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U.S, NUCLEAR RE2LATORY COMMISSION

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Revision 1
June 1984

REGULATORY GUIDE
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OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEAIEff C UR . -'

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REGULATORY GUIDE 1.89

(Task EE 042-2)

-11, '

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CERTAIN ELECTif XQUIPMENT, IMPOOTAT TO

SAFETY FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS .'- 1L ' -'
1-..

A. INTRODUCTION
The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Part 50,
"Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization
Facilities," require that structures, systems, and cornponents important to safety in a nuclear power plant
be designed to accommodate the effects of environmental conditions (ie., remain functional under postulated accident conditions) and that design control
measures such as testing be used to check the adequacy
of design. These general requirements are contained in
General Design Criteria 1, 2, 4, and 23 of Appendix
A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,"
to Part 50; in Criterion III, "Design Control," Criterion
XI, "Test Control," and Criterion XVII, "Quality
Assurance Records," of Appendix B, "Quality Assurance
Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing
Plants," to Part 50; and in 50.55a.
Specific requirements pertaining to qualification of
certain electric equipment important to safety are
contained in 50.49, "Environmental Qualification of
Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear
Power Plants," of 10 CFR Part 50. Section 50.49
requires that three categories of electric equipment
important to safety be qualified for their application
and specified performance and provides requirements
for establishing environmental qualification methods
and qualification parameters. These three categories are
(I) safety-related electric equipment (Class IE), (2)
non-safety-related electric equipment (non-Class
E)
whose failure under postulated environmental conditions
could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of safety
functions by safety-related equipment, and (3) certain
postaccident monitoring equipment. This regulatory
guide applies only to these three categories of electric
equipment inportant to safety.

"The substantial number of changes in this revision has made

it impractical to indicate the

hanges with lines In the mrgin.

USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES

-

**

Section 50.49 does ot include requirements for

seismic and dynamic qualification, protection of electric
eqiipment against other natural phenomena and external
events, and equipment located in a mild environment.
This regulatory guide describes a method acceptable
to the NRC staff for complying with 50.49 of
10 CFR Part 50 with regard to qualification of electric
equipment important to safety for service in nuclear
power plants to ensure that the equipment can perform
its safety function during and after a design basis
accident.
The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has
been consulted concerning this guide and has concurred in the regulatory position.
Any guidance in
this document related to information collection activities
has been cleared under OMB Clearance No. 3150-0011.
B. DISCUSSION
IEEE Std 323-1974, "IEEE Standard for Qualifying
Class- IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating
Stations," 1 published February 28, 1974, was prepared
by Subcommittee 2, Equipment Qualification, of the
Nuclear Power Engineering Committee of the Institute
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and was
approved by the IEEE Standards Board on December 13, 1973. The standard describes basic procedures
for qualifying Class IE equipment and interfaces that
are to be used in nuclear power plants, including components or equipment of any interface whose failure
could adversely affect any Class IE equipment.
For the purposes of this guide, "qualification' is a
verification of design limited to demonstrating that the
electric equipment is capable of performing its safety
Ieopa
,may

Electroiecs

be obtained from the Institute of ectricai Lnd

Engners, Inc., 34s EAst 47th Street, New

New York 10017.

York,

Comments should lbe sent to the Scretary of the Commisslon,

Nuclear Regulatory Commlsslon Washnigton
he.205

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Regulatory Guides are Issued to escriTe

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Public methods acceptable to the,i4IRC
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6. Products
Guides are not substilutes for regula1 o,
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7. Transportation
them is not rectuired.
Methods and sLutions litferent from those set
3
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Health
Guides
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nona
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and Flnancial

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findings
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license byrequisite
the Commission.
This guide was Issued after conslCeratIon of comments received rom
the public. Comments and suggestions for Improvements In these
guides are encouraged at all times, and guides will be revised, as
appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reFiect new Informatlon or experience.

I
GoA\p.,Jjeneral
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Intormation on the subscription service and current GPO prices may
be obtained by writing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: PubilIcatons Sales Manager.

sIeo4d

0
function under significant environmental stresses resulting
from design basis accidents in order to avoid commoncause failures. Paragraph 50.49(e)(5) calls for equipment
qualified by test to be preconditioned by natural or
artificial (accelerated) aging to its end-of-installed-life
condition and further specifies that consideration must
be given to all significant types of degradation that can
have an effect on the functional capability of the
equipment. There are considerable uncertainties regarding
the processes and environmental factors that could result
in such degradation. Oxygen diffusion, humidity, and
accumulation of deposits are examples of such effects.
Because of these uncertainties, state-of-the-art preconditioning techniques are not capable of simulating all
sgnificant types of degradation, and natural pre-aging is
difficult and costly. As the state of the art advances
and uncertainties are resolved, preconditioning techniques
may become more effective. Experience suggests that
consideration should be given, for example, to a combination of () preconditioning of test samples employing
the Arrhenius theory and (2) surveillance, testing, and
maintenance of selected equipment specifically directed
toward detecting those degradation processes that, based
on experience, are not amenable to preconditioning and
that could result in common-cause functional failure of
the equipment during design basis accidents.
It is essential that safety-related electric equipment be
qualified to demonstrate that it can perform its safety
function under the environmental service conditions in
which it will be required to function and for the length of
time its function is required and that non-safety-related
electric equipment covered by paragraph 50.49(bX2)
be able to withstand environmental stresses caused
by design basis accidents under which its failure could
prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of safety functions by safety-related equipment. This concept applies
throughout this guide. The specific environment for
which individual electric equipment must be qualified
will depend on the installed location and the conditions
under which it is required to perform its safety function.
The following are examples of considerations to be
taken into account when determining the environment
for which the equipment is to be qualified: (1) equipment outside containment would generally see a less
severe environment than equipment inside containment;
(2) equipment whose location is shielded from a radiation source would generally receive a smaller radiation dose than equipment at the same distance from the
source but exposed to its direct radiation; (3) equipment required to initiate protective action would generally
be required for a shorter period of time than instrumentation required to follow the course of an accident; and
(4) analyses taking into account arrangements of equipment and radiation sources may be necessary to determine whether equipment needed for mitigation of design.basis accidents other than loss-of-coolant accidents
(LOCA) or high-energy line breaks (HELB) could be
exposed to a more severe environment than the LOCA
or HELB environments delineated in this guide.
.
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.7

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1.89-2

Electric equipment to be qualified in a nuclear

radiation environment should be exposed to radiation
that simulates the calculated integrated dose (normal
and accident) that the equipment must withstand prior
to completion of its intended safety function. Regulatory
Position C.2.c proposes the use of source terms that arm
consistent with previous guidance in the original edition
of this guide, NUREG-0588, "Interim Staff Position on
Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical
Equipment," 2 and the DOR Guidelines, "Guidelines for
Evaluating Environmental Qualification of Class IE
Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors." 3

