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320 vis-a-vis 482

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3. Two provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(for short the Code) which are vital for consideration of

the issue referred to the larger Bench are Sections 320 and
482. Section 320 of the Code provides for compounding of
certain offences punishable under the Penal Code, 1860 (for
short IPC). It reads as follows:
320.

Compounding

of

offences.(1) The offences

punishable under the sections of the Indian Penal Code (45

of 1860) specified in the first two columns of the Table next
following may be compounded by the persons mentioned in
the third column of that Table
TABLE
Offence

Section of the Indian Penal Code applicable

Person by whom offence may be compounded

(1)

(2)

(3)

(2) The offences punishable under the sections of the Indian

Penal Code (45 of 1860) specified in the first two columns of
the Table next following may, with the permission of the
court before which any prosecution for such offence is
pending, be compounded by the persons mentioned in the
third column of that Table
TABLE
Offence

Section of the Indian Penal Code applicable

Person by whom offence may be compounded

(1)

(2)

(3)

(3) When an offence is compoundable under this section,

the abetment of such offence or an attempt to commit such
offence (when such attempt is itself an offence) or where
the accused is liable under Sections 34 or 149 of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) may be compounded in like
manner.
(4)(a) When the person who would otherwise be competent
to compound an offence under this section is under the age
of eighteen years or is an idiot or a lunatic, any person
competent to contract on his behalf may, with the
permission of the court, compound such offence.
(b) When the person who would otherwise be competent to

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320 vis-a-vis 482

compound an offence under this section is dead, the legal

representative, as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (5 of 1908), of such person may, with the consent of
the court, compound such offence.
(5) When the accused has been committed for trial or when
he has been convicted and an appeal is pending, no
composition for the offence shall be allowed without the
leave of the court to which he is committed, or, as the case
may be, before which the appeal is to be heard.
(6) A High Court or Court of Session acting in the exercise of
its powers of revision under Section 401 may allow any
person to compound any offence which such person is
competent to compound under this section.
(7) No offence shall be compounded if the accused is, by
reason of a previous conviction, liable either to enhanced
punishment or to a punishment of a different kind for such
offence.
(8) The composition of an offence under this section shall
have the effect of an acquittal of the accused with whom
the offence has been compounded.
(9) No offence shall be compounded except as provided by
this section.
4. Section 482 saves the inherent power of the High Court
and it reads as follows:
482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the
inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as
may be necessary to give effect to any order under this
Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
20. More than 65 years back, in King Emperor v. Khwaja
Nazir Ahmad7, it was observed by the Privy Council that
Section 561-A (corresponding to Section 482 of the Code)
had not given increased powers to the Court which it did not
possess before that section was enacted. It was observed:
The section gives no new powers, it only provides that
those which the court already inherently possess shall be
preserved and is inserted lest, as Their Lordships think, it

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should be considered that the only powers possessed by the

court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal
Procedure Code and that no inherent power had survived
the passing of the Code.
21. In Khushi Ram v. Hashim8 this Court held as under: (AIR
p. 544, para 3)
3. It is unnecessary to emphasise that the inherent
power of the High Court under Section 561-A cannot be
invoked in regard to matters which are directly covered by
the specific provisions of the Code.
22. The above view of the Privy Council in Khwaja Nazir
Ahmad7 and another decision in Lala Jairam Das v. King
Emperor9 was expressly accepted by this Court in State of
U.P. v. Mohd. Naim10. The Court said: (Mohd. Naim case10,
AIR p. 705, para 7)
7. It is now well settled that the section confers no new
powers on the High Court. It merely safeguards all existing
inherent powers possessed by a High Court necessary
(among other purposes) to secure the ends of justice. The
section

provides

inherently

that those powers

possesses

shall

be

which the

preserved

lest

court
it

be

considered that the only powers possessed by the court are

those expressly conferred by the Code and that no inherent
powers had survived the passing of the Code.
23. In Pampapathy v. State of Mysore11 a three-Judge
Bench of this Court stated as follows: (AIR p. 289, para 8)
8. The inherent power of the High Court mentioned in
Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code can be
exercised only for either of the three purposes specifically
mentioned in the section. The inherent power cannot be
invoked in respect of any matter covered by the specific
provisions of the Code. It cannot also be invoked if its
exercise would be inconsistent with any of the specific
provisions of the Code. It is only if the matter in question is
not covered by any specific provisions of the Code that
Section 561-A can come into operation.
24. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy12, a three-Judge
Bench of this Court referred to Section 482 of the Code and

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320 vis-a-vis 482

in para 7 of the Report held as under: (SCC p. 703)

7. In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High
Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the
conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would
be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of
justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.
The saving of the High Courts inherent powers, both in civil
and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary
public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to
be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or
persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a
lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which
the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would
justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the
interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the
ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered
according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling
necessity for making these observations is that without a
proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision
which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court
to do justice between the State and its subjects, it would be
impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that
salient jurisdiction.
The Court then observed in (L. Muniswamy case12, SCC p.
704, para 9) that the,
[c]onsiderations justifying the exercise of inherent powers
for securing the ends of justice naturally vary from case to
case and a jurisdiction as wholesome as the one conferred
by Section 482 ought not to be encased within the
straitjacket of a rigid formula.
25. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Madhu Limaye v.
State of Maharashtra13 dealt with the invocation of inherent
power under Section 482 for quashing the interlocutory
order even though revision under Section 397(2) of the
Code was prohibited. The Court noticed the principles in
relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High
Court as under: (SCC p. 555, para 8)
(1) that the power is not to be resorted to if there is a
specific provision in the Code for the redress of the

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320 vis-a-vis 482

grievance of the aggrieved party;

