No.

15-1874
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
_______________________________________

PRO-FOOTBALL, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AMANDA BLACKHORSE; MARCUS BRIGGS-CLOUD;
PHILLIP GOVER; JILLIAN PAPPAN; COURTNEY TSOTIGH,
Defendants-Appellees,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor-Appellee.
_______________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division
No. 1:14-cv-01043 (Hon. Gerald Bruce Lee)
_______________________________________

PAGE-PROOF OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT

_______________________________________

Robert L. Raskopf
Todd Anten
Jessica A. Rose
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
& SULLIVAN, LLP
51 Madison Ave., 22nd Floor
New York, NY 10010
(212) 849-7000
[email protected]

Lisa S. Blatt
Robert Alan Garrett
ARNOLD & PORTER LLP
601 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 942-5000
[email protected]

Counsel for Appellant Pro-Football, Inc.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS
Disclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus
case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent
party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a
civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to
the mandamus case.
Corporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are
required to file disclosure statements.
If counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the
required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than
electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.
15-1874
No. __________

Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse

Caption: __________________________________________________

Pursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,

Pro-Football, Inc.
______________________________________________________________________________
(name of party/amicus)

______________________________________________________________________________
appellant
who is _______________________,
makes the following disclosure:
(appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)

1.

Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity?

YES

2.

YES
Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?
NO
If yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:

NO

Pro-Football, Inc. is wholly owned by WFI Group, Inc., which in turn is wholly owned by
Washington Football, Inc.

3.

Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or

other publicly held entity?
YES NO
If yes, identify all such owners:

08/05/2015 SCC

-1-

4.

Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct
financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(b))?
YES NO
If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:

5.

Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)

YES NO
If yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected
substantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is
pursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:

6.

Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?

If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors committee:

s/ Lisa S. Blatt
Signature: ____________________________________

YES

NO

October 30, 2015

Date: ___________________

Pro-Football, Inc.
Counsel for: __________________________________

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
**************************
October 30, 2015
I certify that on _________________
the foregoing document was served on all parties or their
counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by
serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:

s/ Lisa S. Blatt
_______________________________
(signature)

October 30, 2015

________________________
(date)
-2-

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................iii
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ............................................................................1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES .........................................................................................1
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................................................................................5
A.

The Lanham Act ......................................................................................5

B.

Factual Background.................................................................................8

C.

Proceedings Below ..................................................................................9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................................................................11

STANDARD OF REVIEW .........................................................................................13
ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................13
I.

II.

III.

Section 2(a)s Content and Viewpoint Restrictions Violate the First

Amendment........................................................................................................13
A.

Section 2(a) Fails Strict Scrutiny.............................................................14

B.

Section 2(a) Fails Intermediate Scrutiny .................................................20

C.

Registered Trademarks Are Not Government Speech.........................27

D.

Registration Is Not a Government Subsidy.............................................29

Section 2(a) Is Unconstitutionally Vague..........................................................33

A.

Section 2(a) Fails To Provide Fair Notice...............................................34

B.

Section 2(a) Fosters Arbitrary Enforcement ...........................................39

The Governments Delay Violates Due Process ...............................................42

IV.

V.

The Redskins Trademarks Were Properly Registered ......................................45

A.

Section 2(a) Applies Only to Identifiable Persons ..................................46

B.

The District Court Applied the Wrong Test for Disparagement.............48

C.

Petitioners Failed to Show That the Redskins Marks Disparaged

a Substantial Composite of Native Americans .......................................51

Laches Bars the Petition ....................................................................................62

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................64
STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF ORAL ARGUMENT
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Agency for Intl Dev. v. Alliance for Open Socy Intl, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013)..................................................................................30, 32
Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224 (1998)............................................................................................46
Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist.,
245 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2001) .................................................................................36
Application of Natl Distillers & Chem. Corp.,
297 F.2d 941 (C.C.P.A 1962) .............................................................................23
Autor v. Pritzker,
740 F.3d 176 (D.C. Cir. 2014)............................................................................30
B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus.,
135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015)..............................................................................6, 14, 27
Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972)............................................................................................45
Barry v. Barchi,
443 U.S. 55 (1979)..............................................................................................42
Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972)............................................................................................44
Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469 (1989)............................................................................................21
Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 (1971)......................................................................................42, 43
Berger v. Battaglia,
779 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985) ..............................................................................48
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp.,
463 U.S. 60 (1983)..............................................................................................26
iii

In re Boulevard Entmt, Inc.,

334 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ..........................................................................49
Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick,
847 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988) ........................................................................30, 35
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Commn of New York,
447 U.S. 557 (1980)................................................................................20, 21, 22
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commn,
558 U.S. 310 (2010)............................................................................................14
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co.,
486 U.S. 750 (1988)......................................................................................33, 34
Cleveland v. United States,
531 U.S. 12 (2000)..................................................................................27, 33, 34
Coates v. City of Cincinnati,
402 U.S. 611 (1971)............................................................................................34
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666 (1999)............................................................................................43
Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ.,
55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995) ..............................................................................35
Davenport v. Washington Assn,
551 U.S. 177 (2007)......................................................................................30, 31
Dept of Tex., Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S. v. Tex. Lottery
Commn,
760 F.3d 427 (5th Cir. 2014) ..............................................................................30
Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761 (1983)............................................................................................22
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012)............................................................................33, 34, 38
FCC v. League of Women Voters of Col.,
468 U.S. 364 (1984)......................................................................................14, 26

iv

Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement,

505 U.S. 123 (1992)............................................................................................17
Friedman v. Rogers,
440 U.S. 1 (1978)..........................................................................................21, 22
In re Geller,
751 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ..........................................................................58
Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104 (1972)............................................................................................34
Greater New Orleans Broad. Assn v. United States,
527 U.S. 173 (1999)............................................................................................25
Harris v. McCrae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980)............................................................................................30
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. 1 (2010)....................................................................................34, 37, 39
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46 (1988)..............................................................................................26
In re Intl Flavors and Fragrances Inc.,
183 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ..........................................................................43
J.C. Eno (U.S.) Ltd. v. Coe,
106 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1939)............................................................................43
Johnson v. Morris,
903 F.2d 996 (4th Cir. 1990) ..............................................................................44
Johnson v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)............................................................................37, 38, 51
Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352 (1983)............................................................................................37
Lee v. Ventura Cnty. Superior Court,
11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)..........................................................20

Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,

531 U.S. 533 (2001)................................................................................27, 29, 31
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525 (1996)............................................................................................22
Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976)............................................................................................42
In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd.,
33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ................................................................50, 52, 53
McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,
756 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2014) ..............................................................................43
In re McGinley,
660 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981) ......................................................................16, 43
Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973)..............................................................................................50
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Commr of Revenue,
460 U.S. 575 (1983)............................................................................................18
Mishawaka Rubber and Woolen Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co.,
316 U.S. 203 (1942)............................................................................................13
Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246 (1952)......................................................................................47, 48
N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake,
525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008) ..............................................................................37
Natl R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
536 U.S. 101 (2002)............................................................................................62
NEA v. Finley,
524 U.S. 569 (1998)......................................................................................31, 33
N.Y. Times v. Sullivan,
374 U.S. 254 (1964)............................................................................................21

vi

Norris v. United States,

257 U.S. 77 (1921)..............................................................................................62
P.A.B. Produits et Appareils de Beaute v. Satinine Societa in Nome
Collettivo di S.A.e.M. Usellini,
570 F.2d 328 (C.C.P.A. 1978) ............................................................................43
Park N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.,
469 U.S. 189 (1985)..........................................................................................5, 6
Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976)................................................................................42, 43, 44
Perry v. New Hampshire,
132 S. Ct. 716 (2012)..........................................................................................37
Pitt News v. Pappert,
379 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2004) ................................................................................17
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo,
284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003)...............................................................passim
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo,
415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005)..........................................................................9, 64
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo,
565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009)..................................................................9, 45, 63
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo,
567 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008)..................................................................9, 45
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,
514 U.S. 159 (1995)............................................................................................13
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377 (1992)............................................................................................15
Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015)........................................................................................14
Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash.,
461 U.S. 540 (1983)......................................................................................30, 31

vii

Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,

521 U.S. 844 (1997)......................................................................................36, 37
Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth.,
390 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2004)...........................................................................16, 36
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819 (1995)......................................................................................17, 31
Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991)............................................................................................29
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd.,
502 U.S. 105 (1991)......................................................................................17, 18
Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566 (1974)............................................................................................34
Snyder v. Phelps,
131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011)........................................................................................26
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).................................................................................passim
Stuart v. Camnitz,
774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014) ..............................................................................13
Swatch AG v. Beehive Wholesale, LLC,
739 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2014) ..............................................................................13
Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975)............................................................................................50
Test Masters Educ. Servs. v. Singh,
428 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2005) ..............................................................................16
Tough Traveler, Ltd. v. Outbound Prods.,
60 F.3d 964 (2d Cir. 1995) .................................................................................62
Town of Greece v. Galloway,
134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014)........................................................................................36

viii

United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars

($8,850) in U.S. Currency,
461 U.S. 555 (1983)............................................................................................44
United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460 (2010)............................................................................................22
Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co.,
703 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ..........................................................................47
Variable v. Nash,
190 P.3d 354 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) ...................................................................20
Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia SPA,
944 F.2d 870 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ............................................................................63
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
455 U.S. 489 (1982)............................................................................................33
W.D. Byron & Sons, Inc. v. Stein Bros Mfg. Co.,
377 F.2d 1001 (C.C.P.A 1967) ...........................................................................49
Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015)..................................................................................27, 28
Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Assn,
555 U.S. 353 (2009)............................................................................................31
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Decisions
Boswell v. Mavety Media Grp. Ltd.,
1999 WL 1040108 (TTAB 1999) .......................................................................40
In re Condas S.A.,
1975 WL 20869 (TTAB 1975) ...........................................................................40
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc.,
1999 WL 375907 (TTAB 1999) .........................................................................35
In re Heeb Media, LLC,
2008 WL 5065114 (TTAB 2008) .................................................................39, 58

ix

In re Hines,
1994 WL 456841 (TTAB 1994) .........................................................................39
In re In Over Our Heads,
1990 WL 354546 (TTAB 1990) ...................................................................35, 40
In re Lebanese Arak Corp.,
2010 WL 766488 (TTAB 2010) .........................................................................51
In re Squaw Valley Dev. Co.,
2006 WL 1546500 (TTAB 2006) .................................................................39, 58
Statutes
7 U.S.C. 1906........................................................................................................47
15 U.S.C. 1051..................................................................................................7, 31
15 U.S.C. 1052(a) ..........................................................................................passim
15 U.S.C. 1052(b) ...................................................................................................6
15 U.S.C. 1052(c) ...................................................................................................6
15 U.S.C. 1057(a) .................................................................................................25
15 U.S.C. 1057(b) .................................................................................................18
15 U.S.C. 1060......................................................................................................43
15 U.S.C. 1064........................................................................................................7
15 U.S.C. 1065..................................................................................................6, 18
15 U.S.C. 1067........................................................................................................7
15 U.S.C. 1067(a) ...................................................................................................7
15 U.S.C. 1067(b) ...................................................................................................7
15 U.S.C. 1069......................................................................................................64
15 U.S.C. 1071......................................................................................................10
15 U.S.C. 1071(b) ...............................................................................................1, 7
x

