Franciscan Alliance Et Al v. Burwell Et Al - Complaint
Franciscan Alliance Et Al v. Burwell Et Al - Complaint
Franciscan Alliance Et Al v. Burwell Et Al - Complaint
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attempts to redefine sex through legislation, and federal courts have repeatedly
rejected attempts to accomplish the same goal through litigation.
The Regulation not only forces healthcare professionals to violate their medical
judgment, it also forces them to violate their deeply held religious beliefs. Plaintiffs
include the Christian Medical & Dental Associations, which include over 17,000
healthcare professionals, and Franciscan Alliance, a network of religious hospitals
founded by the Sisters of St. Francis of Perpetual Adoration. These religious
organizations are deeply committed to the dignity of every human person, and their
doctors care for everyone with joy and compassion. They eagerly provide
comprehensive care to societys most vulnerable populations, but their religious
beliefs will not allow them to perform medical transition procedures that can be
deeply harmful to their patients. Tragically, the Regulation would force them to
violate those religious beliefs and perform harmful medical transition procedures or
else suffer massive financial liability.
The Regulation also undermines the longstanding sovereign power of the
States to regulate healthcare, ensure appropriate standards of medical judgment, and
protect its citizens constitutional and civil rights. Under this Rule, States are now
required to force all healthcare professionals at state-run facilities to participate in
medical transition procedures (including hormone therapy, plastic surgery,
hysterectomies, and gender reassignment surgery), and to cover those procedures in
the States health insurance plans, even if a doctor believes such procedures are
harmful to the patient. The Rule exposes the States to litigation by its employees and
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patients, despite the fact that neither Congress nor the States expressed any intent
to waive the States sovereign immunity in this area. And the Rule threatens to strip
the States of billions of dollars in federal healthcare fundingover $42.4 billion a
year for Texas alonejeopardizing the availability of healthcare for the nations most
vulnerable citizens.
Ultimately, this case boils down to a very simple question of statutory
interpretation: Can HHS redefine the term sex to thwart decades of settled
precedent and impose massive new obligations on healthcare professionals and
sovereign States? The answer is no, and the new Regulation must be set aside as a
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and multiple other federal laws and
constitutional provisions.
I. PARTIES
1.
integrity of the medical profession within its borders. Moreover, Texas zealously
protects the physician-patient relationship through numerous laws and regulations
ensure that physicians honor their duties to their patients and exercise appropriate
medical judgment when treating patients under their care. Texas also employs
thousands of healthcare employees through its constituent agencies. As an employer,
generally, Texas provides health benefits to hundreds of thousands of its employees
and their families through its constituent agencies. Moreover, Texas oversees and
controls several agencies and healthcare facilities that receive federal funding subject
to Title IX and the new Rule. Specifically, Texas operates healthcare facilities,
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programs, and schools of health education that receive federal funding administered
by HHS. For example, North Texas State Hospital is a mental healthcare facility of
the State of Texas and the largest state hospital in the Texas mental health system.
It consists of two campuses in northern Texas. It provides psychiatric services for
mentally ill persons and persons with mental illness and mental retardation
throughout the North Texas area, as well as the entire State. The campus in Wichita
Falls serves patients with mental illness and mental illness/mental retardation who
have been screened and referred by their local mental health facility, and forensic
psychiatric patients primarily referred for competency restoration. The Wichita Falls
campus is also Medicare certified. The Vernon campus provides maximum security
adult forensic psychiatric services to adults and secured forensic services to
adolescents referred from throughout the State.
2.
Kansas are all similarly situated to Texas in that they also have promulgated laws
and standards demonstrating their sovereign interest in the practice of medicine
within their borders. They are also subject to Title VII as the employers of thousands
of healthcare employees through their constituent agencies, oversee and control
several agencies and healthcare facilities that receive federal funding subject to Title
IX and the new Rule, and/or operate healthcare facilities, programs, and schools of
health education that receive federal funding administered by HHS.
3.
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that the supreme executive power shall be vested in the Governor. KY. CONST. 69.
The Commonwealth of Kentucky is similarly situated to Texas and the other Plaintiff
States in that it has promulgated laws and standards demonstrating its sovereign
interest in the practice of medicine within their borders. It is also subject to Title VII
as the employer of thousands of healthcare employees through its constituent
agencies, oversees and controls several agencies and healthcare facilities that receive
federal funding subject to Title IX and the new Rule, and/or operates healthcare
facilities, programs, and schools of health education that receive federal funding
administered by HHS.
4.
corporation doing business as the Christian Medical & Dental Associations. It has
many members who will be subject to the Regulation because they receive federal
funds, provide medical services that may be requested as part of a medical transition,
and provide health coverage for employees.
5.
hospital system founded by a Roman Catholic order, the Sisters of St. Francis of
Perpetual Adoration, and organized exclusively for charitable, religious, and
scientific purposes within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code. Franciscan is incorporated in Indiana, with its principal place of business in
Mishawaka, Indiana.
6.
founded in 1863 by Mother Maria Theresia Bonzel in Olpe, Germany. Twelve years
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later, in 1875, Mother Theresia sent six Sisters to Lafayette, Indiana, to bring St.
Francis of Assisis ministry of healthcare and education to the Midwest United States.
The first hospital building served as both a convent and a hospital. Three weeks after
their arrival, the Sisters admitted their first patient. They have continued their
healthcare ministry ever since.
