Civil Law Review I Case Digests

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)
Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
CASE DIGEST
IN
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
Prof. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
SUBMITTED BY:
IV - LLB-4402

SURNAME
1ABRINA
2AQUILINO
3BACARRA
4BAET
5BANOCAG
6BARIA
7BERMUDO
8BUESER, AM
9BUESER, JM
10CARLOS
11DAVID
12DAYA
13DE GUZMAN
14DISTURA
15GARCIA
16GENUINO
17GEREMIA
18GONZAGA
19GONZALES
20GUILLERMO
21GUTIERREZ
22LAYSON
23MALABANAN
24MARTINEZ
25MENDOZA
26MOLINA
27NEPOMUCENO
28PATAUEG
29PIO
30RADOVAN
31RODRIGUEZ
32RONQUILLO
33SACRAMENTO
34SITJAR
35TELOG
36TOLENTINO
37TORRES
38YAMAT
CASES ASSIGNED for DIGEST

TANADA V. TUVERA to VAN DORN V. ROMILLO
QUITA V. CA to LLORENTE V. CA
VELAYO V. SHELL CO. PHILS to RCPI V. CA
MERALCO V. CA to REYES V. LIM
NDC V. MADRIGAL to SPS. PAHANG V. METROBANK
ABACAN V. NUI to REPUBLIC V. CA
SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC to REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO
ATENZA V. BRILLANTES to CHING MING TSOI V. CA
REPUBLIC V. MOLINA to FERRARIS V. FERRARIS
ZAMORA V. ZAMORA to CALISTERIO V. CALISTERIO
REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO to JIMENEZ V. REPUBLIC
OCAMPO V. FLORENCIANO to PELAYO V. LAURON
ILUSORIO V. ILUSORIO to ESTONINA V. CA
AYALA INVESTMENT V. CA to RELUCIO V. LOPEZ
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS BANK V. DAILO to SAGUID V. REY
HONTIVEROS V. RTC, BR.25 ILOILO to PATRICIO V. DARIO III
ANDAL V. MACARAIG to CABATANIA V. REGODOS
SAYSON V. CA to AGUSTIN V. PROLLAMANTE
IN RE CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN LIN to TAMARGO V. CA
LAHOM V. SIBULO to SANTOS V. CA
PEREZ V. CA to ATOK V. IAC
REPUBLIC V. GUZMAN to EVADEL REALTY V. SORIANO
NAZARENO V. CA to HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO V. CA
SERASPI V. CA to DBP V. CA
VILLANUEVA V. CA to REPUBLIC V. SILIM
QUILALA V. ALCANTARA to DIONISIO V. ORTIZ
ROMAN CATHOLIC V. CA to CITY OF ANGELES
REPUBLIC V. CA to DKC HOLDINGS V. CA
ARUEGO V. CA to BUGNAO V. UBAG
BAGTAS V. PAGUIO to NERA V. RIMANDI
CANEDA V. CA to AZNAR V. GARCIA
UNSON V. ABELLA to CANIZA V. CA
PECSON V. CORONEL to ROSALES V. ROSALES
FRANCISCO V. ALFONSO to DE PAPA V. CAMACHO
LLORENTE V. RODRIGUEZ to DIAZ V. IAC
DELA PUERTA V. CA to SARITA V. CANDIA
ABLLENA DE BACAYO V. BORROMEO to SANCHEZ V. CA
NAZARENO V. CA to BICARME V. CA

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I.
PRELIMINARY TITLE--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4
II.
HUMAN RELATIONS--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15
III.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29
IV.
CIVIL PERSONALITY--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 35
V.
CITIZENSHIP-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 36
VI.
MARRIAGE---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 39
VII.
VOID MARRIAGES------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 51
VIII.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 53
IX.
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 73
X.
LEGAL SEPARATION-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 77
XI.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 82
XII.
PROPERTY RELATIONS---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 85
XIII.
THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 108
XIV.
PATERNITY AND FILIATIOIN---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 116
XV.
ADOPTION----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 136
XVI.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 143
XVII.
CASES IN PROPERTY-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 152
XVIII.
CASES IN SUCCESSION----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 193

1) TAADA VS. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915. April 24, 1985
Doctrine:
The publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents.
Facts:
The petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders.
The respondents contend that the publication in the Official Gazette is not a requirement for the effectivity of the
laws where the laws provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date that they are to take effect, publication in the
Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity based on Article 2 of the Civil Code.
The interpretation of the respondent is in accord with the Courts construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions, the Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for an effectivity date - for the date of publication is material in determining its date of
effectivity which is the 15th day following its publication - but not when the law itself provides for the date when it
goes into effect.
Issue:
Whether there is still a need for publication of the presidential decrees with specified dates of effectivity.
Held:
Yes, there is still a need for publication. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Officila
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Section 1 of CA 638 provides that: Section 1.
There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature
of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as
have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of
documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and
legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official
Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must
be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing,
to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise
impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders
need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability"
is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect.
2) TAADA VS. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
Facts:
1. In the first Tanada case the petitioners were invoking due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law, which is Art. 2 of the Civil
Code. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
"otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately
upon their approval. In the decision of the case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
2. Petitioners are now moving for a reconsideration/clarification of the aforementioned decision.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the clause UNLESS IT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED solely refers to the fifteen-day
period and not to the requirement of publication.
2. Whether or not the word LAWS refer to all laws or only to those of general application.
3. Where should publication of said laws be made?
Held:
1. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make
the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteenday period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his
separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days
from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply
because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is
that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law be effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely
that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to
comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence.

It must be noted at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less
important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative
enactments of the government.
2. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.
Thus, all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature. Covered by this rule are:
a. Presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative
powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution;
b. Administrative rules and regulations, if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
also to a valid delegation;
c. Charter of a city;
d. Circulars issued by the Monetary Board if meant to fill in the details of the Central Bank Act which that
body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required for the following:
a. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not
the public;
b. Letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties;
c. Municipal ordinances, which are covered by the Local Government Code.
3. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of
the laws, and publication is to be made in the Official Gazette as decided upon in the first Tanada case, however,
the Court made this pronouncement:
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette,
considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly,
newspapers of general circulation could
better perform the function of communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily
available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is
not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2
of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If
it does, it obviously
has not yet been published.
At any rate, the Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we
find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to
interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article
2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the
legislature.

3) PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION v THE HON. SECRETARY OF

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, VIVENCIO DE MESA, RODRIGO MIKIN and CEDRIC LEYSON
G.R. No. 103144. April 4, 2001
Doctrine:
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise
of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred
by the Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letter
of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties
Facts:
Petitioner Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment. Sometime in January 1985, private respondents, who were
recruited by petitioner for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees in the amount of
P5,000.00 for private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de
Mesa and Cedric P. Leyson.
After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Arabia on January 29,
1985. They then began work for Al-Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign principal of petitioner.
While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a second contract on February 4, 1985
which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits
and privileges. On April 1, 1985, their foreign employer allegedly forced them to sign a third contract which
increased their work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic
monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third contract, the services of private respondents were terminated
by Al-Hejailan and they were repatriated to the Philippines.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa the return of their
placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. When petitioner
refused, they filed a case before the POEA against petitioner Philsa and its foreign principal, Al-Hejailan.
Several hearings were conducted before the POEA Hearing Officer. On the aspects of the case involving money
claims arising from the employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA rendered a decision dated
August 31, 1988, ordering respondent PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT AND SERVICE CORPORATION
to pay complainants, jointly and severally with its principal Al Hejailan. Almost simultaneous with the
promulgation of August 31, 1988 decision of the POEA on private respondents money claim, POEA issued
separate Order dated August 29, 1988 resolving the recruitment violation aspect of private respondents
complaint. In this order, POEA found petitioner liable for three (3) counts of illegal exaction, two (2) counts of
contract substitution and one count of withholding or unlawful deduction from salaries of workers.
From the said Order, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was subsequently denied. After the denial
of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. However, public
respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed en toto the assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but this was likewise denied. Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11,
Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of
publication.
Issue: Whether or not POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11 Series of 1983 is void for lack of publication?
Held: Yes, the said memorandum circular is void for lack of publication.

In Taada vs. Tuvera, the Court held, as follows:
"We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise
of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred
by the Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letter
of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties."
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared ineffective as the same was never
published or filed with the National Administrative Register. POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983
provides for the applicable schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or
authority holders. Under the said Order, the maximum amount which may be collected from prospective Filipino
overseas workers is P2,500.00. The said circular was apparently issued in compliance with the provisions of
Article 32 of the Labor Code.
It is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances which should be
published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or
filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues however that the imposition of administrative sanctions on petitioner
was based not on the questioned administrative circular but on Article 32 and Article 34 (a) 28 of the Labor Code.
The argument is not meritorious. The said articles of the Labor Code were never cited, much less discussed, in
the body of the questioned Orders of the POEA and Secretary of Labor and Employment. In fact, the said Orders
were consistent in mentioning that petitioner's violation of Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 was the
basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions against petitioner. Furthermore, even assuming that petitioner
was held liable under the said provisions of the Labor Code, Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code
presupposes the promulgation of a valid schedule of fees by the Department of Labor and Employment.
Considering that, as, previously discussed, Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 embodying such a
schedule of fees never took effect, there is thus no basis for the imposition of the administrative sanctions against
petitioner
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that the questioned administrative circular is not among those
requiring publication contemplated by Taada vs. Tuvera as it is addressed only to a specific group of persons
and not to the general public.
Again, there is no merit in this argument. The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group,
namely private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling in
Taada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres, the administrative circulars
questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies
engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper
publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or implemented.
Our pronouncement in Taada vs. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only
exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of
these exceptions.
4) Unciano Paramedical College c CA
G.R. No. 100335, April 7, 1993
Doctrine:

Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
is applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by the trial court with grave abuse of
discretion.
Facts:
On April 16, 1990, private respondents Elena Villegas and Ted Magallanes, thru their mothers, Victoria Villegas
and Jacinta Magallanes, respectively, filed before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 21, a petition for injunction and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against
petitioners Unciano Paramedical College, Inc., Mirando C. Unciano, Sr., Dominador Santos, Editha Mora, Dr.
Evelyn Moral and Laureana Vitug, they alleged therein that:
1.
On July 1989, the above-named students initiated a petition proposing to the school authorities the
organization of a student council in the school. They solicited support of their petition from the studentry by asking
the students to endorse the same with their signatures. They were able to get at least 180 signatures.
2.
On August 18, 1989, the students were summoned to the Office of Dr. Moral and were admonished
not to proceed with the proposal because, according to her, the school does not allow and had never allowed
such an organization.
3.
On October 28, 1989, in compliance with an announcement to see the Dean of Nursing, the abovenamed students met with Dean Vitug and Dr. Moral who informed them that they would be barred from enrollment
for the second semester because the school does not allow their students to put up a student council. Dr. Moral
advised them to get their Honorable Dismissal.
4.
On November 6, 1989, the students again approached Dr. Moral who informed them that they were
no longer allowed to enroll because they are allegedly members of the National Union of Students of the
Philippines (NUSP) and the League of Filipino Students (LFS), officers of the student organization they organized,
and, moreover 'drug addicts.' The students asked for proof of these accusations but were not given any.
5.
On 29 November 1989, the students were informed that the President had unilaterally refused to
allow them to enroll and it was up to their parents to request or appeal to the school officials to change their
decision. Mrs. Victoria Villegas and Mrs. Jacinta Magallanes wrote to the school officials to request that their
children be allowed to enroll . Dr. Moral informed them that the Board of Trustees will have to decide on these
requests.
6.
On 11 December 1989, the students were informed that the Board of Trustees had refused to grant
the parents' request."
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective May 17, 1990, enjoining petitioner school from not
enrolling private respondents in its College of Nursing and setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction on June 4, 1990.
Petitioners filed an opposition but the RTC still ordered the school to allow the students to enroll.
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC and based its the ruling in the recent case of Ariel Non, et al.
vs. Hon. Sancho Dames II, , May 20, 1990, the Supreme Court, abandoned and overruled its decision in Alcuaz
and declared thus:
The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest,
considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and
regulatory powers over all educational institutions. When a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is
enrolling for the entire school year
'Every student has the right to enroll in any school, college or university upon meeting its specific requirement and
reasonable regulation: Provided, that except in the case of academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary
regulation, the student is presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the entire period he is expected to his
complete his course without prejudice to his right to transfer.'
Hence the instant appeal.
Issue: If the Ariel Non Doctrine should be applied retroactively to govern and invalidate the legal effects of the
incidents that took place prior to its adoption and which incidents were proper and valid under the ALCUAZ
doctrine prevailing at the time said incident took place.

Held: No, the Non doctrine should not be applied to the instant case. Under the then prevailing Alcuaz doctrine
which was promulgated on May 2, 1988, the contract between them and private respondents was validly
terminated upon the end of the first semester of school year 1989-1990.
Although said doctrine was later abandoned in Non, et al. v. Dames II, et al., supra, this case was promulgated
much later, or on May 20, 1990, when the termination of the contract between them had long become fait
accompli. Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the
new doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on
the faith thereof. Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by the trial court with grave abuse
of discretion.
The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive effect to cases that arose before its promulgation on
May 20, 1990, as in this case, which was filed on April 16, 1990. If it were otherwise, it would result in oppression
to petitioners and other schools similarly situated who relied on the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on May
2, 1988, which recognized the termination of contract theory.
The contract between the parties was validly terminated upon the end of the first semester of school year 19891990, or in October, 1989. This is the status quo. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction which ordered petitioners to allow private respondents "to enroll for the first
semester of school year 1990-1190." 16 Guided by the Capitol case, certainly, this writ will not restore the status
quo but will go a step backward, then restore the condition preceding the status quo. Private respondents do not
possess any clear legal right to re-enroll, corollarily, petitioners are not obliged legally to re-admit them.
5) Cui v Arellano University
G.R. No. L-15127; May 30, 1961
Facts:
Plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant university from the school year 1948-1949. He finished his
law studies in the defendant university up to and including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the time
he was studying law in the defendant university, he was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that
his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the end of each semester and when his scholarship grants
were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the
latter from the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in the college of law or the
fourth year, is in total of P1,033.87. However, before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as
above stated, he was made to sign the following contract covenant and agreement which provides that in
consideration of the scholarship granted to him by the University, he waives his right to transfer to another school
without having refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent of his scholarship cash.
For the last semester of his law studies, plaintiff enrolled in the college of law of the Abad Santos
University and graduated therefrom. After graduating in law he applied to take the bar examination. Plaintiff then
petitioned the defendant university to issue to him the needed transcripts. However, the defendant refused until
after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he could not take the
bar examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the sum
which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this case.
Issue: Whether or not the said provision of the contract is valid.
Held: No, the stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. The practice of
awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not a good custom nor has it received some
kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano University. The
University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference to the
giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of
the scholarships if they transfer to other schools. The same goes for leading colleges and universities of the
United States after which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions scholarships are
granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help
gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien.
10

6) People vs Jabinal
55 SCRA 607
Facts:
On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in possession of a revolver without the requisite license or
permit. He claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had
appointments as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and as Confidential Agent from the PC
Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry
the said firearm. The accused further contended that in view of his appointments, he was entitled to acquittal on
the basis of the Supreme Courts decisions in People vs. Macarandang and in People vs. Lucero.
The trial court found the accused criminally liable for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition on the ground
that the rulings in Macarandang* and in Lucero* were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa**.
The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Courts rulings in the cases
of Macarandang and of Lucero.
Held: The appellant was acquitted.
Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law
means; this is the reason why Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides that, Judicial decisions applying and
interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system. The interpretation upon a law by the
Supreme Court constitutes in a way a part of the law as of the date the law was originally passed, since the
courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends
to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim legis
interpretatio legis vim obtinetthe interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force
of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and in Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law of
the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm and when he was arraigned by the trial
court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967,but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply
to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Considering that the appellant possessed a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in
Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm, the
appellant should be absolved. The appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was
held not to be punishable.
*The accused were acquitted for through their appointment as confidential/secret agent they were deemed to be
peace officers. Peace officers had the privilege of carrying firearms without license.
**Mapa was convicted although he was a secret/confidential agent. The court ruled that thelaw did not explicitly
provide that secret/confidential agents are among those who are exempted from acquiring a license to carry a
firearm.
7) Van Dorn vs. Romillio

139 SCRA 139
Doctrine:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law
Facts:
11

Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States. They were
married in Hongkong in 1972. After the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines. They begot
two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively. The parties were divorced in Nevada,
United States, in 1982 and petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. In 1983,
private respondent filed suit against petitioner alleging the petitioners business in Ermita (the Galeon Shop) is a
conjugal property of the parties and prayed that private respondent be declared with right to manage said
property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgement in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. The Court below denied the motion to dismiss
since the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree had no bearing in this case.
The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Issue: Whether the foreign divorce on the parties has affected the alleged conjugal property in the Philippines?
Held: It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept
of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
8) QUITA vs. CA
G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998
Facts: Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941, but not
blessed with any children. Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, USA, submitting as evidence their
agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. A decree of divorce
was granted on July 23, 1954. After 3 weeks, Fe married Felix Tupaz in San Francisco, but eventually ended into
a divorce. For the third time, she married again in USA.
April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed with RTC QC a petition for
issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Blandina Dandan, surviving spouse of Arturo, and their children opposed the petition. Later, Ruperto Padlan,
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of deceased Arturo, intervened. October, 7, 1987, Fe moved fot the
immediate declaration of heirs of deceased Arturo and distribution of his estate.
The trial court disregarded the divorce between Fe and Arturo, and expressed the view that their marriage
subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972.
Issues: Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo was void ab initio.
Whether or not Fe can be declared the primary beneficiary of Arturos estate.
Held: No, Blandinas marriage to Arturo was valid, thus, Fe cannot be declared a beneficiary to Arturos estate.
12

At the time Fe obtained a divorce decree against Arturo in San Francisco, she was already an alien and no longer
a Filipino citizen. Hence, the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines, since it is considered valid in Fes national
law, which is the USA law.
9) CATALAN vs. BRAGANZA
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007
Facts:
Felicitas Catalan married Orando on June 4, 1950. They migrated to USA and became naturalized citizens
thereof. On April 1988, they divorced.
June 16, 1988, Orlando married Merope in Pangasinan. Later, Felicitas filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with RTC Dagupan against Orlando and Merope, contending that Merope has a prior subsisting
marriage with Eusebio Bristol. RTC ruled in favor of Felicitas.
Issue: Whether Felicitas has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of Orlando on
the ground of bigamy.
Held: There is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage under the New
Civil Code, which is the law governing at the time of marriage between Orlando and Merope, nor even in the
Family Code. however, only a party who can demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to declare
the nullity of marriage must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based
on a cause of action.
In the instant case, Felicitas personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained
due to the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Thus, the case is remanded to trial court
for reception of additional evidence necessary.
10) SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS

G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007
Facts:
The case involves the settlement of Felicisimos estate. During his lifetime, he contracted 3 marriages. First was
with Virginia, who predeceased him. On May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, but ended to a
divorce, when Merry filed a divorce complaint in Hawaii and was granted. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married
Felicidad. Felicisimo died on December 18, 1992. Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and settlement of Felicisimos estate. She filed with RTC Makati a petition for letters of administration.
Rodolfo, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action, alleging that the petition should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna where Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death, and that Felicidad has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress.
Issue: Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the effectivity of
the Family Code.
Held: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as the surviving spouse of Felicisimo. But
there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce decree obtained by Merry, as well as the marriage
of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws of USA.
13

Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient, proof of its authenticity and due execution must also be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having
legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by
a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo solemnized in California USA, she only submitted photocopies of
the Marriated Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California. The Court, however, cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case was remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry and the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo.
11) AZNAR VS. GARCIA
7 SCRA 95
Facts:
CIF of Davao directed the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to
Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the
property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, of said residue to be payable to
Mrs. Carrie Louise C Borton, etc, in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E.
Christensen. Helen Christensen Garcia filed an opposition, as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged
natural child, she having been declared by the Court as one. The court ruled that Edward E. Christensen was a
citizen of the United States of America and of the State of California at the time of his death and he was domiciled
in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the Philippine Law shall govern the administration of the will of Edward Christensen.
Held: The Court ruled that the Philippine Law shall govern the testamentary disposition of Edward Christensen.
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the national law shall govern intestate and testamentary successions.
National law refers to the private law of the state of which the decedent is a citizen, in the case at bar, the private
law of the State of California. Article 94 of the Civil Code of State of California refers back the case, when a
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar.
12) BELLIS vs. BELLIS
20 SCRA 358
Facts:
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, United States. He had 5 legitimate children with his first wife, 3
legitimate children with hi second wife, and had 3 illegitimate children. On August 5, 1952, Amos Bellis executed a
will in the Philippines. July 8, 1958, Amos died.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project
of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children of Amos Bellis, and
therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. Under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs of legitimes.
Issue: Which law must apply Texas Law or Philippine Law?
Held: The decedents national law, which is the Texas law, governs the order of succession, the amount of
successional rights, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and the capacity to succeed.
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.
A provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine
Law and not with his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 16 of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.
14

Since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined
under Texas Law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos Bellis.
13) TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN vs. BOHANAN
G.R. No. L-12105, January 30, 1960
Facts:
On April 24, 1950, admitting to probate C. O. Bohanans last will and testament, executed on April 23, 1944 in
Manila, CFI found that the testator was born in Nebraska and a citizen of California, but temporarily stayed in the
Philippines for a long period of time. At the time of his death, he was a citizen of the United States and of the State
of Nevada, and his will was executed in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada. Out of his total estate of
P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and of all shares of stock of several mining
companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children, he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each.
Magdalena, his wife, and her 2 children opposed the validity of the testamentary provisions contending that the
will deprived them of their legitime.
Magdalena alleged that the trial court erred in recognizing the Reno divorce secured by the testator from his
Filipino wife Magdalena, and that divorce should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction.
According to the laws of the State of Nevada, no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife. The
divorce was granted to the testator on May 20, 1922.
Issue: Whether Philippine laws or the law of the State of Nevada should apply.
Held: The testator died in 1944, thus, the old Civil Code governs. The old Civil Code provides that successional
rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question.
The foreign law, specifically Section 9905, compiled Newada Laws, was introduced as evidence. That law can be
taken judicial notice by the Court, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of
partition.
According to Article 10 of the Old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are governed by the national
law of the testator, and it has been decided without dispute that the national law of the testator is that of the State
of Nevada, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will.
14) LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000
Facts:
Lorenzo (enlisted serviceman of the US Navy from March 10, 1927 Septermber 30, 1957) and Paula were
married on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo went back to the US while Paula
stayed in the conjugal home at Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was naturalized as an American
citizen. He visited the Philippines and discovered that his wife, Paula was pregnant and was living in with his
brother Ceferino.
On November 1, 1951, Lorenzo filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California and was
granted.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia in Manila and begot 3 children. On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo
executed a notarized Last Will and Testament. On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC for
the probate and allowance of his last will and testament, moving that Alicia be appointed as Special Administratrix
of his estate, but was denied because Lorenzo was still alive. On January 24, 1984, trial court admitted the will to
probate. On June 11, 1985, Lorenzo died. On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition for
letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor, contending that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse
and that the testamentary provisions in Lorenzos will encroached on her legitime and share in the conjugal
property.
Issue: Whether or not Paula is entitled to inherit from Lorenzos estate.
15

Held: Foreign law should apply. Lorenzos divorce decree with Paula is recognized as valid.
Foreign laws must be alleged and proved. Our courts do not take judicial notice of them.
The fact is Lorenzo became an American citizen long before and at the time of 1) his divorce from Paula; 2)
marriage to Alicia; 3) execution of his will; and 4) death. Issues arising from these incidents are governed by
foreign law.
Both RTC and CA decisions in hastily applying Philippine law are erroneous. Heres why:
1)
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
LORENZOs divorce from PAULA was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
2)
LORENZOs will is valid. Article 17 The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. In this case, whether the will
was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will
was duly probated. The trial court should not that Congress did not intend to extend the same succession (system
of legitime) to foreign nationals.
16

II. HUMAN RELATIONS
15) ALFREDO M. VELAYO vs. SHELL
G.R. No. L-7817, October 31, 1956.
FACTS
CALI, a domestic airline corporation, met with its creditors to inform them that the corporation was on the verge of
insolvency and had to stop operations. To ensure payment of their claims against CALI, the creditors agreed that
it would be advantageous not to present suits against CALI but to strive for a fair pro-rata division of its assets,
although CALI announced that in case of non-agreement of the creditors on a pro-rata division of the assets, it
would file insolvency proceedings. Right after the meeting, defendant Shell Philippines, one of CALIs creditors
who was present in the meeting and who agreed to the pro-rata division, assigned its credit to its sister company,
Shell USA. Shell USA then filed with a California court an action for collection of the assigned credit and applied
for a writ of attachment against CALIs Douglas C-54 plane which was in California. Prior to the meeting with
creditors, CALI had already offered the plane to Shell Philippine but the offer was rejected. Velayo, as assignee of
the other creditors of CALI, filed this action for damages against defendant Shell Philippines. He claims that that
fraudulent assignment of Shell Philippines credit to Shall USA prejudiced the other creditors and was contrary to
the agreed pro-rata division of assets.
ISSUE: WON Shell Philippines, taking advantage of its knowledge of the existence of CALI's airplane in
the US, acted in bad faith in assigning its credit to its sister company effectively defeating the agreed prorata division of assets among the creditors of CALI.
HELD: PROVISIONS ON HUMAN RELATIONS INTENDED AS CATCH-ALL PROVISIONS FOR ANY WRONG
FOR WHICH NO SPECIFIC REMEDY IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW.
Defendant schemed and effected the transfer to its sister corporation in the United States, where CALI's plane C54 was. By that swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said insolvent's property depriving the
latter and the Assignee that was latter appointed, of the opportunity to recover said plane.
Chapter 2 of the PRELIMINARY TITLE of the Civil Code, dealing on Human Relations, provides the following:
"Art 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performances of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith".
It maybe said that this article only contains a mere declaration of principles and while such statement may be is
essentially correct, yet We find that such declaration is implemented by Article 21 and sequence of the same
Chapter which prescribe the following:
"Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage".
Another rule is expressed in Article 24 which compels the return of a thing acquired 'without just or legal grounds'.
This provision embodies the doctrine that no person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another,
which has been one of the mainstays of every legal system for centuries. It is most needful that this ancient
principle be clearly and specifically consecrated in the Civil Code to the end that in cases not foreseen by the
lawmaker, no one may unjustly benefit himself to the prejudice of another. Now, if Article 23 of the Civil Code goes
as far as to provide that:
"Even if an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to the fault or negligence of the
defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited." with much more
reason the Defendant should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of
confidence.
Arnel P. Bacarra
17

16) Albenson Enterprises Corporation vs. CA

G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Albenson Enterprises delivered to Guaranteed Industries, located at 3267 V. Mapa St. Sta.Mesa,
Manila, mild steel plates. As part payment, Albenson was given a check drawn against the account of E.L.
Woodworks. However, when the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored because of lack of funds.
This led Albenson to trace the origin. This led them to a certain Eugenio Baltao. They made afterwards an
extrajudicial demand to private respondent Baltao. But he denied that he signed on the check because
Guaranteed Industries was already inexistent. This led Albenson to file a criminal complaint for violation of BP 22.
However, it was later found out that his namesake, Eugenio Baltao III, his son, was the one who manages E.L.
Woodworks located on the ground floor of the Baltao Building. Nevertheless, Assistant Fiscal Sumaway filed the
information. But Provincial Fiscal Castro instructed the trial fiscal to dismiss the information. Because of the unjust
filing of the criminal complaint, Baltao filed a complaint for damages against Albenson Enterprises. The trial court
ruled in favor of Baltao. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the criminal complaint by Albenson Enterprises constituted an abuse
of right?
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, the following are the
requisites for abuse of right: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law
which do not especially provide for their own sanction. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the
following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order,
or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure. A closer look at the said articles and it can be revealed that
Articles 19 and 21 share a common element: that the act is intentional. Article 20, however, does not distinguish. It
is dependent on the circumstances of the case. By applying these to the case at hand, it cannot be said that
Albenson Enterprises was abusing the rights of Baltao. The trial court and the appellate court made a mistake of
lumping the three articles and used them as bases for the award of damages in a civil complaint filed against the
petitioners. Albenson was prompted by its natural instinct and right to file a criminal complaint because it was not
able to collect the payment of the mild steel plates it had delivered. It had every right to exhaust all legal remedies
to collect its unpaid credit.
Arnel P. Bacarra
17) GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R No. 81262, August 25, 1983
FACTS:
Private respondent Tobias was employed by Globe Mackay in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and
administrative assistant. Petitioner discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it
lost several thousands of pesos. Tobias was implicated as the number one suspect. Police investigations were
conducted as a result of said anomaly.
The police reports exculpated Tobias from any participation in the offense. Unsatisfied, petitioner still hired private
investigators. Pending the investigation of the private detectives, petitioner filed a complaint for estafa against
Tobias.
Later, Tobias was terminated. Hence, he filed an action for illegal dismissal. While his case awaits resolution, he
sought employment with RETELCO. However, petitioner, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the
latter stating that Tobias was dismissed due to dishonesty.
18

Thus, Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious and abusive acts of petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should indemnify private respondent for damages.
HELD: Article 19 of the Civil Code known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and
to observe honesty and good faith. Violation of Article 19 can result to right to damages pursuant to Article 21 or
Article 22.
This article was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury.
In the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were merely exercising
their legal right to dismiss private respondent.
Nevertheless, the Court, after examining the record and circumstances of the case ruled that petitioners have
indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent.
Notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who reported the possible existence of anomalous
transactions, petitioner Hendry showed belligerence and told plaintiff that he was the number one suspect and to
take a one week vacation leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave
his keys to petitioner Hendry. The high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled
for. And this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to work after
his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are
the crook and swindler in this company."
The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress
the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right
of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised
and the effects flowing therefrom.
Therefore, petitioners are liable for damages.
Arnel P. Bacarra
18) BARONS MARKETING VS. CA
G.R. No. 126486, February 9, 1998
FACTS
Private respondent Phelps Dodge, Phil. Appointed petitioner Barons Marketing Corp as one of its dealers of
electrical wires and cables. As such, petitioner was given by private respondent 60 days credit for its purchases
reckoned from the date of delivery. During the period December 1986 to August 1987, defendant purchased on
credit from plaintiff various electrical wires and cables in the total amount of P4,102,438.3. Of this amount,
P300,000 was paid leaving a balance of P3,802,748.2. Respondent wrote petitioner demanding payment of its
unpaid obligation. In response, petitioner requests to pay the amount in monthly installments of P500,000 plus
1% interest. Said offer was rejected by respondent. Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint before the
Pasig RTC against petitioner for recovery of P3,802,748.2, including interest with 25% attorneys fees, exemplary
damages of P100,000 and cost of litigation. In its answer, petitioner admitted the purchase made but disputed the
amount. Petitioner likewise interposed a counterclaim on the ground of abuse of rights since it suffered injury to
its reputation.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of private respondent, which decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
19

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is guilty of abuse of rights or whether private respondent
intended to prejudice or injure petitioner when it rejected petitioners offer and filed the action for
collection.
HELD: No. It is an elementary rule in jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad
faith rests upon the party alleging the same. In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to prove bad faith on the part
of private respondent.
Private respondent was driven by legitimate reasons for rejecting petitioners offer and instituting the action for
collection before the trial court. As pointed out by private respondent. The corporation had its own cash position
to protect in order to pay its own obligations. Clearly, this would be inimical to the interests of any enterprise,
especially profit-oriented one like private respondent. It is plain to see that this is a case of an exercise of rights,
not an abuse thereof. As such, private respondent has not acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy as to violate Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Arnel P. Bacarra
19) MWSS vs. Act Theater
G.R. No. 147076, June 17, 2004
FACTS:
On September 22, 1988, four employees of the respondent Act Theater, Inc., namely, Rodolfo Tabian, Armando
Aguilar, Arnel Concha and Modesto Ruales, were apprehended by members of the Quezon City police force for
allegedly tampering a water meter in violation of P.D. No. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876. On account of the
incident, the respondents water service connection was cut off. Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint
for injunction with damages against the petitioner MWSS.
In the civil case, the respondent alleged in its complaint filed with the court a quo that the petitioner acted
arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously, in cutting off the respondents water service connection without prior
notice. Due to lack of water, the health and sanitation, not only of the respondents patrons but in the surrounding
premises as well, were adversely affected. The respondent prayed that the petitioner be directed to pay
damages.
The petitioner insists that in cutting off the respondents water service connection, the petitioner merely exercised
its proprietary right under Article 429 of the Civil Code, which provides that the owner or lawful possessor of a
thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner validly exercised its right under Article 429 of the Civil Code.
HELD: No, the petitioner did not validly exercise its right under Article 429 of the Civil Code. A right is a power,
privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or recognized as a result of long
usage, constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person against the other. Concededly, the petitioner, as
the owner of the utility providing water supply to certain consumers including the respondent, had the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. However, the exercise of rights is not without
limitations. Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be exercised.
When a right is exercised in a manner, which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong
is committed for which actor can be held accountable. In this case, the petitioner failed to act with justice and give
the respondent what is due to it when the petitioner unceremoniously cut off the respondents water service
connection.
Arnel P. Bacarra
20) Carpio vs. Valmonte
G.R. No. 151866, September 9, 2004
20

FACTS:
Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her
services for their church wedding. At about 4:30 p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where the
bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived, several persons were already there. Among those present
was petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion.
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the
reception was to be held. She paid the suppliers, gave the meal allowance to the band, and went back to the
suite. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. It was at this juncture that petitioner
allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: "Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong
bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha." Petitioner then ordered one of the
ladies to search Valmontes bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitioner
discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost.
The bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the room were searched. Valmonte was allegedly
bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the evening. Later, police officers arrived
and interviewed all persons who had access to the suite and fingerprinted them including Valmonte. During all the
time Valmonte was being interrogated by the police officers, petitioner kept on saying the words "Siya lang ang
lumabas ng kwarto." Valmontes car which was parked at the hotel premises was also searched but the search
yielded nothing.
After a futile attempt for a formal apology, Valmonte filed a suit for damages against Carpio.
The trial court rendered dismissed Valmontes complaint for damages. It ruled that when petitioner sought
investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she was merely exercising her right and if damage results from a person
exercising his legal right, it is damnum absque injuria.
The CA reversed, holding that petitioners verbal assault upon Valmonte was done with malice and in bad faith
since it was made in the presence of many people without any solid proof except petitioners suspicion. Such
unfounded accusation entitles Valmonte to an award of moral damages for she was publicly humiliated, deeply
insulted, and embarrassed.
ISSUE: Should Valmonte be entitled to Damages?
HELD: Yes. The victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any
remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not
only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring
from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First of these
fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It
provides that "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith." One is not allowed to exercise his right in a
manner which would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if he would thereby offend morals or good
customs.
In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by
her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. This being
the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly
accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of the
jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner
virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor,
but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act
which, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a
manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing jewelry
cannot justify her acts toward respondent. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no
21

other purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in
relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable.
Arnel P. Bacarra
21) RCPI VS CA
G.R No. L-44748, August 29, 1986
FACTS:
Plaintiff-respondent Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not only
wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business as well
because other people have come to know of said defamatory words. Defendant-corporation as a defense, alleges
that the additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between the sending and receiving operators and that they
were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the telegram and that the Tagalog
words are not defamatory. The telegram sent through its facilities was received in its station at Legaspi City.
Nobody other than the operator manned the teletype machine which automatically receives telegrams being
transmitted. The said telegram was detached from the machine and placed inside a sealed envelope and
delivered to plaintiff, obviously as is. The additional words in Tagalog were never noticed and were included in the
telegram when delivered.
The trial court ruled that in favor of the plaintiff holding that the liability of petitioner-company-employer is
predicated on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, upon appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner-company-employer is liable for damages under Articles 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code.
HELD: Yes. The cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code. As
well as on respondent's breach of contract thru the negligence of its own employees.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting messages. Every time
a person transmits a message through the facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the
rate or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to transmit the message accurately. There is no question that in the
case at bar, libelous matters were included in the message transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the
sender. There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in
the message sent to the private respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees.
Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner.
To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner's business is
to deprive the general public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy. In most
cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However, since negligence may be hard to
substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by
considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.
The decision is affirmed.
22) MERALCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-39019, January 22, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a public utility corporation providing electric power for the
consumption of the general public in Metro Manila. Petitioner Pedro Yambao is a bill collector of MERALCO.
22

Private respondents Isaac Chaves and Juana O. Chaves, husband and wife, filed the complaint for damages,
together with their children, Isaac Chaves Jr. and Rosendo Chaves. Isaac Sr. And Isaac Jr. and Rosendo were
members of the Philippine Bar; Isaac Sr. And Isaac Jr. were practicing lawyers and Rosendo was a legal officer at
the Agricultural Productivity Commission. Juana O. Chaves was a public school teacher.
Private respondents became the customer of petitioner MERALCO in the year 1953. At or about the end of March,
1965, petitioner Yambao went to the residence of private respondents and presented two overdue bills, one for
January 11 to February 9, 1965, for the sum of P7.90, and the other for February 9 to March 10, 1965, for the sum
of P7.20.
On April 2, 1965, Isaac Chaves went to the main office of petitioner but paid only one bill, for January 11 to
February 9, 1965, leaving the other bill unpaid. Thereafter, on April 21, 1965, petitioner caused the electric service
in private respondents residence to be discontinued and the power line cut off. On the following day, Rosendo
went to petitioners main office and paid the unpaid bill. The power line was restored at about 7:00 pm on the
same day.
Private respondents filed an action for recovery of damages for embarrassment, humiliation, wounded feelings
and hurt pride by reason of the disconnection of their electric service by the petitioner.
The CFI ordered rendered decision in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioner to pay private respondent
moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
The Court of Appeal, affirmed in toto the trial courts decision. Respondent Court stressed the importance and
necessity of 48 hour advance written notification before the disconnection of service may be effected.
ISSUE: Whether advance written notification before the disconnection of service may be effected?
RULING: Yes. Petitioner being a public Utility having monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro Manila
and some nearby municipalities. Being such, the State may regulate the conditions under which the manner by
which a public utility such as MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service to delinquent customer. Among
others, a prior written notice to the customer is required before disconnection of service. Failure to give such prior
notice amounts to a tort.
23) CUSTUDIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996.
FACTS:
Herein private respondents owned a parcel of land wherein a two-storey apartment building was constituted
therein, for this, tenants then were occupying the latter building. Such property was surrounded by other
immovables (houses) owned by herein petitioners, Custidio and Santos. Before reaching the property of the
private respondents from the P. Burgos St. there were two passage ways in between the said other immovable,
but however, they were only narrow paths.
After sometimes, the petitioners constructed adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width.
Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first
passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that
the entire passageway was enclosed. As a result, the tenants left the apartment because there was no longer a
permanent access -ingress and engress to the public street.
The private respondents filed an action for the grant of an easement of right of way. The trial court ordered the
petitioner to give plaintiff permanent access ingress and egress, to the public street and that in turn, the private
respondent will pay a sum of Php 8000 to the petitioner as an indemnity for the permanent use of the
passageway. On appeal by the private respondent to the CA, the latter Court affirmed the decision of the lower
court as to give a right of way to the private respondents and awarded the latter actual, moral and exemplary
damages. For this, petitioner appealed to the SC questioning the award of damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper?
RULING: No. A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of damages was based
solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when
the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway. However, the mere fact that
23

the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages,
there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the
plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since
damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or
harm which results from the injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result
of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may
maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it.
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the
principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following
requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. The act of
petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,
without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose
and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that (e)very owner may enclose or fence his land
or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon.
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of
way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents had no
existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory
right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave private
respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a
corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.
24) GASHEM vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993.
FACTS:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
alleges in said complaint that: she is 22 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the
Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; that the plaintiff is an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette, Fernandez
Avenue, Dagupan City and that the parties happened to know each other when the Manager of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette, Johnny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff; the latter courted and proposed to marry
her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after
the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's
parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987,
the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with
him; as a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to
abort the foetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her
until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than
P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting
her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married
with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his
24

apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she
had deceived him by stealing his money and passport.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered a decision favoring the
private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees.
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent
were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to
sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private
respondent, (d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e)
by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents in accordance with Filipino customs
and traditions made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by
looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine
hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions.
The CA affirmed in toto the trial court's ruling. Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.
RULING: It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral
wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to
the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino
customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such
Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways.
He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or
tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a
Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does
not possess good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law wife" is now his legal wife as their
marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the
private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship,
the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner
asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent
and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the
case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong . Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is
set forth in the report of the Senate Committee on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
"The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely
decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous
men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in
many of the American states .."
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
Article 2176, of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter." is limited to negligent acts or omissions
and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana,
is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa
aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery,
false imprisonment and deceit.
In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the
New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal
Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these
opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus,
25

Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21
has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than
the Anglo-American law on torts.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation
to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme
or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify
the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and
deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however,
that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with
him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to
their supposed marriage." In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of
every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction the kind illustrated by the Code
Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction
punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was
above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake,
that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both
parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in
Batarra vs. Marcos, the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as
far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily
because of her own doing."
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior
educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the
very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so
circumstanced could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry
were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that
indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted
satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she
would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and
so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner
committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to
act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions. The pari delicto rule does
not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of
intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral
seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she
found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto
with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault."
At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court
condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in
their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their
daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
25) RELLOSA vs. PELLOSIS
G.R. No. 138964 August 9, 2001.
26

FACTS:
Respondents were lessees of a parcel of land, owned by one Marta Reyes, located at Malate, Manila.
Respondents had built their houses on the land which, over the years, underwent continuous improvements. After
the demise of Marta, the land was inherited by her son Victor Reyes. Sometime in 1986, Victor informed
respondents that, for being lessees of the land for more than twenty (20) years, they would have a right of first
refusal to buy the land. Sometime in the early part of 1989, without the knowledge of respondents, the land
occupied by them was sold to petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was able to ultimately secure title to the property in
her name.
On 31 May 1989, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a suit for the "Declaration of Nullity of
the Sale," made in favor of petitioner Cynthia Ortega predicated upon their right of first refusal.
The Office of the Building Official issued a resolution ordering the demolition of the houses of respondents. The
following day Cynthia Ortega, together with her father and co-petitioner, Vicente Rellosa, hired workers to
commence the demolition of respondents' houses. Due to the timely intervention of a mobile unit of the Western
Police District, the intended demolition did not take place following talks between petitioner Rellosa and counsel
who pleaded that the demolition be suspended since the order sought to be implemented was not yet final and
executory. On 11 December 1989, respondents filed their appeal contesting the order of the Office of the Building
Official. On 12 December 1989, petitioners once again hired workers and proceeded with the demolition of
respondents' houses.
Respondents filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, praying that petitioners be ordered to pay
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, for the untimely demolition of the houses.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents and instead ordered them to pay petitioners moral damages.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered petitioners to pay respondents of moral
damages, exemplary damages and Attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a premature demolition
RULING: The Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals that there was a premature demolition. Hence,
the petitioners should pay damages to the lessees.
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or recognized
as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person against another.
The exercise of these rights is not without limitations. The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil
Code requires every person to act with justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith.
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong
is committed for which the actor can be held accountable.
At the time petitioners implemented the order of demolition, barely five days after respondents received a copy
thereof, the same was not yet final and executory. The law provided for a fifteen-day appeal period in favor of a
party aggrieved by an adverse ruling of the Office of the Building Official but by the precipitate action of petitioners
in demolishing the houses of respondents (prior to the expiration of the period to appeal), the latter were
effectively deprived of this recourse. The fact that the order of demolition was later affirmed by the Department of
Public Works and Highways was of no moment. The action of petitioners up to the point where they were able to
secure an order of demolition was not condemnable but implementing the order unmindful of the right of
respondents to contest the ruling was a different matter and could only be held utterly indefensible.
Digested by: Baet, Mark
26) NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, INC.
G.R. No. 126204, November 20, 2001
FACTS:
On May 14, 1987, the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) issued invitations to bid for the supply and
delivery of 120,000 metric tons of imported coal for its Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant in Calaca,
Batangas. The Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO) prequalified and was allowed to participate as one of the
bidders. After the public bidding was conducted, PHIBRO's bid was accepted. NAPOCOR's acceptance was
conveyed in a letter dated July 8, 1987, which was received by PHIBRO on July 15, 1987.
27

On July 10, 1987, PHIBRO sent word to NAPOCOR that industrial disputes might soon plague Australia, the
shipment's point of origin, which could seriously hamper PHIBRO's ability to supply the needed coal. From July 23
to July 31, 1987, PHIBRO again apprised NAPOCOR of the situation in Australia, particularly informing the latter
that the ship owners therein are not willing to load cargo unless a "strike-free" clause is incorporated in the charter
party or the contract of carriage. In order to hasten the transfer of coal, PHIBRO proposed to NAPOCOR that they
equally share the burden of a "strike-free" clause. NAPOCOR refused.
On August 6, 1987, PHIBRO received from NAPOCOR a confirmed and workable letter of credit. Instead of
delivering the coal on or before the thirtieth day after receipt of the Letter of Credit, as agreed upon by the parties
in the July contract, PHIBRO effected its first shipment only on November 17, 1987.
Consequently, in October 1987, NAPOCOR once more advertised for the delivery of coal to its Calaca thermal
plant. PHIBRO participated anew in this subsequent bidding. On November 24, 1987, NAPOCOR disapproved
PHIBRO's application for pre-qualification to bid for not meeting the minimum requirements. Upon further inquiry,
PHIBRO found that the real reason for the disapproval was its purported failure to satisfy NAPOCOR's demand
for damages due to the delay in the delivery of the first coal shipment.
This prompted PHIBRO to file an action for damages with application for injunction against NAPOCOR with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati City. In its complaint, PHIBRO alleged that NAPOCOR's act of
disqualifying it in the October 1987 bidding and in all subsequent biddings was tainted with malice and bad faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not NAPOCOR abused its right or acted unjustly in disqualifying PHIBRO from the public
bidding.
RULING: No. NAPOCOR was not bound under any contract to approve PHIBRO's pre-qualification requirements.
In fact, NAPOCOR had expressly reserved its right to reject bids as provided in its Instruction to Bidders found in
the "Post-Qualification Documents/Specifications for the Supply and Delivery of Coal for the Batangas Coal-Fired
Thermal Power Plant I.
27) FRENZEL vs. CATITO
G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent who was married to Teresita Santos, a
Filipino citizen. He works as a pilot for New Guinea Airlines. On the other hand, private respondent Ederlina P.
Catito was married to Klaus Muller, a German national. She worked as a masseuse in the Kings Cross nightclub
in Sydney, Australia. The two met when Alfred went on a vacation in Sydney. They met again and this time, Alfred
was able to convince Ederlina to stop working and to go back to the Philippines. When she returned to the
Philippines, she was given money by Alfred to put up a beauty salon. Later on, he also gave money to her to be
able to purchase a house and lot in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. But since he was aware that aliens
were prohibited to purchase lands, he agreed to have Ederlina as the sole vendee. Later also, they opened two
bank accounts with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in Kowloon, Hong Kong. Also, there were
subsequent purchases of other real and personal properties. These were made on the anticipation on the part of
Alfred that he and Ederlina will get married soon. However, this failed to materialize because of the fact that
Ederlina was still married to Klaus. Ederlina failed to secure a divorce from Klaus. This exasperated Alfred and
eventually their relationship started to fade. Later on, Alfred filed a complaint before the RTC of Davao City for
recovery of real and personal properties. He demanded from Ederlina that she return all the money that were
used to purchase the properties and also the properties which were bought, especially the house and lot and
three other lots. However, the complaint of Alfred was dismissed by the RTC. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfred is entitled to recover the said properties?
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The contention of petitioner Frenzel that to bar him from
recovering the properties would be in violation of Article 22 of the Civil Code on unjust enrichment did not hold
water. It must be remembered that a contract which violates the Constitution and the laws is void and vests no
rights and creates no obligations. It does not produce any legal effect. His reliance on Article 22 is misplaced
28

because in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or the parties are in pari delicto. This is founded
on the general principles of public policy. It must be remembered that Alfred knew all along that he was
disqualified from purchasing lands. His contention that he entered into the transaction because he was expecting
that he and Ederlina will get married in the future is not a valid one. He also knew that he cannot get married to
Ederlina because he still had a valid existing marriage with Teresita Santos.
28) REYES vs. LIM
G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003
FACTS:
Petitoner Reyes and private respondent Lim entered into a Contract to sell a parcel of land located in F.B.
Harrison, St. The parties stipulated that Lim shall pay a down payment of P10 Million of the P28 Million purchase
price. On one hand, Reyes shall ensure that the lessee of the property, Harrison Lumber, shall have vacated the
lot upon payment of the balance.
The day to consummate the contract arrived however Harrison Lumber has still not vacated the land. Worse, Lim
found out that Reyes had already sold the lot to Line One Food Corporation. Aggrieved, Lim filed an action for
specific performance and nullification of the subsequent contract of sale plus damages. The trial court and Court
of Appeals ruled in favor of Lim.
Hence, the present petition. Reyes primarily contends that the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision when it was
based on equity. Petitioner argues that it is Rule 57 to 61 of the Rules on Civil Procedure which should be applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of petitioner is tenable.
RULING: According to the Supreme Court, the case involves an issue left unanswerable due to silence or
insufficiency of the law and the rules of court. At this instance, Article 9 of the Civil Code expressly mandates the
Court to make a ruling despite the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law. This calls for equity which fills
open spaces in the law.
Before rescission of the contract can be had, the parties must be restored to their status quo ante. This was
ordered by the Court.
To rule otherwise would improve Reyes to the detriment of Lim contrary to Article 22 of the Civil Code which
provides that no person shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. Article 22 applies to substantive
as well as procedural remedies.
Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
29) NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs. MADRIGAL WAN HAI LINES CORPORATION
G.R. No. 148332, September 30, 2003
FACTS:
The National Development Company, petitioner, is a government-owned and controlled corporation. petitioners
Board of Directors approved the privatization plan of the NSCP. In May 1993, the Board offered for sale to the
public its one hundred percent (100%) stock ownership in NSCP as well as its three (3) ocean-going vessels (M/V
National Honor, M/V National Pride and M/V National Dignity).
Consequently, petitioner released to the public an Information Package containing NSCPs background, assets,
operational and financial status.
During the public bidding the lone bidder was herein respondent, Madrigal Wan Hai Lines Corporation, a domestic
private corporation. Mr. Willie J. Uy, respondents Consultant, submitted a bid of $15 million through the Proposal
Letter Form.
The respondents bid was rejected by petitioner and the Commission on Audit.
But since there was no other bidder, petitioner entered into a negotiated sale with respondent. After several
negotiations, respondent increased its offer to $18.5 million which was accepted by petitioner.
Accordingly, petitioner issued a Notice of Award to respondent of the sale of the NSCP shares and vessels for
$18.5 million.petitioner and respondent executed the corresponding Contract of Sale, and the latter acquired
NSCP, its assets, personnel, records and its three (3) vessels.
29

After a while, respondent was surprised to receive from the US Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service
(US IRS), a Notice of Final Assessment against NSCP for deficiency taxes on gross transportation income derived
from US sources for the years ending 1990, 1991 and 1992.
Anxious that the delay in the payment of the deficiency taxes may hamper its shipping operations overseas,
assumed and paid petitioners tax liabilities, including the tax due for the year 1993.Eventually, respondent
demanded from petitioner reimbursement for the amounts it paid to the US IRS. But petitioner refused despite
repeated demands. Hence, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court complaint against petitioner for
reimbursement and damages
the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondent and against petitioner. The trial court found, among others,
that even before the sale, petitioner knew that NSCP had tax liabilities with the US IRS, yet it did not inform
respondent about it.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the trial courts judgment with modification.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is legally bound to reimburse respondent for the amounts it paid corresponding to the
formers tax liabilities to the US IRS.
HELD:
The case at bar calls to mind the principle of unjust enrichment Nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest.
No person shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of others. This principle of equity has been
enshrined in our Civil Code, Article 22 of which provides:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act or performance by another or by any other means, acquires or comes
into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.
Justice and equity thus oblige that petitioner be held liable for NSCPs tax liabilities and reimburse respondent for
the amounts it paid. It would be unjust enrichment on the part of petitioner to be relieved of that obligation.
DIGEST BY: JIHAN A.M. BANOCAG
30) ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA vs. COURT
OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
FACTS:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of Jose Panganiban,
province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named
accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto
Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias
Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any
authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force and violence
prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally
demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and
carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and
his family in the amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further the
sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the
incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a
civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. the Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court decision but with modification
hence this petition.
30

ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil
indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
HELD:
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex
delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA
472). In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability
arising from the act as a crime.
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person
entitled to the civil action may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person
who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal
where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of
evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not
criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the
felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability
(See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the
criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires
only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond
to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment
awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates
to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing
that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be
adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as
efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided
for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate
action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial,
appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate
civil action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite
a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
31

III. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
31) DONATO VS. LUNA
160 SCRA 441
FACTS:
Paz Abayan filed an information for Bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato. She also filed with the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court a civil action for declaration of nullity of marriage to petitioner because of a prior
marriage of petitioner. In his answer petitioner claimed that his 2nd marriage was void because it was solemnized
without a valid marriage license and that violence, intimation and undue influence were employed by Paz to obtain
his consent.
Prior to the date set for the trial of the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the
case because the civil action raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined before the criminal case
can proceed.
ISSUE:
Does a criminal case for bigamy suspend the civil case of annulment of marriage on the ground that the latter
constitutes a prejudicial question?
HELD:
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. I must be noted that the issue before the
JDRC touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or
innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's 2nd wife, the herein private respondent Paz
Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the 2nd marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained
through deceit.
He who contracts a 2nd marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.
32) RICARDO QUIAMBAO vs. HON. ADRIANO OSORIO
G.R. No. L-48157, March 16, 1988
FACTS:
In a complaint for forcible entry filed by herein private respondents Zenaida Gaza Buensucero, Justina Gaza
Bernardo and Felipe Gaza against herein petitioner Ricardo Quiambao before the then Municipal Court of
Malabon, Rizal,it was alleged that private respondents were the legitimate possessors of a 30,835 sq. m. lot
known as Lot No. 4, Block 12, Bca 2039 of the Longos Estate situated at Barrio Longos, Malabon Rizal, by virtue
of the Agreement to Sell No. 3482 executed in their favor by the former Land Tenure Administration ; that under
cover of darkness, petitioner surreptitiously and by force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered into a 400 sq.
m. portion thereof, placed bamboo posts "staka" over said portion and thereafter began the construction of a
house thereon;
After hearing, the municipal court denied the motion to dismiss. It ruled that inasmuch as the issue involved in the
case was the recovery of physical possession, the court had jurisdiction to try and hear the case.
Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for certiorari
with injunction against public respondent Judge and private respondents, praying for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering respondent judge to suspend the hearing in the ejectment case until after the
resolution of said petition
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition, maintaining that the administrative case did not
constitute a prejudicial question as it involved the question of ownership, unlike the ejectment case which involved
merely the question of possession.
Meanwhile, the Land Authority filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. C-1576 alleging the
pendency of an administrative case between the same parties on the same subject matter and praying that the
petition for certiorari be granted, the ejectment complaint be dismissed and the Office of the Land Authority be
allowed to decide the matter exclusively.
32

ISSUE:
whether or not the administrative case between the private parties involving the lot subject matter of the ejectment
case constitutes a prejudicial question which would operate as a bar to said ejectment case.
HELD:
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.The
doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are
pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be preemptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the existence of a prejudicial
question in a civil case is alleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final
determination of the former.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Court are: [a] the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal action; and
[b] the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in character, it is obvious that
technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of. Equally apparent, however, is the intimate correlation
between said two [2] proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of private respondents to eject petitioner
from the disputed portion depends primarily on the resolution of the pending administrative case. For while it may
be true that private respondents had prior possession of the lot in question, at the time of the institution of the
ejectment case, such right of possession had been terminated, or at the very least, suspended by the cancellation
by the Land Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in their favor. Whether or not private respondents can
continue to exercise their right of possession is but a necessary, logical consequence of the issue involved in the
pending administrative case assailing the validity of the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent
award of the disputed portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award
to petitioner are voided, then private respondents would have every right to eject petitioner from the disputed
area. Otherwise, private respondent's light of possession is lost and so would their right to eject petitioner from
said portion.
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial court to have taken is to hold the
ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the administrative case. Indeed, logic and
pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such move. To allow the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the
possibility of petitioner's right of possession being upheld in the pending administrative case is to needlessly
require not only the parties but the court as well to expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to be a
sheer exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper application for a
stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in another court,
especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of causes on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where
the rights parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action
are settled the second action should be stayed.
While this rule is properly applicable to instances involving two [2] court actions, the existence in the instant case
of the same considerations of Identity of parties and issues, economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels
and the parties as well as the need to resolve the parties' right of possession before the ejectment case may be
properly determined, justifies the rule's analogous application to the case at bar.
If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature of a prejudicial question to an administrative case,
We see no reason why the reverse may not be so considered in the proper case, such as in the petition at bar.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Civil Case No. 2526 of the then Municipal Court of
Malabon, Rizal is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
33) ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA and LEONILO JACALAN vs. HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, HON.
CELSO V. ESPINOSA, and SPS. FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR. and ROSITA TAGHOY TIGOL
G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995
33

FACTS:
the above-named accused [herein petitioners Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Dionisio Jacalan], conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with one another, without the knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA
TIGOL, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
said owner by occupying or possessing a portion of her real property, Lot No. 3635-B. whereon they constructed
their respective residential houses against the will of Rosita Tigol, which acts of the said accused have deprived
the latter of the use of a portion of her land, to her damage and prejudice because despite repeated demands the
said accused failed and refused, as they still fail and refuse to vacate the premises above-mentioned.
Petitioners moved for the suspension of their arraignment on the ground that there was a prejudicial question
pending resolution in another case being tried in Branch 27 of the same court. The case, docketed as Civil Case
No. 2247-L and entitled "Anselmo Taghoy and Vicente Apa versus Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and Rosita T. Tigol, et al.,"
concerns the ownership of Lot No. 3635-B. 1 In that case, petitioners seek a declaration of the nullity of TCT No.
13250 of Rosita T. Tigol and the partition of the lot in question among them and private respondent Rosita T. Tigol
as heirs of Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed in 1990 by petitioners, three years before May 27,
1993 when the criminal case for squatting was filed against them.
the trial court denied the petitioners' motion and proceeded with their arraignment. Petitioners, therefore, had to
enter their plea (not guilty) to the charge.
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the court in its order dated September
21, 1993. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
whether the question of ownership of Lot No. 3635-B, which was pending, in Civil Case No. 2247-L, is a
prejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
HELD:
We hold that it is.
A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. To justify suspension
of the criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution is based but also that the decision of the issue or issues raised in the civil case
would be decisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 2 Rule 111, 5 provides:
Sec. 6. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial questions are: (a) the
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In the criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a piece of land not belonging to them but to
private respondent and against the latter's will. As already noted, the information alleges that "without the
knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL" petitioners occupied or took possession of a portion of "her
property" by building their houses thereon and "deprived [her] of the use of portion of her land to her damage and
prejudice.
Now the ownership of the land in question, known as Lot 3635-B of the Opon cadastre covered by TCT No.
13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-L now pending in Branch 27 of the RTC at Lapulapu City. The resolution,
therefore, of this question would necessarily be determinative of petitioners criminal liability for squatting.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondent judge is ordered to SUSPEND the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 012489 until the question of ownership in Civil Case No. 2247-L has been resolved with finality
and thereafter proceed with the trial of the criminal case if the civil case is decided and terminated adversely
against petitioners. Otherwise he should dismiss the criminal case.
SO ORDERED.
34) BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE
334 SCRA 106
34

FACTS:
Petitioner Maynardo Beltran and Charmaiene Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion
Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City. After 24 years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed, in the RTC of
Quezon City, Br. 87, a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. In her Answer to said petition, petitioners wife alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the
conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. She then filed a criminal case for
concubinage against petitioner and his paramour before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61. Petitioner,
in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the
Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for
declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge
Alden Cervantes denied the motion, so was with a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner then went to the RTC of
Makati, on certiorari , questioning the Orders issued by Judge Cervantes. The RTC denied the petition also a
Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Does the declaration of nullity of marriage a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage?
HELD:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. It has two (2) essential
elements: a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriage is not a prejudicial question to the
concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of
the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves
the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
In DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS ( 226 SCRA 572) , the SC ruled that the import of Article 40 of the Family
Code is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable bases for declaring a previous marriage an
absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
So, that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment
declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other
than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the
nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioners argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage
be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from
the beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of LANDICHO VS. RELOVA ( 22 SCRA 731), cited in DONATO VS. LUNA (160
SCRA 441), where the SC held that: xxx Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged
by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not
his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal
case of concubinage
35

35) SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG and LOLITA T. PAHANG vs. HON. AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court- Branch 56, Mandaue City, DEPUTY SHERIFF, Regional Trial Court-Branch
56 and METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 148595, July 12, 2004
FACTS:
the petitioners, Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang, received a short-term loan of one million five hundred
thousand pesos (P1,500,000.00) from the respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company. The loan was covered
by Non-Negotiable Promissory Note and was, likewise, secured by a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land
covered . As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the interest and the penalties due thereon, the respondent
foreclosed the real estate mortgage extrajudicially. As a consequence, the mortgaged property was sold at public
auction to the respondent bank as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was executed by Ex-Officio Sheriff in
favor of the respondent and was registered with the Register of Deeds.
the respondent wrote the petitioners that the one-year redemption period of the property would expire on January
27, 1999. Instead of redeeming the property, the petitioners filed, a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial sale
against the respondent bank and the Sheriff.
After the expiration of the one-year redemption period, the respondent consolidated its ownership over the
foreclosed property. Consequently, TCT No. 44668 was issued by the Register of Deeds in its name. On July 23,
1999, the respondent filed a Petition for Writ of Possession.
ISSUE:
whether or not the complaint of the petitioners in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 for annulment of extrajudicial sale is a
prejudicial question to the petition of the respondent bank for the issuance of a writ of possession in LRC Case
No.
HELD:
The contentions of the petitioners have no merit.
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue that
must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action and the
respondents petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1, Psd-07-021410, TCT No.
44668 is but an incident in the land registration case and, therefore, no prejudicial question can arise from the
existence of the two actions.
It bears stressing that the proceedings in a petition and/or motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, after
the lapse of the statutory period for redemption, is summary in nature.The trial court is mandated to issue a writ of
possession upon a finding of the lapse of the statutory period for redemption without the redemptioner having
redeemed the property. It cannot be validly argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it merely
complied with its ministerial duty to issue the said writ of possession.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Cost against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
36) ABACAN vs. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC
G.R. No. 140777. April 8, 2005
FACTS:
Two opposing factions within respondent Northwestern University, Inc. (NUI), the Castro and the
Nicolas factions, seek control as the legitimate board thereof. These two factions are parties to Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) Case No. 12-96-5469, which is an action filed by the Nicolas faction to nullify the
36

election of the directors of NUI belonging to the Castro faction and SEC Case No. 12-96-5511 which is a
counter-suit initiated by the Castro faction seeking the nullification of several board resolutions passed by the
Nicolas faction.
On December 19, 1996, SEC Hearing Officer Rolando G. Andaya, Jr., issued an Order authorizing the
Castro faction and the Metropolitan Bank Laoag City branch to withdraw the amount of P2.5M from the account
of NUI with said bank. Metrobank thru Petitioner Abacan, complied and released P1.4 M in favor of the Castro
faction. The Nicolas faction then initiated a criminal complaint for estafa against the Castro faction as well as
the petitioners herein who are officers of Metrobank, however the criminal case was later dismissed insofar as
petitioners are concerned.
Nicolas faction filed a suit for damages against Castro faction and petitioner on the ground that the
corporate funds of NUI deposited with said bank in the sum of P1.4 M was withdrawn without the knowledge,
consent or approval of NUI to the grave and serious damage and prejudice of the latter.
Marieta Y. Palanca filed a motion to dismiss alleging that SEC Case No. 12-96-5469 must take
precedence over the civil case since it is a logical antecedent to the issue of standing in said case. Petitioners
then prayed for the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 11296-14 against them, or in the alternative, to
hold in abeyance the proceedings therein until after the final determination of SEC Case No. 12-96-5469.
However, NUI avers that the rule on prejudicial question finds no application between the civil complaint below
and the case before the SEC as the rule presupposes the pendency of a civil action and a criminal action; and
even assuming arguendo that the issues pending before the SEC bear a similarity to the cause of action below,
the complaint of NUI can stand and proceed separately from the SEC case inasmuch as there is no identity in the
reliefs prayed for.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is prejudicial question in this case.
RULING:
Yes. Considering the rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question, being to avoid two conflicting
decisions, prudence dictates that we apply the principle underlying the doctrine to the case at bar.
A prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be
determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it must be lodged in another court
or tribunal.
In the case at bar, the question of which between the Castro and the Nicolas factions are the de jure
board of directors of NUI is lodged before the SEC. The complaint before the RTC of Laoag meanwhile alleges
that petitioners, together with their co-defendants, comprised of the Castro faction, wrongfully withdrew the
amount of P1.4 M from the account of NUI with Metrobank. Moreover, whether or not Roy Nicolas of the Nicolas
faction is a duly elected member of the Board of NUI and thus with capacity to institute the herein complaint in
behalf of the NUI depends on the findings of the SEC in the case pending before it. It would finally determine
whether Castro, et al. legally withdrew the subject amount from the bank and whether Nicolas lawfully initiated the
complaint in behalf of herein respondent NUI. It is petitioners claim, and we agree, that the presence or absence
of their liability for allowing the withdrawal of P1.4 M from the account of NUI with Metrobank in favor of the
Castro faction is reliant on the findings of the SEC as to which of the two factions is the de jure board. Since the
determination of the SEC as to which of the two factions is the de jure board of NUI is crucial to the resolution of
the case before the RTC. Hence, the trial court should suspend its proceedings until the SEC comes out with its
findings.
37

IV. CIVIL PERSONALITY
37) Antonio Gelus v. Court of Appeals
No. L-16439. July 20, 1961
Doctrine: Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the
one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on
account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could deliberately accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact,
even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal
death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked of juridical personality under Article
40 of the Civil Code, which expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently alive.
Reyes, JBL, J.
FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the petitioner, a physician, for the first time in 1948 through her aunt
Paula Yambot. The said physician made three abortions on Villanueva on the following circumstances: (1) In
1950, when she became pregnant by her present husband, Oscar Lazo, before they were legally married, and
she deisred to conceal her pregnancy from her parents; (2) after their marriage, her second pregnancy proved to
be inconvenient as she was then working for the COMELEC; and lastly (3) on February 21, 1955 she was
aborted of a 2-month old fetus for the amount of P50.00.
Upon knowing of the last abortion, Lazo filed a complaint for damages against Geluz, claiming that he did
not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Lazo and against Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as
damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the award.
ISSUE: W/N the award of damages was proper.
HELD: NO. the Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06
upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This the Court
believes to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does
not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality; being incapable of having rights and
obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the
one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on
account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could deliberately accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact,
even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal
death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked of juridical personality under Article
40 of the Civil Code, which expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently alive.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages,
evidently because of Lazos indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the petitioner herein,
clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower
court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee Lazo
was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the
suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes
thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the
appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His
only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued
for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of
record, was clearly exaggerated.
38

