1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.

JUANITO DASIG, BALBINO GABUNI and MARCELINO DAYAO

G.R. No. L-5275
August 25, 1953
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRINCIPLE OF INADMISSIBILITY OF
CONFESSION OBTAINED THROUGH PROMISE OF EXCLUSION FROM
INFORMATION. Where the evidence submitted against the
defendants is not the confession that one of them had made upon
promise that he would be excluded from the information and
made a state witness, but his testimony in open court, there is no
occasion for the defendants to invoke the principle of
inadmissibility of confession obtained through such promise.
2. EVIDENCE; WITNESSES; RULE "FALSUS IN UNO FALSUS IN
OMNIBUS," EXPLAINED. The rule falsus in uno falsus in omnibus
is not a mandatory rule of evidence, but rather a permissible one,
which allows the jury or the court to draw the inference or not to
draw it as circumstances may best warrant. (70 C. J., 783). The
rule has its limitations, when the mistaken statement is consistent
with good faith and is not conclusively indicative of a deliberate
perversion, the believable portion of the testimony should be
admitted. (III Wigmore. secs. 1009-1015, pp. 674-683.) There are,
therefore, these requirements for the application of the rule, i.e.,
that the false testimony is as to a material point, and there should
be a conscious and deliberate intention to falsify. Lyric Film
Exchange, Inc. v. Cowper, 36 Off. Gaz., 1642.)
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The said rule should not apply
where there is sufficient corroboration on many grounds of the
testimony; where the mistakes are not on the very material
points; where the errors do not arise from an apparent desire to
pervert the truth but from innocent mistakes and the desire of the
witness to exculpate himself though not completely.
4. EVIDENCE; LEADING QUESTIONS; AN EXAMPLE OF IT. The
question. "How many days previous to that trip of yours on
December 24, 1949? Was it the day previous?" is a leading
question.
5. ID.; WITNESSES; TESTIMONY AS TO DATES. Human memory
on dates or days is frail, and unless the day is an extraordinary or

unusual one for the witness, there is no reasonable assurance of

its correctness.
Defendants in the above-entitled case appeal from a judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Isabela, finding them guilty of the
crime of robbery with homicide, and sentencing them to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Norberto
Ramil, in the sum of P4,000, and the complainant, Jacinta
Galasinao, in the sum of P190, and to pay the costs of the
prosecution.
The record discloses that in the evening of December 23, 1949, at
about midnight, while Norberto Ramil and his wife, Jacinta
Galasinao, and their daughter and son, Segunda and Domingo,
respectively, were sleeping in their house situated not far away
from the municipal building of Antatet (now Luna), Province of
Isabela, the said spouses were suddenly awakened by the barking
of dogs and the grunting of pigs. Ramil got up and walked quietly
towards a window, to find out what the dogs were barking at, but
just then two persons who had entered the house faced him. The
wife heard these persons talking in whispers and saw them in
front. She lighted a lamp, and as she did so the two intruders
levelled their guns at her husband and demanded from him to
produce his pistol. As the husband could not produce any pistol
and said he had none at all, they fired at him. He used his two
hands to protect himself, but to no avail. As he received the shots,
he fell down in a stooping position and then slumped on the floor,
face downwards. The wife and her two children, who had already
been awakened, cried for help, but the intruders levelled their
guns at them, commanding them to keep quiet and threatening to
kill if they did not do so. For fear, they had to stop. The intruders
then went inside the bedroom and ran-sacked the contents of the
trunk which contained their valuables. P10 in cash and jewels
worth P180 were taken away.
The Chief of Police of Antatet, who lived around twenty meters
away from the house of Ramil, heard three pistol shots, so he
repaired to the municipal building to fetch one of his policemen,
then they passed by the house of the Mayor, and together with
him they proceeded to the house of Ramil. When they reached it

the robbers were already gone. They found Ramil already dead
with gun-shots wounds on the left eye, in the right breast, at the
back, and at the left index finger. They questioned the wife, who
recounted, to them what had happened. The chief of police found
a fired bullet, caliber .32, inside the truck, four empty .22 caliber
cartridges near the dead body, three empty .32 caliber shells, one
near the broken box inside the bedroom and the other two five
meters from the house of the deceased, and three .45 caliber
empty shells under the house just below the body the dead body.
The following day, a physician of Antatet performed an autopsy on
the dead body of Ramil and he found four gunshot wounds in the
places already indicated above. When he opened the chest cavity,
he discovered a .22 caliber slug right at the heart.
The above facts are not contradicted. The evidence, upon which
the judgment of conviction is based, consists of the testimony on
one, Jose Mallillin, that of Andres Bumanglag, which in part
corroborates Mallillin's testimony, and the findings of a ballistic
expert of the Philippine Constabulary to the effect that the
empty .32 caliber cartridges found under the house of Ramil had
been fired from the Llama auto-pistol possessed by, and licensed
in the name of, Mallillin, and that the .32 caliber slug, Exhibit C,
which was found inside the trunk, had also been fired therefrom.
These findings were based on the fact that the striations found in
the said bullet are identical with and congruent to those which he
fired from the same Llama auto-pistol, and the pin marks at the
empty .32 caliber cartridges are identical with and congruent to
that found at an empty cartridge fired from the same pistol.
Mallillin was formerly a school teacher of Antatet and had resided
there, but on the date of the robbery he was living in a contiguous
town, Cauayan. He testified as follows: On the evening in
question, while he was on his way home, he saw four persons
near a checkpoint, and as he passed by, two of them got hold of
him and a third snatched his pistol away and compelled him to
follow them. The four were later recognized by him to be the
defendants Balbino Gabuni, Juanito Dasig and Marcelino Dayao,
and Sergio Eduardo. They boarded a jeep, which was parked near
the road and in which there were two others whom Mallillin did
not recognize, and then they drove to the junction of the

Cabatuan-Antatet roads. Here they all went down and walked

towards Antatet.
When the party was around 100 meters from the municipal
building, he saw his companions talking to Andres Bumanglag.
Taking Bumanglag aside, he informed the latter that he had been
held up. Upon Mallillin' suggestion, his companions asked
Bumanglag how the house of Ramil could be entered, and the
latter answered that it could be done through a window near the
well. They also asked further information from him, and thereafter
he was allowed to go away, but with the warning that if he would
squeal, he would be put to death.
After Bumanglag had left, they went to a place around fifty meters
from the House of Ramil, the intended victim. Here they waited till
about midnight when they approached the house. Gabuni then
ordered Mallillin to stay in a place beside the road. Dasig and
Eduardo then gave him their shoes for him to keep, while the five,
including the two unknown persons, approached the house. Dasig
and Eduardo entered the house through the window, while Gabuni
stayed at the door in front. Gabuni gave his carbine to Dayao and
Mallillin's Llama pistol to Dasig, while Eduardo held a .22 caliber
pistol.
Five minutes after the three had gone up the house, Mallillin heard
three shots. Then he heard a voice calling for help. He got
frightened, so he hurriedly went away bound for Cauayan. While
still in Antatet, he heard the policemen of Antatet exchange shots
with his companions. He arrived in Cauayan at about one o'clock.
At around 4:30 that morning, Sergio Eduardo called at his house
and asked for their shoes, and as he went away, he warned
Mallillin not to squeal, otherwise he would be killed. Mallillin asked
for his pistol and was informed that it was with Marcelino Dayao.
That same morning he went to Dayao and got it from the latter.
Juanito Dasig also called at his house that same morning, warning
him that if he would squeal, he would be in a bad fix, informing
him further that their two companions, whom Mallillin had not
recognized, had gone to Manila to fetch some more of their
companions until they reach as many as twenty.
The above is Mallillin's version. He was apprehended by the
authorities on December 31, 1949. Four days before his arrest, he

further said, he had decided, after consultation with his wife, to go

to the chief of police of Cauayan to ask him to accompany him to
Cabatuan, where he was going to relate all that had happened,
but that it so happened that when he saw the chief of police, the
latter had no time to hear him as he was going away and was
then ready with his baggage to go to Manila.
When Mallillin was taken to Constabulary barracks on December
31, 1949, he had a talk with Lieutenant Panis of the Constabulary.
Panis promised him that he would be used as a state witness if he
would disclose all that he knew about the robbery. With this
promise Mallillin made a complete disclosure of the above facts to
Lieutenant Panis. His statement was put in writing, although it
was not sworn to before the justice of the peace until January 3,
1950. His affidavit was introduced at the trial as Exhibit 4-Gabuni,
Exhibit 3-Dasig-Dayao, and contains substantially the same facts
testified to by him during the trial.
The testimony of Andres Bumanglag is to the effect that that
same evening, he had been playing guitar with two companions
at the house of one Labog, and that when they went home and as
they were approaching his house, he was suddenly held up by two
persons. When brought to a group to which the two belonged, he
recognized Mallillin, Gabuni, chief of police of Cauayan, and Dasig.
He was asked about the number of policemen of Antatet, the arms
that they had, the caliber of the arms, and the persons who had
firearms. Finally, they asked him to draw a sketch of the house of
Norberto Ramil and its position in relation to the house of the
mayor, as well as the position of the window through which
entrance could be gained into the house. Bumanglag was very
much frightened because, at the beginning when he re-fused to
answer the questions that they asked him, he was kicked and
threatened by the group. Besides, Mallillin had informed him that
he himself had been held-up, and that he should tell what they
asked him, he was kicked and threatened by the group. Besides,
Mallillin had informed him that he himself had been held-up, and
that he should tell what they asked him, other-wise both of them
would be killed. After getting all the information they desired,
Bumanglag was allowed to go home. A few minutes after he went
to bed he heard some shots, and stray bullets hit his house and a

