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SJC-12043
COMMONWEALTH

Suffolk.

Present:

vs.

MICHELLE CARTER.

April 7, 2016. - July 1, 2016.

Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, &

Hines, JJ.

Homicide. Youthful Offender Act. Grand Jury. Evidence, Grand

jury proceedings. Practice, Criminal, Grand jury
proceedings.

Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the

county of Suffolk on October 22, 2015.

The case was reported by Botsford, J.

Dana Alan Curhan (Joseph P. Cataldo with him) for the

defendant.
Shoshana E. Stern, Assistant District Attorney (Katie Cook
Rayburn, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the
Commonwealth.
Eva G. Jellison & David J. Nathanson, for Youth Advocacy
Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services & another,
amici curiae, submitted a brief.
CORDY, J.

On February 6, 2015, the defendant, Michelle

Carter, was indicted as a youthful offender under G. L. c. 119,

54, on a charge of involuntary manslaughter after she, at the
age of seventeen, encouraged Conrad Roy (the victim), then
eighteen years of age, to commit suicide.

To indict a juvenile

as a youthful offender, the grand jury must hear evidence

establishing probable cause that (1) the juvenile is between the
ages of fourteen and eighteen at the time of the underlying
offense; (2) the underlying offense, if committed by an adult,
would be punishable by imprisonment in State prison; and (3) the
underlying offense involves the infliction or threat of serious
bodily harm.

G. L. c. 119, 54.

The defendant moved in the

Juvenile Court to dismiss the youthful offender indictment,

arguing that the Commonwealth failed to present the grand jury
with sufficient evidence of involuntary manslaughter and that the
defendant's conduct did not involve the infliction or threat of
serious bodily harm.

The motion was denied.

The principal question we consider in this case is whether

the evidence was sufficient to warrant the return of an
indictment for involuntary manslaughter where the defendant's
conduct did not extend beyond words.

We conclude that, on the

evidence presented to the grand jury, the verbal conduct at issue

was sufficient and, because a conviction of involuntary
manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment in State prison and
inherently involves the infliction of serious bodily harm, the
grand jury properly returned an indictment under the youthful
offender statute.

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the

Juvenile Court.1
1.

Background.

The grand jury heard evidence from four

witnesses over the course of three days.

That evidence, viewed

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Commonwealth

v. Moran, 453 Mass. 880, 885 (2012), included the following:
On the afternoon of July 13, 2014, an officer with the
Fairhaven police department located the deceased in his truck,
parked in a store parking lot.

The medical examiner concluded

that the victim had died after inhaling carbon monoxide that was
produced by a gasoline powered water pump located in the truck.
The manner of death was suicide.

1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Youth Advocacy

Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services and the

American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts.

The victim had been receiving treatment for mental health

issues since 2011.

In 2013, the victim attempted to commit

suicide by overdosing on acetaminophen.

A friend saved his life

by contacting emergency services.

During the course of the investigation into the victim's
suicide, a police review of his recent electronic communications
caused them to further explore his relationship with the
defendant.

The victim and the defendant met in 2011 and had been

dating at various times during that period, including at the time

of the victim's death.

Because they did not live in the same

town, the majority of their contact took place through the

exchange of voluminous text messages and cellular telephone
calls.2

The grand jury heard testimony and were presented with

transcripts concerning the content of those text messages in the

minutes, days, weeks, and months leading up to the defendant's
suicide.

The messages revealed that the defendant was aware of

the victim's history of mental illness, and of his previous

suicide attempt, and that much of the communication between the
defendant and the victim focused on suicide.

Specifically, the

defendant encouraged the victim to kill himself,3 instructed him

In a written memorandum of decision, the judge stated that,

although the defendant and the victim rarely were in the same
physical location, "[t]he rapidity of the[ir] electronic
exchanges was almost immediate, similar to a conversation."
2

as to when and how he should kill himself,4 assuaged his concerns

over killing himself,5 and chastised him when he delayed doing
so.6

The theme of those text messages can be summed up in the

phrase used by the defendant four times between July 11 and July
12, 2014 (the day on which the victim committed suicide):

"You

just [have] to do it."

