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    08 - Volunteer's Dilemma Game

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    Rudi Cahyadi
    The document describes the volunteer's dilemma game where players must independently decide whether to volunteer (V) or not (N). Volunteering provides a group benefit but costs the individual. There is a Nash equilibrium where each player volunteers with some probability p. For a 2-person group, p* = 0.75, but for a 4-person group p* decreases to 0.37 as the chance of any one person's volunteer impacting the group outcome decreases with larger group size. Experimental data from past studies show average volunteer rates that converge towards the predicted probabilities as the number of rounds increase.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    08 - Volunteer's Dilemma Game

    Uploaded by

    Rudi Cahyadi
    198 views5 pages
    The document describes the volunteer's dilemma game where players must independently decide whether to volunteer (V) or not (N). Volunteering provides a group benefit but costs the individual. There is a Nash equilibrium where each player volunteers with some probability p. For a 2-person group, p* = 0.75, but for a 4-person group p* decreases to 0.37 as the chance of any one person's volunteer impacting the group outcome decreases with larger group size. Experimental data from past studies show average volunteer rates that converge towards the predicted probabilities as the number of rounds increase.

    Original Description:

    this is baoir a game why you shou7ld playt a game if you really need to study

    Original Title

    08_Volunteer's Dilemma Game

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    The document describes the volunteer's dilemma game where players must independently decide whether to volunteer (V) or not (N). Volunteering provides a group benefit but costs the individual. There is a Nash equilibrium where each player volunteers with some probability p. For a 2-person group, p* = 0.75, but for a 4-person group p* decreases to 0.37 as the chance of any one person's volunteer impacting the group outcome decreases with larger group size. Experimental data from past studies show average volunteer rates that converge towards the predicted probabilities as the number of rounds increase.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    198 views5 pages

    08 - Volunteer's Dilemma Game

    Uploaded by

    Rudi Cahyadi
    The document describes the volunteer's dilemma game where players must independently decide whether to volunteer (V) or not (N). Volunteering provides a group benefit but costs the individual. There is a Nash equilibrium where each player volunteers with some probability p. For a 2-person group, p* = 0.75, but for a 4-person group p* decreases to 0.37 as the chance of any one person's volunteer impacting the group outcome decreases with larger group size. Experimental data from past studies show average volunteer rates that converge towards the predicted probabilities as the number of rounds increase.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    of 5

    The Volunteer Dilemma Game

    The Volunteers Dilemma


    (Mixed Strategies)

    Simultaneously and independently, players have


    to decide if they wish to volunteer (V) or not (N).

    Volunteering incurs a personal cost (5 points) but


    benefits everyone in the group (20 points).

    Every group member benefits if at least one person


    volunteers.
    There is no additional benefit if there is more than one
    volunteer in the group.

    The payoff is 0 if no one volunteers in the group.

    Nash Equilibrium

    Nash Equilibrium

    Consider a 2-person setup.

    Can (V, V) be a (symmetric pure-strategy) N.E.?

    Consider a 2-person setup.

    No. One can increase his payoff from 15 to 20 if he deviates


    from V to N.

    Can (N, N) be a (symmetric pure-strategy) N.E.?

    There are asymmetric pure-strategy N.E. in which one


    person volunteers and the other does not: (V, N) and
    (N, V).

    No. One can increase his payoff from 0 to 15 if he deviates


    from N to V.

    Construct a payoff matrix and verify on your own.

    There is a symmetric mixed-strategy N.E. in which


    each person volunteers with a probability p*.

    Nash Equilibrium (Symmetric)

    Nash Equilibrium

    Mixed strategy N.E. for N = 2

    Consider a 4-person setup.

    Each person must feel indifferent between


    volunteering and refraining.

    Expected payoff by choosing V = 20 5 = 15.


    Expected payoff by choosing N

    Find pure-strategy N.E. for a 4-person volunteers


    dilemma game.
    There exists a symmetric mixed-strategy N.E. in which
    each person volunteers with a probability p*.

    Depend on if the other person volunteers or not


    Expected payoff = p 20 + (1 p) 0 = 20p.

