G.R. No.

157485, March 26, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY AKLAN
NATIONAL COLLEGE OF FISHERIES (ANCF) AND DR. ELENITA R.
ANDRADE, IN HER CAPACITY AS ANCF
SUPERINTENDENT,Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN,
NAMELY: SALVACION L. SIN, ROSARIO S. ENRIQUEZ, FRANCISCO L.
SIN, MARIA S. YUCHINTAT, MANUEL L. SIN, JAIME CARDINAL SIN,
RAMON L. SIN, AND CEFERINA S. VITA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDODE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CAG.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the
First Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of New Washington and Batan, Aklan
in Civil Case No. 1181, segregating from the Aklan National College of Fisheries
(ANCF) reservation the portion of land being claimed by respondents.
Petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, represented by ANCF and
Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity as Superintendent of ANCF. Respondents
claim that they are the lawful heirs of the late Maxima Lachica Sin who was the
owner of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan,
and more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of cocal, nipal and swampy land, located at Barangay Tambac, New
Washington, Aklan, containing an approximate area of FIFTY[]EIGHT
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIX (58,606) square meters, more or less, as per
survey by Geodetic Engineer Reynaldo L. Lopez. Bounded on the North by
Dumlog Creek; on the East by Adriano Melocoton; on the South by Mabilo Creek;
and on the West by Amado Cayetano and declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Maxima L. Sin (deceased) under Tax Declaration No. 10701 (1985) with
an assessed value of Php1,320.00.2
On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a
complaint against Lucio Arquisola, in his capacity as Superintendent of ANCF
(hereinafter ANCF Superintendent), for recovery of possession, quieting of title,
and declaration of ownership with damages. Respondent heirs claim that a 41,231
square meterportion of the property they inherited had been usurped by ANCF,

creating a cloud of doubt with respect to their ownership over the parcel of land
they wish to remove from the ANCF reservation.
The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by
respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of land within the area, which included said
portion of private respondents alleged property, as civil reservation for educational
purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent furthermore averred that the subject
parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include ANCF as a party defendant
and Lucio Arquisola, who retired from the service during the pendency of the case,
was substituted by Ricardo Andres, then the designated OfficerinCharge of
ANCF.
The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan, Aklan,
in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659 which expanded the
jurisdiction of firstlevel courts. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1181
(4390).
Before the MCTC, respondent heirs presented evidence that they inherited a bigger
parcel of land from their mother, Maxima Sin, who died in the year 1945 in New
Washington, Capiz (now Aklan). Maxima Sin acquired said bigger parcel of land
by virtue of a Deed of Sale (Exhibit B), and then developed the same by planting
coconut trees, banana plants, mango trees and nipa palms and usufructing the
produce of said land until her death in 1945.
In the year 1988, a portion of said land respondents inherited from Maxima Sin
was occupied by ANCF and converted into a fishpond for educational purpose.
Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin asserted that they were previously in possession
of the disputed land in the concept of an owner. The disputed area was a swampy
land until it was converted into a fishpond by the ANCF. To prove possession,
respondents presented several tax declarations, the earliest of which was in the year
1945.
On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring plaintiffs [respondent heirs herein]
the owner and possessor of the land in question in this case and for the defendants
to cause the segregation of the same from the Civil Reservation of the Aklan

National College of Fisheries, granted under Proclamation No. 2074 dated March
31, 1981.
It is further ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs actual
damages for the unearned yearly income from nipa plants uprooted by the
defendants [on] the land in question when the same has been converted by the
defendants into a fishpond, in the amount of Php3,500.00 yearly beginning the year
1988 until plaintiffs are fully restored to the possession of the land in question.
It is finally ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the sum
of Php10,000.00 for attorneys fees and costs of this suit.3
According to the MCTC, the sketch made by the Court Commissioner in his report
(Exh. LL) shows that the disputed property is an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain. Furthermore, the land covered by Civil Reservation under
Proclamation No. 2074 was classified as timberland only on December 22, 1960
(Exh. 4D). The MCTC observed that the phrase Block II Alien or Disp. LC
2415 was printed on the Map of the Civil Reservation for ANCF established
under Proclamation No. 2074 (Exh. 6), indicating that the disputed land is an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The MCTC likewise cited a decision of this Court in the 1976 case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals4where it was pronounced that:
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on
them can be acquired. The claims of persons who have settled on, occupied, and
improved a parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are
considered worthy of protection and are usually respected, but where the President,
as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain lands, and warning all
persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in such
lands by a person who has settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of
purchase. And patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved from
sale, or appropriated are void. (Underscoring from the MCTC, citations omitted.)
Noting that there was no warning in Proclamation No. 2074 requiring all persons
to depart from the reservation, the MCTC concluded that the reservation was
subject to private rights if there are any.
The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land by
virtue of their and their predecessors open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession amounts to an imperfect title, which should be respected and protected.
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan,

where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6130.

On May 2, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the MCTC judgment
with modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is modified absolving
Appellant Ricardo Andres from the payment of damages and attorneys fees. All
other details of the appealed decision are affirmed in toto.5
The RTC stressed that Proclamation No. 2074 recognizes vested rights acquired by
private individuals prior to its issuance on March 31, 1981.
The RTC added that the findings of facts of the MCTC may not be disturbed on
appeal unless the court below has overlooked some facts of substance that may
alter the results of its findings. The RTC, however, absolved the Superintendent of
the ANCF from liability as there was no showing on record that he acted with
malice or in bad faith in the implementation of Proclamation No. 2074.6
Petitioner Republic, represented by the ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her
capacity as the new Superintendent of the ANCF, elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals through a Petition for Review. The petition was docketed as CAG.R. SP
No. 65244.
On February 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the
petition for lack of merit. In addition to the findings of the MCTC and the RTC, the
Court of Appeals held:
Moreover, petitioner had not shown by competent evidence that the subject land
was likewise declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960.
Considering that lands adjoining to that of the private respondents, which are also
within the reservation area, have been issued original certificates of title, the same
affirms the conclusion that the area of the subject land was agricultural, and
therefore disposable, before its declaration as a timberland in 1960.
It should be noted that Maxima Lachica Sin acquired, through purchase and sale,
the subject property from its previous owners spouses Sotera Melocoton and Victor
Garcia on January 15, 1932, or 28 years before the said landholding was declared a
timberland on December 22, 1960. Tacking, therefore, the possession of the
previous owners and that of Maxima Lachica Sin over the disputed property, it
does not tax ones imagination to conclude that the subject property had been
privately possessed for more than 30 years before it was declared a timberland.
This being the case, the said possession has ripened into an ownership against the
State, albeit an imperfect one. Nonetheless, it is our considered opinion that this

should come under the meaning of private rights under Proclamation No. 2074
which are deemed segregated from the mass of civil reservation granted to
petitioner.7 (Citation omitted.)
Hence, this Petition for Review, anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
UPHOLDING RESPONDENTS CLAIM TO SUPPOSED PRIVATE RIGHTS
OVER SUBJECT LAND DESPITE THE DENR CERTIFICATION THAT IT IS
CLASSIFIED AS TIMBERLAND.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISIONS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS RELEASING THE SUBJECT LAND
BEING CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS FROM THE MASS OF PUBLIC
DOMAIN AND AWARDING DAMAGES TO THEM.8
The central dispute in the case at bar is the interpretation of the first paragraph of
Proclamation No. 2074:
Upon recommendation of the Director of Forest Development, approved by the
Minister of Natural Resources and by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I,
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby set aside as
Civil Reservation for Aklan National College of Fisheries, subject to private rights,
if any there be, parcels of land, containing an aggregate area of 24.0551 hectares,
situated in the Municipality of New Washington, Province of Aklan, Philippines,
designated Parcels I and II on the attached BFD Map CR203, x x x [.]9
The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that respondents
retain private rights to the disputed property, thus preventing the application of the
above proclamation thereon. Theprivate right referred to is an alleged imperfect
title, which respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the subject property,
through their predecessorsininterest, for 30 years before it was declared as a
timberland on December 22, 1960.
At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an application
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the
Property Registration Decree. Nevertheless, the courts a quo apparently treated
respondents complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and declaration
of ownership as such an application and proceeded to determine if respondents
complied with the requirements therefor.

The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, as
follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
An equivalent provision is found in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, which provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessorsininterest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself
or through his predecessorsininterest under a bona fide claim of ownership since
time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.10
With respect to the second requisite, the courts a quo held that the disputed

property was alienable and disposable before 1960, citing petitioners failure to
show competent evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before its
formal classification as such on said year.11 Petitioner emphatically objects,
alleging that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State and that lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.
After a thorough review of the records, we agree with petitioner. As this Court held
in the fairly recent case of Valiao v. Republic12:
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or
disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not
susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation
thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership
and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of
State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number
of years is alienable and disposable. (Citations omitted.)
This Court reached the same conclusion in Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap,13 which presents a similar issue with
respect to another area of the same province of Aklan. On November 10, 1978,
President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among
other islands, caves and peninsulas of the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine

reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). On

September 3, 1982, PTA Circular 382 was issued to implement Proclamation No.
1801. The respondentsclaimants in said case filed a petition for declaratory relief
with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular 382 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes. The respondents claim that
through their predecessorsininterest, they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of their lands in Boracay since
June 12, 1945 or earlier since time immemorial.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition for review of the above case
with this Court, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064
classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land
(protection purposes) and six hundred twentyeight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares
of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). Petitionerclaimants and other
landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,
mandamus and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064, alleging that it infringed on
their prior vested right over portions of Boracay which they allege to have
possessed since time immemorial. This petition was consolidated with the petition
for review concerning Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 382.
This Court, discussing the Regalian Doctrine visvis the right of the claimants to
lands they claim to have possessed since time immemorial, held:
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping
with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized
that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or
disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited and
classified.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an

administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a

legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number
of years is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such wellnigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot
accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open
to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot
be assumed. They call for proof.14 (Emphases in the original; citations omitted.)
Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show
competent evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before its
formal classification as such in 1960 does not lead to the presumption that said
land was alienable and disposable prior to said date. On the contrary, the
presumption is that unclassified lands are inalienable public lands. Such was the
conclusion of this Court in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and
Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,15 wherein we held:
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state
that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands
leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber
land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition. x x x. (Emphasis supplied, citation deleted.)
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended, and the equivalent provision in Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree was furthermore painstakingly debated upon by the
members of this Court in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic.16 In Malabanan,
the members of this Court were in disagreement as to whether lands declared
alienable or disposable after June 12, 1945 may be subject to judicial confirmation
of imperfect title. There was, however, no disagreement that there must be a
declaration to that effect.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify
a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
Since respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by their
predecessorsininterest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership.
Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private rights within the

purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the application of said

proclamation to the subject property. We are thus constrained to reverse the rulings
of the courts a quo and grant the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil
Case No. 1181 (4390) for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24,
2003, which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan in
Civil Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New
Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181 (4390), segregating from the
Aklan National College of Fisheries reservation the portion of land being claimed
by respondents isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) of
the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington and Batan, Aklan is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 150000
Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
(Chairperson)
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
TRI-PLUS CORPORATION,

Respondent. Promulgated:
September 26, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the Decision[1] dated September 14, 2001 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60671, which affirmed the judgment of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Metro Cebu in LRC Case No. N-21 granting
herein respondents application for registration of title to Lots Nos. 1061 and 1062
of the Cadastral Survey of Consolacion, Cebu.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On April 30, 1997 Tri-Plus Corporation[2], through its president, Euclid C. Po, filed
with the MTC of Consolacion, Metro Cebu,[3] an Application for Registration of
Title over two parcels of land designated as Lots 1061 and 1062 of the cadastral
survey of Consolacion, Cebu, containing an area of 3,939 and 4,796 square meters,
respectively, and located at Barangay Tayud, Consolacion, Cebu.[4] In its
application, Tri-Plus alleged that it is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcels
of land, including the improvements thereon, having acquired the same through
purchase; and that it is in actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and
peaceful possession of the subject properties in the concept of an owner for more
than 30 years, including that of its predecessors-in-interest.[5] The case was
docketed as LRC Case No. N-21.[6]
On September 4, 1997, the trial court received an Opposition to the Application for
Registration filed by the Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) on the grounds that neither the applicant nor its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto; that the muniments of title submitted by the applicant which consists,
among others, of tax declarations and receipts of tax payments, do not constitute

competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for
or of its open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the claim
of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant may no longer be
availed of by the applicant because it failed to file an appropriate application for
registration in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
892; and that the subject parcels of land are portions of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and are not subject to private
appropriation.[7]
On September 19, 1997, Tri-Plus presented documentary evidence to prove
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the law. On even date, a
Manifestation and Motion was filed by the heirs of Toribio Pepito praying that they
be given a period of 10 days within which to file their written opposition.
[8]
However, the oppositors failed to file their written opposition on time. The trial
court then commissioned its clerk of court to receive evidence from the applicant
and directed the former to submit a report thereon. Accordingly, a Commissioners
Report was submitted on the proceedings taken.[9]
In its Judgment dated February 26, 1998, the MTC made the following finding and
conclusion:
The totality of the evidence, both documentary and testimonial,
of the applicant clearly shows that it and its predecessors-in-interest
had been in actual, public, exclusive and continuous possession in
concept of owner of the parcels of land above-mentioned for no less
than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the instant petition for
registration of its imperfect title. This being so, the applicant is
entitled that its title be confirmed under the provisions of the Torrens
System of Registration.[10]
Accordingly, it disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the applicant TRI-PLUS LAND CORPORATION
the exclusive and absolute owner of Lot 1061 of the Cadastral Survey
of Consolacion, Cebu, as shown on plan Ap-07-002362 (Exhibit J)
and described in its corresponding technical description (Exhibit K),

and Lot 1062 of the Cadastral Survey of Consolacion, Cebu, as shown

on plan Ap-07-002366 (Exhibit O) and described in its corresponding
technical description (Exhibit P).
Once this decision becomes final, let an Order for the issuance
of the decree of registration for Lots 1061 and 1062, Consolacion
Cadastre, be issued in the name of TRI-PLUS LAND
CORPORATION.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The OSG appealed the trial courts judgment with the CA.[12]
Subsequently, the Land Registration Authority (LRA), through its Director
on Registration, submitted a Report dated August 6, 1998 to the MTC, pertinent
portions of which read as follows:
1. Two (2) parcels of land described as Lots 1062 and 1061,
Cad. 545-D, Consolacion Cadastre on Plan Ap-07-002366 and Ap-07002362,
both
situated
in
the
Barangay
of
Tayud,Municipality of Consolacion, Province of Cebu, are being
applied for original registration of title;
2. After examining the afore-said plan discrepancy was noted in
the bearings and distances of line 3-4 and 4-5 of Lot 1061, Ap-07002362, being S.57 deg. 19W 8.02m. and S.52 deg. 10W 18.24, which
do not conform with the bearings and distances (N. 52 deg. 01E.,
18.00m) and (N. 52 deg. 47E., 17.71m.) along lines 12-13 and 11-12,
respectively of plan Rs-07-01-000358, lot 1508, Consolacion Cad.
545-D, decreed in LRA (NALTDRA) Record No. N-60851.
3. That the above discrepancy was brought to the attention of
the Regional Technical Director, DENR, Land Management Services,
Region VII, Mandaue City, for verification and correction in a letter
dated 7 July 1998.
4. This Authority is not in a position to verify whether or not the
parcels of land subject of registration are already covered by land
patent.[13]

On September 14, 2001, the CA rendered the presently assailed Decision

finding no reversible error in the appealed judgment, thereby, affirming the same.
[14]

Hence, herein petition based on the following assignments of errors:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID
NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE
THE CASE, BECAUSE THE IDENTITY OF THE LAND
REMAINS UNCERTAIN.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT FAILED
TO DISCHARGE THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE
PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT IS
DISQUALIFIED FROM ACQUIRING LANDS OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN.[15]
As to the first assigned error, petitioner contends that the CA erred in relying on the
original survey plan approved by the Lands Management Services of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) when it ruled that the
applicant was able to duly establish the identity of Lot 1061. This reliance,
petitioner argues, is mistaken considering that the Report of the Director on
Registration of the LRA pointed to a discrepancy in the bearings and distances of
the boundaries which separate Lot 1061 from an adjoining land, Lot 1058. This
discrepancy, petitioners submit, casts doubt on the identity of the land subject of
the application for registration. Petitioner then concludes that if there is uncertainty

in the metes and bounds of the property sought to be titled, the trial court cannot
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Hence, the proceedings
before the trial court, including its decision granting the application for
registration, are void.
As to the second assignment of error, petitioner argues that the CA erred in holding
that the applicant was able to prove that the subject properties are alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. Petitioner contends that a mere notation
appearing in the survey plans of the disputed properties showing that the subject
lands had been classified as alienable and disposable on June 25, 1963 is not
sufficient to establish the nature and character of these lands. Petitioner asserts that
there should be a positive act on the part of the government, such as a certification
from the DENR, to prove that the said lands are indeed alienable and disposable.
Petitioner further contends that even if the subject properties were classified as
alienable and disposable on June 25, 1963, the law, nonetheless, requires that such
classification should have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Anent the last assigned error, petitioner contends that since the applicant failed to
discharge the burden of proving that the subject properties are alienable and
disposable, there is no basis for the CA to rule that these properties are private
lands.
In its Comment, respondent contends that it was able to prove the identity
of Lot 1061 with certainty. While it admits the discrepancy in the bearings and
distances which form the boundary between Lot 1061 and the adjoining Lot 1058,
respondent contends that such discrepancy is merely technical in nature because
Lots 1058 and 1061 remain the same and that there is neither an increase nor
decrease in the area of the subject lot sought to be titled; and that what was
required by the LRA in its Report was for the applicant to correct and adjust the
bearings and distances of Lot 1061 in order to conform to the boundaries of Lot
1058.
Respondent also argues that the notations appearing in the survey plans of the
subject properties serve as sufficient proof that these lands are alienable and
disposable. Respondent asserts that the survey plans were duly approved by the

DENR, Lands Management Services whose official acts are presumed to be in

accordance with law.
Lastly, respondent argues that its predecessor-in-interests continuous, actual,
adverse and peaceful possession of the subject properties in the concept of an
owner for a period of more than 30 years, coupled with the fact that they declared
these lands in their name, gives a strong presumption in respondents favor that the
subject properties no longer form part of the public domain.
Parties filed their respective Memoranda.[16]
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
At the outset, however, the Court does not agree with petitioners contention
in its first assigned error that respondent failed to properly identify Lot 1061 which
is one of the lots sought to be titled.
Insofar as the identity of the land subject of an application for original
registration is concerned, this Court has laid down the rule, as follows:
The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan,
duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of
original registration of land is a mandatory requirement. The reason for
this rule is to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does
not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a
previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be
overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land. The
failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioners application
for registration.[17]

However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals[18] and in the more

recent cases of Spouses Recto v. Republic of the Philippines[19] and Republic of the
Philippines v. Hubilla[20], the Court ruled that while the best evidence to identify a
piece of land for registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan from the
Bureau of Lands (now the Lands Management Services of the DENR), blueprint
copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification. In the
present case, respondent submitted in evidence a blueprint copy of the Advance

Plan of Lot 1061[21] and a Technical Description[22] thereof, both of which had been
duly certified and approved by the Lands Management Services of the DENR. The
Court finds these pieces of evidence as substantial compliance with the legal
requirements for the proper identification of Lot 1061. The discrepancy in the
common boundary that separates Lot 1061 from Lot 1058, as contained in the LRA
Report does not cast doubt on the identity of the subject lot. As the CA correctly
held, the discrepancy is not substantial because it does not unduly increase or affect
the total area of the subject lot and at the same time prejudice the adjoining lot
owner. It is only when the discrepancy results to an unexplained increase in the
total area of the land sought to be registered that its identity is made doubtful.
Besides, only a portion of the many boundaries of Lot 1061 has been found to bear
a discrepancy in relation to the boundary of one adjoining lot and the LRA Report
simply recommends that the Lands Management Services of the DENR verify the
reported discrepancy and make the necessary corrections, if needed, in order to
avoid duplication in the issuance of titles covering the same parcels of land.
Petitioners argument that, on the basis of the LRA Report, the MTC should
have dismissed respondents application for registration for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, is without merit. The MTC could not have possibly done this
because said Report was submitted to the trial court more than five months after
the latter rendered its Decision. A copy of the LRA Report attached to the present
petition shows that it is dated August 6, 1998 while the MTC decision was
rendered much earlier on February 26, 1998. In fact, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) perfected its appeal by filing a notice of appeal of the MTC
Decision on April 2, 1998, which is also prior to the submission of the LRA report.
Hence, by the time the LRA report was submitted to the MTC, the latter has
already lost jurisdiction over the case, not on the ground cited by petitioner but
because the appeal to the CA was already perfected, vesting jurisdiction upon the
appellate court.
In any case, while the subject lands were properly identified, the Court finds that
respondent failed to comply with the other legal requirements for its application for
registration to be granted.
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a)
that the land forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the

public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of
ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.[23]
In the present case, the Court finds merit in petitioners contention that
respondent failed to prove the first requirement that the properties sought to be
titled forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain.
Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the
classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the Executive Department. Under the
Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land.[24] All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.[25]Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain.[26]
It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to
establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.[27]
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject
lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in
effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly
the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a
legislative act or statute.[28] The applicant may also secure a certification from the
Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. [29] In the case at
bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands
Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical
correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever
with the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to

submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the lands
subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
As to the second requirement, testimonial evidence were presented to prove
that respondents predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject lots
in the concept of an owner for the period required by law. The first witness was
Thelma Pilapil who claims to be the daughter of Constancia Frias from whom
respondent bought Lot1061. Pilapil testified that her family has been in possession
of Lot 1061 since her birth.[30] When her testimony was offered on October 7, 1997,
she was 40 years old.[31]Deducting 40 years from 1997, it means that her family
started possession of Lot 1061 only in 1957. The second witness who was
presented was Tomas Frias from whom respondent bought Lot 1062. Frias testified
that he was 67 years old at the time that his testimony was taken on October 7,
1997.[32] He claims that he started owning the subject lot when he was 17 years old
and had been in possession of the same since then. [33] Hence, by simple arithmetic,
the testimony of Frias proves that he came to possess Lot 1062 only in 1947. While
he testified that Lot 1062 was previously owned by his father and that he inherited
the property from his parents, no evidence was presented to show that the latter
indeed previously owned the said property and that they had been in possession of
the same on or before June 12, 1945.
Moreover, other pieces of evidence presented by respondent to prove the period of
its possession and that of its predecessors-in-interest show that the subject
properties were declared for taxation purposes beginning only in 1961. [34] This date
may be considered as relatively recent considering that respondents predecessorsin-interest claim to have been in possession of the subject properties as early as
1947. While belated declaration of a property for taxation purposes does not
necessarily negate the fact of possession, tax declarations or realty tax payments of
property are, nevertheless, good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner,
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual, or at least, constructive possession.[35] In the present case, respondent failed
to explain why, despite the claim of its predecessors-in interest that they possessed
the subject properties in the concept of an owner as early as 1947, it was only in
1961 that they started to declare the same for purposes of taxation.
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent and its predecessors-ininterest failed to prove that they had been in open, continuous, exclusive and

notorious possession of the subject properties under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier, as required by law.
Well-entrenched is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases
rests on the applicant who must show clear, positive and convincing evidence that
his alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and duration required by
law.[36] In the present case, the Court finds that respondent failed to prove, by clear
and convincing evidence, the legal requirements that the lands sought to be titled
are alienable and disposable and that its predecessors-in-interest were already in
possession of the subject lots since 1945 or earlier.
As to the last assigned error, respondent having failed to prove that the
subject properties are alienable and disposable public lands, the Court agrees with
petitioner that there would be no basis in concluding that these lands have already
become private. The presumption remains that said properties remain part of the
inalienable public domain and, therefore, could not become the subject of
confirmation of imperfect title.
Finally, while it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the
distribution of alienable public lands as a spur to economic growth and in line with
the ideal of social justice, the law imposes stringent safeguards upon the grant of
such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the prejudice of the national
patrimony.[37] The Court must not, therefore, relax the stringent safeguards relative
to the registration of imperfect titles.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated September 14, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 60671
is REVERSED and SETASIDE. Respondent Tri-Plus Corporations application
for registration and issuance of title to Lots 1061 and 1062, Consolacion Cad-545D, in LRC Case No. N-21 filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Consolacion,
Metro Cebu, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 163766

Petitioner,
Present
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
CANDY MAKER, INC.,
as represented by its President, Promulgated:
ONG YEE SEE,*
Respondent June 22, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to set aside the May 21, 2004 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 73287, which affirmed in toto the October 12, 2001 Decision[2] of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Taytay, Rizal in Land Registration Case No. 990031 declaring respondent the owner of the parcels of land designated as Lots
3138-A and 3138-B in Plan CSD. 04-018302, Cainta-Taytay Cadastre.
Sometime in 1998, Candy Maker, Inc. decided to purchase Lot No. 3138
Cad. 688 of the Cainta-Taytay Cadastre, a parcel of land located below the
reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters, about 900 meters away from the
Laguna de Bay, and bounded on the southwest by the Manggahan Floodway, and
on the southeast by a legal easement.
On April 1, 1998, Geodetic Engineer Potenciano H. Fernandez, prepared and
signed a Subdivision Plan of the property for Apolonio Cruz. The property was
subdivided into two lots: Lot No. 3138-A with an area of 10,971 square meters,
and Lot No. 3138-B with an area of 239 square meters. [3] The technical description
of Lot No. 3138 was also prepared by Fernandez, and was approved by the
Regional Technical Director of the Bureau of Lands on April 14, 1998.[4]
On April 29, 1999, Antonio, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed Cruz, executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker, Inc.[5] The buyer declared Lot

No. 3138 for taxation purposes in 1999 under Tax Declaration Nos. 004-18929,
004-18930 and 004-18931.[6]
On June 16, 1999, Candy Maker, Inc., as applicant, filed an application with
the MTC of Taytay, Rizal, for the registration of its alleged title over Lot No. 3138A and Lot No. 3138-B under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.
Acting thereon, the MTC issued an Order[7] on June 18, 1999 directing the
applicant to cause the publication of the notice of initial hearing and for the Deputy
Sheriff to post the same. The Administrator of the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) and the Directors of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) and Forest
Management Bureau (FMB) were also instructed to submit their respective reports
on the status of the parcels of land before the initial hearing scheduled on October
29, 1999.
The Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of
Antipolo City filed on August 18, 1999 his Report [8] declaring that "[t]he land falls
within the Alienable and Disposable Zone, under Land Classification Project No.
5-A, per L.C. Map No. 639 certified released on March 11, 1927 and that the
property is the subject of CENRO Case No. 520(97) entitled Perpetua San Jose v.
Almario Cruz. On the other hand, the LRA, in its September 21, 1999 Report,
[9]
recommended the exclusion of Lot No. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal
easement and intended for public use, hence, inalienable and indisposable.
On September 30, 1999, the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
approved Resolution No. 113, Series of 1993, providing that untitled shoreland
areas may be leased subject to conditions enumerated therein.
The applicant filed its Amended Application[10] on December 15, 1999 for
the confirmation of its alleged title on Lot No. 3138, alleging therein that:
1. x x x the applicant is the President of CANDYMAKER[,]
INC. and registered owner of a parcel of land located at Panghulo
Brgy. San Juan, Taytay, Rizal with an area of TEN THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE (10,971) square meters and as
fully described and bounded under Lot 3138-A plan CSD-04018302[,] copy of which and the corresponding technical descriptions
are hereto attached to form parts hereof;
xxxx

8. That for Lot 3138-A the applicant hereby prays for the
benefit granted under the Land Registration Act and/or under the
benefits provided for by P.D. No. 1529, as applicant and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, and
peaceful occupation and possession of the said land since time
immemorial in [the] concept of true owners and [adverse] to the
whole world; x x x[11]
On March 27, 2000, the MTC issued an Order[12] admitting the Amended
Application and resetting the initial hearing to June 23, 2000. However, upon the
requests of the LRA for the timely publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in
the Official Gazette,[13] the court moved the hearing date to September 22, 2000,
[14]
then on January 26, 2001[15]and until finally, to June 15, 2001.[16]
On July 20, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, the LLDA filed its
Opposition[17] to the Amended Application in which it alleged that the lot subject of
the application for registration may not be alienated and disposed since it is
considered part of the Laguna Lake bed, a public land within its jurisdiction
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4850, as amended. According to the LLDA,
the projection of Lot No. 3138-A, Cad-688-D Csd-04-018302 in its topographic
map based on the Memorandum[18] of Engineer Christopher Pedrezuela of the
Engineering and Construction Division of the LLDA indicated that it is located
below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters referred to datum 10.00
meters below mean lower water and under Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the
property is a public land which forms part of the bed of the Laguna Lake.
This Memorandum was appended to the application.
At the hearing conducted on August 31, 2001, the applicant marked in
evidence the complementary copies of the Official Gazette and the Peoples Tonight
as Exhibits E-1 and F-1, respectively.[19]
Except as to the LLDA and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which
was represented by the duly deputized provincial prosecutor,[20] the court, upon
motion of the applicant, issued an Order of general default.[21]
The applicant presented as witnesses its Treasurer, Fernando Co Siy, and
Antonio Cruz, one of the vendees.
Cruz testified that his grandparents owned the property,[22] and after their
demise, his parents, the spouses Apolonio Cruz and Aquilina Atanacio Cruz,

inherited the lot;[23] he and his father had cultivated the property since 1937,
planting palay during the rainy season and vegetables during the dry season; his
father paid the realty taxes on the property,[24] and he (Cruz) continued paying the
taxes after his fathers death.[25] Cruz insisted that he was the rightful claimant and
owner of the property.
Sometime in the 1980s, Apolonio Cruz executed an extrajudicial deed of
partition in which the property was adjudicated to Antonio Cruz and his sisters,
Felisa and Eladia, to the exclusion of their five (5) other siblings who were given
other properties as their shares.[26] He did not know why his ancestors failed to
have the property titled under theTorrens system of registration.[27] He left
the Philippines and stayed in Saudi Arabia from 1973 to 1983.[28] Aside from this,
he hired the services of an upahan to cultivate the property.[29] The property is
about 3 kilometers from the Laguna de Bay, and is usually flooded when it rains.[30]
Fernando Co Siy testified that the applicant acquired Lot No. 3138 from
siblings Antonio, Eladia and Felisa,[31] who had possessed it since 1945;[32] that
after paying the real estate taxes due thereon,[33] it caused the survey of the lot;
[34]
that possession thereof has been peaceful[35] and none of the former owners
claims any right against it;[36]neither the applicant nor its predecessors-in-interest
received information from any government agency that the lot is a public land;
[37]
the subject lot is 3 kms. away from Laguna de Bay,[38] above its elevation and
that of the nearby road;[39] the property is habitable[40] and was utilized as a riceland
at the time it was sold by the former owners; [41] and that he was aware that a legal
easement is affecting the lot and is willing to annotate it in the land title.[42]
On cross-examination by the LLDA counsel, Siy admitted that his
knowledge as to the distance of the lot with respect to the Laguna de Bay came
from somebody residing in Taytay and also from an adjacent owner of the lot;
[43]
that the lot is submerged in water since there is no land fill yet; [44] and that no
improvements had been introduced to the property.[45]
The LLDA moved for a joint ocular inspection of the parcels of land in order
to determine its exact elevation.[46] On September 14, 2001, a Survey Team of the
Engineering and Construction Division of the LLDA, composed of Ramon D.
Magalonga, Virgilio M. Polanco, and Renato Q. Medenilla, conducted an actual
ground survey of the property. The team used a total station and digital survey
instrument to measure the elevation of the ground in reference to the elevation of
the lake water. A representative of the applicant witnessed the survey. The team
found that the lot is below the prescribed elevation of 12.50 m. and thus part of the

bed of the lake; as such, it could not be titled to the applicant. The team also
reported that the property is adjacent to the highway from the Manggahan
Floodway to Angono, Rizal. The LLDA moved that the application be withdrawn,
appending thereto a copy of the Survey Report.[47]
The LLDA did not offer any testimonial and documentary evidence and
agreed to submit the case for decision based on its Opposition.
On October 12, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision granting the application
for registration over the lots. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the court hereby
rendered judgment confirming title of the applicants over the real
property denominated as Lot 3138-A Csd-04-018302 of Cad-688-D
Cainta-Taytay Cadastre; Lot 3138-B Csd-04-018302 of Cad 688-D
Cainta-Taytay Cadastre.[48]
On appeal to the CA, the petitioner contended that the MTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the application for registration since the actual copies of the
Official Gazette (O.G.) where the notice of hearing was published were not
adduced in evidence; the applicant likewise failed to establish exclusive ownership
over the subject property in the manner prescribed by law. The petitioner argued
further that the requirements of Section 23, par. 1 of P.D. No. 1529, [49] as amended,
are mandatory and jurisdictional, and that failure to observe such requirements has
a fatal effect on the whole proceedings. Citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals[50] and Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, MM, Br. 170,
[51]
the Republic averred that a mere certificate of publication is inadequate proof of
the jurisdictional fact of publication because the actual copies of the O.G. must be
presented at the initial hearing of the case. Moreover, witnesses were not presented
to prove specific acts to show that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in exclusive, open, continuous, and adverse possession of the subject
lots in the concept of the owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier, in accordance with
Sec. 14, par. 1 of P.D. No. 1529.[52] It noted that the testimonies of the applicants
witnesses are more of conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of
ownership. Other than the general statement that they planted rice and vegetables
on the subject lots, their possession could properly be characterized as mere casual
cultivation since they failed to account for its exclusive utilization since 1945 or
earlier. After stressing that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership,
it concluded that the subject lots rightfully belong to the State under the Regalian
doctrine.[53]

The applicant averred in its Appellees Brief[54] that it had marked in evidence
the actual copy of the O.G. where the notice of initial hearing was published; in
fact, the MTC Decision stated that the copy of the O.G. containing the notice was
referred to as Exhibit E-1. Moreover, Sec. 14, par. 1 of P.D. 1529 is inapplicable
since it speaks of possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. Instead, par. 4 of the same section [55] should govern because the
subject parcels of land are lands of private ownership, having being acquired
through purchase from its predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, inherited the same
from their parents. It pointed out that there were no adverse claims of interest or
right by other private persons and even government agencies like
the Province of Rizal. Lastly, while tax declarations and tax receipts do not
constitute evidence of ownership, they are nonetheless prima facie evidence of
possession.
On May 21, 2004, the appellate court rendered judgment which dismissed
the appeal and affirmed in toto the Decision of the MTC,[56] holding that the copy
of the O.G., where the notice was published, was marked as Exhibit E-1 during the
initial hearing. On the issue of ownership over the subject lots, the CA upheld the
applicants claim that the parcels of land were alienable and not part of the public
domain, and that it had adduced preponderant evidence to prove that its
predecessors had been tilling the land since 1937, during which palay and
vegetables were planted. In fact, before the lots were purchased, the applicant
verified their ownership with the assessors office, and thereafter caused the
property to be surveyed; after the lots were acquired in 1999 and a survey was
caused by the applicant, no adverse claims were filed by third persons. Further, the
CA ruled that tax declarations or tax receipts are good indicia of possession in the
concept of the owner, which constitute at least positive and strong indication that
the taxpayer concerned has made a claim either to the title or to the possession of
the property.
The Republic, now petitioner, filed the instant Petition for Review on the
following issues:
A.
WHETHER THE LAND IN QUESTION MAYBE THE SUBJECT
OF REGISTRATION.

B.
WHETHER THE COURT A QUO ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
OVER
THE RES CONSIDERING
ITS
INALIENABLE
CHARACTER.
C.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT RESPONDENT
COMPLIED WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ON
POSSESSION AS MANDATED BY SECTION 14 OF P.D. NO.
1529.[57]
Petitioner asserts that the Engineers Survey Report[58] and the Laguna de Bay
Shoreland Survey[59] both show that Lot No. 3138-A is located below the
reglementary lake elevation, hence, forms part of the Laguna Lake bed. It insists
that the property belongs to the public domain as classified under Article 502 of the
Civil Code.[60] Citing the ruling of this Court in Bernardo v. Tiamson,[61] petitioner
avers that the subject lot is incapable of private appropriation since it is a public
land owned by the State under the Regalian doctrine. On this premise, petitioner
avers that the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter, and as a
consequence, its decision is null and void.
Petitioner maintains that respondent failed to present incontrovertible
evidence to warrant the registration of the property in its name as owner. The
testimonies of the two witnesses only proved that the possession of the land may
be characterized as mere casual cultivation; they failed to prove that its
predecessors occupied the land openly, continuously, exclusively, notoriously and
adversely in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
On the other hand, respondent argues that the Engineers Survey Report and
the Laguna de Bay Shoreland Survey have no probative value because they were
neither offered nor admitted in evidence by the MTC. It
points out that petitioner failed to invoke these reports in the appellate court.
It was only when the petition was filed with this Court that the respondent learned
of its existence. Petitioners reliance on the reports/survey is merely an afterthought.
The case ofBernardo v. Tiamson is irrelevant because the factual issues are
different from those of this case.

On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Manifestation [62] with this Court,
appending thereto the report[63] conducted by the survey team of the LLDA
Engineering and Construction Division on April 12, 2005. It stated that the 10,971
sq m property subject of the case is below the 12.5 elevation, and that the profile
distance of the property from the actual lake waters is about 900 m. to 1 km.
The issues in this case are the following: (1) whether the MTC had
jurisdiction over the amended application; (2) whether the property subject of the
amended application is alienable and disposable property of the State, and, if so,
(3) whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence to prove its
ownership over the property under Section 14 of P.D. 1529.
The petition is meritorious.
On the first issue, we find and so rule that the MTC acquired jurisdiction
over respondents application for registration since a copy of the O.G. containing
the notice of hearing was marked and adduced in evidence as Exhibit E-1. The
representative of the OSG was present during the hearing and interposed his
objection thereto.
On the second and third issues, we find and so rule that the property subject
of this application was alienable and disposable public agricultural land until July
18, 1966. However, respondent failed to prove that it possesses registerable title
over the property.
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 1942,
reads:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, nay apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty

years immediately preceding the filing of the application

for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
This provision was further amended by P.D. No. 1073 by substituting the phrase
for at least thirty years with since June 12, 1945; thus:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter
VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that
these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession, and occupation by the applicant himself or
through his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier (emphasis supplied).
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the
following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona
fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.[64]

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The presumption is
that lands of whatever classification belong to the State. [65] Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by
the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public
domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of
owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.
[66]
The statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does not
operate against the State unless the occupant proves possession and occupation of
the same after a claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a
grant from the State.[67]
No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant from
the government, whether express or implied. It is indispensable that there be a
showing of a title from the State. [68] The rationale for the period since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945 lies in the presumption that the land applied for
pertains to the State, and that the occupants or possessor claim an interest thereon
only by virtue of their imperfect title as continuous, open and notorious possession.
A possessor of real property may acquire ownership thereof through
acquisitive prescription. In Alba Vda. de Raz v. Court of Appeals,[69] the Court
declared that:
x x x [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that (o)wnership
and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of ten years, this provision of
law must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This
article states that x x x (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things
requires possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed
by law. Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by
mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten
years unless such possession was acquired con justo titulo y buena
fe (with color of title and good faith). The good faith of the possessor
consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership. For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of
the recognized modes of acquisition of ownership or other real rights
but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.[70]

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,

an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, or
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a
legislative act or statute.[71] Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply. A certification of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
stating that the land subject of an application is found to be within the alienable
and disposable site per a land classification project map is sufficient evidence to
show the real character of the land subject of the application.[72]
The applicant is burdened to offer proof of specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim over the land. [73] Actual possession consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually
exercise over his own property.[74] A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land
by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership; such
possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant
from the State.[75]
In this case, the evidence on record shows that the property is alienable
agricultural land. Romeo Cadano of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office, Antipolo Rizal, certified that the property falls within the
Alienable and Disposable zone, under Land Classification Project No. 5-A, per
L.C. Map No. 639 certified released on March 11, 1927. [76] However, under R.A.
No. 4850 which was approved on July 18, 1966, lands located at and below the
maximum lake level of elevation of the Laguna de Bayare public lands which
form part of the bed of said lake. Such lands denominated as lakeshore areas are
linear strips of open space designed to separate incompatible element or uses, or to
control pollution/nuisance, and for identifying and defining development areas or
zone. Such areas of the lake with an approximate total area of 14,000 hectares form
a strip of the lakebed along its shores alternately submerged or exposed by the
annual rising and lowering of the lake water. They have environmental ecological
significance and actual potential economic benefits.
Under Section 1 of the law, the national policy of the State is to promote and
accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces, cities and towns within the context of the national and
regional plans and policies for social and economic development and to carry out
the development of the Laguna Lake region with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality

of
human
life
and
ecological
systems,
and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
The rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore
town of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for
municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like, created deep
concern on the part of the Government and the general public over the
environmental impact of such development, on the water quality and ecology of
the lake and its related river systems. The inflow of polluted water from
the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas
around the lake and the increasing urbanization have induced the deterioration of
the lake, and that water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate
further if steps are not taken to check the same. The floods in the Metropolitan
Manila area and the lakeshore towns are also influenced by the hydraulic system of
the Laguna de Bay, and any scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily
involve the lake and its river systems.
This prompted then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to issue on October 17,
1978 P.D. 813 amending Rep. Act No. 4850. Under Section 6 of the law, the LLDA
is empowered to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
effectively carry out the policies and programs therein provided including the
policies and projects of the LLDA, subject to the approval of the National
Economic Development Authority.
In 1996, the Board of Directors of LLDA approved Resolution No. 113,
series of 1996 relating to the Environmental Uses Fee Systems and Approval of the
Work and Financial Plan for its operationalization in the Laguna de Bay Basin.
Section 5 of the Resolution provides that the LLDA as a matter of policy is to
maintain all shoreland areas lying below elevation 12.50 meters as buffer zone in
consonance with the LLDA policies, plans programs for the improvement of the
water quality and pollution and conservation of the water resources of the Laguna
de Bay.
As gleaned from the Survey Report of Magalonga, Polanco and Medenilla of
the LLDA based on the ocular inspection dated September 14, 2001 as well as the
Memorandum of Engineer Christopher Pedrezuela, the property is located below
the reglementary level of 12.50 m.; hence, part of the bed of the Laguna de Bay,
and, as such, is public land. Although the Report and Memorandum were not
offered as evidence in the MTC, the respondent admitted in its Manifestation in
this Court that the property is situated below the 12.50 elevation based on the
survey of Magalonga, Polanco and Medenilla, the same survey team who

conducted an ocular inspection of the property on April 12, 2005, which thus
confirmed the September 14, 2001 survey report. This is a judicial admission in the
course of judicial proceedings which is binding on it.[77]
Under R.A. No. 4850 and the issuances of LLDA, registerable rights
acquired by occupants before the effectivity of the law are recognized. However,
the respondent failed to adduce proof that its predecessors-in-interest had acquired
registerable title over the property before July 18, 1966:
First. Cruz failed to prove how his parents acquired ownership of the
property, and even failed to mention the names of his grandparents. He likewise
failed to present his fathers death certificate to support his claim that the latter died
in 1980. There is likewise no evidence when his mother died.
Second. Cruz also failed to adduce in evidence the extrajudicial partition
allegedly executed by his parents in 1980 where the property was supposedly
deeded to him and his sisters, Felisa and Eladia, to the exclusion of their five
siblings.

