Europe 2020 Book Social EU

A key objective of the book is to take a critical look at and draw lessons from
the past, 2000-2010 Lisbon Strategy. Another important objective is to

explore the format and role of EU coordination and cooperation in the
social field in the new EU governance framework, in a context marked by
slow recovery after the global economic crisis. Finally, the book also makes
proposals for the further reinforcement of this coordination and cooperation
and for the improvement of the different instruments available at EU,
national and sub-national levels.
The analysis and concrete proposals presented in the book will be invaluable
to policy-makers, researchers and other stakeholders interested in contri
buting to building a more Social EU. They will help to encourage new ideas
and innovative approaches.
Eric Marlier is the International Scientific Coordinator of the CEPS/INSTEAD Research

Institute, Luxembourg, and has written widely on comparative socio-economic
analysis, social indicators and social policy monitoring.
Eric Marlier and David Natali (eds.), with Rudi Van Dam
The adoption in June 2010 by EU leaders of a target to lift at least 20 million

people out of the risk of poverty and exclusion by 2020 is an important step
forward. However, delivering on this and the Unions four other mutually
reinforcing targets, and achieving the EUs ambitious social objectives,
raises many political and technical challenges. These are examined in depth
in this book.
Eric Marlier and David Natali (eds.),

with Rudi Van Dam
EUROPE 2020: Towards a More Social EU?
How can Europe 2020, the EUs new Strategy for smart, sustainable and
inclusive growth, lead to a stronger Social EU with less poverty and greater
social cohesion? This book by a number of eminent scholars and experts is
the first to attempt to answer this question.
EUROPE 2020
Towards a More Social EU?
David Natali is Associate Professor at the Roberto Ruffilli Faculty of Political Science in
Forli (Italy) and Co-Director of the European Social Observatory (OSE, Belgium).
ISBN 978-90-5201-688-7
P.I.E. Peter Lang

Brussels
Work & Society

Vol. 69
P.I.E. Peter Lang
Rudi Van Dam is Coordinator Social Indicators at the Belgian Federal Public Service
Social Security and Country Delegate to the Indicators Sub-Group of the EU Social
Protection Committee.
This document is licensed to Eniko Vincze (3-5256156|00)
www.peterlang.com
P.I.E. Peter Lang
A key objective of the book is to take a critical look at and draw lessons from
the past, 2000-2010 Lisbon Strategy. Another important objective is to
explore the format and role of EU coordination and cooperation in the
social field in the new EU governance framework, in a context marked by
slow recovery after the global economic crisis. Finally, the book also makes
proposals for the further reinforcement of this coordination and cooperation
and for the improvement of the different instruments available at EU,
national and sub-national levels.
The analysis and concrete proposals presented in the book will be invaluable
to policy-makers, researchers and other stakeholders interested in contri
buting to building a more Social EU. They will help to encourage new ideas
and innovative approaches.
Eric Marlier is the International Scientific Coordinator of the CEPS/INSTEAD Research

Institute, Luxembourg, and has written widely on comparative socio-economic
analysis, social indicators and social policy monitoring.
Eric Marlier and David Natali (eds.), with Rudi Van Dam
The adoption in June 2010 by EU leaders of a target to lift at least 20 million

people out of the risk of poverty and exclusion by 2020 is an important step
forward. However, delivering on this and the Unions four other mutually
reinforcing targets, and achieving the EUs ambitious social objectives,
raises many political and technical challenges. These are examined in depth
in this book.
Eric Marlier and David Natali (eds.),

with Rudi Van Dam
EUROPE 2020: Towards a More Social EU?
How can Europe 2020, the EUs new Strategy for smart, sustainable and
inclusive growth, lead to a stronger Social EU with less poverty and greater
social cohesion? This book by a number of eminent scholars and experts is
the first to attempt to answer this question.
EUROPE 2020
David Natali is Associate Professor at the Roberto Ruffilli Faculty of Political Science in
Forli (Italy) and Co-Director of the European Social Observatory (OSE, Belgium).
E-ISBN 978-3-0352-6027-4
P.I.E. Peter Lang

