Interpretive Theories - Dworkin Sunstein and Ely

Bond Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 2
Article 5
2005
Interpretive Theories: Dworkin, Sunstein, and Ely

Tina Hunter
[email protected]
Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr

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Interpretive Theories: Dworkin, Sunstein, and Ely

Abstract
Interpretive theory about the nature of law is the view that legal rights and duties are determined by the
scheme of principle that provides the best justification of certain political practices of a community: a scheme
identifiable through an interpretation of the practices that is sensitive both to the facts of the practices and to
the values or principles that the practices serve. Interpretivism was first postulated by Dworkin as a criticism
of the positivist school of judicial reasoning which focuses on rules in interpretation, and is most closely
asociated with the work of Austin and Hart. Dworkin rejects the positivist conceptions of law and
interpretation, instead theorizing that rights are premised upon a comprehensive set of moral precepts that
make individual rights valuable, and act as trumps. Interpretivism as developed by Dworkin includes the
claim that interpretation is sensitive to values, and therefore fundamental to interpretivism is natural law. This
paper examines modern judicial interpretivism, assessing the theories of Dworkin, Sunstein and Ely, by
comparative analysis, including their advantages and disadvantages. By applying these theories to a recent
judicial decision, it is possible to assess contemporary judicial interpretive theory in Australia.
Keywords
interpretive theory, judicial interpretivism, Dworkin, Sunstein, Ely
This article is available in Bond Law Review: http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol17/iss2/5
INTERPRETIVETHEORIES:DWORKIN,SUNSTEIN,ANDELY
ByTinaHunter*
Introduction
Interpretivetheoryaboutthenatureoflawistheviewthatlegalrightsanddutiesare
determined by the scheme of principle that provides the best justification of certain political
practicesofacommunity:aschemeidentifiablethroughaninterpretationofthepracticesthat
issensitivebothtothefactsofthepracticesandtothevaluesorprinciplesthatthepractices
serve.1InterpretivismwasfirstpostulatedbyDworkinasacriticismofthepositivist
school of judicial reasoning2 which focuses on rules in interpretation, and is most
closely asociated with the work of Austin and Hart.3 Dworkin rejects the positivist
conceptions of law and interpretation, instead theorizing that rights are premised
uponacomprehensivesetofmoralpreceptsthatmakeindividualrightsvaluable,and
act as trumps. Interpretivism as developed by Dworkin includes the claim that
interpretation is sensitive to values, and therefore fundamental to interpretivism is
naturallaw.4
This paper examines modern judicial interpretivism, assessing the theories of Dworkin,
SunsteinandEly,bycomparativeanalysis,includingtheiradvantagesanddisadvantages.
Byapplyingthesetheoriestoarecentjudicialdecision,itispossibletoassesscontemporary
judicialinterpretivetheoryinAustralia.
TheContextofInterpretiveTheoriesofLaw
Interpretation of law is fundamental to the democratic system and the Rule of Law.
Indeed,underSection1oftheAmericanConstitution,thereisaseparationofpowers,
with the various parts of lawmaking made a separate function of the respective
branchesofpowerwithinthelegalsystem:
*
1
2
3
4
BA(Hons)Syd,GDipA(LIS)(Dist),MAppSc(LIM)(Dist).
NicosStavros,InterpretivistTheoriesofLaw(Winter2003)TheStanfordEncyclopediaof
Philosophyhttp://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/lawinterpretivist/>at12
April2005.
RonaldDworkin,TakingRightsSeriously(1977).
TheodoreMBenditt,LawasRuleandPrinciple(1978),659.
Stavros,aboven1,at2.
78
LEGISLATURE
EXECUTIVE
Makes
Law
Implements
Law
JUDICIARY
Interprets
Law
The interpretation of the law falls within the function of the Judiciary. The primary
roleofthejudgesistointerpretthelawbyutilizingmanytoolsavailable.Whentrying
tointerprettheconstitution,thereisanefforttoattempttobalanceagainstrulebased
positivism which is indeterminate, (law is impossible to grasp and very hard to
interpretasrulebased),withotherfactorssuchasvaluesandprinciples.Interpretive
theory in law involves different views about what approach to interpretation will
makeforthebestsystemoflaw,consideringmanyfactors,andsettingasiderulesas
theonlysourceofinterpretation.(Thisisthedebatebetweenruleboundvs.rulefree
statutoryinterpretation.)
MethodsofInterpretation:5
Textualism:insiststhatthetextisthefoundationforstatutorymeaningandit
isbinding.Eitherthetextisbindingbecauseitreflectsthelegislaturesintent
or it is binding whether it reflects the intent or not the principle of textual
priority.
Structural arguments examine words within the structure of the particular

statuteandwithreferencetootherprovisionsinthestatuteandotherstatutes.
Ifaparticularwordisambiguous,thestructuralistwilllooktootherusesof
the word in the provision and in other laws in order to ascertain a coherent
andconsistentdefinition.
Purpose refers to the general goal of the Congress or Parliament in enacting

the statute and takes into consideration the evil for which the statute is
enacted to remedy. Remedying such evil would then be the purpose or
generalgoalof the statute. Purpose takes the form of a standardthat sets to
AsidentifiedbyJosephFerarro,ElementsOutlineLegalPhilosophy(2002).
79
(2005) 17.2 Bond Law Review
undotherulelikenatureofaterm.Thepurposiveinquirydoesnot,however,
ascertaintheintentionofthelegislature.
Legislativehistory(intent):Onemaylooktothelegislativehistoryinorderto
discerntheintentionorspecificunderstandingofthelegislatorsthatenacteda
particular statute. History can give an ambiguous word a contextual
definitionandmayclarifythetextitself.Attentiontolegislativehistorymay
also reflect deference to the legislatures more democratic, specialized and
lawmakingprimacy.
When interpreting the constitution there is a need to have stability in the