kapok three nearby, so he and his family had to go down the

house to seek shelter from stray bullets.
On January 3, 1950, Andres Bumanglag also made an affidavit
before Lieutenant Panis, which was sworn to by him before the
justice of the peace of Antatet. In this affidavit, Exhibit 5-Gabuni,
he mentions the fact that before the robbery a group of persons,
four of whom were armed, came and asked information from him
about the house of Norberto Ramil, and that on that occasion he
also saw Mallillin with them, who told him that he was held saw
held up by the group.
The trial court gave credit to the testimonies of Mallillin and
Bumanglag as above outlined, and together with the identification
made by the wife of Ramil of one of the appellants by the latter's
stature, and on the further ground that the cartridges and some of
the bullets found in the premises had been fired from the Llama
pistol of Mallillin, held that the crime of robbery with homicide had
been committed by the accused-appellants herein, and sentenced
them as above indicated.
In this court the attorneys for the appellants contend that
inasmuch as Mallillin's confession was obtained by a promise
made by the Constabulary Lieutenant Panis that Mallillin would be
excluded from the information and made a state witness,
Mallillin's confession is not admissible against him and neither
should it be admissible against the appellants herein. It is evident
that counsel misunderstands the application of the principle in
evidence that a confession secured through promise of immunity
is not admissible. The evidence submitted against the appellants
is not the confession made by Mallillin; it is his testimony given in
open court. There is, therefore, no occasion to invoke the principle
of evidence in question.
The most important claim of the defendants-appellants is that
inasmuch as Mallillin was an accomplice in the crime and his
testimony contains flaws in many particulars, the maxim Falsus in
uno falsus in omnibus should be applied to the whole of his
testimony, and the judgment of conviction would then have no leg
to stand on. There are certainly many points or particulars in
Mallillin's testimony which can not stand careful scrutiny. First of
all, we have the supposed compulsion or hold-up which he claims

he was subjected to. Mallillin admits that the defendantsappellants had been his companions in various games, like poker,
"pekyo", etc. Then there is the circumstance that the supposed
hold-up took place in the center of the town. According to some
defense witnesses, Mallillin had also been telling of robberies that
might take place in town. It is unreasonable, therefore, to
conclude that Mallillin was not an unwilling companion in the
commission of the crime.
But, on the other hand, we find that his testimony is corroborated
by evidence worthy of credit. That he was present on the occasion
of the robbery can not be denied, because his Llama pistol was
proven to have been fired at the scene of the robbery, as
cartridges and bullets proved to have been fired from the said
pistol had been found in the house where the robbery was
committed. And the fact that appellants had been companions of
Mallillin in many gambling games points to the close acquaintance
between them and them unity of purpose as well. While his story
that it was not he who furnished the data about the climbing of
the house and its surroundings, his statement that Juanito Dasig
and Sergio Eduardo were the ones who went inside the house is
corroborated by the inmates of the house to the effect that only
two of the robbery entered the house.
Again, the testimony about the different arms used, a carbine in
the possession of Dayao, a pistol given Eduardo by Gabuni
these facts are corroborated by the finding of .22 caliber slugs
and empty shells in the heart of the victim and in the house and
in the premises. The testimony of Mallillin that Gabuni carried a .
45 caliber pistol, which was his service pistol as chief of police, is
also untrue because the examination of the .45 caliber bullet
found in the premises shows that it was not fired from the service
pistol of Gabuni. But Mallillin's assertion may be due to innocent
error on his part. He perhaps thought that the pistol that Gabuni
carried was his service pistol. But Gabuni may have planned to
avoid identification by using a firearm different from that which he
used as member of the police force.
Then there is the corroboration of the testimony of Mallillin given
by Andres Bumanglag, whom the trial court considered as a
trustworthy witness. We find nothing from the record which would

justify us in reversing the appraisal of the above testimony and

the credit given this corroborating witness by the trial court.
It has been stated that the rule (Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus)
invoked is not a mandatory rule of evidence, but rather a
permissible one, which allows the jury or the court to draw the
inference or not to draw it as circumstances may best warrant.
(70 C.J. 783.) The unbelievable allegation of Mallillin, that he was
forced into joining the band against his will, arises from the
natural desire of an accomplice to shift the blame to his coconspirators and exculpate himself; while his assertion that the
gun Gabuni carried was his service pistol maybe an innocent
mistake on Mallillin's part. His claim that it was Bumanglag who
indicated where access to the victim's house may be had may
also be untrue, be-cause Mallillin had been said to have been in
the house. Do these flaws and defects render his testimony wholly
inadmissible under the rule invoked?
We take advantage of this opportunity to explain the true scope of
this much invoked and abused rule of (Falsus in uno falsus in
omnibus.) Professor Wigmore states that this rule ceased to be
the rule in England as early as the beginning of the eighteenth
century. He criticizes the board rule as unsound, because not true
to human nature; that because a person tells a single lie, he is
lying throughout his whole testimony, or that there is strong
possibility that he is so lying. The reason for it is that once a
person knowingly and deliberately states a falsehood in one
material aspect, he must have done so as to the rest. But it is also
clear that the rule has its limitations, for when the mistaken
statement is consistent with good faith and is not conclusively
indicative of a deliberate perversion, the believable portion of the
testimony should be admitted. Because though a person may err
in memory or in observation in one or more respects, he may
have told the truth as to others. (III Wigmore, Secs. 1009-1015,
pp. 674-683.) There are, therefor, these requirements for the
application of the rule, i.e., that the false testimony is as to a
material point, and that there should be a conscious and
deliberate intention to falsify. (Lyric Film Exchange, Inc. vs.
Cowper, 1937, 36 Off. Gaz., 1642.)

The rule is also carefully considered in the case of the Santisima

Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283, 5 Law. Ed. 454, thus:
Where a party speaks to a fact in respect to which he cannot be
presumed liable to mistake, as in relation to the country of his
birth, or his being in a vessel on particular voyage, or living in a
particular place, if the fact turn out otherwise, it is extremely
difficult to exempt him from the charge of deliberate falsehood;
and courts of justice, under such circumstances, are bound upon
principles of law and morality and justice to apply the maxim
falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. What ground of judicial belief can
there be left when the party has shown such gross insensibility to
the difference between right and wrong, between truth and
falsehood.
In the case of Godair vs. Ham National Bank, 80 N.E., 407, the
Supreme Court of Illinois made the following very illuminating
expression of the scope of the rule:
As to the second criticism, it has uniformly been held by this Court
that the maxim, "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus," should only be
applied in cases where a witness has knowingly and willfully given
false testimony. Chittenden vs. Evans, 41 Ill. 251; City of Chicago
vs. Smith, 48 Ill. 107; United States Express Co. vs. Hutchings, 58
Ill. 44; Pope vs. Dodson, Id. 360; Guliher vs. People, 82 Ill. 145;
Swan vs. People, 98 Ill. 610; Hoge vs. People, 117 Ill. 35, 6 N.E.
796; Freeman vs. Easly, 117 Ill. 317, 7 N.E. 856; Overtoom vs.
Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., 181 Ill. 323, 54 N.E. 898;
Matthews vs. Granger, 196 Ill. 164, 63 N.E. 658.
In City of Chicago vs. Smith, supra, on page 108 of 48 Ill., it was
said: "As to the eight instructions asked by the defendant and
refused, we are of opinion, under the authority of the case of
Brenman vs. People, 15 Ill. 511, it should not have been given.
There the court say it does not follow, merely because a witness
makes an untrue statement, that his entire testimony is to be
disregarded. This must depend on the motive of the witness. If he
intentionally swears falsely as to one matter, the jury may
properly reject his whole testimony as unworthy of credit. But, if
he makes a false statement through mistake or misapprehension,
they ought not to disregard his testimony altogether. The maxim,

'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,' should only be applied in cases

where a witness wilfully and knowingly gives false testimony.
And in Pope vs. Dodson, supra, on page 365 of 58 Ill.: "The tenth
instruction in the series given for appellee is palpably erroneous.
It told the jury that, if the witness Lovely, "has sworn falsely in any
material statement," the jury might disregard her entire
statement except so far as it was corroborated. A witness cannot
be discredited simply on the ground of an erroneous statement. It
is only where the statements of a witness are willfully and
corruptly false in contradicted on a material point," then the jury
had the right to disregard his whole testimony unless
corroborated by other testimony. The court said (page 146 of 82
Ill.): 'The instruction was clearly erroneous. When analyzed, it
plainly tells the jury that "if they believe, from the evidence, that
Alfred F. Foote has been contradicted on a material point, then the
jury have a right to disregard his whole testimony unless
corroborated by other testimony." This is not the law. . . If the
witness, whether defendant or otherwise, is shown, by proof, to
have sworn wilfully and knowingly false on any material matter,
his evidence may be rejected so far as it is not corroborated. . .
The mere fact, however, that he is contradicted as to some
material matter is not enough to warrant the rejection of his
evidence altogether.
In Overtoom vs. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., supra, the
court instructed the jury that "if they believe any witness has
testified falsely, then the jury may disregard such witness'
testimony except in so far as it may have been corroborated." In
disposing of this instruction the court said (page 330 of 181 Ill.,
page 901 of 54 N.E.): "A witness may have testified falsely upon
some matter inquired about from forgetfulness or honest mistake,
and in such case the jury would not be authorized to disregard his
entire testimony, whether corroborated or not. It is the corrupt
motive, or the giving of false testimony knowing it to be false,
that authorizes a jury to disregard the testimony of a witness and
the court to so instruct them."
With the above limitations of the rule in mind, it is clear that the
maxim should not apply in the case at bar for three reasons. First,
there is sufficient corroboration on many grounds of the

