Yaptinchay v. Torres, G.R. No. L-26462, June 9, 1969

YAPTINCHAY V.
TORRES
G.R. No. L-26462 June 9, 1969
Petitioner: Teresita Yaptinchay
Respondent: Hon. Guillermo Torres CFI Judge Rizal
Facts: Isidro Yaptinchay and Teresita Yaptinchay, the petitioner, lived as husband
and wife openly for 19 years. Isidro Yaptinchay died Intestate. Teresita Yaptinchay
was first appointed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, as
Special Administratrix and then as regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay. An opposition was registered by Josefina Yaptinchay, the alleged legal
wife, and Ernesto Yaptinchay and other children, of the deceased Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay, upon the ground that said Teresita C. Yaptinchay, not being an heir of
the decedent. After the parties were heard, the probate court granted counterpetitioners' prayer and named Virginia Y. Yaptinchay special administratrix upon a
P50,000-bond.
This time, Teresita filed in another branch (Pasig Branch) of the Rizal, CFI an
action for replevin and preliminary injunction for liquidation of the partnership
supposedly formed during the period of her cohabitation with Isidro and for
damages. Respondent judge Torres ordered issued a temporary restraining order
that Virginia et. al. and their agents from disposing any of the properties listed in
the complaint and from interfering with Teresitas rights to, and possession over the
house now standing at North Forbes Park
Issue: W/N preliminary injunction may be granted (in relation to Teresitas
prayers)?
Held: No.
Ratio: Petition dismissed and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction dissolved
and set aside.
Injunction is not to be granted for the purpose of taking property out of possession
and/or control of a party and placing it in that of another whose title thereto has not
been clearly established. In the verified petition before this Court, Teresita avers
that construction of said North Forbes Park property was undertaken jointly by her
and deceased, Teresita even contributing her own exclusive funds therefor. But in
her amended complaint she had said that she acquired through her own personal
funds and efforts real properties such as North Forbes Park house. Virginia et. al.
dispute Teresitas claim of complete or even partial ownership of the house,
maintaining that construction of that house was undertaken by the deceased without
Teresita's intervention and with his own personal funds.
Note that it was only after hearing and considering the evidence adduced and the
fact that after the death of Isidro the Forbes Park house was among the properties of
the deceased placed under Virginias administration that respondent judge issued
the injunction order. Thus, petitioner herein is not entitled to the injunction she
prayed for below.
Furthermore, grant or denial of an injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the
court, in the exercise of which appellate courts will not interfere except in a clear
case of abuse. Although Teresitas presented loans that she had contracted during
the period when said house was under construction as proof of ownership, evidence
was wanting which would correlate such loans to the construction workthe
evidence, on the contrary were indicative that the loans she obtained from the bank
were for purposes other than the construction of the home. Thus, the unsupported
assertion that the North Forbes Park house is petitioner's exclusive property may
not be permitted to override the prima facie presumption that house, having been
constructed on Isidros lot (or of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and
during his marriage with Josefina, is part of the estate that should be under the
control of the special administratrix.
Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on the provisions of Art.
144, CC be decisive. Art. 144 says that: "When man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership." But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil
relationship envisaged in Art. 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the existence of
which must first be shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to
accrue. One such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner
had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property
involved. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests
in the property in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that
would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. For, the
existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial protection is
wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights; nor is it a
remedy to enforce an abstract right.
There must be proof that the property claimed was acquired by the labour, industry,
or efforts of both parties in an amorous relationship.

Yaptinchay v. Torres, G.R. No. L-26462, June 9, 1969

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