Item (8) of Regulatory Position C.2.c addresses

qualfication of equipment exposed to low-level radiation
doses. Numerous studies that have compiled radiation
effects data on all classes of organic compounds show
that compounds with the least radiation resistance have
damage thresholds greater than 104 rads and would
remain functional with exposures somewhat above the
threshold value. Thus, for organic materials, radiation
qualification may be readily justified by existing test
data or operating experience for radiation exposures
below 104 rads. However, for electronic components,
studies have shown failures in metal oxide semiconductor
devices at somewhat lower doses. Therefore, radiation qualification for electronic components may have a
lower exposure threshold.
The regulatory positions delineated in this guide
reflect the state of the art. Research programs currently
in progress are investigating such concerns as the effects
of oxygen in a LOCA environment, the validity of
sequential versus simultaneous applications of steam and
radiation environments, and fission product releases
following accidents. The staff recogriizes that the results
of research programs may lead to revisions of the
regulatory positions.
C. REGULATORY POSITION
The procedures described by IEEE Std 323-1974,
"IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for
Nuclear Power Generating Stations," are acceptable to
the NRC staff for satisfying the Commission's regulations
pertaining to the qualification of electric equipment for
service in nuclear power plants to ensure that the
equipment can perform its safety functions subject to
the following:
1. Section 50.49, "Environmental Qualification of
Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear
!-

2
Copies may be obtained from the NRC(GPO Sales Program,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Waslunglon, D.C. 20555.
3
Available for inspection or copying at the U.S Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Publc Document Room, 1717 H Street
NW., Washington, D.C., as Enclosure 4 to IE BuUetin No. 79-01B,
January 14, 19S0.

Power Plants," of 10 CFR Part 50 requires that safetyrelated electric equipment (Class IE) as defined in
paragraph 50A9(b)(1) be qualified to perform its intended
safety functions. Typical safety-related equipment and
systems are listed in Appendix A to this guide. Paragraph
50.49(b)(2) requires that non-safety-related electric equipment be environmentally qualified if its failure under
postulated environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of the safety functions by
safety-related equipment. Typical examples of non-safetyrelated electric equipment are included in Appendix B
to this guide. Paragrapb 50.49(b)(3) requires that certain
postaccident monitoring equipment also be environmentaDy qualified. These are specified as "Categories 1
and 2" in Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants
to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and
Following an Accident."
2. Paragraph 50.49(d) and Section 6.2 of IEEE Std
323-1974 require equipment specifications to include
performance and environmental conditions. For the
requirements called for in item (7) of Section 6.2 of
IEEE 323-1974 and paragraph 50.49(d)(3), the following
should be included:
a. Temperature and Pressure Conditions Inside
Containment for LOCA and Main Steam Line Break
(MSLB). The following methods are acceptable to the
NRC staff for calculating and establishing the containment pressure and temperature envelopes to which
equipment should be qualified:
(1) Methods for calculating mass and energy
release rates for LOCAs and MSLBs are referenced in
Appendix C to this guide. The calculations should
account for the time dependence and spatial distribution
of these variables. For example, superheated steam
followed by saturated steam may be a lirmiting condition
and should be considered.
(2) For pressurized water reactors (PWRs) with
a dry containment, calculate LOCA or MSLB containment environment using CONTEMPT-LT or equivalent
industry codes.
(3) For PWRs with an ice condenser containment, calculate LOCA or MSLB containment environment using LOTIC or equivalent industry codes.
(4) For boiling water reactors (BWRs) with a
Mark I, II, or III containment, calculate LOCA or
MSLB environment using CONTEMPT-LT or equivalent
industry codes.

b. Effects of Sprays and Chemicals. The effects of

containrnent spray system operation should be considered.
This consideration should include, as appropriate, the
effects of demineralized water spray or chemical spray
systems.
c. Radiation Conditions Inside and Outside Containment. The radiation environment for qualification of
electric equipment should be based on the radiation
environment normally expected over the instaled life of
the equipment plus that associated with the most severe
design basis accident during or following which the
equipment must remain functional The accident-related
environmental conditions should be assumed to occur at
the end of the installed life of the equipment. Methods
acceptable to the NRC staff for establishing radiation
doses for the qualification of equipment for BWRs and
PWRs are provided in Appendix D and the folowing:
(1) The source term to be used in determining
the radiation environment associated with a design basis
LOCA should be taken as an instantaneous release to
the containment of 1007i of the noble gas activity, 50%
of the halogen activity, and 1% of the remaining fission
product activity. The fission product solids should be
assumed to remain in the primary coolant and to be
carried by the coolant to th- containrment sump(s).
(2) For all other design basis accidents (e.g.,
non-LOCA high-energy line breaks or rod ejection or
rod drop accidents), the qualification source term
calculations should use the percentage of fuel damage
assumed in the plant-specific analysis (provided in the
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)). The nuclide
inventory of the breached fuel elements should be
calculated at the end of core life assuming continuous
full-power operation. The inventory of the fuel rod gap
should be assumed to be 10% of the total rod activity
inventory of iodine and 10% of the total activity inventory of noble gases (except for krypton-85, for which a
release of 30% should be assumed). All the gaseous
constituents in the gaps of the breached fuel rods
should be assumed to be instantaneously released to the
primary system. When substantial fuel damage is postulated, 100% of the noble gases, 50% of the halogens,
and 1% of the remaining fission product solids in the
affected fuel rods should be assumed to be instantaneously released to the primary system.
(3) For a limited number of accident-monitoring
instrumentation channels with instrument ranges that
extend well beyond the values the selected variables can
attain under limiting conditions as specified in Regulatory
Guide 1.97, Revision 2, the environm ental qualification
should be consistent with Regulatory Positions C1.3.1.a
and C.1.3.2.a of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rerision 2.

Since the test profiles included in Appendix A to

IEEE Std 323-1974 are only representative, they should

not be considered an acceptable alternative to using
plant-specific containment temperature and pressure
design profiles unless plant-specific analysis is provided
to verify the applicability of those profiles.