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical
necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned;
and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act
does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
V. CITIZENSHIP
38) Mercado vs. Manzano
G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999
Doctrine:
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result
of an individuals volition.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the
City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III.
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a
certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United
States.
COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with
dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.
The respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien
Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a
Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on September
14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an
American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
It would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual
citizenship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Private Respondent Manzano is disqualified from the position for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy.
HELD: NO.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and
mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using
an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau
of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his
Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the
United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and
voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American
law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result
of an individuals volition.
The phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring
39

to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination
of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering
that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws
of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have
said before as a dual citizen.Petition dismissed
39) Republic v. Chule Lim
G.R. NO. 153883, January 13, 2004
Facts:
Chule Lim claimes that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to
Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and
prays that they be corrected.
During the hearing, respondent testified thus:
First, she claims that her surname "Yu" was misspelled as "Yo". She has been using "Yu" in all her school records
and in her marriage certificate. 2 She presented a clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) 3 to
further show the consistency in her use of the surname "Yu".
Second, she claims that her fathers name in her birth record was written as "Yo Diu To (Co Tian)" when it should
have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian)."
Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and
mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that
her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she should have
been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married.
Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents were both Filipinos from
Camiguin. She added that she and her daughters father were never married because the latter had a prior
subsisting marriage contracted in China.
In this connection, respondent presented a certification attested by officials of the local civil registries of Iligan City
and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is no record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from
1948 to the present.
The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not present any evidence although it actively
participated in the proceedings by attending hearings and cross-examining respondent and her witnesses.
On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondents petition and rendered judgment.
Issue: whether or not lims citizenship should be changed from Chinese to Filipino?
Held: YES. To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite as error respondents recourse to Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court to effect what indisputably are substantial corrections and changes in entries in the civil
register. To clarify, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the
correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure
to be adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic v. Valencia7 where we held that even substantial errors in
a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by
the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is
one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. 8
40

As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we take it that the Republics failure to cite this error amounts to a
recognition that this case properly falls under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court considering that the
proceeding can be appropriately classified as adversarial.
Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional
requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of
the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an
alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship.9 Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625,
that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a
statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths,
and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines." 10
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate
children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that
her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said
constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth
without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar,11 citing In re Florencio Mallare,12 we held:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be
necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29
Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12,
1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither
could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to
which he is rightfully entitled.13
This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of
majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old. 14 The exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. 15
In its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals decision in allowing respondent to
use her fathers surname despite its finding that she is illegitimate.
The Republics submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her fathers
surname. What it did allow was the correction of her fathers misspelled surname which she has been using ever
since she can remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her to use her
fathers surname.
Court of Appeals is was correct when it held:
Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To bar her at this time from using her fathers surname which she
has used for four decades without any known objection from anybody, would only sow confusion. Concededly,
one of the reasons allowed for changing ones name or surname is to avoid confusion.
Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law regulating the use of aliases, a person is allowed
to use a name "by which he has been known since childhood."
While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname, 18 there is no such requirement for the
continued use of a surname which a person has already been using since childhood. 19
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship remains
valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future
mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. 20 In this case, the
Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future
mischief. In respondents case, the change in the surname that she has been using for 40 years would even avoid
confusion to her community in general.
41

VI. MARRIAGE
40) Balogbog vs. CA
G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal who died
intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing
their parents. In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and
accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and
that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. In their
answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died single and
without issue in their parents residence at Asturias, Cebu.
To support their claim, the petitioners obtained a certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect
that that office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was prepared by
Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga, who testified that there was no record of the marriage of Gavino
and Catalina in the Book of Marriages. On the other hand, the private respondents presented several pieces of
testimonial evidence to bolster their claim.
ISSUE:
Whose claim, as supported by their respective pieces of evidence, will prevail?
HELD:
The claim of the private respondents will prevail. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a
woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only
by cogent proof to the contrary. In this case, petitioners claim that the pieces of evidence presented by private
respondents was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of
Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged marriage of private
respondents parents. This contention has no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias, the defendants, who questioned the
marriage of the plaintiffs, produced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario,
Cavite for the month of January, 1916, to show that there was no record of the alleged marriage. Nonetheless,
evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although
a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no
marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. Here, private respondents proved,
through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of
whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private
respondents, were recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
Neither is there merit in the argument of the petitioners that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed
because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses,
declared that they were taking each other as husband and wife. An exchange of vows can be presumed to have
been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for
having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding
without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence. The law favors the validity
of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a
matter of constitutional concern.
41) VDA. De Jacob V. CA
312 SCRA 772
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was
appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage
42

Contract between herself and the deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim,
he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur,
granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46 (entitled "Tomasa
vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his
share of the deceaseds estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the
validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with damages (Civil
Case No. T-83) questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo.
appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana,
CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original copy of the Marriage
Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for
registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract
issued in 1978. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the solemnizing officer
thus giving the implication that there was no copy of the marriage contract sent to, nor a record existing in the civil
registry of Manila;
In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed his "thumbmark" on said contract
purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of the marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit executed between
appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a day before the alleged date of marriage or on 15 September 1975 attesting that
both of them lived together as husband and wife for five (5) years, Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus
the trial court concluded that the "thumbmark" was logically "not genuine". In other words, not of Alfredo Jacobs;
Issue: Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased Alfredo Jacob was valid?
Held:
Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a voidable one may be assailed only in a
direct proceeding.8 Aware of this fundamental distinction, Respondent Pilapil contends that the marriage between
Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage
ceremony.9 We cannot sustain this contention.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void because the parties had no marriage
license. This argument is misplaced, because it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years. 10 An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. 11
Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of
the Civil Code.12 The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed adoption
took place prior the effectivity of the Family Code.
"It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its
execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses." 13 Upon a showing that the document was
duly executed and subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be
adduced to prove its contents.14
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1) excluded the testimonies of
petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the following: (a) photographs of the
wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had
solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding
had not been recorded in the Book of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of parties to the
marriage; (c) the subsequent authorization issued by the Archbishop through his vicar general and chancellor,
Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be reflected through a
corresponding entry in the Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances
of the loss of the marriage certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio
sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they
have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary"
evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,15 the Court clarified this misconception thus:
. . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was
43

barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, . . . which may
not be prove[n] by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not
dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs precede
proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of
secondary evidence of the contents.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v.
Ramolete.16 But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence." 17
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by
witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have
previously narrated the execution thereof.18 The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person
who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the
person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost." 19
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during
the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the
testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in
court. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence testimonial and
documentary may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage contract were certain irregularities
suggesting that it had fraudulently been obtained. 20 Even if we were to agree with the trial court and to disregard
the reconstructed marriage contract, we must emphasize that this certificate is not the only proof of the union
between Dr. Jacob and petitioner.
Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of
Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO). 26 He finds
it quite "bizarre" for petitioner to have waited three years before registering their marriage. 27 On both counts, he
proceeds from the wrong premise. In the first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record
purposes does not invalidate the marriage. 28 In the second place, it was not the petitioners duty to send a copy of
the marriage certificate to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer. 29
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is . . . of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not
only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.
A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always
presume marriage.
This jurisprudential attitude31 towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 32 Given the
undisputed, even accepted,33 fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife, 34 we find that
the presumption of marriage was not rebutted in this case.
42) Republic Of The Philippines v. CA
G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992
Facts:
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and
who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi
City.
The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law
applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for
adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered its
44

decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family
Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.
Petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private
respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption
by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles,
as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for adoption.
Issues:
1.)
Can the Family Code be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles and;
2.)
Granting that the FC should be applied retroactively should the adoption in favor of private respondent
only, her husband not being a petitioner.
Held:
1.)Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject
to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the
holder. The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should
be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society,
sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. Vested rights include not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right
has vested.
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption by herself,
without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and
unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the
same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot
be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court acquired jurisdiction
thereover in accordance with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established
rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. We do not find in the present case such facts as would constitute it as an exception to the rule.
2.)Petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family Code should not apply retroactively, the Court of
Appeals should have modified the trial court's decision by granting the adoption in favor of private respondent
Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not being a petitioner. We do not consider this as a tenable position and,
accordingly, reject the same.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his wife, his
affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that
he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. The pertinent parts of his written consent and the
foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are sufficient to make him a copetitioner. Under the circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he must have yielded
to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his part sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is
evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal requirements should
yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must
not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of pleadings.
43) SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 174689, October 22 2009
FACTS
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The petition impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and
Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his
45

certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male
transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified
himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United
States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in
Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction
surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
"female." On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made. During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner. Its relevant portions read: Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with
his present sex. Firstly, the court is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted
like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is
not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. Likewise, the court believes that no harm,
injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting
the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the
realization of their dreams. Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present
petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose
any opposition.
ISSUE
Whether or not sex reassignment is a ground for change of entry in the birth certificate?
HELD
No, there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment and its effect. The sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant Civil Register
Law (Act 3753). If the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth is not attendant by error,
the same is immutable and may not be changed by reason of a sex reassignment surgery.
44) SY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent contracted marriage on November 15, 1973. both were then 22 years old. Their union
was blessed with two children. Respondent left their conjugal dwelling, since the they lived separately.
Petitioner filed a petition for legal separation. Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of
gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by
the spouse. The trial court granted custody of the children to Filipina.
Petitioner filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband, which RTC convicted him for lesser
offense of slight physical injuries.
Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. RTC denied. CA affirmed. The petitioner for the first time on appeal, the issue with regard to the
absence of marriage license.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is valid?
HELD: No. The marriage is not valid on the ground that there is no marriage license.
46

Although, the petitioner raises the issue for the first time on appeal the issue on lack of marriage license. The
petitioner states that though she did not categorically state her petition for annulment of marriage before the trial
court that the inconguinoty in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would
lead to the conclusion that her marriage to respondent was void from the beginning, she pointed out that these
critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before the Court.
The marriage license was issued one year after the ceremony took place. Hence the marriage was celebrated
without the marriage license.
Petition granted.
45) SEVILLA vs. CARDENAS
G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, Jaime Sevilla and respondent Carmelita Cardenas were allegedly married without a valid
marriage license. The former contended that his marriage with the latter was contracted through machinations,
duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose
Cardenas of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. That they never applied or obtained a marriage license for their
supposed marriage, thus no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. In support for his
contention, petitioner further argued that although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan,
Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any
marriage license, Upon verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of
San Juan, a Certification was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage
license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office."
However, Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the Certificates
issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void for lack of a valid marriage license?
HELD: No. It has been held by the Court that the certificates issued by the Local Civil Registrar were not
sufficient as to invalidate the marriage license no. 2770792 which had been secured by the parties. It could be
easily implied from the said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to
locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work and that they failed
to locate the book in which the marriage license was entered. Likewise, both certifications failed to state with
absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in
charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in
evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that
his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material
contents therein, had been exerted.
It is required that the custodian of the document is authorize to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register.
As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the
names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.
46) MALLION vs. EDITHA ALCANTARA
47

G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006
FACTS:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition with the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City
seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of the Family
Code, citing respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in
a decision dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant evidence to
warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking." The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed for
failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 another petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage with
respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. For her part,
respondent filed an answer with a motion to dismiss, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res
judicata and forum shopping.
In an order dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondent's motion to dismiss. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same, that is, the declaration of nullity of
his marriage to respondent, the cause of action in the earlier case was distinct and separate from the cause of
action in the present case because the operative facts upon which they were based as well as the evidence
required to sustain either were different. Because there is no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims
that res judicata does not lie to bar the second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that there was no
violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment counters that while the present suit is anchored on a different
ground, it still involves
the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, that is, the validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage,
and prays for the same remedy, that is, the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Respondent thus contends that
petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that petitioner violated the rule on
multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this petition could have been raised during the trial in Civil Case No.
SP 4341-95.
ISSUE:
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the
absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same proceeding
where the marriage is being impugned on the ground of a party's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code?
HELD: Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of marriage
license constitute separate causes of action, the present case would not fall under the prohibition against splitting
a single cause of action nor would it be barred by the principle of res judicata.
The contention is untenable. Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits
on points and matters determined in the former suit."
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon the
following precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice
for the same cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the
public tranquility and happiness.
48

Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2)
it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order
on the merits; and (4) there is between the first and the second actions identity of parties, of subject matter,
and of causes of action.
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is in issue is the presence of the fourth
requisite. In this regard, the test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether
the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the
maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered
the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him seeking the declaration of nullity
of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first petition
which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence
necessary to sustain the present petition which is anchored on the purported absence of a marriage license.
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action . By definition,
a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. In both petitions, petitioner
has the same cause the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon
which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of
the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and
respondent's marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid
celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95,
however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with
law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises
now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as
regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other
admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been
adjudged in that case.
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the
form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case. It bears stressing that a party cannot
divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing
when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every
ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by
piecemeal in successive action to recover for the same wrong or injury.
47) NAVARRO vs. DOMAGTOY
A.M. No. MTJ-96-108. July 19, 1996
FACTS:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G.
Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit
Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn
F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G.
del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has
49

jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was
solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from
the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a
married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by
the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen
each other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the
marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which
states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated."
Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence
a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge
Demosthenes C. Duquilla, MTC of Basey, Samar. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar
Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of
cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and
that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that
she is already dead.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not the joint affidavit is sufficient proof of the wife's presumptive death?
2.Whether or not the respondent judge erred when he solemnized the marriage outside his court's jurisdiction?
HELD:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the joint affidavit is insufficient proof to declare wife's presumptive death.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides that for the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage
under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the absent spouse.
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a
mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or
presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death.
Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was
manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such
neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
2. The Supreme Court ruled that Judge Domagtoy erred when he soemnized the marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction. According to article 8 of the Familiy Code The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers
the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or viceconsul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or
in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer
in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.
50

There is no proof that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover,
the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del
Rosario.
One of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Article 8, which is a directory
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.
Respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with
authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
The Supreme Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable
in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that
respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law. Judge Domagtoy is SUSPENDED
for a period of 6 months.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a
subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
48) BESO vs. DAGUMAN
A.M. No. 99-1211, January 28, 2000
FACTS:
On August 28, 1997, the marriage between Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman was solemnized by Judge Juan
Daguman at J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar. After the wedding, Yman abandoned Petitioner.
Thereafter, Petitioner found that her marriage was not registered at the Civil Registry. She then filed an
administrative complaint against the Respondent charging him with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority for
solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the
marriage contract with the office of the Local Registrar.
In his Comment, Respondent averred that the civil marriage had to be solemnized outside his territory because on
that date respondent was physically indisposed and unable to report to his station in Sta. Margarita and that Beso
and Yman unexpectedly came to his house urgently requesting the celebration of their marriage rites since the
complainant, who is an overseas worker, would be out of the country for a long period and their marriage license
would lapse before she could return to the Philippines. He further averred that after handling to Yman the first
copy of the marriage certificate, he left the three remaining copies on top of the desk in his private office intending
later to register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the fourth in his office but said copies were lost;
that he diligently searched for them and even subpoenad Yman to further inquire but was told that Complainant
put the copies of the marriage certificate in her bag during the wedding party and that Complainant already left for
abroad.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority?
HELD:
Yes. As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, his authority to solemnize
marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Considering that respondents Judge's
jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with
authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog. As provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a
51

marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:(1) when
either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;(2) when the residence of either party is located in
a remote place; (3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage
may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. The foregoing
circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when he failed to register the marriage.
Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code requiring the same not later than fifteen
days after the marriage. The records show that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge's
part. Hence, Respondent is guilty of neglect of duty and abuse of authority.
49) REPUBLIC vs. IYOY

G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
FACTS:
Private respondent Crasus Iyoy filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, in relation with Articles 68, 70, and 72, with Fely Ada Rosal.
According to him, they got married in 1961. The marriage produced five children. But the marriage faded because
Fely was a nagger, extravagant and hot-tempered. In 1984, Fely left for the United States. Barely a year after she
left, Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the divorce papers. But he ignored the request
Sometime in 1985, he was informed that Fely had already married an American. In 1987, she came back to the
Philippines with her American family. In 1990, she came back to attend the wedding of their eldest son, but in the
invitations, she used the surname of her American husband. She returned in 1992 for the operation of their fourth
child. In her Answer to the Complaint, she asserted that she was already an American citizen in 1988, that she
was no longer hot-tempered, nagger and extravagant and that the only reason she went to the United States was
that their income was not enough to sustain their family, that it was Crasus who was irresponsible and in fact living
with another woman who bore her a child. She also denied that she sent a letter requesting him to sign the
divorce papers. After hearing both sides, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court
but this time it had added a ratiocination, stating that Article 26, 2 nd paragraph of the Family Code is applicable
also to this case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was psychological incapacity on the part of Fely?
2. Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable?
HELD
1. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill
will, on the part of the errant spouse. It was held in previous rulings that irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the
said Article.
2. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The second paragraph of Article 26 is not applicable. As plainly
worded, the provision refers to a special situation wherein a foreigner divorces his or her Filipino spouse.
However, in this case, it cannot be applied because of the simple fact that at the time Fely secured a divorce
decree, she was still a Filipino. Fely admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she married her American
spouse in 1985 but she also admitted that she became and American citizen only in 1988. Thus, she was still a
Filipino citizen and Article 15 of the Civil Code applies, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition and legal capacity, even though she was already living abroad.
52

50) REPUBLIC vs. ORBECIDO III

GR No. 154380 October 5, 2005
FACTS:
In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed
with a son and a daughter, Krsitoffer and Kimberly. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the US bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married an
American, Innocent Stanley. Thereafter, Cipriano filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. Finding merit on the petition, the court granted the same.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the Republic contends that Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case
because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino and an alien.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent can remarry pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code?
HELD:
The Supreme Court was unanimous in holding that par. 2, Art. 26 of the Family Code should be interpreted to
allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried,
also to remarry.
The twin elements of Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code are as follows: (1) there is a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner and (2) a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship at the time of the celebration
of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry. In this case, when Lady Myros was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. Subsequently, the wife obtained a divorce
capacitating him to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites are both present in the case. Thus, Cipriano, the divorced
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, for respondents plea to prosper, he must prove that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
must show sufficient proof of the divorce decree. Cipriano failed to do this so the petition of the Republic was
granted.
51) Atienza vs. Brillantes
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, 29 March 1995
Quiason, J.:
FACTS: A complaint file by complainant Lupo A. Atienza (Atienza) for gross immorality and appearance of
impropriety against respondent Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr. (Brillantes).
Atienza has two children with Yolanda De Castrp (De Castro). There was a time when Atienza chanced
upon Brillantes sleeping on his bedroom and was later on informed by their houseboy that Brillantes is cohabiting
wioth De Castro.
Atienza claims that Brillantes was married to Zenaida Ongkiko (Ongkiko) whom the latter has five
children.
Brillantes denied having married Ongkiko, because it was celebrated without a marriage license, the
same incident also happened on their second marriage. Brillantes was thereafter abandoned by Ongkiko
seventeen years ago.
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Brillantes claims that when he married De Castro in Los Angeles, California, he believed in good faith and
for all legal purposes that he was single because his marriage with Ongkiko was celebrated without a license.
ISSUE: Wether a judicial declaration that the previous marriage was void is under Article 40 of the Family Code
required before entering into a second marriage.
RULING: YES, respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines, while
the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable to marriages entered into after the effectively of the
Family Code on 3 August 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said article is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other Laws. This is particularly true with Article 40 of the Family Code,
which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of
Article of the Family Code in this case.
>Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser
52) Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, 8 March 2001
David, Jr. C,.J.:
FACTS: Complainant-petitioner Herminia Borja-Manzano (Herminia) was the lawful wife of the late David
Manzano being married on 21 May 1966. On 22 nd of March 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with
one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez (Judge Sanchez). That Judge Sanchez
should have known that the marriage was a bigamous one as the marriage clearly stated that both contracting
parties were Separate.
Judge Sanchez claims innocence as to the fact of the previous marriage, and solemnized their marriage
in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Sanchez should be held liable.
RULING: YES, for Article 31 of the Family Code to apply the provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation
to apply, the following requisites must apply:
1.)
The man and woman have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;
2.)
The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3.)
The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4.)
The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they lived together for at least five years and are without
legal impediment to marry each other.
5.)
The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the
parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Not all this requirement are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate
affidavits executed on 22nd of March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself. David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also in their marriage contract, it was
indicated that both were separated.
Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser
54

VII. VOID MARRIAGES
53) Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
G.R. No. 132524, 29 December 1998
Martinez, J:
FACTS: Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio), son of petitioner Federico Suntay (Federico), was married to Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay (Isabel:) their marriage was celebrated in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Subsequently it
was declared as void ab initio or null and void.
The basis of the Court of First Instance for such a ruling was that Emilio suffers from a mental aberration
known as schizophrenia.
Emilio predeceased his mother, decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Isabel, herein respondent, the
daughter of Emilio and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for letters of
administration of the intestate estate of her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay.
Petitioner Federico moved to dismiss the case on the ground of Article 922 of the Civil Code an
illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of representation the legitimate relatives of her father or mother.
Federico contends that Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent Isabels father predeceased his mother, the late
Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. It opened a path to succession by representation, as a consequence of declaration by
the Court of First Instance that the marriage of respondent Isabels parents is null and void. Making Isabel an
illegitimate child and has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother the decedent.
ISSUE: Whether Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco-Suntay is a legitimate child despite the declaration that her parents
marriage was void ab initio denying her succession right from her grandmother.
RULING: YES. the marriage of Emilio Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled on the basis of Article
85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which refers to marriages which are considered voidable. Being conceived and born of
a voidable marriage before the decree of annulment, she is considered legitimate.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which
provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered as legitimate
The annulment of the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the society formed by the putative
spouses, but It cannot destroy consequences which marital union produced during its continuance.
54) Nial vs. Bayadaog
G.R. No. 133778, 14 March 2000
Ynares Santiago, J.:
FACTS: Pepito Nial (Pepito) and Teodulfa Bellones was married on September 26, 1974 whereby petitioners
Babyline, Ingrid, Archie and Pepito Jr., a;; surnamed Nial were born. Pepito shot Teodulfa resulting to the latters
death. One year and eight months after the incident Pepito and Norma Bayadog, herein respondent (Bayadog)
got married without any marriage license. Pepito and Bayadog executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986
state that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years thus exempting them from securing a
marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident. Thereafter petitioners question the validity of the subsequent
marriage of Pepito and Bayadog due to the absence of a marriage license as it was void.
ISSUE: Whether the cohabitation of Pepito and Bayadog is that one in contemplation of the law.
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RULING: No, the five year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be
a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third part was involved at any time within the five
years and continuity that is unbroken.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with
each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to this wedding day. From the time Pepitos first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even
assuming that Pepito and respondent had started living with each other the fact remains that their five year period
of cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is
valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of a marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting
marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each
other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even
where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation
by either spouse with any third party as being as husband and wife.
55) Ty vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 127406, 27 November 2000
Quisumbing, J.:
FACTS: Private Respondent Edgardo M. Reyes married in a civil ceremony Anna Maria Regina Villanueva
thereafter a church wedding was celebrated. The marriage was subsequently declared null and void ab initio for
lack of marriage license and lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying the marriage, private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes
married Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on 4 April 1979. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maira was
rendered only on 4 August 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner Ofelia P. Ty took place on 4 April 1979.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be
entered into validity.
RULING: YES, a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or
a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contacting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring previous marriage void.
In the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into 1979, before
Wiegel, at that time the prevailing rules was found In Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private
respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity
before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondents second
marriage to petitioner was valid.
56) Terre vs. Terre
A.M. No 2349, 3 July 1992
Per Curiam
FACTS: Complaint Dorothy B. Terre met respondent Atty. Jordan Terre for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high
school classmates; Dorothy was then married to Merillo Bercellina. Dorothy and Atty. Jordan went to manila to
pursue their education of personal choosing. Atty. Jordan took up law at Lyceum Univsersity, still courting Dorothy
on the process this time with more persistence. Jordan explained to Dorothy that their marriage is void ab initio
due to the reason that Dorothy and Merlito were first cousins, convince by his explanation and having secured a
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favorable advice from her mother and ex in-laws, Dorothy agreed to marry Atty. Jordan. In their marriage license
Atty. Jordan wrote single as her status explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, no need to go to
court for a declaration. Later on Dorothy found out that Atty. Jordan was already married to one Helina Malicdem.
When Atty. Jordan prior marriage with Dorothy was subsisting, no judicial declaration was
obtained as to nullity of or any judicial declaration obtained as to nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with
complainant.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Jordan Terre should be liable for gross immorality.
RULING: Yes, respondent Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an agreement ran counter
to the prevailing case law of the court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally
free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first a marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential. Even if we are to assume , arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith,
the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to
complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem
must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
VIII. PSCYHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
57) Santos vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995
En Banc:
FACTS: Petitioner Leouel Santos (Leouel), a first lieutenant in the Philippine Army, and private respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos (Julia) were married. The ecstasy did not last long because of the frequent interference of
Julias parents into the young spouses family affairs.
Julia left for United States of America to work as a Nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven months
after her departure, Julia called up Leoule for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return
home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the
United States during a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, he
desperately tried to locate Julia but his efforts were in vain.
Having failed, Leouel filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for Voiding of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether Leouels petition to declare their marriage with Julia void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family
Code will prosper.
RULING: No, Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precept un our law on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorder clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psycholigic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be legitimate.
The factual setting in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to
decree nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his
present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every
individual problem.
57

58) Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119190, 16 January 1997
Torres, Jr.:
FACTS: Petitioner Chi Ming Tsos (Petitioner) and private respondent Gina Lao-Tsoi (Respondent) were married
at the Manila Cathedral. They went and proceeded to the house of petitioners mother and slept together on the
same room in the first night of their married life. Instead of enjoying the night of their marriage, petitioner just went
to bed and slept on his side then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between
them during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first
week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, uncle, his mother
and his nephew. They were all invited to join them. There was no sexual intercourse between them, since
petitioner avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or just by sleeping on a rocking chair located at the
living room. Respondent claims that she never seen her husbands private parts.
They submitted themselves to medical examinations, respondent was found to be healthy and still a virgin
but petitioner was told to return but never did. It was found that petitioner is capable of having sexual intercourse
with a woman.
Respondent claims that petitioner is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be declared as null and void ab initio due to psychological incapacity.
RULING: Yes, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children based on
the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligations is
equivalent to incapacity.
It is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is a shared
feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy
but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each
others feelings at a time is needed by the other can go along way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage
is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love, amor gignit amore,
respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social
institution.
59) REPUBLIC VS. CA and MOLINA
GR No. 108763. February 13, 1997
FACTS: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a
year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage,
observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his
dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances.
Thereafter, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986. Roridel became the sole breadwinner of the family.
In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their
child a week later. The couple are separated-in-fact for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
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Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a
psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs
decision. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity
HELD: In Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In
the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but
appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of
proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The
incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically
or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation
must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225
of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to
appeal as counsels for the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding
that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
60) BARCELONA vs. CA & TADEO R. BENGZON
G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003
FACS: On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner
petitioner Diana before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87. On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo
filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial court granted.
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana.
Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First, the second petition fails to
state a cause of action. Second, it violates Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping.
Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in Support of the
Motion.
The trial court issued on 18 September 1996 an Order deferring resolution of the Motion until the parties
ventilate their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the trial court
issued on second order denying the motion.
Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals
assailing the trial courts first order deferring action on the Motion and the second order denying the motion for
reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the motion for
reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in its first order erred in deferring
action on the Motion until after a hearing on whether the complaint states a cause of action. Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeals pointed out that the trial courts second order corrected the situation since in denying the motion
for reconsideration, the trial court in effect denied the Motion. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that
the allegations in the second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be
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true. The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular No. 04-94. To determine the existence
of forum shopping, the elements of litis pendentia must exist or a final judgment in one case must amount to res
judicata in the other. In this case, there is no litis pendentia because respondent Tadeo had caused the dismissal
without prejudice of the first petition before filing the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because there
is no final decision on the merits.
ISSUE: Whether the allegations of the second petition for annulment of marriage sufficiently state a cause of
action.
HELD: The petition has no merit. Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to state a cause of
action is untenable.
We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The petition sought the declaration of
nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and
petitioner Diana were legally married at the Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship as shown by the
marriage contract attached to the petition. The couple established their residence in Quezon City. The union
begot five children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November 1964; Isabel, born on 28 October 1968; Ernesto Tadeo, born
on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle born on 7 March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February 1978. The
petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of
their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present
time.
Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth in Santos and
Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second petition is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of
the alleged psychological incapacity. The second petition also fails to state that the alleged psychological
incapacity existed from the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, the second
petition is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the disability of the petitioner to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the second petition did not even state the marital obligations
which petitioner Diana allegedly failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged.
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. The obvious effect
of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need
to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral
sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not
require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to
allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity.
The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent Tadeo, the
correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right.
61) MARCOS vs. MARCOS
G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000
FACTS: Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was
transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B.
Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the
Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service.
They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an
escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone
conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts. After their marriage on September
6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from
the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.
After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different
business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their
children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage
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in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would
even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for
a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their
cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. When she was
discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness
Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
On October 16, 1994 the spouses had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not
want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that
she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to
her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her
sister's house.
On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center
where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions. Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and
driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got
mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even beat her
driver.
At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Paraaque,
while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel
and physically abusive to them. The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for
psychological evaluation while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations
mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their
children.
CA reversed the RTC and held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of
the evidence presented on the basis that there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was
suffering from an incapacity which was psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have
known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity was grave, had preceded the marriage and was
incurable."
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial
Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because
the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
2) Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of
the determination of the merits of the Petition.
HELD: 1)The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important
is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
2) We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not
lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were
already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not
gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently
drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
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Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is
gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At best, the evidence presented by
petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural
requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the
alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her
failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
62) REPUBLIC vs. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO
G.R. No. 149498. May 20, 2004
FACTS: On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her
husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
In October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the
Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November
16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial
Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending
money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he
never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but
he did not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given
address. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication,
respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial
court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion existed
between the parties. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion to present her evidence
ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to
support her testimony.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage between petitioner Lolita and Toshio null and
void on the basis of the records that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner
and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of
his family.
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to
the Court of Appeals but the same was denied.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court emphasized that this
case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina and Santos vs. Court of Appeals. In
those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a
Japanese national. Hence, this petition,
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ISSUE: Whether or not the mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them constitute
psychological incapacity.
HELD: We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible
but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on
how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have
greatly helped respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This
could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that
the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume
psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the
marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty
as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,
not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying
with the obligations essential to marriage.
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the
present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a
Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms
used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
63) DEDEL vs. DEDEL
G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner David met respondent Sharon while he was working in the advertising business of his father.
Eventually, their relationship resulted in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on
September 28, 1966 and followed by civil marriage in a church wedding on May 20, 1967. The union produced
four children. The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and
mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the AFP; a Lieutenant in the Presidential
Security Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical
psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the
Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. When
Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim.
Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on
December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then,
Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149.
Summons was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the
country considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the Philippines.
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Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation
of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and
projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder
exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for
remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and
irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are
indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
The trial court declared the marriage between the spouses Dedel null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, appealed alleging that THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A
CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA
CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution
dated January 8, 2002. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated
HELD: No. The petition is DENIED.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have
some bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The wellconsidered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be
helpful or even desirable.
Respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that
she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid
assumption thereof. It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in
church rites, and which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
64) CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO
G.R. NO. 158896. October 27, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner Juanita and respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the
Catholic Church on August 11 1973. After discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the couple
decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed
for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all
throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him.
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In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal
home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to marry his
paramour. The trial court denied respondent Manuels petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner
Juanita.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr.
Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.
HELD: The petition for review is hereby granted.
The presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the
case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession
with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature, and her inability to endear herself to his parents are
grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither
is there any showing that these defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. In fact, the psychiatrist reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic
and essential obligations of marriage.
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that respondent Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuels own evidence, contains
candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to gauge whether or not her husband
fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage.
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of
the Family Code. It must be shown that respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered
personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state and not
merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has
admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that particular point
The psychological report of respondent Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia, showed that the root cause of
petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable not from the inception of their marriage as required by law but from
her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the
priesthood, her husbands philandering, admitted no less by him, and her inability to conceive. Thus, from the
totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window into the Siayngcoss life and
have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with
the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
65) VILLALON VS. MA. CORAZON VILLALON
G.R. No. 167206. November 18, 2005
FACTS: Petitioner was married to respondent for 18 years. Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of his marriage
to respondent, citing psychological incapacity on his part as a ground. Petitioner alleged the psychological
disorder as that of Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Cassanova Complex.
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to respondent Ma.
Corazon before the RTC of Pasig City on the ground of petitioners psychological incapacity which he claimed
existed even prior to his marriage.
According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to
maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity and
irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his desire for
other women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the fundamental
obligations of companionship and consortium towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed that his marriage to
respondent be declared null and void ab initio.
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Respondent filed an answer denying petitioners allegations. She asserted that her 18-year marriage to
petitioner has been fruitful and characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more growth in their relationship
and that their marital squabbles were normal based on community standards. Petitioners success in his
professional life aided him in performing his role as husband, father, and provider. Respondent claimed that
petitioners commitment to his paternal and marital responsibilities was beyond reproach.
On October 7, 1996, the trial court directed the prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there
was collusion between the parties. As a result of the report, there was no collusion. The OSG opposed to the
petition. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Petitioner testified that he met respondent sometime in the early seventies when he applied for a job at
Metrobank, where respondent was employed as a foreign exchange trader. They began dating in 1975 and had a
romantic relationship soon thereafter. After going steady for about two years, petitioner and respondent were
married at the San Pancracio Chapel in Paco, Manila on April 22, 1978. In the middle of 1993, petitioner decided
to separate from respondent because their marriage reached a point where there was no longer any
communication between them and their relationship became devoid of love, affection, support and respect due to
his constant urge to see other women. Moreover, their relationship tended to be one-sided since respondent was
unresponsive and hardly ever showed her love, needs, wants and emotions.
Petitioner admitted that on certain occasions before his marriage, he had two girlfriends at the same
time. He also saw other women even when he became engaged to and, later on, married respondent.
Respondent learned of his affairs but reacted in a subdued manner. Petitioner surmised that it was respondents
nature to be silent and withdrawn.
In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal abode and moved into an apartment located five to ten
minutes away. Before he left, he and his wife spoke to their three children who, at that time, were 14, 8, and 6
years old, respectively. Petitioner consulted a child psychologist before talking to his children. He considered
himself as a good and loving father and described his relationship with the children as great. Despite the
separation, petitioner would regularly visit his children who stayed with him on alternate weekends, voluntarily
gave monthly support to the children and paid for their tuition fees and also shouldered the childrens medical
expenses as well as the maintenance and miscellaneous fees for the conjugal abode.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged psychological
disorder of Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex. Dr. Dayan submitted a
psychological report on both petitioner and respondent based on clinical interviews and psychological tests.
Respondent testified that she first learned of her husbands infidelity in 1980. She discovered that he was
having an affair with one of her friends who worked as a trader in her husbands company. The affair was cut
short when the woman left for the United States to work. Eventually, she and petitioner were able to rebuild their
relationship and overcome the crisis.
When asked about the womanizing ways of her husband, respondent averred that she did not know
whether her husbands acts could be deemed womanizing since there were only two instances of infidelity which
occurred 13 years apart. She also theorized that petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled so he could
marry her old friend. She stated that she has not closed her doors to petitioner but the latter would have to give up
his extra-marital relationship.
To controvert the findings of petitioners expert witness, respondent presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia
Villegas, who testified that Dr. Dayans findings were incomplete because a team approach was necessary in
evaluating an individuals personality. An evaluation of ones psychological capacity requires the expertise of a
psychiatrist and social worker.
The trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of petitioner. Thereafter. The respondent and the OSG seasonably filed an
appeal from the decision of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversed and set aside the trial courts decision. Contrary to
the trial courts findings, the appellate court held that petitioner failed to prove the juridical antecedence, gravity
and incurability of his alleged psychological incapacity. Petitioners sexual infidelity was made to appear as
symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder when, in reality, the same merely resulted from a general
dissatisfaction with the marriage.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision but it was denied. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was indeed psychologically incapacitated to render his marital obligations
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HELD: The petition has no merit.
The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.
The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It
must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage
Petitioner failed to establish the incurability and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. He simply
fall out of love and has consequently refused to stay married to her. Refusal to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage is not psychological incapacity within the meaning of law.
66) A. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS VS. BRIX FERRARIS

G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
FACTS: On February 20, 2001, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision denying the petition for
declaration of nullity of petitioners marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy
does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were
insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated April 20, 2001
where the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court on the
basis that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological
incapacity or that his defects were incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage. The Court of
Appeals also found that Dr. Dayans testimony failed to establish the substance of respondents psychological
incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed
personality disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor
or an adverse integral element in respondents character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and
complying with the essential marital obligations.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on
certiorari with this Court.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration. The Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to file
comment but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file comment. Further, the
Court directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on petitioners motion for reconsideration
which it complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Brix is psychologically incapacitated as to render his marriage with Amy void.
HELD: No. The Court found Brixs alleged mixed personality disorder, the"leaving-the-ho use" attitude whenever
he and Amy quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and
lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.
A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute
psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,
not physical, illness.
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The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.
67) ZAMORA VS. CA and Norma ZAMORA
G.R. NO. 141917. February 7, 2007
Facts:
Bernardino Zamora and Norma Zamora were married on June 4, 1970. Their union was not blessed of a child.
Two years after, Norma left the country and went to the US to work as a nurse. After two years she did come back
in the Philippines and thereafter she made periodic visits until she was already a US citizen.
Bernardino filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on the alleged psychological
incapacity of Norma. To support his position, he alleged that his wife was horrified by the mere thought of
having children as evidenced by the fact that she had not borne him a child. Furthermore, he also alleged that she
abandoned him by living in the US and that throughout their marriage they live together for not more than three
years. He alleged that Art.36 of the Family Code provides that the marriage contracted by any party who at that
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations of the marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization and that one of the
essential marital obligations is to procreate children through sexual cooperation which is the basic end of
marriage.
On the other hand, Norma denied that she refused to have a child. She portrayed herself as one who loves
children as she is a nurse by profession and that she would from time to time borrow her husbands niece and
nephews to care for them.
Issue:
Whether or not Norma was suffering from psychological incapacity, hence their marriage be declared void?
Held:
No. Norma was not psychologically incapacitated.
Under the law, the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented, considered totality, should be
sufficient to convince the court of the psychological incapacity of the party concerned.
In the case at bar the petition filed by Bernardino was not sufficient as to substantiate his allegations that Norma is
psychologically incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to bear a child was
strongly disputed, as the records undeniably bear out. Furthermore, the acts and behavior of Norma that
Bernardino cited occurred during the marriage, and there is no proof that the former exhibited a similar
predilection even before or the inception of the marriage.
68) DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993
FACTS:
Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition on May 29, 1991 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled
"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against Roberto Domingo. The petition alleged
among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a
Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he
had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing;
she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy;
from January 23, 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the
Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer;
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since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of
approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime in June
1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further
discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she
confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take
care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and administration of said properties to
her brother/attorney-in-fact. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership over said
properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the
sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be
placed under the proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the
same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
HELD:
Yes, a judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary and it can be filed even if not for the purpose of
remarriage.
Under the law, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be
the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
marry again.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
"ART. 40.The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." (n).
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of
other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between
the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery
of the latter's presumptive legitimes.
Therefore, in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting
desires to enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the
previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
69) BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
Facts:
Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion
Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City. They were blessed with four children. After 24 years of marriage, Beltran
filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
before the RTC of Quezon City.
Charmaine Felix answer she alleged that it was Meyanard who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a
certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage
against Meynard and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution found
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probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information against them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No.
236176, was filed before the MTC of Makati City.
On March 20, 1998, Meynard filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest
in the criminal case. He argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a
prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not the pending case involving a declaration of nullity of marriage based on article 36 is a prejudicial
question to a criminal action of concubinage involving identical parties.
Held: No. It is not a prejudicial question.
Under the law, the pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the
said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.
In the case at bar, the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
70) MARBELA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI BOBIS
G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000
FACTS:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said
marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with
petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally
Hernandez. Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on
February 25, 1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed
a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of
the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the
criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998.
ISSUE:
Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a
prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
HELD:
No, it is not a prejudicial question.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage,
requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear
implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of
the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there
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is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be
remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur, two of which are a
previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at
the material time of the first marriage.
Therefore, Isagani cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him. The
court should then immediately proceed with the criminal case without waiting for the result of the civil case.
71) MERCADO vs. CONSUELO TAN
G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000
FACTS:
Ma. Consuelo Tan and Vincent Mercado were married in 1991. However, at the time of the marriage of Tan with
Mercado, the latter was actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva on 1976. In
the first marriage he have two children and in the second marriage he has one child.
On October 5, 1992, a complaint for bigamy was filed by Tan against Mercado. A month later, a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed by Mercado against Oliva. On May 6, 1993, the trial court declared the
marriage of Mercado and Oliva as void ab initio. Nevertheless, the lower court found accused Mercado guilty of
the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the lower court by stating that accused Mercado failed to comply with Article 40 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Mercado is guilty of bigamy despite of his having obtained a judicial declaration of nullity
of marriage?
RULING:
Yes, Mercado is guilty of bigamy.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code and the rulings enunciated in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and Domingo vs. Court
of Appeals which expressly state that in order to re-marry, one must first obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of
the previous marriage.
In the case at bar, accused Mercado failed to comply with the requirement because he married Tan without first
securing a judicial declaration of his marriage with Oliva. He only filed for such a month after he was charge with
the crime of bigamy.
Therefore, the crime of bigamy was already consummated when he contracted a second marriage while the first
was still subsisting. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial.
72) MORIGO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates four years.. After the school year 1977-1978 they lost contact
with each other. Yet, after some time, when Lucia was in Singapore she sent a letter to Lucio, their friendship was
rekindled. They became sweethearts and on 1986 Lucia returned to the Philippines. On 1990 they eventually got
married. After their marriage celebration, Lucia once again left for Canada. After a year, Lucia filed with the
Ontario Court a petition for divorce against Lucio which was granted on January 17, 1992.
In October of the same year, Lucio married Maria Lumbago. Thereafter, he filed a petition for nullity of his
marriage to Lucia on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. In 1993, an Information for
Bigamy was filed against Lucio. He moved for the suspension of the arraignment alleging that the civil case for
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judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was
denied.
Subsequently, Lucio was convicted by the Trial Court and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction
of Bigamy. It ruled that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of
contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved.
Issue:
Whether or not Lucio is guilty of bigamy by contracting a marriage with Maria, considering that there was no
marriage ceremony took place with his marriage with Lucia.
Held:
No, he is not guilty.
Under the law, the first element of Bigamy is that the offender has been legally married and under the principle of
retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The
contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
In the case at bar, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio and
Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract
bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Legally speaking, Lucio
was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of.
Therefore, Lucio is acquitted by the Supreme Court from the charge of Bigamy because Lucio was not married to
Lucia at the time he contracted his marriage with Maria,
73) CALISTERIO vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO
G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000
Facts:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value of
P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, Marietta Calisterio. Teodorico was the second husband of
Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds. James Bounds disappeared without a trace
on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without
Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.
On 09 October 1992, Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court
a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia
Armas claiming to be the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, and that the marriage between the latter and
Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. Marietta opposed the petition.
Marietta stated that her first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his
whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with
Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the
estate of the decedent.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia and declared the
latter as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos. Respondent Marietta appealed the
decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals which ruled in her favor.
Issue:
Whether or not the second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should be
deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
Held:
72

The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at
that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the
Family Code itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 (2) of the New Civil Code which
provides: Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the
spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less
than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391.
The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent
court.
Under the foregoing provisions a judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long
as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases
are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It
follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
Therefore, it remained undisputed that Mariettas first husband, James Bounds, had been absent or had
disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased
Theodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the civil code should
thus be deemed valid.
74) REPUBLIC vs. NOLASCO
220 SCRA 21
FACTS:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed
that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null
and void. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who
had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did
not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead," 2 and second, Nolasco's attempt to
have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage.
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a
British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet
Monica Parker lived with respondent on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's hometown
of San Jose, Antique after his seaman's contract expired. Respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose,
Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a
seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working
overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son.
The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked
permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983. Respondent further testified
that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all
the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of
the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from
among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica. On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had
lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He
insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such information even after they were married. He also
testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine government
authorities.
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Respondent presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her daughter-in-law Janet
Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given birth to Gerry Nolasco. When
asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that Janet
Monica never got used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to
dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when she
(Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left for England. She
further claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's present whereabouts.The trial court
granted Nolasco's petition declaring Janet Monica Parker Nolasco as presumptively dead, without prejudice to her
reappearance. The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring
Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a
well founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence this Petition for Review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
HELD:
Four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1.
That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
Code;
2.
That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3.
That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4.
That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as
to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to
ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded
belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's
departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's
contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there. In Respondent's
testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his supposed efforts
to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:
Well, while the cognoscente would readily know the geographical difference between London and Liverpool, for a
humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one place in England, the port where his ship docked
and where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave home to visit relatives in Pasay City,
Kalookan City, or Paraaque, would announce to friends and relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent
error in naming of places of destination does not appear to be fatal. Is not well taken. There is no analogy
between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as
pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider
that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular
person there which is in effect what Nolasco says he did can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal
background even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her.
The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims
were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends
of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of
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Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind
of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. As
noted before, there are serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said
testimony merely tended to show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common
acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he cut short
his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months
from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally reached
San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents
and their place of residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the
police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet
Monica's departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that
Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.
The spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal
abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The Court notes that
respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same proceeding.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the
requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his
petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied. In fine, respondent failed to establish that
he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the
issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
74) REPUBLIC VS. LORINO
G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino filed, On August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her husband, a
verified petition with the RTC under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law provided for in
the Family Code, for a Court declaration that her husband is judicially presumed dead for the purpose of
remarriage. She alleged that: A) she and FRANCISCO LORINO, JR. were married on June 12, 1987 and begot
three (3) children. B) Before they got married she was unaware that her husband was a habitual drinker,
possessed with violent character/attitude, and had the propensity to go out with friends to the extent of being
unable to engage in any gainful work. C) Because of her husbands violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave
him behind and decided to go back to her parents together with her three (3) children. D) From the time of her
physical separation from her husband in 1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all. She had absolutely no
communications with him, or with any of his relatives. She believes that he is already dead and is now seeking
through this petition for a Court declaration that her husband is judicially presumed dead for the purpose of
remarriage. On August 28, 2000, the RTC issued an order directing, the publication of the petition in a newspaper
of general circulation. On September 16, 2000, the order for hearing was published in a newspaper of general
circulation in this province once a week for three consecutive weeks and be posted in the bulletin boards of the
Hall of Justice and the Municipal Hall, San Mateo, Rizal. Finding the said petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, the same is hereby set for hearing before the Court on September 18, 2000. The trial court ruled
declaring the presumptive death/absence of Francisco Lorino, Jr. pursuant to Art. 41 of the New Family Code but
subject to all restrictions and conditions provided therein. The judgment being immediately final and executory
under the provisions of Article 247 of the Family Code, thus: Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be
immediately final and executory, Despite the decision of the trial court having become final, the Office of the
Solicitor General, nevertheless filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC had the records elevated to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals, treating the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure, denied the Republics appeal and accordingly affirmed the appealed decision.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the Court of Appeals duly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal on a final and executory judgment
of the Regonal Trial Court.
HELD:
No. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to
perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family
Code, are "immediately final and executory". It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due
course to the Republics appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is immediately
final and executory. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a
statutory privilege." Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in
summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final and executory", the right to appeal was not
granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of
presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7,
2001. Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory it becomes
immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and whether made by the highest court
of the But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar, let it be stated
that the RTCs decision dated November 7, 2001, was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.
It was erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of
Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.
76) TY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 127406. November 27, 2000
FACTS:
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil
ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on
August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void
ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and
void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty,
herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4,
1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
Private respondent filed a petition, which alleged that his marriage with petitioner was void for lack of marriage
license and his marriage with Anne Maria was still subsisting.
ISSUE:
Whether or not nullity of first marriage is required before obtaining 2 nd marriage.
HELD:
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986), the Court held that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a
petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her
previous valid marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that:
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time
they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial
declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a
married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the
marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings in Gomez,
Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code. Article 40 of said Code
expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
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Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Terre v. Terre (1992) the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous
marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first marriage in 1977 was void since his
first wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have known that the prevailing case law is
that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
In the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that
time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent
being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could
contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondents second marriage to
petitioner is valid.
77) CARINO vs. CARINO
351 SCRA 131
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago S. Carino contracted two marriages during his lifetime, the first was on June 20, 1969,
with petitioner Susan Nicdao, with whom he had two children, and the second was on November 10, 1992, with
respondent Susan Yee and had no children at all in their 10 years of cohabitation. On November 23, 1992, SPO4
Santiago Carino passed away in the care of Susan Yee who paid the medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner
and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies, petitioner was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and respondent has collected
P21,000.00
On December 14, 1993, respondent filed the instant case for the collection of money against petitioner to
return to respondent at least one half of the money she has collected from the government agencies. Petitioner
failed to file her answer and was declared in default. Respondent then admitted that her marriage with the
deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without the judicial declaration of nullity of the 1 st marriage.
She also claimed that she was not aware that the deceased has a previous marriage and only found out when
petitioner introduced herself as the wife. To bolster her action for collection of money, respondent contended that
the marriage of petitioner with the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the
required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased
and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number, and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent. And on appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the two marriages contracted by the deceased are valid
HELD:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning,
where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for the purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable by law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and deceased does not fall within
the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensible to
the validity of their marriage. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and
deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is
valid and that they secured the valid marriage license.
It does not follow from the foregoing disposition , however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the
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deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under the scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and the
petitioner does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent. The fact remains that their
marriage was solemnize without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent and the deceased is likewise, void ab initio. As to the death
benefits that the deceased obtained from the government agencies, it should be given to his legal heirs as it was
declared an intestate succession. The children from the first marriage shall be the ones obtaining the said
benefits.
78

IX. VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
78) ANAYA vs. PALAROAN
36 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an
action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through
force and intimidation; that judgment was rendered therein on 23 September 1959 dismissing the complaint of
Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora's counterclaim; that (per paragraph IV) while
the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to settle the judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora
that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the
non-divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of defendant that definitely wrecked
their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly commenced ... frank disclosure of which,
certitude precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that was solemnized between
them constituted 'FRAUD', in obtaining her consent, within the contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil
Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page 3). She prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.
Failing in its attempt to have the parties reconciled, the court set the case for trial on 26 August 1966 but it
was postponed. Thereafter, while reviewing the expendiente, the court realized that Aurora's allegation of the
fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage. The court dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a
ground for annulment of marriage.
HELD:
We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a
cause for its annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the
facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be;
This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species of fraud enumerated in Article
86, as follows:
ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article:
(1)
Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2)
Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the
penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;
(3)
Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other
than her husband.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will
give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as ground for annulment of
marriage to the foregoing three cases may be deduced from the fact that, of all the causes of nullity enumerated
in Article 85, fraud is the only one given special treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void and
voidable marriages. If its intention were otherwise, Congress would have stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud
in general is already mentioned therein as a cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and
specifically dealing with "fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article," and proceeds by enumerating the
specific frauds (misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure of a previous conviction, and concealment of
pregnancy), making it clear that Congress intended to exclude all other frauds or deceits. To stress further such
intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds was followed by the interdiction: "No other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage."
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated
circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the
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article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to
annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been
thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her
consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself
alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it
agrees with the rule or not.
On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret intention on the
husband's part not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage:
hence her action for annulment based on that fraud should have been brought within four years after the
marriage. Since appellant's wedding was celebrated in December of 1953, and this ground was only pleaded in
1966, it must be declared already barred.
79) AQUINO vs. DELIZO
109 Phil. 21
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal which dismissed petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent
Conchita Delizo.
The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1955, was based on the ground of fraud, it being
alleged, among other things, that respondent, at the date of her marriage to petitioner Aquino, on December 27,
1954, concealed from the latter that fact that she was pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or
about four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer, defendant claimed that the child was
conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff.
At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared and the court a quo ordered Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose
Goco to represent the State in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff however, testified and the
only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Defendant neither
appeared nor presented any evidence despite the reservation made by her counsel that he would present
evidence on a later date.
On June 16, 1956, the trial court, noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that the child was born
within 180 days after the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by
the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud that would annul a marriage, dismissed the complaint. Through a
verified "petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence", plaintiff tried to present the certificates of birth and
delivery of the child born of the defendant on April 26, 1955, which documents, according to him, he had failed to
secure earlier and produce before the trial court thru excusable negligence. The petition, however, was denied.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has been excusable neglect in plaintiff's inability to
present the proof of the child's birth, through her birth certificate, and for that reason the court a quo erred in
denying the motion for reception of additional evidence. On the theory, however, that it was not impossible for
plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse during their engagement so that the child could be their
own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or even suspect that defendant was pregnant
when he married her, the appellate court, nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
Plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision be reconsidered, or, if such reconsideration be denied, that the
case be remanded to the lower court for new trial.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion. From that order, the plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru the
present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant
by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.
HELD:
The court held that the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint cannot be sustained.
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant
by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. The defendant wife
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was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we
are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat
as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a
woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the
abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of
the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a
height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. If, as claimed by
plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not
she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true
state of affairs. Even physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the woman herself who shows and gives her
subjective and objective symptoms, can only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at five months. and
50% at six months.
The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse
before they got married and therefore the child could be their own. This statement, however, is purely conjectural
and finds no support or justification in the record.
Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken together with what has already
been adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals
should, therefore, not have denied the motion praying for new trial simply because defendant failed to file her
answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a
provincial fiscal has been ordered to represent the Government precisely to prevent such collusion. As to the
veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes, the same can best be determined only after hearing
evidence. In the circumstance, we think that justice would be better served if a new trial were ordered.
80) JIMENEZ vs. REPUBLIC
109 PHIL 273
FACTS:
The plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios Cazares
contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the
office of her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that
the condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that
for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married. The wife was
summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She did not file an answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to
the provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether
there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up,
concocted or fabricated. On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a
physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation and to
submit, within ten days from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result thereof. On 14 March 1957 the
defendant was granted additional five days from notice to comply with the order of 17 December 1956 with
warning that her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the required doctor's certificate would be
deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that judgment upon the evidence presented by her husband
would be rendered.
After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the Court entered a decree annulling the
marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. The city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree
thus entered, upon the ground, among others, that the defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily
established as required by law; that she had not been physically examined because she had refused to be
examined; that instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and
compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and that the decree sought to
be reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end their marriage to collude or connive
with each other by just alleging impotency of one of them. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed or that the
wife be subjected to a physical examination. Pending resolution of his motion, the city attorney timely appealed
from the decree. On 13 May 1957 the motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of
the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent.
HELD:
The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence,
to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole
testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his
marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained
from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her
part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be
inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical
examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may do without doing violence to and
infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to
be a witness against herself. "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption
is in favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in
accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to costs.
82

X. LEGAL SEPARATION
81) DE OCAMPO vs. FLORENCIANO
G.R. No. L-13553, February 23, 1960
FACTS:
In 1938, Jose and Serafina were married and lived together as husband and wife. They were blessed of
several children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, Jose discovered on several occasions that
Serafina was maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. For this reason, Jose sent his wife Serafina to Manila
in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for a year. However, Jose discovered that his wife, while
in Manila was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. After Serafina finished her study in
1952, she and her husband lived separately. On June 18, 1955, Jose surprised his wife in the act of having illicit
relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Jose signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation, to which Serafina agreed provided she is will not be charged with adultery. On July 5, 1955, a petition
for legal separation was filed by Jose in conformity with the condition requested by Serafina.
The Court of Appeals found that in the night of June 18, 1955, the husband upon discovering the illicit
happening has expressed his wish to file a petition for legal separation and defendant readily agreed to such
filing. And when she was questioned by the Fiscal upon orders of the court, she reiterated her conformity to the
legal separation even as she admitted having had sexual relations with one Nelson Orzame. Interpreting these
facts virtually to mean a confession of judgment the Appellate Court declared that under Art. 101, legal separation
could not be decreed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court committed a reversible error.
RULING:
Yes. As we understand the article, it does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made
by the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of judgment.
Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff
to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand.
Yet, even supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a confession of
judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery independently of such statement, the decree may and
should be granted, since it would not be based on her confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff.
What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession
defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will immediately confess judgment,
purposely to prevent it.
The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated from
her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to answer the
complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the dismissal. Allowing the
proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion, which implies more than consent or lack of
opposition to the agreement.
82) BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO
G.R. No. L-10699, October 18, 1957
FACTS:
William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife
Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the
University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom
she begot a baby girl that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment;
that thereafter the spouse lived separately and later executed a document liquidating their conjugal partnership
and assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share. The complaint prayed for confirmation of the
liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage; that the defendant be declared
disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just and equitable. Upon petition of the
plaintiff, the court subsequently declared the wife in default, for failure to answer in due time, despite service of
83

summons; and directed the City Fiscal or his representatives toinvestigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the
Civil Code, whether or not a collusion exists between the parties and to report to this Court the result of his
investigation within fifteen (15) days from receipt of copy of this order. The City Fiscal or his representative is also
directed to intervene in the case in behalf of the State.
As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross-examined plaintiff Brown. His
questions (strenuously objected to by Brown's counsel) elicited the fact that after liberation, Brown had lived
maritally with another woman and had begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying
the legal separation asked, on the ground that, while the wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a
misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in permitting the Assistant Fiscal Rafel Jose of Manila to act as counsel for the
defendant, who defaulted.
RULING:
NO. Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining him with regard to his marital relation with Lilia Deito, who
was not his wife, the Assistant Fiscal acted as counsel for the defaulting wife, "when the power of the prosecuting
officer is limited to finding out whether or not there is collusion, and if there is no collusion, which is the fact in the
case at bar, to intervene for the state which is not the fact in the instant case, the truth of the matter being that he
intervened for Juanita Yambao, the defendant-appellee, who is private citizen and who is far from being the state.
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was already barred, because Brown did
not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon
his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation can not
be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years
from and after the date when such cause occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of
such findings and conclusion.
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance
thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest
and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
83) LERMA vs. CA

G.R. No. L-33352 December 20, 1974
FACTS:
Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz are husband and wife. Petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the
respondent and a certain Teodoro Ramirez. Respondent a complaint against the petitioner for legal separation
and/or separation of properties, custody of their children and support, with an urgent petition for support pendente
lite for her and their youngest son, Gregory, who was then and until now is in her custody. The respondent's
complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life.The petitioner
filed his opposition to the respondent's application for support pendente lite, setting up as defense te adultery
charge he had filed against the respondent.Judge Luciano of CFI of Rizal granted the respondent's application for
support pendente lite to the following effect: (1) the respondent was declared entitled to support pendente lite from
the date of the filing of the complaint; and (2) the amount of such monthly support was reduced from P2,250.00 to
P1,820.00.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals and requested for prohibition and preliminary injunction to annul the
aforementioned orders. Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition and issued a writ of preliminary
injunction to stop Judge Luciano from enforcing said orders. Moreover, on opposition of the respondent , the Court
of Appeals dismissed such petition of the petitioner.
84

ISSUE:
Whether or not adultery is a good defense against the respondent's claim for support pendente lite.
RULING:
Yes. The probable failure of the respondent's suit for legal separation can be foreseen since she is not an
innocent spouse, having been convicted of adultery by the Court of First Instance. It is true that the judgment of
conviction is on appeal in the Court of Appeals, but the same undoubtedly satisfies the standard of provisional
showing set by the aforesaid Rule. If legal separation cannot be claimed by the guilty spouse in the first place, the
fact that an action for that purpose is filed anyway should not be permitted to be used as a means to obtain
support pendente lite, which, without such action, would be denied on the strength of the decisions of this Court
recognizing adultery as a good defense. Otherwise, as pointed out by the petitioner, all that an erring spouse has
to do to circumvent such defense would be to file a suit for legal separation no matter how groundless.
The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property, presupposes the
existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of
the Civil Code, which states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to
live separately from each other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of
an act which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered
as within the intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the same Code the
obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act
which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the
spouse has given cause for legal separation." The loss of the substantive right to support in such a situation is
incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite.
84) BUGAYONG vs. GINEZ
G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant Leonila Ginez on August
27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan, while on leave. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with their
sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling
of her sister-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan,
Pangasinan, from which place she later moved to Dagupan City to study in a local college there.
As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco and some from
anonymous writers informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife which he did not even care to mention. In
August, 1952, plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of one
Mrs. Malalang, defendant's godmother. She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of Pedro
Bugayong, a cousin of the plaintiff-husband, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and
wife. Then they repaired to the plaintiff's house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the
second day, Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had
committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left, which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to
locate her and failing to find her, he went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his wounded feelings".
On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint for
legal separation against his wife. The motion to dismiss was answered by plaintiff and the Court, considering only
the second ground of the motion to dismiss i. e., condonation, ordered the dismissal of the action.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is condonation on the part of the husband with respect to the legal separation case
on account of adultery of the wife.
RULING:
Yes. The Court considered plaintiff's line of conduct under the assumption that he really believed his wife guilty of
adultery. What did he do in such state of mind. In August, 1952, he went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife
and after finding her they lived together as husband and wife for 2 nights and 1 day, after which he says that he
85

tried to verify from her the truth of the news he had about her infidelity, but failed to attain his purpose because his
wife, instead of answering his query on the matter, preferred to desert him, probably enraged for being subjected
to such humiliation. And yet he tried to locate her, though in vain.
A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, especially those portions quoted above, clearly
shows that there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of rank infidelity amounting
to adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to
adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of
the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be
brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as husband and wife for one
day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as
husband and wife all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation
between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation
occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.
There is no merit in the contention of appellant that the lower court erred in entertaining condonation as a ground
for dismissal inasmuch as same was not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss, because in the second
ground of the motion to dismiss.
85) LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L- 18008. October 30, 1962
FACTS:
After several years of marriage with Enrique Sta. Maria, a decree of legal separation was granted by the court. On
the other hand, Elisea Laperal has also ceased to live with him. A special procedure for change of name and /or
permission to resume the maiden name of herein petitioner Elisea Laperal, was filed. The petition was opposed
on the ground that the same violates the provisions of Art. 372 of the New Civil Code. The court however granted
the petition on the ground that her continued use of her married name will give rise to confusion in her affairs and
in the eventual liquidation of their conjugal assets. The State appealed.
That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise
ceased to live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted
to resume using her maiden name to ELISEA LAPERAL. In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court denied the
petition for the reason that Article 372 of the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally
separated from her husband, to continue using the name and surname she employed before the legal separation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for the change of name should be granted.
RULING:
No, Art. 372 of New Civil Code is written in a language that is mandatory, that the wife, even after the legal
separation has been decreed should continue using her name and surname employed before legal separation.
This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum.
It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged
status for the benefit of all concerned.
The Supreme Court decided that from the petition quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the only reason
relied upon for the change of name is the fact that petitioner is legally separated from her husband and has, in
fact, ceased to live with him for many years. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which refers to
change of name in general, may prevail over the specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code with
regards to married women legally separated from their husbands. Even, however, applying Rule 103 to this case,
the fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis for the petition at bar is, in the opinion of the Court, not a
sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to provide an
easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372.
86) ONG vs. LUCITA G. ONG
G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006
86

FACTS:
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at
the San Agustin Church in Manila. They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all
of the age of majority. In 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation alleging that her life with William was
marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct.
Lucita claimed that she and William quarreled almost every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her;
William would shout invectives at her like "putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga", and he would slap her, kick her, pull
her hair, bang her head against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand; the causes
of these fights were petty things regarding their children or their business.William would also scold and beat the
children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from
hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her
In 1995, after she protested with Williams decision to allow their eldest son Kingston to go to Bacolod, William
slapped her and said, "it is none of your business". In the same year, she asked William to bring Kingston back
from Bacolod; a violent quarrel ensued and William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms; when
William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun
at her and asked her to leave the house; she then went to her sisters house in Binondo where she was fetched
by her other siblings and brought to their parents house in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her parents
doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries.
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting language against her, or
whipped the children with the buckle of his belt. RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation. It found
that "it is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William) had their frequent quarrels and
misunderstanding which made both of their lives miserable and hellish. This is even admitted by the defendant
when he said that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife. Defendant had regarded the plaintiff
negligent in the performance of her wifely duties and had blamed her for not reporting to him about the
wrongdoings of their children." The CA found that the testimonies for Lucita were straightforward and credible and
the ground for legal separation. William filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether a decree of legal separation should not be granted following Art. 56(4) of the FC which provides that
legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation.
HELD:
A decree of legal separation should be granted in this case. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to
his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision. As correctly
observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife,
which made his life miserable, and he blames her for being negligent of her wifely duties and for not reporting to
him the wrongdoings of their children.
Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous accounts of the instances when William displayed violent
temper against Lucita and their children; such as: when William threw a steel chair at Lucita threw chairs at their
children slapped Lucita and utter insulting words at her use the buckle of the belt in whipping the children; pinned
Lucita against the wall with his strong arms almost strangling her, and smashed the flower vase and brick rocks
and moldings leaving the bedroom in disarray shouted at Lucita and threw a directory at her, in front of Linda and
the employees of their business, because he could not find a draft letter on his table got mad at Charleston for
cooking steak with vetchin prompting William to smash the plate with steak and hit Charleston, then slapped
Lucita and shouted at her "putang ina mo, gago, wala kang pakialam, tarantado" when she sided with Charleston.
William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in order for her side of the
family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his reputation by filing the legal
separation case just so her parents and her siblings could control the properties he worked hard for. The Court
finds such reasoning hard to believe. The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his
reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there
would be such a smear on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucitas decision to seek relief from the
courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.
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88

