Key v. Ashcroft, 4th Cir. (2003)
Key v. Ashcroft, 4th Cir. (2003)
Key v. Ashcroft, 4th Cir. (2003)
No. 02-1805
COUNSEL
Ronald D. Richey, RONALD D. RICHEY & ASSOCIATES, Rockville, Maryland, for Petitioner. Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant
Attorney General, Linda S. Wendtland, Larry P. Cote, Office of
Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C. for Respondent.
KEY v. INS
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Musilimot Oluwatoyin Key petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("Board") denial of her motion to reopen her
deportation proceedings. Key is a citizen and native of Nigeria. She
is married to an American citizen and has four children, including two
young daughters. Keys motion to reopen is based on her eligibility
for asylum based on alleged changed circumstances in Nigeria involving its laws, tribal customs, and country conditions. The crux of these
allegations is Keys fear of her father in Nigeria, who demands that
Keys five-year-old daughter be subjected to female genital mutilation
if the daughter visits Nigeria. Key alternatively claims she is eligible
for an adjustment in status based on her marital status. For the following reasons, we deny Keys petition for review.
We review the Boards denial of a motion to reopen or a motion
to reconsider for abuse of discretion. 8 C.F.R. 3.2(a) (2002); INS v.
Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1992); Stewart v. INS, 181 F.3d 587,
595 (4th Cir. 1999). We utilize extreme deference in reviewing the
denial of a motion to reopen because immigration statutes do not contemplate reopening and the applicable regulations disfavor motions to
reopen. M.A. v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc). The
denial of a motion to reopen is an abuse of discretion when the denial
is "arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law." Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290
F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 592
(3d Cir. 1994)). See also Gottesman v. INS, 33 F.3d 383, 389 (4th Cir.
1994) (holding the Boards decision will be upheld unless petitioners
show it was arbitrary or capricious).
The Board cannot grant a motion to reopen when the alleged detrimental change in circumstances was previously available but not
presented in prior deportation proceedings. "A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evi-
KEY v. INS
dence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could
not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. . . ." 8
C.F.R. 3.2(c)(1)(2002).
In reviewing Keys motion to reopen based on her petition for asylum, we find the Government has presented credible evidence that
Key knew of the conflict with her father as early as the birth date of
her daughter, long before the deportation hearing in which Key conceded deportability before the immigration judge. Moreover, the precedent Key claims represents a significant change in the law, see
Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996) (holding petitioner challenging deportation order can raise female genital mutilation as basis for asylum in motion to reopen), was published and
available to Key prior to her initial deportation hearing in November
1996. Thus Kasinga did not constitute a significant change in the law
at the hearing before the immigration judge.
We also deny Keys motion to reopen on the basis that her marital
status warrants an adjustment of status. The Board correctly found
that this claim was untimely filed. See 8 C.F.R. 3.2(c)(2) (2000).*
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
*A motion to reopen that applies for asylum based on changed circumstances that are material and previously unavailable is not subject to the
ninety-day filing period. The Board denied the motion to reopen as
untimely only insofar as Key attempts to claim an adjustment of status
in her motion to reopen.