(2) that it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent
abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice;
(3) that it should not be exercised as against the express
bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.
26. In Raj Kapoor v. State14 the Court explained the width
and amplitude of the inherent power of the High Court
under Section 482 vis--vis the revisional power under
Section 397 as follows: (SCC pp. 47-48, para 10)
10. The opening words of Section 482 contradict this
contention because nothing of the Code, not even Section
397, can affect the amplitude of the inherent power
preserved in so many terms by the language of Section 482.
Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law
when a specific provision is made: easy resort to inherent
power is not right except under compelling circumstances.
Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent
power should not invade areas set apart for specific power
under the same Code. In Madhu Limaye case13 this Court
has exhaustively and, if I may say so with great respect,
correctly discussed and delineated the law beyond mistake.
While it is true that Section 482 is pervasive it should not
subvert legal interdicts written into the same Code, such,
for instance, in Section 397(2). Apparent conflict may arise
in some situations between the two provisions and a happy
solution: (Madhu Limaye case13, SCC pp. 555-56, para 10)
10. would be to say that the bar provided in sub-section
(2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional
power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High
Court will have no power of revision in relation to any
interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the
other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will
come into play, there being no other provision in the Code
for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But
then, if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory
character which could be corrected in exercise of the
revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the

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320 vis-a-vis 482

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High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in

case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation
which is an abuse of the process of the court or for the
purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the
High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained
in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the
inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be
few and far between. The High Court must exercise the
inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the
desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding
initiated

illegally,

vexatiously

or

as

being

without

jurisdiction.
In short, there is no total ban on the exercise of inherent
power where abuse of the process of the court or other
extraordinary situation excites the courts jurisdiction. The
limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. The policy of the
law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple,
should not be taken up to the High Court resulting in
unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final
orders are clearly capable of being considered in exercise of
inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the court in the
face. In between is a tertium quid, as Untwalia, J. has
pointed out as for example, where it is more than a purely
interlocutory order and less than a final disposal. The
present case falls under that category where the accused
complain of harassment through the courts process. Can
we state that in this third category the inherent power can
be exercised? In the words of Untwalia, J.: (SCC p. 556, para
10)
10. The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to
prevent the abuse of the process of the court and/or to
secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by
an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can
examine the matter in an appropriate case under its
inherent powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for
exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with
Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, although not
accepting, that invoking the revisional power of the High
Court is impermissible.

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320 vis-a-vis 482

I am, therefore clear in my mind that the inherent power is

not rebuffed in the case situation before us. Counsel on both
sides, sensitively responding to our allergy for legalistics,
rightly agreed that the fanatical insistence on the formal
filing of a copy of the order under cessation need not take
up this Courts time. Our conclusion concurs with the
concession of counsel on both sides that merely because a
copy of the order has not been produced, despite its
presence in the records in the court, it is not possible for me
to hold that the entire revisory power stands frustrated and
the inherent power stultified.
27. In Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee15 the Court considered
the scope of Section 482 of the Code in a case where on
dismissal of the petition under Section 482, a second
petition under Section 482 of the Code was made. The
contention before this Court was that the second petition
under Section 482 of the Code was not entertainable; the
exercise of power under Section 482 on a second petition by
the same party on the same ground virtually amounts to
review of the earlier order and is contrary to the spirit of
Section 362 of the Code and the High Court was in error in
having quashed the proceedings by adopting that course.
While accepting this argument, this Court held as follows:
(SCC pp. 439-40, paras 3, 5 & 7)
3. The inherent power under Section 482 is intended to
prevent the abuse of the process of the court and to secure
ends of justice. Such power cannot be exercised to do
something which is expressly barred under the Code. If any
consideration of the facts by way of review is not
permissible under the Code and is expressly barred, it is not
for the court to exercise its inherent power to reconsider the
matter and record a conflicting decision. If there had been
change in the circumstances of the case, it would be in
order for the High Court to exercise its inherent powers in
the prevailing circumstances and pass appropriate orders to
secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the
process of the court. Where there is no such changed
circumstances and the decision has to be arrived at on the
facts that existed as on the date of the earlier order, the

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320 vis-a-vis 482

exercise of the power to reconsider the same materials to

arrive at different conclusion is in effect a review, which is
expressly barred under Section 362.
*

5. Section 362 of the Code expressly provides that no court

when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a
case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a
clerical or arithmetical error save as otherwise provided by
the Code. Section 482 enables the High Court to make such
order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under
the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The inherent
powers, however, as much are controlled by principle and
precedent as are its express powers by statute. If a matter
is covered by an express letter of law, the court cannot give
a go-by to the statutory provisions and instead evolve a
new provision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction.
*

7. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be

invoked to override bar of review under Section 362. It is
clearly stated in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal16, that the
inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for doing
that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. The law is
therefore clear that the inherent power cannot be exercised
for doing that which cannot be done on account of the bar
under other provisions of the Code. The court is not
empowered to review its own decision under the purported
exercise of inherent power. We find that the impugned order
in this case is in effect one reviewing the earlier order on a
reconsideration of the same materials. The High Court has
grievously erred in doing so. Even on merits, we do not find
any compelling reasons to quash the proceedings at that
stage.
28. In Dharampal v. Ramshri17 this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 438, para 6)
6. It is now well settled that the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising
powers which are expressly barred by the Code.
29. In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P.18 a two-Judge

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320 vis-a-vis 482

Bench of this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 147-48, para 2)

2. It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High
Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be
necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to
prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice. But the expressions abuse of the
process of law or to secure the ends of justice do not
confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the
alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice
could only be secured in accordance with law including
procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers
are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used
sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482
of the Code in cases where there is no express provision
empowering the High Court to achieve the said object. It is
well-nigh settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in
respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the
Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision
of the Code. In the present case, the High Court overlooked
the procedural law which empowered the convicted accused
to prefer statutory appeal against conviction of the offence.
The High Court has intervened at an uncalled for stage and
soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial stage of
the trial.
30. In G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P.19 the Court was
concerned with the order of the High Court whereby the
application under Section 482 of the Code for quashing the
criminal proceedings under Sections 406 and 420 IPC
pending in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Ghaziabad was dismissed. In para 8 of the Report, the Court
held as under: (SCC p. 643)
8. Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code has to be
exercised with great care. In exercise of its jurisdiction the
High Court is not to examine the matter superficially. It is to
be seen if a matter, which is essentially of a civil nature, has
been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings
are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before
issuing process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal
of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This Court