XI. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
87) ARROYO vs. DE ARROYO
G.R. No. L-17014, August 11, 1921
FACTS:
In 1910 Mariano and Dolores married each other and lived together as husband and wife. In 1920 Dolores went
away and left their common home with the intention of living separately from her husband Mariano. After failing to
convince and induce Dolores to come back and resume her marital obligations, Mariano filed an action to compel
her to live with him. Dolores answered by claiming that her husband was very cruel and in turn prayed for a
decree of separation. The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that
the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient
justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with
him.
The Court has carefully examined and weighed every line of the proof, and is of the opinion that the conclusion
stated is wholly untenable. The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her
husband in an aggravated degree; and to his cause are chiefly traceable without a doubt the many miseries that
have attended their married life. During the trial it was found out that the husband was not cruel to the wife.
Furthermore, it was the wife who was excessively jealous without any proof of infidelity of the husband. Therefore
the wife is morally and legally obligated to live with her husband.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the wife can be ordered by the court to live with her husband and failure of which will constitute
contempt of court?
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court in this case is unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo is entitled to the unconditional and
absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint
though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient
cause and that it is her duty to return. Moreover, upon examination of the authorities the court ruled that it is
convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are
invalid, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine
that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal
rights of consortium.
At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the
same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the
cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is
declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause;
and she is admonished that it is her duty to returnNo. The court ruled in the negative. The authorities are
convinced that it is not within the province of the court to compel the wife to live with her husband because such
obligation is purely personal in nature. However the court can declare her to be absent from the marital home
without sufficient cause. She is further admonished that it is her duty to return.
88) PELAYO vs. MARCELO LAURON
G.R. No. L-4089, January 12, 1909
FACTS:
Arturo Pelayo, a physician, filed a complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on or
about the 13th of October of said year, at night, the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants, situated in
San Nicolas, and that upon arrival he was requested by them to render medical assistance to their daughter-inlaw who was about to give birth to a child; that therefore, and after consultation with the attending physician, Dr.
Escao, it was found necessary, on account of the difficult birth, to remove the fetus by means of forceps which
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operation was performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remove the afterbirth, in which services he was occupied
until the following morning, and that afterwards, on the same day, he visited the patient several times; that the just
and equitable value of the services rendered by him was P500, which the defendants refuse to pay without
alleging any good reason therefor; that.
In answer to the complaint counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation therein contained and alleged as
a special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said childbirth, and that when she
was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with
them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay their was
accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances
ISSUE:
Whether or not father and mother-in-law may be compelled to pay the fees concerning the services
performed with the daughter-in-law.
RULING:
No. In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the
plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her
childbirth, is the husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law, the defendants herein. Father and
mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support,
among which is the furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement; and, on the other
hand, it does not appear that a contract existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician, for which
reason it is obvious that the former can not be compelled to pay fees which they are under no liability to pay
because it does not appear that they consented to bind themselves.
The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the first and second errors assigned to the judgment below are
unfounded, because, if the plaintiff has no right of action against the defendants, it is needless to declare whether
or not the use of forceps is a surgical operation. From the foregoing it may readily be understood that it was
improper to have brought an action against the defendants simply because they were the parties who called the
plaintiff and requested him to assist the patient during her difficult confinement, and also, possibly, because they
were her father and mother-in-law and the sickness occurred in their house. The defendants were not, nor are
they now, under any obligation by virtue of any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of any
contract entered into between them and the plaintiff from which such obligation might have arisen.
89) ILUSORIO V. ILUSORIO

GRN 139789, May 12, 2000
FACTS: Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For
many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of
thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board . Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala
Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio
City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children.
On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano's arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5)
months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda, alleged that during this time, their mother gave
Potenciano an overdose of an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor. As a consequence, Potenciano's
health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the person and
property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latter's advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired
judgment.
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On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo
City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents refused petitioner's demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.
CA granted visitation rights in favor of Erlinda though she did not pray for such and the administration of
the Cleveland Condominium
ISSUE: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss?
HELD: The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by
the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the rightful custody of
a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the
prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to,
and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio's
liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age,
or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his liberty.
Likewise, Potenciano Ilusorio did not request the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium and not to allow his
wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not object to seeing them.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial
choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal
to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear
before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this
will run against his fundamental constitutional right.
In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any
penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is
a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman's free choice.
91

XII. PROPERTY RELATIONS
90) MOISES JOCSON V. C.A
170 SCRA 333
FACTS: Emilio Jocson during his lifetime sold parcels of land to his daughter Agustina. One said parcels of land
bears and entry in the TCT Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete. These parcels of land are claimed by one
of the surviving heirs of Emilio to have been sold fictitiously and without any or insufficient consideration.
Futhermore he claimed that when his father sold one of the land, it was still part of the conjugal property of their
parents which has not been liquidated.
Agustina on the otherhand claim that the sale was with sufficient consideration and rebutted the allegation that
she has no source of income by alleging she is engaged in playa buying business. This was not controverted by
Moises.
ISSUE: Will the presumption that a property is conjugal arise based on the entry in the registry which states that
the owner is Married to thereby making it conjugal.
HELD; In order for the presumption to apply, it must first be proven that the property was acquired during the
marriage. The description married to does not vest title but merely serves to describe the civil status.
Registration does not vest ownership but merely confirms one already vested. The allegation that the sale is
fictitious due to insufficient consideration must be proven by the one who allege the same. In this case Moises
failed to prove this fact which likewise fails to overcome the presumption that a sale is with sufficient
consideration.
91) TODA JR V. ROSEMARIE TUASON-TODA
153 SCRA 713
FACTS: Benigno Toda, Jr and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda were married on June 9, 1951 and were blessed with two
children. Individual differences and the alleged infidelity of Benigno, however, marred the conjugal union thereby
prompting Rose Marie to file on December 18, 1979 in the CFI of Rizal, a petition for termination of conjugal
partnership for alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds against Benigno.
In order not to lengthen the proceedings, the parties entered into a compromise agreement. However said
agreement caused further litigation due to the question on its effectivity. This is material to determine when and
how much certain shares of stock is payable.
ISSUE: When is the effectivity of a compromise agreement entered into by the husband and wife? Is it when the
court approves of the same or when the spouses signed it?
HELD: The compromise agreement separating their properties is given effect only upon the approval of the court.
Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, "(i)n the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the
separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order."
Hence, the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the
parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective on y upon judicial
approval, without which it is void. Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides that the conjugal
partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of separation of property
92) WONG V. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ROMARICO HENSON
200 SCRA 792
FACTS: Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda on January 6, 1964. They have three children but even during
the early years of their marriage, Romarico and Katrina had been most of the time living separately. The former
stayed in Angeles City while the latter lived in Manila. During the marriage or on January 6, 1971, Romarico
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bought a 1,787 square-meter parcel of land in Angeles City for P11,492 from his father, Dr. Celestino L. Henson
with money borrowed from an officemate.
Meanwhile, in Hongkong sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the
latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale valued at 199,895 Hongkong dollars or P321,830.95. 4 When
Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded
payment of their value.
Thereafter Anita and her husband filed an action for collection of sum of money. After trial, the court promulgated
a decision in favor of the Wongs. It ordered Katrina and Romarico Henson to pay the Wongs.
A writ of execution was thereafter issued. Levied upon were four lots in Angeles City all in the name of Romarico
Henson ... married to Katrina Henson.
ISSUE: WON the judgment of execution extends to the properties owned by the husband
HELD: The Court disagrees with the CA that the said properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. Having been
acquired during the marriage, they are still presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership even though Romarico
and
Katrina
had
been
living
separately.
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that Romarico exclusively owns the properties.
While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is
unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of
the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount importance considering that in
the determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during covertrue, the controlling factor is the
source of the money utilized in the purchase.
The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may not be paid for with them her
obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership. In
addition to the fact that her rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the consent of her husband and her authority to incur such indebtedness had not been alleged in the
complaint and proven at the trial.
Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988), a wife may bind
the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family or when she
borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the family if the husband fails to
deliver the proper sum; 32 when the administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the
courts 33 or by the husband 34 and when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. 35 Having failed to establish
that any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's
personal obligation to them.
93) BELCODERO V. CA
227 SCRA 303
FACTS: Alayo D. Bosing, married Juliana Oday on 27 July 1927, with whom he had three children. In 1946, he
left the conjugal home, and he started to live instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he later begot one child,
named Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Belcodero.
On 23 August 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis from the Magdalena Estate, Inc. In the
deed, he indicated his civil status as, "married to Josefa R. Bosing," the common-law wife. In a letter which he
addressed to Magdalena Estate, Inc., he authorized the latter to transfer the lot in the name of his "wife Josefa R.
Bosing." The final deed of sale was executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc. A few days later, or on 09 November
1959, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 48790 was issued in the name of "Josefa R. Bosing, . . . married to Alayo
Bosing, . . ."
On 06 June 1958, Alayo married Josefa while his prior marriage with Juliana was still subsisting. Alayo died on 11
March 1967. About three years later, or on September 1970, Josefa and Josephine executed a document of
extrajudicial partition and sale of the lot in question, which was there described as "conjugal property" of Josefa
and deceased Alayo. In this deed, Josefa's supposed one-half (1/2) interest as surviving spouse of Alayo, as well
93

as her one-fourth (1/4) interest as heir, was conveyed to Josephine for a P10,000.00 consideration, thereby
completing for herself, along with her one-fourth (1/4) interest as the surviving child of Alayo, a full "ownership" of
the property. A new TCT No. 198840 was issued on June 1974 in the name of Josephine.
On October 1980, Juliana (deceased Alayo's real widow) and her three legitimate children filed with the court a
quo an action for reconveyance of the property. TC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION BELONGS EXCLUSIVELY TO THE PETITIONERS.
HELD: It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the Property was titled in the name of Josefa at
Alayo's request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The property unquestionably was acquired by
Alayo. Alayo's letter, dated 06 October 1959, to Magdalena Estate, Inc., merely authorized the latter to have the
title to the property transferred to her name. More importantly, she implicitly recognized Alayo's ownership when,
three years after the death of Alayo, she and Josephine executed the deed of extrajudicial partition and sale in
which she asserted a one-half (1/2) interest .
The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana. Under
both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), "all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife." This presumption has not been convincingly rebutted.
As regards the property relation between common-law spouses, Article 144 of the Civil Code merely
codified the law established through judicial precedents under the old code. In both regimes, the co-ownership
rule had more than once been repudiated when either or both spouses suffered from an impediment to marry.
The present provisions under Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code did not much deviate from the old
rules; in any case, its provisions cannot apply to this case without interdicting prior vested rights (Article 256,
Family Code).
It was at the time that 'the adjudication of ownership was made following Alayo's demise (not when Alayo merely
allowed the property to be titled in Josefa's name which clearly was not intended to be adversarial to Alayo's
interest), that a constructive trust was deemed to have been created by operation of law under the provisions of
Article 1456 of the Civil Code.
Article 1456. If the property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. AFFIREMED.
94) VALDEZ V. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY and CONSUELO M. GOMEZVALDEZ
260 SCRA 221
FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in January 1971 and had five children. In a petition,
dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
code. After the hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court, in its decision of 29 July 1994,
granted the petition, declaring among others that (1) the marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent
Consuelo Gomez-Valdez null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations; and (2) the petitioner and the
respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article
147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code, within
thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and
52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." In an order, the TC made the following clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by
both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained
through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own
their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of
properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code
shall apply.
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The TC said that considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent
as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be held
controlling.
ISSUE: WON Article 147 of the Family Code apply to cases where the parties are psychologically incapacitated.
HELD: The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148,
such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have
been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes
of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed
to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family and of the household.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed
by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not
included in the co-ownership.
Thus, petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as
well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions
on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family
Code, should aptly prevail. AFFIRMED.
95) ESTONINA V. COURT OF APPEALS
266 SCRA 627
FACTS: The controversy involves Lot C situated in Barrio Santisima Cruz, Sta. Cruz, Laguna with an area of 273
square meters. The said parcel of land was in the name of Santiago Garcia who died on October 2, 1967. Some
six years after Santiago Garcia's death, or on March 10, 1973, the then CFI of Manila issued an order granting
Trinidad Estonina's application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Consequently, a notice of attachment was
inscribed in favor of Trinidad Estonina covering all the rights, title, interest, and participation that Consuelo Garcia,
the widow of Santiago Garcia, may have in and to the parcel of land covered by the said title.
On August 14, 1977, the children of Santiago Garcia with his first wife, Adela Isoreta, namely Ofelia, Remedios,
Elvira and Castor all surnamed Garcia, executed a deed selling, transferring and conveying unto the spouses
Celso Atayan and Nilda Hicban their "title, rights, interest and participation which is four tenths (4/10) pro indiviso
share" in the said parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82229. About a year after, Santiago Garcia's second wife
and widow, Consuelo Garcia and their children, Virgilio, Marilou and Lolita, all surnamed Garcia, followed suit and
also sold to the spouses Atayan, their four-tenths (4/10) pro indidviso share in the same parcel of land. On
February 22, 1980, Estrella R. Garcia, the widow of Santiago Garcia, Jr. (Santiago Garcia's son from his first
marriage), and their children, Roderick, Elizabeth, Dorothy and Erlinda, likewise sold to the spouses Atayan, their
one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82229.
Subsequent to a favorable decision obtained by Trinidad Estonina against Consuelo Garcia, execution pending
appeal was made on the parcel of land formerly covered by TCT No. T-82229 on July 20, 1979. The said parcel of
land was sold at a public auction where Trinidad Estonina was the highest bidder. Consuelo Garcia appealed the
decision in Civil Case before the IAC which, however, ruled in favor of Trinidad Estonina. Upon the finality of the
said decision, TCT No. T-82229 was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Laguna and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-
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99961 was issued in favor of "Trinidad Estonina married to Paulino Estonina".
On July 25, 1985, the spouses Atayan filed a complaint for annulment of sheriff's sale and transfer certificate of
title with damages before Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna, impleading as
defendants therein the spouses Trinidad and Paulino Estonina , Nicanor E. Silvano, Reynaldo G. Javier, Edmund
R. Solidum, the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and the heirs of Santiago Garcia who sold to the spouses Atayan
their pro indiviso shares in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82229.
RTC:dismissed the complaint. It found the lot covered by TCT No. T-82229, was acquired during the marriage of
Santiago Garcia and Consuelo Gaza, and is presumed to be conjugal in nature. Upon the death of Santiago
Garcia on October 2, 1967, his conjugal share of one-half (l/2) of the said parcel of land was transmitted to his
heirs by intestate succession. By the law on intestate succession, his nine children, five by his first wife and four
out of the subsequent marriage, and Consuelo Garcia, his second wife and widow, inherited the same at onetenth (1/10) each pro indiviso. The remaining one-half (1/2) pertained to the conjugal share of Consuelo Garcia.
Thus, inasmuch as Consuelo Garcia inherited one-tenth (1/10) of her husband's conjugal share in the said
property and is the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of 55% (or 1/10 plus
1/2) of the said parcel of land. What could be attached by the spouses Estonina and later levied on execution and
sold at public auction was only Consuelo Garcia's rights and interests which is fifty five per cent (55%) of the
property.
CA: the parcel of land in question was not the conjugal property of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia, but was the
former's exclusive property. It was therefore the entire property that formed part of Santiago Garcia's estate upon
his death. When Santiago Garcia died, his nine children and Consuelo Garcia inherited the said property each to
the extent of one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share. Hence, it was only Consuelo Garcia's one-tenth(l/l0) pro indiviso
share in the parcel of land in question which could be validly attached, levied and sold in execution to satisfy the
judgment against her and in favor of Trinidad Estonina in Civil Case No. 88430.
ISSUE: WON the land is a conjugal property of Santiago and Consuelo
HELD: The property involved in this dispute is indeed the exclusive property of the deceased Santiago Garcia. It
has been repeatedly held that the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code that all property of the marriage
belong to the conjugal partnership applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation
of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. In the case at bench, the petitioners have been unable to
present any proof that the property in question was acquired during the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo. They
anchor their claim solely on the fact that when the title over the land in question was issued, Santiago was already
married to Consuelo as evidenced by the registration in the name of "Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Gaza".
This, according to the spouses Estonina, suffices to establish the conjugal nature of the property.
In the case of Jocson v. Court of Appeals The fact that the properties were registered in the name of
"Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses'
coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does
not confer title but merely confirms one already erdsting. The words "married to" preceding "Alejandra Poblete"
are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson. In other words, the import from the certificates of title is
that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been registered in his name alone, and that he
is
married
to
Alejandra
Poblete.
Being the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia, it was the entire parcel of land in question that formed
part of his estate and which passed to his ten heirs by compulsory succession upon his death. And as correctly
held by the Court of Appeals, what could therefore be attached and sold at public auction in Civil Case No. 88430
was only the one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share of Consuelo Garcia in the said parcel of land. The sale at public
auction of the disputed property in its entirety by the Sheriff in favor of Trinidad Estonina over and above the onetenth (1/10) share of Consuelo Garcia is null and void, belonging as it does to the other heirs of Santiago Garcia
and later to the spouses Atayan.
Anent the contention that the spouses Atayan are guilty of laches, suffice it to state that this residual argument
deserves scant consideration. Being strangers to Civil Case No. 88430 where the writ of execution over the land
in question was issued, they cannot be faulted for filing the "proper action" only in 1985 or six (6) years after the
levy on execution. Besides, it was only in 1984 that the Court of Appeals rendered a decision finally cancelling the
title of their predecessors-in-interest and issuing another one in favor of Trinidad Estonina. The action filed by the
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spouses Atayan seeking the annulment of the sheriffs sale and the transfer certificate of title with damages
immediately thereafter or on July 25, 1985 cannot be considered as undue delay nor does it imply a lack of
interest to enforce their claim over the disputed property.
96) AYALA INVESTMENT VS. CA & SPS. SHING
GR NO. 118305, FEBRUARY 12, 1998
DOCTRINE: If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a
surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of "obligations
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family.
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo
Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements, making himself jointly and severally
answerable with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband
Alfredo Ching with the CFI of Pasig.
After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and
severally pay AIDC the principal amount of P50,300,000 with interests.
Upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Upon AIDC's putting up of an
P8,000,000 bond, a writ of execution was issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr., Deputy Sheriff of
Pasig, caused the issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their
conjugal properties. Petitioner Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied.
Private respondents filed a case of injunction against petitioners to enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners
cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the
subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. The lower court issued a temporary
restraining order.
AIDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, questioning the order of the lower court enjoining
the sale. Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the lower court from enforcing its
Order, thus paving the way for the scheduled auction sale of respondents-spouses conjugal properties.
The auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale. Upon expiration of the
redemption period, petitioner sheriff issued the final deed of sale which was registered.
AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the petition for injunction filed before the CFI of Pasig on the ground that the same
had become moot and academic with the consummation of the sale. Respondents filed their opposition to the
motion arguing, among others, that where a third party who claim is ownership of the property attached or levied
upon, a different legal situation is presented; and that in this case, 2 of the real properties are actually in the name
of Encarnacion Ching, a non-party to the civil case.
RTC: the conjugal partnership of gains of respondents-spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching is not liable for
the payment of the debts secured by respondent-husband Alfredo Ching. Thus, the sale on execution null and
void.
CA: Affirmed decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
WON a surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his employer is within the contemplation of Art.
161 of the Civil Code and considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership?
HELD:
No. The surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his employer is not considered for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.
We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the terms "redounded to the benefit of" or
"benefited from" on the one hand; and "for the benefit of" on the other. They mean one and the same thing. Art.
161 (1) of the Civil Code and Art. 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use the term "for the
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benefit of." On the other hand, Art. 122 of the Family Code provides that "The payment of personal debts by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar
as they redounded to the benefit of the family." As can be seen, the terms are used interchangeably.
From the jurisprudential rulings of this Court, we can derive the following conclusions:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services
to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term . . . . obligations for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the
family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or
services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession
of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated,
where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that
such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only
as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of
"obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of
the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband
enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
The provisions of the Family Code is applicable in this case. These provisions highlight the underlying concern of
the law for the conservation of the conjugal partnership; for the husband's duty to protect and safeguard, if not
augment, not to dissipate it.
This is the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the obligations entered into by one of the spouses
must be those that redounded to the benefit of the family and that the measure of the partnership's liability is to
"the extent that the family is benefited."
Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one.
Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the
benefit of the family.
97) GUIANG VS. CA AND GILDA COPUZ
G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998
DOCTRINE: The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence
of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in
the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
FACTS:
Private respondent Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. They have three children,
namely: Junie (18 years old), Harriet (17), and Jodie (15). The couple bought a 421 sq. meter lot in Koronadal,
South Cotabato from Manuel Callejo through a conditional deed of sale. The consideration was payable in
installment. In 1988, the couple sold one-half portion of their Lot to petitioner-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda
Guiang. Since then, Guiang occupied the one-half portion and built their house thereon. They are thus adjoining
neighbors of the Corpuzes.
Gilda Corpuz left for Manila to look for work abroad. Unfortunately, she became a victim of an unscrupulous illegal
recruiter. She was not able to go abroad. She stayed for sometime in Manila.
After his wife's departure for Manila, Judie Corpuz seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling. He stayed most of
the time at his place of work. Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the remaining one-half portion
including their house to Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother. Gilda Corpuz replied that she was objecting to
the sale. Harriet, however, did not inform her father about this; but instead gave the letter to Luzviminda Guiang
so that she would advise her father.
However, in the absence of his wife Gilda, Judie Corpuz pushed through the sale. He sold to Luzviminda Guiang
thru a "Deed of Transfer of Rights" remaining one-half portion of their lot and the house.
Gilda returned home. She found her children staying with other households. Only Junie was staying in their
house. Harriet and Joji were with Mr. Panes. Gilda gathered her children together and stayed at their house. Her
husband was nowhere to be found. She was informed by her children that their father had a wife already.
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For staying in their house sold by her husband, spouses Guiang complained before the Barangay authorities for
trespassing. The parties thereat signed a document for amicable settlement stating that Gilda Corpuz and her
three children must leave voluntarily the house without any charge.
Thereafter, Gilda approached the Barangay Captain for the annulment of the settlement. Annulment not having
been made, they stayed put in her house and lot. Spouses Guiang filed a motion for execution of the amicable
settlement with the MTC.
However, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed a Complaint against her husband Judie Corpuz and PetitionerSpouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The said Complaint sought the declaration of a Deed of Transfer of
Right, which involved the conjugal property, null and void. The trial court ruled in favor of private respondent. CA
affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed.
HELD: NO
Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed was validly executed by the parties in good faith and for valuable
consideration. The absence of private respondent's consent merely rendered the Deed voidable under Article
1390 of the Civil Code. The provision in par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices of consent, i.e., contracts which
were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence or fraud. In this instance, private respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal
property was totally inexistent or absent.
The contract falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which provides that "...In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void..."
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to by petitioners were perpetrated in the
execution of the document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that barangay
authorities made her sign said document through misrepresentation and coercion. In any event, its execution
does not alter the void character of the deed of sale between the husband and the petitioners-spouses. The fact
remains that such contract was entered into without the wife's consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondent's consent. To constitute
a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: cause, object, and consent,
the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.
Doctrinally, a void contract cannot be ratified. By Art.1390 of the Civil Code, the Deed to Transfer of Rights cannot
be ratified, even by an amicable settlement.
Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the
parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale,
petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after which the barangay authorities
secured an "amicable settlement" and petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement,
however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its
tenor was to the effect that private respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the
Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.
Petition denied.
98) FERRER VS. FERRER
G.R. No. 166496, November 9, 2006
It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended
the acts or efforts, as the case may be.
FACTS:
In her Complaint for payment of conjugal improvements, sum of money, and accounting with prayer for injunction
and damages, petitioner alleged that she is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer (Alfredo), half-brother of respondents
Manuel M. Ferrer (Manuel) and Ismael M. Ferrer (Ismael).
Before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of lot. He applied for a loan with the Social Security
System (SSS) to build improvements thereon, including a residential house and a two-door apartment building. It
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was during their marriage that payment of the loan was made using the couples conjugal funds. From their
conjugal funds, petitioner posited, they constructed a warehouse on the lot. Moreover, petitioner averred that
respondent Manuel occupied one door of the apartment building, as well as the warehouse; however, in
September 1991, he stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging that he had acquired ownership over the property
by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their spouses.
It is petitioners contention that when her husband was already bedridden, respondents Ismael and Flora Ferrer
made him sign a document, purported to be his last will and testament. The document, however, was a Deed of
Sale covering Alfredos lot and the improvements thereon.
Learning of this development, Alfredo filed with the RTC a Complaint for Annulment of the said sale against
respondents. The RTC dismissed the same. The RTC found that the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, and public policy, and should be complied with by the parties in
good faith, there being no compelling reason under the law to do otherwise. The dismissal was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Further, in support of her Complaint, petitioner alluded to a portion of the Decision of the RTC, which stated, that
in determining which property is the principal and which is the accessory, the property of greater value shall be
considered the principal. In this case, the lot is the principal and the improvements the accessories. Since Article
120 of the Family Code provides the rule that the ownership of accessory follows the ownership of the principal,
then the subject lot with all its improvements became an exclusive and capital property of Alfredo with an
obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership of the cost of improvements at the time of liquidation of [the]
conjugal partnership. Clearly, Alfredo has all the rights to sell the subject property by himself without need of
Josefas consent.
According to petitioner, the ruling of the RTC shows that, when Alfredo died she had the right to be reimbursed for
the cost of the improvements on Alfredos lot. Hence, one-half thereof should be reimbursed and paid by
respondents as they are now the registered owners of Alfredos lot. She averred that respondents cannot claim
lack of knowledge about the fact that the improvements were constructed using conjugal funds as they had
occupied one of the apartment buildings on Alfredos lot, and even paid rentals to petitioner.
For their part, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that petitioner had no cause of action against
them, and that the cause of action was barred by prior judgment.
RTC rendered an Order, denying the Motion to Dismiss. According to the RTC, no pronouncement as to the
improvements constructed on Alfredos lot has been made and the payment of petitioners share in the conjugal
partnership constitutes a separate cause of action. A subsequent Order was issued by the RTC, denying
respondents Motion for Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for Certiorari, alleging
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the RTC in denying the dismissal.
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the Petition. It held that petitioners Complaint failed to state a
cause of action. The appellate court rationalized as follows:
[W]e believe that the instant complaint is not the proper action for the respondent to enforce her right of
reimbursement of the cost of the improvement[s] on the subject property. As correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, the same should be made and directed in the settlement of estate of her deceased husband Alfredo
Ferrer pursuant to Article 129 of the Family Code. Such being the case, it appears that the complaint herein fails
to state a cause of action against the petitioners, the latter not being the proper parties against whom the subject
action for reimbursement must be directed to. xxx Albeit the respondent herein has the legal right to be
reimbursed of the cost of the improvements of the subject property, it is not the petitioners but the estate of her
deceased husband which has the obligation to pay the same. The complaint herein is therefore dismissible for
failure to state a cause of action against the petitioners. Needless to say, the respondent is not without any
further recourse as she may file her claim against the estate of her deceased husband.
In light of the foregoing, we find that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioners motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon. Court of Appeals rendered a Resolution denying
the motion.
Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners Complaint for failure to state a cause of
action.
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HELD:
NO.After a reading of the allegations contained in petitioners Complaint, we are convinced that the same failed to
state a cause of action.
According to petitioner, while the RTC recognized that the improvements constructed on Alfredos lots were
deemed as Alfredos exclusive and capital property, the court also held that petitioner, as Alfredos spouse, has
the right to claim reimbursement from the estate of Alfredo. It is argued by petitioner that her husband had no
other property, and his only property had been sold to the respondents; hence, she has the legal right to claim for
reimbursement from the respondents who are now the owners of the lot and the improvements thereon. In fine,
petitioner asseverates that the Complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action
because the respondents have the correlative obligation to pay the value of the improvements.
Petitioner was not able to show that there is an obligation on the part of the respondents to respect or not to
violate her right. While we could concede that Civil Case No. 61327 made a reference to the right of the spouse
as contemplated in Article 120 of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the
obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no
obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner-spouse.
Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the
separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both
spouses. Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of
the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the
improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. The subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive
property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.
What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the allegations contained in the Complaint that they are
the buyers of the subject premises, are not petitioners spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse
upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It is the owner-spouse who has the
obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may
be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the obligation to respect petitioners right to be reimbursed.
It can be said, thus, that respondents act of acquiring the subject property by sale was not in violation of
petitioners rights. The same can also be said of the respondents objection to reimburse petitioner. Simply, no
correlative obligation exists on the part of the respondents to reimburse the petitioner. Corollary thereto, neither
can it be said that their refusal to reimburse constituted a violation of petitioners rights. As has been shown in the
foregoing, no obligation by the respondents under the law exists. Petitioners Complaint failed to state a cause of
action against the respondents, and for this reason, the Court of Appeals was not in error in dismissing the
same.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
99) DOCENA VS. HON. RICARDO LAPESURA
GR NO. 140153, MARCH 28, 2001
FACTS:
On June 1, 1977, private respondent, Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of
land against lessees, petitioner-spouses Docena. The petitioners clamed ownership of the land based on
occupation since time immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case. In a decision dated
November 24, 1989, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the petitioners to vacate the land they have leased
from plaintiff-appellant.
On May 22, 19995, Hombria filed a Motion for Execution of the above decision which has already become
final and executory. The above motion was granted by judge Lapesura and a Writ of Execution was issued
therefore. An alias Writ of Demolition was then filed by the Sheriff.
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners eith the Court of Appeals, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the orders and the sheriff in issuing the
Alias Writ of Demolition. CA dismissed the petition on the grounds that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day
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period provided under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Bar
Matter No. 803 and that the certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by the husband
alone. the The Motion for reconsideration was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
HELD: YES.
Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. In fact, he is the
sole administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The husband may
defend the conjugal partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife. Corollarily, the husband alone
may execute the necessary certificate of non-forum shopping to accompany the pleading. The husband as the
statutory administrator of the conjugal property could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition alone,
without the concurrence of the wife. If suits to defend an interest in the conjugal prperties may be filed by the
husband alone, with more reason, he may sign the certficate of non-forum shopping to be attched to the petition.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and the wife
jointly. However, an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required, joint
management or administration does not require that the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may
validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases as
provided under Article 124 of the Family Code. It is believed taht even under the provisions of the Family Code,
the husband alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contests the writs of demolition
issued against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without being joined by his wife. The signing of the
attached certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect.
100) MANALO VS. CAMAISA

GR No. 147978, January 23, 2002
FACTS:
Thelma A. Jader-Manalo was interested in buying the two properties of Spouses Camaisa. So she negotiated for
the purchase through a real estate broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno. She made a definite offer to buy the properties to
respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife, respondent Norma Camaisa in the
presence of the real estate broker.
After Edilberto signed the contracts, Manalo delivered to him two checks as down payments. The contracts were
given to Edilberto for the formal affixing of his wife's signature. However, the following day, petitioner received a
call from respondent Norma, requesting a meeting to clarify some provisions of the contracts. To accommodate
her queries, petitioner, accompanied by her lawyer, met with Edilberto and Norma and the real estate broker at
Cafe Rizal in Makati. During the meeting, handwritten notations were made on the contracts to sell, so they
arranged to incorporate the notations and to meet again for the formal signing of the contracts.
When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real estate broker at Edilberto's office for the formal
affixing of Norma's signature, she was surprised when respondent spouses informed her that they were backing
out of the agreement because they needed "spot cash" for the full amount of the consideration. Petitioner
reminded respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had already been duly perfected and Norma's refusal to
sign the same would unduly prejudice petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property of the without the wifes written
consent.
HELD: NO.
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases
requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family Code
provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
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jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife
for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective,
the consent of both husband and wife must concur.
Even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties,
which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself
admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the
negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.
101) CARLOS VS. ABELARDO
GR NO. 146504, April 9, 2002
DOCTRINE:
The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership
FACTS:
In October 1989, respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and requested him to
advance the amount of US$25,000.00 (P625, 000. 00) for the purchase of a house and lot. To enable and assist
the spouses conduct their married life independently and on their own, petitioner, in October 31, 1989, issued a
check in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged receipt thereof.
When petitioner inquired from the spouses in July 1991 as to the status of the amount he loaned to them, the
latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a definite settlement
of the same. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioners inquiries on the amount to the
extent of making various death threats against petitioner.
Despite formal demand for the payment of the said loan, spouses were unable to pay their obligation. Hence, this
prompted petitioner to institute a collection suit against respondent and his wife. As they were separated in fact for
more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint, respondent and his wife filed separate answers. Maria
Theresa Carlos-Abelardo admitted securing a loan together with her husband, from petitioner. She claimed,
however, that said loan was payable on a staggered basis so she was surprised when petitioner demanded
immediate payment of the full amount.
In his separate Answer, respondent admitted receiving the amount of US$25,000.00 but claimed that the said
US$25,000.00 was never intended as loan of defendant. It was his share of income on contracts obtained by
defendant.
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. CA reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the loan is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
Yes. The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code:
Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family
may have been benefited; If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
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While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly,
the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became
the conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of
respondent, under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.
Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family. The defendants never denied that the check of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the
subject house and lot. They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal home, thus benefiting the family.
On the same principle, acknowledgment of the loan made by the defendant-wife binds the conjugal partnership
since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence, defendant-husband and defendant-wife are
jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan.
102) RELUCIO VS. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ
G.R. NO. 138497 January 16, 2002
FACTS:
Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for "APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC.," against defendant Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda
Relucio. Angelina alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally married to her, abandoned the
latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration
of the conjugal properties, that defendant Lopez maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with petitioner
since 1976. It was further alleged that defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio, during their period of cohabitation
have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled corporations, residential,
agricultural, commercial lots, houses, apartments and buildings, cars and other motor vehicles, bank accounts
and jewelry. These properties, which are in the names of defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio singly or jointly
or their dummies and proxies, have been acquired principally if not solely through the actual contribution of
money, property and industry of defendant Lopez with minimal, if not nil, actual contribution from petitioner
Relucio. On December 8, 1993, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner on the ground that
private respondent has no cause of action against her.An Order dated February 10, 1994 was issued by herein
respondent Judge denying petitioner Relucio's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a
necessary or indispensable party because some of the subject properties are registered in her name and
defendant Lopez, or solely in her name. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing
the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision denying the petition.
ISSUE: Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal property, accounting,
etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action against petitioner.
HELD:: No. The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband. Nowhere in the allegations does it
appear that relief is sought against petitioner. Respondent's causes of action were all against her husband. The
first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix of the conjugal partnership or
absolute community property arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger to
this cause of action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses, to wit: "If a spouse without just cause
abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition
the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the
conjugal partnership property xxx". The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to
the exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her first
cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent that
can possibly support a cause of action. The second cause of action is for an accounting "by respondent husband."
The accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage. Petitioner has nothing to do with
the marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can exist against petitioner on this
ground. Respondent's alternative cause of action is for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in the co-owned
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property "acquired during his illicit relationship and cohabitation with [petitioner]" and for the "dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains between him [Alberto J. Lopez] and the [respondent]." The third cause of action is
essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. It does not involve
the issue of validity of the co-ownership between Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner. The issue is whether there is
basis in law to forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share, if any there be, in property co-owned by him with petitioner.
Respondent's asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share alone. Failure of Alberto J. Lopez to
surrender such share, assuming the trial court finds in respondent's favor, results in a breach of an obligation to
respondent and gives rise to a cause of action. Such cause of action, however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not
petitioner. The respondent also sought support. Support cannot be compelled from a stranger. The action in
Special Proceedings M-3630 is, to use respondent Angelina M. Lopez' own words, one by "an aggrieved wife
against her husband."
103) Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs. Miguela C. Dailo
G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005
Facts
During their marriage, respondents Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. purchased a house and lot with the
Deed of Absolute Sale executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee.
Without the knowledge and consent of respondent Miguela Dailo, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing her to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners
Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot. Gesmundo was able to obtain a
loan from petitioner and as security executed a Real Estate Mortgage on the subject property in favor of petitioner.
Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and as a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
on the mortgaged property.
After the death of her husband, during one of her visits to the subject property, respondent learned that petitioner
had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed
because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in
nature, respondent instituted a case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent, and upon elevation, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts finding in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebut the
presumption that the subject property was conjugal in nature. Hence, the appellate court declared as void the
mortgage on the subject property because it was constituted without the knowledge and consent of respondent, in
accordance with Article 124 of the Family Code. With respect to the damage to respondents car, the appellate
court found petitioner to be liable because it is responsible for the consequences of the acts or omissions of the
person it hired to accomplish the assigned task. All told, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision, but
deleted the award for damages and attorneys fees for lack of basis.
As a response to above decision, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner argues that
although Article 124 of the Family Code requires the consent of the other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal
properties, the framers of the law could not have intended to curtail the right of a spouse from exercising full
ownership over the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to him under the concept of co-ownership. Thus,
petitioner would like the Court to uphold the validity of the mortgage to the extent of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.s
share in the conjugal partnership. In addition, petitioner imposes the liability for the payment of the principal
obligation obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the conjugal partnership to the extent that it redounded to
the benefit of the family.
Issues
1.
Whether or not the mortgage constituted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the subject property as coowner thereof is valid as to his undivided share.
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2.
Whether or not the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan obtained by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. the same having redounded to the benefit of the family.
Held
On the first issue, the Court cited the case, Guiang v. Court of Appeals, where it was held that the sale of a
conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife and the same principle shall squarely applies
to the instant case.
Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage
settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations
between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains
already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or
other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo,
Jr. even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership,
where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their
separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the
absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is
expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage
settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership
under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership
apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal
partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written
consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or
encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where
the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are
correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondents consent.
On the second issue, the Court cited that under Article 121 of the Family Code, The conjugal partnership shall be
liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent
that the family may have been benefited; . . . . For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted
by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the
requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make
a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate
the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the
family as a unit.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the
creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove). Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to
finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing
adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the
records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded
to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the
principal obligation.
104) In Re: Petition For Separation Of Property Elena Buenaventura Muller vs. Helmut Muller
G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006
Facts
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Germany. The couple
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resided in Germany at a house owned by respondents parents but decided to move and reside permanently in
the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he
sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and
the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of
petitioner.
Due to incompatibilities, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court.
The trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between the
petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the
marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the
respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in
violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse during
the marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real property, therefore, inherited by
respondent-petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute community of property of the herein spouses.
Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as the personal properties purchased thereby,
belong exclusively to the respondent-petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance used by the respondentpetitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be recovered by the respondent-petitioner, its
acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which provides that "save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The law will leave the parties in the situation
where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary partition by the parties of the said real property.
Hence, as regards the property situated in Antipolo and the improvements thereon, the Court shall not make any
pronouncement on constitutional grounds.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial courts
Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and
not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered petitioners ownership over the property in trust
for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which
prohibits respondent from acquiring the same.
Issue
Whether or not the respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the amount used to purchase the land as well as
the costs for the construction of the house.
Held
The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by
operation of law in view of petitioners marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of
hereditary succession, respondents disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an
ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in
evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold
otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity is likewise misplaced. He
who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Thus, in the instant
case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on
respondents part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which
he is not allowed to own.
In view of the foregoing, the Court ordered the Decision of the Court of Appeals to be REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court terminating the regime of absolute community between the
petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of property between them and ordering the partition of the
personal properties located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED.
105) Agapay vs. Palang
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276 SCRA 341
Facts
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol in 1949. A
few months after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. The trial court found evidence that as early as 1957,
Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii.
On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second marriage with nineteen-year-old
Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the
Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located in Pangasinan. Consequently, a Transfer
Certificate of Title covering said rice land was issued in their names.
A house and lot in Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September 23, 1975, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole
vendee. A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was later issued in her name.
On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal
property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were
convicted of Concubinage upon Carlinas complaint and two years later, Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private respondents,
instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court. Private respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by
Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the riceland is registered in their names (Miguel and Erlinda),
she had already given her half of the property to their son Kristopher Palang. She added that the house and lot is
her sole property, having bought the same with her own money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded from
claiming aforesaid properties since the latter had already donated their conjugal estate to Herminia.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint after declaring that there
was little evidence to prove that the subject properties pertained to the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel
Palang.
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial courts decision. The Court of Appeals declared the plaintiffsappellants as the owners of the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his
cohabitation with defendant appellee.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner can be considered as the rightful co-owner of the riceland and the house and lot.
Held
The Court held that under Article 148 of the Family Code, providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a
woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision. If the
actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell
and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade the Court that she actually contributed money to buy the subject
riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around
twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S.
Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as
her share in the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.
Petitioner again claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In
the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their case from the operation of
Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not
having been adduced, the Court cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased even before they started
living together. In any case, even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of
co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential. Since petitioner failed to
prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, the Court finds no basis to justify her co-
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ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should revert to the conjugal partnership
property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on when she was only 22
years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the
falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase
price and directed that Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent
by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of
the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that
the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage.
106) Tumlos vs. Fernandez

330 SCRA 718
Facts
Herein respondents were the plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed before the MTC of Valenzuela against herein
Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint, the said spouses alleged that they
are the absolute owners of an apartment building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III; that through tolerance they
had allowed the defendants-private respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last seven (7) years
without the payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will
pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which
agreement was not complied with by the said defendants; that they have demanded several times for the
defendants to vacate the premises, as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building; and
that they have also demanded payment of P84,000.00 from Toto and Gina Tumlos representing rentals for seven
(7) years and payment of P143,600.00 from Guillerma Tumlos as unpaid rentals for seven (7) years, but the said
demands went unheeded.
Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. She averred therein that the
Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as
evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in question together
with Respondent Mario Fernandez. Thus, she asked for the dismissal of the complaint.
After an unfruitful preliminary conference, the MTC required the parties to submit their affidavits and other
evidence on the factual issues defined in their pleadings within ten (10) days from receipt of such order and
thereafter promulgated its judgment.
Upon appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the two other defendants alleged in their memorandum on appeal that
Respondent Mario Fernandez and Petitioner Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the
property in question as their love nest. It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment
building with their two (2) children for around ten (10) years, and that Guillerma administered the property by
collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that Respondent Mario deceived
her as to the annulment of his marriage.
In the same memorandum, petitioner and the two other defendants further averred that it was only recently that
Toto Tumlos was temporarily accommodated in one of the rooms of the subject premises while Gina Tumlos acted
as a nanny for the children. In short, their presence there was only transient and they were not tenants of the
Fernandez spouses.
The RTC subsequently rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of the MTC.
The petitioner and the two other defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the decision of
affirmance by the RTC was constitutionally flawed for failing to point out distinctly and clearly the findings of facts
and law on which it was based vis--vis the statements of issues they have raised in their memorandum on
appeal. They also averred that the Contract to Sell presented by the plaintiffs which named the buyer as Mario P.
Fernandez, of legal age, married to Lourdes P. Fernandez, should not be given credence as it was falsified to
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appear that way. According to them, the Contract to Sell originally named Guillerma Fernandez as the spouse of
Respondent Mario. As found by the RTC in its judgment, a new Contract to Sell was issued by the sellers naming
the respondents as the buyers after the latter presented their marriage contract and requested a change in the
name of the vendee-wife. Such facts necessitate the conclusion that Guillerma was really a co-owner thereof, and
that the respondents manipulated the evidence in order to deprive her of her rights to enjoy and use the property
as recognized by law.
The RTC subsequently ruled that the Contract to Sell submitted by the Fernandez spouses appeared not to be
authentic, as there was an alteration in the name of the wife of Respondent Mario Fernandez. Hence, the contract
presented by the respondents cannot be given any weight. The court further ruled that Guillerma and Respondent
Mario acquired the property during their cohabitation as husband and wife, although without the benefit of
marriage. From such findings, the court concluded that Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos was a co-owner of the subject
property and could not be ejected therefrom.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that from the inception of the instant case, the only
defense presented by private respondent Guillerma is her right as a co-owner of the subject property, which was
not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma. It was only on appeal that Guillerma alleged that she cohabited with the
petitioner-husband without the benefit of marriage, and that she bore him two (2) children. Attached to her
memorandum on appeal are the birth certificates of the said children. Such contentions and documents should
not have been considered by the RTC, as they were not presented in her affidavit/position paper before the MTC.
Even if the said allegations and documents could be considered, the claim of co-ownership must still fail as
Respondent Mario Fernandez is validly married to Respondent Lourdes Fernandez as per Marriage Contract.
Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. Thus, the property relations governing their
supposed cohabitation is that found in Article 148 of the Family Code. It is clear that actual contribution is
required by this provision. Hence, if actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership
and no presumption of equal shares.
In the instant case, no proof of actual contribution by Guillerma Tumlos in the purchase of the subject property
was presented. Her only evidence was her being named in the Contract to Sell as the wife of Respondent Mario
Fernandez. Since she failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the subject apartment
building, the Court finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Respondent Mario. The said property is thus
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership property of Mario and Lourdes Fernandez, it being acquired
during the subsistence of their marriage and there being no other proof to the contrary.
The RTC also found that Respondent Mario has two (2) children with Guillerma who are in her custody, and that
to eject them from the apartment building would be to run counter with the obligation of the former to give support
to his minor illegitimate children, which indispensably includes dwelling. Such finding has no leg to stand on, it
being based on evidence presented for the first time on appeal.
Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was validly presented, the RTC failed to consider that the need
for support cannot be presumed. Article 203 of the Family Code expressly provides that the obligation to give
support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
Issues
1.
Whether or not the petitioner is a co-owner of the property pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code.
2.
Whether or not the petitioners claim for support bar the subject ejectment suit.
Held
On the first issue, the Court held that it cannot accept petitioners submission that she is a co-owner of the
disputed property pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code. As correctly held by the CA, the applicable law is not
Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the Family Code. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and
a woman, who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together conjugally, may
be deemed co-owners of a property acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual
contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere cohabitation without proof of contribution will not result in a coownership.
Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman, who are not
incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. It does
not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a coownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful
110

wife.
Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those submitted by petitioner herself before the RTC, it
is clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was legally married to Lourdes
Fernandez. It is also clear that, as readily admitted by petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in a state of
concubinage. Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code is inapplicable.
In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the
subject property. Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is
unsubstantiated and in any event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the
Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition. Clearly,
there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership. The property in question belongs to the conjugal
partnership of respondents. Hence, the MTC and the CA were correct in ordering the ejectment of petitioner from
the premises.
On the second issue, the Court disagree with the petitioner that the childrens right to support, which necessarily
includes shelter, prevails over the right of respondents to eject her. The Court emphasized that the case at bar is
an ejectment suit whereby respondents seek to exercise their possessory right over their property. It is summary
in character and deals solely with the issue of possession of the property in dispute and it has been shown that
they have a better right to possess it than does the petitioner, whose right to possess is based merely on their
tolerance. Further, Article 298 of the Civil Code expressly provides that the obligation to give support shall be
demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same need it for maintenance, but it shall not
be paid except from the date of judicial and extrajudicial demand. In this case, none was made.
107) Eustaquio Mallilin vs. Ma. Elvira Castillo
333 SCRA 628
Facts
On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition and/or Payment of CoOwnership Share, Accounting and Damages" against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo. The complaint alleged that
petitioner and respondent, both married and with children, but separated from their respective spouses, cohabited
after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while their respective marriages still subsisted. During their union, they
set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president and chairman of the board of
directors, and respondent as vice-president and treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner and respondent
acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondent's name. In 1992, due to
irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitioner demanded from respondent his share in the subject
properties, but respondent refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name.
In her Amended Answer, respondent admitted that she engaged in the customs brokerage business with
petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation was organized with other individuals
and duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1987. She denied that she and petitioner
lived as husband and wife because the fact was that they were still legally married to their respective spouses.
She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real personal properties involved in petitioner's action for partition on
the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and registered solely in her name.
On November 25, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, in accordance with Rule 34 of the
Rules of Court. She contended that summary judgment was proper, because the issues raised in the pleadings
were sham and not genuine.
The respondent contended that even if she and petitioner actually cohabited, petitioner could not validly claim a
part of the subject real and personal properties because Art. 144 of the Civil Code, which provides that the rules
on co-ownership shall govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife
but not married, or under a marriage which is void ab initio, applies only if the parties are not in any way
incapacitated to contract marriage. In the parties' case, their union suffered the legal impediment of a prior
subsisting marriage. Thus, the question of fact being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether they lived together as
husband and wife, was irrelevant as no co-ownership could exist between them. Further, respondent maintained
that petitioner cannot be considered an unregistered co-owner of the subject properties on the ground that, since
titles to the land are solely in her name, to grant petitioner's prayer would be to allow a collateral attack on the
validity of such titles.
Petitioner opposed respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. 8 He contended that the case presented genuine
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factual issues and that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been repealed by the Family Code which now allows, under
Art. 148, a limited co-ownership even though a man and a woman living together are not capacitated to marry
each other. Petitioner also asserted that an implied trust was constituted when he and respondent agreed to
register the properties solely in the latter's name although the same were acquired out of the profits made from
their brokerage business. Petitioner invoked Articles 1452 and 1453 of the Civil Code.
On January 30, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision granting respondent's motion for summary judgment. It
ruled that an examination of the pleadings shows that the issues involved were purely legal. The trial court also
sustained respondent's contention that petitioner's action for partition amounted to a collateral attack on the
validity of the certificates of title covering the subject properties. It held that even if the parties really had
cohabited, the action for partition could not be allowed because an action for partition among co-owners ceases to
be so and becomes one for title if the defendant, as in the present case, alleges exclusive ownership of the
properties in question. For these reasons, the trial court dismissed Case.
On appeals, the Court of Appeals, ordered the case remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits. It cited
the decision in Roque v. Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect that an action for partition is at once an action
for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties
involved. If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the property, the action for partition should not be dismissed.
Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner,
the court should dismiss the action, not because the wrong remedy was availed of, but because no basis exists
for requiring the defendant to submit to partition. Resolving the issue whether petitioner's action for partition was a
collateral attack on the validity of the certificates of title, the Court of Appeals held that since petitioner sought to
compel respondent to execute documents necessary to effect transfer of what he claimed was his share,
petitioner was not actually attacking the validity of the titles but in fact, recognized their validity. Finally, the
appellate court upheld petitioner's position that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been repealed by Art. 148 of the
Family Code.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision of Court of Appeals. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals
granted respondent's motion and reversed its previous decision.
Issue
Whether or not the fact that the petitioner and respondent indeed cohabited is material to determine co-ownership
of properties between the parties.
Held
The Court held that although Art. 144 of the Civil Code, applies only to cases in which a man and a woman live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage provided they are not incapacitated or are without
impediment to marry each other, or in which the marriage is void ab initio, provided it is not bigamous, therefore,
does not cover parties living in an adulterous relationship. Art. 148 of the Family Code, however, provides for a
limited co-ownership in cases where the parties in union are incapacitated to marry each other.
It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case were not capacitated to marry each
other at the time that they were alleged to have been living together, they could not have owned properties in
common. The Family Code, in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who
live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides that, if the parties are
incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property
or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership even though the couples are not capacitated to
marry each other.
In this case, there may be a co-ownership between the parties. Consequently, whether petitioner and respondent
cohabited and whether the properties involved in the case are part of the alleged co-ownership, are genuine and
material. All but one of the properties involved were alleged to have been acquired after the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988. With respect to the property acquired before the Family Code took effect if it is shown
that it was really acquired under the regime of the Civil Code, then it should be excluded.
108) Elna Mercado-Fehr vs. Bruno Fehr
G.R. No. 152716, OCTOBER 23, 2003
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Facts
This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code filed by petitioner Elna MercadoFehr against respondent Bruno Fehr before the Regional Trial Court of Makati in March 1997.
After due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of property. Custody
over the two minor children was awarded to petitioner.
After a careful scrutiny of the inventory of properties submitted by both parties, the Court finds the following
properties to be excluded from the conjugal properties:
a) The Bacolod property, considering that the same is owned by petitioners parents; and
b) Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium, considering that the same was purchased on installment basis by
respondent with his exclusive funds prior to his marriage, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983.
In view of the above decision, Suite 204, LCG Condominium was declared the EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY of
respondent. Accordingly, petitioner was directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 in the name of respondent.
The Petitioner and Respondent are further enjoined to jointly support their minor children, Michael and Patrick
Fehr, for their education, uniforms, food and medical expenses.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204, LCG
Condominium and the support of the children. Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on installment
basis at the time when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in accordance with Article 147 of
the Family Code.
Resolving said motion, the trial court held that since the marriage between petitioner and respondent was
declared void ab intio, the rules on co-ownership should apply in the liquidation and partition of the properties they
own in common pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code. The court, however, affirmed its previous ruling that
Suite 204 of LCG Condominium was acquired prior to the couples cohabitation and therefore pertained solely to
respondent.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal questioning the order of the trial court but subsequently withdrew the notice and
instead filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, questioning the findings
of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of said Decision, which was also denied by the appellate court.
Issue
Whether or not Suite 204 of LCG Condominium should be governed by the rules on co-ownership and what rules
should be applied in the settlement of the common properties?
Held
It appears from the facts, as found by the trial court, that in March 1983, after two years of long-distance
courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and moved in with respondent in the latters residence in Metro Manila. Their
relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael Bruno Fehr, was born on December 3, 1983. The couple got
married on March 14, 1985. In the meantime, they purchased on installment a condominium unit, Suite 204, at
LCG Condominium, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983 executed by respondent as the buyer
and J.V. Santos Commercial Corporation as the seller. Petitioner also signed the contract as witness, using the
name "Elna Mercado Fehr". Upon completion of payment, the title to the condominium unit was issued in the
name of petitioner.
In light of these facts, the Court gave more credence to petitioners submission that Suite 204 was acquired
during the parties cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said property should be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar.
This provision creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire during their cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry
each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a
party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Article 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed
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by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family household."
Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their
marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. It has not been shown that petitioner and
respondent suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and
wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in his residence and were later united in marriage. Their marriage,
however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code because of respondents psychological
incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations.
The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at
the time when petitioner and respondent were already living together. Hence, it should be considered as common
property of petitioner and respondent. Further, the Court held that the property regime of the parties should be
divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership.
109) Saguid vs. Rey
G.R. No. 150611.JUNE 10, 2003
Facts
Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid
sometime in July 1987. After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit as husband and wife in a house built on
a lot owned by Jacintos father. Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel Saguid
Brothers. Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from
1992 to 1994. In 1996, the couple decided to separate.
On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with
Receivership against the petitioner. She alleged that from her salary as entertainer in Japan, she was able to
contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer
and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects,
with a total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties
and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed
to her.
Private respondent stated that she had a total of P35,465.00 share in the joint account deposit which she and the
petitioner maintained. Gina declared that said deposits were spent for the purchase of construction materials,
appliances and other personal properties.
Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed that the expenses for the construction of their house were defrayed solely
from his income. He averred that private respondents meager income as fish dealer rendered her unable to
contribute in the construction of said house. Petitioner further contended that Gina did not work continuously in
Japan from 1992 to 1994. When their house was repaired and improved sometime in 1995-1996, private
respondent did not share in the expenses because her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily needs and
business of her parents. Petitioner further claimed that his savings from his income in the fishing business were
the ones used in purchasing the disputed personal properties.
The respondent was allowed to present evidence ex parte after the trial court declared the petitioner as in default
for failure to file a pre-trial brief. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Subsequently, a
decision was rendered in favor of the private respondent.
On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals except for the award for moral damages.
Issue
What provision of the Family Code shall governed the property regime of the petitioner and private respondent?
Held
The Court held that the property regime of Jacinto and Gina, who was validly married to another man at the time
of her cohabitation with the former, should be governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, as it applies to
adulterous relationships and under this regime, proof of actual contribution is required.
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In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987, which is before the
date of the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 148 still applies because this provision was intended precisely to
fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no
provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private
respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However,
nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are
receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials in the total amount of P11,413.00.
On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed personal properties came
partly from their joint account. While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account
deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to
Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their share
shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence
and value of which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-half,
which is P 55,687.50 each.
On the basis of the evidence established, the extent of private respondents co-ownership over the disputed
house is only up to the amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution in the construction thereof. While for the
personal properties, her participation should be limited only to the amount of P55,687.50.
115

XIII. THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION
110) Hontiveros vs. RTC Br. 25, Iloilo City & Spouses Gregorio Hontiveros & Teodora Ayson
G.R.No. 125465, June 29, 1999
Facts:
Spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio
Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before the RTC Iloilo City.
Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a land located at the town of Jamindan, Province of Capiz, as
shown by OCT No. 0-2124, issued pursuant to the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court which modified
decision of CFI Capiz, in a land registration case filed by private respondent Gregorio Hontivero. Also, that they
were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case. The income consisted
of rentals from tenants of the land in the amount of P66,000.00 per year from 1968 to 1987, and P595,000.00 per
year thereafter; and that private respondents filed the land registration case and withheld possession of the land
from petitioners in bad faith.
Private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that private respondent Hontiveros was a widower
while private respondent Ayson was single. They denied that they had deprived petitioners of possession of and
income from the land. They alleged that possession of the property in question had already been transferred to
petitioners on August 7, 1985, by virtue of a writ of possession, dated July 18, 1985, issued by the clerk of court of
the RTC Capiz, Mambusao, the return thereof having been received by petitioners counsel. Since then,
petitioners have been directly receiving rentals from the tenants of the land. The complaint failed to state a cause
of action since it did not allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made, considering that
petitioner Augusto Hontiveros and private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros are brothers. The decision of the IAC
in Land Registration Case was null and void since it was based upon a ground which was not passed upon by the
trial court. That petitioners claim for damages was barred by prescription with respect to claims before 1984; that
there were no rentals due since private respondent Hontiveros was a possessor in good faith and for value; and
that private respondent Ayson had nothing to do with the case as she was not married to private respondent
Gregorio Hontiveros and did not have any proprietary interest in the subject property. Private respondents prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint and for an order against petitioners to pay damages to private respondents by
way of counterclaim, as well as reconveyance of the subject land to private respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC palpably erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that it does not allege
under oath that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made prior to filing as required by Art. 151 of
FC.
Held:
No. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the suit is not
exclusively among family members. Petitioners claim that whenever a stranger is a party in a case involving
family members, the requisite showing of earnest efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory. They argue that
since private respondent Ayson is admittedly a stranger to the Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the
requirements of Art. 151 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the
phrase members of the same family refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and
descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood.
In Gayon v. Gayon, the enumeration of brothers and sisters as members of the same family does not
comprehend sisters-in-law. In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that sisters-in-law (hence,
also brothers-in-law) are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since
Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of members of the family, we find no
reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the mater. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner
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Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a
compromise before filing the present suit.
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. Consequently,
private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and
petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered
strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151.
Petitioners finally question the constitutionality of Art. 151 of the Family Code on the ground that it in effect
amends the Rules of Court. This, according to them, cannot be done since the Constitution reserves in favor of
the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules of pleadings and procedure. Considering the conclusion we
have reached in this case, however, it is unnecessary for present purposes to pass upon this question. Courts do
not pass upon constitutional questions unless they are the very lis mota of the case.
111) Guerrero vs. RTC Ilocos Norte, Judge Luis Bello & Pedro Hernando
G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994
Facts:
Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana against private respondent, this case assumed another dimension
when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brother-in-law the complaint
should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise.
Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties exerted earnest efforts towards a compromise and that
the same failed. However, private respondent Pedro G. Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect since
he did not file any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on this ground in his answer. It was only at the pretrial conference, that the relationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and Hernando was noted by respondent
Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr.
Guerrero claims that since brothers by affinity are not members of the same family, he was not required to exert
efforts towards a compromise.
Issue:
Whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family contemplated in Art. 217, par.
(4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court
requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise before a suit between them may be instituted and
maintained.
Held:
No. The reason for the requirement that earnest efforts at compromise be first exerted before a complaint is
given due course is because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between
members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a
litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close relatives
generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. A litigation in a family is to be lamented far more than a
lawsuit between strangers .
In Gayon v. Gayon, the enumeration of brothers and sisters as members of the same family does not comprehend
sisters-in-law. The attempt to compromise as well as inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the the filing
of a suit between members of the same family.
Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of "members of the family", we find
no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner
Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a
compromise before filing the present suit.
Also, Guerreros wife has no actual interest and participation in the land subject of the suit, which the petitioner
bought, before he married his wife.
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112) Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. vs. Hon. Edmundo Acua, RTC Judge Caloocan City and Alberto
Moreno
G.R. no. 154132 August 31, 2006
Facts:
Alberto Moreno filed with the RTC of Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, his wife
Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of
mortgage. Respondent Moreno contends that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or
execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe,
who were the ones that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he
could not have executed the said contract because he was working abroad.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss because private respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family
wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from
the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed. Petitioner contends that since the complaint does not contain any fact or averment that earnest
efforts toward a compromise had been made prior to its institution, then the complaint should be dismissed for
lack of cause of action.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss, it held that earnest efforts towards a compromise is not required before the
filing of the instant case considering that the above-entitled case involves parties who are strangers to the family.
Issue:
Whether or not lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise is not a ground for a motion to dismiss in
suits between husband and wife when other parties who are strangers to the family are involved in the
suit.
Held:
Yes. The Code Commission that drafted Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family Code
was taken explains: it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members
of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is
allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates
deeper bitterness than between strangers.
In Magbaleta vs. Gonong, the case involved brothers and a stranger to the family, the alleged owner of the subject
property. The Court, taking into consideration the explanation made by the Code Commission in its report, ruled
that: These consideration s do not however weigh enough to make it imperative that such efforts to compromise
should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a
party thereto, whether as a necessary or indispensable one. It is not always that one who is alien to the family
would be willing to suffer the inconvenience of; much less, relish the delay and the complications that wrangling
between or among relatives more often than not entail.
Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the
determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who just happened to have innocently acquired some kind of
interest in any right or property disputed among its members should be made to depend on the way the latter
would settle their differences among themselves. 22 x x x.
Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes
it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can prosper.
Petition is Dismissed.
FAMILY HOME
113) Modequillo vs. Breva
G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
Facts:
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In 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.
finding the defendants-appellees Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay jointly and severally liable to plaintiffsappellants as compensation for the death of Audie Salinas for hospitalization expenses of Renato Culan- Culan.
The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC Davao City to
satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay at
Malalag, Davao del Sur.
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area
of 600 square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and assessed value of P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration
No. 87008-01359, registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del
Sur; and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of
3 hectares with a market value of P24,130.00 and assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87-0801848 registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur.
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging that the
residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the
commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152
and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt
sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of
the Family Code. As to the agricultural land although it is declared in the name of defendant it is alleged to be still
part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a
cultural minority was not approved by the proper government agency. An opposition thereto was filed by the
plaintiffs.
Issue:
Whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages may be satisfied by way
of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.
Held:
Yes. Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied
as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil
Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus,
the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses
or head of the family who owns the home.
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered
service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such,
and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether
judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article
153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being
a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner
and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of
this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not
mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive
effect.
119

Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited? No. The debt or liability
which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16,
1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both
preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from
execution provided in the Family Code.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made by the
sheriff shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.
114) Manacop vs. CA and F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC.,
G.R. No. 104875 November 13, 1992
Facts:
Owing to the failure to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between
petitioner's corporation and private respondent herein, the latter filed on July 3, 1989, a complaint for a sum of
money, with a prayer for preliminary attachment, against the former. As a consequence of the order on July 28,
1989, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued on August 11, 1989 which triggered the
attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by Manacop Construction President Florante F. Manacop,
herein petitioner.
The petitioner insists that the attached property is a family home, having been occupied by him and his
family since 1972, and is therefore exempt from attachment.
RTC held that the subject property is not exempt from attachment.
Issue:
Whether or not the property of Florante Manacop is exempt from attachment.
Held:
No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular
accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on
January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall
under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner
and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of
this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not
mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive
effect.
115) Manacop vs. CA and E & L MERCANTILE INC.
227 SCRA 57
Facts:
On March 10, 1972, Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased a 446-square-meter
residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00. The property is located at Commonwealth Village,
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
120

Private Respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co.,
Inc. before the RTC Pasig to collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and
his company entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent.
On July 15, 1986, E & L Mercantile filed a motion for execution which the lower court. However, execution of the
judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal properties of
petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels were sold at public auction for which
certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff.
Petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff from
continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not yet executory.
Private respondent opposed the motion alleging that the property covered by TCT No. 174180 could not be
considered a family home on the grounds that petitioner was already living abroad and that the property, having
been acquired in 1972, should have been judicially constituted as a family home to exempt it from execution.
RTC ruled in favor of private respondent. It held that petitioners residence was not exempt from execution as it
was not duly constituted as a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code.
CA affirmed.
Issue: May a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued before the effectivity of the Family Code
be executed on a house and lot constituted as a family home under the provision of said Code?
HELD
Yes. [The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. On the contrary, its Decision and Resolution are
supported by law and applicable jurisprudence.]
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in holding that his residence was not exempt from execution in view of
his failure to show that the property involved has been duly constituted as a family home in accordance with
law. He asserts that the Family Code and Modequillo require simply the occupancy of the property by the
petitioner, without need for its judicial or extrajudicial constitution as a family home.
Petitioner is only partly correct. True, under the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject
property became his family home under the simplified process embodied in Article 153 of said Code. However,
Modequillo explicitly ruled that said provision of the Family Code does not have retroactive effect. In other words,
prior to August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code had to be followed for a family home to be
constituted as such. There being absolutely no proof that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially
constituted as a family home, it follows that the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioner. Since
the debt involved herein was incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court issued prior to August 3, 1988, the
petitioner cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of the Family Code.
Petitioner contends that he should be deemed residing in the family home because his stay in the United States is
merely temporary. He asserts that the person staying in the house is his overseer and that whenever his wife
visited this country, she stayed in the family home. This contention lacks merit.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by any of its
beneficiaries must be actual. That which is actual is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to
something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy, however,
need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the beneficiaries
enumerated by Article 154 of the Family Code.
116) Versola vs. Ong
G.R. No. 164740 July 31, 2006
Facts:
Private respondent Dr. Victoria T. Ong Oh granted a loan to a certain Dolores Ledesma in the amount of P1M. As
a security for said loan, Ledesma issued to private respondent a check for the same amount dated 10 February
1993 and promised to execute a deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot located at Tandang Sora,
Quezon City which did not materialize.
121