Work & Society
Brussels
Vol. 69
This
document is licensed to Eniko Vincze (3-5256156|00)
P.I.E. Peter Lang
Rudi Van Dam is Coordinator Social Indicators at the Belgian Federal Public Service
Social Security and Country Delegate to the Indicators Sub-Group of the EU Social
Protection Committee.
www.peterlang.com
P.I.E. Peter Lang
1
pages de titre.p65
24/11/2010, 11:50
2
pages de titre.p65
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Europe 2020
P.I.E. Peter Lang

Bruxelles Bern Berlin Frankfurt am Main New York Oxford Wien
z
3
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4
pages de titre.p65
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Eric MARLIER and David NATALI (eds.),

with Rudi VAN DAM
Europe 2020
Work & Society

No.69
5
pages de titre.p65
24/11/2010, 11:50
This book was written at the request of the Belgian Presidency of the
Council of the European Union as an independent academic contribution to developing the operational basis for the Europe 2020 Strategy.
It builds on the background document prepared for the international
conference on EU Coordination in the Social Field in the Context of
Europe 2020: Looking Back and Building the Future (September 2010,
La Hulpe, Belgium). The conference was organised by the EU Belgian
Presidency and the European Commission, with the support of the
RECWOWE (Reconciling Work and Welfare in Europe) Research
Network. Special thanks go to the Belgian Federal Public Service Social Security for their support throughout the project. It should be
stressed that the book does not represent in any way the views of the
European Commission, the European Union, the EU Belgian Presidency
or the Belgian Federal Public Service Social Security. All the authors
have written in a strictly personal capacity, not as representatives of
any Government or official body. Thus they have been free to express
their own views and to take full responsibility for the judgments made
about past and current policy and for the recommendations for future
policy.
Cover picture: Hugh Frazer, Tour Madou, Brussels, 2008.

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photocopy,
microfilm or any other means, without prior written permission from the
publisher. All rights reserved.
P.I.E. PETER LANG S.A.

ditions scientifiques internationales
Brussels, 2010
1 avenue Maurice, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
[email protected]; www.peterlang.com
ISSN 1376-0955
ISBN 9783035260274
D/2010/5678/74
Printed in Germany
CIP available from the Library of Congress, USA and the British Library, GB
Bibliographic information published by Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek.
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available on the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>.
6
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Contents
Foreword .............................................................................................. 11
Laurette ONKELINX
List of Main Abbreviations and Acronyms Used.............................. 13
1. Europe 2020: Towards a More Social EU?.................................. 15
Hugh FRAZER and Eric MARLIER,
with David NATALI, Rudi VAN DAM and Bart VANHERCKE
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
Policy Context and Objectives of the Book ............................. 15

Overall Architecture of Europe 2020 ....................................... 18
Outline of the Contents ............................................................ 27
A More Social EU .................................................................... 33
2. Mapping the Components of Social EU:

A Critical Analysis of the Current Institutional Patchwork ...... 45
Maurizio FERRERA
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
Introduction .............................................................................. 45
The Challenge: Closure vs. Opening ....................................... 48
A New Nested Architecture.................................................. 52
A More Social EU: Reconfiguring the Patchwork ................... 55
Europe 2020 and Its Institutional Potential .............................. 63
Conclusion ............................................................................... 65
3. Aftershock: The Coming Social Crisis

in the EU and What Is to Be Done ................................................ 69
Roger LIDDLE and Patrick DIAMOND,
with Simon LATHAM and Tom BRODIE
3.1 Introduction .............................................................................. 69
3.2 The Multidimensional Nature of the Crisis,
the Challenge It Poses to Solidarity
and the Present Ambiguity of EU Integration .......................... 71
3.3 The Multidimensional Nature of the Crisis.............................. 76
3.4 The Role of the EU and How Its Social Dimension
Might Be Strengthened ............................................................ 86
3.5 Conclusion: Pointers for the Future ......................................... 88
4. The Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020

