Ferson Schadt Methodology

American Finance Association
Measuring Fund Strategy and Performance in Changing Economic Conditions

Author(s): Wayne E. Ferson and Rudi W. Schadt
Source: The Journal of Finance, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Jun., 1996), pp. 425-461
Published by: Wiley for the American Finance Association
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THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE . VOL. LI, NO. 2 . JUNE 1996
Measuring Fund Strategy and Performance

Changing Economic Conditions
in
WAYNE E. FERSON and RUDI W. SCHADT*

ABSTRACT
The use of predeterminedvariables to represent public information and time-variation has produced new insights about asset pricing models, but the literature on
mutual fund performance has not exploited these insights. This paper advocates
conditional performance evaluation in which the relevant expectations are conditioned on public information variables. We modify several classical performance
measures to this end and find that the predeterminedvariables are both statistically
and economically significant. Conditioningon public information controls for biases
in traditional market timing models and makes the average performance of the
mutual funds in our sample look better.
THEPROBLEM
OFACCURATELY
measuring the performance of managed portfolios
remains largely unsolved after more than 30 years of work by academics and
practitioners. Standard measures of performance, designed to detect security
selection or market timing ability, are known to suffer from a number of biases.
Traditional measures use unconditional expected returns as the baseline. For
example, an "alpha" may be calculated as the past average return of a fund in
excess of a risk-free rate, minus a fixed beta times the average excess return
of a benchmark portfolio. However, if expected returns and risks vary over
time, such an unconditional approach is likely to be unreliable. Common time
variation in risks and risk premiums will be confused with average performance.
* Ferson is from the University of Washington School of Business Administration,Department
of Finance and Business Economics DJ-10, Seattle, Washington 98195, and Schadt is from the
Edwin L. Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas 75275-0333. We
thank numerous colleagues for comments and helpful discussions, including Connie Becker, David
P. Brown, Stephen Brown, Jon Christopherson,John Cochrane,William Goetzmann,Mark Grinblatt, CampbellHarvey, Ravi Jagannathan, Debbie Lucas, Jianping Mei, Ed Rice, the editor Rene
Stulz, Bill Sharpe, Andy Siegel, Karl Snow, and an anonymousreferee. Vincent Wartherdeserves
special recognition for providing some of the empirical analysis described herein, and David
Modest and Peter Knez deserve thanks for supplying some of the data. This paper was presented
in workshops at the Universities of Alberta, Arizona State, British Columbia, California at Los
Angeles, Chicago, Notre Dame, Oklahoma, Washington, and at J. P. Morgan Investment Management, and at the following conferences: the 1993 European Finance Association, the 1994
National Bureau of EconomicResearch Summer Institute, the third annual Osaka Conferenceon
Finance, the 1994 Southwestern Finance Association and the 1994 Western Finance Association.
Ferson acknowledges financial support from the Pigott-Paccarprofessorshipat the University of
Washington.
425
426
The Journal of Finance
The problem of confounding variation in mutual fund risks and risk premia
*has long been recognized (e.g. Jensen (1972), Grant, (1977)), but previous
studies interpreted it as reflecting superior information or market timing
ability. We emphasize a different interpretation. This paper takes the view
that a managed portfolio strategy that can be replicated using readily available public information should not be judged as having superior performance.
Traditional, unconditional models can ascribe abnormal performance to an
investment strategy that is based only on public information. (See Breen,
Glosten, and Jagannathan (1989) for an example.) Using instruments for the
time-varying expectations, it is possible to control commonvariation caused by
public information and reduce this source of bias.
Recent studies have documented that the returns and risks of stocks and
bonds are predictable over time, using dividend yields, interest rates, and
other variables. If this predictability reflects changing required returns in
equilibrium, then measures of investment performance should accommodate
the time variation.
There is reason to think that predictability using predetermined instruments represents changing required returns. For example, standard beta
pricing models of expected returns can capture a substantial fraction of the
predictability in passive portfolios (Ferson and Harvey (1991), Evans (1994),
Ferson and Korajczyk(1995)). Also, conditional versions of simple asset pricing
models may be able to explain the cross-section of returns better than unconditional models (e.g. Chan and Chen (1988), Cochrane (1992), Jagannathan
and Wang, (1996)).
We advocate conditional performance evaluation, using measures that are
consistent with a version of market efficiency in the semi-strong form sense of

Fama (1970). We believe that a conditional approach is especially attractive in
fund performanceevaluation for two reasons. First, many of the problems with
traditional measures reflect their inability to handle the dynamic behavior of
returns.' Second, it is possible that the trading behavior of managers results in
more complex and interesting dynamics than even those of the underlying
assets they trade. Our results suggest that this indeed is the case.
We modify Jensen's alpha and two simple market timing models to incorporate conditioning information. We use these models to illustrate the intuitive appeal and the empirical importance of conditional methods for performance evaluation. We examine monthly data for 67 mutual funds over the
1968-1990 period, and find that conditioning information is both statistically
and economically significant.
1 A few previous studies partially address this issue. Grinblatt and Titman (1989a) use predetermined information on the attributes of firms to develop performance benchmarks, but they use
unconditional expected returns as the baseline for measuring performance. Glosten and Jagannathan (1994) use a contingent claims approach to address nonlinearities that may arise when
managers engage in dynamic strategies, but they also use unconditional expected returns. Sirri
and Tufano (1992) use rolling regressions for Jensen's alpha, an approach that may approximate
conditional betas. Chen and Knez (1992, 1994) develop general measures of perfprmance using the
framework of Hansen and Richard (1987).
427
Introducing the information variables changes the estimated performance of

many funds. We also find two striking empirical results at the aggregate level.
First, the unconditional Jensen's alphas of the mutual funds are negative more
often than positive, which is similar to the evidence that Jensen (1968) and
Elton et al. (1992) interpret as indicating poor average performance. Using the
conditional models, the distribution of the mutual fund alphas is consistent
with neutral performance for the group.
A second result involves the market timing models of Treynor and Mazuy
(1966) and Merton and Henriksson (1981). The evidence of these models
suggests that the market timing ability of the typical mutual fund manager in
our sample is perverse in the sense that funds on average have higher market
exposure when subsequent market returns are low. Chang and Lewellen
(1984), Henriksson (1984), and Grinblatt and Titman (1988) found similar
results. We modify the approaches of Treynor-Mazuy and Merton-Henriksson
to condition on public information and find that the evidence of negative timing
performance for the group of mutual funds is removed.
The conditional models allow us to estimate time-varying conditional betas,
and we find evidence that mutual fund betas are correlated with the public
information variables. The more pessimistic results of the unconditional models are attributed to the common variation in mutual fund betas and expected
market returns that is captured by these variables.
Further preliminary analysis suggests that the negative correlation between
mutual fund conditional betas and expected market returns may be related to
the flows of net new money into mutual funds. Changes in the conditional
betas of the funds are negatively related to changes in net new money flows,
and cash holdings are positively correlated with net new money flows. These
relations present intriguing opportunities for future research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the basic models.
Section II discusses market timing. Section III describes the data. Section IV
presents the main empirical results. Section V examines the robustness of the
results. Section VI offers concluding remarks.
I. The Models
The appeal of a conditional model for performance evaluation can be illustrated with the following hypothetical scenario. Suppose that the expected
market excess return and its volatility move together proportionately over
time with economic conditions, as in the model of Merton (1980). Consider a
mutual fund that wishes to keep its volatility relatively stable over time. Based
on economic conditions, the fund will lower its beta when the market is more
volatile and raise it in less volatile markets. The beta of the fund will be
negatively correlated with the market return, so the average excess return of
the fund will be less than the average beta of the fund applied to the average
market premium. The use of an unconditional model would lead to the conclusion that the fund has a negative alpha. However, this does not reflect
performance, but the fact that the fund takes more risk when the premium for
428
beta risk is low. A conditional model that controls for the time-varying betas
and market premium shows that the fund has neutral performance.
The rest of this section describes our basic assumptions and develops a
simple model for conditional performanceevaluation. We also discuss how our
models are related to the traditional, unconditional approach.
A. The Basic Assumptions
The first assumption is the form of an asset pricing model that describes the
conditional expected returns of the assets available to portfolio managers. We
use a conditional version of Sharpe's (1964) Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM)to illustrate the approach. Of course, studies have rejected the CAPM
for conditional returns (e.g. Ferson, Kandel, and Stambaugh (1987), Bollerslev,
Engle, and Wooldridge(1988), and Harvey (1989)), and Roll (1978) shows that
the inferences about performance can be sensitive to the specification of an
inefficient benchmark. We therefore extend the analysis to a multiple-factor
asset pricing model, and find that the results are robust.
The second important assumption is a notion of market efficiency. The
traditional performance evaluation literature assumes that the user of a performance measure holds unconditional expectations. With this assumption the
use of any information by managers, including public information, may lead to
measured abnormal performance. In contrast, we assume that market prices
fully reflect readily available, public information. We hypothesize that managers may use this information to determine their portfolio strategies. The use
of public information should not imply abnormal performance, under semistrong form market efficiency, because investors can replicate on their own any
strategy which depends on public information.2
The third assumption required for our approach is a functional form for the
betas, or factor sensitivities of a managed portfolio. Time-variation in a managed portfoliobeta may come from three distinct sources. First, the betas of the
underlying assets may change over time. Second, the weights of a passive
strategy such as buy-and-hold, will vary as relative values change. Third, a
manager can actively manipulate the portfolio weights by departing from a
buy-and-hold strategy.
We model the combined effect of these factors on the risk exposures indirectly, as a "reduced form." We use a linear function, which is a natural
extension of traditional approaches. For example, Admati and Ross (1985), and
Admati, et al. (1986) assume that managers act as if they maximize a constant
absolute risk aversion expected utility function, defined over normally distributed variables. In this case the portfolio weights are linear functions of the
information, and if the betas of the underlying assets are fixed over time, the
2 Of course, the argument that investors can replicate or undo
managers'trades that are based
on public information assumes that investors can infer the trades. It also ignores any cost
advantages in trading that funds may have over investors and assumes that managers do not
waste resources by "churning"their clients' portfolios at cost.
429
managed portfolio beta would also be a linear function of the information. A

linear function for beta is also attractive because it results in simple regression
models that are easy to interpret. While we use simple, linear functions to
illustrate the conditional approach, the correct specification is an empirical
issue. The general approach can accommodate many choices for the functional
form.
B. A Model Based on the CAPM

