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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46570

April 21, 1939

JOSE D. VILLENA, petitioner,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, respondent.
Vicente del Rosario for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Secretary of the Interior to
restrain him and his agents from proceeding with the investigation of the herein petitioner, Jose D. Villena, mayor of
Makati, Rizal, which was scheduled to take place on March 28, 1939, until this case is finally determined by this
court. The respondent was required to answer, but the petition for preliminary injunction was denied.
It appears that the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, upon the request of the Secretary of the
Interior, conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the petitioner, as a result of which the latter was found to have
committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of the law profession. The
respondent, therefore, on February 8, 1939, recommended to the President of the Philippines the suspension of the
petitioner to prevent possible coercion of witnesses, which recommendation was granted, according to the answer
of the Solicitor-General of March 20, 1939, verbally by the President on the same day. The Secretary of the Interior
suspended the petitioner from office on February 9, 1939, and then and thereafter wired the Provincial Governor of
Rizal with instruction that the petitioner be advised accordingly. On February 13, 1939, the respondent wrote the
petitioner a letter, specifying the many charges against him and notifying him of the designation of Emiliano Anonas
as special investigator to investigate the charges. The special investigator forthwith notified the petitioner that the
formal investigation would be commenced on February 17, 1939, at 9 a. m., but due to several incidents and
postponements, the same had to be set definitely for March 28, 1939. Hence, the petition for preliminary injunction
referred to in the beginning of this opinion.
The petitioner contends in his petition:
(1) That the Secretary of the Interior has no jurisdiction or authority to suspend and much less to prefer by
himself administrative charges against the petitioner and decide also by himself the merits of the charges as
the power to suspend municipal elective officials and to try and punish them for misconduct in office or
dereliction of duty is lodged in some other agencies of the government;
(2) That the acts of the respondent in suspending the petitioner from office and in preferring by himself
charges against him and in designating a special investigator to hear the charges specified in Exhibit A are
null and void for the following reasons:
(a) Because the Secretary of the Interior, by suspending the petitioner, has exercised control over local
governments when that power has been taken away from the President of the Philippines by the
Constitution for the to abrogate and the power to abrogate means the power to power to control has
been interpreted to include the power usurp and the power to usurp necessarily includes the power to
destroy;
(b) Because even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over local
governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the
provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipal
officials are those contained in section 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words,

the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that power
under existing law, in accordance with section 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the
latter provision govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials
while section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the general law which must yield to the special law;
(c) Because the respondent Secretary of the Interior is exercising an arbitrary power by converting
himself into a complainant and at the same time judge of the charges he has preferred against the
petitioner;
(d) Because the action of the respondent Secretary of the Interior is not based on any sworn statement
of any private person or citizen of this government when section 2188 of the Administrative Code
requires the complaint against elective municipal officials to be under oath in order to merit
consideration by the authorities.
Petitioner prays this Honorable Court:
(a) To issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondent restraining him, his agents, attorneys and
all persons acting by virtue of his authority from further proceeding against the petitioner until this case is
finally determined by this court;
(b) To declare, after the hearing of this petition, that the respondent is without authority or jurisdiction to
suspend the petitioner from the office of mayor of Makati and to order his immediate reinstatement in office;
(c) To declare that the respondent has no authority to prefer charges against the petitioner and to investigate
those charges for the grant him that power the respondent would be acting as prosecutor and judge of the
case of his own creation.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor-General contends in his answer:
1. That section 79 (C) in relation with section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code expressly empowers the
respondent as Secretary of the Interior to "order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the
service of any bureau or office under his department" and in connection therewith to "designate an official or
person who shall conduct such investigation"; (Par. 4.)
2. That although section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, invoked by the petitioner, empowers the
provincial governor to `receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for
neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office', said section does not
preclude the respondent as Secretary of the Interior from exercising the power vested in him by section 79
(C) in relation with section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code; and that, moreover, said section 2188 must
be read in relation with section 37 of Act No. 4007, known as the Reorganization Law of 1932; (Par. 4 [b].)
3. That at the commencement of the investigation the petitioner did not question the power or jurisdiction of
the Department of the Interior to investigate the administrative charges against him but merely contended that
the filing of said charges was not in accordance with law for the reason that they did not bear the oaths of the
complainants; (Par. 5.)
4. That the authority of a department head order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person under
his department necessarily carries with it by implication the authority to take such measures as he may deem
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the investigation, such as by suspending the officer under
investigation to prevent coercion of witnesses; and that, furthermore, the suspension from office of the herein
petitioner by the respondent was authorized by the Chief Executive, who is empowered by section 64 (B) of
the Administrative Code to remove officials from office; (Par. 7.)
5. That the petition does not allege facts and circumstances that would warrant the granting of the writ of
preliminary injunction under section 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure; (Par. 8.)
6. That it is a well-settled rule "that courts of equity have no power to restrain public officers by injunction from
performing any official act which they are by law required to perform, or acts which are not in excess of the
authority and discretion reposed in them." (Par. 9)
The issues presented in this case may be reduced to an inquiry into the legal authority of the Secretary of the
Interior (a) to order an investigation, by a special investigation appointed by him, of the charges of corruption and
irregularity brought to his attention against the mayor of the municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, who is the
petitioner herein, and (b) to decree the suspension of the said mayor pending the investigation of the charges.

Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code provides as follows:

The Department Head shall have direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction and may, any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, repeal or modify the
decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus of offices when advisable in the public interest.
The Department Head may order the investigation of any act conduct of any person in the service of any
bureau of office under his department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an
official or person who shall conduct such investigations, and such committee, official, or person may summon,
witness by subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, administer oath and take testimony relevant to the
investigation.
The above section speaks, it is true, of direct control, direction, and supervision over bureaus and offices under the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, but this section should be interpreted in relation to section 86 of the same
Code which grants to the Department of the Interior "executive supervision over the administration of provinces,
municipalities, chartered cities and other local political subdivisions." In the case of Planas vs. Gil (37 Off. Gaz.,
1228), we observed that "Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without
limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and
effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a
knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation." The principle there
enunciated is applicable with equal force to the present case.
We hold, therefore, that the Secretary of the Interior is invested with authority to order the investigation of the
charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose.
As regards the challenged power of the Secretary of the Interior to decree the suspension of the herein petitioner
pending an administrative investigation of the charges against him, the question, it may be admitted, is not free from
difficulties. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who
is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by section 2188 of the
Administrative Code which provides that "The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made
under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of
office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. For minor delinquency he may
reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable he shall submit written charges
touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by
registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by
the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Where
suspension is thus effected, the written charges against the officer shall be filed with the board within five days." The
fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by section 2188 of the Administrative Code to the
provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior
from exercising a similar power. For instance, counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the
President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal
(sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in
the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official, it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of
the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to
suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the
power to suspend a municipal official. Here is, parenthetically, an instance where, as counsel for petitioner admitted,
the power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Upon the other hand, it may be argued with some degree
of plausibility that, if the Secretary of the Interior is, as we have hereinabove concluded, empowered to investigate
the charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose, preventive suspension may
be a means by which to carry into effect a fair and impartial investigation. This is a point, however, which, for the
reason hereinafter indicated, we do not have to decide.
The Solicitor-General argues that section 37 of Act No. 4007, known as the Reorganization Law of 1932, by
providing, "the provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding," that "whenever a specific power,
authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be
understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall have authority to act directly in
pursuance thereof, or to review, modify or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or
service", should be interpreted to concede to the Secretary of the Interior the power to suspend a mayor of a
municipality. The argument is so generally sweeping that, unless distinctions are made, the effect would be the
complete abrogation at will of the powers of provincial and municipal officials even in corporate affairs of local
governments. Under the theory suggested by the Solicitor-General, the Secretary of the Interior could, as observed
by able counsel for the petitioner, enter into a contract and sign a deed of conveyance of real property in behalf of a
municipality against the opposition of the mayor thereof who is the local official authorized by law to do so (sec.
2196, Revised Administrative Code), or in behalf of a province in lieu of the provincial governor thereof (sec 2068,

Ibid.), and otherwise exercise powers of corporate character mentioned in sections 2067 and 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code and which are lodged in the corresponding provincial and municipal officials. And if the power
of suspension of the Secretary of the Interior is to be justified on the plea that the pretended power is governmental
and not corporate, the result would be more disastrous. Then and thereunder, the Secretary of the Interior, in lieu of
the mayor of the municipality, could directly veto municipal ordinances and resolutions under section 2229 of the
Revised Administrative Code; he could, without any formality, elbow aside the municipal mayor and himself make
appointments to all non-elective positions in the municipal service, under section 2199 of the Revised Administrative
Code; he could, instead of the provincial governor, fill a temporary vacancy in any municipal office under subsection
(a), section 2188, as amended, of the said Code; he-could even directly appoint lieutenants of barrios and wrest the
authority given by section 2218 of the Revised Administrative Code to a municipal councilor. Instances may be
multiplied but it is unnecessary to go any further. Prudence, then, dictates that we should hesitate to accept the
suggestion urged upon us by the Solicitor-General, especially where we find the path indicated by him neither
illuminated by the light of our own experience nor cemented by the virtuality of legal principles but is, on the
contrary, dimmed by the recognition however limited in our own Constitution of the right of local self-government and
by the actual operation and enforcement of the laws governing provinces, chartered cities, municipalities and other
political subdivisions. It is not any question of wisdom of legislation but the existence of any such destructive
authority in the law invoked by the Government that we are called upon to pass and determine here.
In the deliberation of this case it has also been suggested that, admitting that the President of the Philippines is
invested with the authority to suspend the petitioner, and it appearing that he had verbally approved or at least
acquiesced in the action taken by the Secretary of the Interior, the suspension of the petitioner should be sustained
on the principle of approval or ratification of the act of the Secretary of the Interior by the President of the
Philippines. There is, to be sure, more weight in this argument than in the suggested generalization of section 37 of
Act No. 4007. Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the circumstances, it
should be observed that there are certain prerogative acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by
subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional power and prerogatives of the
Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification
will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (par. 3, sec. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign
prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem). Upon the other hand, doubt is entertained by some members of the
court whether the statement made by the Secretary to the President in the latter's behalf and by his authority that
the President had no objection to the suspension of the petitioner could be accepted as an affirmative exercise of
the power of suspension in this case, or that the verbal approval by the President of the suspension alleged in a
pleading presented in this case by the Solicitor-General could be considered as a sufficient ratification in law.
After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the government in this case on the board
proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and
considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII,
of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated
by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Runkle vs. United States [1887], 122 U. S.,
543; 30 Law. ed., 1167: 7 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1141; see also U. S. vs. Eliason [1839], 16 Pet., 291; 10 Law. ed., 968;
Jones vs. U. S. [1890], 137 U. S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691; 11 Sup. Ct., Rep., 80; Wolsey vs. Chapman [1880], 101 U.
S., 755; 25 Law. ed., 915: Wilcox vs. Jackson [1836], 13 Pet., 498; 10 Law. ed., 264.)
Fear is expressed by more than one member of this court that the acceptance of the principle of qualified political
agency in this and similar cases would result in the assumption of responsibility by the President of the Philippines
for acts of any member of his cabinet, however illegal, irregular or improper may be these acts. The implications, it is
said, are serious. Fear, however, is no valid argument against the system once adopted, established and operated.
Familiarity with the essential background of the type of government established under our Constitution, in the light of
certain well-known principles and practices that go with the system, should offer the necessary explanation. With
reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily
visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive.
The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation
of the principles that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the
President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the
executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of
Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the
language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the direction of the President."
Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the

projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the
Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the
matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority" (Myers vs. United States, 47
Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at 30; 272 U. S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160). Secretaries of departments, of course, exercise
certain powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in any way affect the constitutional power of control and
direction of the President. As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain
matters but this is by mere concession of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field. If
the President, then, is the authority in the Executive Department, he assumes the corresponding responsibility. The
head of a department is a man of his confidence; he controls and directs his acts; he appoints him and can remove
him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any of his secretaries. It is therefore logical that he, the President, should
be answerable for the acts of administration of the entire Executive Department before his own conscience no less
than before that undefined power of public opinion which, in the language of Daniel Webster, is the last repository of
popular government. These are the necessary corollaries of the American presidential type of government, and if
there is any defect, it is attributable to the system itself. We cannot modify the system unless we modify the
Constitution, and we cannot modify the Constitution by any subtle process of judicial interpretation or constitution.
The petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., concurring in the result:
I concur in the result. The Secretary of the Interior is nowhere given the power to suspend a municipal elective
officer pending charges, and in the absence of such power he may not suspend him. The power to suspend cannot
be implied even from an arbitrary power to remove, except where the power to remove is limited to cause; in such
case, the power to suspend, made use of as a disciplinary power pending charges, is regarded as included within
the power of removal (46 Corpus Juris, sec. 142, page 982). Provincial governors alone are expressly empowered
to suspend municipal officers under certain conditions by section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, and the
President of the Philippines by section 2191, as amended, of the same Code. Though the suspension of the
petitioner by the Secretary of the Interior was unauthorized, the implied approval by the President of the Philippines
validated such suspension.
IMPERIAL, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result because in my opinion (1) the President of the Philippines, under sections 64 (b), and 2191 of
the Revised Administrative Code, as the latter has been amended, and section 11 (1), Article VII, of the Constitution,
is vested with the power to expel and suspend municipal officials for grave misconduct, and it appears that the
suspension was ordered by virtue of that authority; and (2) the Secretary of the Interior acted within the powers
conferred upon him by section 79 (C), in connection with section 86, of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended, in ordering an administrative investigation of the charges against the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor
of the municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal.
It is a fact that, as a result of the investigation conducted by the Division of Investigation of the Department of
Justice, the respondent, in turn, ordered the administrative investigation of the petitioner and recommend his
temporary suspension to the President of the Philippines to preclude him from exerting pressure upon the witnesses
who would testify in the investigation, and that the President of the Philippines, through Secretary Jorge B. Vargas,
stated that he had no objection to the suspension. The act of the President of the Philippines, in my opinion, was an
exercise of his power to suspend the petitioner and the statement that he had no objection was, at bottom, an order
of suspension. The circumstance that in the communication which the respondent addressed to the petitioner it
appeared as though the suspension had been ordered by him, is immaterial and does not alter the merits of the
case, as the facts disclose that the order of suspension came directly from the President of the Philippines.
However, I dissent from the conclusion of the majority that, under the existing presidential system of government
and in view of the fact that the department secretaries are, in the last analysis, agents of the executive, the acts of
the said officials are presumptively deemed the acts of the executive and that, consequently, the suspension of the
petitioner directed by the respondent should be considered, under the same theory, as the suspension decreed by
the President of the Philippines. I believe that the principle thus enunciated is at once dangerous and without legal
sanction. Under the law each of these officials has his own powers and duties and I doubt seriously if it has ever
been the intention of the legislative to confuse their duties and prerogatives, for otherwise it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to limit and fix responsibility. The respondent himself could not have so understood the law when, under