Police Corruption Newburn
Police Corruption Newburn
Police Corruption Newburn
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Tim Newburn
The London School of Economics and
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Tim Newburn
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Forewor d
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s discussion of the Police Service and policing in
the United Kingdom was punctuated with examples of malpractice and
misconduct. Twenty years on, several high profile scandals involving officers at all
ranks of the police service in a number of forces, have again placed the police
service, and discussion of police corruption in particular, under the official and
public spotlight.
The Police Service has taken an active and leading role in tackling police
corruption and in putting in place strategies to detect, investigate and eliminate
corruption within its ranks. The Association of Chief Police Officers Taskforce on
Corruption, established in September 1998, has taken the lead at a national level;
individual forces, most notably the Metropolitan Police Service are putting in place
preventive strategies more robust than those previously introduced in the United
Kingdom; and, Her Majestys Inspectorate of Constabulary has completed a
Thematic Inspection on Integrity within the Police Service.
This publication contributes to the debate by providing a review of the published
English language literature on corruption. By its very nature a literature review is
historical. It is hoped that in identifying key lessons drawn from the experiences of
police organisations in various jurisdictions, this report will inform the very
substantial work now underway in the Police Service.
The study should prove a useful addition to our knowledge in this sensitive area.
Dr Gloria Laycock
Head of Policing and Reducing Crime Unit
Research, Development and Statistics Directorate
Home Office
June 1999
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Acknowledgements
I am hugely grateful to the following for their very generous advice and guidance:
Ben Bowling (Cambridge), Cyrille Fijnaut (Leuven), Janet Foster (Cambridge),
Gareth Newham (Braamfontein), Clive Norris (Hull), Maurice Punch
(Amsterdam), Eli Silverman (New York), Phillip Stenning (Toronto), Richard Ward
and Timothy Stone (Chicago), and especially to David Dixon (New South Wales).
Tracking down what was often almost untraceable literature could not have been
done in the time available without the invaluable support of Karola Winter at
Goldsmiths. In addition, the libraries at the Institute of Criminology, Cambridge,
the Home Office, the London School of Economics and the JFK School of
Government, Harvard provided considerable support at short notice.
Thanks are also due to the staff of the Police and Reducing Crime Unit, especially
to Jacquie Russell for all her help and support.
The Author
Tim Newburn is the Joseph Rowntree Foundation Professor of Urban Social Policy
at Goldsmiths College, University of London.
PRCU would like to thank David Dixon, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law of the
University of New South Wales for acting as independent assessor for this report.
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Executive summar y
A series of public scandals over the past few years, albeit apparently involving a
small number of officers, has caused concern about the standard of ethics and
integrity within the Police Service.
In response, the Association of Chief Police Officers has illustrated its commitment
to take the issues of corruption within the service seriously with the establishment
of a Presidential Taskforce. Individual forces, most notably the Metropolitan Police
Service, are taking steps to tackle corruption within their ranks. Her Majestys
Inspectorate of Constabulary have undertaken a Thematic Inspection on Integrity.
Early in these activities, there was a recognised need to pull together the central
lessons from previous efforts to tackle corruption, both here in the United Kingdom
and also in other jurisdictions. In recognition of this demand, the Home Office
Policing and Reducing Crime Unit commissioned this review.
This work aims to provide a common level of knowledge and understanding of
police integrity and corruption, its causes and the efficacy of strategies for its
prevention. Other issues of relevance include the links between integrity (and
lapses in it) and the development of corruption, and strategies for instilling
organisational values and integrity in staff. It is not an aim of this report to provide
an assessment of the current extent or nature of police corruption in the United
Kingdom. It is hoped this work will provide an essential base for the development
of robust prevention strategies in the longer term.
By definition, a literature review is necessarily historical and shaped by available
material. The review covers the main English language literature on the issues of
police corruption and police ethics over the past 20 years. It includes the
sociological and criminological literature, together with a review of the main
official inquiries from the United States and Australia.
Key findings
The review concludes with eleven key messages central to any understanding of
corruption and which should underpin reforms introduced for its prevention:
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the causes of corruption include: factors that are intrinsic to policing as a job;
the nature of police organisations; the nature of police culture; the
opportunities for corruption presented by the political and task environments;
and, the nature and extent of the effort put in to controlling corruption;
reform must look at the political and task environments as well as the
organisation itself;
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Contents
Page
Forewor d
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Acknowledgements
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Executive summar y
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List of figures
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1.Introduction
Corruption in various jurisdictions
Aim and methodology
The report
1
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3
4
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5
8
11
13
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16
25
4. Corruption control
Human resource management
Anti-corruption policies
Internal controls
The external environment and external controls
Possible unintended consequences of corruption control
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45
References
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56
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List of figures
Figur e no.
Caption
Page
10
11
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INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction
Corruption in the police service in the United Kingdom has come under increasing
public and official scrutiny in the past 12 months. A series of public scandals, albeit
apparently involving a small number of officers, has caused concern about the
standard of ethics and integrity within the police service. In response, the police
service is putting in place a range of short and longer term reforms to tackle
malpractice and misconduct within its ranks.
Corruption in various jurisdictions
United Kingdom
From the earliest days of the Bow Street Runners; through the formation of the
New Police in the 1820s; to the scandals in the 1960s and 1970s policing in the
United Kingdom has been punctuated with examples of malpractice and
misconduct. The range of corrupt activities uncovered included the concealment of
serious crimes, bribery, the fabrication and planting of evidence. Modern day
scandals of the sort characterised in the nations consciousness by the Birmingham
Six, the Guildford Four, the Carl Bridgewater affair, and the activities of the West
Midlands Serious Crime Squad have involved the suppression of evidence, the
beating of suspects, tampering with confessional evidence and perjury. In response
to these latter activities legislative changes, most notably the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984, were introduced with the aim of regulating police behaviour.
United States
The experience of the police service in the United Kingdom is in no way unique.
The history of policing in other jurisdictions, such as the United States and
Australia, is similarly punctuated with examples of police malpractice and
misconduct. It has been suggested most notably by the Knapp Commission that the
New York Police Department (NYPD) in particular suffered from corruption from
the outset: systematic payoffs from brothels and gambling dens and shakedowns of
small businesses were documented from the end of the nineteenth century through
to the 1950s. During the 1970s widespread graft and bribery covering drugs, vice,
gambling enforcement and criminal investigation more generally were uncovered
(Knapp, 1972), taking a more serious turn in the 1990s with allegations that a
group of officers were involved not only in the usual shakedown and protection
activities, but were themselves involved in trafficking cocaine and other illicit
drugs (Mollen, 1994).
Australia
There is also considerable evidence of longstanding corruption within Australian
policing (Finnane, 1994). Evidence of gambling-related corruption is available from
INTRODUCTION
the earliest days of this century, particularly in New South Wales in the 1930s and
Victoria in the 1950s. A series of official inquiries (the Beach, Kaye, Lucas, Lusher
and Neesham Inquiries) have uncovered organised police corruption in New South
Wales, Queensland and Victoria since the 1970s.Two recent inquiries: the
Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police
Misconduct in Queensland (Fitzgerald, 1989); and, the Royal Commission into the
New South Wales Police Service (Wood, 1997), both found widespread and
organised corruption within the police service. Both investigations also pointed to
wider problems: inadequate education and training of officers, particularly with
regard to ethical training; insufficient or poor management; a police code or
culture which showed contempt for the criminal justice system; disdain for the law
and rejection of its application to police; disregard for the truth; and abuse of
authority (Fitzgerald, 1989: 200).
Aim and methodology
This study aims to identify key issues in police integrity and corruption, with a
specific emphasis on the causes of corruption and the efficacy of different
prevention strategies. Other issues of relevance include the links between integrity
(and lapses in it) and the development of corruption, and strategies for instilling
organisational values and integrity in staff. It is not an aim of this report to
provide an assessment of the current extent or nature of police corruption in the
United Kingdom.