The conditional CAPM implies that equation (1) is satisfied for the assets
available to portfolio managers:
rit+l =3im(Zt)
rmt+l + ui,t+
t - O,...
T-
1,
(la)
E(ui,t+llZt) = 0,
(lb)
E(ui,t+lrmt+llZt) = 0,
(lc)
where Rit+1 is the rate of return on the investment asset i between times t and
t + 1, rit = Rit - Rft is the excess return, Rft is the return of a one-month
Treasury bill, Zt is a vector of instruments for the information available at time
t, and rmt+1 is the excess return of the market factor. The /im(Zt) are the time
t conditional market betas of the excess return of asset i. Equation (lb) follows
from the market efficiency assumption and equation (ic) says that the f3im(Zt)
are conditional regression coefficients.
Equation (1) implies that any unbiased forecast of the difference between the
return of a security and the product of its beta and the excess return on the
market factor which differs from zero must be based on an information set that
is more informative than Zt. Using only the information Zt the forecast of this
difference is zero. A portfolio strategy that depends only on the public information Zt will satisfy a similar regression. The intercept, or "alpha" of the
regression should be zero, and the error term should not be related to the
public information variables.3
Because we hypothesize that the manager uses no more information than Zt
the portfolio beta, I3pm(Zt), is a function only of Zt. Using a Taylor series
3That is, if Rp,t+l = x(Zt)'Rt+1, where x() is an N-vector of weights and Rt+1 is the N-vector of
the available risky security returns, then the portfolio excess return will satisfy equation (1), with
I3pm(Zt) = x(Zt)'13m(Zt),where 13m(Zt) is the vector of the securities' conditional betas. The error term
in the regression for the portfolio strategy is upt+l=
x(Zt)'ut+i, where ut+1 is the vector of the
uit,+1's, and therefore
E(up,t+jjZt)
= E(x(Zt)'ut+jjZt)
=x(Zt)'E(ut+jjZt)
= 0.
430
we approximate this function linearly, following Shanken (1990) and others:

mpm(Zt)
= bop+ B,zt,
(2)
where zt = Zt - E(Z) is a vector of the deviations of Zt from the unconditional

means, and Bp is a vector with dimension equal to the dimension of Zt. The
coefficient bopmay be interpreted as an "averagebeta," i.e., the unconditional
mean of the conditional beta: E(I,pm(Zt)).4
The elements of Bp are the response
coefficients of the conditional beta with respect to the information variables Zt.
Equations (1) and (2) imply the following generating process for the managed portfolio return:
rpt+1= boprmt+l+ BT[zt rmt+i] +
up,t+i,
(3)
where E(up,t+llZt)= E(up,t+l rmt+llZt)= 0. Now consider a regression of a

managed portfolio excess return on the market factor and the product of the
market factor with the lagged information:
rpt+l = ap + Sip rmt+l + S p(ztrmt+i)
+ spt+i
(4)
Taking the relevant expected values in (4) and comparing the result with (3)
shows that the model implies ap = 0, 61p = bop,and 82p = Bp.5
C. Interpreting the Conditional Model
Our approach may be interpreted as a special case of a general asset pricing
framework based on the expression E(mt+l Rt+llZt) = 1, where mt+l is a
stochastic discount factor and Rt+l is the vector of the gross returns of the
primitive assets available to portfoliomanagers. Our version of the conditional
CAPM implies that the stochastic discount factor is a linear function of the
market excess return, where the coefficients may depend linearly on Zt.
The regression (4) may also be interpreted as an unconditional multiple
factor model, where the market index is the first factor and the product of the
market and the lagged information variables are additional factors. The additional factors may be interpreted as the returns to dynamic strategies, which
hold zt units of the market index, financed by borrowing or selling zt in Trea4 This interpretation is an approximation,as it ignores the higher order terms in the Taylor
expansion. The informationvariables are demeaned for ease of exposition.
5 OLS estimation of the regression model imposes the same moment conditions as does Hansen's (1982) GMM estimator. Consider a linear conditional beta P,_- = b + B'zt-, in a linear
regression model Yt = x1t4-l + Et. The moment conditions:
Ut = XtYt - (xtx')(b
+ Bzt-),
E(utlzt-1)
= 0
would be the basis of the GMMestimation. Typically, the implementation of the GMMwould use
the implication:E(ut 0 zt-1) = 0. Considerthe OLS regression estimator of the linear model which
results from substituting the beta equation into the regression and note that the error terms are
related as Etxt = ut. It is easy to verify that the two sets of moment conditions are the same.
431
sury bills. This interpretation is similar to Hansen and Jagannathan (1991)

and Cochrane (1992). The coefficient ap in (4) is the average difference between
the managed portfolio excess return and the excess return to the dynamic
strategies which replicate its time-varying risk exposure. A manager with a
positive conditional alpha is one whose average return is higher than the
average return of the dynamic strategies.
Our approach may be contrasted with Chen and Knez (1994), who construct
mt?1 as a time-varying combination of the primitive assets available to fund
managers. Theirs is a conditional version of the method of Grinblatt and
Titman (1989b). The idea is to construct a minimum-variance-efficient portfolio to use as a benchmark in the place of a market index. By constructing an
efficient benchmark portfolio, the problem of benchmark inefficiency is
avoided, at least in theory. However, it requires that the set of primitive assets
available to managers is correctly specified, a difficult empirical task indeed!
Specifying mt,1 using an asset pricing model does not require measuring the
returns of all the assets that are available to portfolio managers. Also, using
familiar asset pricing models is convenient for relating our results to the
traditional literature. However, since the asset pricing model is likely to be
misspecified, the results may be sensitive to an inefficient benchmark. Therefore, it is important to investigate the sensitivity of the results to alternative
benchmarks.
Investors who wish to make optimal portfolio decisions need to avoid the
errors that an unconditional model is likely to make in classifying portfolio
performance. A conditional alpha should be a more reliable guide for meanvariance improving portfolio adjustments. Simple portfolio theory shows that
alpha is zero if the benchmark portfolio is mean-variance efficient. A positive
alpha for a particular investment means that the ratio of expected excess
return to variance, for the benchmark, is increased by shifting funds into the
positive-alpha investment. If investors form expectations of future returns and
risks using public information, the conditional expectations should determine
the relevant alphas. Our results show that conditional alphas and unconditional alphas are significantly different, so relying on unconditional alphas is
likely to produce inferior investment decisions.
While conditional alphas are an improvement, the fact that conditioning
information is important raises deeper issues about optimal investment decisions. Time-varying risks and expected returns require a dynamic investment
model. In a dynamic model, investors may not optimally choose conditional
mean-variance efficient portfolios (e.g., Merton (1973)), and multiple-factor
benchmarks may be appropriate. Also, in a dynamic model the investment
horizon of the investor becomes a complex issue. In general, the form of the
model is not invariant to the return measurement interval (see Longstaff
(1989) and Ferson and Korajczyk (1995)), and the optimal investment horizon
is an endogenous variable. These issues are complex, but they are important
for applying conditional performance measures in practice.
432
D. Multiple-Factor Models
It is easy to extend the analysis to use a conditional multiple-beta or exact
arbitrage pricing (APT) model for the expected returns on the assets available
to managers:6
K
E(Rjt+jIZt) = Xo(Zt)+ Ebtj(Zt)Aj(Zt)
i=O, ...
t
NAT
T-1
(5)
j=1
where the bi1(Zt),.. ., biK(Zt)are the time t conditional betas or factor loadings,
which measure the systematic risk of asset i relative to the K risk factors. The
Aj(Zt),j = 1, ... , K are the market prices of systematic risk or the expected
risk premiums.
In our multiple factor models, we replace equation (2) with a similar equation for each of the K factor-betas of a managed portfolio. That is, we model
each of the conditional betas as a linear function of the information. Our
unconditional K-factor model regression is a multiple regression of the excess
returns on a constant and the K factor-portfolios, and the intercept is the
unconditional alpha. In our conditional K-factor model, the regression equation has (L + 1)K + 1 regressors. The regressors are a constant, the K factorportfolios, and the products of the L information variables in Zt with the
K factor-portfolios.
E. Traditional Measures Revisited: Jensen's (Unconditional) Alpha
A traditional approach to measuring performance is to regress the excess
return of a portfolio on the market factor. Assuming that the market beta is
constant, the slope coefficient is the market beta and the intercept, ap, is the
unconditional alpha coefficient, which measures the average performance(e.g.
Jensen (1968)):
rPt+1 =
ap + bp rmt+1 + Vpt+l.
(6)
It is well known that Jensen's original methodologypresents problems when

risk and return are not constant over time. We can use our model to correct
alpha for bias caused by common variation in betas and expected market
returns. Assume that equation (3) is the true model for a managed portfolio
return, but the analyst uses the unconditional regression of equation (6).
Under standard assumptions, the OLS regression estimates satisfy:
plim(bp) = bop+ B,Cov(rm; z rm)/Var(rm)
(7)
plim(ap) = E(rm)[bop - plim(bp)] + Cov(rm; BpZ)

6 The multiple-beta model was developed by Merton (1973). The APT was developed by Ross
(1976) and extended for conditioning informationby Stambaugh (1983).
433
where E(@),Cov( ), and Var( ) denote the unconditional mean, covariance and
variance, respectively. The notation z rm refers to the vector of the products of
the lagged information variables with the market excess return.
The first term in the expression for plim(ap) reflects the fact that the OLS
slope-coefficient in equation (6) is not a consistent estimate of even the average
conditional beta, bop. The second term reflects the covariance between the
conditional beta of the fund and the future market return. Equation (7) may be
interpreted as a missing-variable bias in equation (6). The effect depends on
the regression coefficients of the omitted variables, zrm, on the included variable, rm. WhenBp = 0, the managed portfolio beta is not a function of the
public information, the conditional and unconditional betas are the same, and
the probability limit of the intercept is zero.
Evaluating equation (7) at the sample moments and using the OLS estimates from (4), we can obtain bias-adjusted estimates of alpha. The adjusted
alpha is numerically identical to the OLS estimate of ap in equation (4). We can
also use our conditional K-factor models to adjust for bias in the alphas that
results from omitting the conditioning information in those models. The adjustment is a straightforward extension of the adjustment to alpha in the
CAPM.7
Equation (7) is similar to expressions derived by Jensen (1972), Grant
(1977), and Grinblatt and Titman (1989b) in an unconditional setting. However, the interpretation is different. Traditional studies view the covariance
between beta and the future market return as a result of portfolio managers'
superior information. Equation (7) is developed under the hypothesis that
managers do not have superior information. In our model the hypothesis of no
abnormal performance allows a covariance between beta and the future market return, because of their common dependence on the public information
variables.
7 Standard analysis shows that the slope coefficient in the unconditional factor model regression for asset i converges in probability to:
bo, - B>,E(Z) + Cov(F)-' Cov(F; Z'Bp, F),

where bog is the vector
the L x K matrix of
K factors. When the
regressions converges
of the expected values of the K conditional betas for asset i, and BP, is
the beta response coefficients for asset i, and F is the vector of the
true alpha is zero, the intercept in the unconditional factor model
to:
E{Z'Bp,F} - E(F)'Cov(F) -1 Cov(F; ZBp, F).

