CLARENCE TIU Conflict of Laws Notes Last Edit June 2017

CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
THESE ARE MY NOTES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. JUN PILARES. IT
IS MAINLY SOURCED FROM THE HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE SEMPIO-DY, BUT REFERENCES WERE ALSO
MADE FROM PROFESSOR SALONGA’S TIMELESS BOOK ON THE SUBJECT, AS WELL AS THE ATENEO
BAROPS SUMMER REVIEWER. I INCORPORATED CASE DOCTRINES FROM THE CASE LIST, AS WELL
AS CASES MENTIONED BY ATTY. PILARES IN CLASS.
FOR THE GLORY OF GOD ✝

CLARENCE TIU ATENEO LAW 3B BATCH 2017
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONFLICT OF LAWS 3
A. DEFINITION: CONFLICT OF LAWS; PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 3
B. PURPOSE; THEORIES 3
C. CONFLICT OF LAWS VS PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5
D. ELEMENTS OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 5
E. FOREIGN ELEMENT 5
F. RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT PROBLEMS; GENERAL FRAMEWORK 6

PHASES INVOLVED IN RESOLVING CONFLICTS PROBLEMS 6
OVERVIEW OF JURISDICTION 7
OVERVIEW OF CHOICE OF LAW AND THE DOCTRINE OF CHARACTERIZATION 8
OVERVIEW OF ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT 16
G. SOME DOMESTIC SOURCES OF CONFLICTS OF LAW RULES 17

1. CONSTITUTION 17
2. CIVIL CODE 18
3. FAMILY CODE 19
4. REVISED PENAL CODE 21
5. CORPORATION CODE 21
6. RULES OF COURT 21
II. RULES ON JURISDICTION AND VENUE 22

RULES ON JURISDICTION 22
SERVICE OF SUMMONS 28
RULES INVOLVING FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 31
RULES ON VENUE 36
FORUM NON CONVENIENS 39
III. CHOICE OF LAW: PHILIPPINE CONFLICT OF LAW RULES 45

PROCEDURAL MATTERS 45
PERSONAL STATUS, LEGAL PERSONALITY AND CAPACITY 45
NATIONALITY, RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE 48
FAMILY LAW 63
SUCCESSION 75
PROPERTY 77
CONTRACTS 80
TORTS AND CRIMES 84
IV. RULES ON RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT91
CLARENCE TIU CONFLICT OF LAWS

ATENEO LAW 3B, BATCH 2017 2 OF 102 ATTY. JUN PILARES
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONFLICT OF LAWS
A. DEFINITION: CONFLICT OF LAWS; PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
DEFINITION OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

‣ It is that part of law which comes into play when the issue before the court affects some fact, event or transaction that is
so clearly connected with a foreign system of law as to necessitate recourse to that system
‣ Conflict of Laws embraces those universal principles of right and justice which govern the courts of one state having
before them cases involving the operation and effect of the laws of another state or country
‣ It is that part of the municipal law of a state which directs its courts and administrative agencies, when confronted with a
legal problem involving a foreign element, whether or not they should apply foreign laws
‣ It is domestic law but it points to the potential application of foreign law, domestically.
DEFINITION OF A “CONFLICT OF LAWS” CASE

‣ It is any case which involves facts occurring in more than one state or nation, so that in deciding the case, it is necessary
to make a choice between the laws of different state or countries.
‣ “State”, as used in Conflict of Laws, includes not only foreign sovereign countries or states but also political subdivisions
of states or countries which have their own legal systems, such as the different states constituting the USA, the federal
states of Australia, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and Germany, etc.
SOURCES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

1. DIRECT SOURCES
‣ Bilateral and multilateral treaties and international conventions; constitutions; codifications and statutes; judicial
decisions; and international customs
2. INDIRECT SOURCES
‣ The same as other branches of law: among others, the natural moral law, and the writings and treatises of thinkers
and famous writers and jurists on the subject
B. PURPOSE; THEORIES
PURPOSE OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

‣ With the fast advance of modern technology in the means of communication between and among states, the rapid
growth and expansion of international trade and commerce, the influx of tourists and foreign traders to our country as
well as the massive migration of our countrymen to work and live in foreign shores, the great increase of business
transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines, all these bring about many and varied problems in Conflict of
Laws.
‣ Hence, the necessity nor only for lawyers and judges but for our citizens as a whole to study this subject as an
important department of law
‣ The premise of Conflict of Laws is that there is a diversity of laws among the different states of the world, such that each
group of people have a language, culture, morals, customs, religion, ideals, and beliefs, peculiar to such group. Such
matters are reflected in their laws and legal systems.
‣ For example, while the great majority of the countries in the world allow absolute divorce, our country still has not
legalized it because of religious and cultural considerations.
THEORIES THAT JUSTIFY THE APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES

1. THEORY OF COMITY
‣ According to this theory, no foreign law would be allowed to operate in another state except by the “comity of
nations” which pertains to the reciprocal courtesy which the members of the family of nations owe to one another.

‣ Based on two principles:
a. Reciprocity
‣ Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the on hand, nor of mere cotters and
goodwill, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one state allows within its territory, to the legislative,
executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and
to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws. In this case, a
French citizen sued an American in a French Court. Judgment was rendered in favour of the plaintiff who later
filed an action in an American Court to enforce the judgment. The American court found that the trial in the
French court was fair and impartial but even in such a case, French tribunals do not regard American decisions
with finality but they still review the latter’s decisions on the merits, as they are regarded merely as prima facie
evidence of plaintiff’s claim. Hence, the same effect should be given by American courts to French decisions
on the “principle of reciprocity” (Hilton vs Guyot)
b. Persuasiveness of a Foreign Judgment

2. VESTED-RIGHTS THEORY
‣ Under this theory, our courts enforce not the foreign law or foreign judgment but the rights or rights that have been
vested under such law or judgment.
‣ Rights once acquired under a foreign law or judgment should be enforced regardless where the suit for its
enforcement was filed. Thus the idea of uniformity and predictability of results would be achieved. If a foreign law
gives a person a right, the mere fact that the law of the forum does not give him a similar or the same right is no
reason to refuse to help him get what belongs to him.
‣ The exception is, if foreign law is against the public policy of the forum.
‣ It is a principle of every civilized law that vested rights should be protected. This principle also discourages forum-
shopping.
‣ In one case, Mrs. Gray filed an action in New Hampshire for damages against her husband Mr. Gray for personal
injuries alleged to have been caused to her by the latter while driving from their home in New Hampshire to Maine
where the accident happened. In Maine, the spouses are barred from maintaining an action against each other. There
is no such prohibition in New Hampshire. The American Court ruled in the above case that foreign torts should be
governed by the lex loci delicti commissi. A right having been crated by the appropriate law, the recognition of its
existence follows everywhere.
3. THEORY OF LOCAL LAW

‣ The adherents of this theory believe that we apply a foreign law not because it is foreign, but because our own law by
applying a similar rule requires us to do so, hence, it is as if the foreign law has become part of our own internal or
domestic law.
‣ A good example of this theory is Art. 16, par. 2, of the New Civil Code, which requires us to apply the national law of
the deceased in the matter of his testate or intestate succession. If the deceased was a Chinese although the children
are already Filipinos, we are required to apply Chinese Law, not because out is the appropriate foreign law, but
because our own Civil Code tells us to do so.
4. THEORY OF HARMONY OF LAWS

‣ Under this theory, identical or similar problems should be given identical or similar solutions, thus resulting in harmony
of laws.
‣ Certainty of solutions to the same or similar problems are of particular importance in areas where the parties are likely
to think in advance of the legal consequences of their transactions
‣ For example, transactions involving real property should be governed by the lex situs, in the interest of certainty and
uniformity of result. Similarly civil status must be governed by a single law for the sake of certainty, such as whether a
person is single or married. The application of the same or similar solution also prevents the bad practice of forum-
shopping
5. THEORY OF JUSTICE
‣ Since the purpose of all laws, including Conflict of Laws is the dispensation of justice, the proper foreign law should
be applied in order to attain this objective. The defect of the this theory, however, is that different persons may have
different ideas of what is just. Should we, then leave the questions to the different notions of fairness and justice?
WHAT IS THE PROPER THEORY TO FOLLOW?

‣ Basically, first, see what statutes provide, in the absence of it, apply which theory or theories would promote justice,
equity, and public policy in a given situation.

‣ It will be observed the the theories adverted to do not mutually exclude one another, perhaps, the truth may be found in
combination. Certainly if the world is to progress in understanding and judgment, it must recognise this imperative
postulate: that sometimes, we have to apply the proper foreign law because courtesy, convenience, and international
duty so demand; because there are vested rights we cannot conceivably ignore; because all too often, the foreign law has
become part and parcel of our law; because identical situations should be resolved by identical remedies, irrespective of
forum; and finally, because to do otherwise may ultimately result in the negation of justice (Paras)
‣ In the absence of an applicable provision in the code or statute, the various theories should be examined and weight as
they bear on a given conflicts problem. No single theory contains the whole truth, no one approach is completely valid.
The policies behind all of the theories have validity. This suggests that they are not entirely exclusive. Indeed, there may
be a gain in using different theories at different places to make more readily apparent the change in policies deemed
dominate as the situations vary (Salonga)
C. CONFLICT OF LAWS VS PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
CONFLICT OF LAWS AS A DISTINCT SUBJECT FROM PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

‣ Conflict of laws is not part of International law. Although it is sometimes thought as part of it because of the presence of a
foreign element in a given problem, it is not international in character but is part of the municipal law of each state.
‣ By “municipal law” in Conflict of Laws is meant the internal or local law of each state, since each state has its own
internal or local system of law, so each state also has its own conflict of laws.
CONFLICT OF LAWS PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
As to persons Governs private individuals and Governs sovereign states and entities that are internationally
involved corporations recognized or possessed of international personality, such as
the United Nations
As to nature Municipal in character International in character
As to Deals with transactions strictly Applies only to transactions in which only sovereign states or
transactions private in nature, in which the entities with international personality are concerned and
involved country as such has generally no which generally affect public interest
interest
As to Recourse is had to judicial or Concerned states may first resort to peaceful remedies like
remedies administrative tribunals in diplomatic negotiations, mediation, inquiry and conciliation,
applied accordance with the rules of arbitration or judicial settlement by international tribunals like
procedure of the country which they the United Nations. If these remedies fail, the states
sit concerned may resort to forcible remedies like severance of
diplomatic relations, retorsions, reprisals, embargo, boycott,
non-intercourse, pacific blockades, collective measures
under the UN Charter, and finally, war
D. ELEMENTS OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
1. Part of Municipal Law
2. Directive to Courts/ Administrative Agencies
3. Foreign Element
4. Application or Non-Application of Foreign Law
E. FOREIGN ELEMENT
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES VS CA, G.R. NO. 122191 OCTOBER 8, 1998

‣ Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, we agree with petitioner that the
problem herein could present a "conflicts" case.
‣ A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said
to contain a "foreign element".
‣ The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely
confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception.
‣ The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that
one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one
State involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form.
‣ In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine
national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with
the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national
borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a "conflicts" situation
to arise.
LAUREL VS GARCIA, G.R. NO. 92013 JULY 25, 1990

‣ We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law
situation arises (in real property) only when:
1. There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer
immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and
effect of a conveyance, are to be determined and
2. A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same
matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.
‣ In the instant case, none of the above elements exists. The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title.
There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to
validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is
governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
‣ No foreign element because the issue in this case is whether the Government can properly dispose of its assets, thus the
Court said there is no issue as to whether domestic or whether foreign law should apply, it is NOT a conflict of law issue.
F. RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT PROBLEMS; GENERAL FRAMEWORK
PHASES INVOLVED IN RESOLVING CONFLICTS PROBLEMS
PHASES
1. DETERMINATION OF JURISDICTION
‣ First, determine whether the court has jurisdiction over the case
‣ If it has no jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed on that ground
‣ If it has jurisdiction, the court will determine whether it should assume jurisdiction over the case or dismiss it on the
ground of forum non conveniens (inconvenient forum)
‣ Note that it is the law of the forum (where the case was filed) that determines whether the court has jurisdiction or not
over the case
2. DETERMINE WHETHER TO APPLY INTERNAL LAW OR THE PROPER FOREIGN LAW

‣ Court will then determine whether to apply the internal law of the forum or the proper foreign law, considering the
attendant circumstances
3. ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT
‣ KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA AND NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS VS KITAMURA, G.R. NO. 149177, NOVEMBER 23,
2007

‣ In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of
law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Corresponding to these phases are the following questions:
1. Where can or should litigation be initiated?

2. Which law will the court apply? and
3. Where can the resulting judgment be enforced?
‣ Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law
which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.
‣ The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law.
While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the "minimum contacts" for one do not always
provide the necessary "significant contacts" for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to
a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment
‣ It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or
administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it:
1. Dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case;
2. Assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or
3. Assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or States.
‣ The court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and rthe laws. While it may
choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or
other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns
‣ Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony" or the law of the place where a contract is
made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the "law of the place where a contract is executed
or to be performed." It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the "state of
the most significant relationship rule," to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine
which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the
court should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of
business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.
‣ The following three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are
rules proper for the second phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in
resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of
jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.
‣ This is a very important case, this provides the basic framework of a conflict of laws case.
‣ 3 Phases of a Conflict of Laws Case, for every issue, you need to determine which phase it belongs to
1. Jurisdiction
2. Choice of Law
3. Enforcement of Judgment
OVERVIEW OF JURISDICTION
DEFINITION OF JURISDICTION
‣ Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case
‣ It has also been referred to as the power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear, and determine certain
controversies
‣ It is also considered as an authority to execute the decisions rendered by the court.
ASPECTS OF JURISDICTION IN CIVIL CASES

1. Jurisdiction over the Subject-Matter
2. Jurisdiction over the Person of the Parties
3. Jurisdiction over the Res or thing involved in the litigation

ASPECTS OF JURISDICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES
1. Jurisdiction over the Subject-Matter
2. Jurisdiction over the Place (Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases)
3. Jurisdiction over the Person of the Accused
VENUE
‣ Venue is the place, or the geographical area in which a court with jurisdiction may hear and determine a case or the place
where a case is to be tried
‣ Venue is procedural and not substantive. Because it is merely procedural, the parties can waive the venue of a case.
‣ In civil cases, unlike in criminal cases, venue is NOT a matter of jurisdiction
‣ It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of
trial
‣ This also means that the Court can dismiss an action motu proprio for lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but NOT
for improper venue
JURISDICTION VS VENUE
JURISDICTION VENUE
It is is the authority to hear and determine a case It is the place where the case is to be heard or tried
It is a matter of substantive law It is a matter of procedural law
It establishes a relation between the court and the It establishes a relation between plaintiff and defendant
subject-matter
It is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties It may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties
DAVAO LIGHT AND POWER CO. VS CA, G.R. NO. 111685, AUGUST 20, 2001
‣ Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters.
‣ Jurisdiction may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of an action;
‣ The venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties and an objection that the
plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong county may be waived by the failure of the defendant to make a timely objection.
‣ In either case, the court may render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or
agreement of the parties, whether or not a prohibition exists against their alteration.
OVERVIEW OF CHOICE OF LAW AND THE DOCTRINE OF CHARACTERIZATION
CHOICE OF LAW
‣ Choice of law deals with the problem that arises when two or more states have a connection to cases about which their
respective laws differ.
‣ Each court must then choose which laws to apply based on choice of law rules that themselves rest on public policy.
‣ It seek to answer two important questions:
1. What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states;
and
2. To what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW

‣ RULE: IN THESE INSTANCES THE FORUM MUST APPLY ITS INTERNAL LAW (LEX FORI)

1. When the application of internal law is provided for by law
2. Where there is failure to plead and prove foreign law (doctrine of processual presumption)
3. Where the case involves any of the exceptions to the application of foreign law
4. As to questions of “characterization” of the legal issues of a particular case
APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW

‣ RULE: THE FORUM MUST APPLY FOREIGN LAW, IF IT IS PROVIDED FOR BY ITS INTERNAL LAW OR IT MAY, IN ITS
DISCRETION, APPLY IT IN THE ABSENCE OF A CONTRARY PROHIBITION
‣ Our laws may expressly provide the application of foreign law
‣ EXCEPT: IN THESE CASES, FOREIGN LAW CANNOT BE APPLIED:

1. Enforcement of the foreign law would run counter to an important public policy
2. Application of foreign law would infringe good morality as understood in the forum
3. When the foreign law is penal in nature
4. Where the foreign law is procedural in nature
5. When the case involves real or personal property in the forum
6. When the foreign law is fiscal or administrative in nature
7. Where the application of foreign law would involve injustice or injury to the citizens or residents in the forum
8. Where the application of foreign law would endanger vital interests of the State of the forum
CASES WHEN FOREIGN LAW CANNOT BE APPLIED IN THE PHILIPPINES (EXPOUNDED)

1. ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN LAW WOULD RUN COUNTER TO AN IMPORTANT PHILIPPINE PUBLIC POLICY
‣ The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim (or statute) obnoxious to the forum's public policy.
‣ CADALIN VS POEA, G.R. NO. L-104776 DECEMBER 5, 1994

‣ In this case, the Court ruled that even if Bahrain’s Amiri Decree No. 23 prescribes a one-year prescriptive period
for labor benefits claimed by the Filipino petitioners, to enforce such foreign law as regards the claims in question
would contravene the Philippine’s public policy on the protection to labor.
‣ As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of
process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum.
This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.
‣ A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either
as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.
‣ However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when
the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the practical effect of treating the
foreign statute of limitation as one of substance.
‣ A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims
based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of "borrowing statutes," one form provides that an action
barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute
has not run against it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides: “If by the
laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines
Islands.”
‣ In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains
the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
‣ The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public policy to enforce
the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would
contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
‣ Examples: The following cannot be enforced in the Philippines: (a) divorce obtained by Filipino spouses abroad, (b)
joint wills executed by Filipinos abroad, even if valid in such foreign country, (c) incestuous marriages and those against
public policy under Art. 37 and 38 of the Family COde, even if valid under the foreign country where it was solemnised
2. APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW WOULD INFRINGE GOOD MORALITY AS UNDERSTOOD IN THE PHILIPPINES
‣ In general this covers all transactions that infringe good morality as understood by the forum and those inconsistent
with the best interests of the people.

‣ Examples: Foreign laws recognizing prostitution, agreements under foreign laws that corrupt the proper administration
of justice or reward crimes, contracts under foreign laws to corrupt public officials
3. WHEN THE FOREIGN LAW IS PENAL IN NATURE

‣ Crimes committed in foreign countries are violations of penal laws of those countries and cannot be prosceuted here,
especially as we follow the principle of territoriality in criminal law.
‣ But, a “penal clause” in a contract entered into abroad may be enforced here because such clause is not criminal in
nature but only provides for liquidated damages.
4. WHERE THE FOREIGN LAW IS PROCEDURAL IN NATURE

‣ There are no vested rights in rules of procedure, hence a party to ana con must submit himself to the procedural
formalities of the forum, except when the law is both procedural and substantive like the rules on prescription, and the
Statute of Fraus which under Philippine law are substantive.
‣ Example: An american cannot insist on a jury trial here in the Philippines, neither can he insist in the application of
American procedural laws in the case in the Philippines where he is a party
5. WHEN THE CASE INVOLVES REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE PHILIPPINES
‣ The law of the place where the property is located (lex situs or lex rei sitae) governs all property found or located in the
Philippines
6. WHEN THE FOREIGN LAW IS FISCAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE

‣ Purely fiscal such as revenue generating laws
‣ We are not bound to enforce foreign revenue or administrative laws. We are not concerned with the collection of taxes
by foreign countries or with foreign laws relating to governmental functions or matters
7. WHERE THE APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW WOULD INVOLVE INJUSTICE OR INJURY TO PHILIPPINE CITIZENS OR
RESIDENTS
‣ Foreign laws that would result or care injustice to citizens or residents of our country should not be enforced or given
effect here.
‣ Example: A foreign law putting the age of majority at 21 and refusing to recognize contracts of Filipinos abroad who
are above 18 but below 21, considering that the age of majority of our country is 18
8. WHERE THE APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW WOULD ENDANGER VITAL INTERESTS OF PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
‣ The national interests and security of our country should not be jeopardized by foreign laws, nor should we enforce
foreign laws that undermine our governmental processes
PRESENTATION AND PROOF OF FOREIGN LAWS IN EVIDENCE; DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION

‣ RULE: FOREIGN LAWS MUST BE ALLEGED AND PROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR RULES OF EVIDENCE, OTHERWISE
THE PRESUMPTION OF IDENTITY OR SIMILARITY ARISES. THE FOREIGN LAW IS PRESUMED THE SAME AS THE DOMESTIC
LAW
‣ Foreign law must be treated as a fact that must be pleaded and proved by the party invoking it.
‣ Foreign law may either be written or unwritten.
‣ NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES VS CA AND C.F. SHARP, G.R. NO. 112573, FEBRUARY 9, 1995
‣ A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary
is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein
‣ Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign
country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of
Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful
exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty.
‣ Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
‣ It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a
defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum.
‣ In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the
extraterritorial service of process on SHARP. As to what this law is is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be
taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact.Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated

copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is
and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of
validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must
stand.
‣ Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of identity or
similarity or the so-called processual presumption may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the
matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines.
‣ Foreign laws must be proven as a fact, under the rules of evidence, courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws
RULES OF EVIDENCE
RULE 132(B): Authentication and Proof of Documents
Section 19. Classes of Documents. — For the purpose of their in presentation evidence, documents are either public or
private. Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
(25a)
Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as
the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a)
RULE 130(C): Rules of Admissibility of Testimonial Evidence

Section 46. Learned treatises. — A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science, or art is
admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the
subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling
as expert in the subject.
PROOF OF WRITTEN FOREIGN LAW

‣ See Rule 132, Sec. 25 & 26, Rules of Court
‣ RULE: WRITTEN LAW MAY BE EVIDENCED BY EITHER:
1. An official publication thereof or
2. A copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy; and if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, accompanied, with a certificate that such officer has the custody.
‣ The certificate may be made by any of the following officers and must be authenticated by the seal of his office:
1. Secretary of the embassy or legation,
2. Consul general,
3. Consul,
4. Vice- consul, or
5. Consular agent or
6. Any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
‣ But note that this does not exclude presentation of other competent evidence such as testimony of witnesses skilled in
that foreign law (Williamette v. Muzzal 1935)

‣ Also, remember that the strict rules of court to prove foreign law do not apply in:
1. Election cases,
2. Land registration,
3. Cadastral,
4. Naturalization and
5. Insolvency proceedings, and
6. Other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. (Rule 1, Sec. 4, Rules of Court)
PROOF OF UNWRITTEN FOREIGN LAW

‣ RULE: THE FOLLOWING ARE ADMISSIBLE:
1. The oral testimony of expert witnesses and
2. Printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the State concerned if proved to be commonly
admitted in such courts (Rule 130, Sec. 46, Rules of Court; Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. CA 2000)
NATURE AND COMPOSITION OF CONFLICT OF LAW RULES

‣ These are the kinds of law as to whether it governs cases with or without a foreign element:
1. INTERNAL RULE
‣ A purely internal provision of law of law governs a domestic problem, one without a foreign element.
‣ It either authorizes, commands, or prohibits a certain at or mode of conduct.
‣ It immediately solves the question raised whether the particular act is allowed, commanded or prohibited
2. CONFLICT OF LAW RULE

‣ This is a provision of law which governs a factual situation possessed of a foreign element.
‣ It is usually expressed in the form of an abstract proposition that a given legal question is “governed” by the law of a
particular country”, whether may be an internal law or the proper foreign law, to be ascertained in the manner
indicated by the provision.
‣ It decides only which law or jurisdiction will give the final solution
‣ Kinds of Conflict Rules:

a. One-sided Rule
‣ Indicates when Philippine law will apply
‣ Example: Art. 15 of the NCC resting to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Art. 818 says that two or more
persons cannot make a will jointly. These provisions provide the application of Philippine law to Filipinos
b. All-sided or Multilateral Rule
‣ Indicates whether to apply the internal law or the proper foreign law
‣ Example: Art. 16 of the NCC provides that real and personal property are subject to the law of the country
where it is situated. Art. 17 provides that the forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. These provisions provide
whether to apply Philippine or foreign law
‣ But note that while Art. 15 is only a one-sided rule as literally worded, the Philippine Supreme Court has given
it multi-lateral application in that it has held that foreigners, in their status and legal capacity, are governed by
their national law (Gibbs vs Gibbs; Recto vs Harden 1956)
PARTS OF A CONFLICT OF LAW RULE

‣ Unlike a purely internal rule which governs purely domestic problems without a foreign element, a conflict rule which
indicates whether to apply the internal law or the foreign law has two parts which are readily recognizable.
1. FACTUAL SITUATION
‣ These are the set of facts or situation presenting a conflicts problem because there is a foreign element involved
‣ It takes the form of factual events or operative facts

2. POINT OF CONTACT/CONNECTING FACTOR
‣ This is the law of the country with which the factual situation is most intimately connected
‣ Prescribes the municipal law to which the question should referred or connected
‣ Thus while the first part states certain operative facts, the legal consequences of which are determined in the second
part, that is the first part “raises”, while the second part “answers or solves”, a legal question
‣ Example: Article 16 of the Civil Code may be divided as follows: (1) Real property as well as personal property (Factual
Situation); (2) Is subject to the law of the country where it is situated (or the situs of the res) (Point of Contact). Art.
1763 providing that the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported (Point of Contact)shall govern the
liability of the common carrier for their loss, destruction or deterioration (Factual Situation)
DOCTRINE OF CHARACTERIZATION/QUALIFICATION
‣ THIS IS THE PROCESS OF ASSIGNING A CERTAIN SET OF FACTS OR FACTUAL SITUATION TO ITS PROPER OR CORRECT
LEGAL CATEGORY
‣ Basically, it is the process of assigning a disputed question to its correct legal category
‣ This is in relation to the determination of whether the forum should apply forum/internal law or foreign law in a given
conflict of laws case.
‣ Every rule of law is based on situations of fact, actual or imagined, since the legislator must try to solve factual
situations that might arise in the future, based on past observation and experience.
‣ These legal categories may be family relations, contracts, torts, succession, property, etc.
‣ By characterizing the problem, the court or the parties involved reach the proper solution whether to apply the internal
or proper foreign law.
STAGES OF CHARACTERIZATION
1. CLASSIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
‣ Whether the question relates to contracts, property, torts, succession etc.
‣ The difficulty in characterization arises from the fact that a conflicts situation or problem may be characterized by the
lex fori differently from the characterization of the lex causae (law of the state with which the act or transaction is most
closely connected).
‣ The lex fori might regard the problem as a tort, while the lex causae regards it as contract. The lex fori might regard
the problem as a crime, while the lex causae considers it only as a tort.
‣ As a matter of convenience, the classification should be determined in accordance with the law of the forum.
‣ Most writers hold that on the grounds of practical necessity and convenience, it is the forum, or the lex fori which
should determine the problem’s characterization unless the result would be clear injustice.
‣ In this case, a californian wife dies. Her californian husband claims that the entire properties acquired by the
spouses during the marriage as his alone by accretion, following California law on property relations of spouses.
Under Philippine law, however, this is a problem in succession, so that inheritance taxes should be paid by the
husband as the lands in question were located in the Philippines. The SC held that the properties inherited by the
husband were subject to estate taxes, categorizing the problem as one of succession. (Gibbs vs Gov’t)
2. DETERMINATION OF THE APPLICABLE LAW BASED ON “POINTS OF CONTACT” TEST

‣ One or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the determination of the applicable law.
These "test factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting factors" could be any of the following:
a. Nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;
b. Seat of a legal or juridical person;
c. Situs of a thing or the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated.
d. Locus actus or the place where an act has been done;
e. Place where an act is intended to come into effect
f. Lex loci intentionis or the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement;
g. Lex fori or the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done; and
h. Flag of a ship (Saudi Arabian Airlines vs CA, 1998)

‣ This is the tricky part, sometimes it is easy because the law tells us what law to apply (like for property, the place where
it is located), but sometimes is is difficult because no internal law tells us what to apply (tort or intrinsic validity of
contracts). In the latter case, there are theories and jurisprudence to help us. Just remember the different theories and
principles discussed later on.
CASE
‣ The ratio of the court in this case correlates the afore-mentioned principles on choice of law and characterization
‣ SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES VS CA, G.R. NO. 122191 OCTOBER 8, 1998
‣ As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important
questions:
1. What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more
states; and
2. To what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.
‣ Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal system that should ultimately control.
Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both notions of justice and predictability,
they do not always do so. The forum is then faced with the problem of deciding which of these two important
values should be stressed.
‣ Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of facts
or rules fall. This process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of qualification". It is the
"process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule."
‣ The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the forum to select the proper law. Our starting point of analysis
here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or operative fact.
‣ An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point of
contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim)
and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of
performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
‣ Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the determination of
the applicable law. These "test factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting factors" could be any of the
following:
1. The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;
2. The seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
3. Then, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when
real rights are involved;
4. The place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been made, a
marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts
and torts;
5. The place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual duties,
or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;
6. The intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci
intentionis;
7. The place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex fori — the law of the
forum — is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of "procedure" not going to the
substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the
otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it falls under
one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
8. The flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its
master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment
‣ In this case, considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting factor"
or "point of contact" could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred.
And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort
(the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place).
‣ This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing
and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights
and in the performance of its duties, "act with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith."
Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in

another country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or
the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had
lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the
Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
‣ Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and
rules on tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping
abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the "State of the most
significant relationship" rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of
this case.
‣ In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following
contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to
the particular issue:
1. The place where the injury occurred;
2. The place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
3. The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
4. The place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
THE PROBLEM OF “RENVOI"

