Reviewer in Political Law
Reviewer in Political Law
Reviewer in Political Law
Constitutional Law
Constitutional Law
separately, approve its enactment. In this case, the bill also officially
becomes a law.
DISQUALIFICATION
APPLICABLE WHEN
Cannot hold any other office or employment in the Govt or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
GOCCs or their subsidiaries. (Sec. 13, Article VI)
During his term. If he does so, he forfeits his seat. (Sec. 13,
Article VI)
Legislators cannot be appointed to any office. (Sec.
13, Article VI)
Constitutional Law
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Constitutional Law
Rules on Succession.
a) Vacancy at the beginning of the term.
i)
elect shall
act as President until a President shall have been chosen and
qualified.
iv) No President and Vice President chosen nor shall have
qualified,
or both shall have died or become permanently disabled: The
President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives shall act as President until a
President or a Vice President shall have been chosen and
qualified. In the event of inability of the officials mentioned,
Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one
who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or
a Vice President shall have qualified.
Constitutional Law
Constitutional Law
Constitutional Law
Constitutional Law
Constitutional Law
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Veto power (Sec. 27, Art. VI) 10. Power of general supervision over local
governments (Sec. 4, Art. X) 11. Power to
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A JUSTICIABLE QUESTION calls upon the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies
wherein there are rights (property or personal rights) involved which are legally demandable
and enforceable. It is one which is proper to be examined or decided in courts of justice
because its determination would not involve an encroachment upon the legislative or
executive power.
A POLITICAL QUESTION is one which under the Constitution is to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the validity or legality, of a particular measure or a
contested act.
In my more than 40 years of being a lawyer, I have never seen a busier Supreme Court than the present one, more
specifically the Supreme Court after the 1987 Constitution. So many controversial issues have seen their way into the
halls of this highest court in the land which in the past should have been initially resolved by the lower courts.
Government contracts and transactions of public interests have been brought for scrutiny at the first instance before
this supposed court of last resort by just about any individual or juridical entity having doubts as to their factual validity
and regularity. The emerging belief, though erroneous, is that the Supreme Court’s approval is required in
government deals or in any government action; a belief that has engendered the tendency to run to the Supreme
Court for all sorts of grievances or disagreements with certain government decisions. A case in point is the recent
filing by two lawyers of a petition questioning the controversial appointments of two commissioners to the recently
vacated posts in the Comelec.
To be sure, the Supreme Court seems to be "busier" now not because it wants to dip its finger into every pie. It really
has more work to do now because the 1987 Constitution expanded its power of judicial review not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government (Section 1, Article VIII). The new provision clearly "did not just grant the court the
power to do nothing". It gave the court greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent such grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government (Estrada vs. Desierto 353 SCRA 491). But can
the Supreme Court use this expanded power to review the presidential power to appoint, particularly of the two
Comelec commissioners?
Under the "political question" doctrine arising from the principle of separation of powers, the Judicial Branch cannot
decide questions "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government" (Taada vs. Cuenco 103 Phil.1068). In the matter of the power of appointment, there is no
question that it is executive in nature (Gov’t vs. Springer 50 Phil. 259). It is essentially a discretionary power of
the president performed according to "his best lights". (Luego vs. CSC 143 SCRA 327). The selection of the
appointee–taking into account the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his
personality – is the prerogative and a matter addressed solely to the discretion of the appointing authority
(Lapinid vs. CSC 197 SCRA 106). Thus both the Luego and Lapinid cases categorically declare that "this is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide".
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The 1987 Constitution has indeed limited the scope of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of
judicial review. Thus in the case of the president’s appointing power, judicial review may be done if grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction has been committed. This means that the
president’s exercise of the discretionary power to appoint according to his best lights is subject to the condition
that the appointee "should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be
faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred" (Luego, Supra). If he
does not, then the appointment may be questioned as a grave abuse of discretion.
In the case of the two Comelec Commissioners, there is clearly no grave abuse of discretion, not even any abuse of
discretion. It is unquestionable that the President has the power to appoint them (Sec.1[2] Art. IX C, Sec. 16, Art. VII).
Apparently, nobody has also questioned their qualifications for the position fixed by the Constitution (Sec.1[1] Art. IX
C). Questions have been raised only as to their character and personality and their alleged partisan inclinations which
have nothing to do with the minimum qualification requirements for the position. The Supreme Court should therefore
junk the petition for it merely raises issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of their appointment. The wisdom
or folly of their appointment, or any appointment for that matter, is the sole responsibility of the President to the
sovereign people. This is purely a political question.