Juvy Ann D.

Ansan
Batongbakal vs Zafra / G.R. No. 141806 / January 17, 2005
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent filed a complaint for maintenance of peaceful possession over a landholding
situated in Bulacan against petitioner and her alleged co-owners thereof.
Moreover, respondent claimed to be the rightful tenant of the land in question in support of a
case filed by herein petitioner for cancellation of certificates of land transfer against respondent,
in which respondent was found to be a tenant of petitioner; and that he was disturbed by
petitioner and her co-defendants by dumping filling materials on the landholding.
The Provincial Adjudicator ruled that respondent is a bona fide tenant of the landholding in
question and that petitioners are ordered to cease and desist from committing any acts tending
to eject, oust or disturb the plaintiff in his landholding.
Petitioner and her co-defendant appealed. The DARAB dismissed the appeal, affirmed in toto
the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator, and ordered petitioner and her co-defendants to
vacate the premises and respect respondents peaceful possession and cultivation thereof.
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in which she claimed, inter alia, that the DARAB decision was
based on a falsified case record which contained documents from other cases surreptitiously
inserted therein by the DARAB. The motion was denied.
Only petitioner assailed the DARAB decision via a petition filed with the CA. In her petition, she
proffered that she was denied due process as she was not given the opportunity to present
evidence and the DARAB secretly inserted documents in the record on which it based its
decision; and that she is not the owner of the landholding over which respondent was claiming
to be a tenant that covered by Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 16(M), hence, he could
not have been her tenant thereon. Petitioner further proffered that the DARAB had no
jurisdiction over the case.
The CA dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition was filed.
ISSUE:
(1) The identity of the land in question,
(2) The alleged tenancy of respondent thereon,
(3) The alleged denial of due process to petitioner.

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RULING: The petition was denied.
IDENTITY OF LAND IN QUESTION
The complaint filed by respondent identified the subject landholding as that over which he was
pronounced as rightful tenant in Adm. Case No. III-62-87 which, as explained above, was the
land covered by CLT No. 255927. Consistent with this identification, respondent submitted as
evidence the affidavit of Gil del Rosario and the Landowners Ledger mentioned above, both of
which refer to the land covered by CLT No. 255927. The CLT No. 16(M) submitted by
respondent in the present case may thus be considered merely as irrelevant evidence.
ALLEGED TENANCY OF RESPONDENT
xxx This being so, the herein plaintiffs who happen to be legitimate tenants are entitled to a
security of tenure and be maintained in the peaceful possession and cultivation of their
respective landholdings until and after their status as a tenant[s] has been proven otherwise.
Furthermore, even if the defendants [now petitioners] were to claim that they are unaware of the
occupancy of the land by the herein tenants on the assumption that the deceased Faustino
Ocampo did not report the matter to them, the law is clear on the matter that the successor or
the transferee of an agricultural land is bound and subrogated to the rights and obligations of
the transferor.
DUE PROCESS AS OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
There is no question that the "essence of due process is a hearing before conviction and before
an impartial and disinterested tribunal" but due process as a constitutional precept does not,
always and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. The essence of due process is to be
found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of ones defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may
be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments
or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
Far from being deprived of the opportunity to be heard then, it was petitioners choice not to take
advantage of such opportunity. Furthermore, the DARAB cited the existence in the record of the
questioned documents, such documents were not the only bases to support its ruling.