‣ “Renvoi” is a french word which means “refer back” or “return”
‣ In Anglo-American countries, the term used is “remission”, which means to refer a matter for consideration or
judgment,
‣ It is method of disposing a conflict problem by referring a matter for judgment or consideration to another State.
‣ Types of Renvoi:
1. Remission
‣ Reference is made back to the law of the forum;
2. Transmission
‣ Reference is made to a third State
‣ The problem of renvoi arises when there is doubt as to whether the reference by lex fori (the law of the country where the
problem arises) to the foreign law involves:
1. A reference to the internal law of the foreign law or
2. A reference to the entirety of the foreign law, including its conflicts rules
‣ In such case, if the first state follows the nationality theory and the second state follows the domiciliary theory, the
problem of renvoi will most probably arise.
‣ Example: A California citizen who had resided in the Philippines for 50 years and who dies here, leaving a sizeable estate.
Art. 16 of the NCC provides that in testate or intestate succession, the national law of the deceased which, in this case, is
California law should be applied. But California’s internal law has one rule for its own citizens who reside there, and
another rule for its citizens who have domiciles abroad. In the latter case, California provides that the law of the domicile of
its deceased citizen should apply. Thus, while Philippine laws refers the matter to California law, as the national law of the
deceased, California law refers the matter back to Philippine law, by providing the the law of the deceased’s domicile
should apply. Should the Philippine court tasked to settle the estate of the deceased accept the “renvoi” and apply
Philippine law, or insist that California internal law binding on its own citizen-residents be applied, as the national law of
the decedent? This is the renvoi problem.
THEORIES TO SOLVE THE RENVOI PROBLEM

1. Rejection of Renvoi
‣ The reference of the matter for judgment is confined exclusively to the internal law of the other State;
2. Acceptance of Renvoi (Single Renvoi)

‣ Reference is to the entirety, including the conflicts rule of the other State; and if the State of the forum finds that the
matter is referred to back to it, the court might conclude that the reference to the other State has not provided a direct
solution, in such case, the court might accept the reference and apply its own internal law (remission) or the laws of
the third State (transmission).
3. Desistment or Mutual Disclaimer of Jurisdiction

‣ Reference is also to the entirety, including the conflicts rule of the other State; and if the State of the forum finds that
the matter is referred to back to it, the court might conclude that the other State has no rule of law applicable to the
situation, in such case, the court left is with no other alternative but to apply its own internal law
4. Foreign Court Theory

‣ The law to be applied by the court of the forum is that law the court of the State referred would have applied.
‣ Double renvoi may arise, the court of the forum, in applying the foreign court theory, finds that the referred State
accepts the renvoi. In which case, the court of the forum shall therefore apply what the court of the State referred
would have applied
OVERVIEW OF ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT
RULES OF COURT
SECTION 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
a. In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to
the thing; and
b. In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. (50a)
EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

‣ RULE: IT IS MERELY PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENCE UPON THE TITLE TO THE THING OR OF A RIGHT AS BETWEEN THE PARTIES
AND THEIR SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST BY A SUBSEQUENT TITLE
‣ This is so as in case of judgment against a specific thing or against a person, the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of:
3. Want of jurisdiction
4. Want of notice to the party
5. Collusion
6. Fraud
7. Clear mistake of law or fact
‣ These are the grounds for impugning a Foreign Judgment
PROCEDURE OF ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT

‣ RULE: FILE A VERIFIED PETITION IN THE RTC FOR RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT,
AVERRING THAT THE COURT WHO RULED OVER IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES AND THE SUBJECT MATTER.
‣ You need to aver the requirements under Sec. 48, last sentence
‣ RTC has jurisdiction because this action is incapable of pecuniary estimation (even if the foreign judgment itself was
one which is capable of pecuniary estimation, such as a money judgment)
‣ The plaintiff also has to prove the law of that foreign court

‣ RULE: FILE A VERIFIED PETITION IN THE RTC FOR RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT,
AVERRING THAT THE COURT WHO RULED OVER IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES AND THE SUBJECT MATTER.
‣ You need to aver the requirements under Sec. 48, last sentence

‣ Prove the law of that foreign court
CASE
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION VS CA, G.R. NO. 114323, JULY 23, 1998
‣ The recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the
courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which
the judgment is relied on.
‣ This Court has held that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the
forum.
‣ Thus, if under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be rendered by adopting
the arbitrator's findings, then the same must be accorded respect. In the same vein, if the procedure in the foreign court
mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the
courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.
‣ A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is
shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein
‣ Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country
having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule
131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise
of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty.
‣ Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
G. SOME DOMESTIC SOURCES OF CONFLICTS OF LAW RULES

*These bulk of provisions are not yet important as of now as it will be further discussed later, just understand the general
concept
1. CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE IV: CITIZENSHIP

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission, they
are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

ARTICLE V: SUFFRAGE
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein they
propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
2. CIVIL CODE
Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the
Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. (8a)
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found. (10a)
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of
the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
Article 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by
the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with
those which this Code prescribes. (n)
Article 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country, which is executed in accordance with
the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own
country, shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the Philippines. (n)
Article 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly, or in the same instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or
for the benefit of a third person. (669)
Article 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in the
Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country where they may have been executed. (733a)
Article 829. A revocation done outside the Philippines, by a person who does not have his domicile in this country, is valid
when it is done according to the law of the place where the will was made, or according to the law of the place in which
the testator had his domicile at the time; and if the revocation takes place in this country, when it is in accordance with
the provisions of this Code. (n)
Article 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. (n)

Article 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which
are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes
a counter-offer.
Acceptance made by letter or telegram does not bind the offerer except from the time it came to his knowledge. The
contract, in such a case, is presumed to have been entered into in the place where the offer was made. (1262a)
Article 1753. The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall govern the liability of the common
carrier for their loss, destruction or deterioration.
3. FAMILY CODE
Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice- consul of the
Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the
solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official. (75a)
Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for them
before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their
respective diplomatic or consular officials.
Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity herein required, submit
an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract marriage. (66a)
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1),
(4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted
with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship between the
parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own
spouse. (82)
Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall be
governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence.
This rule shall not apply:
(1) Where both spouses are aliens;
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines and executed in the
country where the property is located; and
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting property situated in a
foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity. (124a)
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
(206a)
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:

(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the termination of
their guardianship relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country
adoptions as may be provided by law. (28a, EO 91 and PD 603)
Art. 187. The following may not be adopted:

(1) A person of legal age, unless he or she is a child by nature of the adopter or his or her spouse, or, prior to the
adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his or her own child during
minority.
(2) An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations; and

(3) A person who has already been adopted unless such adoption has been previously revoked or rescinded. (30a, EO 91
and PD 603)
4. REVISED PENAL CODE
Article 2. Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the
provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior
waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by
the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities
mentioned in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of
this Code.
5. CORPORATION CODE
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. - No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a
license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any
court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before
Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws. (69a)
6. RULES OF COURT
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 39: Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments
SECTION 14. Return of writ of execution. - The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately
after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after
his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect
during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court
every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The
returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies
thereof promptly furnished the parties. (11a)
REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE

RULE 131: Burden of Proof and Presumptions
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction;
RULE 132: Presentation of Evidence

Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose
of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he
be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a) 

II. RULES ON JURISDICTION AND VENUE
RULES ON JURISDICTION
ASPECTS OF JURISDICTION IN CIVIL CASES

1. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
‣ Jurisdiction over the person is the legal power of the court to render a personal judgment against a party to an action or
proceeding
‣ Jurisdiction in personam is the power which a court has over the defendant’s person and which is required before a court can
enter a personal or an in personam judgment
‣ Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is required ONLY in an action in personam. Jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is NOT a prerequisite in an action in rem and quasi in rem
‣ Jurisdiction over the defendant: acquired either by:
a. Voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or
‣ Submission to the court’s jurisdiction takes the form of an appearance that seeks affirmative relief except when the
relief sought is for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant.
‣ As a rule, an appearance in whatever form without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person,
is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court
‣ BUT, when the appearance is precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, it is not considered
an appearance in court
b. By service of summons
‣ Jurisdiction over the plaintiff is acquired by his filing of the complaint or petition
‣ By doing so, he submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court
2. JURISDICTION OVER THE RES

‣ Res” in civil law is a ‘thing,’ an ‘object.’
‣ It means everything that may form an object of rights in opposition to ‘persona’ which is the subject of rights.
‣ It includes an object, subject-matter or status

‣ Jurisdiction over the res refers to the court’s jurisdiction over the thing or the property which is the subject of the
action.
‣ This type of jurisdiction is necessary when the action is an action in rem or quasi in rem.
‣ When the action is one in personam, jurisdiction over the res is not sufficient to authorize the court to render a
judgment against the defendant. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is required
‣ Jurisprudence holds that if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not
required.
‣ Jurisdiction over the res may be acquired by the court by either:
1. Placing the property or thing under its custody (custodia legis) or constructive seizure
‣ Such as attachment or publication and service of notice
2. Through statutory authority conferring upon it the power to deal with the property or thing within the court’s
territorial jurisdiction.
‣ Such as suits involving the status of the parties or suits involving the property in the Philippines of non-resident
defendants.
‣ Any relief granted in rem or in quasi in rem actions must be confined to the res, and the court cannot lawfully
render a judgment against the defendant
3. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT-MATTER
‣ Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law which may be either the Constitution or a statute and
determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought
‣ Jurisdiction over the subject matter is referred to as the power of a particular court to hear the type of case that is
then before it.
‣ The term also refers to the jurisdiction of the court over the class of cases to which a particular case belongs

‣ The parties, the court or the rules cannot confer jurisdiction over the subject-matter. It cannot be granted by the
agreement of the parties; acquired, waived, enlarged, or diminished by any act or omission of the parties; or conferred
by the acquiescence of the courts
‣ Whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, calls for interpretation and application of the law of
jurisdiction which distributes the judicial power among the different courts in the Philippines
‣ The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein.
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT-MATTER

‣ See BP 129 or the Judicial Reorganizational Act which is the law that confers jurisdiction of courts. I listed only those
relevant to Conflict of Laws
1. JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS (RTC)
a. Actions incapable of Pecuniary Estimation
b. Real Actions where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000,00 or exceeds P50,000 if in Metro Manila. EXCEPT
actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer
c. Other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or
the value of the property in controversy exceeds P300,000, or in Metro Manila, exceeds P400,000
2. JURISDICTION OF MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS (MTC)

a. Actions of Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
b. Real Actions where the assessed value of the property involved does not exceed P20,000,00 or does not exceed
P50,000 if in Metro Manila.
c. Other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy does not exceed P300,000, or in Metro Manila, does
not exceed P400,000.
REQUIREMENT OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE PARTIES

‣ RULE: JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT IS REQUIRED ONLY IN AN ACTION IN PERSONAM.
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT IS NOT A PREREQUISITE IN AN ACTION IN REM AND QUASI IN
REM
‣ Kinds of actions in relation to the Effect of Judgment
1. Action in personam: an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability
2. Action in rem: an action against the thing itself instead of against the person.
3. Action quasi in rem: one wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property
‣ Note: These kinds of actions should be distinguished from the kinds of actions for purposes of venue under Rule 4 (Real or
Personal actions). When the kinds action of action pertain to the effects of judgment it goes to who is bound by the
judgment. For in personam actions, only the parties are bound, for in rem and quasi in rem actions, the whole world is bound
‣ In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide
the case. On the other hand, in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is NOT a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
‣ However, summons must still be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but
merely for satisfying the due process requirements
HOW JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE PARTIES IS ACQUIRED

1. JURISDICTION OVER THE PLAINTIFF
‣ Acquired by his filing of the complaint or petition, by doing so, he submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court
‣ JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT

a. Voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or
‣ Submission to the court’s jurisdiction takes the form of an appearance that seeks affirmative relief except when the relief
sought is for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant.
‣ As a rule, an appearance in whatever form without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a
submission to the jurisdiction of the court

‣ BUT, when the appearance is precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, it is not considered an
appearance in court
b. By service of summons
ACTIONS IN PERSONAM, ACTIONS IN REM, AND ACTIONS QUASI IN REM

1. ACTION IN PERSONAM
‣ An action against a person on the basis of his personal liability
‣ A proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of
the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel
him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court.
‣ The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability
directly upon the person of the defendant
‣ No one other than the defendant is sought to be held liable, not the whole world.
‣ Such as: Action for damages, Action to recover, title to or possession of real property, Action for ejectment (Forcible
entry or unlawful detainer)
‣ Judgment will be binding against the parties only
2. ACTION IN REM
‣ An action against the thing itself instead of against the person.
‣ It is binding against the whole world
‣ The action is directed against the interest of every person in relation to the property involved
‣ Such as: Declaration of nullity of marriage, Land registration proceeding, Proceeding as to the probate of a will
3. ACTION QUASI IN REM
‣ One wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein
to the obligation or lien burdening the property
‣ One wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein
to the obligation or lien burdening the property
‣ It deals with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these
questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut-off the rights or
interests of all possible claimants
‣ The action is directed against the interest of a particular person in relation to the property involved
‣ Such as: Action for partition; Action for accounting; Attachment; Foreclosure of mortgage
‣ The action is in rem or quasi in rem in that it affects either the (Sec. 15, Rule 14):
a. Personal status of the plaintiff
b. Property within the Philippines, in which:
i. The defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or
ii. In which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or
iii. The property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines
ACTIONS IN REM VS REAL ACTIONS

‣ Actions in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem should be distinguished from the kinds of actions for purposes of venue
under Rule 4 (Real or Personal actions).
‣ The former are concerned as to the effect of judgment (who are bound by the jugdment), the latter is concerned as to
the venue of the action.
‣ Remember the real actions are those actions affecting title to, possession of real property, or any interest therein,
everything else are personal actions
‣ When the kinds action of action pertain to the effects of judgment it goes to who is bound by the judgment. For in
personam actions, only the parties are bound, for in rem actions, the whole world is bound

SERVICE OF SUMMONS AS REQUIREMENT OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
‣ In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and
decide the case.
‣ Thus, summons must be served upon him for purposes of acquiring the jurisdiction over his person
‣ When the defendant in an action in personam does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, our courts
cannot try the case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court.
‣ Extra-territorial service or Service by publication is NOT sufficient in this case
‣ On the other hand, in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is NOT a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
‣ In this case, however, summons must still be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements
VILLAREAL VS CA, G.R. NO. 107314, SEPTEMBER 17, 1998

‣ As a rule, where the defendant in an action in personam is a non-resident, and refuses to appear and submit to the
jurisdiction of the court, the jurisdiction of the latter is limited to the property within the country, which the court may have
ordered attached. In such a case, the property itself is “the sole thing which is impleaded and is the responsible object
which is the subject of the judicial power.” Accordingly, “the relief must be confined to the res, and the court cannot
lawfully render a personal judgment against him.” However, if property is attached and later the defendant appears, “the
cause becomes mainly a suit in personam, with the added incident that the property attached remains liable, under the
control of the court, to answer to any demand which may be established against the defendant by the final judgment of
the court.
‣ The following instances have been considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court: the filing by defendant
of a motion to admit answer; the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the judgment by default; and the filing of a
petition to set aside the judgment of default.
MACASAET VS FRANCISCO, G.R. NO. 156759, JUNE 5, 2013

‣ Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam –the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to
subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action – is an element of due
process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over
the defendantin an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an actionas long
as it acquires jurisdiction over the resthat is thesubject matter of the action. The purpose of summons in such action is
not the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process.
‣ The distinctions that need to be perceived between an action in personam, on the one hand, and an action inrem or quasi
in rem, on the other hand, are aptly delineated in Domagas v. Jensen, thusly:
‣ The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in
personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in
personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the
jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or
seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a
proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the
person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions
to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment
against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the property to determine its state. It has been held that
an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the
person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In
Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in which
personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in personam.
Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.
‣ On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such
persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the
purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi
in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these
questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests
of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.
‣ As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant who does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in

court; but when the case is an action in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because they have jurisdiction over the res,
and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. In the latter instance,
extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the defendant, and such extraterritorial service of
summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for the purpose of complying with the
requirements of fair play or due process, so that the defendant will be informed of the pendency of the action
against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may
be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so
minded. On the other hand, when the defendant in an action in personam does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, our courts cannot try the case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over
his person unless he voluntarily appears in court.
‣ As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by the act of
filing the initiatory pleading. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by the proper
service of the summons, or by a voluntary appearance in the action.
‣ Upon the filing of the complaint and the payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk of court forthwith issues the
corresponding summons to the defendant. The summons is directed to the defendant and signed by the clerk of court
under seal. It contains the name of the court and the names of the parties to the action; a direction that the defendant
answers within the time fixed by the Rules of Court; and a notice that unless the defendant so answers, the plaintiff will
take judgment by default and may be granted the relief applied for. To be attached to the original copy of the summons
and all copies thereof is a copy of the complaint (and its attachments, if any) and the order, if any, for the appointment of a
guardian ad litem.
‣ The significance of the proper service of the summons on the defendant in an action in personam cannot be
overemphasized. The service of the summons fulfills two fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; and (b) to afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the
claim brought against him.As to the former, when jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in a civil action through
the proper service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such proper service, the ensuing trial and judgment
are void. If the defendant knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of personal
jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing in the action, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. As to the latter, the essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of his defense. With the proper service of the
summons being intended to afford to him the opportunity to be heard on the claim against him, he may also waive
the process. In other words, compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue
of due process as it is of jurisdiction.
‣ Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly be effected on the defendant himself whenever
practicable. Such personal service consists either in handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if the
defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering it to him. The rule on personal service is to be rigidly enforced in
order to ensure the realization of the two fundamental objectives earlier mentioned. If, for justifiable reasons, the
defendant cannot be served in person within a reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be effected either
(a) by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
The latter mode of service is known as substituted service because the service of the summons on the defendant is made
through his substitute.
‣ It is no longer debatable that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully,
and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective. This is because substituted
service, being in derogation of the usual method of service, is extraordinary in character and may be used only as
prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a
reasonable time may substituted service be resorted to. Hence, the impossibility of prompt personal service should be
shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant himself and the fact that such efforts failed, which statement
should be found in the proof of service or sheriff’s return. Nonetheless, the requisite showing of the impossibility of
prompt personal service as basis for resorting to substituted service may be waived by the defendant either expressly or
impliedly.
‣ In this case, there is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of petitioners in
person at their office address, the first in the morning of September 18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same
date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet and Quijano were "always out and not available" and the other petitioners
were "always roving outside and gathering news." After Medina learned from those present in the office address on his
second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office during the business hours of that or
any other day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time would be futile. The
circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal
service by all means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should
he be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that regard, what was a reasonable time was
dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do

not cling to such strictness should the circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the
procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.
‣ In reality, petitioners’ insistence on personal service by the serving officer was demonstrably superfluous. They had
actually received the summonses served through their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings in
the RTC, including an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam and a pre-trial brief ad cautelam. They had
also availed themselves of the modes of discovery available under the Rules of Court. Such acts evinced their
voluntary appearance in the action.
NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS VS LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING, G.R. NO. 175799, NOVEMBER 28, 2011
‣ The rules on extra-territorial service of summons apply to actions in rem or quasi in rem, not for actions in personam. The
Philippine courts cannot tray any case against it because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over its person
unless it voluntarily appears in court.
‣ Section 23 of Rule 14: “The defendant’s voluntary appearance in an action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The
inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not
be deemed a voluntary appearance.”
‣ It can thus be observed that the section merely mentions other grounds in a Motion to Dismiss aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. This clearly refers to affirmative defenses, rather than affirmative
reliefs.
‣ By seeking affirmative reliefs, the Court has discussed, a party is actively participating in the proceedings
which is tantamount to an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of
the case.
‣ In this case, the defendant foreign corporation, NM Rothschild, availed of affirmative reliefs as while its motion to dismiss
was still pending, it prayed for and was able to avail of modes of discovery against Lepanto (i.e. written interrogatories,
requests for admission, deposition, and motions for production of documents)
CHAVES BIACO VS PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK, G.R. NO. 161417 FEBRUARY 8, 2007
‣ In actions quasi in rem (such as foreclosure of mortgage), jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not required, it
being sufficient that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon
the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements. The violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to due process arising from want of valid service of
summons on her warrants the annulment of the judgment of the trial court.
‣ In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent PCRB undoubtedly vested the trial court with
jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject
matter. However, the petitioner was denied due process and was not able to participate in the judicial foreclosure
proceedings as a consequence. The violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to due process arising from want of
valid service of summons on her warrants the annulment of the judgment of the trial court.
‣ Basically, Court held that summons must still be served on the defendant even if the action was one quasi in rem, the
purpose of this is to satisfy due process requirements (not for jurisdiction). Failure to do so may be a ground for annulment
of judgment under Rule 47, based on violation of due process which is a ground recognized by jurisprudence (although it’s
not enumerated as a ground in Rule 47 specifically)
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES IN CONFLICT OF LAW CASES AS A QUESTION OF DUE PROCESS; MINIMUM CONTACTS DOCTRINE
INTERNATIONAL SHOE CO. VS WASHINGTON, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
‣ “Minimum Contacts” with the forum state can enable a court in that state to exert personal jurisdiction over a party
consistent with the Due Process clause
‣ A casual presence of a corporation or its agent in a state in single or isolated incidents is not enough to establish
jurisdiction
‣ Consent from the corporation may be implied from the corporation’s presence and activities in the state through the acts
of authorized agents. The activities of their agents in behalf of the corporation are minimum contacts with the state to
make it reasonable and in conformity with the due process clause.
‣ The activities of the corporation in Washington were systematic and continuous rather that irregular or casual. The
corporation received the benefits and protection of the laws of the state, and therefore established the minimum contacts
to be under their jurisdiction

‣ The presence of “minimum contacts,” often exhibited through defendant’s doing or transacting business in the forum
state, is a requirement of due process. The Due Process Clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or
relations. Doing so would lay “too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due process
‣ Whether due process is satisfied must depend upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws, which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. That clause does not
contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations. But, to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state.
SERVICE OF SUMMONS
SUMMONS
‣ It’s a mode, writ, process, notice, or warning the service of which confers jurisdiction to the court over the person of
the defendant.
‣ It is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her.
‣ Fundamentally, it is a notice to the defendant that a particular person named therein has commenced an action against
him in a particular court.
‣ An important part of that notice is a direction that the defendant answer the complaint within the period fixed by
the Rules and that unless he so answers, plaintiff will take judgment by default and may be granted the relief applied
for.
‣ Consequence of failure to issue summons: If the defendant is not summoned or has not voluntarily appeared, judgment
against him is void.
‣ Also, strict compliance with the Rules is necessary to make the service valid
 
PURPOSE OF SUMMONS
1. In Actions in Personam: MAINLY TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT
‣ Since it is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him, the most basic purpose of summons, whatever
be the nature of the action involved, is to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.
‣ However, in an action in personam, the purpose of summons is not only to comply with due process but also to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
‣ It needs to be noted at this point that the mere filing of the complaint does not enable the court to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. By the filing of the complaint and the payment of the required filing and docket fees, the court acquires
jurisdiction only over the person of the plaintiff, not over the person of the defendant.
‣ Service of such summons is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person and is acquired through coercive
process, generally by the service of summons issued by the court, or through the defendant’s voluntary appearance or submission to
the court
‣ Where the action is in personam, that is, one brought against a person on the basis of her personal liability, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case
2. In Actions in Rem/ Quasi in Rem: TO SATISFY PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
‣ In actions in rem and quasi in rem, the court is not concerned with the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. In
these actions, it is the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the res which principally matters.
‣ The service of summons or notice to the defendant is NOT for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely
for satisfying the “due process requirements”
‣ In an action in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that
the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
‣ This does not, however, mean that the service of summons may be dispensed with. The Court adds that summons must still be
served upon the defendant in order to satisfy the due process requirements
MODES OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

‣ Section 6 to 16, Rule 14 deals with the different kinds of modes of service of summons
‣ But, there are really only 4 general modes, the other modes fall under these three also but are just more specific:
1. Service in person
2. Substituted Service

3. Service by publication
4. Other modes in special instances (fascimile, electronic means, and other manners the court may deem sufficient, etc)
‣ Other specific modes:

1. Service upon an entity without a juridical personality
2. Service upon a prisoner
3. Service upon minor and an incompetent
4. Service upon a private domestic juridical entity
5. Service upon a foreign private juridical entity
6. Service upon the Republic of the Philippines
7. Service upon Public Corporations
8. Extraterritorial Service (In case on non-resident and the action is in rem or quasi in rem)
SERVICE IN PERSON AND SUBSTITUTED SERVICE
RULES OF COURT
RULE 14: SUMMONS
SECTION 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. (7a)
SECTION 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. (8a)
This is the general rule, every time summons should be served, it must be by service upon person, as much as possible.
Substituted service may only be done if service upon person cannot be performed within a reasonable time. This is so
especially if the action is one in personam.
SERVICE BY PUBLICATION
RULES OF COURT
RULE 14: SUMMONS
SECTION 15. Extraterritorial service. - When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the
action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in
which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly
or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within
the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under Section 6;
or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which
case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the
defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice,
within which the defendant must answer. (17a)
SECTION 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity.

If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in the Philippines or has no resident agent, service may, with leave of
court, be effected out of the Philippines through any of the following means:
a. By personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign country with the assistance of the
Department of Foreign Affairs;

b. By publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country where the defendant may be found and by
serving a copy of the summons and the court order by registered mail at the last known address of the defendant;
c. By facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof of service; or
d. By such other means as the court may in its discretion direct. (14a) (As amended by SC Resolution, A.M. No. 11-3-6-
SC, March 15, 2001)
SECTION 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. - In any action where the defendant is
designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation
and in such places and for such time as the court may order. (16a)
SECTION 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. - When any action is commenced against a defendant who
ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also effected
out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section. (18a)
‣ RULE: GENERALLY, SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION IS AVAILABLE ONLY IN ACTIONS IN REM OR QUASI IN REM. IT IS NOT
AVAILABLE AS A MEANS OF ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT IN AN ACTION IN
PERSONAM
‣ Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an
objection of any sort against the right sought to be established.
‣ It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear
and decide it
‣ It’s NOT available in actions in personam because of due process considerations
‣ Service by Publication is one of the recognized mode of service in these instances:

1. Extraterritorial Service (Sec. 15, Rule 14)
2. Against a defendant who is a foreign private juridical entity not registered and with no resident agent in the Philippines (Sec. 12,
Rule 14)
3. Against a defendant who is a resident when his identity or whereabouts are unknown (Sec. 12, Rule 14)
4. Against a defendant who is a resident when he is temporarily out of the Philippines (Sec. 16, Rule 14)
‣ NOTE: In case of actions in personam against a non-resident defendant who is a foreign private juridical entity not registered and with
no resident agent in the Philippines, service by publication is NOT allowed, it must still be by service upon person or substituted
service, but since that is not possible, as it is a non-resident, then you can only acquire jurisdiction over him by his voluntary
appearance Service by publication and the other modes recognized in Sec. 12, Rule 14 is only available if the action is in rem or quasi
in rem (Villareal vs CA 1998, Macasaet vs Francisco 2013)
‣ EXCEPTION: IN THESE ACTIONS IN PERSONAM, SERVICE BY PUBLICATION IS PERMISSIBLE:

1. Against a defendant who is a resident when his identity or whereabouts are unknown (Sec. 14, Rule 14)
‣ Where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained despite a diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order
‣ The rule in Sec. 14 of Rule 14 authorizes summons by publication in any action and the rule obviously does not distinguish
whether the action is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. The tenor of the rule authorizes summons by publication whatever the
action may be as long as the identity of the defendant is unknown or his whereabouts are unknown.
2. Against a defendant who is a resident when he is temporarily out of the Philippines (Sec. 16, Rule 14)
‣ Under Sec. 16 of Rule 14, “When any action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but
who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section.
‣ The ‘preceding section’ referred to in Sec. 16 is necessarily Sec. 15 on extraterritorial service of summons. Significantly, one of
the modes of service of summons under Sec. 15 is “by publication in a newspaper of general circulation...” Summons by
publication, therefore, applies to a resident of the Philippines who is temporarily out of the country.
‣ Like in the case of an unknown defendant or one whose whereabouts are unknown, the rule affecting residents who are
temporarily out of the Philippines applies in any action.
‣ BUT this rule authorizing summons by publication appears superfluous and unnecessary. Without such provision, a resident
defendant temporarily outside of the Philippines may still be served through the substituted service under Sec. 7 of Rule 14.