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320 vis-a-vis 482

has laid down certain principles on the basis of which the

High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Code. Jurisdiction under this section has to be exercised
to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice.
31. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka
v. M. Devendrappa20 restated what has been stated in the
earlier decisions that Section 482 does not confer any new
powers on the High Court, it only saves the inherent power
which the court possessed before the commencement of
the Code. The Court went on to explain the exercise of
inherent power by the High Court in para 6 of the Report as
under: (SCC p. 94)
6. It envisages three circumstances under which the
inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give
effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of
the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends
of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down
any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of
inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with
procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise.
Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express
provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge
of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is
the doctrine which finds expression in the section which
merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the
High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in
the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their
constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the
right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of
justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit,
concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest
(when the law gives a person anything it gives him that
without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers
under the section, the court does not function as a court of
appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section
though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and
with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the

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tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be

exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial
justice for the administration of which alone courts exist.
Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and
if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to
produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It
would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any
action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion
of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified
to

quash

any

proceeding

if

it

finds

that

initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process

of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise
serve the ends of justice.
32. The Court in para 9 further stated: (M. Devendrappa
case20, SCC p. 96)
9. the powers possessed by the High Court under
Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very
plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise.
Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of
this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power
should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.
The High Court being the highest court of a State should
normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case
where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so
when the evidence has not been collected and produced
before the court and the issues involved, whether factual or
legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true
perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hardand-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which
the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of
quashing the proceeding at any stage.
33. In CBI v. A. Ravishankar Prasad21 the Court observed in
paras 17, 19, 20 and 39 of the Report as follows: (SCC pp.
356-57 & 363)
17. Undoubtedly, the High Court possesses inherent
powers

under

Section

482

of

the Code of

Criminal

Procedure. These inherent powers of the High Court are

meant to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial
justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to

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prevent abuse of the process of the court.

*

19. This Court time and again has observed that the
extraordinary power under Section 482 CrPC should be
exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. The
court would be justified in exercising the power when it is
imperative to exercise the power in order to prevent
injustice. In order to understand the nature and scope of
power under Section 482 CrPC it has become necessary to
recapitulate the ratio of the decided cases.
20. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the
courts have consistently taken the view that they must use
the courts extraordinary power only to prevent injustice
and secure the ends of justice. We have largely inherited
the

provisions

of

inherent

powers

from

the

English

jurisprudence, therefore the principles decided by the

English courts would be of relevance for us. It is generally
agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect
its process from abuse. The English courts have also used
inherent power to achieve the same objective.
*

39. Careful analysis of all these judgments clearly reveals

that the exercise of inherent powers would entirely depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case. The object of
incorporating inherent powers in the Code is to prevent
abuse of the process of the court or to secure ends of
justice.
34. In Devendra v. State of U.P.22, while dealing with the
question whether a pure civil dispute can be the subjectmatter of a criminal proceeding under Sections 420, 467,
468 and 469 IPC, a two-Judge Bench of this Court observed
that: (SCC p. 504, para 24)
24. the High Court ordinarily would exercise its
jurisdiction

under

Section

482

of

the

[Code]

if

the

allegations made in the first information report, even if

given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, do
not make out any offence.
35. In Sushil Suri v. CBI23 the Court considered the scope

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and ambit of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court and

made the following observations in para 16 of the Report:
(SCC p. 715)
16. Section 482 CrPC itself envisages three circumstances
under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised by
the High Court, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under
CrPC; (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of court; and
(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is trite that
although the power possessed by the High Court under the
said provision is very wide but it is not unbridled. It has to
be exercised sparingly, carefully and cautiously, ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice for which alone
the court exists. Nevertheless, it is neither feasible nor
desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern
the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of the court. Yet, in
numerous cases, this Court has laid down certain broad
principles which may be borne in mind while exercising
jurisdiction

under

Section

482

CrPC.

Though

it

is

emphasised that exercise of inherent powers would depend

on the facts and circumstances of each case, but the
common thread which runs through all the decisions on the
subject is that the court would be justified in invoking its
inherent jurisdiction where the allegations made in the
complaint or charge-sheet, as the case may be, taken at
their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
constitute the offence alleged.
36. Besides B.S. Joshi2, Nikhil Merchant3 and Manoj
Sharma4 there are other decisions of this Court where the
scope of Section 320 vis--vis the inherent power of the
High Court under Section 482 of the Code has come up for
consideration.
37. In Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab24 in the
appeal before this Court which arose from an order of the
High Court refusing to quash the FIR against the appellant
lodged under Sections 379, 406, 409, 418, 506/34 IPC on
account

of

compromise

entered

into

between

the

complainant and the accused, in paras 5 and 6 of the

Report, the Court held as under: (SCC p. 584)
5. It is on the basis of this compromise that the application

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320 vis-a-vis 482

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was filed in the High Court for quashing of proceedings

which has been dismissed by the impugned order. We notice
from a reading of the FIR and the other documents on
record that the dispute was purely a personal one between
two contesting parties and that it arose out of extensive
business dealings between them and that there was
absolutely no public policy involved in the nature of the
allegations made against the accused. We are, therefore, of
the opinion that no useful purpose would be served in
continuing with the proceedings in the light of the
compromise and also in the light of the fact that the
complainant has on 11-1-2004 passed away and the
possibility of a conviction being recorded has thus to be
ruled out.
6. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in
disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal
nature, the court should ordinarily accept the terms of the
compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the
matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the
prosecution

is

luxury

which

the

courts,

grossly

overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time

so saved can be utilised in deciding more effective and
meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to
the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the
technicalities of the law.
38. In Ishwar Singh v. State of M.P.25 the Court was
concerned with a case where the appellant-accused was
convicted and sentenced by the Additional Sessions Judge
for an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC. The High
Court

dismissed

the

appeal

from

the

judgment

and

conviction. In the appeal, by special leave, the injured

complainant was ordered to be joined as party as it was
stated by the counsel for the appellant that mutual
compromise has been arrived at between the parties i.e. the
accused on the one hand and the complainant victim on the
other hand during the pendency of the proceedings before
this Court. It was prayed on behalf of the appellant that the
appeal be disposed of on the basis of compromise between
the parties. In para 12 of the Report, the Court observed as