Juvy Ann D. Ansan

NASECORE V. ERC / G.R. No. 90795 / July 6, 2011
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), created under the Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), used to apply the Return on Rate Base (RORB)
method to determine the proper amount a distribution utility (DU) may charge for the services it
provides. The RORB scheme had been the method for computing allowable electricity charges
in the Philippines for decades, before the onset of the EPIRA. Section 43 (f) of the EPIRA allows
the ERC to shift from the RORB methodology to alternative forms of internationally accepted
rate-setting methodology, subject to multiple conditions. The ERC, through a series of
resolutions, adopted the Performance-Based Regulation (PBR) method to set the allowable
rates DUs may charge their customers. MERALCO, a DU, applied for an increase of its
distribution rate under the PBR scheme docketed as ERC Case No. 2009-057 RC (MAP
2010 case) on 7 August 2009. Petitioners NASECORE, FOLVA, FOVA, and Engineer
Robert F. Mallillin (Mallillin) all filed their own Petitions for intervention to oppose the application
of Meralco.
However, ERC granted the application due to the petitioners failure to appear in
the hearing. Hence, petitioners seek for a TRO.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not petition shall be granted.
RULING:
No. This Court finds that the real motive behind the filing of the present Petition is to obtain an
indefinite TRO and this, the Court cannot countenance. Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court
provides the rules for permanent injunctions, to wit:
Sec. 9. When final injunction granted.
If after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act
or a c t s c o m p l a i n e d o f p e r m a n e n t l y e n j o i n e d , t h e c o u r t s h a l l g r a n t a
final
injunction
perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission or
continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction.
Petitioners assert that this Court should issue a TRO because of the huge amount
that would unduly burden the consumers with the continued application of the MAP 2010
rates. According to petitioners, if not stayed, the present financial hardships of 4.3
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million MERALCO customers due to the global financial meltdown and the recent
calamities in the country will surely further worsen. Petitioners also c l a i m t h a t t h e r e i s a n
extreme urgency to secure a TRO, considering that the assailed decision
i s immediately executory.
The purpose of a TRO is to prevent a threatened wrong and to protect the property or rights
involved from further injury, until the issues can be determined after a hearing on the
merits. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure, a TRO may
be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by a verified application
that great or irreparable injury would be incurred by an applicant before the writ of preliminary
injunction could be heard.
If such irreparable injury would result from the non-issuance of the requested writ
or if the extreme urgency referred to by petitioners indeed exists, then they should have
been more vigilant in protecting their rights. As they have all been duly notified of the
proceedings in the ERC case, they should have appeared before the ERC and
participated in the trials.
We find that petitioners erred in thinking that the non-issuance of the TRO they
requested would put consumers in danger of suffering an irreparable injury. But this
asserted injury can be repaired, because, had petitioners participated in the proceedings
before the ERC and the latter had found merit in their appeal, the undue increase in
electric bills shall be refunded to the consumers.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Juvy Ann D. Ansan

Republic vs Gingayon / G.R. No. 166429 / December 19, 2005
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Courts decision in Agan v.
PIATCO, promulgated in2003 (2003 Decision). This decision nullified the Concession
Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport Passenger Terminal III entered into between the Philippine Government (Government)
and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the amendments
and supplements thereto. The agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a new international
airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during
the concession period of 25 years. The contracts were nullified and that the agreement was
contrary to public policy. At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3
facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. However, the
ponencia was silent as to the legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities following the nullification of the
contracts, as well as whatever rights of PIATCO for reimbursement for its expenses in the
construction of the facilities. After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities
have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to
put the airport terminal into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO conducted
several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities. In 2004, the Government filed a
Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay RTC. The Government sought upon the filing of the
complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and
control overthe NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited the
amount of P3,002,125,000.00 (3 Billion) in cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines,
representing the NAIA 3 terminals assessed value for taxation purposes. The Government
insists that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs the expropriation proceedings in this case to
the exclusion of all other laws. On the other hand, PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act No. 8974
which does apply.
ISSUE:
(1) The administration of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 in the expropriation
proceedings of this case.
RULING:
The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has to be observed before the
Government may take over the NAIA 3, that there must be payment to PIATCO of just
compensation in accordance with law and equity. Any ruling in the present expropriation case
must be conformable to the dictates of the Court as pronounced in the Agan cases. Rule 67
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outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Rep.
Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government
infrastructure projects. Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more
favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the
national government expropriates property for national government infrastructure projects.
Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than national
infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67
continues to apply. Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the
immediate payment by the Government of at least the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to
PIATCO and provides certain valuation standards or methods for the determination of just
compensation. Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in favor of
the Government over NAIA 3 is held in abeyance until PIATCO is directly paid the amount of P3
Billion, representing the proffered value of NAIA 3 under Section 4(c) of the law.

Juvy Ann D. Ansan

COMELEC vs Cruz / G.R. No. 186616 / November 20, 2009
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
The respondents filed a petition against Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled "An
Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA
No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991"). The
respondents argued that: the term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively
and not retroactively; the implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a
violation of the equal protection of the law; and barangay officials have always been apolitical.
The RTC granted the petition and declared the challenged proviso constitutionally infirm. Hence,
this petition was filed.
The COMELEC takes the position that the assailed law is valid and constitutional. RA No. 9164
is an amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a
penal law; hence, it cannot be considered an ex post facto law. Furthermore, the COMELEC
argues that there is no violation of the one subject-one title rule, as the matters covered by RA
No. 9164 are related; the assailed provision is actually embraced within the title of the law.
ISSUES:
(1) The retroactive application
(2) Application of equal protection clause in this case
(3) Violation of the constitution
RULING: The petition was GRANTED.
THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
The House therefore clearly operated on the premise that the LGC imposed a three-term limit
for barangay officials, and the challenged proviso is its way of addressing any confusion that
may arise from the numerous changes in the law.
All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the challenged proviso has been there all along
and does not simply retroact the application of the three-term limit to the barangay elections of
1994. Congress merely integrated the past statutory changes into a seamless whole by coming
up with the challenged proviso.

