G.R. No.

L-32717 November 26, 1970 was worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent Commission on proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate
AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner,  Elections is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law,
vs. implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal
the use of political jingles by candidates. This resolution is immediately hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. executory."4 functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to
Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf. its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in
Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent. the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its
1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency
before us was one of power. Respondent Commission on Elections was in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In
FERNANDO, J.: called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on petitioner. To repeat, its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the
no such authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the
The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity
a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in this special unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a
civil action for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of respondent made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It
Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates.
purposes, was not in vain. Nor could it be considering the conceded with the words "and the like."5 For respondent Commission, the last three Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law.
absence of any express power granted to respondent by the Constitutional words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently.
Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such implication arising What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle
from any provision found therein, if deference be paid to the principle that a of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission
statute is to be construed consistently with the fundamental law, which applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically was aptly summed up by the present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly, as the
accords the utmost priority to freedom of expression, much more so when referred to.6 It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was branch of the executive department — although independent of the
utilized for electoral purposes. On November 3, 1970, the very same day the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement President — to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of
the case was orally argued, five days after its filing, with the election barely to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. the 'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
a week away, we issued a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely
prayed for. This opinion is intended to explain more fully our decision. 'administrative questions.'" 11 It has been the constant holding of this Court,
The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot
Commission was its failure to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no
In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being in higher law than the Constitution. 12Our decisions which liberally construe its
petitioner, after setting forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or powers are precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may its
his candidacy for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention, prescription.7 Thus, certain Administrative Code provisions were given a responsibility under the Constitution to insure free, orderly and honest
alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to "construction which should be more in harmony with the tenets of the elections be adequately fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification then for
him five days previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was fundamental law."8 The desirability of removing in that fashion the taint of lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent
given due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has always commended Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional
equipped with sound systems and loud speakers, an order which, itself. The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert right as free speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its
according to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right ... to freedom of any collision between what a statute provides and what the Constitution filing, stood on solid footing.
speech."1 There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation rendering it free from
to petitioner, he would seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying constitutional defects. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the
for a preliminary injunction. On the very next day, this Court adopted a conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is unconstitutional, but also WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970,
resolution requiring respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer grave doubts upon that score.9 respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from
not later than November 2, 1970, at the same time setting the case for enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid
hearing for Tuesday November 3, 1970. No preliminary injunction was order banning the use of political taped jingles. Without pronouncement as
2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its to costs.
issued. There was no denial in the answer filed by respondent on favor obeisance to such a cardinal precept. The view advanced by him that
November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in the petition, but the if the above provision of the Constitutional Convention Act were to lend
justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision of the itself to the view that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited, then Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo and
Constitutional Convention Act,2which made it unlawful for candidates "to the challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in Villamor, JJ., concur.
purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free
propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding that this preferred
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.
matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin." 3 It curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the
was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the equally vital right of suffrage. What respondent Commission did, in effect,
recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda Separate Opinions
was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this
material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. It prayed that the constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its
petition be denied for lack of merit. The case was argued, on November 3, action by the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
1970, with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C. would be free, either by himself or through others, to use his mobile
Felizmena arguing in behalf of respondent. loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be
emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer1 on the
This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions of the 1971 Constitutional
the election being barely a week away, issued on the afternoon of the contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent Commission, then Convention Act, I concur with the views of Mr. Justice Fernando in the
same day, a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition, setting forth the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That main opinion that "there could be no justification .... for lending approval to
the absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of
a ban in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the principle express terms assures. 10 which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech." I
that the construction placed on the statute by respondent Commission on would only add the following observations:
Elections would raise serious doubts about its validity, considering the 3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law,
infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding portion setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether
This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of  # Separate Opinions though such "jingles" may occasionally offend some sensitive ears, the
reasonableness required by the due process clause of our Constitution. Commission's ban on "streamers" being placed on the candidate's mobile
Originally, respondent Commission in its guidelines prescribed summarily unit or carrier, which "streamers" are less likely to offend the voters' sense
that the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit — roaming around and TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: of sight should likewise be held to be an unreasonable, oppressive and
announcing a meeting and the name of the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's same constitutional right.
used only for a certain place for a meeting and he uses his sound system
In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer1 on the
at the meeting itself, there is no violation." 2Acting upon petitioner's
unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions of the 1971 Constitutional The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by
application, however, respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a
Convention Act, I concur with the views of Mr. Justice Fernando in the respondent Commission, laudable as it may be, should not be sought at
sound system by anyone be he a candidate or not whether stationary or
main opinion that "there could be no justification .... for lending approval to the cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his
part of a mobile unit is not prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional
any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of
Convention Act" but imposed the condition — "provided that there are no
which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech." I the Act's limitation in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be
jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers."
would only add the following observations: made by a candidate or by another person with his knowledge and
consent.
Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a
This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of
verbally recorded form of election propaganda, is no different from the use
reasonableness required by the due process clause of our Constitution. Case Digest: Amelito Mutuc vs Commission on Elections
of a 'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of election propaganda, and both
Originally, respondent Commission in its guidelines prescribed summarily
forms of election advertisement fall under the prohibition contained in sec.
that the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit — roaming around and
12 of R.A. 6132," and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been
announcing a meeting and the name of the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is Amelito Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional
recorded can be subject of confiscation by the respondent Commission
used only for a certain place for a meeting and he uses his sound system Convention (1970). His candidacy was given due course by the
under par. (E) of sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern day and age of the
at the meeting itself, there is no violation." 2Acting upon petitioner's Commission on Elections (COMELEC) but he was prohibited from playing
electronically recorded or taped voice which may be easily and
application, however, respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a his campaign jingle on his mobile units because that was an apparent
inexpensively disseminated through a mobile sound system throughout the
sound system by anyone be he a candidate or not whether stationary or violation  of COMELEC’s ban (via a COMELEC resolution) “to purchase,
candidate's district, respondent Commission would outlaw "recorded or
part of a mobile unit is not prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
taped voices" and would exact of the candidate that he make use of the
Convention Act" but imposed the condition — "provided that there are no gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights,
mobile sound system only by personal transmission and
jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers." athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
repeatedly personally sing his "jingle" or deliver his spoken message to the
voters even if he loses his voice in the process or employ another person cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.”  It was
to do so personally even if this should prove more expensive and less COMELEC’s contention that the jingle proposed to be used by Mutuc is
Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a a recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda
effective than using a recorded or taped voice. verbally recorded form of election propaganda, is no different from the use material (falling under and the like’s category), and under the above
of a 'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of election propaganda, and both COMELEC rule, the same is subject to confiscation.
forms of election advertisement fall under the prohibition contained in sec.
Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's
12 of R.A. 6132," and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been ISSUE: 
basic freedom of speech and expression. They cannot pass the
recorded can be subject of confiscation by the respondent Commission
constitutional test of reasonableness in that they go far beyond a 1. Whether or not COMELEC’s contention is correct.
under par. (E) of sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern day and age of the
reasonable relation to the proper governmental object and are manifestly
electronically recorded or taped voice which may be easily and
unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary. 2. Whether or not the COMELEC ban is valid.
inexpensively disseminated through a mobile sound system throughout the
candidate's district, respondent Commission would outlaw "recorded or HELD:
Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the taped voices" and would exact of the candidate that he make use of the
mobile unit or carrier is concerned, respondent Commission's adverse mobile sound system only by personal transmission and 1. No. By virtue of Ejusdem Generis, general words following any
ruling that the same falls within the prohibition of section 12, paragraphs repeatedly personally sing his "jingle" or deliver his spoken message to the enumeration must be of the same class as those specifically referred to.
(C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner. I would note that voters even if he loses his voice in the process or employ another person COMELEC contended that the ban makes unlawful the distribution of
respondent Commission's premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no to do so personally even if this should prove more expensive and less electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans,
different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster' "in that these both effective than using a recorded or taped voice. flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
represent forms of election advertisements — to make the candidate and matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words “and the like.” For
the fact of his candidacy known to the voters — is correct, but its COMELEC, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. The
Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's Supreme Court did not agree. It is quite apparent that what was
conclusion is not. The campaign appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters'
basic freedom of speech and expression. They cannot pass the contemplated in the said law violated by Mutuc was the distribution of
ears while that of the "streamers" is through the voters' eyes. But if it be
constitutional test of reasonableness in that they go far beyond a gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a
held that the Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges unreasonably,
reasonable relation to the proper governmental object and are manifestly favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. It does not
oppressively and arbitrarily the candidate's right of free expression, even
unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary. include campaign jingles for they are not gadgets as contemplated by the
though such "jingles" may occasionally offend some sensitive ears, the
Commission's ban on "streamers" being placed on the candidate's mobile law.
unit or carrier, which "streamers" are less likely to offend the voters' sense Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the
of sight should likewise be held to be an unreasonable, oppressive and 2. No. This is a curtailment of Freedom of Expression. The Constitution
mobile unit or carrier is concerned, respondent Commission's adverse prohibits the abridgment of the freedom of speech.
arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's same constitutional right. ruling that the same falls within the prohibition of section 12, paragraphs
(C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner. I would note that
respondent Commission's premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no
The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by
different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster' "in that these both
respondent Commission, laudable as it may be, should not be sought at
represent forms of election advertisements — to make the candidate and
the cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his
the fact of his candidacy known to the voters — is correct, but its
candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of
conclusion is not. The campaign appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters'
the Act's limitation in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be
ears while that of the "streamers" is through the voters' eyes. But if it be
made by a candidate or by another person with his knowledge and
held that the Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges unreasonably,
consent.
oppressively and arbitrarily the candidate's right of free expression, even