and the Crisis in Between .............................................................. 93
David NATALI
4.1 Approaching Europe 2020:
the Lisbon Strategy and the Crisis ........................................... 93
4.2 The Lisbon Strategy: Logics and Promises .............................. 94
4.3 Economic and Financial Crisis:
A Three-Step Process ............................................................... 97
4.4 The Lisbon Strategy Ten Years on:
A More Complex Understanding ........................................... 100
4.5 Concluding Remarks: Some Hypothesis
on the Future EU Socio-economic Governance ..................... 107
5. Delivering the Goods for Europe 2020?
The Social OMCs Adequacy and Impact Re-assessed ............. 115
Bart VANHERCKE
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................ 115
5.2 The Adequacy of the Social OMCs Toolbox:
Mixed Evidence (at best) ....................................................... 117
5.3 Assessing the Impact of the Social OMC:
Procedural and Substantive Effects on the Ground ............ 125
5.4 Mechanisms of Change: Explaining the Discrepancy
Between the OMCs Adequacy and Impact ........................... 132
5.5 Conclusions and Next Steps................................................... 134
6. Assessing the EU Approach to Combating Poverty
and Social Exclusion in the Last Decade .................................... 143
Mary DALY
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................ 143
6.2 The Background to Poverty and Social Exclusion
in the EU Repertoire .............................................................. 144
6.3 Social Policy Emphases in Lisbon ......................................... 147
6.4 Poverty and Social Exclusion in Empirical Terms ................ 150
6.5 Conclusion and Overview ...................................................... 156
7. A Territorialised Social Agenda to Guide Europe 2020

and the Future EU Cohesion Policy ........................................... 163
Marjorie JOUEN
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................ 163
7.2 The Barca Report: An Inspiring Blueprint
for Addressing Social Issues
from a Territorial Perspective ................................................ 164
7.3 Europe 2020: an Opportunity to Socialise
the Cohesion Policy ............................................................... 171
7.4 Territorialising the EU Social Objectives........................... 174
7.5 Conclusion ............................................................................. 177
8. Social Impact Assessment as a Tool for Mainstreaming
Social Protection and Inclusion Concerns in Public Policy ...... 181
Martin KHNEMUND
8.1 Introduction ............................................................................ 181
8.2 Social IA in Europe: Key Findings ........................................ 183
8.3 Common Challenges for Social IA
in the EU Member States ....................................................... 187
8.4 Solutions for Effective Social IA ........................................... 195
8.5 Conclusions .............................................................................. 198
9. The Potential of Eurotargets:
Reflecting on French Experience ................................................ 201
Robert WALKER
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
9.5
9.6
9.7
Introduction ............................................................................ 201

The French Poverty Target and Scoreboard ....................... 203
Strategy and Politics .............................................................. 206
Setting Targets ....................................................................... 209
Targets and Distortion............................................................ 213
Targets and Policy Design ..................................................... 216
Conclusions ............................................................................ 221
10. Strengthening Social Inclusion in the

