(d)(1), Petitioner filed a 2254 habeas corpus petition in the
federal district court. Some months later, he filed a motion requesting voluntary
dismissal of the petition without prejudice. The district court granted this motion.
Approximately four months later, Petitioner filed a motion to reinstate the
dismissed habeas petition. The district court denied the motion to reinstate, and
Petitioner filed the instant federal petition. The district court then denied this
petition as time-barred. The court noted that, even if it tolled the period when
Petitioners first habeas petition was pending, a total of 482 untolled days would
still have passed before the instant petition was filed. The court concluded that
Petitioner had not demonstrated extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable
tolling, and the court therefore dismissed the petition as time-barred.
In his application for a certificate of appealability, Petitioner argues that he
is entitled to equitable tolling because, inter alia, (1) this petition relates back to
his original petition, (2) he relied on the district courts representation that he
could re-file, (3) he was convicted under an unconstitutional statute and thus is
actually innocent of any crime, and (4) he diligently pursued his claims. As for
Petitioners first argument, a 2254 petition cannot relate back to a previously
filed petition that has been dismissed without prejudice because there is nothing
for the current petition to relate back to. Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1219
(10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). As for Petitioners second
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argument, the record reflects that the first petition was dismissed without
prejudice to re-filing, but the district court never represented that a re-filed
petition would be free from all potential statutory bars. Moreover, Petitioners
apparent ignorance regarding the legal consequences of a dismissal without
prejudice simply does not justify equitable tolling under our precedent. See id. at
1220. As for Petitioners third argument, we will not address it because he did
not raise this argument for tolling in the district court. See Gibson v. Klinger, 232
F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000). Finally, as for Petitioners fourth argument, we
note that a petitioners diligent pursuit of claims only warrants equitable tolling if
the petitioner also demonstrates that extraordinary circumstances beyond his
control caused his failure to comply with the statute of limitations, see Marsh,
223 F.3d at 1220, and we are not persuaded that Petitioner has done so here.
For the foregoing reasons and for substantially the same reasons stated by
the district court, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown that reasonable
jurists would debate whether the district court was correct in dismissing the
petition as time-barred. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). We
therefore DENY the application for a certificate of appealability and DISMISS
the appeal. All other pending motions are also DENIED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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