RULES INVOLVING FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
CORPORATION CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Sec. 123. Definition and rights of foreign corporations. - For the purposes of this Code, a foreign corporation is one
formed, organized or existing under any laws other than those of the Philippines and whose laws allow Filipino citizens
and corporations to do business in its own country or state. It shall have the right to transact business in the Philippines
after it shall have obtained a license to transact business in this country in accordance with this Code and a certificate of
authority from the appropriate government agency. (n)
Sec. 128. Resident agent; service of process. - The Securities and Exchange Commission shall require as a condition
precedent to the issuance of the license to transact business in the Philippines by any foreign corporation that such
corporation file with the Securities and Exchange Commission a written power of attorney designating some person who
must be a resident of the Philippines, on whom any summons and other legal processes may be served in all actions or
other legal proceedings against such corporation, and consenting that service upon such resident agent shall be
admitted and held as valid as if served upon the duly authorized officers of the foreign corporation at its home office.Any
such foreign corporation shall likewise execute and file with the Securities and Exchange Commission an agreement or
stipulation, executed by the proper authorities of said corporation, in form and substance as follows:
"The (name of foreign corporation) does hereby stipulate and agree, in consideration of its being granted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission a license to transact business in the Philippines, that if at any time said corporation
shall cease to transact business in the Philippines, or shall be without any resident agent in the Philippines on whom any
summons or other legal processes may be served, then in any action or proceeding arising out of any business or
transaction which occurred in the Philippines, service of any summons or other legal process may be made upon the
Securities and Exchange Commission and that such service shall have the same force and effect as if made upon the
duly- authorized officers of the corporation at its home office.”
Whenever such service of summons or other process shall be made upon the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Commission shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, transmit by mail a copy of such summons or other legal process to the
corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such copy by the Commission shall be necessarypart of and
shall complete such service. All expenses incurred by the Commission for such service shall be paid in advance by the
party at whose instance the service is made.
In case of a change of address of the resident agent, it shall be his or its duty to immediately notify in writing the
Securities and Exchange Commission of the new address. (72a; and n)
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. - No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a
license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any
court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before
Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws. (69a)
RA 7042: FOREIGN INVESTMENTS ACT OF 1991

Section 3. Definitions.-
d.) The phrase "doing business" shall include soliciting orders, service contracts, opening offices, whether called "liaison"
offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year
stay in the country for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty (180) days or more; participating in the
management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other
act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the
performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive
prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization:
‣ Provided, however, That the phrase "doing business: shall not be deemed to include mere investment as a
shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights
as such investor; nor having a nominee director or officer to represent its interests in such corporation; nor appointing
a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in its own name and for its own
account;

IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7042 (FOREIGN INVESTMENT ACT OF 1991) AS
AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8179
SECTION 1. DEFINITION OF TERMS. – For purposes of these Rules and Regulations:

f. Doing business shall include soliciting orders, service contracts, opening offices, whether liaison offices or branches;
appointing representatives or distributors, operating under full control of the foreign corporation, domiciled in the
Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or periods totaling one hundred eighty (180) days
or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm, entity or corporation in
the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and
contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to
and in progressive prosecution of commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization. The
following acts shall not be deemed “doing business” in the Philippines:
(1) Mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business, and/or
the exercise of rights as such investor;
(2) Having a nominee director or officer to represent its interests in such corporation;
(3) Appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in the representative’s
or distributor’s own name and account;
(4) The publication of a general advertisement through any print or broadcast media;
(5) Maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the purpose of having the same processed by another entity
in the Philippines;
(6) Consignment by a foreign entity of equipment with a local company to be used in the processing of products for
export;
(7) Collecting information in the Philippines; and
(8) Performing services auxiliary to an existing isolated contract of sale which are not on a continuing basis, such as
installing in the Philippines machinery it has manufactured or exported to the Philippines, servicing the same, training
domestic workers to operate it, and similar incidental services.
RULES ON ACTIONS INSTITUTED BY FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

1. Licensed Foreign Corporations
‣ Can sue before Philippine courts on any transaction.
2. Unlicensed Foreign Corporations
a. Doing business in the Philippines
‣ Cannot sue in Philippine Courts
‣ EXCEPT: When a Philippine citizen or entity which has contracted with said corporation, and obtained benefits
from their transactions, he may be estopped from challenging the foreign corporation’s corporate personality in
a suit brought before Philippine courts
b. Not doing business in the Philippines

‣ Can sue before Philippine courts on an isolated transaction or on a cause of action entirely independent of any
business transaction (It needs no license to sue)
MEANING OF “DOING BUSINESS”

‣ There is no definitive rule on what constitutes “doing”, “engaging in”, or “transacting” business in the Philippines.
‣ The term “implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the
performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to or in progressive prosecution
of the purpose and subject of its organization.
‣ See the definition in the Foreign Investment Act

‣ Note that the Corporation Code uses the word “transacting business”, while the FIA uses “doing business”
CASES
EUROPEAN RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGIES INC. VS INGENIEUBURO BIRKHA, G.R NO. 159586, JULY 26, 2004

‣ A single act or transaction may be considered as “doing business” when a corporation performs acts for which it was
created or exercises some of the functions for which it was organized.
‣ In this case, the act of participating in a bidding process constitutes “doing business” because it shows the foreign
corporation’s intention to engage in business in the Philippines. By participating in the bidding conducted by the CDC
for the operation of the waste management center, the German Consortium exhibited its intent to transact business in
the Philippines.
‣ As a general rule, unlicensed foreign non-resident corporations cannot file suits in the Philippines.
‣ A corporation has legal status only within the state or territory in which it was organized. For this reason, a corporation
organized in another country has no personality to file suits in the Philippines.
‣ In order to subject a foreign corporation doing business in the country to the jurisdiction of our courts, it must acquire
a license from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and appoint an agent for service of process. Without
such license, it cannot institute a suit in the Philippines.
‣ The object of requiring a license is not to prevent the foreign corporation from performing single acts, but to prevent it
from acquiring domicile for the purpose of business without taking the steps necessary to render it amenable to suits
in the local courts.
‣ However, an exception to this prohibition is when the party questioning the capacity of a foreign corporation to
institute an action in our courts had obtained benefits from its dealings with such foreign corporation and
thereafter committed a breach of or sought to renege on its obligations.
‣ This is based on estoppel
AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES SINGAPORE VS INTERGRATED SILICON TECHNOLOGY, G.R. NO. 154618, APRIL 14, 2004
‣ A foreign corporation without a license is not ipso facto incapacitated from bringing an action in Philippine courts. A
license is necessary only if a foreign corporation is “transacting” or “doing business” in the country.
‣ However, an unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may still bring suit in Philippine courts
against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited from said corporation. Such a suit is
premised on the doctrine of estoppel.
‣ A party is estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering
into a contract with it. This doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence and capacity applies to foreign as well as
domestic corporations.
‣ The principles regarding the right of a foreign corporation to bring suit in Philippine courts may thus be
condensed in four statements:
1. If a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, it cannot sue before the Philippine
courts;
2. If a foreign corporation is not doing business in the Philippines, it needs no license to sue before Philippine courts
on an isolated transaction or on a cause of action entirely independent of any business transaction;
3. If a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, a Philippine citizen or entity which has
contracted with said corporation may be estopped from challenging the foreign corporation’s corporate
personality in a suit brought before Philippine courts; and
4. If a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines with the required license, it can sue before Philippine
courts on any transaction.
‣ There is no definitive rule on what constitutes “doing”, “engaging in”, or “transacting” business in the Philippines.
Jurisprudence has it, however, that the term “implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and
contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident
to or in progressive prosecution of the purpose and subject of its organization.”
‣ The Court has identified two general tests to determine whether or not a foreign corporation can be considered
as “doing business” in the Philippines:
1. Substance test - whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body of the business or enterprise for which it was
organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another.
2. Continuity test - the term doing business implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and
contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally
incident to, and in the progressive prosecution of, the purpose and object of its organization.
‣ The Foreign Investments Act of 1991 defines “doing business” as follows: “Sec. 3, par. (d). The phrase “doing business”
shall include soliciting orders, service contracts, opening offices, whether called “liaison” offices or branches; appointing
representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or
periods totaling one hundred eighty (180) days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any

domestic business, firm, entity, or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of
commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of
some of the functions normally incident to, and in the progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and
object of the business organization.
‣ See also Sec. 1 of the IRR of FIA provides that the following shall not be deemed “doing business”:
RULES ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
CORPORATION CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Sec. 127. Who may be a resident agent. - A resident agent may be either an individual residing in the Philippines or a
domestic corporation lawfully transacting business in the Philippines: Provided, That in the case of an individual, he must
be of good moral character and of sound financial standing. (n)
Sec. 128. Resident agent; service of process. - The Securities and Exchange Commission shall require as a condition
precedent to the issuance of the license to transact business in the Philippines by any foreign corporation that such
corporation file with the Securities and Exchange Commission a written power of attorney designating some person who
must be a resident of the Philippines, on whom any summons and other legal processes may be served in all actions or
other legal proceedings against such corporation, and consenting that service upon such resident agent shall be
admitted and held as valid as if served upon the duly authorized officers of the foreign corporation at its home office. Any
such foreign corporation shall likewise execute and file with the Securities and Exchange Commission an agreement or
stipulation, executed by the proper authorities of said corporation, in form and substance as follows:
"The (name of foreign corporation) does hereby stipulate and agree, in consideration of its being granted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission a license to transact business in the Philippines, that if at any time said
corporation shall cease to transact business in the Philippines, or shall be without any resident agent in the
Philippines on whom any summons or other legal processes may be served, then in any action or proceeding arising
out of any business or transaction which occurred in the Philippines, service of any summons or other legal process
may be made upon the Securities and Exchange Commission and that such service shall have the same force and
effect as if made upon the duly-authorized officers of the corporation at its home office."
Whenever such service of summons or other process shall be made upon the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Commission shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, transmit by mail a copy of such summons or other legal process to the
corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such copy by the Commission shall be necessarypart of and
shall complete such service. All expenses incurred by the Commission for such service shall be paid in advance by the
party at whose instance the service is made.
In case of a change of address of the resident agent, it shall be his or its duty to immediately notify in writing the
Securities and Exchange Commission of the new address. (72a; and n)
RULES OF COURT
RULE 14: Summons
SECTION 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. - When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which
has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law
for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its
officers or agents within the Philippines.
If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in the Philippines or has no resident agent, service may, with leave of
court, be effected out of the Philippines through any of the following means:
a) By personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign country with the assistance of the
Department of Foreign Affairs;
b) By publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country where the defendant may be found and by
serving a copy of the summons and the court order by registered mail at the last known address of the defendant;
c) By facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof of service; or
d) By such other means as the court may in its discretion direct. (14a) (As amended by SC Resolution, A.M. No. 11-3-6-
SC, March 15, 2001)

SECTION 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. - When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or
association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. (13a)
SERVICE WHEN THE DEFENDANT IS A FOREIGN PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY WHICH IS REGISTERED IN THE PHILIPPINES OR HAS A
RESIDENT AGENT
‣ See Rule 14, Sec. 12
‣ RULE: SERVICE MAY BE MADE ON ITS RESIDENT AGENT, DESIGNATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW FOR THAT PURPOSE,
BUT IF THERE BE NO SUCH AGENT, SERVICE CAN BE MADE ON EITHER:
1. The government official designated by law to that effect, or
2. Any of its officers or agents within the Philippines
‣ Note that when the foreign corporation has a subsidiary incorporated under the SEC, then use Sec. 11 for Domestic
Corporations, since the subsidiary is a domestic corporation.
‣ When a foreign corporation has designated a person to receive summons on its behalf pursuant to the Corporation Code.
That designation is exclusive and service of summons on any other person is inefficacious
SERVICE WHEN THE FOREIGN PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY IS NOT REGISTERED IN THE PHILIPPINES OR HAS NO RESIDENT AGENT
‣ See Rule 14, Sec. 12, as amended
‣ RULE: SERVICE MAY, WITH LEAVE OF COURT, BE EFFECTED OUT OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ANY OF THE
FOLLOWING MEANS:
1. By personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign country with the assistance of the Department of Foreign
Affairs
2. By publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country where the defendant may be found and by serving a
copy of the summons and the court order by registered mail at the last known address of the defendant;
3. By facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof of service; or
• So, email also if service can be proven
4. By such other means as the court may in its discretion direct.
‣ Remember that if the action is in personam, service must still be made by service upon person or substituted service.
Other modes of service are only applicable for actions in rem or quasi in rem. But service upon person or substituted
service cannot be practically done since the defendant is a non-resident foreign corporation, then you can only acquire
jurisdiction over its person by its voluntary appearance
SERVICE WHEN THE DEFENDANT IS A DOMESTIC CORPORATION, PARTNERSHIP OR ASSOCIATION

‣ See Rule 14, Sec. 11
‣ RULE: SERVICE SHOULD BE MADE ON EITHER THE FOLLOWING PERSONS:
1. President
2. Managing partner
3. General manager
4. Corporate secretary
5. Treasurer
6. In-house counsel
‣ This list is exclusive. To whom service may be made is limited to the persons enumerated and summons cannot be
served upon any other person. Jurisprudence now requires strict compliance with this rule
‣ One should look at the functions of the officer, not the nomenclature.
‣ Note: Person in charge of office NOT included here
‣ Service to Government-owned or controlled corporations

‣ If created by law: See the charter who are authorized to receive summons.

‣ If created through the corporation code: Follow Sec. 11, Rule 14
RULES ON VENUE

RULE 4: Venue of Actions
SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the Municipal Trial Court of the municipality or city
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. (1[a], 2[a]a)
SECTION 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. (2[b]a)
SECTION 3. Venue of actions against non-residents. - If any of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the
Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the
property or any portion thereof is situated or found. (2[c]a)
VENUE OF REAL ACTIONS

‣ RULE: REAL ACTIONS SHALL BE COMMENCED AND TRIED IN THE PROPER COURT WHICH HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
AREA WHEREIN THE REAL PROPERTY INVOLVED, OR A PORTION THEREOF, IS SITUATED
‣ The rule, in its simplified form means that if the action is real, the venue is local and refers to the place where the real
property involved, or any portion thereof, is situated
‣ Real actions are those affecting:
7. Title to, or
8. Possession of real property, or
9. Interest therein
‣ All else are personal actions
VENUE OF PERSONAL ACTIONS

‣ RULE: EITHER IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING, AT THE CHOICE OF THE PLAINTIFF (SINCE HE IS THE ONE WHO FILES THE
CASE):
1. Place of residence of the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs ,
2. Place of residence of the defendant or any of the principal defendants
‣ In the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff
‣ Plaintiff can always file it in his place of residence regardless whether the defendant is a resident or non-resident
‣ Use of the word “principal” means that if there are multiple plaintiffs or defendants, the residence of the “principal”
plaintiff/defendant is to be considered.
‣ This was inserted to prevent the joinder of minor parties who live far away
‣ If the non- resident defendant cannot be found in the Philippines, apply Sec. 3
‣ Residence means actual residence, where there is personal, actual and physical habitation.
‣ For purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted; Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention

to make it one’s domicile; A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may
have numerous places of residence (Saludo vs Amex 2006)
VENUE OF ACTIONS AGAINST NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANTS NOT FOUND IN THE PHILIPPINES

‣ This applies when:
1. Any of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the Philippines and
2. The action is in rem or quasi in rem in that it either:

a. Affects the personal status of the plaintiff
‣ Such as annulment of marriage
b. Affects any property of the defendant located in the Philippines.
‣ Such as foreclosure of real mortgage
‣ RULE: THE ACTION IN ANY OF THE ABOVE SITUATIONS MAY BE COMMENCED AND TRIED IN THE COURT OF THE PLACE
WHERE THE PLAINTIFF RESIDES, OR WHERE THE PROPERTY OR ANY PORTION THEREOF IS SITUATED OR FOUND
‣ Ex: If an action for partition of real property is filed by the plaintiff, a resident of Manila, naming his co- owner brothers,
all residents of Los Angeles, California as defendants, and involving a property located in Makati City, the plaintiff has a
choice of venue. He may commence and have the action tried either in Manila, the place where he resides OR in
Makati City, the place where the property is situated.
‣ Jurisdiction is limited to the res, namely, the personal status of the plaintiff or the property of the defendant located in
the Philippines. This can only be a action in res/ quasi in res where the jurisdiction of the court is confined to the res.
‣ Action in personam against non-resident defendant not in the Philippines cannot be made since the court does not
have jurisdiction over his person.
‣ The judgment must be confined to the res, and no personal judgment can be rendered against the defendant,
UNLESS he submits to the jurisdiction of the court.
STIPULATIONS AS TO VENUE

RULE 4: Venue of Actions
SECTION 4. When Rule not applicable. - This Rule shall not apply - (a) In those cases where a specific rule or law
provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof. (3a, 5a)
REQUISITES OF VALID STIPULATION AS TO AN EXCLUSIVE VENUE

1. MUST BE IN WRITING
2. MUST BE MADE BEFORE THE FILING OF THE ACTION, AND
3. MUST BE EXCLUSIVE AS TO THE VENUE
4. MUST NOT BE CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY
‣ Venue can be stipulated by the parties but it must not be contrary to public policy
‣ A written agreement of the parties as to venue before the filing of an action is not only binding upon the parties but also
on the courts.
‣ The parties must employ categorical and suitably limiting language that they wish the venue of the action be laid only
and exclusively at a definite place.
‣ In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation on venue should be deemed as merely an agreement on
an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. (Lantin v Lantion, 2006)
‣ Where the exclusivity clause does not make it necessarily all encompassing, such that even those not related to the
enforcement of the contract should be subject to the exclusive venue, the stipulation designating venues should be
strictly confined to the specific undertaking or agreement. (SMC v Monasterio, 2005)

‣ But, if there’s a specific rule or law, that rule or law will govern over the stipulation.
CASES
UNIMASTERS CONGLOMERATION INC. VS CA, G.R. NO. 119657, FEBRUARY 7, 1997
‣ Rule 4 of the Rules of Court sets forth the principles generally governing the venue of actions. It explicitly allows for
written agreements on legal venue, such waiver being merely a privilege which is not contrary to public policy or
prejudicial to 3rd persons.
‣ Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive – in the sense that the suit may only be filed in the place agreed upon –
or permissive – in that parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law.
‣ As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties. Since convenience is the
main purpose of the said rule, stipulations designating venues other than those assigned by Rule 4 should be interpreted
as designated to make it more convenient for the parties to institute actions arising from or in relation to their agreements.
‣ Unless the parties make very clear, by employing categorical and suitably limiting language, that they wish the venue of
actions between them to be laid only and exclusively at a definite place, and to disregard the prescription of the Rules of
Court, agreements on venue should not be regarded as mandatory or restrictive, but merely permissive, or
complementary.
SWEET LINE INC. VS TEVES, G.R. NO. L-37750, MAY 19, 1978
‣ Although venue may be changed or transferred from one province to another by agreement of the parties in writing under
Rule 4, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, such an agreement will not be held valid where it practically negates the
action of the claimants.
‣ The philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as well as his
witnesses and to promote the ends of justice.
‣ To the same effect and import, and, in recognition of the character of contracts of this kind, the protection of the
disadvantaged is expressly enjoined by the New Civil Code — “In all contractual property or other relations, when one of
the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance indigence, mental weakness, tender age
and other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.”
SPECIAL RULES OF VENUE IN LIBEL SUITS
REPUBLIC ACT No. 4363: AN ACT FURTHER AMEND ARTICLE THREE HUNDRED SIXTY OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE. (Approved: June 19, 1965)
Section 1. Article three hundred sixty of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act Numbered Twelve hundred
and eighty-nine, is further amended to read as follows:
"Art. 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any
defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
"The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author
thereof.
"The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and
first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense:
‣ Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at
the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila
or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does
not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where
he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published
and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
matter is printed and first published:

‣ Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed and vice
versa:
‣ Provided, furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall
acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts:
‣ And provided, finally, That this amendment shall not apply to cases of written defamations, the civil and/or
criminal actions to which have been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this law.
"Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by
the provincial or city fiscal of the province of city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where
such actions may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article.
"No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de officio
shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party.".
RULE OF VENUE IN LIBEL CASES

‣ If one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is Manila City at the time of the commission of the
offense, the action shall be filed in:
1. The CFI of Manila or
2. The city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and
‣ If such public officer does NOT hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed
1. In the CFI of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or
2. Where the libelous article is printed and first published
‣ TIME. INC. VS REYES, G.R. NO. L-28882, MAY 31, 1971

‣ Where a statute creates a right and provides a remedy for its enforcement, the remedy is exclusive; and where it
confers jurisdiction upon a particular court, that jurisdiction is likewise exclusive, unless otherwise provided. Hence.
‣ The venue provisions of RA 4363 should be deemed mandatory for the party bringing the action, unless the question
of venue should be waived by the defendant. Under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 4363,
actions for damages by public officials for libelous publications against them can only be filed in the CFIs of the city or
province where the offended functionary held office at the time of the commission of the offense, in case the libelous
article was first printed or published outside the Philippines.
‣ The assertion that a foreign corporation or a nonresident defendant is not inconvenienced by an out of town suit is
irrelevant and untenable, for venue and jurisdiction are not dependent upon convenience or inconvenience to a party;
and moreover, venue was fixed under RA No. 4363, pursuant to the basic policy of the law that is, as previously
stated, to protect the interest of the public service when the offended party is a public officer, by minimizing as much
as possible any interference with the discharge of his duties.
‣ We are here confronted 'by a specific venue statute, conferring jurisdiction in cases of libel against public officials to
specified courts, and no other. The rule is that where a statute creates a right and provides a remedy for its
enforcement, the remedy is exclusive; and where it confers jurisdiction upon a particular court, that jurisdiction is
likewise exclusive, unless otherwise provided. Hence. The venue provisions of RA 4363 should be deemed mandatory
for the party bringing the action, unless the question of venue should be waived by the defendant, which was not the
case here. Only thus can the policy of the Act be upheld and maintained. Nor is there any reason why the
inapplicability of one alternative venue should result in rendering the other alternative also inapplicable.
‣ So, in summary, whats the rule for libel suits filed by public officials against nonresidents? In cases where the
alleged libelous material was first published outside of the Philippines, the second option under RA4364 (file in
the CFI where first published) cannot be availed of, and the public official MUST follow the first option, file the
case in the CFI where he is holding office at the time of the commission of the libel.
FORUM NON CONVENIENS
‣ RULE: EVEN IF THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CONFLICTS CASE, IT MAY, BY INVOKING THE PRINCIPLE OF
FORUM NON CONVENIENS, REFUSE TO EXERCISE OR ASSUME THAT JURISDICTION, IN VIEW OF ANY OF THE PRACTICAL
REASONS:

1. The evidence and the witnesses may not be readily available in the forum
2. The court dockets of the forum may already be clogged so that to permit additional cases would hamper the speedy
administration of justice.
3. The belief that the matter can be tried and decided in another jurisdiction, either because the main aspects of the
case transpired there or the material witnesses have their residence there
4. To curb the evils of “forum shopping” (such as when the non-resident plaintiff might have filed the case in the forum
merely to secure procedural advantages or to annoy or harass the defendant
5. The forum has no particular interest in the case. the parties not being citizens of the forum of are residents elsewhere;
or the subject-matter of the case evolved somewhere else
6. Other courts are open and the case may be better tried in said courts
7. The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be enforced by the plaintiff
8. The difficulty of ascertaining the foreign law applicable
‣ The doctrine should generally apply only if the defendant is a corporation.
‣ For if the defendant is an individual, the proper forum may not be able to acquire jurisdiction over him (such as if is not
residing at such forum), thus leaving the plaintiff without any remedy
‣ Dismissal due to forum non conveniens presupposes that the trial court already has jurisdiction over the subject-
matter of the case
‣ The dismissal of the court is itself an exercise of jurisdiction
‣ Do not confuse lack of jurisdiction with forum non conveniens, the latter involves the refusal of a court, in its discretion
to exercise jurisdiction it already has.
‣ ATTY. PILARES: Forum non conveniens is resolved in determination of the first stage of a conflict of law case, which
pertains to “jurisdiction”. It involves a question on whether the court where the action is filed should exercise its
jurisdiction. It should not involve choice of law questions.
PURPOSE, ORIGIN AND BASIS

‣ See the First Phil. International Bank vs CA case, basically it was developed as a tool against Forum-Shopping.
TEST TO DETERMINE THE MOST CONVENIENT FORUM

1. Whether the forum is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
2. Whether it is in the position as to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and
3. Whether it has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision (principle of effectiveness)
HOW IS FORUM NON CONVENIENS INVOKED ?

‣ RULE: DEFENDANT MUST RAISE IT IN AN ANSWER AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
‣ It cannot be used as a ground for motion to dismiss, because it’s not one of the grounds enumerated in Rule 16
‣ Defendant must prove in trial that the facts show that the Philippine court is not a convenient forum
‣ The trial court may use it as a ground to dismiss the case, but it will be incorporated in the judgment of the case.
‣ ATTY. PILARES: In reality, the defendant invoking forum non conveniens, is forced to go into trial and argue the
merits of the case alongside proving that the forum is inconvenient. So while bringing witnesses and presenting
evidence the defendant is also raising forum non conveniens in the trial. So there's a conflict because it’s as if the
forum is not convenient anymore, this is a gap in the rules.
CASES
FIRST PHIL. INTERNATIONAL BANK VS CA, G.R. NO. 115849, JANUARY 24, 1996
‣ Forum-shopping originated as a concept in private international law, where non-resident litigants are given the option to
choose the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for various reasons or excuses, including to secure procedural
advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. To
combat these less than honorable excuses, the principle of forum non conveniens was developed whereby a
court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most “convenient” or
available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.

‣ Forum shopping “occurs when a party attempts to have his action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels
he will receive the most favorable judgment or verdict.”
‣ In the Philippines, forum-shopping has acquired a connotation encompassing not only a choice of venues, as it was
originally understood in conflicts of laws, but also to a choice of remedies.
1. As to the choice of venues, the Rules of Court, for example, allow a plaintiff to commence personal actions where
the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides,
at the election of the plaintiff (Rule 4, Sec. 2 [b]).
2. As to remedies, aggrieved parties, for example, are given a choice of pursuing civil liabilities independently of the
criminal, arising from the same set of facts. A passenger of a public utility vehicle involved in a vehicular accident may
sue on culpa contractual, culpa aquiliana or culpa criminal - each remedy being available independently of the others
- although he cannot recover more than once.
‣ In either of these situations (choice of venue or choice of remedy), the litigant actually shops for a forum of his action. This
was the original concept of the term forum shopping. Eventually, however, instead of actually making a choice of the
forum of their actions, litigants, through the encouragement of their lawyers, file their actions in all available courts, or
invoke all relevant remedies simultaneously. What therefore originally started both in conflicts of laws and in our domestic
law as a legitimate device for solving problems has been abused and misused to assure scheming litigants of dubious
reliefs.
‣ Elements of forum shopping:
1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well as
2. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and
3. The identity on the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL VS ROUZIE, G.R. NO. 162894, FEB. 26 2008

‣ Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura, the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-
of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the
instances where the Court held that the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with a foreign
element, the following requisites had to be proved:
1. That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort;
2. That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and
3. That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision
‣ Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from
seeking remedies elsewhere.
‣ In this case, the defendant’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial
court of its jurisdiction over the civil case and the parties involved.
‣ Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense.
‣ While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so
only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.
THE MANILA HOTEL CORP. VS NLRC, G.R. NO. 12077, OCT. 13, 2000
‣ Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses
to do so provided:
1. That the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
2. That the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and
3. That the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
COMMUNICATIONS MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC. VS CA, G.R. NO. 102223, AUGUST 22, 1996
‣ The Philippine Court may refuse to assume jurisdiction in spite of its having acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the court
may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met:
1. That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to

2. That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and,
3. That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA AND NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS VS KITAMURA, G.R. NO. 149177, NOV. 23, 2007
BANK OF AMERICA NT & SA VS CA, G.R. NO. 120135, MARCH 31, 2003
‣ The doctrine of forum non-conveniens, literally meaning ‘the forum is inconvenient’, emerged in private international law
to deter the practice of global forum shopping, that is to prevent non-resident litigants from choosing the forum or place
wherein to bring their suit for malicious reasons, such as to secure procedural, advantages, to annoy and harass the
defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue.
‣ Under this doctrine, a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the
most “convenient” or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
‣ Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the
particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
‣ The doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss because Section 1,
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a ground.
‣ While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only
after vital facts are established to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.
‣ The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of defense.
PHILSEC INVESTMENT CORPORATION VS CA, G.R. NO. 103493, JUNE 19, 1997
‣ The trial court's refusal to take cognizance of the case is not justifiable under the principle of forum non conveniens. Rule
16 (on motion to dismiss) of the ROC does not include forum non conveniens.
‣ The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly
considered a matter of defense.
‣ Also, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do
so only after "vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances" require the court's
desistance.
PUYAT VS ZABARTE, G.R. NO. 141536, FEBRUARY 26, 2001

‣ Under the principle of forum non conveniens, even if the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law, courts may
nonetheless refuse to entertain a case for any of the following practical reasons:
1. The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main aspects of the case
transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there;
2. The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum , a practice known as forum shopping , merely to secure
procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;
3. The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-residents or aliens when the docket may already be
overcrowded;
4. The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be maintained; and
5. The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.
‣ An action to enforce a foreign judgment CANNOT be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens
‣ Since the present action lodged in the RTC was for the enforcement of a foreign judgment, there was no need to
ascertain the rights and the obligations of the parties based on foreign laws or contracts. The parties needed only to
perform their obligations under the Compromise Agreement they had entered into.
‣ Under Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment in an action in personam rendered by a
foreign tribunal clothed with jurisdiction is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors-in-interest by a subsequent title.
‣ Also, under Section 5(n) of Rule 131, a court -- whether in the Philippines or elsewhere -- enjoys the presumption that
it is acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction, and that it is regularly performing its official duty.

