Aquinas and Wisdom as the Aim of Education

Abstract
This paper seeks to revive interest in a Thomist conception of education which argues that the central and
most important aim of education is a search for truth and wisdom. Although set within a Christian
worldview, Aquinass robust and unflinching realism leads him to argue that though the gaining of skills and
scientific knowledge is important, a much more important aim of education is the gaining of wisdom.
Wisdom here is not restricted to virtue, but includes created wisdom or scientific knowledge, as well as
uncreated wisdom, which gives meaning to our lives and grounds our reasons for pursuing knowledge in the
first place. The paper outlines Aquinass account of the human being and shows how an understanding of the
composite nature of the human person leads us to appreciate why the ultimate purpose of human lives is not
found in material things, but in truth and ultimately, in Wisdom itself. This is a far cry from the economic
rationalist view of education which sees it as a commodity that can be bought and sold.
Key words Aquinas, aims of education, wisdom, soul

Introduction
The need to explicate and promote a Thomist understanding of teaching and education has become more
urgent because instrumentalist conceptions of the purposes of education have become entrenched in our
understanding of education and of its aims. Though it is not denied that education can be instrumentally
conceived, the practical life is directed towards an end and that for Aquinas is ultimately God. Whatever else
is achieved through the gaining of new practical skills and training, education as Aquinas conceives of it is
intrinsically valuable because it is directed towards the gaining of wisdom where this means leading a life in
active co-operation with Gods Will and in which human fulfilment is recognised as contributing to the
common good. Although the final end of human beings as a consequence of their rational nature is God, says
Aquinas, it is difficult for them to discern what good actions are and so they need to acquire good character
and virtue (Aquinas, 1948, Summa Theologica (hereinafter, ST), I-II, Q.1, Art. 4 and I-II, Q. 1, Art.5).
Education in these terms demands the formation of character and this is means the preparation of human
persons so that they are receptive to the gaining of virtue.
The Thomist idea that there is a common good is rejected in modern society, according to MacIntyre
(1998, p.105), because it is supposed that there are a great variety of different conceptions of the common
good from which to choose. Choice is king and any education which supposes that there is only one
overarching purpose for the development of our rational natures must be misguided and bad. A Thomist
education, therefore, is by definition, a bad education.1 We shall argue in this paper that on the contrary, a
Thomist education is a good education precisely because it takes seriously the claim that education is
centrally concerned with the common good. Not only is it concerned with the common good, but also with
the search for truth and wisdom, which we find ultimately in God, who is our final destination. An education
which does not set us on the path to our ultimate end through a life of virtue and service to the common good
is no education at all, for it does not lead to personal human fulfilment, whatever else it might accomplish.
MacIntyre is right, however, to point to its marked dissonance with the current dominant conception of
education as a commodity.
Coupled with economic rationalism and an obsession with placing a monetary value on all its aspects, the
instrumentalisation of education has led to its commodification. So much so, that governments and leaders of
educational institutions talk unashamedly of students as customers and of education as products to be
marketed.2 In the contemporary university and higher education system, many and varied products have been
devised in order to entice the customer to buy something which, so it is claimed, will enhance their
employability and increase their earning capacity. Vice Chancellors are now chief executives of businesses
that are in the marketplace, both locally and internationally, selling their wares in order to make a profit.3 So
successful have they been that, according to statistics, education is Australias third largest export.4 While
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there is no doubt that it is a significant contributor to the economic well-being of Australia and so to its
common good, it is not quite so clear that overseas students, their families and their countries have received a
commensurate contribution to their common good. This has been largely due to migration policies which
have allowed many students to settle in Australia following the completion of their studies.
Australia has been a popular destination for overseas students because it is perceived as safe and many
universities have come to depend heavily on the fees earned from overseas students. Recent racist bashings
of Indian students, despite wide condemnation from many quarters, received little government reaction and
amounted to denial that the assaults were racially motivated. One motivation for this lack of reaction was
fear that publicity about these attacks, or admission that they were racially motivated, would cause
considerable damage to the education Industry and hence revenue would fall (Sheridan, 2009). It did not
seem to be shame that Australian citizens had behaved in this reprehensible way nor that the overseas
students in our education system could be deprived of an education which provided them with opportunities
to become better and more fulfilled persons. Students who come to Australia are overwhelmingly clustered
in vocational training courses and this suggests that their main purpose for being in the higher education
system is to gain skills in a particular area and for training in order to gain employment in particular
industries (Department of Education, Science and Training, 2004). They cannot be criticised for this, for
such skills are also necessary for human fulfilment, but in acknowledging this, it is emphasised that
education is not to be conceived as an industry whose motivation is profit, for it is clear that in such a
conception, the student is simply the purchaser of a product. Such a product may be a set of technical skills
or knowledge in a particular specialised vocation or some combination of these. Courses are marketed on this
basis to overseas students.5
Because education is considered a commodity or a product, there is an obsession with the quality control
of products, with monitoring the performance of academic staff and reporting in great detail to government.