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320 vis-a-vis 482

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follows: (SCC p. 670)

12. Now, it cannot be gainsaid that an offence punishable
under Section 307 IPC is not a compoundable offence.
Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
expressly states that no offence shall be compounded if it is
not compoundable under the Code. At the same time,
however, while dealing with such matters, this Court may
take into account a relevant and important consideration
about compromise between the parties for the purpose of
reduction of sentence.
39. The Court also referred to the earlier decisions of this
Court in Jetha Ram v. State of Rajasthan26, Murugesan v.
Ganapathy Velar27, Ishwarlal v. State of M.P.28 and Mahesh
Chand v. State of Rajasthan29 and noted in para 13 of the
Report as follows: (Ishwar Singh case25, SCC p. 670)
13. In Jetha Ram v. State of Rajasthan26, Murugesan v.
Ganapathy Velar27 and Ishwarlal v. State of M.P.28 this
Court, while taking into account the fact of compromise
between the parties, reduced sentence imposed on the
appellant-accused

to

already

undergone,

though

the

offences were not compoundable. But it was also stated

that in Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan29 such offence
was ordered to be compounded.
Then, in paras 14 and 15 the Court held as under: (Ishwar
Singh case25, SCC p. 670)
14. In our considered opinion, it would not be appropriate
to order compounding of an offence not compoundable
under the Code ignoring and keeping aside statutory
provisions. In our judgment, however, limited submission of
the

learned

counsel

for

the

appellant

deserves

consideration that while imposing substantive sentence, the

factum of compromise between the parties is indeed a
relevant circumstance which the court may keep in mind.
15. In the instant case, the incident took place before more
than fifteen years; the parties are residing in one and the
same village and they are also relatives. The appellant was
about 20 years of age at the time of commission of crime. It
was his first offence. After conviction, the petitioner was
taken into custody. During the pendency of appeal before

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the High Court, he was enlarged on bail but, after the

decision of the High Court, he again surrendered and is in
jail at present. Though he had applied for bail, the prayer
was not granted and he was not released on bail.
Considering the totality of facts and circumstances, in our
opinion, the ends of justice would be met if the sentence of
imprisonment awarded to the appellant (Accused 1) is
reduced to the period already undergone.
40. In Rumi Dhar v. State of W.B.30, the Court was
concerned with the applicability of Section 320 of the Code
where

the

commission

accused
of

the

was

being

offences

prosecuted

under

for

Sections

the
120-

B/420/467/468/471 IPC along with the bank officers who

were being prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with
Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
The accused had paid the entire due amount as per the
settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery before
the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The accused prayed for her
discharge on the grounds: (i) having regard to the
settlement arrived at between her and the bank, no case for
proceeding against her has been made out; (ii) the amount
having already been paid and the title deeds having been
returned, the criminal proceedings should be dropped on
the basis of the settlement; and (iii) the dispute between
the parties were purely civil in nature and that she had not
fabricated any document or cheated the bank in any way
whatsoever and charges could not have been framed
against her. The CBI contested the application for discharge
on the ground that mere repayment to the bank could not
exonerate the accused from the criminal proceeding. The
two-Judge Bench of this Court referred to Section 320 of the
Code and the earlier decisions of this Court in CBI v.
Duncans Agro Industries Ltd.31, State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal32, State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma33, Janata Dal v. H.S.
Chowdhary34 and Nikhil Merchant3 which followed the
decision in B.S. Joshi2 and then with reference to Article 142
of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code refused to
quash the charge against the accused by holding as under:
(Rumi Dhar case30, SCC p. 372, para 24)

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24. The jurisdiction of the court under Article 142 of the

Constitution of India is not in dispute. Exercise of such
power

would,

however,

depend

on

the

facts

and

circumstances of each case. The High Court, in exercise of

its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, and this Court, in terms of Article 142 of the
Constitution of India, would not direct quashing of a case
involving crime against the society particularly when both
the learned Special Judge as also the High Court have found
that a prima facie case has been made out against the
appellant herein for framing the charge.
41. In Shiji v. Radhika35 this Court considered the exercise
of inherent power by the High Court under Section 482 in a
matter where the offence was not compoundable as the
accused was already involved in commission of the offences
punishable under Sections 354 and 394 IPC. The High Court
rejected the prayer by holding that the offences with which
the appellants were charged are not personal in nature to
justify quashing the criminal proceedings on the basis of a
compromise arrived at between the complainant and the
appellants. This Court considered the earlier decisions of
this Court, the provisions contained in Sections 320 and 394
of the Code and in paras 17, 18 and 19 of the Report held as
under: (SCC pp. 712-13)
17. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not
compoundable under Section 320 CrPC is by itself no reason
for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under
Section 482 CrPC. That power can in our opinion be
exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a
conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a
trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle
distinction between compounding of offences by the parties
before the trial court or in appeal on the one hand and the
exercise of power by the High Court to quash the
prosecution under Section 482 CrPC on the other. While a
court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against
conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding
of an offence based on a settlement

arrived at between

the

offences

parties

in

cases

where

the

are

not

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Bench
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compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may

quash the prosecution even in cases where the offences
with

which

the

accused

stand

charged

are

non-

compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court

under Section 482 CrPC are not for that purpose controlled
by Section 320 CrPC.
18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the
plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by itself,
makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same
with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of
the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and
only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be
recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the
prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of
law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate
the situations in which the exercise of power under Section
482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the
exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice
and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may
result in the abuse of the process of law. The High Court
may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon
to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an
appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section
482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above,
the High Court will have to consider the facts and
circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit
case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.
19. Coming to the case at hand, we are of the view that the
incident in question had its genesis in a dispute relating to
the access to the two plots which are adjacent to each
other. It was not a case of broad daylight robbery for gain. It
was a case which has its origin in the civil dispute between
the parties, which dispute has, it appears, been resolved by
them. That being so, continuance of the prosecution where
the complainant is not ready to support the allegations
which are now described by her as arising out of some
misunderstanding and misconception will be a futile
exercise that will serve no purpose. It is noteworthy that the
two alleged eyewitnesses, who are closely related to the