The work was commissioned by the Policing and Reducing Crime Unit to provide
a common level of knowledge and understanding of police corruption, its causes,
and strategies for its prevention, amongst the Police Service and other
organisations. It is hoped this work will provide an essential base for the
development of prevention strategies in the longer term.
This review covers the main English language literature on the issues of police
corruption and police ethics over the past 20 years. It includes the sociological and
criminological literature, together with a review of the main official inquiries from
the United States and Australia. While the majority of material reviewed is drawn
from the experiences of police forces in the US and Australia, this is not
exclusively the case. Where material is available in other jurisdictions, this has also
been included.
INTRODUCTION
The repor t
The report is presented in three substantive chapters:
Chapter three then moves on to examine the causes and sources of police
corruption. The chapter ends by looking briefly at the policing of drugs, thought
by many to be the source of considerable new dangers of corruption within the
police service.
Having discussed what are generally agreed to be the key factors in the
development of corruption, the following chapter then looks at the reverse:
strategies that have been used in the attempt to control, reduce or prevent
corruption.
Key findings of this review are presented in Chapter Five. Principal amongst these
is that although it is unrealistic to think that corruption can be eliminated, there is
good evidence to suggest that it can be controlled and that full-scale organisational
corruption can be prevented.
Dimensions
Corruption of authority
Kickbacks
Opportunistic theft
Shakedowns
Protection of illegal
activities
The fix
Internal payoffs
Flaking or padding
types of police corruption, to which Punch (1985) suggests adding a ninth, each of
which can be analysed along one or more of five dimensions: the acts and actors
involved; the norms violated; the degree of support from the peer group; the
degree of organisation of deviant practices; and, the reaction of the police
department. Figure 1 summarises these types, ranging in a hierarchy from rule
breaking to lawless behaviour.
Two issues are raised by this list of corrupt activities. First, whether it is in fact
helpful and/or realistic to consider all of them to be corrupt. If so, what is it that
links them all together? If not, on what basis might some of the activities be
excluded from the list? The second issue relates to the fact that Roebuck and
Barkers (1974) typology was ordered in a hierarchy from the least to the most
serious. Implicit in this model, and in much writing about police corruption, is the
idea that officers who become corrupt tend to start at the bottom with the least
serious offences and then progress some or all the way along the road to the other
end of the spectrum. We will return to this problem referred to by Kleinig (1996)
as the slippery slope argument later in this chapter. First, we consider what
corrupt activities have in common and what separates them from other forms of
deviance by police officers.
The problem of definition
As was suggested at the outset, there are many competing definitions of corruption.
There are broad, inclusive definitions which suggest that police corruption is
loosely identified as deviant, dishonest, improper, unethical or criminal behaviour
by a police officer (Roebuck and Barker, 1974). There are also significantly
narrower definitions. James Q Wilson (1963), for example, distinguishes between
activities such as accepting bribes (which he along with everyone else considers to
be the prototypical form of corrupt behaviour) and criminal activities such as
burglary on duty (which he considers to be qualitatively different criminal but
not corrupt). Although both acts are criminal, the point of Wilsons distinction is
that bribery of police officers involves the exploitation of authority in a way that
burglary by police officers need not. There is a parallel here with work on so-called
white collar crime (see Klockars, 1977).
Both white collar crime and what Stoddard (1968) referred to as blue coat crime
(police corruption) are those which are committed in the course of occupations.
Thus, as Klockars (1977:334) puts it, if police officers steal from the scene of a
crime they are called to investigate, they are corrupt. If they steal from their
families, from their friends, or from stores and homes without the cover of their
police role, they are merely thieves. Police corruption, it is generally accepted,
However, useful as this is, most discussion of corruption goes further and includes
reference to activities that are not necessarily criminal (the acceptance of gratuities
or minor kickbacks 1); activities that do not involve the provision of services
(indeed, activities that may involve the failure to police); and, activities that do
not involve the exchange of money (or, indeed, other material goods). Thus,
McMullans (1961: 183-4) definition of corruption is sufficiently broad to include a
range of such activities:
a public official is corrupt if he accepts money or moneys worth for doing
something he is under a duty to do anyway, that he is under a duty not to do, or
to exercise a legitimate discretion for improper reasons.
Punch (1985) broadens this definition in two ways. He defines corruption as
occurring:
when an official receives or is promised significant advantage or reward
(personal, group or organisational) for doing something that he is under a duty
to do anyway, that he is under a duty not to do, for exercising a legitimate
discretion for improper reasons, and for employing illegal means to achieve
approved goals.
This definition recognises that the particular ends of corrupt activity may not
involve personal reward but, rather, may be undertaken for the benefit of a wider
group (a specialist squad for example) or the police organisation as a whole. Such a
definition differs, therefore, from Goldsteins (1977) view that corruption is
designed to produce personalgain for the officer or others (emphasis added).
Secondly, Punch broadens the definition to include not only illegitimate but also
approved goals what is sometimes, but often rather misleadingly, referred to in
the UK as noble cause corruption.
Whether it is helpful to consider all forms of activity which involve the use of
illegitimate means to secure legitimate ends as corrupt is questionable however.
There are various forms of policing practice ranging from the use of excessive
force through to procedural breaches resulting in conviction which whilst clearly
illegitimate, are not necessarily helpfully categorised as corrupt. In a similar
fashion, many definitions of corruption exclude such activities as sleeping,
drinking, taking drugs or having sex whilst working, feigning illness, reckless
driving and other forms of minor police deviance. They do so because such
misconduct doesnt involve material reward or gain (Barker and Wells quoted in
Palmer, 1992). In such cases the corrupt motivation is argued not to be present.
Perhaps the most inclusive definition of corruption is provided by Kleinig
(1996:166). He suggests that:
Police officers act corruptly when, in exercising or failing to exercise their
authority, they act with the primary intention of furthering private or
departmental/divisional advantage.
Kleinig argues that the advantage of this definition is that it enables many acts and
practices that may never show themselves as corrupt for example, doing what one
is duty-bound to do solely for personal advancement to be included within a
definition of corruption. This would clearly cover activities that would come under
the general rubric of process corruption (Wood, 1997a), as well as activities such
as over-zealous policing with the aim of personal advancement. Though such
activities may not be what we normally think of as corrupt, he argues that they
should be considered to be so because they are motivated by the spiritof
corruption. As Kleinig argues, it is motivation that is the key to understanding
corruption. Corruption, at heart, is an ethical problem before it is a legal or
administrative problem.
Where does all this leave us? First and foremost it should make us wary of seeking
an all-inclusive definition of corruption. It may be that defining the essential
characteristics of corruption is largely impossible. Nonetheless, the discussion does
allow us to make some general observations about police corruption:
corrupt acts may involve the use or the abuse of organisational authority;
corruption may be internal as well as external, i.e. it may simply involve two
(or more) police officers; and
the motivation behind an act is corrupt when the primary intention is to further
private or organisational advantage.
work. However, the leaders of what Sherman (1978) refers to as reform police
departments departments attempting to fight corruption within their ranks
have often taken a rather harder-line stance. O.W. Wilson one of the best known
American police reformers was firmly against even the acceptance of a free cup of
coffee, and Patrick V Murphy the Commissioner of New York in the aftermath of
the Knapp Commission famously stated: except for your paycheck, there is no such
thing as a clean buck (quoted in Goldstein, 1975:29). The question remains,
therefore, where and how is the line to be drawn in practice?