‣ Its judgment may, however, be assailed if there is evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact. But precisely, this possibility signals the need for a local trial court
to exercise jurisdiction. Clearly, the application of forum non coveniens is not called for.
PIONEER CONCRETE PHILIPPINES VS TODARO, G.R. NO 154830, JUNE 8, 2007

‣ The doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a ground.
‣ While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only
after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance; and that the
propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination, hence it
is more properly considered a matter of defense.
WING ON COMPANY VS SYYAP, 64 O.G. 8311 (1967)

‣ Unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should be rarely disturbed, and
furthermore, the consideration of inadequacy to enforce the judgment, which is one of the important factors to be
considered in the application of said principle, would precisely constitute a problem to the plaintiff if the local courts
decline to assume jurisdiction on the basis of said principle, considering that defendant is a resident of the Philippines.
IN RE: UNION CARBIDE 634, F. SUPP. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)

‣ In this case, a case filed in the USA by Indian plaintiffs for torts which happened in India was ordered dismissed by the
SC on grounds of forum non conveniens
‣ The Indian legal system is in a far better position than the American courts to determine the cause of the tragic event and
thereby fix liability. All of the private interest factors described in Piper and Gilbert weigh heavily toward dismissal of this
case on the grounds of forum non conveniens. The public interest factors set forth in Piper and Gilbert also favor
dismissal.
1. The Indian courts have greater access to all the information needed to arrive at the amount of the compensation to be
awarded the victims.
‣ The presence in India of the overwhelming majority of the witnesses and evidence, both documentary and real
‣ This would by itself suggest that India is the most convenient forum for this consolidated case.
2. The additional presence in India of all but the less than handful of claimants
3. The administrative burden of this immense litigation would unfairly tax this or any American tribunal.
‣ The cost to American taxpayers of supporting the litigation in the United States would be excessive. When
another, adequate and more convenient forum so clearly exists, there is no reason to press the United States
judiciary to the limits of its capacity.
4. No American interest in the outcome of this litigation outweighs the interest of India in applying Indian law and Indian
values to the task of resolving this case.
‣ The Bhopal plant was regulated by Indian agencies. The Union of India has a very strong interest in the aftermath
of the accident which affected its citizens on its own soil. Perhaps Indian regulations were ignored or contravened.
‣ India may wish to determine whether the regulations imposed on the chemical industry within its boundaries were
sufficiently stringent.
‣ The Indian interests far outweigh the interests of citizens of the United States in the litigation.
‣ The Court thus finds itself faced with a paradox. In the Court's view, to retain the litigation in this forum, as plaintiffs
request, would be yet another example of imperialism, another situation in which an established sovereign inflicted its
rules, its standards and values on a developing nation. This Court declines to play such a role.
‣ This Court defers to the adequacy and ability of the courts of India. Their interest in the sad events of December 2-3,
1984 at the UCIL plant in the City of Bhopal, State of Madhya Pradesh, Union of India, is not subject to question or
challenge. The availability of the probative, relevant, material and necessary evidence to Indian courts is obvious and has
been demonstrated in this opinion.
‣ India's interest in the outcome of the litigation exceeds America’s. The lex loci delicti analysis used in other jurisdictions
indicates that the law of the state where the tort occurred should be applied. The place in which the tort occurred was, to
a very great extent, India. Other states apply the "most significant relationship" test, or "weight of contacts" test, which
evaluate in which state most of the events constituting the tort occurred. The contacts with India with respect to all
phases of plant construction, operation, malfunction and subsequent injuries are greater in number than those with the
United States. Thus, under any one of these three doctrines, it is likely that Indian law will emerge as the operative law. An

Indian court, therefore, would be better able to apply the controlling law than would this United States Court, or a jury
working with it. This public interest factor also weighs in favor of dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens.
PIPER AIRCRAFT VS REYNO, 454 U.S. 235 (1981)

‣ Plaintiffs of a case may not defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens merely by showing that the
substantive law that would be applied in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiffs than that of the present
forum. The possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight
in the forum non conveniens inquiry.
‣ The doctrine of forum non conveniens is designed in part to help courts avoid conducting complex exercises in
comparative law.
‣ When the home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient. When the
plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less reasonable. Because the central purpose of any forum
non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff's choice deserves less
deference.
‣ The forum non conveniens determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only
when there has been a clear abuse of discretion; where the court has considered all relevant public and private interest
factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference.

III. CHOICE OF LAW: PHILIPPINE CONFLICT OF LAW RULES
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
LAW WHICH GOVERNS PROCEDURAL LAW

‣ RULE: WITH REGARD TO PROCEDURAL LAWS, THE FORUM MUST APPLY ITS OWN PROCEDURAL LAW (LEX FORI) IN
RESOLVING A CONFLICT CASE
‣ The application of foreign law is limited to the substantive aspects.
‣ EXCEPTION: IN CASE OF LAWS WHICH ARE BOTH PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE, SUCH AS THE PRESCRIPTION OF
ACTIONS
‣ Prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws; it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive,
depending on the characterization given such a law.
‣ The modern trend is to consider the prescriptive periods or the statute of frauds that the parties had in
mind at the time of the transaction took place. Then, proceed to apply the intended law in its “totality”
including its periods of prescription and its statute of frauds.
‣ Example: A, an englishman, borrowed money from B, another englishman, in England, evidence by a promissory
note. Under English Law, the period to sue on the promissory note is 4 years. In the Philippines, the period of
prescription is 10 years. If the action is filed in the Philippines beyond 4 years from the issuance of the note but
within 10 years, has the action prescribed? Yes, because English Law was evidently intended by the parties to
govern their transaction.
‣ EXCEPTION TO EXCEPTION:
1. WHEN THE COUNTRY OF THE FORUM HAS A "BORROWING STATUTE”
‣ In this case, the characterization of a statute of limitation becomes irrelevant
‣ A borrowing law or statute directs the State of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the
pending claims based on a foreign law.
‣ In short, it has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance
‣ One kind of borrowing statute provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will
not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it.
‣ Section 48 of the old Code of Civil Procedure is a borrowing statute, it provides: “If by the laws of the
state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the
Philippines Islands.”
‣ This has been superseded already but the court in several cases has said it is still good rule
‣ However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the
country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign
statute of limitation as one of substance. A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the
foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of
"borrowing statutes," one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will
not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it (LWV Construction vs
Dupo 2009)
2. IF THE PROPERTY INVOLVED IS LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN WHICH CASE, PHILIPPINE LAW (LEX SITUS)
APPLIES
‣ In this case, it becomes an issue of property, ownership or title, thus property law applies.
PERSONAL STATUS, LEGAL PERSONALITY AND CAPACITY
Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person
and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be
lost. (n)

Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere
restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter
arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. (32a)
Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state
of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The
consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws.
Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion. A married woman, twenty-one years of age
or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law. (n)
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a)
Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies
within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)
Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased
is determined by law, by contract and by will. (32a)
PERSONAL LAW
‣ It is the law which attaches to a person wherever he may go.
‣ It is the law which generally governs a peron’s status, capacity, condition, family relations and the consequences of his
actuations.
‣ It may be his national aw, the law of his domcile, or the law of the situs of the even or transaction wherein he was
involved, depending on the theory applied and enforced in the forum
MEANING OF “STATUS”
‣ It is the legal position of an individual in his society.
‣ It consists of personal qualities and relationships, more or less permanent, with which the state and the community are
concerned.
‣ It includes such matters as:
1. The beginning and end of legal personality,
2. Capacity to have rights in general
3. Civil status of a person (whether single, married, widowed, or divorced)
4. Whether he has reached the age of majority
5. Capacity to enter into various transactions
6. Family relations and its various aspects such as birth, legitimation, paternity and filiation, adoption, emancipation,
marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession
7. A person’s name, sex, and profession in certain cases
MEANING OF “CAPACITY”
‣ Capacity is merely part of a person’s status.
‣ It is the sum total of his rights and obligations
‣ There are two general kinds of capacity under Art. 37 of the New Civil Code
1. Juridical Capacity (Passive Capacity)

‣ It is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations
‣ It is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death
2. Capacity to Act (Active Capacity)

‣ It is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
‣ Some specific kinds of capacity include: testamentary capacity, capacity to contract, capacity to succeed, etc.
CHARACTERISTICS OF STATUS
1. It is conferred principally by the state, not the individual
2. It is a matter of public or social interest
3. Being a concept of social order, it cannot easily be terminated at the mere will or desire of the parties concerned.
4. It is generally supposed to have a universal character. When a certain status is created by the law of one country, it is
generally recognized all over the world.
LAW WHICH GOVERNS PERSONAL LAW OF PERSONS

‣ RULE: FAMILY RIGHTS AND DUTIES, OR TO THE STATUS, CONDITION AND LEGAL CAPACITY OF PERSONS ARE GOVERNED
BY THEIR NATIONAL LAW (LEX NATIONALII)
‣ Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (Art. 15, NCC)
‣ Thus, Philippine laws govern the family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of Filipinos,
wherever they are
‣ By analogy, the Supreme Court has given Art. 15 application to foreigners in that their status and legal capacity, are
governed by their national law (Recto vs Harden)
‣ What if a person is stateless and thus has no national law, what law would govern his personal law?
‣ Apply the domiciliary theory. If such person was domiciled in the Philippines, then Philippine law applies.
OTHER THEORIES ON HOW THE PERSONAL LAW IS DETERMINED

1. Nationality Theory (Personal Theory)
‣ The status and capacity of person is determined by the law of his nationality of national law
2. Domiciliary Theory (Territorial Theory)

‣ The status and capacity of person is determined by the law of his nationality of his domicile
3. Situs or Electic Theory

‣ Views the particular place or situs of an event or transaction as generally the controlling law
‣ The Philippines follows the nationality theory, while the United States, like other common law countries, follows the
domiciliary theory. Thus in the Philippines, the personal law is the same as national law.
CASES
RECTO VS HARDEN, 100 PHIL 427 (1959)
‣ Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines follows the nationality principle, which applies to Filipino nationals. However,
in the case of aliens, such as in this case, the court may refer to their national law if they belong to a country following the
nationality principle or the law of their domicile if they follow the domiciliary principle.
BARNUEVO VS FUSTER, 29 PHIL 606 (1913)

‣ Jurisdiction of the courts is not an element of the parties’ personal law. Regardless of such personal law, it is an element
of the public or political law of the forum state. Questions regarding procedure are generally submitted to the territorial
principle. In this case, the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter.
‣ The Court said that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and persons, and that the national law of the spouses
doesn’t apply precisely because the authority and jurisdiction of courts are not a matter of private law of persons, but of
the public law or political law of the nation. It would be contrary to public policy to have a litigant win his case in court but
be unable to have the court enforce his rights because the foreign intervener invokes his national law.
‣ The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not comprised within the personal status of the
husband and wife, simply because the whole theory of the statutes and of the rights which belong to everyone does not
go beyond the sphere of private law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of the private law of
persons, but of the public or political law of the nation. The Philippine courts have authority to decree the divorce

according to the personal/national law of the foreigners even when the national laws of Spain confer the jurisdiction over
divorce cases to Spanish ecclesiastical courts.
‣ Jurisdiction of courts is independent from the law to be applied, even if such law is the foreign personal law of the parties
INSULAR GOVERNMENT VS FRANK, 13 PHIL 236 (1909)

‣ No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are
determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters connected with its performance are regulated by
the law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of
evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought
‣ In this case, Frank’s claim that he was an adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when he arrived at Manila; that he
was an adult a the time he made the contract but was a minor at the time the Plaintiff attempted to enforce the contract,
more than a year later, is not tenable. At the time and place of the making of the contract in question, Frank had full
capacity to make the same, since the contract was executed in Illinois, then such laws should govern the validity of the
contract
‣ Relation to personal law? I think the case implies that since Frank was from the US, then his capacity to act (enter into
acts with legal effect) should be governed by his personal law, US law.
NATIONALITY, RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE
1987 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE 4: CITIZENSHIP
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission, they
are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
ARTICLE V SUFFRAGE
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein they
propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
RA 7042: FOREIGN INVESTMENTS ACT OF 1991
Section 3. Definitions.-

b.) The term "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines or a domestic partnership or association wholly
owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty
percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a
trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national
and at least sixty (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of the Philippine nationals:
‣ Provided, That where a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) registered enterprise, at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stocks outstanding and entitled to
vote of both corporations must be owned and held by citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty percent (60%) of
the members of the Board of Directors of both corporations must be citizens of the Philippines, in order that the
corporations shall be considered a Philippine national;
HAUGUE CONVENTION ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE CONFLICT OF NATIONALITY LAWS (1930)
Article 1. It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognised by other
States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally
recognised with regard to nationality.
Article 2. Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular State shall be determined in
accordance with the law of that State.
Article 3. Subject to the provisions of the present Convention, a person having two or more nationalities may be regarded
as its national by each of the States whose nationality he possesses.
Article 4. A State may not afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a State whose nationality such
person also possesses.
Article 5. Within a third State, a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without
prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of any conventions in force, a third State shall, of
the nationalities which any such person possesses, recognise exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the
country in which he is habitually and principally resident, or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances
he appears to be in fact most closely connected.
Article 6. Without prejudice to the liberty of a State to accord wider rights to renounce its nationality, a person possessing
two nationalities acquired without any voluntary act on his part may renounce one of them with the authorisation of the
State whose nationality he desires to surrender. This authorisation may not be refused in the case of a person who has his
habitual and principal residence abroad, if the conditions laid down in the law of the State whose nationality he desires to
surrender are satisfied.
RA 9225: Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003

Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18)
years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the
Philippines.

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other
existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their
oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or
extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they
are naturalized citizens.
PD 1083: CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES
Article 2. Purpose of Code. Pursuant to Section 11 of Article XV of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides that
"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs and interests of national cultural communities in the formulation
and implementation of state policies," this Code:
(a) Recognizes the legal system of the Muslims in the Philippines as part of the law of the land and seeks to make Islamic
institutions more effective;
(b) Codifies Muslim personal laws; and
(c) Provides for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws among Muslims.
Article 3. Conflict of provisions.

(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the
prejudice of a non-Muslim.
Article 8. Legal capacity. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired
and may be lost.
Article 9. Restrictions on capacity. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age,
insanity, imbecility, the state of being deaf-mute, the condition of death-illness (marad-ul-maut), penalty, prodigality,
absence, family relations, alienage, insolvency, and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed
by this Code and other Islamic laws and, in a suppletory manner, by other laws.
Article 10. Personality, how acquired. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for
all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born alive, however, briefly, at the time it is completely delivered from
the mother's womb.
Article 11. Extinction of personality.

(1) Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of a deceased person is
determined by this Code, by contract, and by will.
(2) After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead.

Article 12. Simultaneous death. If, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, there is a
doubt as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other shall prove the same; in the
absence of such proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from
one to the other. However, the successional rights of their respective heirs shall not be affected.
Article 13. Application.

(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the
male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines.
(2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code,
the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.
(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the essential requisites and legal impediments to marriage,
divorce, paternity and filiation, guardianship and custody of minors, support and maintenance, claims for customary
dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to marry, solemnization and registration of marriage and divorce, rights
and obligations between husband and wife parental authority, and the properly relations between husband and wife
shall be governed by this Code and other applicable Muslim laws.
Article 16. Capacity to contract marriage.

(1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and any Muslim female of the age of puberty or upwards and not
suffering from any impediment under the provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is presumed to
have attained puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen.
(2) However, the Shari'a District Court may, upon petition of a proper wali, order the solemnization of the marriage of a
female who though less than fifteen but not below twelve years of age, has attained puberty.
(3) Marriage through a wali by a minor below the prescribed ages shall be regarded as betrothal and may be annulled
upon the petition of either party within four years after attaining the age of puberty, provided no voluntary cohabitation
has taken place and the wali who contracted the marriage was other than the father or paternal grandfather.
Article 37. How governed. The property relations between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order:
(a) By contract before or at the time of the celebration of marriage;
(b) By the provisions of this Code; and
(c) By custom.
Article 38. Regime of property relations. The property relations between the spouses, in the absence of any stipulation to
the contrary in the marriage settlements or any other contract, shall be governed by the regime of complete separation of
property in accordance with this Code and, in a suppletory manner, by the general principles of Islamic law and the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
Article 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be
granted only after the exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by:
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
(b) Vow of continence by the husband (ila);
(c) Injurious assanilation of the wife by the husband (zihar);
(d) Acts of imprecation (li’an);
(e) Redemption by the wife (khul’);
(f) Exercise by the wife of the delegated right to repudiate (tafwld); or
(g) Judicial decree (faskh).
Article 176. Effect of registration of conversion to Islam.

(1) Registration of a person's conversion to Islam shall constitute a prima facie proof that he professes Islam.

(2) Whoever disputes the profession or renunciation of Islam by any person shall have the burden of proving the contrary.
Article 178. Effect of conversion to Islam on marriage. The conversion of non-Muslim spouses to Islam shall have the
legal effect of ratifying their marriage as if the same had been performed in accordance with the provisions of this Code
or Muslim law, provided that there is no legal impediment to the marriage under Muslim law.
Article 179. Effect of change of religion. The change of religion by a Muslim shall not have the effect of extinguishing any
obligation or liability whatsoever incurred prior to said change.
DEFINITIONS
‣ NOTE: For purposes of determining the personal law of a person, only his nationality and domicile are important
1. NATIONALITY
‣ Refers to a personal and more or less permanent membership in a political community.
‣ As a rule, each State is free to determine by its own municipal law the persons it considers as its nationals. Thus, any
question as to whether a person is a national of particular State shall be determined by the municipal law of that State.
Also, a person having two or more nationalities may be regarded as a national by each of the States whose nationality
he possesses (Art. 2 and 3, Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws in 1930)
‣ The the field of Conflict of Laws, nationality and citizenship are the same.
‣ Once a Filipino is naturalized in another country, his national law already becomes the law of his new citizenship
‣ The national law of an individual regulates his civil status and condition, his family rights and duties, the intrinsic
validity of his will and the rights of succession to his properties (Arts. 15, 16 par. 2 and 1069, NCC)
2. RESIDENCE
‣ Residence refers to “actual or physical” residence, as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It refers to one’s
personal, actual or physical habitation or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be one’s legal
residence or domicile, provided one resides therein with continuity and consistency (Garcia Fule vs CA 1976)
‣ A person may have multiple places of residence
‣ Residence is important merely for procedural purposes, such as for purposes of Venue under the Rules of Court.
3. DOMICILE
‣ Domicile is the place with which a person has a settled connection for legal purposes, either because: he resides
there or it is the place assigned to him by law.
‣ A person can only have one domicile or legal residence
MODES OF ACQUIRING NATIONALITY

1. Birth
a. Jus Sanguinis
‣ It is citizenship by blood, citizenship acquired from the parents.
‣ The Philippines follows this
b. Jus Soli
‣ A person is a citizen of the country where he was born, or of the country of his birth
2. Naturalization
‣ Grant of citizenship upon application by some act which would qualify an individual for a new nationality.
3. Repatriation
‣ Recovery of original nationality upon fulfillment of certain conditions
4. Subjugation
‣ When a State is defeated or conquered, all the citizens acquire the nationality of the conquering State.
5. Cession

‣ When a State has been ceded in another State, all the people of the territory acquire the nationality of the State in
which their territory has been merged
MODES OF LOSING NATIONALITY

1. Release
‣ A citizen may apply for release from citizenship of his State
2. Deprivation
‣ The State concerned may deprive their citizens of nationality
‣ Ex. the Philippines may deprive their citizens of nationality upon entry into the military service of a foreign power.
3. Expiration
‣ May result from a long stay abroad without any indication of a desire to return
4. Renunciation
‣ A person may repudiate his nationality in favor of another.
5. Substitution
‣ Loss of nationality ipso facto by naturalization abroad or by marriage
DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PERSON IS A CITIZEN OF A CERTAIN STATE

‣ RULE: EACH COUNTRY OR STATE HAS THE SOLE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE UNDER ITS INTERNAL LAW
WHO ARE ITS CITIZENS OR NATIONALS.
‣ Any question as to whether a person possess the nationality of a particular state should be determined in accordance
with the law of that state (Art. 2, Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws)
‣ Art. 4 of the 1987 Constitution determines who are Filipino citizens
KINDS OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS

1. NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS
‣ These are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship (Art. 4, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution)
‣ These are enumerated in the Art. 4 of the 1987 Constitution
a. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
b. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines
c. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority; and
d. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
2. NATURALIZED CITIZENS
‣ Those who were formerly aliens but by judicial, legislative, or administrative process, have become Filipino citizens
‣ Foreign spouses who are married to Filipino spouses may also be considered citizens by naturalization through
marriage if they have no disqualifications to become Filipino citizens by naturalisation
‣ Also, the spouse and minor children of those who had been naturalized as Filipino citizens are also considered to be
naturalized by derivative naturalisation
NATIONALITY OF CORPORATIONS
‣ See foreign investments act
‣ RULE: THE TERM "PHILIPPINE NATIONAL" INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:
1. Citizen of the Philippines
2. Domestic partnership or association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; or
3. Corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock
outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines

‣ Provided that where a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) registered enterprise, at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stocks outstanding and
entitled to vote of both corporations must be owned and held by citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty
percent (60%) of the members of the Board of Directors of both corporations must be citizens of the
Philippines, in order that the corporations shall be considered a Philippine national
DUAL CITIZENSHIP
‣ RULE: THE PHILIPPINES IS NOT CONCERNED IF A FILIPINO HAS ANY OTHER CITIZENSHIP, ALONG AS HE IS FILIPINO, HE
IS TREATED AS SUCH.
‣ From the point of view of the Philippines, Filipinos who have citizenship in other countries are solely Filipinos.
‣ Dual citizenship cannot be avoided due to the diverse laws of the different countries around the world as to who are their
citizens and who are not.
‣ Instances when Dual or Multiple Nationalities arise:

1. Concurrent application of jus soli and jus sanguine at birth;
2. Refusal of certain States to accept a full application of the doctrine of expatriation;
3. Marriage; or
4. Any formal or voluntary act of the individual

‣ For candidates for public office with dual citizenship, upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as person with dual citizenship. (Mercado vs Manzano 1999)
PROBLEM OF DUAL CITIZENSHIP; THEORY OF EFFECTIVE NATIONALITY

‣ Problems of dual citizenship arise when it involves a third state, who is faced with an issue of which citizenship to
recognize
‣ RULE: IF THE LITIGATION ARISES IN A THIRD COUNTRY, THE FORUM MAY RECOGNIZE EXCLUSIVELY IN ITS TERRITORY
THE NATIONALITY OF THE STATE WITH WHICH THE CIRCUMSTANCES HE APPEARS TO BE IN FACT MOST CLOSELY
CONNECTED
‣ This is the “theory of effective nationality”
‣ Within a third State, a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without
prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of any conventions in force, a third State shall,
of the nationalities which any such person possesses, recognise exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the
country in which he is habitually and principally resident, or the nationality of the country with which in the
circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected.(Art. 5, Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality
Laws in 1930)
NATURALIZATION
‣ It is the process of conferring on an alien the citizenship of another country by any of the means provided by law.
‣ It is considered not as a matter of right but of privilege and may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed
by law.
MODES OF NATURALIZATION TO PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

1. By judicial process
‣ This is in accordance with CA No. 475, as amended by RA 530
2. By legislative process
‣ This is when Philippine citizenship is conferred by the direct and special act of Congress on deserving aliens
3. By administrative process
‣ This is under RA 9139 or the “Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000”. Under this law, Special Committee on
Naturalization is created, with the power to approve, deny, or reject applications for naturalization field with said
Committee.
4. By derivative naturalization
‣ This is when Philippine citizenship is conferred on the:
a. Wife of a naturalized husband

b. Minor children of a naturalized father
c. Alien wife of a natural-born or naturalized citizen, in the latter case, the marriage having taken place after the
husbands’ naturalization.
MARRIAGE OF FOREIGN INDIVIDUALS AND FILIPINOS

1. Foreign woman married to a Filipino
‣ Becomes ipso facto a Filipino provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under its naturalization
law.
‣ However, to settle the matter of the wife’s citizenship once and for all, the Court deemed it proper to adopt the
procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration. The wife must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien
certificate of registration with the BOI. (Mo Ya Lim Yao v. CIR 1971)
‣ This is also the case, in case of the minor children of the foreign who became a Filipino, they will also be naturalized by
derivative naturalization
2. Filipinos married to aliens

‣ Retain their citizenship unless by their act or omission they are deemed under the laws to have renounced their
citizenship (Art. 4, Sec. 4, 1987 Constitution).
LOSS OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

‣ Under CA 64, as amended by RA 106, a Filipino may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways:
1. By naturalization in a foreign country
2. By express renunciation of citizenship
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-
one years of age and more
4. By rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country
5. By cancellation of the certificate of Philippine naturalization
6. By having been declared by competent authority, a deserted of the Philippine Armed Forces in time of war, unless
subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted; and
7. In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner, if by virtue of the laws in force in her husband’s country,
she acquires his nationality. (But under the COnstitution, she retains her Philippine citizenship unless by her act or
omission, she is deemed under the law to have renounced her Philippine citizenship)
RE-ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

‣ Under Sec. 2 of CA 63, as amended by RA 106, Philippine citizenship may be re-acquired:
1. By naturalization, provided the applicant possesses none of the disqualifications under Sec. 2 of Act No. 2927
2. By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corps,
3. By direct act of Congress
PRINCIPLES OF DOMICILE
1. Every person must have a domicile;
2. A person cannot have two simultaneous domiciles;
3. Every natural person, as long as he is free and sui juris, may change his domicile;
4. A domicile once acquired is retained unless a new one is obtained.
5. The presumption is in favor of the continuance of an existing domicile
6. The burden of proof is on the one who alleges that a change of domicile has taken place
7. The forum determines domicile according to its own standards
KINDS OF DOMICILE
1. Domicile of Origin

‣ The domicile of a person’s parents at the time of his birth
2. Constructive Domicile
‣ The domicile established by law after birth in case of persons under legal disability, regardless of their intention or
voluntary act.
3. Domicile of Choice
‣ Is the place voluntarily chosen by a person sui juris as his home and to which, whenever he is absent he has the
intention of returning.
‣ There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile:

a. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality
b. Intention to remain (animus manendi)
c. Intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non-revertendi)
‣ The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time, the change of
residence must be voluntary and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
IMPORTANCE OF DOMICILE
1. Inadequacy of nationality principle in determining personal law of:
a. Stateless persons,
b. Persons of multiple nationality, and
c. Persons belonging to countries of composite system of law on territorial basis
2. Personal status of individuals from States following the domiciliary principle may be the subject of litigation in the
Philippines;
3. Occasional reference by Philippine law to the lex domicilii in determining the validity of certain acts
‣ Examples: Formal validity of a will (Art. 816, NCC), Revocation of a will outside the Philippines (Art. 829, NCC)
CASES
TALAROC V. UY, 92 PHIL. 52 (1952)
‣ Prior to the 1935 Constitution, Nationality was based on the principle of nationality by place of birth, jus soli. Also, the
marriage of an American woman with an alien conferred his nationality upon her during coverture; that upon the
dissolution of the marriage by death of the husband, the wife reverted, ipso facto, to her former status, unless her
conduct or acts showed that she elected to retain the nationality of her husband, and that where the widowed mother
herself thus reacquired her former nationality, her children, she being their natural guardian, should follow her nationality
with the proviso that they may elect for themselves upon reaching majority.
‣ In this case, Alejandro Uy was deemed a Filipino Citizen because on the date of the adoption of the 1935 Constitution,
when jus soli had been the prevailing doctrine, he is already a philippine citizen was his mother reacquired her former
philippine nationality, by virtue of the death of her alien husband. He is thus a citizen under SECTION 1. The following are
citizens of the Philippines: "(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
FRIVALDO V. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727 (1996)

‣ Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that
he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R. A. 7160).
‣ Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Despite
his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon and he
now boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation
under P.D. No. 725.
‣ En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted ; with serious defects, which we shall now discuss in
seriatim.
1. First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed," asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino
exercising legislative powers, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances in her
memorandum. This memorandum cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or
authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a
legislative enactment. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy.