(4) The calculation of the radiation environment

associated with design basis accidents should take into
account the time-dependent transport of released fission
products within various regions of the containment and
auxiliary structures.
189-3

(5) Electric equipment that could be exposed

to radiation should be environmentally qualified to a
radiation dose that simulates the calculated radiation
environment (normal and accident) that the equipment
should withstand prior to completion of its required
safety functions. Such qualification should consider that
equipment damage is a function of total integrated dose
and can be influenced by dose rate, energy spectum,
and particle type. The radiation qualification should
factor in doses from all potential radiation sources at
the equipment location. Plant-specific analysis should be
used to justify any reductions in dose or dose rate
resulting from component location or shielding. The
qualification environment at the equipment location
should be established using an analysis similar in nature
and scope to that included in Appendix D to this guide
and incorporating appropriate factors pertinent to the
actual plant design (e.g., reactor type, containment
design).
(6) Shielded components need be qualified only
to the gamma radiation environment provided it can be
demonstrated that the sensitive portions of the component or equipment are not exposed to significant beta
radiation dose rates or that the effects of beta radiation,
including heating and secondary radiation, have no
deleterious effects on component performance. If, after
considering the appropriate shielding factors, the total
beta adiation dose contribution to the equipmerit or
component is calculated to be less than 10% of the
total gamma radiation dose to which the equipment or
component has been qualified, the equipment or component is considered qualified for the beta and gamma
radiation environment.
(7) Electric equipment located outside containment that is exposed to the radiation from a recirculating fluid should be qualified to withstand the radiation
penetrating the containment plus the radiation from the
recirculating fluid.
(8) Electric equipment that may be exposed to
low-level radiation doses should not generally be considered exempt from radiation qualification testing. Exceptions may be based on qualification by analysis supported
by test data or operating experience that verifies that
the dose and dose rates will not degrade the operability
of the equipment below acceptable values.

a. Electric equipment that could be submerged

should be identified and qualified by testing in a submerged condition to demonstrate operability for the
duration required. Analytical extrapolation of results for
test periods shorter than the rquired duration should
be justified.

b. Electric equipment located in an area where

rapid pressure changes are postulated simultaneously
with the most adverse relative humidity should be
qualified to demonstrate that the equipment seals and
vapor barriers will prevent moisture from penetrating
into the equipment to the degree necessary to maintain
equipment functionability.
c. The parameters to which electric equipment is
being qualified (e.g., temperature, pressure, radiation) by
exposure to a simulated environment in a test chamber
should be measured sufficiently close to the equipment
to ensure that actual test conditions accurately represent
the environrment characterized by the test.
d. Performance characteristics that demonstrate the
operability of equipment should be verified before,
after, and periodically during testing throughout its
range of required operability. Variables indicative of
momentary failure that prevent the equipment from
performing its safety function, e.g., rnomentary opening
of a relay contact, should be monitored continuously to
ensure that momentary failures (if any) have been
accounted for during testing. For long-term testing,
however, monitoring during periodic intervals may be
used if justified.
e. Chemical spray or demineralized water spray
that is representative of service conditions should be
incorporated during simulated event testing at pressure
and temperature conditions that would occur when the
spray systems actuate.
f. Cobalt-60 or cesium-137 would be acceptable
gamma radiation sources for environmental qualification.

d. Environmental Conditions for Equiputnt Outside

Containment. Electric equipment that is subjected to the
effects of pipe breaks and is required to mitigate the
consequences of the breaks or to bring the plant to
safe shutdown should be qualified for the txpected
environmental conditions. The techniques to calculate the
environmental conditions should employ a plant-specific
model

4. The suggested values in Section 6.3.1.5, "Margin,"

of IEEE Std 323-1974, except time margins, are acceptable for meeting the requirements of paragraph 5Q49(e)(8).
Altematively, quantified margins should be applied to
the environmental parameters discussed in Regulatory
Position C.2 to ensure that the postulated accident
conditions have been enveloped during testing. These
margins should be applied in addition to any conservatism applied during the derivation of local environmental
conditions of the equipment unless these conservatisms
can be quantified and shown to contain appropriate
margins. The margins should account for variations in
commercial production of the equipment and the inaccuracies in the test equipment.

3. Section 6.3, "Type Test Procedures," of IEEE Std

323-1974 should be supplemented with the following:

Some electric equipment may be required by the

design to perform its safety function only within the

1.89-4

first ten hours of the event. This equipment should

remain functional in he accident environment for a
F^ period of at least 1 hour in excess of the time asssumed
in the accident analysis unless a time margin of less
hj'
than one hour can be justified. This justification must
include, for each piece of equipment, () consideration
of a spectrum of breaks, (2) the potential need for the
equipment later in an event or during recovery operations, (3) a determination that failure of the equipment
after performance of its safety function wll not be
detrimental to plant safety or mislead the operator,
and (4) a determination that the margin applied to the
minimum operability time, when combined with the
other test margins, will account for the uncertainties
associated with the use of analytical techniques in the
derivation of environmental parameters, the number of
units tested, production tolerances, and test equipment
inaccuracies. For all other equipment (e.g., postaccident
monitoring, recombiners), the 10% time margin identified
in Section 6.3.1.5 of IEEE Std 323-1974 should be
used.
r

5. Section 6.3.3, "Aging," of IEEE Std 323-1974

and paragraph 50.49(e)(5) should be supplemented with
the following:
a. If synergistic effects have been identified prior
to the initiation of qualification, they should be accounted
for in the qualification programL Synergistic effects
known at this time are dose rate effects and effects
~
resulting from the different sequence of applying radiar-11 tion and (elevated) temperature.
b. The expected operating temperature of the
equipment under service conditions should be accounted
for in thermal aging. The Arrhenius methodology is
considered an acceptable method of addressing accelerated
thermal aging within the limitation of state-of-the-art
technology. Other aging methods will be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis.
c. The aging acceleration rate and activation
energies used during qualification testing and the basis
upon which the rate and activation energy were established should be defined, justified, and documented.
d. Periodic surveillance and testing programs are
acceptable to account for uncertainties regarding agerelated degradation that could affect the functional
capability of equipment. Results of such programs will
be acceptable as ongoing qualification to modify designated life (or qualified life) of equipment and should be
incorporated into the maintenance and refurbishment/
replacement schedules.
6. Replacement electric equipment installed subsequent to February 22, 1983, must be qualified in accordance with the provisions of 50.49 unless there are
sound reasons to the contrary. The NRC staff considers
he following to be sound reasons for the use of replace'.nent equipment previously qualified in accordance with
the DOR Guidelines or NUREG-0588 in lieu of upgrading:
1.89-5

a. The item of equipment to be replaced is a

component of equipment that is routinely replaced as
part of normal equipment maintenance, e.g., gaskets,
o-rings, coils; these may be replaced with identical
components.
b. The item to be replaced is a component that is
part of an item of equipment qualified as an assembly;
these may be replaced with identical omponents.
c. Identical equipment to be used as a replacement
was on hand as a part of the utility's stock prior to
February 22, 1983.
d. Replacement equipment qualified in accordance
with the provisions of 50.49 does not exist.
e. Replacement equipment qualified in accordance
with the provisions of 50.49 is not available to meet
installation and operation schedules. However, in such
case, the replacement equipment may be used only until
upgraded equipment can be obtained and an outage of
sufficient duration is available for replacement.
f. Replacement equipment qualified in accordance
with 50.49 would require significant plant modifications to accommodate its use.
g. The use of replacement equipment qualified in
accordance with 50.49 has a significant probability of
creating human factor problems that would negatively
affect plant safety and performance, for example:
(1) Knowledge, skills, and ability of existing
plant staff would require significant upgrading to operate
or maintain the specific replacement equipment;
(2) The use of the replacement equipment
would create a one-of-a-kind application; or
(3) Maintenance, surveillance, or calibration activities would be unnecessarily complex.
7. In addition to the requirements of paragraph
50.49(j) of 10 CFR Part 50 and Section 8, "Documentation," of IEEE Std 323-1974, documentation should
address the information identified in Appendix E to this
guide. A record of the qualification should be maintained
in an auditable file to permit verification that each item
of electric equipment is qualified to perform its safety
function under its postulated environmental conditions
throughout its instaled life.
D. IMPLEMENTATION.
The purpose of this section is to provide information
to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's
plans for using this regulatory guide.
Except in those cases in whuch the applicant or
licensee proposes an acceptable alternative method for
complying with specified portions of the Commission's