interpretation, to ensure continuity and coherence in law making. There are
essentially two schools of thought in judicial interpretation originalism, and non
originalism:
ORIGINALISM
NON-ORIGINALISM
(Looking to past)
Intention who,
where, why,
motivation
(Looking forward contemporary)
Structure
Values
Text common
understanding
of constitution
Reasons
Gaps
Vagueness/
imprecision
Thetermoriginalismisusedtorefertoscholarsandjudgeswhoholdthatthata
Constitution should only (or principally) be interpreted according to the
intentionsofitsdraftersandratifiers.6Thisisrulelikesinceitdefinestheanswer
tocasesbeforetheyarise.
Stavros,aboven1,at2.
80
The term nonoriginalism refers to scholars and judges who utilise other tools
thanthatoftext,intentionandstructuretointerpretthemeaningofthelaw.Non
originalistsusemanyothertoolssuchasvalues,reasonandprinciplestointerpret
the meaningof the laws, in order toapply them to individual cases. Within this
schoolofthought,thereareanumberofinterpretivetheorists,anditisthisarea
thatwillbeconsideredindetailinthisanalysis.
The debate between originalists and nonoriginalists has been affected by anxieties
about the authority of the Constitution and doubts about the legitimacy of judicial
review. NonOriginalism focuses on extrinsic factors in the interpretation of the
constitution,suchasvalues,reason,gapsinthelaw,andvaguenessandimprecision,
using principles to assist in the interpretation of the law within the context of the
societyitserves.
AdvantagesofOriginalism:
JudicialdiscretioncouldbepoorlyexercisedbytheJudiciary,yetasystemof
rulesbasedonoriginalismwillensurejudicialdisciplineininterpretation;
Originalismlimitsinadvancejudicialdecisionmaking,anddoesnotthreaten
predictability.Alternativeapproachesintroduceuncertainty;
Reducesjudicialdiscretionandmakesconstitutionallawmorerulelike;
Theseruleshaveademocraticpedigreebyvirtueoftheirconnectiontopast
judgments;
Originalunderstandingsaregenerallysoundorjust,asarebasedonprevious
tenets;
Original understandings are democratically grounded and subject to
democraticcorrection.
CriticismofOriginalism:
Concrete contemporary questions do not always have concrete historical

answers;
Thesearchfororiginalunderstandingsleadstomanyindeterminacies;
Ruleboundconstitutionwillnotresultfromhardoriginalism;
New and unanticipated circumstances or changed norms complicate the
attempttofindclearanswersinhistory;
Changingsocietalnormsarenotconsideredwithinoriginalistinterpretation,
thereforesocietymaybehamperedinitsnaturalevolutionordevelopment;
81
Hard originalism produces a worse (less just) society due to narrow

confinement of judicial interpretation that has no synchronicity with the
societyinwhichitoperateswithin.
ContemporaryoriginalistssuchasBork,andScaliaJJ,aswellsomepositivists(suchas
Hart)feelthatthetextoftheConstitutionisallthatisnecessarytoreachaconclusion
aboutConstitutionallaw.Legalpositivismclaimsthatwhatthelawis,asopposedto
what it should be, ought to be the guiding principle in interpreting the text of the
Constitution.
Robert Dworkin, a great opponent of legal positivism, and a leading nonoriginalist

interprevist,statesthatthelegalpositivistsplainfactmethodofinterpretationisnot
quitesoplain.Dworkinsattackontheplainfacttheory,statingthatdisagreements
about what the law is are actually disagreements about the best constructive
interpretation of some past legal event,7 heralded the arrival of interpretivism in the
legalinterprevistscene.Thiswaspreviouslydominatedbypositivistandnaturallaw
theories about the nature of law, and has stimulated a great deal of debate. What
followsarethetheoriesofthreeofthegreatestinterpretivistsofthemodernera,and
theirimpactoncontemporaryjudicialinterpretation.
DworkinsInterpretativeTheoryofLawJudicialActivist
Ronald Dworkin is an American legal philosopher, and professor at both Yale and
Oxford Universities Law Schools. Dworkins works, most predominantly Taking
RightsSeriously(1977),rejectsthepositivistconceptionsoflawprevalentamonglegal
realists, instead theorizing that rights are premised upon a comprehensive set of
moralpreceptsthatmakeindividualrightscomprehensible.Afrequentcommentator
on constitutional questions, Dworkin criticized originalist Borks notion of basing
contemporaryjurisprudenceontheoriginalintentoftheauthorsoftheconstitution,
asunworkable.8HisotherimportantworksincludeAMatterofPrinciple(1985),Laws
Empire (1986), Lifes Dominion (1993), and Freedoms Law: The Moral Reading of the
AmericanConstitution(1996).
7
8
SeeDworkininCassRSunsteinThePartialConstitution(2000),111.
RonaldDworkin,Biography(2005)
<http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/people/A0816492.html>at16March2005.
82
OutlineofDworkinsRightsThesisinInterpretation.9
Essentially, Dworkins Rights Thesis is a response to Hart (and to some extent,

Kelsen), and the Positivist Movements rulebased law and interpretation. His
response is a two phase attack, and outlines his thesis of interpretation. One of
Dworkinsmainconcernshasbeentodevelopanddefendatheoryofinterpretation,
andtoofferanaccountofhowcourts(andjudges)notonlydodecidehardcases,but
how they ought to decide hard cases, (i.e. those cases in which the settled rules run
outorinwhichnosettledruleapplies).
A.
DworkinsResponsetoHartsSocialFactThesis
Thisthesisassertsitisanecessarytruththatlegalvalidityisultimatelyafunctionof
certainkindsofsocialfacts,andthevalidityofalawisthepresenceofcertainsocial
facts,especiallyformalpromulgationbythelegislature.
InrespondingtotheSocialFactthesis,Dworkindevisedataxonomyofinterpretation:
Rulesactinallornothingfashion
Policynormspromotingcollectivegoals
Principlenormsprotectingindividualrights,whichtendtoinclinetowards
onedirection,andcontinuetoleadinthatdirection
InHartsformofpositivism,whentherulesrunout,allajudgeisleftwithtomake
decisionsinhard,orpenumbralcases,isdiscretion.10Dworkinrejectsthisthesison
the ground that there are some legal standards the authority of which cannot be
explained in terms of social facts. In deciding hard cases, for example, judges often
invokemoralprinciplesthatDworkinbelievesdonotderivetheirlegalauthorityfrom
thesocialcriteriaoflegalitycontainedinaruleofrecognition.11
ItisthisconcernaboutpenumbralcasesthatfuelsDworkinscritiqueofHart.Hiskey
insight is his perception that when judges reason about hard cases, they appeal to
principles and other standards beyond positivist rules (i.e. those rules that are
identifiablebyvirtueoftheirpedigree,byhowtheycameaboutasspecifiedbysome
setofsecondaryrulesorrulesofrecognition).Unlikelegalrules,principleshaveno
discernible pedigree in Harts sense. Principles function as a reason in favour of a
particular decision, but do not compel a result in the way a rule does. Also unlike a
legalruleinHartssense,aprinciple,suchastheprincipletowhichthecourtreferred
9 HisrightsthesiswasoutlinedinRonaldMDworkinTakingRightsSeriously(1977).
10 Dworkin,aboven2,chapter4.
11 Dworkin,aboven2,40.
83
inRiggs,can,accordingtoDworkin,remainaprincipleeventhoughitmaynotalways
befollowed.Principles,too,frequentlygiveexpressiontobackgroundrightsheldby
oneofthepartiestoadispute,andsuchrightsfrequentlytrumportakepriorityover
otherconsiderations.12
Dworkin believes a moral principle is legally authoritative where it contributes to the best
moraljustificationforasocietyslegalpracticesandinterpretationconsideredasawhole,if,
andonlyifitsatisfiestwoconditions:
1.
theprinciplecohereswithexistinglegalmaterials;and
2.
theprincipleisthemostmorallyattractivestandardthatsatisfies(1).13
Therefore,thecorrectlegalinterpretationisthemoralprinciplethatmakesthelawthe
morallybestitcanbe.Accordingly,inDworkinsview,adjudicationisandshouldbe
interpretive.
B.
TheissueofHardorPenumbralcase:
In Hard Cases, Dworkin distinguishes between two kinds of legal argument.