Goldstein (1975) raises this issue of drawing the line in a chapter entitled
administrative dilemmas. Whilst it is clearly an administrative dilemma it is also
fundamentally an ethicaldilemma. The practical answer to the question in any
given situation requires a clear statement of ethical principles. As with many such
questions, however, it is quite possible to defend different answers.
By far the most comprehensive treatment of this question is provided by Kleinig
(1996)3. Kleinig begins by pointing out one significant difference between bribes
and gratuities: bribes are generally of a significant size and often in proportion (at
least) to the favour being requested, whereas gratuities tend to be more symbolic.
Moreover, he argues that whereas bribes are offered and accepted in order to
corrupt authority, there is nothing in principle that implies that the offer of a
gratuity is done with the intention of influencing the exercise of authority or that,
alternatively, even in cases where the actions of an officer are aimed at securing a
gratutity, that the gratuity wouldnt have been offered anyway. Nonetheless, the
question of whether it is appropriate for police officers to accept gratuities remains
a difficult one for police managers. Kleinigs arguments in favour of, or in
opposition to, acceptance of gratuities and similar benefits are outlined in Figure 2
(page 10).
Perhaps the strongest argument against the acceptance of gratuities results from the
idea that the provision of policing4 is deemed to be a public good (Jones and
Newburn, 1998). Being a public good it is presumed that individuals and groups
cannot or should not be prevented from using them and, moreover, that policing is
indivisible: it cannot meaningfully be divided amongst individuals and groups
(Johnston, 1992). The acceptance of gratuities, at least on a regular or systematic
basis may, therefore, detract from the democratic ethos of policing (Kleinig,
1996:178). As Feldberg (1985:274) put it: gratuities are simply an inducement to a
police officer to distribute the benefit of his presence disproportionately to some
taxpayers and not others. Gratuities are an inducement to treat policing services as
a club good.
Figure 2: Arguments supporting and opposing the acceptance of gratuities and benefits
A.
Appreciation
Not significant
Officially offered
Police culture
B.
Sense of obligation
Slippery slope
Remove temptation
Purchase preferential
treatment
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their use may be what is required of the just police officer under some extreme
circumstances. Klockars argues it is not possible for the officer to be both innocent
and just. In deciding whether to punish an officer who has achieved ends we
applaud but who, believing there to be no alternative, uses illicit means to achieve
them, we face an ethical dilemma.
Dirty Harry problems are a staple part of police life, Klockars argues. One of the
dangers of the moral cynicism which many police officers may develop as a result
of the realities of police work is that they may come to regard dirty means as ends
in themselves: meting out punishment to those who are guilty but who, because of
the inefficiencies of the criminal justice system, or other difficulties, are likely to
escape retribution. Klockars then goes on to examine three attempts at a resolution
of the Dirty Harry Problem (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Resolving the Dirty Har ry Problem
Resolution
Description
Snappy bureaucrats
Bittners peace
Skolnicks craftsmen
The difference between Skolnicks and Klockars views of the Dirty Harry Problem
lies in their attitude to creating a more morally sensitive or ethical police officer.
Skolnick is a pessimist in this regard, whereas Klockars sees a solution, albeit an
uncomfortable one.
The slippery slope to becoming bent
A number of tricky ethical dilemmas have been raised so far in this chapter. Before
concluding, one further issue linking the subjects of gratuities and dirty means
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must be considered. That is, the relationship between minor and major
transgressions of the rules of ethical conduct particularly whether there is a
slippery slope which necessarily leads from the former to the latter. According to
Kleinig (1996:174) it is still very common to find woven into theories about the
sources of police corruption the suggestion that actual corruption starts off in a
small way and then becomes increasingly addictive. There are two versions of the
slippery slope argument, he suggests: the logical and the psychological.
The logical version: posits that because even the acceptance of a minor
gratuity involves the same implicit rationale as, say the acceptance of cash
compromising professional impartiality for personal gain the person who does
the former undermines the grounds they may have had for refusing the latter.
The logic is that because both are wrong, or both are wrong for the same reasons,
having engaged in minor acts of illegitimate conduct opens up the way for more
significant transgressions. A second version of the argument has it that although
the gap between minor and major transgressions may be significant, there are
many other transgressions in this gap which make the setting of some logical
boundary impossible. Whichever version of the argument one employs, the
logical conclusion is that the acceptance of minor gratuities like a free cup of
tea ought to be avoided.
The key policy implication of Shermans argument is ensuring that there is some
point a boundary where the redefintion of self that is required is so great that
most will be discouraged from making the leap. As Kleinig (1996) points out what
is interesting about this version of the slippery slope argument, is that it does not
necessarily hold the acceptance of minor gratuities to be unacceptable (though
Sherman is clearly uncomfortable with such gratuities). What is problematic about
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their acceptance is that doing so requires a redefinition of self that makes the
acceptance of more significant gifts easier.
Summar y
There is no straightforward solution to either the question of definition or to the
ethical problems outlined. The discussion illustrates the simple but uncomfortable
fact that complex ethical problems are an inherent part of policing. Recognising
the problems and the complexities involved is an important stage in constructing a
coherent administrative policy response to them. The next stage is understanding
the sources and causes of corruption in the police service. We turn to this issue in
Chapter Three.
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it is pervasive corrupt practices are found in some form in a great many police
agencies in all societies;
it is not simply a problem of the lower ranks corruption has been found at all
levels of the police organisation;
there are certain forms of policing, or areas of the police organisation, which are
more at risk of corruption; and
This helps us begin the process of explaining the causes of corruption: that is to
focus on the nature and context of police work. Predictably there are many
competing explanations for police corruption in the criminological literature6. One
of the traditional occupational explanations of corruption has been that it is the
product of bad apples and atypical of the organisation. In this chapter, we begin by
examining briefly the reasons why the bad apples theory of police corruption has
been largely discredited in recent years, before moving on to examine what it is
about the nature and context of police work that facilitates or causes corruption.
A few bad apples?
When confronted with allegations of corruption for which there is supporting
evidence, police agencies will generally claim that the problem identified is limited
to a small number of corrupt officers who are quite unrepresentative of the wider
standards exhibited by the organisation. The history of policing, however, is full of
examples where this explanation could simply not be sustained in the face of
overwhelming evidence of organised corruption. Thus, perhaps best known of all,
after the revelations of Officer Frank Serpico in New York City, the Knapp
Commission hearings destroyed the police unions argument that police corruption
was confined to a few rotten apples in an otherwise healthy barrel (Sherman,
1978: xxviii). In Knapps view:
14
15
16
Constant factors
Discretion
Managerial secrecy
Status problems
Association with
lawbreakers/contact
with temptation
B. Variable factors
Community structure
Organisational
characteristics
Legal opportunities
for corruption
Corruption controls
Social organisation
of corruption
Moral cynicism
17
dominant coalitions adopt deviant goals and it is at this point that police
agencies become corrupt.
Low managerial visibility
Linked closely to the discretion inherent in much police work is the fact that it is
often difficult for others to see it. As Goldstein (1990:6) observes under the best
of circumstances, police agencies have several peculiar characteristics that make
them especially difficult to administer. Police officers are spread out in the field,
not subject to direct supervision. This enables them to resist managerial edicts,
policies and even disciplinary actions (Manning, 1979:63). Importantly, there is
also, it is suggested, a degree of complicity in rule-bending or rule-breaking which
is engendered by the existence of discretion and low visibility in the job. In the
more extreme forms of process corruption such as the excessive use of force, the
relative invisibility of the work may actually be exploited. It is in relation to those
parts of the police service that are most secretive or least transparent that
accusations of malpractice (process or financial corruption) are most common
(Evans and Morgan, 1998). The authors argue that it is possible to introduce
compensating factors. Thus, most of the provisions recommended by the
Committee for the Prevention of Torture in line with the European Convention
concern the need for greater transparency.