Subsequently, Ledesma sold the said house and lot to petitioners for P2.5M. Petitioners paid Ledesma P1M as
downpayment, with the remaining balance of P1.5M to be paid in monthly installments of P75,000. Petitioners,
however, were only able to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to Ledesma. To raise the full amount that Ledesma
demanded, petitioners applied for a loan with Asiatrust Bank, Inc. (Asiatrust) in the amount of P2M. In the course
of the application for said loan, petitioners, private respondent, and Ledesma convened with Asiatrust to arrive at
a scheme to settle the obligation of Ledesma to private respondent and the obligation of petitioners to Ledesma.
In keeping with the foregoing agreement, private respondent granted Ledesma an additional loan of P450,000.00.
Ledesma, in turn, executed a Deed of Sale transferring the title of the subject property to petitioners. Private
respondent then delivered the title of the said property to Asiatrust. The Deed of Sale was registered and the title
in the name of Ledesma was cancelled and a new one was issued in the names of petitioners. Thereafter,
Asiatrust approved the loan application of petitioners. However, when Asiatrust tried to register the Real Estate
Mortgage covering the subject property executed in its favor by petitioners, it discovered a notice of levy on
execution was annotated on the title in connection with Ledesma's obligation to a certain Miladay's Jewels, Inc., in
the amount of P214,284.00. Because of this annotated encumbrance, Asiatrust did not register said Real Estate
Mortgage and refused to release the P2M loan of petitioners. When private respondent presented Ledesma's
check for payment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was already closed. Subsequently,
when private respondent presented for payment the check issued by petitioners, the said check was likewise
dishonored because there was a stop payment order. With the dishonor of the checks and with Asiatrust's refusal
to release the P2M loan of petitioners, private respondent came away empty-handed as she did not receive
payment for the P1.5M loan she granted to Ledesma that was assumed by petitioners. As a result, private
respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against Ledesma, petitioners, and Asiatrust.
RTC ruled in favor of Dr. Victoria T. Ong Oh. CA affirmed withmodification.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Execution with the RTC. The property in the name of Spouses Versola were
subsequently levied upon. On 5 August 2002, private respondent filed with the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for
Issuance of Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola. Petitioners opposed
the said motion on the following grounds: (1) the property sold at the public auction is the family home of
petitioners which is exempt from execution pursuant to Article 155 of the Family Code; and (2) no application was
made by private respondent for the determination of the value of their family home to be subjected to execution,
as required under Article 160 of the Family Code.
Petitioners maintain that said objection to the sale was based on the fact that there was no order or clearance
from the trial court for the sheriff to proceed with the auction sale, in clear violation of Article 160 of the Family
Code, which requires an application by the creditor and a determination of the actual value of the family home by
the court ordering the sale of property under execution.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners timely raised and proved that their property is exempt from execution.
Held:
No. Article 153 of the Family Code provides:
The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as the family residence.
From the time of its constitution and so long as its beneficiaries resides therein, the family home continues to be
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of
the value allowed by law.
Under the cited provision, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as
a family residence; there is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal
privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor
himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption
merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the
Sheriff. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exception.
122

In the instant case, it was only after almost two years from the time of the execution sale and after the "Sheriff's
Final Deed of Sale" was issued did petitioners rigorously claim in their Opposition to private respondent's Ex-parte
Motion for Issuance of Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola that the
property in question is exempt from execution. Even then, there was no showing that petitioners adduced
evidence to prove that it is indeed a family home.
117) Patricio vs. Marcelino G. Dario III and CA
G.R. No. 170829 November 20, 2006
Facts:
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and
their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left
was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building. On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino
Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Thereafter, petitioner and
Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and
terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino
Marc instituted an action for partition.
The RTC ordered the partition and the sale of the property by public auction. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home should
continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could
not partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also
held that the minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G.
Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home.
Issue:
Whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary
under Article 154 of the Family Code.
Held:
No. Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and
wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants,
brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and
who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships
enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal
support upon the head of the family.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried
person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether
the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term descendants contemplates all descendants of the person
or persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the
grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec
nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private
respondents minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits
derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and
grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years
from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal
grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his
immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents,
especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
123

Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father. Thus,
despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario
IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite
of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support,
and who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal
age.
124

XIV. PATERNITY AND FILIATION
118) Andal vs. Macaraig
G.R. No. L-2474 May 30, 1951
FACTS:
Emiliano Andal was the owner of the parcel of land in question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis
Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former on the occasion of
his marriage to Maria Dueas. Emiliano Andal had been in possession of the land from 1938 up to 1942, when
Eduvigis Macaraig, taking advantage of the abnormal situation then prevailing, entered the land in question.
Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live
in his house to help him work his farm. His sickness became worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he
became so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his
wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until the middle of 1943. Since May,
1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943,
Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria
Dueas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal. If the son born to the couple is deemed
legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit the land in question. If otherwise, then the land should revert back to
Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to succeed him under the law. The lower court rendered judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the child born by Maria is considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano.
HELD:
Yes. Article 108 of the Civil Code provides that children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following
that of the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation
of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was
physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first one hundred and twenty days
of the three hundred next preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include
(1) absence during the initial period of conception, (2) impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable, and
(3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison
regulations. Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is
presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within three hundred (300) days
following the dissolution of the marriage. There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during
the initial period of conception, especially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September
10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the
contrary, there is enough evidence to show that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were still
living under the marital roof, or at least had access one to the other. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the
same house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude
cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife. Also, even though Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis
and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from bed does not show that this
does not prevent carnal intercourse. He was not impotent. The fact that Maria Dueas has committed adultery
can not also overcome this presumption. Therefore, presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in favor of the
child has not been overcome.
Renren Geremia
119) Teofista Babiera vs. Presentacion B. Catotal
G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000
FACTS:
Presentacion B. Catotal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Node, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for
the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. The case was docketed
125

as Special Proceedings No. 3046. From the petition filed, Presentacion asserted that she is the only surviving
child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990
respectively. On September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by "hilot" in the house of spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a
housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth of
her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54
years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature. Petitioner, then 15 years
old, saw with her own eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house,
assisted by "hilot". The birth certificate of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth,
signature of informant forged, and it contained false entries, to wit: a) The child is made to appear as the
legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, when she is not; b) The signature
of Hermogena Cariosa, the mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c) The family name Babiera is
false and unlawful and her correct family name is Guinto, her mother being single; d) Her real mother was Flora
Guinto and her status, an illegitimate child. The natural father, the carpenter, did not sign it. Also, the respondent
Teofista Barbiera's birth certificate is void ab initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically and
medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena Cariosa Babiera,
was already 54 years old; b) Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941, the year petitioner was born; c)
Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void and simulated birth certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the
hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the estate. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner therein.
Teofista averred "that she was always known as Teofista Babiera and not Teofista Guinto and that plaintiff is not
the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C. Babiera, for the truth of the matter
is that they are sisters of the full-blood. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved
that petitioner was not the biological child of Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no evidence was presented to
show that Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It further observed that she was already 54 years old at the
time, and that her last pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted that the supposed birth took
place at home, notwithstanding the advanced age of Hermogena and its concomitant medical complications.
Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the signature therein, which
was purported to be that of Hermogena, was different from her other signatures.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Teofista is the legitimate child of spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa.
HELD:
No. Article 171 of the Family Code states that, the child's filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special
circumstances, his heirs. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The interest of respondent in the civil status of
petitioner stems from an action for partition which the latter filed against the former. The case concerned the
properties inherited by respondent from her parents. Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to
the present case. A close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns
the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring
of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words,
the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the
former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses
Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. Also, the
prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth
Certificate does not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio. A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled
upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate which shows that the mother was already fiftyfour years old at the time of the child's birth and which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the
supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such mother is a
proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said certificate.
Renren Geremia
126

120) Marissa Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994
FACTS:
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially in
Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the grave on November 13, 1989. He died
intestate.The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24, 1990, private respondents
Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. Proc.
No. 797 (90) before the RTC of San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the issuance of letters
of administration of Vicente's estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar. They alleged, that the decedent is
survived by no other heirs or relatives either any ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or
legally adopted. Also, despite claims or representation to the contrary, petitioners can well and truly establish,
given the chance to do so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who pre-deceased him, and
whose estate had earlier been settled extra-judicial, were without issue and/or without descendants whatsoever,
and that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to
them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir. Petitioner opposed the petition and alleged
that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate. The parties
further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only
legitimate child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary evidence,
among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth; (2) Baptismal Certificate; (3) Income Tax Returns and Information
Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter; and (4) School Records. She
also testified that the said spouses reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other
hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to beget a
child during their marriage and that the late Isabel, then thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr.
Constantino Manahan, a noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. The trial court decided in favor of the
petitioner. However, the Court of Appeals, reversed the said decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is the legitimate child and thus the surviving heir of the spouses Benitez.
HELD:
No. A careful reading of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code will show that they do not contemplate
a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a
certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child
of his wife. Thus, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically
impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not
have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization
or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.
Articles 170 and 171 speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the
action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to
apply these articles to the case at bench for it is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that
petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and
Isabel. Factual finding of the appellate court that petitioner was not the biological child or child of nature of the
spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian is meritorious. There was strong and convincing evidence that
Isabel Chipongian never became pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child.
Renren Geremia
121) Jao vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioner, assisted by her mother, filed a case for recognition and support against Perico Jao. The latter
127

denied paternity thus the parties agreed to a blood grouping test conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation. The result indicated that the petitioner could not have been the offspring of the latter and her
mother, Arlene. The lower court found the test conclusive however, upon a second motion for reconsideration the
trial resulted on the declaration of the petitioner being the child of Perico and is entitled to support. The latter
questioned said decision to the Court of Appeals where it reversed said decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the results of the blood grouping test are admissible and conclusive to prove nonpaternity.
HELD:
Yes. The use of blood typing in cases of disputed percentage has already become an important legal
procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to nonpaternity, although inconclusive to paternity. This is because the fact that the blood type of a child is a possible
product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents. On
the other hand, if the blood type of the child is not a possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of
the alleged father are cross-matched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.
Renren Geremia
122) Artemio G. Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994
FACTS:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano C. Virata.
Petitioner was one of the clients of Atty. Virata. On several occasions, she and petitioner took lunch together.
Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor, met petitioner again
who was engaged in the same business and they renewed acquaintances. Since then, he would give her his
unsold allocation of goods. Later, he courted her more than four years. Their relationship became intimate and
with his promise of marriage, they eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in April, 1962. They stayed at La Mesa
Apartment, located behind the Filipinas Telephone Company branch office, of which he is the president and
general manager. He came home to her three or four times a week. The apartment was procured by Melencio
Reyes, Officer-in-Charge of the Filipinas Telephone Company branch office. He also took care of the marketing
and paid rentals, lights and water bills. Unable to speak the local dialect, Leoncia was provided also by Melencio
with a maid by the name of Nena. Petitioner used to give her P700.00 a month for their expenses at home. In
June, 1962, Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time, was fetched by petitioner and they transferred to San Juan
St., Pasay City. In October, 1962, she delivered a still-born female child at the Manila Sanitarium. The death
certificate was signed by petitioner. Thereafter, while they were living at Highway 54, Makati, private respondent
Merceditas S. Ilano was born on December 30, 1963 also at the Manila Sanitarium. Her birth was recorded as
Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. Leoncia
submitted receipts issued by the Manila Sanitarium to show that she was confined there from December 30, 1963
until January 2, 1964 under the name of Mrs. Leoncia Ilano. The support by petitioner for Leoncia and Merceditas
was sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered by him, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of Leoncia) or
thru Merceditas herself. Sometimes in the form of a check like Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532, the
signature appearing thereon having been identified by Leoncia as that of petitioner because he often gives her
checks which he issues at home and saw him sign the checks. During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were
living as husband and wife, he showed concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at
the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods as her parent.
Those signatures were both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas because he signed them in their residence in
their presence and of Elynia. Since Merceditas started to have discernment, he was already the one whom she
recognized as her Daddy. He treated her as a father would to his child. He would bring home candies, toys, and
anything a child enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep. In May,
1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived with Leoncia and petitioner. She accompanied her aunt when
she started having labor pains in the morning of December 30, 1963. Petitioner arrived after five o'clock in the
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afternoon. When the nurse came to inquire about the child, Leoncia was still unconscious so it was from petitioner
that the nurse sought the information. Inasmuch as it was already past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse
promised to return the following morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth certificate to
Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following morning. Prior to the birth of Merceditas, Elynia
used to accompany her aunt and sometimes with petitioner in his car to the Manila Sanitarium for prenatal checkup. At times, she used to go to his office at 615 Sales St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, upon his instructions to get money as
support and sometimes he would send notes of explanation if he cannot come which she in turn gave to her aunt.
They stayed at 112 Arellano St., then Sta. Cruz, Manila in 1966 before they finally transferred to Gagalangin in
1967. Petitioner lived with them up to June, 1971 when he stopped coming home.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Merceditas is the child of Artemio and is entitled to support.
HELD:
Yes. Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are conceived and
born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those
born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on
account of certain legal impediments. Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas
was conceived, she is a spurious child. In this regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate
children other than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are
entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code. The Civil Code has given these
rights to them because the transgressions of social conventions committed by the parents should not be visited
upon them. They were born with a social handicap and the law should help them to surmount the disadvantages
facing them through the misdeeds of their parents. However, before Article 287 can be availed of, there must first
be a recognition of paternity either voluntarily or by court action. The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence of
recognition on the part of petitioner. The evidences submitted like the signature in the report cards, testimonies,
and other pieces of evidence shows that petitioner indeed recognized Merceditas as his child and thus entitles her
to support.
Renren Geremia
123) Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992
FACTS:
Private respondent is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, by the father of the
petitioner, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. Petitioner is the known administratrix of the real and personal properties
left by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City on September 28, 1983. Private
respondent has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during which time,
she and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a consequence thereof,
they begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire and behest of said
Atty. Ocampo. Chad, the son of private respondent by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born in Angeles
City on October 5, 1980 had been sired, showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative
father for being his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to
herein private respondent. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled to a share
in the intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs. The
deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner of real and personal property, located in
Baguio City, Angeles City and in the Province of Pampanga with approximate value of several millions of pesos.
The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried by the petitioner and the inheritance of the
surviving heirs including that of said Chad has not likewise been ascertained. The only known surviving heirs of
the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O.
Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this instant complaint is filed. Private
respondent has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity of friends and relatives for the
sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be extended financial
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support from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. Several demands, verbal and written, have
been made for petitioner to grant Chad's lawful inheritance, but despite said demands, the latter failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to satisfy the claim for inheritance against the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Chad is entitled to inherit from Atty. Ocampos estate as his illegitimate child.
HELD:
Yes. Although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the
minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the
allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further that the two causes of
action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in
our jurisprudence. Also, the action has not yet prescribed. The applicable law is Article 285 of the Civil Code which
states that the action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority. The
Court holds that the right of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under
the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the
recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. where we held that the fact of filing of the
petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in
accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the
enactment of a new law.
Renren Geremia
124) John Paul E. Fernandez, et al., vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994
FACTS:
Violeta P. Esguerra, single, is the mother and guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, Claro Antonio Fernandez
and John Paul Fernandez, met sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis courts. A Meralco employee
and a tennis enthusiast, Carlito used to spend his week-ends regularly at said courts, where Violeta's father
served as tennis instructor. Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they started
their illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after their first meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner
Claro Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of petitioner John Paul on not know that Carlito was married until the birth of
her two children. She averred they were married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985, however, she
discovered that the marriage license which they used was spurious. Petitioners presented the following
documentary evidence: their certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal
certificate of petitioner Claro which also states that his father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken
during the baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta
Esguerra. In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two petitioners. He averred
he only served as one of the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was corroborated by the
testimony of Rodante Pagtakhan, an officemate of respondent Carlito who also stood as a sponsor of petitioner
Claro during his baptism.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Claro Antonio and John Paul are children of Carlito and are entitled for support.
HELD:
No. The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals may be reviewed by this court
only under exceptional circumstances. One such situation is when the findings of the appellate court clash with
those of the trial court as in the case at bench. It behooves us therefore to exercise our extraordinary power, and
settle the issue of whether the ruling of the appellate court that private respondent is not the father of the
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petitioners is substantiated by the evidence on record. The evidence offered by the petitioners is insufficient to
prove their filiation. Petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of the private respondent in
the baptism of petitioner Claro. These photographs are far from proofs that private respondent is the father of
petitioner Claro. As explained by the private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of
petitioner Claro. The pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent showering affection to
Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity. The baptismal certificates of petitioner Claro naming
private respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that private respondent
participated in its preparation. The certificates of live birth of the petitioners identifying private respondent as their
father are not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do no show that private
respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates. Also, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a
close friend of Violeta Esguerra and the private respondent which should render unquestionable his identification
of the private respondent during petitioner Claro's baptism. In the absence of this proof, we are not prepared to
concede that Father Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can remember
the parents of the children he has baptized.
Renren Geremia
125) Camelo Cabatania vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124814 October 21, 2004
FACTS:
Florencias version was that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on September 9, 1982 and
that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her husband left her in the early part of 1981,
she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and was eventually hired as petitioners household
help. It was while working there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where
they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got
pregnant. Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioners child 27 days after their sexual
encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on suspicion that
Florencia was pregnant, petitioners wife sent her home. But petitioner instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod
City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunts house in Tiglawigan,
Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo Regodos.
Petitioner Camelo Cabatanias version was that he was a sugar planter and a businessman. Sometime in
December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the course of her employment, she would often
go home to her husband in the afternoon and return to work the following morning. This displeased petitioners
wife, hence she was told to look for another job. In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to
go home and spend New Years Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San
Carlos City and invited her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and petitioner
offered to lend her save money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse. While
doing it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with the child of
her husband. They went home the following day. In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another
household, went to petitioners house hoping to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioners wife was in
need of one, she was re-hired. However petitioners wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and inquired about
the father of the unborn child. She told petitioners wife that the baby was by her husband. Because of her
condition, she was again told to go home and they did not see each other anymore. Petitioner was therefore
surprised when summons was served on him by Florencias counsel. She was demanding support for private
respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she was already
pregnant when they had sex. He denied going to Bacolod City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He
vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City.
The trial court gave probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that she misrepresented
herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was alive. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of
the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Camelo should be entitled to support as Camelo Cabatanias child.
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HELD:
No. Clearly, this petition calls for a review of the factual findings of the two lower courts. As a general rule, factual
issues are not within the province of this Court. Factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by
the Court of Appeals, become final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. However, the Court is
convinced that this case falls within one of the exceptions. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high
standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. The applicable provisions of the law are
Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code which states that: the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In
the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws; Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children. Private respondents copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of which was
without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is
not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate
child on the information of a third person. Also, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public
document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the
veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and
baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted
indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same. Private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of
voluntary recognition. On the other hand, the fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting
marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even
though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The
presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to
protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as
evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
Renren Geremia
126) SAYSON VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1992
Cruz, J.:
FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and
Teodoro. Eleno died in 1952 and Rafaela in 1976.
One of their children, Teodoro married to Isabel died on 1972. The wife of Teodoro, Isabel then after died
in 1981. The properties of the couple Teodoro and Isabel were left with private respondents Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel, who were their children.
On April 25, 1983, Maurico, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Juana (mother of Isabel) filed for partition of
the estate of Teodoro and Isabel, which was opposed by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, who claimed successional
rights to the estate. Likewise, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint for the partition of Eleno and
Rafaelas estate through representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the private respondents. Judge Rafael declared that Delia and
Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption.
Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate. Consequently, the three children were
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entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation. On the other case, Judge Saez held that
being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence, the same
excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
The Court of Appeals modified the decision in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from
inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but affirmed all other respects.
Hence, this petition for review by certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to inherit from their parents and their grandparents.
HELD: A challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally in an action for partition but in a
direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court
must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of
recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners
stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their
adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the
following Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction
as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also
supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of
his love for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and
Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her
grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited
had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children.
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents
were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the
same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the
adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of
either party.
127) LIYAO vs. TANHOTI-LIYAO
378 SCRA 563
FACTS: This is a petition for compulsory recognition of William Liyao Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the
late Willima Liyao against Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina
Liyao (children and wife of William).
According to Corazon G. Garcia, William Liyao Jr.s mother and representative, she was married to but
living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years and cohabited with late William Liyao from
1965 to the time of Williams untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together with the knowledge of
William Liyaos legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, who were both employed at
the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were the vice president and president,
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respectively. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao Jr. (Billy). Since then, he had been in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao
by the latters direct and overt acts which among others, the payment of medical and hospital expenses, food and
clothing and bringing him to vacations and various social gatherings as evidenced by the pictures taken on the
said occasions.
On the other hand, according to Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, her parents, William Liyao and Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married. She grew up and lived with her parents at San Lorenzo Village , Makati until
she got married. Her parents were not separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her
parents would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her father came home regularly even during out of
town to change cloths until he suffered from two strokes before the fatal attack which led to his death on
December 2, 1975. She further testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo and was not
legally separated from her husband and the records from Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that the couple
obtained any annulment of their marriage. Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testimony was similar to Ms. Linda that their
parents were legally married and had never been separated. They resided at San Lorenzo Village until the time of
their fathers death.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the William, Jr. and Corazon. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the ruling of the trial court and ruled in favor of Juanita, Pearl and Linda.
Issue: Whether or not William, Jr. is entitled to inherit.
Held: The Court sustained the decision of the Court of Appeals stating that the fact that Corazon had been living
separately from Ramon at the time petitioner was conceived and born has no bearing to the legitimacy of the
child. While the physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the
grounds in impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy
of the child mentioned in Art. 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband or in proper cases, his
heirs under the conditions set forth under Art. 262 of the Civil Code. It is therefore clear that the present petition
initiated by petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao Jr., as the illegitimate son
of late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate
even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The Court cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that
only the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and
subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband presumed to be the father
does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be
the child of his mothers alleged paramour.
128) DE JESUS vs. ESTATE OF DIZON
366 SCRA 499
Vitug, J.:
FACTS: Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this
marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de
Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March
1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real
property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint for "Partition
with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the
corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of
petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be
the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.
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The trial court denied, due to lack of merit. However. the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower
court and ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The Trial Court decreed that
the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding inasmuch as petitioners were seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
In the instant petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners maintain that their recognition as being
illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status
as such and does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
ISSUE: Whether an action for partition is proper to ascertain the question of paternity & filiation or whether it
should be taken in an independent suit.
HELD: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing the civil register or a final judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1)
the open and continuos possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court or record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement
of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicted on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or record or an authentic
writing, judicial action within the applicable statue of limitations is essential in order to establish the
child's acknowledgement.
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in
effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This
step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during
the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,
and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully
impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners'
alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This
issue, i.e whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly
adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo
B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the
paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or
contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be
considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as having been an adulteress.
129) LABAGALA vs. SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 132305; December 4, 2001
Quisumbing, J.:
FACTS: Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila . Alleging that Jose had fraudulently
registered it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents herein) sued Jose for recovery
of 2/3 share of the property.
The trial court in that case decided in favor of the sisters, recognizing their right of ownership over portions
of the property. The Register of Deeds of Manila was required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in
the certificate of title to said property.
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Jose died intestate. The respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and possession
against herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to recover from her the 1/3
portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner's sole possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs to them by operation of law, because they
are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and without issue. They claimed that the purported sale
of the property made by their brother to petitioner sometime in March 1979 was executed through petitioner's
machinations and with malicious intent, to enable her to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT
No. 172334) in petitioner's name alone.
Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery .The deed showed that Jose affixed his
thumbmark thereon but respondents averred that, having been able to graduate from college, Jose never put his
thumb mark on documents he executed but always signed his name in full.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by respondent
but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed not to know any person by the name of Ida C. Labagala. She claimed to be the
daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his share in the subject property. She maintained that she had always stayed
on the property, ever since she was a child. She argued that the purported sale of the property was in fact a
donation to her, and that nothing could have precluded Jose from putting his thumbmark on the deed of sale
instead of his signature. She pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never acknowledged respondents' claim
over the property such that respondents had to sue to claim portions thereof. She lamented that respondents had
to disclaim her in their desire to obtain ownership of the whole property.
Trial court ruled in favor of petitioner which was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES: (1) whether or not respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in this action for recovery of title and
possession; and (2) whether or not petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property he co-owned with
respondents, through succession, sale, or donation.
HELD: Petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code is misplaced. This article should be read in
conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful reading
of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man's
child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the child's filiation. It does not refer to
situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple.
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not
a man's child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents
are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at
all. Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title and possession, and thus outside the scope of Article
263 on prescriptive periods.
Petitioner's reliance on Sayson is likewise improper. The factual milieu present in Sayson does not obtain
in the instant case. What was being challenged by petitioners in Sayson was (1) the validity of the adoption of
Delia and Edmundo by the deceased Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and (2) the legitimate status of Doribel Sayson.
While asserting that Delia and Edmundo could not have been validly adopted since Doribel had already been
born to the Sayson couple at the time, petitioners at the same time made the conflicting claim that Doribel was not
the child of the couple. The Court ruled in that case that it was too late to question the decree of adoption that
became final years before. Besides, such a challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally
but in a direct proceeding.
Petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago, has the same birthdate as Ida Labagala. The similarity is too
uncanny to be a mere coincidence.
During her testimony before the trial court, petitioner denied knowing Cornelia Cabrigas, who was listed as
the mother in the birth certificate of Ida Labagala. In her petition before this Court, however, she stated that
Cornelia is the sister of her mother, Esperanza. It appears that petitioner made conflicting statements that affect
her credibility and could cast along shadow of doubt on her claims of filiation.
Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is in
reality the child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, and contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and
Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner can not inherit from him through intestate
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succession. It now remains to be seen whether the property in dispute was validly transferred to petitioner through
sale or donation.
Jose did not have the right to transfer ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof
belonged to his sisters. Petitioner could not have given her consent to the contract, being a minor at the
time. Consent of the contracting parties is among the essential requisites of a contract, including one of sale,
absent which there can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay any centavo for the
property, which makes the sale void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation, or
some other act or contract.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation.
130) ESTATE OF LOCSIN vs. JUAN C. LOCSIN
G.R. No. 146737, December 10, 2001
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.:
FACTS: Eleven months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E.
Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City , a "Petition for Letters of Administration" praying that he
be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged that he is an acknowledged natural
child. The trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing which order was duly published, thereby giving
notice to all persons who may have opposition to the said petition.
Before the scheduled hearing, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and
Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition. They averred that respondent
is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed
"Sr." in his name.
On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late
Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C.
Locsin alleging that respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or the statute of limitations.
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) also entered its appearance in
the estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. This was followed by an appearance and opposition of Ester
Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between
herein respondent and the deceased.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased, respondent submitted a
machine copy of his Certificate of Live Birth found in the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local
Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City which contains the information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that
he was the informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures. To prove the existence and
authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth, respondent presented the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Respondent
also offered in evidence a photograph showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing
Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent claims, shows that he and his mother have been
recognized as family members of the deceased.
Petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of
Certificate of Live Birth found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila indicating that the birth of respondent
was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan
C. Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his
birth was recorded on January 30, 1957, however, his Certificate of Live Birth was recorded on a December 1,
1958 revised form.
The trial court found that the Certificate of Live Birth and the photograph are sufficient proofs of
respondent's illegitimate filiation. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the order of the trial court. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration, while respondent filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Both motions were
denied by the Appellate Court.
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ISSUE: Which of the two documents Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 (Exhibit "8") is genuine.
HELD: Exhibit 8 for the petitioners.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties is obviously easier. Thus, in
proving the authenticity of Exhibit "D," more convincing evidence than those considered by the trial court should
have been presented by respondent.
The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the record of respondent's birth which took
place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38 years ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City at that time was Emilio
G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth record allegedly made and entered in the Local
Civil Registry in January, 1957 was based merely on her general impressions of the existing records in that Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary from those appearing
in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be
clarified in more persuasive and rational manner. In this regard, we find Vencer's explanation not convincing.
Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a December 1, 1958 revised
form. Asked how a 1958 form could be used in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered
that "x x x during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had
requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form." The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition
of an event. It does not satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form dated December 1, 1958 could have been used
on January 30, 1957 or almost (2) years earlier.
Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila is
on Municipal Form No 102, revised in July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that
the 1956 forms would continue to be used several years thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is
unlikely.
There are other indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit "D." The back cover of the 1957 bound volume
in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the
other entries.
The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon copy of the alleged
original and sticks out like a sore thumb because the entries therein are typewritten, while the records of all other
certificates are handwritten. Unlike the contents of those other certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate important
particulars, such as the alleged father's religion, race, occupation, address and business. The space which calls
for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a purported signature
of the alleged father, but the blanks calling for the date and other details of his Residence Certificate were not
filled up.
When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume, Vencer had no answer except to state, "I
am not aware of this because I am not a bookbinder."
The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not
respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been given more faith and credence by the courts below.
In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar that:
"Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines . . . explicitly prohibit, not only the
naming of the father of the child born out of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or
made by him, but also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which he could be identified.
Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon
the information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother
of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child."
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The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals
where this Court said that "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in its preparation)
is not competent evidence of paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family
Code for purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation
and may be refuted by contrary evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong,
complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges
of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified
Certificate of Live Birth.
131) EDGARDO TIJING & BIENVENIDA TIJING vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. No. 125901; March 8, 2001)
Quisumbing, J.:
FACTS: Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was
born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila .
Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of
Tondo, Manila .
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job.
Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also
left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the
child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.
Upon her return, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's
house in Tondo, Manila , but did not find them there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out
for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to
discover that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and
also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance.
Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez,
allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for
the first time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of
the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to her
the boy despite her demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their
son. Petitioners presented two witnesses. The 1 st, witness is Vasquez who testified that she assisted in the
delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic. The 2nd, Benjamin Lopez who declared that his
brother admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not
blessed with children.
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she
gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong,
Manila . She added, though, that she has two other children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez. She said the
birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of
Manila on August 4, 1989.
On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not
have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The trial court also held that the minor
and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas
Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural child of petitioners.
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The sheriff implemented the order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In his report, the sheriff
stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered the minor and he turned over the custody of said child to petitioner
Edgardo Tijing.
The Court of Appeals reversed and expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its view,
the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor. It ruled
that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same
person.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?
(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is the son of
petitioners?
HELD: The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the
latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving
minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of
the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. It
must be stressed too that in habeas corpusproceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject
to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient
to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she admitted that after the
birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas
Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas
Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile
because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son.
Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years
together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.
Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead
of the midwife. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the
registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child.
Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had
strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his
alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Needless to stress, the trial court's
conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the
minor and petitioner concerned. Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book,
discharge order and the signatures of petitioners.
All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The
writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.
132) AGUSTIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PROLLAMANTE
G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005
Corona, J.:
FACTS: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner
Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City . In
their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they entered into an intimate
relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels
insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11,
2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City . The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel
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as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for
Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for
adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998,
long before Martins conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one other secret lover. Arnel admitted that their
relationship started in 1993 but "he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one
secret lover, a certain Jun, but also because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and possessive.
Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel terminated the affair although he still treated her
as a friend such as by referring potential customers to the car aircon repair shop" where she worked. Later on,
Arnel found out that Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel and his entire family went to the
United States for a vacation. Upon their return in June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had
impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because their "last intimacy was sometime in
1998." Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnels wife and family. On January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the
Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot to demand that he acknowledge Martin as his child. According to
Arnel, he could not get through Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had no "alternative but to move
on but without bumping or hitting any part of her body." Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and the
community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were falsified.
The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually married and that his birth year
was 1965 when it should have been 1964.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action,
considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is
not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father. He attached the certification of the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory that his signature in the birth certificate was forged.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves to
DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUES: (1) whether a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition and (2) whether DNA
paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioners constitutional right to
privacy and right against self-incrimination.
HELD: The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely
allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of
the documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively
integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with
jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals,20 we allowed the integration of an action to compel recognition with
an action to claim ones inheritance:
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative
or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the
complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such
acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such
acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the
putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the
petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the complaint filed
by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased
and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel
recognition. Further, that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance,
may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or rationale for
integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends completely
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on the determination of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately
related the main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate
to these proceedings.
On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a conclusive means of
proving paternity. He also contends that compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and right against selfincrimination as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. These contentions have no merit.
The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against
self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of
guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object
evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken from the person of the
accused from the realm of self-incrimination. These include photographs,28 hair,29 and other bodily
substances.30We have also declared as constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as
pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery,31 expulsion of morphine from ones mouth32 and the tracing of
ones foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints.33 In Jimenez v. Caizares,34 we even authorized the
examination of a womans genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she
was impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive
and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results, per our ruling in Yatar,35
are now similarly acceptable.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public
service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that
enhance public service and the common good.
133) In re: Petition for Change of Name of Julian Lim
G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005
Facts:
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa
Wang, filed a petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let him study
there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle
names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipate that Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle
name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different
surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have the letter R but if
there is, they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested
to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.
The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. The trial court found that the reason given for the change of
name sought in the petitionthat is, that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore
because of his middle namedid not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the
change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a
person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code,
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why
this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added that
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when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his name by
dropping his middle name.
Issue: Whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174 of the Family Code
Held: The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for
which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among
the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that
the change of name would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier
and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and
difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of
name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he
reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the
change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
134) Briones vs. Miguel

G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and
Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. Later, petitioner filed an
Amended Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents.
The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel.
The petitioner further alleges that he caused the minor child to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take
care of him and send him to school. That respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to the
house of the petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and requested that
they be allowed to bring the said child for recreation at the SM Department store. They promised him that they will
bring him back in the afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not bring him back
as promised by them. The petitioner went several times to respondent Maricel P. Miguel at Tanza, Tuguegarao
City but he was informed that the child is with the latters mother at Batal Heights, Santiago City. When he went
there, respondent Francisca P. Miguel told him that Michael Kevin Pineda is with her daughter at Tuguegarao City.
He sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social Welfare to locate his son and to bring him
back to him, but all his efforts were futile. Hence, he was constrained to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and
as he has demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.
The respondents filed their Comment, in their Comment, the respondent Loreta P. Miguel denies the allegation of
the petitioner that he was the one who brought their child to the Philippines and stated that she was the one who
brought him here pursuant to their agreement. She likewise denies petitioners allegation that respondents Maricel
P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel were the ones who took the child from the petitioner or the latters parents. She
averred that she was the one who took Michael Kevin Pineda from the petitioner when she returned to the
Philippines and that the latter readily agreed and consented.
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Respondent Loreta P. Miguel alleges that the petitioner was deported from Japan under the assumed name of
Renato Juanzon when he was found to have violated or committed an infraction of the laws of Japan. She further
stated that since the time the petitioner arrived in the Philippines, he has not been gainfully employed. The
custody of the child was entrusted to petitioners parents while they were both working in Japan. She added that
even before the custody of the child was given to the petitioners parents, she has already been living separately
from the petitioner in Japan because the latter was allegedly maintaining an illicit affair with another woman until
his deportation.
Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be given to her and invokes Article 213,
Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Issue:
Who Should Have Custody of the Child?
Held: Under the Family Code there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally
adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid
marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.
Obviously, Michael is a natural ("illegitimate," under the Family Code) child, as there is nothing in the records
showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both
acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over
him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his fathers recognition of him.
There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental authority over the
minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep him in her company. She cannot be deprived of
that right, and she may not even renounce or transfer it "except in the cases authorized by law.
Article 213 of the Family Code that, generally, no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mothers unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall
justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone else. In the past, the following
grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect
or abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, and affliction with a communicable disease.
135) de Santos vs. Hon. Angeles and Conchita Talag de Santos
G.R. No. 105619 December 12, 1995
Facts:
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a
daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship became strained to the
breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag, private respondent herein.
Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in
1949.
Aware that said decree was a worthless scrap of paper in our jurisdiction which then, as now, did not recognize
divorces, Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had been
cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967,
Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted a
marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving
properties with an estimated value of P15,000,000.00.
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court asking for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor
in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She alleged, among other things, that the decedent
was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. There being
no opposition, her petition was granted.
After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner decided to intervene. Thus, in a motion she
filed she argued that private respondent's children were illegitimate. This was challenged by private respondent
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although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her children were born prior to Sofia's death in 1967.
After approval of private respondent's account of her administration, the court a quo passed upon petitioner's
motion. The court declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and instituted and declared them, along
with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos. Petitioner sought a reconsideration of
said order but this was denied. Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that
since only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers
and sisters.
Issue:
Can natural children by legal fiction be legitimized?
Held:
Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception
for him to qualify as a "natural child."
In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent and deceased Antonio
de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was still subsisting.
That private respondent and the decedent were married abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada, U.S.A. a
decree of divorce from his legitimate wife does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not
recognized in this jurisdiction at the time. Evidently, the decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had to
have the marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the Philippines. It may be added here that he was likewise
aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged wife died, he hastily contracted
another marriage with private respondent, this time here in Tagaytay.
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XV. ADOPTION
136) Republic vs CA and Zenaida Bobiles
G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992
Facts:
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years
old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial Court.
The trial court rendered the minor child, JASON CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience
and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the spouses
Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the
petitioner.
The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when
the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a
petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court
rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No.
209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife
is mandatory.
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should be dismissed outright for
it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code
which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the
petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing
of her petition for adoption.
Issue: Can the Family Code be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by Zenaida Bobiles and
granting that the Family Code should not apply retroactively, should the CA have modified the trial courts decision
by granting the adoption in favor of private respondent only, her husband not being a petitioner?
Held:
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof,
subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the
holder. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an
exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption by herself,
without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and
unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the
same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot
be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding, the trial court acquired jurisdiction there over in
accordance with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his
wife, his affidavit of consent attached to the petition and expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that he
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himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. Those declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory
testimony in open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the circumstances then obtaining, and
by reason of his foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his part
sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in
language and pedantry in the formal requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations
of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid
adherence to procedural rules on the form of pleadings.
137) Cang vs. CA
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot three
children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born
on January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed. However, Anna Marie
learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos. Upon
learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony
pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court which rendered a decision approving the joint
manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to live separately and apart or from bed and board.
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial
District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the
three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced
his American wife and never remarried.
While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a
month a portion of which was remitted to the Philippines for his children's expenses and another, deposited in the
bank in the name of his children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano,
respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings for the adoption of the three
minor Cang children before the Regional Trial Court. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith
signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had
"evaded his legal obligation to support his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had
been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she would be going to the United States to attend to
a family business, leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally hamper her job-seeking venture
abroad; and that her husband had long forfeited his parental rights over the children.
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an
opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially
capable of supporting the children while his finances were "too meager" compared to theirs, he could not "in
conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children."
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his children alleging
that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of their children to private
respondents. The Regional Trial Court issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody
over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court then directed the
Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.
Issue:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that
the latter has abandoned them?
Held:
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It is evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the
validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the
parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is insane or hopelessly intemperate. The court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the
petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not sought,
the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination.The issue of
abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront.
Only upon failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon
his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits. In its ordinary sense, the word abandon
means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the
act of abandonment imports any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioners conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. Physical
estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly,
petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal
obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and
children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Wherefore, the questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and
Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano.
138) In the matter of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus of a minor Angelie Anne Cervantes, Nelson
Cervantes and Zenaida Cervantes vs. Gina Carreon Fajardo and Conrado Fajardo
G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989
Facts:
This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over the person of the minor Angelie
Anne Cervantes.
The minor was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are
common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brotherin-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and
custody of the child when she was barely two (2) weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by
herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina Carreon
The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioners over the child before the Regional Trial
Court and rendered a decision granting the petition. The child was then known as Angelie Anne Fajardo. The
court ordered that the child be freed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from legal obligation
and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie
Anne Cervantes, a child of petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate .
Thereafter, adoptive parents, Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes, received a letter from the respondents demanding
to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to
the demand.
As a result, while petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her yaya at the
petitioners' residence on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her mother. Respondent Gina Carreon
brought the child to her house. Petitioners thereupon demanded the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused,
saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she
had executed was not fully explained to her. She sent word to the petitioners that she will, however, return the
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child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount of P150,000.00.
Issue:
Who has the right to the custody of Angelie Ann Cervantes?
Held:
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is
paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply
where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors,
the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the
resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this
criterion.
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina
Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open
cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can
grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously
given birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three years but who eventually
left her and vanished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose father is not
her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who
are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and
giving her a future better than what the natural mother who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation
with a married man, can most likely give her.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A
decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the
adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case,
parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the
right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.
The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are hereby granted to petitioners to whom they
properly belong, and respondents are ordered (if they still have not) to deliver said minor to the petitioners
immediately upon notice hereof.
139) Macario Tamargo, Celso Tamargo and Aurelia Tamargo vs. CA and Hon. Rubio and Victor Bunduc
and Clara Bunduc
G.R. No.85044 June 3, 1992
Facts:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an
air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the
Regional Trial Court by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and
Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's
natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to
adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the then Court of First Instance. This petition for
adoption was grunted on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing
petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa
Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents
from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
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Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents,
parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were
not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners, then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial
court's Decision. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Adelbertos natural parents are indispensable parties to the action?
Held: This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the
doctrine of "imputed negligence, where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts
committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental
liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents their parental
authority which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them, may be seen to be
based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when
an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control.
Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in
the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed
and the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental authority was still
lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the
natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for
damages.
The basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the
minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.
We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon
the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the
adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is
essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case,
however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden
them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented
(since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be
unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis
underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the
part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to
their control at the time the tort was committed.
140) LAHOM vs. SIBULO

G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
150

Facts:
Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom filed in 1971 a petition to adopt Melvin Sibulo,
Isabelita Lahom`s nephew. The petition was granted in 1972. Hence, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed
the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."
However, in 1999, the petitioner filed a petition to rescind the adoption on the ground of the continuous refusal of
the respondent to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom and for his indifference towards the petitioner by
failing to visit her in Naga.
In 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect which deleted
from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
Issue: Whether or not the adoption of respondent may still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter.
Held: The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child
the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of
adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under
the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements,
the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner
after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five-year
bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption
decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could
not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has
no vested right in statutory privileges. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right," the
privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is a
privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare
of the child.
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption
decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the
bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in
the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child
his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of
his estate.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
141) IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005
Facts:
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
alleging that Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and surname and that he is now a widower
and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name Astorga be changed to ' Garcia,
her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname
.
The trial court granted the adoption and ruled that the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
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The petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to
use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name but was denied by the trial court ruling
that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his
middle name.
Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Held: We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the
community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a
person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the
convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as
well as public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name.
The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from
other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is
continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name '
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 of the
Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as 'An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To
Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother's surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is
identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the
mother's surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code
merely provides that 'an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Also, Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of
the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
The Underlying Intent of Adoption Is In Favor of the Adopted Child '
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents
and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 Article V of RA 8552.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie's continued use of her mother's surname (Garcia) as her
middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and
Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her
biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the
future.
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Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them
at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached
to both her mother and father. She calls them 'Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy family.
Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother's surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued
loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes In Favor Of Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right
and justice to prevail.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use,
as middle name her mother's surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie
should be allowed to use her mother's surname 'GARCIA as her middle name.
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XVI. PARENTAL AUTHORITY
142) DAVID vs. CA
G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in
Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the
relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son,
Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls,
namely Christine and Cathy Mae.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J. to Villar's house in
Angeles City and introduced him to Villar's legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar
to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to
allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar
refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next
school year. Hence, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner ruling that the custody of the child shall be given to the
mother and directing respondent to give a temporary support of P 3,000.00 a month. The Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC`s judgment holding that habeas corpus case was not the proper remedy in that the latter
contemplate a situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated. Moreover, it ruled that in
an adulterous relationship, the question of custody shall be brought in a case singularly filed for the purpose and
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the other minor children. It ruled that it is for the best interest of
Christopher J. That he should temporarily remain under the custody of respondent until the issue on custody and
support shall have been determined in a proper case. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the child shall be given to the child.
Held: Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor
children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated
from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private
respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to
Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner,
who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been
deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support
to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children,
especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born.
Petitioner is a market vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC decision was
rendered. She augments her income by working as secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a
monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can personally attend to
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her children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for time lost during the day. That she
receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her.
Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the close family
ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is.
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this case is
justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child. The order for
payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child.
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at
the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is
over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically
expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice
of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the
mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not
condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent is ORDERED to
deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to give him
temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate
action.
143) Libi vs IAC
G.R. No. 70890 September 18, 1992
Facts:
Respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who was an 18-year-old first year
commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi
who was then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his parents.
Julie Anne Goting and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until after two years when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell
after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of their break
up, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands of reconciliation but the latter persited with her refusal
prompting the former to resort to threats against her. Hence, Julie Anne stayed at the house of her bestfriend to
avoid Wendell. Julie Ann and Wendell died each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the sme firearm, a
revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside
the residence of private respondents.
Private respondent submitted that Wendell caused their daughter`s death by shooting her with the firearm
and then turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. Petitioner`s, however contended that an unknown third
person, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as narcotics informer must
have caused their death.
Julie Ann`s parents filed a case to recover civil damages arising from the vicarious liability of Wendell`s parents
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for vicarious liability.
Held: In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court cites Fuella cs
Callado, et al. Which supposedly holds that the subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor
children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligation arising from both quasi-delicts and
criminal offenses, followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from teh same case explaining why under Article
2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for
the damage cause by their minor children. Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding the
parents liable, but the categorization of their liability being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard
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second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant comparative analysis. Our
concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delict of their minors is
subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the
parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence could constitute a valid and substantial defense.
We believe that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children is primary and not
subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors,
the persons responsible for the act or omission , in this case the minor and the father , in cas of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are solidary liable.
Under the foregoing rule, we hereby rule that the parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil
liability arising from criminal offenses committed by theri minor children under their legal authority or control, or
who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of the family
to prevent such damages.
In the case at bar, whether the death of hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict
committed by Wendel Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioner liable for damages arising therefrom.
Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal
imperatives herein explained, we conjoin with its findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite
diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.
144) Espiritu vs.CA
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City
where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a
local hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire
immigrant status sometime later. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law
relationship of husband and wife. Subsequently, Rosalind Therese was born. While they were on a brief vacation
in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the U.S.A., Reginald Vince was
born.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990. Teresita blamed
Reynaldo for the break-up, stating he was always nagging her about money matters. Reynaldo, on the other
hand, contended that Teresita was a spendthrift, buying expensive jewelry and antique furniture instead of
attending to household expenses. Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She claims,
however, that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch with her
children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet
completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, copetitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy
against her and she was afraid of being arrested. Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and
filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children.
The RTC dismissed the petition for habeas corpus suspendeding Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and
Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation. The Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the custody of the two children.
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Held: In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take
into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother
is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling
reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its
discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third
party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of age. Rosalind celebrated her
seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while Reginald reached the same age on January 12, 1995. Both are
studying in reputable schools and appear to be fairly intelligent children, quite capable of thoughtfully determining
the parent with whom they would want to live. Once the choice has been made, the burden returns to the court to
investigate if the parent thus chosen is unfit to assume parental authority and custodial responsibility.
We are inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the regional trial court because it gave greater attention
to the choice of Rosalind and considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing on the issue of custody.
When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was referred to a child psychologist, Rita Flores Macabulos, to
determine the effects of uprooting her from the Assumption College where she was studying. Four different tests
were administered. The results of the tests are quite revealing. The responses of Rosalind about her mother were
very negative causing the psychologist to delve deeper into the child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by
Rosalind was an incident where she saw her mother hugging and kissing a "bad" man who lived in their house
and worked for her father. Rosalind refused to talk to her mother even on the telephone. She tended to be
emotionally emblazed because of constant fears that she may have to leave school and her aunt's family to go
back to the United States to live with her mother.
At about the same time, a social welfare case study was conducted for the purpose of securing the travel
clearance required before minors may go abroad. Social Welfare Officer Emma D. Estrada Lopez, stated that the
child Rosalind refused to go back to the United States and be reunited with her mother. She felt unloved and
uncared for. Rosalind was more attached to her Yaya who did everything for her and Reginald. The child was
found suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother's infidelity.
Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7-year age reference in the law applies to the date when the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed, not to the date when a decision is rendered. This argument is flawed.
Considerations involving the choice made by a child must be ascertained at the time that either parent is given
custody over the child. The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable.
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now over 7 years of age. They understand the
difference between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best interests would be better
served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency. There
is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family Code.
Teresita does not deny that she was legally married to Roberto Lustado on December 17, 1984 in California. Less
than a year later, she had already driven across the continental United States to commence living with another
man, petitioner Reynaldo, in Pittsburgh. The two were married on October 7, 1987. Of course, to dilute this
disadvantage on her part, this matter of her having contracted a bigamous marriage later with Reynaldo, Teresita
tried to picture Reynaldo as a rapist, alleging further that she told Reynaldo about her marriage to Lustado on the
occasion when she was raped by Reynaldo. Expectedly, Judge Harriet Demetriou of the Pasig RTC lent no weight
to such tale. And even if this story were given credence, it adds to and not subtracts from the conviction of this
Court about Teresita's values. Rape is an insidious crime against privacy.
The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to another does not fall under "compelling
reasons" is neither meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only are the children over seven years old and their
clear choice is the father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional
disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to
mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the records appears to have become final.
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The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both over seven years old.
Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is
a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The
presumption under the second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside,
and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in
Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding
custody of the minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special
pronouncement is made as to costs.
145) SANTOS vs. CA

G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in
Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. From the time the boy was released from
the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private
respondents Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's parents, the respondent
spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the subsequent support of the
boy because petitioner could not afford to do so. Julia Bedia-Santos left for the U.S.A. in 1988 to work. Petitioner
alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United States proved futile.
PR`s claim that although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son.
PR`s contended that petitioner abducted the boy when petitioner along with his two brothers visited the Bedia
household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr., before
the RTC which was granted on the same day and was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of minor Leouel Santos, Jr. shall be awarded to the petitioner.
Held: The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled
to keep them in their custody and company.The child's welfare is always the paramount consideration in all
questions concerning his care and custody.
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case
of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case
of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. The situation obtaining in the case at bench is one where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is
working in the United States while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is present. Not only are they physically apart
but are also emotionally separated. There has been no decree of legal separation and petitioner's attempt to
obtain an annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of his wife has failed.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody of his minor son to
his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental
authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's
unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully shown by private respondents.
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We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental authority and the
concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to
be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding
factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy.
The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when
he took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent
right to the child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest
criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his
efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To
award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance
to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1992
as well as its Resolution dated November 13, 1992 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Custody over the
minor Leouel Santos Jr. is awarded to his legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr.
146) NERISSA Z. PEREZ vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C. PEREZ
255 SCRA 661
ROMERO, J.
FACTS:
Private respondent Ray Perez is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu while petitioner Nerissa, his wife is a
registered nurse. They were married on December 6, 1986. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk
pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray II in New York on July 20, 1992. Petitioner who began work in the
US in October 1988, used part of her earnings to build a model house in Mandaue City, Cebu. She also sought
medical attention for her successive miscarriages in New York. In February 1992, petitioner became a resident
alien. Private respondent stayed with her in the US twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike
his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed. In January 1993, the couple and their baby
arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the US. When Nerissa came home a few days before
Ray IIs first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms. Petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws and
rely solely on her husbands meager income of P 5,000.00. She longed to be with her only child but her husband
was keeping him away from her. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here , where he could raise his son even
as he practiced his profession. Petitioner was forced to move to her parents home in Mandaue. Nerissa filed a
petition for Habeas Corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody of their son to her.
The court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the one year old child to his mother, citing paragraph 2, of
Art. 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial courts
order and awarded custody of the boy to his father. Holding that granting custody to the boys father would be for
the childs best interest and welfare.
ISSUE:
As between father and mother, who should have rightful custody of a child who bears in his person both their
genes?
HELD:
When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the applicable law.
Since the Code does not qualify the word separation to mean legal separation decreed by a court, couples
who are separated in fact, such petitioner and private respondent, are covered within its terms.
The Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision . Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of
Minors). The provisions of law mandate that a child under 7 years of age shall not be separated from his mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word shall in Article 213 of the
Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
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The general rule that a child under 7 years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its raison d' etre in
the basic need of a child for his mothers loving care. Only the most compelling reasons shall justify the courts
awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole
parental authority. In the past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother
of custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease. It has long been
settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child.
(Gutierrez, Alvin F.)
147) VANCIL vs. HELEN G. BELMES

G.R. No. 132223
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
FACTS:
Bonifacia Vancil is the mom of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died in US in 1986. Reeder had a
common-law wife, Helen Belmes, with whom he had two kids, Valerie & Vincent. Bonifacia instituted guardianship
proceedings over person & properties of Valerie (6 yrs old) & Vincent (2 yrs old). Estate consists of proceeds from
their dads pension benefits worth P100k. RTC Cebu appointed Bonifacia as legal & judicial guardian.
Natural mother Helen opposed claiming she already filed a similar petition for guardianship. She later on filed a
motion for Removal of Guardian &Appointment of New One claiming that shes the natural mom in actual custody
of & exercising parental authority over children. She further asserted that Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado,
USA & that shes a naturalized US citizen. Regional Trial Court rejected & denied motion.
The Court of Appeals reversed. FC 225: parents, father or in his absence, mother are considered
as natural
guardian of minor children. Revised ROC Rule 93 Sec. 7 confirms designation of parents as ipso facto guardian
of their minor kids w/o need of court appointment & such can only be transferred to another person for a good
reason. CA found no reason why biological mom should be deprived of her legal right. Affirming RTC would
abdicate & violate the very basic fundamental tenets in civil law & the constitution on family solidarity.
Bonifacia claims that she should be appointed as the guardian based on the
undisputed proof that Helens
live-in partner has raped Valerie seven times while under Helens custody.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bonifacia should be appointed as the guardian
HELD:
No. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The case is moot. Valerie since already turned 18 on Sept. 2, 1998. Only thing
in dispute is guardianship of Vincent. Art. 211 (FC): Father & mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over
their common children. Fathers decision shall prevail in cases of disagreement unless theres a judicial order to
the contrary. Thus, Helen, being the natural mom of Vincent has the natural & legal right to his custody. Such right
is inherent & not created by state/decision of courts but derives from nature of parental relationship (Sagala-Eslao
vs. CA). Art. 214 (FC) allows substitute parental authority of surviving grandparent only in case of death, absence
or unsuitability of parents. Helen is very much alive & has continuously exercised parental authority over Vincent.
Helens unfitness was only asserted Valerie & since shes already of major age, such cannot be appreciated
anymore. Even if Helen were unfit, Bonifacia still wont qualify considering that shes a US citizen & resident. She
wont be able to perform the responsibilities &obligations required of a guardian. Most probably shell just delegate
those duties to another person who might not be qualified. Shes been out of the country since 1987 and
considering that shes old & was previously convicted of libel, its not likely that shell come back here to fulfill her
duties. Besides, only2 yrs are left for her to exercise guardianship over child. True that law does not require courts
to only appoint residents as guardians but court should not appoint guardians who are not within our courts
jurisdiction for it will be difficult to protect the wards in such instances.
VITUG, CONCURRING: Law & jurisprudence recognizes deep ties that bind parent & child. Parents are placed
1st in rank in matters of parental authority. Childs legitimacy doesnt affect the order of priority in exercise of
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parental authority. FC176 states that illegitimate child shall be under parental authority of mom who should be
entitled for the childs custody.
148) ST. MARYS ACADEMY vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS

G.R. No. 143363
PARDO, J.
FACTS:
In February 1995, defendant-appellant St Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the
SY 1995-96.Part of the campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. A
student of that school and part of the campaign, Sherwin Carpitanos along w/other high school students were
riding in a Mitsubishi jeep driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. En route to
Larayan Elem School, it was alleged that minor James drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the
jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.
The Regional Trial Court held St Marys liable for indemnification for loss of Sherwins life, actual damages for
burial and so-related expenses, attorneys fees and moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed decision but
absolved from any liability the driver-minor James and jeeps owner Vivencio Villanueva. St. Marys appealed. The
Court of Appeals reduced actual damages to PhP25K but affirmed the rest of its previous decision. School filed
Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding St. Marys liable for said death
2.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages against the school
HELD:1. Yes.CA held school liable under Arts 218 & 219 FC, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in
allowing a minor to drive in the campaign to visit public schools to solicit enrollment. School was also liable in not
having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for petitioner to be liable, it must be shown
that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence, must have a causal connection to the accident.
But respondent-spouses Daniel and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the
negligence of the school or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide
of the jeep. This was confirmed by the testimony of the traffic investigator who instituted a report of the accident.
Hence, reliance on Art 219 FC that those given the authority and responsibility under Art 218 shall be principally
and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts oromissions of the unemancipated minor was unfounded.
Liability, whether caused by the negligence of the minor-driver or mechanical detachment of the jeeps steering
wheel guide, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of St Marys was only a remote
cause
of
the
accident, an event that the school had no control over.
2. Yes. Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva for
he even admitted this fact. The Court has held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public
service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused the latter while the
vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. It is not the schools but the registered owned of the vehicle
who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. Judgment reversed. Case
remanded to TC for determination of liability of defendants excluding St Marys.
149) LACSON vs. LACSON
G.R. No. 150644
GARCIA, J.:
161

FACTS:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V.
Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less
than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually
forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they
stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and then with her brother Noel
Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Leas mother. As the trial
court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years,
shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own. It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea
did not badger her husband Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated
December 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his
promise of support, despite Leas efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that
Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Through the years and up to the
middle part of 1992, Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee
and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up nursing at St. Pauls College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995
when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for support before the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was about to graduate.
In that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as amended, docketed as Civil Case No. 22185, Maowee and Maonaa,
thru their mother, averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces of
valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976. They also alleged that, owing to years of Edwards
failure and neglect, their mother had, from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban. As she
would later testify, Lea had received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as P400,000.00 to P600,000.00. As
applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sisters Maowee and Maonaa support pendente lite
at P12,000.00 per month, subject to the schedule of payment and other conditions set forth in the courts
corresponding order of May 13, 1996. Following trial, the RTC rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the
plaintiff sisters, as represented by their mother. In that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate formula set
forth therein, ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented 216 months, or
18 years, of support in arrears.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the grant of support in arrears from 1976 to 1994
HELD:
The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of the CA confirmatory of that of the trial
court respecting the demand Lea made on the petitioner to secure support for the respondents. As a matter of
long and sound appellate practice, factual findings of the CA are accorded respect, if not finality, save for the most
compelling and cogent reasons. Not one of the well-recognized exceptions to this rule on conclusiveness of
factual findings appear to obtain in this case. Accordingly, the Court cannot grant the petitioners plea for a review
of the CAs findings bearing on the actuality that, as basis for an award of support in arrears, an extrajudicial
demand for support had been made on the petitioner as evidenced by the December 10, 1975 note adverted to.
Lest it be overlooked, the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review, as here, is generally limited to correction
of errors of law. Complementing that postulate is the rule that the Court is not bound to analyze and weigh all over
again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, except when, as earlier indicated, compelling
reasons demand a review of the factual conclusions drawn from such evidence.
162

CASES IN PROERTY
150) LEUNG YEE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FRANK L. STRONG MACHINERY COMPANY and J. G.
WILLIAMSON, defendants-appellees
G.R. No. L-11658
CARSON, J.
FACTS:
The "Compaia Agricola Filipina" bought rice-cleaning machinery from the machinery company, and executed a
chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase price. It included in the mortgage deed the building
of strong materials in which the machinery was installed, without any reference to the land on which it stood. The
indebtedness secured by this instrument not having been paid when it fell due, the mortgaged property was sold
by the sheriff, in pursuance of the terms of the mortgage instrument, and was bought in by the machinery
company. The mortgage was registered in the chattel mortgage registry, and the sale of the property to the
machinery company in satisfaction of the mortgage was annotated in the same registry on 29 December 1913. On
14 January 1914, the "Compaia Agricola Filipina" executed a deed of sale of the land upon which the building
stood to the machinery company, but this deed of sale, although executed in a public document, was not
registered and made no reference to the building erected on the land and would appear to have been executed
for the purpose of curing any defects which might be found to exist in the machinery company's title to the building
under the sheriff's certificate of sale. The machinery company went into possession of the building at or about the
time when this sale took place, that is to say, the month of December 1913, and it has continued in possession
ever since. At or about the time when the chattel mortgage was executed in favor of the machinery company, the
"Compaia Agricola Filipina" executed another mortgage to Leung Yee upon the building, separate and apart from
the land on which it stood, to secure payment of the balance of its indebtedness to Leung Yee under a contract for
the construction of the building. Upon the failure of the mortgagor to pay the amount of the indebtedness secured
by the mortgage, Leung Yee secured judgment for that amount, levied execution upon the building, bought it in at
the sheriff's sale on or about the 18 December 1914, and had the sheriff's certificate of sale duly registered in the
land registry of the Province of Cavite. At the time when the execution was levied upon the building, the
machinery company, which was in possession, filed with the sheriff a sworn statement setting up its claim of title
and demanding the release of the property from the levy. The Court gave judgment in favor of the machinery
company, relying upon Article 1473 and the fact that the company had its title to the building registered prior to the
date of the registry of plaintiffs certificate. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff to recover possession of the building from the machinery company
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment with costs against the appellant. Building separate from land does not
affect character as real property; Registry of chattel mortgage does not affect character of the building and the
machineries installed therein. The Chattel Mortgage Law contemplates and makes provision for mortgages of
personal property; and the sole purpose and object of the chattel mortgage registry is to provide for the registry of
"Chattel mortgages," mortgages of personal property executed in the manner and form prescribed in the statute.
The building of strong materials in which the machinery was installed was real property, and the mere fact that the
parties seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its
character as real property. It follows that neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage registry of the
instrument purporting to be a chattel mortgage of the building and the machinery installed therein, nor the
annotation in that registry of the sale of the mortgaged property, had any effect whatever so far as the building
was concerned. Possession before sheriffs sale, not Article 1473 (on good faith), controlling as to ownership of
property. The ruling cannot be sustained on the ground of Article 1473, second paragraph, but on the ground that
the agreed statement of facts discloses that neither the purchase of the building by plaintiff nor his inscription of
the sheriff's certificate of sale in his favor was made in good faith, and that the machinery company must be held
to be the owner of the property under the third paragraph of the above cited article of the code, it appearing that
the company first took possession of the property; and further, that the building and the land were sold to the
machinery company long prior to the date of the sheriff's sale to the plaintiff. (Gutierrez, Alvin F.)
163

151) DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MYLO O. QUINTO
and JESUSA CHRISTINE S. CHUPUICO, respondent.
G.R. No. 109946
BELLOSILLO, J.
FACTS:
Development Bank of the Philippines filed this petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals holding that the mortgages in favor of the bank were void and ineffectual because when constituted the
mortgagors, who were merely applicants for free patent of the property mortgaged, were not the owners thereof in
fee simple and therefore could not validly encumber the same. Petitioner granted a loan of P94,000.00 to the
spouses Santiago Olidiana and Oliva Olidiana. To secure the loan the Olidiana spouses executed a real estate
mortgage on several properties. At the time of the mortgage the property was still the subject of a Free Patent
application filed by the Olidianas with the Bureau of Lands but registered under their name in the Office of the
Municipal Assessor of Molave for taxation purposes.The Olidiana spouses filed with the Bureau of Lands
a Request for Amendment of their Free Patent applications over several parcels of land including Lot No. 2029
(PIs-61). In this request they renounced, relinquished and waived all their rights and interests over Lot No. 2029
(Pls-61) in favor of Jesusa Christine Chupuico and Mylo O. Quinto, respondents herein. This second mortgage
also included Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) as security for the Olidiana spouses financial obligation with petitioner.
Thereafter, for failure of Santiago and Oliva Olidiana to comply with the terms and conditions of their promissory
notes and mortgage contracts, petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed all their mortgaged properties. However, when
petitioner tried to register the sale and the affidavit of consolidation and to have the tax declaration transferred in
its name it was discovered that Lot No. 2029 had already been divided and covered in the name of Jesusa
Christine Chupuico, while the other half known as Lot 2029-B was covered by the same in the name of Mylo 0.
Quinto. Since there was no showing that the sales application was approved before the property was mortgaged,
the trial court concluded that the Olidiana spouses were not yet its owners in fee simple when they mortgaged the
property. The lower court also said that with the subsequent issuance of the Free Patent by the Bureau of Lands
for the respondents. Therefore petitioner could not have acquired a valid title over the subject property by virtue of
the foreclosure and subsequent sale at public auction. Resultantly, the trial court declared the following as null
and void. Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals which likewise ruled in favor of respondents, hence the
instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the land in dispute could have been validly mortgaged while still the subject of a Free Patent Application
with the government
HELD:
Petitioner bank did not acquire valid title over the land in dispute because it was public land when mortgaged to
the bank. The Court cannot accept petitioners contention that the lot in dispute was no longer public land when
mortgaged to it since the Olidiana spouses had been in open, continuous, adverse and public possession thereof
for more than thirty (30) years. Meanwhile the government still remained the owner thereof, as in fact the
application could still be canceled and the land awarded to another applicant should it be shown that the legal
requirements had not been complied with. What divests the government of title to the land is the issuance of the
sales patent and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds. It is the registration and issuance of the
certificate of title that segregate public lands from the mass of public domain and convert it into private property.
Since the disputed lot in the case before us was still the subject of a Free Patent Application when mortgaged to
petitioner and no patent was granted to the Olidiana spouses. Thus, since the disputed property was not owned
by the Olidiana spouses when they mortgaged it to petitioner, the contracts of mortgage and all their subsequent
legal consequences as regards the subject lot are null and void. It is essential requisite for the validity of a
mortgage that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of a property mortgaged, and it appearing that the mortgage
164

was constituted before the issuance of the patent to the mortgagor, the mortgage in question must of necessity be
void and ineffective. For the law explicitly requires an imperative for the validity of a mortgage that the mortgagor
be the absolute owner of what is mortgaged.
152) ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LIWAN
CONSI, respondents.
G.R. No. 88883
PARAS, J.
FACTS:
Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, was located sometime
between December 25, 1930 and December 31, 1930, a period of six (6) days, by A.I. Reynolds in accordance
with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, better known as the Philippine Bill of 1902, in a socalled Declaration of Location. The said Declaration of Location of mineral claim was duly recorded in the Office of
the Mining Recorder sometime on January 2, 1931. Fredia mineral claim, together with other mineral claims, was
sold by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining Company, the earlier corporate name of Atok Big Wedge Mining
Company, Inc. in a Deed of Sale executed on November 2, 1931. Since then petitioner Atok has been in
continuous and exclusive ownership and possession of said claim up to the present. Atok has paid the realty
taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia mineral claim. The Fredia mineral claim together with other mineral
claims owned by Atok has been declared under Tax Declaration No. 9535 and that in view of Presidential Decree
No. 1214 an application for lease was filed by Atok covering the Fredia mineral claim.
On the other hand, private respondent Liwan Consi has a lot below the land of a certain Mr. Acay at Tuding Slide,
Itogon, Benguet. He constructed a house thereon sometime in 1964. The lot is covered by Tax Declaration No.
9462. When he first constructed his house below the lot of Mr. Acay he was told that it was not necessary for him
to obtain a building permit as it was only a nipa hut. And no one prohibited him from entering the land so he was
constructing a house thereon. It was only in January 1984 when private respondent Consi repaired the said house
that people came to take pictures and told him that the lot belongs to Atok. Private respondent Consi has been
paying taxes on said land which his father before him had occupied. On January 1984, the security guards of Atok
informed Feliciano Reyes, Security Officer of Atok, that a construction was being undertaken at the area of the
Fredia mineral claim by private respondent Liwan Consi. Feliciano Reyes instructed the cashier to go and take
pictures of the construction. Feliciano Reyes himself and other security guards went to the place of the
construction to verify and then to the police to report the matter. On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a complaint for
forcible entry and detainer against Liwan Consi. On January 29, 1987, after due hearing, the Municipal Trial Court
of Itogon. This case against Liwan Consi is hereby ordered dismissed. Petitioner ATOK appealed the decision to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio and Benguet. the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner ATOK. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an individual's long term occupation of land of the public domain vests him with such rights over
the same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim
HELD:
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining
Corporation case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as
he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is
as good as though secured by patent.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record pointed that the petitioner Atok has faithfully complied with all the
requirements of the law regarding the maintenance of the said Fredia Mineral Claim. The perfection of the mining
claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain.
By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of
165

any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the
private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok. With this
ruling enunciated by the Court, it can further be declared and held that petitioner Atok has the exclusive right to
the property in question. (Gutierrez, Alvin F.)
153) Republic vs. De Guzman, et.al.
326 SCRA 574
FACTS:
Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title was filed by Norma Almanzor against
respondents over lands located in Silang, Cavite.
It is undisputed that the lands were released as agricultural land on 1965 and that the Petition for Confirmation of
Imperfect Title was filed by the respondents on 1991.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents.
The CA affirmed such ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents have overthrown the presumption that the lands are part of the public
domain?
HELD:
The petition for confirmation of imperfect title was filed four (4) years short of the required thirty (30) year
period possession requirement under PD 29 and RA 6940.
The respondents period of occupancy over the subject land 26 years at the time of the filing of the petition, four
(4) years short of the required 30-year period possession requirement under the law.
Prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965, any occupation or possession thereon cannot be considered in
the counting of the 30-year possession requirement.
The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain.
154) Isaguirre vs. De Lara
332 SCRA 803
FACTS:
Alejandro De Lara was the original applicant-claimant for Miscellaneous Sales Application on 1942. He
was succeeded by his wife, respondent Felicitas De Lara upon his death.
On said land stood a 2-story commercial and residential apartment in the name of private respondents sons.
Sometime on 1960, a Deed of Sale and Special Cessation of Rights and Interests was executed in favor of the
petitioner, Cornelio. Subsequently, an OCT was executed in his name.
Meanwhile, an OCT was issued to the respondent anent the sales application.
Petitioner then filed an action for Quieting of Title and Damages against herein respondent.
166