2. Second. Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings," asserting that
Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 x x x (and) was approved in just one day or on June 30,
1995 x x x," which "prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof." On the basis of the parties'
submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the
presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee.
3. Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective
as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code
"must exist on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed."
‣ It will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship,
unlike that for residence and age. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995—the very day the term of
office of governor (and other elective officials) began—he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such
office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already
qualified to govern his native Sorsogon.
‣ But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument to the effect that the citizenship
qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter.
Frivaldo could not have been a voter-much less a validly registered one — if he was not a citizen at the time of such
registration.
‣ But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to
the date of the filing of his application on August 17,1994.
‣ A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby
filling certain voids in our laws. P.D. 725 granted a new right to women—the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship
even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also
provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine
citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship," because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such
former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the
advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of
repatriation.
‣ At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said
law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied
for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
‣ While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it
is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said
law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17,
1994. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date
of his application.
‣ Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be deemed settled.
Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated—i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored — as of August 17, 1994,
his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date.
‣ It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not
effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from
running for any elective local position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor
in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship—
long before May 8, 1995.
KOOKOORITCHKIN V. SOL GEN, 81 PHIL. 435 (1948)

‣ In this case, Kookooritchkin’s alleged philippine citizenship by virtue of naturalisation was in issue. He was a russian
refugee.
‣ Kookooritchkin’s declaration is valid under Section 5 of the Naturalization Law, the failure to reconstitute his certificate of
arrival notwithstanding. What an unreconstituted document intended to prove may be shown by other competent
evidence. It is an undisputed fact that the Kookooritchkin has been continuously residing in the Philippines for about 25
years, without having been molested by the authorities, who are presumed to have been regularly performing their duties
and would have arrested him if his residence is illegal can be taken as evidence that he is enjoying permanent residence
legally. That a certificate of arrival has been issued is a fact that should be accepted upon Kookooritchkin's undisputed
statement that it cannot be assumed that the receiving official would have accepted the declaration without the certificate
attached thereto.

‣ Court ruled that he was a stateless person upon entering into the Philippines and was naturalized by virtue of his
declaration of naturalisation
‣ Kookooritchkin testified categorically that he is not a Russian citizen and that he has no citizenship. His testimony
supports the lower court's pronouncement that he is a stateless refugee in this country. While he stated that he is a
citizen or subject of the Empire of Russia in his petition for naturalization, the Empire has ceased to exist since the
Czars were overthrown by the Bolshevists, and Kookooritchkin disclaims allegiance or connection with the Soviet
Government established after the overthrow of the Czarist Government.
‣ The SolGen’s testimony, besides being uncontradicted, is supported by the well-known fact that the ruthlessness of
modern dictatorship has scattered throughout the world a large number of stateless refugees or displaced persons,
without country and without flag. The tyrannical intolerance of dictatorships toward all opposition induced them to
resort to beastly oppression, concentration camps and blood purges, and it is only natural that the not-so-fortunate
ones who were able to escape to foreign countries should feel the loss of all bonds of attachment to the hells which
were formerly their fatherland's. Kookooritchkin belongs to that group of stateless refugees.
‣ Knowing, as all cultured persons all over the world ought to know, the history, nature and character of the Soviet
dictatorship, presently the greatest menace to humanity and civilization, it would be too much to require further
evidence of Kookooritchkin's claim that he is stateless than his testimony that he owes no allegiance to the Russian
Communist Government and, because he has been at war with it, that he fled from Russia to permanently reside in
the Philippines.
‣ After finding in this country economic security in a remunerative job, establishing a family by marrying a Filipina with
whom he has a son, and enjoying for 25 years the freedoms and blessings of our democratic way of life, and after
showing his resolution to retain the happiness he found in our political system to the extent of refusing to claim
Russian citizenship even to secure his release from the Japanese and of casting his lot with that of our people by
joining the fortunes and misfortunes of our guerrillas, it would be beyond comprehension to support that the
Kookooritchkin could feel any bond of attachment to the Soviet dictatorship.
NOTTEBOHM CASE (LIECHTENSTEIN V. GUATEMALA), 155 I.C.J. REP. 4 (1955)

‣ The naturalisation of Nottebohm was in issue here. He was a german citizen, residing in Guatemala but was later
naturalized in Liechtenstein. The issue was whether he claim rights and protection of Liechtenstein by virtue of such
naturalisation. Court said NO.
‣ Nationality is within the domestic jurisdiction of the State. When two States have conferred their nationality upon the
same individual and this situation is no longer confined within the limits of the domestic jurisdiction of one of these States
but extends to the international field, international arbitrators or the Courts of third States which are called upon to deal
with this situation would allow the contradiction to subsist if they confined themselves to the view that nationality is
exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the State.
‣ In order to resolve the conflict to ascertain whether nationality has been conferred in circumstances such as to
give rise to an obligation on the part of the respondent State to recognize the effect of that nationality,
international arbitrators have given their preference to the real and effective nationality, that which accorded with
the facts, that based on stronger factual ties between the person concerned and one of these States whose
nationality is involved.
‣ Different factors are taken into consideration, and their importance will vary from one case to the next: there is the
habitual residence of the individual concerned but also the centre of his interests, his family ties, his participation in public
life, attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc.
‣ Nationality constitutes the juridical expression of the fact that an individual is more closely connected with the population
of a particular State. Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State to exercise protection if it constitutes a translation
into juridical terms of the individual's connection with that State.
‣ The Court stated the essential facts of the case and pointed out that Nottebohm always retained his family and business
connections with Germany and that there is nothing to indicate that his application for naturalization in Liechtenstein was
motivated by any desire to dissociate himself from the Government of his country.
‣ Members of Nottebohm's family had, moreover, asserted his desire to spend his old age in Guatemala. His actual
connections with Liechtenstein were extremely tenuous. If Nottebohm went to that country in 1946, this was because of
the refusal of Guatemala to admit him. There is thus the absence of any bond of attachment with Liechtenstein, but there
is a long-standing and close connection between him and Guatemala, a link which his naturalization in no way weakened.
‣ Naturalization was not based on any real prior connection with Liechtenstein, nor did it in any way alter the manner of life
of the person upon whom it was conferred in exceptional circumstances of speed and accommodation.
‣ In both respects, it was lacking in the genuineness requisite to an act of such importance, if it is to be enticed to be
respected by a State in the position of Guatemala. It was granted without regard to the concept of nationality adopted in
international relations.

MARCOS V. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995)
‣ Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the
physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence
and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has
taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's
intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places.
However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his
domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
‣ For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws.
As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
‣ It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy that ought to be decisive in determining whether or
not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. It stands to reason therefore, that
petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency
qualification requirement. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First
District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
‣ We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places.
‣ Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various
residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention
to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she
naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually
established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the
height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences
in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-
publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her
siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her
influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter
century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority
of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban,
Leyte.
‣ First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it
follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by
operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary
to private respondent's averments.
‣ Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
‣ In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to
convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred.
‣ Third, when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged — by virtue of
Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is
that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac,
Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But
assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin. The inescapable conclusion derived from
this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
‣ Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a
right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that
she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her
domicile.
POE V. LLAMANZARES V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 221697, 8 MARCH 2016; (INCLUDE RESOLUTION OF THE MR)

‣ Issue of Philippine Natural-Born Citizenship
‣ Court ruled that Poe is a Filipino Natural-Born citizens as it was established by evidence that her parents were
“probably” Filipinos
‣ Presumption regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unacceptable in Philippine Law. There is more than sufficient
evidence that Poe has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Hence, the burden of proof was on
private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen.
‣ Private respondents should show that Poe’s parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift
the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos. In fact, there is a
high probability that her parents are Filipinos. The Solicitor General offered official Statistics from the Philippine
Statistics office that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,985. While the
Filipinos born in the country were more than 10 Million. On this basis, there is a 99% chance that the child born in the
Philippines would be a Filipino which in turn, would indicate more than ample probability that Poe’s parents are
Filipinos.
‣ Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of Poe’s parents are the fact that:
1. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo
2. She has typical Filipino features
‣ There are disputable presumptions that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature. On this
basis, it is safer to assume that Poe’s parents are Filipinos. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd.
‣ Issue of Residency/Domicile of 10 years for Purposes of Presidential Candidacy Qualifications

‣ Poe alleged that her residency should be counted from May 24, 2005 when she returned for good from the US. There
are three requisites to acquire a new domicile 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality 2. Intention to remain
(animus manendi) and 3. Intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non- revertendi). The purpose to remain in or
at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time, the change of residence must be voluntary and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
‣ Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their US domicile and relocated to
the Philippines for good. These evidence include former US passport showing her arrival on May 24, 2005 and her
return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad, email correspondences with freight company to arrange for
the shipment of household items as well as with the pet Bureau; school records of her children showing enrolment in
the Philippine to the Philippine schools starting on June 2005 etc.
‣ COMELEC refused to consider the petitioner’s domicile has been timely changed as of May 24, 2005 and maintained
that although there is physical presence and animus manendi, there is no animus revertendi.Respondents contend
that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquired
Philippine citizenship since she is still an American until July 7, 2006 on the basis of previous cases ruled upon by the
Supreme Court.
‣ SC held that the other cases previously decided by the court wherein residence was counted only from the acquisition
of permanent residence were decided as such because there is sparse evidence on establishment of residence. These
cases cannot be applied in the present case. In the case at bar, there is overwhelming evidence that leads to no to
other conclusion that Poe decided to permanently abandon her US residence and reside in the Philippines as early as
May 24, 2005.
‣ These evidence, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship is clear that when she
returned in May 2005, it was for good.
‣ The stamp in her passport as a balikbayan does not make Poe an ordinary transient.
‣ Poe was able to prove that her statement in her 2012 COC was only a mistake in good faith. Such a mistake could be
given in evidence against her but it was by no means conclusive considering the overwhelming evidence submitted by
Poe. Considering that the COMELEC failed to take into consideration these overwhelming evidence, its decision is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The decision of the COMELEC is hereby annulled and set aside. Poe is thus
declared qualified to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Election on May 9, 2016.
GAMBOA VS TEVES, G.R. NO. 176579, JUNE 28, 2011

‣ In explaining the definition of a "Philippine national," the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Foreign Investments
Act of 1991 provide:
‣ b. "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines or a domestic partnership or association wholly owned by
the citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty
percent [60%] of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the
Philippines; or a trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a
Philippine national and at least sixty percent [60%] of the fund will accrue to the benefit of the Philippine nationals;

Provided, that where a corporation its non-Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange Commission
[SEC] registered enterprise, at least sixty percent [60%] of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of both
corporations must be owned and held by citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty percent [60%] of the members of
the Board of Directors of each of both corporation must be citizens of the Philippines, in order that the corporation shall
be considered a Philippine national. The control test shall be applied for this purpose.
‣ Compliance with the required Filipino ownership of a corporation shall be determined on the basis of outstanding capital
stock whether fully paid or not, but only such stocks which are generally entitled to vote are considered.
‣ For stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough to
meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is
essential. Thus, stocks, the voting rights of which have been assigned or transferred to aliens cannot be considered held
by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals.
‣ Individuals or juridical entities not meeting the aforementioned qualifications are considered as non-Philippine nationals.
(Emphasis supplied)
‣ Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned "capital" required in the Constitution. Full beneficial
ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The
legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in
accordance with the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is "considered as non-Philippine nationals.”
‣ The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipinos in
accordance with the constitutional mandate. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock,
coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is constitutionally required for the State’s grant of authority to operate a
public utility. The undisputed fact that the PLDT preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, are non-voting and earn
only 1/70 of the dividends that PLDT common shares earn, grossly violates the constitutional requirement of 60 percent
Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership of a public utility.
‣ In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn less than 60 percent of the dividends, of
PLDT. This directly contravenes the express command in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution that "[n]o franchise,
certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to x x x
corporations x x x organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens x x x.”
‣ To repeat, (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises the sole right to
vote in the election of directors, and thus exercise control over PLDT; (2) Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDT’s common
shares, constituting a minority of the voting stock, and thus do not exercise control over PLDT; (3) preferred shares,
99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred shares earn only 1/70 of the dividends that common
shares earn; (5) preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares; and (6) preferred shares constitute 77.85%
of the authorized capital stock of PLDT and common shares only 22.15%. This kind of ownership and control of a public
utility is a mockery of the Constitution.
GAMBOA VS TEVES, G.R. NO. 176579; OCTOBER 9, 2012- MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
‣ The FIA clearly and unequivocally defines a "Philippine national" as a Philippine citizen, or a domestic corporation at
least "60% of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote" is owned by Philippine citizens.
‣ The FIA, like all its predecessor statutes, clearly defines a "Philippine national" as a Filipino citizen, or a domestic
corporation "at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote" is owned by Filipino
citizens. A domestic corporation is a "Philippine national" only if at least 60% of its voting stock is owned by Filipino
citizens. This definition of a "Philippine national" is crucial in the present case because the FIA reiterates and clarifies
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which limits the ownership and operation of public utilities to Filipino
citizens or to corporations or associations at least 60% Filipino-owned.
‣ The FIA is the basic law governing foreign investments in the Philippines, irrespective of the nature of business and area
of investment. The FIA spells out the procedures by which non-Philippine nationals can invest in the Philippines
‣ Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned "capital" required in the Constitution. Full beneficial
ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required.
The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino
nationals in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is "considered as non-Philippine
national
‣ This is consistent with Section 3 of the FIA which provides that where 100% of the capital stock is held by "a trustee of
funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits," the trustee is a Philippine national if "at least sixty
percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals." Likewise, Section 1(b) of the Implementing
Rules of the FIA provides that "for stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals,
mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with
appropriate voting rights, is essential.”

‣ Since the constitutional requirement of at least 60 percent Filipino ownership applies not only to voting control of
the corporation but also to the beneficial ownership of the corporation, it is therefore imperative that such
requirement apply uniformly and across the board to all classes of shares, regardless of nomenclature and category,
comprising the capital of a corporation. Under the Corporation Code, capital stock consists of all classes of shares issued
to stockholders, that is, common shares as well as preferred shares, which may have different rights, privileges or
restrictions as stated in the articles of incorporation
‣ Since a specific class of shares may have rights and privileges or restrictions different from the rest of the shares in a
corporation, the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution must
apply not only to shares with voting rights but also to shares without voting rights. Preferred shares, denied the right to
vote in the election of directors, are anyway still entitled to vote on the eight specific corporate matters mentioned above.
Thus, if a corporation, engaged in a partially nationalized industry, issues a mixture of common and preferred non-
voting shares, at least 60 percent of the common shares and at least 60 percent of the preferred non-voting
shares must be owned by Filipinos. Of course, if a corporation issues only a single class of shares, at least 60 percent
of such shares must necessarily be owned by Filipinos. In short, the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino
citizens must apply separately to each class of shares, whether common, preferred non-voting, preferred voting
or any other class of shares. This uniform application of the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens
clearly breathes life to the constitutional command that the ownership and operation of public utilities shall be reserved
exclusively to corporations at least 60 percent of whose capital is Filipino-owned. Applying uniformly the 60-40 ownership
requirement in favor of Filipino citizens to each class of shares, regardless of differences in voting rights, privileges and
restrictions, guarantees effective Filipino control of public utilities, as mandated by the Constitution.
NARRA NICKEL MINING VS REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES, G.R. NO. 195580, APRIL 21, 2014
‣ The main issue in this case is centered on the issue of petitioners’ nationality, whether Filipino or foreign. In their previous
petitions, they had been adamant in insisting that they were Filipino corporations, until they submitted their Manifestation
and Submission dated October 19, 2012 where they stated the alleged change of corporate ownership to reflect their
Filipino ownership. Thus, there is a need to determine the nationality of petitioner corporations.
‣ Basically, there are two acknowledged tests in determining the nationality of a corporation: the control test and the
grandfather rule. Paragraph 7 of DOJ Opinion No. 020, Series of 2005, adopting the 1967 SEC Rules which implemented
the requirement of the Constitution and other laws pertaining to the controlling interests in enterprises engaged in the
exploitation of natural resources owned by Filipino citizens, provides:
‣ Shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall
be considered as of Philippine nationality, but if the percentage of Filipino ownership in the corporation or partnership is
less than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding to such percentage shall be counted as of Philippine nationality.
Thus, if 100,000 shares are registered in the name of a corporation or partnership at least 60% of the capital stock or
capital, respectively, of which belong to Filipino citizens, all of the shares shall be recorded as owned by Filipinos. But if
less than 60%, or say, 50% of the capital stock or capital of the corporation or partnership, respectively, belongs to
Filipino citizens, only 50,000 shares shall be counted as owned by Filipinos and the other 50,000 shall be recorded as
belonging to aliens.
‣ The first part of paragraph 7, DOJ Opinion No. 020, stating "shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least
60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality," pertains to the
control test or the liberal rule. On the other hand, the second part of the DOJ Opinion which provides, "if the percentage
of the Filipino ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding to
such percentage shall be counted as Philippine nationality," pertains to the stricter, more stringent grandfather rule.
‣ Prior to this recent change of events, petitioners were constant in advocating the application of the "control test" under
RA 7042, as amended by RA 8179, otherwise known as the Foreign Investments Act (FIA), rather than using the stricter
grandfather rule. The pertinent provision under Sec. 3 of the FIA provides:
‣ SECTION 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act:
‣ a.) The term Philippine national shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a domestic partnership or association wholly
owned by the citizens of the Philippines; a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty
percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is wholly owned by Filipinos or a trustee of funds for
pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national and at least sixty
percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals: Provided, That were a corporation and its non-
Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registered enterprise, at least sixty
percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of each of both corporations must be owned and held
by citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty percent (60%) of the members of the Board of Directors, in order that the
corporation shall be considered a Philippine national.
‣ The grandfather rule, petitioners reasoned, has no leg to stand on in the instant case since the definition of a "Philippine
National" under Sec. 3 of the FIA does not provide for it. They further claim that the grandfather rule "has been

abandoned and is no longer the applicable rule." They also opined that the last portion of Sec. 3 of the FIA admits the
application of a "corporate layering" scheme of corporations. Petitioners claim that the clear and unambiguous wordings
of the statute preclude the court from construing it and prevent the court’s use of discretion in applying the law. They said
that the plain, literal meaning of the statute meant the application of the control test is obligatory.
‣ We disagree. "Corporate layering" is admittedly allowed by the FIA; but if it is used to circumvent the Constitution and
pertinent laws, then it becomes illegal. Further, the pronouncement of petitioners that the grandfather rule has already
been abandoned must be discredited for lack of basis.
‣ See Dissent of Justice Leonen

‣ The so-called "Grandfather Rule" has no statutory basis. It is the Control Test that governs in determining Filipino
equity in corporations. It is this test that is provided in statute and by our most recent jurisprudence.
FAMILY LAW
NEW CIVIL CODE

Article 16. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of
the country wherein said property may be found. (10a)
Article 17. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
 
FAMILY CODE
Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice- consul of the
Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the
solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official. (75a)
Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for them
before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their
respective diplomatic or consular officials. Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the
certificate of legal capacity herein required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to
contract marriage. (66a)
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1),
(4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted
with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and

(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately
preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n)
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship between the
parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own
spouse. (82)
Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall be
governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence. This rule shall
not apply:
(1) Where both spouses are aliens;
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines and executed in the
country where the property is located; and
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting property situated in a
foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity. (124a)
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
(206a)

Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:
(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the termination of
their guardianship relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country
adoptions as may be provided by law. (28a, EO 91 and PD 603)
Art. 187. The following may not be adopted:

(1) A person of legal age, unless he or she is a child by nature of the adopter or his or her spouse, or, prior to the
adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his or her own child during
minority.
(2) An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations; and
(3) A person who has already been adopted unless such adoption has been previously revoked or rescinded. (30a, EO 91
and PD 603)
1987 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE 12: NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Section 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost
his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
PERSONAL LAW
‣ Refers to laws that concern persons, their legal condition and civil status.
‣ Under Philippine law, this is determined either by:
1. Nationality
2. Domicile
LAW WHICH GOVERNS THE LEGAL STATUS AND CAPACITY OF A PERSON TO CONTRACT MARRIAGE
‣ RULE: DETERMINED BY THE NATIONAL LAW OF THE PERSON (LEX NATIONALII)
‣ “Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.” (Art. 15, NCC)
LAW WHICH GOVERNS THE VALIDITY (FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE) OF MARRIAGES

‣ RULE: GOVERNED BY THE PLACE OF CELEBRATION (LEX LOCI CELEBRACIONIS)
‣ If the marriage is valid by the law of the place of celebration or lex loci celebrationis, it is also valid in other places.
‣ All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country. (Art. 26, FC)

‣ BUT, substantive validity of marriages of Filipino nationals who marry abroad before Philippine consular or diplomatic
officials are governed by Philippine law.
‣ EXCEPTION: MARRIAGES PROHIBITED UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW WILL NOT BE UPHELD AS VALID IN THIS COUNTRY
EVEN IF THE LEX LOCI CELEBRATIONIS CONSIDERS IT VALID. THESE ARE:
‣ See Art. 26 par. 2, FC
1. Art. 35 (1): Party below 18 years of age
2. Art. 35 (4): Bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41
3. Art. 35 (5): Contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other
4. Art. 35 (6): Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53
5. Art. 36: Psychological Incapacity
6. Art. 37: Incestuous Marriages
7. Art. 38: Marriages against public policy
8. Others contrary to public policy: same-sex marriages, common-law marriages, etc
‣ BASICALLY, for marriages solemnized abroad, it is VALID in the Philippines if valid at the place of celebration, BUT,
only the requirements of a marriage license and the authority of the solemnizing officer is dispensed with.
‣ A marriage ceremony is not dispensed with. Common-law marriages obtained by Filipinos abroad are not
recognized. Article 26 uses the word “solemnized” and not “contracted” or “performed.” “Solemnization,” as used
in marriage statutes, has a very technical and limited meaning. It means the performance of the formal act or
ceremony by which a man and a woman contract marriage and assume the status of husband and wife (Sta. Maria).
‣ Also, public policy in the Philippines mandates that only a man and a woman can marry each other. This clear
public policy consideration is enunciated in Article 1 of the Family Code, stating that marriage is a special contract
of permanent union between a man and a woman. Article 2(1) also states that the contracting parties must be a
male and a female. In fact, the Family Code is replete with terms and articles clearly indicating that marriage is a
heterosexual relationship. (Sta. Maria).
‣ Applying the first paragraph of Article 26, marriages without a license solemnized abroad, and proxy marriages
abroad shall be valid in the Philippines if such marriages are valid in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they are solemnised (Sta. Maria).
‣ However, NOTE that there is NO law which prohibits same-sex marriages thus, Art. 17 on “prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon
in a foreign country” doesn’t really apply
LAW WHICH GOVERNS ANNULMENT OR NULLITY

‣ Lex loci celebrationis also determines the cause or ground for annulment.
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREES

‣ RULE: WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE
IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE
FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW. (ART. 26, 2ND PARAGRAPH)
1. Between Filipino citizens
‣ Not recognized because of the public policy against absolute divorce
2. Between alien spouses

‣ Recognized, if valid by their national law
3. Between Filipino and alien spouses (mixed marriages)

‣ Recognized, provided that the divorce was validly obtained by the alien spouse.
‣ The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides the recognition in the Philippines of a particular
absolute divorce obtained in another country which will allow the divorced Filipino to remarry. Hence, where a valid
marriage is celebrated, either in the Philippines or abroad, between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner and,
subsequently, the foreigner-spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (San Luis v. San Luis 2007)

‣ The second paragraph of Article 26 also applies to a situation where originally, at the time of the marriage ceremony,
both parties were Filipinos, but at the time of the divorce, the petitioner was already a citizen of a foreign country that
allows absolute divorce. For purposes of Article 26 therefore, the determinative point when the foreigner who procured
the divorce should be a foreigner is at the time of the divorce and not at the time of the marriage ceremony (Republic
v. Orbecido III, 2005)
‣ How do you determine citizenship for purposes of divorce?
‣ The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. (Bayot vs CA 2008)
AS TO THE ALIEN SPOUSE AS TO THE FILIPINO SPOUSE
Recognition of Recognized provided:

Recognized, provided:
Foreign Divorce
1. The foreign divorce decree is valid under 1. The foreign divorce decree is valid under the
Decree
the national law of the alien spouse
national law of the alien spouse, and it is
duly pleaded, proved and authenticated.
2. Foreign law is duly pleaded and proved
2. The foreign divorce decree was obtained by

3. The foreign divorce decree is duly
the alien spouse, NOT the Filipino spouse
authenticated.
3. The divorce must be absolute, it must
capacitate the alien spouse to remarry
Procedural File a Petition for Enforcement of Foreign 1. File a Petition for Recognition of Foreign
Remedies Divorce Decree and present the foreign Divorce Decree based on Art. 26 (2nd par.) in
divorce decree as presumptive evidence in relation to Rule 108 (Rules of Court) on
accordance with Sec. 48, Rule 39, Rules of Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Court, then file a petition for Cancellation or Civil Registry
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry

2. File a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
under Rule 108, Rules of Court
Marriage based on Psychological Incapacity

under Art. 36, Family Code
NOTE: The alien spouse can claim no right ATTY. PILARES: An action for nullity might be
under the 2nd par. of Article 26 of the Family easier to obtain, and it is better to plead that both
Code as the substantive right it establishes is spouses are psychologically incapicated
in favor of the Filipino spouse. The provision
was included in the law "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse. (Corpuz vs Sto. Tomas,
2010)
LAW WHICH GOVERNS PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SPOUSES

‣ RULE: IN THE ABSENCE OF A CONTRARY STIPULATION IN A MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT, THE PROPERTY RELATIONS OF THE
SPOUSES SHALL BE GOVERNED BY PHILIPPINE LAWS (ART. 80, FAMILY CODE)
‣ This is regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence
‣ This rule applies to mixed marriages
‣ EXCEPT: THIS RULE SHALL NOT APPLY IN THE FOLLOWING CASES:

1. Where both spouses are aliens
2. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines and executed in
the country where the property is located; and
3. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting property situated in a
foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity
CAPACITY TO ADOPT
‣ The capacity of aliens to adopt as governed by Art. 184 of the Family Code has already been superseded by the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998 (RA 8552) as governed by the Rules of Domestic Adoption

QUALIFICATIONS OF FILIPINO ADOPTERS QUALIFICATIONS OF ALIEN ADOPTERS
Qualifications of Filipinos
Qualifications of Aliens
1. Legal age
1. Must possess the same qualifications for filipino
citizens
2. In possession of full civil capacity and legal rights
2. His country has diplomatic relations with the

3. Of good moral character
Philippines
4. Has not been convicted of any crime involving

3. He has been living in the Philippines for at least
moral turpitude
three continuous years prior to the filing of the

5. Emotionally and psychologically capable of caring petition for adoption and maintains such
for children
residence until the adoption decree is entered
6. At least 16 years older than the adoptee; and

4. He has been certified by his diplomatic or
consular office or any appropriate government
7. In a position to support and care for his children in
agency to have the legal capacity to adopt in his
keeping with the means of the family
country; and
BUT, the requirements of 16- year difference between

DOMESTIC 5. His government allows the adoptee to enter as
the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when
ADOPTION his adopted child
the adopter is:

BUT, the requirements on residency and certification
1. The biological parent of the adoptee; or
of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his country may

2. The spouse of the adoptee’s parent
be waived, if the adopter, who is an alien, is:
(Sec. 4, Rule on Adoption, (A) Domestic Adoption) 1. A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity,
2. One seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his

Filipino spouse
3. One who is married to a Filipino citizen and

seeks to adopt jointly with his spouse a relative
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouse
(Sec. 4, Rule on Adoption, (A) Domestic Adoption)
1. At least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be adopted at
the time of application, unless the petitioner is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the spouse
of such parent, in which case the age difference does not apply;
2. Has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his national
laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited counselor in his country;
3. Has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; e) that he is eligible to adopt under his national
law;
4. Can provide the proper care and support and instill the necessary moral values and example to all his
children, including the child to be adopted;
INTER-
5. Agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child, as embodied under Philippine laws and the U. N. Convention
COUNTRY
on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions of
ADOPTION
Republic Act No. 8043;
6. Comes from a country with which the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose government maintains
a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption of a Filipino child is allowed under his
national laws; and
7. Possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in this Rule, in Republic Act No.
8043 and in all other applicable Philippine laws.
(Sec. 30, Rule on Adoption, (B) Inter-Country Adoption)

NOTE: Inter-country adoption applies to Filipino citizens and Aliens permanently residing abroad (Sec. 28, Rule
on Adoption, (B) Inter-Country Adoption)
CASES
PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA, G.R. NO. 80116, 30 JUNE 1989
‣ In the case of Van Dorn v Romilo, the court stated in regards the legal standing of a foreign spouse after divorce: “There
can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil

Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary
to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent
is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.”
‣ In this case, the Court ruled that since the crime of adultery can only be filed by a husband against his wife, Geiling, a
german citizen, is not a husband of Pilapil since the former filed a valid case of divorce and was already decreed upon by
the proper court.
‣ A foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in
view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
ROEHR V. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. NO. 142820, 20 JUNE 2003

‣ As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, BUT the
legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.
‣ Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by
the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so
on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
‣ In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the
German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to
have parental custody of their two children.
‣ The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the proceeding nor has she given her opinion to
the Social Services Office.
‣ Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said
proceedings.
‣ More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the
effect that when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did
not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was.
CANG V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 105308, 25 SEPTEMBER 1998

‣ As regards the divorce obtained in the US, it was ruled in Tenchavez vs. Escano that a divorce obtained by Filipino
citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code is not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State policy. While
Herbert is now an American Citizen, as regards, Anna Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino Citizen, the divorce
has no legal effect.
‣ But note that it is recgonized in favour of the Filipino under Art. 26 of the Family Code
BAYOT V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 155635, 7 NOVEMBER 2008

‣ A divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
‣ The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad.
‣ An absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction
‣ A foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national
law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign
divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
‣ It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties.
And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the
ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so.
‣ Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] , it must be shown that the
parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
‣ It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this
jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to

actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima facie
evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
‣ Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this
jurisdiction.
‣ In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. Consequent to the dissolution
of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for
instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.
‣ The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as
follows: Art. 26. “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”
‣ The twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
‣ The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship
at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry
CORPUZ V. STO. TOMAS, G.R. NO. 186571, 11 AUGUST 2010

‣ The alien spouse can claim no right under the 2nd par. of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
‣ The provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.”
‣ The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts
created by the divorce decree.
‣ Essentially, the 2nd par. of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or
her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without it, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize
divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond.
‣ Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino
spouse and his or her alien spouse.
‣ An action based on the 2nd par. of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.
‣ No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that
already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.
‣ However, the foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition
for its recognition in this jurisdiction. Thus, the Court qualified its decision. In this case, the unavailability of the 2nd par. of
Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with
the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect
of foreign judgments.
‣ The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates
proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Thus, the Court deemed it more
appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian
divorce law given that Article 26 interests will be served by such action and Daisylyn’s conformity with the petition.
‣ The Court noted that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. It held that it was legally improper. The
law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law
should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given
res judicata effect. But in this case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree, hence the
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce
any legal effect.