testimony. Second, the mistakes are not on the very material

points. Third, the errors do not arise from an apparent desire to
pervert the truth, but from innocent mistakes and the desire of
the witness to exculpate himself though not completely.
The next legal question to decide is whether the credible evidence
submitted, together with that adduced on behalf of the
defendants, prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was the three
appellants who participated in the commission of the crime. The
evidence submitted by the appellants of their defenses of alibi are
not satisfactory to us. That presented by appellant Juanito Dasig,
which consists of the testimony of the nurse, that on the night in
question Dasig was in his house because his wife was suffering
from stomach-ache, is not satisfactory for the reason that the
nurse did not positively state that the date when she went to
attend Dasig's wife was December 23, 1949. This date was
included in the leading questions propounded by counsel for
appellants, where the date is insiduously joined with another fact
and witness' affirmative answer may refer to the more important
fact contained in the answer, not to the date. Thus, the first
question asked was as follows:
"Q: Do you remember having attended to the wife of Juanito Dasig
sometime or around December 23, 1949? A. yes, sir." (t.s.n.,
p.174)
The affirmative answer may well mean that she did actually
attend, and may not imply that she did so on December 23, 1949.
Another question was:
Q. How many days previous to that trip of yours on December 24,
1949? Was it the day previous? A. Previous. (t.s.n. p. 176)
This question is a leading question. The witness also connects the
night of the robbery with a trip supposedly made by her with one
Dr. Modales. But as to this occasion of the trip, her answer as to
the date is also ambiguous, thus:
Q. Do you remember the date of that trip of yours with Dr.
Modales when you left him in Antatet? A. It seems to me it was
on December 24, 1949. (t.s.n., p. 175; Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, however, this witness testified that she
never keeps a record of the cases that she attends to every day,
and on being asked what cases she attended in December, 1949,

she answered that she can not tell unless she saw her record. Its
date, therefore, December 23, 1949, was not remembered by her
but put into her mind by the leading questions of the counsel. To
convince the court that the attendance took place on December
23rd, it was necessary for her to have shown that that date
appeared in the record she kept.
The alibi presented by Gabuni is to the effect that on December
23, he and Sergeant Tamani were together the whole day and
evening, and during the evening Gabuni stayed at home. That
Gabuni and Sergeant Tamani should stay in a barrio two
kilometers away, on patrol, from nine in the morning to six in the
evening, of fully nine hours, is hard to understand. For them to
spend four more hours drinking and eating together in a
restaurant, evidently without their returning to their offices to
report the results of their supposed mission, is still harder to
believe. But for them to eat again at the home of Gabuni, after
they had already eaten in a restaurant, is the height of
improbability. Gabuni must have been on vacation that day, not
on duty. If Gabuni was really and actually on patrol on hat day,
why was not the police blotter submitted? But even if the above
story, improbable as it is, were assumed to be true, and his claim
that he was at his house at ten in the evening and woke up at six
in the morning, also true, it is still not impossible for him to have
gone down the house after ten o'clock in the evening to join the
commission of the robbery, and come back at home in time to be
there and wake up at six o'clock in the following morning.
Neither can the defense of alibi presented by appellant Marcelino
Dayao stand the test of careful scrutiny. That Dayao was with his
witnesses on certain days and on the occasions mentioned, in the
case of witnesses Silverio Anies and Jauna Molina on the
presentation of the latter's claim, and in the case of witness
Daniel Yuson on the occasion of a night of gambling, may be
assumed to be true. But their assertion that it was on the precise
date, December 23, 1949, that they saw or were with Dayao is
difficult to believe. Human memory on dates or days is frail, and
unless the day is an extraordinary or unusual one for the witness,
there is no reasonable assurance of its correctness. Dayao's
witnesses did not prove that some extraordinary or unusual thing

had happened on that day, that would have made them

remember it. As to Anies, the presentation of the claim is
admitted by him to be a common occurrence, such that he had to
admit he can not remember the dates when other similar
applicants saw him. As to witness Yuson, the playing of mahjong
was also a common pastime. Neither Anies nor Yuson presented
any writing or book entry where the event or occasion they
mentioned took place. The trial court did not believe their
testimony, and we are unable to find that its conclusion is not
borne out by human experience.
Having found that sufficient admissible evidence, worthy of credit,
has been adduced to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
defendants-appellants were the ones who perpetrated the robbery
in question, and the evidence with which they sought to prove
their defenses of alibi having been found to be unsatisfactory, we
must affirm, as we hereby affirm, the judgment appealed from,
with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
2. GR No. 176389
ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176864
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A.
GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ,
PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.
December 14, 2010
Facts:
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters
Carmela, nineteen years old, and xxx, seven, were brutally slain
at their home in Paraaque City. Following an intense

investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of

whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a
frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the
identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially
to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details
of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of
Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It
presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who
claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong"
Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter
Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits.
She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an
accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony,
on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for
rape with homicide against Webb, et al.
The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, presided over
by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused
since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.
prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the
others corroborating her testimony. These included the medicolegal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security
guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of
the Webbs household, police officer Biongs former girlfriend, and
Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellitas husband.
Webbs alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that
he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He
presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary
and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense
presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and
the incredible nature of her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaros detailed narration of the crime
and the events surrounding it, the trial court found a credible
witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling crossexaminations.

On January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings,

the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as
charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez,
Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on
Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months,
and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded
damages to Lauro Vizconde.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision,
modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum
and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages
to Lauro Vizconde.
The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by
publicity or that the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient
evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part
in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother and
sister.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in
this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request of
Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from
Carmelas cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under
the safekeeping of the NBI.
The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the
Rule on DNA Evidence to give the accused and the prosecution
access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail
themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the
Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same
having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows,
however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence
that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent
motion to acquit on the ground that the governments failure to
preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right
to due process.

Controlling Issues:
1. Whether or not Alfaros testimony as eyewitness, describing the
crime and identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez,
Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed
it, is entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his
alibi and rebut Alfaros testimony that he led the others in
committing the crime.
Other Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the
governments failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI
found on Carmelas cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that
would prove his innocence; and
2. Whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart,
raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and sister.
Held:
The Right to Acquittal Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled
to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due
process given the States failure to produce on order of the Court
either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen
taken from Carmela.
When Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA
evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the
technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent
had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence.
Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure
even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did
not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up
the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webbs
application for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on
when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of

Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary

actions taken against him and the other accused.
They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but
merely as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its
decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the
appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of
their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the
meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the
accuseds lack of interest in having such test done, the State
cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be
required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.
Suspicious Details
Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since
November or December 1994 as an "asset." She supplied her
handlers with information against drug pushers and other criminal
elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious
drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir.
Alfaros tip led to the arrest of the leader of the "Martilyo gang"
that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force
gave her "very special treatment" and she became its "darling,"
allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the
NBI offices.
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however,
they teased her about it and she was piqued. One day, she
unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the
real story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed
interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell
his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to
press her, she told him that she might as well assume the role of
her informant.
Webbs U.S. Alibi
Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi
through (a) the travel preparations; (b) the two immigration
checks; (c) details of US sojourn; (d) the second immigration
check; and (e) alibi versus positive identification; and (f) a
documented alibi.

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive,

clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a) he was present at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b)
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked
cynicism over the accuracy of travel documents like the passport
as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and
arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have been
impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he
supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to
the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26,
1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower
courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.
Effect of Webbs alibi to others
Webbs documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's
testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to
Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For,
if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S.
when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will not hold
together. Webbs participation is the anchor of Alfaros story.
Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.
Conclusion
In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not
whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence of the
accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities,
but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his
guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man
to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to ones inner being, like
a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in
prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her
handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde
massacre that she could not produce?

The Supreme Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the

Decision dated December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January
26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and
ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio
Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel
Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of
which they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined
for another lawful cause.

same court was also denied, hence the present appeal on the
Supreme Court.
On April 20, 2010, the Court granted the request of Webb
to submit the semen specimen taken from Carmelas cadaver on
DNA analysis, believing it is under the safekeeping of the NBI. The
NBI, however, denied that the specimen is under their custody
and that it was turned over to the trial court. The trial court on the
other hand, denied the claim that the specimen was under their
care. This prompted Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit
denying Webb of his right to due process.

Version 2
CASE:
On June 30, 1991, Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters
Carmela and Jennifer were brutally murdered in their home in
Paraaque. In an intense investigation, a group of suspects were
initially arrested by the police, but were eventually discharged
due to suspicions of frame up. Later in 1995, The National Bureau
of Investigation announced the resolution of the crime as they
presented a star witness Jessica M. Alfaro who pointed at the
accused (herein appellants) Webb et.al. as the main culprits. She
also included police officer Gerardo Biong as an accessory to the
crime. Relying on Alfaros testimony, information for rape with
homicide was filed by the public prosecutors against appellants.
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City Branch 274 presided
over by Judge Tolentino took over the case. With Alfaros detailed
narration of the events of the crime, the court found her
testimony credible, noting that her delivery are spontaneous and
straightforward. On January 4, 2000, trial court rendered
judgment finding accused (herein appellants) guilty as charged,
imposing them the penalty of reclusion perpetua while Biong, as
an accessory to the crime, was given an indeterminate prison
term of eleven years, four months and one day to twelve years.
Damages were also awarded to Lauro Vizconde.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision, with a modification on Biongs penalty to six years
minimum and twelve years maximum, plus increased awards of
damages to Lauro Vizconde. A motion for reconsideration on the

ISSUE/HELD:
1.) Whether or not Webb was indeed denied of due process on the
premise that the semen specimen was lost under the care of the
government and must immediately be acquitted? NO.
2.) WON Alfaros testimony is entitled to belief? NO.
3.) WON Webbs evidences are proven sufficient enough to rebut
Alfaros testimony? NO.
4.) WON Biong acted to cover up the crime after its commission,
thus making himself an accessory to the crime? NO.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SET ASIDE the Decision
dated December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 0336 and Acquits
accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano,
Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez,
Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were
charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guild beyond
reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from
detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.
1.)
Webb cited Brady v. Maryland, and claimed that he is
entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right
to due process given the States failure to produce on order of the
Court either by negligence or willfull suppression the semen
specimen taken from Carmela. Webb is not entitled to acquittal for
failure to produce the semen specimen at such stage. Brady v.