Argumentsofpolicyjustifypoliticaldecisionsbyshowingthatthedecisionadvances
orprotectssomecollectivegoalofthecommunityasawhole.14Incontrast,arguments
of principle justify a political decision by showing that the decision respects or
securessomeindividualorgroupright.15
Therefore, judicial decisions (even hard ones), Dworkin notes, should be based on
principle,andnotpolicy,since:
Unelectedjudgesarenotasgoodatpolicymakingasthelegislature;
Judicialpolicybaseddecisionsamountstoretroactivelegislation;
Political decisions should be made by political officials inside of political
theory.
Furthermore, Dworkin believes that judges should, and do, when deciding hard
cases:16
Resorttoprinciples,whichprotectpreexistinglegalrights;
12
13
14
15
16
APhilosophyofLaw,TheoriesofLaw(2002).
<http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/lawtheory.html>at14April2005.
Dworkin,aboven2,823.
Dworkin,aboven2,82.
Dworkin,aboven282.
Dworkin,aboven2.
84
Theserightsmustbeconcrete,institutionalandlegal;
In ascertaining such rights, judicial autonomy insulates judges from
backgroundpoliticalmorality(atleastforthemajorpart);
Judges must develop the best available theory supporting other rules in an
area;
If the theory is indeterminative, judges use principles of moral and political
philosophytofillouttheareaoflaw;
Usethissamemodeofanalysisforstatutoryinterpretation;
TheForceofPrecedentislimitedtounderlyingcases;
ThisideaofprecedentandmoralsasunderpinningthedecisionsofJudgesis
best described by Dworkins analogy to the Chain Novel (each successive case
building on the story of the last case, to ensure a coherent, readable, developing
story),wherejudicialinterpretationisbasedonacoherentsetofwelljustified
moralprinciples(eg.Honour,integrity,etc),thusensuringjudicialintegrityin
interpretation;
Vertical Integrity where judges ensure that the decisions are, as much as
possible, consistent with the principles embedded in precedent, and main
structuresofconstitutionalarrangement;
HorizontalintegrityJudgesshouldensurethatprinciplestheytaketodecide
or govern one case, should be given the full weight in other cases (this
demonstratesclearlythechainNovelconcept).
IndeedDworkinnotes:
[J]udges should decide hardcases by interpreting the political structure of their

community in the following, perhaps special way: by trying to find the best
justificationtheycanfind,inprinciplesofpoliticalmorality,forthestructureasa
whole, from the most profound constitutional rules and arrangements to the
detailsof,forexample,theprivatelawoftortorcontract.17
Dworkinalsoferventlybelievesthatthejobofajudgeisaverydifficultone,onethat
is so difficult so as to be Herculean. Dworkin, then, does not expect that any judge
(excepttheidealperfectjudgethusknownasJusticeHercules)willalwayscometo
the right interpretation of the law. He does, however, think that there is a correct
interpretation,onewhichaccuratelyweighsprinciples,protectsnaturalrights,andis
consistentwiththesocietysmorals.Eveninveryhardcases,Dworkinmaintainsthat
there is a right decision.18 It is with this elusive perfect decision that judges concern
18 JulesL.ColemanandJeffrieMurphy,PhilosophyofLaw(1990),47.
85
themselves, and while they need not find the right interpretation, according to
Dworkin,theyareobligatedtoseekit.
ApplicationoftheRightsThesistoInterpretation
SinceprincipleholdsafundamentalroleinDworkinsviewofjudicialinterpretation,
itisessentialtodelineatethedifferencebetweenprinciple,policyandrules.Dworkin
claimsthatjudgesareobligatedtoconsiderprinciples.Whathemeansbythisisthat
judgeshaveanobligationwheninterpretingalaw,totakeallrelevantprinciplesinto
account, consider their relative weights, and then determine which principles are
dominant. Two examples of principles provided by Dworkin illustrate how judges
haveusedprincipleindeterminingthejudgmentofacase.19
In Riggs v Palmer,20 a New York court decided a case in which a grandson who
murderedhisgrandfatherwastoalsocollecttheinheritance.Thecourtfoundthathe
could not inherit, even though there were no written statutes to support the decision.
Instead,thecourtappealedtomoralreasoning,citingtheprinciplethatnooneshouldbe
permitted to profit from his own wrongdoing. This decision was to become a
landmarkformanyothercases.21
In another case, Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,22 even though there were no
applicable rules (ie statute), a New Jersey court decided that automobile
manufacturers could not claim limited liability for defective parts and the damages
caused by them. The court based its decision on the principle that automobile
manufacturers have a special obligation because, among other reasons, cars are so
essential.23
These examples provide a sense of what Dworkin means by principles. However

Dworkinfurtherexplainsthedistinctionbetweenprinciplesandrules.Principles,says
Dworkin,donotnecessitateaparticulardecisionthewaythatrulesdo.Whenaclear
ruleexiststhatshouldbeappliedtoacase,thejudgesimplyappliestheruletodecide
the case. Principles are not rules, but rather reasons that the judge takes into
consideration.Acrucialdistinctionbetweenrulesandprinciples,then,isthatrulesare
19
20
21
22
23
Dworkin,aboven2,74.
RiggsvPalmer(1889)NYCA.
Dworkin,aboven2,75.
HenningsenvBloomfieldMotors(1960)32NJ358,SupremeCourtofNewJersey.
Dworkin,aboven2,756.
86
appliedallornothing,whereasprincipleshaveadimensionofweightorimportance.
Whentwoprinciplesconflict,oneprinciplemaysupersedeanother.24
DworkinonJudicialInterpretation
As illustrated by Dworkin in Riggs v Palmer and Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors,