Third. Cruz claimed that he and his parents cultivated the property and
planted palay and vegetables, and that they had been paying the realty taxes over
the property before his parents died. However, no tax declarations under the names
of the spouses Apolonio Cruz and/or Eladia Cruz and his siblings were presented,
or realty tax receipts evidencing payment of such taxes. Indeed, while tax receipts
and tax payment receipts themselves do not convincingly prove title to the land,
[78]
these are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in
his right mind would pay taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least,
constructive possession.[79] While tax receipts and declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute, at the least, proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property, particularly when accompanied by
proof of actual possession of property.[80] The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes not only manifests ones sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property, but also announces an adverse claim against the State
and all other interested parties with an intention to contribute needed revenues to
the government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.[81]
Fourth. When he testified on October 5, 2001, Antonio Cruz declared that he
was 74 years old.[82] He must have been born in 1927, and was thus merely 10
years old in 1937. It is incredible that, at that age, he was already cultivating the
property with his father. Moreover, no evidence was presented to prove how many
cavans of palay were planted on the property, as well as the extent of such
cultivation, in order to support the claim of possession with a bona fide claim of
ownership.
Fifth. Cruz testified that he hired a worker upahan to help him cultivate the
property. He, however, failed to state the name of the worker or to even present
him as witness for the respondent.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73278 is SET ASIDE. The
Municipal
Trial
Court
of
Taytay,
Rizal
is
DIRECTED to dismiss the application for registration of respondent Candymaker,
Inc. in Land Registration Case No. 99-0031. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

PACIFICO M. VALIAO, for G.R. No. 170757

himself and in behalf of his coheirs LODOVICO, RICARDO, Present:
BIENVENIDO, all Surnamed
VALIAO and NEMESIO M.
GRANDEA,
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
Petitioners,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
- versusMENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
MACARIO
Promulgated:
ZAFRA, and MANUEL YUSAY,
Respondents,
November 28, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking to set aside the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 54811, which reversed the Decision [3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, in Land
Registration Case No. 03, granting petitioners' application for registration of title
over a parcel of land located in Ilog, Negros Occidental.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
On August 11, 1987, petitioners[4] Pacifico, Lodovico, Ricardo, Bienvenido, all
surnamed Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea filed with the RTC of Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental an application for registration of a parcel of land with an area of
504,535 square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of
Ilog, Negros Occidental.

On June 20, 1988, private oppositors Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay filed their
Motion to Dismiss the application on the following grounds: (1) the land applied
for has not been declared alienable and disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar
the application for registration; and (3) the application has no factual or legal basis.
On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration on the
following grounds, among others: that neither the applicants nor
their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or
prior thereto; that the muniment/s of title and/or the tax declaration/s and tax
payments/receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the application,
do/es not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of
the land applied for or of their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation in the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto; that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain belonging
to the Republic, which is not subject to private appropriation; and that the present
action is barred by a previous final judgment in a cadastral case prosecuted
between the same parties and involving the same parcel of land.
On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss. Trial
thereafter ensued.
In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that they
acquired the subject property in 1947, upon the death of their uncle Basilio
Millarez (Basilio), who purchased the land from a certain Fermin Payogao,
pursuant to a Deed of Sale[5] dated May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten in Spanish
language. Basilio possessed the land in question from May 19, 1916 until his death
in 1947. Basilio's possession was open, continuous, peaceful, adverse, notorious,
uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death, the applicants

as co-heirs possessed the said land until 1966, when oppositor Zafra unlawfully
and violently dispossessed them of their property, which compelled them to file
complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft against Zafra. In support of
their claim of possession over the subject property, petitioners submitted in
evidence Tax Declaration No. 9562[6] dated September 29, 1976 under the names of
the heirs of Basilio Millarez.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted petitioners' application
for registration of the subject property, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby orders
and decrees registration of Lot No. 2372 subject of the present
proceedings and the registration of title thereto, in favor of the
applicants, who are declared the true and lawful owners of said Lot
No. 2372, except applicant Lodovico Valiao, who sold his right to
Macario Zafra.
Upon the finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of
registration and Certificate of Title be issued in the name of the
applicants, Heirs of Basilio Millarez, namely: Pacifico Valiao,
Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao and Nemesio Grandea, subject to
the rights of private oppositors, Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay
over said lot whose fishpond permits are declared VALID and will
expire on December 31, 2003.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[7]

Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors and the Republic, through
Assistant Prosecutor Josue A. Gatin, filed an appeal with the CA, which reversed
the trial court's findings in its Decision dated June 23, 2005. The CA ruled that the
classification of lands of the public domain is an exclusive prerogative of the
executive department of the government and in the absence of such classification,
the lands remain as unclassified until it is released therefrom and rendered open to

disposition. Further, there exists a prior cadastral case involving the same parties
herein and the same Lot No. 2372, which ruled that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the
Republic. The CA held that such judgment constitutesres judicata that bars a
subsequent action for land registration. It also ruled that the subject property is part
of the inalienable land of the public domain and petitioners failed to prove that
they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
GRANTED. Accordingly, We REVERSE the Decision dated
December 15, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, DENY the
application for registration of title filed by petitioners-appellees,
DECLARE as moot and academic any and all claims of private
oppositors-appellants over Lot No. 2372, and DECLARE the subject
parcel of land to be inalienable and indisposable land belonging to the
public domain.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated November 17, 2005. Hence, the present petition with the
following issues:

I
WHETHER OR NOT LOT NO. 2372 OF THE ILOG CADASTRE IS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CLAIM OF PRESCRIPTION BY THE
APPLICANT WILL LIE ON LOT NO. 2372.
III

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS IN CAD. CASE NO. 23, ENTITLED LODOVICO
VALIAO, ET, AL., VS. MACARIO ZAFRA, ET, AL., AC G.R. NO.
CV-68873, CONSTITUTES RES JUDICATA AS FAR AS THIS
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS CONCERNED.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED POSSESSION OF THE
APPLICANTS
THROUGH
THEIR
PREDECESSORS-ININTEREST IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THEIR CLAIM FOR
PRESCRIPTION.[9]

Petitioners claim that Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain. The possession of applicants' predecessors-in interest since 1916
until 1966 had been open, continuous and uninterrupted; thus, converting the said
land into a private land. The subject lot had already become private in character in
view of the length of time the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had
possessed the subject lot, which entitles them to the confirmation of their title.
Petitioners further claim that prior dismissal in a cadastral proceeding does not
constitute res judicata in a subsequent application for registration of a parcel of
land.
In its Comment, the OSG submits that the issues to be resolved in the present
petition, i.e., whether Lot No. 2372 is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain and whether petitioners have the right to have the said property registered
in their name through prescription of time are questions of fact, which were
already passed upon by the CA and no longer reviewable by the Court, since
findings of fact of the CA, when supported by sufficient evidence, are conclusive
and binding on the parties. The OSG further claims that petitioners failed to prove
that the subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain and that petitioners' application for land registration is already barred by a
prior decision in a cadastral case. Lastly, the OSG asserts that petitioners did not

present sufficient evidence to prove that their possession over the subject lot
applied for had been open, peaceful, exclusive, continuous and adverse.
Anent the propriety of filing a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts and that
only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the
function of the lower courts whose findings on these matters are received with
respect and are, as a rule, binding on this Court. This rule, however, is subject to
certain exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are
contrary to those of the trial court.[10] Due to the divergence of the findings of the
CA and the RTC, the Court will now re-examine the facts and evidence adduced
before the lower courts.
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their duly-authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

From the foregoing, petitioners need to prove that: (1) the land forms part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona

fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.[11] These the petitioners must
prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.[12]
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain.[13] Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or
disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not
susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation
thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership
and be registered as a title.[14] The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption
of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of
the application
is alienable
or disposable.
To
overcome
this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of
the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.[15]
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number
of years is alienable and disposable.[16]

No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question
has been classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In the
absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already
classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still
inalienable public domain.[17]Verily, the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply unless and until the land subject thereof is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain.
With respect to the existence of a prior cadastral case, it appears that on July
11, 1966, the petitioners filed in Cadastral Case No. 23 of the then CFI of Negros
Occidental a petition to reopen the proceedings relative to three lots, one of which
is Lot No. 2372. The lower court, in its Order [18] dated October 20, 1980, held that
Lot No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. It found that after the subject lot was
declared public land, it was found to be inside the communal forest. On appeal, the
CA, in its Decision[19] dated August 7, 1984, found no reversible error and affirmed
the decision of the cadastral court. Thereafter, a petition elevating the case to this
Court was dismissed for lack of merit. [20] In the present case, the CA, in its
Decision dated June 23, 2005, ruled that such judgment constitutes res
judicata that will bar a subsequent action for land registration on the same land.
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court held that a judicial
declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same
applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same
land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 [22] of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public lands remain
alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, not only did the petitioners fail to prove
that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain, they failed to demonstrate that they by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the subject land since June
12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by the law.
It is settled that the applicant must present proof of specific acts of ownership
to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which
are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession.[23] Actual
possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature
as a party would actually exercise over his own property.[24]
The testimonies of Nemesio and Pacifico as to their own and their predecessors-ininterest's possession and ownership over the subject lot fail to convince
Us. Petitioners claim that Basilio was in possession of the land way back in 1916.
Yet no tax declaration covering the subject property, during the period Basilio
allegedly occupied the subject property, i.e., 1916 to 1947, was presented in
evidence. Other than the bare allegations of Nemesio and Pacifico that Basilio
allegedly introduced improvements on the subject property, there is nothing in the
records which would substantiate petitioners' claim that Basilio was in possession
of Lot No. 2372 since June 12, 1945 or earlier, the period of possession required by
law. Hence, petitioners' assertion that Basilio possessed the property in question
from 1916 to 1947 is, at best, conjectural and self-serving.
As regards petitioners' possession of the land in question from 1947 to 1966,
petitioners could only support the same with a tax declaration dated September 29,
1976. At best, petitioners can only prove possession since said date. What is
required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by petitioners and
their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12,
1945 or earlier.[25] Petitioners failed to explain why, despite their claim that their
predecessors-in-interest have possessed the subject properties in the concept of an
owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1976 that they started to declare
the same for purposes of taxation. Moreover, taxdeclarations and receipts are

not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not
supported by any other evidence. The disputed property may have been declared
for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration, or of their
predecessors-in-interest, but it does not necessarily prove ownership. They are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership.[26]
Evidently, since the petitioners failed to prove that (1) the subject property was
classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2)
they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and registration of
the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 54811, which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, in Land Registration Case No. 03,
is AFFIRMED. The application for registration of title filed by the petitioners
Pacifico Valiao, Lodovico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao, and Nemesio
Grandea, over Lot No. 2372, with a total area of 504,535 square meters, more or
less, situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros
Occidental, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171136

October 23, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LYDIA CAPCO DE TENSUAN, represented by CLAUDIA C.
ARUELO, Respondent.

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision1 dated January 13 2006
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84125, which affirmed the
Decision2 dated October 18, 2004 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Taguig City, Branch 74 in LRC Case No. 172 LRA Rec. No. N-701 08). The
MeTC confirmed the title of herein respondent, Lydia Capco de Tensuan Tensuan),
to the parcel of agricultural land, designated as Lot 1109-A, located at Ibayo, Sta.
Ana, Taguig City, with an area of 4,006 square meters subject property), and
ordered the registration of said property in her name.
The following facts are culled from the records:
On August 11, 1998, Tensuan, represented by her sister, Claudia C. Aruelo
(Aruelo), filed with the MeTC an Application for Registration3 of Lot Nos. 1109-A
and 1109-B, docketed as LRC Case No. 172. In her Application for Registration,
Tensuan alleged that:
2. That Applicant is the absolute owner and possessor of those two (2) paraphernal
parcels of land situated at Sta. Ana, Taguig, Metro Manila, within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, bounded and described as Lot 1109-A and 1109-B in
Conversion Subdivision Plan Swo-00-001456 as follows:
(a) Lot 1109-A, Swo-00-001456
"A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 1109-A of the Plan Swo-00-001456, being a
conversion of Lot 1109, MCadm 590-D, Taguig, [Cadastral] Mapping,
L.R.C. Record No.), situated in Brgy. Sta. Ana, Mun. of Taguig, Metro
Manila, Island of Luzon.
x x x x"
(b) Lot 1109-B, Swo-00-001456

"A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 1109-B, of plan Swo-00-001456, being a conversion

of Lot 1109, MCadm 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping, L.R.C. Record No.),
situated in Sta. Ana, Mun. of Taguig, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon.
x x x x"
3. That said two (2) parcels of land at the last assessment for taxation were
assessed at Sixty Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty Pesos (P60,820.00), Philippine
currency, under Tax Declaration No. D-013-01563 in the name of the Applicant;
4. That to the best of the knowledge and belief of Applicant, there is no mortgage,
encumbrance or transaction affecting said two (2) parcels of land, nor is there any
other person having any interest therein, legal or equitable, or in adverse
possession thereof;
5. That Applicant has acquired said parcels of land by inheritance from her
deceased father, Felix Capco, by virtue of a "[Kasulatan] ng Paghahati-hati at Pagaayos ng Kabuhayan
" dated September 14, 1971, and Applicant specifically alleges that she and her
deceased father, as well as the latters predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the said lands
under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, and many years earlier,
as in fact since time immemorial, as provided under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529;
6. That said parcels of land are and have been, since the inheritance thereof,
occupied by Applicant herself;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due notice, publication and
hearing, the paraphernal parcels of land hereinabove described be brought under
the operation of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and the same confirmed in the name
of Applicant.4 (Emphasis ours.)

On August 20, 1998, Tensuan filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Lot
1109-B from the Application for Registration and to Amend the
Application.5 According to Tensuan, she was withdrawing her Application for
Registration of Lot 1109-B because a review of Plan Swo-00-001456 had revealed
that said lot, with an area of 338 square meters, was a legal easement. The MeTC,
in its Order6 dated September 30, 1998, granted Tensuans motion.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an
Opposition to Tensuans Application for Registration on December 28, 1998. The
Republic argued that (1) neither Tensuan nor her predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject property since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniment/s of title
and/or tax declaration/s and tax payment receipt/s attached to the application do/es
not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the
subject property or of Tensuans open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property in the concept of owner since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (3) the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis
of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by Tensuan who failed to file
an appropriate application for registration within the period of six months from
February 16, 1976, as required by Presidential Decree No. 892; and (4) the subject
property forms part of the public domain not subject of private appropriation.7
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) also filed its own
Opposition8 dated February 12, 1999 to Tensuans Application for Registration,
averring as follows:
2. That projection of the subject lot in our topographic map based on the
technical descriptions appearing in the Notice of the Initial Hearing
indicated that the lot subject of this application for registration is located
below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters referred to datum
10.00 meters below mean lower water. Site is, therefore, part of the bed of
Laguna Lake considered as public land and is within the jurisdiction of
Laguna Lake Development Authority pursuant to its mandate under R.A.
4850, as amended. x x x;

3. That Section 41 of Republic Act No. 4850, states that, "whenever Laguna
Lake or Lake is used in this Act, the same shall refer to Laguna de Bay
which is that area covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual
maximum lake level of elevation of 12.50 meters, as referred to a datum
10.0 meters below mean lower low water (MLLW). Lands located at and
below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed of said lake
(Section 14, R.A. 4850, as amended, x x x);
4. That on the strength of the oppositors finding and applying the abovequoted provision of law, herein applicants application for registration of the
subject land has no leg to stand on, both in fact and in law;
5. That unless the Honorable Court renders judgment to declare the land as
part of the Laguna Lake or that of the public domain, the applicant will
continue to unlawfully posses, occupy and claim the land as their own to the
damage and prejudice of the Government in general and the Laguna Lake
Development Authority in particular;
6. That moreover, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable and
indisposable in the absence of declaration by the Director of Lands as
required by law.9
During the initial hearing on February 18, 1999, Tensuan marked in evidence the
exhibits proving her compliance with the jurisdictional requirements for LRC Case
No. 172. There being no private oppositor, a general default against the whole
world, except the government, was declared.10
To prove possession, Tensuan presented two witnesses, namely, her sister Aruelo
and Remigio Marasigan (Marasigan).
Aruelo, who was then 68 years old, testified that Tensuan and her predecessors-ininterest have been in possession of the subject property even before the Second
World War. The subject property was originally owned by Candida de Borja, who
passed on the same to her only child, Socorro Reyes, and the latters husband,
Felix Capco (spouses Capco). The subject property became part of the spouses
Capcos conjugal property. Aruelo and Tensuan are among the spouses Capcos

children. During the settlement of Felix Capcos estate, the subject property was
adjudicated to Tensuan, as evidenced by the Kasulatan ng Paghahati at Pag-aayos
ng Kabuhayan11 dated September 14, 1971.12
Marasigan claimed that he had been cultivating the subject property for the last 15
years, and he personally knew Tensuan to be the owner of said
property.13 Marasigans father was the caretaker of the subject property for the
Capcos for more than 50 years, and Marasigan used to help his father till the same.
Marasigan merely inherited the job as caretaker of the subject property from his
father.
Among the evidence Tensuan presented during the trial were: (1) the Kasulatan ng
Paghahati-hati at Pagaayos ng Kabuhayan dated September 14, 1971;14 (2) Tax
declarations, the earliest of which was for the year 1948, in the name of Candida de
Borja, Tensuans grandmother;15 (3) Real property tax payment receipts issued to
Tensuan for 1998;16 (3) Blueprint copy of Plan Swo-00-001456 surveyed for Lydia
Capco de Tensuan;17 (4) Technical description of the subject property, duly
prepared by a licensed Geodetic Engineer and approved by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR);18 and (5) Certification dated July 29,
1999 from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the
DENR (CENRO-DENR) which states that "said land falls within alienable and
disposable land under Project No. 27-B L.C. Map No. 2623 under Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1141 dated January 3, 1968."19
Engineer Ramon Magalona (Magalona) took the witness stand for oppositor
LLDA. He averred that based on the topographic map and technical description of
the subject property, the said property is located below the prescribed lake
elevation of 12.5 meters. Hence, the subject property forms part of the Laguna
Lake bed and, as such, is public land. During cross-examination, Magalona
admitted that the topographic map he was using as basis was made in the year
1967; that there had been changes in the contour of the lake; and that his findings
would have been different if the topographic map was made at present time. He
likewise acknowledged that the subject property is an agricultural lot. When
Magalona conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property, said property and

other properties in the area were submerged in water as the lake level was high
following the recent heavy rains.20
On May 26, 2000, an Investigation Report was prepared, under oath, by Cristeta R.
Garcia (Garcia), DENR Land Investigator, stating, among other things, that the
subject property was covered by a duly approved survey plan; that the subject
property is within the alienable and disposable zone classified under Project No.
27-B, L.C. Map No. 2623; that the subject property is not reserved for military or
naval purposes; that the subject property was not covered by a previously issued
patent; that the subject property was declared for the first time in 1948 under Tax
Declaration No. 230 in the name of Candida de Borja;21 that the subject property is
now covered by Tax Declaration No. D-013-01408 in the name of Lydia Capco de
Tensuan; that the subject property is agricultural in nature; and that the subject
property is free from adverse claims and conflicts. Yet, Garcia noted in the same
report that the "the applicant is not x x x in the actual occupation and possession of
the land" and "LLDA rep. by Atty. Joaquin G. Mendoza possesses the legal right to
file opposition against the application x x x."22 The Investigation Report was
submitted as evidence by the Republic.
In its Decision dated October 18, 2004, the MeTC granted Tensuans Application
for Registration, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, from the evidences adduced and testimonies presented by the
parties, the Court is of the considered view that herein applicant has proven by
preponderance of evidence the allegations in the application, hence, this Court
hereby confirms the title of applicant LYDIA CAPCO DE TENSUAN married to
RODOLFO TENSUAN, of legal age, Filipino and a resident of No. 43 Rizal
Street, Poblacion, Muntinlupa City to the parcel of agricultural land (Lot 1109-A,
Mcadm 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) located at Ibayo-Sta. Ana, Taguig,
Metro Manila containing an area of Four Thousand Six (4,006) square meters; and
order the registration thereof in her name.
After the finality of this decision and upon payment of the corresponding taxes due
on said land subject matter of this application, let an order for issuance of decree
be issued.23

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, insisting that the MeTC should not
have granted Tensuans Application for Registration considering that the subject
property is part of the Laguna Lake bed, hence, is not alienable and disposable.
The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84125.
In the herein assailed Decision of January 13, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the MeTC Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated
October 18, 2004 is AFFIRMED.24
Hence, the Republic filed the present Petition with the following assignment of
errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS GRANT OF THE
APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION OF [TENSUAN] DESPITE
HER FAILURE TO PROVE OPEN, ADVERSE, CONTINUOUS,
EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION IN THE CONCEPT OF
AN OWNER OF THE SUBJECT LAND FOR THIRTY YEARS.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS GRANT OF THE
APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION OF [TENSUAN]
BECAUSE THE SUBJECT LAND BEING PART OF THE LAGUNA
LAKE BED IS NOT ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.25
The Republic contends that Tensuan failed to present incontrovertible evidence to
warrant the registration of the property in the latters name as owner. Aruelos
testimony that her father possessed the land even before the Second World War and
Marasigans claim that he and his father have been tilling the land for a total of
more than 65 years are doubtful considering that the subject property is located
below the reglementary lake elevation and is, thus, part of the Laguna Lake bed.

Also, the CENRO Certification is not sufficient evidence to overcome the

presumption that the subject property still forms part of the public domain, and is
not alienable and disposable. On the other hand, Tensuan asserts that the Petition
should be dismissed outright for raising questions of fact. The findings of the
MeTC and the Court of Appeals that the subject property is alienable and
disposable, and that Tensuan and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
adverse, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the same for the period
required by law, are supported by preponderance of evidence.
We find the instant Petition meritorious.
The Republic asserts that the assigned errors in its Petition are on questions of law,
but in reality, these questions delve into the sufficiency of evidence relied upon by
the MeTC and the Court of Appeals in granting Tensuans Application for
Registration of the subject property. It is basic that where it is the sufficiency of
evidence that is being questioned, it is a question of fact.26
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court
is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings
complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.27 In Reyes v. Montemayor,28 we
did not hesitate to apply the exception rather than the general rule, setting aside the
findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts and looking into the evidence on
record ourselves, in order to arrive at the proper and just resolution of the case, to
wit:
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of law shall be raised in
a Petition for Review before this Court. This rule, however, admits of certain
exceptions, namely, (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the

petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
While as a general rule appellate courts do not usually disturb the lower courts
findings of fact, unless said findings are not supported by or are totally devoid of
or inconsistent with the evidence on record, such finding must of necessity be
modified to conform with the evidence if the reviewing tribunal were to arrive at
the proper and just resolution of the controversy. Thus, although the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive on this Court, which is not a
trier of facts, if said factual findings do not conform to the evidence on record, this
Court will not hesitate to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower
courts. In the instant case, the Court finds sufficient basis to deviate from the rule
since the extant evidence and prevailing law support a finding different from the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals and the RTC. (Citations omitted.)
Tensuan anchors her right to registration of title on Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, which
reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The aforequoted provision authorizes the registration of title acquired in
accordance with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which
provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but

whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
The requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are: (1) that the property in question is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and that such possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.29 In Heirs of
Mario Malabanan v. Republic,30 we affirmed our earlier ruling in Republic v.
Naguit,31 that Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed.
We proceed to determine first whether it has been satisfactorily proven herein that
the subject property was already alienable and disposable land of the public
domain at the time Tensuan filed her Application for Registration on August 11,
1998.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and
that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony. The same doctrine also states that all
lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. Consequently, the burden of proof to overcome the

presumption of ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying

for registration. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified and alienated
by the State to a private person, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.32
As to what constitutes alienable and disposable land of the public domain, we turn
to our pronouncements in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Yap33:
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest
or timber. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions:
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or
forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law, giving
the government great leeway for classification. Then the 1987 Constitution
reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks.
Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. x x x
xxxx
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping
with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized
that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or
disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and
classified."
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a

legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number
of years is alienable and disposable. (Citations and emphasis omitted.)
As proof that the subject property is alienable and disposable, Tensuan presented a
Certification dated July 29, 1999 issued by the CENRO-DENR which verified that
"said land falls within alienable and disposable land under Project No. 27-B L.C.
Map No. 2623 under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1141 dated January 3,
1968." However, we have declared unequivocally that a CENRO Certification, by
itself, is insufficient proof that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable. As we
held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.34:
It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the
PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified
as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to
do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves,
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications
submitted by respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications
were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court
should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts
stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in
evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence as follows:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by
law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in
Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy x x x.
The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the
DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO
should have attached an official publication of the DENR Secretarys issuance
declaring the land alienable and disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: "Sec. 23.
Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even
against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date
of the latter."
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not
fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of
Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the
Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ships logbook.
The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of
original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The
certifications are not even records of public documents. The certifications are

conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no probative value.

Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not
prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as
proclaimed by the DENR Secretary.
Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts
stated therein.1wphi1 Such government certifications may fall under the class of
documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As
such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of
issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the
testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein. Here,
Torres, a private individual and respondents representative, identified the
certifications but the government officials who issued the certifications did not
testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the certifications cannot be
given probative value. The contents of the certifications are hearsay because Torres
was incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the certifications.
Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was not an officer of CENRO or FMSDENR, and he did not conduct any verification survey whether the land falls
within the area classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable.
(Emphases ours, citations omitted.)
While we may have been lenient in some cases35 and accepted substantial
compliance with the evidentiary requirements set forth in T.A.N. Properties, we
cannot do the same for Tensuan in the case at bar. We cannot afford to be lenient in
cases where the Land Registration Authority (LRA) or the DENR oppose the
application for registration on the ground that the land subject thereof is
inalienable. In the present case, the DENR recognized the right of the LLDA to
oppose Tensuans Application for Registration; and the LLDA, in its Opposition,
precisely argued that the subject property is part of the Laguna Lake bed and,
therefore, inalienable public land. We do not even have to evaluate the evidence
presented by the LLDA given the Regalian Doctrine. Since Tensuan failed to

present satisfactory proof that the subject property is alienable and disposable, the
burden of evidence did not even shift to the LLDA to prove that the subject
property is part of the Laguna Lake bed.
Given the lack of evidence that the subject property is alienable and disposable, it
becomes unnecessary for us to determine the other issue in this case, i.e., whether
Tensuan has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation; and that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. Regardless of the character and length of her possession
of the subject property, Tensuan cannot acquire registerable title to inalienable
public land.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 13,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84125 and Decision dated
October 18, 2004 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig City, Branch 74 in
LRC Case No. 172 LRA Rec. No. N-70 1 08) are SET ASIDE. The Application for
Registration of Lydia Capco de Tensuan is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

SAAD AGRO-INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. No. 152570

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------x Promulgated:
PEDRO URGELLO, September 27, 2006
Intervenor-Appellant.

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

The instant petition for review assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 18 July 2001 and 18 March 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64097,
reversing and setting aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch 11, Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-17173.

The antecedents follow.

On 18 October 1967, Socorro Orcullo (Orcullo) filed her application for

Free Patent for Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D, a parcel of land with an area of

12.8477 hectares located in Barangay Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu. Thereafter, on 14

February 1971, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued Free
Patent No. 473408 for Lot No. 1434, while the Registry of Deeds for the Province
of Cebu issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-6667 over the said lot.
[1]
Subsequently, the subject lot was sold[2] to SAAD Agro- Industries,
Inc. (petitioner) by one of Orcullos heirs.

Sometime in 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General,
filed a complaint[3] for annulment of title and reversion of the lot covered by Free
Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 and reversion of Lot No. 1434 of Cad315-D to the mass of the public domain, on the ground that the issuance of the said
free patent and title for Lot No. 1434 was irregular and erroneous, following the
discovery that the lot is allegedly part of the timberland and forest reserve of
Sibonga, Cebu. The discovery was made after Pedro Urgello filed a lettercomplaint with the Regional Executive

Director of the Forest Management Sector, Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR) Region VII, Cebu City, about the alleged illegal cutting
of mangrove trees and construction of dikes within the area covered by Urgellos
Fishpond Lease Agreement.[4] On 14 July 1995, Urgello filed a complaint-inintervention against the heirs of Orcullo, adopting the allegations of respondent.
[5]
However, the heirs failed to file their answer to the complaint and were thus
declared in default.[6]

In its Decision[7] dated 15 May 1999, the trial court dismissed the
complaint, finding that respondent failed to show that the subject lot is part of the
timberland or forest reserve or that it has been classified as such before the
issuance of the free patent and the original title. According to the trial court, the
issuance of the free patent and title was regular and in order, and must be accorded
full faith. Considering the validity of the free patent and the OCT, petitioners
purchase of the property was also declared legal and valid. The trial court also
denied the complaint-in-intervention filed by Urgello.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in its Decision[8] reversed and set aside the trial
courts judgment. It held that timber or forest lands, to which the subject lot
belongs, are not subject to private ownership, unless these are first classified as
agricultural lands. Thus, absent any declassification of the subject lot from forest to
alienable and disposable land for agricultural purposes, [9] the officers erred in
approving Orcullos free patent application and in issuing the OCT; hence, title to
the lot must be cancelled.[10] Consequently, the Court of Appeals invalidated the
sale of the lot to petitioner. However, it declared that Urgellos Fishpond Lease
Agreement may continue until its expiration because lease does not pass title to the
lessee; but thereafter, the lease should not be renewed. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals decreed:

WHEREFORE, the
decision
appealed
from
is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one issued
declaring Free Patent No. 473408 and the corresponding OCT [No.]
0-6667 asNULL and VOID ab initio.

SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. is directed to surrender the owners

duplicate copy of OCT [No.] 0-6667 to the Register of Deeds of Cebu
City.

The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is hereby ordered to cancel OCT

[No.] 0-6667 and all other transfer certificates of title that may have
been subsequently issued.

Lot No. 1434, CAD 315[-]D located at Barangay Abugon, Sibonga,

Cebu, subject matter of this case, is hereby REVERTED as part of
[the] public domain and to be classified as timberland.[11]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration, claiming insufficiency of evidence and

failure to consider pertinent laws, proved futile as it was dismissed for lack of
merit. The Court of Appeals categorically stated that there was a preponderance of
evidence showing that the subject lot is within the timberland area.[12]

Petitioner now claims that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the DENR
officers testimony. It claims that the testimony was a mere opinion to the effect that
if there was no classification yet of an area, such area should be considered as a
public forest. Such opinion was premised on the officers construction of a
provision of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code,[13] the pertinent portion of which reads:

Those still to be classified under the present system shall continue to

remain as part of the public forest.[14]

Petitioner points out that P.D. No. 705 took effect on 19 May 1975, or long
after the issuance of the free patent and title in question. Thus, the provision stating
that all public lands should be considered

as part of the public forests until a land classification team has declassified them is
applicable only after the effectivity of P.D. No. 705 and cannot be made retroactive
to cover and prejudice vested rights acquired prior to the effectivity of said law,
petitioner concludes.[15] It adds that if the subject lot was encompassed by the term
public forest, the same should have been designated as a Timberland Block, not
as Cadastral Lot No. 1434, CAF-315-D, Sibonga Cadastre which was the
designation made by the Republic prior to 1972.[16]

Petitioner also questions the Court of Appeals reliance on the land

classification map (L.C. Map) presented by respondent. The trial court had
previously declared L.C. Map No. 2961 as inadmissible, finding that the plaintiff
has not duly proved the authenticity and contents. According to petitioner, the L.C.
Map presented in court is neither a certified true copy nor one attested to be a true
copy by any DENR official having legal custody of the original thereof, and thus
should not have been made the basis of the cancellation of the free patent and title.
[17]

Petitioner further contends that the projection survey conducted by the DENR to
determine if the subject lot falls within the forest area is not clear, precise and
conclusive, since the foresters who conducted the survey used a magnetic box
compass, an unreliable and inaccurate instrument, whose results are easily affected
by high tension wires and stones with iron minerals.[18]

Finally, petitioner claims that respondent failed to overcome the presumption of

regularity of the issuance of the free patent and title in favor of Socorro Orcullo.
In sum, petitioner asserts that respondent failed to show that the subject lot is
inside the timberland block, thereby casting doubt on the accuracy of the survey
conducted by the Bureau of Forestry and the opinions of DENR officers. Since
respondent is the original plaintiff in the reversion case, the burden is on it
to prove that the subject lot is part of the timberland block, petitioner adds.

There is merit in the petition.

Under the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in
land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.[19] Under this doctrine,
lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State.[20] In instances where a parcel of land considered to be
inalienable land of the public domain is found under private
ownership, the Government is allowed by law to file an action for

reversion,[21] which is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land
to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of
the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter
between the grantor and the grantee.[22]

It has been held that a complaint for reversion involves a serious

controversy, involving a question of fraud and misrepresentation committed
against the government and it is aimed at the return of the disputed portion of the
public domain. It seeks to cancel the original certificate of registration, and nullify
the original certificate of title, including the transfer certificate of title of the
successors-in-interest because the same were all procured through fraud and
misrepresentation.[23] Thus, the State, as the party alleging the fraud and
misrepresentation that attended the application of the free patent, bears that burden
of proof. Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and
annulment of title, should never be presumed but must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate.[24]

It is but judicious to require the Government, in an action for reversion, to show

the details attending the issuance of title over the alleged inalienable land and
explain why such issuance has deprived the State of the claimed property.

In the instant case, the Solicitor General claimed that Free Patent No.
473408 and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-6667 were erroneously and
irregularly obtained as the Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau) did
not acquire jurisdiction over the land subject thereof, nor has it the power and
authority to dispose of the same through [a] free patent grant, hence, said patent
and title are null and void ab initio.[25] It was incumbent upon respondent to prove
that the free patent and original title were truly erroneously and irregularly
obtained. Unfortunately, respondent failed to do so.

The Court finds that the findings of the trial court rather than those of the appellate
court are more in accord with the law and jurisprudence.

In concluding that the subject parcel of land falls within the timberland or forest
reserve, the Court of Appeals relied on the testimony of Isabelo R. Montejo that as
it had remained unclassified until 1980 and consequently became
an unclassified forest zone, it was incapable of private appropriation. The pertinent
portions of Montejos testimony read:

Q: And in that particular [R]evised Forestry Code, there is that

statement that unless classified by a land classification team, an
area can never be released.

A: Yes sir.

xxx

Q: Prior to 1980, there was no classification was [sic] ever of the

lands of the public domain in the town of Sibonga?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: In other words, nobody knew in the whole DNR before and now
DENR what areas were timberland and what areas are not
timberland in the town of Sibonga prior to 1980?
A: Yes, sir, that is why the law states that if there is no classification
should be [sic] considered as the public forest in order to
protect the resources.[26]

Obviously, respondents counsel and witness were referring to P.D. No. 705
particularly Section 13 thereof which reads:

CHAPTER II
CLASSIFICATION AND SURVEY

SEC. 13. System of Land Classification.The Department Head shall

study, devise, determine and prescribe the criteria, guidelines and
methods for the proper and accurate classification and survey of all
lands of the public domain into agricultural, industrial or commercial,

residential, settlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing lands,

and into such other classes as now or may hereafter be provided by
law, rules and regulations.

In the meantime, the Department Head shall simplify through interbureau action the present system of determining which of the
unclassified lands of the public domain are needed for forest purposes
and declare them as permanent forest to form part of the forest
reserves. He shall declare those classified and determined not to be
needed for forest purposes as alienable and disposable lands, the
administrative jurisdiction and management of which shall be
transferred to the Bureau of Lands: Provided, That mangrove and
other swamps not needed for shore protection and suitable for
fishpond purposes shall be released to, and be placed under the
administrative jurisdiction and management of, the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. Those still to be classified under
the Present system shall continue to remain as part of the public
forest. (Emphasis supplied.)

Reliance on this provision is highly misplaced. P.D. No. 705 was promulgated only
on 19 May 1975, or four (4) years after the free patent and title were awarded to
Orcullo.Thus, it finds no application in the instant case. Prior forestry laws,
including P.D. No. 389,[27] which was revised by P.D. No. 705, does not contain a
similar provision. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. The Court does not infer any
intention on the part of then President Marcosto ordain the retroactive application
of Sec. 13 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, even assuming for the nonce that subject parcel
was unclassified at the time Orcullo applied for a free patent thereto, the fact
remains that when the free patent and title were issued thereon in 1971, respondent
in essence segregated said parcel from the mass of public domain.Thus, it can no

longer be considered unclassified and forming part of the public forest as provided
in P.D. No. 705.

Respondents main basis for asserting that the subject lot is part of the timberland or
forest reserve is a purported L.C. Map No. 2961.[28] However, at the hearing on 6
June 1997, the trial court denied admission of the map for the purpose of showing
that the subject lot falls within a timberland reserve after respondent had failed to
submit either a certified true copy or an official publication thereof. [29] The Court
observes that the document adverted to is a mere photocopy of the purported
original, and not the blue print as insisted by respondent.[30] A mere photocopy does
not qualify as competent evidence of the existence of the L.C. Map. Under the best
evidence rule, the original document must be produced, except:

1. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced

in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

2. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;

3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other

documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and

4. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public

officer or is recorded in a public office.[31]

In this case, respondent claims that the presentation of the original L.C. Map is
unnecessary since it is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in the public
office.[32]Evidence, indeed, is admissible when the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. However, to prove its
contents, there is a need to present a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof.[33] In addition, while the L.C. Map may be considered a public
document and prima facieevidence of the facts stated therein,[34] the map, to be
admissible for any purpose, must be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record.[35]
The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly. The same rule holds
true when the Government is one of the parties. The Government, when it comes to
court to litigate with one of its citizens, must submit to the rules of procedure and
its rights and privileges at every stage of the proceedings are substantially in every
respect the same as those of its citizens; it cannot have a superior advantage. This
is so because when a sovereignty submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court and
participates therein, its claims and rights are justiciable by every other principle
and rule applicable to the claims and rights of the private parties under similar
circumstances.[36] Failure to abide by the rules on admissibility renders the L.C.
Map submitted by respondent inadmissible as proof to show that the subject lot is
part of the forest reserve.

Some officers from the CENRO office in Argao, Cebu testified that they
personally saw the subject lot and that it falls within the timberland or forest
reserve. Ultimately, however, the basis of their declaration is the L.C. Map which
respondent failed to present in accordance with the rules on admissibility. Two
foresters in fact testified that the subject lot was a mangrove area. [37] The foresters
who conducted the survey may have been competent and their techniques reliable;
nevertheless, the observation that mangroves grow in the subject lot is not
conclusive as to the nature of the land at present or at the time the free patent and
title were issued. Assuming that the area is covered by mangroves when they
surveyed it, there is no proof that it was not planted with trees and crops at the time
Orcullo applied for free patent. Respondent was also unable to establish that the
subject lot has very deep and muddy soil or are mudflats, such that it is unsuitable
for fruit and non-fruit bearing trees.[38] Yet these are factual matters which the

Court does not generally delve into. As it is, a mere declaration from the said
officers, without any other supporting evidence, is not sufficient to establish that
the area in question is part of the forest reserve.

Even assuming that the L.C. Map submitted by respondent is admissible in

evidence, still the land in question can hardly be considered part of the timberland
or forest reserve. L.C. Map No. 2961, which purports to be the correct map of the
areas demarcated as permanent forest pursuant of the provisions of P.D. No. 705 as
amended[39] was made only in 1980. Thus, the delineation of the areas was made
nine (9) years after Orcullo was awarded the free patent over the subject lot.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court, finding that the disputed land
was classified as timberland 25 years after private individuals had commenced
their continuous possession and cultivation thereof in good faith, declared that they
have the better right. The Court held:

It is not disputed that the aforesaid Land Classification Project

No. 3, classifying the 22-hectare area as timberland, was certified by
the Director of Lands only on December 22, 1924, whereas the
possession thereof by private respondents and their predecessor-ininterest commenced as early as 1909. While the Government has the
right to classify portions of public land, the primary right of a
private individual who possessed and cultivated the land in good
faith much prior to such classification must be recognized and
should not be prejudiced by after-events which could not have
been anticipated. Thus, We have held that the Government, in the
first instance may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions
of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private

interests have intervened before such reservation is made.

[41]
(Emphasis supplied.)