3 On July 8, 2014, between 8:09 P.M. and 8:18 P.M., the defendant

and victim exchanged the following text messages:

Defendant: "So are you sure you don't wanna [kill yourself]
tonight?"
Victim:

"what do you mean am I sure?"

Defendant:
Victim:

"Idk yet I'll let you know"

Defendant:
it tonight"
Victim:

"Like, are you definitely not doing it tonight?"

"Because I'll stay up with you if you wanna do

"another day wouldn't hurt"

Defendant:
you keep doing"

"You can't keep pushing it off, tho, that's all

4 The defendant helped the victim determine the method he

eventually used to kill himself. On July 7, 2014, between

10:57 P.M. and 11:04 P.M., they exchanged the following text
messages:
Defendant: "Well there's more ways to make CO. Google ways
to make it. . . "
Victim:

"Omg"

Defendant:
Victim:

"What"

"portable generator that's it"

Cellular telephone records that were presented to the grand

jury revealed that the victim and defendant also had two cellular
telephone conversations at the time during which police believe
that the victim was in his truck committing suicide.7

The

content of those cellular telephone conversations is only

available as reported by the defendant to her friend, Samantha
On July 11, 2014, at 5:13 P.M., the defendant sent the
victim the following text message: " . . . Well in my opinion, I
think u should do the generator because I don't know much about
the pump and with a generator u can't fail"
On July 12, 2014, between 4:25 A.M. and 4:34 A.M., they
exchanged the following text messages:
Defendant: "So I guess you aren't gonna do it then, all
that for nothing"
Defendant:
determined"
Victim:

"I'm just confused like you were so ready and

"I am gonna eventually"

Victim: "I really don't know what I'm waiting for. .

have everything lined up"

but I

Defendant: "No, you're not, Conrad. Last night was it.

You keep pushing it off and you say you'll do it but u never do.
Its always gonna be that way if u don't take action"
Defendant: "You're just making it harder on yourself by
pushing it off, you just have to do it"
Defendant:

"Do u wanna do it now?"

Victim:

"Is it too late?"

Victim:

"Idkk it's already light outside"

Victim:
tomorrow"

I'm gonna go back to sleep, love you I'll text you

Boardman.

After the victim's death, the defendant sent a text

message to Boardman explaining that, at one point during the

suicide, the victim got out of his truck because he was "scared,"
and the defendant commanded him to get back in.8

Defendant: "No? Its probably the best time now because

everyone's sleeping. Just go somewhere in your truck. And no
one's really out right now because it's an awkward time"
Defendant:
Defendant:
probably won't"

"If u don't do it now you're never gonna do it"

"And u can say you'll do it tomorrow but you

5 During the evening of July 11, 2014, and morning of July 12,

2014, the victim and the defendant exchanged the following text
messages:
Victim: "I'm just to sensitive. I want my family to know
there was nothing they could do. I am entrapped in my own
thoughts"
Victim: "like no I would be happy if they had no guilt
about it. because I have a bad feeling tht this is going to
create a lot of depression between my parents/sisters"
Victim: "i'm overthinking everything. . fuck.
and just do it"

I gotta stop

Defendant:
"I think your parents know you're in a really
bad place. Im not saying they want you to do it, but I honestly
feel like they can except it. They know there's nothing they can
do, they've tried helping, everyone's tried. But there's a point
that comes where there isn't anything anyone can do to save you,
not even yourself, and you've hit that point and I think your
parents know you've hit that point. You said you're mom saw a
suicide thing on your computer and she didn't say anything. I
think she knows it's on your mind and she's prepared for it"

It was apparent that the defendant understood the

repercussions of her role in the victim's death.

Prior to his

suicide, the defendant sought (apparently unsuccessfully) to have

the victim delete the text messages between the two, and after
learning that the police were looking through the victim's
cellular telephone, the defendant sent the following text message
Defendant: Everyone will be sad for a while, but they will
get over it and move on. They won't be in depression I won't let
that happen. They know how sad you are and they know that you're
doing this to be happy, and I think they will understand and
accept it. They'll always carry u in their hearts"
. . .
Victim:

"i don't want anyone hurt in the process though"

Victim: "I meant when they open the door, all the carbon
monoxide is gonna come out they can't see it or smell it.
whoever opens the door"
Defendant: "They will see the generator and know that you
died of CO. . . ."
. . .
Victim:

"hey can you do me a favor"

Defendant:
Victim:

"Yes of course"

"just be there for my family :)"

Defendant: "Conrad, of course I will be there for your

family. I will help them as much as I can to get thru this, ill
tell them about how amazing their son/brother truly was"
. . .
Victim:

"Idk I'm freaking out again"

Victim:

I'm overthinking"

to Boardman:
done.