0
regulations, the methods described herein will be used in
the evaluation of the qualification of electric equipment
for all operating plants and plants that bave not received
an operating license subject to the following:
In accordance with paragraph 50.49(k), applicants for
and holders of operating licenses are not required to
requalify electric equipment important to safety (replacement equipment excepted) in accordance with the provisions of 50.49 and in accordance with this guide if

the NRC has previously required qualification of that

equipment in accordance with "Guidelines for Evaluating
Environmental Qualification of Class IE Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors" (DOR Guidelines), or 0
NUREG-0588, "Interim Staff Position on Environmental
Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment."
These applicants and licensees may continue to use the
criteria in these documents for qualifying electric equipment important to safety in the affected plants, with
the exception of replacement equipment.

.4

Q
1.89-6

APPENDIX A
TYPICAL SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT OR SYSTEMS
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation
Reactor Protection
Containment Isolation
Steanline Isolation
Main Feedwater Shutdown and Isolation
Emergency Power
*Pargraph S.49(b)(1) Identifies safety-related electric equip3nent as a ubset of electric equipment important to safety and
dernes it as the equipment that is relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to ensure (I) the
integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (2) the
capability to shut down the reactor and nantain It In a safe
shutdown condition, or (3) the capability to prevent or nitigate
the consequences of accidents that could result in potential
offsite exposurs comparable to the 10 CFR Prt 100 guidelines.

1.89-7

Emergency Core Cooling

Containment Heat Removal
Containment Fission Product Removal
Containment Combustible Gas Control
Auxiliary Feedwater
Containment Ventilation
Containment Radiation Monitoring
Control Room Habitability System (e.g., HVAC, Radiation
Filters)
Ventilation for Aras Containing Safety Equipment
Component Cooling
Service Water
Emergency Systems to Achieve Safe Shutdown

*0

APPENDIX B

TYPICAL EXAMPLES OF NON-SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT

Associated circuits, as defined in Regulatory Guide
1.75, "Physical Independence of Electric Systems," need
only be qualified to ensure that they will not fail under
postulated environmental conditions in a manner that
could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of safety
functions by safety-related equipment.

core cooling system pump) will include termination

commands on loss of lubrication oil pressure or low
suction pressure. These features are provided for equipment protection. Faiure of these features, however,
would defeat the safety-related function. They must
therefore be environmentally qualified.

The equipment identified in Examples 1, 2, and 3

has typically been classified as safety-related on recently
licensed plants. However, some operating plants were
licensed using less defLnitive safety classification criteria
than those applied to recent designs, and they may
contain non-safety-related equipment such as that in
Examples 1, 2, and 3. The provisions of 50.49
require that the licensee provide appropriate environmental qualification for equipment described in these
examples regardless of the safety classification of that
equipment.

Example 3

Example 4 applies to some plants, depending on the

specific location of control system components.
Example I
The iection of emergency feedwater (EFW) for
PWRs and high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) for
BW'Rs are safety-related functions. The EFW system
and the HPCI system are initiated upon detection of
low water leveL Automatic termination of these systems
upon detection of high water level may also be provided.
The high-level trip in some cases has been considered an
equipment protection device; however, the inadvertent
termination of EFW or HPCI due to misoperation of
the level sensing equipment when subjected to a harsh
environment could defeat the safety-related iection
function. Thus the electric equipment associated with
automatic termination of the injection must be environmentally qualified.

A safety-related fluid system may have non-safetyrelated portions of the system that are isolated from the
safety-related portions of the system upon the generation
of a safety feature actuation signaL Isolation may be
performed by motor-operated valves. These valve operators must be environmentally qualified.
Example 4
Harsh environments associated with HELBs could
cause control system malfunctions resulting in consequences more severe than those for the HELBs analyzed
in the FSAR (Chapter 15) or beyond the capability of
operators or safety systems. In these cases, the control
system failures could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of the safety functions required for the HELBs.
Typical examples of control systems that could fail as a
result of an HELB and whose consequential failure may
not be bounded by HELBs analyzed in the FSAR are:

1. The automatic rod control system,

2. The pressurizer power-operated relief valve control
system,
3. The main feedwater control system,
4. The steam generator power-operated relief valve
control system, and
5. The turbine generator control system.

Example 2
In some cases, the electrical control system for a
pump (for example, a charging pump or an emergency

Based on the above, it may be necessary to environmentally qualify components associated with various
control systems.

0
1.89-8

APPENDIX C
METHODS FOR CALCULATING MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE
LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT

MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK

Acceptable methods for calculating the mass and

energy release to determine the loss-of-coolant accident
environment for PWR and BWR plants are described in
the folloVing:

Acceptable methods for calculating the mass and

energy release to determine the main steam line break
environment are described in the following:

1. Topical
plants.

Report WCAP-8312A

for Westinghouse

2. Section 6.2.1 of CESSAR System 80 PSAR for

Combustion Engineering plants.
3. Appendix
Wilcox plants.

6A

of

B-SAR-205

for Babcock

&

4. NEDO-10320 and Supplements I and 2 for General

Electric plants. NEDO-20533 dated June 1974 and
Supplement i dated August 1975 for GE Mark III.

1. Topical Report WCAP-8822 (MARVEL/TRANSFLA)

for Westinghouse plants. Use of this method is acceptable for aL Westinghouse plants with the exception
that a plant-specific containment temperature analysis
will be required for ice condenser containments.
2. Appendix 6B of CESSAR System 80 PSAR for
Combustion Engineering plants.
3. Section 15.1.14 of B-SAR-205 for Babcock &
Wilcox plants.
4. Same as item 4 above for General Electric plants.