7.
myriad of physician specialist services in the South Suburban Chicago area. Specialty
Physicians is a nonprofit Illinois limited liability company with its principal place of
business in Chicago Heights, Illinois. Specialty Physicians is a member managed
limited liability company, of which Franciscan is the sole member. Specialty
Physicians is organized exclusively for charitable, religious, and scientific purposes
within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Specialty
Physicians provides over $6 million dollars in Medicare and Medicaid services
annually to the poor, disabled, and elderly. Annually, it performs approximately
90,000 outpatient services.
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governmental
agencies
responsible
for
the
issuance
and
Department of Health and Human Services. She is sued in her official capacity only.
11.
Services is the agency that promulgated and now enforces the challenged Regulation.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
12.
and 1361.
13.
A.
14.
In March 2010, Congress passed, and President Obama signed into law,
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148 (March 23, 2010),
and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. 111-152 (March 30,
2010), collectively known as the Affordable Care Act or ACA.
15.
Section 1557 of the ACA states that no individual can be denied certain
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define terms such as sex. Section 1557s sole basis for prohibiting sex discrimination
is based on its reference to Title IX, 20 U.S.C.A. 1681 et seq.
16.
organization if the application of this subsection would not be consistent with the
religious tenets of such organization. 20 U.S.C.A. 1681.
17.
any person, or public or private entity, to provide or pay for any benefit or service,
including the use of facilities, related to an abortion. 20 U.S.C.A. 1688.
18.
At the time that the ACA was enacted in 2010, no federal courts and no
At the time that the ACA was enacted, and to this day, Congress has
repeatedly rejected attempts to expand the term sex in Title IX. Lawmakers have
also rejected multiple attempts to amend the Civil Rights Act to add the new
categories of sexual orientation and gender identity. The first such attempt was
in 1974, and there have been dozens of such attempts since then. All have failed.
20.
The ACA states that nothing in this title (or any amendment made by
this title), shall be construed to require a qualified health plan to provide [abortion
coverage] as part of its essential health benefits for any plan year. 42 U.S.C.A.
18023.
21.
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The Regulation.
22.
1557 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), to extend Title IXs definition of sex to
include gender identity, sex stereotypes, and termination of pregnancy, among
other things. 45 C.F.R. 92.4.
23.
The Rule was published as final May 18, 2016, and it expanded the
definition of gender identity even further from the proposed definition to mean an
individuals internal sense of gender, which may be male, female, neither, or a
combination of male and female. Id. HHS stated in the Rule that gender identity
spectrum includes an array of possible gender identities beyond male and female,
and individuals with non-binary gender identities are protected under the rule.
Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31375, 31392,
31384 (May 18, 2016). HHS cited as authority the Dear Colleague letter issued
10
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jointly by the Department of Education (DOE) and Department of Justice (DOJ) just
five days earlier. 1
24.
offer, or contract for health programs and activities that receive any Federal financial
assistance from HHS. 2 In light of this sweeping application, HHS has estimated the
Rule will likely cover[] almost all licensed physicians because they accept Federal
financial assistance, including payments from Medicare and Medicaid. 3 Other
observers have estimated that the Rule will apply to over 133,000 (virtually all)
hospitals, nursing homes, home health agencies, and similar provider facilities, about
445,000 clinical laboratories, 1,200 community health centers, 171 health-related
schools, state Medicaid and CHIP programs, state public health agencies, federally
facilitated and state-based marketplaces, at least 180 health insurers that market
U.S. Dept of Justice & U.S. Dept of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter, May 13,
2016, http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ixtransgender.pdf.
1
45 C.F.R. 92.4.
80 Fed. Reg. 54171, 54195 (proposed Sept. 8, 2015); 81 Fed. Reg. at 31445.
11
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and professionals, to perform (or refer for) medical transition procedures (such as
hysterectomies, mastectomies, hormone treatments, plastic surgery, etc.), if a
physician or healthcare provider offers analogous services in other contexts. For
example, in the preamble, HHS stated, A provider specializing in gynecological
services that previously declined to provide a medically necessary hysterectomy for a
transgender man would have to revise its policy to provide the procedure for
transgender individuals in the same manner it provides the procedure for other
individuals. 5 HHS explained that a hysterectomy in this medical transition context
would be medically necessary to treat gender dysphoria, 6 thereby declaring medical
Id. at 31429.
12
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necessity, benefit, and prudence as a matter of federal law, and without regard to the
opinions, judgment, and conscientious considerations of the many medical
professionals that hold views to the contrary.
28.
risks and ethics associated with various medical transition procedures, even within
the transgender community itself, the new Rule attempts to preempt the serious
medical and moral debate by concluding in the context of physicians offering health
services that a categorization of all transition-related treatment . . . as
experimental, is outdated and not based on current standards of care. 7 The
Regulation also improperly preempts the prerogative of the States not only to
regulate the healing professions, but also to maintain standards of care that rely upon
the medical judgment of health professionals as to what is in the best interests of
their patients.
29.
that health services need only be covered if they are deemed to be medically
necessary or medically appropriate in the professional opinion of those charged
with the care of the patient at issue. But HHS refused to make this clarification,
stating that some procedures related to gender transition may be required even if
they were not strictly identified as medically necessary or appropriate. 8 Thus, under
the Regulation, if a doctor would perform a mastectomy as part of a medically-
Id.
13
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necessary treatment for breast cancer, it would be illegal for the same doctor to
decline to perform a mastectomy for a medical transition, even if the doctor believed
that removing healthy breast tissue was contrary to the patients medical interest.
30.
patients for medical reasons, these health professionals have serious medical and
religious concerns with offering hormone treatment for a medical transition.
2.
32.
Id.