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner.
The CA reversed the same. It ruled that the transaction that was entered into was an equitable mortgage and not
a sale thus, the petitioners OCT is void.
Respondents motion for execution was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the property until payment of the loan and
the value of the necessary and useful improvements made upon such property.
HELD:
As the sole owner, the respondent has the right to enjoy her property without any other limitations than
those established by law.
As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged property. A mortgage is merely a lien.
Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. It would be redundant for the respondent to go back to court to
establish her right to possess the property.
155) Geminiano et. al. vs. CA
259 SCRA 344
FACTS:
The subject lot was originally owned by petitioners mother Paulina. An unfinished bungalow was
constructed on the lot by the petitioners. The said bungalow was sold by petitioners to respondent in 1978.
Meanwhile, a contract of lease over the lot was earlier entered into by the petitioners mother in favor of the
respondents for a period of 7 years.
Petitioners, after having the lot registered in their names, filed a case for unlawful detainer and damages against
the respondents.
The lower court ruled in favor of the respondents. On appeal, the RTC reversed the same and ordered the
petitioners to reimburse the respondents for the value of the house and the improvements.
The CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents were builders in good faith or mere lessees.
HELD:
Being mere lessees, the respondents knew that their occupation of the premises would continue only for
the life of the lease. Thus, they cannot be considered as possessors or builders in good faith.
Article 448 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 546 of the Civil Code applies only to possessors in good faith. It
does not apply where ones only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be
in the power of the tenant to improve his landlord out of his property.
156) Tecnogas vs. CA
G.R. No. 108894, February 10, 1997
FACTS:
167

Plaintiff is a domestic corporation and a registered owner of the subject land located in San Dionisio,
Paranaque. It purchased the subject land from Pariz Industries, Inc. in 1970 with the buildings, improvements and
the wall existing thereon.
Dedendant Eduardo Uy was the registered owner of the land adjoining petitioners land.
Tecnogas offered to buy from Uy the portion of the latters land occupied by the portion of its buildings and wall.
Uy refused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff is considered a builder in bad faith because he is presumed to know the metes
and bounds of his property as described in the Certificate of Title.
HELD:
The plaintiff purchased the land with the structures already in existence.
Article 527, Civil Code presumes good faith since no proof exists to show that the encroachment over a narrow,
needle-shaped portion of the respondents land was done in bad faith by the builder of the encroaching structures.
It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until the
contrary is proved.
Thus, plaintiff is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the seller in regard to all rights of ownership over the
land sold, including the right to compel the defendant to exercise either of the options under Art. 448, Civil Code.
Plaintiff must also pay rent for the property occupied by its building but only up to the date the respondent serves
notice of its option upon plaintiff and the trial court if such option is for the respondent to appropriate the
encroaching structure.
157) Pleasantville Dvt. Corp. vs. CA
253 SCRA 10
FACTS:
Robillo purchased from petitioner Lot 9 in Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In 1975, respondent
Jardinico bought the rights from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant.
Meanwhile, on 1974, respondent Wilson Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of said subdivision from CTTEI
(exclusive real agent of petitioner).
Said agent, through one of its employees, accompanied Kees wife to inspect lot 8. Unfortunately, the
parcel of land pointed to was Lot 9.
Kee then constructed improvements on said property. Jardinico then filed an ejectment case against Kee.
ISSUE: Whether or not a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong property erroneously delivered by
the owners agent, a builder in good faith?
HELD:
Kee was in good faith. At the time he built improvements of Lot 9, Kee believed that said lot was what he
bought from petitioner. The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis--vis each other, as builder in good faith and owner in
good faith respectively are regulated by law (448, 546, 548, Civil Code).
158) Benitez vs. CA
168

266 SCRA 242
FACTS:
Sometime on 1986, petitioners purchased a lot from Cavite Development Bank. Subsequently, the
respondents bought the same.
Respondents then bought another property adjacent to that of petitioners land. Thereafter, the former then filed a
case against the latter for ejectment upon discovery of the former that the latters house encroached on the
formers land.
MeTC ruled in favor of the respondents. The RTC and CA affirmed the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not possession of a lot encroached upon by a part of anothers house be recovered in an
action for ejectment.
HELD:
Yes, within 1 year from last demand.
That petitioners occupied the land prior to respondents purchase thereof does not negate the latters case for
ejectment.
Prior physical possession is not required. Possession can be acquired by material occupation, by the fact that a
thing is subject to the action of ones will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such
right.
159) Evadel Realty vs. Soriano
April 20, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent-spouses as sellers, entered into a Contract to Sell with petitioner as buyer over a parcel of
land which is part of a huge tract of land known as the Imus Estate.
Upon payment of the first installment, the petitioners introduced improvements thereon and fenced off the
property with concrete walls.
Thereafter, the respondents discovered that the area fenced off by the petitioners exceeded the area subject of
the contract by 2,450 square meters.
A complaint for accion reinvindicatoria was filed by respondents against petitioner.
The trial court, by way of a summary judgment, ruled in favor of respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue regarding petitioners good faith or bad faith as a builder should have been
peremptorily disposed of by the trial court.
HELD:
The petitioner admitted in its Amended Answer that the lot in dispute is covered by the TCT of
respondents.
With this admission, petitioner can no longer claim that it was a builder in good faith.
169

Moreover petitioner, as a real estate developer is presumed to be experienced in business and ought to have
sufficient technical expertise to correctly determine the metes and bounds of the land it acquires.
160) NAZARENO et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
257 SCRA 589
FACTS:
A parcel of land is situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City. It was formed as a result of sawdust
dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river by Sun Valley Lumber Co.
Private respondents Jose Salasanan and Reo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from
Petitioner Antonio Nazareno. For refusal to pay rentals, respondents were ejected.
Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan to perfect his title over the
accretion area being claimed by him. However, it was protested by private respondents. The petitioners claim that
the subject land is private land being an accretion to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 457 of The Civil Code applies.
HELD:
No. The following requites should all concur in order for accretion to apply as a mode of acquiring property under
Article 457 of the Civil Code: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be
the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast).
Petitioners admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on
portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that
the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from
the action of the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. Absence of the first and
second requisites, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.
Article 457 excludes all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature.
When a land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but as
a consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it man-made accretion and, as such, part of the
public domain.
161) NAVARRO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL
G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries
covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. The Director of Fisheries, gave
due course to his application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the property as may be certified by the
Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes.
Sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application to register and confirm his title to a
parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property,
situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.
Emiliano Navarro filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro claimed that the land sought to be
registered has always been part of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay. He was a
lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the Bureau of
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Fisheries and confirmed by the Office of the President and also that he had already converted the area covered
by the lease into a fishpond.
ISSUE:
Is land be considered as foreshore land?
HELD:
Yes. The third requisite of accretion is absent in the case at bar. It states that alluvium must be deposited on the
portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.
Here private respondents' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on the
northern side lies the disputed land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be
attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been
deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of private respondents' own tract of land, not
on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay.
The disputed land is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of
Manila Bay which adjoined private respondents own tract of land on the northern side. Hence, the land which is
adjacent to the property belonging to Pascual cannot be considered an accretion caused by the action of the two
rivers.
162) ROBLES et al vs. CA
328 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Leon Robles primitively owned a land which he occupied the same openly and adversely as early as 1916 and
paid its taxes. When Leon died his son Silvino Robles inherited land, took possession and paid taxes. Upon
Silvinos death, his widow Maria de la Cruz and his children inherited the property, took adverse possession and
paid taxes. However, the task of cultivating the land was assigned to Lucio Robles. Plaintiffs entrusted the
payment of the land taxes to their co-heir and half-brother, Hilario Robles.
In 1962, the tax declaration in Silvinos name was canceled and transferred Hilario Robles and his wife. In 1966,
Andrea Robles secured a loan from the Cardona Rural Bank, Inc., using the tax declaration as security. When the
mortgage debt was unpaid, it was auctioned for sale and Rural Bank was the highest bidder. Consequently the
spouses Robles failed to redeem property. Thus, title was transferred in the name of Rural Bank. Then Rural Bank
sold the same to the Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth Santos.
In 1987, plaintiff discovered the mortgage and attempted to redeem the property, but was unsuccessful. The
spouses Santos also took possession of the property and secured a free patent in their names. Hence a petition
for quieting of title to the land was filed.
ISSUE:
Will the petition prosper?
HELD:
Yes. Hilario mortgaged the disputed property to the Rural Bank of Cardona in his capacity as a mere co-owner
thereof. The said transaction did not divest the plaintiff of title to the property at the time of the institution of the
complaint for quieting of title.
An action to quiet title is a remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property.
It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged
as a cloud on plaintiffs title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy.
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Also, there is an irregularity when the tax declaration of Silvino was cancelled since there was no instrument or
deed of conveyance evidencing its transfer to Hilario Robles.
163) De Aviles vs. CA
264 SCRA 473
FACTS:
Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession of the afore-described property since 1957. In fact he mortgaged the
same with the Rural Bank and Philippine National Bank. When the property was inspected by a bank
representative, Eduardo Aviles, in the presence of the boundary owners, namely, defendant Camilo Aviles,
Anastacio Aviles and Juana and Apolonio Joaquin, pointed to the inspector the existing earthen dikes as the
boundary limits of the property and nobody objected. When the real estate mortgage was foreclosed, the property
was sold at public auction but this was redeemed by plaintiffs' mother and the land was subsequently transferred
and declared in her name.
On March 23, 1983, defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property with
an area of approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and moving the earthen
dikes, thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion.
ISSUE:
Will the remedy of quieting of title apply for settling a boundary dispute?
HELD:
No. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with
respect to title to real property. To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or
shadow upon the owner's title to or interest in real property.
However, the Agreement of Partition executed by private respondent and his brothers (including the petitioners'
father and predecessor-in-interest), in which their respective shares in the inherited property were agreed upon,
and the Deed of Sale evidencing the redemption by petitioner Anastacia Vda. de Aviles of the subject property in a
foreclosure sale are in no way documents that constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners. In
fact, the uncertainty arises from the parties' failure to situate and fix the boundary between their respective
properties.
The construction of the bamboo fence enclosing the disputed property and the moving of earthen dikes are not
the "clouds" or "doubts" which can be removed in an action for quieting of title. An action to quiet title or to remove
cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute.
164) DEL CAMPO vs. CA

351 SCRA 1
FACTS:
Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita, all surnamed Bornales, were the original coowners of 27, 170 sq. m. lot known as Lot 162 under OCT No. 18047. The lot was divided in aliquot shares
among the eight co-owners.
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Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 to Soledad Daynolo. Thereafter, Soledad Daynolo immediately took
possession of the land and built a house thereon. A few years later, Soledad and her husband, Simplicio Distajo,
mortgaged the subject portion of Lot 162 as security for a debt to Jose Regalado, Sr. Then three of the eight coowners of Lot 162, specifically, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo, sold 24,993 square meters of said lot to Jose
Regalado, Sr.
Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who had since died, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the
mortgaged portion of Lot 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr. The latter, in turn, executed a Deed of Discharge of
Mortgage in favor of Soledad's heirs, namely: Simplicio Distajo, Rafael Distajo and Teresita Distajo-Regalado. On
same date, the said heirs sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500.00 to herein petitioners, the spouses
Manuel Del Campo and Salvacion Quiachon.
ISSUE:
Is the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held in common be valid?
HELD:
Yes. Salome's right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-owned property is absolute in accordance with
the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoyment. Since Salome's clear intention was to sell
merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can be made against it and the sale can
be given effect to the full extent.
Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other
co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the
entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said co-owner to the buyer, thereby making the
buyer a co-owner of the property.
In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the extent of the shares which Salome,
Consorcia and Alfredo could validly convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could validly transfer her
share to petitioners in 1951. The logical effect of the second disposition is to substitute petitioners in the rights of
Soledad as co-owner of the land. Needless to say, these rights are preserved notwithstanding the issuance of
TCT No. 14566 in Regalado's name in 1977.
165) Rodil Enterprises vs. CA
G.R. No. 129609; November 29, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner Rodil Enterprises Inc. is the lessee of the Ides O'Racca Building since 1959. It was a "former alien
property" over which the Republic of the Philippines acquired ownership by virtue of RA 477. In 1972, the lease
contract between RODIL and the REPUBLIC was renewed for another 15 years. In 1980, RODIL entered into a
sublease contract with respondents Carmen Bondoc, et al. members of the Ides O'Racca Building Tenants
Association Inc. (ASSOCIATION). In 1982, authorization of the sale of "former alien properties" classified as
commercial and industrial, and the O'RACCA building was classified as commercial property. In 1987,RODIL
offered to purchase the subject property. In 1997, ASSOCIATION also offered to lease the same building.
In May 18, 1992, RODIL signed a renewal contract which would extend the lease for 10 years from 1 September
1987. A supplement to the renewal contract was subsequently entered into on May 25, 1992 where rentals on the
previous lease contract were increased. In September 1992: spouses Saturnino Alvarez and Epifania Alvarez,
sublessees of RODIL, filed with the Office of the President a letter-appeal assailing the authority of Factoran to
enter into the renewal contract of May 18, 1992 with RODIL, and claiming the right to purchase the subject
property. ASSOCIATION instituted another Civil Case praying for the setting aside of the renewal contract of 18
May 1992 as well as the supplementary contract of May 25, 1992. Finally in 1993, RODIL filed an action for
unlawful detainer against Divisoria Footwear (private respondents) and a similar action against Chua Huay Soon
(also private respondents).
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The lower court dismissed the action filed by the ASSOCIATION. The Office of the President then denied the
letter-appeal of the spouses Alvarez but nullified the renewal contract of 18 May 1992 and the supplementary
contract of 25 May 1992. Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila upheld RODIL's right to eject respondents Bondoc,
Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon. The RTC affirmed MTC decision. However the appellate
court declared the renewal contract between RODIL and the REPUBLIC null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic being the owner has freedom to dispose of a thing.
HELD:
Yes. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by
law. Every owner has the freedom of disposition over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and this rule
has no exception. The REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter into a
lease contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has the right to
eject usurpers of the leased property where the factual elements required for relief in an action for unlawful
detainer are present.
The contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 are valid. CA invalidated the contracts because they were
supposedly executed in violation of a temporary restraining order issued by the RTC. CA however failed to note
that the order restrains the REPUBLIC from awarding the lease contract only as regards respondent
ASSOCIATION but not petitioner RODIL.
In an action for unlawful detainer the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession . Respondents have
admitted that they have not entered into any lease contract with the REPUBLIC and that their continued
occupation of the subject property was merely by virtue of acquiescence. The records clearly show this to be the
case. The REPUBLIC merely issued a "temporary occupancy permit" which was not even in the name of the
respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear or Chua but of respondent ASSOCIATION.
Since the occupation of respondents was merely tolerated by the REPUBLIC, the right of possession of the latter
remained uninterrupted. It could therefore alienate the same to anyone it chose. Unfortunately for respondents,
the REPUBLIC chose to alienate the subject premises to RODIL by virtue of a contract of lease entered into on 18
May 1992. Resultantly, petitioner had the right to file the action for unlawful detainer against respondents as one
from whom possession of property has been unlawfully withheld.
166) Heirs of Roman Soriano V. CA
G.R. No. 128177; August 15, 2001
FACTS:
The land in question was originally owned by Adriano Soriano, upon his death, it passed on to his heirs who
leased the same to the spouse De Vera for a period of 15 years. Roman Soriano as one of the children of Adriano
Soriano, acts as the caretaker. The property was subdivided into two lots, lot 1 was sold to respondent spouses
Abalos. As a co-owner of lot 2, Roman ownes , the of which was also sold to the spouses Abalos. He was
ousted as caretaker of the land.
Roman Soriano filed a case for reinstatement and reliquidation. The agrarian court authorized the ejectment, but
on appeal the CA reversed. Subsequently the parties entered into an agreement allowing Roman to sublease the
property. The spouses Abalos filed an application for registration of the title of lot 1 and the of lot 2, which was
granted. The petitioner filed with DARAB for Security of Tenure with prayer for preliminary injunction.
The lower court ruled that the spouses Abalos are the real owner of the land. They filed an application for the writ
of execution of the decision, and to oust Roman Soriano and the sub-lessee. However there was a pending case
with DARAB.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the winning party in the land registration case can effectively oust the possessor whose security of
tenure rights are still pending with DARAB.
HELD:
No. The prevailing party in land registration case cannot be placed in possession of the area while it is occupied
by the one claiming to be an agricultural tenant, pending declaration that the latters occupation was lawful.
Judgement of ownership does not include possession as a necessary incident. Possession and ownership are
distinct legal concepts.
There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not
prohibited by law and consistent with the right of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, among
which are the rights to enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude other person from possession. While
possession is the holding of the thing or enjoyment of a right. A person may be declared owner but may not be
entitled to possession. It may be in the hand if another as a lessee or a tenant.
167) SERASPI vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 135602 April 28, 2000
FACTS:
The lots in question were originally owned by Marcelino Recasa and are both situated in Barangay Lapnag,
Banga, Aklan. When Marcelino died in 1943, and in 1948 his intestate estate was partitioned into three parts to his
corresponding heirs in his Three (3) marriages during his lifetime.
In the same year, Patronicio Recasa (the representing the heirs first marriage) sold their share to Dominador
Recasa (representing heirs in the second marriage). In 1950, Dominador sold their share to Quirico and
Purificacion Seraspi.
In 1958, the Seraspis acquired a loan from Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) the subject land being the security,
however, they failed to pay the loan and the property was foreclosed and sold to the highest bidder KRBI, and
subsequently sold the same to Manuel Rata (brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi) who allowed Quirico to administer
the same.
In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa (Marcelinos heir by his third marriage) took advantage of the fact
that Quirico was paralyzed due to a stroke, forcibly entered the lands in question and took possession thereof.
In 1983 the Seraspis were able to purchase the lands from Manuel Rata and thereafter filed a case against
Simeon Recasa for recovery of possession of the lands.
RTC ruled in favor of Seraspi, but CA reversed on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the there was acquisitive prescription in favor of Simeon Recasa?
HELD:
No, there was no acquisitive prescription
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. In the case at
bar, respondent claim ordinary prescription through adverse possession of the property for more than Ten (10)
years under Art. 1134 of the Civil Code.
However, for purposes of prescription, respondent was not able to prove his just title or good faith required by
acquisitive prescription, as he did not acquire possession of the property through the modes recognized by the
Civil Code for acquisition of ownership or other real rights, namely:
1.
Occupation
2.
Intellectual creation
3.
Law
4.
Donation
5.
Succession
6.
Tradition in consequence of certain contracts
7.
Prescription
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Also, under Article 714, the ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation, nor can respondent
claim that he acquired his right through succession because he was an heir to the original owner, remember that
the property was validly partitioned and the subject lots are not part of those which he inherited, and lastly, he
cannot be considered in good faith as he entered the property without the knowledge and permission of the
original owner, thus making him a mere usurper.
When the property belonging to another is unlawfully taken by another, the former has the right of action against
the latter fir the recovery of the property and such right may be transferred by the sale or assignment of the
property and the transferee can maintain such action against the wrongdoer.
*1974-1983 in only 9 years.
168) CATAPUSAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 109262 November 21, 1996
FACTS:
Bonifacio Catapusan was first married to Narcissa Tanjuatco, the only surviving heir of Dominga Piguing, their (4)
children are the private respondent in the case at bar. Narcissa died in 1910, Bonifacio got married for the second
time, and the children in the second marriage are the petitioners in this case.
Bonifacio died in 1940. Thereafter in 1974, petitioners filed an action for partition of the lot in question
located in Wawa, Tanay, Rizal. Petitioners claim that the Wawa Lot is the property of their father (Bonifacio)
therefore it is co-owned by the heirs of the first and the second marriage. As proof of their claim, they have
presented tax declarations of the four (4) adjacent land owners stating in such document that the owner of the
subject lot is Bonifacio Catapusan. Witnesses were also presented and testified that they saw Bonifacio working
on the lot.
Respondent on the other hand, argues that the Wawa lot was originally owned by Dominga Piguing and
inherited by Narcissa Tanjuatco as her paraphernal property; hence petitioners have no right over the lot. As
evidence, theyve presented tax declarations in their names and also alleged that they have been in open,
continuous and uninterrupted possession of the said lot for more than 50 years.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents declaring them as owner of the property, and such decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals except for Attorneys fees.
ISSUE:
Whether Bonifacio is the owner of the lot?
HELD:
No, He is not an owner.
The tax declarations of neighbors stating that Bonifacio is the owner of the lot is not conclusive, so as the
testimonies of the neighbors that they saw him working on the lot. As oppose to the tax declarations of the
respondents showing they own the land.
Possession be mere tolerance cannot ripen into ownership even if such possession have been for a long period of
time. Also, the declaration of ownership made by the RTC in favor of respondents is proper because ownership
must be decided first before partition may be granted.
169) VERDAD vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 109972 April 29, 1996
FACTS:
Macaria Atega was married twice during her lifetime, first with Angel Burdeos, and second with Canuto Rosales.
She owned a land in Butuan City about 248 sq. m., Macaria died in 1956.
The petitioner is the Zosima Verdad, who purchased the lot in question for P23,000.00 from heirs of
Macarias son (Ramon Burdeos) in 1982. When Socorro (wife of the deceased David Rosales who died some
time after his mother Macaria died) found out in March 30, 1987 that the lot was sold to Verdad, she sought
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intervention of the Lupong Tagapamayapa for redemption, her tender of P23,000.00 was refused because the
current value of the property is higher.
October 16, 1987, no settlement was reached, thus a case was filed by Socorro (private respondent) for
Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction, which the RTC denied stating that redemption period already
lapse.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, it reversed the RTC and declared that Socorro has the right to redeem
the property.
ISSUE:
Whether Socorro Cordero Vda. De Rosales is capacitated to redeem the property even if she is only
related by affinity to Macaria Atega and not an heir?
HELD:
Yes, Socorro is capacitated to make the redemption.
Even if she is not an heir to Macaria, she is an heir to David Rosales who inherited a share of his
mothers estate.
Article 995 of the Civil Code, in the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate
and their descendants, whether legitimate of illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit, without prejudice to
the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under article 1001.
The right to redeem spawned from the non-disclosure of the sale to all co-owners when the sale is in
favor of a third person. In fact, written notice is required under Article 1623, and the redemption period is 30 days
from receipt of such notice.
In the case at bar, no notice was given, hence, the 30 day period stared from the time of discovery of the
sale on March 30, 1987, and stayed by the proceedings in the Punong Tagapamayapa.
There was clear intent to redeem at that time but the offer was rejected by Verdad.
170) TABUSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 108558 June 21, 2001
FACTS:
The lot in question is an unregistered parcel of land in Antipolo, Naval, Leyte with an area of 3,267 square
meters, which latter turned out to be in fact 11,927 square meters.
A case was initiated to declare ownership of the land in question. Herein petitioners claim ownership of
the land through succession from Ignacio Montes and presented tax declarations from 1944 1947 in the name
of Ignacio Montes, but were only paid in 1981. Plaintiff Andrea Tabuso claim to be a successor in interest of
Andrea Elaba (daughter of Maria Montes [Maria is the Sister of Ignacio Montes]). Also, there is a house built on
the lot by Marcelo Tabuso (father of Andrea Tabuso).
Private respondent however, alleged that the land was originally owned by Maria Montes, but she
donated it to Isabel Elaba as supported by a document executed on September 24, 1923, thereafter Isabel sold
the lot to Esteban Abad in 1948. Various tax declarations were also presented by respondent showing that from
1948 1982 tax has been paid on the lot by respondents predecessors in interest mainly by Esteban Abad. Also,
part of the lot is being rented by one Valentin Poblete from Menesio Abad (heir of Esteban) as evidenced by a
lease contract.
During trial, petitioners also presented as witness the counsel of defendant, Atty. Jose Gonzales, who
testified that he owns a lot adjacent to the land in question and that he have personal knowledge that the land in
question had been in the possession of the heirs of Esteban Abad.
RTC ruled that owner of the property is the respondents, which was upheld by the CA on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA was correct in declaring respondents as owner of the land in question?
HELD:
Yes, Court of Appeals was correct.
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The totality of evidence presented leans heavily in favor of herein private respondents. They have been
able to adduce evidence which support their claim that they have been in open, continuous, and uninterrupted
possession for more than 60 years. Also, in view of the size of the land which is 11,927 square meters, it is
unbelievable for an alleged owner such as Tabuso to build only a barong-barong (small house) in the lot, which
was latter shown to be allowed by mere tolerance by a letter addressed to plaintiff asking them to vacate the
property within 3 months time.
Also, petitioners are bound by the testimony of Atty. Gonzales even if he is counsel for the private
respondent because he was presented by the plaintiff themselves as hostile witness.
Petitioners possesses the land as mere holders, distinguished from possession in the concept of an
owner, being a mere holder acknowledges another superior right over the property he possess.
*Petitioners also raised an issue regarding the adjudication of 11,927 square meters to private respondent
when the tax declarations only state 3,267 square meters. This is untenable, because what defines a piece of
land is not the numerical data indicated as its area, but the boundaries or metes and bounds specified in its
description as enclosing the land indicating its limits.
171) DIZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 116854 November 19, 1996
FACTS:
Aida Dizon mortgaged the subject lot to Monte de Piedad Bank on October 23, 1980 and failed to pay the loan
obligation, hence the house and lot mortgage was thereafter foreclosed. The bank told Dizon that she can
repurchase the property, having no means to pay the amount at the moment, she asked Elizabeth Santiago to
repurchase the property in the amount of P550,000.00 on May 28, 1987. The TCT of Dizon was cancelled and a
new one was issued in favor of Santiago in view of the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by Dizon in Favor of
Santiago, also, an Option to Buy Back was signed by the same parties giving Dizon the option to buy back the
said property from Santiago within a period of Three (3) months, with the stipulation that if Dizon failed to used the
option within the agreed period, Dizon shall vacate the property in favor of Santiago.
The period lapse without Dizon exercising her option to buy, thereafter, Santiago asked Dizon to vacate
the premises. Dizon refused, which prompted Santiago to file an Ejectment case before the MTC. After trial, MTC
ordered Dizon to vacate the property. RTC reversed and ordered the cancellation of the TCT in favor of Dizon. CA
affirmed on appeal, but reversed itself upon MR of Santiago.
ISSUE:
Whether Dizon is entitled to possession of the subject property?
HELD:
No, Dizon is not entitled to possession.
The title of the property held by the private respondent is enough proof to hold them as the rightful
possessor upon default of Dizon to exercise her right to redeem the property. Also, the stipulation that Dizon, upon
failure to buy back the property within the specified period, shall vacate the property is a binding agreement, thus,
Santiago is already entitled to possession after the lapse of the said period.
This is ofcourse without prejudice to Dizons right to file another action to determine the ownership of the
property, which she interposed as a defense alleging that the sale was an equitable mortgage. The RTC made an
error in ordering the cancellation of the TCT because Ejectment cases only dwell on the rightful possession and
does not determine ownership with finality.
172) CEQUENA vs. BOLANTE
G.R. 137944 April 6, 2000
FACTS:
178

The land subject of the dispute has an area of 1,728 square meters and situated in barangay Bangad,
Binangonan, Province of Rizal. Respondent Honorata Mendoza Bolante is the only daughter of Sinforoso
Mendoza, while petitioner Cequena is the daughter of Margarito Mendoza. Sinforoso and Margarito are brothers.
The subject lot was declared for tax purposes by Sinforoso since 1926. When he died in 1930, his wife and
daughter continuously possessed the land, and when respondent was of age in 1948, she paid the taxes for the
lot from 1932-1948. Margarito acquired joint possession from 1952, and by a virtue of an affidavit signed allegedly
by respondents mother, transferred tax declaration in the name of Margarito Mendoza starting 1954, who
thereafter cultivated part of the land with his heirs from 1953-1985 until they were ousted by respondents.
The dispute over who has a better right of possession was raised in the trial court, which decided in favor of the
petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed the said decision and declared the respondents as lawful owner and
possessor.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents are the lawful owner and possessor of the land in question?
HELD:
Yes, respondent is the lawful owner and possessor of the land.
By acquisitive prescription of the property under Article 1134 of the New Civil Code, ownership and other
real rights over immovable property may be acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of Ten (10)
years. In the case at bar, respondent acquired their rights over the property through tax declaration of Sinforoso,
when he died in 1930 respondents continued to possess the property and paid taxes from 1932-1948 in the
concept of an owner. Such possession was not disturbed until 1952 when Margarito took joint possession of the
land, however, the possession of respondent which is public, peaceful, and uninterrupted already ripened to
ownership.
*The affidavit that allowed the transfer of tax declaration from Sinforoso to Margarito was doubtful to say
the lease, because one of the alleged signatories is the respondent mother of Honorata who testified that she was
illiterate and could not have signed the document.
*Possession of petitioners cannot ripen into ownership because such possession was not exclusive as
they possess the property at the same time respondent are also living therein from 1952-1985. 1985 respondent
ousted petitioner from the property.
173) DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 129471 April 28, 2000
FACTS:
The land in dispute has an area of 19.4 hectares located in San Miguel, Province of Bohol whose original
ownership rest with Ulpiano Mumar as evidenced by Tax Declaration since 1917.
In 1950, Mumar sold the subject property Carlos Cajes (herein private respondent) who was issued tax
declaration in the same year. He occupied and cultivated the land, planting cassava and camote in certain
portions of the land.
In 1969, unknown to private respondent, Jose Alvarez was able to register a parcel of land with an area of
1,512,468 square meters and OCT #546 was issued in the same year in his name. In 1972 Alvarez sold the
property to spouses Beduya to whom TCT #10101 was issued, the former and the latter never occupied the said
lot the property included in it the 19.4 hectares owned by Cajes.
In the same year, 1972, spouse Beduya acquired a loan from DBP and mortgage the the land under TCT
#10101 for P526,000.00, and in 1978 it was again mortgage for another loan in the amount of P1,430,000.00 in
favor of the petitioner (DBP), no ocular inspection of the land was made.
In 1978 private respondent applied for loan from DBP mortgaging the 19.4 hectares giving as evidence of
ownership tax declarations and a certification of the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Bohol that no
civil, land registration or cadastral case has been filed or instituted before the court affecting the validity of the Tax
Declaration on the 19.4 hectare land. Private respondent approved the loan, however after releasing the money
petitioner found out that the land mortgaged by private respondent was included in the land covered by TCT
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#10101, hence, petitioner immediately cancelled the loan and demanded immediate payment. Private respondent
repaid the loan.
Spouses Beduya failed to pay their loan and the land in TCT #10101 was forclosed. In 1985 during the
foreclosure sale, DBP was the highest bidder, and as spouses Beduya failed to redeem the property, petitioner
consolidated its ownership.
In 1986, petitioner found out that Cajes is occupying a part of the land in TCT #10101, DBP demanded
that Cajes vacate the property but private respondent refused, hence, DBP filed a case for Recovery of
Possession against him. RTC ruled in favor of DBP, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision declaring
Cajes the lawful owner of the 19.4 hectares included in TCT #10101.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA was correct in adjudicating that the 19.4 hectares included in TCT #10101 is owned by
private respondent Carlos Cajes?
HELD:
Yes, Court of Appeals is correct.
Acquisitive prescription already vested in Carlos Cajes ownership of the 19.4 hectares of land he was
paying tax on since he has been in open public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse possession of the said
property in the concept of an owner since 1950. Ordinary prescription requires only such possession for Ten (10)
years. Thus, in 1969, when the spouses Beduya were able to register their land under TCT #10101, the private
respondent Cajes already acquired ownership over the 19.4 hectares he acquired from Mumar who have been in
possession as an owner since 1917. Surely, private respondents possession together with Mumars possession
and occupation of the 19.4 hectares is more than Thirty (30) years required under Act no. 496.
Although the initial case is recovery of possession of real property, and collateral attack is not allowed in
to defeat the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title, the counter claim of the private respondent when he raised the
counterclaim of ownership plus damages, was in fact a direct attack on the title.
DBP cannot be considered a mortgagor in good faith because being a bank, it is required to exercise due
diligence in its dealings as such are impress with public concern. It appears from the facts that it did not conduct
inspection of the property of spouses Beduya when they applied for loan. Also, even when it has knowledge since
1978 that the private respondent has a claim in the land covered by TCT #10101, it still bought the land in
question in the foreclosure sale in 1985 ignoring the fact that would normally raise suspicion because private
respondent is occupying a part of the said lot.
174) VILLANUEVA VS CA
G.R. No. 108921 April 12, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners are the legitimate children of Leon Villanueva, Concepcion Macahilas vda. de Villanueva is his widow.
Leon was one of eight (8) children of Felipe Villanueva, predecessor-in-interest of the parties in the present
case.Private respondents are related by blood to the petitioners as descendants of Felipe.
.
The remaining undivided portion of the land was held in trust by Leon for his co-heirs. During Leon's
lifetime, his co-heirs made several seasonable and lawful demands upon him to subdivide and partition the
property, but for one reason or another, no subdivision took place.
After the death of Leon in August 1972, private respondents discovered that the shares of four of the heirs of
Felipe, namely, Simplicio, Nicolasa, Fausta and Maria Baltazar, spouse of Benito, was purchased by Leon as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed on August 25, 1946 but registered only in 1971.
Leon sometime in July 1970, executed a sale and partition of the property in favor of his own children, herein
petitioners. By virtue of such Deed of Partition, private respondents had succeeded in obtaining Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. C-256. On April 25, 1975, petitioners managed to secure separate and independent
titles over their pro-indiviso shares in their respective names.
Private respondents then filed a case for partition with annulment of documents and reconveyance with the
Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Private respondents contended that the sale in favor of Leon was
fraudulently obtained through m the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 2389,
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declaring "the defendants the legal owners of the property in question through machinations and false pretenses.
On appeal The CA Reversed the Trial courts ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in failing to declare action by the private respondents to recover the
property in question barred by laches, estoppel, prescription.
RULING:
Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the
party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. Its essential elements are: (1) conduct on
the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (2) delay in
asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has an opportunity
to sue; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on
which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant.
At the time of signing of the Deed of Sale of August 26, 1948, private respondents , Ramon and Rosa were
minors. They could not be faulted for their failure to file a case to recover their inheritance from their uncle Leon,
since up to the age of majority, they believed and considered Leon their co-heir and administrator. It was only in
1975, not in 1948, that they became aware of the actionable betrayal by their uncle. Upon learning of their uncle's
actions, they filed an action for recovery.
They did not sleep on their rights, contrary to petitioners' assertion. Under the circumstances of the instant case,
we do not think that respondent appellate court erred in considering private respondents' action. The action was
not too late.
Furthermore, when Felipe Villanueva died, an implied trust was created by operation of law between Felipe's
children and Leon, their uncle, as far as the 1/6 share of Felipe. Leon's fraudulent titling of Felipe's 1/6 share was
a betrayal of that implied trust
Neither is the action barred by prescription, we held that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on
implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the
deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title of the property. Here the questioned Deed of Sale was
registered only in 1971. Private respondents filed their complaint in 1975, hence well within the prescriptive
period.
We held that a land registration case is an action in rem binding upon the whole world, and considering that the
private respondents failed to object to the registration of the realty in question, then res judicata had set in. True,
but notwithstanding the binding effect of the land registration case upon the private respondents, the latter are not
deprived of a remedy. While a review of the decree of registration is no longer available after the expiration of the
one-year period from entry thereof, an equitable remedy is still available. Those wrongfully deprived of their
property may initiate an action for reconveyance of the properly.
175) Eduardo Fontanilla vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119341, November 29, 1999
FACTS:
Spouses Crisanto and Feliciana Duaman were awarded a homestead patent over a parcel of land. Upon their
death, private respondent Luis Duaman, one of their children, inherited a four-hectare portion of the homestead.
On 21 July 1976, in order to expedite the loan application of his two (2) sons, Ernesto and Elpidio Duaman, with
the Development Bank of the Philippines, private respondent transferred to them the ownership of his share in the
homestead.
On 8 August 1985, in view of the imminence of foreclosure of the said lot by the bank, Ernesto and Elpidio sold
the two-hectare portion thereof to Eduardo Fontanilla, Sr. for P30,000.00. The vendee named in the deed of sale
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was Ellen M.T. Fontanilla. . Sometime later, private respondent informed Eduardo Fontanilla of his desire to
repurchase the subject lot.
Private respondent filed a case with the RTC of Cauayan Isabela against petitioners for the "Repurchase of the
Homestead. Upon motion filed by petitioners, the lower court dismissed private respondent's complaint for failure
to state a cause of action
On appeal, the CA reversed the order of the trial court.The CA held that private respondent could still exercise the
right to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended) despite
the fact that it was not him but his sons who conveyed the subject lot to petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent, not being the vendor in the sale of the subject lot to petitioners, could no longer
exercise his right to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land Act against petitioners.
RULING:
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall
be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of
conveyance.(Commonwealth Act 141)
these homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the " State to land-destitute
citizens for their home and cultivation." 2 Further, the plain intent of Section 119 is "to give the homesteader or
patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had gratuitously given to him
as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it.
Petitioners argue that private respondent could no longer avail himself of the right to repurchase under Section
119 because he was not the vendor of the subject lot. Only the vendor allegedly has the right to repurchase.
Petitioners claim is without merit,
Our pronouncement in Madarcos that only the vendor has the right to repurchase was taken out of context by
petitioners. Said pronouncement may not be sweepingly applied in this case because of a significant factual
difference between the two cases. In Madarcos, we ruled that Cantain (petition herein) cannot repurchase the
share of Francisca, his co-heir, because the homestead had already been partitioned and distributed among them
as heirs. In other words, in that case, we held that Catain could not avail himself of the right granted under Section
119 because he was not entitled to repurchase the share of his co-heir in the homestead. Upon the other hand, in
this case, private respondent is precisely seeking to repurchase from petitioners his own share in the homestead
that he inherited from his parents.
There is nothing in Section 119 which provides that the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs" must be the conveyor
of the homestead before any of them can exercise the right to repurchase. Rather, what said law plainly provides
is that the "applicant, his widow, or legal heirs" shall be entitled to repurchase the homestead within (5) years from
the date of conveyance. In this case, there is no dispute that private respondent is the legal heir of spouses
Crisanto and Feliciana Duaman, the homesteaders.
Since the transfer of the subject lot by private respondent to his sons does not fall within the purview of Section
119, it necessarily follows that the five-year period to repurchase cannot be reckoned from the date of said
conveyance. Rather, the date of conveyance for the purpose of counting the five-year period to repurchase under
Section 119 is that alienation made to a third party outside of the family circle which in this case was the
conveyance of the subject lot to petitioners on 8 August 1985. Accordingly, private respondent's complaint for the
repurchase of the subject lot, which was filed on 20 June 1989, was not time-barred as not more than five (5)
years had lapsed since the date of its conveyance to petitioners.
176) Quimen Vs. CA and Yolanda Oliveros
G.R. No. 112331, May 29, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina
inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property equally among
themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the municipal road.
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In February 1982 Yolanda purchased a part of the lot from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was
then acting as his administratrix. According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property for sale she was
hesitant to buy as it had no access to a public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the
assurance that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property for P200.00 per square meter.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public highway a
portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia
refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property.
In February 1986 Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, located directly behind the property of her
parents who provided her a pathway Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for
ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself obstructs the path
so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of the store to reach the road.
On 29 December 1987 Yolanda filed an action with the trial court praying for a right of way through Anastacia's
property. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.
On appeal by respondent Yolanda, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held that she was entitled to
a right of way on petitioner's property
ISSUE:
Whether Yolanda is entitled to a right of way on her property
RULING:
YES, she is entitled. Yolanda sufficiently established the presence of the ff:
1.
her estate (dominant estate) is surrounded by other immovable without an adequate outlet to public
highway;
2.
she is willing to pay the proper indemnity;
3.
the isolation was not due to the acts of Yolanda; and
4.
the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
The criterion of least prejudicial to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance. Where
the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where
the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, if these 2 circumstances do not
concur, the way which will cause the least damage should be used even if it will not be the shortest. In this case,
Anastacias property is least prejudicial since it will not entail the demolition of a sari-sari store which is made of
strong materials.
As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway,
and another right of way which although longer will require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative
should be preferred.
177) Valley Land Resources vs Valley Golf Club
G.R. No. 126584. November 15, 2001
Facts:
Victoria Valley Blvd is composed of road lots which connects Ortigas Avenue and Sumulong Highway. Half of the
Boulevard is made up of road lots owned by defendant-appellant Valley Golf. The other half is supposed to be
owned by Hacienda Benito with whom Valley Golf entered into an agreement, whereby it was agreed that
Hacienda Benito and Valley Golf will own jointly Victoria Valley Blvd, one of the provisions provide that the right of
way shall be owned and maintained jointly by Hacienda Benito and Valley Golf.
Thereafter, Hacienda Benito transferred ownership and all its rights and interests over the road lots covering half
of the Victoria Valley Blvd. to herein plaintiff-appellee Valley Land by virtue of a Mutual Agreement Valley Golf
treated and recognized Valley Land as its alleged new co-owner over Victoria Valley Blvd., sharing half of all the
proceeds of the grant of right of way over the boulevard.
However, in a subsequent review of the agreement between Valley Golf and Hacienda Benito, Valley Golf
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discovered that there is actually no existing co-ownership between them over Victoria Valley Blvd. Valley Golf
retained exclusive ownership over the road lots forming part of Victoria Valley Blvd. notwithstanding their
agreement, and that the other half of the boulevard is no longer under the name of either Hacienda Benito or
Valley Land as the same has been disposed of already and is registered in favor of the Active Realty & Dev't.
Corp.
Based on said discovery, Valley Golf sought to recover the sum of money which it allegedly remitted by mistake to
Valley Land which represents the supposed share of the latter in the grant of right of way. Valley Land in turn
sought the cancellation of Valley Golf s titles over the road lots forming half of Victoria Valley Blvd. The cases
were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo and consolidated therein. In due time, the assailed decision
was rendered and brought to this Court on appeal by Valley Golf
ISSUE: Whether Valley Golf is the sole owner of the subject road lots, or Valley Land is a co-owner thereof
RULING: Valley Golf is the sole owner of the road lots.
The TCTs which are the subject of the road right of way and all the rest of the other certificates of title covering
the road lots are solely in the name of Valley Golf. Consequently, there can be no question that Valley Golf is the
owner of the road lots. As such owner, Valley Golf has the right to enjoy and dispose of the same without any
limitations other than those established by law.
However, Valley Golf made the mistake of sharing the proceeds of the right of way with Valley Land. Considering
that when the said amount was given to Valley Land, it did not have the right to receive the amount as Valley Golf
delivered it under the mistaken belief that Valley Land was a co-owner of the lands, thus Valley Land was under
obligation to return the amount of P1,585,962.96.
178) Cabatingan vs heirs of Corazon Cabatingan
G.R. No. 131953. June 5, 2002
FACTS:
On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a
"Deed of Conditional of Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering () portion of the former's house and lot
located at Liloan, Cebu. Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on
January 14, 1995, bestowing upon: (a) petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land - one located in
Cogon, Cebu and the other, a portion of a parcel of land in Masbate. (b) petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion
of a parcel of land located in Masbate (and (c) petitioner Merly S. Cabatingan, a portion of the Masbate property
These deeds of donation contain similar provisions:
"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR
transfers, conveys, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above property, to become effective upon the death
of the DONOR xxx
Upon learning of the existence of these donations, respondents filed with the RTC an action for Annulment And
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Donations and Accounting. Respondents allege that petitioners, through their
sinister machinations and strategies and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the
execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of
the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa.
Respondents prayed that they be declared as co-owners of the properties in equal shares, together with Nicolas
Cabatingan.
RTC rendered a partial judgment in favor of respondents by declaring the 4 Deeds of Donation as null and void for
being a Donation Mortis Causa and for failure to comply with formal and solemn requisite under Art. 806 of the
New Civil Code; declaring respondents as co-owners of the properties of Conchita
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ISSUE: Whether or not the donations are mortis causa or inter vivos
RULING: The Donations in this case are Mortis Causa.
In a Donation Mortis Causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive." In
determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; transferor retains
ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) Before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
(3) The transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not
contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death. It
establishes the donor's intention to transfer the ownership and possession of the donated property to the donee
only after the former's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other
interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during
her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the following
Acceptance and Attestation clauses, uniformly found in the subject deeds of donation, "That the DONEE does
hereby accept the foregoing donation mortis causa.
179) GONZALES vs. CA
G.R. No. 110335. June 18, 2001
FACTS:
The deceased spouses Ignacio Gonzales and Marina Gonzales were the registered owners of two
parcels of agricultural Land situated at Barrio Fortaleza, Cabanatuan City, Herein petitioners are the successorsin-interest or the children and grandchildren of said Gonzales spouses. On the other hand, private respondents
are the farmers and tenants of said spouses who have been cultivating the parcels of land even before World War
II either personally or through their predecessors-in-interest.
On May 7, 1969, Marina Gonzales died intestate and appointed as administratrix of her estate was petitioner Lilia
Gonzales. Prior to the partition of said estate, Ignacio Gonzales executed a Deed of Donation on July 12, 1972
conveying his share of the property.
When Presidential Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27) took effect on October 21, 1972, the landholdings of the spouses
Gonzales were placed under Operation Land Transfer by virtue of said decree, and private respondents were
accordingly issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Transfer and Emancipation Patents. On March 5, 1974,
the administratrix Lilia Gonzales filed an application for retention with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
requesting that their property be excluded from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) resolution dated February 23, 1983 recommending that the land subject of the deed of donation, or
Lot No. 551-C, be exempt from Operation Land Transfer.
ISSUE:Whether the property subject of the deed of donation which was not registered when P.D. No. 27 took
effect, should be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer.
RULING: No. Article 749 of the Civil Code provides that "in order that the donation of an immovable may be valid,
it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which
the donee must satisfy." Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that "the titles of ownership, or other rights
over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of property shall not prejudice
third persons. From the foregoing provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties to a donation of an
immovable property, all that is required is for said donation to be contained in a public document. Registration is
not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective. However, in order to bind third persons, the donation
must be registered in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds). Although the non-
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registration of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity, the necessity of registration comes into play when the
rights of third persons are affected, as in the case at bar.
It is undisputed in this case that the donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grandchildren, although
in writing and duly notarized, has not been registered in accordance with law. For this reason, it shall not be
binding upon private respondents who did not participate in said deed or had no actual knowledge thereof. Hence,
while the deed of donation is valid between the donor and the donees, such deed, however, did not bind the
tenants-farmers who were not parties to the donation. From the foregoing, the ineluctable conclusion drawn is that
the unregistered deed of donation cannot operate to exclude the subject land from the coverage of the Operation
Land Transfer of P.D. No. 27, which took effect on October 21, 1972. To rule otherwise would render ineffectual
the rights and interests that the tenants-farmers immediately acquired upon the promulgation of P.D. No. 27.
180) Republic vs. Leon Silim
G.R. No. 140487. April 2, 2001
FACTS:
On 17 December 1971, respondents, the Spouses Leon Silim and Ildefonsa Mangubat, donated a 5,600 square
meter parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur
(BPS). In the Deed of Donation, respondents imposed the condition that the said property should "be used
exclusively and forever for school purposes only." 1 This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District
Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and Confirmation of Donation.
Through a fund raising campaign spearheaded by the Parent-Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan, a
school building was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan school building that was
supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land in Barangay Kauswagan could not be released since the
government required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare parcel of land. To remedy this predicament, Assistant
School Division Superintendent of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Sabdani Hadjirol, authorized District
Supervisor Buendia to officially transact for the exchange of the one-half (1/2) hectare old school site of
Kauswagan Elementary School to a new and suitable location which would fit the specifications of the
government. Pursuant to this, District Supervisor Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of Exchange
whereby the donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter..
When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise, that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on
the donated land, he asked the latter why he was building a house on the property he donated to BPS. Vice
Mayor Wilfredo Palma replied that he is already the owner of the said property. Respondent Leon Silim
endeavored to stop the construction of the house on the donated property but Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma advised
him to just file a case in court.
On February 10, 1982, respondents filed a Complaint for Revocation and Cancellation of Conditional Donation,
Annulment of Deed of Exchange and Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Property with damages
against Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma before the RTC of Pagadian City which dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit.
Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, respondents appealed in which the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court and declared the donation null and void on the grounds that the donation was not
properly accepted and the condition imposed on the donation was violated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation is valid.
HELD: Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2) remuneratory
or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. An onerous donation is that which imposes upon the
donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable
consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than the thing donated. Unlike the other forms of donation,
the validity of and the rights and obligations of the parties involved in an onerous donation are completely
governed not by the law on donations but by the law on contracts (Article 733 Civil Code). The donation involved
in the present controversy is one which is onerous since there is a burden imposed upon the donee to build a
school on the donated property.
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In accordance to Art. 745 & 749, there was a valid acceptance of the donation in this case. The written
acceptance of the donation having been considered by the trial court in arriving at its decision, there is the
presumption that this exhibit was properly offered and admitted by the court. Also, a school building was
immediately constructed after the donation was executed. Silim had knowledge of the existence of the school
building put up on the lot.
The condition for the donation in this case was not violated when the lot donated was exchanged with another
one. The purpose for the donation remains the same - for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the
purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and
enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of
funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan School Bldg which could not be accommodated by the limited area
of the donated lot.
181) QUILALA V. ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 13268, December 3, 2001
FACTS: On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of
Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila.
The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of two pages. The first page contains the deed of
donation itself, and is signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as donor, Violeta Quilala as donee, and
two instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the Acknowledgment, which states merely that Catalina
Quilala personally appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that the donation was her free and
voluntary act and deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of the second page the signatures of Catalina
Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on the right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and the other
witness.
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky
Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala..
Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to be
Catalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial
settlement of estate, dividing and adjudicating unto themselves the subject property.
The trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged
before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was no acceptance by Violeta of the
donation in a public instrument, thus rendering the donation null and void. Furthermore, the trial court held that
nowhere in Catalina's SSS records does it appear that Violeta was Catalina's daughter. Rather, Violeta was
referred to therein as an adopted child, but there was no positive evidence that the adoption was legal. On the
other hand, the trial court found that respondents were first cousins of Catalina Quilala. However, since it
appeared that Catalina died leaving a will, the trial court ruled that respondents' deed of extrajudicial settlement
cannot be registered.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with modification the decision of the trial
court by dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action without prejudice to the filing of probate proceedings
of Catalina's alleged last will and testament.
ISSUE: validity of the donation executed by Catalina in favor of Violeta
HELD: Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be made in a public instrument in order
to be valid, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. As
a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to
the donee,and is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee, provided the
donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is
generally considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property. The acceptance, to
be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee.It may be made in the same deed or in
a separate public document, and the donor must know the acceptance by the donee.
In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the certificate of title as well as the technical
description of the real property donated. It stipulated that the donation was made for and in consideration of the
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"love and affection which the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity."
Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor, donee and their witnesses affixed their signature.
However, the Acknowledgment appearing on the second page mentioned only the donor, Catalina Quilala.
The second page of the deed of donation, on which the Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and
one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the donee and the other witness on the right hand margin. Surely, the
requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument
is not absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is
authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the same
has already been duly executed by the parties. Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is
merely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the page does not invalidate the
document. The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the requirement in the above-quoted provision
is deemed substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also render the
donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private
document in part and a public document in another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public
converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the
notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be
acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page, which contains
the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized deed of
donation, was made in a public instrument.
182)
SPOUSES
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127549, January 28, 1998
STA.
MARIA
V.
FACTS: Spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the registered owners of a piece of land, Lot No. 124, located
at Paco, Obando, Bulacan. They acquired said lot under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 6, 1992
executed by the vendors Pedro M. Sanchez, et al.
Plaintiff's aforesaid Lot 124 is surrounded by a fishpond on the northeast portion thereof; by Lot 126, owned by
Florentino Cruz, on the southeast portion; by Lot 6-a and a portion of Lot 6-b, owned respectively by Spouses
Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria, on the southwest; and by Lot 122, owned by the Jacinto
family, on the northwest.
On February 17, 1992, Respondent spouses Fajardo filed a complaint against petitioner Cesar and Raquel Sta.
Maria or Florcerfida Sta. Maria for the establishment of an easement of right of way. Respondents alleged that
their lot, Lot 124, is surrounded by properties belonging to other persons, including those of the petitioners; that
since respondents have no adequate outlet to the provincial road, an easement of a right of way passing through
either of the alternative petitioners properties which are directly abutting the provincial road would be
respondents only convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the provincial road; that respondents
predecessors-in-interest have been passing through the properties of petitioners going to and from their lot; that
petitioners' mother even promised respondents' predecessors-in-interest to grant the latter an easement of right of
way as she acknowledged the absence of an access from their property to the road; and that alternative
petitioners, despite respondents request for a right of way and referral of the dispute to the barangay officials,
refused to grant them an easement. Thus, respondents prayed that an easement of right of way on the lots of
defendants be established in their favor.
Defendants, instead of filing an answer, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower court has no
jurisdiction to hear the case since plaintiffs failed to refer the matter to the barangay lupon. The lower court,
however, in its Order dated May 18, 1992, denied said motion on the premise that there was substantial
compliance with the law.
The trial court found that based on the Ocular Inspection Report there was no other way through which the private
respondents could establish a right of way in order to reach the provincial road except by traversing directly the
property of the petitioners.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the private respondents had sufficiently established the
existence of the four requisites for compulsory easement of right of way on petitioners' property, to wit: (1) private
respondents' property was, as revealed by the Ocular inspection Report, surrounded by other immovables owned
188

by different individuals and was without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) the isolation of private
respondents' property was not due to their own acts, as it was already surrounded by other immovables when
they purchased it; (3) petitioners' property would provide the shortest way from private respondents' property to
the provincial road, and this way would cause the least prejudice because no significant structure would be injured
thereby; and (4) the private respondents were willing to pay the corresponding damages provided for by law if the
right of way would be granted.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A COMPULSORY RIGHT OF WAY CAN BE GRANTED TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS
HELD: In the instant case, the Court of Appeals have correctly found the existence of the requisites. Private
respondents' property is landlocked by neighboring estates belonging to different owners.
The petitioners try to convince the Court that there are two other existing passage ways over the property of Cruz
and over that of Jacinto, as well as a "daang tao," for private respondents' use. But the examination of the records
yields otherwise. Said lots of Cruz and Jacinto do not have existing passage ways for the private respondents to
use. Moreover, the Ocular Inspection Report reveals that the suggested alternative ways through Cruz's or
Jacinto's properties are longer and "circuitous" than that through petitioners' property. This is also clear from the
Sketch Plan submitted by the private respondents wherein it is readily seen that the lots of Cruz and Jacinto are
only adjacent to that of private respondents unlike that of petitioners which is directly in front of private
respondents' property in relation to the public highway.
Under Article 650 of the Civil Code, the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial
to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest. Where there are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the
easement may be established on any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage
should be chosen.The conditions of "least damage" and "shortest distance" are both established in one tenement
petitioners' property.
As to the "daang tao" at the back of private respondents' property, it must be stressed that under Article 651 the
width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and
may accordingly be changed from time to time. Therefore, the needs of the dominant estate determine the width
of the easement.The needs of private respondents' property could hardly be served by this "daang tao" located at
the back and which is bordered by a fishpond.
183) CRISTOBAL V. COURT OF APPEALS

291 SCRA 122
FACTS: Petitioners own a house and lot situated at Visayas Avenue Extension, Quezon City, where they have
been residing from 1961 to the present. Respondent Cesar Ledesma, Inc., on the other hand, is the owner of a
subdivision at Barrio Culiat along Visayas Avenue which once included the disputed residential lots, Lot 1 and Lot
2, located adjacent to petitioners' property. Lots 1 and 2 were originally part of a private road known as Road Lot 2
owned exclusively by Cesar Ledesma, Inc. Petitioners were using Road Lot 2 in going to and from the nearest
public road. When Visayas Avenue became operational as a national road in 1979, Cesar Ledesma, Inc., filed a
petition before the RTC of Quezon City to be allowed to convert Road Lot 2 into residential lots. The petition was
granted, hence, Road Lot 2 was converted into residential lots designated as lot 1 and lot 2. Subsequently, Cesar
Ledesma , Inc., sold both lots to Macario Pacione. In turn, Macario Pacione conveyed the lots to his son and
dauhter-in-law, respondent spouses Jesus and Lerma Pacione.
When the Pacione spouses, who intended to build a house on Lot 1, Visited the property in 1987, they found out
that the lot was occupied by a squatter named Juanita Geronimo and a portion was being used a passageway by
petitioners to and from Visayas Avenue. Accordingly, the spouses complained about the intrusion into their
189

property to the Barangay Office. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, the spouses started
enclosing Lot 1 with a concrete fence.
Petitioners prostested the enclosure alleging that their property was bounded on all sides by residential houses
belonging to different owners and had no adequate outlet and inlet to Visayas Avenue except through the property
of the Paciones. As their protests went unheeded, petitioners instituted an action for easement of right of way.
At the instance of the parties, the trial court ordered an ocular inspection of the property.
The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that one essential requisite of a legal easement of right of way was
not proved, i.e., the absence of an alternative adequate way or outlet to a public highway, in this case, Visayas
Avenue.
On 16 January 1996 the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed decision affirming the findings of the trial court.
ISSUE: whether or not petitioners are entitled to a compulsory easement of
right of way
HELD: To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and
650 of the Civil Code must be established. These are: (1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been paid; (3) that the
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a point
least prejudicial to the servient estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.The burden of proving the existence of these
prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
In the present case, the first element is clearly absent. As found by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, an outlet already exist, which is a path walk located at the left side of petitioners' property and which is
connected to a private road about five hundred (500) meters long. The private road, in turn, leads to Ma. Elena
Street which is about 2.5 meters wide and, finally, to Visayas Avenue. This outlet was determined by the court a
quo to be sufficient for the needs of the dominants estate, hence petitioners have no cause to complain that they
have no adequate outlet to Visayas Avenue.
Further, no evidence was adduced by petitioners to prove that the easement they seek to impose on private
respondents' property is to be established at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. For emphasis, Lot 1 is
only 164 square meters and an improvident imposition of the easement on the lot may unjustly deprive private
respondents of the optimum use and enjoyment of their property, considering that its already small area will be
reduced further by the easement. Worse, it may even render the property useless for the purpose for which
private respondents purchased the same.
It must also be stressed that, by its very nature, and when considered with reference to the obligations imposed
on the servient estate, an easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of the servient owner
and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. Thus, it is incumbent upon the owner of the
dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his
claim for easement of right of way be granted. Petitioners miserably failed in this regard.
On the question of adequacy of the existing outlet, petitioners allege that the path walk is much longer,
circuitous and inconvenient, as from Visayas Avenue one has to pass by Ma. Elena St., turn right to a private
road, then enter, then vacant lot, and turn right again to exit from the vacant lot until one reaches petitioners'
property.
We find petitioners' concept of what is "adequate outlet" a complete disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine that
in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way there must be a real, not ficititious or artificial,
necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up
a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the
same should not be imposed
Admittedly, the proposed right of way over private respondents' property is the most convenient, being the
shorter and the more direct route to Visayas Avenue. However, it is not enough that the easement be where the
way is shortest. It is more improtant that it be where it will cause the least prejudice to the servient estate. As
discussed elsewhere, petitioners failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the proposed right of way shall be at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
184) CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO) V. COURT OF APPEALS
345 SCRA 85
190

FACTS: On May 18, 1989, Conrad L. Leviste filed with the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte, a complaint for
collection of a sum of money and foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine Smelter Corporation (PSC).
For failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court declared PSC in default and allowed plaintiff Leviste to
present evidence ex-parte.
On November 23, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff.
When the decision became final and executory, the trial court issued a writ of execution and respondent sheriff
Eduardo R. Moreno levied upon two (2) parcels of land issued by the Registrar of Deeds in the name of PSC. On
April 24, 1990, the parcels of land were sold at public auction in favor of Vines Realty Corporation. On April 25,
1990, the Clerk of Court, as ex-officio Provincial Sheriff, issued a Certificate of Sale which Judge Luis D. Dictado,
in his capacity as executive judge, approved.
On June 23, 1992, Vines Realty moved for the issuance of a writ of possession over said property. On June 25,
1992, the trial court granted the motion.
On August 7, 1992, copy of the writ of possession was served on petitioner as owner of the power lines standing
on certain portions of the subject property. Later, on August 12, 1992, Vines Realty filed an amended motion for
an order of demolition and removal of improvements on the subject land.
Among the improvements for removal were the power lines and electric posts belonging to petitioner.
Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that petitioner was not a party to the case and therefore not bound
by the judgment of the trial court and that it had subsisting right-of-way agreements over said property.
The trial court proceeded with the hearing despite the fact that petitioner had no counsel present. Thus, only
Vines Realty presented its evidence.
On the same date, November 27, 1992, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of demolition.
On December 7, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with restraining order and
preliminary injunction and the same was granted.
On December 11, 1992, the trial court issued another order directing the National Power Corporation sub-unit in
Camarines Norte to shut off the power lines .
On the same day, December 11, 1992, respondent Vines Realty cut down petitioners electric posts professedly
using a chainsaw and resulting in a loud blast affecting the area.
Even the members of the Sangguniang Bayan at San Jose appealed to respondent Sheriff to desist from
proceeding with the demolition due to a restraining order but to no avail.
On January 26, 1993, the trial court issued an alias writ of demolition
The sheriff, at the request of Vines Realty demolished the remaining electric posts resulting in the cutting off of
power supply to various business establishments and barangays.
Meantime, on January 19, 1993, the Court of Appeals, promulgated a decision dismissing the petition for lack of
merit.
Meanwhile, in response to the publics urgent basic need, petitioner re-constructed its power lines along the
provincial road leading to the Port of Osmea upon authority of DPWH.
On April 23, 1993, however, petitioner received a letter dated April 10, 1993, stating that Vines Realty was the
owner of the roadside and that petitioner could not construct power lines therein without its permission. Petitioner
promptly replied that the power lines were constructed within the right of way of the provincial road leading to the
port of Osmea as granted by the District Engineer of DPWH.
ISSUE: whether petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the power lines located in the land sold at public
auction as a result of extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage
HELD: The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. A court denies a party due process if it
renders its orders without giving such party an opportunity to present its evidence. This Court finds that petitioner
was denied due process. Petitioner could have negated private respondents claims by showing the absence of
legal or factual basis therefor if only the trial court in the exercise of justice and equity reset the hearing instead of
proceeding with the trial and issuing an order of demolition on the same day.
The trial court failed to appreciate the nature of electric cooperatives as public utilities.
191