Juvy Ann D. Ansan

With this conclusion, the respondents constitutional challenge to the proviso based on
retroactivity must fail.
APPLICATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE IN THIS CASE
We see no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a standard because the challenged
proviso did not result in any differential treatment between barangay officials and all other
elective officials. This conclusion proceeds from our ruling on the retroactivity issue that the
challenged proviso does not involve any retroactive application.
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
We find that the challenged proviso does not violate the one subject-one title rule.
First, the title of RA No. 9164, "An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataang Elections, amending Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991," states the laws general subject matter the amendment of
the LGC to synchronize the barangay and SK elections and for other purposes. To achieve
synchronization of the barangay and SK elections, the reconciliation of the varying lengths of
the terms of office of barangay officials and SK officials is necessary. Closely related with length
of term is term limitation which defines the total number of terms for which a barangay official
may run for and hold office. This natural linkage demonstrates that term limitation is not foreign
to the general subject expressed in the title of the law.
Second, the congressional debates we cited above show that the legislators and the public they
represent were fully informed of the purposes, nature and scope of the laws provisions. Term
limitation therefore received the notice, consideration, and action from both the legislators and
the public.
Finally, to require the inclusion of term limitation in the title of RA No. 9164 is to make the title an
index of all the subject matters dealt with by law; this is not what the constitutional requirement
contemplates.

Juvy Ann D. Ansan

Alva vs CA / G.R. No. 157331 / April 12, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
The present petition stemmed from an Information charging petitioner with having committed the
crime of estafa. It was alleged therein that Arnold Alva, by means of false manifestation and
fraudulent representation which he made to Yumi Veranga y Hervera to the effect that he could
process the latters application for U.S. Visa provided she would give the amount of
P120,000.00. He succeeded in inducing her to give and deliver the amount of P120,000.00 on
the strength of said manifestation and representation, well knowing that the same were false
and untrue for the reason that the U.S. Visa is not genuine and were made solely to obtain the
amount of P120,000.00. On 5 September 1995, the RTC issued a Recall Order of the Warrant
of Arrest against petitioner in view of the approval of his bail bond. Upon arraignment, petitioner
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After the trial on the merits, the RTC considered the
case submitted for decision. On 4 May 1999, petitioners counsel filed an Urgent Motion to
Cancel Promulgation praying for the resetting of the 5 May 1999 schedule of promulgation of
the RTCs decision to 17 June 1999 in view of the fact that said counsel already had a prior
commitment on subject date. The RTC granted the motion. The promulgation, however, was
deferred only until 19 May 1999. On 18 May 1999, petitioners counsel again moved for the
deferment of the promulgation, due to prior "undertakings of similar importance."
On 19 May 1999, petitioner and counsel both failed to appear in court despite due notice. In his
stead, claiming to be petitioners representative, a certain Joey Perez personally delivered to the
RTC a hand written medical certificate expressing petitioners inability to attend the days
hearing due to hypertension. In response to the aforestated acts of petitioner and counsel, the
RTC issued an Order directing the promulgation of its decision in absentia and the issuance of a
bench warrant of arrest against petitioner for his failure to appear before it despite due notice.
In its decision dated 25 March 1999, the RTC found petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa.
Meanwhile, as appearing in the records of the RTC, a document entitled Personal Bail Bond
dated 21 May 1999 issued by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation, seemed to have been filed
before and approved by the RTC as evidenced by the signature of Judge Muro on the face of
said bail bond.
For such reason, petitioner appeared to have been admitted to bail anew after his conviction.
Incompatible to the above inference, however, in an Order dated 25 May 1999, judgment was
rendered against Eastern Insurance and Surety Corporation, the bonding company that issued
petitioners original bail bond, in the amount of P17,000.00, for failure to produce the person of
petitioner within the 10 day period earlier provided and to explain why the amount of its
undertaking should not be forfeited. Police Superintendent Ramon Flores De Jesus, Chief of
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Warrant and Subpoena Section, manifested to the RTC the return of the unexecuted Warrant of
Arrest issued on 19 May 1999 for the reason that the address of the accused is not within their
area of responsibility. Nevertheless, De Jesus reassured the RTC that the name of the accused
will be included in their list of wanted persons for our future reference. Examination of the
records of the case revealed that petitioner already moved out of his address on record without
informing the RTC.
On 26 July 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, which was
denied for lack of merit. On appeal before the Court of Appeals, the appellate court required
petitioner to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed it appearing that no new bail
bond for his provisional liberty on appeal had been posted. Petitioner filed a Compliance
essentially stating therein that he immediately posted a new bond for his provisional liberty and
that the presiding judge of the lower court, which issued the questioned decision, duly approved
the new bond. A certified true copy of the bond was submitted together with the Compliance.
The Court of Appeals, nonetheless dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner for "appellants
failure to post a new bond for his provisional liberty on appeal despite our directive, and in view
of the fact that his personal bail bond posted in the lower court had already expired."
Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereto seeking its reversal. On 19
February 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the MR stating that the appellant has failed to
submit himself under the jurisdiction of the court or under the custody of the law since his
conviction in 1999 and that there was no valid bail bond in place when appellant took his
appeal. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the appeal in view of
petitioners alleged failure to post a valid bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal.
2. Whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the
custody of the law despite the posting of the subject bail bond.
RULING:
1. NO. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioners appeal.
Within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, petitioner
impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the RTC final
and executory. Petitioners alleged failure to post a bail bond on appeal is unimportant because
under the circumstances, he is disallowed by law to be admitted to bail on appeal. At the time
petitioner filed his notice of appeal and during the pendency of his appeal even until now he
remains at large, placing himself beyond the pale, and protection of the law.
Section 5 of Rule 114 provides that the RTC is given the discretion to admit to bail an accused
even after the latter has been convicted to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of more
than 6 years but less than 20 years. However, the same also provides for the cancellation of bail
10