14
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such a view is based on the physicians professional training and best medical
judgment. This Regulation would thus force healthcare providers to alter speech and
medical advice to comply with the Rule.
33.
individuals preferred name and pronoun and insistence on using those corresponding
to the individuals sex assigned at birth constitutes illegal sex discrimination if such
conduct is sufficiently serious to create a hostile environment. 10
3.
34.
insurance plans from exercising judgment as to what they cover. HHS stated, [A]n
explicit, categorical (or automatic) exclusion or limitation of coverage for all health
services related to gender transition is unlawful on its face. 11
35.
necessary to treat gender dysphoria, the patients employer or insurance plan would
be required to cover the procedure on the same basis that it would cover it for other
conditions (like cancer). 12 HHS also stated that the range of transition-related
services, which includes treatment for gender dysphoria, is not limited to surgical
10
Id. at 31406.
11
Id. at 31429.
12
Id.
15
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treatments and may include, but is not limited to, services such as hormone therapy
and psychotherapy, which may occur over the lifetime of the individual. 13 As such,
coverage is required under the new Rule notwithstanding the rights of employers that
only offer employee health benefits consistent with the religious beliefs and values of
their organization.
36.
This health benefit requirement of the new Rule applies to any of the
following types of employers who receive HHS funding: 1) any entity principally
involved in providing or administering health services (including hospitals, nursing
homes, counseling centers, physicians offices, etc.), 2) any type of employer who
receives HHS funding for the primary purpose of funding an employee health benefit
program, or 3) any entity such as a university with a health training or research
13
Id. at 31435-36.
16
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Thus, employers who have always offered employee health benefits that
39.
With regard to facilities, the new Rule states that even for sex-specific
Congress was significantly concerned about protecting and preserving the privacy
rights of individuals in intimate areas. See 20 U.S.C. 1686, 117 Cong. Rec. 30407
(1971), 117 Cong. Rec. 39260 (1971), 117 Cong. Rec. 39263 (1971), and 118 Cong. Rec.
5807 (1972). And the predecessor agency of HHS, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW), promulgated regulations guaranteeing the privacy of
individuals in intimate areas. See 34 C.F.R. 106.32(b); 34 C.F.R. 106.33 (A
recipient may provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis
14
15
17
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of sex . . . .). Yet, HHS wholly disregarded any legal right to privacy that could be
violated simply by permitting another person access to a sex-specific program or
facility which corresponds to their gender identity. 16
41.
health programs or activities are allowable only where the covered entity can
demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justification, i.e., that the sex-specific
program is substantially related to the achievement of an important health-related
or scientific objective. HHS stated that it will expect a covered entity to supply
objective evidence, and empirical data if available, to justify the need to restrict
participation in the program to only one sex, and in no case will [HHS] accept a
justification that relies on overly broad generalizations about the sexes. 17
5.
42.
entity seeking federal financial assistance must now certify, in relevant part, that no
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, national origin, sex,
age, or disability be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any health program or activity for which the
Applicant receives Federal financial assistance from the Department. 18
16
17
Id. at 31409.
18
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compliance with the Rule in conspicuous locations by October 16, 2016 (90 days from
the effective date). HHS provided a sample notice in Appendix A to the new Rule,
which states in relevant part that the covered entity does not exclude people or treat
them differently because of race, color, national origin, age, disability, or sex. 19
6.
44.
Covered entities that are found to violate the Regulation may lose their
federal funding, be barred from doing business with the government, or risk false
claims liability. 21
46.
Department of Justice. 22
47.
who believe the covered entity has violated the new Rule. 23
20
22
23
7.
48.
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No Religious Exemption.
basis of sex. Instead, Congress specifically invoked Title IX, 20 U.S.C.A. 1681 et
seq., which includes both a ban on sex discrimination and a generous carve-out for
religious organizations. In this Regulation interpreting Section 1557, however, HHS
has interpreted Congresss reference to Title IX to include the ban, but not the
religious exemption.
49.
Regulation due to the obvious implications for religious healthcare providers, HHS
declined to do so, stating instead that religious objectors could assert claims under
existing statutory protections for religious freedom. 24 HHS also failed to provide any
mechanism by which a religious entity could determine if it was entitled to any
existing religious protections under the law.
C.
50.
medical care, usurps the States legitimate authority over its medical facilities, and
makes it impossible for States to comply with conflicting federal law, among other
harms.
1.
51.
Standard of Care.
profession, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007), as well as an interest in
24
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For
example,
Texas
zealously
protects
the
physician-patient
relationship. Numerous Texas laws and regulations ensure that physicians honor
their duties to their patients. The statewide standard of medical practice rests on the
principle that Texas doctors must exercise independent medical judgment when
treating patients under their care. See, e.g., Murk v. Scheele, 120 S.W.3d 865, 867
(Tex. 2003) (per curiam).
53.
ACA, the Texas Legislature redoubled its longstanding commitment to physicianpatient autonomy. See Garcia v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Examrs, 384 F. Supp. 434,
439 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (upholding regulations designed to preserve the vitally
important doctor-patient relationship). In 2011, the Legislature prohibited medical
organizations from interfering with, controlling, or directing a physicians
professional judgment, Tex. Occ. Code 162.0021, and it mandated that they permit
physicians to exercise independent medical judgment when providing care to
patients, Id. 162.0022.
54.
medical officer to supervise all matters relating to the practice of medicine. Tex.
