GR NO.

83896
FACTS:
The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 issued by
President Corazon C. Aquino. The assailed law provides that:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or
assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary
position,hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or
committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.
The petitioners alleged that the cited provision of EO 284 contravenes the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII
which declares:
The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not,
during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They
shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The petitioners maintained that the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution used in Section
13 of Article VII meant that the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution.
Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the appointive
officials mentioned therein are concerned. The provision relied upon by the respondents provides:
Sec. 7. . . . . .
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
ISSUE No. 1 : Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive
officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB?
No.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his
official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.
Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices
or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional
Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment
during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. While all other appointive officials in the civil
service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so
only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down
the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is
meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants.

The phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution must be given a literal interpretation to refer
only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a
member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under
Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
ISSUE No. 2: Does the prohibition apply to positions held in ex officio capacity?
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified
therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of said officials office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise any other office within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said
officials. The termex-officio means from office; by virtue of office. Ex-officio likewise denotes an act done in an
official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred
by the office. The additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the officials primary
functions. If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible,
or otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of
any other office prohibited by the Constitution.
ISSUE No. 3: Can the respondents be obliged to reimburse the perquisites they have received from the
offices they have held pursuant to EO 284?
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as
such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that in cases where there is no de
jureofficer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties
pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the
salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received
by the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by
them.
Overall, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it actually allows a member of the cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold multiple offices
or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
GR NO. 160261
FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice
Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second
complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question h; as
resulted in a political crisis.
HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved
by the House of Representativesare unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
REASONING:In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches
of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their
indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review
over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another. Both are integral components of the
calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the
powers assigned to it bythe Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the
floor proposing that A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate
impeachment proceedings, this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House
does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period.
The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of
whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed
one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately
turnjusticiable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert
judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.
GR NO. 122156
Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 408
FACTS: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51 % of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding, only two bidders participated. Petitioner Manila Prince, a Filipino Corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian Firm, which bid for the
same number of shares at P44.00 per share. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder,
petitioner matches the bid price of P44.00 per share by Renong Berhad. Subsequently, petitioner sent a manager's
check as bid security to match the bid of Renong Berhad which respondent GSIS refuse to accept. Apprehensive that
GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated which Renong Berhad,
petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be preferred after it has match the bid offered of Malaysian firm under
Section 10, second paragraph of Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING: A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. Since the constitution
is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Article 12, Section 10, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." It
means just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. When the Constitution speaks of "national patrimony", it refers
not only to the natural resources of the Philippines but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has
become a landmark- a living testimonial of Philippine Heritage. While it was restrictively an American Hotel when it
first opened, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy
and patrimony. Respondents further argue that the Constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to GSIS
which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of a person
distinct from the government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it

engages is a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make
the government responsible for his action; and (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action.
Without doubt, the transaction entered into by the GSIS is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to
the constitutional command. Therefore, the GSIS is directed to accept the matching bid of petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel.
GR NO. 161872
Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared
petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right
to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting
the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified
among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of
the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries,
and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed
by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing
in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles
and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no
plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause
of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as
many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be
regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation
since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be
subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
"opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent
impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous
foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations
specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on
"Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the

equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations
are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no
showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not
evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities
for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election.
The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates
with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is
not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would
be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of
these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual
determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order.
The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether
petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
GR NO. 174153
Title
Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006
SC en Banc
Facts
1.

On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino
Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the
1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative
and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").

2.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per
centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least threeper centum (3%) of its
registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of
the 6.3 million individuals.

3.

The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled
"Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition,
the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING
THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERALPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE
ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
4. On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in
the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

Issue
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's
petition.

Decision
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by
the People. Since the full text proposal was not presented to the people during the signing of the petition.
2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary. The present initiative must first comply with Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
3. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commission
on Elections.

GR NO. 118295
Taada, et al., v. Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

I.

THE FACTS
Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the Philippine

Senate of the Presidents ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a selfreliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified
Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
Further, they contended that the national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals
and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the
Filipino First policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.
II.

THE ISSUE
Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and

economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the Presidents
ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]

NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized,
deregulated and privatized.
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine
concurrence in the WTO Agreement.
[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at
the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are
unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them
either.In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that
is unfair.
xxx

xxx

xxx

[T]he constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not necessarily rule out
the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy
in the international community. As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this
constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic
seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom
from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of
natural resources and public utilities.
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without discrimination cannot
be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members.
Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity, the fundamental law encourages industries
that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered
domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with
the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity
to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong
have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez
faire.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products,
domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles while serving as judicial

and legislative guides are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally
fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that
serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity and the promotion of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby
justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and
judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO
Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.
We find no patent and gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or personal hostility in such exercise.
It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it
is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal
reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave
abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its
authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and
review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the
worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine
in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the
political desire of a member.