Dworkin sees judicial interpretation as decisions made within the framework of the
constitution, statute and case law. It is a combination of these three that provides
judgeswiththeabilitytomakedecisions.
AdvantagesoftheTheory
Dworkins rights based thesis has, as its central advantage, the role of principle in
judicial interpretation. As noted in the application of Dworkins thesis above, where
there are competing principles, it is invariable that the broader principle will
dominate, and form the basis of interpretation. Therefore the decision will not be
based upon a set of norms, but rather in response to principles that have always
existed.Hence,
interpretation is successful since it relies upon timeless principles, and there
aretwoelementsofasuccessfulinterpretation;
First, since an interpretation is successful insofar as it justifies the

particularpracticesofaparticularsociety,theinterpretationmustfit
with those practices of that society (in the sense that it coheres with
existing legal materials defining the practices25 what we would
defineasprecedent).
Secondly, since an interpretation provides a moral justification for

thosepractices,itmustpresenttheminthebestpossiblemorallight.26
Dworkinschainnovelanalogyprovidesguidanceanddirection,establishinga
foundationforjudicialinterpretation;
It rejects judicial restraint and gives the Supreme Court a large role in
government(forexampletheroleoftheWarrenCourtintheUSinthe1960s);
It protects individual rights, since the majority should not be allowed to
decidewhatrightstheminorityhas;
Since the Legislature is vulnerable to political pressure, whereas the judges
are insulated, the judiciary is better able to interpret the law according to
principleratherthanpoliticalpressure.
24 Dworkin,aboven27778.
87
DisadvantagesoftheTheory
Dworkin sees the judicial decisionmaker as superhuman (Justice Hercules),

and therefore no human Justice is likely to be able to reach this interpretive
capacity.AllotherdecisionsarelikelytofallshortofthisHerculeanstandard;
The concept of the chain novel may get complicated as norms change and
judicialdecisionshavetoconformwithintherulesofprecedent;
Judges often cannot grasp the systemic effects/consequences of any social
changes(whereaslegislaturesandbureaucraciesmaybeinabetterpositionto
doso,giventheirintimateaccesstothecommunityandresearchresources);
Judgesaredrawnfromanarrowsegmentofsocietyandthereforemaynotbe
betteratmoralandpoliticaldeliberationthanmembersofothergovernment
branches.Inthefaceofuncertaintyandlegitimatedisagreementonmanyof
themoralissues,thedemocraticjudgmentshouldprevail;
Judicial Interpretation concentrates power into the hands of the Judiciary.
Rules of interpretation should be designed to minimize the risks of judicial
discretion,especiallysincemanyclaimsofrightaremadebyminoritygroups;
Democraticgovernanceisanimportantpartoftherightsthatpeoplehaveand
this suggests that judges should be cautious before invalidating democratic
outcomes.
CassSunsteinsInterpretativeTheoryofLawJudicialMinimalist
OutlineoftheTheory
Sunstein critically analyses the interpretive doctrine of Originalism, championed by

Justices Scalia, and Bork, which asserts that judges are obligated to construe the
Constitutioninaccordancewiththemeaninggivenitbythosewhowroteandratified
it.SunsteininsteadassertsthatthebreadthofthewordsoftheConstitutioninvitestheview
that its meaning is capable to change over time.27 It is with this statement that Sunstein
highlightstheheartoftheInterpretivistdebate.28InSunsteinsview,Constitutionscan
andshouldcontributetotheestablishmentofdeliberativedemocracy.
Inhisinterpretivisttheory,legislaturesandotherdeliberativeforumsshouldresolve
most policy issues, not courts.29 In noting this, he rejects the Critical Legal Studies
emphasis on the indeterminacy of law and the role of judges in protecting and
advancing the interests of the powerful. Instead, Sunstein places great emphasis on
27 CassSunstein,ThePartialConstitution(1992),99.
28 CassSunstein,aboven27.
29 CassSunstein,DesigningDemocracy:WhatConstitutionsDo(2001).
88
judges being pragmatic and cautious, deferential to the political processes, anti
theoreticalandrespectfulofpriorcaselaw,tradition,dominantvaluesandthestatus
quo.
Sunsteinbelievesthatcourtsshouldplayonlyalimitedroleinthegoverningstructure
by using technical doctrines to avoid reaching substantive decisions judicial
minimalism.30Analogicalreasoningforcesajudgetoask:Howdoesthiscasecompare
withthosecasesthathavecomebefore?Sunsteinmaintainsthattheuseofanalogical
reasoning reduces the need for theorybuilding...by creating a shared and relatively fixed
background from which diverse judges can work31 and has the advantage of permitting
judgestodecidecasesonnarrowgrounds.
Sunsteins judicial minimalism is far from conservatives he sees the courts as

catalysts for public debate through innovative interpretation, an approach he calls
democracyforcingminimalism.32Heurgescourtstoavoidrendingthebodypolitic
alonglinesoffundamentalmoraldisagreementbyemployingincompletelytheorized
agreements, decisions that look for common ground at the level of practice rather
thanprinciple.33
The traditionbased school of constitutional interpretation provokes Sunsteins ire,

thusprovidingaplatformforhistheoryofinterpretivism.Hearguesthattraditionis
notonlyafatallylimitedguideforconstitutionalinterpretation,itisoftendownright
dangerous.Allcountriestraditionscontainbothgoodandbadthings,andsometimes
the bad things are very bad, whether slavery, apartheid, genocide or other horrors.
Therealchallengeishowtochoosebetweengoodandbad,adecisionthattradition
can often obscure as much as clarify. Moreover, reflexive adherence to tradition
ignores the fact that norms evolve, whether on the political rights of blacks and
women or the way society views homosexuality.34 As he notes, constitutions
necessarilyhavebothpreservativeandtransformativeelements,wheretransformative
goalisprimaryforthegoodofthesociety:
Judicial minimalism, enhances democratic selfgovernment by letting public

debates stay in the political realm, rather than the court providing broad,
sweeping judgments on contentious issues. My particular areas of concern
include affirmative action, discrimination on the basis of sex and sexual
30
31
32
33
34
CassSunsteinOneCaseataTime(1999).
CaseSunstein,aboven30.
Sunstein,aboven29.
Sunstein,aboven27.
Sunstein,aboven29,111.
89
orientation,therighttodieandnewissuesoffreespeechraisedbytheexplosion
of communications technologies, he said. A Supreme Court that limits its
decisions just to the questions at hand might promote a democratic nations
highestaspirationswithoutpreemptingthedemocraticprocess.35
Sunsteinnotesthataminimalistcourtislesslikelytomakeerrors,and,aboveall,the
errorstheydomakewilllikelybelessdamagingtosocietyingeneral.Hearguesthat
minimalism promotes deliberative democracy by encouraging reasongiving.
Transferring important decisions suggesting minimalism is usually sound when the
Courtisdealingwithaconstitutionalissueofhighcomplexityaboutwhichmanypeoplefeel
deeplyandonwhichthenationisdivided(onmoralorothergrounds).36
According to Sunstein, by avoiding foundational constitutional issues through