Sl.
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320 vis-a-vis 482

complainant,

are

also

no

longer

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supportive

of

the

prosecution version. The continuance of the proceedings is

thus nothing but an empty formality. Section 482 CrPC
could, in such circumstances, be justifiably invoked by the
High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and
thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the courts
below.
42. In Ashok Sadarangani v. Union of India36 the issue
under consideration was whether an offence which was not
compoundable under the provisions of the Code could be
quashed. That was a case where a criminal case was
registered against the accused persons under Sections 120B, 465, 467, 468 and 471 IPC. The allegation was that the
accused secured the credit facilities by submitting forged
property documents as collaterals and utilised such facilities
in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening letters of
credit in respect of foreign supplies of goods, without
actually bringing any goods but inducing the Bank to
negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers
and also by misusing the cash credit facility. The Court
considered the earlier decisions of this Court including B.S.
Joshi2, Nikhil Merchant3, Manoj Sharma4, Shiji35, Duncans
Agro Industries Ltd.31, Rumi Dhar30 and Sushil Suri23 and
also referred to the order of reference in one of the cases
before us.
43. In Sadarangani case36 it was held as under: (SCC pp.
327-29, paras 24-31)
24.

Having

carefully

considered

the

facts

and

circumstances of the case, as also the law relating to the

continuance of criminal cases where the complainant and
the accused had settled their differences and had arrived at
an amicable arrangement, we see no reason to differ with
the views that had been taken in Nikhil Merchant case3 or
Manoj Sharma case4 or the several decisions that have
come thereafter. It is, however, no coincidence that the
golden thread which runs through all the decisions cited,
indicates that continuance of a criminal proceeding after a
compromise has been arrived at between the complainant

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and the accused, would amount to abuse of the process of

court and an exercise in futility, since the trial could be
prolonged and ultimately, may conclude in a decision which
may be of any consequence to any of the other parties.
25. Even in Sushil Suri case23 on which the learned
Additional Solicitor General had relied, the learned Judges
who decided the said case, took note of the decisions in
various other cases, where it had been reiterated that the
exercise of inherent powers would depend entirely on the
facts and circumstances of each case. In other words, not
that there is any restriction on the power or authority
vested in the Supreme Court in exercising powers under
Article 142 of the Constitution, but that in exercising such
powers the Court has to be circumspect, and has to exercise
such power sparingly in the facts of each case.
26. Furthermore, the issue, which has been referred to a
larger Bench in Gian Singh case1 in relation to the decisions
of this Court in B.S. Joshi case2, Nikhil Merchant case3, as
also Manoj Sharma case4, deals with a situation which is
different from that of the present case. While in the cases
referred to hereinabove, the main question was whether the
offences which were not compoundable, under Section 320
CrPC could be quashed under Section 482 CrPC, in Gian
Singh case1 the Court was of the view that a noncompoundable offence could not be compounded and that
the courts should not try to take over the function of
Parliament or the executive. In fact, in none of the cases
referred to in Gian Singh case1, did this Court permit
compounding of non-compoundable offences. On the other
hand, upon taking various factors into consideration,
including

the futility

of

continuing

with

the

criminal

proceedings, this Court ultimately quashed the same.

27. In addition to the above, even with regard to CBI v. A.
Ravishankar Prasad21 this Court observed that the High
Court can exercise power under Section 482 CrPC to do real
and substantial justice and to prevent abuse of the process
of court when exceptional circumstances warranted the
exercise of such power. Once the circumstances in a given
case were held to be such as to attract the provisions of

Sl.
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320 vis-a-vis 482

Bench
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Article 142 or Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, it

would be open to the Supreme Court to exercise its
extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution
to quash the proceedings, the continuance whereof would
only amount to abuse of the process of court.
28. In the instant case the dispute between the petitioners
and the Banks having been compromised, we have to
examine

whether

the

continuance

of

the

criminal

proceeding could turn out to be an exercise in futility

without anything positive being ultimately achieved.
29. As was indicated in Harbhajan Singh case37, the
pendency of a reference to a larger Bench, does not mean
that all other proceedings involving the same issue would
remain stayed till a decision was rendered in the reference.
The reference made in Gian Singh case1 need not,
therefore, detain us. Till such time as the decisions cited at
the Bar are not modified or altered in any way, they
continue to hold the field.
30. In the present case, the fact situation is different from
that in Nikhil Merchant case3. While in Nikhil Merchant
case3 the accused had misrepresented the financial status
of the company in question in order to avail of credit
facilities to an extent to which the Company was not
entitled, in the instant case, the allegation is that as part of
a larger conspiracy, property acquired on lease from a
person who had no title to the leased properties, was
offered as collateral security for loans obtained. Apart from
the above, the actual owner of the property has filed a
criminal complaint against Shri Kersi V. Mehta who had held
himself out as the attorney of the owner and his family
members.
31. The ratio of the decisions in B.S. Joshi case2 and in
Nikhil Merchant case3 or for that matter, even in Manoj
Sharma case4, does not help the case of the writ
petitioners. In Nikhil Merchant case3, this Court had in the
facts of the case observed that the dispute involved had
overtures of a civil dispute with criminal facets. This is not
so in the instant case where the emphasis is more on the
criminal intent of the petitioners than on the civil aspect

Sl.
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320 vis-a-vis 482

Bench
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involving the dues of the Bank in respect of which a

compromise was worked out.
The Court distinguished B.S. Joshi2 and Nikhil Merchant3 by
observing

that

those

cases

dealt

with

different

fact

situation.
44. In Rajiv Saxena v. State (NCT of Delhi)38 this Court
allowed the quashment of criminal case under Sections 498A and 496 read with Section 34 IPC by a brief order. It was
observed that since the parties had settled their disputes
and the complainant agreed that the criminal proceedings
need not be continued, the criminal proceedings could be
quashed.
45. In a very recent judgment decided by this Court in the
month of July 2012 in Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana v. State
of Gujarat39 this Court was again concerned with the
question of quashment of an FIR alleging the offences
punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120-B
IPC. The High Court refused to quash the criminal case
under

Section

482

of

the

Code.