"Sam, [the police] read my messages with him I'm

His family will hate me and I can go to jail."

During the

investigation, and after cross-referencing the text messages in

the defendant's cellular telephone and those in the victim's
cellular telephone, the police discovered that the defendant had

Defendant: "I thought you wanted to do this. The time is

right and you're ready, you just need to do it! You can't keep
living this way. You just need to do it like you did last time
and not think about it and just do it babe. You can't keep doing
this every day"
Victim:
I guess"
Victim:

"I do want to. but like I'm freaking for my family.

"idkkk"

Defendant: "Conrad. I told you I'll take care of them.

Everyone will take care of them to make sure they won't be alone
and people will help them get thru it. We talked about this,
they will be okay and accept it. People who commit suicide don't
think this much and they just do it"

6 At various times between July 4, 2014, and July 12, 2014, the

defendant and the victim exchanged several text messages:

Defendant: "You're gonna have to prove me wrong because I
just don't think you really want this. You just keeps pushing it
off to another night and say you'll do it but you never do"
. . .
Defendant: "SEE THATS WHAT I MEAN. YOU KEEP PUSHING IT
OFF! You just said you were gonna do it tonight and now you're
saying eventually. . . ."
. . .
Defendant: "But I bet you're gonna be like 'oh, it didn't
work because I didn't tape the tube right or something like that'

10

erased certain text messages between her and the victim.

The

defendant also lied to police about the content of her

conversations with the victim.

Finally, the defendant

acknowledged in a text message to Boardman that she could have

stopped the victim from committing suicide:

"I helped ease him

. . . I bet you're gonna say an excuse like that"

. . .
Defendant:
Victim:

"Do you have the generator?"

"not yet lol"

Defendant:

"WELL WHEN ARE YOU GETTING IT"

. . .
Defendant: "You better not be bull shiting me and saying
you're gonna do this and then purposely get caught"
. . .
Defendant:
you help"
Defendant:
Victim:

"You just need to do it Conrad or I'm gonna get

"You can't keep doing this everyday"

"Okay I'm gonna do it today"

Defendant:

"Do you promise"

Victim:

"I promise babe"

Victim:

"I have to now"

Defendant:
Victim:

"Like right now?"

"where do I go?

:("

Defendant: "And u can't break a promise. And just go in a

quiet parking lot or something" (emphasis added).

11

into it and told him it was okay, I was talking to him on the
phone when he did it I coud have easily stopped him or called the
police but I didn't."
Based on the foregoing evidence, the Commonwealth
successfully sought to indict the defendant for involuntary
manslaughter, as a youthful offender, asserting that the
defendant's wanton or reckless conduct was the cause of the
victim's death.

After a judge of the Juvenile Court denied the

defendant's motion to dismiss, the defendant filed a petition for

relief under G. L. c. 211, 3.

On February 1, 2016, a single

justice of this court reserved and reported the case to the full
court.
2.

Discussion.

"Ordinarily, a 'court will not inquire into

the competency or sufficiency of the evidence before the grand

One call, at 6:28 P.M. on July 12, came from the victim's
cellular telephone and the other, at 7:12 P.M., came from the
defendant's cellular telephone. Each call lasted over forty
minutes.
7

8 The text message to Samantha Boardman, in relevant part,

stated: "Sam, [the victim's] death is my fault like honestly I

could have stopped him I was on the phone with him and he got out
of the [truck] because it was working and he got scared and I
fucking told him to get back in Sam because I knew he would do it
all over again the next day and I couldnt have him live the way
he was living anymore I couldnt do it I wouldnt let him."

12

jury.'"

Commonwealth v. Rex, 469 Mass. 36, 39 (2014), quoting

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 373 Mass. 591, 592 (1977).