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bonds already granted or the denial of a bail bond application upon the concurrence of two
points: 1) if the judgment of the Regional Trial Court exceeds six (6) years but not more than
twenty (20) years; and 2) upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
presence of any of the five circumstances: (a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist,
or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstances of
reiteration; (b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That
the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon; (d)
That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may
commit another crime.
In the case at bar, petitioner was convicted by the RTC to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
an indeterminate term of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to
seventeen (17) years as maximum of reclusion temporal. Quite clearly, the approval of
petitioners application for bail was discretionary upon the RTC. Basic is the principle that that
the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, to file a petition for bail for someone whose
freedom has yet to be curtailed. In the case at bar, the bench warrant issued by the RTC on 19
May 1999 still remains unserved. Nothing in the records of the case, neither in the RTC nor the
Court of Appeals, demonstrates that petitioner was ever arrested, or that he voluntarily
surrendered or at the very least placed himself under the custody of the law. All told, no bail
should have been granted petitioner. It is beyond dispute that the subject bail bond issued by
Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation was irregularly approved.
Worth noting is the fact that nowhere in the records of the case is it shown that petitioner
applied for bail through a motion duly filed for such purpose nor is there showing that the RTC
issued an Order of Approval or any other court process acknowledging such document. Be that
as it may, even granting for the sake of argument that it was indeed approved by Judge Muro,
such approval did not render the subject bail bond valid and binding for it has been established
that petitioner was not entitled to bail on appeal. That the prosecution appears not to have been
given the chance to object, as evidently required, to the application or approval of the subject
bail bond (with notice to the accused), fortifies the declaration as to its invalidity. Nowhere in the
original records of the RTC does it even show that the prosecution was informed of petitioners
application for bail, much less the approval of such application. As when there is a concurrence
of the enumerated circumstances and the range of penalty imposed, the prosecution must first
be accorded an opportunity to object and present evidence, if necessary, with notice to the
accused. Approval of an application for bail on appeal, absent the knowledge of the prosecution
of such application or, at the very least, failing to allow it to object, is not the product of sound
judicial discretion but of impulse and arbitrariness, not to mention violative of respondent
Peoples right of procedural due process.