The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain.
Such conclusion finds support in easements of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just
compensation for private property condemned for public use.
However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty retains
full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to do with the
land, except those that would result in contact with the wires.
The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the installation
power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its
ordinary use. For these reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither
more nor less than the money equivalent of the property.
Just compensation has been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss, which the owner of
the res expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The value of the land and its character at the
time it was taken by the Government are the criteria for determining just compensation. No matter how
commendable petitioners purpose is, it is just and equitable that Vines Realty be compensated the fair and full
equivalent for the taking of its property, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to
the expropriating entity.
185) VILLANUEVA V. VELASCO
346 SCRA 99
FACTS: Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land in Quezon City. He bought it from
Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said property. The bank had acquired it from the spouses Maximo
and Justina Gabriel at a public auction on March 19, 1983. When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a
small house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of right of way the
Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in a Contract of
Easement of Right of Way.
Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed the aforementioned
small house that encroached upon the two-meter easement. Petitioner was also unaware that private
respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991 for easement, damages and with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against the spouses Gabriel. As successors-ininterest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of easement.
On May 15, 1991, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order. On August 13, 1991, it issued a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Gabriels to provide the right of way and to demolish the small
house encroaching on the easement. On August 15, 1991, the Gabriels filed a motion for reconsideration which
was also denied.
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and upheld the RTCs issuances. The decision became final and
executory on July 31, 1992.
On January 5, 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco of the RTC in Quezon City issued an Alias Writ of Demolition.
On June 20, 1995, the sheriff tried to demolish the small house pursuant to the writ.
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals asserting that the existence
of the easement of right of way was not annotated in his title and that he was not a party to the Civil Case. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit and denied the reconsideration.
ISSUE: whether the easement on the property binds petitioner
HELD: The subject easement (right of way) originally was voluntarily constituted by agreement between the
Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the easement in the instant
petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by necessity or a legal
easement. A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest, and
becomes a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it
belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code.
The essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation
was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least
192

prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The trial court and the Court of Appeals have
declared the existence of said easement (right of way). This finding of fact of both courts below is conclusive on
this Court, hence there is no need to further review, but only to re-affirm, this finding. The small house occupying
one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private respondents cement mixer and motor
vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of private respondents. It is well-settled that the needs of the
dominant estate determine the width of the easement. Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever
edifice obstructs the easement in view of the needs of private respondents estate.
Petitioners second proposition, that he is not bound by the contract of easement because the same was not
annotated in the title and that a notice of lis pendens of the complaint to enforce the easement was not recorded
with the Register of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious. As already explained, it is in the nature of legal easement
that the servient estate (of petitioner) is legally bound to provide the dominant estate (of private respondents in
this case) ingress from and egress to the public highway.
Petitioners last argument that he was not a party to Civil Case and that he had not been given his day in court, is
also without merit under Rule 39, Sec. 47, of the Revised Rules of Court.
Simply stated, a decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the parties to said case and those who
are their successor in interest by title after said case has been commenced or filed in court. In this case, private
respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, initiated Civil Case on May 8, 1991, against the original owners,
the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. Title in the name of petitioner was entered in the Register of Deeds on
March 24, 1995, after he bought the property from the bank which had acquired it from the Gabriels. Hence, the
decision in Civil Case binds petitioner. For, although not a party to the suit, he is a successor-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action in court.
186) COSTABELLA CORPORATION V. CA
193 SCRA 332
FACTS: petitioner owns the real estate properties situated at Sitio Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City, on which it
had constructed a resort and hotel. The private respondents, on the other hand, are the owners of adjoining
properties.
Before the petitioner began the construction of its beach hotel, the private respondents, in going to and from their
respective properties and the provincial road, passed through a passageway which traversed the petitioner's
property. In 1981, the petitioner closed the aforementioned passageway when it began the construction of its
hotel, but nonetheless opened another route across its property through which the private respondents, as in the
past, were allowed to pass. Sometime in August, 1982, when it undertook the construction of the second phase of
its beach hotel, the petitioner fenced its property thus closing even the alternative passageway and preventing the
private respondents from traversing any part of it.
As a direct consequence of these closures, an action for injunction with damages was filed against the petitioner
by the private respondents on September 2, 1982. In their complaint, the private respondents assailed the
petitioner's closure of the original passageway which they (private respondents) claimed to be an "ancient road
right of way" that had been existing before World War II and since then had been used by them, the community,
and the general public, either as pedestrians or by means of vehicles, in going to and coming from Lapu-Lapu
City and other parts of the country. The private respondents averred that by closing the alleged road right of way
in question, the petitioner had deprived them access to their properties and caused them damages.
In the same complainant, the private respondents likewise alleged that the petitioner had constructed a dike on
the beach fronting the latter's property without the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of the residents and
local fishermen, and trapping debris and flotsam on the beach. They also claimed that the debris and flotsam that
had accumulated prevented them from using their properties for the purpose for which they had acquired them.
The complaint this prayed for the trial court to order the re-opening of the original passageway across the
petitioner's property as well as the destruction of the dike.
In its answer, the petitioner denied the existence of an ancient road through its property and counter-averred,
among others, that it and its predecessors-in-interest had permitted the temporary, intermittent, and gratuitous use
of, or passage through, its property by the private respondents and others by mere tolerance and purely as an act
of neighborliness. At any rate, the petitioner alleged, the private respondents were not entirely dependent on the
subject passageway as they (private respondents) had another existing and adequate access to the public road
193

through other properties. With respect to the dike it allegedly constructed, the petitioner stated that what it built
was a breakwater on the foreshore land fronting its property and not a dike as claimed by the private respondents.
Moreover, contrary to the private respondents' accusation, the said construction had benefitted the community
especially the fishermen who used the same as mooring for their boats during low tide. The quantity of flotsam
and debris which had formed on the private respondents' beach front on the other hand were but the natural and
unavoidable accumulations on beaches by the action of the tides and movement of the waves of the sea.
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision on March 15, 1984 finding that the private respondents had
acquired a vested right over the passageway in controversy based on its long existence and its continued use and
enjoyment not only by the private respondents, but also by the community at large. The petitioner in so closing the
said passageway, had accordingly violated the private respondents' vested right.
The respondent Appellate Court held as without basis the trial court's finding that the private respondents had
acquired a vested right over the passageway in question by virtue of prescription. The appellate court pointed out
that an easement of right of way is a discontinuous one which, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, may only
be acquired by virtue of a title and not by prescription.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the respondent appellate court is grossly erroneous and not in accord with
the provisions of Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code on easements and the prevailing jurisprudence on the
matter
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
It is already well-established that an easement of right of way, as is involved here, is discontinuous and as such
can not be acquired by prescription. Insofar therefore as the appellate court adhered to the foregoing precepts, it
stood correct. Unfortunately, after making the correct pronouncement, the respondent Appellate Court did not
order the reversal of the trial court's decision and the dismissal of the complaint after holding that no easement
had been validly constituted over the petitioner's property. Instead, the Appellate Court went on to commit a
reversible error by considering the passageway in issue as a compulsory easement which the private
respondents, as owners of the "dominant" estate, may demand from the petitioner the latter being the owner of
the "servient" estate.
Based on Article 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, Based on the foregoing, the owner of the dominant estate may
validly claim a compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the
(dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after
payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of
way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. Additionally, the burden of proving the existence
of the foregoing pre-requisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
Here, there is absent any showing that the private respondents had established the existence of the four
requisites mandated by law. For one, they failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their respective
properties to a public highway. On the contrary, as alleged by the petitioner in its answer to the complaint, and
confirmed by the appellate court, "there is another outlet for the plaintiffs (private respondents) to the main road."
Thus, the respondent Court of Appeals likewise admitted that "legally the old road could be closed." Yet, it ordered
the re- opening of the old passageway on the ground that "the existing outlet (the other outlet) is inconvenient to
the plaintiff." On this score, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the
dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. To be sure, the true standard
for the grant of the legal right is "adequacy." Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the
dominant estate to a public highway, even if the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need
to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified. For to justify the imposition of an easement or right of way,
"there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it."
Further, the private respondents failed to indicate in their complaint or even to manifest during the trial of the case
that they were willing to indemnify fully the petitioner for the right of way to be established over its property.
Neither have the private respondents been able to show that the isolation of their property was not due to their
personal or their predecessors-in-interest's own acts. Finally, the private respondents failed to allege, much more
introduce any evidence, that the passageway they seek to be re-opened is at a point least prejudicial to the
petitioner. Considering that the petitioner operates a hotel and beach resort in its property, it must undeniably
maintain a strict standard of security within its premises. Otherwise, the convenience, privacy, and safety of its
clients and patrons would be compromised. That indubitably will doom the petitioner's business. It is therefore of
great importance that the claimed light of way over the petitioner's property be located at a point least prejudicial
194

to its business.
As also earlier indicated, there must be a real necessity therefor, and not mere convenience for the dominant
estate. Hence, if there is an existing outlet, otherwise adequate, to the highway, the "dominant" estate can not
demand a right of way, although the same may not be convenient. Of course, the question of when a particular
passage may be said to be "adequate" depends on the circumstances of each case.
The isolation of the dominant estate is also dependent on the particular need of the dominant owner, and the
estate itself need not be totally landlocked. What is important to consider is whether or not a right of way is
necessary
to
fill
a
reasonable
need
therefor
by
the
owner
But while a right of way is legally demandable, the owner of the dominant estate is not at liberty to impose
one based on arbitrary choice. Under Article 650 of the Code, it shall be established upon two criteria: (1) at the
point least prejudicial to the servient state; and (2) where the distance to a public highway may be the shortest.
"The court," says Tolentino, "is not bound to establish what is the shortest; a longer way may be established to
avoid injury to the servient tenement, such as when there are constuctions or walls which can be avoided by a
roundabout way, or to secure the interest of the dominant owner, such as when the shortest distance would place
the way on a dangerous decline."
187) ENCARNACION V. CA
195 SCRA 74
FACTS: Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta Magsino Viuda de Sagun
are the owners of two adjacent estates situated in Buco, Talisay, Batangas. Petitioner owns the dominant estate.
Private respondents co-own the 405-square-meter servient estate which is bounded on the North by the National
Highway, on the South by Tomas Encarnacion, on the East by Mamerto Magsino and on the West by Felipe de
Sagun. In other words, the servient estate stands between the dominant estate and the national road.
Prior to 1960, when the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence, persons going to the national
highway just crossed the servient estate at no particular point. However, in 1960 when private respondents
constructed a fence around the servient estate to provide access to the highway. One-half meter width of the path
was taken from the servient estate and the other one-half meter portion was taken from another lot owned by
Mamerto Magsino. No compensation was asked and non was given for the portions constituting the pathway.
It was also about that time that petitioner started his plant nursery business on his land where he also had his
abode. He would use said pathway as passage to the highway for his family and for his customers.
Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work flourished and with that, it became more and more
difficult for petitioner to haul the plants and garden soil to and from the nursery and the highway with the use of
pushcarts. In January, 1984, petitioner was able to buy an owner-type jeep which he could use for transporting his
plants. However, that jeep could not pass through the roadpath and so he approached the servient estate owners
and requested that they sell to him one and one-half (1 1/2) meters of their property to be added to the existing
pathway so as to allow passage for his jeepney. To his utter consternation, his request was turned down by the
two widows and further attempts at negotiation proved futile.
Petitioner then instituted an action seeking the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over an additional
width of at least two (2) meters over the De Saguns' 405-square-meter parcel of land.
During the trial, the attention of the lower court was called to the existence of another exit to the highway, only
eighty (80) meters away from the dominant estate. On December 2, 1985, the lower court rendered judgment
dismissing petitioner's complaint.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court on January 28, 1987 and rejected
petitioner's claim for an additional easement. The Appellate Court took into consideration the presence of a dried
river bed only eighty (80) meters away from the dominant estate and conjectured that petitioner might have
actually driven his jeep through the river bed in order to get to the highway, and that the only reason why he
wanted a wider easement through the De Sagun's estate was that it was more convenient for his business and
family needs
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has sufficiently established his claim for an additional easement of right of way
HELD: While there is a dried river bed less than 100 meters from the dominant tenement, that access is grossly
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inadequate. Generally, the right of way may be demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no access to a public
highway, and (2) when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the
present case, the river bed route is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no ingress nor egress from
the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump four (4) to five (5) meters up.
Moreover, during the rainy season, the river bed is impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be used at
certain times of the year. With the inherent disadvantages of the river bed which make passage difficult, if not
impossible, it is if there were no outlet at all.
Where a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over adjacent servient
estates as a matter of law.
Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is
sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time." This is taken
to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the
passage. And these needs may vary from time to time. When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he
and his family could easily make do with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to the national highway. But the
business grew and with it the need for the use of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manual hauling of
plants and garden soil and use of pushcarts have become extremely cumbersome and physically taxing. To force
petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft simply because it
could not pass through the improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and can
only be counter-productive for all the people concerned. Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide
enough to accomodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant nursery
business.
The Court is aware that an additional one and one-half (1 1/2) meters in the width of the pathway will reduce the
servient estate . But petitioner has expressed willingness to exchange an equivalent portion of his land to
compensate private respondents for their loss. Perhaps, it would be well for respondents to take the offer of
petitioner seriously. But unless and until that option is considered, the law decrees that petitioner must indemnify
the owners of the servient estate including Mamerto Magsino from whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter was taken to
constitute the original path several years ago.
188) DIONISIO V. ORTIZ
204 SCRA 745
FACTS: The petitioners are co-owners of lots contiguous to each other situated in the Sitio of Kangkong, District
of Balintawak, Quezon City.
The private respondents are also co-owners of lots which are adjacent to the lots owned by the petitioners. Lot
272-B was later subdivided into two lots where Lot 272-A was assigned to Chua Lee and Chua Bun Tong
pursuant to a memorandum agreement executed by and between them. They are also owners of another lot at
the upper portion of Lot 272-B .
By virtue of an agreement entered intobetween the owners of the contiguous lots and the members of the Quezon
City Industrial Estates Association (QCIEA), a right of way was granted over Howmart Road which is a private
road traversing the contiguous lots owned by the petitioners, among others, in favor of the QCIEA members. In
return for its use, QCIEA paid compensation to the petitioners for this right of way. The private respondents are
bona fide members of the QCIEA.
In order to have access to Howmart Road, there is a gate in private respondents' 914 sq. m. lot fronting Howmart
Road and another gate in Lot 272-A. As a result of the subdivision of Lot 272, the private respondents opened a
new gate in Lot 272-B also fronting Howmart Road which is now the gate in question.
On October 5, 1989, under the instructions of Maxima Dionisio, certain persons commenced the digging of holes
in a parallel line and afterwards put up steel posts in front of the newly constructed gate of private respondents
amidst the latter's protestations.The petitioners claim that the surreptitiously constructed gate opened directly into
the house of Maxima Dionisio, exposing them to air and noise pollution arising from the respondents' delivery
trucks and service vehicles.
On November 7, 1989, the private respondents instituted a civil action for damages against the petitioners. The
complaint sought the immediate issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the petitioner to remove the
barricade erected by them in front of the iron gate. The same was granted.
Fifteen days later, the petitioners removed the barricade in front of the gate of the private respondents.
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The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that the issue has already become moot and academic
since the petitioners have already complied with the Order of the lower court.
ISSUE: whether or not the private respondents have an easement of right of way over Howmart Road
HELD: The private respondents' claim that they have every right to use Howmart Road as passageway to EDSA
by reason of the fact that public respondents are bonafide members of the QCIEA which has a standing oral
contract of easement of right of way with the petitioners. The contract is still subsisting even after its alleged
expiration in December, 1988 as evidenced by the two (2) letters signed by Maxima Dionisio and Atty. In such a
case, it is alleged that the petitioners did not have the right to put the barricade in question in front of the private
respondents' gate and stop them from using said gate as passageway to Howmart Road.
There is no question that a right of way was granted in favor of the private respondents over Howmart Road but
the records disclose that such right of way expired in December, 1988. The continued use of the easement
enjoyed by QCIEAincluding the private respondents is by the mere tolerance of the owners pending the
renegotiation of the terms and conditions of said right of way. This is precisely shown by the two letters to the
QCIEA requesting for an increase in compensation for the use of Howmart Road. Absent an agreement of the
parties as to the consideration, among others, no contract of easement of right of way has been validly entered
into by the petitioners and QCIEA. Thus, the private respondents' claim of an easement of right of way over
Howmart Road has no legal or factual basis.
Not having any right, the private respondents are not entitled to the injunctive relief granted by the lower court.
The Court has held in several cases that in order to be entitled to an injunctive writ, one must show an
unquestionable right over the premises and that such right has been violated.
In the case at bar, the private respondents have not shown that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injuction.
The records show that there are two (2) gates through which the private respondents may pass to have direct
access to EDSA: (1) the northern gate which opens directly to EDSA; and (2) the southern gate along Howmart
Road. The records also disclose that the petitioners and the other lot owners previously prohibited and prevented
members of QCIEA from opening new gates. The claim that they were forced to open a new gate by reason of the
subdivision of Lot 272 where a wall was constructed between these 2 lots is untenable. The private respondents
can not assert a right of way when by their own or voluntary act, they themselves have caused the isolation of
their property from the access road.
The fact that the barricade constructed by the petitioners was already removed upon the issuance of the
questioned preliminary injunction does not make the petition moot and academic as ruled by the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals has the power to recallor lift the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction so issued if it finds
that the party is not so entitled. But as earlier found, the private respondents are not entitled to the injunctive relief
considering that they have no clear right over Howmart Road.
189) ROMAN CATHOLIC vs. CA
198 SCRA 300
FACTS:
Private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for nullification of deed of donation, rescission of contract and
reconveyance of real property with damages against petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, before the Regional Trial
Court. Private respondents alleged that on August 23, 1930, spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now
both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of therein defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
covering a certain parcel of land, Lot No. 626located at Kawit, Cavite. Said lot consists of an area of 964 square
meters. The deed of donation allegedly provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a
period of one hundred years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise such would render ipso facto
null and void the deed of donation and the property would revert back to the estate of the donors.
It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the prohibitive period to dispose of the
property, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property n in favor of
petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao for P114,000. 00. A Transfer Certificate of Title was issued by the
Register of Deeds of Cavite on November 15, 1980 in the name of said petitioner spouses.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the cause of action had already prescribed.
HELD:
No. Article 764 of the Civil Code provides that "The donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor,
when the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter," and that "this
action shall prescribe after four years from the non-compliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs
of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs.
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation of a donation must be
brought within four years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in
the case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property
donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not
necessary.
When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the
property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of
the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, we are of
the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of
donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the
rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the
revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
190) REPUBLIC v. DAVID REY GUZMAN
326 SCRA 90
FACTS:
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of Simeon Guzman, a naturalized
American citizen, and Helen Meyers Guzman, an American citizen. In 1968 Simeon died. He left to his sole heirs
Helen and David an estate consisting of several parcels of land located in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
Thereafter, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman
dividing and adjudicating to themselves all the property. The document of extrajudicial settlement was registered
in the Office of the Register of Deeds. The the parcels of land were accordingly registered in the name of Helen
Meyers Guzman and David Rey Guzman in undivided equal shares. Later, Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed
assigning, transferring and conveying to David her undivided 1/2 interest. Since the document appeared not to
have been registered, Helen executed another document, a Deed of Quitclaim, confirming the earlier deed of
quitclaim as well as modifying the document to encompass all her other property in the Philippines. A signed letter
was sent to the Office of the Solicitor General together with documents showing that David's ownership of the 1/2
of the estate of Simeon Guzman was defective. On the basis thereof, the Government filed a Petition for Escheat
praying that 1/2 of David's interest in the subject parcels of land be forfeited in its favor. David prayed that said
petition be dismissed. The trial court dismissed the petition holding that the two deeds of quitclaim executed by
Helen had no legal force and effect and that the ownership of the properties remained with her. The Government
appealed. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE :
Whether or not David, being an American citizen could validly acquire 1/2 interest in each of the subject
parcels of land by way of the two deeds of quitclaim as they are in reality donations inter vivos.
RULING:
Yes. There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor;
(b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi.
When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the donation be made in a
public document and that there should be an acceptance thereof made in the same deed of donation or in a
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separate public document. In cases where the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that
the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both instruments. Not all the elements of a
donation of an immovable property are present in the instant case. The transfer of the property by virtue of the
Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen resulted in the reduction of her patrimony as donor and the consequent
increase in the patrimony of David as donee. However, Helen's intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of
David was not sufficiently established. However, the inexistence of a donation does not render the repudiation
made by Helen in favor of David valid. There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted
her share of the inheritance when she and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement. By virtue of such
extrajudicial settlement the parcels of land were registered in their name in undivided equal share and for eleven
(11) years they possessed the lands in the concept of owner. Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not
ipso facto operate to convert the parcels of land into res nullius to be escheated in favor of the Government. The
repudiation being of no effect whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to their private owner, Helen, who,
although being an American citizen, is qualified by hereditary succession to own the property subject of the
litigation.
191) GESTOPA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
342 SCRA 105
Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of unregistered land. They executed
three deeds of donation mortis causa, in favor of the Private Respondent Mercedes. All deeds contained the
reservation of the rights of the donors (1) to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during their lifetime, and (2) to
sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary.
Later, Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife, executed a deed of donation inter vivos covering the
aforementioned parcels of land plus two other parcels, again in favor of private respondent. This deed of donation
contained two conditions, first, that the Danlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their
lifetime, and second, that the donee can not sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the spouses, without
their prior consent and approval. Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels' tax declaration to her name and
paid the taxes thereon.
However, spouses Danlag later sold parcels 3 and 4 to herein petitioners, spouses Gestopa. They also executed
a deed of revocation recovering the 6 parcels of land subject of the deed of donation inter vivos. Consequently,
private respondent filed with the RTC a petition for quieting of title over the above parcels of land against the
Gestopas and the Danlags. She alleged that she was an illegitimate daughter of Diego Danlag; that she lived and
rendered incalculable beneficial services to Diego and his mother, Maura Danlag, when the latter was still alive. In
recognition of the services she rendered, Diego executed a Deed of Donation conveying to her the six parcels of
land. She accepted the donation in the same instrument, openly and publicly exercised rights of ownership over
the donated properties, and caused the transfer of the tax declarations to her name. However, through
machination, intimidation and undue influence, Diego persuaded the husband of Mercedes, Eulalio Pilapil, to buy
two of the six parcels covered by the deed of donation. Said donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions and,
according to Mercedes, since its perfection, she had complied with all of them; that she had not been guilty of any
act of ingratitude; and that respondent Diego had no legal basis in revoking the subject donation and then in
selling the two parcels of land to the Gestopas. However, petitioners averred that the deed of donation dated
January 16, 1973 was null and void because it was obtained by the private respondent through machination and
undue influence. RTC ruled that the both the donations mortis causa and inter vivos as revoked, and therefore
have no legal effect. The trial court also declared the spouses Danlag as the absolute owners of the disputed
lands. However, CA reversed the decision of the RTC upon appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the donation in this case is inter vivos or mortis causa to determine whether the donor
intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.
Whether or not the revocation is valid
HELD:
On the first issue, the court held that the donation was inter vivos and that the donor intended to transfer
the ownership of the properties. First, Diego Danlag donated the properties in consideration of love and affection
for the donee.. Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked
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ownership over the properties. As correctly posed by the Court of Appeals, what was the need for such
reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the owners of the properties? Third, the donor reserved
sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor
intended to part with the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. A limitation on the right to
sell during the donors life implied that ownership had passed to the donees and donation was already effective
during the donors lifetime.
No. A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by
the donee to comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The donor-spouses did not invoke
any of these reasons in the deed of revocation.
192) NOCEDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
313 SCRA 504
FACTS:
On June 1, 1981, plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, the daughter,
grandson, and widow, respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo, extrajudicially settled a parcel of land, Lot 1121,
located at Bitaog, San Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales, which was said to have an area of 66,530 square meters.
Directos share was 11,426 square meters, Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and the remaining 41,810 square
meters went to Maria Arbizo. On the same date, Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to Noceda, who
is also her nephew. However, on August 17, 1981, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was
executed by plaintiff Directo, Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while
Directo and Noceda got only one-fifth each. In said extrajudicial settlement-partition as well as in the Tax
Declaration 16-0032 over Lot 1121 in the name of the late Celestino Arbizo, the said parcel of land was said to
have an area of only 29,845 square meters.
Noceda later constructed his house on the land donated to him by Directo. Directo, on the other hand,
fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion, and constructed
thereon three huts. However said fence was later removed by Noceda, occupied the three huts and fenced the
entire land of Directo without her consent. Directo demanded that Noceda vacate her land, but the latter
refused. Thus, Directo filed the a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and
rescission/annulment of donation.
During the trial, the lower court ordered that a relocation survey of Lot 1121 be conducted. The engineer
found that the area of Lot 1121 stated in the extrajudicial settlement-partition was smaller than the actual area of
said lot which is 127,298 square meters. He further subdivided Lot 1121, excluding the portions occupied by third
persons, known as Lot 8, the salvage zone and the road lot, on the basis of the actual occupancy of Lot 1121 by
the heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo and the extrajudicial settlement-partition. The portion denominated as Lot A,
with an area of 12,957 square meters was the share of defendant Noceda; Lot C, with the same area as that of
Lot A, was the share of plaintiff Directo, a portion of which was donated to defendant Noceda; and Lot B, with an
area of 38,872 square meters, went to Maria Arbizo.
The trial court declared valid the extra-judicial partition and further held that the deed of donation revoked.
It further ordered the defendant to vacate and reconvey that donated portion to the plaintiff, and to remove the
house built inside the donated portion at the his expense or pay a monthly rental of P300.00. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not said lot should be partitioned in accordance with the extra-judicial settlement
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in revoking the deed of donation
HELD:
The Supreme Court sees no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the respondent Court as follows: The
discrepancies between the extrajudicial settlements executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda and Maria
Arbizo on June 1, 1981 and August 17, 1981 only meant that the latter was intended to supersede the former.
The signature of defendant Noceda in the extrajudicial settlement of August 17, 1981 would show his conformity
to the new apportionment of Lot 1121 among the heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo. The fact that defendant
Noceda occupied the portion allotted to him in the extrajudicial settlement, as well as the donated portion of the
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share of plaintiff Directo, presupposes his knowledge of the extent of boundaries of the portion of Lot 1121 allotted
to him. Moreover, the statement in the extrajudicial settlement of August 17, 1981 with respect to the area of Lot
1121, which was 29,845 square meters, is not conclusive because it was found out, after the relocation survey
was conducted on Lot 1121, that the parties therein occupied an area larger than what they were supposed to
possess per the extrajudicial settlement- partition of August 17, 1981. Although in the extrajudicial settlement
dated August 17, 1981 the heirs of Celestino Arbizo partitioned only a 29,845 square meter lot to conform with the
area declared under tax declaration 16-0032 yet the heirs were each actually occupying a bigger portion the total
area of which exceeded 29,845 square meters. This was confirmed by Geodetic Engineer Quejada in his report.
The survey conducted on Lot 1121 was only a confirmation of the actual areas being occupied by the heirs taking
into account the percentage proportion adjudicated to each heir on the basis of their August 17, 1981 extrajudicial
settlement.
As to the second issue, the court holds proper the judgment of respondent CA. Article 769 of the New
Civil Code states that: The action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance.
This action prescribes within one year to be counted from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was
possible for him to bring the action. As expressly stated, the donor must file the action to revoke his donation
within one year from the time he had knowledge of the ingratitude of the donee. Also, it must be shown that it was
possible for the donor to institute the said action within the same period. The concurrence of these two requisites
must be shown by defendant Noceda in order to bar the present action. Defendant Noceda failed to do so. He
reckoned the one year prescriptive period from the occurrence of the usurpation of the property of plaintiff Directo
in the first week of September, 1985, and not from the time the latter had the knowledge of the usurpation.
Moreover, defendant Noceda failed to prove that at the time plaintiff Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation,
it was possible for plaintiff Directo to institute an action for revocation of her donation.The action to revoke by
reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be counted from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of
the fact; (b) provided that it was possible for him to bring the action. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof
of the concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one (1) year period for bringing the action be
considered to have already prescribed. No competent proof was adduced by petitioner to prove his allegation. In
Civil Cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence. He who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.Factual findings of the Court of
Appeals, supported by substantial evidence on record are final and conclusive on the parties and carry even more
weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court; for it is not the function of this Court
to re-examine all over again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are not supported by the evidence on record or the judgment is based on the
misapprehension of facts. The jurisdiction of this court is thus limited to reviewing errors of law unless there is a
showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. We find no such showing in this case.
193) ELOY IMPERIAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS
316 SCRA 393
FACTS:
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a parcel of land also known as Lot 45 of the Cadastral
Survey of Albay, which he later sold for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein, who then
acquired title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner and private respondents
admit that despite the contracts designation as one of Absolute Sale, it was in fact a donation. Two years after
the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the said deed, on the ground that he was deceived by
petitioner into signing the said document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise agreement,
which provides that: (1) Leoncio recognized the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land donated;
and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square meter portion of the donated land, and to deposit the
proceeds thereof in a bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case of Leoncios death, it was also
agreed that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner to defray burial costs.
In the meantime, Leoncio died, leaving only two heirs, herein petitioner, and an adopted son, Victor
Imperial. Victor substituted for Leoncio in the case, and moved for execution of judgment, which was granted by
the court. Fifteen years thereafter, Victor died single and without issue, survived only by his natural father, Ricardo
Villalon, who was a lessee of a portion of the disputed land. Four years hence, Ricardo died, leaving as his only
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heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon.
Five years thereafter, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of the donation. Petitioner moved
to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the compromise judgment, which was granted by the trial
court. The Court of Appeals however, reversed the trial courts order and remanded the case for further
proceedings. Consequently, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the same case, for Annulment of
Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession, seeking the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale
affecting the above property, on grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. In the amended complaint, it was
alleged that petitioner caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking undue advantage of the latters physical
weakness and mental unfitness, and that the conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner impaired the
legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest.
RTC held that it is a donation, and is hereby reduced proportionately insofar as it affected the legitime of
the late Victor Imperial, which share is inherited by the plaintiffs herein, to the extent that plaintiffs are ordered to
be given by defendant a portion of 10,940 square meters thereof.
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the private respondents had a right to question the donation and;
Whether or not the donation was inofficious and should be reduced.
HELD:
The court held yes. Article 772 of the Civil Code provides that: Only those who at the time of the donors
death have a right to the legitime and their heirs and successors in interest may ask for the reduction of inofficious
donations. As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died, it was only Victor who was entitled to question the
donation. However, instead of filing an action to contest the donation, Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff
and even moved for execution of the compromise judgment therein. No renunciation of legitime may be presumed
from the foregoing acts. It must be remembered that at the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the
compromise agreement has already been rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the
compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise agreement. More importantly, our law on
succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act on the part
of the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code: The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or
authentic instrument, or by petition presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate
proceedings. Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio upon the latters death, his act of moving for execution of the
compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation of his legitime. He was, therefore, not
precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are
Victors heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly recognized under
Article 772, and also in Article 1053: If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance,
his right shall be transmitted to his heirs.
As to the second issue, the court also rules in the affirmative. The donation is inofficious because Leoncio
had no other property at the time of his death, the RTC computed the legitime of Victor based on the area of the
donated property. Hence, in its dispositive portion, it awarded a portion of the property to private respondents as
Victors legitime. This was upheld by the Court of Appeals. Our rules of succession require that before any
conclusion as to the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must be taken: (1)
the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all the payable obligations and charges from the
value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; (2) the value of all donations subject to
collation would be added to it. Having ascertained this action as one for reduction of an inofficious donation, we
cannot sustain the holding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the applicable prescriptive period is
thirty years, under Article 1141 of the Civil Code. The sense of both courts that this case is a real action over an
immovable allots undue credence to private respondents description of their complaint, as one for Annulment of
Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of Property, which suggests the action to be, in part, a
real action enforced by those with claim of title over the disputed land. Unfortunately for private respondents, a
claim for legitime does not amount to a claim of title. The rationale for this is that the donation is a real alienation
which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is
for the account of the heir or donee.
What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an inofficious donation? The Civil Code
specifies the following instances of reduction or revocation of donations: (1) four years, in cases of subsequent
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birth, appearance, recognition or adoption of a child; (2) four years, for non-compliance with conditions of the
donation; and (3) at any time during the lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled to support, for failure of the
donor to reserve property for his or their support. Interestingly, donations as in the instant case, the reduction of
which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period,
for which reason we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions
upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues.
Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under
Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs. From when shall the
ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for
inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues
upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained and
on which basis, the legitimes may be determined. It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio
to initiate this case. The action, therefore, has long prescribed.
194) EDUARTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
253 SCRA 391
FACTS:
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in San Cristobal, San Pablo City,
with an area of 12,199 square meters. He later executed a deed of donation inter vivos, ceding one-half portion
thereof to his niece Helen S. Doria. Later, another deed identically entitled was purportedly executed by Calapine
ceding unto Helen S. Doria the whole of the parcel of land. Doria then donated a portion of the parcel of land to
the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc., on the basis of which said transfer certificate of title was cancelled
and TCT No. T-24444 was issued in its name covering 157 square meters and TCT No. T-24445, in the name of
Helen S. Doria covering the remaining portion of 12,042 square meters.
Doria then sold, transferred and conveyed unto the spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. T-24445, save the portion of 700 square meters on which her house was erected.
Claiming that his signature to the deed of donation was a forgery and that, she was unworthy of his
liberality, Calapine brought suit against Doria, the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses
Eduarte and asked to revoke the donation made in favor of Doria to declare null and to void the deeds of donation
and sale that she had executed in favor of the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses. The
trial court granted held in favor of Calapine. Spouses Eduarte appealed, which as dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deeds of donation should be revoked.
HELD:
Anent the revocation of the first deed of donation, petitioners submit that paragraph (1) of Article 765 of
the Civil Code does not apply in this case because the acts of ingratitude referred to therein pertain to offenses
committed by the donee against the person or property of the donor. Petitioners argue that as the offense imputed
to herein donee Helen Doria - falsification of a public document - is neither a crime against the person nor
property of the donor but is a crime against public interest under the Revised Penal Code, the same is not a
ground for revocation.
In support of this contention, petitioners cite the following portions found in Tolentinos Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code:
Offense against Donor - x x x. The crimes against the person of the donor would include not only
homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal detention, threats and coercion; and those against honor include
offenses against chastity and those against the property, include robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson,
damages, etc. (5 Manresa 175-176).
This assertion, however, deserves scant consideration. The full text of the very same commentary cited
by petitioners belies their claim that falsification of the deed of donation is not an act of ingratitude, to wit:
Offense Against Donor. All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for
revocation. There is no doubt, therefore, that the donee who commits adultery with the wife of the donor, gives
cause for revocation by reason of ingratitude. The crimes against the person of the donor would include not only
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homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal detention, threats, and coercion; those against honor include
offenses against chastity; and those against the property, include robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson,
damages, etc. [Manresa 175-176]. (Italics supplied).
Obviously, the first sentence was deleted by petitioners because it totally controverts their contention. As
noted in the aforecited opinion all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation.
Petitioners attempt to categorize the offenses according to their classification under the Revised Penal Code is
therefore unwarranted considering that illegal detention, threats and coercion are considered as crimes against
the person of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against personal liberty and security
under the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners also impute grave error to respondent Court of Appeals in finding that the second deed of
donation dated July 26, 1984 was falsified. Petitioners deplore the fact that more credence was given to the
testimony of the NBI handwriting expert who found Pedro Calapines signature in the second deed of donation to
be a forgery despite the existence of controverting testimony by PC-INP Crime Laboratory (PCCL) Chief
Document Examiner which petitioners adduced as evidence on their part.
We are not persuaded. Respondent Court of Appeals and the trial court cannot be faulted for giving more
weight and credence to the testimony of the NBI handwriting expert considering that the examination of the said
witness proved to be complete, thorough and scientific.
195) CITY OF ANGELES vs. CA
G.R. No. 97882. August 28, 1996
FACTS:
In an Amended Deed of Donation, private respondent donated to the City of Angeles 51 parcels of land.
Said deed provides that the properties donated shall be devoted and utilized solely for the site of the Angeles City
Sports Center. Petitioners then started the construction of a drug rehabilitation center on a portion of the donated
land. Upon learning thereof, private respondent protested such action for being violative of the terms and
conditions of the amended deed and prejudicial to its interest and to those of its clients and residents. Private
respondent also offered another site for the rehabilitation center. However, petitioners ignored the protest,
maintaining that the construction was not violative of the terms of the donation. The alternative site was rejected
because, according to petitioners, the site was too isolated and had no electric and water facilities.
Consequently, private respondent filed a complaint, alleging breach of the conditions imposed in the
amended deed of donation and seeking the revocation of the same. The trial court issued a temporary restraining
order to enjoin the petitioners from further proceeding with the construction of the center. The RTC further ordered
that the defendants perpetually cease and desist from constructing a Drug Rehabilitation Center or any other
building or improvement on the Donated Land. It also declared the amended Deed of Donation revoked and
rescinded and ordered defendants to peacefully vacate and return the Donated Land to plaintiff.
Petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal. However, while the appeal was pending, petitioners inaugurated
the Drug Rehabilitation Center. The respondent Court rendered the assailed Decision affirming the ruling of the
trial court. Subsequently, the petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether a donor of open spaces in a residential subdivision can validly impose conditions on the said
donation; whether the city government as donee can build and operate a drug rehabilitation center on the donated
land intended for open space; and whether the said donation may be validly rescinded by the donor.
HELD:
The general law on donations does not prohibit the imposition of conditions on a donation so long as the
conditions are not illegal or impossible. In regard to donations of open spaces, P.D. 1216 itself requires among
other things that the recreational areas to be donated be based, as aforementioned, on a percentage (3.5%, 7%,
or 9%) of the total area of the subdivision depending on whether the subdivision is low-, medium-, or high-density.
It further declares that such open space devoted to parks, playgrounds and recreational areas are non-alienable
public land and non-buildable. However, there is no prohibition in either P.D. 957 or P.D. 1216 against imposing
conditions on such donation. We hold that any condition may be imposed in the donation, so long as the same is
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. The contention of petitioners that the
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donation should be unconditional because it is mandatory has no basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not provide that the
donation of the open space for parks and playgrounds should be unconditional. To rule that it should be so is
tantamount to unlawfully expanding the provisions of the decree. Private respondents contention that the
construction of said drug rehabilitation center is violative of the Amended Deed of Donation. Therefore, under
Article 764 of the New Civil Code and stipulation no. 8 of the amended deed, private respondent is empowered to
revoke the donation when the donee has failed to comply with any of the conditions imposed in the deed. We
disagree. Article 1412 of the Civil Code which provides that: If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause
consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed: (1) When the fault is on the
part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the
performance of the others undertaking; comes into play here. Both petitioners and private respondents are in
violation of P.D. 957 as amended, for donating and accepting a donation of open space less than that required by
law, and for agreeing to build and operate a sports complex on the non-buildable open space so donated; and
petitioners, for constructing a drug rehabilitation center on the same non-buildable area. Inasmuch as the
construction and operation of the drug rehabilitation center has been established to be contrary to law, the said
center should be removed or demolished. After due consideration of the circumstances, we believe that the fairest
and most equitable solution is to have the City of Angeles, donee of the subject open space and, ostensibly, the
main beneficiary of the construction and operation of the proposed drug rehabilitation center, undertake the
demolition and removal of said center, and if feasible, recover the cost thereof from the city officials concerned.
Property:Action for Cancellation of Title
196) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LAND, petitioner,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF IRENE BULLUNGAN, represented by her husband DOMINGO
PAGGAO and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ISABELA, respondents.
G.R. No. 104296, March 29, 1996
MENDOZA, J.:
Note: This is a petition for review of the decision of the CA reversing the decision of the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela
declaring Free Patent No. V-79740 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-8817 in the name of Irene Bullungan null
and void so far as the portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 involved in this case is concerned.
FACTS:
Irene Bullungan (now deceased) applied for a FREE PATENT covering lots situated in Angadanan, Isabela.
The lots included a portion of lot (Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 between Lot No. 763 and Lot No. 764) which Vicente
Carabbacan claimed. (Vicente Carabbacan in this case is the present possessor and cultivator of the land in
dispute).
BASIS FOR HER APPLICATION OF FEE PATENT (w/c is false): In her application however, Irene Bullungan
stated that the land applied for by her was not claimed or occupied by any other person and that it was public
land which had been continuously occupied and cultivated by her since 1925.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS DECISION: Upon certification of Assistant Public Land that Irene Bullungan had
been in actual, continuous open, notorious, exclusive and adverse possession of the land since 1925, the Director
of Lands approved Bullungan's application for free patent and an OCT was issued in her name.
STEPS TAKEN BY THE OPPOSITOR
THE PROTEST: Alleging that a portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 (lot in dispute) covered by the free patent issued
to Irene Bullungan overlapped the lot between Lot No. 763 and Lot No. 764, which he was occupying, Vicente
Carrabacan, (the actual possessor of the land) filed a protest to the Director of Lands on 1961. The latter only
ordered an investigation on 1982.
ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE (1st) & CANCELLATION OF FEE PATENT: Vicente Carabbacan also brought
an action for the reconveyance of the portion of the lot in dispute and the cancellation of free patent against Irene
Bullungan before the CFI on 1961.
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DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION BY THE COURT: but this was dismissed by the court without prejudice.
The heirs of Irene Bullungan in turn sought to RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE LAND in an action filed in CFI
on 1972.
2nd ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE: On the other hand, refusing to give up his claim, Vicente Carabbacan filed
again a case for reconveyance on 1972. The cases were thereafter tried jointly.
CFIs DECISION: The court rendered a decision, DISMISSING the complaint of Vicente Carabbacan and ordering
him to vacate the land and upheld the ownership of Irene Bullungan. Carabbacan, who had been in possession
of the land in question, was finally ousted on December 10, 1981.
RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION: Meanwhile, in the investigation conducted by the Director of lands, it was
found out that Vicente Carabbacan had been in actual cultivation of the land since 1947, having acquired the
same from Tomas Tarayao. The land investigator stated that due to a big flood which occurred in December 1947,
the Cagayan River changed its course by moving north-east, resulting in the emergence of a piece of
land, which is the subject of this dispute. Carrabacan took possession of the land and cultivated it. He was in
the continuous, peaceful, open and adverse occupation and cultivation of the land from December 1947 until
1981 when he was ejected by virtue of the decision in Civil Case.
THE PETITIONER: In view of the investigation, the Republic, as represented by the Solicitor General, filed a
COMPLAINT FOR THE CANCELLATION OF FREE PATENT issued in favor of Irene Bullungan on the ground of
fraud and misrepresentation.
RTC: Complaint for Cancellation of Free Patent was GRANTED, thus the court ruled in favor of petitioner,
Republic and justified the reversion of the land in question as an assertion of a governmental right. It declared
that the Free Patent was null and void insofar as the portion of Lot subject to dispute. BASIS: The lower court
found that Irene Bullungan made misrepresentations by claiming in her application for a free patent that she was
in possession of the disputed portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801, when in fact Vicente Carabbacan was occupying
and cultivating the land.
CA: GRANTED the appeal of private respondent, thus REVERSING the lower courts decision. BASIS: on the
ground that, after the lapse of one year from the date of issuance of the patent, the State could no longer bring an
action for reversion. The appellate court held that the certificate of title issued in the name of Irene Bullungan
became incontrovertible and indefeasible upon the lapse of one year from the issuance of the free patent.
PETITIONER-REPUBLIC ARGUMENT: The Republic controverts the ruling of the Court of Appeals. It contends
that the doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens Titles does not bar the filing of an action for cancellation of title and
reversion of land even if more than one year has elapsed from the issuance of the free patent in case of fraud in
obtaining patents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens Title bars the filing of an action for cancellation of title, on
the ground of fraud, if more than one year has elapsed from the issuance of the free patent.
HELD:
NO. The SC agreed as to the argument of petitioner-Republic.
To begin with, there is no question that Free Patent No. 79740 and Original Certificate of Title P-8817 were
obtained through fraud. The trial court found that Irene Bullungan falsely stated in her application for a free patent
that Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 was not claimed or occupied by any other person. The trial court found that a portion
of the lot in question had been in the possession and cultivation of Vicente Carabbacan since December 1947.
Indeed private respondents admit that before Irene Bullungan filed her application for a free patent, she had filed
a complaint for forcible entry against Vicente Carrabacan. The complaint, which was filed in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Angadanan, Isabela, was dismissed precisely because the court found that Carabbacan had
been in possession of the land long before it was sold to Irene Bullungan by Leonida Tarayao.
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The Court of Appeals did not disturb the trial court's finding in this case that Irene Bullungan committed fraud and
misrepresentation. Its decision rests solely on the ground that after the lapse of one year from the date of
issuance of a free patent an action for the cancellation of patent and title on ground of fraud and
misrepresentation can no longer be maintained.
GENERAL RULE: It is settled that once a patent is registered under Act No. 496 (now P.D. No. 1529) and the
corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private
property over which the Director of Lands will no longer have either control or jurisdiction. The Torrens Title
issued on the basis of a free patent or homestead patent becomes as indefeasible as one which was judicially
secured upon the expiration of one year from date of issuance of patent as provided in P.D. No. 1529.
EXCEPTION: However, as held in Director of Lands v. De Luna, even after the lapse of one year, the State may
still bring an action for the reversion to the public domain of lands which have been fraudulently granted to private
individuals. This has been the consistent ruling of this Court.
FRAUD & MISREPRESENTATION: In the case at bar, the failure of Irene Bullungan to disclose that Vicente
Carrabacan was in possession of the portion of land in dispute constitutes fraud and misrepresentation and is a
ground for annulling her title. Where public land is acquired by an applicant through fraud and misrepresentation
the State may institute reversion proceedings even after the lapse of the one-year period.
Public policy demands that one who obtains title to a public land through fraud should not be allowed to benefit
therefrom. Vicente Carabbacan had been in possession of the land even. before Irene Bullungan bought the
possessory rights to the land. It was therefore a misrepresentation for her to state in her application for a free
patent that she had been in possession of the lot in question when the fact is that Carabbacan had been there
ahead of her.
Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado
207

CASES IN SUCCESSION
197) MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO
NEBREDA, DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-4963, January 29, 1953
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Note: This is an ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF THE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION of five (5) parcels of land
situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario
and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of
minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
FACTS:
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this
litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff-lawful wife claims
that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of
said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.
DEED OF SEPARATION: Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria
Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate
as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of
alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon
his death. (waiver of future inheritance)
RTC: Trial court rendered decision ruling in favor of the lawful wife and ordering the defendants (common-lawwife & kids) to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute.
DEFENDANTs ARGUMENT: In its appeal to the SC, defendant claimed that plaintiff has already relinquished her
rights when she expressly renounced any future property she was to inherit from her husband. It was also claimed
that the provisions of the New Civil Code, giving status and rights to natural children, should be given a retroactive
effect so that the illegitimate children of Del Rosario will be entitled to the inheritance.
ISSUE 1:
May Maria Unson validly renounce her future inheritance?
HELD 1:
NO. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former
owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario,
one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she
had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945
much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda
died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only
heir, his widow Maria Uson.
Applying Article 657 of the old Civil Code, Court ruled that the property belongs to the heirs at the moment
of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the
same before his death. The right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945
upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands
that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code).
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because
she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in
the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931 cannot be entertained for the simple reason
that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced. The decision appealed from is
affirmed.
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not the illegitimate children of del Rosario are entitled to the inheritance.
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HELD 2:
NO.
Defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the late
Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the
new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status and rights of natural children and
are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil
Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given
retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation
(Article 2253, new Civil Code). There is no merit in this claim
PRINCIPLE OF NON-IMPAIRMENT OF VESTED RIGHT AS AN EXCEPTION: Article 2253 above referred to
provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event
which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, BUT this is so only when the new
rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a
right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event
which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new
right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin." As already stated in the early
part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945
upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which
commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code).
The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot,
therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
VOID DONATION: As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a
gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that they
were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the
wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the
opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a DONATION OF REAL PROPERTY, inasmuch as
it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a public document and
must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this
essential formality has not been followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.
Succession as a Mode of Transferring Ownership
198) ROMULO A. CORONEL, ALARICO A. CORONEL, ANNETTE A. CORONEL, ANNABELLE C. GONZALES
(for herself and on behalf of Florida C. Tupper, as attorney-in-fact), CIELITO A. CORONEL, FLORAIDA A.
ALMONTE,
and
CATALINA
BALAIS
MABANAG,
petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, and RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ, assisted by
GLORIA F. NOEL as attorney-in-fact, respondents.
G.R. No. 103577. October 7, 1996
MELO, J.:
Note: The petition before us has its roots in a COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE to compel herein
petitioners (except the last named, Catalina Balais Mabanag) to consummate the sale of a parcel of land with its
improvements located along Roosevelt Avenue in Quezon City entered into by the parties sometime in January
1985 for the price of P1,240,000.00.
FACTS:
1st CONTRACT OF ABSOLUTE SALE: Peitioner, Romulo Coronel, et. al. being the sons and daughters of the
decedent Constancio P. Coronel (hereinafter referred to as Coronels) executed a document entitled Receipt of
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Down Payment in favor of plaintiff Ramona Patricia Alcaraz. The document provided that for the total amount of
P1,240,000.00, wherein a downpayment of P50,000.00 was initially paid, the Coronels bind themselves to effect
the transfer in their names the certificate of title of the house and lot they inherited from their father. They also
promised that upon the transfer of the TCT in their names, they will immediately execute the deed of absolute
sale of the property, and the other party Ramona will pay the balance of P1,190,000.00.
(Note: The agreement could not have been a contract to sell because the sellers herein made no express
reservation of ownership or title to the subject parcel of land. Furthermore, the circumstance which prevented the
parties from entering into an absolute contract of sale pertained to the sellers themselves (the certificate of title
was not in their names) and not the full payment of the purchase price. Under the established facts and
circumstances of the case, the Court may safely presume that, had the certificate of title been in the names of
petitioners-sellers at that time, there would have been no reason why an absolute contract of sale could not have
been executed and consummated right there and then).
2nd CONTRACT OF ABSOLUTE SALE/DOUBLE SALE: The Coronels however, upon having the property
registered in their name, sold it to Catalina Mabanag for a higher price (P1,580,000.00), and cancelled and
rescinded the contract with Ramona by depositing the amount of down payment to a bank, in trust for Ramona.
THE COMPLAINT FILED: A complaint for specific performance was filed by the Concepcions against the
Coronels.
RTC: The RTC ruled in favor of respondents Conceptions. Judgment for specific performance is hereby rendered
ordering defendant-Coronels to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale covering that parcel of land
CA: Affirmed the same.
The petitioners claim that there could been no perfected contract on January 19, 1985 because they were then
not yet the absolute owners of the inherited property.
ISSUE 1:
Whether or not petitioners were already the owners of the inherited property when they executed the contract
with respondents.
HELD 1:
Yes. Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a mode of transferring ownership as follows:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or
by operation of law.
Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being the sons and daughters of the decedent Constancio P. Coronel
are compulsory heirs who were called to succession by operation of law. Thus, at the point their father drew his
last breath, petitioners stepped into his shoes insofar as the subject property is concerned, such that any rights or
obligations pertaining thereto became binding and enforceable upon them. It is expressly provided that rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
MOOTNESS OF THE ISSUE: Be it also noted that petitioners claim that succession may not be declared unless
the creditors have been paid is rendered moot by the fact that they were able to effect the transfer of the title to
the property from the decedents name to their names.
ESTOPPEL: Aside from this, petitioners are precluded from raising their supposed lack of capacity to enter into
an agreement at that time and they cannot be allowed to now take a posture contrary to that which they took
when they entered into the agreement with private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz. The Civil Code expressly
states that: Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. Having represented
themselves as the true owners of the subject property at the time of sale, petitioners CANNOT claim now
that they were not yet the absolute owners thereof at that time.
The sale of the subject parcel of land between petitioners and Ramona P. Alcaraz, is deemed perfected.
210

PEITIONERs ARGUMENT: Petitioners also contend that although there was in fact a perfected contract of sale
between them and Ramona P. Alcaraz, the latter breached her reciprocal obligation when she rendered
impossible the consummation thereof by going to the United States of America, without leaving her address,
telephone number, and Special Power of Attorney for which reason, so petitioners conclude, they were correct in
unilaterally rescinding the contract of sale.
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not peitioner-seller is correct in unilaterraly rescinding the contract of sale between the latter and
Ramona Alcaraz, the buyer.
HELD 2:
We do not agree with petitioners that there was a valid rescission of the contract of sale in the instant case.
We note that these supposed grounds for petitioners' rescission, are mere allegations found only in their
responsive pleadings, which by express provision of the rules, are deemed controverted even if no reply is filed by
the plaintiffs (Sec. 11, Rule 6, Revised Rules of Court). The records are absolutely bereft of any supporting
evidence to substantiate petitioners' allegations. We have stressed time and again that allegations must be
proven by sufficient evidence (Ng Cho Cio vs. Ng Diong, 110 Phil. 882 [1961]; Recaro vs. Embisan, 2 SCRA 598
[1961]. Mere allegation is not an evidence (Lagasca vs. De Vera, 79 Phil. 376 [1947]).
Even assuming arguendo that Ramona P. Alcaraz was in the United States of America on February 6, 1985,
we cannot justify petitioner-sellers' act of unilaterally and extradicially rescinding the contract of sale, there being
no express stipulation authorizing the sellers to extarjudicially rescind the contract of sale. (cf. Dignos vs. CA, 158
SCRA 375 [1988]; Taguba vs. Vda. de Leon, 132 SCRA 722 [1984])
Moreover, petitioners are estopped from raising the alleged absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz because although
the evidence on record shows that the sale was in the name of Ramona P. Alcaraz as the buyer, the sellers had
been dealing with Concepcion D. Alcaraz, Ramona's mother, who had acted for and in behalf of her daughter, if
not also in her own behalf. Indeed, the down payment was made by Concepcion D. Alcaraz with her own personal
check for and in behalf of Ramona P. Alcaraz. There is no evidence showing that petitioners ever questioned
Concepcion's authority to represent Ramona P. Alcaraz when they accepted her personal check. Neither did they
raise any objection as regards payment being effected by a third person. Accordingly, as far as petitioners are
concerned, the physical absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz is not a ground to rescind the contract of sale.
ISSUE 3:
Between the Alcaraz and Catalina Mabanag, who between them is the owner of the property subject to
dispute?
HELD 3:
It belongs to Alcaraz.
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to
the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should if be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
The record of the case shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1985 as proof of the second
contract of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City giving rise to the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the name of Catalina B. Mabanag on June 5, 1985. Thus, the second paragraph of Article
1544 shall apply.
The above-cited provision on double sale presumes title or ownership to pass to the first buyer, the
exceptions being: (a) when the second buyer, in good faith, registers the sale ahead of the first buyer, and (b)
should there be no inscription by either of the two buyers, when the second buyer, in good faith, acquires
possession of the property ahead of the first buyer. Unless, the second buyer satisfies these requirements, title or
211

ownership will not transfer to him to the prejudice of the first buyer.
In his commentaries on the Civil Code, an accepted authority on the subject, now a distinguished member of the
Court, Justice Jose C. Vitug, explains:
The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of
the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except when the second buyer first registers in good faith the
second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the
first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since knowledge taints his registration with bad faith (see
also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58530, 26 December 1984). In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No. 56232, 22
June 1984, 129 SCRA 656), it has held that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph,
that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of
Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. No. 95843, 02 September 1992).
(J. Vitug Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition, p. 604).
In a case of double sale, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or not the second buyer was a
buyer in good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers such second sale in good faith, that is, without
knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold.
As clearly borne out by the evidence in this case, petitioner Mabanag could not have in good faith, registered
the sale entered into on February 18, 1985 because as early as February 22, 1985, a notice of lis pendens had
been annotated on the transfer certificate of title in the names of petitioners, whereas petitioner Mabanag
registered the said sale sometime in April, 1985. At the time of registration, therefore, petitioner Mabanag knew
that the same property had already been previously sold to private respondents, or, at least, she was charged with
knowledge that a previous buyer is claiming title to the same property. Petitioner Mabanag cannot close her eyes
to the defect in petitioners' title to the property at the time of the registration of the property.
If a vendee in a double sale registers that sale after he has acquired knowledge that there was a previous
sale of the same property to a third party or that another person claims said property in a pervious sale, the
registration will constitute a registration in bad faith and will not confer upon him any right. (Salvoro vs. Tanega, 87
SCRA 349 [1978]; citing Palarca vs. Director of Land, 43 Phil. 146; Cagaoan vs. Cagaoan, 43 Phil. 554;
Fernandez vs. Mercader, 43 Phil. 581.)
Thus, the sale of the subject parcel of land between petitioners and Ramona P. Alcaraz, perfected on
February 6, 1985, prior to that between petitioners and Catalina B. Mabanag on February 18, 1985, was correctly
upheld by both the courts below.
199)
ISIDORO
M.
MERCADO,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEON C. VIARDO and PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NUEVA ECIJA, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-14127, August 21, 1962
FACTS:
The spouses Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte were defendants in a case where a writ of execution was
issued and levied upon rights and interests the spouses have over a disputed land.
By virtue of the writ of execution as above mentioned, the sheriff sold at public acution of the lots subject of
controversy. This was was bought by Leon Viardo being the highest bidder.. The spouses failed to redeem the
property within the statutory period of one year from the date of sale. A final bill of sale was issued to buyer
Viardo, and a co-owner's copy of the certificate of title was likewise issued to him.
On 28 December 1945 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Land Registration Case acting upon a
verified petition of Leon C. Viardo, ordered the Registrar of Deeds in and for Nueva Ecija, to cancel Original
Certificate of Title and to issue another in lieu thereof in the name of and in the proportion as follows: LEONOR
212

BELMONTE share; FELISA BELMONTE, share; PILAR BELMONTE, /8 share; LEON C. VIARDO, /8
share; and INES DE GUZMAN, share
Spouses Driz and Belmonte filed an action in the CFI against the buyer-Viardo for reconveyance of the said land.
CFI (now RTC): The court dismissed, including the counterclaim of Viardo. Defendant is the legal owner of the
land in question and the right of redemption of the plaintiff of said land had already elapsed.
Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing his counter-claim, the defendant Leon C. Viardo appealed to the Court
of Appeals.
CA: Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, Bartolome Driz died. His children of age substituted him in the
appeal.
The judgment of the CA, granting the prayer of Viardo, eventually became final and executory. The CFI issued a
writ of execution. Prior to the CA ruling, Belmonte sold her interest in the land to Isidoro Mercado. Mercado then
filed a third-party complaint against Belmonte. Viardo then sued Belmonte. CFI ruled that the heirs of Bartolome
could not be held liable personally for judgment rendered against them. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Bartolome Driz can be held personally liable for the judgment rendered against
their father?
HELD:
NO. The only ground of appellant for this contention is that the present owners of these lots are the children
of the spouses Pilar Belmonte and Bartolome Driz, the plaintiffs in civil case No. 161, and that, upon the death of
Bartolome Driz during the pendency of the appeal in civil case No. 161, these children were substituted as parties.
This assignment of error is without merit.
The substitution of parties was made obviously because the children of Bartolome Driz are his legal heirs and
therefore could properly represent and protect whatever interest he had in the case on appeal. But such a
substitution did not and cannot have the effect of making these substituted parties personally liable for whatever
judgment might be rendered on the appeal against their deceased father.
Article 774 of the Civil Code provides: Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,
rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others either by his will or by operation of law.
Moreover, it appears from the evidence that Bartolome Driz was only a formal party to civil case No. 161, the real
party in interest being his wife Pilar Belmonte. The subject matter in litigation was Pilar Belmonte's interest in the
parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 3484, which appears to be paraphernal property.
The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that the remedy of Leon C. Viardo, the creditor was to proceed against
the estate of Bartolome Driz. Judgment MODIFIED.
200) Intestate of the late AGUSTIN MONTILLA, SR.; PEDRO LITONJUA, a movant-appellant,
vs.
AGUSTIN
B.
MONTILLA,
JR.,
administrator-appellee;
CLAUDIO MONTILLA, oppositor-appellee.
G.R. No. L-4170, January 31, 1952
PARAS, C.J.:
FACTS:
213

In a Civil Case rendered by the CFI of Negros Occidental, Pedro L. Litonjua obtained a judgment against
Claudio Montilla for the payment of the sum of P4,000 with legal interest, plus costs amounting to P39.00 In due
time, a writ of execution was issued, but no property of Claudio Montilla was found which could be levied upon.
In order to satisfy the said judgment Pedro L. Litonjua filed in special Proceeding of the CFI of Negros
Occidental, Intestate Estate of Agustin Montilla, Sr., deceased, a motion praying that the interest, property and
participation of Claudio Montilla, one of the heirs of Agustin Montilla, Sr., in the latter's intestate estate be sold
and out of the proceed the judgment debt of Claudio Montilla in favor of Pedro L. Litonjua be paid. This motion
was opposed by Claudio Montilla and by Agustin Montilla, Jr., administrator of the intestate estate
CFI : issued an order denying the motion. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Litonjua, as a creditor, may go after the interest of Montilla Jr. in the intestate Estate of Agustin
Montilla Sr.
HELD:
NO. The creditors of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property which
pertains by inheritance to said heirs, ONLY AFTER all debts of the testate or intestate succession have been paid
and when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs known. The debts of the deceased must first be paid
before his heirs can inherit.
A person who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has NO RIGHT to intervene either in the
proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of the succession.
An execution cannot legally be levied upon the property of an intestate succession to pay the debts of the widow
and heirs of the deceased, until the credits held against the latter at the time of his death shall have been paid can
the remaining property that pertains to the said debtors heirs can be attached.
201)
SOCORRO
LEDESMA
and
ANA
QUITCO
vs.
CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-44837, November 23, 1938
LEDESMA,
plaintiffs-appellees,
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Note: This case is an appeal taken by the defendants Conchita McLachlin, Lorenzo Quitco, Jr., Sabina Quitco,
Rafael Quitco and Marcela Quitco, from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, making
the heirs of their deceased father solidary liable as to the indebtedness incurred by their deceased father
instituted by the plaintiff-creditor in the Intestate Estate of Eusebio, their grandfather and not in the Intestate
Estate of Quitco, their father.
FACTS:
Defendants in this case are the heirs of their deceased debtor-father Lorenzo M. Quitco.
COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP: In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M.
Quitco, while the latter was still single, of which relation, lasting until the year 1921, was born a daughter who is
the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma. In 1921, it seems hat the relation between Socorro Ledesma and Lorenzo
M. Quitco came to an end.
Lorenzo M. Quitco executed a deed acknowledging the plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma as his natural daughter.
214

THE DEBT: On January 21, 1922, Lorenzo issued in favor of the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note for
or on behalf of his indebtedness amounting to 2,000 w/c is to be paid on installment.
THE MARRIAGE TO ANOTHER: Subsequently, Lorenzo married Conchita McLachlin. They had four (4) children,
who are the other defendants.
DEATH: On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died predeceasing his father, but, still later, that is, on December
15, 1932, his father Eusebio Quitco also died, and as the latter left real and personal properties upon his death.
Administration proceedings of said properties were instituted in this court, the said case being known as the
"Intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco," civil case No. 6153 of this court.
In order to satisfy the remaining value of the PN, Socorro went after the Intestate Estate of Eusebio Quitco, to
claim the indebtedness of his debtor-deceased son Lorenzo.
ISSUE 1:
Whether or not the action for the recovery of the sum of P1,500, representing the last installment of the
promisorry note has already prescribed.
HELD 1:
YES. According to the promissory note executed by the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, on January 21, 1922,
the last installment of P1,500 should be paid two years from the date of the execution of said promissory note,
that is, on January 21, 1924. The complaint in the present case was filed on June 26, 1934, that is, more than ten
years after the expiration of the said period. The fact that the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma filed her claim, on
August 26, 1933, with the committee on claims and appraisal appointed in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, does
not suspend the running of the prescriptive period of the judicial action for the recovery of said debt, because the
claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of the promissory note should not have been presented in the intestate
of Eusebio Quitco, the said deceased not being the one who executed the same, but in the intestate of Lorenzo
M. Quitco, which should have been instituted by the said Socorro Ledesma as provided in section 642 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing a creditor to institute said case through the appointment of an administrator
for the purpose of collecting his credit. More than ten years having thus elapsed from the expiration of the period
for the payment of said debt of P1,500, the action for its recovery has prescribed under section 43, No. 1, of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not the properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by
representation are subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who died without
leaving any property
HELD 2:
NO. The claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of the PN should have been presented in the intestate of
Lorenzo and not in the intestate of Eusebio, the formers father.
RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION: While it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code,
a children presents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother,
this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his
deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the
heirs only answer with the properties received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio
Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their said
father from whom they did NOT inherit anything.
The appealed judgment is reversed, and the DEFENDANTS ARE ABSOLVED from the complaint, with the
costs to the appellees
215

202)
DKC
HOLDINGS
CORPORATION,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTOR U. BARTOLOME and REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR METRO MANILA,
DISTRICT III, respondents.
G.R. No. 118248, April 5, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Note: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal Decision of the CA entitled "DKC Holdings
Corporation vs. Victor U. Bartolome, et al.", affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC of Valenzuela, which
dismissed Civil Case No. 3337-V-90 and ordered petitioner to pay P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.
FACTS:
THE LOT IN DISPUTE: The subject of the controversy is a 14,021 square meter parcel of land located in Malinta,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila which was originally owned by private respondent Victor U. Bartolome's deceased
mother, Encarnacion Bartolome, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37615 of the Register of Deeds of Metro
Manila, District III. This lot was in front of one of the textile plants of petitioner and, as such, was seen by the latter
as a potential warehouse site.
THE CONTRACT: DKC entered into a CONTRACT OF LEASE W/ OPTION TO BUY with Encarnacion
Bartolome (plaintiff deceased mother). DKC was given the option to a.) lease or b.) lease with purchase the
subject land w/c must be exercised within a period of two (2) years counted from the signing of the contract.
1st REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PAYMENT: DKC regularly paid its dues to Encarnacion until her death. DKC coursed
its payment to Victor Bartolome, the sole heir of Encarnacion. Victor refused to accept these payments.
THE TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE LOT: Meanwhile, Victor executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication over all the properties of Encarnacion, including the subject lot. Accordingly, respondent Register of
Deeds cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37615 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-14249 in
the name of Victor Bartolome.
2nd REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PAYMENT: On March 14, 1990, petitioner served upon Victor, via registered mail,
notice that it was exercising its option to lease the property, tendering the amount of P15,000.00 as rent for the
month of March. Again, Victor refused to accept the tendered rental fee and to surrender possession of the
property to petitioner.
DKC deposited its payments at China Bank. DKC filed a COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND
DAMAGES against Victor, praying among others the surrender and delivery of possession of the subject land in
accordance with the Contract terms.
RTC: dismissed the complaint filed by DKC, thus ruling in favor of Victor Bartolome.
CA: affirmed in toto.
BASIS OF RTC & CA: Victor is not a party thereto to the contract entered into between his deceased mother and
plaintiff.
ISSUE 1:
Whether or not the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy entered into by the late Encarnacion Bartolome
with petitioner was terminated upon her death or whether it binds her sole heir, Victor, even after her demise.
Stated differently, whether or not Contract of Lease with Option to Buy entered into by the late Encarnacion
Bartolome with petitioner is transmissible to his sole heir.
HELD 1:
216

YES. General Rule: Heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest except when
the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision
of law. (Art 1311 CC)
In the present case, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the rights and obligations
under the Contract intransmissible. More importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations therein are, by their
nature, transmissible.
The nature of intransmissible rights as explained by Arturo Tolentino, an eminent civilist, is as follows:
Among contracts which are intransmissible are those which are purely personal, either by provision of law, such
as in cases of partnerships and agency, or by the very nature of the obligations arising therefrom, such as those
requiring special personal qualifications of the obligor. It may also be stated that contracts for the payment of
money debts are not transmitted to the heirs of a party, but constitute a charge against his estate. Thus, where the
client in a contract for professional services of a lawyer died, leaving minor heirs, and the lawyer, instead of
presenting his claim for professional services under the contract to the probate court, substituted the minors as
parties for his client, it was held that the contract could not be enforced against the minors; the lawyer was limited
to a recovery on the basis of quantum meruit.
In American jurisprudence, "(W)here acts stipulated in a contract require the exercise of special knowledge,
genius, skill, taste, ability, experience, judgment, discretion, integrity, or other personal qualification of one or both
parties, the agreement is of a personal nature, and terminates on the death of the party who is required to render
such service."
TEST:It has also been held that a good measure for determining whether a contract terminates upon the death of
one of the parties is whether it is of such a character that it may be performed by the promissor's personal
representative. Contracts to perform personal acts which cannot be as well performed by others are discharged
by the death of the promissor. Conversely, where the service or act is of such a character that it may as well be
performed by another, or where the contract, by its terms, shows that performance by others was contemplated,
death does not terminate the contract or excuse nonperformance.
NO PERSONAL ACT: In the case at bar, there is no personal act required from the late Encarnacion Bartolome.
Rather, the obligation of Encarnacion in the contract to deliver possession of the subject property to petitioner
upon the exercise by the latter of its option to lease the same may very well be performed by her heir Victor.
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not Victor Bartolome as sole heir is not a party to the contract executed by his deceased mother.
The property subject of the contract was inherited by Victor.
HELD 2:
Victor cannot insist that he is not a party to the Contract because of the clear provision of Art 1311. Being an
heir of Encarnacion, there is PRIVITY OF INTEREST between him and his deceases mother. He only succeeds
to what rights his mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against him.
The subject matter of the Contract is lease, which is a property right. Hence, the death of a party DOES NOT
excuse non-performance of a contract which involves a property right, and the rights and obligations thereunder
pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Non-performance is NOT excused by the death of the
party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract.
203) ARUEGO VS CA
254 SCRA 711
FACTS:
217