We can subtract this expression from the unconditional alphas to adjust them, using our estimates
of Bpifrom the conditional factor models. Alternatively, estimating an intercept in the conditional
model produces the same result.
434
II. Market Timing

A. General Issues
When we depart from the hypothesis that managers simply form portfolios
using public information, it raises a number of issues. Some of these issues are
the same as in the traditional approaches to measuring performance. For
example, the trading of managers with truly superior information must be
"small" in some appropriate sense, so it will not affect equilibrium prices (e.g.
Mayers and Rice (1979)). If managers generate patterns of payoffs which can
not be otherwise obtained in the market, even if at a different cost, then
evaluating the performance is problematic (Dybvig and Ross (1985), Glosten
and Jagannathan (1994), Chen and Knez (1994)). Of course, benchmark inefficiency, as emphasized by Roll (1978), remains a problem.
The traditional performance measurement literature has attempted to distinguish security selection, or stock-picking ability, from market timing, or the
ability to predict overall market returns. However, the literature finds that it
is not easy to separate ability into two such dichotomous categories (see
Glosten and Jagannathan (1994) for a recent discussion). Furthermore, if
managers trade options, spurious timing and selectivity may be recorded (e.g.
Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986)). Similar problems arise with dynamic
strategies, such as portfolio insurance, if trading takes place more frequently
than our return measurement interval, which is monthly. Conditional versions
of the simple market timing models do not resolve these problems.
Market timing ability can only be accurately measured under the assumptions of highly stylized models. Traditional models, in addition to their strong
assumptions about how managers use their abilities, have taken the view that
any information correlated with future market returns is superior information.
In other words, they are unconditional models. Our approach is to use basically
the same simplifying assumptions as the traditional models, but to assume
semi-strong-form market efficiency. The idea is to distinguish "market timing"
based on public information from market timing information that is superior to
the lagged information variables.
B. The Treynor-Mazuy Model
A classic market timing regression is the quadratic regression of Treynor
and Mazuy (1966):
rPt+
ap + bprmt+l +
'ytmu[rm,t+i]2 + Vpt+l,
(8)
where the coefficient ytmu measures market timing ability. Admati et al. (1986)
describe a model in which a manager with constant absolute-risk aversion in
a normally distributed world observes at time t the private signal, rmt+l + 7t,
equal to the future market return plus noise. The manager's response is to
change the portfolio beta as a linear function of the signal. They show that the
Ytmu coefficient in regression (8) is positive if the manager increases beta when
435
the signal about the market is positive. The hypothesis of no abnormal performance implies that ytmu is zero.
Using essentially the same analysis as Admati et al. (1986), we propose a
conditional version of the Treynor-Mazuy regression. Assume that the manager observes the vector (zt, rmt+1 + -rj)at time t, and the question is how to
allocate funds between the market portfolio and a risk-free asset. With exponential utility and normal distributions, the demand for the risky asset is a
linear function of the information. In a two-asset model, the portfolio weight
on the market index is the portfolio beta, and it is a linear function of zt and
(rmt+? + 71j).Replacing equation (2) with this linear function and letting 'Tijoin
the regression error term, we have a conditional version of the Treynor-Mazuy
regression:
rpt+1
ap + bprmt+l+ Cp(zt rmt+i) + ytmc[rmt+1]2 +
Vpt+1
(9)
where the coefficient vector Cp captures the response of the manager's beta to
the public information, Zt. The coefficient ytmc measures the sensitivity of the
manager's beta to the private market timing signal. The term Cp(ztrmt+?)in
equation (9) controls for the public information effect, which would bias the
coefficients in the original Treynor-Mazuy model of equation (8). The new term
in our model captures the part of the quadratic term in the Treynor-Mazuy
model that is attributed to the public information variables. In the conditional
model, the correlation of mutual fund betas with the future market return,
which can be attributed to the public information, is not considered to reflect
market timing ability.
C. The Merton-Henriksson Model
Merton and Henriksson (1981) and Henriksson (1984) describe an alternative model of market timing. In their model a manager attempts to forecast
when the market portfolio return will exceed the risk-free rate. When the
forecast is for an up market, the manager adjusts the portfolio to a higher
target beta. When the market forecast is pessimistic, a lower target beta is
used. Given this model, Merton and Henriksson show that if the manager can
time the market, the coefficient yu in the following regression is positive:
rpt+1= ap + bprmt+i+ 'y[rm,t+i]+ + vpt+i,
(10)
where [rm,t+l]+ is defined as Max(O, rm,t+l). Merton and Henriksson interpret

Max(O, rm,t+l) as the payoff to an option on the market portfolio with exercise
price equal to the risk free asset.8
8 Merton and Henriksson proposed the regression (10) to separate market timing from security
selection ability. However, just as with the Treynor-Mazuy model, this separation is problematic,
as illustrated by Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986). Glosten and Jagannathan (1994) provide
conditions under which the sum of the timing and selectivity components of performance can
correctly estimate the average (unconditional) value added by a manager. Their arguments can be
436
To extend the Merton-Henriksson analysis to a conditional setting, suppose

that the manager attempts to forecast um,t+l = rm,t+l - E(rm,t+llZt), the
deviation from the expected excess return, conditional on the public information. If the forecast is positive, the manager chooses a portfolio conditional beta
of Iup(Zt) = bup + But. If the forecast is negative, the manager chooses
3d(Zt) = bd + Bdzt Using this model for the portfolio betas and equation (1) for
the individual assets, we derive:
=
bdrmt+l + B'd[zt rmt+i] + ycrmt+l + A [zt rmt+i] + upt+
(1)
where
r*t+1=
rm,t+iI{rm,t+l- E(rm,t+llZt) > O}, yc = bup- bd, and
A =Bup-Bd.
{*}is the indicator function. The null hypothesis of no market timing ability
implies that -y and A are zero. The alternative hypothesis of positive
market timing ability is that y, + A' zt > 0, which says that the conditional
beta is higher when the market is above its conditional mean, given public
information, than when it is below the conditional mean. This implies that
E(y, + A'zt) = y, > 0, which says that market timing is on average positive.9
III. The Data

A. The Fund Returns
We study monthly returns for 67 open-end mutual funds from January 1968
to December 1990, a total of 276 observations. As in previous studies that use
monthly data, we implicitly assume that investors evaluate risk and return,
and that mutual fund managers trade using a one-month horizon. The returns
include reinvestment of all distributions (e.g. dividends) and are net of expenses but disregard load charges and exit fees. For the period from 1968 to
1982 the fund data are from Lehmann and Modest (1987). The returns are
calculated from month-end bid prices and monthly dividends obtained from
Standard and Poor's Over-the-Counter Daily Stock Price Records. Dividend
records were checked using Wiesenberger's Investment Companies Annual
compendium and Moody's Annual Dividend Record (Lehmann and Modest
(1987), p. 243). For 67 of the 130 funds from Lehmann and Modest the return
extended to a conditional setting. Of course, the problem of survivorship bias in a sample of funds
such as ours would be likely to make the measure of value added appear too large.
9 The derivation assumes that if xi, i = 1, . . ., N are the manager's portfolio weights, then
E(xiui,t+llZt) = 0, where ui t+l is the error term in equation (1). This says that the manager may
have market timing ability, but has no security selection ability given Zt. The description also
assumes that the managers' forecasts are correct under the alternative hypothesis of market
timing ability. Following Merton and Henriksson (1981), if managers forecasts and beta
adjustments can be correct or incorrect with some fixed probabilities, then it can be shown
that:
plim(,y + A)'zt = E{fp3(Zt) Irm> E(rmlZt), Zt} - E{Jd(Zt)
Irm < E(rmlZt), Zt}.
437
series could be updated through December 1990 using total returns from
Morningstar, Inc. Funds were matched using the overlapping time series.10
Table I records the names of the funds, along with summary statistics for the
1968-1990 period. The funds are grouped by their Wiesenberger type as of
1982, which is roughly the middle of our sample period.1" The funds are
primarily equity funds, with objectives as classified by Wiesenberger varying
from "maximum capital gains" to "income." The excess returns are net of the
monthly return of investing in a Treasury bill with maturity greater than or
equal to one month. The bill data are from Ibbotson & Associates. We place
four of the funds in a "special" category. In two cases (Scudder International
and Templeton Growth) the funds had sizable holdings in foreign equity
markets. Century Shares Trust holds primarily securities issued by financial
firms. Fidelity Capital Trust merged into Fidelity Trend in 1982, so the two
series differ only before that date. One fund, Scudder Income, is a bond fund
that we assign to the income fund group.
Our sample of funds has the potential for survivorship bias, as it contains
only surviving funds. Survivorship may be expected to bias the relative performance measures upwards (e.g. Grinblatt and Titman (1988), Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Malkiel
(1995)). If survivorship bias is important, our estimates of the overall performance of the mutual funds is too optimistic. However, we find that the
traditional measures suggest poor performance for the funds in our sample and
that the poor performance is removed when we control for public information
variables. It seems unlikely that survivorship bias can explain these results.
B. The Predetermined Information Variables
We use a collection of public information variables that previous studies
have shown are useful for predicting security returns and risks over time. The
variables are (1) the lagged level of the one-month Treasury bill yield, (2) the
lagged dividend yield of the CRSP value-weighted New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) stock index, (3) a lagged
measure of the slope of the term structure, (4) a lagged quality spread in the
corporate bond market, and (5) a dummy variable for the month of January.
We use the 30-day annualized Treasury bill yield from the CRSP RISKFREE
files to predict the future returns. This is based on the bill that is the closest
to one month to maturity at the end of the previous month, using the average
of bid and ask prices on the last trading day of each month. The dividend yield
is the price level at the end of the previous month on the CRSP value-weighted
index of NYSE firms, divided into the previous 12 months of dividend pay10 We are grateful to David Modest for making these data available and to Peter Knez for help
with matching and updating the data.
" Elton et al. (1992) evaluate the effects of classification errors that may arise from grouping a
sample of funds at the beginning versus at the end of the period used by Ippolito (1989), and they
found that only 12 of 143 funds changed categories. We conduct an analysis of the information in
the categories below.
438

