Global Financial Systems The Central Bank

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The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Global Financial Systems


Chapter 5
The Central Bank
Jon Danielsson
London School of Economics
2013
To accompany
Global Financial Systems: Stability and Risk
http://www.globalfinancialsystems.org/
Published by Pearson 2013
Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 1 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Book and slides

The tables and graphs are

the same as in the book


See the book for
references to original data
sources
Updated versions of the
slides can be downloaded
from the book web page
www.globalfinancialsystems.org

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 2 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Central Bank (CB)

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 3 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Role of the central bank


The most important institution in the financial system
Has monopoly on printing money liquidity, QE,...
Functions
1. Monetary policy
2. Macroeconomic objectives
3. Financial stability
4. Supervision
5. (Bailing out governments)
Over time, the relative importance of those changes

frequently

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 4 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Background
Often was a private bank
Perhaps established to help in war financing
And may retain some private ownership or connections
But generally is under the control of the government
In some countries private banks may issue money
Danske bank in Northern Ireland, HSBC in Hong Kong,
etc.
May have other names such as monetary authority or

reserve bank or federal reserve system


We use the term central bank to encompass all these

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 5 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Some central banks

First: Swedish Riksbank 1668


Second: Bank of England (BoE, Bank) 1694
Last among major countries: Federal Reserve System

(Fed) in the US, 1913

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 6 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Supervision

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 7 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Supervision and regulation


Regulations refers to the law and the interpretation of the

law by regulators
Supervision refers to the enforcement of regulations
The boundary can be blurred supervisors need to
interpret regulations
Becomes especially problematic if supervisors and
regulators belong to different agencies
Like in Europe Common rulebook the goal to aspire to
While we will discuss financial regulations in detail later,
the key question here is
Should supervision be a part of the central bank?
Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 8 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Arguments for separation

Conflict of interest
1. Monetary policy should be countercyclical, while the
effects of regulation and supervision tend to be
procyclical
Reputation risks
1. The reputation of the central bank is more likely to
suffer, than to benefit, from bank supervision
2. e.g. BCCI in 1991

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 9 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Arguments against separation

Central banks have no choice but to engage with financial

stability, and need to have information and power


Information
1. Supervisory information is valuable for forecasting key
macroeconomic variables and thus implementing
monetary policy
2. CBs also have the responsibility for ensuring the smooth
working of various payment systems
3. CBs need to be informed to act as a LOLR

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 10 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Supervisory structure in the US

The Fed shares the responsibility for regulating and

supervising the US financial system with other agencies


Including the SEC, OCC and FDIC
The Fed also serves as the umbrella supervisor of all bank
holding companies

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 11 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Supervisory structure in the UK


In 1998, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) was

established to supervise commercial banks in UK


During this financial crisis, the UKs tripartite
regulatory system BoE, FSA and the Treasury failed
in a number of important ways
e.g. the run on Northern Rock, RBS buying ABN Amro
The FSA has been abolished and the Prudential
Regulation Authority (PRA) is now part of the BoE
The independent Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is
tasked with microprudential duties

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 12 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Supervisory structures in Europe

In the euro area, the ECB is responsible for monetary

policy
Supervision is still in the hands of the nation state
This is not optimal since European banks operate across
borders
Ideally we would have a European supervisor
European banking union is discussed later

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 13 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Monetary policy

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 14 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Money
World before 1870:

GOLD

SILVER

BIMETALLISM
Mercantilism, increasing capital

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 15 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Fiat money

Money created by governments


First example in China in the 12th century led to high

inflation
Often ends up in too much money being printed, inflation
and failure of the issuing bank

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 16 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Monetary policy
The maindaytoday function of the central bank
Often paired with fiscal policy
These two are used to meet government objectives,

perhaps
level of aggregate output
employment
inflation

By controlling
the supply of money
availability of money
cost of money or rate of interest

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 17 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Money supply and objectives

Money is M (recall M0, M1, M2 and M3 )


Expansionary monetary policy M Typical objective to

combat unemployment or stimulate the economy, or


prevent deflation
Contractionary monetary policy M Combat inflation
and overheating economy

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 18 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Interest rates

The central banks control the shortest interest rates


Why?
There are many different names and mechanisms
CBs do not directly control rates for longer maturities
Twist operations can be used
Often they use inflation targeting and some form of the

Taylor rule (next page)