RECIO V. RECIO, G.R. NO. 138322, 2 OCTOBER 2001
‣ Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
‣ A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17
of the Civil Code.
‣ In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
‣ A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the
alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.
‣ A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.
‣ Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
‣ Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
‣ The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate
mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had
he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to
marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license
‣ In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage.
But divorces are of different types.
‣ The two basic ones are
1. Absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and
2. Limited divorce or a mensa et thoro.
‣ The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is
no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
‣ In this case, the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to his national law. Neither can the Court grant Grace’s prayer to declare her marriage to
Rederick null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.
DEL SOCORRO V. VAN WILSEM, G.R. 193707, 10 DECEMBER 2014

‣ On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil Code in demanding
support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of
nationality.
‣ In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support,
the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.
‣ The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
‣ Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the
laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.
‣ In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by
such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in
advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same

‣ In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts
will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
‣ Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved
in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to
support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
‣ Even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the
noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice
to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
‣ But Atty. Pilares says this statement is not doctrine. The proper doctrine is that the obligation to give support is
determined by the national law of the decedent as it is considered a family duty.
MULLER V. MULLER, G.R. NO. 149615, 29 AUGUST 2006

‣ In this case, Elena argued that as an alien, Helmut is disqualified to owe private lands in the Philippine and that Helmut is
aware of the constitutional prohibition but he circumvented the same. Helmut argued that he is not praying for transfer of
ownership but merely for reimbursement of personal funds.
‣ Article XII, Section 7 of the Constitution: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
‣ Aliens (individuals or corporations) are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also
disqualified from acquiring private lands. The purpose is the conservation of the national patrimony.
‣ The term “private agricultural lands” is to be construed as including residential lots or lands to maintain the conservative
spirit of the Constitution and to prevent aliens from freely acquiring and possessing residential lots and houses.
‣ Helmut was aware of the constitutional prohibition when he declared that he had the Antipolo property titled under
Elena’s name because of the said prohibition.
‣ Thus, CA erred in allowing reimbursement by virtue of an implied trust created between the spouses. First, the
disqualification of aliens from awning lands in the Philippines is absolute except in cases of hereditary succession but not
in cases of implied trust. Besides, no trust can result in favor of a party guilty of fraud. Here, to evade the
constitutional prohibition.
‣ Equity is also misplaced. What cannot be done directly, by public policy, cannot be done indirectly. Thus, Helmut
cannot seek relief by equity where it is clear that he knowingly and willingly brought the property despite the
constitutional prohibition.
‣ Reimbursement is not allowed because to do so would in effect be to permit Helmut to enjoy the fruits of a property
which he is not allowed to own.
‣ The constitution prohibits sale to aliens of residential lands. Thus, an alien whose wife purchased a lot using
conjugal funds, the constitutional prohibition would still bar such alien from recovering and holding the property
acquired.
‣ Such land will form part of the exclusive property of the Filipino spouse, even if it is bought by the exclusive funds of
the foreign spouse
BORROMEO V. DESCALLAR, G.R. 159310, 24 FEBRUARY 2009

‣ In this case, while the acquisition and the purchase by Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation [were] void ab
initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these
properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title
of the transferee is valid.
‣ Since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation’s land for future generations of Filipinos, that aim is
achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or
those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens.
‣ As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no
more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino
hands has been achieved.
FUJIKI V. MARINAY, ET.AL,, G.R. NO. 196049, 26 JUNE 2013

‣ The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
‣ The rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
"does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."
‣ To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court
and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, the service of summons, the
investigation of the public prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd
because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues.”
‣ A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition
by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the
status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
‣ Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign
judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."
The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, as well as
respecting the jurisdiction of other states.
‣ Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where
the corresponding civil registry is located.
‣ In this case, Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as
married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
‣ There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation
of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The
interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his
most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
‣ Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a
bigamous marriage, there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage.
The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
‣ Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental: "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
the "validity of marriage x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage
‣ Braza is NOT applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
‣ A petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate
a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
‣ However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the
recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country.
‣ There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of
the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply

in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
‣ Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. “Where a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law."
‣ The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case
on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
‣ The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage
between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly
consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of
his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree,
which is already effective in the country where it was rendered.
‣ The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who
obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition
abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated
to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino
spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
‣ In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a
case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment.
‣ Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine
courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article
15 of the Civil Code.
‣ For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine:

1. Whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and
2. Whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
‣ If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should,
by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.
‣ However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability.
MATTHEWS V. TAYLOR, G.R. NO. 164584, 22 JUNE 2009

‣ In this case, Joselyn (Filipina spouse) acquired the Boracay property in 1989. Said acquisition was evidenced by a Deed
of Sale with Joselyn as the vendee. The property was also declared for taxation purposes under her name. When Joselyn
leased the property to petitioner, Benjamin (Foreign spouse) sought the nullification of the contract on two grounds: first,
that he was the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds used in purchasing the same; and second, that
Joselyn could not enter into a valid contract involving the subject property without his consent.
‣ Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
‣ Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by
virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands.The primary
purpose of this constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.
‣ The right to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of
the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.
‣ The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save
only in constitutionally recognized exceptions.
‣ Thus, we find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner.
Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering

that Joselyn appeared to be the designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership
thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition.
‣ By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for
his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/
community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent
lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a
husband in respect of conjugal property.
‣ To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property
were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he
would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit
him to have.
‣ The Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and petitioner cannot be nullified on the grounds advanced by
Benjamin
REPUBLIC V. QUINTERO-HAMANO, G.R. NO. 149498, 20 MAY 2004

‣ 4In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. The medical
and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in
general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of
nationality.
SUCCESSION
NEW CIVIL CODE

Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.
Article 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is authorized to make a will in any of the forms established by the
law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be probated in the Philippines. (n)
Article 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by
the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with
those which this Code prescribes. (n)
Article 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country, which is executed in accordance with
the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own
country, shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the Philippines. (n)
Article 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly, or in the same instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or
for the benefit of a third person. (669)

Article 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in the
Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country where they may have been executed. (733a)
Article 829. A revocation done outside the Philippines, by a person who does not have his domicile in this country, is valid
when it is done according to the law of the place where the will was made, or according to the law of the place in which
the testator had his domicile at the time; and if the revocation takes place in this country, when it is in accordance with
the provisions of this Code. (n)
Article 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. (n)
LAW WHICH GOVERNS SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS

‣ RULE: THE NATIONAL LAW OF THE DECEDENT (PERSON WHOSE SUCCESSION IS UNDER CONSIDERATION) GOVERNS THE
INTESTATE AND TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION OF WHATEVER NATURE OF THE PROPERTY AND REGARDLESS OF THE
COUNTRY WHEREIN SAID PROPERTY MAY BE FOUND. (LEX NATIONALII)
‣ This includes:
1. Order of succession
2. Amount of successional rights
3. Intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions (Art. 16 par. 2, NCC)
4. Capacity to Succeed (Art. 1039, NCC)

‣ Whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law (Cayetano v. Leonidas 1984)
LAW WHICH GOVERNS VALIDITY OF WILLS
EXTRINSIC OR FORMAL VALIDITY INTRINSIC OR SUBSTANTIVE VALIDITY
For Filipinos and Foreigners: For Filipinos

‣ Five choices are available to the testator (Art. 815-817)
‣ Philippine law (Art. 16, par. 2)
Governing Law 1. Law of Citizenship

as to the Place 2. Law of Domicile For Foreigners
3. Law of Residence ‣ Their national law (Art. 16, par. 2, Art. 1039)
4. Law of Place of Execution
5. Philippine Law
For Filipinos and Foreigners: For Filipinos

‣ The law in force when the will was executed (Art. 795) ‣ The law as of the time of death (Art. 777, 2263)
Governing Law ‣ For foreigners, the assumption is that the will is being
as to the Time probated here
For Foreigners
‣ Depends on their personal law (Art. 16, par. 2, Art.
1039)
LAW WHICH GOVERNS REVOCATION OF WILLS

‣ See Art. 829, lex domicilii and lex loci celebracionis applies, but not the national law
1. If revocation is made in the Philippines: Follow Philippine law
2. If revocation is made outside the Philippines
a. If testator is NOT domiciled in the Philippines:
‣ Either:
i. Follow the law of the place where the will was made, or
ii. Follow the law of the place where the testator was domiciled at the time of the revocation
b. If testator is domiciled in the Philippines (This situation is not governed by Art. 829)
‣ Either:

i. Follow Philippine law (consistently with the domiciliary principle followed by this article
ii. Follow the law of the place of revocation (consistently with the principle of lex loci celebracionis in Art. 17)
iii. Follow the law of place where the will was made (by analogy with the rules on revocation where the testator is a non-
philippine domiciliary)
LAW WHICH GOVERNS PROBATE OF WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE

‣ RULE: IT IS GOVERNED BY THE INTERNAL LAW OF COURT WHERE IT IS FILED (LEX FORI)
‣ The law of the State where the will is probated or where the appointment is sought, applies
CASES
GIBBS V. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
‣ When the factual situation involves property, there must be an initial characterization of property. As a rule, lex rei sitae
shall initially govern. Intrinsic validity of rules on succession arises only when the lex rei sitae characterizes such
property as a descendible interest of the decedent.
‣ Thus, the nature and extent of the title of the spouse at the time of the acquisition and the dissolution of the community
lands must be determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae. In the Philippines, upon death of the decedent, the
property relationship of the spouses dissolves and the properties are to be treated as conjugal properties to be
distributed between the estate of the decedent and the surviving spouse and not as a descendible interest of the
decedent
‣ Basically, when it comes to the “characterization” of the conflict of the law case, forum law should be applied, this is the
first step in determining what law to apply
BELLIS V. BELLIS
‣ Whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
‣ It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be
applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new
provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.
‣ Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found
‣ Thus, even if the property is found in the Philippines, the court will apply foreign law in governing the intestate
succession and the succession rights involved in relation to the succession of a foreigner.
LLORENTE V. CA, G.R. N0. 124371, 23 NOVEMBER 2000

‣ Intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF EDWARD CHRISTENSEN, G.R. NO. L-16749 JANUARY 31, 1963
‣ Doctrine here is too long, just read the case, it’s very illuminating
PROPERTY
NEW CIVIL CODE

Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

Article 1753. The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall govern the liability of the common
carrier for their loss, destruction or deterioration.
LAW WHICH GOVERNS PROPERTY

‣ RULE: PROPERTY IS SUBJECT TO THE LAW OF THE COUNTRY WHERE IT IS SITUATED. (LEX SITUS OR LEX REI SITAE)
‣ What is covered under this rule?
1. Covers both real and personal property (Art. 16, NCC)
2. Dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the
formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a
conveyance, are to be determined (Laurel vs Garcia)
3. All matters concerning the title and disposition of real property (Orion Savings Bank vs Suzuki 2014)
4. Matters involving the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and
construction of wills and other conveyances (Orion Savings Bank vs Suzuki 2014)
5. Encumbrances and liens on property
‣ Basically, as along as the disposition and encumbrance of title or ownership over property is involved, lex situs applies
‣ EXCEPTION: IN THE FOLLOWING CASES, LEX SITUS DOES NOT APPLY
1. Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration (Art. 16, NCC)
2. For goods being transported, their loss, destruction or deterioration is governed by the law of the country of
destination (Art. 1753, NCC)
CASES
LAUREL V. GARCIA
‣ The Court sees no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law
situation arises only when:
1. There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer
immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and
effect of a conveyance, are to be determined (See Salonga, Private International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and
2. A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters.
Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.
‣ There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to
validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is
governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
‣ It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such
conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative
concurrence.
‣ Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the
President and Congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and
disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.
BELLIS V. BELLIS
‣ Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found

‣ Thus, even if the property is found in the Philippines, the court will apply foreign law in governing the intestate
succession and the succession rights involved in relation to the succession of a foreigner.
CHUA GUAN V. SAMAHAG MAGSASAKA, G.R. NO. 42091, 2 NOVEMBER 1935

‣ It is a common but not accurate generalization that the situs of shares of stock is at the domicile of the owner. The term
situs is not one of fixed of invariable meaning or usage. Nor should we lose sight of the difference between the situs of
the shares and the situs of the certificates of shares. The situs of shares of stock for some purposes may be at the
domicile of the owner and for others at the domicile of the corporation; and even elsewhere. It is a general rule that for
purposes of execution, attachment and garnishment, it is not the domicile of the owner of a certificate but the domicile of
the corporation which is decisive.
‣ Considering the ownership of shares in a corporation as property distinct from the certificates which are merely the
evidence of such ownership, it seems to us a reasonable construction of the Chattel Mortgage Law to hold that the
property in the shares may be deemed to be situated in the province in which the corporation has its principal
office or place of business. If this province is also the province of the owner's domicile, a single registration sufficient. If
not, the chattel mortgage should be registered both at the owner's domicile and in the province where the corporation
has its principal office or place of business. In this sense the property mortgaged is not the certificate but the participation
and share of the owner in the assets of the corporation.
WELLS FARGO BANK & UNION TRUST COMPANY V. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. NO. 46720, JUNE 1940
‣ Originally, the settled law in the United States is that intangibles have only one situs for the purpose of inheritance tax,
and that such situs is in the domicile of the decedent at the time of his death. But this rule has, of late, been relaxed. The
maxim mobilia sequuntur personam, upon which the rule rests, has been described as a mere "fiction of law having its
origin in consideration of general convenience and public policy, and cannot be applied to limit or control the right of the
state to tax property within its jurisdiction" and must "yield to established fact of legal ownership, actual presence and
control elsewhere, and cannot be applied if to do so result in inescapable and patent injustice.”
‣ The relaxation of the original rule rests on either of two fundamental considerations:
1. Upon the recognition of the inherent power of each government to tax persons, properties and rights within its
jurisdiction and enjoying, thus, the protection of its laws; and
2. Upon the principle that as o intangibles, a single location in space is hardly possible, considering the multiple, distinct
relationships which may be entered into with respect thereto.
‣ In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation being domiciled therein.
BEAM, ET.AL. V. YATCO, G.R. NO. 48122, 29 OCTOBER 1948

‣ A question raised by appellants regarding the situs of the properties in question is immaterial:
‣ The express provisions of section 1536 of the Revised Administrative Code, specifying shares issued by any corporation
or sociedad anonima organized in the Philippines among properties subject to inheritance tax.
‣ The pronouncement of the lower court that the actual situs of the shares in question is in the Philippines is fully supported
by the evidence as, according to the testimony of John W. Haussermann, the corresponding certificates of stock were in
the Philippines before and after the death of Mrs. Beam, the owners were represented by proxy at the stockholders'
meetings and their shares voted by their attorney in fact who had the power to collect dividends corresponding to the
share.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET.AL., G.R. NO. L-49407, 19 AUGUST 1988
‣ The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of
their loss, destruction or deterioration
‣ Thus, the rule was specifically laid down that for cargoes transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of the
carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code and in all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of
common carrier shall be governed by the Code of commerce and by laws. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special
law, is merely suppletory to the provision of the Civil Code
‣ The goods in question were transported from San Francisco, California to Tokyo, Japan, to the Philippines. Therefore,
Philippine laws should apply and it is immaterial that the collision actually occurred in foreign waters such as Ise Bay,
Japan. The collision also falls among matters not specifically regulated by the Civil Code and so the Code of Commerce
applies in this case since Book Three of the Code of Commerce deals exclusively with collision of vessels.

ORION SAVINGS BANK V. SUZUKI, G.R. N0. 205487, 12 NOVEMBER 2014
‣ It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it
is located. The reason is found in the very nature of immovable property — its immobility. Immovables are part of the
country and so closely connected to it that all rights over them have their natural center of gravity there.
‣ Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei
sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from one person to another, or by which an interest
therein can be gained or lost. This general principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of
immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and other conveyances
‣ This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to immovable property, no matter what its
nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by
the lex loci rei vitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place where the instrument is
actually made, his capacity is undoubted.
‣ On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national law of the spouses.
However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is
presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.
‣ Matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to
the conjugal nature of the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
CONTRACTS
NEW CIVIL CODE

Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. (1255a)
WARSAW CONVENTION
Article 1
1. This Convention applies to all international carriage of persons, luggage or goods performed by aircraft for reward. It
applies equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an air transport undertaking.
2. For the purposes of this Convention the expression "international carriage" means any carriage in which, according to
the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break
in the carriage or a transhipment, are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the
territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the
sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another Power, even though that Power is not a party to this
Convention. A carriage without such an agreed stopping place between territories subject to the sovereignty,
suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same High Contracting Party is not deemed to be international for the
purposes of this Convention.
3. A carriage to be performed by several successive air carriers is deemed, for the purposes of this Convention, to be
one undivided carriage, if it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation, whether it had been agreed upon
under the form of a single contract or of a series of contracts, and it does not lose its international character merely

because one contract or a series of contracts is to be performed entirely within a territory subject to the sovereignty,
suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same High Contracting Party.
LAW WHICH GOVERNS THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS

‣ RULE: IT IS GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE COUNTRY IN WHICH THEY ARE EXECUTED (LEX LOCI CELEBRACIONIS)
‣ Extrinsic validity covers pertains to the required forms and solemnities
LAW WHICH GOVERNS THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS

‣ RULE: IT IS GOVERNED BY THE PROPER LAW OF THE CONTRACT, THIS MAY EITHER BE THE:
1. Law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (lex loci voluntatis); or
2. Law intended by them impliedly from the contract (lex loci intentionis)
‣ What matters fall under the intrinsic validity of contracts?

‣ The intrinsic validity of contracts pertain to the validity of its provisions
‣ The question of whether there is a breach of an agreement, which includes default pertains to the essential or intrinsic
validity of a contract (Phil. Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. V.P. Eusebio Construction 2004)
‣ What does lex loci intentionis pertain to?
‣ In the absence of an effective choice of law or lex contractus, the law which has the closest and most substantial
connection shall govern, specifically, the center-of-gravity or grouping of contracts approach is used.
‣ This takes into account the various legal systems with the contract and applies the law of the place where the
transaction has its center of gravity or the most important connection.
‣ Basically, take note of which “points of contact” are material to the contract, this may be:
a. Locus actus or the place where an act has been done;
b. Place where an act is intended to come into effect
c. Nationality of the parties, their domicile, their residence, their place of sojourn, or their origin;
d. Seat of a legal or juridical person;
e. Lex fori or the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done; and
‣ BUT, usually, it is the lex contractus or locus actus, meaning the place where the contract is to be
performed
‣ Example: Details of performance, e.g. the rules on manner of demand, days of grace, notice of dishonored, should be
governed by the law of the place where the contract is to be performed.
‣ No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly provided for in our laws. The rule followed by most legal
systems, however, is that the intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed by the lex contractus or "proper law of
the contract." This is the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (the lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them
either expressly or implicitly (the lex loci intentionis). The law selected may be implied from such factors as
substantial connection with the transaction, or the nationality or domicile of the parties. Philippine courts would
do well to adopt the first and most basic rule in most legal systems, namely, to allow the parties to select the law
applicable to their contract, subject to the limitation that it is not against the law, morals, or public policy of the forum
and that the chosen law must bear a substantive relationship to the transaction. (Phil. Export and Foreign Loan
Guarantee Corp. v. V.P. Eusebio Construction 2004)
‣ For international contracts of carriage of persons, luggage or goods performed by aircraft it is governed by the
Warsaw Convention
‣ The Philippines is a signatory to this
VALIDITY OF STIPULATIONS IN CONTRACTS PERTAINING TO CHOICE OF LAW WHICH GOVERNS THE CONTRACT
‣ Note: This is a matter of intrinsic validity of contracts
‣ RULE: THE PARTIES TO A CONTRACT MAY SELECT THE LAW BY WHICH IT IS TO BE GOVERNED, PROVIDED THE CHOICE
OF LAW:
1. IS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, PUBLIC ORDER OR PUBLIC POLICY (ART. 1306, NCC)

‣ Counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the equally general rule that provisions of
applicable law, especially provisions relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into the
contract. Parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with
matters heavily impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor and employment is clearly such an area
and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and
regulations by simply contracting with each other. (Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Ople 1990)
2. BEARS A SUBSTANTIAL RELATIONSHIP TO THE PARTIES OR THEIR TRANSACTION (CADALIN VS POEA, 1994)
‣ The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed. In such a case, the foreign law is
adopted as a "system" to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the
contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth. A basic policy of contract
is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such party expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties' own
choice of the applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship to the parties or their
transaction. (Cadalin vs POEA 1994)
LAW WHICH GOVERNS CAPACITY TO ENTER INTO CONTRACTS

‣ RULE: IT IS GOVERNED BY THE NATIONAL LAW OF THE CONTRACTING PARTY (LEX NATIONALII)
‣ “Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.” (Art. 15, NCC)
LAW WHICH GOVERNS CAPACITY TO CONTRACT IN RELATION TO CONTRACTS INVOLVING PROPERTY

‣ What about the validity of the contract involving disposition of property, based on the capacity of the parties to
contract? is that governed by lex situs or lex rei sitae or even lex loci celebracionis?
‣ ATTY PILARES: No, capacity to contract is governed by the personal law of the person, which is governed by his
national law, as provided under Art. 15 of the Civil Code. This is a component of legal capacity. While several cases say
otherwise, Atty. Pilars seems to suggest that these pronouncements are NOT doctrinal
‣ IN MY OPINION: You need to distinguish what issue is involved. If the issue is the validity of the contract per se (whether it
is void, voidable, etc), because of defects in the parties’ legal capacity to contract, follow Art. 15 or lex nationalii. BUT, if
the issue is title to, ownership or any matter pertaining to the property itself, even if it involves the validity of a contract
based on legal capacity, follow Art. 16 or lex situs. This is because while the general rule is that lex nationalii governs,
when the contract is invoked in relation to property laws, lex situs, as the more specific rule on the matter applies. This is
supported by the case of Orion Savings Bank vs Suzuki 2014 and Laurel vs Garcia 1990
‣ Example: A Filipino minor (aged 17) enters into a contract involving a parcel of land in a foreign country. If the question
is whether the contract is voidable (and not on ownership of the property), apply Art. 15, lex nationalii. However, if the
question pertains to the validity of the contract in relation to title or ownership of such property, apply Art. 16, lex situs,
this would mean that the property laws of such country would govern.
‣ Lex rei sitae even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to immovable property, no matter
what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is
incapacitated by the lex loci rei vitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place where the
instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted. (Orion Savings Bank vs Suzuki 2014)
CASES
GOVERNMENT V. FRANK, G. R. NO. 2935, MARCH 23, 1909
‣ No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are
determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters connected with its performance are regulated by
the law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of
evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought
‣ Frank’s claim that he was an adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when he arrived at Manila; that he was an adult
a the time he made the contract but was a minor at the time the Plaintiff attempted to enforce the contract, more than a
year later, is not tenable.
‣ This case is NOT controlling now.
CADALIN V. POEA, G.R. NO. L-104776, DECEMBER 5, 1994

‣ The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed. In such a case, the foreign law is adopted
as a "system" to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the
formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth.

