G.R. No.

74930 February 13, 1989

RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO
BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN
"NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO
FADUL, petitioners,
vs.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and his co-petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

CORTES, J.:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their
right to information and pray that respondent be directed:

(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang

Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who
were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady
Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or
(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject
information. (Petition, pp. 4-5; paragraphing supplied.]
The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte the following letter:
June 4, 1986
Hon. Feliciano Belmonte
GSIS General Manager
Arroceros, Manila
Sir:

As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am

requesting that I be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of
(the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each
on guarranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We understand that OIC Mel Lopez of
Manila was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be furnished with the
certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in
connection herewith shall be borne by us.
If we could not secure the above documents could we have access to them?
We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom
Constitution of the present regime.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions,
shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitation as may be
provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6).
We trust that within five (5) days from receipt hereof we will receive your
favorable response on the matter.

Very truly your,

(Sgd.) RICARDO C. VALMONTE
[Rollo, p. 7.]
To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied:
June 17, 1986
Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte
108 E. Benin Street
Caloocan City
Dear Compaero:
Possibly because he must have thought that it contained serious legal
implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred to me
for study and reply your letter to him of June 4, 1986 requesting a list of the
opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan
of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos.

My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship exists between the

GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a
duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be
proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.
As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of the GSIS as a
reputable financial institution, I regret very much that at this time we cannot
respond positively to your request.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MEYNARDO A. TIRO
Deputy General Counsel
[Rollo, p. 40.]
On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent
another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free
to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance
of public interest." [Rollo, p. 8.]
On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit.
On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of
the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members,
were granted housing loans by the GSIS [Rollo, p. 41.]
Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After
petitioners filed a consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were
required to file their memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted
for decision.
In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus,
among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of
Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees.
It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners
have no cause of action.
To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not
they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information.
Hence, it is argued that this case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.

Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort
to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available
under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case
unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities
have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.
However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions,
among which is when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil.
466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210;
Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by
petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to
information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the
GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of
this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue, We now address ourselves to the issue of
whether or not mandamus hes to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to
be done, in pursuance of their right to information.
We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts sought to be done, both of which
involve the issue of whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing
loans granted by the GSIS.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy directly involving the
constitutional right to information. In Taada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24,1985, 136
SCRA 27 and in the recent case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May
29, 1987,150 SCRA 530, the Court upheld the people's constitutional right to be informed of
matters of public interest and ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by
the petitioners.
The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
The right of access to information was also recognized in the 1973 Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of
which provided:
The right of the people to information on 'matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought
and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital
to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this
republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this
system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority
conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the
citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been
delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in
Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be
were empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under
limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the
obligation to check the accuracy of information the disseminate. For them, the freedom of the
press and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of
access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's
monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is
in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end
that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue
can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its
will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have
access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression.
But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted
in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to
information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure * and
honesty in the public service. ** It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated
in Legaspi, the people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is
further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of
full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public
interest" or "public concern," and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee [Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission, supra, at p. 542.]
The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public
concern". As observed in Legazpi:

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there

is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a
term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect
their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citezen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by
case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to
or affects the public. [Ibid. at p. 541]
In the Taada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional right to information
was the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate the
actions and conduct of citezens. InLegaspi, it was the "legitimate concern of citezensof ensure
that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are
eligibles" [Supra at p. 539.]
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of
the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the
GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of th eformer
First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the
administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds
assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the
Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay
the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as
employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees
to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with
utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus,
one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (C.A. No. 186, as amended)
was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the
System" [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as respondent himself admits,
the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" [Comment, p. 8.] It is therefore the legitimate
concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of
maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the
supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves
appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the
GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that an its transactions were
above board.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the
alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.

A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through
mandamus proceedings,viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by
law.
Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers.
It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of
information.
Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as
regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on
considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare
what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues
are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves
as the repository of all State power.
Respondent however contends that in view of the right to privacy which is equally protected by
the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS
must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to information.
There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally protected. In the landmark case
of Morfe v. Mutuc[130 Phil. 415 (1968), 22 SCRA 424], this Court, speaking through then Mr.
Justice Fernando, stated:
... The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of
limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one
of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. UItimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the
absolute. state, In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private
sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector protection,
in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become
increasingly important as modem society has developed. All the forces of
technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate
to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian society." [at pp. 444-445.]
When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a
potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the
competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the abovequoted statement of the Court in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his

private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right
cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar College v.
Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name
since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the
party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of
its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature [Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121
Mich 372, 80 N.W. 285, 46 L.RA. 219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31
L.R.A. 286 (1895)), and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to
be violated.
It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers themselves may
not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they
were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that
because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially
those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny [Cf.Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. Nos. 82380 and 82398, April 29, 1988; See also Cohen
v. Marx, 211 P. 2d 321 (1949).]
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS
are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions" only.
It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation performing proprietary
functions, are outside the coverage of the people's right of access to official records.
It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its
insurance function, then its loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional policy of full
public disclosure and the right to information which is applicable only to "official" transactions.
First of all, the "constituent ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government function has
long been repudiated. In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and
Offices (G.R. Nos. L-21484 and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 6441, the Court said
that the government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business,
discharges the same function of service to the people.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would
not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to
information.

Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, to include
government-owned and controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them within the
coverage of the State policy of fun public disclosure is manifest from the records of the
proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
Commissioner Suarez is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. May I ask the Gentleman a few question?
MR. OPLE. Very gladly.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
When we declare a "policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions" referring to the transactions of the State and
when we say the "State" which I suppose would include all of the
various agencies, departments, ministries and instrumentalities of
the government....
MR. OPLE. Yes, and individual public officers, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. Including government-owned and controlled corporations.
MR. OPLE. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions"
which should be distinguished from contracts,
agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the
Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the
consummation of the contract, or does he refer to
the contract itself?
MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here I suppose
is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps
leading to a contract, and already a consummated
contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction.

MR. OPLE. Yes, subject only to reasonable

safeguards on the national interest.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. [V Record of the
Constitutional Commission 24-25.] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the
Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and
controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are
accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a
government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the
people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government
dealings.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS,
subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours
of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of
other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to
the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to
furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to
"access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians
of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a
well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty
of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform
the required act must be clear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November
29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA
443.] The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of
respondent to prepare the list requested.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the
Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents
and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as

petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to the time and manner of
inspection, not incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

Instead of merely affixing my signature to signify my concurrence, I write this separate opinion
simply to say I have nothing to add to Justice Irene R. Cortes' exceptionally eloquent celebration
of the right to information on matters of public concern.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
Instead of merely affixing my signature to signify my concurrence, I write this separate opinion
simply to say I have nothing to add to Justice Irene R. Cortes' exceptionally eloquent celebration
of the right to information on matters of public concern.
Footnotes
* Art. II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
** Art XI, Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with partriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.

The following provisions of the 1987 Constitution are further indicative of the
policy of transparency:
Art. VII, Sec. 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be
informed of the state of his health. The members of the cabinet in charge of
national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines shall not be denied access to the President during such illness.
Art. XI, Sec. 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office
and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath
or his assets liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the
armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the
public in the manner provided by law.
Art. XII, Sec. 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and
the regulation of the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or
guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to the public.