To the idea of low managerial visibility we might add the issue of managerial
support for malpractice. The relative absence of agreed upon standards in
policing is not simply a source of flexibility for patrol officers. It is also a source of
practical and ethical dilemmas one of the things that may in the officers eyes
make it difficult to do the job. According to Wilson (1968) relationships between
patrolmen and administrators tend to be defined by the extent to which the
former feels backed up by the latter. Good governors identify with, and protect,
the ranks. Indeed, they may need to become implicated in their activities
(McConville and Shepherd, 1992; and below). Even when managerial influence is
being brought to bear it may encourage malpractice. Thus, Punch (1994:27)
points out that some senior officers may constantly reiterate the need to stick to
the formal rules but then, in their behaviour, display an emphasis on success even
where the rules may have been bent.
Low public visibility
Linked again to the inherent discretion available to police officers, and also to the
limited degree of managerial oversight that is possible in much policing, there is a
third factor low public visibility. Much of what police officers do is only visible to
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the person or people with whom they are immediately engaged. Perhaps more
importantly, the police have considerable access to private spaces where they
cannot be observed at all: premises and domestic dwellings that have been burgled;
buildings where there is reason to believe a crime may be committed.
Peer group secrecy
Sherman (1978) argues that corrupt police departments are socially organised in
relation to a number of informal rules. The rules have two main purposes. First, to
minimise the chances of external control being mobilised and, secondly, to keep
corrupt activities at a reasonable level. The rule most often referred to in this
connection, is the rule of silence. Officers are socialised into not cooperating with
investigations of their colleagues. Whether or not he participates financially in
corruption activities, an officers adherence to the blue curtain of secrecy rule puts
him squarely within the corruption system, the members of an organisation who
comply with the deviant goal. (Sherman, 1978:47)
Discussing police occupational culture in Britain, McConville and Shepherd
(1992:207) say the most important thing that probationary officers learn in their
first few months in the police is the need to keep their mouths shut about
practices, including those in breach of the rules, which experienced officers deem
necessary in discharging policing responsibilities. Secrecy becomes a protective
armour shielding the force as a whole from public knowledge of infractions
(Reiner, 1992:93).
It is not just secrecy, but the strong bonds of loyalty within police culture that is
identified in several official inquiries as both facilitating and encouraging
corruption and hampering inquiries and control efforts. The Wood Commission
found that:
The strength of the code of silence was evident during the Commission
hearings. Almost without exception officers approached by the Commission
initially denied ever witnessing or engaging in any form of corrupt activity. Even
with an undertaking that police would not be disciplined for failing to report
certain forms of corruption, the offer of amnesty and the availability of
protection against self-incrimination, officer after officer maintained this stand
until presented with irrefutable evidence to the contrary. Each knew the truth,
yet the strength of the code, and the blind hope that no one would break it,
prevailed. (Wood, 1997a:155)
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for corrupt officers it was a means by which they could manipulate and control
fellow officers; and
Managerial secrecy
The code of silence is not simply something which applies to the rank and file.
The Wood Commission in NSW identified an us and them attitude which, they
suggested, encourages police to adopt an adversarial position to anyone who is not
a police officer or who challenges police activity (Wood, 1997a:155; see also
Shearing, 1981; Mollen, 1994) 7. Similarly, the Mollen Commission (1994) made
reference to a police culture that exalts loyalty and suggested that corruption was
allowed to flourish once again in New York not only because of the silence of
honest officers too afraid to talk but also because of willfully blind supervisors who
fear the consequences of a corruption scandal more than corruption itself (1994:1).
Status problems
It is often suggested that bribery and general financial corruption is a far from
unexpected outcome in circumstances where public officials are inadequately paid.
Van Reenen (1997) cites low pay as a cause of a lack of integrity for people in all
positions, particularly in societies where consumption is highly valued but salaries
are low. However, even in societies where police officers are reasonably well paid,
and where corrupt activities are deemed unacceptable, the fact that there is a
perceived mismatch between income and responsibilities may lead to the
development of corruption. Similarly, perceived inequities of income within police
forces may also make the temptations toward corruption more attractive. In the
UK, the most recent expression of concern about the consequences of police
poverty came from the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. In an interview,
Sir Paul Condon said If youre not paying your police officers a wage they can live
on, you are almost inviting them to indulge in malpractice its getting tougher
20
and tougher for young police officers to make ends meet. That doesnt mean they
all go off and do bad things, but if youre serious about integrity you must make sure
there is a reasonable level of pay and conditions that doesnt tempt them into
malpractice.8
Association with lawbreakers/ Contact with temptation
One of the ever-presents of police work is organised criminal interests who engage
in crime as a business enterprise (Goldstein, 1975). They cannot carry out their
business at least not with the freedom they would like without ensuring a
minimum of interference from the police. If one adds in to the mix the discretion
available to the officer, and the limited visibility of police actions, not to mention a
code of secrecy, the opportunity to succumb to the temptations with which an
officer will inevitably come into contact are great. Those who are most interested
in corrupting police officers may well have little to lose and a lot to gain from
bribery and other forms of illegality, and they may also have access to substantial
sums of money or other benefits (Kleinig, 1996). Punch (1994) refers to the
dangers inherent in encouraging police officers to develop close ties with criminals
as going native (see Daley, 1994).
Variable factors
Community structure
The context in which police agencies work is always likely to have a very
significant impact on the nature and style of that work, including the extent to
which officers engage in corrupt practices. The literature from North America and
Australia points to both the direct and indirect influence of the political
environment and political culture in influencing levels of corruption (see
Goldstein, 1975; Knapp, 1972; Mollen, 1994; Fitzgerald, 1989; Wood, 1997).
Indeed, Sherman (1978:32) suggests that capture by the political environment is
probably the leading explanation of why police departments become corrupt.
There is much less evidence of politically-influenced or oriented corruption in the
UK, no doubt largely as a result of the general lack of local political control of
policing, certainly during most of the twentieth century.
Sherman (1978:32) also argues that community tolerance, or even support, for
police corruption can facilitate a departments becoming corrupt, ie they may
legitimate corruption. Community tolerance of such activities (particularly what he
refers to as little scandals) may, he argues, encourage police departments to view
their corrupt practices as legitimate. On a more mundane level it is clear, for
example, that businesses often have a vested interest in maximising police presence
21
(at least at certain times of day) and in reinforcing positive relations with the local
police. For example, Macdonalds in Australia9 offer half priced food to emergency
services staff, including police officers (see Finnane, 1990; Kleinig, 1996).
Organisational characteristics
In its final report the Wood Commission concluded that a service that is seen to
do what it can to maintain high morale, to encourage personal and career
development, to avoid boredom, frustration, stress and cynicism, to develop
meaningful understanding and practical guidance in relation to ethical and
integrity issues, and to emphasise its role of service, is far less likely to have a
serious corruption problem than a service which ignores these factors (1997a:32).
A strong link was drawn between the absence of professional pride and the
development of corruption and malpractice within the organisation. Maintaining
morale, professional standards and respect for authority within the organisation are
in this view considered essentially to be protective factors guarding against the
drift into corruption.