Jose Aruego Sr. had an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian, out of which was born Antonia and Evelyn Aruego.
A Complaint for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed by the two children,
represented by their mother, Fabian. Said complaint prayed for the following:
a.
That Antonia and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose;
b.
That petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the
deceased Jose;
c.
That their share and participation in the estate of Jose be determined and ordered delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged open and continuous possession of the
status of illegitimate children.
RTC declared Antonia as illegitimate daughter of Jose but not as to Evelyn. It ordered petitioners to recognize
Antonia and to deliver to the latter her share in the estate of Jose.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court by
virtue of the advent of the Family Code. Said motion was denied. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON the application of the Family Code will prejudice or impair any vested right of Antonia such that it should not
be given retroactive effect.
HELD:
YES. The action brought by Antonia for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which
was filed before the advent of the Family Code must be governed by Art 285 of the Civil Code and NOT by Art
175, par.2 of the Family Code.
The Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect as its application will prejudice the vested right of Antonia.
The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the Civil Code.
The action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already
deceased, since Antonia was then still a minor when it was filed an exception to the general rule under Art 285
of the Civil Code.
204) LORENZO VS POSADAS
64 PHIL 353
Doctrine:
A transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the predecessor's death, notwithstanding the postponement
of the actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, and the tax measured by the value of the
property transmitted at that time regardless of its appreciation or depreciation.
Facts:
It appears that on May 27, 1922, one Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, Zamboanga, leaving a will and
considerable amount of real and personal properties. On june 14, 1922, proceedings for the probate of his will and
the settlement and distribution of his estate were begun in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The will was
admitted to probate.
The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga considered it proper for the best interests of the estate to appoint a
trustee to administer the real properties which, under the will, were to pass to Matthew Hanley ten years after the
two executors named in the will, was, on March 8, 1924, appointed trustee. Moore took his oath of office and gave
bond on March 10, 1924. He acted as trustee until February 29, 1932, when he resigned and the plaintiff herein
was appointed in his stead. During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, Defendant Collector of Internal
Revenue assessed against the estate of Hanley an inheritance tax together with the penalties for delinquency in
payment. Lorenzo paid the amount under protest. CIR overruled the said protest and refused to refund the
same.
CFI held that the real property of Thomas Hanley, passed to his instituted heir, Matthew Hanley, from the moment
of death of the former, and that from that time, the latter became the owner thereof.
Issue:
Whether an heir succeeds immediately to all of the property of his or her deceased ancestor?
Held:
218

It is well-settled that inheritance taxation is governed by the statute in force at the time of the death of the
decedent. The taxpayer can not foresee and ought not to be required to guess the outcome of pending measures.
The SC hold that a transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the predecessor's death, notwithstanding
the postponement of the actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, and the tax measured
by the value of the property transmitted at that time regardless of its appreciation or depreciation. The mere fact
that the estate of the deceased was placed in trust did not remove it from the operation of our inheritance tax laws
or exempt it from the payment of the inheritance tax. The corresponding inheritance tax should have been paid to
escape the penalties of the laws. This is so for the reason already stated that the delivery of the estate to the
trustee was in esse delivery of the same estate to the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in this case. A trustee is but
an instrument or agent for the cestui que trust. When Moore accepted the trust and took possesson of the trust
estate he thereby admitted that the estate belonged not to him but to his cestui que trust.
205) CASTAEDA vs. ALEMANY

3 PHIL 426
Issue:
Whether or not the will of Doa Juana Moreno was duly signed by herself in the presence of three witnesses,
who signed it as witnesses in the presence of the testratrix and of each other. It was therefore executed in
conformity with law.
Held:
There is nothing in the language of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure which supports the claim of the
appellants that the will must be written by the testator himself or by someone else in his presence and under his
express direction. That section requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either that the testator sign it himself
or, if he does sign it, that it be signed by some one in his presence and by his express direction. Who does the
mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this case the will was
typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence. The English text of section 618 is
very plain. The mistakes in translation found in the first Spanish edition of the code have been corrected in the
second.
(2) To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the
formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings
determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any
provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid. It
could not in this case make any decision upon the question whether the testratrix had the power to appoint by will
a guardian for the property of her children by her first husband, or whether the person so appointed was or was
not a suitable person to discharge such trust.
All such questions must be decided in some other proceeding. The grounds on which a will may be disallowed are
stated the section 634. Unless one of those grounds appears the will must be allowed. They all have to do with
the personal condition of the testator at the time of its execution and the formalities connected therewith. It follows
that neither this court nor the court below has any jurisdiction in his proceedings to pass upon the questions
raised by the appellants by the assignment of error relating to the appointment of a guardian for the children of the
deceased.
It is claimed by the appellants that there was no testimony in the court below to show that the will executed by the
deceased was the same will presented to the court and concerning which this hearing was had. It is true that the
evidence does not show that the document in court was presented to the witnesses and identified by them, as
should have been done. But we think that we are justified in saying that it was assumed by all the parties during
the trial in the court below that the will about which the witnesses were testifying was the document then in court.
No suggestion of any kind was then made by the counsel for the appellants that it was not the same instrument. In
the last question put to the witness Gonzales the phrase "this will" is used by the counsel for the appellants. In
their argument in that court, found on page 15 of the record, they treat the testimony of the witnesses as referring
to the will probate they were then opposing.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, eliminating therefrom, however, the clause "el cual debera ejecutarse
fiel y exactamente en todas sus partes." The costs of this instance will be charged against the appellants.
219

206) IN RE WILL OF RIOSA
39 PHIL 23
FACTS:
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, 1908, in which he disposed of an
estate valued at more than P35,000. The will was duly executed in accordance with the law then in force, namely,
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was not executed in accordance with Act No. 2645,
amendatory of said section 618, prescribing certain additional formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in
force on and after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in writing, signed by the testator, and attested and
subscribed by three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; but was not signed by
the testator and the witnesses on the left margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation state these facts.
The new law, therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the testator, without
the testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor
charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testator's name written by
some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The attestation shall state the fact that the
testator signed the will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the presence
of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the presence of each other. But
the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed
and attested as in this section provided.
Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make said section read as
follows:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass
any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known
by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by
his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of each other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each, and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state
the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will
and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of
the testator and of each other.
The Court of First Instance for the province of Albay rendered its decision on December 29, 1917 disallowing the
will of Jose Riosa.
ISSUE:
The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on the date of the
execution of a will, or the law existing at the death of the testator, controls.
RULING:
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will must be tested by
the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective
effect. This doctrine is believed to be supported by the weight of authority. It was the old English view; in Downs
(or Downing) vs. Townsend (Ambler, 280), Lord Hardwicke is reported to have said that "the general rule as to
testaments is, that the time of the testament, and not the testator's death, is regarded." It is also the modern view,
including among other decisions one of the Supreme Court of Vermont from which State many of the sections of
the Code if Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands relating to wills are taken. (Giddings vs. Turgeon [1886], 58
Vt., 103.)
Of the numerous decisions of divergent tendencies, the opinion by the learned Justice Sharswood (Taylor
vs. Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209) is regarded to be the best considered. In this opinion is found the following:
220

Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so construed only when the
mandate of the legislature is imperative. When a testator makes a will, formally executed according to the
requirements of the law existing at the time of its execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful right of
disposition to apply to it a rule subsequently enacted, though before his death.
It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this court has said, that "all statutes are to be
construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them
a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of
doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the restrospective effect." (Montilla vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos
[1913], 24 Phil., 220. See also Chew Heong vs. U.S. [1884], 112 U.S., 536; U.S. vs American Sugar Ref. Co.
[1906], 202 U.S., 563.) Statute law, as found in the Civil Code, is corroborative; article 3 thereof provides that
"laws shall not have a retroactive effect, unless therein otherwise prescribed." The language of Act No. 2645 gives
no indication of retrospective effect. Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands on cases having special application to testamentary succession. (Abello vs. Kock de Monaterio
[1904], 3 Phil., 558; Timbol vs. Manalo [1906], 6 Phil., 254; Bona vs. Briones, supra; In the Matter of the Probation
of the Will of Bibiana Diquia [1918], R. G. No. 13176, 1 concerning the language of the Will. See also section
617, Code of Civil Procedure.)
The strongest argument against our accepting the first two rules comes out of section 634 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which, in negative terms, provides that a will shall be disallowed in either of five cases, the first
being "if not executed and attested as in this Act provided." Act No. 2645 has, of course, become part and parcel
of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will in question is admittedly not executed and attested as provided by the
Code of Civil Procedure as amended. Nevertheless, it is proper to observe that the general principle in the law of
wills inserts itself even within the provisions of said section 634. Our statute announces a positive rule for the
transference of property which must be complied with as completed act at the time of the execution, so far as the
act of the testator is concerned, as to all testaments made subsequent to the enactment of Act No. 2645, but is
not effective as to testaments made antecedent to that date.
To answer the question with which we began this decision, we adopt as our own the second rule,
particularly as established by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is valid.
The order of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay of December 29, 1917, disallowing the will
of Jose Riosa, is reversed, and the record shall be returned to the lower court with direction to admit the said will
to probate, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
207) ENRIQUEZ VS ABADIA
95 SCRA 627
FACTS:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document
purporting to be his Last Will and Testament. He died on January 14, 1943 and left properties estimated at P8,000
in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees, filed a petition for its probate in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews, who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no
will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction that in
his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand the subject document
in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on the left hand margin of the front
page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with
Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of
the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their
names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The
oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared the subject document to be a holographic will; that it was in the
handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death,
holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be
decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a
221

liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor
and may override any defect in form, said trial court admitted to probate the subject document, as the Last Will
and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Civil Code allowing holographic wills should be applied.
HELD:
No. The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may
execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself and need not
be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time the subject document was executed in 1923 and at the time
that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain
requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters
and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were
not complied with in the subject document because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not
signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were
signed only by the testator.
But Article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon
the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement
of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of
the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is
decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that
although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition
of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed,
and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act.
From the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it
becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change
in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of
reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the
time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his
heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which
dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest
the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature cannot
validate void wills.
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and the subject document is denied probate.
208) Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator vs. ANDRE BRIMO
50 PHIL 867
FACTS:
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of
Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they
are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and
in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
222

There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in
the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with
and executed. lawphil.net
As to the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as
such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause
of the will, which says: that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon
me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a
considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now
possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made
and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to
respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the
person or persons who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect
the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the condition imposed by the decedent in his will is void being contrary to law.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the Civil Code
provides that Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide.
Moreover, the said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his
testamentary dispositions.
Therefore, the condition, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution
of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
The second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the
legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in
such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees.
209) BELLIS vs BELLIS

20 SCRA 358
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first
wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward, George, (who pre-deceased him
in infancy), Henry, Alexander and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he
had three legitimate children: Edwin, Walter and Dorothy and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and
expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order
and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children,
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two
items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives in
equal shares. 1wph1.t
Subsequently, died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount
of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos
223

Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, and pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last
Will and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the
deceased.
The lower court, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Issue: WON the national law of Amos Bellis should apply in the said partition.
Held: YES.
In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the
time of his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law
of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would
still refer to Texas law. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate
or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that Prohibitive laws
concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. It is evident that
whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under
the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto.
210) Bugnao v. Ubag
14 PHIL 163
FACTS:
The last will and testament of Domingo Ubag was admitted for probate. It was signed by him in the presence of
three subscribing and attesting witnesses and appears upon its face to have been duly executed in accordance
with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on the making of wills. The instrument was propounded by his
widow Catalina Bugnao who is the sole beneficiary.
The order admitting the will was appealed by the appellants who are brothers and sisters of the deceased and
would be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate were denied, as it appears that the deceased
left no heirs in the direct ascending or descending line. They contend that Ubag was not of sound mind and
memory, and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will.
The appellants pointed out that one of the attesting witnesses stated that the decease sat up in bed and signed
his name to the will, and that after its execution food was given him by his wife; while the other testified that he
was assisted into a sitting position, and was given something to eat before he signed his name.
Appellants also contended that the decedent was physically incapacitated to make the will because he was then
suffering from an advanced stage of tuberculosis, such that he was too weak to stand or even sit up unaided, and
that he could not speak when he had asthma attacks.
224

Of the four witnesses appellant presented who tried to prove that the attesting witnesses were not present during
the signing of the will by the decedent, two of the witnesses stand to inherit from the decedent if the will were
denied probate. These two witnesses, on direct cross-examination, later admitted that they were not even in the
house of the decedent at the time of the execution of the will. The attesting witnesses, on the other hand, testified
on the due execution and testamentary capacity of the decedent.
Appellants, who are siblings of the decedent, also claimed that the will was obtained by fraud considering that
they were excluded therefrom.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence of the appellants is sufficient to prove that the testator lacked testamentary capacity at the
time of the execution of the will or that he was induced by fraud in making the same
HELD:
That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully established by the testimony of the
subscribing witnesses who swore positively that, at the time of its execution, he was of sound mind and memory.
It is true that their testimony discloses the fact that he was at that time extremely ill, in an advanced stage of
tuberculosis complicated with severe intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his
bed; that he needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of asthma
to which he was subject he could not speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes his
mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to
the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and
physical description of the various parcels of land set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to
give to the person who wrote the will clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his
property, is strong evidence of his testamentary capacity.
Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact that the alleged will leaves all the property of the testator to his widow,
and wholly fails to make any provision for his brothers or sisters, indicates a lack of testamentary capacity and
undue influence; and because of the inherent improbability that a man would make so unnatural and
unreasonable a will, they contend that this fact indirectly corroborates their contention that the deceased never did
in fact execute the will. But when it is considered that the deceased at the time of his death had no heirs in the
ascending or descending line; that a bitter family quarrel had long separated him from his brothers and sisters,
who declined to have any relations with the testator because he and his wife were adherents of the Aglipayano
Church; and that this quarrel was so bitter that none of his brothers or sisters, although some of them lived in the
vicinity, were present at the time of his death or attended his funeral; we think the fact that the deceased desired
to leave and did leave all of his property to his widow and made no provision for his brothers and sisters, who
themselves were grown men and women, by no means tends to disclose either an unsound mind or the presence
of undue influence on the part of his wife, or in any wise corroborates contestants' allegation that the will never
was executed.
For the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for us to attempt to lay down a definition of testamentary
capacity which will cover all possible cases which may present themselves, because, as will be seen from what
has already been said, the testator was, at the time of making the instrument under consideration, endowed with
all the elements of mental capacity set out in the following definition of testamentary capacity which has been
frequently announced in courts of last resort in England and the United States; and while is some cases
testamentary capacity has been held to exist in the absence of proof of some of these elements, there can be no
question that, in the absence of proof of very exceptional circumstances, proof of the existence of all these
elements in sufficient to establish the existence of testamentary capacity.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction which the testator is engaged
at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the person who would naturally be supposed to have
claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among
the objects of his bounty.
The order probating the will affirmed.
211) JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee, vs. ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

22 PHIL 227
FACTS:
225

The testator,Pioquinto Paguio, for some 14 or 15 years prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of
the left side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost the
power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his
mouth. He retained the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of
signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family.
At the time of the execution of his will, four testamentary witnesses were present: Agustin Paguio, Anacleto
Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and attorney, Seor Marco, and one Florentino Ramos.The testator, wrote out on
pieces of paper notes and items relating to the disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered
to Seor Marco, who transcribed them and put them in form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon
which the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them to the testator
asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each time with an affirmative
movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus written by the attorney, it was read in a loud
voice in the presence of the testator and the witnesses; that Seor Marco gave the document to the testator; that
the latter, after looking over it, signed it in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn
signed
it
in
the
presence
of
the
testator
and
each
other.
The executrix and widow of the decedent, Juliana Bagtas, filed a petition to probate the will of Paguio.It was
opposed by Isidro Paguio, son of the deceased and several grandchildren by a former marriage, the latter being
the children of a deceased daughter. Their opposition is based on the ground that the will was not executed
according to the formalities and requirements of the law, and further that the testator was not in the full of
enjoyment and use of his mental faculties to execute a valid will. CFI Bulacan admits the will to probate. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE: DID THE TESTATOR POSSESS THE REQUIRED MENTAL SOUNDNESS TO VALIDLY EXECUTE A
WILL?
HELD: CFI AFFIRMED
Upon this point considerable evidence was adduced at the trial. One of the attesting witnesses testified that at the
time of the execution of the will the testator was in his right mind, and that although he was seriously ill, he
indicated by movements of his head what his wishes were. Another of the attesting witnesses stated that he was
not able to say whether decedent had the full use of his mental faculties or not, because he had been ill for some
years, and that he (the witnesses) was not a physician. The other subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in
the lower court as a witness for the opponents. He was unable to state whether or not the will was the wish of the
testator. The only reasons he gave for his statement were the infirmity and advanced age of the testator and the
fact that he was unable to speak. The witness stated that the testator signed the will, and he verified his own
signature
as
a
subscribing
witness.
Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated that he was present when the will was executed and
his testimony was cumulative in corroboration of the manner in which the will was executed and as to the fact that
the testator signed the will. This witness also stated that he had frequently transacted matters of business for the
decedent and had written letters and made inventories of his property at his request, and that immediately before
and after the execution of the will he had performed offices of his character. He stated that the decedent was able
to communicate his thoughts by writing. The testimony of this witness clearly indicates the presence of mental
capacity on the part of the testator. Among other witnesses for the opponents were two physician, Doctor Basa
and Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa testified that he had attended the testator some four or five years prior to his death
and that the latter had suffered from a cerebral congestion from which the paralysis resulted. The following
question
was
propounded
to
Doctor
Basa:
Q. Referring to mental condition in which you found him the last time you attended him, do you think he was in his
right
mind?
A. I can not say exactly whether he was in his right mind, but I noted some mental disorder, because when I
spoke
to
him
he
did
not
answer
me.
226

Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is that the testator had suffered a
paralysis and that he had noticed some mental disorder. He does not say that the testator was not in his right
mind at the time of the execution of the will, nor does he give it at his opinion that he was without the necessary
mental capacity to make a valid will. He did not state in what way this mental disorder had manifested itself other
than that he had noticed that the testator did not reply to him on one occasion when he visited him.
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his answer was in reply to a hypothetical
question as to what be the mental condition of a person who was 79 years old and who had suffered from a
malady such as the testator was supposed to have had according to the testimony of Doctor Basa, whose
testimony Doctor Viado had heard. He replied and discussed at some length the symptoms and consequences of
the decease from which the testator had suffered; he read in support of his statements from a work by a German
Physician, Dr. Herman Eichost. In answer, however, to a direct question, he stated that he would be unable to
certify to the mental condition of a person who was suffering from such a disease.
We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any way strengthens the contention of the
appellants. Their testimony only confirms the fact that the testator had been for a number of years prior to his
death afflicted with paralysis, in consequence of which his physician and mental strength was greatly impaired.
Neither of them attempted to state what was the mental condition of the testator at the time he executed the will in
question. There can be no doubt that the testator's infirmities were of a very serious character, and it is quite
evident that his mind was not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we cannot include
from this that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity to dispose of his property by will.
The courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills executed under such circumstances, but the weight of
the authority is in support if the principle that it is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly
established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document of
this character.In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is in favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the
burden is upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack of testamentary capacity. The rule of law relating to the
presumption of mental soundness is well established, and the testator in the case at bar never having been
adjudged insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent
upon the opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do.
There are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held that mere
weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person incapable of making a will. The
law does not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental
powers in order to execute a valid will
In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the same contrast as was pictured by
the court in the case just quoted. The striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the
last years of his life may have led some of those who knew him in his earlier days to entertain doubts as to his
mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and
statements of the conduct of the testator at that time all indicate that he unquestionably had mental capacity and
that he exercised it on this occasion. At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear that his conduct
was irrational in any particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature of the business was in
which he was engaged. The evidence show that the writing and execution of the will occupied a period several
hours and that the testator was present during all this time, taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again, the
will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its dispositions are those of a rational person.
212) TRINIDAD NEYRA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ENCARNACION NEYRA, defendant-appellee

76 PHIL 333
FACTS:
227

Severo Nayra died leaving certain properties and two children, by his first marriage, named Encarnacion Neyra
and Trinidad Neyra, and other children by his second marriage; That after the death of Severo Neyra, the two
sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, had serious misunderstandings, in connection with the properties
left by their deceased father.Trinidad Neyra filed a complaint against her sister, Encarnacion Neyra, in CFI Manila,
for the recovery of of a property left by their deceased father, and demanding at the same time of the rents
collected on the said property by the defendant Encarnacion Neyra. CFI decided in favour of Trinidad but at the
same time ordered her to pay Encarnacion the sum of P727.77, plus interests, by virtue of said
counterclaims.Trinidad Neyra appealed from the said decision, to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, dismissed the appeal on a decision dated November 10, 1942, by virtue of said agreement
or compromise, Atty. Lucio Javillonar, claiming to represent Encarnacion Neyra, who had died since November 4,
1942, and other relatives of hers, The heirs of the deceased filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that the
alleged compromise or agreement, dated November 3, 1942, could not have been understood by Encarnacion
Neyra, as she was already then at the threshold of death, and that as a matter of fact she died the following day;
and that if it had been signed at all by said Encarnacion Neyra, her thumbmark appearing on said document must
have been affixed thereto by Trinidad Neyra's attorney, against Encarnacion's will.
Pending the appeal before CA, Encarnacion became seriously ill and was advised by her religious adviser, Fr.
Garcia to reconcile with her sister. Trinidad was invited to her sisters home and they reconciled while
Encarnacion was lying in bed. In the course of their conversation which they also talked about the properties left
by their father and their litigations which had reached the Court of Appeals, and they agreed to have the latter
dismissed, on the condition that the property involved therein should be given exclusively to Trinidad Neyra, that
the latter should waive her share in the rents of said property collected by Encarnacion, and the Trinidad had no
more indebtedness to Encarnacion. Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise as well as the new
will and testament, naming Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to
Encarnacion's express instructions, and the two documents were prepared, in duplicate, and were ready for
signature, since the morning of November 3, 1942; that in the afternoon of that day, of compromise and last will
and testament to Encarnacion Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Father Teodoro Garcia, Dr.
Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he asked her if their terms were in
accordance with her wishes, or if she wanted any change made in said documents; that Encarnacion Neyra did
not suggest any change, and asked for the pad and the two documents, and, with the help of a son of Trinidad,
placed her thumbmark at the foot of each one of the two documents, in duplicate, on her bed in the sala, in the
presence of attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after
which said witnesses signed at the foot of the will, in the presence of Encarnacion Neyra, and of each other. The
agreement was also signed by Trinidad Neyra, as party, and by Dr. M. B. Abad and Eustaquio Mendoza, a
protege, as witnesses.
Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz argue, that when the thumbmark of Encarnacion
Neyra was affixed to the agreement in question, dated November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her bed in
the sala; and that the attesting witnesses were not present, as they were in the caida.
ISSUES:
1.
WHETHER ENCARNACION WAS OF SOUND MIND WHEN SHE SIGNED HER WILL AND THE
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
2.
WHETHER THE WITNESSES WERE PRESENT IN THE SIGNING OF THE WILL
HELD: PETITION DENIED, CA AFFIRMED
1.It has been conclusively shown that Encarnacion Neyra died on November 4, 1942, due to a heart attack, at the
age of 48, after an illness of about two (2) years. Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination,
frankly admitted that, in the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in he afternoon of November 3, 1942,
Encarnacion Neyra talked to her that they understood each other clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really
of sound mind, at the time of signing and execution of the agreement and will in question.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons suffering from Addison's disease,
like the testatrix in this case, remain unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy,
they necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like patients suffering from tuberculosis,
insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties until the moments of their death.
Judging by the authorities above cited, the logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and
possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity, at the time of the execution of the agreement and
228

will, dated November 3, 1942.
2.The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time Encarnacion Neyra thumbmarked the
agreement and will in question, on her bed, in the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida, is
untenable. It has been fully shown that said witnesses were present, at the time of the signing and execution of
the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test is not
whether they actually saw each other at the time of the signing of the documents, but whether they might have
seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it all in this case. And
the thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the agreement and will in question is equivalent to her signature.
213)
In
re
estate
of
Piraso,
deceased.
vs. SALMING PIRASO, ET AL., opponents-appellees.
52 PHIL 660
SIXTO
ACOP, petitioner-appellant,
FACTS:
The proponent Acop appeals the judgment of the CFI Benguet, denying the probate of last will and testament of
the deceased Piraso. The will was written in English; that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although
imperfectly, and could make himself understood in that dialect, and the court is of the opinion that his will should
have been written in that dialect.
ISSUE: WAS THE WILL VALIDLY EXECUTED?
HELD: CFI AFFIRMED
Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, strictly provides that:
"No will, except as provides in the preceding section" (as to wills executed by a Spaniard or a resident of the
Philippine Islands, before the present Code of Civil Procedure went into effect), "shall be valid to pass any estate,
real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the
testator,"
Nor can the presumption in favor of the will established by this court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), to
the effect that the testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he resides, unless there is proof to
the contrary, even he invoked in support of the probate of said document as a will, because, in the instant case,
not only is it not proven that English is the language of the City of Baguio where the deceased Piraso lived and
where the will was drawn, but that the record contains positive proof that said Piraso knew no other language than
the Igorrote dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano; that is, he did not know the English language in which then will is
written. So that even if such a presumption could have been raised in this case it would have been wholly
contradicted and destroyed.
Such a result based upon solidly established facts would be the same whether or not it be technically held that
said will, in order to be valid, must be written in the Ilocano dialect; whether or not the Igorrote or Inibaloi dialect is
a cultivated language and used as a means of communication in writing, and whether or not the testator Piraso
knew the Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will written in said dialect. The fact is, we repeat, that it is
quite certain that the instrument Exhibit A was written in English which the supposed testator Piraso did not know,
and this is sufficient to invalidate said will according to the clear and positive provisions of the law, and inevitably
prevents its probate.
214) GERMAN JABONETA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. RICARDO GUSTILO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
5 PHIL 541
FACTS:
Macario Jaboneta executed under the following circumstances the document in question, which has been
presented for probate as his will:
Being in the house of Arcadio Jarandilla, in Jaro, in this province, he ordered that the document in question be
written, and calling Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses, executed the said
document as his will. They were all together, and were in the room where Jaboneta was, and were present when
he signed the document, Isabelo Jena signing afterwards as a witness, at his request, and in his presence and in
the presence of the other two witnesses. Aniceto Jalbuena then signed as a witness in the presence of the
229

testator, and in the presence of the other two persons who signed as witnesses. At that moment Isabelo Jena,
being in a hurry to leave, took his hat and left the room. As he was leaving the house Julio Javellana took the pen
in his hand and put himself in position to sign the will as a witness, but did not sign in the presence of Isabelo
Jena; but nevertheless, after Jena had left the room the said Julio Javellana signed as a witness in the presence
of the testator and of the witness Aniceto Jalbuena.
The last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta, deceased, was denied probate because the lower court was of
the opinion from the evidence adduced at the hearing that Julio Javellana, one of the witnesses, did not attach his
signature thereto in the presence of Isabelo Jena, another of the witnesses, as required by the provisions of
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure..
ISSUE: EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL WITH RESPECT TO THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF
WITNESSES SIGNING THE WILL IN THE PRESENCE OF EACH OTHER
HELD: TRIAL COURT REVERSED
We can not agree with so much of the above finding of facts as holds that the signature of Javellana was not
signed in the presence of Jena, in compliance with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand and pen in the act of affixing his
signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of the remaining witnesses which shows that Javellana did
in fact there and then sign his name to the will, convinces us that the signature was affixed in the presence of
Jena. The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of the name of the
witness was being written, is of no importance. He, with the other witnesses and the testator, had assembled for
the purpose of executing the testament, and were together in the same room for that purpose, and at the moment
when the witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically present and in such position with
relation to Javellana that he could see everything which took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper
direction, and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the
document was in fact signed before he finally left the room.
The purpose of a statutory requirement that the witness sign in the presence of the testator is said to be that the
testator may have ocular evidence of the identity of the instrument subscribed by the witness and himself, and the
generally accepted tests of presence are vision and mental apprehension. (See Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, vol. 30,
p. 599, and cases there cited.)
In the matter of Bedell (2 Connoly (N.Y.), 328) it was held that it is sufficient if the witnesses are together for the
purpose of witnessing the execution of the will, and in a position to actually see the testator write, if they choose to
do so; and there are many cases which lay down the rule that the true test of vision is not whether the testator
actually saw the witness sign, but whether he might have seen him sign, considering his mental and physical
condition and position at the time of the subscription. (Spoonemore vs. Cables, 66 Mo., 579.)
215) EUTIQUIA AVERA, petitioner-appellee, vs. MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as guardian of
the minors Cesar Garcia and Jose Garcia,objectors-appellants
42 PHIL 45
FACTS:
Eutiquia Avera instituted the probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia; contest was made by Marino Garcia and
Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. The
proponent of the will introduced one of the three attesting witnesses who testified that the will was executed with
all necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties.
Upon the latter point the witness was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of the testator.
Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was their absence accounted for by the proponent of the
will. The attorney for the opposition introduced a single witness whose testimony tended to show in a vague and
indecisive manner that at the time the will was made the testator was so debilitated as to be unable to
comprehend what he was about.
The trial judge found that the testator at the time of the making of the will was of sound mind and disposing
memory and that the will had been properly executed. He accordingly admitted the will to probate.Hence this
appeal
230

ISSUES:
1.
whether a will can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a single attesting
witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the other two;
2.
whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the testator and
of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin.
HELD: lower court affirmed
1.
While it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will bay be proved by the testimony of only one of the
three attesting witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), this court declared after an
elaborate examination of the American and English authorities that when a contest is instituted, all of the attesting
witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of the process of the court.
In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why all three of the attesting witnesses were not
produced, but the probable reason is found in the fact that, although the petition for the probate of this will had
been pending from December 21, 1917, until the date set for the hearing, which was April 5, 1919, no formal
contest was entered until the very day set for the hearing; and it is probable that the attorney for the proponent,
believing in good faith the probate would not be contested, repaired to the court with only one of the three
attesting witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will was contested, incautiously permitted the case to go to
proof without asking for a postponement of the trial in order that he might produce all the attesting
witnesses.Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were not produced, it does not in itself
supply any basis for changing the rule expounded in the case above referred to; and were it not for a fact now to
be mentioned, this court would probably be compelled to reverse this case on the ground that the execution of the
will had not been proved by a sufficient number of attesting witnesses.
2.
We are of the opinion that the will in question is valid. It is true that the statute says that the testator and
the instrumental witnesses shall sign their names on the left margin of each and every page; and it is undeniable
that the general doctrine is to the effect that all statutory requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully
complied with. So far as concerns the authentication of the will, and of every part thereof, it can make no possible
difference whether the names appear on the left or no the right margin, provided they are on one or the other.
The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well stated In Re will of Abangan (40 Phil., 476,
479), where the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avancea, in a case where the signatures were placed at the
bottom of the page and not in the margin, said:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution o will and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this
subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one
must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to
make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that
adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will,
must be disregarded.
In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice to any person, as attendant upon
the actual deviation from the letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial to invalidate the
instrument.
216) IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE.
CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee, vs. NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositorsappellants.
11 SCRA 423
FACTS:
A special proceeding was commenced on October 2, 1958 for the allowance and admission to probate of the
original will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and for the appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor
thereof. Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the testatrix, filed her opposition. Enrique Icasiano, a son of the
testatrix, also filed a manifestation adopting as his own Natividad's opposition to the probate of the alleged will.
Proponent subsequently filed a motion for the admission of an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that
the decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on that date,
submitting the signed duplicate , which he allegedly found only on or about May 26, 1959. oppositors Natividad
231

Icasiano de Gomez and Enrique Icasiano filed their joint opposition to the admission of the amended and
supplemental petition, but by order, the court admitted said petition.
The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa Villacorte died in the City of Manila on
September 12, 1958; that on June 2, 1956, the late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and testament in
duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa Icasiano at Pedro Guevara Street, Manila, published before
and attested by three instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and
Mr. Vinicio B. Diy; that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said three instrumental witnesses on
the same date before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in and for the City of Manila; and that the will
was actually prepared by attorney Fermin Samson, who was also present during the execution and signing of the
decedent's last will and testament, together with former Governor Emilio Rustia of Bulacan, Judge Ramon
Icasiano and a little girl. Of the said three instrumental witnesses to the execution of the decedent's last will and
testament, attorneys Torres and Natividad were in the Philippines at the time of the hearing, and both testified as
to the due execution and authenticity of the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom the will was
acknowledged by the testatrix and attesting witnesses, and also attorneys Fermin Samson, who actually prepared
the document. The latter also testified upon cross examination that he prepared one original and two copies of
Josefa Villacorte last will and testament at his house in Baliuag, Bulacan, but he brought only one original and one
signed copy to Manila, retaining one unsigned copy in Bulacan.
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original, admits that he may have lifted
two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was signed in his presence.
The court issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate to probate. From this order, the oppositors appealed
directly to this Court
ISSUE: WHETHER THE WILL IS VALID IN THE ABSENCE OF A WITNESS SIGNATURE IN ONE PAGE
HELD: CFI AFFIRMED
On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a
testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify
denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two
other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary
public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so
strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over
whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its
component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on
record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano,
49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) "witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or
bungling it or the attestation clause".
That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his
own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page.
The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one
was aware of the defect at the time.
This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory
requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this
Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left
margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement
for the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to make the first page either by letters or numbers is
not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require
satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bid faith but without undue or
unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege.
217) Testate estate of the late VICENTE CAGRO.
PELAGIO CAGRO, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
92 PHIL 1033
JESUSA CAGRO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
FACTS:
232

This is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Samar, admitting to
probate the will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Laoangan, Pambujan, Samar, on February 14,
1949.
The main objection insisted upon by the appellant in that the will is fatally defective, because its attestation clause
is not signed by the attesting witnesses. The signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the
bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the lefthand margin. The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin
conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause.
ISSUE: WHETHER THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WHEN THE WITNESSES SIGNATURES APPEAR
ON THE LEFT MARGINS BUT NOT IN THE ATTESTATION CLAUSE
HELD: CFI REVERSED
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is 'a memorandum
of the facts attending the execution of the will' required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must
necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses,
since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform
substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable,
because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin
of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as
sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the
testator and any or all of the witnesses
218) BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. NARCISA RIMANDO, defendant-appellant..
18 PHIL 450
FACTS:
The lower court admitted the instrument propounded therein as the last will and testament of the deceased, Pedro
Rimando.The defendant appeals the decision, contending that it one of the witnesses was not present during the
signing of the will by the testator and of the other subscribing witnesses. one of the witnesses was the outside
some 8 or 10 feet away, in a small room connected by a doorway from where the will was signed ,across which
was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the other
subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE WILL WAS VALIDLY EXECUTED EVEN IF ONE OF THE WITNESSES WAS IN
ANOTHER ROOM DURING THE SIGNING OF THE WILL
HELD: LOWER COURT AFFIRMED
In the case just cited, on which the trial court relied, we held that:
The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually
saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so,
considering their mental and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of
inscription of each signature.
But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the
subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. This, of
course, does not mean that the testator and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the
instrument in the presence of each other if it appears that they would not have been able to see each other sign at
that moment, without changing their relative positions or existing conditions. The trial courts decision merely laid
down the doctrine that the question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the
instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast
upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions and
their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they
could have seen each other sign. To extend the doctrine further would open the door to the possibility of all
233

manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat the purpose for which this particular condition is
prescribed in the code as one of the requisites in the execution of a will.
219) CANEDA VS CA
222 SCRA 781
FACTS: Testator Mateo Caballero is a widower without any children. He executed a will in the presence of three
witnesses. He was assisted by his lawyer and a notary public in the preparation of his will. Under the said will, the
testator disposed of his properties to persons without blood relation to the testator. The testator himself submitted
the will to the probate court but the testator passed away even before his petition could be heard.
The petitioners, who claimed to be the nephews and nieces of the testator, filed for the settlement of the intestate
estate of Mateo. The probate proceedings and special proceedings filed were consolidated.
Petitioners opposed the allowance of the will of Mateo on the ground that on the date stated in the will, the
testator was already of poor health and could not have executed the will. They likewise questioned the
genuineness of the signature of the testator in the said will.
The probate court allowed the will. On appeal, the petitioners contended that the Attestation Clause was fatally
defective for failing to state that the testator signed in the presence of the witnesses and the witnesses signed in
the presence of the testator and of one another.
Court of Appeals, nevertheless affirmed the probate courts decision and held that there was substantial
compliance with Art. 805.
ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will complies with the requirements of Art. 805
and 809?
HELD: In the case of ordinary or notarial wills, the attestation clause need not be written in a language or dialect
known to the testator since it does not form part of the disposition. The language used in the attestation clause
likewise need not even be known to the attesting witnesses. The last paragraph of Art. 805 merely requires that, in
such a case, the Attestation Clause shall be interpreted to said witnesses.
An Attestation Clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the
instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution of the same. It is a separate
memorandum of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution of the same.
Paragraph 3 of Art. 805 requires three things to be stated in the Attestation Clause, the lack of which would result
in the invalidity of the will:
a)
The number of pages
b)
That the testator signed or expressly caused another to sign, the will and every page thereof
in the presence of the attesting witnesses and
c)
That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all of its
pages, and that said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of
one another.
The purpose of the law is to safeguard against any interpolation or omission of some of its pages, whereas the
subscription of the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of authentication
and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very instrument executed by the testator and attested to by
the witnesses. By attesting and subscribing to the will. The witnesses thereby declare that due execution of the
will as embodied in the Attestation Clause. The Attestation Clause provides strong legal guaranties for the due
execution of a will and to ensure the authenticity thereof. It needs to be signed only by the witnesses and not the
testator, absence of the signature of the former invalidates the will.
234

In the case at bar, the will was comprised of three pages, all numbered correlatively, with the left margin of each
page bearing the respective signatures of the testator and the three attesting witnesses. The testamentary
dispositions were expresses in Cebuano- Visayan dialect and were signed at the foot by the testator. The
Attestation Clause was recite in English and is likewise signed at the end of three attesting witnesses.
What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the Attestation Clause herein is the fact that while it recites that
the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of three attesting witnesses and stated as well
the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said
witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. What
is clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another. The absence of that statement is a fatal defect which must necessarily result in the
disallowance of the will.
As to the substantial compliance rule under Art. 809, while it may be true that the Attestation Clause is indeed
subscribed at the end thereof and at the left margin of each page by the three attesting witnesses, it certainly
cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom that the said witnesses affixed their respective signatures in the
presence of the testator and of each other, since the presence of such signatures only establishes the fact that it
was indeed signed, but it does not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will in the presence of
the testator and of one another.
The execution of a will is supposed to be one act so that where the testator and the witnesses sign on various
days or occasions and in various combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of effectivity. In a
situation like in the case at bar, the defects is not only in the form or language of the Attestation Clause but the
total absence of a specific element requires by Art. 805.
In order that Art. 809 can apply, the defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidenced supplied by the will itself. In
the case at bar, proof of the acts requires to have been performed by the attesting witnesses san be supplied only
by extrinsic evidence thereof. Reversal of the judgment rendered by the CA.
220) AZNAR VS GARCIA
7 SCRA95
FACTS: Aznar (executor) filed a petition to probate the will of the deceased Edward Christensen giving to Helen
Christensen 3, 600 pesos while Lucy all the remainder of his property which was opposed by Helen because it
deprives her legitime as an acknowledged natural children hence she is entitled to of the estate but CFI
opposes the final accounting of the executor.
ISSUE:WON Helen is entitled to share of the estate?
HELD: Remand the case to Philippine court for partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
The citizenship of the deceases was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, hence the meaning of national law in
Art 16 is the conflict of law rules in California. However, ART 946 of California Civil Code authorizes the return of
the question to the law of the testators domicile, The Philippines. Therefore, the Philippine court should not refer
back it to California.
Court of domicile is bound to apply its own law as directed in conflict of law rule of decedent state.
221) CRUZ VS VILLASOR
54 SCRA 31
FACTS: Respondent Manuel Lugay filed a petition for probate of the will of Valente Cruz with the CFI which was
opposed by the petitioner, Agapita Cruz on the ground that the one of the three witnesses is at the same time the
Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with Art. 805 and 806?
235

HELD:The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental
witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to
avow or to own as genuine, to assent and before means in front or preceding in space or ahead of.
Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his
having signed the will in front of himself.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. That
function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. For them he
would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own
act. It would place him in an inconsistent position and the very purpose of the acknowledgement, which is to
minimize fraud would be thwarted.
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would
have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions
of Art. 805 requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Art 806 which requires that the testator
and the required number of witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result
woukd be, as has been said, that only 2 witnesses appeared before the notary public for that purpose.
222) KALAW VS RELOVA
132 SCRA 237
FACTS: The private respondent, who claims to be the sole heir of his sister who is Natividad Kalaw, filed for a
petition to admit to probate the holographic will of his sister. In such will, private respondent Gregorio was named
as the sole heir of all the properties left behind by the testatrix and was also named as the executor of the will.
The petition was opposed by Rosa, the sister of the testatrix, who claims to have been originally instituted as the
sole heir. She alleged that the holographic will contained alterations, corrections and insertions without the proper
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as requires by Art 814 of the Civil Code.
The court denied the petition. Rosa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: whether or not the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the
Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with her as
sole heir.
Held: No. ordinarily, when a number of erasures, correction made by the testator on a holographic will not be
noted under his signature, hence the will is not invalidated as a whole but as most only as respects the particular
words erased or corrected.
However in this case, the holographic will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by
substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by
the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason
that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the will as first written should be
given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be
given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature- the
intention of the testator could not be ascertained. However, there is clear showing of the testators intention to
revoke the institution of Rosa as her sole heir.
Thus, the petition is hereby dismissed and the decision of the respondent judge is affirmed.
223) AJERO VS CA
236 SCRA 488
236

FACTS: Late Anne Sand left a will and named as devisees the petitioner, Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private
respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand. Fe Sand, Lisa Sand and Dr. Jose
Ajero Sr and their children. Petitioner filed for the allowance of decedent holographic will contending that the latter
was of sound mind and not acting under duress. Private Respondent opposed it that the testament body and
signature was not decedents handwriting and such properties, the decedent is not the sole owner. RTC admitted
the will while CA reversed it that the will fails to meet the requirements for its validity under Art 813 and 814
because the dispositions were either unsigned and undated or signed but not dated and erasure had not been
authenticated by decedent.
ISSUE: WON the will is valid?
HELD: Yes. Art 839, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are:
(1) whether the instrument submitted is the decedents will
(2) whether said will was executed in accordance with formalities prescribed by law
(3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed and
(4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were voluntary acts of the decedent
Art. 813 of the new Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the
holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that
these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
In the case at bar, unless, the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of
the holographic will or on testators signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of
authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
In addition to, courts in probate are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will. However, exception,
Courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do and pass upon certain provisions of the
will that Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father John Sand which Dr Ajero question her
conveyance.
224) LABRADOR VS CA
184 SCRA 170
FACTS: Testator Melencio died and left a parcel of land and his children as heirs. He allegedly executed a
holographic will. The holographic will was submitted for probate by petitioner Sagrado, the devisee of the parcel of
the land.
Jesus and Gaudencio opposed the probate of the will on the ground that the will has been extinguished or
revoked by implications of law, when the testator, before his death, sold the parcel of land to the oppositors. The
said transaction was evidenced by the new TCT issued in the name of the oppositors and the Deed of Sale
executed by the testator. Meanwhile, Jesus sold the parcel of land to a 3 rd person, Sagrado sought to have the
Deed of Sale annulled on the ground that it was fictitious.
LC allowed the probate of the will and declared null and void the Deed of Sale. CA reversed the judgment and
disallowed the probate of the will on the ground that it was undated.
ISSUE: WON the alleged holographic will is dated?
HELD: The Holographic is dated. It appears that the date when the testator made the will was stated in the body
of the complaint, on the 2nd page of the will
and this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective
assignment of the said fish pond, and this being in the month of March, 17 th day, in the year 1968, and this
237

decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed, and the one who made this writing is no other that
MELECIO LABRADOR, their father.
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements
are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in
the subject will.
225) PEREZ VS TOLETE
232 SCRA 722
FACTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan are husband and wife, who became American citizens
and residents of New York, U.S.A, with their children, Jocelynm18; Jacqueline,16; and Josephine,14.
Each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is
not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife).
To wit: If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not
sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her, and my
estate shall be administered and distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such presumption.
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament containing the
same provisions as that of the will of her husband.
To wit: If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient
evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he predeceased me, and my estate
shall be administered and distributed in all respects, in accordance with such presumption.
Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Joses
will,
filed
for
separate
probate
proceedings
of
the
wills.
Later, Evelyns mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud
was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New
York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Joses
heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance
with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court
already
issued
an
order,
disallowing
the
wills.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
reprobate
of
the
wills
should
be
allowed
HELD: The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this
country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in
conformity
with
those
which
this
Code
prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is
imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the
Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has
his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such
country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure
and allowance of wills. Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based
238

is
impelled
by
the
fact
that
our
courts
cannot
take
judicial
notice
of
them.
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always
considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir
of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the
instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is
merely a nominal or formal party.
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in
case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with
regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is
presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require
publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in
the
Philippines"
and
to
the
executor,
if
he
is
not
the
petitioner,
are
required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time
and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also
cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or
other
known
heirs,
legatees,
and
devisees
of
the
testator,
.
.
.
"
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time
within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that
the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the
probate
proceedings.
226) TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN

106 PHIL. 997
FACTS: C.O. Bohanan was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that state. Notwithstanding his long
residence in the Philippines, he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the state of his
pertinent residence to spend the rest of his days in that state. His permanent residence or domicile in the United
States depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the
time of his death, he was a citizen of that state.
The oppositors, Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children, question the validity of the executor/testator C.O.
Bohanans last will and testament, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the
form concede to them.
Another, is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia Bohanan, who had received legacies in the
amount of PHP 6, 000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate which, in
accordance with the laws, should be two- thirds of the estate left by the testator.
ISSUE: WON the testamentary dispositions of the testator is valid: as to Magdalena Bohanan and second to his
children?
HELD: The first issue refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be entitled to
receive. The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the testator. It is argued that it was error for the
trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C.
Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction. The court refused to recognize the
claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to
dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his former (or divorced)
wife. No right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada, thus the
oppositor can no longer claim portion of the estate left by the testator.
239

With regards the second issue, the old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in
1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the
person whose succession is in question, thus the two-third rule is not enforceable.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator, C.O Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the United
States and declares that his will and testament is fully in accordance with the laws of the State of Nevada and
admits the same to probate.
The validity of Testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator and as it has been
decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that State of Nevada, which allows the testator
to dipose his properties according to his will, like in the case at bar.
Thus the order of the court approving the project partition made in accordance to testamentary provisions must be
affirmed.
227) Testate Estate of Maloto
158 SCRA 451
FACTS:
Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners believing that no last wiil and
testament was left they iniateda an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate. While the case
was still in progress, the parties executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate. The
agreement provided for the division of the estate into four equal parts among the parties. They then presented
the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval.
Three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN
(Testamento)," dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. It
Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter on whether or not the document or
papers allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de Coral, upon instructions of the
testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted itself and found that the will had been revoked. The respondent court
stated that the presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of the will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently
proven. The appellate court based its finding on the facts that the document was not in the two safes in Adriana's
residence, by the testatrix going to the residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in the latter's
possession, and, her seeking the services of Atty. Palma in order to have a new will drawn up.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana.
HELD:
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an
effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not
imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person
but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the
document destroyed must be the will itself.
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet
that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective
revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of
burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence
and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For
one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will
at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the
express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and
Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the
kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned. Nowhere in the records before us does
it appear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably
positive that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think, believed that the papers she
destroyed was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his
240

information that the burned document was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his testimony on this
point is double hearsay.
228) Molo vs. Molo
90 PHIL 37
FACTS:
The deceased died leaving no forced heir in the descending or ascending line, however he was survived by his
weife and and his nieces and nephews who were the legitimate children of his deceased brother, during his
lifetime he executed two wills, one executed at 1918 and the subsequent one in 1939. The latter will contains a
clause which revokes the will in 1918. The said will containing the clause revoking the previous will, however, was
disallowed.
ISSUE:
Whether the previous will was annulled even if the subsequent will, with revoking clause, was disallowed.
HELD:
A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was
not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to making of wills,
cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void
Execution of Wills
229) Tolentino v Francisco
57 PHIL 749
FACTS:
Gregorio Tolentino had been married to Benita Francisco, but she predeceased him years ago. The pair had no
children with a number of his wifes kin as survivors. However, strained relations, resulting from grave
disagreements, developed between Tolentino and the Francisco relations and he determined to make a new will
in which, apart from certain legacies in favor of a few individuals, the bulk of his estate, worth probably about
P150,000, should be given to Adelaida Tolentino de Concepcion, as his universal heir.
To this end, Tolentino went to the office of Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, an attorney and informed him that he
wanted to make a new will and desired Repide to draft it for him. After the necessary preliminary inquiries had
been made, the attorney suggested to him to bring a copy of the will previously made which was reduced to
itsproper form. As the instrument was taking shape Tolentino stated that he wanted the will to be signed in
Repide's office, with the latter as one of the attesting witnesses. For the other two witnesses Tolentino requested
that two attorneys attached to the office, namely, Leoncio B. Monzon and Ramon L. Sunico, should serve.
When the instrument had been reduced to proper form, changes were made by Tolentino with regards to the
attesting witnesses. Pursuant to these instructions Repide made the desired changes in the will and just before
twelve o'clock noon of the next day Tolentino returned to Repide's office and received from him the criminal
document with a carbon copy thereof. Repide advised the testator that the copy should be executed with the
same formality as the original in order that the intention of the testator should not be frustrated by the possible
loss or destruction of the original.lawphil.netIt is a custom in the office of Repide not to number the consecutive
pages of a will, on the typewriting machine, the duty of numbering the pages being left to the testator himself.
Tolentino thereupon drew two documents from his pocket saving that it was his last will and testament, done in
duplicate, and he proceeded to read the original to the witnesses. After this had been completed, Legarda himself
took the will in hand and read it himself. He then returned it to Tolentino, who thereupon proceeded, with pen and
ink, to number the pages of the will thus, "Pagina Primera", "Pagina Segunda", etc. He then paged the duplicate
copy of the will in the same way. He next proceeded to sign the original will and each of its pages by writing his
name "G. Tolentino" in the proper places. Following this, each of the three witnesses signed their own respective
names at the end of the will, at the end of the attesting clause, and in the left margin of each page of the
241

instrument. During this ceremony all of the persons concerned in the act of attestation were present together, and
all fully advertent to the solemnity that engaged their attention.
After preliminary explanations had been made, Tolentino requested Repide to keep the will overnight in his safe,
In this connection the testator stated that he did not wish to take the will to his home, as he knew that his relatives
were watching him and would take advantage of any carelessness on his part to pry into his papers.
On the morning of November 9, 1930, Gregorio Tolentino was found dead in his bed, having perished by the
hands of an assassin.
ISSUE:
Whether the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law
HELD:
The peculiarity of this case is that, upon the trial of this proceeding for the probate of the will of the decedent, two
of the attesting witnesses, Jose Syyap and Vergel de Dios, repudiated their participation in the execution of the
will at the time and place stated; and while admitting the genuineness of their signatures to the will, pretended that
they had severally signed the instrument, at the request of the testator, at different places. Thus Syyap, testifying
as a witness, claimed that the testator brought the will to Syyap's house on the afternoon of October 21 a time, be
it remembered, when the will had not yet left the hands of the draftsman and upon learning that Syyap could not
be present at the time and place then being arranged for the execution of the will, he requested Syyap, as a mere
matter of complaisance, to sign the will then, which Syyap did. Vergel de Dios has another story to tell of isolated
action, claiming that he signed the will in the evening of October 22 at the Hospital of San Juan de Dios in
Intramuros.
We are unable to give any credence to the testimony of these two witnesses on this point, the same being an
evident fabrication designed for the purpose of defeating the will. In the first place, the affirmative proof showing
that the will was properly executed is adequate, consistent, and convincing, consisting of the testimony of the third
attesting witness, Vicente Legarda, corroborated by Miguel Legarda and Urbana Rivera, two disinterested
individuals, employees of La Previsora Filipina, who were present in Legarda's office when the will was executed
and who lent a discerning attention to what was being done. In the second place, each of the seven signatures
affixed to his will by Syyap appear to the natural eye to have been made by using the same pen and ink that was
used by Legarda in signing the will. The same is also probably true of the seven signatures made by Vergel de
Dios. This could hardly have happened if the signatures of Syyap and Vergel de Dios had been affixed, as they
now pretend, at different times and places. In the third place, Both Syyap and Vergel de Dios are impeached by
proof of contradictory statements made by them on different occasions prior to their appearance as witnesses in
this case. In this connection we note that, after the murder of Gregorio Tolentino, and while the police authorities
were investigating his death, Nemesio Alferez, a detective, sent for Syyap and questioned him concerning his
relations with the deceased. Upon this occasion Syyap stated that Gregorio Tolentino had lately made a will, that it
had been executed at the office of La Previsora Filipina under the circumstances already stated, and that he
himself had served as one of the attesting witnesses.
These circumstances and other incidents revealed in the proof leave no room for doubt in our mind that Syyap
and Vergel de Dios have entered into a conspiracy between themselves, and in concert with the opponents, to
defeat the will of Gregorio Tolentino although they are well aware that said will was in all respects properly
executed; and the trial court, in our opinion, committed no error in admitting the will to probate.
When a will is contested it is the duty of the proponent to call all of the attesting witnesses, if available but the
validity of the will in no wise depends upon the united support of the will by all of those witnesses. A will may be
admitted to probate notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the subscribing witnesses do not unite with the
other, or others, in proving all the facts upon which the validity of the will rests. (Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil.,
380.) It is sufficient if the court is satisfied from all the proof that the will was executed and attested in the manner
required by law. In this case we feel well assured that the contested will was properly executed and the order
admitting to it probate was entirely proper.
SUCCESSION Probate of Wills
230) Mercado vs. Santos
57 Phil. 749
242

FACTS:
Petitioner Mercado applied for the probate of the will of his deceased wife. There was no opposition to it. The
court then admitted the will to probate. After more than a year, the relatives of his wife filed a complaint against
Mercado on the ground of falsifaction or forgery of the will probated. A motion to quash was filed by Mercado
stating that the will has already been admitted to probate. It is therefore conclusively presumed to be genuine.
RTC: For respondent. Motion denied.
CA: Affirms RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the will is can be presumed to be genuine?
HELD: Yes, it is.
A criminal action for falsification of will, will not lie after its admission to probate. This is the effect of the probate of
a will.
The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by publication as a
prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the
judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State.
The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is considered as conclusive as to its due
execution and validity, and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when
he executed the will, and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is
genuine and not a forgery.
The will in question having been probated by a competent court, the law will not admit any proof to overthrow the
legal presumption that it is not a forgery.
A criminal action will not lie against a forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of
competent jurisdiction in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333, and 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
231) Testate Estate of Biascan vs. Biascan
347 SCRA 621
FACTS:
In 1975, respondent Rosalina Biascon filed a petition for her appointment as the administratrix of the intestate
estate of Florencio Biascan and Timotea Zulueta. The court issued an order appointing her as the regular
administrator. Maria Biascon was the legal wife of Florencio and filed an opposition to the appointment. On April 2,
1981, the court issued an order resolving that Maria as legal wife, and Rosalina and her brother as the natural
children of Florencio, are the legal heirs of the deceased and upheld the appointment of Rosalina as the
administratrix. On June 6, 1981 or 58 days after the receipt of the Order, Maria filed her MFR. On November 15,
1981, the fourth floor of the City Hall of Manila was completely gutted by fire. The records of the settlement
proceedings were among those lost in the fire. Thus, on January 2, 1985, private respondent filed a Petition for
Reconstitution of the said records. Due to the delay caused by the fire and the reconstitution of the records, it was
only on April 30, 1985 that the RTC issued an Order denying Marias June 6, 1981 MFR. Sometime thereafter,
Maria died and her lawyer Atty. Lopez was appointed as interim special administrator. Notice of this April 30, 1985
Order allegedly came to the attention of Marias lawyer only on August 21, 1996. Her lawyers thereafter filed a
Notice of Appeal and Record of Appeal on September 20, 1996. The TC issued an order denying the appeal on
the ground that it was filed out of time. A petition for certiorari was filed with the CA which was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the appeal was filed on time?
HELD:
No, it was not.
Section 1. Rule 109 of the RROC enumerates the orders and judgments in special proceedings which may be the
subject of an appeal. An appeal is allowed in these cases as these orders, decrees or judgments issued by a
court in a special proceeding constitute a final determination of the rights of the parties so appealing. The ruling of
the TC that Maria, Rosalina and her brother were entitled to participate in the settlement proceedings falls
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squarely under paragraph b of section 1, Rule 109 as the proper subject of appeal. By so ruling, the TC has
effectively determined that the three persons are the lawful heirs of the deceased. As such, the same may be the
proper subject of an appeal.
Similarly, the ruling of the TC denying Marias motion to set aside the order appointing Rosalina as the regular
administratrix of the estate of Florencio Biascan is likewise a proper subject of appeal. The order of the TC
appointing a regular administrator of a deceased persons estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties
thereunder and is thus appealable. This is in contrast with an order appointing a special administrator which is
appointed only for a limited time and for a specific purpose. Because of the temporary character and special
character of this appointment, the Rules deem it not advisable for any party to appeal from said temporary
appointment.
It is thus clear that the Order dated April 2, 1981 may be the proper subject of an appeal in a special proceeding.
In special proceedings, the period of appeal from any decision or final order rendered therein is thirty days. The
appeal period may only be interrupted by the filing of a motion for a new trial or reconsideration. Once the appeal
period expires without an appeal or a MFR or new trial being perfected, the decision or order becomes final.
Considering that this was only on June 6, 1981 or a full 58 days after the receipt of the order that the MFR was
filed, it is clear that the same was filed out of time. There was no more appeal period to interrupt as the Order had
already become final.
It is well settled that judgments or orders become final and executory by operation of law and not by judicial
declaration. Thus, finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no
appeal is perfected or MFR or new trial is filed. The TC need not even pronounce the finality of the order as the
same becomes final by operation of law. Being final and executory, the TC can no longer alter, modify or reverse
the questioned order. The subsequent filing of the MFR cannot disturb the finality of the judgment order.
The Order of the trial court denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the April 2, 1981 Order was issued
on April 30, 1985. Allegedly, petitioner was only made aware of this April 30, 1985 Order on August 21, 1996
when it inquired from the trial court about the status of the case. Giving petitioner the benefit of the doubt that it
had indeed received notice of the order denying its motion for reconsideration on August 21, 1996, it follows that
petitioner only had until the following day or on August 22, 1996 within which to perfect the appeal.
At this point, we note with disapproval petitioners attempt to pass off its Notice of Appeal as having been filed on
August 22, 1996. In all its pleadings before this Court and the Court of Appeals, petitioner insists that its Notice of
Appeal was filed the day after it secured the August 21, 1996 Certification from the trial court. While the Notice of
Appeal was ostensibly dated August 22, 1996, it is clear from the stamp of the trial court that the same was
received only on September 20, 1996. Moreover, in the Order dated October 22, 1996 of the trial court denying
petitioners appeal, the court clearly stated that the Notice of Appeal with accompanying Record on Appeal was
filed on September 20, 1996.
Considering that it is clear from the records that petitioners notice of appeal was filed on September 20, 1996, the
same was clearly filed out of time as it only had until August 22, 1996 within which to file the said pleading.
232) Nuguid vs. Nuguid,
17 SCRA 449
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid died and was survived by her parents, brothers and sisters. Petitioner Remedios, her sister, filed
for the probate of her holographic will a year after her death. Remedios was instituted as the universal heir in the
said will. The parents opposed this, claiming that they were preterited by the institution of Remedios as the sole
heir thereby invalidating the will. The trial court declared the will to be a complete nullity and therefore creating an
intestacy of the estate of Rosario.
ISSUE:
Whether the parents were preterited creating intestacy of Rosarios estate?
HELD:
Yes, they were.
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the courts area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution
on, the extrinsic validity of the will; the due execution thereof; the testatrixs testamentary capacity; and the
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compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. In the case at bar however, a peculiar situation
exists. The parties shunned aside the question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate. They
questioned the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has
been duly authenticated. But if the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. In the
event of probate or if the court rejects the will, the probability exists that the case will come up once again before
the court on the same issue of the instrinsic validity of or nullity of the will. The result would be a waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These practical considerations induce the SC to meet head-on the issue of
the nullity of the provisions of the will in question, there being a justiciable controversy.
The deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line,
her parents. Her will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather
than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition. There
is no other provision in the will except the institution of Remedios as the universal heir. Such institution by itself is
null and void and, intestate succession ensues. The disputed order declares the will in question a complete
nullity. Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies the institution of the heir. The will however, provides
for the institution of the petitioner as the universal heir and nothing more. The result is the same. The entire will is
null.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they
are not mentioned therein or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Disinheritance in turn is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a
cause authorized by law. The effects flowing from preterition are totally different form those of disinheritance.
Preterition under Article 854 shall annul the institution of an heir. This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there
are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under
Article 918, such disinheritance shall also annul the institution of the heirs but only insofar as it may prejudice the
person disinherited, which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. In disinheritance, the nullity is limited
to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
233) Caniza vs. CA
268 SCRA 641
FACTS:
Caniza was 94 years old and was declared incompetent because of her advanced years. She was represented in
this case by Evangelista, her guardian. Caniza previously allowed the spouses and their relatives to occupy the
house without paying any rent out of the goodness of her heart. However, she needed money for her support,
maintenance and medical treatment. A demand by Evangelista was made on the Estradas to vacate the house
but refused contending that they would inherit the house as stated in Canizas holographic will. Evangelista then
moved to eject the spouses from the premises. The MetTC ruled in favor of Caniza which was reversed by the
RTC on the ground that the "action by which the issue of defendants' possession should be resolved is accion
publiciana, the obtaining factual and legal situation ** demanding adjudication by such plenary action for recovery
of possession cognizable in the first instance by the Regional Trial Court." This was affirmed by the CA. Caniza
died during the pendency of the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the Estradas may rightfully claim the property through the holographic will?
HELD:
No, they cannot.
It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding
possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges
that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law. The only issue that could legitimately be raised under the circumstances was that involving
the Estradas possession by tolerance, i.e., possession de facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to postulate
that the proper remedy for Caiza is not ejectment but accion publiciana, a plenary action in the RTC or an action
that is one for recovery of the right to possession de jure.
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The Estradas possession of the house stemmed from the owners express permission. That permission was
subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made through
her judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed with authority to do so. Nor is it of any consequence that
Caniza executed a will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas, that circumstance did not give them the
right to stay on the premises after demand to vacate on the theory that they might in the future become owners
thereof. The Estradas right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being possible unless
and until the will is duly probated. Prior to the probate of the will, any assertion of possession by them would be
premature and inefficacious.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or revoked; and until
admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit:
"No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court." An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not
inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that
in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to
generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the
death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as
niece of Carmen Caiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Caiza's nephew,
Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted
as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. To
be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Caiza's demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit
instituted by her through her guardian. That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs
have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal at bar.
234) PECSON VS. AGUSTIN CORONEL
G.R. No. L-20374, 11 October 1923
FACTS:
Decedent Dolores Coronel died testate and without issue. She appointed as sole heir her nephew, Lorenzo
Pecson, wife of her niece Angela Coronel, for the services he rendered for the decedent. He was also appointed
as executor thereof, and in his absence, decedents grandson Vincent Pecson. As she cannot read and write, he
asked Vicente Francisco to write the will and sign it in her behalf. In the attestation clause, it stated that the will
was signed by each of (them) us signed these presents in the presence of others and of the testatrix...
Decedents relatives opposed the probate of the will, contending that the will could not be valid because first, it is
not natural in our culture to exclude a persons blood relatives from her vast estate and hence at most, the
decedent merely intended to appoint Lorenzo as executor; and second, that the attestation clause failed to comply
with the provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the relatives exclusion in the will amounts to preterition?
2.
Whether or not the defect in the attestation clause invalidates the will?
RULINGS:
First issue: Relatives Exclusion from the Will
Their exclusion in the will does not amount to preterition. The liberty to dispose of ones estate by will when there
are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889 which provides:
Any person who has no forced heirs may dispose by will all of his property or any part of it in favour of any person
qualified to acquire it. The preference given to Lorenzo is not purely arbitrary, nor a caprice or whim of the
moment as there was sufficient proof that Lorenzo indeed rendered services for the decedent even prior to 1914,
and was the decedents administrator and manager of her affairs in the last years of her life.
Second issue: Defect in the Attestation Clause
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Section 618 of the Civil Code of Procedure provides that: The attestation shall state the number of sheets or
pages used, uponwhich the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will in each and every page
thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of each other. However, the attestation clause of the decedents will stated that it was signed in the
presence of others. In resolving the same, the Court relied on in its decision in In Re Will of Abangan whereby it
ruled that the object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Hence, the laws
on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. However, one must not lose
sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So
when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing
but demands more requisite entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testators will, must be
disregarded. The phrase is then construed to mean as of the other and is a mere grammatical error.
Grammatical or clerical errors are not usually considered of vital importance when the intention is manifest in the
will.
235) ACAIN VS. IAC
G.R. No. 72706, 27 October 1987
FACTS:
Nemesio Acain died testate, leaving the following as heirs: his wife Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain, his
legally adopted daughter Virginia Fernandez, and his nephews and nieces from his brother Segundo Acain. In his
will, he bequeathed all of his property to Segundo, and in case the latter predecease him, all his property will pass
on to Segundos children. As Segundo predeceased Nemesio, the formers children moved for the probate of the
will. Nemesios widow and daughter filed a motion to dismiss, contending that they were preterited. The trial court
denied their motion. On appeal, the IAC reversed and ordered the trial court to dismiss the probate of the will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosa and Virginia had been preterited?
RULING:
Yes. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that: The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of the heir; but the devisese and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heir should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they
are not mentioned therein , or even though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the
entire inheritance, except those legacies and devices, unless it impairs the legitime of the heirs.
In the case of Rosa, preterition shall not apply as she does not ascend nor descend from the testator,
although she is a compulsory heir. There is no preterition because she is not in the direct line. However, in the
case of Virginia, preterition applies because as a legal adoptee, she is vested with the same rights and duties as
that of a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adoptee the legal heir of the adopter.
The universal institution of the petitioner and his siblings to the entire inheritance of the testator results in
totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any other
testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
236) NERI VS. AKUTIN
G.R. No. L-47799, 13 June 1941
FACTS:
247

Agripino Neri died on 12 December 1931 leaving 6 children from his first wife, and 5 children from his
second wife Ignacia Akutin. In his will, he stated that his children by the first marriage shall have no longer any
participation in his estate as they had already received their corresponding shares during his lifetime. However,
during the hearing for declaration of heirs, the court found that contrary to what Agripino declared in his will, that
all his children by the first and second marriages are intestate heirs of the deceased without prejudice to one-half
of the improvements introduced in the properties during the existence of the last conjugal partnership which
should belong to Ignacia Akutin. The Court of Appeals modified the decision and ruled that the will was valid with
respect to the two-thirds part which the testator can freely dispose of.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the omission of the children by the first wife annuls the institution of the children by the
second wife as sole heirs of the testator?
RULING:
Yes. Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited. In this case, while the children of the first marriage were mentioned in the will, they were
not accorded any share in the hereditary property, without expressly being disinherited. The omission of a forced
heir or anyone of them, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to disinherit is not expressly
made or is not at least manifest. Except as to legacies and devises which shall remain valid insofar as they are
not officious, preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession. The will in this case,
there being no legacies or devises, is void.
237) VIADO NON VS. CA
G.R. No. 137287, 15 February 2000
FACTS:
Spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned, among others, a house and lot pertained to as the Isarog
property. Virginia died on 20 October 1982, followed by Julian 3 years later. Left as heirs were their children
namely: Rebecca Viado Non, Delia Viado, Nilo Viado, and Leah Viado Jacobs. Both Nilo and Leah died on 22
April 1987. Nilo left as heirs his wife Alicia and their 2 children.
The children of spouses Viado lived in the Isarog property together with Nilos widow and children.
However, a dispute arose when Rebecca Viado Non asked that the property be divided equally between the 2
families to make room for their growing children. Nilos wife and children claimed absolute ownership over the
property evidence by a deed of donation executed by Julian in favour of Nilo, covering his conjugal share, and
a deed of extrajudicial partition settlement in which Julian, Leah, and Rebecca waived in favour of Nilo all their
interests and rights over their share of the property inherited from Virginia. Both documents were registered 5
years after its execution, and a new TCT is issued by the Register of Deeds in Nilos favor.
Petitioner Rebecca contends that Delia Viado, their retardate sister, was not part of the extrajudicial
settlement, and hence amounts to preterition which should invalidate the settlement. Both the trial court and CA
ruled in favor of Nilos wife and children. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Delias exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement amounts to preterition?
RULING:
Yes. However, in the absence of bad faith and fraud, Article 1104 of the Civil Code must apply which, in
essence, provides that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be
rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her.
238) PEREZ VS. GARCHITORENA
G.R. No. L-31703, 13 February 1930
248