Maryland was overtaken by the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in

Arizona v. Youngblood which held that due process does not
require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it
might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show
bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Further,
during the previous appeals made on CA, the appellants
expressed lack of interest in having a DNA test done, and so the
State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it may be
required to be produced some future time.
2.)
Alfaros testimony, was found doubtful. Testified by Atty.
Sacaguing, he claimed that Alfaro was an asset of the NBI since
1994. When the officers one day teased her about being dormant,
she became piqued and suddenly claimed that she know someone
who knows about the massacre. But when the said someone
was not presented, she told Sacaguing that she might as well
assume the role of her informant. Alfraro never refuted such
testimony. It is possible for Alfaro to lie even with such intricate
details, given that she practically lived in the NBI office. Moreover,
the media is all over the case that everything is thoroughly
reported. Generally, her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent
inconsistencies.
3.)
Among the accused, it was Webb who presented the
strongest alibi. His travel preparations were confirmed by Rajah
Tours and the Philippine immigration, confirming that he indeed
left for San Francisco, California with his Aunt Gloria on March 9,
1991 on board United Airlines Flight 808. His passport was
stamped and his name was listed on the United Airlines Flights
Passenger Manifest. Upon reaching US, the US Immigration
recorded his entry to the country. Moreover, details of his stay
there, including his logs and paychecks when he worked,
documents when he purchased a car and his license are
presented as additional evidence, and he left for Philippines on
October 26, 1992. Supreme Court accused the trial and court of
appeals as having a mind that is made cynical by the rule drilled
into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangmans noose in the
faces of a witness sweaking I saw him do it. A judge, according

to the SC, must keep an open mind, and must guard against
slipping into hasty conclusion arising from a desire to quickly
finish the job of deciding a case. For positive identification to be
credible, two criteria must be met; 1.) the positive identification of
the offender must come from a credible witness 2.) the witness
story of what she personally saw must be believable, not
inherently contrived. For alibi to be credible and established on
the other hand, it must be positive, clear, and documented. It
must show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime. Webb was able to establish his alibis
credibility with his documents. It is impossible for Webb, despite
his so called power and connections to fix a foreign airlines
passenger manifest. Webbs departure and arrival were
authenticated by the Office of the US Attorney General and the
State Department.
3. People vs. Larraaga
G.R. Nos. 138874-75. February 3, 2004
Appellee: People of the Philippines
Appellants: Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar,
Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao, Ariel Balansag, Davidson
Rusia, James Anthony Uy, James Andrew Uy
Per curiam decision
FACTS:
On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline
Chiong failed to come home on the expected time. Two days after,
a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff. Her pants
were torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was
pulled down. Her face and neck were covered with masking tape
and attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The woman was
identified as Marijoy. After almost ten months, accused Davidson
Rusia surfaced and admitted before the police having participated
in the abduction of the sisters. He identified appellants Francisco
Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao,
Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James Andrew Uy as co-

perpetrators in the crime. Rusia provided the following before the

trial court:
1) That at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen
and Josman and told him to ride with them in a white car.
Following them were Larraaga, James Anthony and James
Andrew who were in a red car. Josman stopped the white car in
front of the waiting shed where the sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline
were standing and forced them to ride the car. Rusia taped their
mouths while Rowen handcuffed them jointly.
2) That after stopping by a safehouse, the group thereafter
headed to the South Bus Terminal where they met Alberto and
Ariel, and hired the white van driven by the former. They traveled
towards south of Cebu City, leaving the red car at the South Bus
Terminal.
3) That after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank
and had a pot session. Later, they started to rape Marijoy inside
the vehicle, and thereafter raped Jaqueline.
4) That Josman intructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the
cliff and push her into the ravine.
The claims of Rusia were supported by other witnesses. He was
discharged as an accused and became a state witness. Still, the
body of Jacqueline was never found. The trial court found the
other appellants guilty of two crimes of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the
penalties of two (2) reclusiones perpetua. The appellants assailed
the said decision, arguing inter alia, that court erred in finding
that there was consipiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be
only 16 years old when the crimes were committed.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there was conspiracy.
2) Whether or not the trial court erred in characterizing the crime.
3) Whether or not the trial court erred imposing the correct
penalty.
HELD:
1) Yes. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner
by which the offense was perpetrated, or may be inferred from

the acts of the accused themselves, when such point to a joint

design and community of interest. The appellants actions showed
that they had the same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong
sisters. The Court affirmed the trial courts finding that the
appellants indeed conspired in the commission of the crimes
charged.
2) Yes. The rule is that when the law provides a single penalty for
two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a
special complex crime. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659, provides that in the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, when the victim is killed
or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed. Thus, the resulting crime will change from
complex crime to special complex crime. In the present case, the
victims were raped and subjected to dehumanizing acts. Thus, the
Court held that all the appellants were guilty of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape in the case where Marijoy is the victim; and
simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the case of
Jacqueline.
3) Yes. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by
reason of minority, the imposable penalty to the offender is one
degree lower than the statutory penalty. James Anthony was only
16 years old when the crimes were committed. As penalty for the
special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with homicide and rape is death, the correct penalty to be
imposed should be reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, the
penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention is
reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower from the said
penalty is reclusion temporal. There being no aggravating and
mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on him should
be reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum
period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion

temporal in its medium period, as maximum. With regard to the

rest of the appellants, the statutory penalty as provided above
should be imposed. Therefore, trial court erred in merely imposing
two (2) reclusiones perpetua.
2005 Decision
July 21, 2005

teachers, testified under oath to prove this, however, all were

rejected by the court; he further contended that the body found in
the ravine was not Marijoy's but somebody else's. While, Aznar,
Adlawan, Balansag and Cao, on the other hand, questioned
Rusias testimony for being incredible, inconsistent, and unworthy
of belief.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

versus
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias "PACO"; JOSMAN
AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY"; ALBERTO CAO
alias "ALLAN PAHAK"; ARIEL BALANSAG, DAVIDSON
VALIENTE RUSIA alias "TISOY TAGALOG"; JAMES ANTHONY
UY alias "WANGWANG"; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias
"MM",

ISSUES
Whether the Court erred
1. in according credence to Rusias testimony;
2. in rejecting appellants alibi;
3. in holding that the trial court did not violate their right to due
process when it excluded the testimony of other defense
witnesses; and
4. in holding that the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar was that of
Marijoy.

PONENTE: HILARIO DAVIDE, Jr.

FACTS
On the night of July 16, 1997, Larraaga and seven others
kidnapped the Chiong sisters near the west wing entrance of
Ayala Center Cebu, the two [women] were raped but only
Marijoy's body was found while the other sister's body, was never
found.
The accused [appellants] were charged and later on convicted of
the crimes of of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention [Larraaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Cao,
Balansag; and (James Andrew) Uy] ; and (b) simple kidnapping
and serious illegal detention [Larraaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Cao,
Balansag; (James Andrew) Uy; and (James Anthony) Uy]
The case was centered on the testimony of a co-defendant, David
Valiente Rusia who only appeared 10 months after the incident. In
exchange for immunity, he [Rusia] testified against his
codefendants, he claimed that he was with Larraaga in Ayala
Center, Ceb early in the evening of July 16.
Larraaga raised in his defense that he was in Quezon City and
not in Cebu at the time when the crime is said to have taken
place, some thirty five witnesses, including his friends and

RULING
1. The trial court took into consideration not only Rusia's
testimonies but also the physical evidence and the corroborative
testimonies of other witnesses for being strikingly compatible.
Physical evidence being one of the highest degrees of proof is
give more weight than all witnesses put together. Even assuming
that his testimony standing alone might indeed be unworthy in
view of his character, it is not so when corroborated with other
evidence.
2. It is a well settled rule that the defense of alibi is inherently
weak for being a negative evidence and self-serving, it cannot
attain more credibility than the testimonies of witnesses who
testify on clear and positive evidence. Moreover, alibi becomes
LESS credible when it is corroborated only by relatives or close
friends of the accused. In the case at bar, the accused failed to
meet the requirements of alibi. Larraaga failed to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for
him to be at Ayala Center Cebu during the abduction. His claimed
of being in Quezon City at that time, failed to satisfy the required
proof of physical impossibility. It was shown that it takes only an
hour to travel by plane from Manila to Cebu and that there were

four airlines flying the route. Indeed, Larraagas presence in

Cebu City on the night of July 16, 1997 was proved to be not only
a possibility but a reality.
3. Prof. Bailen, was properly excluded for being not a finger-print
expert but an archaeologist; and that his report consists merely of
the results of his visual inspection of the exhibits already several
months old. While, the affidavit of Atty. Villarin of the NBI was
found to be not testifying in the said for it only contains his own
unsubstantiated opinions, his self-congratulatory remarks, and his
unmitigated frustration over failing to get a promotion when
almost everyone else did. Lastly, Dr. Fortuns separate study
cannot be classified as newly-discovered evidence warranting
belated reception because Larraaga could have produced it
during trial had he wanted to.
4. Inspector Edgardo Lenizo, a fingerprint expert, testified that the
fingerprints of the corpse match those of Marijoy's; that the
packaging tape and the handcuff found on the dead body were
the same items placed on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were
being detained; that the recovered body had the same clothes
worn by Marijoy on the day she was abducted; and that the
members of the Chiong family personally identified the corpse to
be that of Marijoy's.
2006 Decision
January 31, 2006
Minority as a Defense
Larraaga et al were convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape on February 3, 2004; and for
serious illegal detention. The first crime is punishable by death
and the second is punishable by reclusion perpetua. One of the
co-accused, James Andrew Uy, alleged that on July 16, 1997, the
date of the commission of the crime, he was only 17 years old and
262 days old. To prove his claim, Uy presented his birth certificate
duly certified by the City Civil Registrar and the National Statistics
Office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Uy is entitled a mitigating circumstance
due to minority?