Obviously, private interests have intervened before classification was made

pursuant to P.D. No. 705. Not only has Orcullo by herself and through her
predecessors-in-interest cultivated and possessed the subject lot since 1930, a free
patent was also awarded to her and a title issued in her name as early as 1971. In
fact, it appears that the issuance of the free patent and certificate of

title was regular and in order. Orcullo complied with the requisites for the
acquisition of free patent provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public
Land Act), as certified by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.[42]

Besides, the records do not show that respondent has considered the lot in question
as forest reserve prior to the issuance of Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 06667. To declare the land now as forest land on the authority of L.C. Map No. 2961
approved only in 1980, and opinions based on the said map, would unduly deprive
petitioner of their registered property.
The Regalian doctrine is well-enshrined not only in the present Constitution, but
also in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The Court has always recognized and
upheld the Regalian doctrine as the basic foundation of the State's property
regime. Nevertheless, in applying this doctrine, we must not lose sight of the fact
that in every claim or right by the Government against one of its citizens, the
paramount considerations of fairness and due process must be
observed. Respondent in this case failed to show that the subject lot is part of
timberland or forest reserve it adverted to. In the face of the uncontroverted status
of Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 as valid and regular issuances,
respondents insistence on the classification of the lot as part of the forest reserve
must be rejected.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated 16 July 2001 and the Resolution dated 18 March 2002 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 15 May
1999 dismissing the complaint for reversion and the complaint-in-intervention is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 103882. November 25, 1998]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE
CORPORATION, respondents.CULTURAL CENTER
OF THE
PHILIPPINES, intervenor.
[G.R. No. 105276. November 25, 1998]
PASAY
CITY
AND
REPUBLIC
REAL
ESTATE
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Here, the Court is confronted with a case commenced
before the then Court of First Instance(now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal in Pasay
City, in 1961, more than 3 decades back, that has spanned six administrations of
the Republic and outlasted the tenure of ten (10) Chief Justices of the Supreme
Court.
In G.R. No. 103882, the Republic of the Philippines, as petitioner, assails the
Decision, dated January 29, 1992 and Amended Decision, dated April 28, 1992, of
the Court of Appeals[1], which affirmed with modification the Decision of the
former Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch 7, Pasay City) in Civil Case No.
2229-P, entitled Republic of the Philippines versus Pasay City and Republic Real
Estate Corporation.
The facts that matter are, as follows:

Republic Act No. 1899 (RA 1899), which was approved on June 22, 1957,
authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and
municipalities. Section I of said law, reads:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and chartered cities
to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging,
filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish,
provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor
facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation
with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
On May 6, 1958, invoking the aforecited provision of RA 1899, the Pasay City
Council passed Ordinance No. 121, for the reclamation of Three
Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City, empowering the City
Mayor to award and enter into reclamation contracts, and prescribing terms and
conditions therefor. The said Ordinance was amended on April 21, 1959 by
Ordinance No. 158, which authorized the Republic Real Estate
Corporation (RREC) to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms
and conditions.
On April 24, 1959, Pasay City and RREC entered into an Agreement [2] for the
reclamation of the foreshore lands in Pasay City.
On December 19, 1961, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a
Complaint[3] for Recovery of Possession and Damages with Writ of Preliminary
Preventive Injunction and Mandatory Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 2229P before the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, (Branch 7, Pasay City).
On March 5, 1962, the Republic of the Philippines filed an Amended
Complaint[4] questioning subject Agreement between Pasay City and
RREC (Exhibit P) on the grounds that the subject-matter of such Agreement is
outside the commerce of man, that its terms and conditions are violative of RA
1899, and that the said Agreement was executed without any public bidding.

The Answers[5] of RREC and Pasay City, dated March 10 and March 14, 1962,
respectively, averred that the subject-matter of said Agreement is within the
commerce of man, that the phrase foreshore lands within the contemplation of RA
1899 has a broader meaning than the cited definition of the term in the Words and
Phrases and in the Websters Third New International Dictionary and the plans and
specifications of the reclamation involved were approved by the authorities
concerned.
On April 26,1962, Judge Angel H. Mojica, (now deceased) of the former Court
of First Instance of Rizal (Branch 7, Pasay City) issued an Order[6] the dispositive
portion of which was to the following effect:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby orders the defendants, their agents, and all
persons claiming under them, to refrain from further reclaiming or
committing acts of dispossession or dispoilation over any area within the
Manila Bay or the Manila Bay Beach Resort, until further orders of the
court.
On the following day, the same trial court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction[7] which enjoined the defendants, RREC and Pasay City, their agents,
and all persons claiming under them from further reclaiming or committing acts of
dispossession.
Thereafter, a Motion to Intervene[8], dated June 27, 1962, was filed by Jose L.
Bautista, Emiliano Custodio, Renato Custodio, Roger de la Rosa, Belen Gonzales,
Norma Martinez, Emilia E. Paez, Ambrosio R. Parreno, Antolin M. Oreta, Sixto L.
Orosa, Pablo S. Sarmiento, Jesus Yujuico, Zamora Enterprises, Inc., Industrial and
Commercial Factors, Inc., Metropolitan Distributors of the Philippines, and
Bayview Hotel, Inc. stating inter alia that they were buyers of lots in the Manila
Bay area being reclaimed by RREC, whose rights would be affected by whatever
decision to be rendered in the case. The Motion was granted by the trial court and
the Answer attached thereto admitted.[9]
The defendants and the intervenors then moved to dismiss [10] the Complaint of
the Republic, placing reliance on Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5187, which reads:

Sec. 3. Miscellaneous Projects

xxx
m. For the construction of seawall and limited access highway from the
south boundary of the City of Manila to Cavite City, to the south, and from
the north boundary of the City of Manila to the municipality of Mariveles,
province of Bataan, to the north, including the reclamation of the foreshore
and submerged areas: Provided, That priority in the construction of such
seawalls, highway and attendant reclamation works shall be given to any
corporation and/or corporations that may offer to undertake at its own
expense such projects, in which case the President of the Philippines may,
after competitive bidding, award contracts for the construction of such
projects, with the winning bidder shouldering all costs thereof, the same to
be paid in terms of percentage fee of the contractor which shall not exceed
fifty percent of the area reclaimed by the contractor and shall represent full
compensation for the purpose, the provisions of the Public Land Law
concerning disposition of reclaimed and foreshore lands to the contrary
notwithstanding: Provided, finally, that the foregoing provisions and those
of other laws, executive orders, rules and regulations to the contrary
notwithstanding, existing rights, projects and/or contracts of city or
municipal governments for the reclamation of foreshore and submerged
lands shall be respected. x x x. (underscoring ours)
Since the aforecited law provides that existing contracts shall be respected,
movants contended that the issues raised by the pleadings have become moot,
academic and of no further validity or effect.
Meanwhile, the Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. (PLCU) moved to
intervene[11], alleging as legal interest in the matter in litigation the avowed purpose
of the organization for the promotion of good government in Pasay City. In its
Order of June 10, 1969, the lower court of origin allowed the said intervention[12].
On March 24, 1972, the trial court of origin came out with a Decision,
disposing, thus:

WHEREFORE, after carefully considering (1) the original complaint, (2)

the first Amended Complaint, (3) the Answer of Defendant Republic Real
Estate Corporation to the first Amended Complaint, (4) the Answer of
Defendant Pasay City to the first Amended Complaint, (5) the Second
Amended Complaint, (6) the Answer of Defendant Republic Real Estate
Corporation to the Second Amended Complaint, (7) the Answer of
Defendant Pasay City to the Second Amended Complaint, (8) the
Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction of Plaintiff, (9) the
Memorandum In Support of the Opposition to the Issuance of Preliminary
Injunction of Defendant Pasay City and Defendant Republic Real Estate
Corporation, (10) the Answer in Intervention of Intervenors Bautista, et.
al., (11) Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion to Intervene, (12) the Reply to
Opposition to Motion to Intervene of Intervenors Bautista, et. al. , (13) the
Stipulation of Facts by all the parties, (14) the Motion for Leave to
Intervene of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (15) the
Opposition to Motion For Leave to Intervene of Intervenors Bautista, et.
al., (16) the Reply of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc.,
(17) the Supplement to Opposition to Motion to Intervene of Defendant
Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation, (18) the Complaint in
Intervention of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (19) the
Answer of Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, (20) the Answer of
Intervenor Jose L. Bautista, et. al., to Complaint in Intervention, (21) the
Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, and
Intervenors Bautista, et. al., (22) the Opposition of Plaintiff to said Motion
to Dismiss, (23) the Opposition of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience
Union, Inc., (24) the Memorandum of the Defendant Republic Real Estate
Corporation, (25) the Memorandum for the Intervenor Pasay Law and
Conscience Union, Inc., (26) the Manifestation of Plaintiff filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, and all the documentary evidence by the
parties to wit: (a) Plaintiffs Exhibits A to YYY-4, (b) Defendant Republic
Real Estate Corporations Exhibits 1-RREC to 40-a and (c) Intervenor
Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Incs., Exhibits A-PLACU to C-PLACU,
the Court hereby:

(1) Denies the Motion to Dismiss filed on January 10, 1968, by Defendant
Republic Real Estate Corporation and Intervenors Bautista, et. al., as it is the
finding of this Court that Republic Act No. 5187 was not passed by Congress to
cure any defect in the ordinance and agreement in question and that the passage of
said Republic Act No. 5187 did not make the legal issues raised in the pleadings
moot, academic and of no further validity or effect; and
(2) Renders judgment:
(a) dismissing the Plaintiffs Complaint;
(b) Dismissing the Complaint in Intervention of Intervenor Pasay Law and
Conscience Union, Inc.,
(c)Enjoining Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and Defendant Pasay
City to have all the plans and specifications in the reclamation approved by the
Director of Public Works and to have all the contracts and sub-contracts for said
reclamation awarded by means of, and only after, public bidding; and
(d) Lifting the preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on April 26, 1962, as
soon as Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and Defendant Pasay City
shall have submitted the corresponding plans and specifications to the Director of
Public Works, and shall have obtained approval thereof, and as soon as the
corresponding public bidding for the award to the contractor and sub-contractor
that will undertake the reclamation project shall have been effected.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (See Court of Appeals Decision dated January 28, 1992; pp. 68)
Dissatisfied with the said judgment, the Republic appealed therefrom to the
Court of Appeals. However, on January 11, 1973, before the appeal could be
resolved, Presidential Decree No. 3-A issued, amending Presidential Decree No. 3,
thus:

SECTION 1. Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 3, dated September 26,

1972, is hereby amended by the addition of the following paragraphs:
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of
areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National
Government or any person authorized by it under a proper contract.
All reclamations made in violation of this provision shall be forfeited to the State
without need of judicial action.
Contracts for reclamation still legally existing or whose validity has been accepted
by the National Government shall be taken over by the National Government on
the basis of quantum meruit, for proper prosecution of the project involved by
administration.
On November 20, 1973, the Republic and the Construction Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) signed a Contract[13] for the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road Project (Phases I and II) which contract included the reclamation
and development of areas covered by the Agreement between Pasay City and
RREC. Then, there was issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 which transferred to
the Public Estate Authority (PEA) the rights and obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines under the contract between the Republic and CDCP.
Attempts to settle amicably the dispute between representatives of the
Republic, on the one hand, and those of Pasay City and RREC, on the other, did
not work out. The parties involved failed to hammer out a compromise.
On January 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals came out with a
Decision[14] dismissing the appeal of the Republic and holding, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following modifications:
1. The requirement by the trial court on public bidding and the submission of
RRECs plans and specification to the Department of Public Works and Highways
in order that RREC may continue the implementation of the reclamation work is
deleted for being moot and academic;

2. Ordering the plaintiff-appellant to turn over to Pasay City the ownership and
possession over all vacant spaces in the twenty-one hectare area already reclaimed
by Pasay City and RREC at the time it took over the same. Areas thereat over
which permanent structures has (sic) been introduced shall, including the
structures, remain in the possession of the present possessor, subject to any
negotiation between Pasay City and the said present possessor, as regards the
continued possession and ownership of the latter area.
3. Sustaining RRECs irrevocable option to purchase sixty (60%) percent of the
Twenty-One (21) hectares of land already reclaimed by it, to be exercised within
one (1) year from the finality of this decision, at the same terms and condition
embodied in the Pasay City-RREC reclamation contract, and enjoining appellee
Pasay City to respect RRECs option.
SO ORDERED.
On February 14, 1992, Pasay City and RREC presented a Motion for
Reconsideration of such Decision of the Court of Appeals, contending, among
others, that RREC had actually reclaimed Fifty-Five(55) hectares, and not only
Twenty-one (21) hectares, and the respondent Court of Appeals erred in not
awarding damages to them, movants.
On April 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals acted favorably on the said Motion for
Reconsideration, by amending the dispositive portion of its judgment of January
28, 1992, to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the dispositive portion of our Decision dated January 28,
1992 is hereby AMENDED to read as follows:
1. The requirement by the trial court on public bidding and the submission of the
RRECs plans and specification to the Department of Public Works and Highways
in order that RREC may continue the implementation of the reclamation work is
deleted for being moot and academic.
2. Ordering plaintiff-appellant to turn over to Pasay City the ownership and
possession of the above enumerated lots (1 to 9).

3. Sustaining RRECs irrevocable option to purchase sixty (60%) percent of the

land referred to in No. 2 of this dispositive portion, to be exercised within one (1)
year from the finality of this Decision, at the same terms and condition embodied
in the Pasay City-RREC reclamation contract, and enjoining Pasay City to respect
RRECs irrevocable option.
SO ORDERED.
From the Decision and Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals
aforementioned, the Republic of the Philippines, as well as Pasay City and RREC,
have come to this Court to seek relief, albeit with different prayers.
On September 10, 1997, the Court commissioned the former thirteenth
Division of Court of Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the controversy. The
corresponding Commissioners Report, dated November 25, 1997, was submitted
and now forms part of the records.
On October 11, 1997, the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) filed a
Petition in Intervention, theorizing that it has a direct interest in the case being the
owner of subject nine (9) lots titled in its(CCP) name, which the respondent Court
of Appeals ordered to be turned over to Pasay City. The CCP, as such intervenor,
was allowed to present its evidence, as it did, before the Court of Appeals, which
evidence has been considered in the formulation of this disposition.
In G.R. No. 103882, the Republic of the Philippines theorizes, by way of
assignment of errors, that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY
OF PASAY CITY ORDINANCE NO. 158 DATED APRIL 21, 1959 AND
THE RECLAMATION CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN
PASAY CITY AND RREC;
II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT RREC HAD

RECLAIMED 55 HECTARES AND IN ORDERING THE TURN-OVER
TO PASAY CITY OF THE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF NINE
(9) LOTS TITLED IN THE NAME OF CCP.
In G.R. No. 105276, the petitioners, Pasay City and RREC, contend, that::
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 3-A UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES
IN FAVOR OF PASAY CITY AND RREC.
Let us first tackle the issues posed in G.R. No. 103882.
On the first question regarding the validity of Pasay City Ordinance No. 158
dated April 21, 1959 and the Agreement dated April 24, 1959 between Pasay City
and RREC, we rule in the negative.
Section 1 of RA 1899, reads:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and
chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the
reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands
bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair
proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities
and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of
Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
It is the submission of the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, that there are
no foreshore lands along the seaside of Pasay City [15]; that what Pasay City has are
submerged or offshore areas outside the commerce of man which could not be a
proper subject matter of the Agreement between Pasay City and RREC in question

as the area affected is within the National Park, known as Manila Bay Beach
Resort, established under Proclamation No. 41, dated July 5, 1954, pursuant to Act
No. 3915, of which area it (Republic) has been in open, continuous and peaceful
possession since time immemorial.
Petitioner faults the respondent court for unduly expanding what may be
considered foreshore land through the following disquisition:
The former Secretary of Justice Alejo Mabanag, in response to a request
for an opinion from the then Secretary of Public Works and
Communications as to whether the term foreshore areas as used in Section
I of the immediately aforequoted law is that defined in Websters Dictionary
and the Law of Waters so as to make any dredging or filling beyond its
prescribed limit illegal, opined:
According to the basic letter of the Director of Public Works, the law
of Waters speaks of shore and defines it thus: that space movement of
the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit in the line reached by highest
equinoctial tides.
Websters definition of foreshore reads as follows:
That part of the shore between high water and low-water marks
usually fixed at the line to which the ordinary means tide flows: also,
by extension, the beach, the shore near the waters edge.
If we were to be strictly literal the term foreshore or foreshore lands
should be confined to but a portion of the shore, in itself a very
limited area. (p. 6, Intervenors-appellees brief).
Bearing in mind the (Websters and Law of Waters) definitions of
shore and of foreshore lands, one is struck with the apparent
inconsistency between the areas thus described and the purpose to
which that area, when reclaimed under the provision of Republic Act
No. 1899, shall be devoted. Section I (of said Law) authorizes the

construction thereat of adequate docking and harbor facilities. This

purpose is repeated in Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.
And yet, it is well known fact that foreshore lands normally extend
only from 10 to 20 meters along the coast. Not very much more if at
all. In fact, certain parts in Manila bordering on Manila Bay, has no
foreshore to speak of since the sea washes the sea wall.
It does not seem logical, then, that Congress had in mind. Websters
limited concept of foreshore when it enacted Republic Act No. 1899,
unless it intends that the wharves, piers, docks, etc. should be
constructed parallel to the shore, which is impractical.
Since it is to be presumed that Congress could not have intended to
enact an ineffectual measure not one that would lead to absurd
consequences, it would seem that it used foreshore in a sense wider
in scope that that defined by Webster. xxx
To said opinion on the interpretation of the R.A. 1899, plaintiff-appellant
could not offer any refutation or contrary opinion. Neither can we. In fact,
the above construction is consistent with the rule on context in statutory
construction which provides that in construing a statute, the same must be
construed as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should
not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of
its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole (see Araneta vs.
Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709). There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the force
and significance of particular expressions will largely depend upon the
connection in which they are found and their relation to the general
subject-matter of the law. The legislature must be understood to have
expressed its whole mind on the special object to which the legislative act
is directed but the vehicle for the expressions of that meaning is the statute,
considered as one entire and continuous act, and not as an agglomeration
of unrelated clauses . Each clause or provision will be illuminated by those
which are cognate to it and by the general tenor of the whole statute and
thus obscurities and ambiguities may often be cleared up by the most direct

and natural means. Secondly, effect must be given, if it is possible, to every

word and clause of the statute, so that nothing shall be left devoid of
meaning or destitute of force. To this end, each provision of the statute
should be read in the light of the whole.For the general meaning of the
legislature, as gathered from the entire act, may often prevail over the
construction which would appear to be the most natural and obvious on the
face of a particular clause. It is by this means that contradiction and
repugnance between the different parts of the statute may be avoided. (See
Black, Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., pp. 317-319).
Resorting to extrinsic aids, the Explanatory Note to House Bill No. 3630, which
was subsequently enacted as Republic Act No. 1899, reads:
In order to develop and expand the Maritime Commerce of the
Philippines, it is necessary that harbor facilities be correspondingly
improved, and, where necessary, expanded and developed.The
national government is not in a financial position to handle all this
work. On the other hand, with a greater autonomy, many chartered
cities and provinces are financially able to have credit position
which will allow them to undertake these projects. Some cities, such
as the City of Bacolod under R.A. 161, has been authorized to
reclaim foreshore lands bordering it.
Other cities and provinces have continuously been requesting for
authority to reclaim foreshore lands on the basis of the Bacolod City
pattern, and to undertake work to establish, construct on the
reclaimed area and maintain such port facilities as may be
necessary. In order not to unduly delay the undertaking of these
projects, and inorder to obviate the passage of individual pieces of
legislation for every chartered city and province, it is hereby
recommended that the accompanying bill be approved. It covers
Authority for All chartered cities and provinces to undertake this
work. x x x (underscoring supplied)
Utilizing the above explanatory note in interpreting and construing
the provisions of R.A. 1899, then Secretary of Justice Mabanag opined:

It is clear that the Bacolod City pattern was the basis of the
enactment of the aforementioned bill of general application. This socalled Bacolod City pattern appears to be composed of 3 parts,
namely: Republic Act No. 161, which grants authority to Bacolod
City to undertake or carry out ... the reclamation ... of any [sic]
carry out the reclamation project conformably with Republic Act No.
161; and Republic Act No. 1132 authorizing Bacolod City to
contract indebtedness or to issue bonds in the amount not exceeding
six million pesos to finance the reclamation of land in said city.
Republic Act No. 161 did not in itself specify the precise space
therein referred to as foreshore lands, but it provided that docking
and harbor facilities should be erected on the reclaimed portions
thereof, while not conclusive would indicate that Congress used the
word foreshore in its broadest sense. Significantly, the plan of
reclamation of foreshore drawn up by the Bureau of Public Works
maps out an area of approximately 1,600,000 square meters, the
boundaries of which clearly extend way beyond Websters limited
concept of the term foreshore. As a contemporaneous construction
by that branch of the Government empowered to oversee at least, the
conduct of the work, such an interpretation deserves great
weight. Finally, Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 1132
(supplement to RA 161), tacitly confirmed and approved the Bureaus
interpretation of the term foreshore when instead of taking the
occasion to correct the Bureau of over extending its plan, it
authorized the city of Bacolod to raise the full estimated cost of
reclaiming the total area covered by the plan. The explanatory note
to House Bill No. 1249 which became Republic Act No. 1132 states
among the things:
The Bureau of Public Works already prepared a plan for the reclamation of about
1,600,000 square meters of land at an estimated costs of about P6,000,000.00. The
project is self-supporting because the proceeds from the sales or leases of lands so
reclaimed will be more than sufficient to cover the cost of the project.

Consequently, when Congress passed Republic Act No. 1899 in order to facilitate
the reclamation by local governments of foreshore lands on the basis of the
Bacolod City pattern and in order to obviate the passage of individual pieces of
legislation for every chartered city and provinces requesting authority to undertake
such projects, the lawmaking body could not have had in mind the limited area
described by Webster as foreshore lands. x x x.
If it was really the intention of Congress to limit the area to the strict literal
meaning of foreshore lands which may be reclaimed by chartered cities and
municipalities, Congress would have excluded the cities of Manila, Iloilo,
Cebu, Zamboanga and Davao from the operation of RA 1899 as suggested
by Senator Cuenco during the deliberation of the bill considering that
these cities do not have foreshore lands in the strict meaning of the
term. Yet, Congress did not approve the proposed amendment of Senator
Cuenco, implying therefore, that Congress intended not to limit the area
that may be reclaimed to the strict definition of foreshore lands.
The opinion of the then Secretary of Justice Mabanag, who was at that time
the chief law officer and legal adviser of the government and whose office
is required by law to issue opinions for the guidance of the various
departments of the government, there being then no judicial interpretation
to the contrary, is entitled to respect (see Bengzon vs. Secretary of Justice
and Insular Auditor, 68 Phil. 912).
We are not unmindful of the Supreme Court Resolution dated February 3,
1965 in Ponce vs. Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce vs. City of Cebu (L-2266 ,
by a unanimous vote of six (6) justices (the other five (5) members deemed
it unnecessary to express their view because in their opinion the questions
raised were not properly brought before the court), which in essence
applied the strict dictionary meaning of foreshore lands as used in RA 1899
in the case of the city of Cebu. But this was promulgated long after the then
Secretary of Justice Mabanag rendered the above opinion on November 16,
1959 and long after RREC has started the subject reclamation project.
Furthermore, as held by the lower court, Congress, after the Supreme
Court issued the aforementioned Resolution, enacted RA 5187. In Sec. 3

(m) of said law, Congress appropriated money for the construction of the
seawall and limited access highway from the South boundary of the city of
Manila to Cavite City, to the South, and from the North boundary of the
city of Manila to the municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, to
the North (including the reclamation of foreshore and submerged areas ...
provided ... that ... existing projects and/or contracts of city or municipal
governments for the reclamation of foreshore and submerged lands shall be
respected... This is a clear manifestation that Congress in enacting RA
1899, did not intend to limit the interpretation of the term foreshore land to
its dictionary meaning.
It is presumed that the legislature was acquainted with and had in mind the
judicial construction given to a former statute on the subject, and that the
statute on the subject, and that the statute was enacted having in mind the
judicial construction that the prior enactment had received , or in the light
of such existing judicial decisions as have direct bearing upon it (see 50
Am. Jur., Sec. 321, pp. 312-313). But notwithstanding said interpretation
by the Supreme Court of RA 1899 in the Ponce cases, Congress enacted a
law covering the same areas previously embraced in a RA 1899 (as
mentioned earlier, cities without foreshore lands which were sought to be
excluded from the operation of RA 1899 were not excluded), providing that
respect be given the reclamation of not only foreshore lands but also of
submerged lands signifying its non-conformity to the judicial construction
given to RA 1899. If Congress was in accord with the interpretation and
construction made by the Supreme Court on RA 1899, it would have
mentioned reclamation of foreshore lands only in RA 5187, but Congress
included submerged lands in order to clarify the intention on the grant of
authority to cities and municipalities in the reclamation of lands bordering
them as provided in RA 1899. It is, therefore, our opinion that it is actually
the intention of Congress in RA 1899 not to limit the authority granted to
cities and municipalities to reclaim foreshore lands in its strict dictionary
meaning but rather in its wider scope as to include submerged lands.
The Petition is impressed with merit.

To begin with, erroneous and unsustainable is the opinion of respondent court

that under RA 1899, the term foreshore lands includes submerged areas. As can be
gleaned from its disquisition and rationalization aforequoted, the respondent court
unduly stretched and broadened the meaning of foreshore lands, beyond the
intentment of the law, and against the recognized legal connotation of foreshore
lands. Well entrenched, to the point of being elementary, is the rule that when the
law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation
or construction, but only for application.[16]So also, resort to extrinsic aids, like the
records of the constitutional convention, is unwarranted, the language of the law
being plain and unambiguous.[17] Then, too, opinions of the Secretary of Justice are
unavailing to supplant or rectify any mistake or omission in the law.[18] To repeat,
the term foreshore lands refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. (Words and
Phrases, Foreshore)
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of
a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a
low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually
marked by a beach scarp or berm. (Websters Third New International
Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we
cannot broaden its meaning, much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention
of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided
expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of
submerged areas from the term foreshore lands.
Neither is there any valid ground to disregard the Resolution of this Court
dated February 3, 1965 in Ponce v. Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce v. City of Cebu
(L-22669) despite the enactment of Republic Act No. 5187 (RA 5187), the relevant
portion of which, reads:
Sec. 3. Miscellaneous Projects

xxx
m. For the construction of seawall and limited access highway from the
south boundary of the City of Manila to Cavite City, to the south, and from
the north boundary of the City of Manila to the municipality of Mariveles,
province of Bataan, to the north, including the reclamation of the foreshore
and submerged areas: Provided, That priority in the construction of such
seawalls, highway and attendant reclamation works shall be given to any
corporation and/or corporations that may offer to undertake at its own
expense such projects, in which case the President of the Philippines may,
after competitive bidding, award contracts for the construction of such
projects, with the winning bidder shouldering all costs thereof, the same to
be paid in terms of percentage fee of the contractor which shall not exceed
fifty percent of the area reclaimed by the contractor and shall represent full
compensation for the purpose, the provisions of the Public Land Law
concerning disposition of reclaimed and foreshore lands to the contrary
notwithstanding: Provided, finally, that the foregoing provisions and those
of other laws, executive orders, rules and regulations to the contrary
notwithstanding, existing rights, projects and/or contracts of city or
municipal governments for the reclamation of foreshore and submerged
lands shall be respected. x x x.
There is nothing in the foregoing provision of RA 5187 which can be
interpreted to broaden the scope of foreshore lands. The said law is not amendatory
to RA 1899. It is an Appropriations Act, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING
FUNDS FOR PUBLIC WORKS, SYNCHRONIZING THE SAME WITH
PREVIOUS PUBLIC WORKS APPROPRIATIONS.
All things viewed in proper perspective, we reiterate what was said in Ponce v.
Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce v. City of Cebu (L-22669) that the term foreshore
refers to that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and
left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides. As opined by this Court in said cases:
WHEREAS, six (6) members of the Court (Justices Bautista Angelo,
Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Dizon and Jose P. Bengzon) opine that said
city ordinance and contracts are ultra vires and hence, null and void,

insofar as the remaining 60% of the area aforementioned, because the term
foreshore lands as used in Republic Act No. 1899 should be understood in
the sense attached thereto by common parlance; (underscoring ours)
The aforesaid ruling was applied by then Secretary of Justice Claudio
Teehankee, in his opinion dated December 22, 1966, in a case with analogous facts
as the present one, to wit:
December 22, 1966
The Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources
Diliman, Quezon City
Sir:
xxx
I. Facts 1. On January 19, 1961, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
1899, the Municipality of Navotas enacted Ordinance No. 1 authorizing the
Municipal Mayor to enter into a reclamation contract with Mr. Chuanico.
2. On March 15, 1961, a reclamation contract was concluded between the
Municipality of Navotas, represented by the Municipal Mayor, and Mr.
Chuanico in accordance with the above ordinance.Thereunder, Mr.
Chuanico shall be the attorney-in-fact of the Municipality in prosecuting
the reclamation project and shall advance the money needed therefor; that
the actual expenses incurred shall be deemed a loan to the Municipality;
that Mr. Chuanico shall have the irrevocable option to buy 70% of the
reclaimed area at P7.00 per square meter; that he shall have the full and
irrevocable powers to do any and all things necessary and proper in and
about the premises, including the power to hire necessary personnel for the
prosecution of the work, purchase materials and supplies, and purchase or

lease construction machineries and equipment, but any and all contracts to
be concluded by him in behalf of the Municipality shall be submitted to
public bidding.
xxx
3. On March 16, 1961, the Municipal Council of Navotas passed
Resolution No. 22 approving and ratifying the contract.
xxx
III. Comments 1. The above reclamation contract was concluded on the basis of Navotas
Ordinance No. 1 which, in turn, had been enacted avowedly pursuant to
Republic Act No. 1899. This being so, the contract, in order to be valid,
must conform to the provisions of the said law.
By authorizing local governments to execute by administration any
reclamation work, (Republic Act No. 1899 impliedly forbids the execution
of said project by contract. Thus, in the case of Ponce et al. vs. Gomez
(February 3, 1966), five justices of the Supreme Court voted to annul the
contract between Cebu Development Corporation and Cebu City for the
reclamation of foreshore lands because the provisions of said ... contract
are not ... in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 1899, as
against one Justice who opined that the contract substantially complied
with the provisions of the said law. (Five Justices expressed no opinion on
this point.)
Inasmuch as the Navotas reclamation contract is substantially similar to
the Cebu reclamation contract, it is believed that the former is likewise
fatally defective.
2. The Navotas reclamation project envisages the construction of a channel
along the Manila Bay periphery of that town and the reclamation of
approximately 650 hectares of land from said channel to a seaward
distance of one kilometer. In the basic letter it is stated that practically, all

the 650 hectares of lands proposed to be reclaimed under the agreement do

not constitute foreshore lands and that the greater portion of the area . . . is
in fact navigable and presently being used as a fishing harbor by deep-sea
fishing operators as well as a fishing ground of sustenance
fisherman.Assuming the correctness of these averments, the Navotas
reclamation contract evidently transcends the authority granted under
Republic Act No. 1899, which empowers the local governments to reclaim
nothing more than foreshore lands, i.e., that part of the land adjacent to the
sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the
tides. (26 C.J. 890.) It was for this reason that in the cited case Ponce case,
the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6-0 with five Justices abstaining, declared
ultra vires and void the contractual stipulation for the reclamation of
submerged lands off Cebu City, and permanently enjoined its execution
under Republic Act No. 1899.
xxx
In accordance with the foregoing, I have the honor to submit the view that
the Navotas reclamation contract is not binding and should be disregarded
for non-compliance with law.
Very truly yours,
(SGD) CLAUDIO
TEEHANKEE
Secretary of Justice
The said opinion of Justice Secretary Teehankee who became Associate Justice,
and later Chief Justice, of this Court, did, in our considered view, supersede the
earlier opinion of former Justice Secretary Alejo Mabanag, aforestated, as the
cases, in connection with which subject opinions were sought, were with similar
facts. The said Teehankee opinion accords with RA 1899.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as
amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found

to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and
null and void.
What is worse, the same Agreement was vitiated by the glaring absence of a
public bidding.
Obviously, there is a complete dearth of evidence to prove that RREC had
really reclaimed 55 hectares. The letter of Minister Baltazar Aquino relied upon by
RREC is no proof at all that RREC had reclaimed 55 hectares. Said letter was just
referring to a tentative schedule of work to be done by RREC, even as it required
RREC to submit the pertinent papers to show its supposed accomplishment, to
secure approval by the Ministry of Public Works and Highways to the reclamation
plan, and to submit to a public bidding all contracts and sub-contracts for subject
reclamation project but RREC never complied with such requirements and
conditions sine qua non.
No contracts or sub-contracts or agreements, plans, designs, and/or
specifications of the reclamation project were presented to reflect any
accomplishment. Not even any statement or itemization of works accomplished by
contractors or subcontractors or vouchers and other relevant papers were
introduced to describe the extent of RRECs accomplishment. Neither was the
requisite certification from the City Engineer concerned that portions of the
reclamation project not less than 50 hectares in area shall have been accomplished
or completed obtained and presented by RREC.
As a matter of fact, no witness ever testified on any reclamation work done by
RREC, and extent thereof, as of April 26, 1962. Not a single contractor, subcontractor, engineer, surveyor, or any other witness involved in the alleged
reclamation work of RREC testified on the 55 hectares supposedly reclaimed by
RREC. What work was done, who did the work, where was it commenced, and
when was it completed, was never brought to light by any witness before the
court. Certainly, onus probandi was on RREC and Pasay City to show and point
out the as yet unidentified 55 hectares they allegedly reclaimed. But this burden of
proof RREC and Pasay City miserably failed to discharge.

So also, in the decision of the Pasay Court of First Instance dismissing the
complaint of plaintiff-appellant, now petitioner Republic of the Philippines, the
lifting of the writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on April 26, 1962 would
become effective only as soon as Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and
Defendant Pasay City shall have submitted the corresponding plans and
specifications to the Director of Public Works, and shall have obtained approval
thereof, and as soon as corresponding public bidding for the award to the
contractor and sub-contractor that will undertake the reclamation project shall have
been effected. (Rollo, pp. 127-129, G.R. No. 103882)
From the records on hand, it is abundantly clear that RREC and Pasay City
never complied with such prerequisites for the lifting of the writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Consequently, RREC had no authority to resume its reclamation work
which was stopped by said writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 26, 1962.
From the Contract for Dredging Work, dated November 26, 1960, marked
Exhibit 21-A for RREC before the lower court, and Exhibit EE for CCP before the
Court of Appeals, it can be deduced that only on November 26, 1960 did RREC
contract out the dredging work to C and A Construction Company, Inc., for the
reclamation of the 55 hectares initially programmed to be reclaimed by it. But, as
stated by RREC itself in the position paper filed with this Court on July 15, 1997,
with reference to CDCPs reclamation work, mobilization of the reclamation team
would take one year before a reclamation work could actually begin. Therefore, the
reclamation work undertaken by RREC could not have started before November
26, 1961.
Considering that on April 26, 1962 RREC was enjoined from proceeding any
further with its reclamation work, it had barely five (5) months, from November,
1961 to April, 1962, to work on subject reclamation project. It was thus physically
impossible for RREC to reclaim 55 hectares, with the stipulated specifications and
elevation, in such a brief span of time. In the report of RREC (Exhibit DD for
CCP), it was conceded that due to the writ of preliminary injunction issued on
April 26, 1962, C and A Construction Co., Inc. had suspended its dredging
operation since May, 1962.

The graphical report on the Pasay Reclamation project, as of April 30, 1962,
attached to the Progress Report marked Exhibit DD, is a schematic representation
of the work accomplishment referred to in such Progress Report, indicating the
various elevations of the land surface it embraced, ranging from 0.00 meters to the
highest elevation of 2.5 meters above MLLW. Such portrayal of work
accomplished is crucial in our determination of whether or not RREC had actually
reclaimed any land as under its Contract for Dredging Work with C and A
Construction Company (Exhibit EE), the required final elevation for a completely
reclaimed land was 3.5 meters above MLLW, as explicitly provided in said
Contract for Dredging Work. So, the irresistible conclusion is - when the work on
subject RREC-Pasay City reclamation project stopped in April, 1962 in compliance
with the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court of origin, no portion
of the reclamation project worked on by RREC had reached the stipulated
elevation of 3.5 meters above MLLW. The entire area it worked on was only at sea
level or 0.00 meter above MLLW. In short, RREC had not yet reclaimed any area
when the writ of preliminary injunction issued in April 1962.
On this point, the testimonies of Architect Ruben M. Protacio, Architect and
Managing partner of Leandro V. Locsin and partners, Architect and City Planner
Manuel T. Maoza, Jr. of Planning Resources and Operation System, Inc., Rose D.
Cruz, Executive Assistant, Office of the President, from 1966 to 1970, and Dr.
Lucrecia Kasilag, National Artist and member of CCP Advisory Committee, come
to the fore. These credible, impartial and knowledgeable witnesses recounted on
the witness stand that when the construction of the Main Building of the Cultural
Center of the Philippines (CCP) began in 1966, the only surface land available was
the site for the said building (TSN, Sept. 29, 1997, pages 8, 14 and 50), what could
be seen in front of and behind it was all water (TSN, Sept. 29, 1997, pages 127128). When the CCP Main Building was being constructed, from 1966 to 1969,
the land above sea level thereat was only where the CCP Main Building was
erected and the rest of the surroundings were all under water, particularly the back
portion fronting the bay. (TSN, Sept. 13, 1997, pp. 181, 182, 185, 186, 188). Dr.
Lucrecia R. Kasilag stressed that on April 16, 1966, during the ground breaking for
the CCP Main Building, it was water all around (TSN, Sept. 30, 1997, pp. 320, 324,
325).

There was indeed no legal and factual basis for the Court of Appeals to order
and declare that the requirement by the trial court on public bidding and the
submission of RRECs plans and specification to the Department of Public Works
and Highways in order that RREC may continue the implementation of the
reclamation work is deleted for being moot and academic. Said requirement has
never become moot and academic. It has remained indispensable, as ever, and noncompliance therewith restrained RREC from lawfully resuming the reclamation
work under controversy, notwithstanding the rendition below of the decision in its
favor.
Verily, contrary to what the Court of Appeals found, RREC had not reclaimed
any area with the prescribed elevation of 3.5 meters above MLLW, so much so that
in 1978, it (RREC) opted to file with the former Ministry of Public Highways, a
claim for compensation of P30,396,878.20, for reclamation work allegedly done
before the CDCP started working on the reclamation of the CCP grounds. On
September 7, 1979, RREC asked the Solicitor General to settle its subject claim for
compensation at the same amount of P30,396,878.20. But on June 10, 1981,
guided by the cost data, work volume accomplished and other relevant information
gathered by the former Ministry of Public Highways, the Solicitor General
informed RREC that the value of what it had accomplished, based on 1962 price
levels, was only P8,344,741.29, and the expenses for mobilization of equipment
amounted to P2,581,330.00. The aforesaid evaluation made by the government,
through the then Minister of Public Highways, is factual and realistic, so much so
that on June 25, 1981, RREC, in its reply letter to the Solicitor General, stated:
We regret that we are not agreeable to the amount of P10,926,071.29, based on
1962 cost data, etc., as compensation based on quantum meruit. The least we
would consider is the amount ofP10.926,071.29 plus interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from 1962 to the time of payment. We feel that 6% is very much less
than the accepted rate of inflation that has supervened since 1962 to the
present, and even less than the present legal rate of 12% per annum.[19]
Undoubtedly, what RREC claimed for was payment for what it had done, and
for the dredge fill of 1,558,395 cubic meters it used, on subject reclamation project.

Respondent Court likewise erred in ordering the turn-over to Pasay City of the
following titled lots, to wit:
LOT NO. BUILDING AREA OCT/TCT
42 Gloria Maris 9,516 sq.m. OCT 159 in the Restaurant name of GSIS

3 Asean Garden 76,299 sq.m. OCT 10251 in the

name of CCP

12 Folk Arts Theater 1.7503 sq.m. TCT 18627 in the

and PICC parking name of CCP
space

22 landscaped with 132,924 sq.m. TCT 75676 in the

sculpture of Asean name of CCP
Artists-site of
Boom na Boom

23 open space, back 34,346 sq.m. TCT 75677 in the

of Philcite name of CCP

24 Parking space for 10,352 sq.m. TCT 75678 in the

Star City, CCP, name of CCP
Philcite

25 open space, 11,323 sq.m. TCT 75679 in the

occupied by Star name of CCP
City

28 open space, 27,689 sq.m. TCT 75684 in the

beside PICC name of CCP

29 open space, 106,067 sq.m. TCT 75681 in the

leased by El name of CCP
Shaddai
We discern no factual basis nor any legal justification therefor. In the first place, in
their answer to the Complaint and Amended Complaint below, RREC and Pasay
City never prayed for the transfer to Pasay City of subject lots, title to which had
long become indefeasible in favor of the rightful title holders, CCP and GSIS,
respectively.
The annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the certificates of title covering the
said lots is of no moment. It did not vest in Pasay City and RREC any real right
superior to the absolute ownership thereover of CCP and GSIS. Besides, the nature
of the action did not really warrant the issuance of a notice of lis pendens.

Section 14 of Rule 13, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, reads:

Sec. 14. Notice of lis pendens. - In an action affecting the title or the right
of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when
affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the
registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated a notice
of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the
parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the
property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such
notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property
affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of
the action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their
real names.
The notice of lis pendens herein above mentioned may be cancelled only
upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the
purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect
the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Under the aforecited provision of law in point, a notice of lis pendens is
necessary when the action is for recovery of possession or ownership of a parcel of
land. In the present litigation, RREC and Pasay City, as defendants in the main
case, did not counterclaim for the turnover to Pasay City of the titled lots
aforementioned.
What is more, a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue of
validity of a torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, may be posed only in
an action brought to impugn or annul it. (Halili vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 257 SCRA 174; Cimafranca vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147
SCRA 611.) Unmistakable, and cannot be ignored, is the germane provision of
Section 48 of P.D. 1529, that a certificate of title can never be the subject of a
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding instituted in accordance with law.
Although Pasay City and RREC did not succeed in their undertaking to reclaim
any area within subject reclamation project, it appearing that something

compensable was accomplished by them, following the applicable provision of law

and hearkening to the dictates of equity, that no one, not even the government,
shall unjustly enrich oneself/itself at the expense of another[20], we believe; and so
hold, that Pasay City and RREC should be paid for the said actual work done and
dredge-fill poured in, worth P10,926,071.29, as verified by the former Ministry of
Public Highways, and as claimed by RREC itself in its aforequoted letter dated
June 25, 1981.
It is fervently hoped that long after the end of our sojourn in this valley of
tears, the court, for its herein historic disposition, will be exalted by the future
generations of Filipinos, for the preservation of the national patrimony and
promotion of our cultural heritage. As writer Channing rightly puts it: Whatever
expands the affections, or enlarges the sphere of our sympathies - Whatever makes
us feel our relation to the universe and all that it inherits in time and in
eternity, and to the great and beneficent cause of all, must unquestionably refine
our nature, and elevate us in the scale of being.
WHEREFORE:
In G.R. No. 103882, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision, dated January
28, 1992, and Amended Decision, dated April 28, 1992, of the Court of Appeals,
are both SET ASIDE; and Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, dated May 6, 1958, and
Ordinance No. 158, dated April 21, 1959, as well as the Reclamation Agreements
entered into by Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) as
authorized by said city ordinances, are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra
vires, and contrary to Rep. Act 1899.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 26, 1962 by the trial
court a quo in Civil Case No. 2229-P is made permanent, and the notice of lis
pendens issued by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51349 ordered
CANCELLED. The Register of Deeds of Pasay City is directed to take note of and
annotate on the certificates of title involved, the cancellation of subject notice of lis
pendens.
The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, is hereby ordered to pay Pasay City
and Republic Real Estate Corporation the sum of TEN MILLION NINE

HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX THOUSAND SEVENTY-ONE AND TWENTY-NINE

CENTAVOS (P10,926,071.29) PESOS, plus interest thereon of six (6%) percent
per annum from May 1, 1962 until full payment, which amount shall be divided by
Pasay City and RREC, share and share alike.
In G.R. No. 105276, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 135385

December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI
ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN
DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAMCONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU
BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW
TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL
UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY
MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU
SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI
NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO,
BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW
ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY
MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA
GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE
G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE
CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY,
CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN,

VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES,

ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES,
PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER
N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O.
SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE
ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO,
ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S.
LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY,
LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON,
VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG
MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M.
ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING,
SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN,
ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR.,
JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG,
SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S.
TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID,
represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA,
represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID,
represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA,
represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR.,
SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S
ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN
FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR
THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to
comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the

National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency

created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their
Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA
and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment.
The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the
ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and
prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier,
one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They
join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the
dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a
Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that
IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the
responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious
disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be
dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People
and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc.
(Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-inIntervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent
with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be
dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were
granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments
adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and
its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation
of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and
Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains
including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources
found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the
indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and
utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are
found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,
wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
"ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.3

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers
and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the
settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the
ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and
recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole
authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following
officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and
Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of
said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights,
claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes,
and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be
resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used
to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral
but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination."
They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over
executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66
and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and

Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the
assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from
implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular
No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget
and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the
implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out
the States constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which
the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining
the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a
separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception
of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998,
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA
which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale
exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to
dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable
controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of
R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6,
7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves
judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which
he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have
been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing
the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices

Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of
Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the
voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of
Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion

Footnotes
1

Rollo, p. 114.

Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-23.

Id. at 23-25.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states: "No person shall be

deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
5

Rollo, pp. 25-27.

Id. at 27-28.

Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on April 13, 1999, pp.
5-6.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.:
PRECIS
A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche
entitled "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on
Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard Posner1 wrote:2
"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking,
the most 'past-dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent,
pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology,
maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a
method of recovering history. It is suspicious of innovation, discontinuities,
'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness of youth. These ingrained attitudes
are obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction.
But, by the same token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with
history."
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it
introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to
collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and
other natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated
without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This
Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of
our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the
constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to
their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice
to our indigenous people.
This Opinion discusses the following:
I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.
A. The Laws of the Indies
B. Valenton v. Murciano

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

D. The Philippine Constitutions
II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
A. Indigenous Peoples
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
2. Their Concept of Land
III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.
A. Legislative History
IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.
A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of
indigenous peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the public
domain.
1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired
2. The concept of native title
(a) Cario v. Insular Government
(b) Indian Title to land
(c) Why the Cario doctrine is unique
3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.
1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian
Doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands

2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within
the ancestral domains does not deprive the State of ownership over the
natural resources, control and supervision in their development and
exploitation.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes
beyond the parameters of Section 7(a) of the law on ownership
of ancestral domains and is ultra vires.
(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7
(b) of the IPRA is allowed under Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Consitution.
(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57
of the IPRA may be harmonized with Paragraphs 1 and 4,
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International
Indigenous Movement.
DISCUSSION
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE
PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM.
A. The Laws of the Indies
The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power
of dominium.3 This was the foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing
the feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regalia is a
Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the
country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of
the Indies, i.e., more specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of the Spanish Crown with
respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:
"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and
possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in
our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all

lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as
they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our
viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways,
pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into
consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their
probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for
tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them
more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for
us to dispose of as we may wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial
courts designate at such time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable
period within which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall
exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their
title deeds thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and
receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest
shall be restored to us to be disposed of at our will."4
The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest.
Consequently, all lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the
Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge of distributing the lands by
issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military and
civilian.5 Private land titles could only be acquired from the government either by
purchase or by the various modes of land grant from the Crown.6
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage
Law of 1893.7 The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration
of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The law sought to register and tax
lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880. The Royal Decree of 1894, or the
"Maura Law," was partly an amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws
of the Indies, as already amended by previous orders and decrees.8 This was the
last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment"
or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the state.
Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the
government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national
territory of the Philippine Islands. In 1903, the United States colonial government,
through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land
Act.

B. Valenton v. Murciano
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v.
Murciano.9
Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land:
long-time occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation
of the subject land in 1860. Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand,
purchased the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court
ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they had lost all rights to the land by
not objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting
that their 30-year adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in
the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as against
everyone, including the State; and that the State, not owning the land, could not
validly transmit it.
The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of
"those special laws which from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the
public lands in the colonies."10 The question posed by the Court was: "Did these
special laws recognize any right of prescription as against the State as to these
lands; and if so, to what extent was it recognized?"
Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the
disposition of land in the Philippines. However, it was understood that in the
absence of any special law to govern a specific colony, the Laws of the Indies
would be followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed that
until regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the Philippine
Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, theOrdenanza of
the Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754.11
Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de
las Indias, the court interpreted it as follows:
"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those
lands belong to the Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name,
or by the kings who preceded him. This statement excludes the idea that there
might be lands not so granted, that did not belong to the king. It excludes the
idea that the king was not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some
private person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part
of the law all the occupants of the public lands are required to produce before the
authorities named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And

those who had good title or showed prescription were to be protected in their
holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention of the law that mere possession
for a length of time should make the possessors the owners of the land possessed
by them without any action on the part of the authorities."12
The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in
his name, or by the kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown.13 For those
lands granted by the king, the decree provided for a system of assignment of such
lands. It also ordered that all possessors of agricultural land should exhibit their
title deed, otherwise, the land would be restored to the Crown.14
The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it
ordered the Crown's principal subdelegate to issue a general order directing the
publication of the Crown's instructions:
"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the
date of the promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal
lands, whether or not x x x cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to
said subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied.
x x x. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties interested that in
case of their failure to present their title deeds within the term designated, without
a just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their
lands, and they will be granted to others."15
On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands
"wrongfully occupied" by private individuals in the Philippine
Islands. Valenton construed these regulations together with contemporaneous
legislative and executive interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs'
case fared no better under the 1880 decree and other laws which followed it, than it
did under the earlier ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the Court stated:
"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he
proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that
he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain
from them his deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute
owner."16
In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law
in force in these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these
lands by prescription, without any action by the State."17 Valenton had no rights
other than those which accrued to mere possession. Murciano, on the other hand,

was deemed to be the owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the provincial
secretary. In effect, Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of
public land.
As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the
Spanish Government from earliest times, requiring settlers on the public
lands to obtain title deeds therefor from the State, has been continued by the
American Government in Act No. 926."18
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions
of the the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the
public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling,
and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain
native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of
lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public
Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine
Islands remained in the government;19 and that the government's title to public land
sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States.20 The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement,21 and excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands.22
Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land
Act. This new law was passed under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in
scope but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans
and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges.23 After the
passage of the 1935 Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936
by Commonwealth Act No. 141. Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present
Public Land Law and it is essentially the same as Act 2874. The main difference
between the two relates to the transitory provisions on the rights of American
citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth period at par with Filipino
citizens and corporations.24

Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system
under Act 496, or the Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine
Commission, Act 496 placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under
the Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy of the
Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898,25 which, in turn, followed the
principles and procedure of the Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir
Robert Torrens who patterned it after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South
Australia. The Torrens system requires that the government issue an official
certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of the
property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon
noted or the law warrants or reserves.26 The certificate of title is indefeasible and
imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of
said certificate. This system highly facilitates land conveyance and negotiation.27
D. The Philippine Constitutions
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed
and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the
nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country.28There
was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of
state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian
doctrine.29 State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting
point to secure recognition of the state's power to control their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization.30 The delegates to the Constitutional
Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural
resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether
it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the
Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian
doctrine.31
Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and
Utilization of Natural Resources," reads as follows:
"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of

the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with

the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except
as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure
and the limit of the grant."
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV
on the "National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of
the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may
be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII
on "National Economy and Patrimony," to wit:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
be alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into coproduction, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the

development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
x x x."
Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural
resources enumerated therein, whether on public or private land, belong to the
State. It is this concept of State ownership that petitioners claim is being
violated by the IPRA.
II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.
Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the
Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing
Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is simply
known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities
or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It
grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains
and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The
ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law
which traces its origin to native title.
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
- the right to develop lands and natural resources;
- the right to stay in the territories;
- the right in case of displacement;
- the right to safe and clean air and water;
- the right to claim parts of reservations;
- the right to resolve conflict;32
- the right to ancestral lands which include

a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same

ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community
concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from
date of transfer, if the transfer is to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is
tainted by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an
unconscionable consideration.33
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right
to self-governance and empowerment,34 social justice and human rights,35 the right
to preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community
intellectual rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and technologies.36
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office
of the President and is composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to
ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic areas- Region I and the Cordilleras;
Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon,
Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and
Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao.37 The NCIP took over the functions of
the Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural
Communities created by former President Corazon Aquino which were merged
under a revitalized structure.38
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and
practices. When still unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is
granted quasi-judicial powers.39 The NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the
Court of Appeals by a petition for review.
Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited
to, unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall
be punished in accordance with customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12
years and/or fined from P100,000.00 to P500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages.40
A. Indigenous Peoples
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous
Cultural Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is
used in the 1987 Constitution while that of "IPs" is the contemporary international

language in the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 16941 and the
United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.42
ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:
"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a
group of people or homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and
ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community on
communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of
ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such
territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other
distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social and
cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise
include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from
the populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or
colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or
the establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own
social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been
displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their
ancestral domains."
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of
people or homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized
community on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of
people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim
of ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds of language,
customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance
to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions
and cultures, became historically differentiated from the Filipino majority.
ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the
time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social,
economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have been displaced from
their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral
domains.
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of

Luzon, Mindanao, Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu
group of islands. They are composed of 110 tribes and are as follows:
1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc,
Tinggian or Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and
Bago of Ilocos Norte and Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan; Ilongot of
Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of
Cagayan; Ivatan of Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.
2. In Region III- Aetas.
3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal,
Quezon; Alangan or Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya
of Oriental and Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of Occidental Mindoro;
Cuyonon, Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.
4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan,
Isarog, and Kabihug of Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines
Sur; Itom of Albay, Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the Pullon of Masbate and
Camarines Sur.
5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the
Magahat of Negros Occidental; the Corolano and Sulod.
6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.
7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi,
Zamboanga del Sur; the Kalibugan of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and
Yakat.
8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the
Banwaon, Bukidnon, Matigsalog, Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of
Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur,
Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental; the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur,
Misamis Oriental and and Misamis Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan
provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan and Bukidnon.
9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes
of the Dibabaon, Mansaka of Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad,
T'boli and Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur;

Mandaya of the Surigao provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of

South Cotabato; the Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato;
Matigsalog of Davao del Norte and Del Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of
South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del sur and South Cotabato.
10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug,
Yakan/Samal, and Iranon.43
How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as
early as 25,000 to 30,000 B.C.
Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled
largely by the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays.44 The strains from these groups
eventually gave rise to common cultural features which became the dominant
influence in ethnic reformulation in the archipelago. Influences from the Chinese
and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millenium B.C. augmented these
ethnic strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural influences came by way of
Chinese porcelain, silk and traders. Indian influence found their way into the
religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial society.45
The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering
became supplementary activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and
the cultivation of the soil.46 From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine communities,
our ancestors evolved an essentially homogeneous culture, a basically
common way of life where nature was a primary factor. Community life
throughout the archipelago was influenced by, and responded to, common ecology.
The generally benign tropical climate and the largely uniform flora and fauna
favored similarities, not differences.47 Life was essentially subsistence but not
harsh.48
The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form.
They had languages that traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and
used them not only as media of daily communication but also as vehicles for the
expression of their literary moods.49 They fashioned concepts and beliefs about the
world that they could not see, but which they sensed to be part of their lives.50 They
had their own religion and religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality of the
soul and life after death. Their rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking deity
whom they called Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of other deities, in the
environmental spirits and in soul spirits. The early Filipinos adored the sun, the
moon, the animals and birds, for they seemed to consider the objects of Nature as

something to be respected. They venerated almost any object that was close to their
daily life, indicating the importance of the relationship between man and the object
of nature.51
The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from
the Malay word "balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these
shores.52 The barangay was basically a family-based community and consisted of
thirty to one hundred families. Each barangay was different and ruled by a
chieftain called a "dato." It was the chieftain's duty to rule and govern his subjects
and promote their welfare and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he
exercised all the functions of government. He was the executive, legislator and
judge and was the supreme commander in time of war.53
Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down
orally from generation to generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of
the barangay. They were preserved in songs and chants and in the memory of the
elder persons in the community.54 The written laws were those that the chieftain
and his elders promulgated from time to time as the necessity arose.55 The oldest
known written body of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at about
1250 A.D. Other old codes are the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the Principal
Code of Sulu.56 Whether customary or written, the laws dealt with various subjects,
such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime and punishment,
property rights, family relations and adoption. Whenever disputes arose, these were
decided peacefully through a court composed by the chieftain as "judge" and the
barangay elders as "jury." Conflicts arising between subjects of different barangays
were resolved by arbitration in which a board composed of elders from neutral
barangays acted as arbiters.57
Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private
property in land. The chiefs merely administered the lands in the name of the
barangay. The social order was an extension of the family with chiefs embodying
the higher unity of the community. Each individual, therefore, participated in the
community ownership of the soil and the instruments of production as a member of
the barangay.58 This ancient communalism was practiced in accordance with the
concept of mutual sharing of resources so that no individual, regardless of status,
was without sustenance. Ownership of land was non-existent or unimportant
and the right of usufruct was what regulated the development of
lands.59 Marine resources and fishing grounds were likewise free to all. Coastal
communities depended for their economic welfare on the kind of fishing sharing
concept similar to those in land communities.60 Recognized leaders, such as the

chieftains and elders, by virtue of their positions of importance, enjoyed some

economic privileges and benefits. But their rights, related to either land and sea,
were subject to their responsibility to protect the communities from danger and to
provide them with the leadership and means of survival.61
Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in
Maguindanao. The Sultanate of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction
over territorial areas represented today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and
Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan
and Subanon.62The Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato toward
Maranao territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.63
The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still
held in common but was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim
Code of Luwaran. The Code contains a provision on the lease of cultivated lands.
It, however, has no provision for the acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of land.64
The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive
economies where most production was geared to the use of the producers and to
the fulfillment of kinship obligations. They were not economies geared to
exchange and profit.65 Moreover, the family basis of barangay membership as well
as of leadership and governance worked to splinter the population of the islands
into numerous small and separate communities.66
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they
found the Filipinos living in barangay settlements scattered along water routes
and river banks. One of the first tasks imposed on the missionaries and the
encomenderos was to collect all scattered Filipinos together in a reduccion.67 As
early as 1551, the Spanish government assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude
towards the natives.68 The Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and
humanity to civilize these less fortunate people living in the obscurity of
ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and material advantages" of community
life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws."69
The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and
convent would be constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to
construct their houses around the church and the unbaptized were invited to do the
same.70 With the reduccion, the Spaniards attempted to "tame" the reluctant
Filipinos through Christian indoctrination using the convento/casa
real/plaza complex as focal point. The reduccion, to the Spaniards, was a

"civilizing" device to make the Filipinos law-abiding citizens of the Spanish

Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately adopt Hispanic culture and
civilization.71
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as
well as all lands not assigned to them and the pueblos, were now declared to
be crown lands or realengas, belonging to the Spanish king. It was from
the realengas that land grants were made to non-Filipinos.72
The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction
of the concept of public domain were the most immediate fundamental results
of Spanish colonial theory and law.73 The concept that the Spanish king was
the owner of everything of value in the Indies or colonies was imposed on the
natives, and the natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to land.74
Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and
religious, classified the Filipinos according to their religious practices and beliefs,
and divided them into three types . First were the Indios, the Christianized
Filipinos, who generally came from the lowland populations. Second, were
the Moros or the Muslim communities, and third, were the infieles or
the indigenous communities.75
The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored
by the Spaniards and was allowed certain status although below the Spaniards.
The Moros and infieles were regarded as the lowest classes.76
The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were
driven from Manila and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the
hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue them into the deep interior. The upland
societies were naturally outside the immediate concern of Spanish interest, and the
cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were difficult and inaccessible, allowing
the infieles, in effect, relative security.77 Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral
to colonial administration, were not only able to preserve their own culture but also
thwarted the Christianization process, separating themselves from the newly
evolved Christian community.78Their own political, economic and social systems
were kept constantly alive and vibrant.
The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally
mutual feeling of suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one
hand and the non-Christians on the other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an

otherwise culturally and historically related populace through a colonial system

that exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos.79
President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April
7, 1900, addressed the existence of the infieles:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should
adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of
our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and
government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to
conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm
regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort
should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized
customs."80
Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the
path of civilization, the American government chose "to adopt the latter measure as
one more in accord with humanity and with the national conscience."81
The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and
the non-Christian Filipinos. The term "non-Christian" referred not to religious
belief, but to a geographical area, and more directly, "to natives of the Philippine
Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart
from settled communities."82
Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903,
they passed Act No. 253 creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes
(BNCT). Under the Department of the Interior, the BNCT's primary task was to
conduct ethnographic research among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in
Muslim Mindanao, with a "special view to determining the most practicable means
for bringing about their advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT
was modeled after the bureau dealing with American Indians. The agency took
a keen anthropological interest in Philippine cultural minorities and produced a
wealth of valuable materials about them.83
The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos.
The raging issue then was the conservation of the national patrimony for the
Filipinos.

In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a
more rapid and complete manner the economic, social, moral and political
advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to
render real, complete, and permanent the integration of all said national cultural
minorities into the body politic, creating the Commission on National
Integration charged with said functions." The law called for apolicy of
integration of indigenous peoples into the Philippine mainstream and for this
purpose created theCommission on National Integration (CNI).84 The CNI was
given, more or less, the same task as the BNCT during the American regime. The
post-independence policy of integration was like the colonial policy of
assimilation understood in the context of a guardian-ward relationship.85
The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the
Spaniards and Americans, government attempts at integration met with fierce
resistance. Since World War II, a tidal wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands
of Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands and wide open spaces in
Mindanao.86 Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the Torrens
system resulted in the titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers' names.
With government initiative and participation, this titling displaced several
indigenous peoples from their lands. Worse, these peoples were also displaced by
projects undertaken by the national government in the name of national
development.87
It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:
"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national
cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of State policies."88
For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the
"cultural minorities" were addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and
they were referred to as "cultural communities." More importantly this time,
their "uncivilized" culture was given some recognition and their "customs,
traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be considered by the State in the
formulation and implementation of State policies. President Marcosabolished the
CNI and transferred its functions to the Presidential Adviser on National
Minorities (PANAMIN).The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate the ethnic
groups that sought full integration into the larger community, and at the same time
"protect the rights of those who wish to preserve their original lifeways beside the
larger community."89 In short, while still adopting the integration policy, the
decree recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.90

In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as

the Ancestral Lands Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of land
occupancy certificates to members of the national cultural communities who were
given up to 1984 to register their claims.91 In 1979, the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems was created under E.O. No. 561 which provided a
mechanism for the expeditious resolution of land problems involving small settlers,
landowners, and tribal Filipinos.92
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some
100,000 Kalingas and Bontoks of the Cordillera region were displaced by the
Chico River dam project of the National Power Corporation (NPC). The Manobos
of Bukidnon saw their land bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company
(BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the National Development Company was authorized
by law in 1979 to take approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later became the
NDC-Guthrie plantation in Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was possessed by the
Agusan natives.93 Timber concessions, water projects, plantations, mining, and
cattle ranching and other projects of the national government led not only to the
eviction of the indigenous peoples from their land but also to the reduction and
destruction of their natural environment.94
The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to
one of preservation. Invoking her powers under the Freedom Constitution,
President Aquino created the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern
Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities all
under the Office of the President.95
The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right
of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.96 This Constitution goes further
than the 1973 Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of tribal
Filipinos to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing their
right to their ancestral lands and domains, the State has effectively upheld
their right to live in a culture distinctly their own.
2. Their Concept of Land
Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino
mainstream. They are non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal,
mostly upland areas. They have a system of self-government not dependent upon
the laws of the central administration of the Republic of the Philippines. They
follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as different from those of the

rest of the population.97 The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal
with colonial threat worked well to their advantage by making it difficult for
Western concepts and religion to erode their customs and traditions. The "infieles
societies" which had become peripheral to colonial administration, represented,
from a cultural perspective, a much older base of archipelagic culture. The political
systems were still structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of
power and authority. The economic activities were governed by the concepts of an
ancient communalism and mutual help. The social structure which emphasized
division of labor and distinction of functions, not status, was maintained. The
cultural styles and forms of life portraying the varieties of social courtesies and
ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant.98
Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no
traditional concept of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots,
ownership of land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or to
territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or stewards of the land and
that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and
the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary
owners. Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not
only belong to the present generation but the future ones as well.99
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land
except the gods and spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere
stewards.100 Customary law has a strong preference for communal
ownership, which could either be ownership by a group of individuals or families
who are related by blood or by marriage,101 or ownership by residents of the same
locality who may not be related by blood or marriage. The system of communal
ownership under customary laws draws its meaning from the subsistence and
highly collectivized mode of economic production. The Kalingas, for instance,
who are engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products, and
swidden farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards,
pasture and burial grounds should be communally-owned.102 For the Kalingas,
everybody has a common right to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights
and obligations to the land are shared in common.
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also
sanctions individual ownership.The residential lots and terrace rice farms are
governed by a limited system of individual ownership. It is limited because while
the individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the property, he does not
possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil

Code.103 Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is

strongly discouraged except in marriage and succession and except to meet sudden
financial needs due to sickness, death in the family, or loss of crops.104 Moreover,
and to be alienated should first be offered to a clan-member before any villagemember can purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a non-member of
the ili.105
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system.
The concept of individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them.
Inherently colonial in origin, our national land laws and governmental policies
frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal ownership is
looked upon as inferior, if not inexistent.106
III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.
A. The Legislative History of the IPRA
It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous
peoples that the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed
and approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of
1997. The law was a consolidation of two Bills- Senate Bill No. 1728 and House
Bill No. 9125.
Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a
consolidation of four proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural
Communities, Environment and Natural Resources, Ways and Means, as well as
Finance. It adopted almost en toto the comprehensive version of Senate Bill Nos.
1476 and 1486 which was a result of six regional consultations and one national
consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide.108 At the Second Regular
Session of the Tenth Congress, Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a
background on the situation of indigenous peoples in the Philippines, to wit:
"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long
suffered from the dominance and neglect of government controlled by the majority.
Massive migration of their Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk their
territory and many of the tribal Filipinos were pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting
the intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral land and with the massive exploitation
of their natural resources by the elite among the migrant population, they became
marginalized. And the government has been an indispensable party to this insidious
conspiracy against the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs). It organized and
supported the resettlement of people to their ancestral land, which was massive

during the Commonwealth and early years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to
the Regalian Doctrine first introduced to our system by Spain through the Royal
Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government passed laws to
legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant of lands
to migrant homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs."109
Senator Flavier further declared:
"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and
cared for the land long before any central government was established. Their
ancestors had territories over which they ruled themselves and related with other
tribes. These territories- the land- include people, their dwelling, the mountains, the
water, the air, plants, forest and the animals. This is their environment in its totality.
Their existence as indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives through
political, economic, socio-cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the
living and irrefutable proof to this.
Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to
it; and depending on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct peoples."110
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier
proposed a bill based on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the
principle of parens patriae.
According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the
Regalian Doctrine reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,"
our "decisional laws" and jurisprudence passed by the State have "made exception
to the doctrine." This exception was first laid down in the case of Cario v.
Insular Government where:
"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member
of the cultural communities as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is
termed "native title." This ruling has not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed
in subsequent cases."111
Following Cario, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D.
705, P.D. 410, P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or implicitly, and liberally or
restrictively, recognized "native title" or "private right" and the existence of
ancestral lands and domains. Despite the passage of these laws, however, Senator
Flavier continued:

"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has
not implemented the policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its
observance, its wanton disregard shown during the period unto the Commonwealth
and the early years of the Philippine Republic when government organized and
supported massive resettlement of the people to the land of the ICCs."
Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess
their ancestral land. The bill was prepared also under the principle of parens
patriae inherent in the supreme power of the State and deeply embedded in
Philippine legal tradition. This principle mandates that persons suffering from
serious disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a position of actual
inequality in their relation or transaction with others, are entitled to the protection
of the State.
Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21)
Senators voting in favor and none against, with no abstention.112
House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee
on Cultural Communities. It was originally authored and subsequently presented
and defended on the floor by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato.113
Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:
"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar
implications that would promote, recognize the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and development.
Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to
assure and ascertain that these rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural
traditions as well as the indigenous laws that remained long before this Republic
was established shall be preserved and promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker, to
look into these matters seriously and early approval of the substitute bill shall bring
into reality the aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than 12 million
Filipinos that they be considered in the mainstream of the Philippine society as we
fashion for the year 2000." 114
Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation
as mandated in the Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their
land was enunciated in Cario v. Insular Government which recognized the fact
that they had vested rights prior to the establishment of the Spanish and American
regimes.115

After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding
amendments, was approved on Second Reading with no objections.
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE
CONSTITUTION.
A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of
Indigenous Peoples and Do Not Constitute Part of the Land of the Public
Domain.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral
domains and ancestral lands.Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral
domains. These are defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of the Indigenous Peoples
Right Act, viz:
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas
generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and
natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed
by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually
since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by
war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government
and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their
economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests,
pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether
alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship
areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may
no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally
had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home
ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied,
possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the
ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to
the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by
force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces
or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."

Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until
the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by
force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or
corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas,
and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether
alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of
water, mineral and other natural resources. They also include lands which may
no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally
had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home
ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.116
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as
ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not
merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims
of individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not
limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms
and tree lots.117
The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the
procedures embodied in Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of
1993, signed by then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Angel Alcala.118 DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of
ancestral domains by special task forces and ensured the issuance of Certificates of
Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims
(CADC's) to IPs.
The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power
conferred by the IPRA on the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP).119 The guiding principle in identification and delineation is selfdelineation.120 This means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role in determining the
boundaries of their domains and in all the activities pertinent thereto.121
The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set
forth in Sections 51 and 52 of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and
certification of ancestral lands is in Section 53 of said law.

Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law
and upon finding by the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall
issue a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the
community concerned.122 The allocation of lands within the ancestral domain to
any individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the
ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance with customs and traditions.123 With
respect to ancestral lands outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a
Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT).124
CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before
the Register of Deeds in the place where the property is situated.125
(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be
acquired in two modes: (1) bynative title over both ancestral lands and
domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.
(2) The Concept of Native Title
Native title is defined as:
"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which,
as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership
by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thusindisputably presumed to
have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest."126
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under
a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are
deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have
been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to
their ancestraldomains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title
shall be recognized and respected.127 Formal recognition, when solicited by
ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title
(CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the
territories identified and delineated.128
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native
title. Native title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to
ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically declares

ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land.
Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to
have never been public lands and are private.
(a) Cario v. Insular Government129
The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cario v.
Insular Government.130 Cariofirmly established a concept of private land title
that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cario, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration
court 146 hectares of land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed
that this land had been possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time
immemorial; that his grandfather built fences around the property for the holding
of cattle and that his father cultivated some parts of the land. Cario inherited the
land in accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the
Spanish land laws, but no document issued from the Spanish Crown.131In 1901,
Cario obtained a possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage
Law.132 The North American colonial government, however, ignored his possessory
title and built a public road on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his
property in the land registration court. While his petition was pending, a U.S.
military reservation133 was proclaimed over his land and, shortly thereafter, a
military detachment was detailed on the property with orders to keep cattle and
trespassers, including Cario, off the land.134
In 1904, the land registration court granted Cario's application for absolute
ownership to the land. Both the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S.
Government appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet which reversed the land registration
court and dismissed Cario's application. The Philippine Supreme
Court135 affirmed the C.F.I. by applying the Valenton ruling. Cario took the case
to the U.S. Supreme Court.136 On one hand, the Philippine government invoked the
Regalian doctrine and contended that Cario failed to comply with the provisions
of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which required registration of land claims
within a limited period of time. Cario, on the other, asserted that he was the
absolute owner of the land jure gentium, and that the land never formed part of the
public domain.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S.
Supreme Court held:

"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory
that all lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of
conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment
accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also,
that in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the
United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow
that, as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that
Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of
strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the
theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall
recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide."137
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The
choice was with the new colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under
U.S. law.
The Cario decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's
concept of "due process" as well as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the
natives."138 It was based on the strong mandate extended to the Islands via the
Philippine Bill of 1902 that "No law shall be enacted in said islands which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny
to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." The court declared:
"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in
the United States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North
American Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy
land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our taking over the
Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as
consistent with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal administration
of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for private
gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter 1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at
Large, 691), all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are to
be administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to
suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what
was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its
own. The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides
that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the laws.' In the light of the declaration that we have quoted

from section 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready to declare in
the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or
that it meant by "property" only that which had become such by ceremonies of
which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it
proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long
association,- of the profoundest factors in human thought,- regarded as their
own."139
The Court went further:
"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the
present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far
back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals
under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in
the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been
public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the
Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt."140
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as
testimony or memory went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held
by this title is presumed to "never have been public land."
Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees
upheld in the 1904 decision ofValenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court
found no proof that the Spanish decrees did not honor native title. On the contrary,
the decrees discussed in Valenton appeared to recognize that the natives owned
some land, irrespective of any royal grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in the
preamble of the Recopilacion was all "theory and discourse" and it was observed
that titles were admitted to exist beyond the powers of the Crown, viz:
"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover
such clear proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not
own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and laws cited by the counsel
for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were
recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other
words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines
into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14
of the the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in
Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands viceroys and others,
when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm

those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins by
the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in
the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that
titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond
this recognition in their books." (Emphasis supplied).141
The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway
over unconquered territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in
a manner as to convey to the natives that failure to register what to them has
always been their own would mean loss of such land. The registration requirement
was "not to confer title, but simply to establish it;" it was "not calculated to convey
to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in
danger, if he had read every word of it."
By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine
of Valenton. It was frank enough, however, to admit the possibility that the
applicant might have been deprived of his land under Spanish law because of the
inherent ambiguity of the decrees and concomitantly, the various interpretations
which may be given them. But precisely because of the ambiguity and of the
strong "due process mandate" of the Constitution, the court validated this
kind of title.142 This title was sufficient, even without government administrative
action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens certificate. Justice Holmes explained:
"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a
problem not without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it
proper on that account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty
and the act of Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be
observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion that law
and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should
not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived,
was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of
Spain."143
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cario and ordered the registration of the
148 hectares in Baguio Municipality in his name.144
Examining Cario closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the
title it upheld as "native title." It simply said:
"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General,
in his argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under

the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if

not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in
that province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by
the Spanish Laws, and which would have made his title beyond question
good. Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain it does not follow
that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere
trespasser when the present government seized his land. The argument to that
effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an important part of the
Island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would
not have permitted and had not the power to enforce."145
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the
entire length of the Cariodecision. It is observed that the widespread use of the
term "native title" may be traced to Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting
Professor at the University of the Philippines College of Law from the Yale
University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in the Philippine
Law Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law.146 This
article was made after Professor Lynch visited over thirty tribal communities
throughout the country and studied the origin and development of Philippine land
laws.147 He discussed Carioextensively and used the term "native title" to refer to
Cario's title as discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said case.
(b) Indian Title
In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native
title" as defined by Justice Holmes in Cario "is conceptually similar to
"aboriginal title" of the American Indians.148 This is not surprising, according to
Prof. Lynch, considering that during the American regime, government policy
towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made in reference to native Americans.149 This
was clearly demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro.150
In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the
provincial governor to remove the Mangyans from their domains and place them in
a permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused
to comply was to be imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans, including one who
was imprisoned for trying to escape from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus
claiming deprivation of liberty under the Board Resolution. This Court denied the
petition on the ground of police power. It upheld government policy promoting the
idea that a permanent settlement was the only successful method for educating the
Mangyans, introducing civilized customs, improving their health and morals, and

protecting the public forests in which they roamed.151 Speaking through Justice
Malcolm, the court said:
"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the
policy adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by
the Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings with the so-called nonChristian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed
by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable
lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian
policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been
treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the
Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of
guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the
guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary
authority of the United States.152
x x x.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are
not exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all
that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken
from different parts of the country and placed on these reservations, without any
previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they
have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general
good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the
United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and
executive branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the
courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system.
Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons exist for the segregation of the Manguianes
in Mindoro as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United
States."153
Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines.
An Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart by proper authority
for the use and occupation of a tribe or tribes of Indians.154 It may be set apart by
an act of Congress, by treaty, or by executive order, but it cannot be established by
custom and prescription.155

Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It

also covers the "aboriginal right of possession or occupancy."156 The aboriginal
right of possession depends on the actual occupancy of the lands in question by the
tribe or nation as their ancestral home, in the sense that such lands constitute
definable territory occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or nation.157 It is a
right which exists apart from any treaty, statute, or other governmental action,
although in numerous instances treaties have been negotiated with Indian tribes,
recognizing their aboriginal possession and delimiting their occupancy rights or
settling and adjusting their boundaries.158
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights
to land they have held and occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas
by the Europeans. The earliest definitive statement by the U.S. Supreme
Court on the nature of aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson &
Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh.159
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made
by the chiefs of two (2) Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize
this conveyance, the plaintiffs being private persons. The only conveyance that was
recognized was that made by the Indians to the government of the European
discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that the
potentates of the old world believed that they had made ample compensation to the
inhabitants of the new world by bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them;
but in addition, said the court, they found it necessary, in order to avoid conflicting
settlements and consequent war, to establish the principle that discovery gives title
to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, the discovery was
made, against all other European governments, which title might be
consummated by possession.160 The exclusion of all other Europeans gave to the
nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives
and establishing settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the court further stated
that:
"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were
to be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other
power could interpose between them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were,
in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent,
impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a
legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to

their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent

nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their
own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle
that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as
occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and
claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to
grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have been
understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian
right of occupancy."161
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive
right to acquire Indian land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discovererwhether to England, France, Spain or Holland- did this right belong and not to any
other nation or private person. The mere acquisition of the right nonetheless did not
extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by purchase or
conquest, exercised its right, the concerned Indians were recognized as the
"rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain
possession of it." Grants made by the discoverer to her subjects of lands occupied
by the Indians were held to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian
right of occupancy. Once the discoverer purchased the land from the Indians or
conquered them, it was only then that the discoverer gained an absolute title
unrestricted by Indian rights.
The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not
convey a title paramount to the title of the United States itself to other parties,
saying:
"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right
of possession has never been questioned. The claim of government extends to
the complete ultimate title, charged with this right of possession, and to the
exclusive power of acquiring that right."162
It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day,
proves the universal recognition of this principle.163
The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their
native lands without having to invalidate conveyances made by the government to
many U.S. citizens.164

Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case, the
State of Georgia enacted a law requiring all white persons residing within the
Cherokee nation to obtain a license or permit from the Governor of Georgia; and
any violation of the law was deemed a high misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who were
white missionaries, did not obtain said license and were thus charged with a
violation of the Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with
the treaties established between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well
as the Acts of Congress regulating intercourse with them. It characterized the
relationship between the United States government and the Indians as:
"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some
foreign potentate for the supply of their essential wants, and for their protection
from lawless and injurious intrusions into their country. That power was naturally
termed their protector. They had been arranged under the protection of Great
Britain; but the extinguishment of the British power in their neighborhood, and the
establishment of that of the United States in its place, led naturally to the
declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that they were under the protection of the
United States, and of no other power. They assumed the relation with the United
States which had before subsisted with Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one
more powerful, not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and
submitting as subjects to the laws of a master."166
It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct
territorial boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over all the lands
within their domains. Thus:
"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate
trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their
rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties
stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still in force,
manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities,
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and
having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only
acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.
x x x.

"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent

political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial, with the single
exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from
intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast
of the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which those European
potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians. The very term
"nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct from others." x x
x.167
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory,
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent
of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of
Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by
our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States."168
The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the
discoverer as against all other European governments. Designated as the naked
fee,169 this title was to be consummated by possession and was subject to the Indian
title of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged the Indians' legal and just claim
to retain possession of the land, the Indians being the original inhabitants of the
land. The discoverer nonetheless asserted the exclusive right to acquire the Indians'
land- either by purchase, "defensive" conquest, or cession- and in so doing,
extinguish the Indian title. Only the discoverer could extinguish Indian title
because it alone asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while the different
nations of Europe respected the rights of the natives as occupants, they all asserted
the ultimate dominion and title to be in themselves.170
As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee
title to the lands occupied by the Indians when the colonists arrived became
vested in the sovereign- first the discovering European nation and later the
original 13 States and the United States- a right of occupancy in the Indian
tribes was nevertheless recognized. The Federal Government continued the
policy of respecting the Indian right of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title,
which it accorded the protection of complete ownership.171 But this aboriginal
Indian interest simply constitutes "permission" from the whites to occupy the land,
and means mere possession not specifically recognized as ownership by
Congress.172 It is clear that this right of occupancy based upon aboriginal
possession is not a property right.173 It is vulnerable to affirmative action by the

federal government who, as sovereign, possessed exclusive power to extinguish the

right of occupancy at will.174 Thus, aboriginal title is not the same as legal
title. Aboriginal title rests on actual, exclusive and continuous use and occupancy
for a long time.175 It entails that land owned by Indian title must be used within the
tribe, subject to its laws and customs, and cannot be sold to another sovereign
government nor to any citizen.176 Such title as Indians have to possess and occupy
land is in the tribe, and not in the individual Indian; the right of individual Indians
to share in the tribal property usually depends upon tribal membership, the
property of the tribe generally being held in communal ownership.177
As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is
ordinarily used to designate such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal
under general laws.178 Indian land which has been abandoned is deemed to fall into
the public domain.179 On the other hand, an Indian reservation is a part of the
public domain set apart for the use and occupation of a tribe of Indians.180 Once set
apart by proper authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and until the
Indian title is extinguished, no one but Congress can initiate any preferential right
on, or restrict the nation's power to dispose of, them.181
The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral
land claims of indigenous Americans.182 And two things are clear. First,
aboriginal title is recognized. Second, indigenous property systems are also
recognized. From a legal point of view, certain benefits can be drawn from a
comparison of Philippine IPs to native Americans.183 Despite the similarities
between native title and aboriginal title, however, there are at present some
misgivings on whether jurisprudence on American Indians may be cited
authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the possessory rights of the
Indians over their land; title to the land, however, is deemed to have passed to the
U.S. as successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal title of ownership is not
specifically recognized as ownership by action authorized by Congress.184 The
protection of aboriginal title merely guards against encroachment by persons other
than the Federal Government.185 Although there are criticisms against the refusal to
recognize the native Americans' ownership of these lands,186 the power of the State
to extinguish these titles has remained firmly entrenched.187
Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over
the ancestral domains and ancestral lands.188 The IPRA, however, is still in its
infancy and any similarities between its application in the Philippines vis--vis
American Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on the peculiar facts of
each case.

(c) Why the Cario doctrine is unique

In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cario and enshrined
in the IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs.
Native title presumes that the land is private and was never public.Cario is the
only case that specifically and categorically recognizes native title. The long
line of cases citing Cario did not touch on native title and the private
character of ancestral domains and lands. Cariowas cited by the succeeding
cases to support the concept of acquisitive prescription under the Public Land
Act which is a different matter altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land
sought to be registered must bepublic agricultural land. When the conditions
specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act are complied with, the possessor
of the land is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant of the
land.189 The land ceases to be part of the public domain,190 ipso jure,191 and is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the prescribed
statutory period.
It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court declared
that the rule that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by
purchase or grant, belong to the public domain has an exception. This exception
would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of
his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. It is this kind of possession
that would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public
domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish
conquest.193 Oh Cho, however, was decided under the provisions of the Public
Land Act and Cario was cited to support the applicant's claim of acquisitive
prescription under the said Act.
All these years, Cario had been quoted out of context simply to justify long,
continuous, open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of public
agricultural land. It is this long, continuous, open and adverse possession in the
concept of owner of thirty years both for ordinary citizens194 and members of the
national cultural minorities195 that converts the land from public into private and
entitles the registrant to a torrens certificate of title.
(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates
that the Land is Private.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is
further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their

individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the

Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts
ancestral land into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the
State. The necessary implication is that ancestral land is private. It, however,
has to be first converted to public agricultural land simply for registration
purposes. To wit:
"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended, or the Land Registration Act 496- Individual members of cultural
communities, with respect to their individually-owned ancestral lands who, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous
possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time
immemorial or for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding
the approval of this Act and uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs
shall have the option to secure title to their ancestral lands under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in
character and actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming
purposes, including those with a slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are
hereby classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.
The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years
from the approval of this Act."196
ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their
individually-owned ancestral lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only,
not domains, and such lands must be individually, not communally, owned.
Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous
possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time
immemorial197 or for a period of not less than 30 years, which claims are
uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be registered under C.A.
141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, or Act 496, the Land Registration
Act. For purposes of registration, the individually-owned ancestral lands are
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,
provided, they are agricultural in character and are actually used for agricultural,
residential, pasture and tree farming purposes. These lands shall be classified as
public agricultural lands regardless of whether they have a slope of 18% or more.