Health & Safety Code 311.083. The chief medical officer is responsible for adopting
21
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policies to ensure that physicians have the ability to exercise independent medical
judgment. Id. This officer must report to the Texas Medical Board (TMB)the
executive agency responsible for regulating the practice of medicine in Texasany
action or event that constitutes a compromise of the independent medical judgment
of a physician in caring for a patient. Id.
55.
when in need of medical attention. The standard of care established in Texas, and
around the country, enables patients to obtain quality healthcare as determined by
medical professionals, and not those outside the doctor-patient relationship. The
Regulation, however, usurps this standard of care. It discards independent medical
judgment and a physicians duty to his or her patients permanent well-being and
replaces them with rigid commands.
57.
22
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action. And beyond compelling physicians to act against their medical judgment, the
Regulation requires them to express opinions contrary to what they deem to be in the
patients best interest or to avoid even describing medical transition procedures as
risky or experimental. Yet, physicians are under a duty to make reasonable
disclosure of that diagnosis, and risk of the proposed treatment . . ., as would have
been made by a reasonable medical practitioner under the circumstances. Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex. 1975) (citing Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.
1967); W. M. Moldoff, Annotation, Malpractice: physician's duty to inform patient of
nature and hazards of disease or treatment, 79 A.L.R.2d 1028 (1961)). Patients
deserve betterand are treated more humanelyunder State law.
2.
58.
These covered entities, which exist across the country, will now be
covered under the Regulation with respect to all of the operations of such entities.
Thus, these entities will have to offer all manner of (and referrals for) medical
transition procedures and treatments. As a result, Texas and other States will be
23
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forced to allocate personnel, resources, and facility spaces to offer and accommodate
the myriad medical transition procedures now required to be performed under the
new Rule. Healthcare facilities will also be required to open up sex-separated
showers, locker rooms, or other facilities based on individual preference. This is true
even in controlled medical locations where patient access to intimate facilities is often
under the control of healthcare professionals that are supposed to act in the best
interests of the patient. Thus, the requirements of the new Rule amount to a
substantial interference in the control that Texas and other States legitimately
exercise over their healthcare facilities.
3.
60.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits
illegal, placing employers between a legal Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand,
employers are required under Title VII to reasonably accommodate their employees
religious and conscientious objections. On the other hand, the Regulation requires
medical employers to provide (or refer for) medical transition procedures even when
24
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Additional Harms.
The Regulation is costly and burdensome on Texas and other States for
Texas and other States operate as employers that offer covered health
benefits to hundreds of thousands of its employees and their families through its
constituent agencies. The new Rule will require Texas and other States to provide
insurance coverage for medical transition procedures.
64.
The new Rule also purports to require Texas and other States to provide
abortion coverage through its employee health benefits. HHS states that a States
Medicaid program constitutes a covered health program or activity under the Rule.
Thus, the State will be governed by Section 1557 in the provision of employee health
benefits for its Medicaid employees. 81 Fed. Reg. at 31437. Texas and other States
will also have to offer these types of employee benefits to employees at other statecontrolled healthcare entities.
65.
25
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procedures will now be illegal under the new Rule. As a result, Texas and other States
will be required to change their insurance coverage. 25
66.
must
submit
assurances,
notices
of
compliance,
and
other
information,
demonstrating that their health programs and activities satisfy the requirements
imposed by the Regulation. 81 Fed. Reg. at 31392, 31442.
67.
modest estimates. HHS estimates that 7,637,306 state workers will need to receive
training under the new Rule, and that the cost of this training in the first two years
of implementation alone will be $17.8 million.
68.
coercive. Texas, as an example, faces the loss of over $42.4 billion a year in healthcare
funding to serve its most vulnerable citizens. 26 For example, the Medicaid program
pays for more than half of all births in Texas, a cost that otherwise would be
shouldered primarily at the local and provider level, and the Emergency Medicaid
program pays for the emergency conditions of indigent noncitizens (undocumented
Texas and other States do not provide health coverage to their employees
for the termination of a pregnancy, absent certain medically compelled
circumstances. See, e.g., HealthSelect of Texas, Master Benefit Plan Document, at
pp. 8788 (effective Jan. 1, 2016), http://healthselectoftexas.welcometouhc.com/
assets/pdf/HS%20In-Area%201-2016%20MBPD%20Revised%20FINAL.pdf.
25
Tex. Health and Human Servs. Commn, Texas Medicaid and CHIP in
Perspective 8-9 (10th ed. 2015), http://www.hhsc.state.tx.us/medicaid/about/PB/
PinkBook.pdf.
26
26
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immigrants and LPRs) who meet all Medicaid eligibility criteria other than
citizenship. 27
69.
Finally, the new Rule could subject Texas and other States to private
lawsuits for damages and attorneys fees, even though Texas and other States did not
and could not have known or consented to this waiver of their sovereign immunity.
D.
70.
Christian Medical & Dental Association (CMDA) provides a variety of programs and
services supporting its mission to change hearts in healthcare. CMDA promotes
positions and addresses policies on healthcare issues; serves others through overseas
medical mission projects; coordinates a network of Christian healthcare professionals
for fellowship and professional growth; sponsors student ministries in medical and
dental schools; distributes educational resources; provides continuing education for
doctors serving missions in developing countries; and conducts academic exchange
programs overseas. Its members sign a statement of faith to join CMDA and allow
CMDA to serve as a voice for membership values.
71.
Tex. Health and Human Servs. Commn & Tex. Dept of Ins., Impact on
Texas If Medicaid Is Eliminated 20 (2009), http://www.hhsc.state.tx.us/hb497_122010.pdf.