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 19 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Taylor rule
By having a formal rule, a central bank may avoid

inefficiencies induced by a discretionary policy


it = t + rt + a (t t ) + ay (yt yt )
it is the target shortterm nominal interest rate
t the inflation rate (the GDP deflator)
t the desired rate of inflation
rt is the equilibrium real interest rate
yt an estimate of the logarithm of real GDP and yt is the
logarithm of potential output, obtained by a linear trend
yt yt is the output gap
The parameters are restricted to be positive, a , ay > 0,
and Taylor proposed setting them at 0.5

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 20 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Central bank lending

Effectively a ceiling for market (riskfree) rates


In some countries also a floor by setting a slightly lower

rate on reserves held by banks


Also used to provide emergency liquidity in crises

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 21 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Open market operations


Most common procedure trading government bonds

on the open market


Buying M increase the reserve account of sellers
bank
Increases the total volume of reserves in the system
If there are aggregate excess reserves, market rates are
competed down
Hence expansionary open market operations do r
And vice versa
Most common in developed economies

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 22 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Recall reserve requirements


Reserve requirement the minimum reserve a bank

must hold at the CB


Lowering reserve requirements reduces the demand for
reserves
Contrast with expansionary open market operations which
increase the supply of reserves
But roughly the same effect r
M1 = M0 =

Changing the reserve requirements, , changes the money


multiplier, , and hence the volume of M1 given an
amount of M0
Most common in emerging markets (e.g. China)
Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 23 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Chinese reserve requirements


20%

15%

10%

5%

0%
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 24 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Quantitative easing QE
Used when danger of deflation and interest rates are close

to 0
Traditional monetary policy tools dont work
Interest cant be below 0 and banks hoard balances at

the central bank


Involves buying securities typically government bonds

but can be anything from the public


The difference between QE and open market operations is
scale, scope and motivation
More efficient might be helicopter drops of money (next
slide)
Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 25 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Helicopter drops of money


The central bank directly increases money supply

Let us suppose now that one day a


helicopter flies over this community and drops
an additional $1000 in bills from the sky, ... Let
us suppose further that everyone is convinced
that this is a unique event which will never be
repeated,
Milton Friedman 1969
Friedman suggested that a monetary authority can escape

a liquidity trap by bypassing financial intermediaries to


give money directly to consumers or businesses
This is referred to as a money gift or as helicopter money
Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 26 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

QE in UK
The BoEs QE operations amount to 375 billion
Or 6,048 for each of the 62 million people that live in

the UK
Instead of buying government bonds, the Banks QE
operations would likely have been much more effective if
It simply had sent an envelope with 6,048 in notes to

each person in the UK


Except of course the real purpose of QE is perhaps to bail

out the Treasury


At the expense of savers (works like a tax on pensions

savings)

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 27 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Financial Stability

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 28 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Financial stability

A modern term that encompasses additional functions of

the central bank


Because it has a monopoly on printing money it is the
only institution that can provide liquidity support in a
crisis
We discuss this in detail in a later chapter
So generally, the central bank has the ultimate
responsibility for the stability of the financial system

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 29 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

However
Financial stability and monetary stability are often in

conflict
Increasing liquidity in a crisis can be inflationary
And the education and experience of central bank staff
dealing with monetary policy is very different from
financial stability
When central banks neglect financial stability, as was
common before the crisis, they can be woefully
illprepared when a financial crisis happens

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 30 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Bailing Out Governments

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 31 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Bailing out governments

Its not one of the four core functions listed above


But always has been a core function
Even a founding function
BoE founded to help with war funding
Usually viewed as dirty or unseemly
However, under the right conditions it is appropriate
We see the danger a few slides down

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 32 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Mechanisms

Print money and buy government bonds


Unexpected inflation
Why cant it be expected?
Cagan double exponential model below
Seigniorage

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 33 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Central bank holdings of government bonds


relative to GDP, end of year
16%

UK
USA

12%

8%

4%

0%
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 34 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Pros and cons


Only recommended in exceptional circumstances
When done routinely it locks in inflationary expectations

very costly to eventually fight


If the economy is in deep recession (way below output
potential)
And inflation negligible
Justified for two reasons
1. relieves pressure on government
2. reverses contracting money supply

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 35 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Case of one CB one nation state


In most cases the CB belongs to a single nation state
In that case, using the CB to bail out the state is

effectively a tax
And like any other tax has distributional effects
Disproportionately falling on pensioners and savers (who

often cant do much about it)


And benefiting borrowers

Most of the cost falls on domestic residents


For all the talk of the cost of QE in the US and the
impact on China, that is only a small fraction of the
overall impact, the vast majority falling on US residents

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 36 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

European Central Bank (ECB)