1.89-9

0
f

APPENDIX D

METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE CALCULATION

FOR QUALIFICATION RADIATION DOSE
This appendix illustrates the staff model for calculating dose rates and integrated doses for equipment
qualification purposes. The doses shown in Figure D-1
include contributions from airborne and plateout radiation sources in the containment and cover a period of
one year following the postulated fission product release.
The dose values shown are provided for iDustration
only and may not be appropriate for plant-specific
application for equipment qualification levels. The dose
levels intended for qualification purposes should be
determined using the maximum time the equipment is
intended to function. It should be noted, however, that
for equipment that must be qualified for more than
thirty days, a source term that incorporates considerable
quantities of cesium as suggested by the accident at
Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) may produce doses
greater than those estimated by the present source
term.
X

ets Dose Rds)

C.mms Dsetloonn,s)

ler

1. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS USED IN THE ANALYSIS

Gamma and beta doses and dose rates should be
determined for three types of radioactive source distriactivity suspended in the containment
butions: ()
atmosphere, (2) activity plated out on containment
surfaces, and (3) activity mixed in the containment
sump water. A given piece of equipment may receive a
dose contnbution from any or all of these sources. The
amount of dose contributed by each of these sources is
determined by the location of the equipment, the
time-dependent and location-dependent distribution of
the source, and the effects of shielding.
Following the TMI-2 accident, the staff concluded
that a thorough examination of the source term assumptions for equipment qualification was warranted. It is
recognized, however, that the TMI-2 accident represents
only one of a number of possible accident sequences
leading to a release of frsion products and that the mix
of fission products released under various core conditions
could vary substantially.
Research under way may lead to modifications in
source term assumptions. The research will consider the
experience from the TMI-2 accident of 1979, contemporary fission product release phenomenology, the
transport and attenuation of fission products in primary
coolant systems and containments, and distinctions
between design basis accidents and events beyond the
design basis. This research may result in revision of this
guide.

10'

IC,

2. ASSUMPTIONS USED IN CALCULATING FISSION

PRODUCT CONCENTRATIONS

TIMEIHOURSI

Figure D 1 Smple Airborne and iaelcout Doses

an the Conteinment Cnter1ine

or

Dose Point

The beta and gmma integrated dosc-s prtsented in

Tables I) I and D)-2 nd Figure D-1 have been determined
usn modeLs tnd assumptions contained in this appendix.
This analysis incorporates the iportant tiune-dependent
phenomena related to the action of engineered sarety
features (ESFs) and such natural penomena as iodine
plateout, as in preyious staff analyses.
Droses wre calculated for a point inside the containment (at the mdpoint of the containment) taking
sprays aind plateout mechanisms into account. The
dose-s prtsented in Figure I) I are Yalues for a PR
plant havng; a contaiTnent ree volume of 2.5 millon
cubic feet and a power rating of 41 00 MWt.

This section discusses the assumptions used to simulate

the PWR and BWR containments for determining the
time-dependent and location-dependent distribution of
the airborne noble gas and iodine activity within the
containment atmosphere, the activity plated out on
containment surfaces, and the activity in the sump
water.
The staff used a computer prograud, TACT, to model
the time-dependent behavior of iodine -and noble gases
within a nuclear power plant. The TACT code or other
equivalent industry codes would provide an acceptable
method for modeling the transfer of activity from one
containment region to another and for modeling the
reduction of activity due to the action of ESFs. Another
staff code, SPIRT (ReL 1), is used to calculate the
removal
tes of elemental iodine by plateout and

1.89-10

0
sprays. These codes were used to develop the source
term estimates. The assumptions in the following sections
were used to calculate the distribution of radioactivity
within the containment foDowing a design basis LOCA
2.1

WR Dry Containments

The following methods and assumptions were used by

the staff for calculating the radiation environment in
PWR dry containments:
1. In the analysis of the accident radiation environment, the staff assumed that 0% of the iodine core
activity inventory and 100% of the core noble gas
activity inventory were released instantaneously to the
containment atmosphere. One percent of the remaining
"solids" activity inventory was assumed released from
the core and carried with the primary coolant directly
to the containment sump.
2. The containment free volume was taken as 2.52 x
106 ft3 . Of this volume, 74% or 1.86 x 106 ft3 was
assumed to be directly covered by the containment
sprays, leaving 6.6 x 105 ft3 of the containment free
volume unsprayed. The latter includes regions within the
main containment space under the containment dome
and compartments below the operating floor leveL
(Plants with different containment free volumes should
use plant-specific values.)

of iodine. Further, this model assumes that during the

recirculation phases, the pH of the sump water is
maintained above 8.5.
8. The spray removal rate constant () was calculated
using the staff's SPIRT program, conservatively assuming
the operation of only one spray train and an instantaneous partition coefficient (H) for elemental iodine of
5000. The calculated value of the spray removal constant
for elemental iodine was 27.2 hrF.
9. Natural deposition (ie., plateout) of airborne
activity should be determined using a mechanistic model
(see Reference 1). In the stafrs example, plateout of
iodine on containment internal surfaces was modeled as
a first-order rate removal process, and best estimates for
model parameters were assumed. Based on an assumed
total surface area within containment of approximately
5.0 x 105 ft2, the calculated value for the overall
plateout constant for elemental iodine was 1.23 hr .
The assumption that 50% of the activity is instantaneously plated out should not be used.
10. The spray removal and plateout processes were
modeled as competing iodine removal mechanisms.
Removal of iodine from surfaces by the flow of condensed steam or by washoff by the containment spray
may be assumed if such effects can be verified and
quantified by analysis or experiment.

3. The initial distribution of actMity within the

containment should be based on realistic assumptions.
The staff's examples assumed a relatively open (noncompartmented) contairunent with a large release uniformly distributed in the containment. This is a reasonable simplification for dose assessment in a large dry
PWR containment and it is realistic in terms of specifying the time-dependent radiation environment in most
areas of the containment.

11. A spray removal rate constant () for particulate

iodine concentration was calculated using the stafrs
SPIRT program (Ref. 1). The staff calculated a value of
= 0.43 h
and allowed the removal of particulate
iodine to continue until the airborne concentration was
reduced by a factor of 104. The organic iodine concentration in the containment atmosphere is assumed
not to be affected by either the containment spray or
plateout removal mechanisms.

4. The ESF fans were assumed to have a deslgn flow

rate of 220,000 cfm in the post-LOCA environment.
Mixing between all major unsprayed regions and compartments and the main sprayed region was assumed.

12. The sprays were assumed to remove elemental

iodine until the instantaneous concentration in the
sprayed region was reduced by a factor of 200. This is
necessary to achieve an equilibrium airborne iodine
concentration consistent with previous LOCA analyses.