27
27
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28
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to
affirm
transgender
ideology,
provide
medical
29
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for services that they believe to be morally wrong or harmful to patients. CMDA also
makes clear that [t]o decline to provide a requested gender-altering treatment that
is harmful or is not medically indicated does not constitute unjust discrimination
against persons. Id.
76.
their ability to engage in speech advising patients of their medical judgment with
regard to gender transition procedures, as well as to avoid being forced to offer
services or facilities in furtherance of gender transitions.
77.
and who provide services such as hysterectomies, breast reconstruction, and hormone
therapy for other medical reasons. Those members would be required to provide those
services as part of a medical transition procedure under the Regulation.
78.
individuals, and who may be liable for failure to provide or refer for medical transition
procedures.
E.
80.
Since its founding over 140 years ago, Franciscan Alliance has
30
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spiritual needs of employees, patients, and their families. For instance, St.
Anthonys hospital at Crown Point administers sacraments daily upon request,
provides daily Mass, and maintains 24-hour access to the Corpus Christi Chapel to
provide a sacred space for individuals of all faiths to pray and meditate.
Franciscans hospital in Munster, Indiana, provides spiritual care staff to visit with
all newly admitted patients, offers opportunities for prayer and spiritual support,
and maintains a Franciscan priest on staff for Catholic patients and staff who wish
to participate in Catholic Mass or receive the sacraments of Holy Communion,
Reconciliation, or Anointing of the Sick.
81.
seeking to ensure that patients and their families can access the resources of their
own faith traditions to assist in the healing and recovery process, and to make
critical decisions about matters such as end-of-life care and clinical ethics.
82.
Respect for life: treating each person with respect, dignity, fairness,
and compassion so that each person is consciously aware of being
loved.
31
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84.
in a manner that abides by The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
Healthcare Services, as promulgated by the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops and interpreted by the local Bishop.
85.
32
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89.
offer medical services that violate its best medical judgment and religious beliefs,
and 2) requiring Franciscan to provide insurance coverage for services that violate
its religious beliefs.
1.
90.
individual who needs and qualifies for its care, including to individuals who identify
as transgender. Thus, for instance, if a transgender individual required cardiac
care, Franciscan would provide the same full spectrum of compassionate care for
that individual as it provides for every other cardiac patient. And, just as it does for
every other cardiac patient, Franciscan would appropriately tailor that care to the
biologically sex-specific health needs of the patient.
91.
objective fact rooted in nature as male or female persons. Like the Catholic Church
it serves, Franciscan believes that a persons sex is ascertained biologically, and not
by ones beliefs, desires, or feelings. Franciscan believes that part of the image of
God is an organic part of every man and woman, and that women and men reflect
33
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Gods image in unique, and uniquely dignified, ways. Franciscan does not believe
that government has either the power or the authority to redefine sex.
92.
gender transition services is not in keeping with the best interests of its patients.
Franciscan does not offer the full continuum of care related to gender transition
procedures, and thus would not be able to provide ideal care to patients seeking that
care.
94.
exercise of Franciscan.
95.
the following policy entitled the Sex Reassignment Interventions Policy: Sexual
reassignment interventions require a complex set of psychological, psychiatric and
ancillary care services that are not available at Franciscan facilities. Therefore, it
34
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hysterectomies for gender transition, would result in the sterilization of the patient.
Since Franciscan does not believe such a hysterectomy is medically necessary, being
forced to provide such a sterilization procedure would violate Franciscans best
medical judgment and religious beliefs.
98.
35
2.
99.
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party administrator.
101.
102.
Sterilizations;
Abortions.
Franciscan must now choose between (a) following its faith and its best
medical judgment, or (b) following the Regulation. If it follows its faith and its
medical judgment, Franciscan will be subject to lawsuits and penalties. Most
significantly, Franciscan annually provides approximately 900 million dollars in
Medicare and Medicaid services to the poor, disabled, and elderly, and it also
receives approximately $300,000 in HHS grants. If Franciscan refuses to both deny
its faith and lower its standard of care, it risks losing that funding and suffering a
36
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corresponding severe reduction in its capacity to carry out its religious mission to
serve the poor, disabled, and elderly.
104.
business with its third party administrator. The Regulation subjects the third party
administrator to potential liability for administering Franciscans religious health
plan, and thus Franciscan will be forced to indemnify its third party administrator
from this liability. This constitutes an additional substantial burden on its religious
exercise.
F.
105.
Medicaid services annually to the poor, disabled, and elderly. Annually, it performs
approximately 90,000 outpatient services.
108.
services, which will result in Specialty Physicians being impacted by the Regulation
37
Page 38 of 79 PageID 38
in the same manner as Franciscan, in that it will be forced to offer medical services
that violate its religious beliefs under the new Regulation.
109.
112.
Defendants are agencies under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 551(1), and the
new Regulation complained of herein is a rule under the APA, id. 551(4), and
constitutes [a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court. Id. 704.
113.
The APA prohibits agency actions that are not in accordance with law.
5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). Under the APA, courts review questions of law freely and are
under no obligation to defer to the agencys legal conclusions. Inst. for Tech. Dev. v.
38
Page 39 of 79 PageID 39
Brown, 63 F.3d 445, 450 (5th Cir. 1995). In such a context, a courts review is
effectively de novo. Id.; see also Velasquez-Tabir v. I.N.S., 127 F.3d 456, 459 n.9 (5th
Cir. 1997) (under the APA, [r]eview of a question of law is de novo); Meadows v.
S.E.C., 119 F.3d 1219, 1224 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that when reviewing agency
action, legal conclusions are for the courts to resolve (internal quotation mark
omitted)). The Regulation is not in accordance with law for a number of independent
reasons.
