EN BANC

G.R. No. 225442, August 08, 2017

SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE

SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK
LEO DELOS REYES, AND CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS, MINOR, FOR HERSELF
AND AS REPRESENTED BY HER FATHER, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners, v.
QUEZON CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF
MANILA, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, AND NAVOTAS
CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the constitutionality of the curfew ordinances
issued by the local governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The petition prays that a
temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph
Estrada, and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of their respective local governments, to prohibit,
refrain, and desist from implementing and enforcing these issuances, pending resolution of this
case, and eventually, declare the City of Manila's ordinance as ultra vires for being contrary to
Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as amended, and all
curfew ordinances as unconstitutional for violating the constitutional right of minors to travel, as
well as the right of parents to rear their children.

The Facts

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for
minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew
ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan
Rody."3

Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: (a)
Navotas City, through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-02,4 dated August 26, 1999, entitled
"Nagtatakda ng 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa
Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,5
dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No. 80466
entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00A.M. of the Following Day
as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age;
Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila
Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP-2301,7 Series of 2014, entitled "An
Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to
5:00A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other
Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance; collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8
Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an
association of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular
the protection of the rights and welfare of the youth and minors10 - filed this present petition,
arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from
overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c)
deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and
(d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due
process.11 In addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as
amended by RA 10630.12

More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law
enforcers should apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators.13
They further argue that the law enforcer's apprehension depends only on his physical assessment,
and, thus, subjective and based only on the law enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged
curfew violator.14

While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the
activities exempted from the operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working
students or students with evening class, they contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover the
range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be out at night, and,
hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.15

Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they deprive
minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;16 and (b) fail
to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear
no reasonable relation to their purpose.17 They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets
during curfew hours will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of children
of the community.18

Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 419 thereof,
contravenes Section 57-A20 of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision
imposes on minors the penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They contend that
the imposition of penalties contravenes RA 9344's express command that no penalty shall be
imposed on minors for curfew violations.21

Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to
the parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the
rearing of the youth, and that even if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are
available to achieve the same. In this regard, they suggest massive street lighting programs,
installation of CCTVs (closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by
law enforcers as other viable means of protecting children and preventing crimes at night. They
further opine that the government can impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental
counseling and education seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and
that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who allowed their children to be out during
curfew hours.22

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly granted.

I.

At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case. Respondents seek the
dismissal of the petition, questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court to assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners'
direct resort to the Court, contrary to the hierarchy of courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual
controversy and standing to warrant judicial review.23

A. Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.

Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but
also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."24 Section
1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentalitv of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of judicial power,
which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving
rights that were legally demandable and enforceable."25

In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed before the
Court "are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined
under the Constitution."27 It was explained that "[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or
prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also
to set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter
does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly
authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution cited above]."28

In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers
Association, Inc.,29 it was expounded that "[m]eanwhile that no specific procedural rule has been
promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded' constitutional definition of judicial power and because
of the commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion' as a ground for review under Rule 65 and the
courts' expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme Court - based on its power to relax its rules - allowed
Rule 65 to be used as the medium for petitions invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction[.]"30

In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the legislative
councils of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative
powers on the ground that these ordinances violate the Constitution, specifically, the provisions
pertaining to the right to travel of minors, and the right of parents to rear their children. They also
claim that the Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors, conflicts with RA 9344,
as amended, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses. It has been
held that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily,
out of malice, ill will or personal bias."31 In light of the foregoing, petitioners correctly availed of
the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, although these governmental actions were not made
pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.

B. Direct Resort to the Court.

Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail the
constitutionality of legislative and executive enactments, the next question to be resolved is
whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this Court is justified.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be made to the lower-
ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the
[Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there
are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the
petition[.]"32 This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a law or
regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount importance and immediately affects
the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people,"33 as in this case. Hence, petitioners'
direct resort to the Court is justified.
C. Requisites of Judicial Review.

"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality
or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be anactual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case."34 In this case, respondents assail the existence of the first
two (2) requisites.