However, in

Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 163 (1982), we

recognized a limited exception for when the grand jury "fail[] to
hear any evidence of criminal activity by the defendant."

"At

the very least, the grand jury must hear enough evidence to
establish the identity of the accused and to support a finding of
probable cause to arrest the accused for the offense charged"
(footnote omitted).

Rex, supra at 40.

"Probable cause requires

sufficient facts to warrant a person of reasonable caution in

believing that an offense has been committed . . . ; this
standard requires considerably less than that which is required
to warrant a finding of guilt" (citations omitted).

Commonwealth

v. Levesque, 436 Mass. 443, 447 (2002).

a.

Involuntary manslaughter.9

Involuntary manslaughter can

be proved under two theories, either (1) wanton or reckless

conduct or (2) wanton or reckless failure to act.
v.

Commonwealth

Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 456 Mass. 826, 832 (2010).

The

indictment was returned on the basis of the defendant's wanton or

reckless conduct.10

The Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 73 (2013) define

"[i]nvoluntary manslaughter" as "an unlawful killing
unintentionally caused by wanton and reckless conduct." Wanton
or reckless conduct
9

13

Wanton or reckless conduct is "intentional conduct . . .

involv[ing] a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm
will result to another."

Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482,

496 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 399

(1944).

Whether conduct is wanton or reckless is

"determined based either on the defendant's specific

knowledge or on what a reasonable person should have
"is conduct that creates a high degree of likelihood
that substantial harm will result to another. It is
conduct involving a grave risk of harm to another that
a person undertakes with indifference to or disregard
of the consequences of such conduct. Whether conduct
is wanton and reckless depends either on what the
defendant knew or how a reasonable person would have
acted knowing what the defendant knew. If the
defendant realized the grave risk created by his
conduct, his subsequent act amounts to wanton and
reckless conduct whether or not a reasonable person
would have realized the risk of grave danger. Even if
the defendant himself did not realize the grave risk of
harm to another, the act would constitute wanton and
reckless conduct if a reasonable person, knowing what
the defendant knew, would have realized the act posed a
risk of grave danger to another. It is not enough for
the Commonwealth to prove the defendant acted
negligently, that is, in a manner that a reasonably
careful person would not have acted. The Commonwealth
must prove that the defendant's actions went beyond
negligence and amounted to wanton and reckless conduct
as . . . defined . . . ."
Id. at 76-79. The 2016 proposed model jury instructions are
substantially similar in content to the 2013 model jury
instructions.

Our case law uses the phrases "wanton and reckless conduct"
and "wanton or reckless conduct" interchangeably. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482, 496-497 (2012).
10

14

known in the circumstances. . . . If based on the

objective measure of recklessness, the defendant's
actions constitute wanton or reckless conduct . . . if
an ordinary normal [person] under the same
circumstances would have realized the gravity of the
danger. . . . If based on the subjective measure,
i.e., the defendant's own knowledge, grave danger to
others must have been apparent and the defendant must
have chosen to run the risk rather than alter [his or
her] conduct so as to avoid the act or omission which
caused the harm" (quotations and citations omitted).
Pugh, supra at 496-497.
b.
jury.11

Sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand

The Commonwealth bore the burden of presenting the grand

jury with sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable

cause that the defendant's conduct (1) was intentional;12 (2) was

11 Before we consider whether the grand jury heard testimony

sufficient to warrant an indictment against the defendant for

involuntary manslaughter, we address her argument that G. L.
c. 265, 13 (punishing involuntary manslaughter), is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to her. Specifically, the
defendant argues that no one of ordinary intelligence -- never
mind a juvenile -- would understand that encouraging suicide is
prosecutable under existing law.
A criminal statute must be "sufficiently explicit to give
clear warning as to proscribed activities." Commonwealth v.
Orlando, 371 Mass. 732, 734 (1977). "A statute is
unconstitutionally vague if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning. . . . If a statute has been
clarified by judicial explanation, however, it will withstand a
challenge on grounds of unconstitutional vagueness" (quotation
and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Crawford, 430 Mass. 683,
689 (2000). "Where a statute's literal scope . . . is capable of
reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment [to the
United States Constitution], the [vagueness] doctrine demands a
greater degree of specificity than in other contexts" (citation
omitted). Commonwealth v. Abramms, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 581
(2006).