An outline of a course of study is no longer just a list of the lecture topics to be covered, but a contract that
comes under the Trade Practices Act. Most universities, for example, now have a marketing department and
there is much talk about branding and of positioning the institution in order to appeal to particular sections of
the market. Though much of this quality control is justified on the grounds that it seeks to place the learner at
the centre of the pedagogical enterprise, the emphasis is on a reduction of the educational task to a series of
smaller components linked in measureable ways to each other so that the delivery of the educational product
occurs with maximum efficiency and effectiveness. Learning and teaching are reduced to buying and selling,
as buyer and seller negotiate their way through what has been contracted to be delivered.
According to a Heideggerian analysis of education, its colonization by economic rationalism results in
enframing, which is the progressive transformation of entities into resources to be optimized (Thomson,
2001, p. 251). In a market conception of education the student is seen as a customer. In a recession or when
there are few jobs available, employees seek to gain those skills and attributes which will make them a
valuable resource for their employer or prospective employer. Higher education providers and
deconstruction of this term would also confirm the colonization of education by economic rationalism aim
to increase their share of the market and secure their own commercial viability by marketing their
educational products according to previously market researched customer demands. Moreover, under this
kind of thinking, if there is no demand for a particular educational program it should be axed. With one eye
on the job market, the student as educational customer, seeks to maximize his or her skills at the most
effective cost. Educational institutions, then, themselves reconceptualised as businesses, seek to provide the
educational training and skilling that the customer demands.
There are numerous objections that we can raise about this mode of conceptualizing education and
detailed consideration of this has been given in other places and need not delay us here (Ozolins, 2003). It
suffices to say that it leads to a very limited understanding of education and both teaching and learning. The
market model essentially sees teaching and learning as involving an exchange. Customers typically exchange
money for goods and services and so if the student is a customer, the teacher is reduced to a salesperson
whose task is to ensure that the product supplied to the customer is as specified. From this, it follows that
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what is exchanged must be something material and tangible, not something intangible or immaterial. If the
student is a customer, failure to learn means that he or she has not received the product for which he or she
has paid. Teaching, therefore, must be re-conceptualised so that when learning does not occur it is not
through any defect of product, but the customers own failure to follow the instructions for the acquisition of
the skills and training specified in the product. Emphasis on the responsibility of the customer, that is the
student, therefore, is captured by new paradigms of teaching and learning, which centre on the student
hence, student-centred learning not because earlier forms of education centred on the teacher, but because
of the need to shift the responsibility for the failure to learn, if it should occur, to the student.
The student as customer has to gain something as a result of his or her engagement with the process of
education. Hence, if someone is being taught, then something is being exchanged and its acquisition by the
student is a recognition that he or she has learnt. Like anything that is exchanged for money, what is
exchanged has to be delineable and so measureable. Just like a physical object that is purchased, it has to be
able to be fixed in space and time and just like physical objects, such as bags of beans, they are commodities.
Moreover, in this process, provided that the right teaching methods are rigorously applied, the student will
learn. It is recognised that one approach may not be a sufficient cause of learning, but it is assumed that with
a range of suitable teaching strategies, all will learn. The Thomist picture is very different, though it must be
painstakingly constructed from various references throughout his works (Boland, 2006, p.287).6

The nature of the human person and of the soul

There is a great contrast between the economic rationalist and instrumentalist conception of education and
that of Aquinas. Central to a Thomist conception of education is the human person and the purpose of
education is the good of the person and this is to be understood in terms of the common good. Moreover,
Aquinas is in no doubt that the ultimate end for every human being is God. In order to make sense of this
conception of education, we need to answer a number of questions about the nature of the human person,
because without some such account, we cannot provide an explication of what is the good for human persons
nor of what their ultimate end is. It might be added, that even if we reject the idea that the ultimate end of
human beings is God, Aquinass account does not lack cogency, since his arguments turn essentially on what
follows when we claim that the distinguishing feature of human beings is their rational nature (ST, I-II, 1, 4).
We will begin by sketching what, according to Aquinas, a human being is7. Aquinas provides us with an
account of the human person in the Summa Theologica, where he begins firstly with the question of the
nature of God and then secondly examines the nature of spiritual creatures, before turning to the question of
what a human being is. It is, of course, not the only place where he discusses human nature, but it does
provide a convenient summary of his mature thought. There is no simple answer, as Aquinas implies in
commenting on Aristotles view in the Metaphysics that the question of what is a human being is inherently
obscure.8 When Aquinas considers the question, he does so by beginning from a theological point of view,
even though he is well aware of the biological origins of human beings. Indeed, it can be argued that it is a
hallmark of his position that he takes the embodiment of the human being seriously and hence of his or her
material, biological existence. The soul, however, is the seat of the rational character of the human being and
so Aquinas begins his discussion of the nature of the human being in the Summa Theologica with the soul. It
is the soul as first activity of the body which gives it central significance and why, in order to understand
what distinguishes human beings from the rest of creation, Aquinas believes it important to begin with an
account of the soul. Thus, though he does not discount the corporality of human persons, and gives this
close attention, his first consideration is the soul. The soul is the form of the human person (ST, I, 5, 1). This
means that the soul is what animates and what distinguishes living things from non-living things. In the case
of the human soul, it is what actualises, which is to say, what makes us human beings.