1. Actual Case or Controversy.

"Basic in the exercise of judicial power — whether under the traditional or in the expanded
setting — is the presence of an actual case or controversy."35 "[A]n actual case or controversy is
one which 'involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.' In other
words, 'there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on
the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."'36 According to recent jurisprudence, in the
Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is
simplified "by merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the
assailed governmental act."37

"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A

question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must
show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of the act complained of."38

Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable controversy in this
case given the evident clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew
Ordinances impair the minors' and parents' constitutional rights, and whether the Manila
Ordinance goes against the provisions of RA 9344. Based on their asseverations, petitioners have
- as will be gleaned from the substantive discussions below - conveyed a prima facie case of
grave abuse of discretion, which perforce impels this Court to exercise its expanded jurisdiction.
The case is likewise ripe for adjudication, considering that the Curfew Ordinances were being
implemented until the Court issued the TRO39 enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat
or incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely speculative or hypothetical but rather, real and
apparent.

2. Legal Standing.
"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether those
assailing the governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for
adjudication. [Petitioners] must show that they have a personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that they have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct
injury as a consequence of the enforcement of the challenged governmental act."40
"'[I]nterest' in the question involved must be material — an interest that is in issue and will be
affected by the official act — as distinguished from being merely incidental or general."41

"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional
rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."42

As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2) constitutional
rights, namely: (1) the right of minors to freely travel within their respective localities; and (2)
the primary right of parents to rear their children. Related to the first is the purported conflict
between RA 9344, as amended, and the penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal
standing to raise the issue affecting the minor's right to travel,43 because: (a) she was still a minor
at the time the petition was filed before this Court,44 and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew
Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at night after school and
is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. On the other
hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan
(Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of legal
age, and therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of the
Curfew Ordinances, for which they could base any direct injury as a consequence thereof.

None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew Ordinances violate
the parents' right to rear their children as they have not shown that they stand before this Court as
parent/s and/or guardian/s whose constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should be
noted that Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could
have properly filed the petition for himself for the alleged violation of his parental right. But Mr.
Villegas did not question the Curfew Ordinances based on his primary right as a parent as he
only stands as the representative of his minor child, Clarissa, whose right to travel was
supposedly infringed.

As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal personality to

bring an action in court.45 Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK still has no
standing as it failed to allege that it was authorized by its members who were affected by the
Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their behalf.

Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in the controversy.
More particularly, Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged violation of the minors'
right to travel, but not on the alleged violation of the parents' right.
These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing requirement insofar as all
the petitioners are concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case. "In a number of cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of
legal standing, especially when paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when those who
challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may
do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that they have been personally injured by
the operation of a law or any other government act."46

This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances is
placed under judicial review. Not only is this Court asked to determine the impact of these
issuances on the right of parents to rear their children and the right of minors to travel, it is also
requested to determine the extent of the State's authority to regulate these rights in the interest of
general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of overarching significance to the public, which,
therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including, among others, the standing
requirement.

That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case.

II.

A. Void for Vagueness.

Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of parents to rear their
children, this Court must first tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew Ordinances are void
for vagueness.

In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing sufficient
enforcement parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry
out their provisions. They claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led to
the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though they were already of legal age.
They maintain that the enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew offenders based
only on their physical appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they
conceded that the Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the age of the child,
they submit that nowhere does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or
identification of the child to show his age.47

The arguments are untenable.

"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."48
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering
that they do not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because
of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is
prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly.49The void for vagueness doctrine is
premised on due process considerations, which are absent from this particular claim. In one
case, it was opined that:

[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which may involve

"procedural due process uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty cases."
"Procedural due process uncertainty" involves cases where the statutory language was so obscure
that it failed to give adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide
proper standards for adjudication. Such a definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This
perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with the due process clause, a necessary
interrelation since there is no constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are "void-
for-vagueness."50

Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local
authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any
confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point
to the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to the
implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are best left for
the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled
enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners
must show that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous
provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular conduct is
prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of law contravenes due
process because agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law
permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,51 it was ratiocinated that:

A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on ad hoc and subjective basis, and vague standards result in erratic and arbitrary
application based on individual impressions and personal predilections.52

As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the
provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of a
suspected minor would be determined. Thus, without any correlation to any vague legal
provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void for vagueness
doctrine.

Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to identify
suspected curfew violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state
these parameters, law enforcement agents are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found
in statutory law when implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:

Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determinedfrom the child's
birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of
these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies
of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. (Emphases
supplied)

This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew Ordinances because RA 10630
(the law that amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law.53
Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630,54minors caught in violation
of curfew ordinances are children at risk and, therefore, covered by its provisions.55 It is a
long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with law is one of the essential requisites for the
validity of a municipal ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary implication, ordinances should be
read and implemented in conjunction with related statutory law.

Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who was perceived
to be a minor violating the curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond the application of the
Curfew Ordinances by simply presenting any competent proof of identification establishing their
majority age. In the absence of such proof, the law authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct
a visual assessment of the suspect, which - needless to state - should be done ethically and
judiciously under the circumstances. Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to
pursue the appropriate action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the
ordinances invalidated.

All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness is denied.

B. Right of Parents to Rear their Children.

Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents
of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In
this regard, they assert that this right includes the right to determine whether minors will be
required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the right
to impose curfews is primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's interest in
imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.57

Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.

Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights
of parents in the rearing of their children:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the "youth")
for civic efficiency and the development of their moral character are characterized not only as
parental rights, but also as parental duties. This means that parents are not only given the
privilege of exercising their authority over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise this
authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is a reflection of the State's
independent interest to ensure that the youth would eventually grow into free, independent, and
well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is during childhood that minors are prepared
for additional obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child for these [obligations]
must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements
of good citizenship."58 "This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept
and example is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible
citizens."59

By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one's
children."60 In Ginsberg v. New York,61 the Supreme Court of the United States (US) remarked
that "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority
in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society."62 As in our Constitution, the right and duty of parents to rear their children is not only
described as "natural," but also as "primary." The qualifier "primary" connotes the parents'
superior right over the State in the upbringing of their children.63 The rationale for the
State's deference to parental control over their children was explained by the US Supreme Court
in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti),64 as follows:

[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the
freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action
and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important
decisions by minors. But an additional and more important justification for state deference
to parental control over children is that "the child is not [a] mere creature of the State;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."65 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions
concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the
[S]tate may act to promote these legitimate interests."66 Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to
the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is
demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the parents' qualified right to
control the upbringing of their children."67

As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the exercise of
these rights and duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather,
complementary to parental supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo,68 this Court acknowledged the
State's role as parens patriae in protecting minors, viz.:

[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of
protecting the rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an
unfavorable position, vis-a vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what
concerns them, they have the political community to look after their welfare. This obligation the
state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the
United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme
power of every State, x x x."69 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral
development of their children,70 and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their
parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[l]egal restriction on minors, especially those
supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and
maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the
Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for
example, who have the primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the
support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."71

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role
of promoting their children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these
ordinances further compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and
the prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of
parents to rear their children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and lack of
experience, are not only more exposed to potential physical harm by criminal elements that
operate during the night; their moral well-being is likewise imperiled as minor children are prone
to making detrimental decisions during this time.72

At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the
minors are not - whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by
their parents. This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature
of parental authority and the importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively
given unfettered authority over their children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able
to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew
Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places
without parental accompaniment during the curfew hours.73 In this respect, the ordinances
neither dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor
force parents to abdicate their authority to influence or control their minors' activities.74 As
such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a
parent's right to bring up his or her child.

Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to
spend more time at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities
to take a more active role in their children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle
(Schleifer),75 the US court observed that the city government "was entitled to believe x x x that a
nocturnal curfew would promote parental involvement in a child's upbringing. A curfew aids the
efforts of parents who desire to protect their children from the perils of the street but are unable
to control the nocturnal behavior of those children."76 Curfews may also aid the "efforts of
parents who prefer their children to spend time on their studies than on the streets."77 Reason
dictates that these realities observed in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local context.
Hence, these are additional reasons which justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental
rights.
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for violating the parents'
right to rear their children.