15

wanton or reckless; and (3) caused the victim's death.

Life Care

Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 456 Mass. at 832.

The defendant argues that, because she neither was
physically present when the victim killed himself nor provided
the victim with the instrument with which he killed himself, she

The crime the defendant is charged with is neither

objectively nor subjectively vague as applied to the defendant.
"Manslaughter is a common-law crime that has not been codified by
statute in Massachusetts" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v.
Rodriquez, 461 Mass. 100, 106 (2011). General Laws c. 265, 13,
does not describe the crime; instead, it sets out only the
punishment, while the elements of the crime are created as part
of the common law. Under common law, conduct similar to that of
the defendant has been deemed unlawful, see Persampieri v.
Commonwealth, 343 Mass. 19, 22-23 (1961) (jury warranted in
convicting defendant of involuntary manslaughter where he
provided wife with gun, taunted her, and encouraged her to commit
suicide, resulting in her killing herself), and it is therefore
not objectively vague.
On a subjective basis, the evidence presented by the
Commonwealth showed that the defendant was personally aware that
her conduct was both reprehensible and punishable: the defendant
asked the victim to delete the text messages between the two of
them, deleted several of those messages from her own cellular
telephone, and, after police began investigating the victim's
cellular telephone, lied about her involvement and told her
friend that, if the police uncovered the text messages between
her and the victim, she could go to jail. The charge of
involuntary manslaughter is not vague as applied to the
defendant.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there

was evidence that the defendant intended to pressure the victim
into killing himself. The defendant told her friend, Samantha
Boardman, that she "couldn't have [the victim] live the way he
was living anymore. [She] couldn't do it. [She] wouldn't let
him."
12

16

did not cause his death by wanton or reckless conduct.13

She

maintains that verbally encouraging someone to commit suicide, no

matter how forcefully, cannot constitute wanton or reckless
conduct.

Effectively, the argument is that verbal conduct can

never overcome a person's willpower to live, and therefore cannot

be the cause of a suicide.

We disagree.

We have never required in the return of an indictment for

involuntary manslaughter that a defendant commit a physical act
in perpetrating a victim's death.14

We also never have had

occasion to consider such an indictment against a defendant on

the basis of words alone.

This is not, however, the first time

that we have contemplated the charge of involuntary manslaughter

against a defendant where the death of the victim is selfinflicted.

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Atencio, 345 Mass. 627

(1963); Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 343 Mass. 19 (1961).

At issue in Atencio was a "game" of "Russian roulette"
played by the two defendants, Atencio and Marshall, and the
Although not physically present when the victim committed
suicide, the constant communication with him by text message and
by telephone leading up to and during the suicide made the
defendant's presence at least virtual.
13

14 Physical acts are certainly one means by which the

Commonwealth can show the commission prong of involuntary

manslaughter. See Pugh, 462 Mass. at 497. However, the
defendant does not point to -- and our research has not uncovered
-- any case in which physical acts have been made a prerequisite
of involuntary manslaughter.

17

deceased.

Atencio, supra at 628.

Marshall took the gun first,

pointed it at his own head, and pulled the trigger; nothing

happened.

Id. at 628-629.

He passed the gun to Atencio, who

also pointed the gun at his own head and pulled the trigger,
again with no result.

Id. at 629.

Atencio then passed the gun

to the deceased; when he pointed it at his own head and pulled

the trigger, "[t]he cartridge exploded, and he fell over dead."
Id.
In affirming the involuntary manslaughter convictions
against both defendants, we reasoned that "the Commonwealth had
an interest that the deceased should not be killed by the wanton
or reckless conduct of himself and others" (emphasis added).

Id.

"Such conduct could be found in the concerted action and

cooperation of the defendants in helping to bring about the
deceased's foolish act," id., as "[i]t would not be necessary
that the defendants force the deceased to play or suggest that he
play."

Id. at 630.

We concluded that it did not matter that

Atencio was the one who handed the gun to the deceased, as
opposed to Marshall, affirming both defendants' convictions.
at 630.

Id.