114.
39
Page 40 of 79 PageID 40
within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), for the federal government to dictate
appropriate medical views on the necessity and experimental nature of medical
transition procedures, and to dictate what constitutes best standards of care in an
area of science and medicine that is being hotly debated in the medical community.
This violates constitutional and statutory rights of medical professionals, including
substantive due process rights and freedom of speech protections.
116.
Care Act (42 U.S.C. 18116) or Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. 1681 et seq. Section 1557 does not, on its own terms, prohibit discrimination
on the basis of sex. Instead, it prohibits discrimination on the ground prohibited
under . . . title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. 42 U.S.C. 18116(a). Title
IX, in turn, prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex . . . except that . . . this section
shall not apply to an educational institution which is controlled by a religious
organization if the application of this subsection would not be consistent with the
religious tenets of such organization. 20 U.S.C. 1681(a), (a)(3).
117.
Neither Section 1557 nor Title IX uses the term sex to include gender
identity. Thus, HHSs attempt to expand the definition is not in accordance with law
within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A).
118.
parallels the religious exemption in Title IX is also not in accordance with law within
the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A).
40
Page 41 of 79 PageID 41
related services is not in accordance with law within the meaning of 5 U.S.C.
706(2)(A) because it is inconsistent with the Church Amendments, 42 U.S.C. 300a7(b), which protect the right of healthcare entities who receive federal funding to
refuse to participate in or assist with sterilizations.
120.
services is not in accordance with law within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A)
because it is inconsistent with the plain language of Title IX, which prohibits
requiring coverage, payment, or the use of facilities for abortion.
121.
services is not in accordance with law within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A)
because it is inconsistent with the Church Amendments, 42 U.S.C. 300a-7(b), which
protect the right of healthcare entities who receive federal funding to refuse to
participate in or assist with abortions.
122.
services is not in accordance with law within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A)
because it is inconsistent with Section 245 of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.
238(n), which prohibits the federal government and any state or local government
receiving federal financial assistance from discriminating against any healthcare
entity on the basis that the entity refuses to perform abortions, provide referrals for
abortions, or to make arrangements for such abortions.
41
Page 42 of 79 PageID 42
services is not in accordance with law within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A)
because it is inconsistent with the Weldon Amendment, which has been readopted or
incorporated by reference in every HHS appropriations act since 2005, 29 and provides
that no funds may be made available under HHS appropriations act to a government
entity that discriminates against an institution or individual physician or healthcare
professional on the basis that the entity or individual does not provide, pay for,
provide coverage of, or refer for abortions.
124.
services is not in accordance with law within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A)
because it is inconsistent with Section 1303(b)(4) of the ACA, 42 U.S.C. 18023,
which states that [n]o qualified health plan offered through an Exchange may
discriminate against any individual health care provider or health care facility
because of its unwillingness to provide, pay for, provide coverage of, or refer for
abortions.
125.
The Regulation is not in accordance with Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.). Title VII prohibits employers from
discriminating against employees on the basis of religion. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2. This
means that employers, including Plaintiffs, have a duty to reasonably accommodate
their employees religious practices unless doing so would cause undue hardship to
42
Page 43 of 79 PageID 43
to gender transition. This is not in accordance with substantive due process rights
protecting a medical professionals right to not perform a procedure he or she believes
to be experimental, ethically questionable, and potentially harmful.
43
Page 44 of 79 PageID 44
prohibits the federal government from co-opting a states control over budgetary
processes and legislative agendas.
132.
44
Page 45 of 79 PageID 45
138.
139.
140.
142.
144.
Defendants are agencies under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 551(1), and the
new Regulation complained of herein is a rule under the APA, id. 551(4), and
constitutes [a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court. Id. 704.
145.
45
Page 46 of 79 PageID 46
procedures (or refer for the same) that may not be necessary or appropriate, and may
in fact be harmful to the patients.
147.
jurisdiction for HHS to dictate appropriate medical views on the necessity and
experimental nature of medical transition procedures, or to dictate what constitutes
best standards of care in an area of science and medicine that is being hotly debated
in the medical community.
148.
46
Page 47 of 79 PageID 47
inconsistent with the plain language of Title IX, which prohibits requiring coverage,
payment, or the use of facilities for abortion.
152.
47
Page 48 of 79 PageID 48
act in violation of Title VII by not accommodating their employees religious and
conscientious objections to participating in (or referring for) medical transition
treatment or procedures is in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, and
limitations within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(C).
157.
48
Page 49 of 79 PageID 49
49
Page 50 of 79 PageID 50
174.
176.
Defendants are agencies under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 551(1), and the
new Regulation complained of herein is a rule under the APA, id. 551(4), and
50
Page 51 of 79 PageID 51
constitutes [a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court. Id. 704.
177.
The APA prohibits agency actions that are arbitrary, capricious, [or] an
For the reasons discussed above, it is arbitrary and capricious for HHS
51
Page 52 of 79 PageID 52
for abortion and abortion-related services is arbitrary and capricious within the
meaning of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A).
184.
52
Page 53 of 79 PageID 53
capricious within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) because it is void under the
First and Fifth Amendment for vagueness.
189.
capricious within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) because it co-opts States control
over budgetary processes and legislative agendas contrary to the Tenth Amendment.
191.
capricious within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) because it violates the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act.
53
Page 54 of 79 PageID 54
capricious within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) because it violates the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
195.
capricious within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) because it violates the Fifth
Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection clauses.
196.