C. Right to Travel.

Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the minors'
right to travel. They claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore,
necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even if there exists
a compelling State interest, such as the prevention of juvenile crime and the protection of minors
from crime, there are other less restrictive means for achieving the government's interest.78 In
addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.79

Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine, considering
that petitioners have not claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition
of speech-related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism
Council (Southern Hemisphere),80 this Court explained that "the application of the overbreadth
doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial
challenge, applicable only to free speech cases,"81viz.:

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation
in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before
the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise
stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court
confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of
the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case
basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can
only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its
face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a
properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to
depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent
effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The
Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.82 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)

In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free
speech claims, the Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not
recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,83 and
that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was held that rarely, if ever,
will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically
addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by
the 'transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression."'85

In the more recent case of Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was opined that "[f]acial
challenges can only be raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern
Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to violations of due process rights, whereas
facial challenges are raised on the basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm of freedom
of expression."87

That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this case,
there being no claimed curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds
proper to examine the assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny test.

The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to
other countries or within the Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within the general concept of
liberty.90 Liberty - a birthright of every person - includes the power of locomotion91 and the right
of citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they desire
or where they can best pursue the ends of life.92

The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights,
such as the rights to education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion.93 The inter-
relation of the right to travel with other fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of
Maquoketa v. Russell,94 as follows:

Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and association
require one to move about, such movement must necessarily be protected under the First
Amendment. Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First
Amendment Rights cannot be exercised without violating the law is equivalent to a denial
of those rights. One court has eloquently pointed this out:

We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to
freedom of travel and movement. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to their
church, their freedom to worship is impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to
the meeting hall, freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason, people cannot
safely walk the sidewalks or drive the streets of a community, opportunities for freedom of
speech are sharply limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably involved with freedoms set
forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases supplied)

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if
made against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another,
jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the
State96 may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.97

The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and
prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the
minor's movement and activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate
vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming
victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second requirement,
i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing
the State's duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610,98 as amended, RA 9775,99
RA 9262,100 RA 9851, 101 RA 9344,102 RA 10364,103 RA 9211,104 RA 8980,105 RA 9288,106 and
Presidential Decree (PD) 603,107 as amended.

Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local
government units, through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It
reads:

Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may prescribe such
curfew hours for children as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce
curfew ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local authorities.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what
respondents have done in this case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In other
words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict the
minors' exercise of the right to travel.

The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise
constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and
enjoy constitutional rights,108but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those of
adults.109 They are always subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s
and/or guardian/s, and the State.110 As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent,
restricts the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to vote,111
the right to execute contracts,112 and the right to engage in gainful employment.113 With respect
to the right to travel, minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from the Department of
Social Welfare and Development before they can travel to a foreign country by themselves or
with a person other than their parents.114 These limitations demonstrate that the State has broader
authority over the minors' activities than over similar actions of adults,115 and overall, reflect the
State's general interest in the well-being of minors.116 Thus, the State may impose limitations on
the minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do not generally apply to adults.

In Bellotti,117 the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential
treatment of the minors' constitutional rights. These are:first, the peculiar vulnerability of
children; second, their inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature
manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in child rearing:118

[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to
adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern,
...sympathy, and ... paternal attention. x x x.

[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the recognition that, during the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. x x x.

xxxx

[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies
limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse
governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or
involvement in important decisions by minors. x x x.

xxxx

x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be
important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court acknowledged the heightened

dangers on the streets to minors, as compared to adults:

A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young
people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding
restraints and dangers within a broad range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such
action are the crippling effects of child employment, more especially in public places, and the
possible harms arising from other activities subject to all the diverse influences of the
[streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is
within the state's police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of the child or one
that religious scruples dictate contrary action.

It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways. But
even in such use streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other uses,
whether in work or in other things, this difference may be magnified.121 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of their
travel rights, provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds.

Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the
reasonableness of classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either
(i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed
under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.123 The intermediate scrutiny test applies
when a classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires
heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and legitimacy.124 Lastly, the
rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.125

Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less
by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test126 is the applicable test.127 At this juncture, it should
be emphasized that minors enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State
has broader authority over minors than over adults does not trigger the application of a lower
level of scrutiny.128 In Nunez v. City of San Diego (Nunez),129 the US court illumined that:

Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews implicate the fundamental
rights of minors, the parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is necessary. The Supreme
Court teaches that rights are no less "fundamental" for minors than adults, but that the
analysis of those rights may differ:

Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the
state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution
and possess constitutional rights. The Court[,] indeed, however, [has long] recognized that the
State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults. x x x.
Thus, minors' rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults because the state has a greater
range of interests that justify the infringement of minors' rights.

The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when applicable, warrant
differential analysis of the constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x x. The Bellotti test
[however] does not establish a lower level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors
in the context of a juvenile curfew. Rather, the Bellotti framework enables courts to determine
whether the state has a compelling state interest justifying greater restrictions on minors than on
adults. x x x.

x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating minors differently
than adults, we do not believe that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review
burdens on minors' fundamental rights. x x x.

Accordingly, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x x.130 (Emphases
supplied)
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar
circumstances of minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parens patriae to
protect and preserve their well-being with the compelling State interests justifying the assailed
government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional.131 Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the classification
(i) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive means
to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the
interest.132

a. Compelling State Interest.

Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared

policies.133This Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect
and care for them as parens patriae constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by
the State.134 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties
must give way.135 As explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a
compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The limitations on
minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling interest of the State to protect and
care for their welfare.

In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew
Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas,
so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them
against criminal pressure and influences which may even include themselves. As denoted in the
"whereas clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on
minors, recognizes that:

[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care and
guidance, education, and moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug
addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal offenses;

xxxx

[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-
standers, street children, and member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or meander in
public or private roads, streets or other public places, whether singly or in groups without lawful
purpose or justification;

xxxx

[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor children
roaming around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities involved in
various infractions of city ordinances and national laws;
[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of minor
children during night time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse or
cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;

[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need to put a
restraint on the tendency of growing number of youth spending their nocturnal activities
wastefully, especially in the face of the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the
dissident elements of society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering their nefarious
activities[.]136

The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the information gathered by the City
Council to support its passage of the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may serve as a
guidepost to our own treatment of the present case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court
recognized the entitlement of elected bodies to implement policies for a safer community, in
relation to the proclivity of children to make dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions
when left unsupervised during the late hours of night:

Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would materially assist
its first stated interest—that of reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City Council acted on
the basis of information from many sources, including records from Charlottesville's police
department, a survey of public opinion, news reports, data from the United States Department of
Justice, national crime reports, and police reports from other localities. On the basis of such
evidence, elected bodies are entitled to conclude that keeping unsupervised juveniles off the
streets late at night will make for a safer community. The same streets may have a more
volatile and less wholesome character at night than during the day. Alone on the streets at
night children face a series of dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers
may lure them to use narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure them into membership or
participation in violence. "[D]uring the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors
often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could
be detrimental to them." Those who succumb to these criminal influences at an early age
may persist in their criminal conduct as adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to these
theories is beside the point. Those elected officials with their finger on the pulse of their home
community clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its curfew the opportunities for children
to come into contact with criminal influences,the City was directly advancing its first
objective of reducing juvenile violence and crime.138 (Emphases and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)

Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon City and
Manila presented statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of
crimes involving juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators, in their respective localities.139

Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances
pursuant to their police power under the general welfare clause.140 In this light, the Court thus
finds that the local governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to
substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to minors. As
such, a compelling State interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew
Ordinances.

With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to
determine if the restrictions set forth in the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide
the least restrictive means to address the cited compelling State interest - the second requirement
of the strict scrutiny test.

b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.