Legal opportunities for corruption
Sherman (1978) in his study of four corrupt forces is clear about where the most
significant source of corruption lies:
Although New York police have used their official powers to protect or commit
every crime from burglary to election fraud and murder, the main source of
police corruption there has always been the purveyors of illegal pleasures:
prostitution, alcohol, gambling, and, in recent years, narcotics. (1978: xxv)
Shermans observation pretty much holds true for police forces everywhere. Officers
working in the areas cited above stand on what Manning and Redlinger (1977:354)
call the invitational edge of corruption where the temptations are particularly
acute. Goldstein (1975) refers to unenforceable laws: activities which are
prohibited by legislatures around the world, but which large numbers of people
continue to engage in. Even where there is public support for doing so it is not
straightforward for the police to enforce the law. The consequence is that nonenforcement is relatively common, and the opportunities for negotiating a price
for the exercise of discretion become frequent. Corruption becomes an easier
option. The Fitzgerald Inquiry into corruption in Queensland contemplated a
radical solution to this problem. It suggested:
restrictive laws which seek to prohibit activities for which there is a
substantial demand and which are very profitable encourage the involvement of
22
23
Moral cynicism
In Goldsteins view the extent to which the nature of day-to-day police work
contributes to corruption has rarely been fully recognised:
The average officer especially in large cities sees the worst side of
humanity. He is exposed to a steady diet of wrongdoing. He becomes intimately
familiar with the ways people prey on one another. In the course of this
intensive exposure he discovers that dishonesty and corruption are not restricted
to those the community sees as criminal. He sees many individuals of good
reputation engaging in practices equally dishonest and corrupt It is not
unusual for him to develop a cynical attitude in which he views corruption as a
game in which every person is out to get his share. (1975:25)
According to Kleinig (1996:77) it is this cynicism about morality in general, and
about the moral seriousness of those they serve in particular, that results in the
moral constraints that should guide police conduct weakening. Police officers
recognise that they are expected to adhere to standards that they know others in
positions of power and responsibility do not necessarily observe. A further subject
of police cynicism may be the criminal justice system itself. According to Goldstein
(1975:25) an officer who sees the processing of hundreds of petty offenders through
a citys minor courts cannot help but be struck by the futility of the procedure the
lack of justice, the lack of dignity, and the ineffectiveness of the criminal process.
24
This experience may, under some circumstances, also lead to the kind of moral
cynicism described above and, more concretely, to an absence of concern about
fairness and justice in the exercise of their powers. From there, it is a small step to
the corrupt use of police discretion. The Fitzgerald and Wood Inquiries in Australia
made reference to the widespread nature of process corruption (verballing,
threats, planting evidence) with the former concluding that, in part, this was a
consequence of contempt for the criminal justice system, disdain for the law and
rejection of its application to the police, disregard for the truth, and abuse of
authority (Fitzgerald, 1989:200). Dixon (undated, a), examining numerous
inquiries into police malpractice and corruption, suggests that one of the common
features of such cases is derisory police attitudes towards the law: Police officers are
presented with, and themselves relay, contradictory messages: law is both the
fundamental structure of society and the object of their activities, and yet
simultaneously an irrelevant, outdated obstacle to the achievement of sociallymandated tasks of
crime control and order maintenance (undated, a: 6).
In this chapter we have examined the reasons for rejecting the bad apple theory
of police corruption and then considered 13 factors associated with the
development of corruption in police organisations. Before moving on to consider
strategies for the prevention of corruption I want, briefly, to conclude by
considering drug-related police corruption. There are two main reasons for this.
First, doing so illustrates many of the factors discussed in the main part of this
chapter. Secondly, there is currently considerable concern within the police
service in many different jurisdictions about possible increases in drug-related
corruption and the threats it poses.
Drug-related police cor ruption
The essence of Manning and Redlingers (1977) argument about the invitational
edges of corruption is that the problems police officers face in attempting to
regulate an illicit market such as the sale of drugs are similar to the problems
associated with the regulation of other (legitimate) markets. One of the key
differences is that sellers in illicit markets have limited opportunities for legitimate
political influence or for lobbying. Consequently, the focal point for effective
control of their market is enforcement agents. Hence:
The structural constraintsof legally suppressed markets expose the agent to an
accumulation of attempted influence. Because sellers want effective control over
their markets, they must find ways to neutralise enforcement agencies. If they
25
cannot avoid at least arrest and charge, and it is probable that eventually they
cannot, then they must attempt to gain favourable influence with agents.
(Manning and Redlinger, 1979:356)
Moreover, there are a number of other pressures associated with policing drugs
markets. First, there is generally no victim the exchange is usually consensual.
Therefore, enforcement officers are dependent on securing information from close
to the market. Doing so within the rules is not always straightforward. As a
consequence, Manning and Redlinger (1977:358) conclude that agent corruption
is a product of the requirements of narcotics law enforcement and a theme found in
the history of the enforcement enterprise. In addition to the absence of a victim,
the status of such offences is contested; there is widespread use of illicit drugs
despite potentially severe consequences if infractions of the law are detected and
prosecuted. It must also be acknowledged that the use of illicit drugs by police
officers themselves is also likely to have increased in recent years as recreational
use has grown among the general population. Undercover officers may be even
more prone to use than other officers (see Marx, 1988). This may have contributed
to the breaking down of the distinction between clean money (minor bribes
connection, for example, with the non-enforcement of traffic violations) and dirty
money (from activities widely regarded as illegitimate, such as drug-related crime)
(Maas, 1996; Mollen, 1994).
One commentator has suggested that drug trafficking and drug-related crime are
so pervasively corrupting that police confront almost impossible obstacles when
they attempt to move against them (Langer, 1989: 293).Drugs law enforcement has
a number of characteristics some of which it shares with other forms of policing
which make it particularly prone to corrupt practices:
26
Research and official inquiries into the policing of illicit drugs in the UK and
abroad provide evidence of a broad range of corrupt activities: bribery of police
officers to lie on oath and to provide confidential records (Knapp Commission,
1972; Sherman, 1974); increased drug use by officers (Carter, 1990); participation
by police officers in drug dealing and protection of major drug operations (see
McAlary, 1996); arrogation of seized property; illegal searches and seizures (eg the
planting of drugs); the protection of informants; and, involvement in violence
(sometimes indiscriminate) (see Mollen, 1994: 2; also United States General
Accounting Office, 1998).
Manning and Redlinger (1979) conclude that officers working in the drug-related
area are more often placed upon an invitational edge of corruption. It is a
conclusion which applies more generally to all policing aimed at regulating legally
suppressed markets (such as prostitution and pornography). As should be clear by
this stage, these are indeed the areas of policing where corrupt practices, and
especially entrenched corrupt practices, are most often found. It is not just that
they are the forms of policing that are most proximate to the invitational edge of
corruption. These areas of policing also tend to be characterised by the greatest
degree of secrecy and invisibility from managerial, administrative or democratic
oversight. In addition, according to Carter (1990), police departments tend to have
inadequate policies, procedures, training, supervision, support resources, and
administrative control to detect and respond to officer drug use and corruption
(quoted in Henry, 1994: 170).
Here, then, is possibly the major problem now faced by those seeking to control
police corruption. Those areas of police work that have the strongest link with, or
are closest to, the invitational edge are also those which are generally subject to
the least managerial scrutiny and, in the specific case of drugs, are increasingly
associated with extraordinarily large sums of money and therefore very high levels
of (financial) temptation.
27
CORRUPTION CONTROL
11
28
CORRUPTION CONTROL
Even where discussion of ethics does form part of training, Goldstein argues that it
is generally done in a manner that is unlikely to resonate with new recruits or make
much difference to subsequent behaviour. If recruit training is to have any impact
on corruption, it must explore fully and realistically all the dimensions of the
problem and include specific examples of corruption known to exist or to have
existed in the department (1975: 43).
Goldsteins observations were almost certainly completely accurate in the 1970s,
and quite likely are still an accurate description of what happens in most
jurisdictions now. This is confirmed, for example, by the Wood Commission which
noted that recruit training in New South Wales had, until relatively recently, rarely
focused on ethics or integrity and had almost no element of practical application or
guidance. Moreover, the instruction which was available was often totally
inappropriate, with mentoring or buddying of new recruits often taking place in the
most high corruption sections of the force. These conclusions mirror those of the
earlier Mollen Inquiry in New York.