Table I
Summary Statistics for Excess Returns from 1968:01 to 1990:12

The statistics are calculated from monthly returns in excess of one-month T-bill rates for 67
open-end mutual funds. The data cover 23 years. Fund names are taken from Wiesenberger's 1983
annual "Investment Companies" compilation. The fund groupings are derived from tlxe two
classifications assigned by Wiesenberger at the end of 1982, which are reproduced here under their
names: Primary Objective and Investment Policy. The abbreviations are explained at the bottom
of the table. We assigned "balanced" and "flexible" funds to the Income group, conservative stock
funds to the Growth-Income category, funds with a growth objective to the Growth fund group and
aggressive funds are named after their objective Maximum Capital Gain. The Special group
collects those funds that don't fit in either category: Century Shares Trust invests primarily in
securities issued by financial firms, Fidelity Capital merged into Fidelity Trend in 1982, while the
other two funds, Templeton and Scudder International, had sizable foreign positions.
Panel B reports return statistics for relevant benchmark portfolios. The T-bill returns are from
Ibbotson & Associates and are the return from investing in a T-bill with maturity greater or equal
to one month. We use this rate to compute excess returns for the funds and the other benchmarks.
The value-weighted CRSP index represents the excess return for all stocks listed on the NYSE, our
CAPM market proxy. The next four benchmarks are the factor returns for our four-factor model.
The S&P 500 return (incl. dividends), the small cap return, which represents the ninth and tenth
deciles of market values on the NYSE, and the Long Government Bond, which is the excess return
on a long-term (approx. 20 year) U.S. Government bond, are all from Ibbotson Associates, while the
Junk Bond series representing low-grade corporate bonds is from Blume, Keim, and Patel (1991),
updated using the Merrill Lynch High Yield Composite index.
Wiesenberger
Classification
Mutual Funds by
1982 Name
Primary Investment
objective
policy
Standard
Mean Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Panel A
Boston Foundation F.
Financial Industrial In. F.
Franklin Custodian F.-In. Series
Keystone Income F. (K1)
Nation-Wide Secu:rities
Northeast Invest. Trust
Provident F. for In.
Putnam Income Fund
Scudder Income Fund
Security Investment F.
Sentinel Balanced Fund
United Income Fund.
Value Line Income Fund
Wellington Fund
Income Group Average
sgi
ig
i
i
isg
i
i
i
is
i
igs
i
i
sig
bal
flex
flex
flex
bal
flex
flex
flex
bonds
flex
bal
flex
flex
bal
0.19
0.49
0.20
0.15
0.29
0.04
0.27
0.06
0.00
0.26
0.24
0.27
0.31
0.19
3.98
4.16
3.41
3.04
3.80
2.12
4.49
2.63
3.08
4.13
2.85
4.43
4.20
3.50
-22.20
-18.60
-11.51
-14.10
-22.40
-6.01
-25.00
-8.81
-11.11
-18.04
-12.10
-13.10
-16.96
-13.80
11.15
14.17
14.17
9.03
11.62
9.09
13.22
10.19
.11.69
11.41
9.46
15.26
15.24
11.89
0.21
3.56
-15.27
11.97
439
Table 1-Continued
Wiesenberger
Classification
Mutual Funds by
1982 Name
Primary Investment
objective
policy
Standard
Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Panel A: -Continued
Colonial Fund
Composite Fund
Delaware Fund
Eaton and Howard Stock
Fidelity Fund
Financial Industrial Fund
Founders Mutual Fund
Guardian Mutual Fund
Investment Company of America
Investment Trust of Boston
Keystone High-Grade Common
Stock Fund (S1)
National Industries Fund
Philadelphia Fund
Pine Street Fund
Pioneer Fund
Safeco Equity Fund
Selected American Shares
Sentinel Common Stock Fund
Wall Street Fund
Washington Mutual Investors
gi
gis
gis
gi
gi
gi
gi
gi
gi
gi
gi
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
0.11
0.16
0.31
0.08
0.32
0.23
0.09
0.49
0.41
0.13
0.08
3.71
4.37
4.67
4.54
4.57
4.79
4.20
4.99
4.44
4.63
4.80
-16.60
-14.50
-18.60
-17.60
-25.30
-25.00
-15.10
-24.70
-18.00
-20.20
-24.70
9.32
12.96
14.42
20.70
15.27
16.03
15.15
14.20
13.25
13.23
22.80
gi
gi
gi
gi
gi
gi
gi
gis
gi
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
0.03
0.27
0.26
0.38
0.21
0.10
0.38
-0.03
0.46
4.99
5.01
4.37
4.71
5.00
4.30
4.09
5.32
4.49
-20.80
-21.20
-21.70
-25.00
-21.90
-17.90
-19.10
-29.90
-18.50
15.49
17.58
15.27
15.17
15.37
13.93
12.24
15.78
15.53
0.22
4.60
-20.82
15.18
Growth-Income Average
Axe-Houghton Stock Fund
David L. Babson Investment
Boston Company Capital
Appreciation Fund
Colonial Growth Shares
Country Capital Growth
The Dreyfus Fund Inc.
Fidelity Trend Fund
Keystone Growth Fund (K2)
Keystone Growth Common
Stock Fund (S3)
Lexington Research Fund
Penn Square Mutual Fund
g
g
g
cs
cs
cs
0.13
0.20
0.19
5.70
4.80
4.77
-34.90
-23.60
-22.20
20.48
19.26
18.45
g
g
g
g
g
g
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
0.09
0.18
0.20
0.09
0.04
0.21
5.36
4.86
4.42
5.71
5.32
6.69
-25.30
-18.80
-17.20
-30.20
-25.20
-27.80
17.07
14.88
16.62
20.48
18.42
24.40
g
g
flex
cs
0.20
0.31
5.08
4.78
-22.60
-19.00
13.87
15.55
440
Table 1-Continued
Wiesenberger
Classification
Mutual Funds by
1982 Name
Primary Investment
policy
objective
Standard
Mean Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Panel A: -Continued
g
g
g
g
g
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
0.22
0.08
0.37
0.28
0.30
5.36
5.23
5.22
5.91
6.56
-20.60
-24.20
-22.70
-25.50
-27.80
17.55
19.69
17.09
18.07
19.07
cs
0.22
5.61
-27.30
19.24
g
g
g
g
cs
cs
cs
cs
0.20
0.09
0.34
0.49
4.73
5.36
6.49
4.76
-17.70
-22.80
-25.50
-17.20
19.24
20.46
22.21
18.09
0.21
5.37
-23.72
18.58
0.12
0.19
0.09
0.66
0.03
0.25
0.75
6.34
5.18
7.96
4.17
5.70
5.75
8.05
-31.60
-22.50
-34.47
-19.40
-27.30
-28.80
-28.80
19.17
11.98
21.43
13.26
15.33
16.97
25.30
7.76
-31.60
30.40
0.26
6.36
-28.06
19.23
0.45
0.07
0.40
0.82
5.89
4.93
4.64
4.29
-15.50
-18.58
-26.50
-23.90
26.25
22.49
14.04
11.62
Special Group Average
0.43
4.94
-21.12
18.60
Overall Average
0.25
5.26
-23.78
18.24
Pilgrim Fund
Price (T. Rowe) Growth
Putnam Investors Fund
Security Equity Fund
Stein, Roe and F. Capital
Opportunities Fund
Stein, Roe and Farnham
Stock Fund
United Accumulative Fund
United Science and Energy
Value Line Fund
Windsor Fund
Growth Average
Financial Dynamics Fund
Founders Growth Fund
Keystone Speculative
Mutual Shares Corporation
Oppenheimer Fund
Scudder Special Fund
Twentieth Century
Growth Investors
Value Line Special
Situations Fund
mcg
mcg
mcg
mcg
mcg
mcg
mcg
cs
cs
cs
flex
cs
cs
cs
mcg
cs
Maximum Capital Gain Average

Century Shares Trust
Fidelity Capital Fund
Scudder International
Templeton Growth Fund
(inc. in Canada)
g
g
g
g
spec
cs
c&i
cs
-0.01
441

Table 1-Continued
Wiesenberger
Classification
Mutual Funds by
1982 Name
Primary Investment
objective
policy
Mean
Standard
Deviation
0.60
0.29
0.22
4.74
0.25
-22.23
1.35
16.29
0.30
0.08
0.11
0.47
4.65
3.26
2.59
6.68
-22.12
-9.28
-8.97
-29.79
16.06
13.97
11.74
27.09
Minimum Maximum
Panel B
Benchmark Excess Returns
1-Month T-bill (Gross)
Value-Weighted CRSP
index
S&P 500
Government Bonds
Junk Bonds
Small cap
Wiesenberger Classifications
Primary Objective
Investment Policy
mcg
g
maximum capital gain

growth
cs
bal
i
s
income
stability
bonds
c&i
tf
tax-free municipal
bond
flex
spec
holdings are predominantly common stock

balanced; both senior securities and cs are held at
all times
investments concentrated in bonds
holdings are primarily Canadian and/or
international issues
flexibly diversified; usually, but not necessarily,
balanced
specialized; holdings are concentrated in one or
more specified industry groups or types of securities
ments for the index. The term spread is a constant-maturity 10-year Treasury
bond yield less the 3-month Treasury bill yield. The corporate bond defaultrelated yield spread is Moody's BAA-rated corporate bond yield less the AAArated corporate bond yield. The bond yields are the weekly average yields for
the previous month, as reported by Citibase.
The issue of data mining arises in connection with the information variables.
Data mining refers to the fact that many researchers in finance use the same
data, and a chance correlation of future returns with a predictor variable is
likely to be discovered as an "interesting" phenomenon. (See Lo and MacKinlay
(1990) and Foster and Smith (1992) for analyses of data mining biases in asset
pricing studies.) Extending the study of predictability to mutual funds is
interesting, as the fund returns represent a new data set. However, to the
extent that the assets held by funds are similar to those used in previous
studies of predictability, the correlation implies that a data mining bias may be
inherited by the funds. Also, the market index and factor returns that we use
have been prominent in the predictability literature.
442
We assume that the lagged variables are readily available, public information over our entire sample period, which starts in 1968. Most of the academic
studies of these variables appeared in the literature after 1968. Using our
approach, a manager who knew in 1968 that dividend yields, interest rate
levels, and yield spreads could be used to predict stock returns gets no credit
for using this knowledge before it was promoted in the academic literature.
However, similar variables were discussed as stock market indicators as early
as Dow (1920) and Graham (1965), which suggests that investors knew about
them long before they became prominent in the academic literature. Pesaran
and Timmermann (1995) cite a number of additional studies from the 1930s to
the early 1960s that emphasize stock market predictability based on interest
rates, dividend yields, and other cyclical indicators. In a model-selection experiment designed to avoid hindsight, they confirm the importance of predictable components in stock returns.
C. The Risk Factors
We use the value-weighted CRSP index for all stocks listed on the NYSE as
the market factor. We also examine a four-factor model. This model uses large
stocks, small stocks, government bonds, and low-grade corporate bonds. Related factor models are examined by Elton et al. (1992), who use three factors;
Sharpe (1988, 1991), who uses 10 to 12 factors; and the investment firm
BARRA, which uses as many as 68 factors in their model. We chose a relatively
parsimonious factor model because our application is mutual funds, as opposed
to individual common stocks. Also, our conditional model requires that we
estimate more parameters than an unconditional model, so parsimony becomes important.
In the four-factor model, the S&P 500 total return is used to represent large
market capitalization (cap) equities. The small cap index from Ibbotson Associates represents stocks whose market values correspond to the ninth and
tenth decile of market values on the NYSE. Starting in 1982, this small cap
index corresponds to the performance of Dimensional Fund Advisors' nine-ten
portfolio. The third factor is the return to a long-term (approximately 20-year)
U.S. Government bond from Ibbotson Associates. Finally, low-grade corporate
bond returns are based on the return series in Blume, Keim, and Patel (1991),
updated using the Merrill Lynch High Yield Composite Index return.12
D. Naive Strategies
If naive strategies appear to have abnormal performance, it implies that our
benchmarks are inefficient. This would call into question the measures of
performance for the managed portfolios. We therefore construct three strategies to provide a basis of comparison. Each naive strategy enters 1968 with an
initial set of weights: 65 percent large stocks, 13 percent small stocks, 20
12 The Blume, Keim, and Patel series is used for 1968:01-1990:01, and the Merrill Lynch series
is used for the last eleven months of 1990.
443
percent government bonds, and 2 percent low-grade bonds. The first strategy
is a monthly rebalancing strategy, for which these weights are held fixed over
the sample. The second is a buy-and-hold strategy, whose weights change over
time as the relative values of the four asset classes evolve. A buy-and-hold
strategy is passive, but its weights depend on relative values over time.13 Third
is an annual rebalancing strategy, which evolves as buy-and-hold unless the
month is a January, in which case the weights are reset to the initial weights.
IV. Empirical Results