201.
54
Page 55 of 79 PageID 55
203.
The Plaintiffs plan to continue using their best medical and ethical
judgment in treating and advising patients. Performing (or referring for) medical
transition procedures is contrary to their best medical and/or ethical judgment.
204.
professional opinions that medical transition procedures are not the best standard of
care or are experimental.
206.
contrary to the religious and conscientious beliefs of the Plaintiffs, and their beliefs
prohibit them from conducting, participating in, or referring for such procedures.
207.
55
Page 56 of 79 PageID 56
religious views that medical transition procedures are not the best standard of care
or are experimental.
209.
The Regulation would compel the Plaintiffs to speak in ways that they
compelled speech as secured to them by the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
211.
215.
56
Page 57 of 79 PageID 57
religious or conscientious viewpoint that medical transition procedures are not the
best standard of care.
219.
Plaintiffs speech.
220.
225.
57
Page 58 of 79 PageID 58
This exposes the Plaintiffs to penalties for expressing their medical and
moral views of medical transition procedures. It also prohibits Plaintiffs from using
their medical judgment to determine the appropriate standard of care for interactions
with their patients.
228.
231.
governmental interest.
232.
them by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment by prohibiting speech that would otherwise be protected.
234.
58
Page 59 of 79 PageID 59
COUNT VII
Violation of the First and Fifth Amendments of the United States
Constitution
Freedom of Speech and Due Process
Void for Vagueness
235.
236.
nondiscriminatory criteria that it uses for other conditions when the coverage
determination is related to gender transition and decline[s] to limit application of
the rule by specifying that coverage for the health services addressed in
92.207(b)(3)(5) must be provided only when the services are medically necessary
or medically appropriate. 81 Fed. Reg. at 31435.
237.
59
Page 60 of 79 PageID 60
The Regulation does not provide a limiting construction for what the
current standard of care is, nor does it provide guidance as to how physicians can rely
on their best medical judgment when it conflicts with the Regulation.
241.
242.
services they will be required to provide and perform, Defendants have violated the
Plaintiffs rights secured to them by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
244.
246.
60
Page 61 of 79 PageID 61
practice is discriminatory typically requires a nuanced analysis that is factdependent. 81 Fed. Reg. at 31377.
248.
under this part would violate applicable Federal statutory protections for religious
freedom and conscience, such application shall not be required. 45 C.F.R. 92.2(b)(2).
249.
provided or made available, and because Defendants have sole discretion over the
application of the Regulation and any religious freedom protection that applies, the
Regulation vests unbridled discretion over which organizations will have their First
Amendment interests accommodated.
250.
discrimination in federally funded education programs, except that it made clear that
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require or prohibit any person, or public
or private entity, to provide or pay for any benefit or service, including the use of
61
Page 62 of 79 PageID 62
255.
receipt of federal funding. See Agency for Intl Dev. v. Alliance for Open Socy Intl,
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2331 (2013).
256.
standards of care for patients that violate Plaintiffs religious and conscientious
62
Page 63 of 79 PageID 63
beliefs, as well as their medical judgment, and also interfere with the Plaintiffs
practice of medicine.
258.
Plaintiffs receipt of federal funding and violate Plaintiffs rights as secured to them
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
259.
261.
procedures, and services with the goal of transitioning from one sex to another violate
their religious beliefs.
262.
procedures, and services that result in elective sterilizations violate their religious
beliefs.
263.
procedures, services, and activities that contradict the Plaintiffs religious beliefs and
message.
63
Page 64 of 79 PageID 64
insurance coverage for procedures, services, and activities that violate Plaintiffs
religious beliefs and message.
266.
The Regulation exposes the Plaintiffs to civil suits that would hold them
liable for practicing and expressing their sincerely held religious beliefs.
269.
270.
272.
from deliberately offering services and performing (or referring for) operations or
other procedures required by the Regulation. The Plaintiffs compliance with these
beliefs is a religious exercise.
64
Page 65 of 79 PageID 65
278.
U.S.C. 1035.
281.
The Regulation exposes the Plaintiffs to civil suits that would hold them
religious exercise.
65
Page 66 of 79 PageID 66
283.
284.
287.
For the same reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs sincerely held religious
beliefs prohibit them from deliberately offering health insurance that would cover
gender
transition
procedures,
sterilization
procedures,
or
abortion-related
procedures.
288.
facially invalid.
66
Page 67 of 79 PageID 67
The Regulation also makes it much more expensive for Franciscan and
U.S.C. 1035.
297.
The Regulation exposes the Plaintiffs to civil suits that would hold them
religious exercise.
299.
300.
67
Page 68 of 79 PageID 68
303.
them to choose between federal funding and their livelihood as healthcare providers
and their exercise of religion.
305.
and organizations such as the Plaintiffs, while allowing exemptions for similar
conduct based on secular and non-religious reasons. Thus, the Regulation is neither
neutral nor generally applicable.
306.
307.
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
309.
68
Page 69 of 79 PageID 69
COUNT XIV
Violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Due Process Clause
Substantive Due Process
310.
311.
rights to provide medical treatment in accordance with their moral and religious
beliefs.
312.
313.
interest.
316.
317.
due process.
319.
69
Page 70 of 79 PageID 70
COUNT XV
Violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Due Process and Equal Protection
320.
321.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment mandates the equal
327.