minimalistdecisions,courtsprotecttheliberalpoliticalsystembymak[ing]itpossible
for people to agree when agreement is necessary and mak[ing] it unnecessary for people to
agree when agreement is impossible.37 However an important issue recognised by
Sunstein is the difficulty for judges to evaluate when agreement is necessary or
impossible. He advises that courts should not use the passive virtues to perpetuate
injustice.38
Sunsteinsupportshisclaimsaboutdemocracyforeclosingdecisionsinhiscriticismof
RoevWade(1973)whichheseesascreatingdestructiveandunnecessarysocialupheaval,
speculating that a narrower opinion would have produced a range of creative
compromiseswelladaptedtoafederalsystem.39
Sunsteinoffersoverlappingreasonstosupportjudicialminimalism.First,hecontends
that courts are poor instruments of social reform. Study after study, he writes, has
establishedthatcourtsareineffectiveinbringingaboutsocialchange,pointingtoRoe
vWadetosupporthispoint.Roeincreasedwomensaccesstosafeabortion,butitdid
notdramaticallyincreasetheactualnumberandrateofabortions.40Fundamentally,
hecontendsthatRoeproducednegativepoliticalconsequencesbecauseitcontributed
tothecreationofthemoralmajority;helpeddefeattheEqualRightsAmendment;
preventedtheeventualachievementofconsensualsolutionstotheabortionproblem;
35
36
37
38
39
40
Sunstein,aboven29.
Sunstein,aboven30,at120.
90
and severely undermined the womens movement, by defining that movement in

termsofthesingleissueofabortion.41
Sunsteins sees his concept of judicial restraint as good, Sunstein argues since it
contributestosocialstability.Traditionally,judicialrestraintdenotesanunwillingness
to invalidate legislation. Sunsteins version of judicial restraint is epitomized by
judicial rulings that strike down laws when appropriate, but only for narrowly
conceivedreasonsthatdonotembodywideanddeepimplicationsforotherlegal
and publicpolicy issues. As noted, although he does not claim that the Supreme
Court should have upheld the Texasstatutein RoevWade,Sunstein is critical of the
Courtsreasoning.HemaintainsthattheCourtshouldsimplyhavestatedsincethe
pleadings indicated that the plaintiff had been raped that a state may not forbid a
womanfromhavinganabortioninarapecase,orthatastatemaynotbanallabortionsinall
circumstances.Sunsteinconcedesthatsuchadecisionwouldhaveleftwomensright
to abortion in considerable doubt, but he speculates that the democratic process
might have done much better with the abortion issue if the Court had proceeded
morecautiouslyandinahumblerandmoreinteractiveway.
EssentiallySunsteinsisaminimalistinterpretivetheory,advocatingminimaljudicial
interpretation,andutilizingtoolsotherthanrulestointerpretthelaw,ensuringthat
judgeshavelittlepowertoeffectsocialchange.
Wishestoleavepolicymakingtothelegislature,andnottobepartoftherole
ofjudgesincontitutionalinterpretation;
Favours the one case at a time approach , not set precedent for similar but
distinctcases,similartocivillaw;
limitstheexerciseofjudicialdiscretionwherenorulescanbefound.Looksat
theevolutionoflawandhowcaseshavebeendecided,howthetexthasbeen
interpreted through time. This allows the Constitution to set out general
themesandguidanceforcurrenttimes;
Judicial role is most active and firm where democratic processes are most
likelytobreakdownorleastlikelytobereliable(eg:iftherighttovoteisat
stake or when vulnerable classesare at a disadvantage). This should be the
heightoftheoreticalambition;
41 Sunstein,aboven30,at122.
91
No precedent for others, is individual in each case. Thus the one case at a
time doctrine leaves justices isolatedand unable to rely on previous similar
decisionstoguidethejusticeininterpretation;
The theory relies on the interpretation of the court and the power of the
Chief Justice. eg Scalia J, and the Warren Court. This is demonstrable by
SunsteinsanalysisinOneCaseataTime(1999);
SunsteinsendorsementofreachingoutsidetheConstitutionforvaluestouse
in interpreting it leaves him vulnerable to the charge that he favours judges
makinglawoutofwholecloth;
His denial that this permits judges free rein makes him seem inconsistent,
denyingthatajudgespoliticalandsocialvaluespowerfullyinfluencehisor
herconstitutionalinterpretation;
Sunsteins refusal to root the values and perspectives he favors in broad
principles of political morality, combined with his insistence that the Court
develop constitutional doctrine by means of limited, narrowly conceived
rulings, opens him to the charge of favouring an ad hoc, unprincipled
approachtointerpretingtheConstitution.
ElysInterpretativeTheoryofLawJudicialMiddleGround
OutlineoftheTheory
InDemocracyandMistrust42,JohnHartElysprocessbasedexaminationofthejudicial
system identifies faults in the system that are the result of long standing disputes in
constitutionaltheory,resultingindiscrepanciesinjudicialdecisions.43
Ely proposes a new approach to judicial review, determining that dilemma

underminingconstitutionalinterpretationaremethodsleftambiguoustojudges,such
astheincorporationoftheirpersonalvalues.44
In his work on Democracy, Ely critically analyses Judicial Interpretivism. He notes

that:
interpretivismisjudgespracticeofrulingconstitutionalmattersbasedupon
whatisexplicitlyoutlinedintheconstitution;
42 JohnHartEly,DemocracyandDistrust:aTheoryofJudicialReview(1980).
43 Ely,aboven41,1.
44 Ely,aboven41,4372.
92
Noninterpretivism implies that judges may go beyond what it stated in the

documentinordertobestinterpretlaw.
Ely critiques both interpretivism and noninterpretivism. He sees interpretivists

following too closely the original intent of the Founding Fathers, and non
interpretivistsrelyingtooheavilyontheintegrationofpersonalvalues.Elycontends
that views are inconsistent with democratic theories of American government
SupremeCourtjusticesarenotelectedandthereforetherearenolimitationstotheir
tenure.Thisthenidentifiestheproblemofjudicialreview:abodythatisnotelectedor
otherwise politically responsible in any significant way is telling the peoples elected
representativesthattheycannotgovernastheydlike 45sincetheconstitutionwasratified
by the people themselves, Americans accepted it as the document controlling their
destiny.46 Thus, judicial review should move past the judiciary, a constitutionally
unrepresentativebranch,totherepresentativebranch(legislature),therebyreinforcing
constitutionalinterpretationthroughsuitablelegislation.
Elys first proposal in approaching judicial review is determining values that are
acceptableandnecessaryinjudicialrulings.Henotes,
There is simply no way for courts to review legislation in terms of the