    In equilibrium: 15 = 20p or p* = 0.75.

    Nash Equilibrium (Symmetric)

    Nash Equilibrium (Symmetric)

    Mixed strategy N.E. for N = 4

    The Other Three Players

    Each person must feel indifferent between


    volunteering and refraining.

    Player 1

    Player 2

    Player 3

    Expected payoff by choosing V = 20 5 = 15.


    Expected payoff by choosing N

    Depend on if other players volunteer or not.

    Nash Equilibrium (Symmetric)

    Nash Equilibrium (Symmetric)

    The Other Three Players


    Player 1
    ONE out of
    three
    volunteers

    Player 2

    The Other Three Players

    Player 3

    Player 1

    p
    p
    p

    ONE out of
    three
    volunteers

    TWO out of
    three
    volunteer

    Player 2

    Player 3

    p
    p
    p
    p

    Nash Equilibrium (Symmetric)

    10

    Nash Equilibrium (Symmetric)

    The Other Three Players


    Player 1
    ONE out of
    three
    volunteers

    TWO out of
    three
    volunteer

    ALL three
    volunteer

    Player 2

    The Other Three Players

    Player 3

    Player 1

    p
    p
    p
    p
    p
    p

    p
    p

    ONE out of
    three
    volunteers

    TWO out of
    three
    volunteer

    ALL three
    volunteer

    Player 2

    Player 3

    p
    p
    p
    p
    p
    p

    p
    p

    NO one
    volunteers
    11

    12

    Nash Equilibrium (Symmetric)

    Nash Equilibrium (Symmetric)

    The Other Three Players

    ONE out of
    three
    volunteers

    The Other Three Players

    Player 1

    Player 2

    Player 3

    1p

    1p

    1p

    1p

    1p

    1p

    ONE out of
    three
    volunteers

    Player 1

    Player 2

    Player 3

    Joint Prob.1 (1p)3

    1p

    1p

    p (1p)2

    1p

    1p

    p (1p)2

    1p

    1p

    p (1p)2

    TWO out of
    three
    volunteer

    1p

    p2 (1p)

    1p

    p2 (1p)

    1p

    p2 (1p)

    ALL three
    volunteer

    p3

    1p

    NO one
    volunteers

    1p

    1p

    1p

    (1p)3

    TWO out of
    three
    volunteer

    1p

    1p

    1p

    ALL three
    volunteer

    NO one
    volunteers

    1p

    1p

    13

    14

    Nash Equilibrium (Symmetric)

    Nash Equilibrium (Symmetric)

    Mixed strategy N.E. for N = 4

    Each person must feel indifferent between


    volunteering and refraining.

    Mixed strategy N.E.

    Expected payoff by choosing V = 20 5 = 15.


    Expected payoff by choosing N
    the probability that no one

    Depend on if other players volunteer or not. volunteers


    Expected payoff = [1 (1 p)3] 20 + (1 p)3 0 = 20 [1 (1
    p)3]. the probability that at least one of the three other players volunteers

    N = 2: p* = 0.75
    N = 4: p* = 0.37
    The probability of volunteering is decreasing in group
    size.

    In equilibrium: 15 = 20 [1 (1 p)3] or p* = 0.37.


    15

    16

    Rules

    Volunteer Rate (Spring 2011)

    10 rounds of the volunteers dilemma game.

    1
    0.9

    Rounds 1-5: 2 members in each group.


    Rounds 6-10: 4 members in each group.

    Ave p = 0.62

    0.8

    p* = 0.75

    0.7
    0.6
    0.5
    0.4

    p* = 0.37

    0.3
    0.2

    Ave p = 0.38

    0.1
    0
    1

    p* (N = 2)

    p (N = 2)

    p* (N = 4)

    10

    p (N = 4)

    17

    18

    Volunteer Rate (Fall 2013)

    Volunteer Rate (Spring 2012)


    Ave p = 0.80

    Ave p = 0.xx
    Ave p = 0.80

    Ave p = 0.77
    p* = 0.75

    p* = 0.75

    Ave p = 0.40
    p* = 0.37

    p* = 0.37

    Ave p = 0.yy

    19

    20

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