15 U.S.C. 1072..................................................................................................6, 18
15 U.S.C. 1114..................................................................................................6, 43
15 U.S.C. 1115......................................................................................................18
15 U.S.C. 1115(a) ...................................................................................................6
15 U.S.C. 1115(b) .................................................................................................18
15 U.S.C. 1116(d) .................................................................................................18
15 U.S.C. 1117........................................................................................................6
15 U.S.C. 1117(b) .................................................................................................18
15 U.S.C. 1124..................................................................................................6, 18
15 U.S.C. 1125(a) .................................................................................................19
15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(6).........................................................................................6, 18
15 U.S.C. 1127......................................................................................................46
15 U.S.C. 1141b......................................................................................................6
15 U.S.C. 1157(b) ...................................................................................................6
28 U.S.C. 1291........................................................................................................1
35 U.S.C. 153........................................................................................................25
Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 ...............................................................6
Other Authorities
A. Taube, 15 Racist Brand Mascots and Logos that Make the
Redskins Look Progressive, Business Insider, June 19, 2014 ............................41
Brief for United States, In re Tam,
No. 2014-1203 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 2015)............................................................19
Brief for United States, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky,
No. 02-575 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2003) ........................................................................41

xi

I. Shapira, In Arizona, a Navajo High School Emerges as a Defender

of the Washington Redskins, Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 2014 ....................................60
J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition (4th ed. 2014)....................18, 19
Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trademarks of the H.
Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong. (1939) .........................................................35, 47
Merriam-Websters Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003)...............................48, 50
M.M. Manring, Slave in a Box: the Strange Career of Aunt Jemima
(1998)............................................................................................................41, 47
Muriel H. Wright, Oklahoma Historical Society, Contributions of the
Indian People to Oklahoma (1936),
http://digital.library.okstate.edu/Chronicles/v014/v014p156.html ....................60
NCAI, Ending the Legacy of Racism in Sports & the Era of Harmful
Indian Sports Mascots (Oct. 2013) ................................................................56
PTO, Performance and Accountability Report (2014) ............................................31
PTO, Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (2015).................................8, 40
PTO, TTAB Manual of Procedure (2015) ...............................................................41
Restatement (First) of Torts (1938) .........................................................................47
S. Rep. No. 1333 (1946) ..........................................................................................32
T. Vargas, President Obama Says, Id Think About Changing Name
of Washington Redskins, Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 2013 ............................................26
U.S. Copyright Office, Sample Certification of Registration,
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/certificate_sample-1-21-05.pdf .......................25

xii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) cancelled six trademark
registrations of Appellant Pro-Football, Inc. (Redskins or Team) under 2(a) of
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a). Section 2(a) prohibits registration of
trademarks that may disparage persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or
national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disreputehereinafter, the
disparagement clause. The District Court had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C.
1071(b). This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether 2(a)s disparagement clause violates the First Amendment.

2.

Whether 2(a)s disparagement clause is impermissibly vague, in

violation of the First and Fifth Amendments.

3.

Whether the governments decades-long delay between registering

and cancelling the Redskins marks violates due process.

4.

Whether the Redskins marks were disparaging when registered,

starting in 1967.
5.

Whether laches barred the cancellation petition.

INTRODUCTION
This case involves the cancellation of six trademark registrations of the
NFLs Washington Redskins, one of the most storied franchises in sports, on the
ground that the Teams name supposedly disparaged Native Americans under
2(a) of the Lanham Act. To our knowledge, of the over three million trademarks
registered since 1870, no registration has ever been retroactively cancelled for
being disparaging. The Redskins are the first and only. The name is over 80 years
old, and the registrations nearly 50. The PTO initially registered the Redskins
marks in 1967, and again in 1974, 1978, and 1990. Each time, no one objected.
Each time, the PTO did not suggest that the marks disparaged anyone.
This was no oversight. By 1967, the Redskins had won two NFL
championships. Native Americans, like all Americans, presumably knew of the
Team, as did the PTO examiners who registered the Redskins marks. Yet in an
extraordinary about-face, the PTO in 2014 scheduled the cancellation of the
registrationsnot because the Redskins marks are disparaging today, but because
the PTO thought they disparaged a substantial composite of Native Americans in
1967 and thus should never have been registered in the first place.
The District Court erred in granting summary judgment against the Team.
The five Native Americans who sought cancellation did not show any consensus
by a substantial composite of Native Americans. By contrast, the Team

presented extensive evidence of widespread Native American support for the

Redskins name in 1967 and thereafter. Many Native Americans named their own
sports teams the Redskins, and no Native American opposed registration in 1967
or sought cancellation for another 25 years. On a virtually identical record, the
D.C. district court in 2003 held that the Team was entitled to summary judgment.
The PTOs unprecedented cancellation also violated the First and Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution. Section 2(a)s disparagement clause is
hopelessly vague. The PTO endeavored in 2014 retrospectively to discern whether
an undefined, unquantifiable substantial composite of Native Americans in 1967
was insulted by the term redskins. And the PTO forced the Team to defend its
marks in 2014 even though the passage of time was highly prejudicial, including
because key witnesses were long deceased.
There are extraordinary free speech principles at issue far beyond the
Redskins trademarks. Cancelling a registration based on the governments
disapproval of a trademark discriminates against speech based on content and
viewpoint. The District Court nonetheless declared the PTOs action exempt from
any First Amendment scrutiny because registered trademarks are all government
speech and registration is a government subsidy program.
The notion that all two million currently-registered marks are government
speech is astounding. It is equally disturbing. The PTO has registered hundreds if

not thousands of marks that the Team believes are racist, or misogynistic, vulgar,
or otherwise offensive. By way of example only, the following marks are
registered today: TAKE YO PANTIES OFF clothing; DANGEROUS NEGRO shirts;
SLUTSSEEKER dating services; DAGO SWAGG clothing; DUMB BLONDE beer;
TWATTY GIRL cartoons; BAKED BY A NEGRO bakery goods; BIG TITTY BLEND
coffee; RETARDIPEDIA website; MIDGET-MAN condoms and inflatable sex dolls;
and JIZZ underwear. These are not isolated instances. The government routinely
registers pornographers marks: TEENSDOPORN.COM, MILFSDOPORN.COM, THUG
PORN, GHETTO BOOTY, and BOUND GANGBANGS are but a few.1
None of this is government speech. Nor is the government subsidizing these
marks. Registration of trademarks, like copyrights and patents, is not akin to a
government loan, grant, or other type of gift. Rather, the government, acting as a
regulator, finds that because trademarks meet statutory criteria (namely, being
distinctive), they are entitled to legal protection against interference from other
private parties. And because trademark registration constitutes government
regulation, this case is easy. A ban on registering disparaging trademarks
unconstitutionally burdens speech based on content and viewpoint, just as would a
ban on registering copyrights for disparaging books.
1

Federally-registered trademarks are denoted in small caps throughout, and are

available by searching the Trademark Electronic Search System,
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-application-process/search-trademark-database.

It does not matter, as the District Court concluded, that cancellation leaves
mark-owners like the Redskins free to use their names, hoping other laws might
protect against infringement, counterfeiting, and illegal imports. Whether
cancellation deprives a mark of every last cent of its value is not the First
Amendment test. The government cannot turn the lights off at a Redskins night
game because the government disfavors the name, and defend the action because
the Redskins can still play in the dark. Registration confers indispensable legal
protections, and the government cannot condition those protections on a
trademark-owners agreement to forgo disfavored speech.
A professional football teams name, like all sports-team names, is a subject
of popular discourse and, sometimes, strong feelings and opinions. But
withdrawing trademark protection is not a legitimate means for the government to
weigh in on the matter. This Court should reverse the decision below.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

The Lanham Act

Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946 in order to provide national

protection for trademarks used in interstate and foreign commerce. Park N Fly,
Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985). The Act secure[s] to
the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and protect[s] the ability of

consumers to distinguish among competing producers. Id. at 198 (quoting S. Rep.

No. 1333, at 3, 5 (1946)).
The Act permits trademark owners to register marks with the PTO. B&B
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299-1300 (2015). Registration
is significantit confers important legal rights and benefits, including many
procedural and substantive legal advantages. Id. at 1300 (quotation marks
omitted). Those protections include a cause of action for infringement, 15 U.S.C.
1114; evidentiary advantages and remedies in litigation, 1065, 1072, 1115(a),
1117, 1125(c)(6), 1157(b); U.S. Customs assistance to prevent illegal imports,
1124; and enhanced protection overseas, 1141b.
The Lanham Act permits registration of trademarks unless an exception in
2 provides otherwise. Section 2 bars registration of some marks for reasons
related to the functions of trademark law, including to avoid confusion with
existing marks, or with flags, official insignia, or the names of living persons.
1052(b)-(c).
But 2 also bars registration for reasons entirely unrelated to consumer
confusion. Section 2(a) bars registration of immoral or scandalous marks,
1052(a), like its 1905 predecessor statute, Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 5(a),
33 Stat. 724, 725. And since 1946, 2(a)s disparagement clause has barred
registration of marks that may disparage persons, living or dead, institutions,

beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute. 15 U.S.C.

1052(a).2
To obtain registration, trademark owners apply to the PTO. Unless an
examiner finds prima facie evidence that a mark is un-registrable under 2, the
PTO publishes the mark in the Official Gazette. 1051. Then, [a]ny person
who believes that he would be damaged by the registration may file an
opposition. 1067(a), (b). If the PTO registers the mark, any person who
believes that he is or will be damaged may petition the PTO to cancel the
registration. 1064. If the registration was obtained contrary to the
provisions of 2(a), a petitioner can seek cancellation [a]t any time. Id. The
PTOs Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) hears appeals of examiner
registration decisions and reviews cancellation petitions. 1067. If the TTAB
cancels a registration, the owner may sue the petitioner in federal court. 1071(b).
In determining whether a proposed or existing mark violates 2(a)s
disparagement clause, the PTO applies a two-part test:
(1) What is the likely meaning of the matter in question,
taking into account not only dictionary definitions, but
also the relationship of the matter to the other elements in
the mark, the nature of the goods or services, and the
manner in which the mark is used in the marketplace in
connection with the goods or services; and

Hereafter, 2(a) refers to the disparagement clause, unless otherwise specified.

(2) If that meaning is found to refer to identifiable

persons, institutions, beliefs or national symbols, whether
that meaning may be disparaging to a substantial
composite of the referenced group.
PTO, Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) 1203.03(b)(i), (c)
(2015). Drawing from precedent under other parts of 2, the PTO held in this case
that the question is whether each mark was disparaging when registered, not
whether it is disparaging today. JA__[TTAB8-9].
B.

Factual Background

For 82 years, since 1933, the Team has been known as the Redskins. In
1967, the PTO registered the mark THE REDSKINS for entertainment services. ProFootball, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 104-05 (D.D.C. 2003). Over the next
23 years, in 1974, 1978, and 1990, the PTO registered five additional Redskins
marks. [T]he six marks at issue were published and registered without opposition
from Native Americans or anyone else on twelve different occasionssix
publications accompanying six registrations. Id. at 136 n.34.
The Team has since invested tens of millions of dollars in advertising and
promoting its brand. JA__, __, __[D.E.58;D.E.100;A318-24]. According to
public reports, as of August 2014, the Team was valued at $2.4 billion,
approximately $214 million of which is attributable to the Redskins brand.
JA__[D.E.60-16]. For the 25-year period from 1967 to 1992, not a single person
sought to cancel the Redskins registrations.