Aquinas argues against the view that the soul is some kind of material substance and hence, he opposes a
purely materialist conception of the human being. The soul is an immaterial substance9, according to
Aquinas, but this does not commit him to dualism. He argues that though the soul can be considered to be an
intellectual principle in its own right, and, in being the principle through which we gain knowledge of the
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material or sensory world, we can distinguish it from the body, nevertheless, it is so united to the body that
we say that the man knows, rather than that the soul knows (ST, I, 75, 2 and 4). As Copleston (1955, p. 155)
explains in his commentary on Aquinas, the human person is not a combination of two substances, body and
soul, but one substance which forms one human person.10
The immateriality of the soul arises for Aquinas quite straightforwardly, since he says that in order for us
to understand, we need something which enables us to understand, just as the act of seeing requires an eye
with which to see. Understanding is not a physical process, as Aquinas conceives of it, but part of the
operation of the mind since the matters with which it deals are not themselves material. Sensory input into
the mind or the soul needs to be analysed, ordered and classified, but this cannot happen unless the
appropriate representations of sensory experience can be made. These representations require a faculty which
is immaterial, since the information which is received is itself immaterial. As a result, the soul or intellectual
principle is immaterial. Human knowledge, says Aquinas, originates in sensation and remains dependent on
sensation. This is true of all human knowledge; even the highest mystical knowledge depends on the store of
images and memories gathered on the way. The awareness and understanding of the highest knowledge
remains tied to the simplest and most basic knowledge that we have through the senses (ST, I, 84, 7).
For Aquinas, the soul transcends matter because the kinds of things with which it is concerned, though
they are based on the senses, are the result of the activities of the active intellect or agent intellect (agens
intellectus) which organises, classifies and generalises the sensory impressions that we receive through the
senses. We begin with particulars, that is, individual sense impressions, which are then acted on by the agent
intellect to form abstract generalisations, or universals. It is the activity of the soul which forms the basis of
Aquinass conception of how we come to have knowledge of the world. We shall return to a consideration of
the process of knowledge acquisition later, but here it is sufficient to establish that for Aquinas, the human
being is a psycho-physical unity that gains its knowledge through the operation of the soul or the mind on the
sensory or empirical data that floods into the human mind through the five senses (ST, I, 76, 1).
Aquinas steers between a solely materialist conception of the human person and dualist conception in
which the soul and body are independent of each other. While it is true that Aquinas is much more explicit
about the survival of the soul after the death of the person than Aristotle11, he is at pains to indicate that it is
not the human person that survives, since that requires a body. The soul without the body is not in its natural
state, for it needs to be united with a body to be complete, just as the body is not complete without the soul.12
Questions about the immortality of the soul and what this means for embodied creatures like human beings
are considered by Aquinas, but will not concern us here, because, whatever the final end of human beings is
and whatever the shape of resurrected life might be, we will not know until after we die and our immediate
concern is our lives here and now. The important point to draw from this, however, is that for Aquinas,
though he eschews dualism, human beings are not purely material, but also have an immaterial aspect, which
enables them to access the world of the spirit. This means that human beings are able to transcend the
material world.
In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas makes a very strong case for the essential unity of body and soul,
arguing, not unlike modern philosophers, that all the functions of the human person are carried out by and
through physical means. The actions of the soul, perhaps put another way, are realised through the operations
of the body. Aquinas says that all psychic operation, by which we take him to mean mental operation, is
corporeally determined and that while he thinks understanding is not an operation carried out through any
bodily organ, nevertheless its objects are the phantasms, which stand in relation to it as colours to the power
of sight, so that, just as sight cannot function in the absence of colours, so the intellective soul is incapable of
understanding without phantasms. The explication of the nature of phantasms is not entirely without its
difficulties13, but at the risk of glossing important distinctions, we can take them to be sensory
representations in the mind of particular objects that our intellect requires in order to form concepts.
This seems to be what Aquinas means when he says that in order for the soul to understand, it needs the
cognitive powers, provided by the intellect, to make them intelligible, that is, in an abstract form which
enables us to use them in reasoning about the nature of the world. Nevertheless, Aquinas says that powers of
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thinking and of memory are acts of certain bodily organs and function through them and do not remain when
the body perishes. He observes that this is Aristotles view also.14 Aquinas notes that if the powers of the
intellect appear to fade, just as sight fades in old age, this is not because of the weakness of the powers of the
intellect, but rather because of the weakness of the powers which the intellect needs, namely, the
imagination, the memory and the power of thinking (CG, II, 79, 11, p. 257). In modern terms, we would say
that if our intellectual powers decline, it is not because of the decline in the intellect itself, but the ageing and
decay of the brain on which these powers depend.
There is nothing in what Aquinas says here that would not be acceptable up to a point to a materialist.
Modern reductionist theories of the mind would agree that the powers of the intellect clearly depend on the
brain and its processes and when the brain begins to deteriorate, it is most apparent that the powers of the
intellect decline. It is at this point that we have a sharp distinction between Aquinas and the modern
reductionists, however. Aquinas argues that it is precisely because abstractions such as universals and acts of
will are not physically located that we postulate the existence of the intellect, which is also not physical. He
says, If it [the intellect] were a body, it would not be cognizant of universals but only of particulars.