‣ Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign
statute shall be deemed incorporated into their contract "as a set of terms." By such reference to the provisions of the
foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not
operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the contract.
‣ A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such party expectation is protected by giving effect
to the parties' own choice of the applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship to the
parties or their transaction. There is no question that the contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct
connection with the Bahrain law because the services were rendered in that country.
K.K. SHELL SEKIYU OSAKA HATSUBAISHO V. CA, 188 SCRA 145 (1990)
‣ A reading of the Agency Agreement fails to support the conclusion that K.K. Shell is a sub-agent of NSS and is, therefore,
bound by the agreement.
‣ No express reference to the contracting of sub-agents or the applicability of the terms of the agreement, particularly the
choice-of-forum clause, to sub-agents is made in the text of the agreement. What the contract clearly states are NSS'
principal duties, i.e., that it shall provide for the necessary services required for the husbanding of Crestamonte's vessels
in Japanese ports (section 2.0) and shall be responsible for fixing southbound cargoes with revenues sufficient to cover
ordinary expenses (section 3.0).
‣ In view of the inconclusiveness of the Agency Agreement and the pleadings filed in the trial court, additional evidence, if
there be any, would still have to be presented to establish the allegation that K.K. Shell is a sub-agent of NSS. In the
same vein, as the choice-of-forum clause in the agreement (paragraph 12.0) has not been conclusively shown to be
binding upon K.K. Shell, additional evidence would also still have to be presented to establish this defense, K.K. Shell
cannot therefore, as of yet, be barred from instituting an action in the Philippines.
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION V.OPLE, 190 SCRA 90 (1990)

‣ A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA argues, since a contract is the law between the
parties. The principle of party autonomy in contracts is not, however, an absolute principle. The rule in Article 1306,
of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations as they may deem convenient, "provided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.”
‣ Thus, counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the equally general rule that provisions of
applicable law, especially provisions relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into the contract.
Parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily
impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor and employment is clearly such an area and parties are not at
liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting
with each other.
‣ In this case, PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of
Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of
or in connection with the agreement "only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan”.
‣ The first clause of paragraph 10 cannot be invoked to prevent the application of Philippine labor laws and regulations to
the subject matter of this case, i.e., the employer-employee relationship between the parties. We have already pointed out
that the relationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and
regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship.
‣ Neither may petitioner invoke the second clause of paragraph 10, specifying the Karachi courts as the sole venue for the
settlement of dispute; between the contracting parties. Even a cursory scrutiny of the relevant circumstances of this case
will show the multiple and substantive contacts between Philippine law and Philippine courts, on the one hand, and the
relationship between the parties, upon the other: the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also
performed here, at least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a
foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly,
private respondents were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the
above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of
contractual disputes between the parties. Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement
cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law.
BAGONG FILIPINO OVERSEAS CORP. V. NLRC, 135 SCRA 278 (1985)

‣ In this case, the contract provides that the beneficiaries of the seaman are entitled to P20,000 "over and above the
benefits" for which the Philippine Government is liable under Philippine law. It was expressly stipulated in the employment
contract in that case that the workmen's compensation payable to the employee should be in accordance with Philippine

Law or the Workmen's Insurance Law of the country where the vessel is registered "whichever is greater”. Thus,
Hongkong law on workmen's compensation is not the applicable law.
TRIPLE EIGHT INTEGRATED SERVICES, INC. V. NLRC, 299 SCRA 608 (1998)
‣ Established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction.
‣ There is no question that the contract of employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the
Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this case.
‣ Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forums
public policy.Here in the Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The Constitution itself,
in Article XIII Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers, to wit: The State shall afford full protection to labor,
local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities
for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self- organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
CRESCENT PETROLIUM LTD. V. M/V LOK MEHESHWARI, ET.AL., G.R. NO. 155014, 11 NOVEMBER 2005
‣ Two (2) tests have been used to determine whether a case involving a contract comes within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of a court - the locational test and the subject matter test.
1. The English rule follows the locational test wherein maritime and admiralty jurisdiction, with a few exceptions, is
exercised only on contracts made upon the sea and to be executed thereon.
2. The American rule where the criterion in determining whether a contract is maritime depends on the nature and
subject matter of the contract, having reference to maritime service and transactions.
‣ We adopted the American rule and held that whether or not a contract is maritime depends not on the place where
the contract is made and is to be executed, making the locality the test, but on the subject matter of the contract,
making the true criterion a maritime service or a maritime transaction.
‣ In this case, in light of the interests of the various foreign elements involved, it is clear that Canada has the most
significant interest in this dispute. The injured party is a Canadian corporation, the sub-charterer which placed the orders
for the supplies is also Canadian, the entity which physically delivered the bunker fuels is in Canada, the place of
contracting and negotiation is in Canada, and the supplies were delivered in Canada.
‣ The arbitration clause contained in the Bunker Fuel Agreement which states that New York law governs the
construction, validity and performance of the contract is only a factor that may be considered in the choice-of- law
analysis but is not conclusive.
TORTS AND CRIMES
NEW CIVIL CODE

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
REVISED PENAL CODE 

Article 2. Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the
provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior
waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by
the Government of the Philippine Islands;
mentioned in the presiding number;

4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of
this Code.
TORTS VS CRIMES
QUASI-DELICT/TORTS DELICT/CRIMES
Interests
Private interest Public interest
affected
Purpose The protection and vindication of the

interests of the public as a whole, the
Reparation of damage by means of
punishment of the offender, the reformation
indemnification
of the offender, or to deter others from
committing the same act
Scope (as to Only where there is a (penal) law punishing

All acts or omissions in which any kind of
the obligations the act or omission. Nullum crimen sine lege,
fault or negligence intervenes
involved) no crime without a law.
Nature as to Transitory in character, so that the tortfeasor Are local and can be prosecuted only in the
the Place of can be made liable for his wrongful act in places or states where the crimes are
Commission any jurisdiction where he may be found committed
Instituted by
Prosecuted by the injured person Prosecuted in the name of the State
whom
DETERMINATION OF WHETHER AN ACT IS A TORT OR A CRIME

‣ RULE: THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A WRONGFUL ACT IS A TORT OR A CRIME DEPENDS ON THE
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ACT IN THE STATE WHERE THE ACT IS COMMITTED
‣ Note also that in the Philippines, certain acts may be both torts and crimes, such as in cases of defamation, fraud,
and physical injuries (under Art. 33, NCC); and offenses classified as criminal negligence (under Art. 365 of the RPC)
LAW WHICH GOVERNS TORTIOUS ACTS

‣ RULE: IT IS GOVERNED BY THE LAW OF THE PLACE OF WHERE THE WRONG WAS COMMITTED (LEX LOCI DELICTI
COMMISSII)
‣ Rationale:
1. The State where the social disturbance occurred has the primary duty to redress the wrong and determine the
effects of the injury
2. To compensate the victim for the damage or injury suffered
‣ But see rule on maritime torts
MODERN PRINCIPLES IN TORT LIABILITY

‣ In determining the rule of lex loci delicti commissii, how is the locus delicti determined, especially if the wrongful conduct
is committed in one state and the injuries are sustained in another? Because of the difficult in determining where the locus
delicti is, some modern theories have been developed in determining liability for torts
1. Obligation Theory
‣ The tort committed anywhere in the world gives rise to an obligation which follows the defendant wherever he may be
found.
2. Doctrine of Elective Concurrence

‣ Either the laws of the state where the actor engaged in his conduct and where the injury was incurred may be invoked
3. Theory of Most Significant Relationship

‣ The applicable law shall be the law of the country which has the most significant relationship to the situation.
‣ The rights and obligations of the parties in a case of tort is determined by the local law of the state, which, with
respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.
‣ See Saudi Arabian Airlines vs CA 1998, the SC held there that in applying said principle to determine the State which
has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to
their relative importance with respect to the particular issue:
a. The place where the injury occurred;
b. The place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
c. The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
d. The place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
4. State-interest Analysis
‣ This approach considers the relevant concerns that two or more states may have in the case and their
respective interests in applying their laws to it.
‣ This principle provides for the following methodology:
a. Separate false or spurious conflicts (only one State has an interest in applying its tort law), apply the law of such
interested State.
b. If there is a true conflict (more than one State has interest), apply the law of such State which has greater interest
in upholding its tort law.
5. Qaver’s Principle of Preference

‣ Under this theory, a higher standard of conduct and financial protection given to the injured party by one State is
applied by the State where the injury happened, if the latter State adopts a lower standard of conduct and financial
protection to the injured.
‣ Where a State does not have a statutory question of tort liability in conflict cases, the following guidelines may be
used.
a. The State of Injury sets a higher standard for protection against the injury compared to the State of conduct - the
laws of the State of Injury applies
b. The State of Conduct and Injury sets a lower standard than the home State of the injured person - the laws of
the State of Conduct and Injury applies
c. The State of Conduct has established special controls over conduct of the kind in which the defendant was
engaged when caused the injury - the benefits of the laws of the State of Conduct should be accorded to plaintiff;
d. The State in which a Relationship has its Seat has imposed a standard of conduct on one party to that
relationship for the benefit of the other party which is higher compared to that of the State of injury – the laws of
the seat of the relationship applies
CONDITIONS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF TORT CLAIMS

1. The tort is not penal in character
2. The enforcement of the tortious liability will not contravene the enforcing State’s public policy
3. The enforcing State’s judicial machinery is adequate for such enforcement
THEORIES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

‣ These are the different theories that determine whether a state or a legal system has jurisdiction to take cognisance of
criminal cases
1. Territorial Theory
‣ Crimes are punishable by the State in whose territory they are committed
‣ The reason is that the aggrieved state is duty bound to prosecute and punish the offended as his crime affects directly
and particularly the dignity, authority, and sovereignty of the state where the crime is committed.
a. Subjective-Territorial Principle
‣ The state where the crime was begun may prosecute the same, even if it was completed in another state
b. Objective Territorial Principle

‣ The state can prosecute crimes began abroad but completed within its territory

2. Nationality or Personal Theory
‣ A state has power to enact criminal laws which apply even to violations committed thereof by its citizens in other
States;
3. Protective Theory
‣ Determines jurisdiction by reference to the national interest injured by the offense;
4. Universality or Cosmopolitan Theory

‣ Determines jurisdiction by reference to the custody of the person committing the offense;
5. Passive Personality or Passive Nationality Theory

‣ Determines jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or the national character injured by the offense
LAW WHICH GOVERNS CRIMINAL ACTS

‣ RULE: IT IS GOVERNED BY THE LAW OF THE FORUM (LEX FORI)
‣ This is because the courts of the forum cannot choose to apply foreign law in imputing criminal liability against a
person.
‣ Remember this is one exception to the rule on the application of foreign law, when it comes to penal laws, foreign law
cannot be applied.
‣ Thus, if the act is not criminal under the law of the forum, the forum cannot impose a penal liability.
RULE ON PHILIPPINE JURISDICTION ON CRIMINAL LIABILITY

‣ The Philippine conflict rule on criminal liability follows territoriality principle with a mixture of protective principle as shown
in Art. 2 of the RPC
‣ RULE: THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE ARE ENFORCEABLE ONLY WITHIN THE PHILIPPINE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION (ART. 2, RPC)
‣ The territorial jurisdiction covers the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime
zone
‣ EXCEPT: IT IS ENFORCEABLE OUTSIDE OF THE PHILIPPINE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, AGAINST THOSE WHO:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued
by the Government of the Philippine Islands
mentioned in the presiding number
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book
Two of this Code.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V. CA

‣ In this case, considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting factor" or
"point of contact" could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And
applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place
where the alleged tortious conduct took place).
‣ This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing
and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights
and in the performance of its duties, "act with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith." Instead,
petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another
country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality
of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged,
according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines
as the situs of the alleged tort.
‣ Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and
rules on tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping
abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the "State of the most

significant relationship" rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this
case.
‣ In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following
contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue:
1. The place where the injury occurred;
2. The place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
3. The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
4. The place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. V. CA, 342 SCRA 213 (2000)
LOUCKS V. STANDARDS OIL CO., 224 N.Y. 99; N.E. 198 (1913)
‣ In this case, there was a Massachusetts penal statute which provided that, “If a person or corporation by his negligence,
or by the negligence of his or its agents or servants while engaged in his or its business, causes the death of a person
who is in exercise of due care, and not in his or its employment or service, he or it shall be liable in damages to be
assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the negligent party, to be recovered in an action of tort
commenced within two years after the injury which caused the death..” The statute further provided that the damages
were recoverable in a tort action brought by the executor or administrator of the deceased for the benefit of the
deceased’s widow, children or next of kin. The action was brought before a New York Court.
‣ Standard Oil invokes the principle that “The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another.” In one sense, the
statute is indisputably penal. The damages are not limited to compensation; they are proportioned to the offender’s guilt.
But the question is not whether the statute is penal in some sense. The question is whether it is penal within the rules of
private international law. A statute penal in that sense is one that awards a penalty to the state, or to a public officer in its
behalf, or to a member of the public, suing in the interest of the whole community to redress a public wrong. The purpose
must be, not reparation to one aggrieved, but vindication of the public justice.
‣ The Massachusetts statute has been classified in some jurisdictions as penal, and in others as remedial. No matter how
they may have characterized the act as penal, they have not meant to hold that it is penal for every purpose. Even without
that reservation by them, the essential purpose of the statute would be a question for our courts.
‣ The better reason is with those cases which hold that the statute is not penal in the international sense. It is true
that the offender is punished, but the purpose of the punishment is reparation to those aggrieved by his offense.
The damages may be compensatory or punitive according to the statutory scheme. In either case the plaintiffs have a
grievance above and beyond any that belongs to them as members of the body politic. They sue to redress an outrage
peculiar to themselves.
‣ Through all this legislation there runs a common purpose. It is penal in one element and one only; the damages are
punitive. The courts of Massachusetts do not give punitive damages even for malicious torts except by force of statute.
That may have led them to emphasize unduly the penal element in such recoveries. But the punishment of the wrongdoer
is not designed as atonement for a crime; it is solace to the individual who has suffered a private wrong.
‣ The executor or administrator who sues under this statute is not the champion of the peace and order and public justice
of the commonwealth of Massachusetts. He is the representative of the outraged family. He vindicates a private right.
‣ A tort committed in one state creates a right of action that may be sued upon in another unless public policy
forbids
‣ A foreign statute is not law in this state, but it gives rise to an obligation, which, if transitory, ‘follows the person and may
be enforced wherever the person may be found.’ No law can exist as such except the law of the land; but it is a principle
of every civilized law that vested rights shall be protected. The plaintiff owns something, and the Court helps him to get it.
The Court does this unless some sound reason of public policy makes it unwise to lend aid. ‘The law of the forum is
material only as setting a limit of policy beyond which such obligations will not be enforced there.’ Sometimes we refuse
to act where all the parties are nonresidents. That restriction need not detain the Court; in this case all are residents. If did
is to be withheld here, it must be because the cause of action in its nature offends our sense of justice or menaces the
public welfare.
‣ We may even have no legislation on the subject. That is not enough to show that public policy forbids us to enforce the
foreign right. A right of action is property. If a foreign statute gives the right, the mere fact that we do not give a like right is
no reason for refusing to help the plaintiff in getting what belongs to him. We are not so provincial as to say that every
solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home. Similarity of legislation has indeed this
importance; its presence shows beyond question that the foreign statute does not offend the local policy. But its absence

does not prove the contrary. It is not to be exalted into an indispensable condition. The misleading word ‘comity’ has
been responsible for much of the trouble.
‣ There is nothing in the Massachusetts statute that outrages the public policy of New York. New York has a statute which
gives a civil remedy where death is caused in its own state. The fundamental policy is that there shall be some atonement
for the wrong. It cannot be that public policy forbids New York courts to help in collecting what belongs to the widow and
children.
‣ There is a growing conviction that only exceptional circumstances should lead one of the states to refuse to
enforce a right acquired in another.
ASAHI METAL INDUSTRY CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)
‣ Because the facts of this case do not establish minimum contacts such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is
consistent with fair play and substantial justice, the judgment of the Supreme Court of California is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
‣ The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant
weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.
‣ When minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of
jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant.
‣ In the present case, however, the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in California's assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi
are slight. All that remains is a claim for indemnification asserted by Cheng Shin, a Tawainese corporation, against Asahi.
The transaction on which the indemnification claim is based took place in Taiwan; Asahi's components were shipped from
Japan to Taiwan. Cheng Shin has not demonstrated that it is more convenient for it to litigate its indemnification claim
against Asahi in California, rather than in Taiwan or Japan. Asahi has no offices, property or agents in California. It solicits
no business in California, and has made no direct sales in California.
WORLDWIDE VOLKSWAGEN CORPORATION V. WOODSON, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)

‣ A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist "minimum
contacts" between the defendant and the forum State. The concept of minimum contacts performs two functions: it
protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum and it acts to ensure that the
States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in
a federal system.
‣ Thus, the Due Process Clause does not contemplate that a state has in personam jurisdiction over an individual or
corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations. Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or
no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong
interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due
Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to
render a valid judgment.
‣ Here, there is a total absence in the record of those affiliating circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any
exercise of state-court jurisdiction. Petitioners carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma; they close no sales and
perform no services there, avail themselves of none of the benefits of Oklahoma law, and solicit no business there either
through salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated to reach that State. Nor does the record show that
they regularly sell cars to Oklahoma residents or that they indirectly, through others, serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma
market.
‣ Although it is foreseeable that automobiles sold by petitioners would travel to Oklahoma and that the automobile here
might cause injury in Oklahoma, "foreseeability" alone is not a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under
the Due Process Clause.
‣ The foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way
into the forum State, but rather is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Nor can jurisdiction be supported on the theory that
petitioners earn substantial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma.
PEOPLE V. WONG CHENG, 46 PHIL. 729 (1922)

‣ There are two fundamental rules on Jurisdiction over offenses committed on board foreign vessels inside Philippine
territory, in connection with International Law. The Philippines follows the English Rule

1. French rule: Crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the
country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the peace and
security of the territory
2. English rule: Based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes
perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were
committed.
‣ We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or
courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the
disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory,
does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere
possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.
‣ But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the
public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It
seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute
NAVIDA, ET.AL. V. DIZON, ET.AL., G.R. NO. 125078, 30 MAY 2011

‣ The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
all or some of the claims asserted therein. Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by
the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein.
‣ There Is A Valid Cause Of Action Based On The Allegations Of The Complaint Which Fall Under Ra 7691 In Relation To Bp
129 Delineating The Jurisdiction Of Courts
‣ It is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and that the total amount sought in the complaints is
approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants.
‣ The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City and Davao City, as both claims by
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., fall within the purview of the definition of the jurisdiction of the RTC under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.
‣ Quite evidently, the allegations in the Amended Joint Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., attribute to
defendant companies certain acts and/or omissions which led to their exposure to nematocides containing the chemical
DBCP. exposure to the said chemical caused ill effects, injuries and illnesses, specifically to their reproductive system.
‣ Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the cause of action of plaintiff claimants—a quasidelict, which under
the Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission which causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence.
‣ As specifically enumerated in the amended complaints, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point to the acts and/or
omissions of the defendant companies in manufacturing, producing, selling, using, and/or otherwise putting into the
stream of commerce, nematocides which contain DBCP, “without informing the users of its hazardous effects on health
and/or without instructions on its proper use and application.
‣ The acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a quasidelict which is the basis for
the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of approximately P2.7
million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the
RTCs.
‣ Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered resulted from
their exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantations located in the Philippines or while
they were residing within the agricultural areas also located in the Philippines. The factual allegations in the
Amended JointComplaints all point to their cause of action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines.
‣ The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City obviously have reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction over
the cases.

IV. RULES ON RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENT
RULES OF COURT
RULE 39: Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments
SECTION 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the
thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. (50a)
SECTION 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration
of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular
person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or
administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of
letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter
that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (49a)
RULE 131: Burden of Proof and Presumptions

Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction;
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT
RECOGNITION ENFORCEMENT
It means that the defendant is presenting the It means that the plaintiff wants the court to
foreign judgment merely as a defense. This is positively carry out and make effective the foreign
when foreign judgment is given a res judicata judgment. This is when, in addition to the foreign
Definition
effect that is has in the State where it was judgment being recognized, a party is given
rendered affirmative relief to which the judgment entitles
him
As a Matter Involves merely a sense of justice Implies an act of sovereignty

of
Substance

RECOGNITION ENFORCEMENT
Needs no action or proceeding, as a matter of Requires a separate action or proceeding brought

As a Matter defense, but it implies that an action or precisely to make the foreign judgment effective
of proceeding has already been filed against the
Procedure defendant who is invoking the foreign judgment.
In relation to Does not need or does not require enforcement Cannot exist without recognition
each other
Such as:
Such as when a Filipino who had been divorced
by his alien spouse under Art. 26 of the Family
1. Declaratory judgment
Code and who was denied by the local registrar a

2. Judgment without affirmative relief (such as marriage license for her to be able to marry again,
dismissal of complaint) files an action with the proper court to compel
Examples said official to issue to her a marriage license on
3. Judgment which determines parties interest
in a thing or status (quasi in rem action) the basis of the foreign divorce decree obtained
(such as divorce, adoption, quieting of title)
by the alien spouse.
4. A person presents a foreign divorce decree

as a defense in a case for bigamy.
REQUISITES FOR THE RECOGNITION ENFORCEMENT OF A FOREIGN JUDGMENT

1. Foreign judgment was rendered by a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal which has jurisdiction over the parties and the case
in the proper judicial proceedings
2. The judgment must be valid under the laws of the court that rendered it
3. The judgment must be final and executory to constitute res judicata in another action
4. The judgment must not be contrary to the public policy or good morals of the country where it is sought to be enforced
5. The judgment must not have been obtained by fraud, collusion, mistake of fact or law
6. There must be adequate proof of the foreign judgment
7. The judgment must be on a civil or commercial matter, not on a criminal, revenue, or administrative matter
8. The State where the foreign judgment was obtained allows recognition or enforcement of Philippine judgments
(reciprocity requirement)
CONCLUSIVENESS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

1. JUDGMENT IN REM
‣ Conclusive upon the title of the thing (Rule 39, Sec. 48, Rules of Court)
2. JUDGMENT IN PERSONAM
‣ Presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. (Rule 39,
Sec. 48, Rules of Court)
‣ BUT NOTE THAT IS BOTH INSTANCES, ITS NOT CONCLUSIVE AS IT CAN BE BE REPELLED BY EVIDENCE OF:
a. Want of Jurisdiction,
b. Want of Notice to the party
c. Collusion
d. Fraud, or
e. Clear Mistake of law or fact (Rule 39, Sec. 48, Rules of Court)

‣ RULE: FILE A VERIFIED PETITION IN THE RTC FOR RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT
‣ You need to aver the requirements under Sec. 48, last sentence and that the court who ruled over it had jurisdiction
over the parties and the subject matter.

‣ Plaintiff has to prove the law of that foreign court
RECOGNITION OF ARBITRAL AWARDS

‣ RULE: FILE AN ACTION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE ARBITRAL AWARD IN THE RTC FOR CONFIRMATION OF THE AWARD
‣ Proper action is an action for recognition of an arbitral award, not an action to enforce a foreign judgment, since it’s
not a judgment.
‣ The same grounds to impugn foreign judgments are also available to impugn arbitral awards with the addition a
grounds based on "contrary to public policy"
‣ This is based on the Arbitral Law
CASES
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. V. CA, 241 SCRA 192 (1995)
‣ A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It
is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.
‣ Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personal of a tribunal of a foreign country
having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors-in-interest by a subsequent title.
‣ The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of
1. Want of jurisdiction,
2. Want of notice to the party,
3. Collusion
4. Fraud, or
5. Clear mistake of law or fact.
‣ Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was
acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty. Consequently, the party attacking
a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
‣ Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the
invalidity of such judgment. In an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the extraterritorial service of
summons effected at its home office in the Philippines was not only ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court did
not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over it.
‣ It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are
governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment
was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on SHARP. As to what this law is is a
question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact.
‣ Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly
attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese
procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the
presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese
court must stand.
‣ Alternatively, in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so
called processual presumption may be invoked.
‣ Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a
private foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the
defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be made:
1. On its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, (
2. If there is no such resident agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or
3. On any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
‣ If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive summons, the designation is exclusive, and service of
summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless made upon him

‣ Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the government official designated by law, to wit: (a)
the Insurance Commissioner, in the case of a foreign insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of
a foreign banking corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign corporations
duly licensed to do business in the Philippines.
‣ Whenever service of process is so made, the government office or official served shall transmit by mail a copy of the
summons or other legal process to the corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such copy is a
necessary part of the service.
‣ As found by the Court of Appeals, it was the Tokyo District Court which ordered that summons for SHARP be served at
its head office in the Philippines after the two attempts of service had failed. The Tokyo District Court requested the
Supreme Court of Japan to cause the delivery of the summons and other legal documents to the Philippines. Acting on
that request, the Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons together with the other legal documents to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan which, in turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila. Thereafter, the court
processes were delivered to the Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, then to the Executive
Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando
Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its principal office in Manila. This service is equivalent to service on the proper
government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code.
Hence, SHARP’s contention that such manner of service is not valid under Philippine laws holds no water.
‣ Domicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction for
purposes of a personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service or personal service without the
state. This principle is embodied in Section 18, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which allows service of summons on
residents temporarily out of the Philippines to be made out of the country.
‣ The authority of a state over one of its citizens is not terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the state.
The state which accords him privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his domicile
may also exact reciprocal duties. "Enjoyment of the privileges of residence within the state, and the attendant
right to invoke the protection of its laws, are inseparable" from the various incidences of state citizenship. The
responsibilities of that citizenship arise out of the relationship to the state which domicile creates. That
relationship is not dissolved by mere absence from the state. The attendant duties, like the rights and privileges
incident to domicile, are not dependent on continuous presence in the state. One such incident of domicile is
amenability to suit within the state even during sojourns without the state, where the state has provided and
employed a reasonable method for apprising such an absent party of the proceedings against him.
‣ The domicile of a corporation belongs to the state where it was incorporated. In a strict technical sense, such domicile as
a corporation may have is single in its essence and a corporation can have only one domicile which is the state of its
creation. Nonetheless, a corporation formed in one state may, for certain purposes, be regarded a resident in another
state in which it has offices and transacts business. This is the rule in our jurisdiction.
‣ Inasmuch as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four duly registered branches at the time the
collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of the processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of
Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the
said courts’ lawful methods of serving process.
‣ Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only under the
processual presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
BOUDARD V. TAIT, 67 PHIL. 170 (1939)

‣ In this case, the foreign judgment obtained in Hanoi, French Indo-China could not be enforced in the Philippines because
of lack of jurisdiction of the French court over the person of the defendant
‣ The petitioners failed to show that the proceedings against Tait in the Court of Hanoi were in accordance with the laws of
France then in force and
‣ It appears that said documents are not copies of the judicial record of the proceedings against the appellee in the Court
of Hanoi, duly certified by the proper authorities there, whose signatures should be authenticated by the Consul or some
consular agent of the United States in said country.
‣ The petitioners argue that those papers are the original documents and that the Honorable French Consul in the
Philippines had confirmed this fact. Such argument is not sufficient to authorize a deviation from a rule established and
sanctioned by law.
‣ To comply with the rule, the best evidence of foreign judicial proceedings is a certified copy of the same with all the
formalities required in said sections 304 and 305 for only thus can one be absolutely sure of the authenticity of the record.
‣ It is said that the French law regarding summons, according to its English translation presented by the appellants, is of
the following tenor: "SEC. 69 (par. 8). Those who have no known residence in France, in the place of their present
residence: if the place is unknown, the writ shall be posted at the main door of the hall of the court where the complaint
has been filed; a second copy shall be given to the Attorney-General of the Republic who shall visae the original."

‣ In this case, evidence shows that the summons alleged to have been addressed to the appellee, was delivered in
Manila on September 18, 1933, to J. M. Shotwell, a representative or agent of Churchill & Tait Inc., which is an
entity entirely different from the appellee.
‣ Tait was not in Hanoi during the time mentioned in the complaint nor were his employees or representatives. The rule in
matters of this nature is that judicial proceedings in a foreign country, regarding payment of money, are only effective
against a party if summons is duly served on him within such foreign country before the proceedings.
‣ The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam over nonresidents, so as to sustain a money judgment, must
be based upon personal service within the state which renders the judgment
‣ The process of a court has no extraterritorial effect, and no jurisdiction is acquired over the person of the
defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the state. Nor has a judgment of a court of a foreign country
against a resident of his country having no property in such foreign country based on process served here, any
effect here against either the defendant personally or his property situated here
‣ The decision rendered by the Court of Hanoi should not be conclusive to such an extent that it cannot be contested, for it
merely constitutes, from the viewpoint of our laws, prima facie evidence of the justness of appellants' claim, and, as such,
naturally admits proof to the contrary.
QUERUBIN V. QUERUBIN, 87 PHIL. 124 (1950)

‣ In this case, a petition for habeas corpus for the custody of a minor was filed before Philippine Courts seeking to enforce
a interlocutory decree of a California Court. She claims that under Art. 48 of Rule 39, the decree of the Los Angeles Court,
granting her the child's custody, must be complied within the Philippines.
‣ SC said it could not be enforced here.
‣ The decree is by no means final. It is subject to change with the circumstances. The first decree awarded the custody of
the child to the father, prohibiting the mother from taking the child to her (Margaret's) home because of her adulterous
relationship with another man. The decree was amended when Margaret was not in Los Angeles. Because the decree is
interlocutory, it cannot be implemented in the Philippines.
‣ Where the judgment is merely interlocutory, the determination of the question by the Court which rendered it did
not settle and adjudge finally the rights of the parties.
‣ In general, a decree of divorce awarding custody of the child to one of the spouses is respected by the Courts of other
states "at the time and under the circumstances of its rendition" but such a decree has no controlling effects in another
state as to facts and conditions occurring subsequently to the date of the decree; and the Court of another state may, in
proper proceedings, award custody otherwise upon proof of matters subsequent to the decree which justify the decree to
the interest of the child.
‣ In the case at bar, the circumstances have changed. Querubina is not in Los Angeles, she is in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, under
her father's care. It is a long way from one place to the other. Neither can Margaret prove that she can pay the cost of
passage for the minor. She is not a packet of cigarettes one can send by mail. Neither can she answer for Querubina's
support, care and education. In comparison, the father has shown both interest in the child and capacity to provide for
the needs of the child.
PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS V. FASGI ENTERPRISES, INC., 342 SCRA 722 (2000)
‣ Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have
established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries.
‣ In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties
and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity
for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted,
following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an
impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of
laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding
in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings
and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum.
‣ In Soorajmull Nagarmull vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co. Inc., one of the early Philippine cases on the enforcement of
foreign judgments, this Court has ruled that a judgment for a sum of money rendered in a foreign court is presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties and their successors-in-interest by subsequent title, but when suit for its
enforcement is brought in a Philippine court, such judgment may be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact.