In 1992, Suzan Harjo and six other Native Americans successfully petitioned
the PTO to cancel the Redskins registrations on the ground that they disparaged
Native Americans. The D.C. district court reversed, holding that laches barred the
petition, and that the PTO lacked substantial evidence to find the marks
disparaging at the times of registration. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 144-45. The
D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded, instructing the district court to reassess laches
based on the date the youngest petitioner turned 18. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo,
415 F.3d 44, 49-50 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The district court again found laches, ProFootball, Inc. v. Harjo, 567 F. Supp. 2d 46, 62 (D.D.C. 2008), and the D.C. Circuit
affirmed on that ground without reaching the district courts disparagement
holding, Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
C.

Proceedings Below

In 2006, while Harjo was pending, Harjo asked friends to identify younger
Native Americans to refile her petition, and recruited the five Petitioners here.
E.g., JA__[A7549-63]; JA__[A8111-14]; JA__[A8440-66]; JA__[A8579-80];
JA__[A8854-57]. On August 11, 2006, they petitioned the TTAB to cancel the
Redskins registrations. JA__[A1-A4]. The matter was suspended pending Harjo,
then re-opened after the D.C. Circuit ruled for the Team.
In 2014, a divided TTAB again cancelled the registrations.
JA__[A13977/TTAB1] (available at 2014 WL 2757516). The majority concluded

that Petitioners had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that a substantial

composite of Native Americans found the Teams name disparaging between
1967-1990. JA__[TTAB72]. [A] substantial composite of the referenced
group, the TTAB held, is not necessarily a majority. JA__[TTAB9]. The
cancellation will take effect only if the TTABs decision is affirmed.
Judge Bergsman dissented, concluding that the evidence submitted by
[Petitioners] can most charitably be characterized as a database dump; that
Petitioners did not introduce any evidence or argument as to what comprises a
substantial composite of [the Native American] population; and that Petitioners
failed to show that the term Redskins was disparaging in 1967, 1974, 1978, or
1990. JA__[TTAB83-84].
The Team sued Petitioners under 15 U.S.C. 1071, challenging the
cancellations on constitutional and statutory grounds. JA__[D.E.1]. The United
States intervened to defend 2(a)s constitutionality, but did not defend the
TTABs determination that the marks were disparaging. JA__[D.E.46].
On July 8, 2015, the District Court entered summary judgment for
Petitioners and the government and denied the Teams summary judgment motion.
JA__[D.E.161/Op.1-4] (available at 2015 WL 4096277). The court held that
2(a) does not implicate the First Amendment because cancellations do not
burden, restrict or prohibit speech. JA__[Op.14-17]. The court further held that

10

registration is government speech or a government-subsidized program,

exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. JA__[Op.18-30]. The court then
rejected the Teams vagueness and other due process claims, JA__[Op.30-35],
concluded that the marks were disparaging when registered, JA__[Op.35-65],
and held that the public interest and the pendency of Harjo barred the Teams
laches defense, JA__[Op.66-67].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Section 2(a)s disparagement clause violates the First Amendment because it
facially discriminates based on content and viewpoint. Trademarks are expressive,
and the purpose of registration is to protect mark-owners from interference by
private parties who could otherwise infringe or dilute the communicative value of
the marks. Section 2(a) substantially burdens protected speech by withdrawing
registration of trademarks that convey messages the government disfavors. Section
2(a) thus fails both strict scrutiny and the intermediate scrutiny applicable to
commercial speech.
Nor are registered trademarks government speech or a government
subsidy program. No one associates registration with government endorsement,
and registering trademarks is no more a subsidy than registering copyrights or real
estate titles. Registration is a legal protection the government cannot condition on
the mark-owners agreement to forgo speech the government dislikes.

11

The disparagement clause is also unconstitutionally vague. Whether a

trademark disparages a substantial composite of a group like Native
Americans is wholly subjective. Enforcement of 2(a) is entirely arbitrary, as
illustrated by the unprecedented cancellation in this case. And the PTOs
invitation to 300 million Americans to challenge any mark they disfavor
guarantees chaos and unpredictability. Section 2(a)s focus on the marks message
at the time of registration compounds the vagueness and independently violates
due process: the Redskins were forced to defend their marks today against charges
that the marks disparaged Native Americans a half-century ago, in 1967.
Historical records no longer exist, and key witnesses are long dead.
Regardless, the PTO lacked the statutory authority to cancel these
registrations. First, the disparagement clause applies to disparagement of only
specific, identifiable persons, not groups. Second, if the clause applies to
groups, it applies only when at least a representative majority of the referenced
group perceived the mark as actually disparagingstandards the District Court did
not apply. Third, even under the District Courts standard, Petitioners did not
satisfy their burden. A preponderance of the evidence did not show that the
Redskins marks, in connection with professional football, were disparaging in
1967, 1974, 1978, or 1990. Finally, the petition was barred by laches.

12

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the District Courts grant of summary judgment de novo.
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 244 (4th Cir. 2014). No deference is owed to the
PTO; the District Courts review was de novo. JA__[Op.9]; Swatch AG v. Beehive
Wholesale, LLC, 739 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2014).
ARGUMENT
I.

Section 2(a)s Content and Viewpoint Restrictions Violate the First

Amendment
Trademarks reflect core expressive activity by communicating to the public

the name and identity of the producer of a good or service. Their very function
is psychological, Mishawaka Rubber and Woolen Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316
U.S. 203, 205 (1942)to carry[] meaning, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,
514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995). Countless marks speak for themselves: GLOBAL
WARMING SUCKS and I HATE MY TEENAGE DAUGHTER. But all marks are
inherently expressive: HERSHEYS and MERCEDES-BENZ signal a certain quality of
chocolate or automobile. THE NEW YORK TIMES and FOX NEWS CHANNEL signal a
certain type of news. THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
MARCH OF DIMES, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, and REPUBLICAN NATIONAL
COMMITTEE communicate certain religious, charitable, or political missions.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY signals the source and quality of educational services. And
marks like THE REDSKINS, NEW YORK CITY BALLET, THE BEATLES, and THE LION

13

KING signal the source and quality of entertainment services. Registration is not a
government handout, but rather confers procedural and substantive legal
advantages specified by statute. B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1300. The
government cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, deny marks those legal
protections based on their content or viewpoint.
A.

Section 2(a) Fails Strict Scrutiny

1. Content-based lawsthose that target speech based on its

communicative contentare presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified
only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling
state interests. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
Government discrimination among viewpoints is a more blatant and egregious
form of content discrimination. Id. at 2230 (quotation marks omitted). The First
Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commn, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
Section 2(a)s bar on registering disparaging marks is content-based because
the law on its face draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227. Section 2(a) is viewpoint-based because it regulates
speech based on a particular point of view, FCC v. League of Women Voters of
Col., 468 U.S. 364, 383-84 (1984), and because of disagreement with the message
[the speech] conveys, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011).

14

The law permits registration of marks that express a positive view of a person, but
bars registration of marks that express a negative view of the same person. If the
government may not prohibit commercial advertising that depicts men in
demeaning fashion, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388-89 (1992), the
government likewise cannot prohibit registration of trademarks that demean men
or any other group.
The PTO singled out the Redskins marks for disfavored treatment solely
based on disapproval of the Teams name, reasoning that some Native Americans
found it a racial slur, negative, and offensive. JA__, __, __, __[TTAB32,3637,54,75]. The PTO devoted 57 pages of its opinion to consulting dictionaries,
linguists, media articles, and Native Americans to discern the meaning of
redskins and whether that meaning was disparaging in 1967. JA__[TTAB1572] (using word meaning over 50 times). The PTO deemed the marks critical of
and demeaning to Native Americans. Criticizing and demeaning something is a
viewpoint.
The government argues that 2(a) is viewpoint-neutral because it does not
turn on the views held by a trademark applicant. JA__[D.E.110at18] (emphasis
added). But 2(a) does turn on the views expressed by the applicant, as perceived
by the referenced group. The government does not cure viewpoint discrimination
by ignoring the speakers motives. Section 2(a) regulates speech because of a

15

disagreement with the message [the mark] conveys to the referenced group.
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2664.
Although a divided First Circuit held that a regulation banning disparaging
advertisements in city subways was not viewpoint-based, [b]y its very nature, a
prohibition against ads that are hostile to an individual or a group of individuals
is viewpoint based. Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 100 (1st Cir.
2004) (Torruella, J., dissenting). The governments asserted interest in
disassociating itself from marks it finds disparaging to Native Americans only
underscores the governments hostility to the message conveyed by the marks.
In the ordinary case it is all but dispositive to conclude that a law is
content-based and, in practice, viewpoint-discriminatory. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at
2667. Section 2(a) cannot satisfy strict scrutiny. No one has argued otherwise.
2. Citing In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981), the District Court
held that 2(a) does not implicate the First Amendment as the cancellations do
not burden, restrict, or prohibit [the Teams] ability to use the marks.
JA__[Op.15]; accord Test Masters Educ. Servs. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 578 n.9
(5th Cir. 2005). The en banc Federal Circuit is reconsidering McGinley in a case
challenging the PTOs refusal to register a musical bands mark, The Slants. In
re Tam, No. 2014-1203 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc) (oral argument held Oct. 2, 2015).

16

Cancellation obviously burdens the ability to use a mark, and the First
Amendment prohibits regulatory burdens as well as outright bans on speech. The
government offends the First Amendment when it imposes financial burdens on
certain speakers based on the content of their expression. Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995). [T]he distinction
between laws burdening speech is but a matter of degree and the Governments
content-based burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its content-based
bans. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2664 (quotation marks omitted). Lawmakers may no
more silence unwanted speech by burdening its utterance than by censoring its
content. Id.; accord Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 13435 (1992). The threat to the First Amendment arises from the imposition of
financial burdens that may have the effect of influencing or suppressing speech,
and whether those burdens take the form of taxes or some other form is
unimportant. Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 111-12 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito, J.).
Sorrell invalidated a state law that did not ban speech but nonetheless
burdened pharmaceutical marketing by denying manufacturers information that
made their marketing more effective. After referencing burdens over 30 times,
Sorrell held that the State has burdened a form of protected expression, while
leaving unburdened those speakers whose messages are in accord with its own
views. 131 S. Ct. at 2672. The same is true here. See also Simon & Schuster,

17

Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991);
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Commr of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 58283 (1983).
Here are just a few of the burdens that result from cancellation. U.S.
Customs may not stop importation of goods that bear infringing marks. 15 U.S.C.
1124. Mark-owners lose constructive nationwide notice of ownership, 1072, as
well as prima facie evidence of their marks validity, ownership, and exclusive use,
1057(b). They cannot pursue counterfeiting claims and remedies, including
treble damages. 1116(d), 1117(b). And they become subject to dilution claims
by owners of other marks. 1125(c)(6).
If the PTO cancels a registration after more than five years, as occurred here,
the owner loses the benefits of owning an incontestable mark, including
conclusive evidence of key elements of an infringement claim. 1115(b), 1065.
The owner also loses the right to exclusive nationwide use of the mark. 1115,
1072. The owner may retain rights under state common law, but only in regions
where the mark is used. 5 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition
26:32 (4th ed. 2014).
Ex ante, 2(a) chills protected speech. Faced with the prospect of being
denied registrationor worse, cancellation after decades of investmentpeople
will eschew potentially controversial names. And rejected applicants often

18

abandon their chosen marks rather than bear the costs of using unregistered marks
or litigating the denial. This is precisely what the First Amendment was intended
to prevent.
The government argues that unregistered marks retain limited protections
under 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a). Brief for United States at
20-21, Tam, No. 2014-1203 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 2015). But while the Team
believes 43(a) may protect its marks in certain contexts regardless of the outcome
here, the government cites no authority extending 43(a) to marks denied or
cancelled under 2(a). Petitioners argue that owners retain state law protection,
but the government says common law historically denied protection to offensive
marks. JA__[D.E.110at11-13]. And at least 46 States follow the Lanham Act and
thus deny registration to disparaging marks. 3 McCarthy 22:5 & n.1, 22:8.
Whatever legal protections remain, cancellation deprives owners of all legal
rights and advantages attendant to registration. Withdrawing those protections
makes marks less effective in communicating information. The government says
that is the point: 2(a) prevent[s] federal registration from magnifying the impact
of disparaging trademarks or [] encouraging the use of such marks.
JA__[D.E.110at20]. The government cannot credibly maintain that the First
Amendment does not apply, but if it does apply, 2(a) passes muster because it
will be effective at suppressing speech the government does not like.