A. The Statistical Significance of Conditioning Information
In Table II, we regress each fund's excess return on the excess return of the
market factor. The slopes and intercepts are estimates of the unconditional
alpha and beta coefficients, as in equation (6). We also run the regressions for
an equally-weighted portfolio of the funds within each fund group. The results
are summarized in the left-hand columns, and labeled as the unconditional
CAPM. Additional columns record the intercepts, ap, the coefficients, 6lp, and
the R-squares of the regression model (4). These are denoted as the conditional
CAPM.
Table II shows that the betas increase, moving down the table from the
income funds to the maximum capital gain funds. The R-squares are slightly
higher for the conditional model. The right-most column reports right-tail
probability values for the F-test of the marginal explanatory power of conditioning information in the CAPM. The additional variables are significant at
conventional levels for the equally-weighted portfolios of the fund groups,
excepting the income fund group. The F-tests can reject the hypothesis that the
additional variables do not matter, at the 5 percent level, for 50 of the 67
individual funds, and the average of the individual p-values is 0.06.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent
Wald tests produce similar results: the pvalues are below 0.05 for 43 of the 67 funds. We also compute heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent Wald tests, using the Newey and West
(1987) covariance matrix with an MA(1) term, and the results are similar. This
is evidence of statistically significant movements in the conditional market
betas, which are related to the public information variables.
13
The weight vector of the buy-and-holdstrategy evolves as:

xjt =x,t-,(l
+ R,t)/
Xx,t-l(l
+ RJ,t)1
We do not include a monthly rebalancingstrategy for the four-factormodel, because with constant
weights a regression of this strategy's returns on the factors producesa perfect fit by construction.
444
Table II
Measures of Performance Using Conditional and

Unconditional CAPMs
The coefficients ap and bp are the intercept and slope coefficients in the following regression:
(6)
rpt+l = ap + bprmt+l+ Vpt+l1
where rpt+1 is the excess return of a fund and rmt+1 is the excess return of the CRSP valueweighted market index. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-ratios are shown as t(.). For the conditional CAPMmodels, the regressions are:
rpt+l
=ap
+ 6lprmt+l
+ 8'p(ztrmt+i)
(4)
+ Ept+j,
where zt is the vector of predeterminedinstruments, consisting of the dividend yield of the CRSP
index, a Treasury yield spread (longminus short-termbonds), the yield on a short-termTreasury
bill, a corporate bond yield spread (low- minus high-grade bonds), and a dummy variable for
Januarys. Rsq are the R-squares of the regressions and pval(F) is the right-tail probabilityvalue
of the F-test for the marginal significance of the term including the predeterminedvariables. The
funds are groupedby their Wiesenbergertype as of 1982. Our "Special"categoryincludes Scudder
International and. Templeton Growth, which have sizable holdings in foreign equity markets,
Century Shares Trust, which holds primarily securities issued by financial firms, and Fidelity
Capital Trust, which merged into Fidelity Trend in 1982. The data are monthly from 1968-1990,
a total of 276 observations. The units are percentage per month.
Types
Conditional CAPM
Unconditional CAPM
Fund
ap
t(ap)
bp
t(bp) Rsq
ap
t(ap)
5lp
Rsq pval(F)
t(51p)
Panel A: Averages of Individual Fund Regressions

Income
0.0275 0.283
Gro-Inc -0.0572 -0.537
Growth
-0.0766 -0.649
Max. gain -0.0804 -0.433
Special
Overall
0.1980
-0.0307
0.64
0.93
1.03
1.18
22.7
37.6
34.2
25.5
0.702 0.0601 0.604

0.887 -0.0261 -0.244
0.852 -0.0388 -0.340
0.769 0.0842 0.539
0.64
0.93
1.04
1.19
26.6
42.4
39.6
30.5
0.727
0.895
0.863
0.784
0.078
0.066
0.058
0.070
0.928 0.81
15.6 0.619
0.2670
1.300 0.82
22.2 0.651
0.005
0.92
33.4 0.817
0.0220
0.124 0.93
38.4 0.831
0.060
-0.304
Panel B: Results for Equally-WeightedPortfolios of Funds

0.0275 0.43
Income
Gro-Inc -0.0572 -1.66
-0.0766 -1.35
Growth
Max. gain -0.0804 -0.65
Special
Overall
0.1980
-0.0331
1.93
-0.73
0.64 41.5
0.93 118.
1.03 76.5
1.18 35.4
0.892 0.0601 0.913

0.983 -0.0261 -0.766
0.964 -0.0388 -0.715
0.877 0.0842 0.683
0.64 41.5 0.895

0.93 127.0 0.984
1.04 86.4 0.966
1.19 42.9 0.888
0.151
0.008
0.004
0.001
0.81
29.7 0.837
0.2670
2.530 0.82
33.0 0.845
0.027
0.92
80.5 0.971
0.0186
0.421 0.93
90.5 0.974
0.001
Tests for the significance of the individual information variables in the

regressions produce little evidence that the January dummy or the defaultrelated yield spread are important predictors, but the other instruments are
important. This is interesting, as it suggests that our results are not driven by
445
January seasonals or the default spread resolving CAPM-related biases, such

as the small firm effect.14
B. Performance Measured by Alpha

The evidence on the unconditional alphas of managed portfolios remains
controversial. Jensen (1968) found that mutual funds had negative alphas on
average, adjusting for fees. Ippolito (1989) found positive alphas in a more
recent sample. Elton et al. (1992) argue that the positive alphas in Ippolito's
sample may be explained by funds' holdings of asset classes that have positive
alphas. Using a multiple-factor benchmark, they confirm Jensen's result that
mutual funds' unconditional alphas tend to be negative.
Table III focuses on the cross-sectional distributions of the t-ratios for the
alphas. The table shows the minimum and maximum of the t-statistics for each
model, together with their "Bonferroni p-values." These are based on the
Bonferroni inequality. Consider the event that any of N statistics for a test of
size p rejects the hypothesis. Given dependent events, the joint probability is
less than or equal to the sum of the individual probabilities, pN. The Bonferroni p-value places a conservative upper bound on the p-value of a joint test. It
is computed as the smallest of the N p-values for the individual tests, multiplied by N, which is the number of funds. The Bonferroni p-values are onetailed tests of the hypothesis that all of the alphas are zero against the
alternative that at least one is positive (maximum value) or negative (minimum value).
All of the extreme t-ratios are significant by the Bonferroni test, excepting
the minimum ones in the CAPM models, rejecting the joint hypothesis of zero
alphas. However, the tabulation shows more observations in the tails than
would be expected, given a t-distribution (which, with more than 200 degrees
of freedom, is close to a normal distribution). The left tails are thicker than the
right tails in both of the unconditional models. The distribution of the t-ratios
shifts to the right when the conditioning information is introduced into the
models. (We replicate this analysis, excluding the special fund group, and the
results are similar.)
Overall, Jensen's measure would lead to the inference that the funds have
more negative than positive alphas. In the unconditional CAPM, about twothirds of the point estimates of the alphas are negative, including all but three
of the growth funds. Of the 13 "significant" (absolute t-ratio larger than 2.0)
alphas, eight are negative. (The t-statistics are heteroskedasticity consistent.
The results are the same when they are also adjusted for autocorrelation using
the Newey-West covariance matrix.) Based on a simple binomial test, the
14 We also construct Bayesian odds ratios to examine the importance of the lagged variables.
Using an uninformedprior, the odds ratios confirmthat the January dummy and default spread
variables are not important predictors, and that the other variables are jointly and individually
important.
446
Table III
Cross-sectional Distribution of t-statistics for the Alphas in

Conditional and Unconditional Models
For the CAPM,the unconditionalalphas are the intercepts in regressions for the excess returns of
the funds on the excess return of the CRSP value-weighted market index. The conditional alphas
are the intercepts in regressions of fund excess returns on the CRSP index and the productof the
index with a vector of predetermined instruments. The unconditional alphas in the four-factor
models are the intercepts in regressions of the excess returns of the funds on the four factors,
which are the S&P 500 index, the small stock index, the governmentbond index and the low-grade
corporatebond index. The factor returns are measured in excess of the one-month Treasury bill.
The conditional alphas in the four-factormodels are the intercepts when fund excess returns are
regressed over time on the factors and the productsof the factors with the vector of predetermined
instruments. The distributions of the heteroskedasticity-consistent t-ratios for the alphas are
summarized. The numbers in each of the four right-hand columns in the body of the table are the
number of mutual funds for which the t-statistics for the alphas fell within the range of values
indicated in the far left hand column. The Bonferroni p-value is the maximum or minimum
one-tailed p-value from the t-distribution, across all of the funds, multiplied by the number of
funds, which is 67. The instruments are the dividendyield of the CRSPindex, a yield spread (longminus short-term bonds), the yield on a short-term Treasury bill, a corporatebond yield spread
(low- minus high-grade bonds), and a dummy variable for Januarys. The data are monthly from
1968-1990, a total of 276 observations.
Four-FactorModels
CAPM
Minimum t-statistic
Bonferronip-value
-2.326
-1.960
-1.645
-1.282
<
<
<
<
0.0 <
1.282 <
1.645 <
1.960 <
t
t
t
t
t
t<
t<
t<
t<
t<
-2.326
-1.960
-1.645
-1.282
0.0
< 1.282
< 1.645
< 1.960
< 2.326
> 2.326
Maximum t-statistic
Bonferronip-value
Unconditional
Conditional
Unconditional
Conditional
-2.78
0.194
-2.71
0.238
-4.08
0.002
-3.80
0.006
5
4
4
4
26
5
1
3
5
20
8
4
5
4
25
3
3
4
3
25
15
1
3
1
4
18
5
4
2
4
13
0
4
2
2
19
0
3
2
2
3.89
0.004
4.90
0.000
3.80
0.006
6.40
0.000
t-statistic for the hypothesis that 50 percent of the alphas are positive is
-2.32.15
Previous studies finding negative unconditional alphas interpreted them as

indicating poor performance. However, it is difficult to know where the distri15 The t-statistic is (0.5-x)/[(0.5)(0.5)/67]1/2,
where x is the fraction of the 67 alpha estimates that
are negative. This calculationignores the correlationacross the funds. We present joint tests below
which account for cross-equation correlation.
447
bution of the alphas should be centered under the hypothesis of no abnormal

