IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO (A.M. No.

1162 August 29, 1975)

Facts: This is a disbarment matter with regards to Attorney Victorio Lanuevo, the Bar Confidant
for the 1971 Bar Examinations. Supreme Court received a confidential letter that speaks of the
exam notebooks of a examinee named Ramon Galang who has been re-evaluated and recorrected such that he hurdled the Bar Exams and was admitted to the Bar.
Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to
the respective examiners for re-evalution or re-checking. The five examiners admitted having reevaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has the
authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject
and was on the borderline of passing. Ramon Galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam
because of Lanuevos move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5 subjects namely in
(Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).
Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries on Eufrosino de
Vera, a law student of MLQU.
The five examiners were led by Lanuevo to believe that it is the Bar Committees regular activity
that when an examinee has failed in one subject alone, the rest he passed, the examiner in that
subject which he flunked will review his exam notebook.
Afterwards, Lanuevo gained possession of few properties, including that of a house in BF
Homes, which was never declared in his declaration of assets and liabilities.

Issue: WON Lanuevo was guilty of defrauding the examiners such that Galang passed the Bar?

Held: YES, It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent
Lanuevos well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to
each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized reevaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor
subjects which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the
examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing.
The Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the
grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are
submitted to it by the Examiners. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of
the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the
Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than
the examiner.

AS TO GALANGS CRIM CASE: The concealment of an attorney in his application to take the
Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is
a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well settled. The practice of the law is
not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended
or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not
satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was
allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the
Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorneys certificate and the
striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
DECISION: Lanuevo disbarred, Galang stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS V. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIWASA MANUFACTURING

INC. (1994) (J. NOCON)
FACTS: The case arose when the Bureau of Investments (BOI) granted the petitioners
application to amend its BOI certificate by changing the scope of its registered product from
glazed floor tiles to ceramic tiles. Eventually, Mariwasa filed an MR of the said BOI decision.
Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed an petition for review with
respondent Court of Appeals pursuan to Circular 1-91. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from
implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance,
without issuing any preliminary injunction. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the
restraining order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the
same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of EO 226 (the
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987). Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of
Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the
procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226 , a substantive
right which under the constitution cannot be modified. While Mariwasa maintains that whatever
inconsistency there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question
of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which
was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case
HELD: YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as
the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are
concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be

filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals. The
substantive right to appeal from decisions or orders of the BOI under EO 226 remains and
continues to be respected. Circular I-91 simply transferred the venue of the appeals from the
decisions of this agency to respondent CA and a different period of appeal 15 days from notice
(sa EO 226 30 days from receipt of decision). It did not make an incursion into the right to
appeal.

IN RE CUNANAN (94 PHIL. 534)

FACTS: Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952.
The title of the law was, An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to
and including 1955.
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject
shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in
the computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.

ISSUE: Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING: Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced
in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955
Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also
struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to
1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the
following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952
had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to determine who may be
admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only
minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law;
and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to
declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not
revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The
same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules
of admission to the practice of law.

Shigenori Kuroda vs Rafael Jalandoni

83 Phil. 171 Political Law Generally Accepted Principles of International Law
Shigenori Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines during
the Japanese occupation. He was then charged before the Military Commission, headed by
Major General Rafael Jalandoni, due to the atrocities that were done against non combatant
civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to Executive Order No. 68 which
established the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the
trial of accused war criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the
same is not provided for in the Constitution. He further underscores the fact that the Philippines
is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on the Rules and Regulations Covering Land
Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any criminal charges because it has no laws to
base on, national or international.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts?

HELD: Yes. EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance of the
case at bar. EO No 68 is in pursuant to the constitutional provision that states the Philippines
renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the nation. The Hague Convention and other similar
conventions whose principles are generally accepted are hence considered as part of the law of
the land.

Omico Mining v. Vallejos (63 SCRA 285 [1975]

Judge entered into a contract of personal and professional services with private individuals to
head defendants legal department for a fixed yearly salary.
The challenged judgment seeks to enforce a contract which is patently void because it is
contrary to law and public policy. The contract of professional services entered into between
private respondent and the petitioners, while the former was still a judge of the Court of First
Instance, constituted private practice of law in contravention of Section 35 of Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The aforecited rule was promulgated by this Court pursuant to its
constitutional power to regulate the practice of law. It is based on sound reasons of public
policy, for there is no question that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an
attorney-at-law are so inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers,
discretions and privileges of a Judge of the CFI.
This inhibitory rule makes it obligatory upon the judicial officers concerned to give their full time
and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own
private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions.
These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and the desire to promote the public
interest. Private respondent should have known or ought to know that when he was elevated to
the bench of the CFI as a judge thereof, his right to practice law as an attorney was suspended
and continued to be suspended as long as he occupied the judicial position.