19

The District Court found persuasive the assumption that denying name
change[s] does not trigger First Amendment review because people can continue
to call themselves whatever they please. JA__[Op.17 n.5]. The court cited two
state intermediate court decisions that have so held, but they involved unprotected
fighting words, Lee v. Ventura Cnty. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 768
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992), and obscenity, Variable v. Nash, 190 P.3d 354, 356 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2008). Taken to its logical conclusion, the decision below would permit
the government to cancel the birth certificate or social security card of a man
named Joe Redskins, for any reason or no reason.
B.

Section 2(a) Fails Intermediate Scrutiny

Petitioners and the government argued below that 2(a) satisfies the
intermediate scrutiny applicable to commercial speech under Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
The District Court did not apply Central Hudson, reasoning that the federal
trademark registration program is not commercial speech because registered
marks are published in the Official Gazette of the PTO and the Principal
Register, and [t]he Principal Register does not propose a commercial
transaction. JA__[Op.18]. But because cancellation burdens private speech,
supra pp.17-19, and registration is not government speech, infra pp.27-29, that

20

analysis is incorrect. Section 2(a), moreover, involves fully protected speech, not
just commercial speech. Regardless, if Central Hudson applies, 2(a) still fails.
1. Because 2(a) facially denies legal protections to trademarks based on
content and viewpoint, it is subject to strict scrutiny, supra part I.A, not
intermediate scrutiny. Central Hudson also is inapplicable because trademarks do
not themselves propose commercial transactions. Trademarks are brand identifiers
that are both expressive in their own right and enable mark-owners to associate all
of their other speech with their brands. For example, an individual uses his name
both at home, work, and church. Sports teams, just like ballets, musicals, or
improvisational comedies, similarly must have an identity to communicate
effectively with audiences. That they act for a profit is of no moment. Some of
our most valued forms of fully protected speech are uttered for a profit. Bd. of
Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989); see, e.g., N.Y.
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Also, countless non-profit organizations
use registered trademarks, and profit-seeking companies use their registered names
to engage in political speech.
In Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1978), the Court stated that [t]he
use of trade names in connection with optometrical practice is a form of
commercial speech and nothing more. That may be true if the optometrist does
not wish to editorialize on any subject, cultural, philosophical, or political and,

21

instead, [h]is purpose is strictly businessto advertise his services to consumers.

Id. (quotation marks omitted). But the government cancelled the Redskins
registrations for all purposeswhether to sell tickets to games or to pursue
charitable endeavors. And the sole reason for cancellation is the PTOs
disagreement with the cultural, philosophical, and political viewpoint the marks
supposedly expressed. Further, this case involves a facial challenge, and the
government cannot show that commercial marks and purposes outweigh
noncommercial marks, commercial marks used for expressive purposes (music,
museums, newspapers, etc.), and non-commercial uses of commercial marks. See
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).3
2. Even if Central Hudson applied, 2(a) does not directly advance a
substantial governmental interest and is more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest. 447 U.S. at 564-66; see Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667. The
government must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that the
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degreeit cannot rest on mere
speculation and conjecture. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1983);
accord Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2267.

Although this Court cannot overrule Central Hudson, the Team agrees with
Justices of the Supreme Court who have called for the cases reexamination. E.g.,
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).

22

Section 2(a) cannot be justified by what the District Court perceived as the
governments interest in registering only those marks expressing a governmentapproved message. The District Court reasoned that the public closely associates
federal trademark registration with the federal government[,] as the insignia for
federal registration, , is a manifestation of the federal governments recognition
of the mark. JA__[Op.20] (footnote omitted). But the government offered no
evidence of such association, even mistaken association. Consumers have no idea
whether marks are registered or what that legalese means. The purchasing
public knows no more about trademark registrations than a man walking down the
street in a strange city knows about legal title to the land and buildings he passes.
Application of Natl Distillers & Chem. Corp., 297 F.2d 941, 949 (C.C.P.A 1962)
(Rich, J., concurring).
It strains credulity that the public closely associates GUN CONTROL MY
ASS and DOES THIS GUN MAKE MY BUTT LOOK BIG? with the federal government,
which very recently registered these marks. Nor does anyone think the
governments copyright registration of Randall Kennedys Nigger: The Strange
Career of a Troublesome Word (Copyright No. TX0005492813), E.L. James Fifty
Shades of Grey (Copyright No. TX0007583125), or the song Hail to the
Redskins (Copyright No. RE0000325231), reflects government association.

23

Further, mark-owners are not required to use the , and many famous marks
(including the marks here) do not.
The government thus errs in arguing that [a] wrongful perception of
endorsement is particularly reasonable here given that, once registered, trademarks
appear in the government-curated Principal Register. JA__[D.E.127at16]; see
JA__[Op.25]. Moreover, this argument turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy. No
one today thinks registration reflects government approval. But if this Court holds
that it does, how will the government explain registrations like MARIJUANA FOR
SALE, CAPITALISM SUCKS DONKEY BALLS, LICENSED SERIAL KILLER, YID DISH,
DIRTY WHOOORE CLOTHING COMPANY, and MURDER 4 HIRE?4 Why are numerous
confederate-flag logos and so many lewd sexual depictions on a governmentcurated Principal Register? Does registration of THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS unconstitutionally endorse religion? As to the Principal
4

Other startling examples that would reflect government endorsement under the
decision below include: SHANK THE B!T@H board game; CRACKA AZZ
SKATEBOARDS; ANAL FANTASY COLLECTION, KLITORIS, and OMAZING SEX TOYS
sex toys; HOT OCTOPUSS anti-premature ejaculation creams; OL GEEZER
wines; EDIBLE CROTCHLESS GUMMY PANTIES lingerie; WTF WORK? online forum;
MILF WEED bags; GRINGO STYLE SALSA; MAKE YOUR OWN DILDO; GRINGO
BBQ; CONTEMPORARY NEGRO, FD UP, WHITE TRASH REBEL, I LOVE VAGINA,
WHITE GIRL WITH A BOOTY, PARTY WITH SLUTS, CRIPPLED OLD BIKER BASTARDS,
DICK BALLS, and REDNECK ARMY apparel; OH! MY NAPPY HAIR shampoos;
REFORMED WHORES and WHORES FROM HELL musical bands; LAUGHING MY
VAGINA OFF entertainment; NAPPY ROOTS records; BOOTY CALL sex aids; BOYS
ARE STUPID, THROW ROCKS AT THEM wallets; and DUMB BLONDE hair products.
Word limits prevent us from listing more.

24

Register, the government does not say where it is, what it looks like, or how we
can get one. As far as we know, there is no government-issued list of
registrations; one must conduct cumbersome, multi-step searches of PTOs internet
database.
Petitioners erroneously rely on the fact that registrations are issued in the
name of the United States of America, under the seal of the United States Patent
and Trademark Office and must be signed by the Director of the PTO. 15
U.S.C. 1057(a). Patents are exactly the same. 35 U.S.C. 153. Copyright
registrations also issue under the Seal of the United States Copyright Office and
are signed by the Register of Copyrights, United States of America. U.S.
Copyright Office, Sample Certification of Registration, http://www.copyright.gov/
docs/certificate_sample-1-21-05.pdf. But no one thinks the government endorses
any (let alone every) copyrighted book or patent.
Further, 2(a) does not materially advance any interest in government
disassociation; the Register is so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies that
the Government cannot hope to exonerate its case. Greater New Orleans Broad.
Assn v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 190 (1999). Regardless, an interest in
disassociation makes no sense here. The government cancelled these registrations
not because the marks disparage anyone today, but because they supposedly
disparaged Native Americans 50 years ago. Section 2(a) would require

25

cancellation for marks that once were thought disparaging but that the referenced
group has reclaimed as a source of pride, like LOVE IS QUEER dating services.
Nor does 2(a) legitimately advance the governments desire to convey a
message that disparaging others should not be profitable. JA__[D.E.110at15].
Disapproval of speech or desire to prevent offense is classically not a
justification for burdening speech, much less a substantial interest. Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71-72 (1983) (alterations omitted); see
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219-20 (2011); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988). Section 2(a) further does not directly or
materially promote racial harmony and equality. JA__[D.E.110at20] (quotation
marks omitted). The Register is infested with countless trademarks conveying
racist and offensive messages. See supra pp.4, 23-24 & n.4. Disparaging speech
also abounds on the Internet and in books and songs bearing government-registered
copyrights. And if racial harmony justified restricting speech, the First
Amendment would be eviscerated.
Finally, 2(a) excessively burdens speech. The government can accomplish
its goals simply by advising the public of its views. See, e.g., T. Vargas, President
Obama Says, Id Think About Changing Name of Washington Redskins, Wash.
Post, Oct. 5, 2013. Our Constitution favors more speech over less. E.g., League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 395.

26

C.

Registered Trademarks Are Not Government Speech

The District Court erroneously held that trademark registrations are

government speech. JA__[Op.18]. Registering a trademarklike registering a
copyright or issuing a video poker license or patentis regulatory in nature and
does not give rise to any proprietary government interest. Cleveland v. United
States, 531 U.S. 12, 22-24 (2000). In exchange for meeting statutory criteria, the
government confers legal rights and legal advantages to protect marks
against interference from other private parties. B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at
1299-1301 (quotation marks omitted). Registration is designed to facilitate
private speech, not to promote a governmental message. Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001). The PTOs processing of registration
applications no more transforms private speech into government speech than when
the government issues permits for street parades; grants medical, hunting, fishing,
or drivers licenses; records property titles or birth certificates; or issues articles of
incorporation.
The District Court erred (JA__[Op.19-22]) in relying on Walker v. Texas
Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015), which held
that Texass specialty license plates convey government speech. Walker reasoned
that insofar as license plates have conveyed more than state names and vehicle
identification numbers, they long have communicated messages from the States.