The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that
citizens should not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their
constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to
the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it
is possible for governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with
constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn.141

Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors
as they are still accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be
social, religious, or civic.142 Thus, in the present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly
tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to travel but also on their
other constitutional rights.143

In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional impliedly for not

being narrowly drawn, resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to freely exercise
their religion and to free speech.145 It observed that:

The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Christmas Eve Midnight
Mass at the local Roman Catholic Church or Christmas Eve services at the various local
Protestant Churches. It would likewise prohibit them from attending the New [Year's] Eve
watch services at the various churches. Likewise it would prohibit grandparents, uncles, aunts or
adult brothers and sisters from taking their minor relatives of any age to the above mentioned
services. x x x.

xxxx

Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not even attend the city
council meetings if they ran past 10:30 (which they frequently do) to express his views on the
necessity to repeal the curfew ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First Amendment right
to freedom of speech.

xxxx

[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very
narrowly drawn ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and was very carefully drafted
in an attempt to pass constitutional muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First
Amendment rights, travel in a motor vehicle and returning home by a direct route from
religious, school, or voluntary association activities. (Emphases supplied)

After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that only
the Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the Manila and
Navotas Ordinances do not.

The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, namely:
(a) minors accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those
running lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for
emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school students and those who, by virtue of their
employment, are required in the streets or outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those
working at night.146

For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night
classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in
coordination with a specific barangay office; (d) those traveling towards home during the curfew
hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of
legal age having authority over them; (f) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It
also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas
day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta,
All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter
Sunday.147

This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are
inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To
be fair, both ordinances protect the rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel at
night from school or work.148 However, even with those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and,
to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the
minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free
expression, among others.

The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon
protected liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional rights
than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in
detail below:

First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from
engaging in legitimate non-school or non-church activities in the streets or going to and from
such activities; thus, their freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that
participation in legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or church, also
contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and intellectual development, yet, such participation
is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.

Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve and
Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities (such
as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted in
Mosier.149 This legitimate activity done pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise their
religion is therefore effectively curtailed.

Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political
rallies or attend city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to
peaceably assemble and to free expression.

Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these activities outside
curfew hours, but the Court finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in these
legitimate activities during curfew hours. Such proscription does not advance the State's
compelling interest to protect minors from the dangers of the streets at night, such as becoming
prey or instruments of criminal activity. These legitimate activities are merely hindered without
any reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly
drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.

In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their
exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew
regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned fundamental rights.
While some provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot
subsist independently despite the presence150 of any separability clause.151

The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it
sufficiently safeguards the minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions:

Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be
covered by the provisions of this ordinance;

(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;

(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or
other extra-curricular activities of their school or organization wherein their
attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are out
and unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified
by the proper authorities concerned; and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as conflagration,
earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar
incidents[;]
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or returning
home from the same place of employment activity without any detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no
violation of this Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
 (g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious,
recreational, educational, social, communitv or other similar private activity
sponsored by the city, barangay, school, or other similar private civic/religious
organization/group (recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or
when the minor is going to or returning home from such activity, without any detour
or stop; and
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was dismissed
from his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working student.152 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City
Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free
exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.

Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the protection
of these aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association by enabling
minors to attend both official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or
church but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of
free expression are also covered by these items given that the minors' attendance in the
official activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed during the curfew hours.
Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently
safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious masses even
during curfew hours. In relation to their right to travel, the ordinance allows the minor-
participants to move to and from the places where these activities are held. Thus, with these
numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised
activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter
within the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.

To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to run
lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours.
As astutely observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly
considered as an exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e.,
"[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", as accompaniment should be understood not
only in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the
reasonable construction of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the
basic premise that State interference is not superior but only complementary to parental
supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents' right to rear their children
is not only natural but primary.

Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on these ordinances,
is dealing with the welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be incapable of giving proper
consent due to their incapability to fully understand the import and consequences of their actions.
In one case it was observed that:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she
can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the
nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize
the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of
themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.153

Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational capacity, and
balancing the same against the State's compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent
juvenile crime, this Court finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is
reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional. Needless to
say, these exceptions are in no way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with the
lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or modifying
exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes the parameters
of scrutiny as applied in this case.