The

question

for

consideration was that inasmuch as all those offences,

except Section 420 IPC, were non-compoundable offences
under Section 320 of the Code, whether it would be possible
to quash the FIR by the High Court under Section 482 of the
Code or by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution
of India. The Bench elaborately considered the decision of
this Court in Shiji35 and by invoking Article 142 of the
Constitution quashed the criminal proceedings. It was held
as under: (Jayrajsinh case39, SCC paras 13-15)
13. In the light of the principles mentioned above,
inasmuch as Respondent 2 complainant has filed an
affidavit highlighting the stand taken by the appellant
(Accused 3) during the pendency of the appeal before this
Court and the terms of settlement as stated in the said
affidavit, by applying the same analogy and in order to do
complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution, we
accept the terms of settlement insofar as the appellant
herein (Accused 3) is concerned.
14. In view of the same, we quash and set aside the
impugned FIR No. 45 of 2011 registered with Sanand Police

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320 vis-a-vis 482

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Station, Ahmedabad for offences punishable under Sections

467, 468, 471, 420 and 120-B IPC insofar as the appellant
(Accused 3) is concerned.
15. The appeal is allowed to the extent mentioned above.
46. In Y. Suresh Babu v. State of A.P.40 decided on 29-41987, this Court allowed the compounding of an offence
under Section 326 IPC even though such compounding was
not permitted by Section 320 of the Code. However, in Ram
Lal v. State of J&K41 this Court observed that Y. Suresh
Babu40 was per incuriam. It was held that an offence which
law

declares

to

be

non-compoundable

cannot

be

compounded at all even with the permission of the Court.

51. Section 320 of the Code articulates public policy with
regard to the compounding of offences. It catalogues the
offences punishable under IPC which may be compounded
by the parties without permission of the court and the
composition of certain offences with the permission of the
court. The

offences punishable under the special

statutes are not covered by Section 320. When an offence is

compoundable under Section 320, abatement of such
offence or an attempt to commit such offence or where the
accused is liable under Section 34 or 149 IPC can also be
compounded in the same manner. A person who is under 18
years of age or is an idiot or a lunatic is not competent to
contract compounding of offence but the same can be done
on his behalf with the permission of the court. If a person is
otherwise competent to compound an offence is dead, his
legal representatives may also compound the offence with
the permission of the court. Where the accused has been
committed for trial or he has been convicted and the appeal
is pending, composition can only be done with the leave of
the court to which he has been committed or with the leave
of the appeal court, as the case may be. The Revisional
Court is also competent to allow any person to compound
any

offence

who

is

competent

to

compound.

The

consequence of the composition of an offence is acquittal of

the accused. Sub-section (9) of Section 320 mandates that
no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this
section. Obviously, in view thereof the composition of an

Sl.
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320 vis-a-vis 482

offence has to be in accord with Section 320 and in no other

manner.
52. The question is with regard to the inherent power of the
High Court in quashing the criminal proceedings against an
offender who has settled his dispute with the victim of the
crime but the crime in which he is allegedly involved is not
compoundable under Section 320 of the Code.
53. Section 482 of the Code, as its very language suggests,
saves the inherent power of the High Court which it has by
virtue of it being a superior court to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice. It begins with the words, nothing in this Code
which means that the provision is an overriding provision.
These words leave no manner of doubt that none of the
provisions of the Code limits or restricts the inherent power.
The guideline for exercise of such power is provided in
Section 482 itself i.e. to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As has been
repeatedly stated that Section 482 confers no new powers
on the High Court; it merely safeguards existing inherent
powers possessed by the High Court necessary to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of
justice. It is equally well settled that the power is not to be
resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the
redress of the grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be
exercised very sparingly and it should not be exercised as
against the express bar of law engrafted in any other
provision of the Code.
54. In different situations, the inherent power may be
exercised in different ways to achieve its ultimate objective.
Formation of opinion by the High Court before it exercises
inherent power under Section 482 on either of the twin
objectives, (i) to prevent abuse of the process of any court,
or (ii) to secure the ends of justice, is a sine qua non.
55. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial
obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of
administration of justice or to prevent continuation of
unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal
maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id

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320 vis-a-vis 482

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sine qua res ipsa esse non potest. The full import of which is
whenever anything is authorised, and especially if, as a
matter of duty, required to be done by law, it is found
impossible to do that thing unless something else not
authorised in express terms be also done, may also be
done, then that something else will be supplied by
necessary intendment. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such
exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and
substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed
by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide
amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and
circumspection.
56. It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by
the High Court would entirely depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. It is neither permissible nor
proper for the court to provide a straitjacket formula
regulating the exercise of inherent powers under Section
482. No precise and inflexible guidelines can also be
provided.
57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the
ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not
the same thing as compounding of offence. They are
different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the
power of compounding of offences given to a court under
Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of
criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of
a

criminal

court

is

circumscribed

by

the

provisions

contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and

squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of
opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or
criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the
material on record as to whether the ends of justice would
justify such exercise of power although the ultimate
consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.
58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding
having regard to the fact that the dispute between the
offender and the victim has been settled although the
offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion,

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320 vis-a-vis 482

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continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in

futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute
between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored;
securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding
factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect
on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously
endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it
is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the
victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim
has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been
made compoundable in law, with or without the permission
of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under
IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes,
like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants

while working in that

capacity, the settlement between the offender and the

victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain
offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil
flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial,
financial, partnership or such like transactions or the
offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to
dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is
basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have
settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of
the

fact

that

such

offences

have

not

been

made

compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of

its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or
criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of
such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the
offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal
proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice
shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not
exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no
hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.
59. B.S. Joshi2, Nikhil Merchant3, Manoj Sharma4 and
Shiji35 do illustrate the principle that the High Court may
quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise
of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and

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Section 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High
Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing
criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi2, Nikhil Merchant3, Manoj
Sharma4 and Shiji35 this Court has compounded the noncompoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so.
There does exist the distinction between compounding of an
offence under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case
by the High Court in exercise of inherent power under
Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different
although the ultimate consequence may be the same viz.
acquittal of the accused or dismissal of indictment.
60. We find no incongruity in the above principle of law and
the decisions of this Court in Simrikhia15, Dharampal17,
Arun Shankar Shukla18, Ishwar Singh25, Rumi Dhar30 and
Ashok

Sadarangani36.