27

Id. at 2248. For a century, States have used license plate slogans to urge action,
to promote tourism, and to tout local industries, and plate designs are often
closely identified in the public mind with the State. Id. (bracketing and quotation
marks omitted).
By contrast, as discussed above, the two million registered trademarks have
never communicated messages from the government. See supra pp.4, 23-24 &
n.4. No one thinks about the government when buying NIKE shoes, surfing
GOOGLE, or watching NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE games. Many marks, such as
ACLU and NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, represent organizations that regularly
oppose government regulation.
The District Court reasoned that in publishing the Official Gazette and the
Principal Register, the government is the literal speaker. JA__[Op.25]. But
the government publishes copyright registrations, and thus the courts theory
would permit the government to discriminate against books based on content and
viewpoint. The government could refuse to provide permits for unpopular rallies if
it simply posted all permits on the Internet.
Walker observed that Texas maintains direct control over the messages on
specialty plates, including all design, color, typeface and alphanumeric patterns,
135 S. Ct. at 2249, and that Texas reserved the right to deny a plate for any reason,
id. at 2245. By contrast, the Lanham Act generally permits registration of any

28

distinctive mark that would not cause consumer confusion. And the PTO hardly
retains direct control over cancellation; it relies exclusively on private citizens to
seek cancellation. Infra pp.40-41.
D.

Registration Is Not a Government Subsidy

1. The District Court alternatively upheld 2(a) under the principle of Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), that the government may determine the contents
and limits of its programs. JA__[Op.26]. Rust is inapposite because it permits
viewpoint discrimination only when the government uses private parties to express
the governments own message. Rust upheld a Title X provision barring clinics
receiving federal funds for family planning services from advocating abortion. 500
U.S. at 192-95. Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the
counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to governmental
speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, [the Court has]
explained Rust on this understanding. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541. [V]iewpointbased funding decisions can be sustained in instances like Rust, in which the
government used private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its
own program. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
The District Courts reliance on Rust is profoundly disturbing. The PTO
does not use private speakers like NFL teams to transmit specific information
pertaining to [PTOs] own program. Id. Applying Rust would permit one

29

Administration to cancel registrations for NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION and

NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA as disparaging toward pro-life beliefs, and
another Administration to cancel registrations for ABORTION MUST END NOW and
REAL FEMINISTS ARE STILL PRO-LIFE as disparaging to pro-choice beliefs. 15
U.S.C. 1052(a).
2. The District Court also relied on Regan v. Taxation With Representation
of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983), which held that a legislatures decision not to
subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right.
JA__[Op.27]. But registration (i.e., a guarantee of legal protection) is not a
subsidy as that term has ever been understood. The Supreme Court has never
extended the subsidy doctrine to situations not involving financial benefits. Autor
v. Pritzker, 740 F.3d 176, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2014); accord Dept of Tex., Veterans of
Foreign Wars of the U.S. v. Tex. Lottery Commn, 760 F.3d 427, 436 (5th Cir.
2014); Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 509 (9th Cir. 1988). The
Courts subsidy cases involve tax exemptions (Regan); funding to fight AIDS
(Agency for Intl Dev. v. Alliance for Open Socy Intl, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321
(2013)); and Medicaid reimbursement for abortion (e.g., Harris v. McCrae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980)). Likewise, cases like Davenport v. Washington Assn, 551 U.S.
177 (2007), involved the unique context of public-sector agency-shop
arrangements, where the government, as employer, act[s] in a capacity other

30

than as regulator. Id. at 188, 190 (emphasis added); accord Ysursa v. Pocatello
Educ. Assn, 555 U.S. 353 (2009).
Trademark registration is just like registration of copyrights and patents, and
fundamentally differs from AIDS funding, Medicaid, and tax exemptions. The
Lanham Act is Commerce Clause legislation, not Spending Clause legislation. 15
U.S.C. 1051. Mark-owners are not government employees or grant recipients.
And it would be anomalous to label registration a financial subsidy when the PTO
charges would-be-registrants for the full amount of that subsidy. In 1991, the
USPTO became fully supported by user fees to fund its operations. PTO,
Performance and Accountability Report 9 (2014), http://www.uspto.gov/about/
stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2014PAR.pdf. Legal protections for trademarks are less of
a subsidy than taxpayer-funded police protection for rallies.
3. Even if registration is a subsidy, 2(a) imposes impermissible content
and viewpoint-discriminatory burdens.
First, the government may not discriminate based on viewpoint in the
Governments provision of financial benefits. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834
(citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 548); see, e.g., Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 548-49; NEA v.
Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). No case holds to the contrary.
Second, viewpoint discrimination aside, the disparagement clause is invalid
because it has nothing to do with a trademarks function, operation, or purpose.

31

The relevant distinction is between conditions that define the limits of the
governments spending programthose that specify the activities Congress wants
to subsidizeand conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech
outside the contours of the program itself. AID, 133 S. Ct. at 2328. The contours
of the program here are defined by the two purposes of registration:
One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in
purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark
which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it
asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of
a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in
presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his
investment from its misappropriation by pirates and
cheats.
S. Rep. No. 1333, at 3.
Content-based distinctions that do not further these purposes violate the First
Amendment. Otherwise Congress could withhold registration for goods it
disfavors (e.g., guns, fast food); services that risk injury (e.g., sports, skydiving);
goods that appeal to prurient interests (e.g., sex toys, pornography); or marks that
touch upon controversial topics regardless of viewpoint (e.g., abortion, political
activities).
The disparagement clause is not a valid content-based restriction. The
clause does not further a trademarks purpose but only burdens disfavored
expression. Disparaging marks prevent consumer confusion and secure to
owners the fruits of their investments every bit as much as non-disparaging marks.
32

If anything, 2(a) undermines these objectives. By making it harder to police

infringement, cancellation makes it harder for consumers to detect the source of
goods and for owners to capitalize on their investments. By contrast, with the
exception of 2(a)s ban on registering scandalous or immoral marks, the
other criteria for registration further content-neutral goals of preventing consumer
confusion.
II.

Section 2(a) Is Unconstitutionally Vague

Section 2(a) is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide a person

of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited and is so standardless

that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement. FCC v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (quotation marks
omitted). The District Court erroneously applied a relaxed vagueness review
standard, reasoning that 2(a) does not prohibit speech or impose penalties.
JA__[Op.31]. Section 2(a) chills speech, supra pp.17-19, and thus the more
stringent vagueness test applies. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982); accord City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer
Publg Co., 486 U.S. 750, 769-72 (1988). The most rigorous standard
independently applies because 2(a) is a regulatory scheme where the
government is acting as sovereign. Finley, 525 U.S. at 589; see Cleveland,

33

531 U.S. at 23; Fox, 132 S. Ct. at 2317. Regardless, under any standard, the
disparagement clause is unconstitutional.
A.

Section 2(a) Fails To Provide Fair Notice

Statutes fail to provide fair notice if they delegate[] basic policy matters to
[government officials] for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972), or impose a standard so
indefinite that [lawmakers are] free to react to nothing more than their own
preferences, Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578 (1974). Licensing regimes that
confer unbridled discretion on government examiners thus are unconstitutionally
vague. Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770.
The term may disparage is hopelessly subjective, indefinite, and
discretionary. Just as annoying is unconstitutionally vague because [c]onduct
that annoys some people does not annoy others, Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402
U.S. 611, 614 (1971), marks may trigger feelings of disparagement in some but not
others. There is no statutory definition[], narrowing context, or settled legal
meaning[]. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 561 U.S. 1, 20 (2010)
(quotation marks omitted). Nor is there a knowledge requirement to reduce[]
any potential for vagueness. Id. at 21. The mark-owners intent and views are
irrelevant. JA__[Op.42]; Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 125.

34

The PTO has acknowledged 2(a)s vagueness. The PTOs Assistant

Commissioner presciently informed Congress in 1939 that the word disparage
is going to cause a great deal of difficulty in the Patent Office, because it is
always going to be just a matter of the personal opinion of the individual parties as
to whether they think it is disparaging. Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the
Subcomm. on Trademarks of the H. Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong. 21 (1939)
(Hearings). In In re In Over Our Heads, the PTO explained: The guidelines for
determining whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging are somewhat vague and
the determination of whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging is necessarily a
highly subjective one. 1990 WL 354546, at *1 (TTAB 1990) (bracketing and
quotation marks omitted). In Harjo, the PTO observed that whether a mark is
disparaging is highly subjective and, thus, general rules are difficult to postulate.
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 1999 WL 375907, at *35 (TTAB 1999).
Numerous courts have found disparage or similar terms impermissibly
vague. A university policy barring statements that were demeaning of or
promoted negative connotations about a racial or ethnic affiliation was
unconstitutionally vague, because different people find different things
offensive. Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1182, 1184 (6th Cir.
1995); accord Bullfrog, 847 F.2d at 513 (invalidating regulation of audio-visual
materials that attack or discredit economic, religious, or political views or

35

practices); Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2001)
(requiring school to adopt guidelines to avoid sponsoring or disparaging religious
beliefs was impermissibly vague). While a split First Circuit held that
disparaging was not vague, the majority left open the possibility that it would be
vague as part of a government licensing scheme[], where the concern over
subjective decision making has most effect. Ridley, 390 F.3d at 94. Moreover,
Ridley involved an agencys initial refusal to sell limited advertising space shown
to captive audiences in city subways, not an agencys decision to cancel valuable
50-year old trademark registrations. Id. at 69.
The District Court observed that dictionaries define disparage,
JA__[Op.32], but those definitions are themselves vague. Merriam-Websters
defines disparage as, inter alia, to describe (someone or something) as
unimportant, weak, bad, etc. JA__[D.E.60-18]. Terms like bad do not
meaningfully constrain the adjudicators discretion.
The District Court noted that the Supreme Court uses the term disparaging
to determine when legislative prayer is constitutional. E.g., Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1823-24 (2014). But that doctrine regulates
government conduct, where vagueness rules do not apply. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has held the phrase patently offensive unconstitutionally vague
notwithstanding that it formed part of the Courts obscenity test. Reno v. Am. Civil

36

Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 872-73 (1997). And the statutory phrase credible
and reliable is unconstitutionally vague, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352
(1983), even though both terms form parts of constitutional tests, HLP, 561 U.S. at
15; Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 720 (2012).
Section 2(a) is vague apart from the word disparage. It leaves grave
uncertainty about how to estimate the perceptions of the referenced group.
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015). The PTO requires a
substantial composite but has not defined that term, except to say it is not
necessarily a majority. JA__[TTAB71]. The court below held that Petitioners
need not meet any specific threshold. JA__[Op.61]. The district court in Harjo
held that 36.6% of Native Americans was insufficient. 284 F. Supp. 2d at 133
n.32. The PTO in this case found that 30% without doubt was sufficient because
[t]o determine otherwise means it is acceptable to subject to disparagement 1 out
of every 3 individuals, or as in this case approximately 626,095 out of 1,878,285 in
1990. JA__[TTAB71]. That logic has no stopping pointis it acceptable to
subject to disparagement 187,829 people (10%)? Or 18,783 people (1%)? Why
not 8 people? This Court has invalidated indistinguishable provisions. N.C. Right
to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 283-85 (4th Cir. 2008) (statute governing
communications to significant number of registered voters) (emphasis added);

37

see also Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557-59 (statute criminalizing conduct that presents
serious potential risk of injury) (emphasis added).
Nor has the government explained what qualifies as a composite. Must
that reflect the views of group members of different ages, genders, geographic
regions, tribal enrollments? The statutes temporal aspect compounds the
vagueness. The PTO must determine whether a term was disparaging to a
substantial composite a particular group, not as of the present day, but 50
years ago or more.
Alternatively, 2(a) is vague as applied, because the lengthy procedural
history shows that the [Team] did not have fair notice of what was forbidden.
Fox, 132 S. Ct. at 2317-18. Fair notice was absent in Fox because the government
at the time of a television broadcast permitted fleeting expletives, then
retroactively changed course. Id. at 2318. The PTO concluded six times from
1967 to 1990 that the Redskins marks were not disparaging, then abruptly reversed
course. The Redskins had no notice that the PTO would change its mind, but the
PTO nonetheless applied its interpretation retroactively to revoke the registrations.
[A] regulatory change this abrupt on any subject would violate fair notice,
but [that] is surely the case when applied to regulations that touch upon
sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms. Fox, 132 S. Ct. at 3218
(quotation marks omitted). The Team had reason to suppose that [its trademark]

38

would not violate the rule, yet [it] was [found in violation] nonetheless. HLP, 561
U.S. at 23 (giving example that lawyer could not be retroactively disciplined under
state bar rule for media statements he reasonably thought permissible).
B.