The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance

with the requirements of the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A.
141, the Public Land Act, deals specifically with lands of the public domain.198 Its
provisions apply to those lands "declared open to disposition or concession" x x x
"which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, nor
appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor
those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other
valid law x x x or which having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be
so."199 Act 496, the Land Registration Act, allows registration only of private lands
and public agricultural lands. Since ancestral domains and lands are private, if
the ICC/IP wants to avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA
itself converts his ancestral land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of
eighteen per cent (18%) or over,200 from private to public agricultural land for
proper disposition.
The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration
Act has nonetheless a limited period. This option must be exercised within twenty
(20) years from October 29, 1997, the date of approval of the IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of
Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution
classifies lands of the public domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest
or timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same
Article XII mentions ancestral lands and ancestral domains but it does not classify
them under any of the said four categories. To classify them as public lands
under any one of the four classes will render the entire IPRA law a nullity. The
spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs which is loss of
land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of sheer survival of the
ICCs/IPs.201
The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous
cultural communities to their ancestral lands" and that "Congress provide for
the applicability of customary laws x x x in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domain."202 It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct
rights of ownership over their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life
into this constitutional mandate.

B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral

domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the
concept of ownership under thecivil law. This ownership is based on adverse
possession for a specified period, and harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land Act
on administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and
Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles. Thus:
"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more
than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has
continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to
disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has
not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this
chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not
to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied
and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a
tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be
entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this
section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he is not
the owner of any real property secured or disposable under the provision of
the Public Land Law.203
x x x.
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and

occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide

claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona
fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the
rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof."204
Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally
public agricultural land but because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free
patent) or at least thirty years (judicial confirmation), the land has become private.
Open, adverse, public and continuous possession is sufficient, provided, the
possessor makes proper application therefor. The possession has to be confirmed
judicially or administratively after which a torrens title is issued.
A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as
entitled to all the rights of ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the
Philippines defines ownership in Articles 427, 428 and 429. This concept is based
on Roman Law which the Spaniards introduced to the Philippines through the Civil
Code of 1889. Ownership, under Roman Law, may be exercised over things or
rights. It primarily includes the right of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing
owned. And the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing includes the right to receive
from the thing what it produces,205 the right to consume the thing by its use,206 the
right to alienate, encumber, transform or even destroy the thing owned,207 and the
right to exclude from the possession of the thing owned by any other person to
whom the owner has not transmitted such thing.208
1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.
Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a
torrens title but to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT
formally recognizes the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over
their ancestral domain. Thus:

"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership

sustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve
as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of
ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold,
disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights."
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains is held under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept
maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property. It is private simply because it is not part of the public
domain. But its private character ends there. The ancestral domain is owned
in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. The IPRA itself
provides that areas within the ancestral domains, whether delineated or not, are
presumed to be communally held.209 These communal rights, however, are not
exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the Civil Code.210 Co-ownership
gives any co-owner the right to demand partition of the property held in common.
The Civil Code expressly provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in
the co-ownership." Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
thing in common, insofar as his share is concerned.211To allow such a right over
ancestral domains may be destructive not only of customary law of the community
but of the very community itself.212
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real
property, much less corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist
only for a maximum of fifty (50) years subject to an extension of another fifty
years in any single instance.213 Every stockholder has the right to disassociate
himself from the corporation.214 Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved
voluntarily or involuntarily.215
Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the
land but extends to all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future,
to the domain. This is the reason why the ancestral domain must be kept within
the ICCs/IPs themselves. The domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed to
other persons. It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.
Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The
lands are communal. These lands, however, may be transferred subject to the
following limitations: (a) only to the members of the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord
with customary laws and traditions; and (c) subject to the right of redemption of

the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if the land was transferred to a non-member
of the ICCs/IPs.
Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights
or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains,"216 the
IPRA, by legislative fiat, introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a
concept that has long existed under customary law.217
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the
Civil Code as a source of law.218Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide
that custom should be applied in cases where no codal provision is applicable.219 In
other words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom,
when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities.220
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and
uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of
a specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept of ownership under
customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with the
civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land registration.221
To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper
title. The CADT is merely a "formal recognition" of native title. This is clear from
Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:
"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected.
Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of the
concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated."
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is
"belongingness" to the land, being people of the land- by sheer force of having
sprung from the land since time beyond recall, and the faithful nurture of the land
by the sweat of one's brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary relation to the land- the
possession of stewardship through perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of
blessings between man and land; from man, care for land; from the land,
sustenance for man.222
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian
Doctrine Enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands

The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands. Section 7 provides for the rights over ancestral domains:
"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and possession of
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights
include:
a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of
water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places,
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by
them at any time within the domains;
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56
hereof, the right to develop, control and use lands and territories
traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural
resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for
future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and
utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate
the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the
areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection
and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary
laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation
and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or
impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation
for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the
right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference
with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"
c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the territory and not
to be removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free
and prior informed consent, nor through any means other than eminent
domain. x x x;
d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs as a result of
natural catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced
ICCs/IPs in suitable areas where they can have temporary life support
systems: x x x;

e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate the entry of

migrant settlers and organizations into their domains;
f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs
shall have access to integrated systems for the management of their inland
waters and air space;
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim parts of the
ancestral domains which have been reserved for various purposes, except
those reserved and intended for common and public welfare and service;
h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance
with customary laws of the area where the land is located, and only in
default thereof shall the complaints be submitted to amicable settlement and
to the Courts of Justice whenever necessary."
Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:
"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and possession of the
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.
a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the right to
transfer land or property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs,
subject to customary laws and traditions of the community concerned.
b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of
land/property rights by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a non-member
of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs,
or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor
ICC/IP shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not exceeding
fifteen (15) years from the date of transfer."
Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their
ancestral domains which covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d) traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made by them at any time within the
domains. The right of ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right to
develop lands and natural resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the
right to resettlement in case of displacement; (d) the right to regulate the entry of
migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and water; (f) the right to claim parts of

the ancestral domains as reservations; and (g) the right to resolve conflict in
accordance with customary laws.
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the
ancestral domains, Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land
or property rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This
is in keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over the
ancestral lands, but not to domains.
2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the
Ancestral Domains Does Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural
Resources and Control and Supervision in their Development and Exploitation.
The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural
resources is declared in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities, or, it may enter into coproduction, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure
and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations

involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral
oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the state shall promote the development and use of local scientific and
technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution."223
All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources-are owned by the
State. The Constitution provides that in the exploration, development and
utilization of these natural resources, the State exercises full control and
supervision, and may undertake the same in four (4) modes:
1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or
2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or productionsharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations;
3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources
by Filipino citizens;
4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements
with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.
As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and
responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization of these natural
resources. The State may directly undertake the exploitation and development by
itself, or, it may allow participation by the private sector through coproduction,224 joint venture,225or production-sharing agreements.226 These
agreements may be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The
State, through Congress, may allow the small-scale utilization of natural resources
by Filipino citizens. For the large-scale exploration of these resources, specifically
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the State, through the President, may
enter into technical and financial assistance agreements with foreign-owned
corporations.

Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's SmallScale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., coproduction, joint venture or production-sharing, may apply to both largescale227 and small-scale mining.228 "Small-scale mining" refers to "mining activities
which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements and methods and do
not use explosives or heavy mining equipment."229
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right
of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this "ownership"
is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as:
"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of
water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional
hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time
within the domains;"
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting
and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the
domains." It will be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of water
not occupied by the ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the
traditional hunting grounds, fish in the traditional fishing
grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other natural resources
found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under
Section 7 (a) does not cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleumand other
mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna andall other
natural resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution as belonging to the State.
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in
Section 7(a) complies with the Regalian doctrine.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the
Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of the IPRA And is Unconstitutional.
The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:
"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands,
waters, and natural resources and all improvements made by them at any time

within the ancestral domains/ lands. These rights shall include, but not limited to,
the right over the fruits, the right to possess, the right to use, right to consume,
right to exclude and right to recover ownership, and the rights or interests over land
and natural resources. The right to recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost
through fraud or any form or vitiated consent or transferred for an unconscionable
price."
Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over
"lands, waters and natural resources." The term "natural resources" is not one of
those expressly mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the law. Our Constitution and
jurisprudence clearly declare that the right to claim ownership over land does not
necessarily include the right to claim ownership over the natural resources found
on or under the land.231 The IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and
natural resources. Section 7 (a) speaks of the right of ownership only over the
land within the ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law that
speak of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be discussed later, do
not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over these resources.
The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was
not specifically and categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually
assail the constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in general.232Nevertheless, to
avoid any confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to declare that
the inclusion of "natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the
Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and
is contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA
Is Allowed Under Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7
(b) merely grants the ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:
"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56
hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally
occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resourceswithin the
territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and
share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found
therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental
protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary

laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact
upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any
damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective
measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and
encroachment upon these rights;"
The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the
IPRA enumerates the following rights:
a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally
occupied;
b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories
and uphold the responsibilities for future generations;
c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization
of the natural resources found therein;
d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration
of natural resources for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental
protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws;
e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation
and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or
impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation
for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;
f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any
interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights.233
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with
the State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and
conserve" them for future generations, "benefit and share" the profits from
their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions for
their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental
protection and conservation measures." It must be noted that the right to
negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural resources covers only their
exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and

environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It

does not extend to the exploitation and development of natural resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of
management or stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share
in the profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms for their exploration. At the
same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural resources within
their ancestral domains are conserved for future generations and that the
"utilization" of these resources must not harm the ecology and environment
pursuant to national and customary laws.234
The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to
contemplate small-scale utilization of natural resources as distinguished from
large-scale. Small-scale utilization of natural resources is expressly allowed in
the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution "in recognition
of the plight of forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal fishermen and others
similarly situated who exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and
survival."235 Section 7 (b) also expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and
conserve these resources and ensure environmental and ecological protection
within the domains, which duties, by their very nature, necessarily reject utilization
in a large-scale.
(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the
IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Section 57 of the IPRA provides:
"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall
have priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation
of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the
ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and utilization
of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years
renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and
written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the
community, pursuant to its own decision-making process, has agreed to allow such
operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and take
appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract."
Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of
natural resources within ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights'

therein." The terms "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation" of

any natural resources within the ancestral domains obviously refer to largescale utilization. It is utilization not merely for subsistence but for commercial or
other extensive use that require technology other than manual labor.236 The law
recognizes the probability of requiring a non-member of the ICCs/IPs to participate
in the development and utilization of the natural resources and thereby allows such
participation for a period of not more than 25 years, renewable for another 25
years. This may be done on condition that a formal written agreement be entered
into by the non-member and members of the ICCs/IPs.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and
conserve" the natural resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority
rights" in the development or exploitation thereof. Priority means giving
preference. Having priority rights over the natural resources does not necessarily
mean ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior
entity that owns these resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential
rights over the resources to whosoever itself chooses.
Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation
of the said doctrine that all natural resources found within the ancestral domains
belong to the State. It incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine, hence,
requires that the provision be read in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution237 in
relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural resources,
may directly undertake the development and exploitation of the natural
resources by itself, or in the alternative, it may recognize the priority rights of
the ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which the natural resources are found
by entering into a co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreement with them. The State may likewise enter into any of said
agreements with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical,
or enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for the large-scale exploration, development
and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow such
non-member to participate in its agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If the State
decides to enter into an agreement with a non-ICC/IP member, the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the rights of the
ICCs/IPs under the agreement shall be protected. The agreement shall be for a
period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.

To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral

domains, the State, as owner of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of
and by itself, directly undertake the development and exploitation of the natural
resources; or (2) it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering
into an agreement with them for such development and exploitation; or (3) it may
enter into an agreement with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or
juridical, local or foreign; or (4) it may allow such non-member to participate in
the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in
their ancestral domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants
of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small-scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their largescale development and exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to
automatically give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and
it is within its discretion to choose which option to pursue. Moreover, there is
nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely undertake the largescale development of the natural resources within their domains. The ICCs/IPs
must undertake such endeavour always under State supervision or control. This
indicates that the State does not lose control and ownership over the resources even
in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law simply give due respect to the
ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of the land where the natural resources lie, have
traditionally utilized these resources for their subsistence and survival.
Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by
the following provision:
"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other governmental
agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting
any concession, license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing
agreement. without prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not
overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a
field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area
concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the
free and prior informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided,
further, That no department, government agency or government-owned or
-controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production
sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided,
finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance

with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation
process."
Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation
of natural resources shall not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and
government agencies without prior certification from the NCIP that the area
subject of the agreement does not overlap with any ancestral domain. The NCIP
certification shall be issued only after a field-based investigation shall have been
conducted and the free and prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs
obtained. Non-compliance with the consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs
the right to stop or suspend any project granted by any department or government
agency.
As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of
any concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be
issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie within any
ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the NCIP with power over the other
agencies of the State as to determine whether to grant or deny any concession or
license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the
ICCs/IPs have been informed of the agreement and that their consent thereto has
been obtained. Note that the certification applies to agreements over natural
resources that do not necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that
are found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.
V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN
THE INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.
The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism
stretching back to prehistoric times. The movement received a massive impetus
during the 1960's from two sources. First, the decolonization of Asia and Africa
brought into the limelight the possibility of peoples controlling their own destinies.
Second, the right of self-determination was enshrined in the UN Declaration on
Human Rights.238 The rise of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to
the attention of North American Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in
New Zealand the possibility of fighting for fundamental rights and freedoms.
In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded,239 and
during the 1980's, indigenous affairs were on the international agenda. The people
of the Philippine Cordillera were the first Asians to take part in the international
indigenous movement. It was the Cordillera People's Alliance that carried out

successful campaigns against the building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82 and
they have since become one of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the
world.240
Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international
scene. This came as a result of the increased publicity focused on the continuing
disrespect for indigenous human rights and the destruction of the indigenous
peoples' environment, together with the national governments' inability to deal
with the situation.241Indigenous rights came as a result of both human rights and
environmental protection, and have become a part of today's priorities for the
international agenda.242
International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying
policies, programs and specific rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World
Bank, for example, first adopted a policy on IPs as a result of the dismal
experience of projects in Latin America.243 The World Bank now seeks to apply its
current policy on IPs to some of its projects in Asia. This policy has provided an
influential model for the projects of the Asian Development Bank.244
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs
and declares as a State policy the promotion of their rights within the framework of
national unity and development.245 The IPRA amalgamates the Philippine category
of ICCs with the international category of IPs,246 and is heavily influenced by both
the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations
(UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.247
ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries"248 and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It
is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and many other international instruments on the prevention of
discrimination.249 ILO Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning
the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal
Populations in Independent Countries" (ILO No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957.
Developments in international law made it appropriate to adopt new international
standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to removing the assimilationist
orientation of the earlier standards," and recognizing the aspirations of these
peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic
development."250

CONCLUSION
The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by
ethnic and religious differences. These differences were carried over and magnified
by the Philippine government through the imposition of a national legal order that
is mostly foreign in origin or derivation.251 Largely unpopulist, the present legal
system has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society, specifically, the
indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the
evolution of Philippine culture and are vital to the understanding of contemporary
problems.252 It is through the IPRA that an attempt was made by our legislators to
understand Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but through common
experiences in the course of history. The Philippines became a democracy a
centennial ago and the decolonization process still continues. If the evolution of the
Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if
the Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing
democratization,253 it is this Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of
indigenous and customary laws in the country and affirm their co-existence with
the land laws in our national legal system.
With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997.
G.R. No. 5246

September 16, 1910

MANUELA GREY ALBA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,

vs.
ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ, objector-appellee.
Ramon Salinas, for appellants.
Aniceto G. Reyes, for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
These petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan, and Francisco, surnamed Grey y Alba, are
the only heirs of Doa Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey, deceased.
Remedios Grey y Alba, a sister of the petitioners, was married on the 21st day of
March, 1903, to Vicente Reyes and died on the 13th of July, 1905, without leaving
any heirs except her husband. The four petitioners, as coowners, sought to have
registered the following-described property:

A parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talampas, municipality of Baliuag,

Province of Bulacan, upon which are situated three houses and one camarin
of light material, having a superficial area of 52 hectares, 51 ares, and 22
centares; bounded on the north by the highway (calzada) of Talampas and
the lands of Rita Ruiz Mateo; on the east by the lands of the said Rita Ruiz
Mateo, Hermenegildo Prado, Policarpo de Jesus, and a stream called Sapang
Buslut; on the south by the same stream and the lands of the capellania; and
on the west by the stream called Sapang Buslut, and the lands of Vicente de
la Cruz, Jose Camacho and Domingo Ruiz Mateo.
This parcel of agricultural land is used for the raising of rice and sugar cane and is
assessed at $1,000 United States currency. The petition, which was filed on the
18th of December, 1906, was accompanied by a plan and technical description of
the above-described parcel of land.
After hearing the proofs presented, the court entered, on the 12th of February,
1908, a decree in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of
Act No. 926, directing that the land described in the petitioner be registered in the
names of the four petitioners, as coowners, subject to the usufructuary right of
Vicente Reyes, widower of Remedios Grey.
On the 16th of June, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court
of Land Registration asking for a revision of the case, including the decision, upon
the ground that he is the absolute owner of the two parcels of land which are
described in said motion, and which, according to his allegations, are included in
the lands decreed to the petitioners. He alleged that the decree of February 12,
1908, was obtained maliciously and fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby
depriving him of said two parcels of land. He further alleged that he was the
absolute owner of the two parcels of land, having inherited them from his father,
Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the same. He therefore asked,
under the provisions of section 38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496), a
revision of the case, and that the said decree be modified so as to exclude the two
parcels of land described in said motion. The Land Court upon this motion
reopened the case, and after hearing the additional evidence presented by both
parties, rendered, on the 23rd of November, 1908, its decision modifying the

former decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by
Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz. From this decision and judgment the petitioners
appealed and now insist, first, that the trial court erred in reopening the case and
modifying its decree dated the 12th of February, 1908, for the reason that said
decree was not obtained by means of fraud; and, second, that the court erred in
holding that the two parcels of land described in the appellee's motion are not their
property.
It was agreed by counsel that the two small parcels now in dispute forma part of
the land described in the petition and were included in the decree of February 12,
1908, and that the petitioners are the owners of the remainder of the land described
in the said decree.
The petitioners inherited this land from their parents, who acquired the same,
including the two small parcels in question, by purchase, as is evidenced by a
public document dated the 26th of November, 1864, duly executed before
Francisco Iriarte, alcalde mayor and judge of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Bulacan.
Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee, obtained in march, 1895, a state
grant for several parcels of land, including the two parcels in question. This grant
was duly inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan on the 6th of April of
the same year.
It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented their petition in this case the
appellee was occupying the two parcels of land now in question. It is also admitted
that the name of the appellee does not appear in the said petition as an occupant of
the said two parcels. The petitioners insist that the appellee was occupying these
parcels as their tenant and for this reason they did not include his name in their
petition, as an occupant, while the appellee contends that he was occupying the
said parcels as the absolute owner under the estate grant by inheritance.
The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the
name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land,
was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this constituted fraud within
the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act. The trial court further

held that the grant from the estate should prevail over the public document of
purchase of 1864.
The mother of the petitioners died on November 15, 1881; their father died prior to
that time. Manuela, the oldest of the petitioners, was about six years of age when
their mother died. So these children were minors when the father of the appellee
obtained the estate grant.
On the 13th of June, 1882, Jose Grey, uncle and representative of the petitioners,
who were then minors, rented the land owned by the petitioners' deceased parents
to one Irineo Jose for a period of three years. On the 23d of March, 1895, the said
Jose Grey, as the representative of the petitioners, rented the same land for a period
of six years to Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee. This rental contract
was duly executed in writing. This land was cultivated during these six years by
Baldomero R. de la Cruz and his children, one of whom is the appellee. On the
14th of December, 1905, Jose Grey, for himself and the other petitioners, rented the
same land to Estanislao R. de la Cruz for a period of two years. Estanislao de la
Cruz on entering into this rental contract with Jose Grey did so for himself and his
brothers, one of whom is the appellee. While the appellee admits that his father and
brother entered into these rental contracts and did, in fact, cultivate the petitioners'
land, nevertheless he insists that the two small parcels in question were not
included in these contracts. In the rental contract between the uncle of the
petitioners and he father of the appellee the land is not described. In the rental
contract between Jose Grey, one of the petitioners, and Estanislao R. de la Cruz,
brother of the appellee, the two small parcels of land in question are included,
according to the description given therein. This was found to be true by the court
below, but the said court held that as this contract was made by Estanislao R. de la
Cruz it was not binding upon Anacleto R. de la Cruz, the appellee.
The two small parcels of land in question were purchased by the parents of the
petitioners in 1864, as is evidenced by the public document of purchase and sale of
that year. The same two parcels of land are included in the state grant issued in
favor of Baldomero Ratilla de la Cruz in 1895. This grant was obtained after the
death of the petitioners' parents and while they were minors. So it is clear that the
petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was occupying the said parcels as

their lessee at the time they presented their application for registration. They did
not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include in
their application the name of the appellee as one of the occupants of the land. They
believed that it was not necessary nor required that they include in their application
the names of their tenants. Under these circumstances, did the court below commit
an error in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its decree had been entered in
February of the same year?
The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by the
applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain an
accurate description of the land. It shall contain the name in full and the address of
the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all occupants of land and of all
adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known, it shall state what search has been
made to find them. In the form of notice given by statute, which shall be sworn to,
the applicant is required to state and set forth clearly all mortgages or
encumbrances affecting said land, if any, the rights and interests, legal or equitable,
in the possession, remainder, reversion, or expectancy of all persons, with their
names in full, together with their place of residence and post office addresses.
Upon receipt of the application the clerk shall cause notice of the filling to be
published twice in the Official Gazette. This published notice shall be directed to
all persons appearing to have an interest in the land sought to be registered and to
the adjoining owners, and also "to all whom it may concern." In addition to the
notice in the Official Gazette the Land Court shall, within seven days after said
publication, cause a copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be mailed by the clerk to
every person named in the application whose address is known; to cause a duly
attested copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be posted in a conspicuous place on
every parcel of land included in the application, and in a conspicuous place on the
chief municipal building of the town in which the land is situated. The court may
also cause other or further notice of the application to be given in such manner and
to such persons as it may deem proper. The certificate of the clerk that he has
served the notice as directed by the court by publication or mailing shall be
conclusive proof of such service. Within the time allowed in the notices, if no
person appears and answers, the court may at once, upon motion of the applicant,
no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default. By the description in
the published notice "to all whom it may concern," and by express provisions of

law "all the word are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default
an order." If the court, after hearing, finds that the applicant has title, as stated in
his application, a decree or registration shall be entered.
Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject
only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive
upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all the
branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general description "to all whom it may
concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy,
or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in
any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right
of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree
of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a
petition for review within one year. . . . (Sec. 38 of Act No. 496.)
The appellee is not included in any of the exceptions named in section 38 referred
to above.
It will be seen that the applicant is required to mention not only the outstanding
interest which he admits but also all claims of interest, though denied by him. By
express provision of law the world are made parties defendant by the description in
the notice "to all whom it may concern."
Although the appellee, occupying the two small parcels of land in question under
the circumstances as we have set forth, was not served with notice, he was made a
party defendant by publication; and the entering of a decree on the 12th of
February, 1908, must be held to be conclusive against all persons, including the
appellee, whether his (appellee's) name is mentioned in the application, notice, or
citation.
The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on account of
the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, and could
have been opened only on the ground that the said decree had been obtained by
fraud. That decree was not obtained by fraud on the part of the applicants,
inasmuch as they honestly believed that the appellee was occupying these two

small parcels of land as their tenant. One of the petitioner went upon the premises
with the surveyor when the original plan was made.
Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land
Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to
deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be
alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive fraud as distinguished
from constructive fraud.
The question as to the meaning of the word "fraud" in the Australian statutes has
been frequently raised. Two distinctions have been noted by the Australian courts;
the first is the distinction between the meaning of the word "fraud" in the sections
relating to the conclusive effect of certificates of title, and its meaning in the
sections relating to the protection of bona fide purchasers from registered
proprietors. The second is the distinction between "legal," "equitable," or
"constructive" fraud, and "actual" or "moral" fraud. In none of the groups of the
sections of the Australian statutes relating to the conclusive effect of certificates of
title, and in which fraud is referred to, is there any express indication of the
meaning of "fraud," with the sole exception of that of the South Australian group.
(Hogg on Australian Torrens System, p. 834.)
With regard to decisions on the sections relating to the conclusive effect of
certificates of title, it has been held in some cases that the "fraud" there
mentioned means actual or moral fraud, not merely constructive or legal
fraud. In other cases "fraud" has been said to include constructive, legal, and
every kind of fraud. In other cases, against, knowledge of other persons'
right, and the deliberate acquisition of registered title in the face of such
knowledge, has been held to be "fraud" which rendered voidable the
certificates of title so obtained; and voluntary ignorance is, for this purpose,
the same as knowledge. But in none of these three classes of cases was there
absent the element of intention to deprive another of just rights, which
constitutes the essential characteristics of actual as distinguished from
legal-fraud. (Id., p. 835, and cases cited in notes Nos. 85, 86, 87, 88, and 89
at bottom of pages 835 and 836.)

By "fraud" is meant actual fraud-dishonesty of some sort. (Judgment of Privy

Council in Assets Co. vs. Mere Roihi, and Assets Co. vs. Panapa Waihopi, decided
in March, 1905, cited by Hogg in his Supplementary Addendum to his work on
Australian Torrens System, supra.) The same meaning should be given to the word
"fraud" used in section 38 of our statutes (Act No. 496).
The question as to whether any particular transaction shows fraud, within the
meaning of the word as used in our statutes, will in each case be a question of fact.
We will not attempt to say what acts would constitutes this kind of fraud in other
cases. This must be determined from the fact an circumstances in each particular
case. The only question we are called upon to determine, and have determined, is
whether or not, under the facts and circumstances in this case, the petitioners did
obtain the decree of February 12, 1908, by means of fraud.
It might be urged that the appellee has been deprived of his property without due
process of law, in violation of section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
known as the Philippine Bill," which provides "that no law shall be enacted in the
said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law."
The Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition and
given notice by registered mail. This did not do the appellee any good, as he was
not notified; but he was made a party defendant, as we have said, by means of the
publication "to all whom it may concern." If this section of the Act is to be upheld
this must be declared to be due process of law.
Before examining the validity of this part of the Act it might be well to note the
history and purpose of what is known as the "Torrens Land Registration System."
This system was introduced in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens in 1857 and
was there worked out in its practicable form.
The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. As we
have said, upon the presentation in the Court of Land Registration of an application
for the registration of the title to lands, under this system, the theory of the law is
that all occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants, and other interested
persons are notified of the proceedings, and have have a right to appear in

opposition to such application. In other words, the proceeding is against the whole
word. This system was evidently considered by the Legislature to be a public
project when it passed Act No. 496. The interest of the community at large was
considered to be preferred to that of private individuals.
At the close of this nineteenth century, all civilized nations are coming to
registration of title to land, because immovable property is becoming more
and more a matter of commercial dealing, and there can be no trade without
security. (Dumas's Lectures, p. 23.)
The registered proprietor will no longer have reasons to fear that he may
evicted because his vendor had, unknown to him, already sold the and to a
third person. . . The registered proprietor may feel himself protected against
any defect in his vendor's title. (Id., p. 21.)
The following summary of benefits of the system of registration of titles,
made by Sir Robert Torrens, has been fully justified in its use:
First. It has substituted security for insecurity.
Second. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings,
and the time occupied from months to days.
Third. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage.
Fourth. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the
"three R's" can transact his own conveyancing.
Fifth. It affords protection against fraud.
Sixth. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good
holding titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical
defect, and has barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults. (Sheldon on
Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.)
The boldest effort to grapple with the problem of simplification of title to
land was made by Mr. (afterwards Sir Robert) Torrens, a layman, in South

Australia in 1857. . . . In the Torrens system title by registration takes the

place of "title by deeds" of the system under the "general" law. A sale of
land, for example, is effected by a registered transfer, upon which a
certificate of title is issued. The certificate is guaranteed by statute, and, with
certain exceptions, constitutes indefeasible title to the land mentioned
therein. Under the old system the same sale would be effected by a
conveyance, depending for its validity, apart from intrinsic flaws, on the
correctness of a long series of prior deeds, wills, etc. . . . The object of the
Torrens system, them, is to do away with the delay, uncertainty, and expense
of the old conveyancing system. (Duffy & Eagleson on The Transfer of Land
Act, 1890, pp. 2, 3, 5, 7.)
By "Torrens" system generally are meant those systems of registration of
transactions with interest in land whose declared object . . . is, under
governmental authority, to establish and certify to the ownership of an
absolute and indefeasible title to realty, and to simplify its transfer. (Hogg on
Australian Torrens system,supra, pp. 1, 2.)
Compensation for errors from assurance funds is provided in all countries in which
the Torrens system has been enacted. Cases of error no doubt will always occur.
The percentage of errors, as compared with the number of registered dealings in
Australia, is very small. In New South Wales there were, in 1889, 209, 894
registered dealings, the average risk of error being only 2 cents for each dealing.
In Queensland the risk of error was only 1 cents, the number of registered
dealings being 233,309. In Tasmania and in Western Australia not a cent was paid
for compensation for errors during the whole time of operation, (Dumas's
Lectures, supra, p. 96.) This system has been adopted in various countries of the
civilized world, including some of the States of the American Union, and practical
experience has demonstrated that it has been successful as a public project.
The validity of some of the provisions of the statutes adopting the Torrens system
has been the subject of judicial decision in the courts of the United States.
(People vs. Chase, 165 Ill., 527; State vs. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St., 575; People vs.
Simon, 176 Ill., 165; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)

Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission, known as the "Land Registration Act,"
was copied substantially from the Massachussetts law of 1898.
The Illinois and Massachusetts statutes were upheld by the supreme courts of those
States.
It is not enough to show a procedure to be unconstitutional to say that we
never heard of it before. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra; Hurtado vs. California, 110
U. S., 516.)
Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary
requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may
be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon
claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not
encounter any provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the
power of the court over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would
be impossible, were this not so, for it hardly would do to make a distinction
between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those
who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all.
(Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
This same doctrine is annunciated in Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S., 714); The Mary
(9 Cranch, 126); Mankin vs. Chandler (2 Brock., 125); Brown vs. Levee
Commission (50 Miss., 468); 2 Freeman, Judgments, 4th ed., secs. 606, 611.
If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some
particular person, with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds
his body, or to bar some individual claim or objection, so that only certain
persons are entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in personam,
although it may concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on
the other hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to
make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and
if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strenght of alleging facts
which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem.
(Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)

In the case of Hamilton vs. Brown (161 U. S., 256) a judgment of escheat was held
conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. In this
jurisdiction, by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, a
decree allowing or disallowing a will binds everybody, although the only notice of
the proceedings given is by general notice to all persons interested.
The supreme court Massachusetts, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (supra), did not
rest its judgment as to the conclusive effect of the decree upon the ground that the
State has absolute power to determine the persons to whom a man's property shall
go at his death, but upon the characteristics of a proceeding in rem. So we conclude
that the proceedings had in the case at bar, under all the facts and circumstances,
especially the absolute lack on the part of the petitioners of any dishonest intent to
deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure him, constitute due process
of law.
As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under the
provisions of sections 101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. 2365, 2366,
Compilation) we do not decide.
For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment appealed
from should be, and the same is hereby reversed and judgment entered in favor of
the petitioners in conformity with the decree of the lower court of February 12,
1908, without special ruling as to costs. It is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.
CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT G.R. No. 175485
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus -

CORONA, C.J, Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:

RENATO L. MATEO,
July 27, 2011
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The focus of this appeal is the faith that should be accorded to the Torrens title that
the seller holds at the time of the sale.
In its decision promulgated on August 31, 2006, [1] the Court of Appeals (CA)
declared that the respondent and his three brothers were the rightful owners of the
land in litis, and directed the Office of the Register of Deeds of Las Pias City to
cancel the transfer certificate of title (TCT) registered under the name of petitioner
Casimiro Development Corporation (CDC) and to issue in its place another TCT in
favor of the respondent and his three brothers. Thereby, the CA reversed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered on May 9, 2000 (dismissing
the respondents complaint for quieting of title and reconveyance upon a finding
that CDC had been a buyer in good faith of the land in litis and that the
respondents suit had already been time-barred).
Aggrieved, CDC brought its petition for review on certiorari.
Antecedents
The subject of this case is a registered parcel of land (property) with an area of
6,693 square meters, more or less, located in Barrio Pulang Lupa, Las Pias City,
that was originally owned by Isaias Lara, [2] the respondents maternal grandfather.
Upon the death of Isaias Lara in 1930, the property passed on to his children,
namely: Miguela, Perfecta and Felicidad, and a grandson, Rosauro (son of Perfecta
who had predeceased Isaias in 1920). In 1962, the co-heirs effected the transfer of
the full and exclusive ownership to Felicidad (whose married surname was Lara-

Mateo) under an agreement denominated as Pagaayos Na Gawa Sa Labas Ng

Hukuman.
Felicidad Lara-Mateo had five children, namely: Laura, respondent Renato, Cesar,
Candido, Jr. and Leonardo. With the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family,
a deed of salecovering the property was executed in favor of Laura, who, in 1967,
applied for land registration. After the application was granted, Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 6386 was issued in Lauras sole name.
In due course, the property now covered by OCT No. 6386 was used as
collateral to secure a succession of loans. The first loan was obtained from Bacoor
Rural Bank (Bacoor Bank). To repay the loan to Bacoor Bank and secure the
release of the mortgage, Laura borrowed funds from Parmenas Perez (Perez), who,
however, required that the title be meanwhile transferred to his name. Thus, OCT
No. 6386 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 438959 was
issued in the name of Perez. Subsequently, Laura recovered the property by
repaying the obligation with the proceeds of another loan obtained from Rodolfo
Pe (Pe), resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 438595, and in the issuance of
TCT No. S-91595 in Lauras name. She later executed a deed of sale in favor of Pe,
leading to the issuance of TCT No. S-91738 in the name of Pe, who in turn
constituted a mortgage on the property in favor of China Banking Corporation
(China Bank) as security for a loan. In the end, China Bank foreclosed the
mortgage, and consolidated its ownership of the property in 1985 after Pe failed to
redeem. Thus, TCT No. (99527) T-11749-A was issued in the name of China Bank.
In 1988, CDC and China Bank negotiated and eventually came to terms on the
purchase of the property, with China Bank executing a deed of conditional sale for
the purpose. On March 4, 1993, CDC and China Bank executed a deed of absolute
sale over the property. Resultantly, on March 29, 1993, CDC was issued TCT No.
T-34640 in its own name.
In the meanwhile, on February 28, 1991, Felicidad died intestate.
On June 6, 1991, CDC brought an action for unlawful detainer in the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) in Las Pias City against the respondents siblings, namely:
Cesar, Candido, Jr., and Leonardo, and the other occupants of the property.
Therein, the defendants maintained that the MeTC did not have jurisdiction over

the action because the land was classified as agricultural; that the jurisdiction
belonged to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB);
that they had been in continuous and open possession of the land even before
World War II and had presumed themselves entitled to a government grant of the
land; and that CDCs title was invalid, considering that the land had been registered
before its being declared alienable.[3]

On October 19, 1992, the MeTC ruled in favor of CDC, viz:

The Court, after careful consideration of the facts and the laws
applicable to this case[,] hereby resolves:
1. On the issue of jurisdiction.
The defendants alleged that the land in question is an agricultural
land by presenting a Tax Declaration Certificate classifying the land
as FISHPOND. The classification of the land in a tax declaration
certificate as a fishpond merely refers to the use of the land in
question for the purpose of real property taxation. This alone would
not be sufficient to bring the land in question under the operation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
2. On the issue of open and adverse possession by the defendants.
It should be noted that the subject land is covered by a Transfer
Certificate of Title in the name of plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest
China Banking Corporation. Certificates of Title under the Torrens
System is indefeasible and imprescriptible. As between two persons
claiming possession, one having a [T]orrens title and the other has
none, the former has a better right.
3. On the issue of the nullity of the Certificate of Title.
The defense of the defendants that the subject property was a
forest land when the same was originally registered in 1967 and
hence, the registration is void[,] is not for this Court to decide[,] for
lack of jurisdiction. The certificate of title over the property must be

respected by this Court until it has been nullified by a competent

Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff[,] ordering the defendants
1. [sic] and all persons claiming right[s] under it to vacate the
subject premises located at Pulang Lupa I, Las Pias, Metro Manila and
surrender the possession of the same to herein plaintiff;
2. to pay the plaintiff reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the subject premises hereby fixed at (P100.00) one
hundred pesos a month starting November 22, 1990 (the time when
the demand letter to vacate was given) until defendants actually vacate
the property;
No pronouncement as to costs and attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The decision of the MeTC was assailed in the RTC via petition
for certiorari and prohibition. The RTC resolved against CDC, and held that the
MeTC had acted without jurisdiction because the land, being a fishpond, was
agricultural; hence, the dispute was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
DARAB pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988).[5]
CDC appealed to the CA, which, on January 25, 1996, found in favor of
CDC, declaring that the MeTC had jurisdiction. As a result, the CA reinstated the
decision of the MeTC.[6]
On appeal (G.R. No. 128392), the Court affirmed the CAs decision in favor
of CDC, ruling thusly:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution in CA- G.R. SP No. 34039, dated January
25, 1996 and February 21, 1997 respectively, are AFFIRMED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.[7]
The decision in G.R. No. 128392 became final.
Nonetheless, on June 29, 1994, the respondent brought an action for quieting
of title, reconveyance of four-fifths of the land, and damages against CDC and
Laura in the RTC in Las Pias City entitled Renato L. Mateo v. Casimiro
Development Corporation and Laura Mateo de Castro. In paragraph 4 of his
complaint, he stated that he was bringing this action to quiet title on behalf of
himself and of his three (3) brothers Cesar, Leonardo, and Candido, Jr., all
surnamed MATEO in his capacity as one of the co-owners of a parcel of land
situated at Barrio Pulang Lupa, Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila.
On May 9, 2001, the RTC held in favor of CDC, disposing:
WHEREFORE, and by strong preponderance of evidence,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant Casimiro
Development Corporation and against the plaintiff Renato L. Mateo
by (1) Dismissing the complaint, and upholding the validity and
indefeasibility of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34640 in the name
of Casimiro Development Corporation; (2) Ordering the plaintiff
Renato Mateo to pay defendant Casimiro Development Corporation
the sum of [a] P200,000.00 as compensatory damages;
[b] P200,000.00 as attorneys fees; and [c] to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On appeal (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 71696), the CA promulgated its decision on August
31, 2006, reversing the RTC and declaring CDC to be not a buyer in good faith due
to its being charged with notice of the defects and flaws of the title at the time it
acquired the property from China Bank, and decreeing:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 9, 2001 of Branch 225,
Regional Trial Court, Las Pias City in Civil Case No. 94-2045 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered:

(1)
Declaring appellant Renato Mateo and his brothers and coowners Cesar, Candido, Jr., and Leonardo, all surnamed Mateo as well
as his sister, Laura Mateo de Castro as the rightful owners of the
parcel of land, subject of this case; and
(2)
Ordering the Register of Deeds of Las Pias City, Metro-Manila to
cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34640 under the name of appellee
Casimiro Development Corporation, and that a new one be issued in favor of
the appellant and his co-heirs and siblings, mentioned above as coowners pro indiviso of the said parcel.
(3)

No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[9]

The CA denied CDCs motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this appeal, in which CDC urges that the CA committed serious
errors of law,[10] as follows:
(A) xxx in failing to rule that the decree of registration over the
Subject Property is incontrovertible and no longer open to review
or attack after the lapse of one (1) year from entry of such decree
of registration in favor of Laura Mateo de Castro.
(B) xxx in failing to rule that the present action is likewise barred
by res judicata.
(C) xxx in failing to rule that the instant action for quieting of title
and reconveyance under PD No. 1529 cannot prosper because the
Subject Property had already been conveyed and transferred to
third parties who claimed adverse title for themselves.
(D) xxx in failing to rule that the action of respondent for quieting of
title, reconveyance and damages is barred by laches.

(E) xxx in ruling that the Subject Property must be reconveyed to

respondent because petitioner Casimiro Development Corporation
is not a purchaser in good faith.
CDC argues that it was a buyer in good faith; and that the CA did not rule on
matters that fortified its title in the property, namely: (a) the incontrovertibility of
the title of Laura; (b) the action being barred by laches and res judicata; and (c) the
property having been conveyed to third parties who had then claimed adverse title.
The respondent counters that CDC acquired the property from China Bank
in bad faith, because it had actual knowledge of the possession of the property by
the respondent and his siblings; that CDC did not actually accept delivery of the
possession of the property from China Bank; and that CDC ignored the failure of
China Bank to warrant its title.
Ruling
We grant the petition.
1.
Indefeasibility of title in
the name of Laura
As basis for recovering the possession of the property, the respondent has assailed
the title of Laura.
We cannot sustain the respondent.
There is no doubt that the land in question, although once a part of the public
domain, has already been placed under the Torrens system of land registration. The
Government is required under the Torrens system of registration to issue an official
certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named in the certificate is the
owner of the property therein described, subject to such liens and encumbrances as
thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves.[11] The objective is to obviate
possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the
Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further.