FACTS:
Ana Maria Alcantara died testate. The pertinent provisions of her will are as follows:
NINTH. Being single and without forced heir, to show my gratitude to my niece-in-law, Carmen Garchitorena, of
age, married to my nephew, Joaquin Perez Alcantara xxx as my sole and universal heiress to the remainder of my
estate xxx
TENTH. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena dies, I order that my whole estate shall passu unimpaired to her
surviving children; and should any of these die, his share shall serve to increase the portions of his surviving
brothers (and sisters) by accretion, xxx the estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children
insofar as it is legally permissible.
Among Ana Marias properties is a deposit amounting to Php 21,428.23 with La Urbana. Mariano
Garchitorena held a judgment for Php 7, 872.23 against Joaquin, Carmens husband. He attached the La Urbana
deposit to satisfy his claims. Carmen secured an injunction restraining the execution.
Garchitorena contends that the same can be levied because Carmen is a universal heiress. Carmen
contends that the deposit belongs to Carmens children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the instant case is a fideicommissary substitution?
RULING: Yes. Manresa provides 3 requisites for fideicommissary:
1.
First heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate;
2.
An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a 3 rd person the whole or a part of the
estate;
3.
Second heir.
Applying the foregoing to the case, Carmen was called to the enjoyment of the estate according to the 9 th clause
of the will. Clause 10th which provides that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (Carmens) surviving
children, thus, instead of leaving Carmen at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or by living the law to take its
course in case she dies intestate, the said clause not only disposes of the estate in favour of the disposition
thereof in case she should die after the testatrix. The children of Carmen are referred to as second heirs. Hence,
the deposit does not belong to Carmen as her absolute property, but also to her children, from the moment of
death of Ana Maria. It cannot be attached by Mariano.
239) RABADILLA VS. CA
G.R. No. 113725, 29 June 2000
FACTS:
Alejandra Belleza executed a Codicil making Jorge Rabadilla as her heir. The Codicil provides that she is
bequeathing No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre and that should Dr. Rabadilla predecease her, the lot will go to his
wife and children. She also stated that it shall be Dr. Rabadillas obligation to deliver in favour of Marlina
Coscolluela 75 piculs of Export sugar and 35 piculs of domestic sugar, until Marlinas death. In case of Dr.
Rabadillas death, his heir shall fulfil such obligation. In the event that Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs shall later sell,
lease, mortgage the Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall also have the obligation to respect and deliver to
Marlina yearly 100 piculs of sugar ever December.
Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife and children. His son Johnny is herein petitioner.
Marlina then filed a complaint against the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla for the enforcement of the Codicil. The parties
came up with a Memorandum of Agreement whch was, however, not complied with by the heirs. The RTC
dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whehter or not Dr. Rabadillas institution in the Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution?
RULING:
Yes. Article 882 of the New Civil Code provides that the statement of the object of the institution or the
application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a
condition unless it appears that such was his intention. That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at
249

once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and
for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should
disregard this obligation. Article 883 provides that when without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the
preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a
manner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in article 882 is known as an institucion sub modo or
modal substitution. In a modal substitution, the testator states:
1.
The object of the institution;
2.
Purpose or application o the property left by the testator;
3.
Charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.
A mode imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficscy of his rights to the
succession. In a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir
to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but not obligate; and the mode obligates but does
not suspend.
In this case, Alejandra intended Dr. Rabadilla to inherit the property. She likewise imposed an obligation on him
and to his heirs to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to Marlina. However, Alejandra did not make Dr. Rabadillas
inheritance and effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation.
Should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to Alejandras near descendants.
The institution of Dr. Rabadilla is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir
without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution. Since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of
liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heirs should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from
the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as
modal institution.
240) MORENTE VS. DE LA SANTA
G.R. No. L-3891, 19 December 1907
FACTS:
Consuelo Morente died testate. In her will, her husbnd Gumersindo de la Santa was made sole heir,
subject to the condition that he shall not remarry, remain to live with her brothers, and that should he have
children with anyone, the 2/3 of the estate shall remain for her brother Vicente, or the latters children, and the
remaining 1/3 is subject to Gumersindos disposal.
Gumersindo married again 4 months after his wifes death. Consuelos sister asked for the annulment of
the legacy in the will on the ground of remarriage. She contends that the mere act off remarriage of Gumersindo
strips him off of his rights acquired from the will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Consulelos intention that Gumersindos remarriage would forfeit the legacy?
RULING:
No. Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made confidential and
Article 798 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon the
widow or widower.
In this case, there was nothing in the will which would mean that it was Consuelos intention that
Gumersindos remarriage would strip him of his rights from the legacy. There is no express condition attached to
that legacy in references to the 2nd marriage, as the will simply said he will not marry again. No condition was
attached in case of non-compliance.
241) ROSALES VS. ROSALES
No L-40789, 27 February 1987
FACTS:
250

Petra Rosales died intestate, leaving as heirs her husband Fortunato and their 2 children. Carterio
Rosales, also a child of Spouses Rosales, predeceased her, and left as heirs his son Macikequerox and widow
Irenea. The estimated gross value of Petras estate was about Php 30, 000.00.
Magna Rosales Acebes, her daughter, filed for intestate proceedings and was later on appointed as
administratrix. The court then declared the following as Petras legal heirs, and their respective shares:
1.
Fortunato Rosales (husband) ;
2.
Magna Rosales Acebes (daughter) ;
3.
Macikequerox Rosales (grandson) ;
4.
Antonio Rosales (son) .
Irena appealed, contending that as the surviving spouse of Carterio, she is compulsory heir of Petra together with
her son. The court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law?
RULING:
No. Intestate heirs/ legal heirs are divided into two: those who inherit in their own right (as in the order
of intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code), and those who inherit by right of representation as
provided in Article 981 of the Civil Code.
There is nothing in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her
mother-in-law. The provisions of the Code which relates to intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate
with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir.
Article 887, from which Irenea bases her claim refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case
the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of the parent-in-law. The surviving
spouse is considered as a 3rd person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
The estate in this case is that of Petra Rosales, the mother-in-law of Irenea. It is from Petras estate that
Macikequerox draws a share of the inheritance by right of representation as provided in Article 981. Article 971
explicitly declares that Macikequerox is called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not
succeed his father Carterio who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father
would have succeeded. Irenea cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with
her mother-in-law.
242) FRANCISCO vs. FRANCISCO-ALFONSO

G.R. No. 138774. March 8, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio Francisco and
Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased. Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio
Francisco with his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7) children. Gregorio Francisco
(hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential land, situated in Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan,
covered by TCT Nos. T-32740 and T-117160. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to
his daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and
Zenaida Pascual.
After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her half sisters. They
informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983. After verification, Aida learned that
there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August
15, 1983, Gregorio executed a Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels
of land to Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued
TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual.
On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against petitioners for annulment of
sale with damages. She alleged that the signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the Kasulatan sa
Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery.
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In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or simulation of the deed of sale. After
due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. The Court of
Appeals Reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a simulated contract
transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate children?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract of sale.
Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified that Zenaida Pascual and Regina Francisco did not
have any source of income in 1983, when they bought the property, until the time when Felicitas testified in 1991.
As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was engaged in operating a canteen, working as
cashier in Mayon Night Club as well as buying and selling RTW (Ready to Wear) items in August of 1983 and
prior thereto. Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She did not withdraw money
from her bank account at the Rural Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the property. She had personal
savings other than those deposited in the bank. Her gross earnings from the RTW for three years was P9,000.00,
and she earned P50.00 a night at the club.
Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a net income of P300.00 a
day in 1983. She bought the property from the deceased for P15,000.00. She had no other source of income.The
testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to whether there was
consideration for the sale and also as to whether the property was bought below or above its supposed market
value. They could not even present a single witness to the kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase
price. Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and hence, null and
void.
Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code provisions insofar as the transaction
affected respondents legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not
the Family Code. Obviously, the sale was Gregorios way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at
the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her
legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a change of heart and informed his
daughter about the titles to the property.
According to Article 888, Civil Code:
The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and
of the mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the
surviving spouse as hereinafter provided.
Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were the only property
left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her fathers estate. By law, she is
entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child. The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco
must be determined in proper testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir
can not be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.
243) NIEVA vs. ALCALA

G.R. No. L-13386 October 27, 1920
FACTS:
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married Francisco
Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born. Juliana Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her
said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, the parcels of land described in Paragraphs V and X
of the complaint.
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of land
above-mentioned passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco
Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other
252

defendant herein.
Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants herein, took
possession of the parcels of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampo (a
minor) had inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased father.
On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the said
Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for purposes of recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in
question, particularly described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint, invoking the provisions of article 811 of
the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva and if an
illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil
Code.
HELD:
The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an acknowledged natural daughter
of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the property here in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate
relative has no right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code and which reads as
follows:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some
other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property
came.
SC held that the object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family, following the precedents of the foral law.
And it could not be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the right to succeed the natural child and
viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither have the right to inhering from legitimate
ones; the law in the article cited established a barrier between the two families; properties of the legitimate family
shall never pass by operation of law to the natural family. (Ibid. pp. 251-252.)
Article 943, above referred to provides as follows:
A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or
legitimated child.
To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by
operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the express provision of the foregoing article (943).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, without any finding as to
costs. So ordered.
244) SOLIVIO vs. CA
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
FACTS:
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel
"Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or
nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister
of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his
deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr. He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after
his marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24
titles) which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but
no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and
lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were
transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his
253

plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a
college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26,1977 without having set up the
foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties.
Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother,
from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed
to carry out the plan of the deceased.
Celedonia was appointed as the administratix of the estate and later on the court adjudicated her as the
sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javallana Jr. and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE
JAVELLANA FOUNDATION"
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the
court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On
September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property of the deceased was subject to reserve troncal.
HELD:
The Court finds no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reserva
troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva
troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)the ascendant who inherits by operation of law
property from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)relatives within the third
degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property came.
3. The propositusthe descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other
ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not
an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in
question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio,
who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited
by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not
apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article
891. Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children,
surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are
Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral
relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the
whole blood.
However, It is true that by the agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did
agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and therefore,
Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.
The petition for review was granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals were SET ASIDE.
Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate.
However, comformably with the agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of
the deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both the
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petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of
trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes
set forth in its charter.
245) SUMAYA vs. IAC
G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991
FACTS:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets of properties subject of this case: 1) A
one-third (1/3) interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna from his father Jose,
Sr., who died on January 28, 1945; and 2) A one-seventh (1/7) interest pro-indiviso in ten (10) parcels of
registered lands from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950.
On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin
Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the real properties above-mentioned. On November 3, 1952,
Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above described properties in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del
finado Raul Balantakbo."
Consuelo then sold some properties to Mariquita H. Sumaya and Villa Honorio Development Corporation which
the latter in turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut
Cooperative.
On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died. On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis,
and Erasto, all surnamed Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also
all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first named
Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil cases to recover the properties described in the respective
complaints which they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties sold were subject to a reserva troncal and if it is necessary to reserve and
annotate the same.
HELD:
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the Balantakbos and the Coust of Appeals affirmed said
decision.
The SC Held that consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the widowed
spouse) had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable character of the property, in
reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who inherited from a descendant property which the latter inherited
from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right reserved in real property
subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal in
the New Civil Code. This rule is consistent with the rule provided in the second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D.
1529, which provides that: "The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as
third persons are concerned . . ." (emphasis supplied)
The properties involved in this case are already covered by a Torrens title and unless the registration of the
limitation is effected (either actual or constructive), no third persons shall be prejudiced thereby.
The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action of the private respondents did not
prescribe yet. The cause of action of the reservees did not commence upon the death of the propositus Raul
Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of the reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968.
Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right (or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of
fee simple over the reserved property during the lifetime of the reservor. Only when the reservor should die before
the reservees will the latter acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take
their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree (See Velayo
Bernardo v. Siojo, G.R. No. 36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89). The reserva is extinguished upon the death of
the reservor, as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a
reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not exercised within the time for recovery may prescribe in ten
(10) years under the old Code of Civil Procedure (see Carillo v. De Paz, G.R. No. L-22601, October 28, 1966, 18
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SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty years under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. The actions for recovery of the
reserved property was brought by herein private respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years from
the death of the reservor. Therefore, private respondents' cause of action has not prescribed yet.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is
AFFIRMED, except for the modification on the necessity to annotate the reversable character of a property
subject of reserva troncal.
246) RIOSA vs. ROCHA
G.R. No. L-23770, February 18, 1926
FACTS:
Maria Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano Riosa, it being her first and only marriage
and during which time she bore him three children named Santiago, Jose and Severina. The latter died during
infancy and the other two survived their father, Mariano Riosa. Santiago Riosa, now deceased, married Francisca
Villanueva, who bore him two children named Magin and Consolacion Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased, married
Marcelina Casas and they had one child who died before the father, the latter therefore leaving no issue. Mariano
Riosa left a will dividing his property between his two children, Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving the latter the
eleven parcels of land described in the complaint. Upon the death of Jose Riosa he left a will in which he named
his wife, Marcelina Casas, as his only heir.
On May 16, 1917, the will of Jose Riosa was filed for probate. Notwithstanding the fact that Marcelina
Casas was the only heir named in the will, on account of the preterition of Maria Corral who, being the mother of
Jose Riosa, was his legitimate heir, I Marcelina Casas and Maria Corral, on the same date of the filing of the will
for probate, entered into a contract by which they divided between themselves the property left by Jose Riosa, the
eleven parcels of land described in the complaint being assigned to Maria Corral.
Maria Coral then sold some parcels of land to Marcelina Casas and the latter to Pablo Rocha. However
some of the parcels of land were returned by Pablo to Marcelina alleging that the said parcels of land were
erroneously transferred by Maria to Marcelina.
An action was brought by Magin Riosa, for whom the property should have been reserved, against Maria
Corral, whose duty it was to reserve it, and against Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha as purchasers of parcels
10 and 11. The complaint prays that the property therein described be declared reservable property and that the
plaintiffs Jose and Consolacion Riosa be declared reservees; that this reservation be noted in the registry of
deeds; that the sale of parcels 10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be declared valid only in so far as
it saves the right of reservation in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and of the defendant Consolacion Riosa, and
that this right of reservation be also noted on the deeds of sale executed in favor of Marcelina Casas and Pablo
Rocha;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parcels of land subject to reserva troncal necessitates the recording of which in the
registry of deeds.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that Marcelina Casas, as well as Pablo Rocha, Knew of the reservable character
of the property when they bought it. They had knowledge of the provisions of the last will and testament of
Mariano Riosa by virtue of which these parcels were transferred to Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was one of the
legatees in the will. Marcelina Casas was the one who entered into the contract of partition with Maria Corral,
whereby these parcels were adjudicated to the latter, as a legitimate heir of Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was the
very person who drafted the contracts of sale of these parcels of land by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by
the latter to himself. These facts, together with the relationship existing between Maria Corral and Marcelina
Casas and Pablo Rocha, the former a daughter-in-law and the latter a nephew of Maria Corral, amply support the
conclusion that both of them knew that these parcels of land had been inherited by Maria Corral, as her legitime
from her son Jose Riosa who had inherited them, by will, from his father Mariano Riosa, and were reservable
property. Wherefore, the duty of Maria Corral of recording the reservable character of lots 10 and 11 has been
transferred to Pablo Rocha and the reservees have an action against him to compel him to comply with this
obligation. The judgment appealed from is modified and Pablo Rocha is ordered to record in the registry of deeds
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the reservable character of parcels 10 11, the subject of this complaint.
247) DE PAPA vs. CAMACHO
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
FACTS:
Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and
Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles and having a
common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and
great grandfather of defendant.
Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children,
Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the four (4)
parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.
Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs)
and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of
land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, were
adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the
said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in
equal
Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven
(7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said
property subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequently annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title.
Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were
inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of
her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the said seven (7) parcels
of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and
under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because
they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was
inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their
being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not all relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without
distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista, or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant,
the rights of said relatives are subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
HELD:
The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino,, declared the
principles of intestacy to be controlling,
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees
must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the
praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are
related to him within the same degree as the latter. The court, therefore, held, and so rule, that under our laws of
succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the
decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffsappellees would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is
no reason why a different result should obtain simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed by
the interregnum of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the
reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay TongkoCamacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
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WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and the complaint is
dismissed.
248) LLorente vs. Rodriguez, et. Al.
G.R. NO. L-3339, MARCH 26, 1908
FACTS:
Martina Avalle, widow of Llorente, had during her marriage four legitimate children named Jacinta, Julio,
Martin, and Francisco, all with the surname of Llorente y Avalle. In the will executed by her on the 31st of
December, 1900, she instituted as her sole and general heirs her three first-named children, Jacinta, Julio, and
Martin, and the children of the late Francisco, named Soledad and Adela Llorente.
Jacinta died prior to the testatrix, on the 11th of August, 1901, leaving several legitimate children with the
surname of Rodriguez y Llorente, and besides them, a natural daughter named Rosa Llorente.
The said Rosa Llorente, the natural daughter of Jacinta Llorente, wanted to become a party in the
proceedings for the probate of the will of Martina Avalle, but the legitimate children of the said Jacinta Llorente
objected thereto on the ground that they were the sole and exclusive heirs of their mother, the late Jacinta
Llorente, and that the plaintiff, Rosa Llorente, absolutely cannot be a party thereto.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu, where the will was admitted for probate, held that Rosa Llorente had
no right whatever to the inheritance of the late Martina Avalle, and denied her all right to intervene in the
proceedings regarding the estate of the said deceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not the hereditary portion which Martina Avalle left in her will to her legitimate daughter Jacinta
Llorente, and which the latter had not been able to possess because of her death before that of the testatrix,
should also pass to her natural daughter, Rosa Llorente, the same as to her legitimate children.
HELD: No. From the fact that a natural son has the right to inherit from the father or mother who acknowledged
him, conjointly with the other legitimate children of either of them, it does not follow that he has the right to
represent either of them in the succession to their legitimate ascendants; his right is direct and immediate in
relation to the father or mother who acknowledged him, but it cannot be indirect by representing them in the
succession to their ascendants to whom he is not related in any manner, because he does not appear among the
legitimate family of which said ascendants are the head.
If Jacinta Llorente had survived her mother, Martina Avalle, she would have inherited from her, and in
what she inherited from her mother, her natural daughter, Rosa Llorente would have participated, in conjunction
with her legitimate children, from the day in which the succession became operative, because she would then
appear by virtue of her own right to inherit from her mother the legal quota that pertained to her; but, not because
she has said right, would she also be entitled to that of representation, inasmuch as there is no legal provision
establishing such a doctrine; that Rosa Llorente might and should inherit from her natural mother is one thing, and
that she should have the right to inherit from her who would be called her natural grandmother, representing her
natural mother, is quite another thing. The latter right is not recognized by the law in force.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed.
249) FILOMENA PECSON, as administratix of the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson, et al.
vs. ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO
28 PHIL. 81
258

FACTS:
Some time prior to the 17th day of September, 1910, the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was
presented to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay for probate.
Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the legislation of the will on the ground that it had not been
authorized nor signed by the deceased. However, after hearing the respective parties, the court found that the will
had been signed and executed in accordance with the provisions of law.
On the 18th day of September, 1910, the said Tomas Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and Rosario
Mediavillo, presented a motion alleging that Rosario Mediavillo is and Joaquin Mediavillo was a legitimate child of
the deceased Teresa Pecson. Teresa was a daughter of the testator; that the said granddaughter, Rosario
Mediavillo y Pecson, was disinherited by her grandfather, the testator Florencio Pecson, according to clause 3 of
the will, because she failed to show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised her hand against him.
On his will, Florencio Pecson state that he disinherited Rosario Mediavillo "because she was grossly disrespectful
to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore
it is my will that she, the said Rosario Mediavillo, shall have no share in my property."
ISSUES: Whether or not the court may inquire into the cause of the disinheritance and decide whether there is a
ground for such disinheritance.
Whether or not Basiliso Mediavillo, the father of Joaquin Mediavillo, is the latters heir by representation.
HELD: Yes, the Civil Code (art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one of the causes
expressly fixed by law. In accordance with the provisions of that article (848) we find that articles 756 and 853
provide the cases or causes for disinheritance; or, in other words, the cases or causes in which the ancestors may
by will disinherit their heirs.
Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the disinheritance can only be effected by the testament, in which shall
be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. If it is true that heirs can be disinherited only by
will, and for causes mentioned in the Civil Code, it would seen to follow that the courts might properly inquire
whether the disinheritance has been made properly and for the causes provided for by law.
The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or
not, seems to be supported by express provisions of the Civil Code. Article 850 provides that "the proof of the
truthfulness of the reason for disinheritance shall be established by the heirs of the testator, should the
disinherited person deny it." It would appear then that if the person disinherited should deny the truthfulness of the
cause of disinheritance, he might be permitted to support his allegation by proof. The right of the court to inquire
whether or not the disinheritance was made for just cause is also sustained by the provisions of article 851, which
in part provides that:Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if
contradicted, should not be proven . . . shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person
disinherited.
With reference to the second assignment of error, The Supreme Court held that the right of representation shall
always take place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending. In collateral lines, it shall take place
only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the whole or half blood.
It will be remembered that the whole argument of the appellants with reference to the first assignment of error was
that Rosario Mediavillo had been disinherited and the court evidently believed that there were no "legitimate
children, descendants of the deceased, surviving," and that therefore the father or mother of said legitimate
children would inherit as ascendants. Inasmuch, however, as there was a descendant in the direct line, surviving,
the inheritance could not ascend, and for the reason the lower court committed an error in declaring that Basiliso
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Mediavillo was entitled to inherit that share of the estate that would have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he
been living.
Therefore, and for all the foregoing, that part of the judgment of the lower court nullifying and setting aside
paragraph 3 of the will is hereby affirmed, and that art of said judgment which decrees to Basiliso Mediavillo onehalf of the estate of Florencio Pecson, belonging to Teresa Pecson and which would have been given to Joaquin
Mediavillo, had he been surviving, is hereby revoked.
And without any findings as to costs, it is hereby ordered that the cause be remanded to the lower court.
250) DOROTHEO vs CA
320 SCRA 12
FACTS:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in
1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandros death,
petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of
the latters last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandros will to probate. Private
respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void.
The trial court granted the motion and issued an order, declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late
Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and
declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the
late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed
according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the government.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took care
of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon denial of her
motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to
file appellants brief within the extended period granted. This dismissal became final and executory on February 3,
1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989.
Petitioner assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order
which declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandros will that was earlier admitted to probate.
Issue: May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has
become final and executory still be given effect?
Held: The petition is without merit.
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated, particularly on three aspects:
whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedents last will and testament;
compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
the testamentary capacity of the testator;
and the due execution of the last will and testament.
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and
disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress,
fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, that he was of the proper
testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will.
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will
has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is
260

always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that
deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, i[13]
the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had
already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having
attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court
finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity
to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the
remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief
that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the
decision or order
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she precisely
appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of January 30, 1986
wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such
as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were
parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation otherwise
that would amount to forum-shopping. It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his
spouse should be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.
No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic
and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity
thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity that is whether the provisions of
the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro
was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly
held by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
251) URIARTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BENEDICTO ESTRADA
284 SCRA 511
FACTS:
Agatonica Arreza is the offspring of Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil. The Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is
the son of Agatonica. Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another
daughter, the decedent Justa. Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the nephew of Justa by her half sister
Agatonica.
Domingo Arnaldo is the brother of Juan Arnaldo. Domingo and his wife Catalina Azarcon had a daughter, Primitiva
Arnaldo. Primitiva then married Conrado Uriarte who had children, one of whom was Pascasio Uriarte. The widow
and daughters of Pascasio are the petitioners in his case. Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within
the fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte.
The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her brother Gregorio. The children of Primitiva by
Conrado Uriarte, aside from Pascasio, are Josefina, Gaudencio, Simplicio, Domingo and Virgilio, all surnamed
Uriarte. The children of Gregorio Arnaldo, Primitiva's brother, by Julieta Ilogon, are Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas,
Lupecino and Felisa. These other petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives within the fifth degree of
consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo.
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional Trial Court for the partition of the land left
by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare
by inheritance from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares by purchase. Private respondent
claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He complained that
Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the land as Justa's tenant, refused to give him (private respondent) his
share of the harvest. He contended that Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could claim only onehalf of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil.
Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs. In their answer, the heirs denied
they were mere tenants of Justa but the latter's heirs entitled to her entire land.
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They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo, their great
granduncle. It was allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, Ambrocio's nephews, in a holographic will
executed by Ambrocio in 1908. Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the land and Juan, one-third. The heirs
claimed that the land had always been in their possession and that in her lifetime Justa never asserted exclusive
right over the property but only received her share of the harvest from it. They alleged that private respondent did
not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, the original owner of the
property.
ISSUE: Whether a nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant or
spouse survive the decedent
HELD: YES. Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As already stated,
private respondent is the son of Justa's half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's nephew. A nephew is
considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent.
That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being
his aunt's heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, "The determination of whether the relationship is of
the full or half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.
252) SAYSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
205 SCRA 321
FACTS:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno
died on 1952, and Rafaela on 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on 1972. His wife died nine
years later, on, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed
Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother,
filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The action was
resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the
decedent's lawful descendants.
Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate
estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. The complainants asserted the
defense, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
ISSUE: Whether the adopted children of Teodoro (Delia and Edmundo) are entitled to inherit Teodoros share by
right of representation?
HELD:NO! There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno
and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her
grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited
had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children.
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were
total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same
right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption
is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either
party.
253) Bagunu vs. Piedad
G.R. No. L-66574 June 17, 1987
Doctrine: The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and
excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. By right
262

of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place
and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. In the direct line, right of
representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of
representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such
children survive with their uncles or aunts.
The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group
both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate
children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and
descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth
decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring
with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute
rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil
Code gives direction.
Facts:
On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No.
3652, entitled "In the matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late
Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to
respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an
incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity
in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate.
Issue: WON petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, can inherit alongside respondent, a collateral
relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application
among collateral relatives?
Held:No. Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt
of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the
deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent. The right of representation does not apply to "others
collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are
sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate
parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and
fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in
the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity,
expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship
of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction. Respondent, being a
relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the
fifth degree, from succeeding an intestato to the estate of the decedent.
254) DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA guardian of
FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN,
respondents
182 SCRA 427
FACTS: ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, FACTS: Private respondent filed a Petition dated
January 23, 1976 with the CFI of Cavite in a special proceeding "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be
issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special Administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were
the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion. Juliana married Simon Jardin
263

and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy. Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate
son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Pascual Santero died in 1970, while Pablo Santero died in 1973 and Simona Santero died in 1976. Pablo
Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to
wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
In 1976, the court declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit: Petition for the Letters of Administration of the
intestate Estate of Pablo Santero; Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual
Santero; Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero; and Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and
Pascual Santero by Order of the Court in 1977. Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed
her "Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of
the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero and
Pablo Santero. Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children.
In 1980, the court issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the settlement
of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero
and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."
Felisa Jardin filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and it was denied by the trial court. On appeal, the Intermediate
Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court and declaring the Felisa Jardin as the sole heir of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of
heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda,
de Santero.
HELD: NO. Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,
who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code
which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors (petitioners
herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art.
992, Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism
and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in
turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further
grounds of resentment. Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of
264

the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier
provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the
person spoken of. The record shows that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to
be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor
natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article
992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be
the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
255) WENCESLA CACHO, petitioner-appellee, vs. JOHN G. UDAN, and RUSTICO G. UDAN, oppositorsappellants.
G.R. No. L-19996
April 30, 1965
REYES, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
John, Rustico and Silvina are siblings. Silvina G. Udan died leaving a purported will naming her illegitimate son,
Francisco G. Udan, and one Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs, share and share alike. During the probate of the
will, opposition was made by her two brothers on the ground that the will was not attested and executed as
required by law, that the testatrix was incapacitated to execute it; and that it was procured by fraud or undue
influence. Francisco died pending the probate. The RTC denied the oppositions filed by the two brothers. Hence,
this appeal
ISSUE:
WON oppositor brothers, John and Rustico Udan, may claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, the late
Silvina Udan.
HELD:
The Court ruled that the court below correctly held that they were not, for at the time of her death Silvina's
illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, was her heir intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers under Articles 988 and
1003 of the governing Civil Code of the Philippines in force at the time of the death of the testatrix
It decreed that collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only in the absence of descendants,
ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sisters can concur with the widow or widower under
Article 1101, they do, not concur, but are excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate (Art. 1003).
The trial court committed no error in holding that John and Rustico Udan had no standing to oppose the probate
of the will. For if the will is ultimately probated John and Rustico are excluded by its terms from participation in the
estate; and if probate be denied, both oppositors-appellants will be excluded by the illegitimate son, Francisco
Udan, as sole intestate heir, by operation of law.
The death of Francisco two years after his mother's demise does not improve the situation of appellants. The
rights acquired by the former are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the appellants, who
are legitimate brothers of his mother, for the reason that, as correctly decided by the court below, the legitimate
relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. This is clear from Article 992 of the Civil Code.
The legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. This is clear from Article 992 of the
Civil Code.
David T. Tolentino
256) ISABEL DE LA PUERTA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELITA DE
LA PUERTA, respondents.
G.R. No. 77867 February 6, 1990
CRUZ, J.:
265

FACTS:
The testator, Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, leaving her properties to her three
surviving children, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel. Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her legitime and
was appointed executrix of the will.
Vicente and Alfredo opposed the petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel. The two claimed that their
mother was already senile at the time of the execution of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning, that
the properties listed in the inventory of her estate belonged to them exclusively.
Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor. Vicente de la Puerta filed with the CFI of Quezon,
a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta, which was thereafter granted. Isabel appealed the said decision to the
CA. Vicente died during the pendency of the appeal, prompting her to move for the dismissal of the case.
Carmelita filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of
Vicente de la Puerta. The said motion was granted by the probate court granted the motion, declaring that
Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled to the amounts claimed for her support. CA
affirmed this order of the lower court. Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner's main argument is that Carmelita
was not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and
remained his wife until his death in 1978. Carmelita's real parents are Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan.
ISSUE:
WON respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, can claim successional rights to the estate of her alleged grandmother.
HELD:
The Court held that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother and Carmelita is a spurious child. It is
settled that in testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only in the following cases: first,
when the person represented dies before the testator; second, when the person represented is incapable of
succeeding the testator; and third, when the person represented is disinherited by the testator. In all of these
cases, since there is a vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the children or descendants of thefiliation of
private respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, who claims successional rights to the estate of her alleged
grandmother. person represented to succeed by right of representation.
The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of a deceased person try to succeed him in his
rights which he would have had if still living.
Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right to inherit from her directly or in his own
right. No right of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita upon her father's death, which
came after his own mother's death. It would have been different if Vicente was already dead when Dominga
Revuelta died. Carmelita could then have inherited from her in representation of her father Vicente, assuming the
private respondent was a lawful heir. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from
Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate and
illegitimate families. This article provides quite clearly:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
Even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for there would
be no natural kindred ties between them and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either.
Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate estate of her
father but not to the estate of Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be filed
in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father's estate and cannot be considered in the probate of
Dominga Revuelta's will.
David T. Tolentino
257) BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA
MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and
NUMERIANA MANUEL, petitioners, vs. HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995
VITUG, J.:
266

FACTS:
The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died
intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant.
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, filed this suit. During his
marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, a child
named Juan Manuel was born. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In
consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 sqm was
executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land, were later bought by Juan
and registered in his name. The couple were not blessed with a child that is why they took private respondent
Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter." On June 3, 1980, Juan Manuel
executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro over a one-half (1/2) portion of his
land. Juan Manuel died intestate on February 21, 1990. Two years later, Esperanza Gamba also passed away. A
month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the
three parcels of land.
Following the registration of the document of adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles
in the name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles, were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar.
Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over
the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed
of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. The petitioners filed a complaint filed before the RTC Lingayen, Pangasinan, seeking
the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that
petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-ininterest to institute the suit. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the trial court.
Hence, this Petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners are entitled to inherit in the intestate estate of their illegitimate brother, Juan Manuel.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the petitioners are not entitled to inherit from the intestate estate of their illegitimate brother,
Juan Manuel under ARTICLE 992, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child.
The principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family wherein such
doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and
illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since
the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary
dispositions.
A barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family wherein the legitimate
brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot
inherit from the illegitimate child.
Admittedly in her answer, Modesta is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. A ward, without the benefit of
formal/judicial adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. Nevertheless, the complaint of petitioners
seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three TCT's issued to her favor,
as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the
trial court.
David T. Tolentino
258) OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs. ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA,
MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL,
WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL,
ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUALFERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING
JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992
267

PARAS, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio
Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual.
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural,
adopted or spurious children.
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), a Special Proceeding for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. On October 16,
1985, all the heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein
petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual
The Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia
Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual,
their uncle. On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the
Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights.
Both the RTC and CA dismissed the submitted Motions as well as Motions for reconsideration reiterating the
hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
WON Article 992 excludes recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
Ruling:
The Court dismissed the instant petition for lack of merit and affirmed the assailed decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals. It cited the previous decided case of Diaz v. IAC, where such Court ruled that Article 992 of the
Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may
have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the
legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.
The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the doctrine, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father
Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood
brother of their father.
David T. Tolentino
259) MANUEL SARITA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ANDRES CANDIA, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-7768
November 14, 1912
ARELLANO, C.J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Apolinario Cedenio and Roberta Montesa are allegedly the owners of a parcel of land apparently of an
area of 2 cavanes of corn upon which they had planted fruit trees. Respondent Candia claims ownership over the
land having purchased the same from Villarosa, the vendee of Apolinario. Petitioners claim on the other hand, that
as nieces and nephews,they are the collateral heirs of Apolinario, through the latters brothers and sisters. Sarita,
however, is the grandnephew of Apolinario.
The RTC absolved the defendant from the complainant, on the grounds that, with regard to the animals and real
property sued for, there was no proof whatever that they were in possession of the spouses at the time of their
death, and, with respect to the land: (1) That the defendant was the possessor in good faith continuously and was
presumed to hold under just title so long as the contrary should not be proved; and (2) that neither the plaintiffs
nor their alleged predecessors in interest made demand for it during the period of twenty-six years, since the
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ownership thereof was conveyed by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeo to Juan Basa Villarosa, on the 24th of June,
1881, it being that during this very long period of time they did not obtain possession of the property.
Hence, the judgment having been appealed through a bill exceptions.
ISSUE:
WON grandnephews have a right of representation over the estate of the deceased.
HELD:
The Court ruled that the right of representation is limited to nephews and nieces who are children of brothers and
sisters of decedent. The plaintiff Sarita who joins as the representative of his grandfather in a complaint with
others, who are brothers and nephews of the predecessor in interest, lacks such right of representation, for it
belongs in the collateral line only to the nephews and not to the grandnephews. Hence, sister and nephews of the
deceased having appeared to claim the inheritance, they, as the nearest of kin, exclude a remote relative like a
grandnephew.
David T. Tolentino
260) CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and
TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.
G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
This case involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against herein private respondent before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid Civil Case No. Q-88-1054, over a
parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which
was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
Petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of petitioner's father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died
on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero,
and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
Records revealed that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed an
Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66886, as a consequence of which Transfer Certificate of Title No.
358074 was issued in the name of Martin Guerrero. Martin Guerrero then sold the lot to herein private respondent
Teodora Domingo and thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter's name.
After Martin Guerreros death, Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit
one-half of the property in question by right of representation.
Both the RTC and CA granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint for reconveyance and
declared that the documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family
picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code to establish
legitimacy and filiation
HELD:
The Court ruled for the petitioners and reversed and set aside the questioned judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals. Petitioners and Private Respondent were declared co-owners of the subject property with an undivided
one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.
The Court considered two points:
First is the issue on petitioner's legitimacy.
269

The documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken separately and independently of each other, are not per
se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It seems that the lower courts have regrettably overlooked
the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established
and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock
are legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be
properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further
consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The
presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption,
by merely filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact. Indeed, she
overlooked or disregarded the evidential rule that presumptions like judicial notice and admissions, relieve the
proponent from presenting evidence on the facts he alleged and such facts are thereby considered as duly
proved.
Second is the question regarding their filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
The Court is sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general
requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the
declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her
niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no
other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the
necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is in the present case an
absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent's declaration
and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero.
Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result. For while the
documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are
however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to
interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence.
David
T. Tolentino
261) ZOSIMA VERDAD vs. CA
G.R. No. 109972 April 29, 1996
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Zosima Verdad is the purchaser of a 248-square meter residential lot at Magallanes Street, now Marcos
M. Calo St., Butuan City. Private respondent Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales, seeks to exercise a right of legal
redemption over the subject property and traces her title to the late Macaria Atega, her mother-in-law, who died
intestate on 08 March 1956.
During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first with Angel Burdeos and the second, following the
latter's death, with Canuto Rosales. At the time of her own death, Macaria was survived by her son Ramon A.
Burdeos and her grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela Lozada of the first marriage and her
children of the second marriage, namely, David Rosales, Justo Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales
(notice that other respondents in this case are the children from the 2 nd marriage). Socorro is the wife of David
Rosales who sometime after the death of Macaria, died intestate without issue.
It was discovered that the heirs of Ramon Buderos sold the lot in question to petitioner in an instrument dated 14,
June 1982 (for P55,460) and another instrument on 14 Nov 1982 (this time a duly notarized deed of sale for
P23,000), which sale was later discovered by respondent Socorro on 30 Mar 1987. Settlement was attempted at
the Failure of settlement at the Lupong Tagapamayapa prompted the Respondent to initiated a case for the "Legal
Redemption with Preliminary Injunction" before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.
RTC decided that the private respondents' right to redeem the property had already lapsed. On appeal by
respondents, Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts decision declaring plaintiff-appellant, Socorro C.
Rosales, entitled to redeem the inheritance rights (Art. 1088, NCC) or pro indiviso share (Art. 1620, NCC) of the
Heirs of Ramon Burdeos, Sr. in Lot 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre, within the remaining ELEVEN (11) DAYS
from finality hereon, unless written notice of the sale and its terms are received in the interim, under the same
270

terms and conditions appearing under Exhibit "J" and after returning the purchase price of P23,000.00 within the
foregoing period.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON respondents may initiate redemption proceedings over the lot, her not being a legal co-heir, as well as the
timeliness of that the said case was instituted.
HELD:
The Court denied the petition. On the contention of petitioner as to the capacity of Socorro to initiate the
redemption proceedings, the Court ruled that Respondent possess the capacity to ask for a redemption. It is true
that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a mere relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her
parents-in-law; however, Socorro's right to the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in
Macaria's estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his
mother's inheritance.
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother's death. When Macaria died on 08 March 1956 her estate
passed on to her surviving children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the
property. When David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included his undivided interest over the
property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on
succession(Art 995 and 1001). Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David Rosales,
thereupon became co-owners of the property that originally descended from Macaria.
As to the timeliness of the filing of the petition, the Court ruled that such was exercised on time. Concededly, no
written notice of the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-owners required under Article 1623 of
the Civil Code. Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private respondent Rosales
sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31 March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the Office
of the City Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on 16 October 1987, before the trial court.
The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that notwithstanding actual
knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove
all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.
David T. Tolentino
262) FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant, vs.GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO,

CATALINA
FERARIS
DE
VILLEGAS,
JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19382
August 31, 1965
FACTS:
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was
known to have resided in Manilacontinuously until 1944. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last
time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession
and distributing her estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City. The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant,
ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an
aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all
surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo
Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent).
The trial court ruled that the appellees, as children of the only predeceased brother of the decedent, are nearer in
degree than the appellant since nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation.
271

ISSUE:
Who amongst the claimants are entitled to the inheritance?
HELD:
We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent
(three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first
ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir. Appellant is likewise right in her contention
that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with
brothers or sisters of the deceased.
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de
cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. Under Article 1009,
the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals
(uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.
Brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other
collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed
the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering
the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals.
Therefore, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the
decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
263) BICOMONG vs. ALMANZA
G.R. No. L-37365 Nov. 29, 1977
Facts:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas having three children: Perpetua, Igmedia and Ignacio. When
Sisenda died, Simeon married Silvestra producing two children: Felipa and Maura.
The subject matter of the complaint concerns the one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the 5 parcels of
land which she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso.
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint, namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the
Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the CFI of Laguna
and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their
lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.
After the death of Maura Bagsic, properties passed on to Cristela Almanza who took charge of the administration
of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested for the partition of their aunt's properties.
However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the
last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same, the
plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request
as the debts, accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division of the properties
having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration of the same to the defendants.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The respondents have the right to inherit from Maura by
right of representation.
The appellate court certified the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the nephews and nieces from the brothers and sisters whether full or half blood has the right to inherit
Held:
Yes. The nephews and nieces from the brothers and sisters whether full or half blood has the right to inherit.
In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Art. 1003 of the NCC
provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura
Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is
succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10)
children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the NCC.
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the
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maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or
half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood.
The only difference in their right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Art. 1006 of the NCC,
which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of
half blood.
264) CITY OF MANILA VS. ARCHBISHOP
G.R. No. L-10033 / August 30, 1917
FACTS: In 1668, Ana Sarmiento resided with her husband in the City of Manila. She owned properties consisted
of five parcels of land in Malate and Paco. She made a will and later on added a codicil to said will. The will
contained provisions for the establishment of a "Capellania de Misas"; that the first chaplain of said capellania
should be her nephew Pedro del Castillo; that said will contained a provision for the administration of said
property in relation with the said "Capellania de Misas" succeeding administration should continue perpetually. In
1672, Ana Sarmiento died. For more than two hundred years, respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,
through his various agencies, has administered said property.
Petitioner city of Manila filed an action before the CFI to have declared escheated to the city of Manila the
mentioned property. The theory of the petitioner is that one Ana Sarmiento was the owner of said property and
died in the year 1668 without leaving "her or person entitled to the same." However, the respondent opposed
alleging that it has rightfully and legally succeeded to the possession and administration of the property in
accordance with the terms and provisions of the will of Ana Sarmiento.
The trial court denied the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the property can be escheated in favor of City of Manila.
HELD: No
Section 750 of Act No. 190 provides when property may be declared escheated. It provides, "when a person dies
intestate, seized of real or personal property . . . leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same," that then
and in that case such property under the procedure provided for by sections 751 and 752, may de declared
escheated.
The proof shows that Ana Sarmiento did not die intestate. She left a will. The will provides for the administration of
said property by her nephew as well as for the subsequent administration of the same. She did not die without an
heir nor without persons entitled to administer her estate. It further shows that she did not die without leaving a
person by law entitled to inherit her property. Therefore, the property in question cannot be declared escheated.
The will clearly, definitely and unequivocally defines and designates what disposition shall be made of the
property in question. The heir mentioned in said will evidently accepted its terms and permitted the property to be
administered in accordance therewith. And, so far as the record shows, it is still being administered in accordance
with the terms of said will for the benefit of the real beneficiary as was intended by the original owner.
265) TORRES vs. LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-25966
November 1, 1926
FACTS:
Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially declared incapable of taking care of himself and had been placed under the
care of his cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. The will instituted as universal heirs of all his property his
daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno and cousin Lopez. Lopez died 4 days from the time the will was made and the
testator died about a month thereafter. The time the will was made Lopez had not presented his final accounts as
guardian, and no such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death.
Margarita Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent, filed a case claiming half of the estate of
Tomas by intestate succession as next of kin and nearest heir. Luz, on the other hand, claims the same by
accretion and in the character of universal heir under the will of Tomas. Appellant contends that there has
supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the half of the estate which was intended for Vicente F. Lopez and
that this half has descended to the appellant.
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The trial court ruled in favor of Luz.
ISSUE:
Whether or not one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriquez should go to Margarita Lopez being the next of kin and
nearest heir of Vicente Lopez or to his daughter by accretion?
HELD:
Article 753 of the Civil Code which in effect declares that, with certain exceptions in favor of near relatives, no
testamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his guardian before the final accounts of
the latter have been approved. This provision is of undoubted application to the situation before the court and the
provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F. Lopez was not any general incapacity on his
part, but a special incapacity due to the accidental relation of guardian and ward existing between the parties.
Accretion takes place in a testamentary success when two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or
the same portion thereof without special designation of shares and secondly, when one of the persons so called
dies before the testator or renounces the inheritance or is disqualified to receive it. In the case before us we have
a will calling Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same inheritance without special
designation of shares. In addition to this, one of the persons named as heir has predeceased the testator, this
person being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been alive at the time of the testator's death by
reason of his being then the legal guardian of the testator with accounts unsettled, does not make a case for
intestate succession as to his part of the estate. This article (982) is the exact application to the case and its effect
is to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided half which she would have received in
conjunction with her father if he had been alive and qualified to take, but also the half which pertained to him.
There was no error whatever, therefore in the order of the trial court declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the
whole estate.
266) NEPOMUCENO vs. IAC
139 SCRA 206
FACTS:
On July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo died and left a will. In the said will, the testator named and appointed herein
petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the
testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and
Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with
petitioner as husband and wife. The estate was devised to his legal heirs, except the free portion which was
devised to petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the will but was denied by the court on the
opposition of the legal heirs on the ground that petitioner admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, thus,
she is wanting in integrity and letters testamentary should not be issued to her.
The Court of Appeals declared the will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void,
Petitioner contends that the lower court has no jurisdiction in passing upon the question of the intrinsic validity of
the will.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court may pass upon the provisions of the will.
HELD: NO.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the will to be validly drawn, it went on to
pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the courts area of inquiry is limited to an examination and
resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the will. The fact that the probate court declared a devise made in a will null and void will be
sustained where no useful purpose will be served by requiring the filing of a separate civil action and restricting
the court only to the issue of extrinsic validity of the will. There is no useful purpose that would be served if we
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remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the
probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
The prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons who are living
in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the
recipient may receive. The very wordings of the will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was
disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
267) PASTOR vs. CA
122 SCRA 885
FACTS:
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on June 5, 1966, survived by his Spanish
wife Sofia Bossio (who also died), their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor
de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada (QUEMADA).
QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR., which
contained a legacy in favor of Quenada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.s 42% share in the operation of Atlas
Mining.
PASTOR, JR. and his wife claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance Thus,
Quemada appointed as special administrator filed for reconveyance of said claims of alleged properties including
the subject of legacy.
ISSUE:
Whether the probate order resolved with finality the questions of ownership.
Whether the probate ordere resolved the intrinsic validity of the will.
HELD:
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the
will, As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with
finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is
provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
Probate court erred in assuming in its implementing order that the probate order adjudged the issues of
ownership. In case of death of one of the spouses, their respective rights must be liquidated and the debts paid in
the succession proceedings for the deceased spouse. Certiorari is proper where probate court issued erroneous
implementing orders of its probate order. Legacy made in a will cannot be distributed without a prior liquidation of
the decedents estate and payment of debts and taxes. A legacy is not a debt of the estate for which a writ of
execution may issue. An order of execution that varies the terms of a final order can be questioned in a certiorari
proceeding.
268) SANCHEZ vs. CA
G.R. No. 108947 September 29, 1997
FACTS:
Private respondent Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while
Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate children of Rosalia. Petitioners
Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C.
Sanchez. Rosalia filed a petition for letters of administration over the estate of her mother following her death and
the estate of her father, Juan, who was at the time in a state of senility. But before the administration proceedings
could formally be terminated and closed, Juan died. Such that petitioners as heirs of Juan, filed a petition for
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letters of administration over the intestate estate of Juan, which petition was opposed by Rosalia. Thereafter,
Rosalia and petitioners executed a Compromise Agreement wherein they agreed to divide the properties
enumerated therein of the late Juan Sanchez. Petitioners filed a Motion to require administratrix, Rosalia, to
deliver deficiency of 24 hectares and/or to set aside compromise agreement. Private respondent Rosalia and
petitioners entered into and executed a memorandum of agreement which modified the compromise agreement.
Nine years later, petitioners filed a motion to require Rosalia to submit a new inventory and to render an
accounting over properties not included in the compromise agreement. They likewise filed a motion to defer the
approval of the compromise agreement, in which they prayed for the annulment of the compromise agreement on
the ground of fraud.
The trial court declared the compromise agreement void and unenforceable, the same not having been approved
by the intestate court and that the same having been seasonably repudiated by petitioners on the ground of fraud.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and declared the modified compromise agreement valid and binding.
Petitioners contend that, because the compromise agreement was executed during the pendency of the probate
proceedings, judicial approval is necessary to shroud it with validity.
Issue: Whether or not the compromise agreement entered by the parties during the pendency of probate
proceedings is valid and binding.
Held: Yes. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as "a contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced." Being a consensual
contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not required for its
perfection. Petitioners' argument that the compromise was not valid for lack of judicial approval is not novel; the
same was raised in Mayuga vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court ruled: It is alleged that the lack of judicial
approval is fatal to the compromise. A compromise is a consensual contract. As such, it is perfected upon the
meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract. And from that moment not only does it become binding upon
the parties, it also has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata (Civil Code, Art. 2037), even if not
judicially approved . In the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid
compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by their respective counsels, they each negotiated its terms and
provisions for four months; in fact, said agreement was executed only after the fourth draft. As noted by the trial
court itself, the first and second drafts were prepared successively in July, 1969; the third draft on September 25,
1969; and the fourth draft, which was finally signed by the parties on October 30, 1969, followed. Since this
compromise agreement was the result of a long drawn out process, with all the parties ably striving to protect their
respective interests and to come out with the best they could, there can be no doubt that the parties entered into it
freely and voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be bound thereby. To be valid, it is merely required under the law to
be based on real claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by the parties thereto. Indeed, compromise is a
form of amicable settlement that is not only allowed but also encouraged in civil cases. Article 2029 of the Civil
Code mandates that a "court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair
compromise."In opposing the validity and enforcement of the compromise agreement, petitioners harp on the
minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myna. Citing Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they contend that the court's
approval is necessary in compromises entered into by guardians and parents in behalf of their wards or children.
However, we observe that although denominated a compromise agreement, the document in this case is
essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides that "[e]very act which is
intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition,
although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction."For a partition to be
valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the
decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and
liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal
representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the
Register of Deeds. We find that all the foregoing requisites are present in this case. We therefore affirm the
validity of the parties' compromise agreement/partition in this case.
269) NAZARENO VS. CA
343 SCRA 637
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FACTS
Maximinoo Nazareno Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on April 15, 1970 , while Maximo
Sr. died on December 18, 1980 . They were survived by their children, Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico and
Maximinoo Jr. Maximinoo Jr. and Natividad are petitioners in this case, while Romeo and his wife are
respondents.
Deceased spouses Nazareno acquired properties in Quezon City and in Cavite . It is the ownership of some of
these properties that is in question in this case.
It appears that after the death of Maximino Sr. Romeo filed an intestate case in the CFI of Cavite. Romeo was
appointed administrator of his fathers estate. In the course of the proceedings, Romeo discovered that his
parents executed several deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister, Natividad.
This involved 6 lots in QC one of which is a lot occupied by Romeo and his wife. This lot was later sold by
Natividad to Maximino Jr.
Romeo filed on behalf of the estate of Maximino Sr., a case for annulment of sale with damages against Natividad
and Maximino Jr. on the ground that both sales were void for lack of consideration. Trial Court rendered
judgement declaring the nullity of the deed of sale. CA modified RTC, ordered lots cancelled and restored to the
estate of Maximino Sr.
ISSUE: Whether upon death of the deceased spouses their estate alone can seek the annulment of said sale?
Whether the sale is valid?
HELD
The petition is without merit.
The fact that other properties had allegedly been sold by the spouses Maximino Sr. and Aurea does not
necessarily show that the deed of sale made in favor of Natividad is valid.
The trial court and CA found that the Nazareno spouses transferred their properties to their children by fictitious
sales in order to avoid payment of inheritance taxes. It was also found out that Natividad had no means to pay for
the six lots subject of the deed of sale.
The estate of Maximino alone cannot contest the validity of the deed of sale because the estate of Aurea has not
been settled. CA decision affirmed.
270) ZARAGOZA VS. CA
341 SCRA 309
FACTS
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was a registered owner of certain parcels of land situated at the municipalities of
Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara, Iloilo . He had four children, Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentina and Alberta .
On Decemeber 1964 he died without a will.
Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint against Florentino for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of
lots 943 and 871 and for payment of damages. She claims that, his father in his lifetime partitioned the said
properties among his children. The shares of her brothers and sisters were given to them in advance by way of
deed of sale, but without valid consideration. Her share, lots 943 and 871 were not conveyed then. She averred
that because of her marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the
Philippines except by hereditary succession.
Petitioners denied that there was partition of the estate of their father during his lifetime. The trial court ruled and
ordered adjudication lot 871 to the plaintiff Alberta , the claim for lot 943 is dismissed. Ca reversed RTC in so far
as lot 943 is concerned, ordered Alberta as owner of lot 943.
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ISSUE: 1. Whether the partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza of his properties which includes lot 871 and 943
valid?
2. Whether the validity of the sale and consequently, the TCT over lot 943 registered in the name of
Petitioners Florentina be a valid subject matter of the entire proceeding for the delivery of the inheritance share.
HELD
This court affirms the decision of CA, lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of respondent, based on
documentary evidence and testimonial evidence. Partition during the lifetime of Flavio zaragoza is valid. It is basic
in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Article
1080 of the Civil Code is clear, the petition, must be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new
proceeding were all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime.
Second Issue. Petition is a collateral attack. It is not allowed by Sec 48 of PD 1529. The certificate, in absence of
fraud, is eveidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of the owner. The title once registered. Should not
be thereafter impugned, altered or changed except in direct proceeding permitted by law.
271) MENDOZA VS CA
199 SCRA 778
FACTS
Petitioner Mendoza I et al instituted before CFI of Bulacan an action for reconveyance of real property against
private respondents spouses Samonte. Petitioners are legitimate children of deceased Mendoza , Trinidad , their
mother sold a parcel of land to respondents spouses Samonte. Petitioners aver that they are entitled to legal
redemption.
According to the plaintiff, the sale of the disputed property in favor of the defendants was null and void on the
ground that, as a mere co-owner of an undivided estate, Trinidad Mendoza had no right to divide the estate into
parts and then convey a part thereof by metes and bounds to a third person, since there had never been any
partition, judicial or extra judicial, of the estate among the heirs of their late father, Arcadio.
The trial court dismissed the the petitioners complaint. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the deed of sale is void? Whether petitioners can still exercise the right of legal redemption?
HELD:
Petitioner Trinidad is not entitled to one-half (1/2) of said lot but only to the share of one legitimate child or 1 and
1/3 rights and interest, citing article 996 of the Civil Code.
The deed of sale is void insofar as it affects the rights and interests of other petitioners because petitioner Trinidad
can only sell her 1 1/3 rights and interest over the said lot and no more than that. Corollary, the remaining
petitioners can still exercise the right of legal redemption, conformably with Article 1620 of the civil code.
272) AZNAR BROTHERS REALT CO. VS CA
327 SCRA 359
FACTS
Lot no. 4399 containing an area of 34,325 square meters located at Brgy. Mactan, Lapu Lapu City was acquired
By Aznar from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on by virtue of an extrajudicial Partition of real estate with deed of
absolute sale.
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Private respondents were allegedly allowed to occupy portions of lot 4399 provided that they leave the land in the
event that the company would use the property for its purpose. Later, Aznar entered into a joint venture with Sta.
Lucia Realty for development of the subject lot into a multi-million peso housing subdivision and beach resort.
When demands to vacate failed, Aznar filed with MTCC a case for unlawful detainer and damages. Private
Respondents alleged that they are the successors and descendants of the eight children of the late Crisanta and
that they had been residing in the concept of owner since the time of their parents and grandparents. They claim
that the deed of absolute sale was simulated and fraudulent. Thus files with RTC a complaint seeking to declare
the subject document null and void.
MTCC favored Aznar. RTC ordered demolition. CA reversed and set aside RTC and declared Private
Respondents as the rightful possessors.
ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale is valid.
HELD:
Private respondents claim that not all the known heirs participated in the extrajudicial partition, and that two
persons who participated and were made parties thereto were not the heirs of Crisanta.
This claim even if true would not warrant rescission of the deed. Article 1104 of the Civil Code as to parties who
were allegedly not heirs, article 1105 is in point.
Extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale is a notarized document. As such, it has in its favor the
presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It
is admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. Decision of RTC reinstated.
273) RALLA VS. UNTALAN
L-63253-54 APRIL 27 1989
FACTS
Rosendo Ralla, a widower, filed a petition for the probate of his will in the RTC of Albay. In his will he left his entire
estate to his son, Pablo (herein petitioner substituted by heirs), leaving nothing to his other son, Pedro.
At the same time, Pedro filed an action for the partition of the estate of their mother, Paz. With this case, the
brothers agreed to amicably compromise via project partition, whereby sixty-three parcels of land, apparently
forming the estate of their deceased mother was divided between them.
In the course of the proceeding for the probate of Rosendo, Pablo filed a motion to dismiss the petition for probate
on the ground that he was no longer interested in the allowance of the will of his late father for its probate would
no longer be beneficial to him. This motion was denied, it was also denied at the CA. In its decision the CA said,
indeed the petitioner stood to gain if the testate proceedings were to be dismissed because then he would not be
compelled to submit for inclusion in the inventory of the estate of Rosendo comprising 149 parcels of land from
which he alone had been collecting rentals and receiving income, to the exclusion and prejudiced of hi s brother
who was being deprived of his successional rights. Consequently, the court declared Pedro and Pablo the only
heirs of Rosendo who should share equally upon the division of the latters estate and thereupon converted the
testate proceedings into one of intestacy.
After eleven years, one Joaquin Chancoco brother in law of Pablo filed a petition for the probate of the same will
of Rosendo on the ground that the decedent owed him P5000. The petition for probate was granted. Teodorico
Almine, son-in-law of Pablo was appointed special administrator, over and above the objections of the heirs of
Pedro. In taking possession, Teoderico also took possession of the 63 parcels of land subject of the partition
earlier.
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Judge Untalan orderd that the 63 parcels of land should be included in the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of Rosendo and thereafter proceed as probate proceedings. After 2 years, Judge Untalan reconsidered his
order and held that the project partition is respected and upheld.
Petitioners filed an MR but was denied hence the instant case.
ISSUE: Whether the partition should be regarded or respected in view with the probate proccedings of the estate
of Rosendo
HELD:
Verily, the rule that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated. This, of
course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will. Thus this
rule invoked, is inapplicable in the instant case where there are two separate cases each involving the estate of
two different person comprising dissimilar properties.
The project partition is valid and binding upon the brothers as well as upon their heirs especially as this was
accompanied by delivery of possession to them of their respective shares. They are duty bound to respect the
division agreed upon by them and embodied in the document of partition.
Thus the petitioner could no longer question the exclusion of the lands subject of the partition from the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo. Petition dismissed.
274) FELIX BALANAY, Jr. vs. Martinez
L-39247 June 27, 1975
FACTS
Leodegaria Julian died in Davao City , she was survived by her husband Felix Balanay Sr. and by their 6 children,
Felix Jr., Avelina, Beatriz, Carolina Delia and Emilia.
Felix Jr. filed in the lower court a petition for the probate of his mothers notarial will. In the said will, it was
declared that, 1.) She was the owner of the southern half of the nine conjugal lots, 2.) That it was her desire that
her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husbands lifetime. She devised and partitioned
the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husbands one half share of the
conjugal assets.
Feliz Sr. and Avelina opposed the probate on the ground of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence
preterition of the husband and alleged improper partitioned of the conjugal estate. They claim that Felix Jr. should
collate certain properties which he had received from the testatrix. Felix Jr. in his reply attatched an affidavit
signed by Feliz Sr waiving and renouncing hereditary rigts in the estate of his wife in favor of their children.
Avelina contended that the affidavit was void. Lower court denied and gave effect to the affidavit and conformity of
Felix Sr.
In the meantime, A lawyer Montana appeared claiming to be a lawyer of Felix Jr, he filed a motion to withdraw the
probate and to proceed by intestae estae proceeding. The lower court adopted the view of Atty , Montana that the
will was void. So, it dismissed the petition for probate and converted the testate proceeding into an intestate
proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its
allowance or formal validity, and declaring it void.
HELD
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and
because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate. The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the wills
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intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. But the probate court erred in declaring the
will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in
its order it gave effect to the surviving husbands conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary
rights which presumably included in one-half share of the conjugal estate.
The rule is that the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of
the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if
the first invalid disposition had not been made. (Art.792 CC) Where some valid parts will be upheld if they can
be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general
testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries.
The provision of the will of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirs during her husbands lifetime but
should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code.
Felix Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership (Art. 179
and Art 1041 CC) but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half
share in the conjugal estate (1061 CC) it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in Articles 750 and 752 of
the CC. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance or at least
his legitime should be respected.
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the conjugal estate in
the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the
conjugal estate but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her
testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become valid assuming that the will may be
probated.
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the husband, the surviving spouse. His preteritiion did not produce
intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wifes will and renounced his hereditary rights.
Hearing for the petition for probate affirmed.
275) Amorante Plan vs. IAC
L-65656 February 28,1985
FACTS
In the intestate proceeding for the settlement of Regino Bautistas estate, his widow filed a motion dated
December 9, 1964 for authority to sell to Plan the two lots and theater for not less than P140,000. The purpose
was to pay the debts amounting to P117,220. The motion was set for hearing. It was indicated that the children
were notified through one child Milagros Bautista.
Judge Jimenez of the probate court granted the authority to sell to Plan the entire estate of the deceased for not
less than P140,000 so as to pay the obligations of the estate, appearing that all heirs have conformed thereto.
On that day, Florencia and Plan executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage obligations for the two lots.
A motion to approve the sale was filed. Judge signed the original deed of sale under the word approved to
indicate that the sale was okayed by probate court.
Sixteen days after the sale an opposition to the agreement of absolute sale was filed by Federico Bautista child of
the deceased. Federicos counsel did not file any objection to the project of partition as per order by the Judge.
The reason is not hard to surmise. The estate sought to be partitioned had already been sold to Plan.
Federico contended that because there was no compliance with Section 7 Rule 89 of the Rules of Court the sale
was void. Instead of asking the court to act on his petition for relief from the orders authorizing and approving the
sale, Federico filed a separate action against Plan to nullify the sale. Judge dismissed the action. He ruled that the
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nullity of the sael as to Federicos 1/16 share should be resolved in the intestae proceeding. He filed three times
same action, all have been dismissed.
Ca ruled in favor of Federico, it declared void the agreement to sell based on article 1088 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether Federico could nullify in a separate action, instead of an intestate proceeding his fathers estate,
the sale of two conjugal lots made by his mother, with authorization and approval of the probate court.
HELD
We hold that the appellate court erred in ordering Plan to reconvey the disputed property to Federico. Said
judgment is bereft of factual and legal basis. Federico did not pray for reconveyance he prayed for receivership for
nullification of the agreement to sell and the sale itself. Article 1088 of the Civil Code does not justify legal
redemption in this case because it refers to the sale of hereditary rights, and not to specific properties, for the
payment of the debts of the decedents estate as to which there is no legal redemption.
In the instant case we agree with the decision of the Judges that Federicos remedy is in the intestate proceeding
where his petition for relief has been pending for nearly twenty years.
276) Maria Bicarme vs. CA and Cristina Bicarme
L-51914 June 6, 1990
FACTS
Maria Bicarme and Cristina Bicarme are the only surviving co-heirs and co-owners and entitled in equal shares
over the parcel of lands (cornland and Riceland) in litigation. Spouses Bicarme died intestate and were survived
by children, Maria and Victoria (mother of Cristina). Cristina instituted this action for partition, because her aunt,
Maria refused to share with her the yearly fruits of the disputed parcels of lan. Maria howeve, maintains that she
acquired these two parcels of land from deceased spouses Bidaya and since then until the present, had been in
open, public, peaceful and contionous, adverse possession and enjoyment in the concept of absolute owner.
Maria further claims that Cristina never shared or contributed to the payment of taxes of said two parcels of land.
The trial court stated that the provision in the deed of sale (Maria subscribed that the property is inherited from her
father) was in the nature of trust provision in favor of Cristina as co-owner and co-heir.
ISSUE:
Who has ownership rights over the litigated parcels of land
HELD: We agree with the trial court. By admitting that the cornland is inherited property, Maria in effect recognized
Critinas rights thereto as a co-owner co-heir.
Having established that Critinas co-ownership rights, maria nonetheless insists that Cristinas rights are barred by
prescription under secs 40 and 42 of act 190 / art 1116 of the Civil Code where the longest period of both
acquisitive and extinctive prescription is ten years. In the present case, Cristina, it is alleged, asserted her claims
34 yers after her right of action accrued. On Marias claims of acquisitive prescription, the trial court held that
Maria was a trustee with respect to Cristinas share. As such, prescription, as a mode of acquiring title, could not
apply.
An action for partition implies that the thing is still owned in common. If a co-owner holds the property in exclusive
adverse possession as owner, asserting the property in exclusive dominion for a required period, he can acquire
sole title to it as against co-heirs or co-owners. The imprescriptibly of an action for partition cannot thus be
invoked when one of the co-owners has possessed the property as exclusive owner, and for a period sufficient to
acquire it by prescription. From the moment one of the co0owners claims that he is absolute owner and denies
other any question involve is no longer of partition but of ownership.
Acquisitive prescription cannot apply in this case.
282

A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents fruits or profit from the property cannot serve as proof
of exclusive ownership, it is not borne out of clear and complete evidence that he exercise acts of possession
which unequivocally constitute an ouster of the other co-owners. Cristinas rights to partition will therefore prosper.
283

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan

Prof. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

CASES ASSIGNED for DIGEST

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 108

PATERNITY AND FILIATIOIN---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 116

PARENTAL AUTHORITY----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 143

CASES IN PROPERTY-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 152

CASES IN SUCCESSION----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 193

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

1) TAADA VS. TUVERA

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

3) PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION v THE HON. SECRETARY OF

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

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7) Van Dorn vs. Romillio

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

10) SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS

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16) Albenson Enterprises Corporation vs. CA

17) GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS

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