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This is especially true in this case as a close scrutiny of the original records of the case at bar
reveals that petitioner violated the conditions of his bail without valid justificationhis failure to
appear before the RTC, despite due notice, on the day of the promulgation of the latters
judgment, absent any justifiable reason. His absence was a clear contravention of the
conditions of his bail bond to say the least. While, indeed, a medical certificate was hand
delivered and filed by a certain Joey Perez, allegedly a representative of petitioner, stating
therein the reason for the latters absence, the RTC found insubstantial the explanation
proffered. Appropriately, it ordered the promulgation of its judgment in absentia. It also issued a
bench warrant of arrest against petitioner. Upon examination, the subject medical certificate
merely states that petitioner was diagnosed to be suffering from hypertension. It failed to
elucidate further any concomitant conditions necessitating petitioners physical incapability to
present himself before the court even for an hour or two; thus, it considered the absence of
petitioner unjustified. Further, it should be recalled as well, that as early as 4 May 1999,
petitioner and counsel had already been notified of the 19 May 1999 schedule of promulgation.
The first having been postponed in view of the Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation (on 5 May
1999) filed by petitioners counsel. Another telling evidence of the violation of petitioners original
bail bond is when he failed to inform the RTC of his change of address. By failing to inform the
RTC of his change of address, petitioner failed to hold himself amenable to the orders and
processes of the RTC. It was an unmistakable complete breach of the conditions of his bail
bond.
Following from the above discussion, the conviction of petitioner to a period beyond six (6)
years but less than twenty (20) years in tandem with attendant circumstances effectively
violating his bail without valid justification should have effectively precluded him from being
admitted to bail on appeal. The issue of the validity of petitioners bail bond on appeal having
been laid to rest by Section 5 of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court, as amended, petitioners
alleged failure to post a bail bond on appeal is, therefore, unimportant as, under the
circumstances, he is disallowed by law to be admitted to bail on appeal. Thus, for all legal
intents and purposes, there can be no other conclusion than that at the time petitioner filed his
notice of appeal and during the pendency of his appeal even until now he remains at large,
placing himself beyond the pale, and protection of the law.
Inexorably, having jumped bail and eluded arrest until the present, the issue of whether or not
petitioner has lost his right to appeal his conviction now ensues. The Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioners appeal. Within the meaning of the
principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, petitioner impliedly withdrew his appeal
by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the RTC final and executory. By putting
himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the land, petitioner revealed
his contempt of the law and placed himself in a position to speculate at his pleasure his chances
for a reversal. By jumping bail, petitioner has waived his right to appeal.

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2. For the resolution of the second issue, it should have been sufficient to state that for reasons
stated in the foregoing discussion, the question posed has now become academic. However, to
diminish the confusion brought about by ostensibly equating the term "jurisdiction of the court
(over the person of the accused)" with that of "custody of the law", it is fundamental to
differentiate the two. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
surrender; while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant
files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject
to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as
when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Moreover, jurisdiction, once
acquired, is not lost at the instance of parties, as when an accused escapes from the custody of
the law, but continues until the case is terminated.
Evidently, petitioner is correct in that there is no doubt that the RTC already acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused petitioner when he appeared at the arraignment and pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged notwithstanding the fact that he jumped bail and is now
considered a fugitive. As to whether or not petitioner has placed himself under the custody of
the CA, we cannot say the same for "being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the
person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to
the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It
includes, but is not limited to, detention."
In the case at bar, petitioner, being a fugitive, until and unless he submits himself to the custody
of the law, in the manner of being under the jurisdiction of the courts, he cannot be granted any
relief by the CA.

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Ivler vs. San Pedro / G.R. No. 172716 / November 17, 2010
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and
damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner
pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure.
Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal
case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioners motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari
when the MTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and
2. Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for
the death of respondent Ponces husband.

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RULING: Petition granted.
The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the
same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not."
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under
the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that
quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and
penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are
thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but
any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution
for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by
extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe
penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as
grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasioffenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes
occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