Constitution without repeatedly making difficult substantive choices among
competing values, and indeed among inevitably controverted political, social,
andmoralconceptions[theCourt]isaninstitutionchargedwiththeevolution
and application of societys fundamental principles with its constitutional
functiontodefinevaluesandproclaimprinciples.47
Acknowledging that judges will have their personal values, Ely discusses five
elementsthatshouldbeincorporatedorleftoutjudicialprocesses:
naturallaw,
neutralprinciples,
reason,
traditionand
consensus.
Ely is most concerned with natural law because of its vagueness, and tradition
becauseofthepublicsviewthatthepastiscontrollingthepresent.
45 Ely,aboven41,5.
46 Ely,aboven41,6.
47 Ely,aboven41,43.
93
The idea of natural law is relevant to both the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution.However,asElynotes,thereisanimportantdifferencebetweenhowthe
notion functions in both documents. Natural law was used in the Declaration at a
time when there was no established positive law. Ely states, it was the quarrel with
BritainthatforcedAmericanstoreachupwardandbringnaturallawdownfromtheskies,to
be converted into a political theory for use as a weapon in constitutional argument.48
Therefore,naturallawwasinitiallyusedtoattackBritishpolicy.Instead,itbecamethe
frameworkoftheentireConstitution,thedocumentthatoutlinesallbasiclawforthe
country. Ely regards this as a particular problem in judicial affairs, as the only
propositions with a prayer of passing themselves off as natural law are those so uselessly
vaguethatnoonewillnotice.49ElyseesNaturallawassoambiguousthatitsimplywill
notsufficeintacklingallissuesofpublicpolicy.Nonetheless,itisawidelyaccepted
and ubiquitous notion, and Ely notes the universality of Natural law and its wide
application.
Tradition evokes a similar ambiguity from Ely, in that it can support virtually any
cause.Moreover,traditionisimmenselybroadwhenconsideringtheuncertaintiesof
whose tradition to consider, who may count in traditions, whether or not certain
traditions are relevant, and if so, who is to say? etc. He notes, youre in a position to
prove almost anything to those who are predisposed to have it proved or, more candidly, to
admit that tradition doesnt really generate an answerto justify overturning the contrary
judgmentofalegislativebody.50
In the 1978 case, Regents of the University of California v Bakke, issues of affirmative
actionandracialpreferencesdemonstrateproblemsoftradition.Withrespecttotheuse
ofracialdiscriminationtodisfavorminorities,ourcountryhastwoconflictingtraditions.51In
thecontextonminorities,Elyisconcernedwiththeuseoftraditiontodeterminethe
justiceofmanycauses.
Elys critique of judicial review encompasses governmental malfunctioning,

something judicial review aims to remedy, and recognises two types of government
malfunction. The first occurs when representatives prevent political change, and the
second occurs when representatives disadvantage a minority by denying the
protectiongrantedtothemajority.
48
49
50
51
Ely,aboven41,49.
Ely,aboven41,51.
Ely,aboven41,60.
Ely,aboven41,61.
94
Essentially,Elyarguesagainstinterpretivismandoriginalism,contendingthatstrict
construction fails to do justice to the open texture of many of the Constitutions
provisions.Atthesametime,hemaintainsthatthenotionthatjudgesmayinferbroad
moralrightsandvaluesfromtheConstitutionisradicallyundemocratic.Instead,Ely
argued that the Supreme Court should interpret the Constitution so as to reinforce
democraticprocessesandpopularselfgovernment,byensuringequalrepresentation
inthepoliticalprocess.
Ely sees the constitution as a naked document, one that is part of the machinery of
answers and a tool of government. The interpretation of the constitution should not
incorporate the use of principles and values. Rather, Ely notes that interpretation
should be part of the political process, with decisionmaking as part of the elected
offical political process, rather than that by an unelected judge. The value of elected
officials,notesEly,istheiraccesstoclearchannelsofpoliticalchange.Thisrelegates
judgestoapositionofvaluewherethereisanissueconcerningminorities.
Essentially, Ely sees decisions in interpretation as those that should be done

democratically, by elected officials, and judges should not interfere. Furthermore,
decisionsshouldbescrutinisedonlyiftheyare:
selfserving,
affectthepoliticalprocess
affectdiscreteorinsularminorities.
ThereareanumberofadvantagestoElystheory,including:
Ensures focus on the Constitution, as machinery for the decisionmaking
process;
Reinforces the democratic process by returning interpretation to elected
officialsratherthanunelectedofficials;
No reliance on broad principles or moral rights, as this places value laden
decisionsintothehandsoftheunelected,whichisundemocratic;
Thereisclearanddirectaccesstothepoliticalprocess,withoutthenoiseof
theprocessthroughtheunelectedofficialinthejudicialprocess;
Ensures that discrete and insular minorities are treated in accordance with
theirneeds.
ThedrawbackstoElystheoryinclude:
95
Focusontheconstitutionscouldbeseenaslookingback,ratherthanlooking
forward,thusretainingelementsofOriginalistinterpretation;
Concentratesinterpretationintothehandsoftheelectedofficialwithnoskill
orknowledgeofjudicialinterpretation.Atthesametimebindsthehandsof
thosemostcapableofinterpretingthelaw,withknowledge,training,skilland
experience necessary to ensure the rights of all are considered, and the
interpretationhasphilosophicalbasis,ratherthanmerelyapoliticalbasis;
Theneedsofallclassesofpersonsshouldbeconsideredintheinterpretation
and judicial review process, not merely the needs of a selected class. The
judicialreviewprocessshouldbeopenandapplicabletoall,notjusttosome.
ComparativeAnalysis
Whilst all of these contemporary interpretivist theorists are supporters of non

originalistinterpretationoftheconstitutions,therearemanydifferencesintheiruseof
elementsofinterpretivisttheory,bestsummarisedbythecomparativechartbelow:
ELEMENT
DWORKIN
SUNSTEIN
ELY
Judicial Activity
Judicial Activist sees the

role of Justice as paramount
Judicial Minimalism, and

decision through analogical
reasoning reduces the need
for theory building
Critic of judicial review.