performance. For example, the presence of transactions costs, some of which
are deducted from the funds' returns but not from the benchmark returns,
suggests that the alphas should be centered to the left of zero. The presence of
survivorship bias, on the other hand, shifts the distribution of alphas to the
right.
The negative unconditional alphas may reflect a bias caused by omitting
public information that is correlated with the portfolio betas, as is suggested by
our hypothetical example in Section I and the evidence that the predetermined
variables are significant. The "conditional alphas" are the intercepts from
equation (4). About half (34 of 67) of these estimates are negative, and half are
positive. The binomial test produces a t-statistic of -0.12. There are 12 funds
whose conditional alphas have t-statistics larger than two in absolute magnitude. Of these, exactly half (6) are negative, and half are positive. (The results
for autocorrelation-consistent t-statistics are the same.) Thus, a simple adjustment to condition on public information has removed the inference of the
traditional approach that mutual fund alphas tend to be negative.
We repeat our analysis of alphas, using the four-factor asset pricing model.
The four-factor model is motivated by previous evidence that the valueweighted index is not an efficient portfolio. Roll (1978) shows that, given an
inefficient benchmark, seemingly small variations in the benchmark can have
a large impact on alphas. Grinblatt and Titman (1994) also find that measures
of (unconditional) performance can be sensitive to the choice of the benchmark.
Moving from a simple CAPM to the four-factor model does not change the
result that the unconditional alphas tend to be negative more often than would
be attributed to chance. For example, of the 67 point estimates of the unconditional alphas, 46 are negative. The t-statistic for the alpha of an equallyweighted portfolio of the funds is -1.71. Using the conditional four-factor
model, only 38 of the 67 point estimates of ap are negative, and the t-statistic
for the alpha of an equally-weighted portfolio of the funds is 0.14. Overall,
introducing the conditioning information seems to have a greater impact on
the measures of performance than does moving from the single-factor to the
four-factor model.
C. Joint Tests
The summary statistics used above to describe the overall effects of conditioning information on the alphas do not discriminate between funds with
different investment objectives and do not account for dependence of the
regressions across funds. To account for these effects, we conduct joint tests
across the equations. We pool the funds according to their Wiesenberger types,
form five equally-weighted portfolios of the funds, and stack the regressions for
the portfolios into a system of five equations. We restrict the alphas to be zero
in each equation and estimate the systems using Hansen's (1982) generalized
method of moments (GMM). The GMM is robust to nonnormality and allows
for time-varying conditional heteroskedasticity. Such an approach is appropri-
448
ate in view of the fat tails of the distributions and the assumption that betas
may vary with information in the conditional models. The restrictions are
tested using the standard GMMchi-square goodness-of-fit statistic.
The tests reject the hypothesis that the unconditional alphas are jointly zero
in the CAPM(and four-factormodel), the test producinga right-tail probability
value equal to 0.07 (0.02). This confirms our previous observation that there
are more negative unconditional alphas than would be attributed to chance.
The tests for zero conditional alphas also reject the joint hypothesis, producing
right-tail probability values of 0.01 (0.04). However, inspecting the coefficients
for the equally-weighted portfolios suggests that the rejection of zero alphas for
the conditional model is driven by the large positive alpha of the special group,
which includes the international funds. When we repeat the tests with only
four portfolios, excluding the special group, we find that no test can reject the
hypothesis that the alphas are jointly zero.
D. Market Timing: Results for the Naive Strategies
Table IV presents an initial analysis of the market timing models, using the
naive strategies. If the models are well-specified, the naive strategies should
not show evidence of abnormal performance. In the unconditional version of
the Treynor-Mazuymodel, the table shows that the buy-and-hold strategy has
a negative timing coefficient, with a t-statistic of -3.76, and a positive alpha,
with a t-statistic of 2.01. In the unconditional Merton-Henriksson model, the
buy-and-hold strategy has a negative timing coefficient, with a t-statistic of
-1.84, and a positive alpha, with a t-statistic of 1.86. These results are similar
to those of Jagannathan and Korajczyk(1986), who show that naive strategies
may exhibit option-like characteristics and hence have timing coefficients and
alphas with opposite signs. These results indicate a clear misspecification of
the unconditional market timing models.
In the conditional version of the Treynor-Mazuy model, none of the naive
strategies have significant alphas or timing coefficients, and the same is true
in the conditional Merton-Henriksson model. This is interesting, as it suggests
that conditional timing models can control misspecification in the unconditional models. The conditional models may therefore be more informative
about the performance of fund managers than the unconditional models.
E. Market Timing: Results for Mutual Funds Using the Treynor-Mazuy
Model
Table V reports the Treynor-Mazuy(1966) regressions for mutual funds. For

the unconditional model (8), we find 44 of the 67 estimates of the timing
coefficient are negative, and all of the estimates for the maximum gain funds
are negative. Of the 11 individual timing coefficients larger than two standard
errors, eight are negative. The timing coefficient for an equally-weighted
portfolio of all of the funds has a t-statistic of -2.47. Each of the equallyweighted portfolios by fund group, except the income funds, has a t-statistic
449
Table IV
Market Timing Models: Results for Naive Strategies

The three naive strategies are portfolios of four broad indexes: large stocks, small stocks, government
bonds, and low-grade corporate bonds. The portfolio weights of the strategies differ as described in the
text. For the unconditional Treynor-Mazuy models, the timing coefficient is the regression coefficient
on the squared excess market return in a regression for the excess return of the strategy on the excess
return of the CRSP value-weighted market index and its square, and a is the intercept. In the
conditional Treynor-Mazuy models, the regressions include the products of the lagged instrumental
variables with the excess return of the market index. For the unconditional Merton-Henriksson
models, a is the intercept coefficient in regressions for the excess strategy returns on the excess return
of the CRSP value-weighted market index and a variable equal to the maximum of the index excess
return or zero. The timing coefficient is the slope coefficient on the maximum of the index or zero. For
the conditional Merton-Henriksson models, fund excess returns are regressed over time on the CRSP
index, the product of the index with a vector of predetermined instruments, the variable r* and the
product of r* and the instruments, where r* is the product of the index excess return and an indicator
dummy for positive values of the difference between the index excess return and the conditional mean
of the excess return, which is estimated by a linear regression on the instruments. The coefficient a is
the intercept. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-ratios are reported for all coefficients. The instruments
are the dividend yield of the CRSP index, a Treasury yield spread (longminus short-term bonds), the
yield on a short term Treasury bill, a corporate bond yield spread (low- minus high-grade bonds), and
a dummy variable for Januarys. The data are monthly from 1968-1990, a total of 276 observations.
The units for the alphas are percentage per month.
Models
t(a)
Timing
Coefficient
t-Statistic
Panel A: Treynor-Mazuy Models

Unconditional models
Buy-and-hold
Annual rebalance
Fixed weights
0.082
0.047
0.004
2.01
1.09
0.08
-0.004
-0.001
0.001
-3.76
-0.82
0.74
Conditional models
Buy-and-hold
Annual rebalance
Fixed weights
0.057
0.037
0.001
1.39
0.82
0.02
-0.001
0.000
0.001
-0.93
0.12
1.10
Panel B: Merton-Henriksson Models

Unconditional models
Buy-and-hold
Annual rebalance
Fixed weights
0.121
0.045
-0.021
1.86
0.72
-0.32
-0.065
-0.010
0.026
-1.84
-0.33
0.77
Conditional models
Buy-and-hold
Annual rebalance
Fixed weights
0.055
0.028
-0.011
1.03
0.50
-0.20
-0.010
0.009
0.028
-0.33
0.29
0.94
smaller than -1.90. A chi-square test across the five groups strongly rejects
the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero (p-value less than 0.001).
Thus, the evidence is consistent with Grinblatt and Titman (1988) and Cumby
450

Table V
Conditional and Unconditional Measures of Timing and Selectivity:

The Treynor-Mazuy Model
The unconditional timing coefficient is the regression coefficient on the squared excess market
return in a regression for the excess return of the fund on the excess return of the CRSP
value-weighted market index and its square. For the conditional timing coefficients, the regressions also include the products of the lagged instrumental variables with the excess return of the
market index. The alphas are the intercepts of the regressions. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
t-ratios are reported for all coefficients, and denoted as t-stat. The instruments are the dividend
yield of the CRSP index, a Treasury yield spread (longminus short-term bonds), the yield on a
short-term Treasury bill, a corporate bond yield spread (low- minus high-grade bonds), and a
dummy variable for Januarys. The funds are grouped by their Wiesenberger type as of 1982. Our
"special" category includes Scudder International and Templeton Growth, which have sizable
holdings in foreign equity markets, Century Shares Trust, which holds primarily securities issued
by financial firms, and Fidelity Capital Trust, which merged into Fidelity Trend in 1982. The data
are monthly from 1968-1990, a total of 276 observations. The units for the alphas are percentage
per month.
Unconditional
Timing
Coefficient
t-stat
Conditional
Timing
Coefficient
Unconditional
Alphas
t-stat
Coefficient
t-stat
Conditional
Alphas
Coefficient
t-stat

Income
Gro-Inc
Growth
MaxGain
0.0005
-0.0014
-0.0023
-0.0096
0.086
-0.452
-0.496
-2.180
0.0039
0.0010
0.0009
-0.0018
1.16
0.54
0.40
-0.36
Special
-0.0103
-2.160
-0.0121
-2.23
Overall
-0.0028
-0.810
0.0003
0.31
0.015
-0.026
-0.025
0.137
0.216
-0.198
-0.291
0.848
-0.000
-0.041
-0.052
0.112
-0.019
-0.434
-0.545
0.726
0.432
2.090
0.454
2.310
0.036
0.211
0.018
0.002
Panel B: Results for Equally-Weighted Portfolios of Funds

Income
Gro-Inc
Growth
MaxGain
0.0005
-0.0014
-0.0023
-0.0096
0.38
-2.33
-1.90
-2.70
0.0039
0.0010
0.0009
-0.0018
1.72
1.07
0.57
-0.44
Special
-0.0103
-4.37
-0.0121
-3.52
Overall
-0.0028
-2.47
0.0004
0.31
0.015
-0.026
-0.025
0.137
0.230
-0.703
-0.408
1.030
-0.000
-0.041
-0.052
0.112
-0.005
-1.140
-0.870
0.870
0.432
4.020
0.454
4.170
0.030
0.618
0.012
0.247
and Glen (1990), who found negative timing coefficients in unconditional

Treynor-Mazuy regressions.
A negative timing coefficient may arise if the manager has the perverse
ability to predict market moves, but systematically in the wrong direction.
This makes little sense, because an investor could profit by trading against
such a manager. Negative timing coefficients may also reflect the use of
options and related strategies, but there is no evidence of significant positive
alphas to offset the negative unconditional timing coefficients in Table V,
451
excepting for the special group of funds. We do not believe the results of the
unconditional models to be reliable. The evidence in the preceding section
shows that a negative timing coefficient may arise in an unconditional model,
even if the manager follows a buy-and-hold strategy, as the unconditional
model is misspecified.
Using our conditional version of the Treynor-Mazuy regressions, we find
very different results. Of the 67 point estimates of the conditional timing
coefficients for the individual funds, only 27 are negative. There are 13 with
t-ratios larger than two in absolute magnitude, of which only two are negative.
The t-statistic for the timing coefficient of an equally-weighted portfolio of the
funds is +0.31. There is no evidence of systematic nonzero alphas in these
models, excepting the special fund group. Overall, except for the special group,
incorporating conditioning information has essentially removed the findings of
negative timing coefficients in the unconditional model.
The special funds stand out as being different. This group has a strong
positive alpha and a significant negative timing coefficient, even in the conditional Treynor-Mazuy model. This may not be surprising in view of the fact
that the results for the special group are driven largely by the Templeton
Growth Fund and the Scudder International Fund. Glosten and Jagannathan
(1994) also find positive (unconditional) alphas for the Templeton Growth
Fund. The pattern of the coefficients is consistent with a portfolio strategy
similar to writing covered call options. However, these funds concentrate in
international investments, and studies such as Ferson and Harvey (1993) and
Schadt (1995) show that different factors are needed to explain international
equity returns. These results suggest that even the conditional Treynor-Mazuy
model is probably not appropriate for evaluating the special group.
F. Market Timing: Results for Mutual Funds Using the Merton-Henriksson
Model
Table VI summarizes results for the Merton-Henriksson (1981) model, using
equations (10) and (11). In the unconditional model, 46 of the 67 estimates of
the timing coefficients are negative, including all of the estimates for the
maximum gain funds. The binomial test of the hypothesis that 50 percent of
the coefficients are positive produces a t-statistic of -3.05. Of the seven
coefficients larger than two standard errors, six are negative. The coefficient
for an equally-weighted portfolio of the funds has a t-statistic of -2.38. The
chi-square test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly
zero (p-value = 0.008). Based on the unconditional model, the mutual funds'
market timing again appears to be of the "wrong" sign. This evidence is
consistent with the results of Chang and Lewellen (1984), Henriksson (1984),
and Glosten and Jagannathan (1994), and similar to our results for the
Treynor-Mazuy regressions.
The results for the conditional model are quite different. There are 25
negative point estimates for the 67 funds, which produces a t-statistic for the
hypothesis that 50 percent are negative, equal to +2.08. The chi-square test of
452

