Chuaquico Jett I.

1A

IBP vs. Zamora 338 SCRA 81

FACTS
Petitioners ask for the issuance of TRO seeking to nullify the deployment of the
Philippine Marines to join Philippine National Police in visibility patrols around public places of
Metro Manila.
President Estrada commanded the deployment in a Memorandum order issued Jan. 24,
2000 to suppress lawless violence and Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated
not only by ordinary criminals but also by organized syndicates whose members include active
and former police/military personnel whose training, skill, discipline and firepower prove wellabove the present capability of the local police alone to handle. The deployment of a joint PNP
NCRPO-Philippine Marines in the conduct of police visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce
the incidence of crimes specially those perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel.
Police chief of Metro Manila is assigned to lead the implementation and execution of the
Memorandum order for temporary and reasonable period.
The basis of President Estrada in calling out the Marine to aid PNP is based on the
constitutional power vested upon the president enshrined in Sec. 18 Art. VIII.
Petitioners contest that: (1) there is no emergency to be the basis of the execution of the
calling out power. (2) It is a derogation of the constitutional mandate pertaining to the supremacy
of Civilian Authority over Military Authority.
Respondent through the Solicitor General answered that: (1) petitioners has no legal
standing in the case. (2) It is a political question which courts has no jurisdiction.
ISSUES
I.
II.
RULINGS

WON, the finding of factual basis for the execution of the calling out power
of the president is a judicial question
WON, it violates the constitutional mandate of Supremacy of Civilian
Authority

I.

No, it is not a political question but judicial one thus the courts has jurisdiction
over the case

Marcos v. Manglapus: The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against
external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary
powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of
maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe
appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties
in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in
the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the
enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the Presidents exercising as
Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain
public order and security.
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is
appropriate for court review. It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being
decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume
jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for
resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are political questions. The
reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the
legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a
function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of
another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the
law and the Constitution.
As Taada v. Cuenco: puts it, political questions refer to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
government. Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for
discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is
held to be a political question.
Under this definition, the Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue
involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of
power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the
problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. When political questions are involved, the
Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is
being questioned.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Under this definition, a court
is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of
the President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave
abuse of discretion.
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is
clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus,
cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its own. However, this
does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to
show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to
discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no
justifications for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the
proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a
manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his
judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused,
the Presidents exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.
II.

NO, deployment of marines does not constitute a breach of the constitutional

It is clear from the provision of the Letter of Instruction 2000 (LOI) the participation of the
Philippine Marine in the joint visibility patrol with PNP
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility
patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the
provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines
authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility

patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police
Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI,
the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to
provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In
view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over
civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake
the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the
military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the
Constitution.
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance
required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no insidious incursion of the military in
civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists
in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the
assistance of the military in the implementation and execution of certain traditionally civil
functions.
WHEREFORE petition DISMISSED