Therefore, no intellect is a body. (CG ,II, 49, 4) Aquinas goes on to argue that intellectual substances are
immaterial and, paraphrasing his argument, he says that ideas and concepts derived from sense impressions
are not physical in themselves and so do not reside in any physical organ, but in the intellect and for this to
be possible, the intellect itself cannot be physical (CG, I, 50, 3, p .149). He adds that a further reason for
separating the intellect from the senses is the observation that the senses cannot know themselves. Sight, for
example, does not see itself nor sees that it sees. Self reflexive power does belong to the intellect, however,
which is able to know itself and to know that it knows (CG, II, 66, 5, p. 202 and CG, II, 75, 13, pp. 236-237).
Furthermore, because intellectual substances are themselves subsisting forms, they cannot cease to be and so
are incorruptible just as the concept of a circle cannot be changed, but must remain the same, otherwise we
do not have a circle (CG, II, 55, 3, pp. 158-159).
Although Aquinas says that the intellect is able to know itself, he qualifies this by saying that it does not
know itself in its essence. Aquinas allows two ways in which we know, the first is through the senses and
clearly, the intellect, being immaterial, cannot know itself through the senses. Secondly, it is not known in
the same way as indemonstrable or self evident principles that form the basis for our understanding of the
world, for if this were so, there could be no disputes about what kind of thing the soul is. Aquinas concludes,
using an argument that Descartes was to make use of some centuries later, that our mind knows itself through
itself, insofar as it knows concerning itself, that it is. Indeed, from the fact that it perceives that it acts it
perceives that it is.15
The soul and the body are not accidently united, argues Aquinas, rejecting the Platonic view that the soul
is a self subsistent substance which is the mover of the body. Instead, he proposes that the human soul is an
intellectual substance united to the body as its form. In order for this to be the case, two conditions need to be
met: (1) the form is the principle of the substantial being of the thing whose form it is, that is, what makes it
the being that it is; and (2) the form and matter are joined together in the one act of being, that is, one is not
the cause of the other. Aquinas says that though intellectual substance has a mode of being at a higher level
than material substance and so could not communicate its being to corporeal matter in the one act of being,
in the human person the way of uniting is different. In the human case, the corporeal matter as the recipient
of the intellectual substance as its form is raised to a higher level and so there is nothing to prevent an
intellectual substance or soul from being the human bodys form (CG, II, 68, 3, p. 204). The salient point
here is a recognition by Aquinas of the superior nature of the human body, so that it can unite with the
intellectual substance.16

Wisdom as the Aim of Education

The picture of the human person that emerges from a consideration of Aquinas account is of a composite
being, having both a physical aspect and an intellectual one. The rational part of the human being is not
material, but is the crowning glory of the natural world. Having arrived at some sense of the nature of the
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human being, we firstly turn to the question of what is the good for beings of this kind and, indirectly, how
that good is related to the common good of all members of humankind. Secondly, but centrally, is the
question of how the good of human beings is to be secured and so how human beings learn and are taught.
Human life, as we have already stated, is directed to the gaining of truth, which is to say, wisdom and for
Aquinas, true wisdom is God Himself.
The composite nature of the human person means that capacity to transcend the material world is more
than a speculative possibility for Aquinas. We can, he says, understand wisdom as having two aspects and
both of these are immaterial; one aspect enables us to understand the natural world and the other, enables us
to come to understand what is revealed to us by God. Under one aspect it is created and this is the kind of
knowledge and understanding we gain, amongst other means, through science, but the other form of wisdom
is uncreated and it is more important to advance in this latter. Aquinas says, Wisdom is twofold, created and
uncreated. Man is said to be endowed with both and to improve himself by advancing in them. (Aquinas,
1953, De Veritate, (hereinafter DV), Vol. II, Q. 11, Art. 1, para. 10, p. 85) This is a very important statement
human beings do not just advance in relation to created wisdom or what we might loosely call scientific
knowledge and which also includes anything else that can be learned by natural reason.17 Aquinas alerts us to
the end to which human beings are drawn, namely to what surpasses the grasp of their reason and this end
will be apparent to all those who direct their thoughts and actions to that end. That end is God, whose
existence we may know, but knowledge of whom remains hidden from us. Thus, though advancement in
created wisdom is important, ultimate wisdom is knowledge of divine things (ST, I, 1, 6)18 and so of greater
significance is advancement in a deepened understanding of uncreated wisdom.19 At bottom, if in our souls
we are endowed with uncreated wisdom, and though what this amounts to requires some elaboration, it
points to the fact of ineffability within us, to our own deep mysteriousness, for in our innermost depths lies
the mark of the Creator, the source of our being and of uncreated wisdom. The significance for the purposes
of education means that we need to provide the opportunity for persons to be reflective beings. This
indwelling of the Creator within us is also crucial to understanding how one person is able to teach another,
according to Aquinas.20 The light of reason is placed within us by God, and is a likeness of the uncreated
truth, and because no human teaching can be efficacious without the power of that light, it follows that it is
only God that teaches interiorly and principally (Boland, 2007, p.48). Though this is so, it does not relieve us
of actively participating in our own education through reflection on the human condition in general and our
own in particular: we need to be able to respond to God and be open to Him. This is what is meant when
Aristotle says that the highest form of the good for human beings is contemplation. ..the activity of God,
which is supremely happy, must be a form of contemplation; and therefore among human activities that
which is most akin to Gods will be the happiest.( Aristotle, 1976, Book X, viii [1178b7-29], p. 333 )
Aquinas comments perhaps cryptically In De Veritate about the distinction between uncreated and created
wisdom, but nevertheless the distinction between created and uncreated wisdom points to a difference in
their relative levels of importance. It is uncreated wisdom which gives meaning to our lives and so the
pursuit of created wisdom makes sense. The two are closely linked, however, and the latter can help us in our
quest for the former. Uncreated wisdom cannot be changed in any way, whereas created wisdom can be
changed for some extrinsic reason, though not through anything internal to it. Since created wisdom is
knowledge, it will only change for the subject when it becomes actualised in his or her understanding. That
is, what is in potency for the individual, what they did not know, becomes something known. Knowledge,
understood as created wisdom, is conceptual, since it consists in intelligible forms and once it is recognised
as knowledge, does not change, except through some external agency which reveals it (DV, II, 11, 1, para.