HELD: Yes. Uy was able to prove his claim hence he is entitled to

a mitigating circumstance in both crimes charged against him.
This is pursuant to Article 68 and 80 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides that persons below 18 years of age are entitled to
a penalty one degree lower than that imposed by law.
4. G.R. No. L-37945 May 28, 1984
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ADRIANO CAETE and JOSE BILOG alias BOY, defendantsappellants.
RELOVA, J.:
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL
COURT ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT; CASE AT BAR. The
findings of the trial court is entitled to great weight that Caetes
retraction was merely a last minute effort at exculpation,
considering that his extrajudicial confession, Exhibit "C", given in
April 1972, was freely and voluntarily given. The fact is, there was
no evidence presented that said confession was obtained as a
result of violence, torture, intimidation or promise of reward or
leniency, nor that the investigating officer could have been
motivated to concoct facts narrated in said confession.
2. ID.; ID.; ALIBI, CAN NOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION. Appellant Jose Bilogs alibi can not prevail over
the positive identification of Cabig. Aside from the fact that courts
exercise great caution in accepting alibi because it is easily
concocted, it may be proper to repeat what one author said about
alibi as a defense: "it is a reason with a bad reputation."
3. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY;
APPRECIATED IN CASE AT BAR. The killing of Douglas Bilog was
qualified by treachery because the attack was unexpected and
sudden, and the victim had no chance to defend himself.
4. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; PRICE; PRESENT IN CASE AT
BAR. The aggravating circumstance of price was present in the
commission on the crime and this affects not only the person who

received the money or the reward but also the person who gave it
(People v. Talledo, 58 Phil. 539).

not kill Douglas because he has many children to think about (p.
8, tsn., Duero).

***

On April 19, 1972, at about 5:00 p.m., Concepcion Bilog saw from
the window of their house in the ricefield, Jose Bilog riding on a
bicycle going towards the ricefield. On that occasion she saw Jose
Bilog converse with two colonists (pp. 6-7, 10, tsn., Jan. 4, 1973,
Anonas).

Charged and convicted of the crime of murder by the then Court

of First Instance of Palawan the two (2) accused, Adriano Caete
and Jose Bilog, were both sentenced to the maximum penalty of
death and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased,
Douglas Bilog, in the sum of P12,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay proportional costs.
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Accused Jose Bilog and Douglas Bilog were brothers. They were
owners of adjoining ricelands adjacent to the Inagawan-Sub
Colony at Puerto Princess, Palawan (p. 10, tsn, Jan. 4, 1973,
Anonas). They were not in good terms and always quarrelled
because Jose resented the fact that Douglas has received a bigger
share of the lands inherited from their parents. (pp. 12, 20, tsn.,
Anonas).
The ire of Jose against his brother became unbearable that on or
about April 28, 1971, he got his father's shotgun and waylaid
Douglas at the bridge leading their house. A tragic incident was
averted only when Concepcion the wife of Douglas, informed her
uncle, Cervancia, of Jose's evil scheme. Cervancia immediately
went after Jose and succeeded in retrieving the gun from the
latter and tried to settle their differences (p. 10, tsn, Anonas).
Through the intercession of Mr. Aniceto Gamo, a Chief of Section
in the Inagawan-Sub Colony, Jose Bilog had allowed his farm to be
worked by Nicasio Dayao, a prisoner at the Colony (pp. 4-5, 13,
tsn, Duero). Sometime in May, 1971 while Dayao was working in
the ricefield, Jose Bilog offered him P300.00 if he (Dayao) would
kill Douglas. Dayao asked Jose Bilog why he wanted his brother
liquidated. Jose replied that Douglas poisoned their mother and if
Douglas would not be liquidated he (Douglas) would eventually
kill all of them in the family (p. 7, tsn., Duero). Dayao rejected the
proposal and offer of reward. He explained to Jose that he could

Almost at the same time on that day, Angel Rebong, a prisoner of

the colony was sent by Aniceto Gamo to get some palay from
Roming who lived near the ricefield of Jose Bilog (p. 53, tsn.,
Duero). On the highway, Angel Rebong met Jose Bilog who was
then riding a bicycle. Jose told him not to mention to anybody
what he might see in the ricefield (pp. 35, 49, 53, tsn., Duero).
Angel however, did not see anything unusual in the ricefield so he
went directly to the house of Roming. He left Roming's place at
about 6:00 p.m. and reported to Mr. Gamo that he failed to get
the palay. Thereafter, he returned to the General Services
Barracks in the colony's compound. He reached his hut at about
7:00 p.m. (pp. 36-37, tsn., Duero).
At about 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon, Antonio Cabig, an
inmate of the Colony was on his way from the Colony's PX to the
Coconut Division (pp. 64-66, tsn, Duero). He passed the ricefield
of Jose Bilog and saw Douglas and Jose drinking wine in the
latter's hut. They were seated in front of a table with about five
bottles of 'Cuatro Cantos' gin on it (p. 92, tsn., Duero). When
Cabig was 3 or 4 meters from the hut, Douglas saw him and
offered him a drink. He accepted the drink but stayed outside the
hut (pp. 68, 93, tsn., Duero). Not long thereafter, two persons
arrived and joined the drinking party. Appellant Adriano Caete
also arrived and joined the group. He sat beside Jose Bilog (pp. 90,
93, tsn., Id.).
When those around the table were already drunk, Jose (Boy) Bilog
stood up and drew from his waist a "laring," a bladed instrument
about 1-1/2 feet long. Suddenly, Jose stabbed Douglas at the front
part of his body (pp. 75, 77, 114, tsn., Id.). Cabig witnessed the
incident, but could not tell how many stab blows Jose Bilog

delivered. He noticed that the knife embedded in Douglas' body.

At this juncture, Caete got hold of the knife and stabbed Douglas
on the stomach (p. 144, tsn., Id.). Douglas stood up and fought his
assailants with karate blows (p. 118, tsn., Id.). The two persons
who had arrived earlier helped Jose and Caete by hitting Douglas
with a piece of wood. When Boy Bilog caned for assistance, a
colonist, one Roming, came and helped them until Douglas fell
dead. The victim was then dumped in a nearby canal. Caete got
the 'laring' and proceeded to the Colony's brigade with it (p. 140,
tsn., Duero).
When Angel Rebong arrived in his hut, Dugguan Abao, his hutmate, informed him that appellant Adriano Caete came to their
hut with blooded clothes. Caete got Angel's clothes and wore
them and left his blooded clothes (pp. 37-38, tsn., Duero). Angel
then left for the General Services Barracks because he was to
perform guard duty at 8:00 p.m. There he saw appellant Caete
wearing his black pants and Vonnel T-Shirt. The latter told him
that he got his (Angel's) clothes because he had no clothes to
wear (pp. 39, 44, 59, tsn., Duero).
On April 27, 1972, police investigators received information about
the persons seen at the scene of the crime prior to its
commission. They took into custody Adriano Caete and Angel
Rebong and brought them to Puerto Princess for interrogation.
When they reached Puerto Princess, Adriano Caete informed
Angel Rebong that he killed Douglas Bilog (p. 57, tsn., Duero).
Upon investigation, appellant Caete readily admitted that he
together with Jose Bilog, Pedro Macabihag and Ramon Dealogo
killed Douglas Bilog. Caete then voluntarily gave a written
statement. (Exhibit "C"; pp. 157, 158-159, tsn. Duero). Later, he
led Sgt. Maduro to his quarters in the Colony and surrendered the
fatal knife (pp. 162, 180, tsn., Id.). On June 22, 1972 Caete gave
another statement. This time he stated that only he and Jose Bilog
had a hand in the killing of Douglas (p. 177, tsn., Duero).
Dr. Oscar Magtang, Rural Health Physician at Puerto Princess,
Palawan conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Douglas Bilog.
He found 26 injuries, twenty-four (24) of which were incised and
stab wounds scattered all over the body, particularly on the face,

head, chest, abdomen, back, arms, and fingers of both hands.