When Congress exercises its Spending Clause power against the States,
the United States Supreme Court has held that principles of federalism require
70
Page 71 of 79 PageID 71
term sex in the manner put forth by Defendants. While Congress has expressed its
intent to cover gender identity, as a protected class, in other pieces of legislation,
see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 249(a)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. 13925(b)(13)(A), it has not done so
regarding Title IX. In other legislation, Congress included gender identity along
with sex, thus evidencing its intent for sex in Title IX to retain its original and
only meaningones immutable, biological sex as acknowledged at or before birth.
329.
HHS in Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act. Section 1557 does not add a new
non-discrimination provision to the federal code, but merely incorporates by reference
71
Page 72 of 79 PageID 72
pre-existing provisions under Title VI, Title IX, the Americans with Disabilities Act,
and the Rehabilitation Act. Section 1557 does not independently define terms such
as sex.
330.
At the time that the ACA was passed in 2010, no federal courts or
to require . . . any person, or public or private entity, to provide or pay for any benefit
or service, including the use of facilities, related to an abortion. 20 U.S.C.A. 1688.
332.
Thus, no State could fathom, much less clearly understand, that the
and the new Regulation complained of herein is a rule under the APA, id. 551(4),
and constitutes [a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court. Id. 704. The APA requires
the Court to hold unlawful and set aside any agency action that is contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity or in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right. Id. 706(2)(B)(C).
Thus, the Spending Clause violations articulated herein provide the Court with an
additional basis to set aside the new Rule under the APA.
72
Page 73 of 79 PageID 73
COUNT XVII
Unlawful Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity
334.
335.
unless it makes that intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute and acts pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726, 728
n.2 (2003).
336.
language of the relevant statutes, and Defendants did not act pursuant to a valid
exercise of federal power under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
337.
In enacting Section 1557 of the ACA, Congress did not make findings
regarding gender identity, but merely incorporated existing law under Title IX,
which does not extend to gender identity. Congress has in fact declined to pass
specific gender identity legislation on numerous occasions.
338.
73
Page 74 of 79 PageID 74
and the new Regulation complained of herein is a rule under the APA, id. 551(4),
and constitutes [a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court. Id. 704. The APA requires
the Court to hold unlawful and set aside any agency action that is contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity or in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right. Id. 706(2)(B)(C).
Thus, the improper abrogation of the States sovereign immunity articulated herein
provides the Court with an additional basis to set aside the new Rule under the APA.
COUNT XVIII
Violation of the Spending Clause
The Regulation is Unlawful and Unconstitutionally Coercive
341.
342.
The federal government cannot use its Spending Clause powers to coerce
The Supreme Court struck down a similar attempt under the ACA
because such conditions take the form of threats to terminate other significant
independent grants, and are therefore properly viewed as a means of pressuring the
States to accept policy changes. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604.
74
Page 75 of 79 PageID 75
it refuses to comply with the Regulation, Defendants have left the State no real choice
but to acquiesce in such policy. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (The threatened loss of
over 10 percent of a States overall budget, in contrast, is economic dragooning that
leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce. . . .).
346.
presence of clear notice. Congress may use its spending power to create incentives
for [entities] to act in accordance with federal policies. But when pressure turns into
compulsion, the legislation runs contrary to our system of federalism. NFIB, 132 S.
Ct. at 2602 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937))
(internal citation omitted). That is true whether Congress directly commands a State
to regulate or indirectly coerces a State to adopt a federal regulatory system as its
own. Id.
347.
conditions for the receipt of federal funds after the States had already accepted
Congresss original conditions. But [t]he legitimacy of Congresss exercise of the
spending power thus rests on whether the [entity] voluntarily and knowingly accepts
the terms of the contract. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
75
Page 76 of 79 PageID 76
and the new Regulation complained of herein is a rule under the APA, id. 551(4),
and constitutes [a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court. Id. 704. The APA requires
the Court to hold unlawful and set aside any agency action that is contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity or in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right. Id. 706(2)(B)(C).
Thus, the Spending Clause violations articulated herein provide the Court with an
additional basis to set aside the new Rule under the APA.
COUNT XIX
The Regulation Unlawfully Commandeers the States
349.
350.
Article I and invades the powers reserved to the States in the Tenth Amendment.
COUNT XX
Unconstitutional Exercise of Federal Power in Violation of the Tenth
Amendment
352.
353.
State Plaintiffs cannot afford the exorbitant and unfunded costs of the
76
Page 77 of 79 PageID 77
processes and legislative agendas through compelling them to assume costs they
cannot afford, the new Rule invades their sovereign sphere.
355.
The new Rule violates the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
77
Page 78 of 79 PageID 78
g.
h.
i.
Award Plaintiffs the costs of this action and reasonable attorneys fees;
and
j.
Award such other and further relief as it deems equitable and just.
VI. JURY DEMAND
78
Page 79 of 79 PageID 79
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas
JEFFREY C. MATEER
First Assistant Attorney General
BRANTLEY STARR
Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
PRERAK SHAH
Senior Counsel to the Attorney General
ANDREW D. LEONIE
Associate Deputy Attorney General for
Special Litigation
AUSTIN R. NIMOCKS
Associate Deputy Attorney General for
Special Litigation
/s/ Austin R. Nimocks
AUSTIN R. NIMOCKS
Texas Bar No. 24002695
[email protected]
MICHAEL C. TOTH
Senior Counsel for Special Litigation
Special Litigation Division
P.O. Box 12548, Mail Code 009
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
(512) 936-1414
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
STATE OF TEXAS; STATE OF
WISCONSIN; STATE OF
NEBRASKA; COMMONWEALTH
OF KENTUCKY, by and through
Governor Matthew G. Bevin; and
STATE OF KANSAS
79