People of the Philippines vs Simplicio Villanueva

14 SCRA 109 Legal Ethics Practice of Law Isolated Appearance

Facts: In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the municipality of Alaminos
in Laguna. In said case, the private offended party asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule to
prosecute said case. Apparently, Fule was the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the

opposed the appearance of Fule as counsel for the offended party as he said that according to
the Rules of Court when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial
Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private
law practice.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.

HELD: No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services. In the case at bar, Fule is not being compensated but rather hes doing it for free
for his friend who happened to be the offended party. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Further, the fact that the Secretary of
Justice approved Fules appearance for his friend should be given credence.

Renato Cayetano vs Christian Monsod

Legal Ethics Practice of Law

Facts: In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on
Elections. His appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Monsods
appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify for he
failed to meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that the chairman of the COMELEC
should have been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.
Monsods track record as a lawyer:
Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.
Immediately after passing, worked in his fathers law firm for one year.
Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held various
positions in various foreign corporations.
In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local corporations
until 1986.
In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC. What constitutes
practice of law?
HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both
the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in
most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in
the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also
know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what is loosely
described as business counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working day the
average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different
legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at
least some legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most of this work involve
litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this
work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered
the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting,
and negotiation.

In re Edilion
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the
Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of
the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to
the IBP since the latters constitution notwithstanding due notice.
Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining
his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights
to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes,

the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force
and effect.

Issue: WON the payment of IBP dues suffers constitutional infirmity? NO

Held: All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally
sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public
interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren
in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court.
When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the
power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established
by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his
liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he
should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate. 6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion
be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. Why? The right to
practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not
void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

Alcala vs De vera (A.C. No. 620 March 21, 1974)

Facts: An action for annulment of sale of 2 parcels of land was filed against petitioner in the CFI
of Albay. Petitioner engaged the services of respondent lawyer who represented them in the civil
case. On April 17, 1963, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the buyer rescinding the
said sale. The lawyer received the copy of the decision but did not inform the petitioners of it.
On July 17, a sheriff went to their house serving the writ of execution against them. Caught by
surprise, they wrote inquiring about the status of their case, which the Clerk of Court replied that
it was already been decided and since no appeal was taken, a writ of execution was issued
upon the motion. On September 12, they instituted a case for damages against de Vera for
having failed to inform them of the trial courts decision thus, they lost their right to appeal. The
trial court found that the respondent did not inform his client but denied damages. Thus,
petitioner instituted this case for disbarment.

Issue: whether or not a lawyer is bound to exercise extraordinary diligence.

Held: No.An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable
degree of care and skill, having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do.
Fallible like any other human being, he is answerable to every error or mistake, and will be
protected as long as he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge.
Moreover, a party seeking damages resulting from a judgment adverse to him which became
final by reason of the alleged fault or negligence of his lawyer must prove his loss due to the
injustice of the decision. He cannot base his action on the unsubstantiated and arbitrary
supposition of the injustice of the decision. (Tuzon vs. Donato, 58 O.G. 6480)."

HYDRO RESOURCES CONTRACTORS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LABOR ARBITER

ADRIAN N. PAGALILAUAN and the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, public
respondents, and ROGELIO A. ABAN, private respondent.

Facts: Petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its "Legal Assistant and
received basic monthly salary of Pl,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of P50.00 which
gradually increased to P320.00. On September 4, 1980, Aban received a letter from the
corporation informing him that he would be considered terminated effective October 4, 1980
because of his alleged failure to perform his duties well.

Aban filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter ruled that
Aban was illegally dismissed. This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal. Hence, this
present petition.

Issue: Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner
corporation and Aban.

Held: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and reinstate Aban to his
former or a similar position without loss of seniority rights and to pay three (3) years backwages
without qualification or deduction and P5,000.00 in attorney's fees. Should reinstatement not be
feasible, the petitioner shall pay the private respondent termination benefits in addition to the
above stated three years backpay and P5,000.00 attorney's fees.
A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee of a private corporation or
even of the government. This Court has consistently ruled that the determination of whether or
not there is an employer-employee relation depends upon four standards: (1) the manner of
selection and engagement of the putative employee; (2) the mode of payment of wages; (3) the
presence or absence of a power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of a power to
control the putative employee's conduct. Of the four, the right-of-control test has been held to be
the decisive factor.
In this case, Aban received basic salary plus living allowance, worked solely for the petitioner,
dealt only with legal matters involving the said corporation and its employees and also assisted
the Personnel Officer in processing appointment papers of employees which is not act of a
lawyer in the exercise of his profession. These facts showed that petitioner has the power to
hire and fire the respondent employee and more important, exercised control over Aban by
defining the duties and functions of his work which met the four standards in determining
whether or not there is an employee-employer relationship.