‣ In Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, the Court has said that a party attacking a foreign judgment is
tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.
‣ Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based
on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered or that which would go to the
jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend the
action to which he has a meritorious case or defense.
‣ In the instant case, the supplemental settlement agreement was signed by the parties, including Mr. Thomas Ready, on
06 October 1980. The agreement was lodged in the California case on 26 November 1980 or two (2) days after the pre-
trial conference held on 24 November 1980. If Mr. Ready was indeed not authorized by PAWI to enter into the
supplemental settlement agreement, PAWI could have forthwith signified to FASGI a disclaimer of the settlement. Instead,
more than a year after the execution of the supplemental settlement agreement, particularly on 09 October 1981, PAWI
President Romeo S. Rojas sent a communication to Elena Buholzer of FASGI that failed to mention Mr. ReadyÊs
supposed lack of authority. On the contrary, the letter confirmed the terms of the agreement when Mr. Rojas sought
forbearance for the impending delay in the opening of the first letter of credit under the schedule stipulated in the
agreement.
‣ It is an accepted rule that when a client, upon becoming aware of the compromise and the judgment thereon,
fails to promptly repudiate the action of his attorney, he will not 20 afterwards be heard to complain about it.
HANG LUNG BANK, LTD. V. SAULOG, 201 SCRA 137 (1991)

‣ In its pleadings before the court, petitioner appears to be in a quandary as to whether the suit below is one for
enforcement or recognition of the Hongkong judgment.
‣ The complaint therefore appears to be one of the enforcement of the Hongkong judgment because it prays for the grant
of the affirmative relief given by said foreign 17 judgment. Although petitioner asserts that it is merely seeking the
recognition of its claims based on the contract sued upon and not the enforcement of the Hongkong 18 judgment, it
should be noted that in the prayer of the complaint, petitioner simply copied the Hongkong judgment with respect to
private respondent’s liability.
‣ However, a foreign judgment may not be enforced if it is not recognized in the jurisdiction where affirmative relief is being
sought. Hence, in the interest of justice, the complaint should be considered as a petition for the recognition of the
Hongkong judgment under Section 50 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in order that the defendant, private respondent
herein, may present evidence of lack of jurisdiction, notice, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of fact and law, if applicable.
PERKINS V. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING, INC., 93 PHIL. 1034 (1953)

‣ Article 48 (a) dealing with the effect of judgments abroad: if the judgment is about a certain thing, it is conclusive as to the
title thereof. It is not necessary therefore that a foreign judgment be executed here in the Philippines before Res
judicata may apply.
‣ Difference between Execution of Foreign Judgment and Res Judicata
‣ Enforcement of a Foreign Judgment involves a direct act of sovereignty, while Res judicata only intervenes “sense of
justice”
‣ Procedures on how to enforce foreign judgments in different countries

‣ Philippines before repeal of this following rule: a foreign judgment of the US or any of its territories is the same in the
Philippines. To have strength in the Philippines, one must present an action based on it.
‣ ITALY: before a foreign judgment is enforced, a prelim proceeding takes place to ascertain whether the judgment was
made by a court with competent jurisdiction; whether the defendant had notice of the original proceeding; whether D
appeared or was defaulted; whether the enforcement of the Foreign Judgment would be against public policy of Italy.
If the judgment satisfies these, Italian court will not review the justice or injustice of such decision. This is based on
equality of states and rests upon the assumption that the judgments of other states are entitled to full trust and
confidence.
‣ FRANCE: The system prevailing is one Which reviews the Merits of the case. It does not content itself With inquiring
into the jurisdiction of the foreign court, the regularity of the service of the summons, appearance or default, and the
public policy of the state in Which the proceeding for the enforcement of the foreign judgment is brought`, but
examine the Merits of the decision itself.
‣ ENGLAND: in between French and Italian law. foreign judgments are ordinarily conclusive but it will try the case on its
merits in exceptional cases. Courts of equity May enjoin the enforcement of Judgments, domestic or foreign, if They
Have Been procured through fraud, accident, mistake or surprise.
‣ Following the theory of Roman law, a judgment has the nature of a contract or quasi-contract and that the obligation
arising under this priate sentence is presented as a defense of res judicata, It must be considered as any other obligation.

"By Submitting the case to the foreigncourt, the parties are deemded, According to this view, To have made an implied
agreement That They Will abide by the decision of the court. The obligation Arising from the judgment is Referred,
Therefore, to the will of the parties rather than being derived from the sovereign power Directly of the foreign state. ")
‣ Articles 44 and 48 of Rule 39 ROC are clear. They do not require the a “mediated special performance” for the foreign
judgment to have the effect of Res judicata.
‣ It is not the execution of Res judicata that is ordered, but the foreign decision is sought to be enforced. Res Judicata can
be brought up as a defense in that action.
‣ We have found no reason why the decision of the Court of New York should have no effect as res judicata between the
parties.
‣ Litigants, whether natural and foreign, must respect the decisions of the courts of the Philippines; but if they
choose to go to a foreign court, requesting for an incompatible remedy with the disposition of the judgment
obtained in the Philippines, and from obtaining an adverse decision, they should not be allowed to repudiate then
the foreign court and ask compliance with the dcision of the court of the Philippines that they had abandoned.
Allowing to litigate that way is contrary to public order and interest in the Philippines because it disrupts the
orderly administration of the law.
PHILSEC INVESTMENT, INC. V. CA, 274 SCRA 102 (1997)

‣ Private respondents contend that for a foreign judgment to be pleaded as res judicata, a judgment admitting the foreign
decision is not necessary. On the other hand, petitioners argue that the foreign judgment cannot be given the effect of res
judicata without giving them an opportunity to impeach it on grounds stated in Rule 39, §50 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
“want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”
‣ Petitioners’ contention is meritorious. While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in
several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them
on grounds allowed under the law. It is not necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding
for enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect
to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie
evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
‣ In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court
as basis for declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court
were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court
or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then being litigated
in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that might be rendered would
constitute res judicata.
‣ As the trial court stated in its disputed order dated March 9, 1988: On the plaintiff’s claim in its Opposition that the causes
of action of this case and the pending case in the United States are not identical, precisely the Order of January 26,
1988 never found that the causes of action of this case and the case pending before the USA Court, were
identical.
‣ It was error therefore for the Court of Appeals to summarily rule that petitioners’ action is barred by the principle
of res judicata. Petitioners in fact questioned the jurisdiction of the U.S. court over their persons, but their claim
was brushed aside by both the trial court and the 13 Court of Appeals.
‣ To sustain the appellate court’s ruling that the foreign judgment constitutes res judicata and is a bar to the claim of
petitioners would effectively preclude petitioners from repelling the judgment in the case for enforcement. An absurdity
could then arise: a foreign judgment is not subject to challenge by the plaintiff against whom it is invoked, if it is pleaded
to resist a claim as in this case, but it may be opposed by the defendant if the foreign judgment is sought to be enforced
against him in a separate proceeding. This is plainly untenable. It has been held therefore that: A foreign judgment may
not be enforced if it is not recognized in the jurisdiction where affirmative relief is being sought. Hence, in the interest of
justice, the complaint should be considered as a petition for the recognition of the Hongkong judgment under Section 50
(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in order that the defendant, private respondent herein, may present evidence of lack of
jurisdiction, notice, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of fact and 14 law, if applicable.”
NAGARMULL V. BINALBAGAN-ISABELA SUGAR, 33 SCRA 46 (1970)

‣ We are constrained to reverse the appealed decision upon the ground that it is based upon a clear mistake of law and its
enforcement will give rise to a patent injustice.
‣ While under the provisions of Section 50 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, a judgment for a sum of money rendered by a foreign
court is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title, but

when suit for its enforcement is brought in a Philippine court, said judgmentmay be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
‣ Upon the facts of record, We are constrained to hold that the decision sought to be enforced was rendered upon a "clear
mistake of law" and because of that it makes appellant·an innocent party·suffer the consequences of the default or
breach of contract committed by appellee.
‣ There is no question at all that appellee was guilty of a breach of contract when it failed to deliver one-hundred fifty- four
Hessian bales which, according to the contract entered into with appellant, should have been delivered to the latter in the
months of July, August and September, all of the year 1949. It is equally clear beyond doubt that had these one-hundred
fifty-four bales been delivered in accordance with the contract aforesaid, the increase in the export tax due upon them
would not have been imposed because said increased export tax became effective only on October 1, 1949.
‣ To avoid its liability for the aforesaid increase in the export tax, appellee claims that appellant should be held liable
therefor on the strength of its letter of September 29, 1949 asking appellee to ship the shortage. This argument is
unavailing because it is not only illogical but contrary to known principles of fairness and justice. When appellant
demanded that appellee deliver the shortage of 154 bales, it did nothing more than to demand that to which it was
entitled as a matter of right. The breach of contract committed by appellee gave appellant, under the law and even under
general principles of fairness, the right to rescind the contract or to ask for its specific performance, in eithercase with
right to demand damages. Part of the damages appellant was clearly entitled to recover from appellee growing out of the
latter's breach of the contract consists precisely of the amount of the increase decreed in the export tax due on the
shortage·which, because of appellee's fault, had to be delivered after the effectivity of the increased export tax.
‣ To the extent, therefore, that the decisions of the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and of the
High Court of Judicature of Calcutta fail to apply to the facts of this case fundamental principles of contract, the same
may be impeached, as they have been sufficiently impeached by appellant, on the ground of "clear mistake of law", We
agree in this regard with the majority opinion in Ingenohl vs. Walter E. Olsen & Co. (47 Phil. 189), although its view was
reversed. by the "Supreme Court of the United States (273 U.S. 541, 71 L, ed. 762) which at that time had jurisdiction to
review by certiorari decisions of this Court We can not sanction a clear mistake mistake of law that would work an
obvious injustice upon appellant.
MIJARES ET.AL. V. RANADA, ET.AL., G.R. NO. 139325, 12 APRIL 2005

‣ For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in
personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
‣ However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of
jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
‣ Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the
local forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in
this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its validity.
‣ In order to enforce a foreign judgment in the Philippines, the filing of a civil complaint is an appropriate measure for such
purpose. Absent a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim for enforcement of judgment must be
brought before the regular courts.
‣ There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action arising from the enforcement of a foreign
judgment, and that arising from the facts or allegations that occasioned the foreign judgment.
‣ In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic
issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to,
or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance
TUNA PROCESSING, INC. V. PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC., G.R. NO. 185582, 29 FEBRUARY 2012
‣ TPI counters, however, that it is entitled to seek for the recognition and enforcement of the subject foreign arbitral award
in accordance with: 1. RA 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004), 2. Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards drafted during the United Nations Conference on International Commercial
Arbitration in 1958 (New York Convention), 3. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law)
‣ None of these specifically requires that the party seeking for the enforcement should have legal capacity to sue.

‣ How do we reconcile the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines on one hand, and the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, the New York Convention and the Model Law on the other?
‣ In Koruga v. Arcenas, Jr., it was held that the Corporation Code is a general law applying to all types of corporations,
while the New Central Bank Act regulates specifically banks and other financial institutions, including the dissolution
and liquidation thereof. As between a general and special law, the latter shall prevail generalia specialibus non
derogant.
‣ Also in Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, it was held that the Corporation Code
is the general law providing for the formation, organization and regulation of private corporations. On the other hand,
RA 6657 is the special law on agrarian reform. As between a general and special law, the latter shall prevail generalia
specialibus non derogant.
‣ Following the same principle, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in this case as the Act,
as its title - An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines
and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other Purposes - would suggest, is a law
especially enacted to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party
to make their own arrangements to resolve their disputes. It specifically provides exclusive grounds available
to the party opposing an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award.
‣ ADR Act of 2004 incorporated the New York Convention in the Act. It provides: The New York Convention shall govern
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards covered by the said Convention. (Sec. 42) A foreign corporation
not licensed to do business in the Philippines have legal capacity to sue under the provisions of the ADR Act of 2004.
Sec. 45 of the ADR Act of 2004 provides that the opposing party in an application for recognition and
enforcement of the arbitral award may raise only those grounds that were enumerated under Article V of the
New York Convention, to wit:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked,
only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them, under some
incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any
indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or (b) The party against whom the
award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings
or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of
the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated
from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration
may be recognized and enforced; or (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not
in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of
the country where the arbitration took place; or (e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has
been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that
award was made.
2. 2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country
where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: (a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would
be contrary to the public policy of that country.
‣ Clearly, not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the capacity to sue of the party seeking the recognition
and enforcement of the award.
‣ Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, we deny availment by
the losing party of the rule that bars foreign corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines from
maintaining a suit in our courts. When a party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as in
this case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration and by the result of
arbitration, conceding thereby the capacity of the other party to enter into the contract, participate in the arbitration
and cause the implementation of the result.
KOREA TECHNOLOGIES CO. LTD. V. LERMA, G.R. NO. 143581, 7 JANUARY 2008
‣ Art. 15 of the Contract, the arbitration clause. It provides: Article 15. Arbitration.—All disputes, controversies, or
differences which may arise between the parties, out of or in relation to or in connection with this Contract or for the
breach thereof, shall finally be settled by arbitration in Seoul, Korea in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules
of the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board. The award rendered by the arbitration(s) shall be final and binding upon
both parties concerned.
‣ Petitioner claims the RTC and the CA erred in ruling that the arbitration clause is null and void. Petitioner is correct.
‣ Established in this jurisdiction is the rule that the law of the place where the contract is made governs. Lex loci
contractus. The contract in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, our laws ought to govern.

‣ Nonetheless, Art. 2044 of the Civil Code sanctions the validity of mutually agreed arbitral clause or the finality and
binding effect of an arbitral award. Art. 2044 provides, "Any stipulation that the arbitrators’ award or decision shall
be final, is valid, without prejudice to Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040."
‣ Arts. 2038, 2039, and 2040 abovecited refer to instances where a compromise or an arbitral award, as applied to Art.
2044 pursuant to Art. 2043, may be voided, rescinded, or annulled, but these would not denigrate the finality of the
arbitral award.
‣ The arbitration clause was mutually and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties. It has not been shown to be
contrary to any law, or against morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. There has been no showing
that the parties have not dealt with each other on equal footing. We find no reason why the arbitration clause
should not be respected and complied with by both parties.
‣ In Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd., we held that submission to arbitration is a contract and that a clause in a contract
providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitration is a contract.
‣ Again in Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Court of Appeals, we likewise ruled that "the provision to submit to arbitration
any dispute arising therefrom and the relationship of the parties is part of that contract and is itself a contract.”
‣ The arbitration clause which stipulates that the arbitration must be done in Seoul, Korea in accordance with the
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the KCAB, and that the arbitral award is final and binding, is not contrary to
public policy.
‣ This Court has sanctioned the validity of arbitration clauses in a catena of cases.
‣ In the 1957 case of Eastboard Navigation Ltd. v. Juan Ysmael and Co., Inc., this Court had occasion to rule that an
arbitration clause to resolve differences and breaches of mutually agreed contractual terms is valid.
‣ In BF Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we held that "[i]n this jurisdiction, arbitration has been held valid and
constitutional. Even before the approval on June 19, 1953 of Republic Act No. 876, this Court has countenanced the
settlement of disputes through arbitration. Republic Act No. 876 was adopted to supplement the New Civil Code’s
provisions on arbitration.”
‣ And in LM Power Engineering Corporation v. Capitol Industrial Construction Groups, Inc., we declared that: Being an
inexpensive, speedy and amicable method of settling disputes, arbitration––along with mediation, conciliation and
negotiation––is encouraged by the Supreme Court. Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, arbitration also hastens
the resolution of disputes, especially of the commercial kind. It is thus regarded as the "wave of the future" in
international civil and commercial disputes. Brushing aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration between the
parties would be a step backward.
‣ Consistent with the above-mentioned policy of encouraging alternative dispute resolution methods, courts should
liberally construe arbitration clauses. Provided such clause is susceptible of an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute, an order to arbitrate should be granted. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of arbitration.
‣ Having said that the instant arbitration clause is not against public policy, we come to the question on what governs an
arbitration clause specifying that in case of any dispute arising from the contract, an arbitral panel will be constituted in a
foreign country and the arbitration rules of the foreign country would govern and its award shall be final and binding.
DOCTRINE ON ARBITRAL AWARDS IN KOREA TECHNOLOGIES CO. LTD. V. LERMA

‣ For domestic arbitration proceedings, we have particular agencies to arbitrate disputes arising from contractual relations.
In case a foreign arbitral body is chosen by the parties, the arbitration rules of our domestic arbitration bodies would not
be applied.
‣ As signatory to the Arbitration Rules of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in the New York Convention on June 21, 1985, the
Philippines committed itself to be bound by the Model Law.
‣ We have even incorporated the Model Law in Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, otherwise known as the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004 entitled An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the
Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other Purposes, promulgated on April 2,
2004. Secs. 19 and 20 of Chapter 4 of the Model Law are the pertinent provisions:
‣ CHAPTER 4 - INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

‣ SEC. 19. Adoption of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.––International commercial arbitration
shall be governed by the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the "Model Law") adopted by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on June 21, 1985 (United Nations Document A/40/17) and
recommended for enactment by the General Assembly in Resolution No. 40/72 approved on December 11, 1985,
copy of which is hereto attached as Appendix “A".
‣ SEC. 20. Interpretation of Model Law.––In interpreting the Model Law, regard shall be had to its international origin
and to the need for uniformity in its interpretation and resort may be made to the travaux preparatories and the

report of the Secretary General of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law dated March 25,
1985 entitled, "International Commercial Arbitration: Analytical Commentary on Draft Trade identified by reference
number A/CN. 9/264."
‣ While RA 9285 was passed only in 2004, it nonetheless applies in the instant case since it is a procedural law which has a
retroactive effect. Likewise, KOGIES filed its application for arbitration before the KCAB on July 1, 1998 and it is still
pending because no arbitral award has yet been rendered. Thus, RA 9285 is applicable to the instant case. Well-settled is
the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive application of
procedural laws does not violate any personal rights because no vested right has yet attached nor arisen from them.
‣ Among the pertinent features of RA 9285 applying and incorporating the UNCITRAL Model Law are the following:
1. The RTC must refer to arbitration in proper cases
‣ Under Sec. 24, the RTC does not have jurisdiction over disputes that are properly the subject of arbitration
pursuant to an arbitration clause, and mandates the referral to arbitration in such cases, thus: SEC. 24. Referral to
Arbitration.––A court before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject matter of an arbitration
agreement shall, if at least one party so requests not later than the pre-trial conference, or upon the request of both
parties thereafter, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the arbitration agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed.
2. Foreign arbitral awards must be confirmed by the RTC
‣ Foreign arbitral awards while mutually stipulated by the parties in the arbitration clause to be final and binding are
not immediately enforceable or cannot be implemented immediately. Sec. 35of the UNCITRAL Model Law
stipulates the requirement for the arbitral award to be recognized by a competent court for enforcement, which
court under Sec. 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law may refuse recognition or enforcement on the grounds provided
for. RA 9285 incorporated these provisos to Secs. 42, 43, and 44 relative to Secs. 47 and 48, thus:
‣ SEC. 42. Application of the New York Convention.––The New York Convention shall govern the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards covered by said Convention. The recognition and enforcement of such arbitral
awards shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court in accordance with the rules of procedure to be promulgated by
the Supreme Court. Said procedural rules shall provide that the party relying on the award or applying for its
enforcement shall file with the court the original or authenticated copy of the award and the arbitration agreement.
If the award or agreement is not made in any of the official languages, the party shall supply a duly certified
translation thereof into any of such languages. The applicant shall establish that the country in which foreign
arbitration award was made in party to the New York Convention.
‣ SEC. 43. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Not Covered by the New York Convention.––The
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards not covered by the New York Convention shall be done in
accordance with procedural rules to be promulgated by the Supreme Court. The Court may, on grounds of comity
and reciprocity, recognize and enforce a non-convention award as a convention award
‣ SEC. 44. Foreign Arbitral Award Not Foreign Judgment.––A foreign arbitral award when confirmed by a court of a
foreign country, shall be recognized and enforced as a foreign arbitral award and not as a judgment of a foreign
court. A foreign arbitral award, when confirmed by the Regional Trial Court, shall be enforced in the same manner
as final and executory decisions of courts of law of the Philippines
‣ SEC. 47. Venue and Jurisdiction.––Proceedings for recognition and enforcement of an arbitration agreement or for
vacations, setting aside, correction or modification of an arbitral award, and any application with a court for
arbitration assistance and supervision shall be deemed as special proceedings and shall be filed with the Regional
Trial Court (i) where arbitration proceedings are conducted; (ii) where the asset to be attached or levied upon, or the
act to be enjoined is located; (iii) where any of the parties to the dispute resides or has his place of business; or (iv)
in the National Judicial Capital Region, at the option of the applicant.
‣ SEC. 48. Notice of Proceeding to Parties.––In a special proceeding for recognition and enforcement of an arbitral
award, the Court shall send notice to the parties at their address of record in the arbitration, or if any part cannot be
served notice at such address, at such party’s last known address. The notice shall be sent al least fifteen (15) days
before the date set for the initial hearing of the application.
‣ It is now clear that foreign arbitral awards when confirmed by the RTC are deemed not as a judgment of a foreign
court but as a foreign arbitral award, and when confirmed, are enforced as final and executory decisions of our courts
of law.
‣ Thus, it can be gleaned that the concept of a final and binding arbitral award is similar to judgments or awards given
by some of our quasi-judicial bodies, like the National Labor Relations Commission and Mines Adjudication Board,
whose final judgments are stipulated to be final and binding, but not immediately executory in the sense that they may
still be judicially reviewed, upon the instance of any party. Therefore, the final foreign arbitral awards are similarly
situated in that they need first to be confirmed by the RTC.
3. The RTC has jurisdiction to review foreign arbitral awards

‣ Sec. 42 in relation to Sec. 45 of RA 9285 designated and vested the RTC with specific authority and jurisdiction to
set aside, reject, or vacate a foreign arbitral award on grounds provided under Art. 34(2) of the UNCITRAL Model
Law. Secs. 42 and 45 provide:
‣ SEC. 45. Rejection of a Foreign Arbitral Award.––A party to a foreign arbitration proceeding may oppose an
application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award in accordance with the procedures and rules to be
promulgated by the Supreme Court only on those grounds enumerated under Article V of the New York
Convention. Any other ground raised shall be disregarded by the Regional Trial Court.
‣ Thus, while the RTC does not have jurisdiction over disputes governed by arbitration mutually agreed upon by the
parties, still the foreign arbitral award is subject to judicial review by the RTC which can set aside, reject, or vacate
it. In this sense, what this Court held in Chung Fu Industries (Phils.), Inc. relied upon by KOGIES is applicable
insofar as the foreign arbitral awards, while final and binding, do not oust courts of jurisdiction since these arbitral
awards are not absolute and without exceptions as they are still judicially reviewable. Chapter 7 of RA 9285 has
made it clear that all arbitral awards, whether domestic or foreign, are subject to judicial review on specific grounds
provided for.
4. Grounds for judicial review different in domestic and foreign arbitral awards
‣ The differences between a final arbitral award from an international or foreign arbitral tribunal and an award given by a
local arbitral tribunal are the specific grounds or conditions that vest jurisdiction over our courts to review the awards.
‣ For foreign or international arbitral awards which must first be confirmed by the RTC, the grounds for setting aside,
rejecting or vacating the award by the RTC are provided under Art. 34(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
‣ For final domestic arbitral awards, which also need confirmation by the RTC pursuant to Sec. 23 of RA 876 and shall
be recognized as final and executory decisions of the RTC, they may only be assailed before the RTC and vacated on
the grounds provided under Sec. 25 of RA 876.
5. RTC decision of assailed foreign arbitral award appealable

‣ Sec. 46 of RA 9285 provides for an appeal before the CA as the remedy of an aggrieved party in cases where the RTC
sets aside, rejects, vacates, modifies, or corrects an arbitral award, thus: SEC. 46. Appeal from Court Decision or
Arbitral Awards.—A decision of the Regional Trial Court confirming, vacating, setting aside, modifying or correcting an
arbitral award may be appealed to the Court of Appeals in accordance with the rules and procedure to be promulgated
by the Supreme Court. The losing party who appeals from the judgment of the court confirming an arbitral award shall
be required by the appellate court to post a counterbond executed in favor of the prevailing party equal to the amount
of the award in accordance with the rules to be promulgated by the Supreme Court. Thereafter, the CA decision may
further be appealed or reviewed before this Court through a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
‣ Thus, based on the foregoing features of RA 9285, PGSMC must submit to the foreign arbitration as it bound itself
through the subject contract. While it may have misgivings on the foreign arbitration done in Korea by the KCAB, it has
available remedies under RA 9285. Its interests are duly protected by the law which requires that the arbitral award that
may be rendered by KCAB must be confirmed here by the RTC before it can be enforced
‣ With our disquisition above, petitioner is correct in its contention that an arbitration clause, stipulating that the arbitral
award is final and binding, does not oust our courts of jurisdiction as the international arbitral award, the award of which
is not absolute and without exceptions, is still judicially reviewable under certain conditions provided for by the
UNCITRAL Model Law on ICA as applied and incorporated in RA 9285.
‣ Finally, it must be noted that there is nothing in the subject Contract which provides that the parties may dispense with
the arbitration clause.
‣ Having ruled that the arbitration clause of the subject contract is valid and binding on the parties, and not contrary to
public policy; consequently, being bound to the contract of arbitration, a party may not unilaterally rescind or terminate
the contract for whatever cause without first resorting to arbitration.
‣ What this Court held in University of the Philippines v. De Los Angeles and reiterated in succeeding cases, that the act of
treating a contract as rescinded on account of infractions by the other contracting party is valid albeit provisional as it can
be judicially assailed, is not applicable to the instant case on account of a valid stipulation on arbitration. Where an
arbitration clause in a contract is availing, neither of the parties can unilaterally treat the contract as rescinded since
whatever infractions or breaches by a party or differences arising from the contract must be brought first and resolved by
arbitration, and not through an extrajudicial rescission or judicial action.
‣ The issues arising from the contract between PGSMC and KOGIES on whether the equipment and machineries delivered
and installed were properly installed and operational in the plant in Carmona, Cavite; the ownership of equipment and
payment of the contract price; and whether there was substantial compliance by KOGIES in the production of the
samples, given the alleged fact that PGSMC could not supply the raw materials required to produce the sample LPG
cylinders, are matters proper for arbitration. Indeed, we note that on July 1, 1998, KOGIES instituted an Application for
Arbitration before the KCAB in Seoul, Korea pursuant to Art. 15 of the Contract as amended. Thus, it is incumbent upon
PGSMC to abide by its commitment to arbitrate.


CLARENCE TIU Conflict of Laws Notes Last Edit June 2017

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CLARENCE TIU Conflict of Laws Notes Last Edit June 2017

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

CLARENCE TIU Conflict of Laws Notes Last Edit June 2017

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

What is the purpose of conflict of laws?

What is the purpose of conflict of laws?

What are the sources of conflict of laws rules?

What are the sources of conflict of laws rules?

CONFLICT

FOR THE GLORY OF GOD ✝

C. CONFLICT OF LAWS VS PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5

D. ELEMENTS OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 5

F. RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT PROBLEMS; GENERAL FRAMEWORK 6

OVERVIEW OF CHOICE OF LAW AND THE DOCTRINE OF CHARACTERIZATION 8

OVERVIEW OF ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT 16

G. SOME DOMESTIC SOURCES OF CONFLICTS OF LAW RULES 17

4. REVISED PENAL CODE 21

II. RULES ON JURISDICTION AND VENUE 22

RULES INVOLVING FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 31

III. CHOICE OF LAW: PHILIPPINE CONFLICT OF LAW RULES 45

PERSONAL STATUS, LEGAL PERSONALITY AND CAPACITY 45

NATIONALITY, RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE 48

TORTS AND CRIMES 84

IV. RULES ON RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT91

CLARENCE TIU CONFLICT OF LAWS

A. DEFINITION: CONFLICT OF LAWS; PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

DEFINITION OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

DEFINITION OF A “CONFLICT OF LAWS” CASE

SOURCES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

PURPOSE OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

THEORIES THAT JUSTIFY THE APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES

CLARENCE TIU CONFLICT OF LAWS

b. Persuasiveness of a Foreign Judgment

3. THEORY OF LOCAL LAW

4. THEORY OF HARMONY OF LAWS

WHAT IS THE PROPER THEORY TO FOLLOW?

CLARENCE TIU CONFLICT OF LAWS

C. CONFLICT OF LAWS VS PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

CONFLICT OF LAWS AS A DISTINCT SUBJECT FROM PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

CONFLICT OF LAWS PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

As to nature Municipal in character International in character

D. ELEMENTS OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

1. Part of Municipal Law

2. Directive to Courts/ Administrative Agencies

4. Application or Non-Application of Foreign Law

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES VS CA, G.R. NO. 122191 OCTOBER 8, 1998

CLARENCE TIU CONFLICT OF LAWS

LAUREL VS GARCIA, G.R. NO. 92013 JULY 25, 1990

F. RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT PROBLEMS; GENERAL FRAMEWORK

PHASES INVOLVED IN RESOLVING CONFLICTS PROBLEMS

‣ If it has no jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed on that ground

2. DETERMINE WHETHER TO APPLY INTERNAL LAW OR THE PROPER FOREIGN LAW

CLARENCE TIU CONFLICT OF LAWS

1. Where can or should litigation be initiated?

ASPECTS OF JURISDICTION IN CIVIL CASES

2. Jurisdiction over the Person of the Parties

3. Jurisdiction over the Res or thing involved in the litigation

CLARENCE TIU CONFLICT OF LAWS

2. Jurisdiction over the Place (Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases)

3. Jurisdiction over the Person of the Accused

‣ In civil cases, unlike in criminal cases, venue is NOT a matter of jurisdiction

It is a matter of substantive law It is a matter of procedural law

OVERVIEW OF CHOICE OF LAW AND THE DOCTRINE OF CHARACTERIZATION