United States v. Reginald Boone, 94 F.3d 642, 4th Cir. (1996)
United States v. Reginald Boone, 94 F.3d 642, 4th Cir. (1996)
United States v. Reginald Boone, 94 F.3d 642, 4th Cir. (1996)
3d 642
Reginald Boone appeals his sentence imposed by the district court on remand
from this court's decision in United States v. Harris, 39 F.3d 1262 (4th
Cir.1994).1 We vacate Appellant's conviction on Count 36, affirm the
remainder of Appellant's convictions, and remand for resentencing.
Appellant first claims that the district court erred in sentencing him as a career
offender under 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.2 However, Appellant
failed to raise this objection at either of his two sentencing hearings. See United
States v. Terry, 916 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir.1990). Therefore, we review only
for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, ----, 61 U.S.L.W. 4421,
4423 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1993) (No. 91-1306). Although Appellant points out some
Appellant notes a related objection to the district court's adoption of the PSR's
criminal history calculations. However, Appellant's career offender status sets
his criminal history category at VI. See USSG 4B1.1. Accordingly, his appeal
on this issue is mooted by our finding that he was properly sentenced as a
career offender.
Finally, Appellant contends that his convictions on Counts 27 and 36 for use of
a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C.A. 924(c) (West
Supp.1996), are improper in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v.
United States, --- U.S. ----, 64 U.S.L.W. 4039 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1995) (Nos.947448, 94-7492), which was decided during the pendency of this appeal. As the
Government concedes in its supplemental brief, the facts underlying Appellant's
conviction on Count 36 are virtually indistinguishable from the facts of Bailey,
and Appellant's conviction was premised on a definition of "use" expressly
forbidden by the Supreme Court in that case. We find that Bailey applies to
cases on appeal; accordingly, we vacate Appellant's conviction on Count 36
and remand for resentencing. 3
In light of our order vacating Appellant's conviction on Count 36, we need not
reach his contention that he should not have received separate, consecutive
sentences on his two 924(c) convictions