Sees the role of the judge as
confined to those cases where
there are discrete or insular
matters, and confine decisions
to very few
Roe v Wade Decision

based on the principle that
right to privacy, and freedom
of the individual. Seen as
correct decision based on
principle
Judicial
Interpretation
Robust
approach
interpretation
Roe v Wade criticised

decision. Sees court as should
have made a decision that had
a strict interpretation right
of the woman to have abortion

in circumstances of rape, and
available
in
some
circumstances not broad
sweeping principle
to
Pragmatic
and
cautious
approach to interpretation
Judges in best position to

interpret, as insulated from
the political process and
pressure
Limited role of governing

structure, mainly through the
use of technical doctrines
Decisions
made
within
principles that have always
existed and are ageless, not
like norms that flux in
response to society
Sees courts as the catalyst

for public debate
Adheres
to
forcing Minimalism
Democracy
notes that some tradition is

bad, so cannot rely on it
96
People
ratified
the
constitution.
Interpretation
belongs to the legislature , not
the
judiciary,
reinforcing
constitutional interpretation
Interpretation not for the
Judiciary. Rather there should
be active role of political
process
(legislature),
here
decision left to those who are
elected
Use of Principle
Seen as essential. Is the

only thing that we have in
hard (penumbral) cases. Can
invoke policy to make decision
on all cases, and these
principles are not value laden
and changing, but rather
ageless
made decision that look for

common ground at level of
practice, rather than that of
principle
no place for the use of

principle by the Judiciary,
since decision making should be
in the hands of the legislature
Role of Policy
Not for the Judiciary should be in the hands of the

government, as they are
greater equipped to decide
policy, and are part of the
political process
The Legislature and other

forms of deliberative forums
should resolve policy issues,
not courts

process
(legislature),
here
decision left to those who are
elected
of
Major tool in judicial

interpretation illustrated
by the use of the Chain Novel
where all decisions made by
Judges come together to
form and evolving chain novel
that continues the judicial
story
Respectful of prior case law,

and sees need for this to be
built with traditional values
and preserve the status quo
Role of the legislature in the

interpretive process ensure
minimal use or value of
Precedent
Role
of
the
Constitution
Essential
for
Judicial
Interpretation, and one of
the
cornerstones
of
interpretation.
Can and should contribute to

establishing
deliberative
democracy
People
ratified
the
constitution.
Interpretation
belongs to the legislature , not
the
judiciary,
reinforcing
constitutional interpretation
Use
Precedent
All of the interpretive theorists see the need for the interpretation of policy to be
retained with the legislature. Similarly, all recognise the huge importance of the
constitution in interpretation of law. Dworkin and Sunstein also recognise the
importance of Precedent, in varying degrees, in judicial interpretation, whilst Ely
relegatesprecedenttominimalvalue,insteadplacingahighvalueontheroleofthe
legislature.
ThisisconsistentwithElysviewontheroleofthejudicatureininterpretationofthe
law.Elyseestheplaceofthejudiciaryaslimited,placingalowvalueontheirrolein
interpretation, preferring to leave the interpretation to the elected official. This is a
view that is somewhat supported by Sunsteins judicial minimalist view of
interpretation, which notes that the judiciary should not employ principle to decide
cases,ratheratalevelofcommonground.Sunsteinsminimalistapproachencourages
judges to interpret within a framework, discouraging creativity in any form. Rather,
97
he sees judges interpretation to analogous reasoning witha narrow interpretation at

practicelevel.
Dworkins view of judicial decisionmaking, rather than advocating a minimalist

approach, instead embraces judicial activism. Dworkin sees the perfect judge as the
onewhocanmaketheperfectdecision,anditistheroleofalljudgesastryingtofind
therightdecision,invokingprincipleratherthanpolicy,practiceorrules,toreachthat
decision.Dworkinstheoryisuniqueinthatitencapsulatestheroleofthejudgeasthe
measureajudgeshouldalwaysbeattemptingtoreachinhisinterpretiveprocessa
Nirvanathatajudgemayattaingiventherightenvironmentofprinciple,precedent
andjudicialdecisionmaking,whererightsaretrumps.
A recent Australian case illustrates how interpretive theories are applied in judicial
decision making, correlating the judicial reasoning of the Australian Justices with
ContemporaryJudicialReasoning.
TheCase:FardonvAttorneyGeneralofQueensland52
The scheme instituted under the Act is unique in Australia in that it makes a
prisonerwhohasbeenconvictedandsentencedforanoffenceliableforanorder
for further detention imposed by a Supreme Court judge, not because of any
further unlawful actions but because of the potential that the prisoner may
commitfurtherunlawfulactions.53
FactsoftheCase
Relatestoss8and13oftheDangerousPrisoners(SexualOffenders)Act2003(Q),
a State Act which gives the Supreme Court of Queensland the authority to
determinethecontinuedincarcerationofapedophilebeyondhissentence;
HighCourtofAustraliaDecisionin2004fullbench(7Justices)GleesonCJ,
Hayne, Heydon, Callinan, McHugh, Gummow JJ (majority) and Kirby J
(dissenting);
Relates to the continued incarceration of a sexual offender beyond his
sentence,ontheprobabilitythathewillreoffendinthecommunity;
Was challenged by Fardon on the right of the Judicature to continue
incarceration beyond sentence served, and Constitutional Validity of the
52 FardonvAttorneyGeneralfortheStateofQueensland[2004]HCA46(1October2004)High
CourtofAustralia.
53 McMurdoP,inFardon[2003]QCA416at[76].
98
Legislature to detain a prisoner for an unlawful act that was yet to be

committed;
Theoutcomeofthecasewas61,favouringcontinuedincarceration(KirbyJ
dissenting),andvalidatingtheActasconstitutional;
The judicial reasoning from the justices was an application of many of the
theoriesoutlinedabove,particularlyfromthedissentingJustice(KirbyJ),and
hisDworkinianjudicialreasoning.
An analysis of the Fardon decision illustrates the application of Judicial interpretive

theory, particularly when deciding a case based on principles, as illustrated in the
comparativetablebelow:
ELEMENT
DWORKIN
SUNSTEIN
ELY
Protection
of
the Community
from
the
Sexual
Offender
(unacceptable
risk)
Principle-based principle
of the protection of the
community over the right of
the individual to freedom
(Gleeson, CJ, Gummow and
McHugh JJ)
Is the role of the

legislature to deal with these
types of issues (Heydon and
Callinan JJ). This is a valid
protective law authorizing the
involuntary
detention
for
public safety
Constitutional
Validity of the
Act
Detention not authorized as

is against the principles of the
constitutional
right
to
freedom of the individual
(Kirby J)
Is an important principle,
but there are others that are
more important (Kirby, J) see
below, Acts Right to Detain
Is constitutionally invalid as
repugnant...vesting
Chapter
III power in Chapter II
bodies
Use of Principle
Minimal
judicial
interpretation, on a case by
case basis
View of court to treat on a

case by case basis, and to
isolate previous decision of
Kable, treating it in isolation
to Fardon. (Gleeson CJ)
Does
not
impair
the
institutional capacity of the
state supreme courts to
decide cases, and is best
fitted for the needs of the
state (McHugh J)
The principle of Double