Ramos vs. Rada [A.M No. 202 July 22, 1975]

Facts: Moises R. Rada is a messenger in the Court of First Instance of Camarines, Norte
He was charged with violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, which provides as
follows:
Sec.12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of Department: Provided, that this prohibition will be

absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require
that their entire time be at the disposal of the government
Respondent Rada was extended appointment by the Avesco Marketing Corporation on
December 15, 1972 as representative to manage and supervise real properties situated in
Camarines Norte which were foreclosed by the corporation.
His acceptance of such appointment was the basis of the administrative complaint against Rada
which was filed with the Department of Justice on October 3, 1973.
Later, on October 27, 1973, Rada requested permission to accept appointment.
It was not indicated that his acceptance and discharge of the duties as administrator has at all
impaired his efficiency as messenger, nor has it been shown that he did not observe regular
office hours.

Issue: Whether respondent Rada is guilty of violation of sec.12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII
Held: Rada was adjudged guilty of technical violation (lack of prior permission) of Sec 12 of Civil
Service Rule XVIII and meted a penalty of reprimand.
The duties of messenger Rada are generally ministerial which do not require that his entire day
of 24 hours be at the disposal of the government. Such being his situation, it would be to stifle
his willingness to apply himself to a productive endeavor to augment his income, and to award
premium for slothfulness if he were to be banned from engaging in or being connected with a
private undertaking outside of office hours and without forseeable detriment to the Government
service.
His connection with Avesco Marketing Corporation need not be terminated, but he must secure
a written permission from proper government authority.

BELTRAN JR. VS. ABAD (132 SCRA 453 10/11/1984)

FACTS: Court held respondent Elmo S. Abad a successful bar examinee but has not been
admitted to the Philippine Bar in contempt of Court for unauthorized practice of law and he was
fined P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case he failed to pay the fine. (121 SCRA 217).
He paid the fine. Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., the complainant, filed a MOTION TO
CIRCULARIZE TO ALL METRO MANILA COURTS THE FACT THAT ELMO S. ABAD IS NOT
AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW. The Report has found as a fact, over the denials of the
respondent under oath, that he signed Exhibits B, C, and D, and that he made appearances in
Metro Manila courts. This aspect opens the respondent to a charge for perjury. The Report also
reveals that Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe collaborated with the respondent as counsels for Antonio S.

Maravilla one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. (Exhibit D.) Atty. Jacobe should be called to account for his
association with the respondent.
Respondent, when asked about the aforesaid motions, Exhibits "B" and "D", and the signatures
therein, denied that he filed the same and that the signatures therein are his. He also denied
that he appeared in the hearing in the afternoon of December 8, 1983 in the said trial court.
According to him, he was in Batangas at the time. He also testified that the only explanation he
could give regarding the signatures in the aforesaid exhibits is that the same could have been
effected by Atty. Beltran to show the Supreme Court that he (respondent) was still illegally
practicing law. As to the motion for examination and analysis of respondent's signature, the
Investigator, to afford respondent full opportunity to prove his defense, sought the assistance of
the National Bureau of Investigation to compare respondent's signature in the aforesaid exhibits
with the signatures appearing in the pleadings that he filed in the Supreme Court, which latter
signature he admits as genuine and as his own. The aforesaid documentary and testimonial
evidence, as well as the above report of the NBI, have clearly proved that respondent Abad is
still practicing law despite the decision of this Court of March 28, 1983.

ISSUES: Whether or not Abad can engage in practice of law. Whether or not Atty. Jacobe liable
in his collaboration with the respondent.
HELD: No. Only those licensed by the Supreme Court may practice law in this country. The right
to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of
good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of
this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment and
even public trust, since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the
right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege
that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking
admission had practiced law without license. Respondent Abad should know that the
circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and
the right to practice law thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites for becoming a
lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and
his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.) The
regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect
contempt of court. Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to
this Court within ten (10) days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days
imprisonment.

Yes. He violated Canon 9 Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar. in good
standing. A lawyer shall not assist anyone who is not a member of the Bar to practice law in this

country. Thus, he must not take as partner or associate in his law firm a person who is not a
lawyer, a lawyer who has been disbarred and a lawyer who has been suspended from practice
of law. The lawyer who assists in an unauthorized practice of law whether directly or indirectly is
subject to disciplinary action. Finally, Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe is required to explain within ten (10)
days from notice why he should not be disciplined for collaborating and associating in the
practice of the law with the respondent who is not a member of the bar.

CARMEN E. BACARRO, Complainant, vs. RUBEN M. PINATACAN, Respondent.

Adm. Case No. 559-SBC January 31, 1984

Facts: This is an administrative case filed against respondent with moral turpitude and
immorality. Complainant gave birth to a baby girl named Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan; that
because of respondent's betrayal, her family suffered shame, disrepute, moral distress and
anxiety; and, that these acts of respondent render him unfit to become a member of the Bar. On
the other hand, respondent maintains that even admitting the truth of complainant's allegations,
the circumstances of their relationship with each other, does not justify him for disqualification to
the practice of law.