5. Effects of the ESF systems that remove airbone

activity or redistribute activity within containnent (e.g.,
containment spray and containment ventilation systems)
should be evaluated using assumptions consistent with
previous licensing practice. For example, the air exchange
between the sprayed and unsprayed regions was assumed
to be one-half of the design flow rate of the ESF fans.
Good mixing of the containment activity between the
sprayed and unsprayed regions is ensured by natural
convection currents and ESF fans.
6. The containment spray system was assumed to
have two equal-capacity trains each designed to iect
3000 gpm of boric acid solution into the containment
7. Trace levels of hydrazine wre assumed to be
added during the iection phase to enhance the removal

13. The analysis assumed that more than one species

of radioactive iodine is present in a design basis LOCA
The calculation of the post-LOCA environment assumed
that, of the 50%7 of the core inventory of iodine released,
5% is associated with airbome particulate materials, 4%
forms organic compounds, and 91% remains as elemental
iodine. For conservatism, this composition was amed
present at time t = 0. (These assumtions conceming
the iodine form are obtained from Regulatory Guides
1.3, "Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential
Radiological Consequences of a Loss-of-Coolant Accident
for Boiling Water Reactors," and 1.4, "Assumptions
Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consquences of a Loss-of-Coolant Accident for Pressurized
Water Reactors,' when a plateout factor of 2 is assumed
for the elemental form.)

1.89-11

0
14. The staff analysis conservatively ssumed that no
leakage from the containment building to the environment occurred.
15. Removal of airborne activity by engineered safety
features may be assumed when calculating the radiation
environment following other non-LOCA design basis
accidents provided the safety features systems are
automatically activated as a result of the accident.
16. The radiation environment resulting from normal
operation should be based on the conservative source
term estimates reported in the plant's Safety Analysis
Report or should be consistent with the primary coolant
specific activity limits contained in the plant's technical
specifications. The use of equilibrium primary coolant
concentrations based on 1% fuel cladding failures would
be one acceptable method.
2.2 PWR Ice Condenser Containents

For the Mark I and Mark I designs, all of the activity

should be assumed initially released to the drywell area
and the transfer of activity from these regions via
containment leakage to the surrounding reactor building
volume should be used to predict the qualification levels
within the reactor building (secondary contaimnent).

3. Removal of airborne iodine in the drywell or

reactor building by the action of both plateout and
spray processes may be assumed provided the effeotiveness of these competing iodine removal processes are
evaluated using conditions and assumptions consistent
with items 6 through 12 in Section 2.1 and plant-specific
parameters.
4. The removal of airborne activity from the reactor
building by operation of the standby gas treatment
system (SGTS) may be assumed.
3. MODEL FOR CALCULATING THE DOSE RATE OF
AIRBORNE AND PLATEOUT FISSION PRODUCTS

The assumptions and methods presented for calculating

the radiation environment in PWR dry containments are
appropriate for use in calculating the radiation environment for ice condenser containments following a design
basis LOCA with the following modifications:
1. The source should be assumed to be initially
released to the lower containment compartment. The
distribution of the activity should be based on the
forced recirculation fan flow rates and the transfer rates
through the ice beds as functions of time.
2. Credit may be taken for iodine removal via the
operation of the ice beds and the spray system. A
time-dependent removal efficiency consistent with the
steam/air mixture for elemental iodine may be assumed.
3. Removal of.airborne iodine in the upper compartment of the containment by the action of both plateout
and spray processes may be assumed provided these
removal processes are evaluated using conditions and
assumptions consistent with items 6 through 12 in
Section 2.1 and plant-specific parameters.
2.3 BWR Containments
The assumptions and methods presented for calculating
the radiation environment in PWR dry containments are
appropriate for use in calculating the radiation environment for BWRs following a design basis LOCA with the
following modifications:
1. A decontamination factor DF) of 10 may be
assumed for both elemental and particulate iodine as the
iodine activity passes through the suppression pooL No
credit should be taken for the removal of organic iodine
or noble gases in the suppression pooL
2. For Mark III designs, all of the activity passing
through the suppression pool should be assumed instantaneously and uniformly distributed within the containment.

The beta and gamma dose rates and integrated doses

from the airborne activity within the containment
atmosphere were calculated for the midpoint in the
containment. The containment was modeled as a
cylinder with the height and diameter equal Containment
shielding and internal structures were neglected because
they would involve a degree of complexity beyond the
scope of the present work. The calculations of Reference 2 indicate that the specific internal shielding and
structure would be expected to reduce the gamma doses
and dose rates by factors of two or more depending on
the specific location and geometry.

Because of the short range of the betas in air, the

airborne beta doses presented in Tables -1 and D-2
were calculated using an infinite medium approximation.
This is shown in Reference 3 to result in only a small
error. Bcta doses for equipment located on the containment walls or on large internal structures may be
calculated using the semiinfinite beta dose modeL
The staff recognizes that this approach is conservative
and that, for most plant-specific calculations, a semiinfinite beta dose model may be more appropriate. The
use of the semiinfinite model is acceptable provided
there is sufficient justification for its use (such as
location, shielding, minimal thickness). Further, the staff
recognizes that for some equipment the use of a finitecloud beta dose model may be warranted. Because the
use of the finite-cloud model would result in beta doses
much smaller than the values presented in Table D-2, a
case-by-case justification for use of the finite-cloud
model will be required.
.4

The gamma dose rate contribution from the platedout iodine on containment surfaces to the point on the
centerline was also included. The model calculated
the plateout activity in the containment assuming only
one spray train and one ventilation systm were operating. It sbould be noted that washoff of the plated-out

1.89-12

0
iodine activity by the sprays was not addressed in this
e-aluation.

calculated on the assumption of a time-dependent sump

iodine buildup is not significant.)

Finally, all gamma doses were multiplied by a correction factor of 1.3 as suggested in Reference 3 to account
for the omission of the contribution from the decay
chains of the isotopes.

The "solid" fission products should be assumed to be

instantaneously carried by the coolant to the sump and
uniformly distributed in the sump water. The gamma
and beta dose rates and the integrated doses should
be computed for a center point located at the surface
of the large pool of sump water, and the dose rate
calculation should include an estimate of the effects
of buildup.

4. MODEL FOR CALCULATING THE DOSE RATE

OF SUMP FISSION PRODUCTS
The staff model assumed the washout of airborne
iodine from the containment atmosphere to the containment sump. For a PWR containment with sprays and
good mixing between the sprayed and unsprayed regions,
the elemental iodine (assumed to constitute 91% of the
released iodine) is very rapidly washed out of the
atmosphere to the containment sump (typically 90% of
the airborne iodine in less than 15 minutes).
The dose calculations may assume a time-dependent
iodine source. (The difference between the integrated
dose calculated on the assumption of 50% of the core
iodine immediately available in the sump and that

5. CONCLUSION
The values given in Tables D-1 and D-2 and Figure
D-1 for the various locations in the containment provide
an estimate of expected radiation qualification values for
a 4100 MWt PWR design.
The NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research is
continuing its research efforts in the area of source
terms for equipment qualification following design basis
accidents. As more information in this area becomes
available, the source terms and staff models may change
to reflect the new information.