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Salvador vs People / G.R. No. 146706 / July 15, 2005
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Facts:
On June 3, 1994, a Special Mission Group from the PAF Special Operations Squadron
conducted routine surveillance operations at the Manila Domestic Airport to check on reports of
alleged drug trafficking and smuggling being facilitated by certain PAL personnel. They were
ordered to keep close watch on the second airplane, an Airbus 300 parked inside the Domestic
Airport terminal. At around 11:30 that same evening, three (3) persons had boarded the Airbus
300. The team did not move, but continued its surveillance. At 12:15 a.m. the team leader
reported that the three (3) persons who earlier boarded the Airbus 300 had disembarked with
their abdominal areas bulging and then boarded an airplane tow truck with its lights off. At the
Lima Gate of the Domestic Airport, the team blocked and stopped the tow truck. The team
leader identified himself and asked the four (4) persons on board to alight, and approached
Aurelio Mandin whose uniform was partly open, showing a girdle. Then, a package wrapped in
brown packaging tape fell. Suspecting that the package contained smuggled items, the leader
yelled to his teammates, Positive! Thereupon, the rest of the team surrounded petitioner and
his two co-accused who surrendered without a fight. The team searched their bodies and found
that the three were wearing girdles beneath their uniforms, all containing packets wrapped in
packaging tape. Mandin yielded five (5) packets, while petitioner and Santos had four (4) each.
The team confiscated the packets and brought all the accused to the PAFSECOM Office.
Issue:
Whether or not the seized items are admissible in evidence.
Held:
Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where searches and seizures may lawfully be
effected sans a search warrant. These recognized exceptions include: (1) search of moving
vehicles; (2) search in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5)
stop-and-frisk
situations;
and
(6)
search
incidental
to
a
lawful
arrest.
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission of the PAF
operatives was to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of drug trafficking and
smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of the airport. In other words, the search
made by the PAF team on petitioner and his co-accused was in the nature of a customs search.
As such, the team properly effected the search and seizure without a search warrant since it
exercised police authority under the customs law. Law enforcers who are tasked to effect the
enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are authorized to search and seize, without a search
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Juvy Ann D. Ansan

warrant, any article, cargo or other movable property when there is reasonable cause to suspect
that the said items have been introduced into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and
customs law. They may likewise conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle or person
suspected of holding or conveying the said articles, as in the case at bar.

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Juvy Ann D. Ansan

BIRAOGO VS PTC / G.R. No. 192935 / December 7, 2010
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated
July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration,
and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body
as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption
and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine
from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of
law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing
its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create
a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize
the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the
power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth
Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative
Code of 1987.

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Juvy Ann D. Ansan

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who
may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive
power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and
the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not
duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly
created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
(2) WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
(3) WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
(4) WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
of the case.

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Juvy Ann D. Ansan

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which
they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of
each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers
of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested
by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity
of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any
personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out
a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen
or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court,
however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in
the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The
powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of
the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty
is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts
and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to
know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of
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Juvy Ann D. Ansan

the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all,
the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The
function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the
courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to
obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions
to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

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Juvy Ann D. Ansan

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

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Juvy Ann D. Ansan

In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Capt. Gary Alejano, v. Gen. Pedro Cabuay
G.R. 160792, Aug. 25, 2005

FACTS:

A directive was issued to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military
personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident. Petitioners filed a
petition for habeas corpus with SC. The SC issued a resolution, which required respondents to
make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the
CA. CA dismissed the petition because the detainees are already charged of coup detat.
Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees confinement is under a valid
indictment.
ISSUE:

What is the objective of the writ of habeas corpus?

RULING:

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Juvy Ann D. Ansan

The duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the
propriety of the remedy. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the
cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is
being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court
orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas
corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of
error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.

Castillo vs Cruz / G.R. No. 182165 /

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Juvy Ann D. Ansan

FACTS:

Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses
Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to
vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the
Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects.
Several cases were filed by both parties to enforce their rights over the property. The pertinent
case among the filed cases was the issuance by the MTC an alias Writ of Demolition in favor of
the Province. Respondents filed a motion for TRO in the RTC, which was granted. However, the
demolition was already implemented before the TRO issuance.
On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were
deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R.
Mendoza instructing him to protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property,
entered the property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the
RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved
petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault,
trespassing and other forms of light threats.
Thus, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
ISSUES:

(1) WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights;

(2) WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case already filed.

and,

RULING:

1. Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the coverage of the
writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not only
actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.

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Juvy Ann D. Ansan

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo teaches: As the Amparo Rule was intended to
address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. Tapuz v.
Del Rosario also teaches: What it is not is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful
act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the
Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts
complained of and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not
delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into the property.
It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or
continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations of petitioners will not suffice to
prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was
present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.
2. Respondents filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been
barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in
flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be
set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for Writs of Amparo and Habeas
Data.

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