The Torrens system gives the registered owner complete peace of mind, in order
that he will be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed
of any right over the covered land.[12]
The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a
person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the sellers title thereto is
valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was
ineffectual after all, which will not only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will
also erode public confidence in the system and will force land transactions to be
attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of
ownership. The further consequence will be that land conflicts can be even more
abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of
the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued
thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.[13]
Yet, registration under the Torrens system, not being a mode of acquiring
ownership, does not create or vest title.[14] The Torrens certificate of title is merely
an evidence of ownership or title in the particular property described therein.[15] In
that sense, the issuance of the certificate of title to a particular person does not
preclude the possibility that persons not named in the certificate may be co-owners
of the real property therein described with the person named therein, or that the
registered owner may be holding the property in trust for another person.[16]
Nonetheless, it is essential that title registered under the Torrens system
becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible.[17]
The land in question has been covered by a Torrens certificate of title (OCT
No. 6386 in the name of Laura, and its derivative certificates) before CDC became
the registered owner by purchase from China Bank. In all that time, neither the
respondent nor his siblings opposed the transactions causing the various transfers.
In fact, the respondent admitted in his complaint that the registration of the land in
the name of Laura alone had been with the knowledge and upon the agreement of
the entire Lara-Mateo family. It is unthinkable, therefore, that the respondent, fully
aware of the exclusive registration in her sister Lauras name, allowed more than 20

years to pass before asserting his claim of ownership for the first time through this
case in mid-1994. Making it worse for him is that he did so only after CDC had
commenced the ejectment case against his own siblings.
Worthy of mention is that Candido, Jr., Leonardo, and Cesars defense in the
ejectment case brought by CDC against them was not predicated on a claim of their
ownership of the property, but on their being agricultural lessees or tenants of
CDC. Even that defense was ultimately rejected by this Court by observing in G.R.
No. 128392 as follows:
With regard to the first element, the petitioners have tried to
prove that they are tenants or agricultural lessees of the respondent
corporation, CDC, by showing that the land was originally owned by
their grandfather, Isaias Lara, who gave them permission to work the
land, and that CDC is merely a successor-in-interest of their
grandfather. It must be noted that the petitioners failed to adequately
prove their grandfathers ownership of the land. They merely showed
six tax declarations. It has been held by this Court that, as against a
transfer certificate of title, tax declarations or receipts are not adequate
proofs of ownership. Granting arguendo that the land was really
owned by the petitioners grandfather, petitioners did not even attempt
to show how the land went from the patrimony of their grandfather to
that of CDC. Furthermore, petitioners did not prove, but relied on
mere allegation, that they indeed had an agreement with their
grandfather to use the land.
As for the third element, there is apparently no consent between
the parties. Petitioners were unable to show any proof of consent from
CDC to work the land. For the sake of argument, if petitioners were
able to prove that their grandfather owned the land, they nonetheless
failed to show any proof of consent from their grandfather to work the
land. Since the third element was not proven, the fourth element
cannot be present since there can be no purpose to a relationship to
which the parties have not consented.[18]
The respondents attack against the title of CDC is likewise anchored on his
assertion that the only purpose for having OCT No. 6386 issued in the sole name of
Laura was for Laura to hold the title in trust for their mother. This assertion cannot
stand, however, inasmuch as Lauras title had long ago become indefeasible.

Moreover, the respondents suit is exposed as being, in reality, a collateral

attack on the title in the name of Laura, and for that reason should not prosper.
Registration of land under the Torrens System, aside from perfecting the title and
rendering it indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders
the title immune from collateral attack. [19] A collateral attack occurs when, in
another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the present action, an
attack is made against the judgment granting the title. This manner of attack is to be
distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an
action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of
such judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled
under the judgment had been disposed of.[20]
2.
CDC was an innocent purchaser for value
The CA found that CDC acquired the property in bad faith because CDC had
knowledge of defects in the title of China Bank, including the adverse possession
of the respondents siblings and the supposed failure of China Bank to warrant its
title by inserting an as-is, where-is clause in its contract of sale with CDC.
The CA plainly erred in so finding against CDC.
To start with, one who deals with property registered under the Torrens
system need not go beyond the certificate of title, but only has to rely on the
certificate of title.[21]He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as
are annotated on the title.[22] The pertinent law on the matter of burdens and claims
is Section 44 of the Property Registration Decree,[23] which provides:
Section 44. Statutory liens affecting title. Every registered
owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land
taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold
the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on said
certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be
subsisting, namely:

First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws

and Constitution of the Philippines which are not by law required to
appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid against
subsequent purchasers or encumbrances of record.
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two
years immediately preceding the acquisition of any right over the land
by an innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to the right of
the government to collect taxes payable before that period from the
delinquent taxpayer alone.
Third. Any public highway or private way established or
recognized by law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral
thereof, if the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of
such highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been
determined.
Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use
thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to, Presidential Decree No. 27 or any
other law or regulations on agrarian reform.
In short, considering that China Banks TCT No. 99527 was a clean title, that
is, it was free from any lien or encumbrance, CDC had the right to rely, when it
purchased the property, solely upon the face of the certificate of title in the name of
China Bank.[24]
The CAs ascribing of bad faith to CDC based on its knowledge of the
adverse possession of the respondents siblings at the time it acquired the property
from China Bank was absolutely unfounded and unwarranted. That possession did
not translate to an adverse claim of ownership that should have put CDC on actual
notice of a defect or flaw in the China Banks title, for the respondents siblings
themselves, far from asserting ownership in their own right, even characterized
their possession only as that of mere agricultural tenants. Under no law was
possession grounded on tenancy a status that might create a defect or inflict a flaw
in the title of the owner. Consequently, due to his own admission in his complaint
that the respondents own possession was not any different from that of his siblings,
there was really nothing factually or legally speaking that ought to have alerted

CDC or, for that matter, China Bank and its predecessors-in-interest, about any
defect or flaw in the title.
The vendees notice of a defect or flaw in the title of the vendor, in order for it to
amount to bad faith, should encompass facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious person to make further inquiry into the vendors title, [25] or facts
and circumstances that would induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the
status of the title of the property in litigation.[26] In other words, the presence of
anything that excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look
beyond the certificate and to investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the
face of said certificate.[27]
And, secondly, the CA grossly erred in construing the as-is, where-is clause
contained in the deed of sale between CDC (as vendee) and China Bank (as
vendor) as proof or manifestation of any bad faith on the part of CDC. On the
contrary, the as-is, where-is clause did not affect the title of China Bank because it
related only to the physical condition of the property upon its purchase by CDC.
The clause only placed on CDC the burden of having the occupants removed from
the property. In a sale made on an as-is, where-isbasis, the buyer agrees to take
possession of the things sold in the condition where they are found and from the
place where they are located, because the phrase as-is, where-ispertains solely to
the physical condition of the thing sold, not to its legal situation and is merely
descriptive of the state of the thing sold without altering the sellers responsibility to
deliver the property sold to the buyer.[28]
What the foregoing circumstances ineluctably indicate is that CDC, having
paid the full and fair price of the land, was an innocent purchaser for value, for,
according toSandoval v. Court of Appeals:[29]
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another,
without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in,
such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of
such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some
other persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief that
the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could
convey title to the property. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts

which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he
acted in good faith.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari; set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 71696; dismiss the complaint
in Civil Case No. 94-2045; and declare Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34640 in
the name of Casimiro Development Corporation valid and subsisting.
The respondent shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-8936

October 2, 1915

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffsappellants,

vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
D.R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the
district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between
the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.

Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of
said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of
the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate
provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the
wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of
Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th
day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the
original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot
given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs
discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them
had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They
immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an
adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the
registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to
the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the
petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any
objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the
defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the
owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the
registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the
judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it.
In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the
registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it,
even though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory
to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in

fact, belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory should
be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already
lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same
registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right,
may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for
registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the
wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the
proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a
portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the
affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land
registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put
a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were
noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent
thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals
of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing
his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of
land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil.
Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and
binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands
(supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil.
Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S.,
47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an
ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the
registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent
third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed
by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving
notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration
proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to
again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very
purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not
give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect
title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The

certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct

statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the
absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its
owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some
direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would
be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in
a collateralproceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the
period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the
registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no
provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present.
There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which
has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a
particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same
parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future
litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not
parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted
in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions
which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated,
even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the
torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The
title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one
can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different
persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some
jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been
settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the courts.
Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823,
says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to
include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in

the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate.
(Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155;
Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register
of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it
can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to
written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior
date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two
certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens
System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his
"Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general
question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier
in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is
issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under
the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed
to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived
directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate
issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the
case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered
owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two
certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one
continues to hold the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all
the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such
decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of
any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land
or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file
in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry
of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has
acquired an interest.

It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be
opened, for any reason, in any court,except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after
the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened
for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such
decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of
the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe the
law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right
of the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the
name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things,
that when one piece of real property had been sold to two different persons it shall
belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of
course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the
land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration.
While we do not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are
applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto,
yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a
persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double
registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in
consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of
the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land
Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall
prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of
the appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with
notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became
defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right,
and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application. Through their
failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default
judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating
such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their own
omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a

court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands

with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is
to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title
then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot
rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the
expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his
registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all.
Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their
title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right of
the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and
sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to
adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such
damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the
respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first
negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he
can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He
was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the
name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such
registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he
became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants.
He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as
the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the
wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the
appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the
validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the
appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act,
that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule
between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the
owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the
error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The

general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his
vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the
vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the
owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt
upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38,
55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be
protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of
available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of
the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or
interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to
enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of
said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in
his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an
"innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have
been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in
favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to
the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an
"innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent
purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would
be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be applied
.Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent
purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said sections? These
questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and
effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original
certificate" ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or
interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee?
The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued
until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with
the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded,
or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The
purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed

to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well established that
it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National
Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710
[a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice
of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
(Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97;
Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351;
McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases,
341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is
charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise
the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such
presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record
contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which
the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation
would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of
conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to
be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is
indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts
allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of
ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a
purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its
existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien?
Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the
mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona
fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the

existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of
what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule
that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The
fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men,
at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is
mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the
defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from
the owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part
or all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the
vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be
applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser
should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent
purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original
certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the
vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He,
in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in
another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains
precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an
innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name
other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties
we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent
purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where
unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens
system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the
original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world.
That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that
part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose,
for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system.
Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer
the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an
"innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of
said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the appellants
precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the

registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of
notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be
answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in
harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the
appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and
his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a
mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who
has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his
successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had
acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of
their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by
reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he
is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting
from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who
was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties
resulting from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent
transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former
registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens system.
We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens
system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be
sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is
registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be
examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal
rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has
complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be
and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and
exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to
make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore

made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the
predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TRENT, J., dissenting:

I dissent.
In cases of double or overlapping registration, I am inclined to agree with the
reasoning and authority on which it is held in the majority opinion (first) that the
original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the original
holder of the later certificate, where there has been no transfer of title by either
party to an innocent purchaser; both, as is shown in the majority opinion, being at
fault in permitting the double registration to take place; (second) that an innocent
purchaser claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the
original holder of the later certificate, and also as against innocent purchasers from
the holder of the later certificate; the innocent purchaser being in no wise at fault in
connection with the issuance of the later certificate.
But I am of opinion that neither the authorities cited, nor the reasoning of the
majority opinion sustains the proposition that the original holder of the prior
certificate is entitled to the land as against an innocent purchaser from the holder of
the later certificate.

As to the text-book authorities cited in the majority opinion, it is sufficient to say

that the rules laid down by both Hogg and Niblack are mere general rules,
admittedly subject to exception, and of course of no binding force or authority
where the reasoning upon which these rules are based is applicable to the facts
developed in a particular case.
In its last analysis the general rule laid down in the majority opinion rests upon the
proposition set forth in the last page of the opinion wherein it is said that "it would
seem to be a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights
in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied
with all the requirements of the law should be protected." The rule, as applied to
the matter in hand, may be stated as follows: It would seem to be a just and
equitable rule when two persons have acquired separate and independent registered
titles to the same land, under the Land Registration Act, to hold that the one who
first acquired registered title and who has complied with all the requirements of the
law in that regard should be protected, in the absence of any express statutory
provision to the contrary.
Thus stated I have no quarrel with the doctrine as a statement of the general rule to
be applied in cases of double or overlapping registration under the Land
Registration Act; for it is true as stated in the majority opinion that in the
adjudication and registration of titles by the Courts of Land Registration "mistakes
are bound to occur, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable;" and
that in the absence of statutory provisions covering such cases, "it is the duty of the
courts to adjust the rights of the parties, under such circumstances, so as to
minimize such damages, taking into consideration all of the conditions, and the
diligence of the respective parties to avoid them."
But like most such general rules, it has its exceptions and should not be applied in
a case wherein the reasons on which it is based do not exist, or in cases wherein
still more forceful reasons demand the application of a contrary rule.
The general rule relied upon in the majority opinion is a mere application of a well
settled equity rule that: "Where conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit,
that which first occurred will be given the preference." But it is universally laid
down by all the courts which have had occasion to apply this equity rule that "it

should be the last test resorted to," and that "it never prevails when any other
equitable ground for preference exists." (See 19 Cent. Dig., tit. Equity, par. 181;
and may cases cited in 16 Cyc., 139, note 57.) It follows that the general rules, that
in cases of double or overlapping registration the earlier certificate should be
protected, ought not to prevail so as to deprive an innocent purchaser under the
later certificate of his title of the earlier certificate contributed to the issuance of
the later certificate. Hence the holder of the earlier certificate of title should not be
heard to invoke the"just and equitable rule" as laid down in the majority opinion,
in order to have his own title protected and the title of an innocent purchaser of a
later certificate cancelled or annulled, in any case wherein it appears that the holder
of the later certificate was wholly without fault, while the holder of the issuance of
the later certificate, in that he might have prevented its issuance by merely entering
his appearance in court in response to lawful summons personally served upon him
in the course of the proceedings for the issuance of the second certificate, and
pleading his superior rights under the earlier certificate, instead of keeping silent
and by his silence permitting a default judgment to be entered against him
adjudicating title in favor of the second applicant.
The majority opinion clearly recognizes the soundness of the principles I am
contending for by reasoning (with which I am inclined to agree) whereby it
undertakes to demonstrate that as between the original holders of the double or
overlapping registration the general rule should prevail, because both such original
parties must held to have been fault and, their equities being equal, preference
should be given to the earlier title.
The majority opinion further recognizes the soundness of my contention by the
reasoning whereby it undertakes to sustain the application of the general rule in
favor of the original holder of the earlier certificate against purchasers from the
original holder of the later certificate, by an attempt to demonstrate that such
purchasers can in no event be held to be innocent purchasers; because, as it is said,
negligence may and should always be imputed to such a purchaser, so that in no
event can he claim to be without fault when it appears that the lands purchased by
him from the holder of a duly registered certificate of title are included within the
bounds of the lands described in a certificate of title of an earlier date.

At considerable length the majority opinion (in reliance upon the general rule laid
down under the various systems of land registration, other than those based on the
torrens system) insists that a purchaser of land land duly registered in the Land
Registration Court, is charged with notice of the contents of each and every one of
the thousands and tens of thousands of certificates of registry on file in the land
registry office, so that negligence may be imputed to him if he does not ascertain
that all or any part of the land purchased by him is included within the boundary
lines of any one of the thousands or tens of thousands of tracts of land whose
original registry bears an earlier date than the date of the original registry of the
land purchased by him. It is contended that he cannot claim to be without fault
should he buy such land because, as it is said, it was possible for him to discover
that the land purchased by him had been made the subject of double or overlapping
registration by a comparison of the description and boundary lines of the thousands
of tracts and parcels of land to be found in the land registry office.
But such ruling goes far to defeat one of the principal objects sought to be attained
by the introduction and adoption of the so-called torrens system for the registration
of land. The avowed intent of that system of land registration is to relieve the
purchase of registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than the
certificate of title of the vendor in order that he may rest secure as to the validity of
the title to the lands conveyed to him. And yet it is said in the majority opinion that
he is charged with notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in the
office of the registrar so that his failure to acquaint himself with its contents may
be imputed to him as negligence.
If the rule announced in the majority opinion is to prevail, the new system of land
registration, instead of making transfers of real estate simple, expenditious and
secure, and instead of avoiding the necessity for expensive and oftimes uncertain
searches of the land record and registries, in order to ascertain the true condition of
the title before purchase, will, in many instances, add to the labor, expense and
uncertainty of any attempt by a purchaser to satisfy himself as to the validity of the
title to lands purchased by him.
As I have said before, one of the principal objects, if not the principal object, of the
torrens system of land registration upon which our Land Registration Act is

avowedly modelled is to facilitate the transfer of real estate. To that end the
Legislature undertakes to relieve prospective purchasers and all others dealing in
registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title to
such lands furnished by the Court of Land Registration, and I cannot, therefore,
give my consent to a ruling which charges a purchaser or mortgage of registered
lands with notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in the land
registry, so that negligence and fault may be imputed to him should he be exposed
to loss or damages as a result of the lack of such knowledge.
Suppose a prospective purchaser of lands registered under the Land Registration
Act desires to avoid the imputation of negligence in the event that, unknown to
him, such lands have been made the subject of double or overlapping registration,
what course should he pursue? What measures should he adopt in order to search
out the information with notice of which he is charged? There are no indexes to
guide him nor is there anything in the record or the certificate of title of the land he
proposes to buy which necessarily or even with reasonable probability will furnish
him a clue as to the fact of the existence of such double or overlapping registration.
Indeed the only course open to him, if he desires to assure himself against the
possibility of double or overlapping registration, would even seem to be a careful,
laborious and extensive comparison of the registered boundary lines contained in
the certificate of title of the tract of land he proposes to buy with those contained in
all the earlier certificates of title to be found in the land registry. Assuredly it was
never the intention of the author of the new Land Registration Act to impose such a
burden on a purchaser of duly registered real estate, under penalty that a lack of the
knowledge which might thus be acquired may be imputed to him by this court as
negligence in ruling upon the respective equities of the holders of lands which have
been the subject of double or overlapping registration.
On the other hand, I think that negligence and fault may fairly be imputed to a
holder of a registered certificate of title who stood supinely by and let a default
judgment be entered against him, adjudicating all or any part of his registered lands
to another applicant, if it appears that he was served with notice or had actual
notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the Court of Land Registration
wherein such default judgment was entered.

The owner of land who enjoys the benefits secured to him by its registry in the
Court of Land Registration may reasonably be required to appear and defend his
title when he has actual notice that proceedings are pending in that court wherein
another applicant, claiming the land as his own, is seeking to secure its registry in
his name. All that is necessary for him to do is to enter his appearance in those
proceedings, invite the court's attention to the certificate of title registered in his
name, and thus, at the cost of the applicant, avoid all the damage and
inconvenience flowing from the double or overlapping registration of the land in
question. There is nothing in the new system of land registration which seems to
render it either expedient or necessary to relieve a holder of a registered title of the
duty of appearing and defending that title, when he has actual notice that it is being
attacked in a court of competent jurisdiction, and if, as a result of his neglect or
failure so to do, his lands become subject to double or overlapping registration, he
should not be permitted to subject an innocent purchaser, holding under the later
certificate, to all the loss and damage resulting from the double or overlapping
registration, while he goes scot free and holds the land under a manifest
misapplication of the equitable rule that "where conflicting equities are otherwise
equal in merit, that which first accrued will be given the preference." It is only
where both or neither of the parties are at fault that the rule is properly applicable
as between opposing claimants under an earlier and a later certificate of registry to
the same land.
Of course all that is said in the briefs of counsel and the majority opinion as to the
right of the holder of a certificate to rest secure in his registered title so that those
dealing with registered lands can confidently rely upon registry certificates thereto
is equally forceful by way of argument in favor of the holder of one or the other
certificate in case of double or overlapping registration. The problem is to
determine which of the certificate holders is entitled to the land. The decision of
that question in favor of either one must necessarily have the effect of destroying
the value of the registered title of the other and to that extent shaking the public
confidence in the value of the whole system for the registration of lands. But, in the
language of the majority opinion, "that mistakes are bound to occur cannot be
denied and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the
courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize

the damages, taking into consideration all the conditions and the diligence of the
respective parties to avoid them."lawphil.net
It will be observed that I limit the exception to the general equitable rule, as laid
down in the majority opinion, to case wherein the holder of the earlier certificate of
title has actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the course of which the
latter certificate of title was issued, or to cases in which he has received personal
notice of the pendency of those proceedings. Unless he has actual notice of the
pendency of such proceedings I readily agree with the reasoning of the majority
opinion so far as it holds that negligence, culpable negligence, should not be
imputed to him for failure to appear and defend his title so as to defeat his right to
the benefit of the equitable rule. It is true that the order of publication in such cases
having been duly complied with, all the world is charged with notice thereof, but it
does not necessarily follow that, in the absence of actual notice, culpable
negligence in permitting a default judgment to be entered against him may be
imputed to the holder of the earlier certificate so as to defeat his right to the land
under the equitable rule favoring the earlier certificate. Such a holding would have
the effect (to quote the language of the majority opinion) of requiring the holder of
a certificate of title to wait indefinitely "in the portals of the court" and to sit in
the "mirador de su casa" in order to avoid the possibility of losing his lands; and I
agree with the writer of the majority opinion that to do so would place an
unreasonable burden on the holders of such certificate, which was not
contemplated by the authors of the Land Registration Act. But no unreasonable
burden is placed upon the holder of a registered title by a rule which imputes
culpable negligence to him when he sits supinely by and lets a judgment in default
be entered against him adjudicating title to his lands in favor of another applicant,
despite the fact that he has actual knowledge of the pendency of the proceedings in
which such judgment is entered and despite the fact that he has been personally
served with summons to appear and default his title.
"Taking into consideration all of the conditions and the diligence of the respective
parties," it seems to me that there is no "equality in merit" between the conflicting
equities set up by an innocent purchaser who acquires title to the land under a
registered certificate, and the holder of an earlier certificate who permitted a

default judgment to be entered against him, despite actual notice of the pendency
of the proceedings in the course of which the later certificate was issued.
I am convinced, furthermore, that aside from the superior equities of the innocent
purchaser in cases such as that now under discussion, there are strong reasons of
convenience and public policy which militate in favor of the recognition of his title
rather than that of the holder of the earlier title.
One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or dealing in registered lands to
unknown, unspecified and uncertain dangers, to guard against which all such
persons will be put to additional cost, annoyance and labor on every occasion when
any transaction is had with regard to such lands; while the other ruling tends to
eliminate consequences so directly adverse to the purpose and object for which the
land registration law was enacted, and imposes no burden upon any holder of a
certificate of registered lands other than that of defending his title on those rare,
definite and specific occasions wherein he has actual notice that his title is being
challenged in a Court of Land Registration, a proceeding in which the cost and
expense is reduced to the minimum by the conclusive character of his certificate of
title in support of his claim of ownership. Furthermore, judgment against the
innocent purchaser and in favor of the holder of the earlier certificate in a case such
as that under consideration must inevitably tend to increase the danger of double or
overlapping registrations by encouraging holders of registered titles, negligently or
fraudulently and conclusively, to permit default judgments to be entered against
them adjudicating title to all or a part of their registered lands in favor of other
applicants, despite actual notice of the pendency of judicial proceedings had for
that purpose, and this, without adding in any appreciable degree to the security of
thir titles, and merely to save them the very slight trouble or inconvenience
incident to an entry of appearance in the court in which their own titles were
secured, and inviting attention to the fact that their right, title and ownership in the
lands in questions has already been conclusively adjudicated.
The cases wherein there is a practical possibility of double or overlapping
registration without actual notice to the holder of the earlier certificate must in the
very nature of things to be so rare as to be practically negligible. Double or
overlapping registration almost invariably occurs in relation to lands held by

adjoining occupants or claimants. It is difficult to conceive of a case wherein

double registration can take place, in the absence of fraud, without personal service
of notice of the pendency of the proceedings upon the holder of the earlier
certificate, the statute requiring such notice to be served upon the owner or
occupant of all lands adjoining those for which application for registration is made;
and the cases wherein an adjoining land owner can, even by the use of fraud,
conduct proceedings for the registration of his land to a successful conclusion
without actual notice to the adjoining property owners must be rare indeed.
In the case at bar the defendant purchased the land in question from the original
holder of a certificate of title issued by the Court of Land Registration, relying
upon the records of the Court of Land Registration with reference thereto and with
no knowledge that any part of the land thus purchased was included in an earlier
certificate of title issued to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, the holder of the earlier
certificate of title, negligently permitted a default judgment to be entered against
him in the Court of Land Registration, adjudicating part of the lands included in his
own certificate of title in favor of another applicant, from whom the defendant in
this action acquired title, and this despite the fact that he was an adjoining land
owner, had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings and was personally
served with summons to appear and defends his rights in the premises. It seems to
me that there can be no reason for doubt as to the respective merits of the equities
of the parties, and further that the judgment of the majority in favor of the plaintiff
will inevitably tend to increase the number of cases wherein registered land owners
in the future will fail to appear and defend their titles when challenged in other
proceedings in the Courts of Land Registration, thereby enormously increasing the
possibility and probability of loss and damage to innocent third parties and dealers
in registered lands generally, arising out of erroneous, double or overlapping
registration of lands by the Courts of Land Registration.
Carson, J., concurs.

[G.R. No. 14167. August 14, 1919. ]

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner and

appellee. ANTIPAS VAZQUEZ and BASILIO GAYARES, PetitionersAppellants, v. RUFINA ABURAL ET. AL., objectors-appellees.
Cohn & Fisher, for Appellants.
Hilado & Hilado, for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; PURPOSE. The prime
purpose of the Torrens System, as established in the Philippine Islands by the Land
Registration Law (Act No. 496), is to decree land titles that shall be final,
irrevocable, and indisputable.
2. ID.; CADASTRAL SYSTEM; PURPOSE. The purpose of the offspring of
the Torrens System here known as the Cadastral System, as established in the
Philippine Islands by the Cadastral Act (No. 2259), is, like the purpose of the
Torrens System, proper incontestability of title. As stated in Section 1 of the
Cadastral Act, the purpose is to serve the public interest, by requiring that the titles
to any lands "be settled and adjudicated."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. ID.; ID.; PROCEEDINGS. Many precautions are taken to guard against
injustice.
4. ID.; ID.; ID. After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first
adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This constitutes the
decision the judgment the decree of the court. The second action is the
declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the issuance of the
certificates of title by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. Such order is
made if within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision no
appeal is taken from the decision. The third and last action devolves upon the
General Land Registration Office.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINALITY OF DECREE. For a decree to exist in legal
contemplation, it is not necessary to await the preparation of a so-called decree by
the Land Registration Office.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Cadastral proceedings commenced. Notice published in the
Official Gazette. Trial judge also issued general notice. S asks for the registration
in his name of lot No. 1608. Hearing had. On September 21, 1916, the court in a

decree awarded the lot to S. On November 23, 1916, the time for an appeal having
passed, the court declares the decree final. On July 23, 1917, before the issuance
by the Land Registration Office of the so-called technical decree, V and G ask that
the case be reopened to receive proof relative to the ownership of the lot. Motion
denied by the trial court. Held: That since the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of September 21, 1916, has become final, and since no action was taken
within the time provided by law for the prosecution of an appeal by bill of
exceptions, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction, and the appeal must be
dismissed.
7. ID.; ID.; RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. Whether Sections 113 and 513 of the
Code of Civil Procedure apply to cadastral proceedings, quare.
8. GENERAL LAND REGISTRATION OFFICE. The General Land
Registration Office has been instituted "for the due effectuation and
accomplishment of the laws relative to the registration of land." (Administrative
Code of 1917, Sec. 174.)
DECISION
MALCOLM, J. :
The principal question which this appeal presents is When does the registration
of title, under the Torrens System of Land Registration, especially under the
different Philippine laws establishing the Cadastral System, become final,
conclusive, and indisputable? The supplementary questions are At what stage of
the cadastral proceedings does a decree exist in legal contemplation? Does it exist
from the moment that the court, after hearing the evidence, adjudicates the land in
favor of a person and then, or later decrees the land in favor of this person, or does
it exist when the Chief of the Land Registration Office transcribes the adjudication
in the prescribed form?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Cadastral proceedings were commenced in the municipality of Hinigaran, Province
of Occidental Negros, upon an application of the Director of Lands, on June 16,
1916. Notice of the proceedings were published in the Official Gazette as provided

by law. The trial judge also issued general notice to all interested parties. Among
others, Victoriano Siguenza presented an answer asking for registration in his name
of lot No. 1608. The instant petitioners, Antipas Vazquez and Basilio Gayares,
although said to reside in this municipality, and although said to have participated
in other cadastral cases, did not enter any opposition as to this lot. Hearing was had
during September, 1916. On September 21 of this year, the court issued the
following decree:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is hereby decreed that, upon a previous declaration of general default, the
following lots be adjudged and registered in the names of those persons whose
names appear next after the lots, and in accordance with the following conditions: .
..
"Lot No. 1608 with the improvements thereon to the conjugal partnership of
Victoriano Siguenza and Marcela Guanzon."cralaw virtua1aw library
On November 23 of the same year, the court declared final the foregoing decree in
the following language:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The decision rendered by the court in the above-entitled case having become final
on September 21, 1916, it is hereby ordered that the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office issue the decrees corresponding to the lots adjudged by said
decision.
"An appeal having however been interposed as to the lots enumerated as follows,
the decrees thereon, must be suspended until further order by this
court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Lot No. 521.
Eight months later, that is, on July 23, 1917, but before the issuance by the Land
Registration Office of the so-called technical decree, Antipas Vazquez and Basilio
Gayares, the latter as guardian of the minor Estrella Vazquez, came into the case
for the first time. The petitioners, after setting forth their right of ownership in lot
No. 1608, and that it was included in their "Hacienda Santa Filomena," and after
stating that they were in complete ignorance of the proceedings, asked that the
judgment of the court be annulled and that the case be reopened to receive proof
relative to the ownership of the lot. Counsel for Victoriano Siguenza answered by
counter-motion, asking the court to dismiss the motion presented on behalf of
Vazquez and Gayares. The court denied the motion for a new trial on the theory

that there being a decree already rendered and no allegation of fraud having been
made, the court lacked jurisdiction. It may also be stated parenthetically that
counsel for Vazquez and Gayares made an unsuccessful attempt in the Supreme
Court, through mandamus, to have the record completed by the taking of
evidence.
In order that the matter may not be confused, let it again be made clear that counsel
for petitioners have not raised the question of fraud as provided for in Section 38 of
the Land Registration Law, nor have they asked to be relieved from a judgment or
order, pursuant to Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, because of mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. As a matter of fact, they could not
well claim fraud because all the proceedings were public and free from any
suspicion of chicanery. As a matter of fact, also, any special reliance on Section
113 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not get them anywhere because more
than six months had elapsed after the issuance of a judgment in this case. The issue
fundamentally becomes one of whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction
over the appeal, since if the judgment and the supplemental decree issued by the
Judge of the Court of First Instance on September 21, 1916, and November 23,
1916, respectively, have become final, petitioners may no bring their appeal before
this court, because the time for the filing of their bill of exceptions has expired;
while, if the cadastral proceedings did not become final until the formal decree was
issued by the Land Registration Office, then it was proper for them to ask for a
reopening of the case, and it would, consequently, be just as proper for this court to
order the trial court to permit the same.
OPINION.
The prime purpose of the Torrens System is, as has been repeatedly stated, to
decree land titles that shall be final, irrevocable, and indisputable. Incontestability
of title is the goal. All due precaution must accordingly be taken to guard against
injustice to interested individuals who, for some good reason, may not be able to
protect their rights. Nevertheless, even at the cost of possible cruelty which may
result in exceptional cases, it does become necessary in the interest of the public
weal to enforce registration laws. No stronger words can be found than those
appearing in Section 38 of the Land Registration Law (Act No. 496) wherein it is
said that: "Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto. . .
. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description To all whom
it may concern, Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy,

or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any
court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any
person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration
obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration (Court of First Instance)
a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired an interest."cralaw virtua1aw library
While such statements can be made of the Torrens System proper, they become
even more incisive and peremptory when we come to consider the offspring of this
system, here known as the Cadastral System. Under the Torrens System proper,
whether action shall or shall not be taken is optional with the solicitant. Under the
Cadastral System, pursuant to initiative on the part of the Government, titles for all
the land within a stated area, are adjudicated whether or not the people living
within this district desire to have titles issued. The purpose, as stated in section one
of the Cadastral Act (NO. 2259), is to serve the public interests, by requiring that
the titles to any lands "be settled and adjudicated."cralaw virtua1aw library
Admitting that such compulsory registration of land and such excessive
interference with private property constitutes due process of law and that the Acts
providing for the same are constitutional, a question not here raised, yet a study of
the law indicates that many precautions are taken to guard against injustice. The
proceedings are initiated by a notice of survey. When the lands have been surveyed
and plotted, the Director of Lands, represented by the Attorney General, files a
petition in court praying that the titles to the lands named be settled and
adjudicated. Notice of the filing of the petition is then published twice in
successive issues of the Official Gazette in both the English and Spanish
languages. All persons interested are given the benefit of assistance by competent
officials and are informed of their rights. A trial is had. "All conflicting interests
shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees awarded in favor of the persons
entitled to the lands or the various parts thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall
be the bases of original certificates of title in favor of said persons." (Act No. 2259,
Sec. 11.) Aside from this, the commotion caused by the survey and a trial affecting
ordinarily many people, together with the presence of strangers in the community,
should serve to put all those affected on their guard.
After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first adjudicates
ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This constitutes the decision the
judgment the decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial manner. The second
action is the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the
issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land Registration Office.

Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the
decision no appeal is taken from the decision. This again is judicial action,
although to a less degree than the first.
The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office. This
office has been instituted "for the due effectuation and accomplishment of the laws
relative to the registration of land." (Administrative Code of 1917, Sec. 174.) An
official found in the office, known as the chief surveyor, has as one of his duties
"to prepare final decrees in all adjudicated cases." (Administrative Code of 1917,
Sec. 177.) This latter decree contains the technical description of the land and may
not be issued until a considerable time after the promulgation of the judgment. The
form for the decree used by the General Land Registration Office concludes with
the words: "Witness, the Honorable (name of the judge), on this the (date)." The
date that is used as authority for the issuance of the decree is the date when, after
hearing the evidence, the trial court decreed the adjudication and registration of the
land.
The judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the decree, is a
judicial act. As the law says, the judicial decree when final is the base of the
certificate of title. The issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office is
ministerial act. The date of the judgment, or more correctly stated, the date on
which the defeated party receives a copy of the decision, begins the running of the
time for the interposition of a motion for a new trial or for the perfection of an
appeal to the Supreme Court. The date of the title prepared by the Chief Surveyor
is unimportant, for the adjudication has taken place and all that is left to be
performed is the mere formulation of the technical description. If an unknown
individual could wait possibly years until the day before a surveyor gets around to
transcribing a technical description of a piece of land, the defeated party could just
as reasonably expect the same consideration for his appeal. As a matter of fact, the
so-called unknown is a party just as much as the known oppositor for notice is to
all the world, and the decree binds all the world.
Both counsel for petitioners and respondents rely upon the decision of this court in
the case of Tambunting v. Manuel ([1916], 35 Phil.; 699) . That case and the instant
case are not the same. In the Tambunting case the contest was really between two
parties each claiming to have a Torrens title; here one party has the title and the
other is seeking to oust him from his fortress. In the Tambunting case the
declaration of ownership but not the decree of registration had issued; here both
declaration and decree have issued. The doctrines announced in the decision in
Grey Alba v. De la Cruz ([1910], 17 Phil., 49) relating to general notice and the

indefensibility of land titles under the Torrens system are much more applicable
and can, with as much reason, be applied to the cadastral system.
As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final, conclusive
and indisputable, after the passage of the thirty-day period allowed for an appeal
from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of the court
adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken to perfect an appeal.
The prevailing party may then have execution of the judgment as of right and is
entitled to the certificate of title issued by the chief of the Land Registration Office.
The exception is the special provision providing for fraud.
Counsel for appellants and appellees have favored the court with able arguments
relative to the applicability of Sections 113 and 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure
to cadastral proceedings. The view we take of the case would make unprofitable
any discussion of this question.
It appearing that the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros
of September 21, 1916, has become final, and that no action was taken within the
time provided by law for the prosecution of an appeal by bill of exceptions, this
court is without jurisdiction. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed with costs against
the appellants. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Avancea and Moir, JJ., concur.
REYNALDO RODRIGUEZ G.R. No. 135817
and NANCY A. RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioners, Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

CONCORDIA ONG LIM,

EURESTES LIM AND
ELMER LIM, Promulgated:
Respondents.
November 30, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the spouses
Reynaldo and Nancy Rodriguez seeking the reversal of the Decision [1] dated July
18, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27440. The assailed decision
affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, Branch 58,
declaring, inter alia, Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. T-128607 in the names of
petitioners Reynaldo and Nancy Rodriguez null and void and directing them to
vacate the lots subject of litigation.Likewise sought to be reversed is the appellate
courts Resolution dated October 5, 1998 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

As culled from the respective decisions of the RTC of Lucena City, Branch 58
(court a quo) and the appellate court, the factual and procedural antecedents are as
follows:

Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. filed with the court a quo a complaint for cancellation of
certificate of title and injunction against the spouses Rodriguez. In his complaint,
Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. alleged that his mother, Dominga Goyma,[2] was the owner
of two parcels of land (subject lots). The first parcel,[3] containing an area of 28,051
square meters, more or less, is situated in the Sitio of Tulay-Buhangin, Barrio
Ilayang Palo, Municipality of Pagbilao, Province of Quezon. The second parcel,
[4]
containing an area of 260,590 sq m, more or less, is situated in the Sitio of
Tulay-Buhangin, Barrio of Laguimanoc, Municipality of Atimonan (now Padre
Burgos), Province of Quezon. The subject lots were registered in the name of
Dominga Goyma on February 6, 1948 under TCT No. T-2857.

Dominga Goyma died on July 19, 1971 and was survived by her only son, Pablo
Goyma Lim, Jr., a spurious son acknowledged and recognized by her.

The complaint also alleged that during her lifetime, Dominga Goyma exclusively
possessed the subject lots and upon her death, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. succeeded to
all her rights of ownership and possession. However, the spouses Rodriguez,
despite their knowledge that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., was now the owner and
possessor of the subject lots, allegedly unlawfully and fraudulently made it appear
that they had purchased the subject lots from persons who were not the owners
thereof.

The spouses Rodriguez allegedly caused the cancellation of TCT No. T-2857
despite the fact that the owners duplicate copy thereof was in the possession of
Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. On February 10, 1975, TCT No. T-128605 was issued in the
name of Frisco[5] Gudani, estranged husband of Dominga Goyma. This title was
cancelled by TCT No. T-128606 issued in the name of Eduardo Victa also
on February 10, 1975. The latter certificate of title, in turn, was cancelled by TCT
No. T-128607 issued in the name of the spouses Rodriguez also on February 10,
1975.

Since May 1975, the spouses Rodriguez allegedly tried to enter and occupy
the subject lots by force and intimidation. Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. thus prayed in his
complaint that the spouses Rodriguez be permanently enjoined from entering and

occupying the subject lots; TCT No. 128607 be declared null and void and TCT
No. T-2857 in the name of Dominga Goyma be reinstated; and the spouses
Rodriguez be ordered to pay Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. damages, attorneys fees and the
costs of suit.

In their Answer, the spouses Rodriguez denied the material allegations in the
complaint. They alleged that Dominga Goyma was not the mother of Pablo Goyma
Lim, Jr.They averred that the subject lots were the conjugal property of Frisco
Gudani and his wife Dominga Goyma. When the latter died, Frisco Gudani was her
sole surviving heir.

According to the spouses Rodriguez, Frisco Gudani and Dominga Goyma,

as husband and wife, jointly exercised acts of ownership and possession over the
subject lots.When Dominga Goyma passed away, Frisco Gudani executed an
instrument of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased. By virtue of
the said document, Dominga Goymas share in the subject lots was adjudicated in
favor of Frisco Gudani as her sole surviving heir. The extra-judicial settlement
allegedly complied with the requirements of publication under the Rules of Court.

Thereafter, Frisco Gudani allegedly sold the subject lots to Eduardo Victa
who, in turn, sold the same to the spouses Rodriguez. The latter claimed that they
were purchasers in good faith and for value. Further, they denied that they had tried
to enter the subject lots by means of force and intimidation. On the contrary, the
spouses Rodriguez claimed that they have been in possession of the subject lots by
themselves and their predecessors-in-interest.

At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following facts:

1. that plaintiff Pablo Goyma [Lim], Jr., the plaintiff in this case, is the
same person mentioned in the birth certificate as Pablo Go Yma,
xerox copy of which was submitted during the previous preliminary
hearing, marked as Exhibit A;

2. that Pablito Goyma Lim mentioned in the Individual Income Tax

Returns of the deceased Dominga Goyma, xerox copies of which were
submitted during the previous preliminary hearing and marked as
Exhibits B, C and D and in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of
the deceased Dominga Goyma marked as Exhibit E, refers to the
plaintiff Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.;

3. that according to plaintiff Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., he is an

illegitimate child other than natural of the deceased Dominga Goyma;

4. that the deceased Dominga Goyma died on July 19, 1971 and that
at the time of her death, she was then the registered owner of the two
parcels of land mentioned in paragraph 2 of the complaint covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2857; that under the aforesaid
Transfer Certificate of Title, said lands are registered in the name of
Dominga Goyma, wife of Frisco Gudani;

5. that at the time of the death of Dominga Goyma, plaintiff Pablo

Goyma Lim, Jr., was then more than thirty-five (35) years of age;

6. that previous to the instant case, there has been no judicial inquiry
as to the maternity or filiation of plaintiff Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.

x x x x[6]

Efforts of the parties to enter into an amicable settlement of the case fell
through. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued. In the meantime, in the course of
the trial, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. died on September 8, 1988. He was duly
substituted by his surviving spouse, Concordia Ong Lim, and children Eurestes and
Elmer Lim.

During trial, both parties adduced their respective evidence. Among those
presented to support the allegations of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. were the following:
Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 13, 1945 (Exhibit I) covering four parcels
of land, including the subject lots, purchased by Dominga Goyma from Marciano
and Marina Rodriguez; Marital Consent dated March 19, 1932 (Exhibit K)
executed by Frisco Gudani and Dominga Goyma; TCT No. T-2857 (Exhibit A)
covering the subject lots issued in the name of Dominga Goyma;
Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.s Certificate of Birth (Exhibit B) indicating that his mother
was Dominga Goyma; Statement of Assets, Income and Liabilities for 1958
(Exhibit C) of Dominga Goyma indicating Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. as her son;
Income Tax Returns for calendar years 1953 up to 1955 (Exhibit D to F)
ofDominga Goyma, where she invariably claimed personal exemption as head of
the family and stated therein that she was separated from her husband and claimed
an exemption for her son Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.; and Real Property Tax Receipts
from 1955, 1957 up to 1975 (Exhibits H, H-1 up to H-22) covering the subject
property paid by Pablito Goyma Lim, Jr.

For their part, the spouses Rodriguez presented the following documentary
evidence: Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 3, 1975 (Exhibit I) covering the
subject lots showing that the spouses Rodriguez acquired them from Eduardo
Victa; TCT No. T-128607 (Exhibit II) covering the subject lots issued in the name
of the spouses Rodriguez onFebruary 10, 1975; TCT No. T-128606 (Exhibit V)
covering the subject lots issued in the name of Eduardo Victa on February 10,
1975; TCT No. T-128605 (Exhibit IV) covering the subject lots issued in the name
of Frisco Gudani on February 10, 1975; and TCT No. T-2857 (Exhibit III) covering
the subject lots in the name of Dominga Goyma.