Indeed, had the deceased been the first to participate

in the "game," and killed himself before either Atencio or

Marshall touched the gun, his acts would still have been
imputable to the defendants.

Id.

It was, instead, the

atmosphere created in the decision to play the "game" that caused

18

the deceased to shoot himself, as there was "mutual

encouragement" to participate.

Id.

In Persampieri, 343 Mass. at 22, the defendant told his wife

that he intended to divorce her.
suicide.

Id.

She threatened to commit

The defendant, knowing that the victim had already

attempted suicide twice, said she was "chicken -- and wouldn't do

it."

Id.

When she retrieved a .22 caliber rifle, he helped her

to load it and handed it to her, noting that the safety was off.
Id.

With the gun barrel on the floor, the victim struggled to

pull the trigger.

Id. at 23.

The defendant told her that if she

took off her shoe she could reach the trigger, at which point she
successfully shot and killed herself.

Id.

We concluded that the

jury were warranted in returning a verdict of involuntary

manslaughter based on the theory of wanton or reckless conduct,
id., noting that the defendant, "instead of trying to bring [the
victim] to her senses, taunted her, told her where the gun was,
loaded it for her, saw that the safety was off, and told her the
means by which she could pull the trigger.

He thus showed a

reckless disregard of his wife's safety and the possible

consequences of his conduct."

Id.

These cases elucidate that, because wanton or reckless

conduct requires a consideration of the likelihood of a result
occurring, the inquiry is by its nature entirely fact-specific.
The circumstances of the situation dictate whether the conduct is

19

or is not wanton or reckless.

We need not -- and indeed cannot

-- define where on the spectrum between speech and physical acts

involuntary manslaughter must fall.

Instead, the inquiry must be

made on a case-by-case basis.

Here, the particular circumstances of the defendant's
relationship with the victim may have caused her verbal
communications with him in the last minutes of his life on July
12, 2014, to carry more weight than mere words, overcoming any
independent will to live he might have had.

It is in those final

moments, when the victim had gotten out of his truck, expressing
doubts about killing himself, on which a verdict in this case may
ultimately turn.

In that moment of equivocation, the victim

could have continued to delay his death, perhaps attempting

suicide again at a later date, or perhaps seeking treatment; or
he could have gotten back into the truck and followed through on
his suicide.

The grand jury heard that the victim, after the

defendant commanded him to "get back in," obeyed, returning to

the truck, closing the door, and succumbing to the carbon
monoxide.
In our view, the coercive quality of that final directive
was sufficient in the specific circumstances of this case to
support a finding of probable cause.

Those circumstances

included the defendant's virtual presence at the time of the

suicide, the previous constant pressure the defendant had put on

20

the victim, and his already delicate mental state.15

In sum,

there was ample evidence to establish probable cause that the

defendant's conduct was wanton or reckless, under either a
subjective or an objective standard.

The grand jury could have

found that an ordinary person under the circumstances would have

realized the gravity of the danger posed by telling the victim,
who was mentally fragile, predisposed to suicidal inclinations,
and in the process of killing himself, to get back in a truck
filling with carbon monoxide and "just do it."
Mass. at 452.

See Levesque, 436

And significantly, the grand jury also could have

found that the defendant -- the victim's girl friend, with whom
he was in constant and perpetual contact -- on a subjective basis
knew that she had some control over his actions.16
The defendant argues that, even if she was wanton or
reckless, her words (spoken when she was miles away from the
15 As in the case against the husband in Persampieri, the

Commonwealth's evidence here shows that the defendant fully

understood and took advantage of the victim's fragility. Prior
to July 12, 2014, the defendant had helped to plan the victim's
suicide, assuaged the victim's guilt about leaving his family,
expressed her frustration that the victim had, at various times,
delayed killing himself, and threatened to seek mental health
treatment for the victim (despite his protestations) if he did
not kill himself.
16 The defendant admitted to Boardman:

"I helped ease him into

it and told him it was okay, I was talking to him on the phone
when he did it I coud have easily stopped him or called the
police but I didn't."

21

victim) could not be the cause of the victim's death.

Instead,

it was his decision to get back in the truck that resulted in his
suicide.

We are not convinced.