1.89-13

mm

'

Table D-1
ESTIMATES FOR TO1AL AIRBORNE GAMMA DOSE
CONTRIBUTORS IN CONTAINMENT TO A POINT IN THE CONTAINMENT CENTER

Time
(Hr)

Airborne Iodine
Dose (R)

Airborne Noble
Gas Dose (R)

Plateout Iodine
Dose (R)

Total Dose
(R)

0.00
0.03
0.06
0.09
0.12
0.15
0.18
0.21
0.25
0.38
0.50
0.75
1.00
2.00
5.00
8.00
24.0
60.0
96.0
192
298
394
560
720
888
1060
1220
1390
1560
1730
1900
2060
2230
2950
3670
4390
5110
5830
6550
7270
8000
8710

4.82E+4
8.57E+4
1.09E+S
1.25E+5
1.38E+5
1.47E+5
1.55E+5
1.64E+5
1.87E+5
2.03E+5
2.36E+5
2.66E+5
3.62E+5
5.50E+5
6.63E+5
1.01E+6
1.31 E+6
1.45E+6
1.68E+6
1.85E+6
1.95E+6
2.07E+6
2.13E+6
2.16E+6
2.18E+6
2.19E+6
2.20E+6
2.20E+6
2.20E+6
2.20E+6
2.20E+6
2.20E+6
2.20E+6
2.20E+6
2.20E+6
2.20E+6
2.20E+6
2.20E+6
2.20E+6
2.20E+6
2.20E+6

7.42E+4
1.39E+5
1.98E+5
2.51E+5
3.01E+5
3.48E+5
3.92E+5
4.49E+5
6.19E+5
7.6 1E+5
1.03E+6
1.26E+6
2.04E+6
3.56E+6
4.38E+6
6.26E+6
7.16E+6
7.56E+6
8.29E+6
8.76E+6
8.85E+6
9.06E+6
9.15E+6
9.19E+6
9.21E+6

1.69E+3
3.98E+3
7.22E+3
1.IOE+4
1.52E+4
1.96E+4
2.41E+4
3.03E+4
5.05E+4
6.90E+4
1.06E+5
1.40E+5
2.6 1E+5
5.40E+5
7.47E+5
1.45E+6
2.10E+6
2.39E+6
2.86E+6
3.19E+6
3.4 1E+6
3.64E+6
3.76E+6
3.83E+6
3.87E+6
3.89E+6
3.90E+6
3.9 1E+6
3.9 1E+6

1.24E+5
2.29E+S
3.14E+5
3.87E+5
4.54E+5
S.15E+5
5.71E+5
6.43E+5
8.57E+5
1.03E+6
1.37E+6
1.67E+6
2.66E+6
4.65E+6
5.79E+6
8.72E+6
1.06E+7
1.14E+7
1.28E+7
1.38E+7
1.42E+7
1.48E+7
I.SOE+7
1.52E+7
1.53E+7
1.53E+7
1.53E+7
1.53E+7
1.53E+7
1.53E+7
1.53E+7
1.53E+7
1.54E+7
1.54E+7
1.54E+7
1.54E+7
1.54E+7
1.54E+7
1.54E+7
1.54E+7
1.54E+7
1.54E+7

9.21 E+6

9.2 1E+6
9.22E+6
9.22E+6
9.22E+6
9.22E+6
9.22E+6
9.23E+6
9.24E+6
9.24E+6
9.25E+6
9.25E+6
9.26E+6
9.27E+6
9.27E+6
9.28E+6

3.92E+6

3.92E+6
3.92E+6
3.92E+6
3.92E+6
3.92E+6
3.92E+6
3.92E+6
3.92E+6
3.92E+6
3.92E+6
3.92E+6
Total,

.4

0
1.89-14

'

Table D2
ESTIMATES FOR TOTAL AIRBORNE BETA DOSE
CONTRIBUTORS IN CONTAINMENT TO A POINT IN THE CONTAINMENT CENTER

Tine
(Hr) -

Airborne Iodine
Dose (rads)

Airbome Noble
Gas Dose (rads)*

Total Dose
(rads)"

0.00
0.03
0.06
0.09
0.12
0.15
0.18
0.21
0.25
0.38
0.50
0.75
1.00
2.00
5.00
8.00
24.0
60.0
96.0
192
298
394
560
720
888
1060
1220
1390
1560
1730
1900
2060
2230
2950
3670
4390
5110
5830
6550
7270
8000
8710

1.47E+S
2.62E+5
3.33E+5
3.83E+5
4.20E+5
4.49E+S
4.73E+5
5.OOE+S
S.67E+5
6.15E+5
7.13E+S
8.OOE+S
1.07E+6
1.58E+6
1.88E+6
2.8 7E+6
3.89E+6
4.3 7E+6
5.14E+6
5.64E+6
5.99E+6
6.34E+6
6.53E+6
6.63E+6
6.69E+6
6.73E+6
6.75E+6
6.76E+6
6.76E+6
6.76E+6
6.76E+6
6.77E+6
6.77E+6
6.77E+6
6.77E+6
6.7 7E+6
6.77E+6
6.77E+6
6.77E+6
6.77E+6
6.77E+6

5.48E+5
9.86E+5
1.35E+5
1.65E+6
1.9 1E+6
2.14E+6
2.35E+6
2.60E+6
3.30E+6
3.86E+6
4.89E+6
5.81 E+6
9.02E+6
1.65E+7
2.20E+7
4.08E+7
6.15E+7
7.48E+7
I.OOE+8
1.1 7E+8
1.25E+8
1.34E+8
1.39E+8
1.42E+8
1.44E+8
I.45E+8
1.47E+8
I.49E+8
1.5 IE+8
1.5 2E+8
I.S4E+8
1.55E+8
1.62E+8
1.69E+8
1.76E+8
1.83E+8
1.89E+8
1.96E+8
2.03E+8
2.09E+8
2.16E+8

6.95E+5
1.25E+6
1.68E+6
2.03E+6
2.33E+6
2.59E+6
2.82E+6
3.10E+6
3.87E+6
4.48E+6
5.60E+6
6.6 1E+6
1.OIE+7
1.8 IE+7
2.39E+7
4.37E+7
6.54E+7
7.92E+7
1.05E+8
1.23E+8
1.31 E+8
1.40E+8
1.46Ef8
1.49E+8
1.5 1E+8
1.5 2E+8
1.54E+8
1.56E+8
1.58E+8
1.59E+8
1.61E+8
1.62E+8
I .69E+8

Total
'Dose conversion factor is based on absorption by tissue.

1.89-15

1.76E+8
1.83E+8
1.90E+8
1.96E+8
2.03E+8
2.10E+8
2.16E+8
2.23E+8
2.23E+8

S
APPENDIX D
REFERENCES
L

2.

A. K. Postma, R. R. Sherry, and P. Tam, "Technological Bases for Models of Spray Washout and
Airborne Contaminants in Containment Vessels,"
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission, NUREG/CR0009, November 1978.1
E. A. Warman and E. T. Boulette, "Engineering
Evaluation of Radiation Environment in LWR

Containments," in Transactions of the American

Nuclear Society, VoL 23, pp. 604-605, 1976.
3.