Europe 2020 Strategy by Learning from the Past .................. 225
Hugh FRAZER and Eric MARLIER
10.1 Current Approach ................................................................ 225
10.2 Assessment of the Social OMC ........................................... 230
10.3 The Future ........................................................................... 235
10.4 Conclusions ......................................................................... 248
11. Towards a Stronger OMC in a More Social Europe 2020:
A New Governance Architecture
for EU Policy Coordination ...................................................... 253
Jonathan ZEITLIN
11.1 Introduction ......................................................................... 253
11.2 The Governance of the Lisbon Strategy (2000-2010):
A Critical Overview ............................................................ 254
11.3 An Inclusive Governance Architecture
for the post-Lisbon Era? Ambiguities of Europe 2020 ....... 261
11.4 Towards a Stronger OMC
in a More Social Europe 2020 ............................................. 265
11.5 Conclusion ........................................................................... 269
Short Presentation of the Authors ................................................... 275
10
Foreword
Reinforcing the European Union (EU) coordination and cooperation
in the social field was a major priority for the 2010 Belgian Presidency
of the Council of the EU. As Maurizio Ferrera reminds us in this book,
there are at least three fundamental reasons why a strong social EU
dimension is required. First and foremost, it is a matter of social justice.
Secondly, social protection is a productive factor. And thirdly, the EU
needs a social face to retain the support of its citizens. Still, there are
important threats to the European Social Model(s) of which the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 is the most recent and probably the
most acute one.
In this context the Belgian Presidency was very pleased to be able to
take up the challenge of contributing to the collective endeavour of the
Union and its Member States to develop the Europe 2020 Strategy.
This Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which was
endorsed by the 27 EU Heads of State and Government at their June
2010 European Council, sets the EU five integrated and mutually reinforcing targets to be reached by 2020. One of them is to lift at least 20
million people out of the risk of poverty and exclusion. EU leaders also
adopted economic and employment Guidelines. These should guide the
policies which EU and Member States will deploy in pursuit of the new
Strategys objectives and targets.
Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force on 1 December
2009, gives an increased status to social issues and contains a number of
important provisions to enhance an integrated policy approach for
economic, employment, social and environmental issues. One of the
Treatys fundamental innovations is the so-called Horizontal Social
Clause which offers an important stepping stone for mainstreaming
social objectives in all relevant policies at EU, national and sub-national
levels.
With the Europe 2020 framework, the European Council clearly
opted for a different, more integrated and stringent approach to ensure
progress on our common objectives. Important tools are now available.
Whether the Europe 2020 Strategy will lead to a more Social EU will
depend on its rigorous implementation by Member States and the European Commission. The European Parliament as well as the national and
sub-national Parliaments will also have an important role to play in this
respect.
11
Europe 2020: Towards a More Social EU?
To elucidate some of the key issues at stake, the Belgian Presidency

organised with the support of the European Commission an international Conference on EU Coordination in the Social Field in the Context of Europe 2020: Looking Back and Building the Future (14-15
September 2010, La Hulpe, Belgium). Bringing together a large number
of policy-makers, key experts and stakeholders, the conference was
intended to serve as ideas box on how to strengthen the EUs social
dimension and how to address the current patchwork of social policies.
This book builds on the background document that was prepared for
the Conference. It also builds on the conferences very rich presentations and discussions. I hope that the thorough analysis and concrete
proposals it contains will support and inform the implementation of the
Europe 2020 Strategy in the coming years.
Laurette ONKELINX
Belgian Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Social Affairs
and Public Health, in charge for Social Integration
12
List of Main Abbreviations

and Acronyms Used
BEPG
CJEU
COFACE
CPAG
DG
DG ECFIN
DG EMPL
EAPN
EES
EIoP
EMCO
EMU
EPAP
EPC
EPSCO
ESF
ESN
EU
EU-15
EU-27
EU-SILC
FEANTSA
FP
Broad Economic Policy Guideline

Court of Justice of the European Union
Confederation of Family Organisations in the EU
Child Poverty Action Group
Directorate-General
DG for Economic and Financial Affairs
of the European Commission
DG for Employment, Social Affairs
and Equal Opportunities of the European Commission
European Anti-Poverty Network
European Employment Strategy
European Integration online Papers
Employment Committee
European Monetary Union
European Platform against Poverty
Economic Policy Committee
EU Employment, Social Policy, Health
and Consumer Affairs Council of Ministers
European Social Fund
European Social Network
European Union
The 15 old EU Member States, before the May 2004
and January 2007 Enlargements (Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Sweden, United Kingdom)
All 27 EU Member States (EU-15 plus Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia,
Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia)
EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
European Federation of National Organisations Working
with the Homeless
Framework Programme
13
HCSACP
Haut-Commissaire aux Solidarits Actives