10, p. 85). It is not clear what kind of change Aquinas has in mind here, since this sounds somewhat Platonic,
but given his empiricist commitments, this does not seem to be a natural reading of what he means. A better
reading of Aquinas here suggests he has a reliabilist view of the operation of the human sensory apparatus
and that we can trust that it will produce knowledge. Thus, something which has been labelled as created
wisdom will not change, since whatever it is, it is true. Created wisdom then could be changed only through
the addition of further observational data that enables the observer to know something which he or she could
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have only potentially known previously. This means that the kind of change from potential knowledge in the
subject to actual knowledge does not involve a change in created wisdom itself, only its actualisation in the
subject. The change is in the subject, who now actually knows, rather than potentially knows. Thus, created
wisdom by and large cannot change, otherwise, we could not be sure that it was wisdom or knowledge at
all.21 This has implications about the nature of what is transmitted to the pupil by the teacher. What has to be
transmitted is knowledge, quite obviously, otherwise it is not created wisdom that the pupil learns, but
something else altogether, ignorance or falsehood. This is not the most important implication, however.
More importantly, it implies that the teacher has an obligation to be knowledgeable about what he or she is to
teach the pupil.
Such ambiguities about the nature of wisdom as there are in Aquinas are the result of his preference for
providing an account of wisdom based on reason, even where he explicitly indicates that for some things
human beings require revelation, he argues that reason is still to be employed to reveal other things that are
asserted. For example, we can argue from the revelation of the Resurrection of Jesus to the general
resurrection of human beings (ST, I, 1, 8). Aquinas clearly suggests that we should not accept anything as
true unless it also coheres with other propositions or beliefs about the world that we hold true. If, for
example, something that we regard as revealed as true to us does not cohere with other things we know then
it is unlikely to be revelation. In addition, if what follows from something we regard as revelation does not
seem to be true and our reasoning is impeccable, then we have to conclude that what we thought was
revelation was not. For Aquinas, reason and revelation were two paths to the same truth and neither could be
discounted in our search for wisdom.
Aquinass view about wisdom can be contrasted to that of Bonaventure who distinguishes several forms
of wisdom. Bonaventure agrees with Aquinas that the end of human contemplation is wisdom, which is to
say God, but Bonaventure does not emphasise rationality as a means to its acquisition to the extent that
Aquinas does. While Aquinas would not entirely disagree, wisdom, according to Bonaventure, is a kind of
ecstatic union with God. For Aquinas, though the acquisition of wisdom leads ultimately to a union with
God, this accomplished for the most part through the will and intellect working together. He also recognises,
however, that human reason is limited and needs the grace of God, that is, revelation, to know anything at all
about God. He is no Kierkegaardian mystic, however, remaining confident that despite its limitations, human
reason remains our best means of attaining the truth, which is God.22

Conclusion
The foregoing discussion enables us to draw a number of conclusions. Firstly, we have seen that the human
being, from a Thomist perspective, is a composite of body and soul. Thus, the human being is unique among
the creatures of the world in being endowed with a rational mind. Aquinass argument for the human body
being the highest form of corporeal body, however, has another argument, perhaps, rarely considered when
arguing for human superiority. Aquinas, following Aristotle, also argues that human beings have a superior
sense of touch to animals.23 Of course, it is also to be noted that in relation to the other senses, there are other
animals that surpass human abilities to see, hear and to smell. Nevertheless, given enormous advantages that
human hands give human beings to manipulate their world, the argument does have some plausibility.
Certainly, taken together with the superiority of the human brain, it seems that Aquinass argument that the
human body is the highest kind of body and so fittingly united to the soul, which is the lowest of the
intellectual substances, is at least plausible. The union of the two, body and soul, mean that the acquisition of
knowledge is a collaborative enterprise between the senses, which are material, and the intellect, which is
immaterial. Human beings, therefore, come to know about their world through their senses which provide the
intellect with the raw materials to construct concepts.