There were abrasions on the neck and lower abdomen. Death was
due to severe hemorrhage (pp. 55-58, tsn. Anonas). Dr. Magtang
made a written report, Exhibit "F" (p. 53, tsn. Id.). According to
said doctor, the most severe of these wounds were those inflicted
on the left mammary region of the chest going vertically
downward and injuring the heart, and the stab wound on the
abdomen (pp. 60-61, tsn., Anonas).
Adela Pereyna, Chief, Record and Document Section and Parcel
Investigation, of the Iwahig Penal Colony testified that per records
in her custody Adriano Caete was convicted by the Court of First
Instance of Cebu of robbery on September 7, 1960; that he
transferred to Davao Penal Colony for work assignment bearing
Serial No. 34831-P; that he escaped while serving sentence on
January 10, 1963, but was captured and recommitted to prison on
the following day; that he escaped again on April 7, 1964; that on
August 6, 1966, he was committed to the Iwahig Penal Colony
after having been convicted of robbery by the Court of First
Instance of Ormoc City; that because he did not reveal his
Identity, he was included in the list of new arrivals and given
serial No. 55791-P; that at the Verification and Identification
Section, his Identity was established as the same Adriano Caete
who was previously given Serial No. 34831-P and who escaped
from the Davao Penal Colony or, April 7, 1964; that he was
prosecuted for evasion of sentence in the. Davao Court of First
Instance with the aggravating circumstance of recidivism; and,
that his term of sentence was due to expire on August 23, 1975
(pp. 41-43, tsn. April 16,1973, Anonas; Exh. "D", p. 109, Rec). (pp.
4-10, Appellee's Brief).
Appellant Adriano Caete assails the decision against him and
submits that the lower court erred (1) in not rejecting his extrajudicial confession, Exhibit "C", notwithstanding that the case was
merely concocted, incredible and in conflict with the People's
evidence; (2) in not finding that there were at least seven (7)
possibilities or versions as to who committed the crime and in not
acquitting him on reasonable doubt; (3) in finding that the crime
was committed in conspiracy with the attendance of evident

premeditation, price, treachery and in not finding that Caete

should have been found guilty only of physical injuries or at most
homicide.
On the other hand, appellant Jose Bilog claims that the lower
court erred (1) in giving credit to the testimony of prosecution
witness Antonio Cabig, notwithstanding that said witness is
"known to be a confirmed degenerate and an admitted perjurer";
(2) in disregarding his defense of alibi; and (3) in not acquitting
him on reasonable doubt.

Q You said that Douglas Bilog was killed, do you know the persons
who killed ...
Q Do you know how Douglas was killed?
A Yes, sir.
Q In what way was he killed'?
A Douglas was drunk and he was stabbed by Boy Bilog.
Q Where?

Appellant Caete subjects that the extra-judicial admission,

Exhibit "C", should have been disregarded, not due to violence in
the taking thereof, but on the ground that the same had been
successfully explained by him; that the contents thereof were
merely concocted and this is supported by the evidence of the
prosecution; that aside from the irreconciliable conflict between
what' is contained in his extra-judicial confession and what
prosecution witness Antonio Cabig testified in court, said extrajudicial confession contains statements which are strikingly
incredible; and that the credibility of prosecution witness Cabig as
to the participation of appellant Caete in the killing of Douglas
Bilog is doubtful.

WITNESS:

The contention is utterly without merit. The findings of the trial

court is entitled to great weight that Caete's retraction was
merely a last minute effort at exculpation, considering that his
extra-judicial confession, Exhibit "C", given in April 1972, was
freely and voluntarily given. The fact is, there was no evidence
presented that said confession was obtained as a result of
violence, torture, intimidation or promise of reward or leniency,
nor that the investigating officer could have been motivated to
concoct facts narrated in said confession.

Q When you said Caete, was he the same person whom you
have just pointed to?

Besides, even with the exclusion of said Exhibit "C", there is the
testimony of Antonio Cabig who witnessed the incident from the
time Jose Bilog stabbed his brother on his breast up to the time
Douglas fell after receiving the thrust of Caete. Hereunder is
Cabig's testimony regarding the horrifying incident:

A Yes, sir.

A He was stabbed near the hut and near the river.

COURT: (To Witness)
Q Did you see by your own eyes when that incident happened?
A Yes, sir.
FISCAL DILIG:
Q Who was the companion of Boy Bilog when he hit Douglas
Bilog?
A Caete.

A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL DILIG:
Q You said that Boy Bilog hit with this bladed instrument marked
as Exh. "B" Douglas Bilog was Douglas Bilog hit?

FISCAL DILIG:
Q In what part of the body of Douglas Bilog was hit?
A At the back of the body and here at the front.

Q After Boy Bilog hit his brother Douglas, do you know what
happened to the knife marked as Exh. "B"?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened to that weapon marked as Exh. "B"?
A The knife dropped in the hand of Boy Bilog. After the knife was
dropped, Douglas Bilog stood up and he was hit again.
COURT: (To witness)
Q By whom?
A He was hit again by Cenete.
FISCAL DILIG:
Q You said that Douglas Bilog was hit by Adriano Caete. What
instrument did Caete stab Douglas?
A The same knife used by Boy Bilog.
Q And in what particular part of the body of Douglas was stabbed
by Caete with the same weapon marked as Exh. "B"?
A At the left side and on the breast.
Q And after Douglas was hit and stabbed by Caete on the side
and breast, do you know what happened to Douglas?
A Douglas stood up and the two civilians helped in clubbing
Douglas.
Q After that, what happened?
A Douglas fell down.
Q And after Douglas Bilog had fallen down, what did you do, if
any?
A I went home already to the Coconut Section.
Q Prior to that incident, did you already personally know Jose
Bilog.
A Yes, sir. (TSN, pp. 77-78, January 8, 1973 hearing)

Likewise, appellant Jose Bilog's alibi cannot prevail over the

positive Identification of Cabig. He points out that on the day of
the incident, April 19, 1972, he was in his house doing household
chores as his wife was in Puerto Princess doing some marketing.
On this score, the lower court rightfully observed:
Jose Bilog's alibi has no merit. His house is but three kilometers
away from the place of the incident and he was seen by the
widow of the deceased leaving his house on a bicycle about 4:00
o'clock that afternoon. At 5:00 o'clock, he was met by Angel
Rebong at the highway while riding his bicycle and at 6:00 o'clock
late in the afternoon, Antonio Cabig saw him drinking liquor with
the deceased in his hut in the banana plantation (pp. 154-155,
Rec.).
The defense of alibi cannot be believed where the distance
between two barrios is only eight kilometers and can be traversed
by walking one and one-half hour (People vs. Manangan, L-32733,
Sept. 11, 1974, 59 SCRA 31). (pp. 9-10, Appellee's Brief).
Aside from the fact that courts exercise great caution in accepting
alibi because it is easily concocted, it may be proper to repeat
what one author said about alibi as a defense: "it is a reason with
a bad reputation."
Again, We agree with the findings of the trial court that "while Jose
Bilog tried to shift the blame at Caete, Caete too wanted the
Court to believe that it was Jose Bilog who did the heinous act.
Repudiating his confession, Caete tried to convince the Court
that he was simply offered P1,000.00 in consideration of his
admission of the crime. On cross- examination, however, Caete
slipped and admitted that the P1,000.00 consideration was
offered for him to execute the killing. It is therefore evident that
Caete's testimony disowning the crime is but a last minute
attempt at exculpation."
The killing of Douglas Bilog was qualified by treachery because
the attack was unexpected and sudden, and the victim had no
chance to defend himself. Likewise, the aggravating circumstance
of price was present in the commission of the crime and this

affects not only the person who received the money or the reward
but also the person who gave it. (People vs. Talledo, 58 Phil. 539).

Arraigned on September 7, 1989, petitioner Gil Macalino, Jr.,

assisted by his counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty".4

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED but, for

lack of necessary votes, the sentence is modified in that both
appellants shall each suffer Reclusion Perpetua only, and shall
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Douglas Bilog in the
sum of P30,000.00. Costs against both appellants. SO ORDERED.

The pertinent facts are the following:

5.

G.R. No. 121802

September 7, 2000

GIL MACALINO, JR., petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF

PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
E C I S I O N DE LEON, JR., J.:

THE
D

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of

the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 dated August 31, 1995, in
CA-G.R. CR No. 14513, convicting petitioner Gil Macalino, Jr. of the
crime of Frustrated Homicide.
The record shows that on January 5, 1987, Provincial Fiscal
Victoriano L. Tizon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Siquijor an
Information charging Gil Macalino, Jr. with frustrated homicide,
defined and penalized under Article 249 in relation to Article 250
of the Revised Penal Code, which was allegedly committed as
follows:
That at about 8:00 oclock in the evening of March 23, 1986, at
the wharf area of Larena, Siquijor, situated at North Poblacion,
Larena, Siquijor, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloneously stabbed one Fely
"Pono" Garcia, using a bladed weapon, hitting the victim at the
mid clavicular line, subcostal area (1) left; which injury would
have caused the death of the victim had not been due to a timely
and expert medical attendance extended to him and not by virtue
of the assailants spontaneous desistance.
Contrary to the Provisions of the RPC.3

Victim Fely Garcia testified that on March 23, 1986, at around 8:00
oclock in the evening, he was in front of Virgies Store at the
wharf area of Larena, Siquijor with his friends, Salvador Rocamora
and June Uzarraga, to have a drinking spree.5 While waiting for
their companions, Gil Macalino, Jr., along with his father and two
other brothers, Manny and Ogie, arrived on board a jeep at
Nicarter Mahusay Eatery, which was located beside Virgies
Store.6 Fely Garcia approached the Macalinos to talk about the
incident that happened between them on March 17, 1986 and to
ask for forgiveness.7 The March 17, 1986 incident involved a
fistfight between the two younger brothers of Macalino, Jr. and the
group of Fely Garcia, which resulted in the filing of a case against
the group of Fely Garcia before the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Macalino, Jr. did not reciprocate his plea for forgiveness and told
Fely Garcia that he had another purpose, after which Fely Garcia
went back to Virgies Store.8
A few minutes later, Fely Garcia saw the Macalino brothers
advancing towards him at Virgies Store. Santos "Junjun" Garcia, a
brother of Fely Garcia, went near his brother, Fely Garcia, but the
latter shoved him away. Upon reaching Fely Garcia, Macalino, Jr.
suddenly stabbed Fely Garcia.9 The knife used was a rambo knife
about 9 inches long with a jagged edge.10 After Fely Garcia
was hit on the stomach, he ran for a distance of about 30 meters
towards the wharf, and then fell down. Fely Garcia was brought to
Siquijor Provincial Hospital where he was treated for one (1)
month. For the said medical treatment, Fely Garcia spent
P9,000.00.11
Salvador Rocamora, Jr. corroborated the testimony of Fely Garcia
on all material points. He further testified that Macalino, Jr.
attempted to incite trouble in front of Virgies Store which drew
the ire of Santos Garcia. Santos tried to assault Macalino, Jr. but
Salvador and Fely Garcia pushed him away. Turning to his right,

after pushing Santos Garcia, Salvador saw Macalino, Jr. pulling

back the hunting knife from the body of Fely Garcia.12

Macalino, Sr. met Lt. Balimbingan at the Larena wharf that same
evening and upon seeing him, the latter just nodded at him.