M. J. Kolar and N. C. Olson, "Calculation of Accident Doses to Equipment Inside Containment of

Power Reactors," in Transactions of the American
Nuclear Society, VoL 22, pp. 808-809, 1975.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kocher, D. C., Ed., "Nuclear Decay Data for Radionuclides Occurring in Routine Releases from Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Facilities," ORNL/NUREG/TM-102, August
1977.
Lorenz, R. A., J. L. Collins, and A. P. Malinauskas,
"Fission Product Source Terms for the LWR Loss-ofCoolant Accident: Summary Report," U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-0091, May 1978.*
Normand, E., and W. R. Determan, A Simple Algorithm
to Calculate the Immersion Dose," in Transactions of
*Copies are available from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161.

the American Nuclear Society, VoL 18, pp. 358-359,

1974.
Postma, A. K., and R. Zavadoski, "Review of Organic
Iodide Formation Under Accident Conditions in Water
Cooled Reactors," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
WASH-1233, pp. 62-64, October 1972.*
Rogovin, M., et al, "Three Mile Island-A Report to the
Commissioners and to the Public," NUREG/CR-1250,
Volume II, Part 2, April 5, 1979.*
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Technical Basis
for Estimating Fission Product Behavior During LWR
Accidents," NUREG-0772, June 1981.*

.4

1.89-16

0
APPENDIX E

QUALIFICATION DOCUMENTATION FOR ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT

In order to ensure that an environmental qualification
program conforms to General Design Criteria 1, 2, 4,
and 23 of Appendix A; Sections IU, XI, and XVII of
Appendix B; and 50.49 of 10 CFR Part S0, the
following information on the qualification program
should be submitted to NRC for electric equipment
within the scope of this guide:
1. Provide a list of all electric equipment within the
scope of this guide such as the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
r.
g.
h

Switchgear
Motor control centers
Valve operators and solenoid valves
Motors
Logic equipment
Cable
Connectors
Sensors (pressure, pressure differential, temperature, flow and level, neutron, and other radiation)
i. Limit switches
j. Heaters
k. Fans
L Control boards
m.Instrument racks and panels
n. Electric penetrations
o. Splices
p. Terminal bloeks
2. For each item of equipment identified
provide the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.

in 1,

Type (functional designation)

Mianufacturer
Manufacturer's type number and model number
Plant ID/tag number and location

3. Categorize the equipment identified in item I into

one of the following categories:
a. Equipment that will experience the environmental
conditions of design basis accidents through which it
must function to mitigate such accidents; it must be
qualified to demonstrate operability in the accident
environment for the time required for accident mitigation
with safety margin to failure.
b. Equipment that will experience environmental
conditions of design basis accidents through which it
need not function for mitigation of such accidents but
through which it must not fail in a manner detrimental
to plant safety or accident mitigation; it must be qualified to demonstrate the capability to withstand any

accident environment for the time during which it

must not fail with safety margin to failure.
c. Equipment that will experience environmental
conditions of design basis accidents through which it
need not function foT mitigation of such accidents and
whose failure (in any mode) is deemed not detrimental
to plant safety or accident mitigation; it need not be
qualified for any accident environment.
d. Equipment that has performed its safety function prior to the exposure to an accident environment
and whose failure (in any mode) is deemed not detrimental to plant safety and will not mislead the operator; it need not be qualified for an accident environment.
4. For each item of equipment in the categories of
equipment listed in item 3, provide the following:
a. The system safety function requirements for
equipment in categories 3.a, 3.b, and 3.d.
b. An environmental envelope as a function of
time that includes all extreme parameters, both maximum and minimum values, expected to occur during
plant shutdown and design basis accident (including
LOCA and MSLB), including postaccident conditions,
for equipment in categories 3.a and 3.b.
c. Length of time equipment in categories 3.a and
3.b must perform its safety function when subjected to
any of the limiting environment specified above.

d. The technical bases that justify the placement

of each item of equipment in categories 3.b, 3.c, and
3.d.
5. For each item of equipment identified in categories 3.a and 3.b, state the actual qualification envelope
simulated during testing (defining the duration of the
environment and the margin in excess of the design
requirements). If any method other than type testing
was used for qualification, identify the method and
define the equivalent "qualification envelope" so derived.
6. Provide a summary of test results that demonstrates the adequacy of the qualification program. If any
analysis is used for qualification, justification of all
analysis assumptions must be provided.
7. Identify the qualification documents that contain
detailed supporting information, including test data, for
items 5 and 6.

1.89-17

VALUE/IMPACT STATEMENT
Background

The Commission (in Memorandum and Order CLI-8021 dated May 23, 1980) directed the staff to use
NUREG-0588, "Interim Staff Position on Environmental
Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment,"
along with a document entitled "Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualification of Class IE Electrical
Equipment in Operating Reactors" (DOR Guidelines,
January 14, 1980) as requirements that licensees and
applicants must meet in order to satisfy the equipment
qualification requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. Subsequently, the Commission approved a final rule for
electric equipment qualification ( 50.49 of 10 CFR
Part 50). Revision I to Regulatory Guide 1.89 will
provide an acceptable method for meeting the requirements of 50.49.

requirements for equipment qualificatiorL. Methods for

establishing temperature and pressure profiles for a
loss-of-coolant accident and main steam line break are
provided, and radiological source terms are given.
3. Regulatory Position C.3, which provides the staff
position pertaining to test procedures.
4. Regulatory Position CA, which provides the staff
position regarding establishing margin in testing requirements.
S. Regulatory Position C5, which provides the staff
position regarding aging of equipment.
6. Regulatory Position C.6, which provides the
staff position regarding qualiication of replacement
equipment.

Substantive Changes and Their Value/Impact

The following positions were added in Revision I to
Regulatory Guide 1.89:
1. Regulatory Position C.1, which adds to the scope
of the guide non-safety-related electric equipment whose
failure under postulated environmental conditions could
prevent satisfactory accomplishment of safety functions
(for example, the associated circuits defined in Regulatory Guide 1.75, "Physical Independence of Electric
Systems") and certain postaccident monitoring equipment.
2. Regulatory Position C.2, which provides the staff
position on establishing performance and environmental

7. Regulatory Position C.7, which provides the staff

position on the documentation of equipment qualification procedures and results.
Value - This guide provides the staff's views on
individual sections of IEEE Std 323-1974 and describes
acceptable methods for meeting the requirements of
50.49 of 10 CFR Part S0. This guide should enhance
the licensing process.

Impact - This regulatory guide does not impose any

new costs or obligations on licensees or applicants.
Thus, no impact will result from issuance of this guide
with respect to requirements in effect at this timne.

0
1.89-18