A new anti-corruption strategy was developed in New York which placed heavy
emphasis on ethics and values training for officers, especially those in supervisory
positions (Giuliani and Bratton, 1995). Wood recommended that the teaching of
ethics and integrity should be practically integrated in every aspect of police
education and training in New South Wales, from recruitment, through continuing
education to management training (1997: 542).
There are good reasons to believe that an emphasis on ethics and integrity is
important to tackling corruption in police departments (see Kleinig, 1996; Palmer
1992):
a code of ethics may contribute to mutual respect among officers and to the
development of a positive esprit de corps;and
As Klockars (1985) points out in his discussion of the Dirty Harry Problem, moral
judgements about when to use dirty means rest on two technical issues: first, the
range of legitimate options available and, secondly, the competence of the
29
CORRUPTION CONTROL
individual officer. There is, in this regard, a straightforward link between training,
competence and malpractice/corruption. Straightforwardly, the better officers are at
using legitimate means, the less they will need to have recourse to illegitimate
ones. Police agencies that train their officers, and provide them with the resources
they require to achieve the goals of the job legitimately should, he argues, find that
its officers are less likely to (have to) resort to dirty means.
Professional pride
There is some disagreement in the literature over the significance of pride in
integrity. A common hypothesis is that the more pride police officers have in their
department, the more resistant they will be to corruption. Sherman, in his
examination of managerial reform strategies in four forces, found that little of the
reform executives attention (generally police administrators) was found to have
been directed at building pride. Rather, they tended to concentrate on the removal
of temptation and increasing fear of detection. As a consequence, he argues that
pride is the consequence of long-term reform efforts, rather than a cause of the
reduction of corruption. Fear of detection, he suggests, appears to be causally prior
to pride in integrity, at least in police departments in which corruption was once
widespread (Sherman, 1978: 144). On the other hand, there are those writing in
the field of corporate or business crime, for example, who take the view that
deterrence via the threat of prosecution is less likely to have lasting long-term
benefits than other more persuasive measures aimed at ensuring compliance
(Braithwaite, 1989). Central to such measures are increased emphasis on
managerial responsibility.
Police management responsibility
Management and supervision are discussed in greater detail below in connection
with internal control issues. However, there is one aspect of management that it is
most relevant to discuss at this point: the issue of responsibility. One of the
implications of the rejection of the bad apple theory is that, in order to proliferate,
corrupt practices need, at the very least, the implicit support of officers in
supervisory and managerial positions. One of the key aspects in any strategy
designed to tackle corruption is inculcating a sense of responsibility for police
integrity among staff in those positions. The best known strategy for tackling this is
that associated with Patrick V Murphy in New York. Integrity was a centrepiece of
his approach to reform and police commanders and supervisors were held
personally accountable for combatting corruption in their commands (Mollen,
1994). As Officer Frank Serpico said in his testimony to the Knapp Commission,
police corruption cannot exist unless it is at least tolerated at higher levels in the
Department (Mass, 1997:383).
30
CORRUPTION CONTROL
they are running a clean organisation even if this weakens their ostensible
effectiveness;
they will be as open as possible about internal deviance and will co-operate fully
with external agencies; and
they will personally serve as role models for integrity (Punch, 1994: 34).
31
CORRUPTION CONTROL
32
CORRUPTION CONTROL
Preventive control
Under this general rubric three main approaches to changing the organisation
and, in particular, to changing internal administrative practices may be identified:
internal accountability; tight supervision; and, the abolition of procedures that
encourage corruption.
Internal accountability
One of the issues for police agencies is how to ensure that those in supervisory and
managerial positions take responsibility for tackling corruption. While police
departments may place great emphasis, at least at a rhetorical level, on the idea of
accountability to the community, it is frequently the case that they are reluctant to
impose accountability within the organisation (Nixon and Reynolds, 1996). One of
the responses to the identification of widespread corruption is the institutionalisation of an internal accountability policy. Such a policy seeks to diffuse
responsibility for control of misconduct both vertically and horizontally. In effect
the organisation does this by employing, in essence, the idea of vicarious liability.
Under such a policy managers are held responsible for the behaviour of their staff,
and peers are held to be responsible for ensuring probity within the ranks. In the
aftermath of both the 1970s and 1990s corruption scandals in New York this was a
key issue. The response in both cases, in the words of the Mollen Commission, was
reinventing the enforcement of command accountability (Mollen, 1994: 5).
Tight supervision
Increased or tightened supervision is an almost ubiquitous response to the
emergence of a corruption scandal. The extent to which this is possible is
constrained by the extent of decentralisation already present within the police
agency. In Chicago in the 1990s one of the responses to corruption was to increase
emphasis on early warning systems. The use of such systems is based, largely, on
the idea of the slippery slope of corruption. As the Commission on Police
Integrity (1997: 20) put it, in almost all instances, police officers who get into
serious trouble begin with relatively minor violations of department rules which
evolve over time into [more serious] behaviour.12
One way of tightening control is to increase the number of rules and the amount of
paperwork. However, there are numerous examples where officers have been able to
comply with the bureaucratic requirements, whilst continuing with activities which
are clearly outside the standards of behaviour the forms are attempting to instil (see
McAlary, 1994). In New York after the Knapp Commission, decentralisation, but
not debureaucratisation, was the principal strategy, in particular the increase of
33
12
CORRUPTION CONTROL
34
CORRUPTION CONTROL
Citizens: Every police agency receives some information about possible police
corruption from members of the public. This is despite the fact that the social
organisation of corruption means that most of it will remain hidden from the
public. How prepared and how well organised police agencies are to collect and
respond to such intelligence varies. A number of issues arise here. How can
police agencies ensure that complaints of corruption are properly and fully
recorded? Adopting and enforcing procedural rules for controlling the intake of
complaints is problematic. Going public on the difficulties associated with the
management of complaints may in itself lead to a drop in the number of
complaints being made. One method of testing the system is to have internal
affairs or complaints investigation bureaux telephone anonymous complaints
themselves and then study recording and reporting practices. There is a second
problem associated with such reports: how should police agencies treat
anonymous reports of corruption and malpractice? A proportion of people
making complaints will wish to remain anonymous. Yet for a number of reasons,
but particularly protecting officers from malicious complaints, some agencies are
reluctant to accept anonymous reports. Sherman is unclear how much difference
the quantity of corruption intelligence received from the public makes to the
ability of internal policing units to detect corruption. Moreover, most of the
intelligence provided is used for postmonitory detection. Nonetheless, the more
flexible and responsive police agencies are to reports from the public, the greater
the likelihood that they will enhance their premonitory intelligence capabilities.
Police officers: The best source of intelligence is that from police officers: both
honest and corrupt officers, though it is the latter who are of greatest use to
investigators. As Sherman (1978: 159) puts it: while honest officers still had
more opportunity than citizens to infer corruption or to observe it accidentally,
they may still have been ignorant of much or most of the corruption activities.
What honest officers did not know, corrupt officers did know. The problem was
to induce corrupt officers to betray their co-conspirators and provide the
information needed for premonitory detection of corruption.
Two assumptions about policing and corruption have made agencies shy away
from attempting to use corrupt officers as a source of premonitory intelligence.
The first is the idea that corruption is simply the province of a few bad apples
and that once they have been discarded the problem is dealt with. The second
is that police agencies are often thought to be overridingly loyal and
monolithic the code of silence is too strong to allow officers to betray their
colleagues. As we have seen in previous chapters, there are strong reasons to
believe both of these assumptions to be misplaced. The bad apple theory has
35
INTRODUCTION
13
been rejected by most of the major inquiries into police corruption. The idea
of a monolithic police culture is also now challenged. Thus, the Wood
Commission, using the work of Chan (see Chan, 1997) rejected explanations
of corruption as the product of police culture13, and argued that significant
cultural change was possible.
