Tennyson Walters V., 3rd Cir. (2016)
Tennyson Walters V., 3rd Cir. (2016)
Tennyson Walters V., 3rd Cir. (2016)
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 157(b)(1) and (b)(2)(I). The
District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. 1291.
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debtors also claimed the bankruptcy judge was biased because she decided seventeen
pleadings and motions in favor of Tehrani. Id. Finally, the debtors contended there was
a pattern from the series of pleadings by plaintiff and the corresponding rulings by the
court, designed so [a]ll of the ducks would then be in line for the bankruptcy court to
enter a nondischargeable judgment. Id. at 23a (internal citation omitted).
The District Court rejected these allegations of bias and affirmed the Bankruptcy
Court on all issues the debtors raised. Tehrani v. Walters, No. 2:136544(KM), 2015 WL
1815510 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2015). On the bias claim, the District Court held even assuming
all the debtors allegations were true, it comes nowhere near a showing of judicial bias
requiring disqualification. App. 22a. In particular, it held [i]t is unreasonable to infer
bias based on [Tehranis attorneys] regular practice of bankruptcy law in this district.
Id. It noted if an attorney could not litigate more than a certain number of cases in a
particular court without creating an inference of bias, the judicial system might grind to a
halt. Id. And the court found the debtors contentions of bias regarding the bankruptcy
judges connections to the now-deceased judge to be innocuous and wholly
unpersuasive. Id. It rejected the debtors claim the bankruptcy judge was biased because
she decided in Tehranis favor. As the court stated, [a] losing streak, without more, is
not suggestive of bias; it ordinarily reflects nothing more or less than the judges view of
the merits. Id. Finally, the court held there was nothing erroneous, let alone improper,
about the courts procedural actions (lifting the automatic stay to permit state court
proceedings to go forward, then adopting the state courts findings of fraud by way of
collateral estoppel). Id. at 23a.
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On appeal, the debtors present one issue for review: whether the District Court
erred in finding that the bankruptcy judge did not err by failing to disqualify herself from
their bankruptcy proceeding.
Where a party has not requested that the district judge recuse himself or herself
during proceedings in the district court, we review a recusal argument made on appeal for
plain error. Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 166 (3d Cir.
2004). This standard applies with respect to bankruptcy court proceedings as well. For
reversible plain error to exist, there must be (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects
substantial rights; and (4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Moreno, 809 F.3d 766, 773 (3d Cir.
2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A judge must disqualify h[er]self in any proceeding in which h[er] impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. 455(a) (2012). Under 455(a), if a
reasonable [perso]n, were [that person] to know all the circumstances, would harbor
doubts about the judges impartiality . . . , then the judge must recuse. Selkridge, 360
F.3d at 167 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The debtors contend, as they did in the District Court, that a review of . . .
relationships in the bankruptcy case demonstrates that there was impropriety or/and an
appearance of impropriety. Appellants Opening Br. 14 (emphasis removed). But as the
District Court correctly pointed out, [t]he facts . . . do not raise any reasonable inference
of bias. App. 21a. This conclusion was not plain error. Even if the contentions the
debtors made in the District Court were true, none of them would cause an objective
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