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    Tanenggee Vs People

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    Nath Antonio
    The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of petitioner Carlos Tanengee for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The Court found that the petitioner's written statement admitting to taking out loans using falsified documents, which was given during an administrative investigation by his employer bank, was admissible. While the investigation was not criminal in nature, the statement was made voluntarily without any intimidation or coercion. The petitioner also failed to substantiate his claims that another employee was responsible for the falsified documents. Therefore, the Court affirmed the lower courts' reliance on the statement as evidence in convicting the petitioner.

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    Tanenggee Vs People

    Uploaded by

    Nath Antonio
    783 views5 pages
    The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of petitioner Carlos Tanengee for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The Court found that the petitioner's written statement admitting to taking out loans using falsified documents, which was given during an administrative investigation by his employer bank, was admissible. While the investigation was not criminal in nature, the statement was made voluntarily without any intimidation or coercion. The petitioner also failed to substantiate his claims that another employee was responsible for the falsified documents. Therefore, the Court affirmed the lower courts' reliance on the statement as evidence in convicting the petitioner.

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    Remedial Law - Rules of Admissibility - case digest

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    Tanenggee vs People

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    The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of petitioner Carlos Tanengee for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The Court found that the petitioner's written statement admitting to taking out loans using falsified documents, which was given during an administrative investigation by his employer bank, was admissible. While the investigation was not criminal in nature, the statement was made voluntarily without any intimidation or coercion. The petitioner also failed to substantiate his claims that another employee was responsible for the falsified documents. Therefore, the Court affirmed the lower courts' reliance on the statement as evidence in convicting the petitioner.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    783 views5 pages

    Tanenggee Vs People

    Uploaded by

    Nath Antonio
    The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of petitioner Carlos Tanengee for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The Court found that the petitioner's written statement admitting to taking out loans using falsified documents, which was given during an administrative investigation by his employer bank, was admissible. While the investigation was not criminal in nature, the statement was made voluntarily without any intimidation or coercion. The petitioner also failed to substantiate his claims that another employee was responsible for the falsified documents. Therefore, the Court affirmed the lower courts' reliance on the statement as evidence in convicting the petitioner.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    of 5

    G.R. No.

    179448

    June 26, 2013

    CARLOS L. TANENGGEE, Petitioner,


    vs.
    PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

    Ponente: Del Castillo, J.


    Facts:
    1. Five separate Information for estafa through falsification of commercial documents were
    filed against petitioner.
    2. The said Information portray the same mode of commission of the crime as in Criminal
    Case No. 98-163806 but differ with respect to the numbers of the checks and promissory
    notes involved and the dates and amounts.
    3. In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank auditors conducted an audit of the
    Commercio Branch for more than a week.
    4. Thereafter or on 26 January 1998, appellant was asked by Elvira Ong-Chan, senior vice
    president of Metrobank, to report to the Head Office on the following day.
    5. When appellant arrived at the said office, he was surprised that there were seven other
    people present: two senior branch officers, two bank lawyers, two policemen (one in uniform
    and the other in plain clothes), and a representative of the Internal Affairs unit of the bank,
    Valentino Elevado.
    a. Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a paper in connection with the audit
    investigation; that he inquired what he was made to sign but was not offered any
    explanation; that he was intimidated to sign and was threatened by the police that he will be
    brought to the precinct if he will not sign; that he was not able to consult a lawyer since he
    was not apprised of the purpose of the meeting; and that just to get it over with he signed
    the paper which turned out to be a confession.
    b. After the said meeting, appellant went to see Tan at his office but was unable to find the
    latter.
    c. He also tried to phone him but to no avail.
    d. He asserts that said written statement was taken in violation of his rights under Section
    12, Article III of the Constitution, particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel,
    and right to be informed of the first two rights. Hence, the same should not have been
    admitted in evidence against him.
    Issue:
    Whether or not the written statement executed by the appellant is admissible in evidence.
    Held:

    We find the Petition wanting in merit.

    Petitioners written statement is admissible in evidence.

    The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt


    obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the
    CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation.

    Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after
    a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
    significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain
    rights which attach upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have
    competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of
    the two other rights above.19 In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave
    an uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he
    managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement
    authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was
    neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner during the
    questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to
    have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written
    statement.

    Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 20 we declared that the right to counsel
    "applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
    administrative investigation." Amplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the
    recent case of Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission:21

    However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of
    Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary
    rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in
    a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. 22

    Here, petitioners written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted
    by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the
    course of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in
    admitting in evidence and in giving due consideration to petitioners written statement as
    there is no constitutional impediment to its admissibility.

    Petitioners written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

    Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an already
    prepared typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis and his
    supposition is just an afterthought for there is nothing in the records that would support his
    claim of duress and intimidation.

    Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the
    contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary." 23 Petitioner
    failed to overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his written statement was found to
    have been executed freely and consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his
    statement were of such nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish.
    The details contained therein attest to its voluntariness. As correctly pointed out by the CA:

    As the trial court noted, the written statement (Exhibit N) of appellant is replete with details
    which could only be supplied by appellant. The statement reflects spontaneity and
    coherence which cannot be associated with a mind to which intimidation has been applied.
    Appellants answers to questions 14 and 24 were even initialed by him to indicate his
    conformity to the corrections made therein. The response to every question was fully
    informative, even beyond the required answers, which only indicates the mind to be free
    from extraneous restraints.24

    In People v. Muit,25 it was held that "one of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of
    petitioners extrajudicial statement is that it contains many details and facts which the
    investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied without the
    knowledge and information given by him."

    Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges, criminal
    or administrative, against the investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly
    intimidated him and forced him to sign negate his bare assertions of compulsion and
    intimidation. It is a settled rule that where the defendant did not present evidence of
    compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his
    supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was presented, his
    extrajudicial statement shall be considered as having been voluntarily executed. 26

    Neither will petitioners assertion that he did not read the contents of his statement before
    affixing his signature thereon "just to get it over with" prop up the instant Petition. To recall,
    petitioner has a masteral degree from a reputable educational institution and had been a
    bank manager for quite a number of years. He is thus expected to fully understand and
    comprehend the significance of signing an instrument. It is just unfortunate that he did not

    exercise due diligence in the conduct of his own affairs. He can therefore expect no
    consideration for it.

    No suppression of evidence on the part of the prosecution.

    Petitioner claims that the prosecution should have presented Tan in court to shed light on
    the matter. His non-presentation created the presumption that his testimony if given would
    be adverse to the case of the prosecution. Petitioner thus contends that the prosecution
    suppressed its own evidence.

    Such contention is likewise untenable. The prosecution has the prerogative to choose the
    evidence or the witnesses it wishes to present. It has the discretion as to how it should
    present its case.29 Moreover, the presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does
    not apply where the evidence was at the disposal of both the defense and the
    prosecution.30 In the present case, if petitioner believes that Tan is the principal witness who
    could exculpate him from liability by establishing that it was Tan and not him who signed the
    subject documents, the most prudent thing to do is to utilize him as his witness. Anyway,
    petitioner has the right to have compulsory process to secure Tans attendance during the
    trial pursuant to Article III, Section 14(2) 31 of the Constitution. The records show, however,
    that petitioner did not invoke such right. In view of these, no suppression of evidence can be
    attributed to the prosecution.

    Petitioners denial is unavailing.

    The Court is also not persuaded by the bare and uncorroborated allegation of petitioner that
    the loans covered by the promissory notes and the cashiers checks were personally
    transacted by Tan against his approved letter of credit, although he admittedly never saw
    Tan affix his signature thereto. Again, this allegation, as the RTC aptly observed, is not
    supported by established evidence. "It is settled that denials which are unsubstantiated by
    clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence. They merit no weight
    in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
    witnesses who testified on affirmative matters." 32 The chain of events in this case, from the
    preparation of the promissory notes to the encashment of the cashiers checks, as narrated
    by the prosecution witnesses and based on petitioners own admission, established beyond
    reasonable doubt that he committed the unlawful acts alleged in the Informations.

    WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
    CA-G.R. CR No. 23653 dated December 12, 2006 and September 6, 2007, respectively, are
    hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the minimum term of the indeterminate
    sentence to be imposed upon the petitioner should be four (4) years and two (2) months of
    prision correccional.
    SO ORDERED.

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