Enlisting the support of honest officers in the battle against corruption whilst
essential, was recognised to be far from easy. Nonetheless, the Mollen
Commission were optimistic and argued, in part on the basis of the reforms
introduced by Commissioner Murphy after the Knapp Commission, that such a
strategy was possible. What they might also have noted, however, was that
although such a strategy is possible, and probably necessary, it comes with its
own costs. New York under Patrick Murphy was one force that did successfully
use police officers in the fight against corruption. The most controversial policy
in New York was undoubtedly the use of field associates.
36
CORRUPTION CONTROL
the corruption, seeking safety in the safe and rarefied air of administrative
positions (Henry, 1994). At some point in the future, however, once promoted
into senior management positions, the birds would come to play a vital role in
the reform of the police department.
Corruption patrols: these were members of the internal policing units who
looked for general indications of corruption activities. Locations known for
gambling, prostitution, drugs sales and illegal drinking would be observed for
signs of payoffs.
37
CORRUPTION CONTROL
14
Integrity tests: are perhaps one of the most controversial tactics. Artificial
situations would be constructed in which officers would be given an
opportunity to commit corrupt acts. Officers who failed the test would be
arrested. Oakland Police Department used integrity tests in relation to its
most persistent form of corruption thefts of property from arrestees (using
criminology students as stooges) whereas in New York integrity tests were
used across the range of corrupt activities: theft from persons and property;
protection of (fake) gambling operations; and drugs sales. Such tests change
the question being asked from is he corrupt? to is he corruptible? (Marx,
1992). More recently in the UK the idea of integrity testing has been adapted
as one of the proposed responses to the problem of racism (Macpherson,
1999). Ethical tests raise a host of ethical questions. There are, for example,
issues about the proper role of the state and about how enticing
inducements to corruption can be reasonably made. Kleinig (1996:161) takes
the view that when people are entrapped we lack an evidentiary basis for
thinking of them as criminals. In practical terms, the outcome of stings and
integrity tests is itself often confusing.14
Marx (1988; 1992) refers to the more sophisticated covert practices now practised
widely in policing as the new surveillance. Crucially, it is particularly well suited
to corruption control: the diffuse, often victimless quality of corruption lends itself
well to discovery via covert means (1992:155). This is a position endorsed by
Sherman (1978) who suggested that premonitory detection strategies were
associated with, at least short-term, declines in corrupt activities. It is worth noting
Marxs (1992:164) point, however, that there have been no systematic efforts to
evaluate the governments use of undercover tactics against itself.
Investigation
Sherman (1978) argues that the detection of corruption is a necessary, but not a
sufficient, condition for the imposition of punitive sanctions against corruption.
Detection may provide the targets, investigation then generally follows in its wake,
before sanctions can be considered. The literature on police corruption is, however,
full of sorry tales of the failure of police forces to investigate properly allegations of,
or intelligence concerning, corrupt practices (see, for example, McAlary, 1994).
Given the relative invisibility of corrupt activities, the collection of direct
evidence of the commission of a corrupt act requires particular tactics. The targets
of investigation vary and may be broad or narrow (ie the identified officer(s) or
broader groups of which they are a part). The nature of the definition used is
38
CORRUPTION CONTROL
linked closely with the method of investigation followed and the model of
corruption held by investigators. The use of a more limited definition generally
means that a model of investigation along the lines of a criminal trial will be
adopted where the focus is on establishing whether specific events occurred. This
mode is based on a largely individualistic model of corruption. It tends not to
consider patterns and trends in corruption, and by focusing on individuals rather
than groups or networks, it runs the risk of tipping off others who may be
involved in corruption activities. A broader definition is closer to fishing
expedition. It always looks for patterns in corruption focuses on arrangements
rather than events and has as its target the greatest number of corrupt officers
possible. As a strategy it allows investigators to postpone making arrests until the
optimum amount of evidence has been collected.
As with detection, investigation increasingly involves undercover
techniques.These include: surveillance; turn-arounds; body-microphones; wiretaps;
and, faked situations Whilst intelligence from wiretaps, direct observation by
corruption patrol officers, and integrity tests have all proved important in anticorruption activities, verbal testimony remains the most common source of
information in this, as in all forms of criminal investigation. However, the manner
in which such interviews are conducted may impact on the willingness of witnesses
to provide evidence, and the timing may affect the possibility of gathering
premonitory evidence. There are notable examples of police forces being openly
antagonistic towards members of the public alleging corrupt activities (McAlary,
1994; Maas, 1997), with complainants finding themselves subject to crossexamination and interrogation. The failure to ensure the co-operation of witnesses
reduces the opportunity of collecting important postmonitory evidence of corrupt
activities, but also undermines sometimes fatally the opportunity for enlisting
the help of the witness in premonitory activities. Interviews conducted too early in
an investigation may also impact negatively on the opportunity for gathering
premonitory information. Rather in the manner of the precipitate arrest,
interviewing a key player in a network of corruption may tip off all the others
involved and lead to the destruction of other evidence.
The external environment and external controls
In addition to implementing strategies aimed at changing the organisation,
strategies aimed at changing the environment are also important in tackling
corruption. As was outlined in Chapter Three, there are considerable pressures on
police agencies to become corrupt from the organisational environment. The two
major environmental elements posing a threat have been labelled the task
39
CORRUPTION CONTROL
40
CORRUPTION CONTROL
to suggest that corrupt activities are simply the product of one or two individuals
who are out of control. The organisation, it is implied, is clean. For this and other
reasons it is generally significantly more difficult to have organisations defined as
corrupt than it is to do so in relation to individuals. Thus, in parallel with
corporate crime it is possible often for the organisation to avoid sanctions because
the focus of prosecutions is generally on individuals and, similarly, individuals may
sometimes be able successfully to use the organisation as a shield (Punch, 1996).
Four obstacles have been identified as hindering the investigation and prosecution
of organisations:
Organisations can often prevent other organisations from exerting control over
them. Sherman argues that two legitimate grounds are often cited by control
agents to account for their failure to mobilize control in response to information
about deviance. First, that the information is false or that the source is
unreliable. Secondly, that the information available is insufficient to meet the
standards of proof required.
Even when social control is mobilised there are few effective means of
punishment. Punitive sanctions may be both material and symbolic. The former
are rarely applied to organisations, the latter can be. It is for this reason that
during corruption scandals there tends to be a battle of definition over whether
the deviance identified is deviance by individual members or deviance
characteristic of the entire organisation. As Sherman (1978: 24-5) puts it: the
imposition of a symbolic sanction against the organisation is a matter of
manipulation of appearances.
41
CORRUPTION CONTROL
15
scandal, and official public inquiries set up in the aftermath may play a vital role
in the establishment of successful corruption control strategies;
42
CORRUPTION CONTROL
As Marx points to in much of his work, undercover or covert tactics raise troubling
issues. These include:
the redirection of resources away from crimes known to the police towards
possible offences;
where state officials are themselves the target of such tactics, the danger is that
the legitimacy of particular state institutions is threatened.
The reform of a corrupt police dept is a major social change and is only achieved at
a certain cost. There may be unintended, and sometimes undesirable,
consequences:
There may, at least for a period, be a significant impact on the public perception
of policing and a concomitant decrease in the legitimacy accorded the police.
43
CORRUPTION CONTROL
the paradox is that more control can weaken control by disturbing normal
patterns and generating resentment. He goes on to argue:
There is no doubt that there has to be close supervision, formal prohibitions,
and strong sanctions in an organisation with such a sensitive task as police
have and with a mandate that is defined by the criminal law. If a policeman
is corrupt then he is a criminal and must expect tough sanctions. But it is
doubtful if a tough regime is the best remedy for the corruption issue.