The

principle

propounded

in

Simrikhia15 that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court

cannot be invoked to override express bar provided in law is
by now well settled. In Dharampal17 the Court observed the
same thing that the inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are
expressly barred by the Code. Similar statement of law is
made in Arun Shankar Shukla18. In Ishwar Singh25 the
accused was alleged to have committed an offence
punishable under Section 307 IPC and with reference to
Section 320 of the Code, it was held that the offence
punishable under Section 307 IPC was not compoundable
offence and there was express bar in Section 320 that no
offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable
under the Code. In Rumi Dhar30 although the accused had
paid the entire due amount as per the settlement with the
bank in the matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery
Tribunal, the accused was being proceeded with for the
commission

of

the

offences

under

Sections

120-

B/420/467/468/471 IPC along with the bank officers who

were being prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)
(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court refused to
quash the charge against the accused by holding that the
Court would not quash a case involving a crime against the
society when a prima facie case has been made out against

Sl.
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320 vis-a-vis 482

the accused for framing the charge. Ashok Sadarangani36

was again a case where the accused persons were charged
of having committed the offences under Sections 120-B,
465, 467, 468 and 471 IPC and the allegations were that the
accused secured the credit facilities by submitting forged
property documents as collaterals and utilised such facilities
in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening letters of
credit in respect of foreign supplies of goods, without
actually bringing any goods but inducing the bank to
negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers
and also by misusing the cash-credit facility. The Court was
alive to the reference made in one of the present matters
and also the decisions in B.S. Joshi2, Nikhil Merchant3 and
Manoj Sharma4 and it was held that B.S. Joshi2 and Nikhil
Merchant3 dealt with different factual situation as the
dispute involved had overtures of a civil dispute but the
case under consideration in Ashok Sadarangani36 was more
on the criminal intent than on a civil aspect. The decision in
Ashok Sadarangani36 supports the view that the criminal
matters involving overtures of a civil dispute stand on a
different footing.
61. The position that emerges from the above discussion
can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in
quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different
from the power given to a criminal court for compounding
the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power
is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to
be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such
power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent
abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to
quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be
exercised where the offender and the victim have settled
their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances
of each case and no category can be prescribed. However,
before exercise of such power, the High Court must have
due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous
and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even

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though the victim or victims family and the offender have

settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature
and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any
compromise between the victim and the offender in relation
to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants
while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any
basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such
offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and
predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for
the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising
from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or
such like transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes
where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature
and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this
category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise
between the offender and the victim, the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the
criminal case would put the accused to great oppression
and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him
by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete
settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words,
the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or
contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the
criminal

proceeding

or

continuation

of

the

criminal

proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law

despite settlement and compromise between the victim and
the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it
is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if
the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative,
the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash
the criminal proceeding.
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303
15. Taking an overall view of the facts in Nikhil Merchant
case (2008) 9 SCC 677 and keeping in mind the decision in
B.S. Joshi case (2003) 4 SCC 675 and the compromise

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arrived at between the Company and the Bank and the

consent terms, this Court took the view that technicality
should not be allowed to stand in the way of quashing of the
criminal proceedings, since the continuance of the same
after the compromise had been arrived at between the
parties, would be a futile exercise.
16. Reference was also made to another decision of this
Court in Manoj Sharma v. State (2008) 16 SCC 1 where
following the decisions rendered in B.S. Joshi case and in
Nikhil Merchant case and after referring to various other
decisions, this Court ultimately came to the conclusion that
continuance of the criminal proceedings before the trial
court would be an exercise in futility and, accordingly,
quashed the same.
21. After referring to Nikhil Merchant case1, this Court in
Rumi Dhar case (2009) 6 SCC 364 also held that the High
Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC
and the Supreme Court in terms of Article 142 of the
Constitution, would ordinarily direct the quashing of a
charge involving a crime against society, particularly, when
both quashing of a case, continuance whereof after the
settlement is arrived at between the parties, would be a
futile exercise.
22. Reference was then made to another decision of this
Court in Sushil Suri v. CBI (2011) 5 SCC 708 in which the
Bench was called upon to deliberate upon the very same
issue, as has been raised in the present writ petition. In the
said case, after discussing earlier decisions, including those
rendered in B.S. Joshi case and in Nikhil Merchant case, the
Court, while placing reliance on Rumi Dhar case, observed
that while the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 142 of
the Constitution was not in dispute, the exercise of such
power

would,

however,

depend

on

the

facts

and

circumstances of each case.

24. .............................................................. It is, however,
no coincidence that the golden thread which runs through
all the decisions cited, indicates that continuance of a
criminal proceeding after a compromise has been arrived at
between the complainant and the accused, would amount

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to abuse of the process of court and an exercise in futility,

since the trial could be prolonged and ultimately, may
conclude in a decision which may be of any consequence to
any of the other parties.
27. In addition to the above, even with regard to CBI v. A.
Ravishankar Prasad (2009) 6 SCC 351 this Court observed
that the High Court can exercise power under Section 482
CrPC to do real and substantial justice and to prevent abuse
of the process of court when exceptional circumstances
warranted

the

exercise

of

such

power.