Contre la Pauvret
IA
Impact assessment
IG
Integrated Guideline
IORP
Institutions for occupational retirement provision
JRSPSI
Joint Report on Social Protection
and Social Inclusion
NAP
National Action Plan
NAP/inclusion
National Action Plan for social inclusion
NAP/employment National Action Plan for employment
NARB
National Report on Poverty and Wealth
NGO
Non-Governmental Organisation
NHS
National Health Service
NRP
National Reform Programme (for growth and jobs)
NSR
National Strategy Report
NSRF
National Strategic Reference Framework
NSRSPSI
National Strategy Report on Social Protection and
Social Inclusion
NUTS
Nomenclature dUnits Territoriales Statistiques
(Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics)
OECD
Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development
OMC
Open Method of Coordination
PROGRESS
Community Programme for Employment
and Social Solidarity
PSA
Public Sector Agreement
SEA
Single European Act
SCP
Stability and Convergence Programme
SGP
Stability and Growth Pact
SME
Small and medium size enterprise
Social OMC
OMC for social protection and social inclusion
SPC
EU Social Protection Committee
TEEC
Treaty establishing the European Community
TFEU
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
14
1. Europe 2020:
Hugh FRAZER and Eric MARLIER,
with David NATALI, Rudi VAN DAM and Bart VANHERCKE
1.1 Policy Context and Objectives of the Book
2010 was a critical juncture for the European Union (EU) in at least
two major respects. First, the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force on 1
December 2009 and gives an increased status to social issues, started to
be implemented. One of the Treatys fundamental innovations is the socalled Horizontal Social Clause (Article 9 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) which states that In defining
and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into
account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against
social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection
of human health (European Union, 2009).1 Another important innovation in the new Treaty is that it guarantees the freedoms and principles
set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (which the Treaty introduces into EU primary law) and gives its provisions a binding legal
force; this concerns civil, political and economic as well as social rights.
A second reason why 2010 was a turning point for the EU is that the
Lisbon Strategy, launched by the European Council2 in March 2000 as a
framework for EU socio-economic policy coordination, ended in June
2010 with the adoption by EU leaders of the new Europe 2020 Strategy.
During 2010, discussions took place at EU and country levels on how
1
2
It is important to highlight that the Union refers here to both the EU as a whole and
its individual Member States.
The European Council, which brings together the EU Heads of State and Government and the President of the European Commission, defines the general political
direction and priorities of the EU. Every spring, it holds a meeting that is more particularly devoted to economic and social questions the Spring European Council.
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, it has become
an official institution and has a President. The Conclusions of the June 2010 European Council are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/council_conclusion
_17_june_en.pdf.
15
best to implement the new Strategy so as to achieve its objectives of

smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (European Commission,
2010; European Council, 2010).
These institutional and policy developments happened in a difficult
social, employment, economic and budgetary context marked by slow
recovery from the global economic and financial crisis. This was a very
different situation from that of March 2000 when EU leaders set the EU
strategic goal of becoming by 2010 the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion
(European Council, 2000).
The Spanish and Belgian Presidencies of the EU Council of Ministers (hereafter: Council), in the first and second half of 2010 respectively, had the challenging task of contributing to shaping and implementing the EUs post-2010 socio-economic governance during this
difficult period. The subsequent Presidencies, and in particular the
Hungarian Presidency in the first half of 2011, will have to fine-tune the
actual implementation of the new Strategy.
This book was prepared at the request of the EU Belgian Presidency
as an independent academic contribution to developing the operational
basis for the Europe 2020 Strategy. It builds on the background document that was prepared for the international conference on EU coordination in the social field in the context of Europe 2020: Looking back
and building the future, organised by the Belgian Presidency and the
European Commission in La Hulpe (Belgium) in September 2010. It
also builds on the conferences very rich presentations and discussions.
The main focus of the book is on the role that EU coordination and
cooperation in the social field3 should or at least could potentially play
in the new EU governance framework. In doing this, one of its key tasks
is to draw lessons from the past decade to inform the development of
this future cooperation and coordination.
The three main objectives of the book are:
1. to assess both the procedural and substantive aspects of EU
coordination and cooperation in the social field to date (in the
broad Lisbon Strategy context) its main strengths and
weaknesses;
It is on purpose that the expression EU coordination and cooperation in the social

field rather than Social Open Method of Coordination (OMC) has been used as
the book wishes to adopt a broad approach to the future Social EU.
16
Hugh Frazer & Eric Marlier, with David Natali, Rudi Van Dam & Bart Vanhercke
2. to put forward some first ideas on the format and role of EU