Also admitted in evidence by the court a quo was the deposition of Frisco
Gudani taken on October 22, 1977. The court a quo summarized the contents of his
deposition as follows:

x x x From the deposition, it appears that Prisco M. Gudani, a 77 yearold laborer resident of Barrio Binahaan, Pagbilao, Quezon, was
married to Dominga Goyma on March 22, 1922. They lived together
for eleven (11) months and they were separated when Prisco Gudani
left the conjugal dwelling one night without the knowledge of
Dominga Goyma, never returning to the conjugal dwelling since
then. He knows that Dominga Goyma is now dead. He knows too that
Pablo Goyma Lim is the son of the late Dominga Goyma. His
statement in his Affidavit, datedJune 25, 1976 (Exhibit C-Deposition)
that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. is not the son of Dominga Goyma is not
correct. He said that it was Atty. Alejandro B. Aguilan who prepared
said affidavit and told him to sign it otherwise what property he will
receive will be forfeited in favor of the government. He does not
know anything about the two parcels of land subject of this case. On
the affidavit, dated March 15, 1973 (Exhibit D-Deposition)
adjudicating unto himself the property stated therein, including the
two parcels of land subject of this case, he explained that said affidavit
was prepared by Atty. Alejandro B. Aguilan, who must have known
about the properties left by Dominga Goyma and made him
understand that he is inheriting the three (3) parcels of land left by
Dominga Goyma, the truth being that he had never set foot on these
properties and he does not know anything about these
properties. When he arrived, the prepared affidavit was read to him
and he was told to sign. Atty. Aguilan explained to him that if he will
not sign the document, the properties will go to the government and,
because he did not want these properties to go to the government, he
signed the affidavit in order to get the properties. Had it been
explained to him that these properties will not be forfeited in favor of
the government, he will not sign the affidavit. The first time Atty.
Aguilan told him about the properties of Dominga Goyma was about
two years after her death. Atty. Aguilan went to him in his residence
in Pagbilao, Quezon and told him that if he will not agree to get the
property of Dominga Goyma, those properties will go to the

government. Atty. Aguilan told him that because he had not

contributed anything in the acquisition of said properties, his share is
one-fourth. On March 15, 1973, Atty. Aguilan made him sign a
prepared petition for the issuance of a second owners duplicate copy
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2857 (Exhibit E-Deposition). On
the same date, he was also made to sign an Affidavit of Loss prepared
by Atty. Aguilan (Exhibit E-1, Deposition). He had not at any time
been in possession of the owners copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-2857. He signed both the foregoing documents on the
explanation of Atty. Aguilan that he will use them in order to look for
the title. He does not know Eduardo Victa and had never met him
personally. When shown the DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE OF
REAL PROPERTY, dated September 10, 1974 (Exhibit FDeposition), he admitted he sold the property. Said document was
prepared by Atty. Aguilan who told him that the P20,000.00 constitute
his one-fourth share of the properties of Dominga Goyma, but Atty.
Aguilan told him to receive only P10,000.00 because the P10,000.00
will be used to cover the expenses of litigation. Of
the P10,000.00 left, P5,000.00 was given to him and the
other P5,000.00 was taken by Atty. Aguilan, as they are share and
share alike in the P10,000.00. He explained that when he signed the
deed of sale, he was made to understand that he was selling only the
one-fourth share of the property that he owns and the price for the
one-fourth share is P20,000.00. On the document entitled DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY, dated January 17,
1975 (Exhibit G-Deposition) he claims not to have received
the P60,000.00. Atty. Aguilan, who prepared the document, told him
to sign it andhe (Atty. Aguilan) will deliver the money later. Atty.
Aguilan did not mention the P60,000.00, but only P20,000.00. It was
only Atty. Aguilan who was present when he signed the document.He
met defendant Reynaldo Rodriguez once when he went to the office of
Atty. Magadia and Atty. Uy at the Baas Building, Rizal
Avenue, Manila, in the company of Atty. Aguilan. He was invited to a
restaurant and told by Reynaldo Rodriguez that he purchased the
properties for a very low price and he would give Gudani an

additional amount of P1,500.00 upon the termination of the case that

may be filed by Pablo Goyma Lim, that is why he was holding
the P10,000.00 to be spent for the expected litigation. After eating,
Reynaldo Rodriguez gave him P50.00 for him to buy betel leaves. He
said that Atty. Alejandro B. Aguilan is a lawyer in Pagbilao, Quezon,
who persuaded him to agree to recover his share from the properties
of Domingo Goyma. x x x[7]

Based on the evidence presented by both parties, the court a quo rendered
judgment in favor of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. and against the spouses Rodriguez. In
support of its conclusions, the court a quo made the following factual findings:

Dominga Goyma married Frisco Gudani on March 22, 1922. However, after
living together for only eleven (11) months, Frisco Gudani left the conjugal abode
and never returned. They never had any children. On March 19, 1932, Frisco
Gudani and Dominga Goyma executed a public instrument denominated as
MARITAL CONSENT,[8] the contents of which are quoted below in full:

MARITAL CONSENT

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That I, Prisco Gudani, Filipino, of legal age, married and a resident of

Pagbilao, Tayabas, declares:

That I am the husband of Dominga Go Imco Ima, Filipina, of legal

age, and also a resident of Pagbilao, Tayabas, for whom I make this
marital consent.

That since the year 1924, for certain reasons which are delicate to
state or mention herein, my wife and I have been living separately.

It was agreed by and between us from the time we separated that each
could then live the life of a single person as if we did not take each
other as husband and wife, and that each could then make his or her
own living without the intervention and responsibility of the other.

Under this state of life that we have, living separately, and upon
request that I grant her a marital consent, by these presents I do hereby
give and grant unto my wife, Dominga Go Imco Ima, full power and
authority and consent to do and perform any and every act and thing
whatsoever requisite, necessary or proper to be done in whatever she
may undertake to do in which under the law in force and in these
Island my presence and personal intervention is necessary, as fully to
all intents and purposes as I might or could do if present and
intervening in person, and specially the following acts:

To buy or sell, hire, lease or mortgage, lands or buildings, and other

forms of real property, upon such terms and conditions, and under
such covenants as my wife may deem proper;

To purchase and sell, hire or pledge, goods, wares, merchandise,

chattels, choses in action, and other forms of personal property that
are or may come into her possession as owner or otherwise;

To borrow or lend moneys, with or without security, upon such terms

and conditions as she may approve; and to transact any and all

business, operations and affairs with any institution as may be deemed

proper and convenient by her;

To make, sign, execute and deliver contracts, documents, agreements,

deeds and other writings of whatsoever nature, kind and description,
with any and all persons, concerns, and entities, upon terms and
conditions acceptable to her;

To prosecute and defend any and all suits, actions and other
proceedings in the courts, tribunals, departments and offices of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, and to terminate compromise,
settle and adjust the same.

I do hereby renounce any and all rights, title, interest and

participation, rights of actions, if any I have, in connection with the
properties, real or personal, that my wife might have acquired by
purchase, exchange, or otherwise, from any person from the time we
were separated, in 1924, and to all that she may acquire in the future.

In consideration of all that is provided above in this marital consent,

and in consideration of the renunciation made by my husband, I,
Dominga Go Imco Ima, hereby agree also to renounce any and all
rights, title, interest and participation, and also any right of action, that
I may have in connection with any property, real or personal, acquired
or which may be acquired by my husband since we were separated in
1924, and that any debts or obligations incurred or which may be
incurred by me since we were separated in 1924, and in the future
pursuant to this marital consent, are my sole debts and obligations in
which my husband can have no responsibility.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we together have hereunto signed our

names below as signs of our conformity with the things mentioned
above, at Pagbilao, Tayabas, P.I., on this 19th day of March, 1932.

(SGD) PRISCO M. GUDANI

PRISCO GUDANI
Husband

(SGD) DOMINGA GO YMCO YMA

DOMINGA GO IMCO IMA
Wife

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

(SGD) SEVERINO F. MARTINEZ

(SGD) Illegible

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Municipality of Pagbilao)
Province of Tayabas ) S.S.

Before me, a Notary Public in and for the Province of Tayabas,

Philippine Islands, personally appeared Prisco Gudani, exhibiting to
me his cedula personal No. G-4219255 issued at Pagbilao, Tayabas,
and dated December 15, 1931 AND Dominga Go Ymco Ima, without
a personal cedula by reason of her sex, personally known to me and
known to me to be the same persons who executed the foregoing
instrument, and they acknowledge to me that they executed the same
freely and voluntarily for the uses and purposes therein stated.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed

my notarial seal at Pagbilao, Tayabas, on this 19th day of March 1932.

(SGD) MARIANO P. DULDULAO

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission will expire on
December 31, 1933

Doc. No. 15
Book No. 11
Page No. 5
Series of 1932.
After Frisco Gudani had left the conjugal abode, Dominga Goyma and Pablo
Lim cohabited with each other as common law husband and wife. They had a son,
Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. who was born on March 28, 1935.

On December 13, 1945, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit I),

Dominga Goyma purchased from the spouses Marciano and Marina Rodriguez
four (4) parcels of land, including the subject lots. As a result of the said sale, the
certificate of title (TCT No. 11473) covering the said lots were canceled and, in
lieu, thereof TCT No. T-2857 was issued in favor of Dominga Goyma, wife of
Frisco Gudani, by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Quezon.

The subject lots were purchased by Dominga Goyma from her personal
funds when she and Frisco Gudani were already separated and after they had
executed the instrument denominated as Marital Consent dated March 19,
1932. He did not contribute anything in the purchase of the subject lots nor did he
know about their existence.

The owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857 was in Dominga Goymas
custody and during her lifetime, she took possession of the subject lots and
instituted therein as tenants Dominador Torres, Loreto Estopace and Simeon
Estopace. Before she passed away on July 19, 1971, Dominga Goyma gave TCT
No. T-2857 to her son, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., who immediately took possession of
the subject lots.

Two (2) years after Dominga Goymas death, Atty. Alejandro D. Aguilan
went to see Frisco Gudani in Pagbilao, Quezon, and informed the latter about the
properties, including the subject lots, left by the deceased. Atty. Aguilan falsely
made Frisco Gudani to believe that if he would not acquire the properties for
himself, the same would be forfeited in favor of the government. Frisco Gudani
was then persuaded by Atty. Aguilan to affix his signature on the following
documents: (a) an Affidavit dated March 15, 1973 adjudicating to himself the
properties mentioned therein, including the subject lots; (b) a Petition dated March
15, 1973 filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon for the issuance of a
second owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857; (c) an Affidavit of Loss
dated March 15, 1973 for the loss of the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T2857; and (d) an Affidavit dated June 27, 1976 stating that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.
was not the son of Dominga Goyma.

After the subject lots were adjudicated in favor of Frisco Gudani and the
second owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857 was obtained, Atty. Aguilan
likewise made the former sign the Deed of Conditional Sale of Property
dated September 10, 1974 covering the subject lots in favor of Eduardo Victa. The
two parties to the instrument never met each other and it was only Atty. Aguilan
who was present when Frisco Gudani signed the same. The notary public before
whom they supposedly acknowledged the same was not present.

For the said purported sale, Frisco Gudani received P5,000.00 only because,
according to Atty. Aguilan, he did not contribute anything to the acquisition of the
subject lots.Thereafter, Frisco Gudani was made to sign by Atty. Aguilan a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated January 17, 1975 transferring the subject lots to Eduardo
Victa.

For a time, the subject lots continued to be covered by TCT No. T-2857 in
the name of Dominga Goyma. On February 3, 1975, as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale(Exhibit I), Eduardo Victa sold the subject lots to the spouses
Rodriguez. Aside from the said instrument, the following documents were given to
the spouses Rodriguez: (a) the second duplicate owners copy of TCT No. T-2857;
(b) Affidavit dated March 15, 1973 of Frisco Gudani adjudicating to himself the
properties of Dominga Goyma, including the subject lots; and (c) Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property dated January 17, 1975 executed by Frisco Gudani
in favor of Eduardo Victa.

All these documents were presented by a certain Atty. Magadia to the

Register of Deeds of the Province of Quezon on February 10, 1975. On the basis of
these documents, TCT No. T-2857 was canceled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. T128605 was issued in the name of Frisco Gudani on February 10, 1975. Thereafter,
TCT No. T-128605 was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-128606 was
issued by the same Register of Deeds in the name of Eduardo Victa also
on February 10, 1975. Finally, TCT No. T-128606 was canceled and, in lieu
thereof, TCT No. T-128607 was issued by the same Register of Deeds in the name
of the spouses Rodriguez also on February 10, 1975.

Based on its factual findings, the court a quo concluded that the evidence
showed that the transactions involving the subject lots, particularly the transfers
thereof from the deceased Dominga Goyma to Frisco Gudani and from him to
Eduardo Victa were fraudulent and made through the machinations of Atty.
Aguilan. The latter, according to the court a quo, took advantage of his legal
training in making Frisco Gudani, a simple- minded laborer, an unsuspecting and
nave tool in a grand scheme to dispossess plaintiff Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. of the
property rightfully his by inheritance from his mother, the deceased Dominga
Goyma.[9]

Given the fraudulent character of the transactions, the court a quo held that
the spouses Rodriguez could not avail of the protective mantle of the law
protecting purchasers for value in good faith. The spouses Rodriguez were
declared to be purchasers in bad faith because they had prior knowledge of the
claim of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. over the subject lots and even anticipated his filing
of the case against them.

The court a quo also stated that even granting arguendo that fraud attendant
to the transactions were not sufficient to vitiate consent as to nullify the
transactions, still the transactions entered into by Frisco Gudani relative to the
subject lots were void for want of authority to sell them.

The court a quo explained that since Dominga Goyma died on July 19,
1971 without a will, legal or intestate succession takes place following paragraph
(1) of Article 960[10] of the Civil Code. Under the law on intestacy, particularly
Article 998[11] thereof, the widower or widow who survives with illegitimate
children shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the illegitimate children
to the other half.

However, in Frisco Gudanis case, he did not contribute any amount in the
purchase of the subject lots. Moreover, these were acquired by Dominga Goyma
after her de facto separation from Frisco Gudani. The estate left by the deceased,
including the subject lots, should have first been partitioned in an appropriate
estate proceeding to determine those entitled thereto. Without the said proceeding
or prior thereto, Frisco Gudani could not lay valid claim, if he had any, over the
subject lots as sole heir and he could not have been the owner thereof who could
legally transfer ownership by means of sale.

The decretal portion of the Decision dated May 17, 1990 of the court a
quo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of the substituted plaintiffs, CONCORDIA ONG LIM,
EURESTES LIM and ELMER LIM and against the defendants, the
spouses REYNALDO RODRIGUEZ and NANCY A. RODRIGUEZ,
as follows:

a)

Declaring as null and void all transactions relative to the

properties in question submitted to the Register of Deeds for
the Province of Quezon on February 10, 1975;

b)

Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-128607 in the

name of defendants as null and void and ordering the

reinstatement of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2857 in the

name of DOMINGA GOYMA, of age, the wife of
Frisco Gudani, plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest;

c)

Ordering the defendants to immediately vacate the premises

of the properties subject of this litigation;

d)

Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the amount

of P24,000.00 as attorneys fees; and

e)

Ordering the defendants to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[12]
Aggrieved, the spouses Rodriguez filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals
which rendered the assailed Decision dated July 18, 1995 affirming in toto the
decision of the court a quo. The appellate court substantially affirmed the factual
findings and conclusion of the court a quo. It stressed that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.
was the son of the decedent Dominga Goyma as evidenced by a voluntary
acknowledgment made in his record of birth (Exhibit C) and in the other
documentary evidence presented during trial. His right to succession was
transmitted when Dominga Goyma passed away on July 19, 1971 following Article
777[13] of the Civil Code. On the other hand, Frisco Gudani could not dispose of the
subject lots before partition of the estate of Dominga Goyma and without authority
given by Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.

On the matter of whether the spouses Rodriguez purchased the subject lots
in good faith and for value, the appellate court ruled in the negative, as record was
replete with evidence disproving their claim of good faith. Rejecting the argument
proffered by the spouses Rodriguez, the appellate court held that Frisco Gudani
and Eduardo Victa were not indispensable parties because they were not in
possession of the subject lots and their interests therein were inferior and irrelevant

to, and could not affect, the right of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. to a designated portion
of the subject lots by inheritance from his mother Dominga Goyma.

The decretal portion of the appellate courts decision reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[14]

The spouses Rodriguez filed a motion for reconsideration which the

appellate court denied in the assailed Resolution dated October 5, 1998.

Forthwith, the spouses Rodriguez (petitioners) filed the present petition for
review on certiorari and in support thereof allege the following:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING
THAT
RESPONDENTS
PREDECESSOR-ININTEREST, PABLO GO IMA LIM, WAS A CO-OWNER OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES AND ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF OF THE
SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID
PABLO GO IMA LIM WAS NOT RECOGNIZED BY HER [SIC]
PARENTS AS AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD AND THE ALLEGED
DOCUMENTS
PROVING
HIS
VOLUNTARY
ACKNOWLEDGMENT DO NOT SUFFICE TO PROVE HIS
FILIATION TO HIS PARENTS.

II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE VENDEE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES,
PRISCO GUDANI, COULD NOT VALIDLY DISPOSE OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES BEFORE PARTITION AND WITHOUT
THE LEGAL AUTHORITY GIVEN BY THE ILLEGITIMATE
CHILD, PABLO GO IMA LIM.

III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS WERE PURCHASERS
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR
VALUE.

IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT THE VENDEES OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES, PRISCO GUDANI AND EDUARDO VICTA, NOT
BEING INDISPENSABLE PARTIES, THEY WERE PROPERLY
NOT IMPLEADED AS DEFENDANTS IN THE COMPLAINT.[15]

The petition is bereft of merit.

Petitioners assail the filiation of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. stating

that he was not duly acknowledged or recognized by either of his
parents. This contention is erroneous. It is axiomatic that factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
appellate court, are conclusive and binding on the Court. [16] In this
case, the court a quo and the appellate court are in agreement
that, based on the evidence presented, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was
the illegitimate and acknowledged son of Dominga Goyma.

The Court has laid down the manner of establishing the

filiation of children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, as follows:

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate

children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2)
an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall
be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in, any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not
just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a

voluntary recognition that does not require a separate

action for judicial approval.[17]

Various documentary evidence were proffered by Pablo Goyma

Lim, Jr. to prove that he was the illegitimate and acknowledged
son of Dominga Goyma. Among them were his certificate of birth
(Exhibit B) indicating that his mother was Dominga Goyma;
statement of assets, income and liabilities for 1958 (Exhibit C) of
Dominga Goyma indicating him as her son and; income tax
returns for calendar years 1953 up to 1955 (Exhibits D to F)) of
Dominga Goyma where she invariably claimed personal
exemption as head of the family and stated therein that she was
separated from her husband and claimed an exemption for her
son, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. These pieces of documentary evidence,
whose authenticity were not refuted by petitioners, were properly
considered by the court a quo and the appellate court to establish
that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was acknowledged by Dominga Goyma
to be her illegitimate son.

The court a quo, as affirmed by the appellate court, likewise correctly

nullified TCT No. T-128607 in the name of petitioners. In fact, all the
transactions relative to TCT No. T-2857, i.e., affidavit of Frisco Gudani
adjudicating to himself the subject lots and their purported sale by him to
Eduardo Victa and by the latter to petitioners, were declared null and void by
the court a quo on the ground that, as established by evidence, these were all
made through the fraudulent machinations of Atty. Aguilan.
It should be recalled that Atty. Aguilan made Frisco Gudani affix his
signature on, among other documents, a Petition dated March 15, 1973 filed
with the Court of First Instance of the Province of Quezon for the issuance of a
second owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857 and an Affidavit of Loss
dated March 15, 1973 for the loss of the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T2857. Obviously, these documents contained falsehoods because TCT No. T2857 was never lost and, in fact, had been in the possession of Dominga Goyma
during her lifetime and, when she passed away on July 19, 1971, in the
possession of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.
It has been consistently ruled that when the owners duplicate certificate
of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, then
the reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered the decision
had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of
the original certificate.[18] In such a case, the decision authorizing the issuance
of a new owners duplicate certificate of title may be attacked any time.[19]
Applying this rule, it is apparent that the second owners duplicate copy of
TCT No. T-2857 issued upon the petition of Frisco Gudani was void. Further,
the certificates of title (TCT No. T-128605 in the name of Frisco Gudani, TCT
No. T-128606 in the name of Eduardo Victa and TCT No. T-128607 in the
names of petitioners) that were subsequently issued covering the subject lots
may be nullified because they all emanated from a void document, i.e., the
second owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857 that was procured by Frisco

Gudani, or more particularly by Atty. Aguilan, in behalf of Frisco Gudani,

through fraud. Transfer certificates of title may be annulled if issued based on
void documents.[20]

Petitioners cannot raise the defense of indefeasibility of

a Torrens title with respect to TCT No. T-168607 because the
principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not apply where
fraud attended the issuance of the title. The Torrens title does not
furnish a shield for fraud.[21] They cannot deny any knowledge of
the fraud that attended the transactions involving the subject
lots, including their acquisition thereof. Stated differently,
petitioners cannot claim that they were purchasers in good faith
and for value because the transactions involving the subject lots
were so replete with badges of fraud and irregularities that should
have put them on guard about the defects in the respective titles
of Frisco Gudani and Eduardo Victa.

To recall, TCT No. T-2857 was cancelled and, in lieu thereof,

TCT No. T-128605 was issued in the name of Frisco Gudani,
on February 10, 1975. The latter was thereafter cancelled by
TCT No. T-128606 issued in the name of Eduardo Victa also
on February 10, 1975. The latter certificate of title, in turn, was
cancelled by TCT No. T-128607 issued in the name of the spouses
Rodriguez also on February 10, 1975. These highly irregular
transfers of ownership, i.e., cancellation and/or issuance of
certificates of title, involving the subject lots all transpiring on
the same date eloquently betray the fraud that attended the
transactions, including petitioners acquisition thereof. It is

certainly unlikely that petitioners had no knowledge of these

fraudulent transactions.

Petitioners claim of being purchasers in good faith and for

value was debunked by the court a quo, thus:
Defendant spouses, under the premises, cannot avail of
the protective mantle of law protecting a purchaser for
value and in good faith, as they are not purchasers for
value and neither have they acted in good
faith. Defendants cannot successfully put up a picture
of innocence as to the fraud that characterized the
transactions relative to their ultimate acquisition of the
properties subject of this litigation. Defendant Reynaldo
Rodriguez was well aware that on his acquisition of the
properties, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. will file suit against him
that is why he retained P10,000.00 of the purchase
price, which amount is intended to be used in the
expected litigation. In fact, defendant Reynaldo
Rodriguez admitted to Frisco Gudani that he purchased
the properties at a very low price because of which he
promised to give Frisco Gudani an additional amount
of P1,500.00 upon the termination of the case.[22]

On this point, the appellate court succinctly stated that as to

the contention that appellants (referring to petitioners) purchased
the properties in good faith and for value, the record is replete
with evidence negating such contention and the issue had been

thoroughly discussed in the appealed decision which would render

any further discussion a superfluity.[23]

Contrary to the petitioners contention, Eduardo Victa and

Frisco Gudani are not indispensable parties. The complaint filed
by Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was for the cancellation of TCT No. T128607 in the name of petitioners and to enjoin them from
entering the subject lots. The following discussion on who is or is
not an indispensable party is apropos:

An indispensable party is one whose interest will be

affected by the courts action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of the case can be
had. The partys interest in the subject matter of the suit
and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined
with the other parties that his legal presence as a party
to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his
absence there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of
the parties before the court which is effective,
complete, or equitable.

Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his

interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct
and divisible from the interest of the other parties and
will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which
does complete justice to the parties in court. He is not
indispensable if his presence would merely permit

complete relief between him and those already parties

to the action or will simply avoid multiple litigation.[24]

A final determination could be had in the complaint for

cancellation of TCT No. T-128607 and injunction even without
Eduardo Victa and Frisco Gudani. Only the petitioners are
indispensable parties therein and their insistence that
Eduardo Victa and
Frisco Gudani should
likewise
be impleaded deserves scant consideration.

Having established that petitioners TCT No. T-128607

emanated from a void document, i.e. the second owners duplicate
copy of TCT No. T-2857 procured by Frisco Gudani and/or Atty.
Aguilan through fraud and when Domingas owners duplicate
certificate of title had not been lost, and that petitioners were not
purchasers in good faith and for value, the Court concludes that
the nullification of petitioners TCT No. T-128607 is warranted
under the circumstances. The appellate court therefore
committed no reversible error in affirming the decision of the
court a quo which, among others, declared as null and void TCT
No. T-128607 in the name of petitioners and, instead, reinstated
TCT No.T-2857 in the name of Dominga Goyma, mother of
Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. (now substituted by his spouse and children)
respondents Concordia Ong Lim, Eurestes and Elmer Lim.

The Court finds it unnecessary, at this point, to determine

the successional rights, if any, of Frisco Gudani to the properties

left by Dominga Goyma. Such matter is better threshed out in the

proper special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate
estate of Dominga Goyma. As held by this Court, matters which
involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent
fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction.[25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision

dated July 18, 1995 and Resolution dated October 5, 1998 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27440 areAFFIRMED in toto.

G.R. No. 174004, October 09, 2013

VIRGILIO G. CAGATAO, Petitioner, v. GUILLERMO ALMONTE,
ARTHUR AGUILAR, SPS. ERNESTO FERNANDEZ AND AVELINA
FERNANDEZ, MARVIN JOHN FERNANDEZ, MARSON FERNANDEZ,
AND MARJUN FERNANDEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the March 9, 2006 Amended
Decision1 and the August 7, 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CAG.R. CV No. 72094, modifying the June 22, 2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 24, Echague, Isabela (RTC), in Civil Case No. Br. 24-0458, an
action for annulment of sale, cancellation of title and damages.
The Facts
This case stemmed from an action for annulment of deeds of sale, cancellation of
title and damages filed on April 18, 1996 by petitioner Virgilio G. Cagatao
(Cagatao) against respondents Guillermo Almonte (Almonte), Arthur Aguilar
(Aguilar), Spouses Ernesto and Avelina Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), and
Marvin John Fernandez, Marson Fernandez and Marjun Fernandez (collectively
theFernandez Siblings).4cralawlibrary
On February 16, 1949, a homestead patent over the property subject of this
controversy (Lot No. 5598, Pls-67) was issued in favor of Juan Gatchalian.5
Cagatao claimed that sometime in 1940, Gatchalian sold the lot to Delfin Manzulin
(Manzulin) in exchange for one carabao, as embodied in a barter agreement which
was unfortunately destroyed or lost during the Second World War.6 In 1990,
Manzulin allegedly executed a private written document in the Ilocano dialect,
transferring ownership over the property to his son-in-law, Cagatao.7 The latter
then occupied and cultivated the land until the Fernandez Siblings attempted to
take possession of the lot, thereby prompting him to file the subject complaint
before the RTC.8cralawlibrary
The respondents, on the other hand, contended that on April 3, 1993, the Spouses
Fernandez purchased the property from Almonte and Aguilar who had in their

possession a tax declaration covering the said land.9 To protect their interest, on
January 17, 1996, Spouses Fernandez once again bought the same property for
P220,000.00 from Emmaculada Carlos (Carlos), believed to be the owner of the lot
by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12159-A, a reconstituted
titlein her name.10 The former, in turn, executed a deed of sale, dated January 22,
1996, in favor of their children, the Fernandez Siblings, resulting in the issuance of
TCT No. T-249437 in their names.11cralawlibrary
In his Memorandum before the RTC, Cagatao questioned the sale to Spouses
Fernandez by Carlos because, at that time, Manzulin was already the owner of the
subject property. He also pointed out that it was highly irregular that Spouses
Fernandez would buy the same property from two different vendors on two
different occasions. Apart from these anomalous transactions, Cagatao insisted
that TCT No. T-249437 in the name of the Fernandez Siblings was a nullity
because the sale from the Spouses Fernandez was simulated, as testified to by
Avelina Fernandez (Fernandez) who confirmed that she and her husband did not
sign the deed of sale purporting to have transferred ownership of the property to
the Fernandez Siblings.12cralawlibrary
The respondents claimed that Cagatao was unable to present proof of title or any
public document embodying the sale of the property from Gatchalian to Manzulin
and from the latter to Cagatao. They also argued that even if a homestead patent
was indeed issued to Gatchalian, the same became void when he (Gatchalian) did
not occupy the land himself, in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public
Land Act of 1936).13cralawlibrary
Pending litigation, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
respondents from disturbing Cagataos possession of the land in question during
the pendency of the case.14 In its Decision, dated June 22, 2001, however, the RTC
ruled that Cagataos evidence was insufficient to prove his ownership over the land
in question because Manzulin never acquired a lawful title to the property from his
predecessor, Gatchalian. The court explained that the transfer to Manzulin was
null and void because it failed to comply with Section 2015 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141. As to the supposed conveyance of the lot from Manzulin to Cagatao, it
could not have been valid because the document alleged to be a deed of sale was a
private document which did not conclusively establish his (Cagataos) right to the
property because of the requirement in contract law that the transmission of rights
over an immovable property must be contained in a public document.
The RTC, after noting that Cagatao had no valid title, ruled that his claim of

possession could not prevail over the claim of ownership by Spouses Fernandez as
evidenced by a certificate of title. Accordingly, it upheld the validity of the deed of
sale, dated January 17, 1996, between Spouses Fernandez and Carlos. It, however,
nullified the transfer from Spouses Fernandez to Fernandez Siblings because
Avelina herself admitted that she and her husband never signed the deed of sale
which transferred ownership to their children. Finally, the RTC sustained the
validity of TCT No. T-12159-A in the name of Carlos, theorizing that someone
must have applied for an original certificate of title from which the said title was
derived.16 Thus, the RTC disposed:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. the dismissal of the plaintiffs [Cagataos] Complaint;
2. the Cancellation and setting aside of the writ of preliminary injunction;
3. the Register of Deeds to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-249437 issued
in favor of Marvin, Marson and Marjun, all surnamed Fernandez, the Deed of Sale
(Exhibit C) dated January 22, 1996 being null and void; and
4. declaring the Deed of Sale (Exhibit 2) dated January 17, 1996 in favor of Sps.
Avelina M. Fernandez and Ernesto S. Fernandez and TCT No. T-12159-A
registered in the name of Emmaculada G. Carlos as valid and binding.
SO ORDERED.17
Aggrieved, Cagatao elevated the case to the CA. On July 29, 2005, the CA partly
granted his petition and modified the decision of the RTC. The CA deemed as
speculative and without legal basis18 the trial courts conclusion that Gatchalian
might have abandoned his homestead patent, leaving it open for another person to
apply for a patent and secure an original certificate of title from which TCT No. T12159-A in the name of Carlos originated. In other words, the ownership of the
land remained with Gatchalian by virtue of the homestead patent in his name, and
neither the alleged transfer to Manzulin nor the theory of abandonment of the RTC
could divest him of said title.
In addition, the CA took note of Entry No. 7259 in the memorandum of
encumbrances at the dorsal side of TCT No. T-12159-A, which disclosed the
existence of another deed of sale entered into by Carlos and the respondents on
January 17, 1979. Holding that the two sales could not overlap, it invalidated the
January 17, 1996 deed of sale between Carlos and Spouses Fernandez. It also
considered as void the sale of the same property by Almonte to Spouses Fernandez
and observed that neither the latter nor the Fernandez siblings invoked this
transaction as the basis of their claim.

Although the CA declared that Cagataos claim of ownership could not be

recognized, it nevertheless ruled that his possession could not be disturbed because
only the true owner could challenge him for possession of the subject property.
Leaving the parties where it found them, the CA
disposed:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1) the Register of Deeds is ORDERED TO CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 249437 issued in favor of Marvin, Marson and Marjun, all surnamed
Fernandez; 2) the Deed of Sale dated January 17, 1996 between Emmaculada
Carlos and the Fernandez spouses is declared NULL and VOID; 3) the Deed of
Sale dated January 22, 1996 between defendants-appellees Fernandez siblings and
the Fernandez spouses is DECLARED NULL and VOID; 4) the Deed of Sale
dated April 3, 1993 between the Fernandez spouses and Guillermo Almonte and
Arthur Aguilar is likewise DECLARED NULL and VOID; 5) the verbal sale
between Delfin Manzulin and plaintiff-appellant is DECLARED NULL and
VOID. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction against defendants-appellants
Fernandez siblings is made PERMANENT.19
The respondents moved for a reconsideration of the CA decision on August 24,
2005. On March 9, 2006, the CA rendered the questioned Amended Decision,
reversing itself when it ruled that the deed of sale between Carlos and Spouses
Fernandez could not be declared null and void, especially because Carlos was not
impleaded as a party in the case. It, however, stressed that Cagataos possession of
the subject property should be respected. Any party, including the respondents,
who would like to assert their claim of ownership or a better right over the lot
should assert their right in an appropriate action in court against him.
Not in conformity, Cagatao moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied
by the CA in its Resolution, dated August 7, 2006.20cralawlibrary
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
In his petition, Cagatao raises the following issues:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the
reconstituted TCT No. 12159-A in the name of Emmaculada Carlos is
void.

II.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that homestead
title holder Juan Gatchalian and the petitioner as his successors-ininterest are the true owners of the subject property.

III.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in rendering the challenged

Amended Decision by deleting from the dispositive portion of the
original Decision its ruling that the Deed of Sale between Emmaculada
Carlos and respondents Spouses Fernandez over the subject property is
void.21
The Courts Ruling

Cagataos entire petition revolves around the assertion that the reconstituted TCT
No. 12159-A in the name of Carlos was a fake and should have been declared
void. This claim is based on the existence of an allegedly falsified annotation
(Entry No. 7259), the speculative nature of the RTCs declaration that the said title
appeared valid, and the fact that the respondents were not able to present an
affidavit of loss or any proof of judicial reconstitution.22cralawlibrary
The Court cannot accommodate the petitioner.
The validity of TCT No. 12159-A cannot be attacked collaterally; Carlos is an
indispensable party
From the arguments of Cagatao, it is clear that he is assailing the validity of the
title of Carlos over the land in question. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 clearly states
that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with
law. An attack on the validity of the title is considered to be a collateral attack
when, in an action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the said action,
an attack is made against the judgment granting the title.23 Cagataos original
complaint before the RTC was for the cancellation of TCT No. T-249437 in the
name of the Fernandez Siblings and the nullification of the deeds of sale between
the Fernandez Siblings and Spouses Fernandez, and the earlier one between the
latter and Almonte and Aguilar. Nowhere in his complaint did Cagatao mention
that he sought to invalidate TCT No. 12159-A. It was only during the course of the
proceedings, when Spouses Fernandez disclosed that they had purchased the
property from Carlos, that Cagatao thought of questioning the validity of TCT No.
12159-A.

Although the CA correctly ruled that the transfer from Gatchalian to Manzulin was
invalid, the existence of a valid Torrens title in the name of Carlos which has
remained unchallenged before the proper courts has made irrelevant the issue of
whether Gatchalian and his successors-in-interest should have retained ownership
over the property. This is pursuant to the principle that a Torrens title is
irrevocable and its validity can only be challenged in a direct proceeding. The
purpose of adopting a Torrens System in our jurisdiction is to guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized. This is to avoid any possible conflicts of
title that may arise by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the
Torrens title and dispense with the need of inquiring further as to the ownership of
the property.24 Hence, a Torrens certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon
the whole world unless it is nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction in a direct
proceeding for cancellation of title.25cralawlibrary
Moreover, Carlos, as the registered owner of the lot whose title Cagatao seeks to
nullify, should have been impleaded as an indispensable party. Section 7, Rule 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines indispensable parties to be parties in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. It is clear
in this case that Cagatao failed to include Carlos in his action for the annulment of
TCT No. 12159-A. Basic is the rule in procedural law that no man can be affected
by any proceeding to which he is a stranger and strangers to a case cannot be
bound by a judgment rendered by the court.26 It would be the height of injustice to
entertain an action for the annulment of Carlos title without giving her the
opportunity to present evidence to support her claim of ownership through title. In
addition, it is without question a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no
person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.27cralawlibrary
Thus, should Cagatao wish to question the ownership of the subject lot of Carlos
and Spouses Fernandez, he should institute a direct action before the proper courts
for the cancellation or modification of the titles in the name of the latter two. He
cannot do so now because it is tantamount to a collateral attack on Carlos title,
which is expressly prohibited by law and jurisprudence.
Deed of sale between Carlos and Spouses Fernandez is presumed valid
The CA did not err in amending its decision and recognizing the validity of the sale
between Spouses Fernandez and Carlos. Time and again, the Court has repeatedly
ruled that a person dealing with a registered land has the right to rely on the face of
the Torrens title and need not inquire further, unless the party concerned has actual

knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man
to make such an inquiry. The indefeasibility of a Torrens title as evidence of
lawful ownership of the property protects buyers in good faith who rely on what
appears on the face of the said certificate of title. Moreover, a potential buyer is
charged with notice of only the burdens and claims annotated on the title.28 As
explained in Sandoval v. Court of Appeals,29
. . . a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when
the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has
knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or status of the title of the
property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion
should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the
title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within
the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a
purchaser in good faith; and hence does not merit the protection of the law.30
In this case, there has been no showing that Spouses Fernandez were aware of any
irregularity in Carlos title that would make them suspicious and cause them to
doubt the legitimacy of Carlos claim of ownership, especially because there were
no encumbrances annotated on Carlos title. At any rate, that is the proper subject
of another action initiated for the purpose of questioning Carlos certificate of title
from which Spouses Fernandez derived their ownership because, otherwise, the
title of Spouses Fernandez would become indefeasible. The reason for this is
extensively explained inTenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals:31
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the
most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a
person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is
valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was
ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if
this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land
transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would
be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are
now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government,
recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to
accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the
law are satisfied.32
While the Court finds that the validity of TCT No. 12159-A cannot be attacked
collaterally and that Cagatao had not sufficiently established his claim of

ownership over the subject property, it agrees with the CA that he, the current
possessor, shall remain to be so until such time that his possession is successfully
contested by a person with a better right.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

HEIRS OF JULIAN TIRO,

Petitioners,

G.R. No. 170528

Present:

- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

PHILIPPINE
ESTATES
Promulgated:
CORPORATION,
Respondents.
August 26, 2008
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision[1] dated 1 July 2005, rendered by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 78582, which affirmed the Decision [2] dated 16 April 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Lapu-Lapu City, in Civil Case No. 4824-L
dismissing petitioners complaint and declaring the respondent as the owner of the
disputed property.