Section 2(a) Fosters Arbitrary Enforcement

Section 2(a) fosters arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, driven by the

subjective personal views of PTO officials. According to the PTO, prior
registrations that are similar to the applicants do[] not bind the [PTO]. In re
Heeb Media LLC, 2008 WL 5065114, at *9 (TTAB 2008). The often-stated
maxim that each case must be decided on its own facts never rings so loudly as it
does in Section 2(a) refusals. In re Hines, 1994 WL 456841, at *5 (TTAB 1994).
As a result, PTO decisions are arbitrary and unpredictable:
Registration GRANTED

Registration DENIED as Disparaging

HEEB (June 29, 2004)

HEEB, Heeb, 2008 WL 5065114, at *1

DYKE NIGHT (May 22, 2012)

FAG FABULOUS AND GAY
(Sept. 20, 2005)
DAGO SWAGG (June 4, 2013)
WILD INJUN (Jan. 28, 1992)
SQUAW (Oct. 30, 2007)

2 DYKE MINIMUM (Office Action

Oct. 11, 2007)
MARRIAGE IS FOR FAGS (Office
Action Nov. 19, 2008)
DAGO MARYS
(Office Action Jan. 17, 2007)
URBAN INJUN
(Office Action Nov. 19, 2007)
SQUAW, In re Squaw Valley Dev. Co.,
2006 WL 1546500 (TTAB 2006)

39

Other examples abound. The PTO concluded that BLACK TAIL for an adult
entertainment magazine does not disparage African-American women, Boswell v.
Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 1999 WL 1040108 (TTAB 1999), that JAP does not
disparage Japanese Americans, In re Condas S.A., 1975 WL 20869 (TTAB 1975),
and that MOONIES does not disparage the Unification Church, Over our Heads,
1990 WL 354546. PTO examiners have registered OFF-WHITE TRASH,
DANGEROUS NEGRO, CELEBRETARDS, STINKY GRINGO, MIDGET-MAN, and YID
DISH, and LITTLE INDIAN GIVER, among countless examples. There is no rhyme or
reason to the PTOs approval of some marks and disapproval of others.
The District Court held that the PTO sets forth sufficient guidelines
because it posts examiners decisions on its website, published instructions in
its Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure, and adopted a dictionary definition
of disparage in Harjo. JA__[Op.33]. But posting arbitrary and inconsistent
decisions on the Internet informs the public only that the decisions are arbitrary
and inconsistent. The Manual states, circularly, that a mark may be disparaging
to a substantial composite of the referenced group when the mark may offend the
sensibilities of the group. TMEP 1203.03(b) (2015). The dictionary definitions
are no more clarifying.
The government contends that procedural limitations protect registrationholders because the TTAB itself does not initiate cancellation, JA__[D.E.127at5

40

n.5], and instead waits for anyone who alleges [he is] disparaged to seek
cancellation, PTO, TTAB Manual of Procedure 309.03(b) (2015). But delegating
enforcement discretion to the whim of 300 million citizens renders 2(a) more
arbitrary, unpredictable, and discriminatory, not less. As the government has told
the Supreme Court, [t]o arm millions of private citizens with such potent relief
unacceptably chills speech. Brief for United States at 25, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, No.
02-575 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2003).
THE REDSKINS is not the only registered mark touching on the subject of
race. AUNT JEMIMAs logo is one example. M.M. Manring, Slave in a Box: the
Strange Career of Aunt Jemima (1998). There are others, including the registered
logos of CHIQUITA, UNCLE BENs, and CREAM OF WHEAT. A. Taube, 15 Racist
Brand Mascots and Logos that Make the Redskins Look Progressive, Business
Insider, June 19, 2014. And many involve Native Americans, like ESKIMO JOES,
RED MAN, and LITTLE INDIAN GIVER. This case sets a dangerous precedent.
Because the government outsources enforcement of 2(a) to anyone alleging
offense from a registered mark, affirming the decision below would allow anyone
to seek cancellation not only of the registrations above, but also potentially to
harass many longstanding non-profit organizations like UNITED NEGRO COLLEGE
FUND, NAACP, and ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CITIZENS.

41

III.

The Governments Delay Violates Due Process

The massive delay between registration and cancellation deprived the

Redskins of [t]he fundamental requirement of due processthe opportunity to

be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quotation marks omitted). By 2006, when
Petitioners sought cancellation, the best evidence of what Native Americans
thought in 1967 was long gone.
1. The District Court erroneously held that due process does not apply
because trademark registrations are not property interest[s]. JA__[Op.35]. If
that were true, the government could cancel decades-old registrations at will,
without any hearing or even notice. But when an interest has been initially
recognized and protected by law, the procedural guarantees of [due process]
apply whenever the State seeks to remove or significantly alter that protected
status. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1976). Thus, for example, [o]nce
licenses are issued, they are not to be taken away without procedural due
process. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). Where the law engendered a
clear expectation of continued enjoyment of a license, the license-holder has
asserted a legitimate claim of entitlement that he may invoke at a hearing.
Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 n.11 (1979).

42

The government initially recognized and protected the Redskins marks in

1967, giving the Team a legitimate claim of entitlement and a clear expectation
of continued enjoyment. Indeed, the Lanham Act protects marks indefinitely.
McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 756 F.3d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 2014). The
government cannot remove or significantly alter that protected status, Paul, 424
U.S. at 710-11, without procedural due process, Bell, 402 U.S. at 539.
Further, the Lanham Act authorizes mark-owners to sell their registered
marks, 15 U.S.C. 1060, and to exclude others from infringing them, id. 1114.
These are the hallmarks of a protected property interest. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (describing
Lanham Act provisions dealing with infringement of trademarks, which are the
property of the owner because he can exclude others from using them).
The D.C. and Federal Circuits have held that cancelling trademark
registrations triggers due process. J.C. Eno (U.S.) Ltd. v. Coe, 106 F.2d 858, 85960 (D.C. Cir. 1939); P.A.B. Produits et Appareils de Beaute v. Satinine Societa in
Nome Collettivo di S.A.e.M. Usellini, 570 F.2d 328, 332, 334 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
The Federal Circuit later held that a company lacked a constitutionally protected
property interest in obtaining federal registration. In re Intl Flavors and
Fragrances Inc., 183 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). Even
were that correct, but see McGinley, 660 F.2d at 484, cancellation is fundamentally

43

different. See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78
(1972) (contrasting firing tenured professors with refusing to renew a one-year
contract).
Finally, stigmatizing charges paired with damage to tangible interests
trigger due process. Johnson v. Morris, 903 F.2d 996, 999 (4th Cir. 1990)
(quotation marks omitted). Here, the charge that Redskins disparages Native
Americans tarnishes the Teams name and would significantly alter the Teams
tangible rights. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573; Paul, 424 U.S. at 708.
2. The delay between the registrations of the marks and the cancellation
petition in 2006 violated due process. That delay was 39 years for the 1967 mark,
32 years for the 1974 marks, 28 years for the 1978 marks, and 16 years for the
1990 mark. To determine whether unreasonable delay violates the Fifth
Amendment, courts weigh the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendants assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. United States v.
Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency, 461
U.S. 555, 564 (1983).
First, the length of delay is quite significant. Id. at 565 (18 months is
quite significant). Second, no good reason justifies the delay. If the PTO
thought the marks violated 2(a), it could have denied registration. Third, the
Team has consistently argued that the delay violated it rights. Fourth, the delays

44

are seriously prejudicial because they hampered the [Team] in presenting a

defense on the merits, through, for example, the loss of witnesses or other
important evidence. Id. at 569. For instance, the Redskins could not:
Take contemporaneous surveys of Native American views in 1967, 1974,
1978, and 1990. Harjo, 565 F.3d at 883; Harjo, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 5758; Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 143 & n.37. These surveys would have
provided the best evidence of the collective views of Native Americans,
and it is impossible to overstate the significance of the lost opportunity.
Procure contemporaneous testimony about prevailing viewpoints of the
1960s and 1970s. Memories fade, and what has been forgotten can
rarely be shown. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
Procure testimony from Edward Bennett Williams, the Redskins
president from 1965-1980, who died in 1988. Petitioners rely heavily on
Williams 1972 meeting with Native Americans. Infra p.56. His
testimony about that meeting would have been highly relevant, and Mr.
Williams may very well have had other interactions with Native
Americans that would have provided contemporaneous evidence of their
opinions of the Redskins name. Harjo, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 57.
Procure testimony about a purported 1973 Redskins-related resolution
of the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) on which
Petitioners and the District Court relied. Infra p.57. The Team disputes
the existence of the resolution, and its purported author died in 1993.
IV.

The Redskins Trademarks Were Properly Registered

First, 2(a) does not cover disparagement of groups. Second, 2(a) sets a

far higher standard for disparagement than the one the District Court applied.
Third, under any standard, Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the marks were disparaging in 1967, 1974, 1978, or 1990, the dates
of registration.
45

A.

Section 2(a) Applies Only to Identifiable Persons

Although not raised below, it is fairly possible to construe 2(a) to avoid

any constitutional issue in this case. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S.
224, 237 (1998). Section 2(a)s prohibition of disparagement of persons, living or
dead refers only to identifiable individuals or corporations. 15 U.S.C. 1052(a).
The Lanham Act defines person as a juristic person as well as a natural person,
and defines juristic person as a firm, corporation, union, association, or other
organization capable of suing and being sued in a court of law. 15 U.S.C. 1127.
Those definitions equally apply to the plural term persons. Id. The Act
accordingly protects specific, identifiable individuals or juristic persons. It is not
concerned with groups as a whole, like blondes, lawyers, vegetarians, women, or
racial and ethnic groups. Indeed, the phrase living or dead, which modifies
persons, makes little sense as a modifier of an entire group, such as a gender.
And interpreting persons to mean a group of individuals sharing some quality or
affinity would render meaningless 1127s exclusion of an association of
individuals from the definition of person unless the association can sue or be
sued.
Nor does it make sense that Congress intended to prohibit registration of
marks that falsely suggest a connection with a group, as opposed to an
identifiable person[]. 15 U.S.C. 1052(a). And other federal statutes that

46

include groups so specify. E.g., 7 U.S.C. 1906 (Nothing in this chapter shall
be construed to prohibit, abridge, or in any way hinder the religious freedom of any
person or group.).
The legislative history shows that Congress worried about Abraham
Lincoln gin and terms that disparage[d] specific people of eminence or
juristic persons and institutions, like Harvard or the New York Athletic Club.
Hearings 18-21. The Act thus embrac[ed] concepts of the right to privacy and
the right to control the use of ones identity in commerce. Univ. of Notre Dame
Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
It is not plausible that Congress sub silentio intended to bar famous trademarks like
AUNT JEMIMA, which was registered well before the Lanham Act, but which may
disparage African-Americans under the PTOs regime. Marning, Slave in a Box,
supra.
Congress legislated against the legal backdrop that the term disparagement
addressed statements injuring a business-owners commercial interests, and not
someones personal reputation. Restatement (First) of Torts 573 cmt. g
(1938); id. 629. Congress presumptively intended to incorporate this settled
principle, which precludes the notion that 2(a) covers all potentially negative
statements about any groups identity. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,

47

263 (1952). And if 2(a) does not extend to groups, the PTO lacked statutory
authority to cancel the registrations.
B.