coordination and cooperation in the social field in the new
Europe 2020 Strategy the opportunities and risks; and
3. to make proposals for the further reinforcement of EU
coordination and cooperation in the social field in the socioeconomic context marked by the crisis, and for the improvement of the different instruments available at EU, national and
sub-national levels (including proposals on how to address the
current patchwork of social policies).
We hope that the analysis presented in the book and the concrete
proposals on how to use the new opportunities provided by the Europe
2020 agenda can be used by policy-makers, researchers and other
stakeholders to contribute to building a more Social EU. We also hope
that it will help to encourage new ideas and innovative approaches.
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, we introduce (in Section 1.2) the overall architecture of the new EU socio-economic governance and explain the complex interplay between its different parts: the
three priorities, the five EU headline targets which need to be translated
into national targets, the seven flagship initiatives, the ten Integrated
Guidelines for employment and economic policies, and the newly
introduced concept of a European semester that should contribute to
mobilising the different instruments in support of the new Strategy and
to aligning it with the Stability and Growth Pact. We also discuss the
(potentially) key role of the EU Social Protection Committee (SPC)4 in
implementing and monitoring the social dimension of Europe 2020. In
Section 1.3, we then briefly outline the contents of the individual chapters and their main messages. The chapters assess the logic of the new
Strategy and of the instruments to be mobilised for improving social
policy coordination and cooperation at EU level. In doing so many
contributions reflect on and draw lessons from the Social Open Method
of Coordination (OMC) over the past decade while others consider the
broader aspects of EU governance in the social field (e.g. cohesion
policy, EU and national targets, social impact assessment, etc.). Finally,
Section 1.4 concludes and makes concrete recommendations in relation
to nine interrelated areas in which we consider that the Europe 2020
Strategys institutional arrangements can be developed so as to maximise the possibility of building a more Social EU.
The SPC consists of officials from mainly Employment and Social Affairs Ministries
in each Member State as well as representatives of the European Commission. The
SPC reports to the EU Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs
(EPSCO) Council of Ministers.
17
1.2 Overall Architecture of Europe 2020

In the words of the European Commission (2010), Europe 2020 is a
Strategy to turn the EU into a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy delivering high levels of employment, productivity and social
cohesion. () This is an agenda for all Member States, taking into
account different needs, different starting points and national specificities so as to promote growth for all.
Efficient socio-economic governance at EU, national and subnational levels is a necessary condition for a successful implementation
of this agenda. With this logic in mind, Europe 2020 has been organised
around three integrated pillars as shown in Figure 1.1 (European Commission, 2010 and 2010a):
1. Macro-economic surveillance, which aims at ensuring a stable
macro-economic environment conducive to growth and employment creation. In accordance with Integrated Guidelines 1
to 3 (see Table 1.1), it covers macro-economic and structural
policies to address macro-economic imbalances, macro-financial vulnerabilities and competitiveness issues which have a
macro-economic dimension. It is the responsibility of the EU
Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN) Council.
2. Thematic coordination, whose focus is on structural reforms in
the fields of innovation and R&D, resource-efficiency, business
environment, employment, education and social inclusion (Integrated Guidelines 4-10; see Table 1.1). Policies pursued in
this context are expected to deliver smart, sustainable and inclusive growth and employment creation at EU and national
levels and also to help remove obstacles to achieving the objectives set in the Guidelines. Thematic coordination combines EU
priorities, EU headline targets (and national targets that underpin them) and EU flagship initiatives (see Sections 1.2.1, 1.2.2
and 1.2.3 below). It is conducted by the sectoral formations of
the EU Council of Ministers (thus including, for social protection and inclusion matters, the EU Employment, Social Policy,
Health and Consumer Affairs (EPSCO) Council). It reflects
the EU dimension, shows clearly the interdependence of Member States economies, and allows greater selectivity on concrete
initiatives which push the strategy forward and help achieve the
EU and national headline targets (European Commission,
2010).
3. Fiscal surveillance under the Stability and Growth Pact, which
should contribute to strengthening fiscal consolidation and fosThis document is licensed to Eniko Vincze (3-5256156|00)
18
tering sustainable public finances. It is expected to help to ensure the overall consistency of EU policy advice by identifying
the fiscal constraints within which Member States actions are
to be developed.
Figure 1.1: The three pillars of the Europe 2020 Strategy
FIVE EU HEADLINE TARGETS
Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP)
Europe 2020 Integrated Guidelines
Macro-economic
surveillance
Thematic
coordination
Fiscal
surveillance
Stability and
Convergence
Programmes (SCPs)
National Reform
Programmes (NRPs)
Source: Figure based on European Commission, 2010a
Integrated Guidelines were adopted at EU level to cover the scope of