Once

the

circumstances in a given case were held to be such as to

attract the provisions of Article 142 or Articles 32 and 226 of
the Constitution, it would be open to the Supreme Court to
exercise its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution to quash the proceedings, the continuance
whereof would only amount to abuse of the process of
court.
Ashok Sadarangani v. Union of India,(2012) 11 SCC
321
14. In the present case, having regard to the fact that the
liability to make good the monetary loss suffered by the
Bank had been mutually settled between the parties and
the accused had accepted the liability in this regard, the
High Court had thought it fit to invoke its power under
Section 482 CrPC. We do not see how such exercise of
power can be faulted or held to be erroneous. Section 482
of the Code inheres in the High Court the power to make
such order as may be considered necessary to, inter alia,
prevent the abuse of the process of law or to serve the ends
of justice. While it will be wholly unnecessary to revert or
refer to the settled position in law with regard to the
contours of the power available under Section 482 CrPC it
must be remembered that continuance of a criminal
proceeding which is likely to become oppressive or may
partake the character of a lame prosecution would be good
ground to invoke the extraordinary power under Section 482
CrPC.

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CBI v. Narendra Lal Jain,(2014) 5 SCC 364

11. The decisions in Nikhil Merchant2 as well as in some
other cases, namely, B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana5 and
Manoj Sharma v. State6 were referred to a larger Bench in
Gian Singh3 for an authoritative pronouncement as to
whether in the said cases this Court had indirectly
permitted compounding of non-compoundable offences.
The larger Bench hearing the matter in its judgment3 took
the view that: (SCC p.

340, para 57)

57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the

ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not
the same thing as compounding of offence. Strictly
speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a
court under Section 320 is materially different from the
quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.
Eventually, in para 61 the note of caution insofar as heinous
and grave offences and offences under special laws, as
already noticed, was sounded and it was held that Nikhil
Merchant2, B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana5 and Manoj
Sharma v. State6 were correctly decided.
12. Reference of a case to a larger Bench necessarily has to
be for a reconsideration of the principle of law on which the
case has been decided and not the merits of the decision.
The decision rendered by any Bench is final inter partes,
subject to the power of review and the curative power. Any
other view would have the effect of conferring some kind of
an appellate power in a larger Bench of this Court which
cannot be countenanced. However, the principle of law on
which the decision based is open to reconsideration by a
larger Bench in an appropriate case. It is from the aforesaid
perspective that the reference in Gian Singh3 has to be
understood,

namely,

compoundable

whether

offence

on

quashing
the

of

basis

a
of

nona

compromise/settlement of the dispute between the parties

would be permissible and would not amount to overreaching
the provisions of Section

320 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure. In fact, this is the question that was referred to

the larger Bench in Gian Singh3 and not the merits of the

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decision in Nikhil Merchant2.

13. The decision in Gian Singh3 holding the decision
rendered in Nikhil Merchant2 and other cases to be correct
is only an approval of the principle of law enunciated in the
said decisions i.e. that a non-compoundable offence can
also be quashed under Section 482 CrPC on the ground of a
settlement between the offender and the victim. It is not an
affirmation, for there can be none, that the facts in Nikhil
Merchant2 justified/called for the due application of the
aforesaid principle of law. Also, neither Nikhil Merchant2 nor
Gian Singh3 can be understood to mean that in a case
where

charges

are

framed

compoundable offences

for

commission

of

non-

or for criminal conspiracy to

commit offences under the PC Act, if the disputes between

the parties are settled by payment of the amounts due, the
criminal proceedings should invariably be quashed. What
really follows from the decision in Gian Singh3 is that
though
Section
parties,

quashing

non-compoundable

offence

under

482 CrPC, following a settlement between the

would

not

amount

to

circumvention

of

the

provisions of Section 320 of the Code, the exercise of the

power under Section 482 will always depend on the facts of
each case. Furthermore, in the exercise of such power, the
note of caution sounded in Gian Singh3 (para 61) must be
kept in mind. This, in our view, is the correct ratio of the
decision in Gian Singh3.
Gopakumar B. Nair v. CBI,(2014) 5 SCC 800
14. We will be failing in our duty unless we advert to the
proponements propounded with regard to other aspects.
They are really matters of concern and deserve to be
addressed. The submission as put forth is that the first
respondent is a lady and she was following the command of
her husband and signed the documents without being
aware about the transactions entered into by the husband
and nature of the business. The allegation in the chargesheet is that she has signed the pronotes. That apart, as
further alleged, she is a co-applicant in two cases and
guarantor in other two cases. She was an Assistant

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Commissioner

of

Commercial

Taxes

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and

after

taking

voluntary retirement she has joined the public life, and

became a Member of the Rajya Sabha. Emphasis is also laid
that she is a lady and there is no warrant to continue the
criminal proceeding when she has paid the dues of the
Banks, and if anything further is due that shall be made
good. The assertions as regards the ignorance are a mere
pretence and sans substance given the facts. Lack of
awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be considered
nor

accepted

in

economic

offences.

The

submission

assiduously presented on gender leaves us unimpressed. An

offence under the criminal law is an offence and it does not
depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are
certain provisions in CrPC relating to exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether pertains
to a different sphere. A person committing a murder or
getting

involved

in

financial

scam

or

forgery

of

documents, cannot claim discharge or acquittal on the

ground of her gender as that is neither constitutionally nor
statutorily a valid argument. The offence is gender neutral
in this case. We say no more on this score.
15. As far as the load on the criminal justice dispensation
system is concerned it has an insegregable nexus with
speedy trial. A grave criminal offence or serious economic
offence or for that matter the offence that has the
potentiality to create a dent in the financial health of the
institutions, is not to be quashed on the ground that there is
delay in trial or the principle that when the matter has been
settled it should be quashed to avoid the load on the
system. That can never be an acceptable principle or
parameter, for that would amount to destroying the stem
cells of law and order in many a realm and further
strengthen the marrows of the unscrupulous litigations.
Such a situation should never be conceived of.
State of T.N. v. R. Vasanthi Stanley, (2016) 1 SCC 376

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