The District Court Applied the Wrong Test for Disparagement

Even assuming 2(a) protects groups from disparaging marks, the District
Court applied a test that does not adequately capture the groups views and that
does not adequately guard against grave constitutional doubts.
1.

The Statute Requires at Least a Majority

This Court should interpret 2(a) to require that at least a majority of the
referenced group finds the mark disparaging. See Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 133
n.32 (36.6% not a substantial composite in the context of this case).
Substantial means being largely but not wholly that which is specified.
Merriam-Websters Collegiate Dictionary 1245 (11th ed. 2003) (emphasis added).
The District Courts undefined minority standard creates a hecklers veto,
one of the most persistent and insidious threats to first amendment rights.
Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1001 (4th Cir. 1985). And a majority
requirement reduces (but by no means eliminates) the vagueness inherent in the
statute. See supra pp.37-38. No one has identified how many Native Americans
constitute a substantial composite, an omission that precludes a meaningful
defense. Because the District Court applied a minority test, the court held that all
of the teams evidence that Native Americans took pride in the Teams name was

48

simply irrelevant. JA__[Op.59-61]. Whether some or even most Native

Americans favored the name did not matter. Id.
The District Court cited Federal Circuit decisions rejecting a majority
requirement, JA__[Op.36], but none of those cases involved cancellation. The
Federal Circuit has held only that a minority suffices to show a prima facie case
that a mark violates 2(a), at the initial, ex parte application stage. E.g., In re
Boulevard Entmt, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1339-41 (Fed. Cir. 2003). But in a
cancellation proceeding, as distinguished from an opposition or an ex parte
proceeding, where long established and valuable rights may be involved,
cancellation must be granted with due caution. W.D. Byron & Sons, Inc. v. Stein
Bros Mfg. Co., 377 F.2d 1001, 1003 (C.C.P.A 1967). That is why a preponderance
standard applies in a cancellation proceeding but not an ex parte proceeding, and a
majority standard should too.
If this Court applies a majority requirement, the Team is entitled to summary
judgment. Petitioners made no attempt to quantify the percentage of Native
Americans who may have found the marks disparaging at any relevant time.
JA__[TTAB84] (Bergsman, J., dissenting).
2.

The Statute Requires a Representative Sample

The District Court held that those with non-mainstream views on whether
a term is disparaging can certainly constitute a substantial composite of a

49

referenced group. JA__[Op.59]. Because that holding at a minimum raises grave

constitutional doubts, this Court should apply the substantial composite test to
require a representative sample or cross-section of the referenced group. See In re
Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Composite
means combining the typical or essential characteristics of individuals making up
a group. Merriam-Websters 255. Courts require a representative cross-section in
analogous contexts. Speech may not be proscribed as obscene unless the average
person would find it so and no segment of the community would ascribe serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to it. Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 23-25 (1973). Likewise, a fair-cross-section requirement ensures that juries
reflect the judgment of the community, which is absent if the jury pool is made
up of only special segments. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
3.

The Statute Requires Actual Disparagement

The District Court incorrectly read 2(a)s may disparage language to bar
registration of marks that are capable of being viewed as disparaging, regardless of
whether they actually disparage. JA__, __[Op.44-45,63]. Congress used the term
may to eliminate an intent requirement, Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 124-25, not to
eliminate an actual disparagement requirement. The PTO has repeatedly held,
including in this case, that the question is whether the mark is disparaging, not
whether it hypothetically might be. Board decisions require proof of

50

disparagement, not merely capacity to disparage. JA__[A291]; In re Lebanese

Arak Corp., 2010 WL 766488, at *8 (TTAB 2010) (test is whether the mark does,
in fact, disparage).
Just about everything is potentially disparaging to someone, and Congress
could not have intended to write a statute that broad and indeterminate. And
barring trademarks that are potentially disparaging to a substantial composite
of a group independently renders the statute unconstitutionally vague. Johnson,
135 S. Ct. at 2557-58 (serious potential risk is unconstitutionally vague)
(emphasis added). Divining whether a mark may potentially disparage groups
50or 500years ago is a bankrupt exercise.
C.

Petitioners Failed to Show That the Redskins Marks Disparaged a

Substantial Composite of Native Americans

Even under the standard applied below, a preponderance of the evidence did
not show that the marks may disparage a substantial composite of Native
Americans at the times of registration. In an exhaustive, 50-page opinion, the D.C.
district court concluded in Harjo that [t]here is no evidence in the record that
addresses whether the use of the term redskin(s) in the context of a football team
and related entertainment services would be viewed by a substantial composite of
Native Americans, in the relevant time frame, as disparaging. Harjo, 284 F.
Supp. 2d at 144.

51

That is again true. Virtually all the evidence the District Court cited is
legally irrelevant under 2(a) because it: (1) pertains to the use of the term
redskin in contexts other than football; (2) represents the views of non-Native
Americans; (3) post-dates the relevant time periods; or (4) represents the opinions
of individual Native Americans, not a substantial number. See Harjo, 284 F.
Supp. 2d at 127-36. The court disregarded significant, unrebutted evidence that
many Native Americans took pride in the Teams name in 1967 and thereafter.
The Team was entitled to summary judgment. But at a minimum, Petitioners were
not. At every turn, the court ignored the summary judgment standard, resolving
conflicting evidence against the Redskins and drawing inferences in the light most
favorable to Petitioners.
1.

1967

The three types of evidence the District Court cited failed to show, by a
preponderance, that a substantial composite of Native Americans in 1967
considered Redskins disparaging in the context of a football team.
Dictionary Usage Labels. The District Court relied on three dictionaries
from 1898-1967 that gave negative usage labels, like often offensive, to the
term redskin. JA__[Op.43]. But generic dictionary usage labels do not reflect
attitudes towards the term in connection with the services described in [the]
application for registration, i.e., professional football. Mavety, 33 F.3d at 1371.

52

They reflect opinions of dictionary editors, or a dictionary editors best guess about
how the general public might feel about a word. No evidence showed that any
usage label reflected the views of any Native American. Although the Federal
Circuit has considered dictionary labels in determining whether a term is
offensive to the general public under 2(a)s scandalous and immoral
clause, that court has never considered dictionary labels dispositive of how any
specific group might react to a term. See Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 129-30 (views
of the general populace and the Native American population are distinct). The
Federal Circuit has criticized dictionary labels even as measures of the general
publics attitudes. Mavety, 33 F.3d at 1373. Prior Federal Circuit cases relying
upon dictionary evidence, see JA__[Op.44-45], arose from ex parte proceedings,
where a prima facie standard applies.
Even if dictionary labels are relevant, they undermine the decision below.
Of the 14 dictionary definitions for redskin in evidence between 1960 and
1967the relevant period for the 1967 markonly two contain the usage label
often offensive. JA__[D.E.81-2at3]. This suggests the term was not regarded as
disparaging in 1967. E.g., Mavety, 33 F.3d at 1374 (dictionaries insufficient to
show views of substantial composite where other dictionaries did not designate
the term as vulgar).

53

Scholarly, Literary, and Media References. The District Court identified

three pre-1967 sourcesa 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica article and two journal
articlescritical of the term redskin. JA__[Op.47]. Three. It is remarkable that
Petitioners came up with so little supporting their position in the hundreds of years
between the first use of the term redskin and 1967. JA__[R.E.83-1at3-4].
Worse, none of these sources addressed the term in connection with football.
The court relied on a 1963 article stating that [a]most all the students at
the Haskell Institute, a Native American vocational school, resent being called
redskins. JA__[Op.47]. This kind of sourceless hearsay would have no probative
value even if it referenced football, which it did not, and even if disputed facts
could be resolved against the Redskins, which they cannot. The authors offered no
explanation for their assertion. JA__[D.E.73-21at4].
Contrary to the District Courts conclusion (JA__, __[Op.47,51]), a 1911
Encyclopedia Britannica entry noting that the term redskin is not in such good
repute as the corresponding German and French terms is not an authoritative
source of what Native Americans thought in 1967 about a football team. Nor is a
single sentence in a 1962 article criticizing the term redskin in isolation. JA__,
__[Op.47, 51].
Statements of Individuals or Group Leaders. The District Court relied on
declarations created for this litigation from four prominent Native Americans.

54

JA__[Op.54-57]. Their self-serving, present-day testimony does not reliably

reflect the views of a substantial composite of Native Americans decades agoand
certainly not undisputedly so at summary judgment. Such historical recollections
are invariably tainted by subsequent exposure and current views. Further,
Petitioners presented no evidence that [these statements] are a reasonable proxy
for a substantial composite of the entire Native American population. Harjo, 284
F. Supp. 2d at 135. Extrapolating the views of a broader population from the
views of so few is critically flawed. JA__[D.E.82-1-2at19-36].
Similarly self-serving is the 1993 NCAI Executive Council resolution
adopted to support the Harjo cancellation petitionstating that the Teams name
had always been disparaging. JA__[D.E.73-68at2]; JA__[Op.58]. The court
found this resolution probative of NCAIs constituent members collective
opinion during the entire relevant time period. JA__[Op.58-59]. A tribal
organizations retroactive declaration by fiat is not evidence that any Native
American viewed the Teams name as disparaging in 1967. Harjo, 284 F. Supp.
2d at 135. Nor does the Executive Council of a tribal organization invariably
reflect the views of its members, any more than the U.N. Security Council
invariably reflects the views of humankind. At a minimum, a reasonable factfinder could disregard this as evidence of Native American attitudes in 1967. And

55

again, the NCAI did not oppose the marks before the PTO in 1967 or seek
cancellation thereafter.
2.

1974, 1978, and 1990

With respect to the five marks registered in 1974, 1978, and 1990, the
District Court additionally relied on a 1972 meeting between then-Team President
Edward Bennett Williams and eight Native American leaders who objected to
the Teams name, including then-NCAI President Leon Cook. JA__[Op.52-53].
The court termed this meeting strong evidence that the term may disparage.
JA__[Op.53]. But there was no evidence that these eight leaders represented the
views of their organizations, much less the views of a substantial composite of
Native Americans. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 135. Cook testified that the
attendees were activists and that the NCAI membership did not endorse[] the
meeting. JA__[D.E.88-13at10-12]. And even if Cook spoke for the NCAI, the
NCAIs positions are far outside the mainstreamthe organization wants to ban
any Indian-related team names, mascots, and logos. NCAI, Ending the Legacy of
Racism in Sports & the Era of Harmful Indian Sports Mascots 8, 9 (Oct. 2013).
And again, after that meeting, neither Cook nor anyone else opposed the
registration of additional marks in 1974, 1978, or 1990, or sought their
cancellation. At a minimum, whether the participants in the meeting represented
Native Americans more broadly was a disputed issue of fact.