Petitioners Guillerma Tiro, Dominga Tiro Nunez

and Maximo Tiro filed
before the RTC a Complaint for Quieting of Title against respondent Philippine
Estates Corporation, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 4824-L. Petitioners
alleged that they are the children of the late Julian Tiro and the authorized
representatives of the Heirs of the late Pedro Tiro. Both decedents were
purportedly, during their lifetime, the lawful absolute and registered owners of the
disputed land as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-1121.
[3]
The disputed property is herein described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 2914 of the Cadastral Survey of Opon,
L.R.C. Record No. 1003) situated in the Barrio of Marigondon,
Municipality of Opon, Province of Cebu, Island of Mactan xx x;
containing an area of EIGHT THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY (8,120) SQUARE METERS.[4]
Petitioners averred that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
actual possession of the disputed land since time immemorial until they were
prevented from entering the same by persons claiming to be the new owners
sometime in 1995. After examining the records found in the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, they discovered that OCT No. RO-1121 had already
been cancelled as early as 1969 and that the subject property, after several other
transfers, was presently registered in the name of respondent under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 35672.[5]
The records in the Office of the Register of Deeds showed each transfer
involving the disputed land. Petitioners learned that OCT No. RO-1121, registered
in the names of Julian and Pedro Tiro, was cancelled on 10 September 1969. In its
place, TCT No. 2848 was issued in favor of Spouses Julio Baba
and Olimpia Mesa. The registration of the disputed property in favor of the
Spouses Baba was supported by two documents: (1) an Extrajudicial Declaration
of Heir and Confirmation of Sale [6] dated 20 August 1969, executed by
Maxima Ochea (Ochea), claiming to be the only surviving heir of Julian and
Pedro Tiro, wherein she confirmed and ratified an alleged sale of the subject land

made before World War II by Julian and Pedro Tiro in favor of

Spouses Bibiano Amores and Isabel Digno; and (2) another document entitled
Deed of Confirmation,[7] also dated 20 August 1969, executed by the
Spouses Amores, wherein they verified that they subsequently transferred the
disputed property to the Spouses Baba sometime in 1947.
On 20 June 1979, TCT No. 2848 was cancelled to give way to the issuance
of TCT No. 9415 in the name of Spouses Ronaldo Velayo and Leonor Manuel,
after the Spouses Baba sold the disputed property to them. [8] Subsequently, the
same property was sold by the Spouses Velayo to Pacific Rehouse Corporation, as
a consequence of which TCT No. 9415 was cancelled and TCT No. 30186 was
issued in the name of the latter on 16 February 1995.[9] Finally, on 25 October
1996, following the sale of the disputed land to respondent, TCT No. 30186 was
cancelled and TCT No. 35672 was issued in its name.[10]
Petitioners averred that Ochea, who executed the document Extrajudicial
Declaration of Heir and Confirmation of Sale, which resulted in the cancellation of
OCT No. RO-1121 in the name of Julian and Pedro Tiro, was not in any way
related to Julian and Pedro Tiro. It was the petitioners contention that
since Ochea was not an heir of the original registered owners, she had no right to
cause the transfer of the disputed property and, thus, her transfer and all subsequent
transfers of said property, including that made to respondent, were invalid.
[11]
Instead of presenting documents to evidence their relationship to the decedents
Julian
and
Pedro Tiro,
petitioners
offered
the
testimonies
of
[12]
[13]
petitioners Maximo Tiro and his son-in-law Joveniano Diasana. Finally, the
petitioners prayed that all the transactions emanating from the Extrajudicial
Declaration of Heirs and Confirmation of Sale, executed by Maxima Ochea, be
declared void, including the transfer made in favor of the respondent; that the title
which was issued in the name of respondent be cancelled; and that the property be
restored and registered in the name of the petitioners.[14]
In its Answer dated 10 February 1998, respondent claimed that its
predecessor-in-interest Pacific Rehouse Corporation acquired the subject land from
the Spouses Velayo, the registered owners of the property who were also in
possession of the same at the time of the sale. There was nothing in the title or any
circumstances during the sale that would indicate any defect in the
Spouses Velayos title to the property. Respondent pointed out that 27 years had

elapsed since the cancellation of OCT No. RO-1121 before petitioners asserted
their rights over the disputed land. Moreover, petitioners predecessors-in-interest
Julian and Pedro Tiro did not question the cancellation of their title to the property
during their lifetimes. Hence, respondent argued that petitioners action for quieting
of title was barred by laches and prescription.[15]
To support its allegations, respondent presented TCT No. 2914 in the name
of the Spouses Velayo as proof that they were the registered owners of the disputed
property at the time they sold it to Pacific Rehouse Corporation.[16] Additionally,
respondent presented a Decision[17] dated 28 June 1994 in Civil Case No. R-1202,
entitled SpousesVelayo v. Spouses Tiro, rendered by the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Lapu-Lapu City to further prove that the Spouses Velayo were also in
possession of the disputed property at the time of its sale to
Pacific Rehouse Corporation. Civil Case No. R-1202 was a case for Forcible Entry
with Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and in its Decision dated 28 June
1994, the MTC declared the Spouses Velayo the rightful possessors of the subject
property and ordered petitioner Maximo Tiro and his co-defendant spouse to
vacate the portion of the property which they forcibly entered on 7 May
1994. Respondent likewise presented the Deed of Sale[18] dated 4 October 1994
executed by the Spouses Velayo in favor of Pacific Rehouse Corporation; the Deed
of Transfer[19] dated 23 October 1996 executed by Pacific Rehouse Corporation in
favor of respondent; and various tax declarations issued in the names of the
Spouses Baba, Spouses Velayo, Pacific Rehouse Corporation, and respondent
during the years that each of them claimed ownership over the disputed property.[20]
On 16 April 2002, the RTC issued a Decision[21] in Civil Case No. 4824-L
dismissing petitioners Complaint. The trial court noted that petitioners claims
of filiation to Julian and Pedro Tiro were not supported by documents. The
testimonies of petitioners witnesses were also inconsistent as to the location of the
disputed land, as well as the number of Pedro Tiros children. The RTC stressed that
even assuming that petitioners were heirs of the late Julian and Pedro Tiro, and
Maxima Ochea was in no way related to them, petitioners claims had already
prescribed, considering that the Complaint was filed more than ten years since the
registration of the disputed property in the name of the Spouses Baba in 1969.
Petitioners allegation that they were in continuous possession of the subject
property until 1995 was also belied by the Decision dated 28 June 1994 of the

MTC in Civil Case No. R-1202, ordering petitioners to vacate the disputed
property, which they forcibly entered, and to restore possession to the
Spouses Velayo. Lastly, the RTC ruled that respondent was an innocent purchaser
for value who relied on the correctness of the certificate of title in the name of the
vendor.
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on 2 May 2002 questioning the 16 April
2002 Decision of the RTC. The petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals an
appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 78582, questioning the decision rendered by
the trial court.
However, instead of filing an Appellants Brief as required by the Court of
Appeals, petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78582 a
Motion to Grant New Trial Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 53, [22] on 8 January
2004. They attached as annexes to their motion the following documents to prove
that Julian Tiro was their father: (1) Certificates of Baptism of
Pastor Tiro and Dominga Tiro;[23] (2) marriage contract of Dominga Tiro;[24] (3)
Certificate of Marriage of Guillerma Tiro;[25] (4) Certification of Marriage of
Pastor Tiro;[26] and (5) Certificate of Baptism of Victoria Tiro.[27] In a
Resolution[28] dated 5 August 2004, the appellate court denied the motion.
In its Decision dated 1 July 2005, the Court of Appeals likewise denied the
petitioners appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78582 and affirmed the RTC Decision dated
16 April 2002 in Civil Case No. 4824-L. The appellate court found that petitioners
failed to prove that they were the heirs of Julian and Pedro Tiro. It also took into
account the fact that during their lifetime, Julian and Pedro Tiro never questioned
the transactions which affected their land. The Court of Appeals gave significant
weight to the respondents statements that it had acquired the subject property from
the registered owners, supported by the registered titles that were presented in
court. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that even assuming that the first few
transfers turned out to be fraudulent, the transfer to respondent, a purchaser in good
faith, may be the root of a valid title.[29]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 25 July 2005,[30] which
the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 28 October 2005.[31]

Hence, the present Petition, in which petitioners make the following

assignment of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE ACT OF THE REGISTER (sic) OF
DEEDS OF REGISTERING A CLEARLY VOID AND
UNREGISTRABLE DOCUMENT CONFERS NO VALID TITLE
ON THE PRESENTOR AND HIS SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE IN SPOUSES SANTIAGO, ET AL.
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. [NO.] 103959,AUGUST
21,
1997 WHEREBY
IT
IS
HELD
[THAT]
THE TORRENS SYSTEM DOES NOT CREATE OR VEST
TITLE. IT ONLY CONFIRMS AND RECORDS TITLE ALREADY
EXISTING AND VESTED. IT DOES NOT PROTECT A USURPER
FROM THE TRUE OWNER NOR CAN IT BE A SHIELD IN THE
COMMISSION OF FRAUD. WHERE ONE DOES NOT HAVE
ANY RIGHTFUL CLAIM OVER A REAL PROPERTY,
THE TORRENS SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION CONFIRM[S] OR
RECORD[S] NOTHING.[32]
This Petition lacks merit.
Petitioners main contention is, since Ochea was not even related to either
Julian or Pedro Tiro, the Declaration of Heir and Confirmation of Sale which she
executed could not have resulted in the cancellation of OCT No. RO-1121 in the
names of Julian and Pedro Tiro. They further argue that since the initial transfer of
the disputed land was fraudulent, therefore, all the subsequent transfers, including
that made to respondent, were all invalid.
Petitioners arguments are unfounded.

Insofar as a person who has fraudulently obtained property is concerned, the

consequently fraudulent registration of the property in the name of such person
would not be sufficient to vest in him or her title to the property. Certificates of
title merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. The indefeasibility
of the torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the
rightful owner of real property. Good faith must concur with registration because,
otherwise, registration would be an exercise in futility.[33] However, where good
faith is established, as in the case of an innocent purchaser for value, a forged
document may become the root of a valid title. [34]
A person is considered in law as an innocent purchaser for value when he
buys the property of another, without notice that some other person has a right or
an interest in such property, and pays a full price for the same at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in
the property. A person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and the law will in no
way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the
property. The courts cannot disregard the rights of innocent third persons, for that
would impair or erode public confidence in the torrens system of land
registration. Thus, a title procured by fraud or misrepresentation can still be the
source of a completely legal and valid title if the same is in the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value.[35]
In the present case, respondent was clearly an innocent purchaser for
value. It purchased the disputed property from Pacific Rehouse Corporation, along
with other parcels of land for a valuable consideration, i.e., shares of common
stock of respondent with a value of P148,100,400.00. Pacific Rehouse Corporation,
in turn, purchased the property from Spouses Velayo, also for valuable
consideration in the amount of P1,461,600.00. The certificates of title of
Pacific Rehouse Corporation and the Spouses Velayo were clean and appeared
valid on their face, and there was nothing therein which should have put the
respondent on its guard of some defect in the previous registered owners title to the
disputed property. In addition to their certificate of title, the Spouses Velayo even
presented to Pacific Rehouse Corporation a copy of the MTC Decision dated 28
June 1994 in Civil Case No. R-1202 ordering petitioners to vacate the disputed
property, which they forcibly entered, and to restore possession thereof to the

Spouses Velayo. The said Decision supported the Spouses Velayos claim of title to
the disputed property.
In Spouses Chu, Sr. v. Benelda Estate Development Corporation,[36] this
Court pronounced that it is crucial that a complaint for annulment of title must
allege that the purchaser was aware of the defect in the title, so that the cause of
action against him or her will be sufficient. Failure to do so, as in the case at bar, is
fatal for the reason that the court cannot render a valid judgment against the
purchaser who is presumed to be in good faith in acquiring said property. Failure to
prove, much less impute, bad faith to said purchaser who has acquired a title in his
or her favor would make it impossible for the court to render a valid judgment
thereon, due to the indefeasibility and conclusiveness of his or her title.
In this case, petitioners directed all allegations of bad faith solely
at Ochea. The property in question had already been the subject of five succeeding
transfers to persons who were not accused of having purchased the same in bad
faith. Petitioners attempt, therefore, to have respondents certificate of title to the
disputed property annulled, must fail.
In Veloso v. Court of Appeals,[37] this Court enunciated that a title issued to
an innocent purchaser and for value cannot be revoked on the basis that the deed of
sale was falsified, if he had no knowledge of the fraud committed. The Court also
provided the person prejudiced with the following recourse:
Even granting for the sake of argument, that the petitioners
signature was falsified and consequently, the power of attorney and
the deed of sale were null and void, such fact would not revoke the
title
subsequently
issued
in
favor
of
private
respondent Aglaloma. In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was
held, viz:
The right of an innocent purchaser for value must
be respected and protected, even if the seller obtained his
title through fraud. The remedy of the person
prejudiced is to bring an action for damages against
those who caused or employed the fraud, and if the
latter are insolvent, an action against the Treasurer of

the Philippines may be filed for recovery of damages

against the Assurance Fund. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners cite Sps. Santiago v. Court of Appeals.[38] In Santiago, the plaintiff and
the defendants were the parties to the void contract of sale of the disputed
property. The contract was considered simulated for lack of consideration and
given the fact that defendants failed to take possession of the subject property. For
this reason, the Court did not hesitate to cancel the certificates of title in the
defendants names, since they were found not to be the rightful owners of the
property. More importantly, the defendants were not innocent purchasers for value,
since they were privy to the nullity of the contract of sale covering the
property. Santiago is clearly inapplicable to the present case. Respondent herein
who paid adequate consideration for the disputed land, took possession of the
same, and is already the fifth transferee following the allegedly fraudulent initial
transfer of the land, cannot be placed in the same position as a vendor who was a
party to a simulated sale of a real property.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78582, promulgated
on 1 July 2005, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-43105 August 31, 1984
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Director of Lands), petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION) AND SANTOS
DEL RIO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-43190 August 31, 1984
AURORA BAUTISTA, OLIMPIO LARIOS, FELICIDAD DE LA CRUZ,
ELPIDIO LARIOS, LUCITA BANDA, BENITO SANTAYANA,
FRUCTUOSA BANHAO LUCIO VELASCO, GREGORIO DATOY,

FELIMON GUTIERREZ, ET AL.,petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND SANTOS DEL RIO, respondents.
Bonifacio, Perez & Concepcion for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent Appellate Court.
Eduardo Cagandahan for respondent Santos del Rio.

CUEVAS, J.:
These two 1 Petitions for Review of the same decision of the defunct Court of
Appeals 2 have been consolidated in this single decision, having arisen from one
and the same Land Registration Cage (LRC Case No. N-283, Laguna), and
presenting as they do issues which may be resolved jointly by this Court.
The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of the trial
court and ordered the registration of the land in favor of applicant, now private
respondent, Santos del Rio. Petitioner Director of Lands in G.R. No. L-43105
claims that the land sought to be registered is part of the public domain and
therefore not registerable. Petitioners private oppositors in G.R. No. L-43190, on
the other hand, allege that they reclaimed the land by dumping duck egg shells
thereon, and that they have been in possession of the same for more than twenty
(20) years.
The lot subject matter of this land registration case, with an area of 17,311 square
meters, is situated near the shore of Laguna de Bay, about twenty (20) meters
therefrom (Exh. D), 3 in Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna. It was purchased by
Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on April 19, 1909. The Deed of Sale evidencing
said purchase is duly recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
The land was declared for tax purposes beginning the year 1918, and the realty
taxes thereon had been paid since 1948. When Benedicto del Rio died in 1957, his
heirs extrajudicially partitioned his estate and the subject parcel passed on to his
son, Santos del Rio, as the latter's share in the inheritance.

Santos del Rio, herein applicant-private respondent, filed his application for
registration of said parcel on May 9, 1966. The application was opposed by the
Director of Lands and by private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L-43190.
Sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained permission from Santos del Rio
to construct duck houses on the land in question. Although there was no definite
commitment as to rentals, some of them had made voluntary payments to private
respondent. In violation of the original agreement, private oppositors constructed
residential houses on the land which prompted private respondent to file an
ejectment suit against the former in 1966. 4Meanwhile, during the latter part of
1965 and in 1966, private oppositors had simultaneously filed their respective sales
applications with the Bureau of Lands, and in 1966, they opposed Santos del Rios
application for registration. The Court of First Instance of Laguna dismissed the
application for registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a favorable judgment
from the Court of Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed
their respective Petitions for Review of said decision.
The two consolidated petitions raise substantially the same issues, to wit :
1) whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land; and
2) whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to
the land.
Property, which includes parcels of land found in Philippine territory, is either of
public dominion or of private ownership. 5 Public lands, or those of public
dominion, have been described as those which, under existing legislation are not
the subject of private ownership, and are reserved for public purposes. 6 The New
Civil Code enumerates properties of public dominion in Articles 420 and 502
thereof. Article 420 provides:
The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State without being for public use, and
are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
Article 502 adds to the above enumeration, the following:
(1) Rivers and their natural beds;
(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in
their natural beds and the beds themselves;
(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public
dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands and their
beds;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
The Director of Lands would like Us to believe that since a portion of the land
sought to be registered is covered with water four to five months a year, the same is
part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay, or is at least, a foreshoreland, which brings
it within the enumeration in Art. 502 of the New Civil Code quoted above and
therefore it cannot be the subject of registration.
The extent of a lake bed is defined in Art. 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866, as
follows:
The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground
covered by their waters when at theirhighest ordinary depth.
(Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "highest ordinary depth" in the above definition has been interpreted in
the case of Government of P.I. vs. Colegio de San Jose 7 to be the highest depth of
the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being the "regular,

common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year." The
foregoing interpretation was the focal point in the Court of Appeals decision
sought to be reviewed. We see no reason to disturb the same.
Laguna de Bay is a lake. 8 While the waters of a lake are also subject to the same
gravitational forces that cause the formation of tides 9 in seas and oceans, this
phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the case of lakes. 10 Thus, the
alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, could
hardly account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed four
to five months a year during the rainy season. Rather, it is the rains which bring
about the inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since the rise in the water
level which causes the submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period (four
to five months a year) than the level of the water at which the is completely dry,
the latter should be considered as the "highest ordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay.
Therefore, the land sought to be registered is not part of the bed or basin of Laguna
de Bay. Neither can it be considered as foreshore land. The Brief for the Petitioner
Director of Lands cites an accurate definition of a foreshore land, to wit:
... that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left
dry by the flux and reflux of the tides... 11
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water mark and
that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. 12
As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion of the land
in question is due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay
from different sources. 13 Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not due
to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land within the
meaning of the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought to
be registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore
land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore
capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that
he has a registerable title. This brings us to the second issue, which is whether or
not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land.

The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of
lands but only the registration of title which applicant already possesses over the
land. 14 Registration under the Torrens Law was never intended as a means of
acquiring ownership. Applicant in this case asserts ownership over the parcel of
land he seeks to register and traces the roots of his title to a public instrument of
sale (Exh. G) in favor of his father from whom he inherited said land. In addition
to this muniment of title, he presents tax declarations (Exhs. F, G, H, I) covering
the land since 1918 and also tax receipts (Exhs. J, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, K, K-1, K-2, K3) dating back to 1948. While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence
of ownership, 15 they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property. 16 The then Court of Appeals found applicant by himself and through his
father before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and
adverse possession of the disputed land for more than thirty (30) years, counted
from April 19, 1909, when the land was acquired from a third person by
purchase. 17 The record does not show any circumstance of note sufficient enough
to overthrow said findings of facts which is binding upon us. Since applicant has
possessed the subject parcel in the concept of owner with just title and in good
faith, his possession need only last for ten years in order for ordinary acquisitive
prescription to set in. 18 Applicant has more than satisfied this legal requirement.
And even if the land sought to be registered is public land as claimed by the
petitioners still, applicant would be entitled to a judicial confirmation of his
imperfect title, since he has also satisfied the requirements of the Public Land Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. 1942). Sec. 48 of
said Act enumerates as among the persons entitled to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, the following:
(a) ...
(b) Those who, by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest, have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under bona fide c of ownership, for at least tirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title ...

The claim of private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L43190, that they have
reclaimed the land from the waters of Laguna de Bay and that they have possessed
the same for more than twenty (20) years does not improve their position. In the
first place, private persons cannot, by themselves reclaim land from water bodies
belonging to the public domain without proper permission from government
authorities. 19 And even if such reclamation had been authorized, the reclaimed
land does not automatically belong to the party reclaiming the same as they may
still be subject to the terms of the authority earlier granted. 20 Private oppositorspetitioners failed to show proper authority for the alleged reclamation, therefore,
their claimed title to the litigated parcel must fall. In the second place, their alleged
possession can never ripen into ownership. Only possession acquired and enjoyed
in the concept of owner can serve as the root of a title acquired by
prescription. 21 As correctly found by the appellate court, the private oppositorspetitioners entered into possession of the land with the permission of, and as
tenants of, the applicant del Rio. The fact that some of them at one time or another
did not pay rent cannot be considered in their favor. Their use of the land and their
non-payment of rents thereon were merely tolerated by applicant and these could
not have affected the character of the latter's possession 22 which has already
ripened into ownership at the time of the filing of this application for registration.
The applicant private-respondent having satisfactorily established his registerable
title over the parcel of land described in his application, he is clearly entitled to the
registration in his favor of said land.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED and the registration in favor of applicant private-respondent of the
land described in his application is hereby ordered.
Costs against private petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
GUARANTEED HOMES, INC., G.R. No. 171531
Petitioner,
- versus - Present:
HEIRS OF MARIA P. VALDEZ, QUISUMBING, J.,

(EMILIA V. YUMUL and VICTORIA Chairperson,

V. MOLINO), HEIRS OF SEVERINA CORONA,*
P. TUGADE (ILUMINADA and CARPIO MORALES,
LEONORA P. TUGADE, HEIRS OF TINGA, and
ETANG P. GATMIN (LUDIVINA BRION, JJ.
G. DELA CRUZ (by and through
ALFONSO G. DELA CRUZ), HILARIA
G. COBERO and ALFREDO G. COBERO) Promulgated:
and SIONY G. TEPOL (by and through
ELENA T. RIVAS and ELESIO TEPOL,
JR.), AS HEIRS OF DECEDENT PABLO January 30, 2009
PASCUA,
Respondents.
x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Court of
Appeals Decision dated 22 March 2005[2] and Resolution dated 9 February
2006[3] in CA-G.R. CV No. 67462. The Court of Appeals reversed the 12
November 1999 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City,
Branch 73[4] which granted the motion to dismiss filed by Guaranteed Homes, Inc.
(petitioner). The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Respondents, who are the descendants of Pablo Pascua (Pablo), filed a
complaint seeking reconveyance of a parcel of land with an area of 23.7229
hectares situated in Cabitaugan, Subic, Zambales and covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 404 in the name of Pablo. [5] In the alternative, the
respondents prayed that damages be awarded in their favor.[6]
OCT No. 404[7] was attached as one of the annexes of respondents
complaint. It contained several annotations in the memorandum of encumbrances

which showed that the property had already been sold by Pablo during his lifetime
to Alejandria Marquinez and Restituto Morales. Respondents also attached copies
of the following documents as integral parts of their complaint: Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-8241,[8] TCT No. T-8242,[9] TCT No. T-10863,[10] the
Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales [11] executed by
Cipriano Pascua, Sr. (Cipriano), and the Deed of Sale with Mortgage [12] between
spouses Albino Rodolfo and Fabia Rodolfo (spouses Rodolfo) and petitioner.
In their complaint,[13] respondents alleged that Pablo died intestate sometime
in June 1945 and was survived by his four children, one of whom was the deceased
Cipriano.[14] On 13 February 1967, Cipriano executed a document denominated as
Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales, [15] wherein he
declared himself as the only heir of Pablo and confirmed the sales made by the
decedent during his lifetime, including the alleged sale of the disputed property to
spouses Rodolfo.
Respondents likewise averred that on the following day 14 February 1967,
TCT No. T-8241[16] was issued in the name of Cipriano without OCT No. 404
having been cancelled.[17] However, TCT No. T-8241 was not signed by the
Register of Deeds. On the same day, TCT No. T-8242 was issued in the name of
the spouses Rodolfo and TCT No. T-8241 was thereby cancelled. [18] Subsequently,
on 31 October 1969, the spouses Rodolfo sold the disputed property to petitioner
by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. Consequently, on 5 November 1969,
TCT No. T-8242 was cancelled and TCT No. T-10863 [19] was issued in the name of
petitioner.[20]
It was further averred in the complaint that Jorge Pascua, Sr., son of Cipriano, filed
on 24 January 1997 a petition before the RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 75, for the
issuance of a new owners duplicate of OCT No. 404, docketed as Other Case No.
04-0-97.[21] The RTC denied the petition.[22] The trial court held that petitioner was
already the owner of the land, noting that the failure to annotate the subsequent
transfer of the property to it at the back of OCT No. 404 did not affect its title to
the property.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss[23] the complaint on the grounds that the
action is barred by the Statute of Limitations, more than 28 years having elapsed

from the issuance of TCT No. T-10863 up to the filing of the complaint, and that
the complaint states no cause of action as it is an innocent purchaser for value, it
having relied on the clean title of the spouses Rodolfo.
Impleaded as defendants, the heirs of Cipriano filed an answer to the
complaint in which they denied knowledge of the existence of the extrajudicial
settlement allegedly executed by Cipriano and averred that the latter, during his
lifetime, did not execute any document transferring ownership of the property.[24]
The Register of Deeds and the National Treasurer filed, through the Office
of the Solicitor General, an answer averring that the six (6)-year period fixed in
Section 102 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 for the filing of an action
against the Assurance Fund had long prescribed since the transfer of ownership
over the property was registered through the issuance of TCT No. T-10863 in favor
of petitioner as early as 1969. They also claimed that respondents have no cause of
action against the Assurance Fund since they were not actually deprived of
ownership over the property, as they could have recovered the property had it not
been for their inaction for over 28 years.[25]
The RTC granted petitioners motion to dismiss. [26] Noting that respondents had
never claimed nor established that they have been in possession of the property and
that they did not present any evidence to show that petitioner has not been in
possession of the property either, the RTC applied the doctrine that an action to
quiet title prescribes where the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.

The trial court found that the complaint per its allegations presented a case of
implied or constructive trust on the part of Cipriano who had inaccurately claimed
to be the sole heir of Pablo in the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate which
led to the issuance of TCT No. T- 8241 in his favor. As the prescriptive period for
reconveyance of a fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned
from the date of the issuance of the title, the trial court held that the action for
reconveyance had already prescribed with the lapse of more than 28 years from the
issuance of TCT No. T-10863 on 5 November 1969 as of the filing of the complaint
on 21 November 1997.

The RTC added that it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property
may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.
The RTC further held that petitioner had the right to rely on TCT No. T- 8242 in the
name of spouses Rodolfo. Petitioner is not obliged to go beyond the title
considering that there were no circumstances surrounding the sale sufficient to put
it into inquiry.
Concerning the Assurance Fund, the RTC held that the claim against it had long
prescribed since Section 102 of P.D. No. 1529 provides for a six-year period within
which a plaintiff may file an action against the fund and in this case the period
should be counted from the time of the issuance of the challenged TCT No. T10863 on 5 November 1969and thus expired in 1975.

Undaunted, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.[27]

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs order.[28] In ordering the reinstatement of
the complaint, the appellate court ruled that the averments in respondents
complaint before the RTC make out a case for quieting of title which has not
prescribed. Respondents did not have to prove possession over the property since
petitioner as the movant in a motion to dismiss hypothetically admitted the truth of
the allegations in the complaint. The appellate court found that possession over the
property was sufficiently alleged in the complaint which stated that neither
petitioner nor the Rodolfo spouses ever had possession of the disputed property as
a number of the Pascua heirs either had been (still are) in actual, continuous and
adverse possession thereof or had been enjoying (still are enjoying) the use thereof.
[29]
By the same token, laches had not set in, the Court of Appeals added.
The appellate court further held that the ruling of the RTC that petitioner is an
innocent purchaser for value is contrary to the allegations in respondents
complaint.
Hence, the present petition for review.

The sole issue before this Court revolves around the propriety of the RTCs granting
of the motion to dismiss and conversely the tenability of the Court of Appeals
reversal of the RTCs ruling.
The petition is meritorious.
It is well-settled that to sustain a dismissal on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear on
the face of the complaint, and the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with
the
prayer of the complaint. For the purpose, the motion to dismiss must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. [30] The
admission, however, is limited only to all material and relevant facts which are
well pleaded in the complaint.[31]
The factual allegations in respondents complaint should be considered in tandem
with the statements and inscriptions on the documents attached to it as annexes or
integral parts. In a number of cases, the Court held that in addition to the
complaint, other pleadings submitted by the parties should be considered in
deciding whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of
action.[32] Likewise, other facts not alleged in the complaint may be considered
where the motion to dismiss was heard with the submission of evidence, or if
documentary evidence admitted by stipulation discloses facts sufficient to defeat
the claim.[33] For while the court must accept as true all well pleaded facts in the
complaint, the motion does not admit allegations of which the court will take
judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply to legally impossible facts, nor
to facts inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts which appear by record or document
included in the pleadings to be unfounded.[34]
In the case at bar, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss. At
the hearing, the parties presented documentary evidence. Among the documents
marked and offered in evidence are the annexes of the complaint.[35]
Based on the standards set by this Court in relation to the factual allegations and
documentary annexes of the complaint as well as the exhibits offered at the hearing

of the motion to dismiss, the inescapable conclusion is that respondents complaint

does not state a cause of action against petitioner.
Firstly, the complaint does not allege any defect with TCT No. T-8242 in the
name of the spouses Rodolfo, who were petitioners predecessors-in-interest, or any
circumstance from which it could reasonably be inferred that petitioner had any
actual knowledge of facts that would impel it to make further inquiry into the title
of the spouses Rodolfo.[36] It is basic that a person dealing with registered property
need not go beyond, but only has to rely on, the title of his predecessor-in-interest.
Since "the act of registration is the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar
as third persons are concerned, it follows that where there is nothing in the
certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or
any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than
what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or
inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule were
otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which
the Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely be futile and nugatory. The
public shall then be denied of its foremost motivation for respecting and observing
theTorrens system of registration. In the end, the business community stands to be
inconvenienced and prejudiced immeasurably.[37]
Contrary to the assertion of respondents, OCT No. 404 was expressly
cancelled by TCT No. T-8241. The alleged non-signature by the Register of Deeds
Soliman Achacoso, , does not affect the validity of TCT No. T-8241 since he
signed TCT No. T- 8242 and issued both titles on the same day. There is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. The presumption is
further bolstered by the fact that TCT No. T-8241 was certified to be on file with
the Registry of Deeds and registered in the name of Cipriano. It is enough that
petitioner had examined the latest certificate of title which in this case was issued
in the name of the immediate transferor, the spouses Rodolfo. The purchaser is not
bound by the original certificate but only by the certificate of title of the person
from whom he had purchased the property.[38]
Secondly, while the Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and
Confirmation of Sales executed by Cipriano alone despite the existence of the
other heirs of Pablo, is not binding on such other heirs, nevertheless, it has

operative effect under Section 44 of the Property Registration Decree, which

provides that:
SEC. 44. Statutory Liens Affecting Title. Every registered owner
receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration,
and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate
of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all
encumbrances except those noted on said certificate and any of the
following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
xxxx
Even assuming arguendo that the extrajudicial settlement was a forgery, the
Court still has to uphold the title of petitioner. The case law is that although
generally a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title, there are
instances when such a fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title.
[39]
And one such instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred
from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the
land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the
right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate.[40]
The Court cannot give credence to respondents claims that the Extrajudicial
Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales was not registered and that
OCT No. 404 was not cancelled by the Register of Deeds. The Register of Deeds
of Zambales certified that the extrajudicial settlement was recorded on 14 February
1967, per Entry No. 18590. This is in compliance with Section 56 of Act No. 496,
[41]
the applicable law at the time of registration, which provides that:
Sec. 56. Each register of deeds shall keep an entry book in
which he shall enter in the order of their reception all deeds and other
voluntary instruments, and all copies of writs and other process filed
with him relating to registered land. He shall note in such book the
year, month, day, hour, and minute of reception of all instruments, in
the order in which they are received. They shall be regarded as
registered from the time so noted, and the memorandum of each
instrument when made on the certificate of title to which it refers shall
bear the same date. [Emphasis supplied]

Registration in the public registry is notice to the whole world. Every

conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry
affecting registered land shall be, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be
constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or
entering.[42]
Thirdly, respondents cannot make out a case for quieting of title since OCT
No. 404 had already been cancelled. Respondents have no title to anchor their
complaint on.[43] Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is
based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by
which means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive
possession and enjoyment of the property.[44]
Moreover, there is nothing in the complaint which specified that the
respondents were in possession of the property. They merely alleged that the
occupants or possessors are others not defendant Spouses Rodolfo [45] who could be
anybody, and that the property is in actual possession of a number of the Pascua
heirs[46] who could either be the respondents or the heirs of Cipriano. The
admission of the truth of material and relevant facts well pleaded does not extend
to render a demurrer an admission of inferences or conclusions drawn therefrom,
even if alleged in the pleading; nor mere inferences or conclusions from

facts not stated; nor conclusions of law; nor matters of evidence; nor
surplusage and irrelevant matters.[47]
The other heirs of Pablo should have filed an action for reconveyance based
on implied or constructive trust within ten (10) years from the date of registration
of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
[48]
The legal relationship between Cipriano and the other heirs of Pablo is
governed by Article 1456 of the Civil Code which provides that if a property is
acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes.
From the above discussion, there is no question that petitioner is an innocent
purchaser for value; hence, no cause of action for cancellation of title will lie
against it.[49] The RTC was correct in granting petitioners motion to dismiss.
Lastly, respondents claim against the Assurance Fund also cannot prosper.
Section 101 of P.D. No. 1529 clearly provides that the Assurance Fund shall not be
liable for any loss, damage or deprivation of any right or interest in land which
may have been caused by a breach of trust, whether express, implied or
constructive. Even assumingarguendo that they are entitled to claim against the
Assurance Fund, the respondents claim has already prescribed since any action for
compensation against the Assurance Fund must be brought within a period of six
(6) years from the time the right to bring such action first occurred, which in this
case was in 1967.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67462 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 12
November 1999Order of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73 in
Civil Case No. 432-097 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-69303

July 23, 1987

HEIRS OF MARIA MARASIGAN, namely, Teofilo, Isabel, Maximina, Anicia,

and Francisco, all surnamed Marasigan, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and MARIA
MARRON, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Who has a better right to the property in question, the party who bought it with a
notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of her title or the party in whose favor
the notice of lis pendens was made? The appellate court answered this question in
favor of the party who had the notice annotated and who won the litigation over the
property. We affirm.
The disputed property in this case is a residential lot (Lot No. 2-A) covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 100612 issued by the Register of Deeds of the City
of Manila in the name of one Fe Springael-Bazar, married to Felicisimo Bazar.
The pertinent facts as disclosed by the record are as follows:
On April 24, 1975, Civil Case No. 97479 entitled "Maria Marron v. Felicisimo
Bazar and Fe S. Bazaar" was filed before the then Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XIII. The action sought to compel defendants Bazar to execute a
registrable Deed of Absolute Sale of their lot covered by T.C.T. No. 100612 in
favor of Maria Marron.
On January 27, 1976, while Civil Case No. 97479 was still pending, the private
respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of T.C.T.
No. 100612.
On February 24, 1976, judgment was rendered in Civil Case No. 97479. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants as follows:

a) Ordering the defendants Fe Springael Bazar and Felicisimo Bazar as

vendors (1) to execute in favor of the plaintiff Maria Marron as vendee a
Deed of Absolute Sale in a public instrument over the residential lot covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 100612 issued by the Registry of Deeds
of the City of Manila to and in the name of Fe S. Bazar, married to
Felicisimo Bazaar; and (2) to deliver to plaintiff sufficient copies of such
deed of sale, together with the Owner's copy of said Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 100612, in order that the plaintiff can register the Deed of Absolute
Sale with the Registry of Deeds of the City of Manila and secure a transfer
certificate of title for the land in her name.
b) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P500.00
Philippine Currency, as and for attorney's fees; and
c) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the suit. (Rollo, p. 15).
The above judgment became final and executory so Maria Marron filed a motion
for execution which was granted. A writ of execution was issued by the court on
July 12, 1976. The spouses Bazar, however, refused to surrender their title to the
property in question and to execute the required deed of sale in Marron's favor. On
November 29, 1978, the lower court finally ordered the Clerk of Court to execute
the deed of sale in behalf of the erring spouses. When the said deed was presented
to the Register of Deeds of Manila for registration, the Deputy Clerk of Court was
advised to secure a court order in order that the new title issued in the name of
herein petitioner Maria Marasigan could be cancelled.
It appears that on December 18, 1974, a deed of absolute sale of Lot 2-A covered
by T.C.T. No. 100612 was executed by Fe S. Bazar in favor of Maria Marasigan
for and in consideration of the sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).
However, it was only on July 5, 1977 that said deed was registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Manila. Consequently, T.C.T. No. 100612 was cancelled and
a new title was issued in Maria Marasigan's name. When the Register of Deeds of
Manila issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 126056 naming Maria Marasigan as
the new owner of Lot 2-A, the notice of lis pendens caused to be annotated by
Marron on the Bazar's title was carried over on the said new title.

Meanwhile, on May 26, 1977, the Bazaars filed a petition for relief from the
judgment dated February 24, 1976 in Civil Case No. 97479. While their petition
was still pending, they moved to set aside the said judgment on June 22, 1979 on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over their persons.
On the other hand, on February 24, 1979, Marron instituted L.R.C. Case No. 7680
captioned "Maria Marron v. Maria Marasigan" which prayed for a court order
requiring the Register of Deeds of Manila to register the deed of sale executed by
the Deputy Clerk of Court in behalf of the Bazaars pursuant to the order dated
November 29, 1978 of the Court of First Instance, Manila, Branch XIII. L.R.C.
Case No. 7680 was tried by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV acting
as a land registration court. Said case was dismissed for the following reason:
... This court acting as a Land Registration Court, with limited and special
jurisdiction cannot act on this petition under summary proceedings but (sic)
should be ventilated before a court of general jurisdiction Branch XIII,
which issued the aforesaid Order dated November 29, 1978, the said petition
is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice on the part of
the petitioner to institute the appropriate civil action before the proper
court. ... (Annex "A," p. 4, Rollo, p. 138)
On September 6, 1979, Marron filed another case docketed as Civil Case No.
126378 to have Marasigan's TCT 126056 cancelled conformably to the procedure
outlined in the decision of the above land registration court. On July 30, 1980, the
parties submitted said case for decision.
On February 18, 1982, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV to which
Civil Case No. 126378 was assigned dismissed Marron's complaint for being
premature since the decision rendered by the CFI, Branch XIII in Civil Case No.
97479 had not yet become final and executory considering that it was still the
subject of a petition for relief from judgment.
On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court, on August 7, 1984, ruled that Marron
is entitled to the property under litigation by virtue of the notice of lis
pendens annotated at the back of Maria Marasigan's title. The appellate court
further ruled that the decision in Civil Case No. 97479 had become final and

executory because the petition for relief from judgment of the spouses Bazar was
filed out of time. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and another one
entered
(a) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel T.C.T. No. 126056 in
the name of Maria Marasigan and issue another in the name of Maria
Marron by virtue of the Deed of Sale executed by the Branch Clerk of Court
of Branch XIII;
(b) Ordering the said Register of Deeds, during the pendency of this case, to
refrain from registering any deed of sale pertaining to T.C.T. No. 126056 in
the name of Maria Marasigan other than that of the herein plaintiff; and
(c) Ordering the defendant Maria Marasigan to pay attorney's fees in the
amount of P10,000.00. (IAC, Decision. Rollo, pp. 17-18).
Maria Marasigan who died in the course of the proceedings is now represented by
her heirs in the instant petition which assigns the following errors:
I
THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND
THAT THE RIGHT OF ACTION OF RESPONDENT MARIA MARRON (AS
PLAINTIFF) IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97479 HAD PRESCRIBED AND SHE
INCURRED IN LACHES.
II
THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND
THAT RESPONDENT ABANDONED OR WAIVED HER PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND EFFECTS TO/OF THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97479, WHEN
SHE FILED CIVIL CASES NO. 7680 AND 126378, DURING ITS
EFFECTIVITY.
III

THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING

THAT THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97479 HAS BECOME FINAL
AND EXECUTORY.
IV
THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND
THE LACK OF JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL CASES NO.
7680 AND 126378 OVER THE PERSONS OF PETITIONERS.
V
THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING
THAT THE TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97479 HAS JURISDICTION
OVER THE PERSONS OF DEFENDANTS SPOUSES FELICISIMO BAZAAR
AND FE S. BAZAAR.
VI
THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND
THAT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY THE DEPUTY
CLERK OF COURT, WAS NOT LEGAL AND VALID AND WITHOUT PROOF
AND EFFECT. (Brief for the appellant, pp. 1 and 2)
We find no merit in the present petition.
There is a clear showing that although the late Maria Marasigan acquired the
property in question from the Bazaars pursuant to a deed of absolute sale on
December 18, 1974 or a little over four months before the filing of Civil Case No.
97479, the transaction became effective as against third persons only on July 5,
1977 when it was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila. It is the act of
registration which creates constructive notice to the whole world. Section 51 of Act
496, as amended by Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529)
provides:
Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance ...
affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of

the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it
relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such
registering, filing or entering.
Moreover, there is no question that when the late Maria Marasigan was issued her
transfer certificate of title to the subject property (T.C.T. No. 126056), the Registrar
of Deeds of Manila then carried over to the new title the notice of lis
pendens which the private respondent had caused to be annotated at the back of the
Bazar's title. In case of subsequent sales or transfers, the Registrar of Deeds is duty
bound to carry over the notice of lis pendens on all titles to be issued. Otherwise, if
he cancels any notice of lis pendens in violation of his duty, he may be held civilly
and even criminally liable for any prejudice caused to innocent third persons (The
Director of Lands, et al. v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177).
A notice of lis pendens means that a certain property is involved in a litigation and
serves as notice to the whole world that one who buys the same does it at his own
risk (Rehabilitation Finance Corporation v. Morales, 101 Phil. 171). It was also a
clear notice to Maria Marasigan that there was a court case affecting her rights to
the property she had purchased.1avvphi1
As earlier stated it was only on July 5, 1977 that the sale between Maria Marasigan
and the Bazaars became effective as against third persons. The registration of the
deed of sale over the subject property was definitely subsequent to the annotation
made on January 27, 1976. Consequently, Marasigan was bound by the outcome of
the litigation against her vendors or transferors. (See Rivera v. Tirona, et al., 109
Phil. 505).
We reiterate the established rule that:
... the filing of a notice of lis pendens charges all strangers with a notice of
the particular litigation referred to therein and, therefore, any right they may
thereafter acquire on the property is subject to the eventuality of the suit.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and
necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation
within the power of the Court until the judgment or decree shall have been
entered; otherwise, by successive alienations pending the litigation, its

judgment or decree shall be rendered abortive and impossible of

execution. ... (Laroza v. Guia, 134 SCRA 34 1)
The late Marasigan's transferors did not interpose any appeal from the adverse
judgment dated February 24, 1976 in Civil Case No. 97479. The 30-day period
under the old rule (Rule 41, section 3 of the Revised Rules of court now amended
by Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, section 39) within which the Bazaars may have
taken an appeal started to run from May 12, 1976 when they were served with a
copy of the said decision. On June 11, 1976, the February 24, 1976 decision in
Civil Case No. 97479 became final and executory. At this point after the finality of
the said decision, the Bazaars no longer had the right to alienate the property
subject of the litigation. Any transaction effective during the period of litigation is
subject to the risks implicit in the notice of lis pendens and to the eventual outcome
of the litigation.
Moreover, we agree with the finding of the appellate court that the petition for
relief from judgment by the Bazaars dated May 26, 1977 was filed beyond the two
periods provided in Section 3 Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court. There may
have been some errors in the computations but the petition itself was out of time.
Rule 38, Section 3 of said Rules provides, in part, that:
Sec. 3. Time for filing petition. ... A petition provided for in either of the
preceding sections of this rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days
after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be
set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was
entered or such proceeding was taken. ...
The 60-day period must be reckoned from May 12, 1976 when the Bazaars were
served with a copy of the assailed decision. Therefore, the 60-day period expired
on July 11, 1976. It was only after 379 days or more than 12 months after they
learned of the judgment that the Bazaars filed their petition for relief from said
judgment. (See Domingo v. Dela Cruz, 23 SCRA 1121) The appellate court
computed the 6-month period from the date of the judgment was rendered. Rule 38
states that the counting should commence from the entry of the judgment or order.
(See Dirige v. Biranya, 17 SCRA 840). A judgment is entered only after its finality

and Civil Case No. 97479 became final on June 11, 1976. Since the records do not
bear the exact date the questioned judgment was entered, the 6-month period can
be counted for purposes of our decision from July 12, 1976 when the writ of
execution of the final judgment was issued. The phrase "or other proceeding" in
Section 3 of Rule 38 includes a writ of execution (Aquino v. Blanco, 79 Phil. 647).
The 6-month period from July 12, 1976 lapsed on January 8, 1977. A period of ten
(10) months had already lapsed when the Bazaars filed their petition for relief from
judgment on May 26, 1977. Obviously, the petitioners cannot now question the
effects of the final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. 97479. In the words
of Laroza v. Guia (supra) they cannot render the final judgment abortive and
impossible of execution. The deed of sale executed by the Deputy Clerk of Court
on behalf of the Bazar spouses pursuant to the court's judgment was valid and
binding.
The petitioners cannot also raise before us the issues of prescription or laches and
lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the Bazar spouses in Civil Case No. 97479.
This cannot be done in this petition which stems from Civil Case No. 126378 in
the trial court and AC-G.R. No. 00183 in the appellate court. The Bazaars were the
proper parties who ought to have raised them as defenses either in a motion to
dismiss or in their answer. Since they did not do so, the same were deemed waived.
(See Rule 9, section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court; MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc.
v. Estrella, 113 SCRA 378; Torreda v. Boncaros, 69 SCRA 247; Visayan Electric
Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 39 SCRA 43; Republic v.
Mambulao Lumber Company, 6 SCRA 858).
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.