Secondly, we turned to the question of what is the good for a creature such as the human being and
Aquinas tells us that it is the pursuit of wisdom. Wisdom, however, has two parts, the first, created wisdom,
enables us to make sense of the world and to arrange our practical, material lives24, and the second, uncreated
wisdom, is concerned with what is central to the well-being of human persons, namely the pursuit of the
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good and of the truth. The two parts of wisdom, however, cannot be regarded as separated from one another
in the sense that the human intellect is called upon to exercise completely different powers in pursuit of one
form of wisdom from the other. This is not the case: that which drives us to learn more and more about how
the laws governing the natural world operate and to seek the underlying cause of things is the same thing
which impels us to pursue the truth and draws us to beauty and goodness. It is the desire for the good, as
Aquinas explains, even when we choose what is bad for us, that motivates us to act. We act because we
judge that it is good.25 True wisdom is being able to choose to act in such a way that we choose what is
genuinely good for us and this is what education is about. Moreover, it is the same will and imagination
operating in concert with our human intellect that enables us to pursue both created and uncreated wisdom.
The pursuit of uncreated wisdom, that is, ultimate good, is what every human being strives for and so is the
higher and more important task of education.
As Maritain observes, modern conceptions of the human being are reductionist, for they claim that human
beings are to be understood solely in terms of sense experience. The purely scientific account of the human
being relies heavily on measureable and observable data that can be depended on to further our conception of
the human being, ignoring any account which might take notice of the conceptions of being and of essence.
It is only one aspect of wisdom, the created kind, important but it does not address the question of uncreated
wisdom, which is to say, the question of that which is deeply mysterious. Maritain concludes that the
scientific account of the human person cannot answer the basic questions which stir the human heart. That is,
it cannot answer questions about whether there is a soul, whether there are values and whether there is free
will, to name a few examples. Hence, although science can provide valuable information, it cannot answer
fundamental questions about the nature of the human person and it is these questions which demand a
response (Maritain, J., 1945, pp.4-5).
This does not mean that created wisdom is not also important nor that it should not be pursued within the
educational context, rather it is to point out that our responsibilities as educators does not end with vocation
training and teaching skills. These are not dismissed as unimportant by Aquinas nor should they be thought
of as unimportant. Nevertheless, if our intention is to educate the whole person, then it is necessary to not
stop at training and imparting skills, but seek that knowledge which will draw us closer to our ultimate good,
which is God. Aquinas says that this is the one final end to which human beings are directed as a
consequence of their rational nature (ST I-II, 1, 4). Good actions will be those which lead us towards that
end, but the problem is that it is difficult for individuals to know what their good is) (ST I-II, 1, 5). The best
prospect of being able to be discerning enough to be able to direct oneself to ones good is to acquire good
character and the virtues.
What is indispensible to the acquisition of the virtues is the right kind of habituation and not everyone is
inclined to gain the virtues. Intellectual instruction in the virtues will only have an effect on those who
already possess them to some extent.26 That is, it is only in such a case that whoever is being instructed is
likely to be not only receptive to being taught, but also have had some exposure to the importance of the
virtues. In commenting on Aristotle, Aquinas notes that mere words are not sufficient.27 In adding to this,
MacIntyre observes that Aquinas says that in practical matters the truth of ones assertions are not tested by
argument but by deeds and way of life.28 According to MacIntyre, in saying this, Aquinas goes some way
beyond Aristotle (MacIntyre, 1998, p. 98). Wisdom is more than virtue, it is about being able to discern the
good and to actively pursue it. It leads us to make the right decisions in our lives. For Aquinas, the ultimate
aim of all human beings is to reach the source of Wisdom and of truth, for this is what we were made for.
Whatever else education aims for, this is the most important, since it this aim which gives meaning to our
lives. Such a conception of education is a long way from those who conceive of it as a commodity.

Notes
1

MacIntyre, of course, rejects this view.

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Conference Presentation 2009 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia

See Commonwealth of Australia (2009) Transforming Australias Higher Education System, Canberra: AGPS. The
first statement in this report is, Higher education is integral to achieving the Governments vision of a stronger and
fairer Australia. It fuels economic development, productivity and high skilled jobs and supports Australias role as a
middle power and leader in the region. It does, later, somewhat belatedly, acknowledge the importance of the
development of persons and of knowledge for its own sake, but it remains to be seen how committed the government is
to a broader vision of education.
3
It is worth qualifying this picture somewhat, as the funding policies of the Liberal government of John Howard (19962007) meant that universities were forced to look for funds in the marketplace. International students became a
lucrative source of income. This was successful because universities were able to offer a high quality education and
many students were able to remain in Australia following their studies.
4
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2007) Australia in Brief: Trading with the World, at URL:
http://www.dfat.gov.au/aib/trade_investment.html Accessed 10/08/2009; See also http://blog.taragana.com/n/indianstudents-are-australias-third-largest-export-income-earner-24937/ Accessed 10/08/2009
5
Some would argue that this is all overseas students wish to gain from their training in Australia. A particular
qualification which allows them to practise a certain profession or to obtain a job. They might resent the idea that they
are to be formed as persons according to a Thomist or some other conception of education and what constitutes
fulfilment according to its lights. We do not have scope to respond fully to this here, but it is worth observing that it is
a common human trait that we want to find meaning in our lives and that we want to be happy. The motivations for
training in specific technical skills is not just for the sake of getting a job, but for these further ends. Moreover, as will
be argued, the relationship between learner and teacher is not simply one of a transaction between buyer and seller.