D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was raised- to further
discuss the validity of its penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.

To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parentis or guardian under Section
8 thereof,154 does not impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance
requires the minor, along with his or her parent/s or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and
community service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of the minor be unable to
pay the fine imposed - or in addition to the fine imposed therein.155Meanwhile, the Manila
Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the minor based on the age and frequency of
violations, to wit:

SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this ordinance shall
be sanctioned/punished as follows:

(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a
REPRIMAND for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or
person exercising parental authority.

(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the
sanction/penalty shall be:

1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;

2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a
warning about the legal impostitions in case of a third and subsequent
violation; and
3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one
(1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That
 the complaint shall be filed by the Punong Barangay with the office of the
City Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and underscoring supplied).

Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors these
sanctions - i.e., (a) community service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d)
imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the
imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:

SEC. 57. Status Offenses. — Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if
committed by an adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not be punished if
committed by a child.

SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. — Ordinances enacted by local governments

concerning juvenile status offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy,
parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and
misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct,
public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism,
gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of
children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for said violations, and they shall instead
be brought to their residence or to any barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the
custody of their parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for in such
ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict
with the law." The ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such as counseling,
attendance in group activities for children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting education
seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the conduct
of minors, when the similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or penalized (i.e.,
status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for
violations of these regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew ordinances on minors,
without penalizing them for violations thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.

"Penalty" 157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of

imprisonment or fine";158 "[p]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who
commits a deliberate or negligent act."159 Punishment, in turn, is defined as "[a] sanction - such
as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed against a person
who has violated the law."160

The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of the
minor in violation of the regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A thereof
empowers local governments to adopt appropriate intervention programs, such as community-
based programs161 recognized under Section 54162 of the same law.

In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention
program that a local government (such as Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in
an ordinance to promote the welfare of minors. For one, the community service programs
provide minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they promote accountability for their
delinquent acts without the moral and social stigma caused by jail detention. In the same light,
these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance with the law and legal orders. More
importantly, they give them the opportunity to become productive members of society and
thereby promote their integration to and solidarity with their community.

The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with Sections
57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing
disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or friendly
reproof' or "counsel or warning against fault or oversight."163 The Black's Law Dictionary
defines admonition as "[a]n authoritatively issued warning or censure";164 while the Philippine
Law Dictionary defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke, warning or reminder,
[counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or warning."165
Notably, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our
jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning or admonition shall not
be considered a penalty."166

In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition are
clearly not penalties - as they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the
rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear, their objectives are to formally inform and educate
the minor, and for the latter to understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his
future conduct.

A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or
imprisonment imposed by the City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined as
"a severe or formal reproof."167 The Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of lawyer
discipline that does not restrict the lawyer's ability to practice law";168 while the Philippine Law
Dictionary defines it as a "public and formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person
in fault by his superior officer or body to which he belongs. It is more than just a warning or
admonition."169 In other words, reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement made to
denounce the error or violation committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke the erring individual,
and to sternly warn the erring individual including the public against repeating or committing the
same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring individual or violator to unwarranted censure
or sharp disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate
that reprimand is a penalty,170 hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.

Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in
our various criminal and administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344,
as amended, evidently prohibits.

As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It states that
"[n]o penalty shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]."
Thus, for imposing the sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew
violations, portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with
the clear language of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other
hand, the impositions of community service programs and admonition on the minors are allowed
as they do not constitute penalties.

CONCLUSION

In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the
strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote
juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City
Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of
the three which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the
Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise
their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to
achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by
their parents or guardian", has also been construed to include parental permission as a
constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure;
the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit.

In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void,
while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with
this Decision.

For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions imposing
reprimand and fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended. Hence, following the rule that ordinances should always conform with the law, these
provisions must be struck down as invalid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court hereby declares Ordinance
No. 8046, issued by the local government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg.
No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government
of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No.
SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local government of the Quezon City is declared
CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus,VALID in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.