Probably the two most important elements are clarity of guidelines and
seriousness of resources Everyone in the organisation must know what is
not acceptable and that infringements will be pursued professionally and with
vigour. (Punch, 1994: 33-4)
There seems to be considerable agreement with this position. McCormack (1996)
for example has suggested that it is quite possible to effect behavioural change
within organisations as a result of the imposition of strong internal controls which
heighten the risk of detection. However, he argues that long-term change depends
more upon internalising new ethical standards (McCormack, 1996: 245). Both, it
appears, are required. Sherman says that conformity to organisational policy is
maintained by a good balance of pride and fear, deterrence and voluntary
compliance (quoted by McCormack, 1996). Just to prove the point that this is
simpler than it sounds, Simpson notes that the question of what constitutes a
good balance seems, however, to be what constitutes the problem in this
discussion (Simpson, 1977: 136).
44
the causes of corruption include: factors that are intrinsic to policing as a job;
45
reform must look at the political and task environments as well as the
organisation itself;
As is suggested above, there are certain areas of policing that are more prone to
corruption than others: vice, drugs, licensing and those areas where police officers
have regulatory powers are generally cited as being corruption-prone and, indeed,
figure largely in accounts of police corruption around the world (Mollen, 1994;
Morton, 1992; Wood, 1997). Punch (1994) suggests that three issues emerge from
this fact. First, given that there is some predictability to corruption there should be
some cautious anticipation of the dangers that might result from certain types of
policing and from the placing of particular individuals close to the invitational
edge. Second, this means that vulnerable people should not be placed in
situations where the opportunities are particularly tempting to them. Clearly, there
are problems in defining vulnerability in this regard. Officers known to have, or
have had, drink problems and officers with debts might be two that would fall into
the category. Thirdly, it is, or at least may be, possible to reduce opportunities in
particular areas. Punch (1994), for example, suggests it is quite possible to remove
some kickback opportunities by taking some decisions out of the hands of officers.
Police agencies often respond to the inherent vulnerability of some jobs by
ensuring that the staff posted to them are rotated on a regular basis. The Fitzgerald
Report (1989) recommended the rotation of officers in sensitive or high risk areas
on a three year to five year basis. Regular drug-testing of employees is becoming
more common and though in operation in New York prior to the Mollen
Commission inquiry into corruption, was tightened up subsequently. Finally, a
declaration of assets and financial interests is one further way of screening
46
employees both for potential vulnerability and for unexplained income. This has
now become standard for senior officers in the New South Wales Police Service
and for all officers working in designated sensitive areas (Palmer, 1992).
One response to the challenge of corruption has been to propose that the whole
approach agencies take to the task of policing needs to be reformed. More
particularly, some commentators have suggested that the adoption of the approach
and style generally associated with community policing is likely to reduce the
likelihood of corruption (Bracey, 1992). This, for example, is the response adopted
by the New South Wales Police Service in answer to to concerns about corruption
raised by the Lusher Inquiry (Lusher, 1981).
Whilst there is much in the community policing model which, if implemented
successfully, would be expected to reduce certain forms of corrupt activity
especially process corruption there are great dangers in treating community
policing as if it were a panacea for the problems of policing, corruption included.
First, as this report should have made clear, designing a strategy for tackling
corruption requires an approach that is multi-faceted and focuses both on the
environment being policed as well as the police organisation itself. Secondly, it is
perfectly possible that community policing itself brings with it a certain
corruption-proneness the possibility that corrupt practices may be facilitated and
will flourish unless particular vigilance is exercised. As Kleinig (1996: 232) puts it,
police who become too closely identified with and involved in the community
they serve often find it difficult to fulfil their law enforcement function. The risk of
corruption must also be faced. Not only will associations be forged that make
enforcement difficult, but police may start to share some of the perspectives of
those whose activities they are expected to be curbing. The likelihood is that any
style or approach to policing will bring with it certain implications for corruption
and, therefore, for corruption control. While there may be many arguments that
can be advanced in support of community policing (or problem oriented policing,
and so on) a reduction in the opportunities or likelihood of corruption is unlikely
to be central.
At the core of this report is the idea that the central facet of any anti-corruption
strategy should be an emphasis on ethical policing. Much corrupt behaviour by
police officers bribery, shake-downs, the protection of criminal activity is in
itself illegal and therefore clearly unethical. There is, however, as Chapter Three
illustrated, a range of other activities which are not so straightforwardly classified.
Policing involves making difficult ethical choices or decisions. There is
considerable evidence to suggest that police agencies have tended to downplay, or
47
to completely ignore, the ethical dilemmas that their officers inevitably have to
confront. Relatively little emphasis, if any, is put on ethics training for new recruits
or for those in service. Indeed, statements or codes of ethics, where they exist,
often tend to be little more than general statements of intent which simply sit in
folders or hang decoratively on office walls, rather than living documents which
inform day-to-day practice and are the subject of active discussion and debate.
Without doubt, a much more sustained focus on what might constitute ethical
policing is not only a key challenge for the police service in the next century, but
an important element in the attempt to control corruption.
Of course, these issues do not only affect the police. There has in the UK in recent
years been an increasing focus on ethics and standards in public life. Whilst, at
least initially, these discussions were largely confined to political life, there are
good reasons why such principles should be extended to public services such as the
police service. Integrity which has formed a very significant focus in this report
lies at the heart of the Nolan principles (Nolan, 1998). Nolan defines this
straightforwardly as the duty of holders of public office not to place themselves
under any financial or other obligation to individuals or organisations that might
influence them in the performance of their official duties. The Nolan Committee
went on to outline six other principles of public life selflessness, objectivity,
accountability, openness, honesty and leadership and to argue that these applied
across the public service. Such principles require some elaboration in order to
clarify their precise application to policing. However, they potentially provide the
basis for the establishment of something that might be recognised as ethical
policing not dissimilar to attempts that have previously been made, for example,
to articulate the values that underpin what might be described as democratic
policing (Jones et al, 1994).
Ethical policing is, however, not a solution to the problem of corruption. Partly,
this is because any successful anti-corruption strategy must involve much more
besides. Equally, however, it is because as is the case with many significant social
or organisational problems, there is no such thing as a solution. There are two
fundamental reasons for this. First, responses to complex problems are themselves
usually complex or multi-faceted. They are rarely simple or straightforward.
Secondly, rarely is it the case that such problems are solved. Rather, the more
realistic aim is usually to attempt to minimise the impact of the problem. The
available evidence suggests that corruption within the police is unlikely ever to
be completely eliminated. Unfortunately, all too often official inquiries into
police corruption somewhat undermine the force of their otherwise impressively
realistic recommendations by suggesting that the implementation of new tactics
48
will, for example, enable a new Commissioner to drive corruption from the
ranks (Mollen, 1994: 6).
The are a number of dangers that may result from such an assumption. The first is
the danger that unrealistic expectations will be created among the public leading to
a sense of betrayal when (possibly minor) future examples of corrupt activity come
to light (as they surely will). Secondly, and alternatively, it may simply increase
public scepticism about the ability of the service to reform itself. Similarly,
pronouncements about the aim of completely eliminating corruption may lead to
disenchantment and/or scepticism within the police service itself. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, such nave assumptions about corruption may lead police
management, and others responsible for the governance of the police, to take their
eye off the ball.
The evidence reviewed in this report suggests that any complacency about
corruption, or lack of realism about the prospects of reform, will lead to the cycle
beginning all over again. Whilst there are examples of conspicuous success in
reforming highly corrupt police forces, there are equally conspicuous examples of
corruption returning with equal if not greater force to those self-same forces some
years in the future. Vigilance and realism must be the watchwords of the police
administrator seeking to control corruption.
49
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