EU priorities and targets (see Section 1.2.4). Country-specific recommendations will be addressed to countries. Policy warnings could be
issued in case of an inadequate response. The reporting of Europe 2020
and the Stability and Growth Pact evaluation will be done simultaneously to bring the means and the aims together, but keeping the instruments and procedures separate and maintaining the integrity of the Pact.
Figure 1.2 summarises the complex architecture of Europe 2020
which should contribute to a coordinated response to largely common
challenges (European Commission, 2010 and 2010a).
19
Figure 1.2: Overall architecture of Europe 2020

EU priorities
EU level tools
National level
tools
Smart
growth
Sustainable
Inclusive
growth
growth
Ten Integrated Guidelines
Five headline targets
Monitoring and guidance (*)
Annual Growth Survey
Annual policy guidance and recommendations
Seven flagships
EU levers for growth and jobs (**)
European semester
National reform Programmes
(with national targets)
Notes: (*) Macro, thematic and fiscal surveillance; (**) The three levers are: Single
Market relaunch, Trade and external policies, EU financial support.
Source: Figure based on European Commission, 2010a
1.2.1 Three mutually reinforcing priorities

The March 2010 European Council agreed to the European Commissions proposal to launch a new Strategy for jobs and growth, Europe
2020, based on enhanced socio-economic policy coordination. Europe
2020 is organised around three priorities expected to be mutually reinforcing (European Commission, 2010):
smart growth, i.e. strengthening knowledge and innovation as
drivers of our future growth;
sustainable growth, i.e. promoting a more resource efficient,
greener and more competitive economy; and
inclusive growth, i.e. fostering a high-employment economy
delivering social and territorial cohesion. This priority is about
empowering people through high levels of employment, investing in skills, fighting poverty and modernising labour markets, training and social protection systems so as to help people
anticipate and manage change, and build a cohesive society.
1.2.2 Five EU headline targets

to be translated into national targets
To that end, the June 2010 European Council agreed to set five EU
headline targets which will constitute shared objectives guiding the
action of Member States and the Union (European Council, 2010):
to raise to 75% the employment rate for women and men aged
20-64;
20
to raise combined public and private investment levels in research and development (R&D) to 3% of EUs Gross Domestic
Product;
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20% compared to 1990
levels, increase the share of renewables in final energy consumption to 20%, and move towards a 20% increase in energy
efficiency (i.e. the 20/20/20 climate/energy targets); and to
increase to 30% the emissions reduction if the conditions are
right5;
to improve education levels, in particular by aiming to reduce
school drop-out rates to less than 10% and by increasing the
share of 30-34 years old having completed tertiary or equivalent education to at least 40%;
to promote social inclusion, in particular through the reduction
of poverty, by aiming to lift at least 20 million people out of the
risk of poverty and exclusion. This target is based on a combination of three indicators: the number of people at risk of poverty6, the number of people materially deprived7, and the
number of people aged 0-59 who live in jobless households
(defined, for the purpose of the EU target, as households where
none of the members aged 18-59 are working or where members aged 18-59 have, on average, very limited work attachment). So, the target will consist of reducing the number of
people in the EU (120 million) who are at risk of poverty
and/or materially deprived and/or living in jobless households
by one sixth.
In light of these interrelated targets, Member States have to set their
national targets taking account of their relative starting positions and
national circumstances and according to their national decision-making
procedures. They should also identify the main bottlenecks to growth
5
The EU is committed to taking a decision to move to a 30% reduction by 2020