Table VI
Conditional and Unconditional Measures of Timing and Selectivity:

The Merton-Henriksson Model
For the unconditional models, alpha is the intercept in regressions for the excess returns of the
funds on the excess return of the CRSP value-weighted market index and a variable equal to the
maximum of the index excess return or zero, and t(a) is the heteroskedasticity-consistent
tstatistic. In the unconditional models, the timing coefficient gamma is the slope coefficient on the
maximum of the index or zero, and t(y) is the heteroskedasticity-consistent
t-statistic. For the
conditional models, fund excess returns are regressed over time on the CRSP index, the product of
the index with a vector of predetermined instruments, the variable r* and the product of r* and
the instruments, where r* is the product of the index excess return and an indicator dummy for
positive values of the difference between the index excess return and the conditional mean of the
excess return, where the conditional mean is estimated by a linear regression on the instruments.
In the conditional models alpha is the intercept in this regression and gamma is the slope
coefficient on the product of r* and the instruments, and t(a) and t('y) are the heteroskedasticityconsistent t-statistics. The instruments are the dividend yield of the CRSP index, a Treasury yield
spread (longminus short-term bonds), the yield on a short-term Treasury bill, a corporate bond
yield spread (low- minus high-grade bonds), and a dummy variable for Januarys. The funds are
grouped by their Wiesenberger type as of 1982. Our "special" category includes Scudder International and Templeton Growth, which have sizable holdings in foreign equity markets, Century
Shares Trust, which holds primarily securities issued by financial firms, and Fidelity Capital
Trust, which merged into Fidelity Trend in 1982. The data are monthly from 1968-1990, a total
of 276 observations. The units for the alphas are percentage per month.
Unconditional Model
Fund
t(a)
Conditional Model
t(y)
t(a)
t(y)
0.0587
0.0261
0.0119
-0.0576
0.894
0.500
0.344
-0.496
-2.200

Income
Gro-Inc
Growth
MaxGain
0.009
-0.001
0.031
0.391
0.114
0.003
0.010
1.560
0.0099
-0.0308
-0.0594
-0.2590
0.11
-0.32
-0.46
-1.97
Special
0.742
2.290
-0.2990
Overall
0.109
0.465
-0.0758
-0.006
-0.057
-0.053
0.179
-0.114
-0.508
-0.550
0.880
-1.77
0.641
2.780
-0.2610
-0.68
0.033
0.008
-0.0014
0.216
Panel B: Results for Equally-Weighted Portfolios of Funds

Income
Gro-Inc
Growth
MaxGain
0.009
-0.001
0.031
0.391
0.106
-0.030
0.389
2.100
0.0099
-0.0308
-0.0594
-0.2590
0.22
-1.43
-1.59
-2.84
Special
0.742
Overall
0.102
-0.006
-0.057
-0.053
0.179
-0.065
-1.230
-0.669
1.050
5.470
-0.2990
-4.86
0.641
4.910
1.560
-0.0746
-2.38
0.025
0.397
0.0587
0.0261
0.0119
-0.0576
1.200
1.110
0.293
-0.626
-0.2610
-3.450
0.0013
0.039
the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero produces a right-tail pvalue of 0.004. Of the seven coefficients more than two standard errors from
zero, only three are negative. The t-statistic for the equally-weighted portfolio
of the funds is +0.04. Based on the conditional model, and excepting the
453
special group, we no longer find the mutual funds' market timing to be of the
"wrong" sign. If anything, the timing coefficients reveal some weak evidence of
positive market timing ability, once we control for the predetermined information variables.
G. Conclusions About the Market-Timing Models
Table VII summarizes the cross-sectional distributions of the t-ratios associated with the key timing coefficients in the four market timing models. The
Bonferroni p-values indicate that the extreme t-ratios are significantly different from zero, except for the maximum values in the unconditional timing
models, but the tails of the distributions are thicker than the normal. In both
of the timing models the distribution of the t-ratios shifts to the right when the
conditioning information is introduced. The right tails of the distributions are
thicker and the left tails are thinner than in the unconditional models. It is
clear that introducing the conditioning information makes a dramatic impact
on the results of the timing models.
Both the Treynor-Mazuy and the Merton-Henriksson models are motivated
using strong assumptions about how mutual fund managers use any superior
information that they might have. When these strong assumptions fail, the
models will not separate timing and selectivity. As the assumptions are unlikely to be true, the models may be viewed as approximations to a more
complicated relation between the portfolio weights of the managers and the
future market return. In the unconditional versions of the models, the underlying asset betas are assumed to be constant. The Treynor-Mazuy model
approximates the relation between managers' weights and the future market
return by a linear function, while the Merton-Henriksson model uses an
indicator function (the weight is either zero or one, depending on the forecast
of the market return). In our conditional versiohs of the models, the assumptions are simple extensions of the assumptions in the original models.
While our extensions of these models are adequate to illustrate that the use
of conditioning information is important, we do not advocate using them to
evaluate managers in practice. For example, even the conditional timing
models are likely to be misspecified when applied to funds with sizable holdings of non-U.S. stocks. We believe that the development of more sophisticated
and realistic market timing models in the presence of conditioning information
is an important problem for future research.
H. Interpreting the Empirical Results
The evidence shows that the use of conditioning information makes the
performance of the funds in our sample look better. We can interpret these
results using a simple specification analysis. In Table II we found that the
unconditional betas are typically slightly smaller than the average conditional
betas. From equation (7), if the conditional alphas are larger than the unconditional alphas for a typical fund, it implies that the term BpCov(z; rm) is
negative for the typical fund. (We examine the sample values of this term and
454
Table VII
The Cross-sectional Distribution of t-statistics for the Key Timing

Coefficients in Conditional and Unconditional Market Timing
Models
For the Treynor-Mazuy model, the unconditional timing coefficient is the regression coefficient on
the squared excess market return in a regression for the excess return of the fund on the excess
return of the CRSP value-weighted market index and its square. In the conditional TreynorMazuy models, the regressions include the products of the lagged instrumental variables with the
excess return of the market index, and the timing coefficient is the regression coefficient on the
squared excess market return. For the unconditional Merton-Henriksson models, the regression is
the excess return of the fund on the excess return of the CRSP value-weighted market index and
a variable equal to the maximum of the index excess return or zero. The unconditional timing
coefficient is the slope coefficient on the variable defined as the maximum of the index or zero. For
the conditional Merton-Henriksson models, fund excess returns are regressed over time on the
CRSP index, the product of the index with a vector of predetermined instruments, the variable rn
and the product of r* and the instruments, where r* is the product of the index excess return with
an indicator dummy for positive values of the difference between the index excess return and the
conditional mean of the excess return, estimated by a linear regression on the instruments. The
instruments are the dividend yield of the CRSP index, a yield spread (longminus short-term
bonds), the yield on a short-term Treasury bill, a corporate bond yield spread (low- minus
high-grade bonds), and a dummy variable for Januarys. The distributions of the heteroskedasticity-consistent t-ratios for the coefficients are summarized. The numbers in each of the four
right-hand columns in the body of the table are the number of mutual funds for which the
t-statistics for the alphas fell within the range of values indicated in the far-left-hand column. The
Bonferroni p-value is the maximum or minimum one-tailed p-value from the t-distribution, across
all of the funds, multiplied by the number of funds, which is 67. The data are monthly from
1968-1990, a total of 276 observations.
Merton-Henriksson
Treynor-Mazuy
Minimum t-statistic
Bonferroni p-value
t < -2.326
-2.326 < t < -1.960
-1.960 < t < -1.645
-1.645 < t < -1.282
-1.282 < t < 0.0
0.0
1.282
1.645
1.960
<
<
<
<
t
t
t
t
t
<
<
<
<
>
1.282
1.645
1.960
2.326
2.326
Maximum t-statistic
Bonferroni p-value
Unconditional
Conditional
Unconditional
Conditional
-5.98
0.000
6
2
4
12
20
-4.01
0.003
2
1
3
5
16
-4.15
0.002
5
2
4
2
33
-3.74
0.008
2
2
1
1
19
16
2
2
2
1
25
4
0
3
8
15
5
0
1
0
31
4
3
2
2
2.43
0.524
4.16
0.001
2.05
1.38
3.33
0.033
confirm that this is the case.) In other words, the component of the correlation
of mutual fund betas with the future market return that can be attributed to
the predetermined information tends to be negative. Since the future market
return can be written as rm = E(rmIZ) + E, and E is uncorrelated with Z, we can
455
replace rm in the above term with E(rmjZ). A similar interpretation is implied

by the results of the market timing models.16
Why would fund managers tend to reduce their market betas when public
information implies relatively high expected market returns, and/or raise
them when expected returns are relatively low? Managed portfolio betas can
change because the portfolio weights are managed or because the underlying
asset betas change. The phenomenon could arise, therefore, from the underlying assets held by mutual fund managers. There is some weak evidence in
favor of this interpretation. The buy-and-hold strategy produces negative
timing coefficients in the unconditional timing models, and the coefficient is
close to zero in the conditional models. If fund portfolios are concentrated in
large stocks, the patterns of beta variation suggested by these results are
consistent with the time-variation in large stock betas (negative correlation
with expected market returns), as suggested by Chan and Chen (1988) and
documented by Ferson and Harvey (1991) and Jagannathan and Wang (1996).
Movements in the underlying asset betas, however, are unlikely to fully
explain our results. The response coefficients for the funds' betas are significantly different from those of the buy-and-hold strategy. Also, we find negative
alphas for the funds, but not for the buy-and-hold strategy, in the unconditional Jensen model. Deviations in mutual fund portfolio weights from the
buy-and-hold strategy are probably important.
One hypothesis is that the movements in beta are driven by the flow of
money into mutual funds. If more new money flows into the funds when the
public perceives expected stock returns to be high, and if managers take some
time to allocate new money according to their usual investment styles, then the
funds would have larger cash holdings at such times. Larger cash holdings
imply lower betas. Of course, the effects of new money flows on the fund's betas
will depend on the magnitudes of the flows, relative to the size of the asset
holdings. To investigate this new money-flow hypothesis, it is necessary to use
data on the flow of money, fund distributions, and redemptions.17
Warther (1995) studies aggregate money flows for classes of mutual funds.
In private communication he provided a separate analysis of our time-varying
16
For example, if the conditional version of the Treynor-Mazuy model, equation (9), is assumed
to be the "true" model, then the unconditional model (8) has a left-out-variables bias. The OLS
estimate of the unconditional timing coefficient will converge, under standard assumptions, to
Ytmc + Cov(CQzrm; rn), where the time subscripts have been suppressed. The covariance term
arises when funds' betas are related to the future market return through the public information.
Our results indicate that this covariance is negative for the average fund. We can simplify the
covariance term by considering a regression of the vector of information variables on the future
market return. Let A be the vector of the slopes of this regression and assume that the error terms
are independent of rm. Then, the probability limit of the unconditional timing coefficient is ytmc +
(C;A)Var(r'). Our results suggest that C>4 = I3C,3 A, is negative for the average fund, where CP,
measures the response of the fund's beta to the public information variable Z4,and A, measures the
relation of Zj to the future market return.
17 Since the new money-flow hypothesis
relies on unspecified market "frictions," it may be
theoretically inconsistent with the CAPM. Future research into the determinants of mutual fund
risk-taking behavior may require theoretical models which accommodate market frictions.
456
conditional betas. The net new money for a group of mutual funds is defined by
Warther as the net sales (the dollar value of new shares sold, excluding
automatically-reinvested dividends), normalized by the lagged aggregate stock
market value. Warther finds that changes in net new money are negatively
related to changes in our estimated mutual fund betas. In monthly regressions
for 1976:03 to 1990:12, of beta changes on new money changes, the t-statistics
for the slope coefficients are between -2.8 and -3.9, depending on the fund
group. This is consistent with our conjecture that funds' betas are lower when
more new money flows into the funds.
Warther finds that, on average, funds invest about 62 cents of each new
dollar in the concurrent month, while 38 cents goes into cash. He also analyzes
the relation between new money inflows and the portfolio weight in cash, and
he finds a significant positive relation between the two. When inflows are
large, cash balances tend to increase. While Warther's analysis of our conditional betas is preliminary, the results are consistent with our conjecture that
fund betas change in response to larger cash positions associated with net
inflows of new money. A more comprehensive analysis of these relations should
be interesting. (We are grateful to Professor Warther for contributing this
analysis.)
I. Conditional Betas and Fund Strategy