Issue: WON respondent is entitled to take the lawyers oath despite having a case involving his
good moral character
Held: Yes, the court allowed Ruben to take the lawyers oath. considering that respondent has
legally recognized and acknowledged complainant's child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan as
his own, and has undertaken to give financial support to the said child, We hold that he has
realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and is now prepared to turn over a new leaf. But
he must be admonished that his admission to and continued membership in the Bar are
dependent, among others, on his compliance with his moral and legal obligations as the father
of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.

Ratio: One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the
applicant must be of good moral character. This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the
high moral standards and the dignity of the legal profession, and one of the ways of achieving
this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to
be honest and to possess good moral character. "As a man of law, (a lawyer) is necessary a
leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen" He sets an example to his fellow
citizens not only for his respect for the law, but also for his clean living. Thus, becoming a lawyer
is more than just going through a law course and passing the Bar examinations.

In the Matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo A. Diao vs. Severino G. Martinez
Facts: Telesforo A. Diao took the law examinations in 1953 and was admitted to the Bar.
Two years later, Severino Martinez charged Diao of falsifying the information in his application
for such Bar Examination. Upon further investigation, it was found that Diao did not finish his
high school training, and neither did he obtain his Associate in Arts (AA) degree from
Quisumbing College in 1941.
Diao practically admits first charge, but claims that he served the US army, and took the
General Classification Test which, according to Diao, is equivalent to a High School Diploma,
although he failed to submit certification for such claim from any proper school officials.
The claim was doubtlful, however, the second charge was clearly meritorious, as Diao did not
obtain his AA degree from Quisumbing College. Diao claims that he was erroneously certified,
and asserts that he obtained his AA from Arellano University in 1949.
This claim was still unacceptable, as records would have shown that Diao graduated from the
University in April 1949, but he started his Law studies in October 1948 (second semester, AY
1948-1949) and he would not have been permitted to take the Bar, as it is provided in the Rules,
applicants under oath that Previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily
completed the required pre-legal education (AA) as required by the Department of Private
Education

Issue: Whether Telesforo A Diao should be Disbarred.

Ruling: Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the Bar Exams, but did by falsifying
information. Admission under false pretenses thus give grounds for revoking his admission in
the Bar, as passing the Bar Exam is not the only requirement to become an attorney at law.
Thus, the name Telesforo A. Diao is deleted from the roll of attorneys and he is required to
return his law diploma within thirty days.

IN RE: ARGOSINO (270 SCRA 26, 03/19/1997)

FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant.
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino was previously involved with hazing which caused the death of
Raul Camaligan a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites but he was convicted for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. He was sentenced with 2 years and 4 months of
imprisonment where he applied a probation thereafter which was approved and granted by the
court. He took the bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take the oath. He filed for a
petition to allow him to take the lawyers oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law
averring that his probation was already terminated. The court note that he spent only 10 months
of the probation period before it was terminated.

ISSUE: Whether or not Al Argosino may take the lawyers oath office and admit him to the
practice of law.
HELD: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the STRICT,
INTELLECTUAL and MORAL QUALIFICATIONS required of lawyers who are instruments in the
effective and efficient administration of justice. The court upheld the principle of maintaining the
good moral character of all Bar members, keeping in mind that such is of greater importance so
far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned. Hence he was
asked by the court to produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed and has become
a responsible member of the community through sworn statements of individuals who have a
good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of
time to certify that he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession. The petitioner is then
allowed to take the lawyers oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and thereafter to practice the legal
profession.

Fernando Collantes v. Viente Renomeron (200 SCRA 584)

Facts: This complaint for disbarment is relative to the administrative case filed by Atty.
Collantes, house counsel for V& G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against Atty.
Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latters irregular actuations with regard
to the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute Sale with
Assignment (in favor of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.
Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, respondent suspended the registration
of the documents with certain special conditions between them, which was that V&G should
provide him with weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket
money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondents Quezon City house and lot by V&G or
GSIS representatives.
Eventually, respondent formally denied the registration of the documents. He himself elevated
the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio (of the

National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration-NLTDRA). The Administrator then
resolved in favor of the registrability of the documents. Despite the resolution of the
Administrator, the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded from the
parties interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted in his previous denial.

Issues: (1) WON the respondent, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by the Court for his
malfeasance as a public official, and (2) WON the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
government service in the discharge of official tasks.
Held: (1) Yes, a lawyers misconduct as a public official also constitutes a violation of his oath
as a lawyer. The lawyers oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money
or malice. The lawyers oath is a source of obligations and its violation is a ground for his
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.
(2) Yes, the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the discharge
of their official tasks (Canon 6). The Code forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any
mans cause for any corrupt motive or interest (Rule 1.03).