Jeopardy
needs
to
be
protected,
(imbued
in
Australian Legislation under
the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights; as
Is a minority rights issue, so

there is a role of the
judicature here, as is insular
matter, confined to few
(Gleeson, CJ)
People
ratified
the
constitution.
Interpretation
belongs to the legislature. The
validity of the Act is vested in
the Legislature, and enacted
by
the
Supreme
court,
therefore constitutionally valid
(Gummow,
McHugh,
and
Gleeson)
process - the protection of the
community is a legislative issue
(Gleeson, CJ Gummow, Heydon,
McHugh, Hayne, Callinan JJ)
No place for the use of
principle by the Judiciary.
Should
not
be
deciding
principle, merely interpreting
the legislature in discrete
cases (Majority Justices)
99
well as the principle of

freedom of the individual. It
is this right that is trumps
(Kirby J)
Acts right to
detain
the
Prisoner
has no right to detain and

treat in a criminal manner, as
has served sentence; should
be dealt with in a civil manner,
as
has
served
criminal
sentence (Kirby J)
Allowable in this instance

not punitive but legitimate,
non-punitive purpose so ok.
Consider on case-by-case basis
(Callinan, Heydon JJ)
Legitimacy
of
Act
is
protection of community so
therefore Act is valid. Is
response of the Legislature
with the assent of the people
through
the
constitution.
(Majority)
Role
of
Judiciary
The independence of the

Judiciary has been severely
compromised
by
the
legislature
deciding
who
should be detained and who
should not. This is the role of
the judiciary (Kirby J)
Limited to interpretation on
a case by case basis
Legislature
is
more
important in interpretation
the
The above analysis illustrates the scope of judicial interpretation in The Australian
HighCourtatpresent.Allofthejudgesonthebenchareinterpretivists,ensuringthat
they consider factors other than intention, text, and structure when interpreting the
constitution.Howevertheirinterpretationrangesfromfaithfulapplicationofjudicial
activist theory as postulated by Dworkin, to the valid role of the legislature in
interpretinglaw,andeverythinginbetween.Byanalyzingthejudgmentsoftheseven
High Court Justices, it is possible to illustrate contemporary judicial interpretive
theory.
100
Bibliography
APhilosophyofLaw,TheoriesofLaw(2002)
<http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/lawtheory.html>at14April2005.
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CassSunstein,ThePartialConstitution(1992).
CassSunstein,DesigningDemocracy:WhatConstitutionsDo(2001).
CassSunstein,OneCaseataTime:JudicialMinimalismontheSupremeCourt(1999).
EdgarBodenheimer,Jurisprudence:ThePhilosophyandMethodoftheLaw(1962).
FardonvAttorneyGeneralfortheStateofQueensland[2004]HCA46(1October2004)HighCourt
ofAustralia.
Fardon[2003]QCA416at[76],PMcMurdo.
IanMcLeod,LegalTheory(2003).
MarshallCohen(ed),RonaldDworkinandContemporaryJurisprudence(1983).
NicosStavros,InterpretivistTheoriesofLaw(Winter2003)TheStanfordEncyclopediaof
Philosophyhttp://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/lawinterpretivist/>at12April
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Bond Law Review

Interpretive Theories: Dworkin, Sunstein, and Ely

Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr

Interpretive Theories: Dworkin, Sunstein, and Ely

interpretive theory, judicial interpretivism, Dworkin, Sunstein, Ely

This article is available in Bond Law Review: http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol17/iss2/5

Structural arguments examine words within the structure of the particular

Purpose refers to the general goal of the Congress or Parliament in enacting

(2005) 17.2 Bond Law Review

When interpreting the constitution there is a need to have stability in the

(Looking forward contemporary)

Concrete contemporary questions do not always have concrete historical

(2005) 17.2 Bond Law Review

Hard originalism produces a worse (less just) society due to narrow

Robert Dworkin, a great opponent of legal positivism, and a leading nonoriginalist

Essentially, Dworkins Rights Thesis is a response to Hart (and to some extent,

(2005) 17.2 Bond Law Review

In Hard Cases, Dworkin distinguishes between two kinds of legal argument.

[J]udges should decide hardcases by interpreting the political structure of their

(2005) 17.2 Bond Law Review

These examples provide a sense of what Dworkin means by principles. However

As illustrated by Dworkin in Riggs v Palmer and Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors,

First, since an interpretation is successful insofar as it justifies the

Secondly, since an interpretation provides a moral justification for

(2005) 17.2 Bond Law Review

Dworkin sees the judicial decisionmaker as superhuman (Justice Hercules),

Sunstein critically analyses the interpretive doctrine of Originalism, championed by

Sunsteins judicial minimalism is far from conservatives he sees the courts as

The traditionbased school of constitutional interpretation provokes Sunsteins ire,

Judicial minimalism, enhances democratic selfgovernment by letting public

(2005) 17.2 Bond Law Review

According to Sunstein, by avoiding foundational constitutional issues through

and severely undermined the womens movement, by defining that movement in

(2005) 17.2 Bond Law Review

Ely proposes a new approach to judicial review, determining that dilemma

In his work on Democracy, Ely critically analyses Judicial Interpretivism. He notes

Noninterpretivism implies that judges may go beyond what it stated in the

Ely critiques both interpretivism and noninterpretivism. He sees interpretivists

There is simply no way for courts to review legislation in terms of the

(2005) 17.2 Bond Law Review

Elys critique of judicial review encompasses governmental malfunctioning,

Essentially, Ely sees decisions in interpretation as those that should be done

(2005) 17.2 Bond Law Review

Whilst all of these contemporary interpretivist theorists are supporters of non

Judicial Activist sees the

Judicial Minimalism, and

Critic of judicial review.

Roe v Wade Decision

Roe v Wade criticised

of the woman to have abortion

Judges in best position to

Limited role of governing

Sees courts as the catalyst

notes that some tradition is

Seen as essential. Is the

made decision that look for

no place for the use of

Not for the Judiciary should be in the hands of the