The relationship between teacher and learner is far more complex. Moreover, as Aquinas, emphasises throughout his
writings, love is an essential element in all human life and so if we understand that learning will bring us closer to the
truth, then it follows that if we are to teach with any effectiveness, we need to prepare the ground so that pupils are
receptive to what is to be taught and develop a love of learning.
6
Boland (2006) is critical of those who would remove Aquinass reflections on teaching from their contexts,
nevertheless, by considering these various reflections within their contexts a coherent conception of his views on
teaching and learning can be gleaned.
7
We will use human person interchangeably with human being. Some would argue for a distinction between human
being and human person on the grounds that the latter term should be used to describe a human being in terms of his
or her functional capacities. For example, a human person is capable of being self aware, able to make decisions about
his or her future, solve complex problems, communicate in a complex way and be able to reason. That is, he or she
needs to be able to exercise these functions or at least a subset of these to be counted as a human person. There are
well known problems with such a definition, such as those raised when a person is comatose. A person, for example,
in a post-coma unresponsiveness state (also termed persistent vegetative state) would on a functionalist account (or
property-thing account) not be considered a person, even though they continue to have (at least) a biological life. For
an account of such theories and why they should be rejected see Moreland, J.P and Rae, S. B. (2000).
8
Aquinas says that when one inquires What is a human being? it is obscure because the term is introduced without
giving some account of what constitutes being a human being. See Aquinas, Thomas (1993a) Commentary on
Aristotles Metaphysics, Notre Dame Indiana: Dumb Ox Books, in Metaphysics, VII, 17, 1662.
9
Aquinas says the soul is immaterial because it operates immaterially. Because it is immaterial, however, does not
make it immortal. This requires a further argument. We do not intend to consider this further argument here.
10
Copleston adds that though the human soul survives death, it is strictly speaking not a human person when it is in a
state of separation from the body.
11
See Aristotle (1986) De Anima, Book III, Ch.5 [430a22-23; 742-743] For Aristotle, only part of the soul survives
death and is said to be immortal.
12
Aquinas says that it is contrary to the nature of the soul to be without the body, and as Aristotle argues in De Caelo et
Mundo, I. See Aquinas (1955) Summa Contra Gentiles (CG) tr. C.J. ONeil (New York, Image Books, Doubleday)
Book IV, Ch. 79, 10
13
The question of the nature of phantasms has been the subject of much discussion. Pasnau provides a recent account,
concluding that Aquinass account of our cognitive processes is plausible. The phantasm provides one part of the story
in explaining our conceptualising and the way in which our intellectual thought is conducted. Though not all our
thinking is in images or phantasms, it is hard to avoid using them. See Pasnau, R. (2002, pp. 278-294).
14
Aquinas says, That is why Aristotle says that the soul never understands without a phantasm [De Anima, III, 7, 431a
17], and that it understands nothing without the passive intellect [De Anima, III, 5, 430a 25], which he terms the
cogitative power, and which is destructible. Aquinas, Thomas (1956) Summa Contra Gentiles (CG), Book II, 80, 6, p.
261
15
Aquinas says, Sic igitur, secundum intentionem Augustini, mens nostra per seipsam novit seipsam inquantum de se
cognoscit quod est. Ex hoc enim ipso quod percipit se agere, percipit se esse; agit autem per seipsam, unde per
seipsam de se cognoscit quod est. [So therefore, following Augustines meaning, our mind knows of itself what it is
insofar as it knows concerning itself that it is. From this, because it perceives that it acts, it perceives that it is; of
course it acts through itself and so through itself knows of itself that it exists. (authors translation)] (CG, III, 46, 8, p.
157)
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16

Aquinas does provide an argument to this effect in the following paragraphs of the Summa Contra Gentiles, arguing
from the increasing complexity of living organisms. See CG, II, 68, pp. 6-12.
17
Aquinas says that sciences are differentiated according to the various means through which knowledge is obtained.
The astronomer may prove the earth is round, for example, though mathematical reasoning. While the physicist does
so through observation of the matter itself. (ST, I, 1, 1)
18
See also Augustine, (1991) De Trinitate, Book XII, Ch. 1, p. 323.
19
Science is an example of created wisdom because it is able to tell us about the nature of the world, but it is not able to
tell us why there is a world in the first place science, however, points to what Nesteruk claims is the apophatic
mystery of wisdom science enables us to understand the world, but does not enable us to understand the purpose of
the world or its own limits. Ultimately, created wisdom needs to be brought into contact with theology in order to be
able to address the question of uncreated wisdom. See Nesteruk, A.V. 2006, p.75.
20
Aquinas addresses this question in De Veritate, 11, Article 1, and also in Aquinas, Thomas (1929) in II Sentences, 9
and 28. In II Sentences, 28, Art. 5, Aquinas asks the question whether it is possible for a person to know the truth
without grace (that is, without Gods action). He answers that human persons are able to know by the natural light of
the agent intellect without the need for an additional act of grace.