Dr. Timoteo J. Badoy, Jr., physician at Siquijor Provincial Hospital

testified that on March 23, 1986, he treated a certain Fely Garcia
for a stab wound on the stomach.13 He issued a certification that
contains the following findings:

While Macalino, Sr. was waiting for his co-employees to board the
ferryboat at the Larena wharf, Fely Garcia approached him and
asked in a provocative manner, "What now sir?" Taken by surprise,
Macalino, Sr. answered "Why?"20 After such brief exchange of
words, the boat signaled for departure so Macalino, Sr. returned to
the restaurant.21 However, before he could get out of the
restaurant, a commotion occurred at the wharf which was about 2
to 3 meters away from the restaurant.22 Later on, he learned of
the stabbing incident and that his son, Macalino, Jr., was involved.
The authorities brought Macalino, Jr. to the PC headquarters at
Caipilan. While in jail, his son complained of some pain. Macalino
Sr. accompanied his son to Lazi Medicare and Community Hospital
in Siquijor where he was confined for more than two weeks.23

Stab wound, mid-clavicular line, subcostal area (L) with:

1. Perforated penetrated jejunum
2. Hemoperitoneum
3. Hypovolemia14
Dr. Timoteo Badoy, Jr. likewise declared that the injury sustained
by Fely Garcia was fatal and that he might have died if he had not
been given medical attention. Dr. Badoy opined that a pointed
and sharp-edge instrument caused the wound.15
Patrolman Fortunato S. Ates, member of the Siquijor Integrated
National Police, was at the Larena wharf on the evening of March
23, 1986. While waiting for the departure of the boat, he heard
someone shouting, "Help, there is a stabbing incident, Pano is
stabbed."16 Ates immediately rushed to the scene of the crime
and saw Macalino, Jr. still holding the bladed weapon. Ates
introduced himself as a policeman and asked Macalino, Jr. to drop
his weapon. Macalino, Jr. did not resist the arrest by Ates who later
turned Macalino, Jr. over to a certain Lt. Balimbingan.

Dr. Magdalena Tan-Lim, physician of Lazi Medicare and

Community Hospital treated Macalino, Jr. on March 24, 1986.24
Macalino, Jr. was admitted in the hospital from March 24 to April 2,
1986. The medical certificate indicated the following injuries
suffered by Macalino, Jr.: "hematoma on the left cheek and
traumatic injury hypogastric region."25

The defense gave a different version of the incident.

Vice-Mayor Soledado Lomosad, a resident of Larena, Siquijor for

more than 62 years testified on the reputation and character of
the Garcia brothers. He stated that the Garcias were
troublemakers and, in fact, several criminal cases had been filed
against them.

Gil Macalino, Sr., father of the accused, testified that at about 3:00
oclock in the afternoon of March 23, 1986, he and some
employees of the Department of Agriculture were having a
"despedida" party in Tugawe Beach in Cang-alwang, Siquijor.17
Suddenly, Alex Bonachita appeared in a motorcycle, and
challenged the group asking "Who is brave among you?"18 Before
leaving, Alex Bonachita told them that he would be waiting for
them at Larena.19 Threatened, Macalino, Sr. sought assistance
from the PC headquarters at Caipilan and was provided with
security by Lt. Balimbingan.

Petitioner Gil Macalino, Jr. testified that at around 8:00 oclock in

the evening of March 23, 1986, he was fetched at the instance of
his father from his house in Bontod, Larena. He was asked to drive
a vehicle taken by his fathers companion.26 Upon reaching the
vehicle parked on the side of Nicarter Mahusay Eatery, his father
came out of the restaurant and told him to stay. While sitting on
the drivers seat, Lt. Balimbingan approached him and asked
where his father was. Macalino, Jr. called his father who was then
inside the Nicarter Mahusay Eatery, and thereafter, Macalino, Sr.
and Lt. Balimbingan had a conversation.27

Lt. Balimbingan approached Macalino, Jr. for the second time and
told him to settle his differences with the Garcias. At that
instance, Macalino, Jr. alighted from the jeep and walked with Lt.
Balimbingan toward Virgies Store. After Lt. Balimbingan left, Fely
Garcia and Santos Garcia arrived and approached him. He noticed
that something was bulging on the right side of Santos Garcias
waist. Santos Garcia asked him, "What now, do you wish to fight"
and immediately after, Santos Garcia kicked him. Macalino, Jr. was
thus forced to bend down and before he could straighten up, Fely
Garcia boxed him on the left side of his face causing him to reeled
around. After that, he heard a shout saying "Watch out from
behind Jun". Macalino, Jr. then immediately faced the Garcia
brothers. At that time, he noticed that Santos was holding a knife
in his right hand. He immediately held Santos hand and took hold
of the knife, all in a span of one minute. Upon seeing Fely Garcia,
together with his companions,28 rushing towards him, he drew
the knife from the scabbard and stabbed Fely Garcia.29 While still
holding the knife, a certain man in civilian clothes approached
Macalino, Jr. The man identified himself as Patrolman Ates and
ordered him to drop his weapon. Macalino, Jr. willingly complied
with the order.30
On November 9, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision
convicting petitioner Gil Macalino, Jr., the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds, and so holds, that Gil Macalino, Jr. is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated
Homicide defined and penalized in Art. 249 in relation to Art. 250
in the Revised Penal Code and judgment is hereby rendered
sentencing the accused Gil Macalino, Jr., applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, to an imprisonment of Two (2) years,
Four (4) months and One (1) day of Prision Correccional as
minimum to Ten (10) years of Prision Mayor as maximum together
with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to pay the
amount of NINE THOUSAND PESOS (P9,000.00) for actual
damages,
THREE
THOUSAND
PESOS
(P3,000.00)
for
compensatory damages and FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P15,000.00) for moral damages and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.31
On December 14, 1992, Macalino, Jr. filed a Motion for
Reconsideration32 but, the same was denied for lack of merit.33
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to
the Court of Appeals. Except for the deletion of the awards for
actual and moral damages, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, except for the deletion of the awards for actual and
moral damages, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED, in
all other respects. No pronouncement as to costs.
Hence, petitioner filed this appeal and interposed two (2)
assigned errors, to wit:
I
THE KNIFE IN QUESTION IS OWNED BY THE BROTHER OF [sic]
SANTOS GARCIA, WRENCHED SAID KNIFE INTENDED TO HARM
THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER AND USED BY PETITIONER IN
STABBING ONCE FELY GARCIA WHILE ATTACKING THE ACCUSEDPETITIONER WITH COMPANIONS OF SAID VICTIM; TO DISABLE THE
SUPERIOR STRENGTH THAT WILL HARM THE ACCUSED; SAID
EVIDENCE UNCONTRADICTED AND UNREBUTTED BY THE
PROSECUTION, THEREFORE, THE SELF-DEFENSE OF ACCUSED
UNREBUTTED.
II
THE CONVICTION CONCLUDED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
AND APPROVED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS BASED ON
PROBABILITIES, SURMISES, CONJECTURES AND SUPPOSITION,
INSTEAD OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THAT THE COURT OF
APPEALS HAS NO AUTHORITY OR EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY,
AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.34
Thus, petitioners grievances deal with issues of facts, which, in
turn, eventually hinge upon the credibility of the witnesses.
In weighing the version of the prosecution as well as of the
defense, the trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses more credible. It is a settled doctrine that, as a general

rule, this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial
court in the appreciation of evidence and credibility of witnesses
for it is only the trial court that had the opportunity to observe,
weigh and assess these matters. Only when it is evident in the
records that some facts or circumstances of weight and influence
have been overlooked by the trial court which, if considered,
would affect the result, will this Court act otherwise.35 In the
present case, no cogent reason justifies our departure from the
aforecited rule. Fely Garcia accurately narrated the manner of
how Macalino, Jr. stabbed him, thus:

A That one (witness pointed to a man who answered when asked

that his name is Gil Macalino, Jr.).

PROSECUTOR DOMINGUEZ:

ATTY. FUA:

While you were already back at the store of Virgie Gomez, did you
know what these Macalino brothers do?

Your Honor please, we move for the deletion of the thinking of his
brother Your Honor.

A They approached towards us.

xxx

Q And when they approached you, were you still standing with
your companions Salvador Rocamora and June Uzarraga?

WITNESS:

A Yes.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q What did he use in stabbing you?

A A hunting knife.
Q Will you please describe how the stabbing incident started?
A While I was standing in front of Virgies store, they approached
us and my younger brother Junjun Garcia thought that I was being
ganged up, so he went near me and I shoved him aside.

xxx

xxx

After I shoved him aside, I was hit here (witness pointed to the
right side of his body showing a scar).
COURT:

Q What happened when they were already in front or near you,

can you recall what happened?