Belongs to 17 governments
By using the ECB to bail out (private or public entities) it

is a tax on all residents of the euro zone for the benefit of


some countries only
Turns the EU into a transfer union
This limits the legitimacy of the ECB to fulfil its core
functions
Two possibilities
because the ECB belongs to no one, it is easy to abuse it
and therefore it is subject to excessive amounts of rules

and restrictions limiting its flexibility

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 37 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Challenges for Central Banking

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 38 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Conflict between financial stability and


monetary policy
During the gold standard, financial stability was the main

priority as monetary policy took care of itself


After World War II, the financial system was highly
regulated with very few financial crises
Financial stability low priority
Governments misinterpreted Keynes and used monetary
policy routinely to stimulate the economy
End result stagflation

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 39 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

From the 1980s


Inflation a serious issue
Consequently, central banks focused much more on

monetary policy than financial stability


As a consequence, in the 1980s and 1990s monetary
policy
became the main even only objective of central banks
Successful generals syndrome
Decoupling supervision from the central banks

exacerbated this problem


This left them woefully unprepared in 2007
This is a key explanation for how poorly many central
banks reacted to the crisis
Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 40 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Objectives may coincide

Deleveraging during crises leads to a reduction in money

supply even deflation


Increase in liquidity needed for both financial stability and
monetary policy
One tool two purposes
Interest rates needed for two different purposes

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 41 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Central bank independence

Monetary policy suggests central bank independence


Because politicians like to use interest rates for

shortterm political gains


The case is not as clear cut for financial stability
The use of taxpayers money to help private institutions is
a political matter, involving the finance ministry/treasury
It is unlikely to be the best equipped, but is the most
appropriate

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 42 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

When things go wrong


Ideally, inflation should be constant at a low rate e.g.

3%
The reason is price uncertainty holds back economic
growth
High inflation is costly not to mention hyperinflation
Deflation is costly
The best way to destroy the capitalist system is to debauch
the currency. Vladimir Lenin

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 43 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Hyperinflation

Hyperinflation over 50% per month


Most of the important episodes occurred in
Europe after WWI and WWII
Latin American in the 1980s and 1990s
Former Soviet Union in the 1990s
All-time record: Hungary 1945-1946, prices tripled daily
Large costs of inflation
One cause is seignorage to finance budget deficits

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 44 of 50

The Central Bank

Country

Supervision

Monetary policy

Highest
month

Hungary
Jul 1946
Zimbabwe Nov 2008
Yugoslavia Jan 1994
Germany
Oct 1923
Greece
Oct 1944
China
May 1949

Financial stability

Highest monthly
inflation rate
4.19 1016 %
8 1010 %
3 108
29,500%
13,800%
2,178%

Bailing

Challenges

Prices
double
15.0
24.7
1.4
3.7
4.3
6.7

hours
hours
days
days
days
days

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 45 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

The Weimar republic (Germany) 19211923

First documented economic behavior of hyperinflation


Dramatic increases in prices and interest rates,

redenomination of the currency, flight from cash to hard


assets etc.
Main cause was the treaty of Versailles and war
reprarations
60 marks per dollar in 1921 to 8000 end of 1922
Ended with the introduction of the Rentenmark

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 46 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Zimbabwe from 1980


Chronic hyperinflation since independence in 1980
1 Zimbabwe dollar was worth about USD 1.25
Inflation 624% in 2004, 1,730% in 2006
August 2006 revalued currency at 1,000 :1
Inflation 11,000% 2007, issue of larger denomination

notes
100m, 250m, 500m, 25b then 100b between May and July
November 2008, inflation 516 quintillion percent
On 16 January 2009, issued a ZWD 100 trillion bill
Redenomination on February 2009 removing 12 zeroes
(and 10 zeros in August 2008)
Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 47 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Hyperinflation in Germany and Zimbabwe


Notice the similar course of price growth
Consistent with Cagans 1956 empirical model
Jan/1922
1014

Jul/1922

Jan/1923

Jul/1923
1010

Zimbabwe
Germany
1010

107

104

106

101
10

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 48 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Deflation
When prices fall
It is costly because
1. Those with money postpone purchases because things
will be cheaper in the future
2. This makes prices fall even more
3. A vicious cycle
Benefits those who own money
Is costly for most businesses (who borrow to operate)
And regular workers who see salaries drop

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 49 of 50

The Central Bank

Supervision

Monetary policy

Financial stability

Bailing

Challenges

Some examples

The gold standard


The Great Depression
Japan from 1990
Adjusting to it is costly
1. Not quite deflation but Germany reduced domestic
factor costs in the 2000s internal devaluation
2. Similar to problems facing European sovereigns in
trouble

Global Financial Systems 2013 Jon Danielsson, page 50 of 50

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