Because there was evidence that

the defendant's actions overbore the victim's willpower, there

was probable cause to believe that the victim's return to the
truck after the defendant told him to do so was not "an
independent or intervening act" that, as a matter of law, would
preclude his action from being imputable to her.
345 Mass. at 629-630.

See Atencio,

The text messages suggest that the victim

had been delaying suicide for weeks; to ignore the influence the
defendant had over the victim would be to oversimplify the
circumstances surrounding his death.

His delay of that suicide

and subsequent excuses for such delays were followed by his girl
friend's disappointment, frustration, and threats to seek
unwanted treatment on his behalf.

In sum, we conclude that there

was probable cause to show that the coercive quality of the

defendant's verbal conduct overwhelmed whatever willpower the
eighteen year old victim had to cope with his depression, and
that but for the defendant's admonishments, pressure, and
instructions, the victim would not have gotten back into the
truck and poisoned himself to death.

Consequently, the evidence

before the grand jury was sufficient for a finding of probable

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cause that the defendant, by wanton or reckless conduct, caused

the victim's death.17
It is important to articulate what this case is not about.
It is not about a person seeking to ameliorate the anguish of
someone coping with a terminal illness and questioning the value
of life.

Nor is it about a person offering support, comfort, and

even assistance to a mature adult who, confronted with such

circumstances, has decided to end his or her life.

These

situations are easily distinguishable from the present case, in

which the grand jury heard evidence suggesting a systematic
campaign of coercion on which the virtually present defendant
embarked -- captured and preserved through her text messages -that targeted the equivocating young victim's insecurities and
acted to subvert his willpower in favor of her own.

On the

17 The speech at issue in this case is not protected under the

First Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. 16 of

the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights because the Commonwealth
has a compelling interest in deterring speech that has a direct,
causal link to a specific victim's suicide. See Mendoza v.
Licensing Bd. of Fall River, 444 Mass. 188, 197 n.12 (2005)
(content-based restrictions on expressive conduct must satisfy
"strict scrutiny" standard, meaning government must "demonstrate
that the restriction is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end"
[citation omitted]); Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, 564
U.S. 786, 799 (2011); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728
(1997) (State "has an unqualified interest in the preservation of
human life" [citation omitted]). See also State v. MelchertDinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 23 (Minn. 2014) (affirming in part
constitutionality of statute prohibiting "assist[ing]" suicide as
against First Amendment challenge).

23

specific facts of this case, there was sufficient evidence to

support a probable cause finding that the defendant's command to
the victim in the final moments of his life to follow through on
his suicide attempt was a direct, causal link to his death.
3.

Conclusion.18

The grand jury were justified in

returning an indictment of involuntary manslaughter against the

defendant.

Because involuntary manslaughter carries a potential

punishment of incarceration in State prison and is inherently a

crime that involves the infliction of serious bodily harm,19 and
because the defendant was seventeen years of age at the time of
the offense, her indictment as a youthful offender on the
underlying involuntary manslaughter charge was also supported by
the evidence.

The motion judge's denial of the defendant's

motion to dismiss is affirmed.

18 The defendant argues that the indictment is flawed where the

grand jurors did not consider the charges from the perspective of
a "reasonable juvenile of the same age" standard. Massachusetts
currently does not require that a grand jury consider charges
based on such a standard. This issue was not raised below. See
G. L. c. 277, 47A ("In a criminal case, any defense or
objection based upon defects in the institution of the
prosecution or in the complaint or indictment, other than a
failure to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an
offense, shall only be raised . . . by a motion in conformity
with the requirements of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal
Procedure"). There was not an evidentiary hearing on the issue,
the judge did not offer any opinion as to the argument's merits,
and the arguments presented by the defendant and amici at this
stage regarding the impact of juvenile indictments are being
raised for the first time on appeal. The argument was therefore
waived.

24

So ordered.

19 The defendant argues that her conduct cannot constitute the

infliction or threat of serious bodily harm, as is required for

an indictment under the youthful offender statute, G. L. c. 119,
54. Having concluded that the grand jury were justified in
returning an indictment for involuntary manslaughter, we are
convinced that they were also justified in returning such
indictment under the youthful offender statute, given that
involuntary manslaughter under these circumstances inherently
involves the infliction of serious bodily harm.