56

The District Court improperly credited Cooks assertion in 2015 testimony

that the NCAI General Assembly in 1973 purportedly approved by voice vote an
oral resolution calling for the Team to change its name. JA__[D.E.88-13at15];
JA__[Op.55]. There is no record of thisnothing in NCAIs files, no newspaper
reports. Nothing. Petitioners witnesses, including Cook, testified that the NCAI
documented its resolutions, JA__[D.E.88-13at14-17]; JA__[D.E.71-2at4], yet there
was no documentation of this resolution. Again, the court was supposed to
resolve conflicting evidence and draw inferences in the Teams favor, but did the
opposite.
Dictionary evidence from 1960-1990 is non-probative for the reasons
discussed. See supra pp.52-53. In any event, only a minority of dictionaries for
that period attached negative usage labels to the word redskin. JA__[D.E.81-2at35]; see Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 130-31; JA__[TTAB89-92] (Bergsman, J.,
dissenting).
The post-1967 newspaper articles reporting certain Native Americans
efforts to change the Teams name or describing individual objections to the name
are not probative either. Cf. JA__[Op.47-51]. [I]t is impossible to determine if
[these articles] would represent a substantial composite of Native Americans.
Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 135. The District Court credited these articles as
probative of whether the Team name is disparaging based on the evidence

57

presented in Geller, Heeb Media, and Squaw Valley. JA__[Op.51]. But those
cases involved the prima facie evidence standard applicable to refusals to register,
not the preponderance standard applicable to cancellations. Squaw Valley, 2006
WL 1546500, at *15; Heeb, 2008 WL 5065114, at *7; see In re Geller, 751 F.3d
1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2014). And all but 12 articles were published after 1978, yet
the court inappropriately considered all the articles retroactively probative of what
Native Americans thought in 1974 and 1978.
This evidence did not support cancellation of the 1974, 1978, or 1990 marks,
and certainly not on summary judgment.
3.

Supplemental Evidence Does Not Justify Departing from

Harjo

Defendants offered no supplemental evidence justifying a departure from

the D.C. district courts decision in Harjo, which granted summary judgment to the
Team because, among other reasons, the evidence did not prove disparagement.
Cf. JA__[Op.64-65]. Harjo considered most of the evidence the District Court
cited as new, including the 1972 meeting, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 135, testimony
from individual Native Americans, and efforts by Native American advocacy
organizations, id. The Haskell article is irrelevant, supra p.54, and the fact that the
University of Utah changed the name of its mascot is not probative of the views of
a Native Americansespecially given that at least 20 Native American sports
teams simultaneously retained the name Redskins, infra p.60. And Dr. Nunbergs
58

[a]dditional data analysis, JA__[Op.65], filter[ed] out all use of the term
redskins in the professional football context, JA__[TTAB36]. That is why Harjo
rejected Nunbergs original analysis. 284 F. Supp. 2d at 127. Filtering out sports
references renders Nunbergs analysis incomplete and scientifically unsound.
JA__[D.E.84-1at7-8].
4.

Native Americans Supported the Teams Name

The District Court disregarded extensive evidence that many Native

Americans did not regard the term Redskins, in connection with sports, as
disparaging in 1967 and thereafter. Most significant is the telling, undisputed
fact that the six marks at issue were published and registered without opposition
from Native Americans or anyone else on twelve different occasions. Harjo, 284
F. Supp. 2d at 136 n.34. That not a single Native American asked the PTO to
refuse to register or cancel the marks as disparaging in 1967, 1974, 1978, or 1990
overwhelmingly shows that a substantial composite of Native Americans did not
consider them disparaging at those times.
As Harjo recognized, the Team adopted the name to associate itself with and
honor Native Americans, including its four Native American players and Native
American head coach. 284 F. Supp. 2d at 104; JA__[D.E.94-3at2]; JA__[D.E.983]. This is common in sports. It is simply a historical accident that the Team is the
Washington Redskins rather than any other Native American sports mascot. The

59

word red alone cannot make the name disparaging. Oklahoma, the name of a
U.S. State, means Red People in Choctaw.5
Indeed, at least 20 Native American schools across the country named their
own sports teams the Redskins between 1967 and 1990. JA__[D.E.84-1at3233]; JA__[D.E.84-4]; JA__-__[D.E.89-14to89-16;D.E.90-1to90-16;D.E.91-1to9116;D.E.92-1to92-16]; e.g., I. Shapira, In Arizona, a Navajo High School Emerges
as a Defender of the Washington Redskins, Washington Post, Oct. 26, 2014
(describing Red Mesa Redskins high school football team). In 1977, hundreds of
Native Americans representing 80 tribes competed for and participated in an AllIndian Half-Time Marching Band and Pageant at a Redskins-Cowboys game in
Washington, D.C. JA__[D.E.93-2.to.93-14]; JA__[D.E.98-7.to.98-10];
JA__[D.E.98-13.to.98-15]; JA__[D.E.99-8.to.99-13]; JA__[D.E.80at2]. The event
was coordinated by the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs, widely covered in tribal
newspapers, and broadly supported by prominent Native American organizations,
such as the National Tribal Chairmens Association, which represented the
countrys 750,000 Indians on reservations,6 and the National Indian Education
Association. Id.
5

Muriel H. Wright, Oklahoma Historical Society, Contributions of the Indian

People to Oklahoma (1936), http://digital.library.okstate.edu/Chronicles/v014/
v014p156.html.
6

As of 1972. JA__[D.E.129-4at5].

60

Haskell students and faculty were enthusiastic participants; the campus

paper described the event as a highlight of the year, JA__[D.E.98-14];
JA__[D.E.93-13]a key point the District Court ignored in crediting Petitioners
evidence about Haskell. No evidence showed that any Native American
organization or individual opposed this event. JA__[D.E.89-8at14-18]. In light of
the events prominence, the absence of any opposition is strong evidence that a
substantial composite of Native Americans did not view the Teams name as
disparaging between 1967 and 1978, when five of the six marks were registered.
Prominent Native American tribal leaders have expressed support for the
Teams name over the years. JA__, __, __[A9364;A9381-83;A9386-93]. In 1988,
former U.S. Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell said the name conveyed dignity
and respect. JA__[D.E.88-16]. And if later evidence is relevant, a survey
conducted in 2003-2004 by the University of Pennsylvanias independent National
Annenberg Election Survey questioned 768 Native Americans in 48 States, and
found that 90% did not consider the Teams name offensive. JA__[D.E.88-2];
JA__[D.E.82-1at19-20].
The District Court discounted all this because it purportedly does not show
that [] there is not a substantial composite of Native Americans who find the matter
was one that may disparage. JA__[Op.60]. But this evidence is the most
compelling proof of the collective Native American view toward the name

61

Redskins in the context of sports. At a minimum, there are genuine issues of

material fact. More broadly, it is unclear how a registrant could ever defend its
mark on the District Courts theory. Apparently nothing beyond conclusive
evidence that every single member of a group viewed the marks as nondisparaging would suffice.
V.

Laches Bars the Petition

Petitioners unreasonably delayed in seeking cancellation, and that delay

prejudiced the Redskins. Laches thus bars their claims. Natl R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121-22 (2002); Harjo, 565 F.3d at 882.
It is undisputed that (1) all Petitioners were aware of the Redskins marks
for many years before [their] eighteenth birthday, and that (2) nothing
prevent[ed] them from filing the Petition immediately after turning
eighteen. JA__[D.E.100at10]; JA__[D.E.118at4]; JA__[D.E.88-8at22-23]. The
oldest Petitioner waited six years; the youngest Petitioner, 11 months, 20
days. That was unreasonable. Norris v. United States, 257 U.S. 77, 80 (1921) (11
months); Tough Traveler, Ltd. v. Outbound Prods., 60 F.3d 964, 968 (2d Cir.
1995) (13 months). Petitioners were recruited by Harjo and represented by Harjo
counsel. They did not need a year to prepare this petition.
The delay prejudiced the Team because the Team continued to invest in
developing enormous goodwill in 2000-2006, including specifically in 2005-

62

2006, the year of the youngest defendants delay. JA__[D.E.100at10-11];

JA__[D.E.118at4]. Precise figures are in the millions. JA__[D.E.98-4(sealed)].
Forbes estimated that the value of the Teams brand management grew $18 million
in 2006 to $130 million. JA__[D.E.98-4at6]. That economic prejudice establishes
laches. [L]aches requires only general evidence of prejudice, which may arise
from mere proof of continued investment in the late-attacked mark alone. Harjo,
565 F.3d at 884.
The District Court erred in excusing all delay based on the pendency of
Harjo. JA__[Op.66-67]. The pendency of litigation by other people does not toll
a statute of limitations, and is likewise irrelevant for laches. In the patent context,
for example, other litigation excuses delay only if the claimant is herself
involved in the pending litigation, and the claimant notifies her prospective
opponent that she intends to sue once the pending litigation is concluded. Vaupel
Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia SPA, 944 F.2d 870, 877 (Fed. Cir.
1991). Petitioners did not so notify the Redskins. No Petitioner offered Harjo as a
reason for the delay, and indeed Petitioners sued while Harjo was pending. It
would be perverse to allow Harjo to excuse this delay when Harjo organized this
suit to avoid the consequences of her own years-long delay.
In conflict with the D.C. Circuit, the District Court alternatively held that the
public interest precludes a laches defense. JA__[Op.67]. But the Lanham Act

63

provides for laches [i]n all inter partes proceedings. 15 U.S.C. 1069. The
District Courts theory would make section 1069 meaningless as to
cancellation petitions. Harjo, 415 F.3d at 48. The prevailing public interest here
is in repose for the Redskins and other mark-owners who have spent decades
building their brand in reliance on registrations issued long ago.
CONCLUSION
The District Courts judgment should be reversed and summary judgment
should be entered in favor of the Redskins.
Dated: October 30, 2015

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Lisa S. Blatt
Lisa S. Blatt
Robert Alan Garrett
ARNOLD & PORTER LLP
601 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 942-5000
[email protected]
Robert L. Raskopf
Todd Anten
Jessica A. Rose
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
& SULLIVAN, LLP
51 Madison Ave., 22nd Floor
New York, NY 10010
(212) 849-7000
[email protected]
Counsel for Appellant
Pro-Football, Inc.

64

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF ORAL ARGUMENT

The Redskins request oral argument. This lawsuit challenges the PTOs
cancellation of decades-old registrations for valuable Redskins trademarks. Oral
argument will materially assist the Court in resolving the substantial constitutional
and statutory claims at issue.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(C), that
the attached Brief of Appellant contains 13,997 words and complies with the
typeface requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and the
type style requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(6) because it
has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Word 2007, in 14point Times New Roman font.

Dated: October 30, 2015

/s/ Lisa S. Blatt

Lisa S. Blatt

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 30, 2015, I electronically filed the foregoing
document with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using
the appellate CM/ECF system. I certify that all participants in the case are
registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the appellate
CM/ECF system.

Dated: October 30, 2015

/s/ Lisa S. Blatt

Lisa S. Blatt