Q Who was the younger brother of yours?

A Yes.

PROSECUTOR DOMINGUEZ:

Q What happened.
A I was stabbed.

Q Do you mean to say that this is the scar of the wound that was
inflicted on you by the accused, Gil Macalino, Jr.?

Q Who stabbed you?

A Yes.36

A Gil Macalino, Jr.

For his part, prosecution witness Salvador Rocamora testified in

this wise:

Q Do you know Gil Macalino, Jr. personally?

A Yes.

A Santos Garcia, Jr.

ATTY. FUA:

Q If he is in the courtroom this morning, can you point to him?

Q As far as Gil Macalino, Jr. actuations can you tell if Gil Macalino,
Jr. was looking for trouble?

A Yes.

A I could not tell.

Q Will you please point to him?

Q You could not tell because he was only listening to the advise
[sic] of Lt. Balimbingan and his actuations were not looking for
trouble?
A Yes.
Q And so when Junjun Garcia arrived, you pushed him away
because to your mind there was no reason why he should rushed
to Gil Macalino, Jr., is that correct?

COURT:
That is why the question is being asked. Let the witness answer.
A I cannot be certain about that because after the incident, I
followed Fely Garcia to the hospital, so that I could not know
anymore what happened the rest of the evening.
COURT:

A Mine was only to pacify Junjun Garcia because I dont want

trouble and I dont want him to be involved in a trouble.

You mean the Court to understand that before you left the scene,
you never saw Gil Macalino, Jr. being inflicted with injuries from
the hands of any Garcia?

Q But until that moment when you pacified Junjun Garcia you
were certain that Gil Macalino, Jr. did not yet stab Fely Garcia?

A I have never seen it.37

A When Junjun Garcia rushed towards Gil Macalino, Jr. the first to
parry him was Fely Garcia and Junjun Garcia was pushed towards
me, so I have to push him out and when I pushed him out, I
turned my head and I saw that Fely Garcia was being stabbed,
and I saw the hunting knife being pulled out, and after that I could
not remember, after I pushed out Junjun Garcia, Fely Garcia was
facing already with Gil Macalino, Jr.
Q As far as you can remember this Junjun Garcia was not able to
rush at the accused here Gil Macalino, Jr. he was prevented by
Fely Garcia and by you, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q And as far as you can remember Fely Garcia had not touched at
all Gil Macalino, Jr., is that correct?
A Yes.
Q You are saying to the court, therefore, that on that entire
evening of March 23, 1989 this Gil Macalino, Jr. never sustained
any injury, which was inflicted by the Garcia brothers?
PROSECUTOR DOMINGUEZ:
Objection, Your Honor. The witness would be incompetent. This
witness testified that he followed Fely Garcia to the hospital and
he would not know whether there was anything that transpired
during that . After that.

Based on the above testimonies, Santos "Junjun" Garcia had no

opportunity to go near Macalino, Jr. How can Macalino, Jr.,
therefore, wrested the knife from the former? The Court of
Appeals, in conformity with the observation of the trial court,
stated that:
There is sustainable basis for the trial courts observation that it
was unbelievable for appellant to have wrested subject knife from
Santos (Junjun) Garcia, Jr. Aptly rationalized and concluded the
lower court:
xxx

xxx

xxx

x x x It is unbelievable that, alone at the time of the scuffle

between him and Pano Garcia and Santos Garcia, Jr. he was able
to wrest away the knife from Santos Garcia, Jr. And the knife was
still in its scabbard when he wrested it from Santos Garcia. If
Santos Garcia, Jr. really did wield the knife against Gil Macalino, Jr.
surely Santos Garcia Jr. would have wielded the knife without
scabbard. It is improbable that he got the knife from Santos
Garcia, Jr., scabbard and all. The truth of the matter is that in all
probability the knife was his own and he drew it from its scabbard
and stabbed Pano Garcia with it."38
Nonetheless, assuming arguendo that the questioned knife was
actually owned by Santos Garcia, and that Macalino, Jr. merely
used the same to ward off the attack of Fely Garcia, the question

that now arises is: Would the act of stabbing Fely Garcia still be
justified? We answer in the negative.

Q And it was in this position when you were able to get hold of the
arm including the handle of the knife?

In this appeal, Macalino, Jr. reiterates his contention before the

Court of Appeals that he acted in self-defense. He tries to
maintain a posture of innocence, and to support his claim of selfdefense, he presented a medical certificate39 showing hematoma
on his left cheek and traumatic injury hypogastric region.

A Not the handle but the hand that was holding the knife.

In pleading self-defense, petitioner in effect admitted that he

stabbed the victim. It was then incumbent upon him to prove that
justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, relying on
the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution. The reason is that even if the prosecution evidence
were weak, such could not be disbelieved after petitioner
admitted the fact of stabbing the victim.40 Hence, the burden of
proof shifts to the petitioner, who must establish with clear and
convincing evidence all of the elements of self-defense: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.41

xxx

In the present case, petitioners claim of self-defense does not

persuade us. His version of the events, does not support finding of
unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual,
sudden and unexpected attack or an imminent danger thereof,
and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude; there has to
exist a real danger to the life or personal safety of the person
claiming self-defense. Nothing of that sort could reasonably be
said of the actuation of the Garcia brothers. At most, they merely
displayed a threatening or intimidating attitude. This is evident
from the testimony of petitioner himself, and we quote:
PROS. DOMINGUEZ:
What was the position of Junjun Garcia42 when you saw him after
you turned your back?
A He was holding this way (witness demonstrates his two hands
as if holding something).

Q You mean to say that you held the hand before any trusting
motion was made?
A Not yet because he made an attempt to draw the scabbard.
xxx

xxx

PROS. DOMINGUEZ:
In the middle of the fifth paragraph43 do you remember having
testified to this "When I heard a shout from my brother Elpedio
who was standing near the jeep at that time, in vernacular
"Bantay sa luyo, Jun". Sensing that I was gravely in danger, I
immediately made an about face when I discovered that Santos
Garcia, Jr. had already drawn his knife and was making a thrust
towards my stomach." Do you remember having testified to this?
A He just made an attempt to draw.
Q So you are now repudiating the statement that you made in this
counter affidavit in this particular portion the fact that he was
already thrusting you?
A Yes.
xxx

xxx

xxx

PROS. DOMINGUEZ:
When you were able to grab the knife together with the scabbard
was the snap button that includes the handle of the knife already
opened?
ATTY FUA:
We will object to that, Your Honor.
xxx
COURT:

xxx

xxx

So it is established that it is the same knife and there is a

scabbard and over that scabbard is a little snap, [sic] that is
closed by a snap. You agree [sic] that?

Was that snap already opened or closed when you got possession
of the knife?

The court finds it incredible that Fely Garcia did not, even once,
make use of his knife in attacking Macalino, Jr. if such was indeed
his intention. Incidentally, Macalino, Jr. admitted he was not alone
that night. He even testified that his three younger brothers were
in the crime scene and in fact one of them gave him a warning,
"Watch out from behind, Jun". Macalino Jr. should have presented
his brothers who were present in the crime scene, to corroborate
his testimony, but he did not.

A It was opened.

In the case of People v. Jotoy,45 we ruled that:

Q Can you demonstrate how long did it take you to wrest the knife
and to unsheath [sic] it?

But even if We assume that it was the deceased who attacked the
accused with a knife, as the latter would make Us believe, We still
hold that there was no self-defense because at that point when
the accused was able to catch and twist the hand of the
deceased, in effect immobilizing him, the unlawful aggression had
already ended. Thus, the danger having ceased, there was no
more need for the accused to start stabbing the deceased, not
just once but five (5) times.

PROS. DOMINGUEZ:
Yes, Your Honor.

A One minute [sic] more or less when I grabbed for it.

Q And did you not say that when you turned around you saw
Junjun Garcia already holding a knife and you also saw Fely Garcia
also holding his knife?
A Yes, he was holding also a knife.
Q And the knife that was held by Pano Garcia did not have any
scabbard, it was already bare blade?
A I was not able to notice whether there was a scabbard but he
must have been holding the knife.
Q When you tried to take hold of the hand of Junjun Garcia which
held the knife and also tried to wrest the knife from him did you
have to employ both of your hands?
A Yes.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q And this process took you one minute?

A Yes, more or less.
Q And Fely Garcia who was only about one meter from you and
also holding a knife was not able to do anything in that one meter
while both of your hands was employed in holding the arm of
Junjun Garcia?
A I did not notice because my intention was to the knife?44

We reiterated the same rule in People vs. Tampon,46

Even granting arguendo that the initial act of aggression came
from Entellano as alleged by the appellant, we still cannot sustain
his plea of self-defense. As testified by the appellant, he grappled
with Entellano for the knife and was able to take possession of the
same. At this point, it was no longer necessary for appellant to
stab Estellano in order to protect himself. His subsequent act of
stabbing the now unarmed Estellano belies his claim that he acted
in self-preservation, and indicates nothing more than the preserve
desire to kill.
In sum, petitioner failed to prove self-defense by clear and
convincing evidence. His testimony suffers seriously from want of
credibility; it is more of denial, which, like alibi, is inherently a
weak defense and can easily be concocted.47
Therefore, we find no error in the trial court in finding petitioner
Gil Macalino, Jr. responsible for stabbing the victim Fely Garcia.
With regards to damages, the Court of Appeals is correct in
deleting the award of actual or compensatory damages and moral

damages. Moral damages cannot be awarded without factual

basis or proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation and similar injury.48 Likewise, the court can
only grant actual or compensatory damages for such expenses if
supported by receipts.49
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated August 31, 1995 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14513 is hereby AFFIRMED and
the instant petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.