21
Aquinas says, Sapientia vero increata nullo modo mutabilis est; creata vero in nobis mutatur per accidens, non
per se. Est enim ipsam considerare dupliciter. Uno modo secundum respectum ad res aeternas de quibus est; et sic
omnino immutabilis est. Alio modo secundum esse quod habet in subiecto; et sic per accidens mutatur, subiecto mutato
de potentia habente sapientiam in actu habens. Formae enim intelligibiles, ex quibus sapientia consistit, et sunt rerum
similitudines, et sunt formae perficientes intellectum. [Uncreated wisdom is in no way changeable, on the other hand,
created wisdom is changed in us through an outside event, but not of itself. It [that change] is itself in fact considered in
two ways. In one way in relation to eternal things[of which it is] it is thus in every way unchangeable. In the other way
according to its existence in the subject; it changes when an external event changes the knowledge that the subject had
in potential to [knowledge] he has actually. Thus the intelligible forms of which knowledge consists [which] are the
likenesses of things, are also the forms perfecting the understanding. Authors translation.] (DV, II, 11, 1, para. 10, p.
85) This passage needs to be understood in terms of an account of Aquinass theory of knowledge, an undertaking
beyond our scope here. It is perhaps worth noting, however, that when Aquinas is talking about wisdom, he means the
understanding of the underlying causes of things. When we observe an effect, we seek to find its cause. Clearly, if we
have got this right, then we have got to the bottom of how things actually are and so we have come to actually know
what previously we only knew potentially. That is, previously we did not know the cause, but now we do. We accept
the self evident principle that every effect has a cause and that this cause does not change to some other (this does not
preclude there being more than one sufficient cause, but does require a finite number of them). Created wisdom has not
changed in this sense, we who now know have in relation to it. For an illuminating account of Aquinass theory of
knowledge, see Stump, E. (2003) pp. 217-243. Of course, quantum mechanics might be a counter-example, but even
here there are those who would argue for hidden causes. See especially the work of the physicist David Bohm. For one
example, Bohm, D. (1981) especially pp. 65-109.
22
Bonaventure outlines his view of wisdom in Collations on the Six Days of Creation (Collationes in Hexaemeron).
There are four major divisions that Bonaventure draws. Firstly, there is objective wisdom, sapientia uniformis, which
is found in philosophy, specifically in logic and ethics. Secondly there is sapientia omniformis, which is knowledge of
God through His creation. Thirdly, sapientia multiformis is found in the understanding of sacred scripture and
fourthly, there is sapientia nulliformis, formless knowledge, found through contemplation and is the inner knowledge
of God. The final division in wisdom Bonaventure makes is between uncreated and created wisdom. The former refers
to the formless wisdom that stands behind all of creation and this may be glimpsed by the mystic. Formless knowledge
corresponds to Aquinass uncreated wisdom. Created wisdom is other than this, and in Aquinass account seems to
correspond most closely, though not exclusively to the sapiential uniformis. See Cullen, Christopher M. (2006 ) pp.
25-26
23
Aquinas, Thomas (1994) Book II, Lecture XIX, paras. 482and 483 [De Anima 421a16-26] and Book II, Lecture XXII,
para. 517 [De Anima, 422b17-22] ; Condillac also argues for human superiority over animals in the sense of touch in
his important work, Trait des Sensations originally published 1754, p.8 note; See also, Millbank, J. and Pickstock, C.,
2001, pp. 60-87; Chrtien, J-L, 2004, Body and touch, pp. 83-131; Ward, G., 2007, pp. 105-126 . The human finger
can distinguish objects as small as one thousandth of a millimetre in size, about the diameter of a bacterium.
24
Augustine, to whom Aquinas refers, says that this is the province of the lower function of the mind, the management
of temporal and material affairs. The higher function of the mind, which incorporates the lower function, is concerned
with truth and justice. De Trinitate, Book XII, Ch. 1, p. 323
25
Aquinas says that the object of the will is a good or an apparent good and will not be moved to an evil unless that
which is not good seems to be good in some respect to reason. ST, I-II, Q.77, Art. 2
26
See Aquinas Commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics, X, Lect. XIV, 2139-47
27
Aquinas says, Next [2, b ], at It is perhaps, he shows that habituation is required for a man to become virtuous. To
acquire virtue, Aristotle says, we ought not to be satisfied with mere words. But we ought to consider it a thing of
great value ifeven after possessing everything that seems to make men virtuouswe attain virtue. There are three
views on these matters. Some philosophers maintain that men are virtuous by nature, i.e., by natural temperament
together with the influence of the heavenly bodies. Others hold that men become virtuous by practice. Still others say
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that men become virtuous by instruction. All three opinions are true in some degree. Aquinas, 1993b, X, Lect. XIV,
Ch. 9, #2143
28
Aquinas says the following: So the views of the philosophers seem to harmonize with our arguments, and
consequently have some credibility. However, in practical matters the truth is tested by a mans conduct and way of
living, for these are the dominant factors. we must therefore examine the preceding opinions by judging them from the
facts and from the actual life (of the philosopher). If they agree with the facts we should accept them; if they disagree
we should consider them mere theories., Aquinas, 1993b, X, Lect. XIII, Ch.8, #2132

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