This section summarizes the main observations from our examination of the
conditional beta functions. Since the funds' beta functions are significantly
different from the passive strategies, they may provide additional insights into
active management behavior.
Wiesenberger uses an internal approach to fund classification, which
means that funds are grouped using data on their asset holdings. Our
approach measures fund strategy by the response of the exposures to public
information, without the need for asset holdings data. It is interesting to
compare the two approaches. We conduct a simple analysis of variance in
which we regress the cross-section of the average risk exposures to each
factor on dummy variables indicating the group to which the fund is
assigned. We exclude the funds in our special category from this analysis.
These regressions indicate that the fund groupings capture 25 to 49 percent
of the variance of the average sensitivities of the funds. Thus, the groupings
are related to the average risk exposures, but there is still significant
variation of the exposures within a fund category.
We conduct a similar analysis of variance for the beta response coefficients,
Bp. The results show that the Wiesenberger fund groupings are also related to
the dynamic behavior of the risk exposures. For example, the sensitivity of the
conditional market betas to the dividend yield increases, moving from the
income funds to the maximum capital gain funds. The income fund betas are
generally more sensitive to shifts in the term structure and the quality-related
457
yield spread than are the growth funds.18 In the four-factor models, the
coefficients measuring the sensitivity of the factor betas to the slope of the
term structure are significant for half of the income funds. However, the signs
of the coefficients differ across the funds, which suggests that different income
funds may adopt different strategies in response to changes in the term
structure. There is more variation of the beta response coefficients than of the
average exposures, within a fund group. This makes sense if managers within
a fund group adopt similar long run investment policies, but may use different
short run strategies. We believe that a more in-depth analysis of mutual funds'
conditional betas should be interesting.
V. Robustness of the Results

A. Subperiod and Out-of-Sample Analyses
We split the sample into two equal subperiods with 138 observations each.
Estimating the Jensen's alphas on the subperiods produces results similar to
the full sample. The unconditional alphas are negative more often than positive, and the distribution of the alphas and of their t-ratios shifts to the right
when the conditioning information is introduced.19
The timing coefficients from the Treynor-Mazuy models present a similar
picture in the first subperiod as in the full sample, and moving from the
unconditional to the conditional model shifts the distribution of the coefficients
to the right. We find more negative timing coefficients in the second subperiod
than in the full sample. The estimates of the alphas present similar impressions in the subperiods as in the full sample period. In the Merton-Henriksson
timing models, we find that the distribution of the timing coefficients and the
alphas are similar in both subperiods to the results for the full sample.
We conduct out-of-sample experiments in which we estimate the CAPM and
four-factor models using the data to 1985. We call these coefficients the
historical alphas and betas. Then, using the last 60 months of data (19861990), we estimate alphas for both the conditional and unconditional models.
The out-of-sample alphas use the sample means for the last 60 months and the
historical regression betas or beta-response function coefficients. The last18
Many of the response coefficientsfor the dividend yield (and 23 of the 25 significant ones) are
negative, which suggests that managers reduce their market exposure when equity yields are
high. The passive, buy-and-holdstrategy has a t-statistic of -2.4. Since the dividendyield goes up
when stock prices go down, the buy-and-holdstrategy may automatically reduce its stock market
exposure. Such a "priceeffect"can induce a negative response coefficient.The monthly rebalancing
strategy does not display a dividend yield effect.
19 We find that 40 of the 67 unconditional CAPMalphas are negative in the second subperiod
and all seven with absolute t-ratios larger than two are negative. Thirty-eight of the conditional
alphas are negative, but only five t-ratios are significant, and only two of these are negative. The
Bonferroni p-values for the hypothesis of a negative alpha are less than 0.10 for all of the
unconditionalmodels, with the single exception of the unconditional CAPMin the second subperiod (p-value = 0.102). Only 28 of the conditionalCAPMalphas in the first subperiodare negative,
five t-ratios are smaller than -2.0, and ten t-ratios are larger than +2.0.
458
period alphas use coefficients estimated with only the last 60 months of data.
We find that the mass of the distributions of both of these estimated alphas
shifts to the right when the conditioning information is introduced.
B. The Persistence of Performance
We calculate the cross-sectional correlations of the individual alphas in the
first and second halves of the sample. The correlation of the unconditional
CAPM alphas is 0.26 and the correlation of the alphas in the conditional CAPM
is 0.29, so this evidence of persistence in the alphas is similar in both models.
However, previous studies have found that persistence in performance may be
concentrated in the extreme-performance funds. We delete roughly the top and
bottom 10 percent (seven each) of the alphas in the first subperiod and
calculate the correlations on the remaining sample. The correlation of the
alphas in the conditional CAPM is only 0.14 when the tails are removed, while
using the unconditional CAPM the correlation on the subsample is 0.32. This
suggests that persistence concentrated in the extreme performers may be more
easily detected using conditional methods. We believe that future research
should use conditional models to further study the persistence in mutual fund
performance.20
VI. Concluding Remarks

This paper explores the effects of incorporating lagged information variables
in the analysis of investment performance, an approach that we call conditional performance evaluation. In contrast to traditional methods based on
unconditional returns, we take the view that a managed portfolio strategy that
uses only readily available public information does not imply abnormal performance. Using monthly data for 67 mutual funds over the 1968-1990 period,
we find evidence that their risk exposures change in response to public information on the economy. The use of conditioning information in performance
measurement is both statistically and economically significant.
Traditional measures of average performance (Jensen's alpha) are negative
more often than positive, which has been interpreted as inferior performance.
Both a simple CAPM and a four-factor model produce this result in our sample.
However, using conditional models, the distribution of alphas shifts to the
right and is centered near zero.
Traditional measures of market timing suggest that the typical mutual fund
takes more market exposure when stock returns are low. This has been
interpreted as perverse market timing ability. Alternatively, the negative
timing coefficients can reflect the importance of written call or put options, or
other derivative strategies. We find that unconditional versions of the TreynorMazuy (1966) and Merton-Henriksson (1981) market timing models are misspecified when applied to naive strategies, and that conditional versions of
20
See Christopherson et al. (1994) for a study of persistence in pension manager performance
using conditional models.
459
these models are an improvement. Using the conditional market timing models for U.S. equity funds, the evidence of perverse market timing for the typical
fund is removed.
The relatively pessimistic results of the traditional measures is attributed to
common time-variation in the conditional betas and the expected market
return. WVhenthis predictability is ignored, fund managers as a group show
spurious inferior performance. This "inferior" performance is primarily due to
a negative covariance between mutual fund betas and the conditional expected
market return. When the common variation is controlled using lagged instruments, the conditional models make the performance of the funds in our
sample look better. Our results suggest that there is much more interesting
work to be done. Incorporating public information variables into the analysis
of investment performance is an important area for future research.
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American Finance Association

Measuring Fund Strategy and Performance in Changing Economic Conditions

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE . VOL. LI, NO. 2 . JUNE 1996

Measuring Fund Strategy and Performance

WAYNE E. FERSON and RUDI W. SCHADT*

The Journal of Finance

consistent with a version of market efficiency in the semi-strong form sense of

Measuring Fund Strategy and Performance

Introducing the information variables changes the estimated performance of

The Journal of Finance

Measuring Fund Strategy and Performance

managed portfolio beta would also be a linear function of the information. A

B. A Model Based on the CAPM

The Journal of Finance

we approximate this function linearly, following Shanken (1990) and others:

where zt = Zt - E(Z) is a vector of the deviations of Zt from the unconditional

where E(up,t+llZt)= E(up,t+l rmt+llZt)= 0. Now consider a regression of a

Measuring Fund Strategy and Performance

sury bills. This interpretation is similar to Hansen and Jagannathan (1991)

The Journal of Finance

E(Rjt+jIZt) = Xo(Zt)+ Ebtj(Zt)Aj(Zt)

It is well known that Jensen's original methodologypresents problems when

plim(ap) = E(rm)[bop - plim(bp)] + Cov(rm; BpZ)

Measuring Fund Strategy and Performance

bo, - B>,E(Z) + Cov(F)-' Cov(F; Z'Bp, F),

E{Z'Bp,F} - E(F)'Cov(F) -1 Cov(F; ZBp, F).

The Journal of Finance

II. Market Timing

Measuring Fund Strategy and Performance

ap + bprmt+l+ Cp(zt rmt+i) + ytmc[rmt+1]2 +

where [rm,t+l]+ is defined as Max(O, rm,t+l). Merton and Henriksson interpret

The Journal of Finance

To extend the Merton-Henriksson analysis to a conditional setting, suppose

bdrmt+l + B'd[zt rmt+i] + ycrmt+l + A [zt rmt+i] + upt+

rm,t+iI{rm,t+l- E(rm,t+llZt) > O}, yc = bup- bd, and

III. The Data

Irm < E(rmlZt), Zt}.

Measuring Fund Strategy and Performance

The Journal of Finance

Summary Statistics for Excess Returns from 1968:01 to 1990:12

Measuring Fund Strategy and Performance

The Journal of Finance

Special Group Average

Maximum Capital Gain Average

Measuring Fund Strategy and Performance

maximum capital gain

holdings are predominantly common stock

The Journal of Finance

Measuring Fund Strategy and Performance

IV. Empirical Results

The weight vector of the buy-and-holdstrategy evolves as:

The Journal of Finance

Measures of Performance Using Conditional and

rpt+l = ap + bprmt+l+ Vpt+l1

Panel A: Averages of Individual Fund Regressions

0.702 0.0601 0.604

Panel B: Results for Equally-WeightedPortfolios of Funds

0.892 0.0601 0.913

0.64 41.5 0.895

Tests for the significance of the individual information variables in the