compared to 1990 levels as its conditional offer with a view to a global and comprehensive agreement for the period beyond 2012, provided that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and that developing
countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities. (European Council, 2010).
According to the EU definition, people at risk of poverty are people living in a
household whose total equivalised income is below 60% of the median national
equivalised household income (the equivalence scale is the so-called OECD modified
scale).
Based on the limited information available from the EU Statistics on Income and
Living Conditions (EU-SILC) data-set, this indicator focuses on the number of people living in households who cannot afford at least 4 items out of a list of 9.
21
and indicate, in their National Reform Programmes (NRPs), how they

intend to tackle them. Member States have to submit their draft NRPs
to the Commission in November 2010 and their final NRPs in April
2011. It is important to highlight that the European Council has stressed
that all common policies, including the common agricultural policy
and cohesion policy, will need to support the Strategy, and that progress towards the headline targets will be regularly reviewed.
1.2.3 Seven flagship initiatives

To underpin these targets and catalyse progress under each priority
theme, the Commission has suggested seven flagship initiatives which
should encompass a wide range of actions at national, EU and international levels: Innovation Union, Youth on the move, A digital
agenda for Europe, Resource efficient Europe, An industrial policy
for the globalisation era, An agenda for new skills and jobs and
European platform against poverty (EPAP). Unlike the other flagships
announced by the Commission, there was no prior consideration given
to what the EPAP would be and how it would relate to the existing EU
coordination and cooperation in the social field. It was a top-down
initiative without much apparent coherent thought and lacking any
consultation with stakeholders. Several chapters in the present volume
discuss the potential role and added value of the EPAP in creating a
more Social EU.
1.2.4 Ten Integrated Guidelines for employment

and economic policies
Finally, ten Integrated Guidelines for implementing the Europe 2020
Strategy have been adopted by the Council in October 2010 six broad
guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and the EU,
and four guidelines for the employment (and in fact also social) policies
of the Member States (Table 1.1). These Guidelines were adopted on
the basis of the Treaty on the functioning of the EU Article 121 for the
former and Article 148 for the latter. Their aim is to provide guidance to
Member States on defining their NRPs and implementing reforms,
reflecting interdependence and in line with the Stability and Growth
Pact.8
The broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and of
the Union were adopted by the Council in July 2010 (EU Council of Ministers,
2010), whereas the guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States
were adopted in October 2010 (EU Council of Ministers, 2010a).
22
Table 1.1: Ten integrated guidelines for Europe 2020

Guideline 1
Guideline 2
Guideline 3
Guideline 4
Guideline 5
Guideline 6
Guideline 7
Guideline 8
Guideline 9
Guideline 10
Ensuring the quality and sustainability of public finances

Addressing macroeconomic imbalances
Reducing imbalances in the euro area
Optimising support for R&D and innovation, strengthening the
knowledge triangle and unleashing the potential of the digital economy
Improving resource efficiency and reducing greenhouse gases
emissions
Improving the business and consumer environment, and modernising
and developing the industrial base in order to ensure the full functioning of the internal market
Increasing labour market participation of women and men, reducing
structural unemployment and promoting job quality
Developing a skilled workforce responding to labour market needs
and promoting lifelong learning
Improving the quality and performance of education and training
systems at all levels and increasing participation in tertiary or equivalent education
Promoting social inclusion and combating poverty
Source: EU Council of Ministers, 2010 and 2010a
It will be important for the EU and Member States to mobilise all the
potentialities provided by several of these Guidelines, and in particular
by Guideline 10 (on Promoting social inclusion and combating poverty) which reads as follows:
The extension of employment opportunities is an essential aspect of Member States integrated strategies to prevent and reduce
poverty and to promote full participation in society and economy.
Appropriate use of the European Social Fund and other EU funds
should be made to that end. Efforts should concentrate on ensuring
equal opportunities, including through access for all to high quality,
affordable, and sustainable services, in particular in the social field.
Public services (including online services, in line with Guideline 4)
play an important role in this respect. Member States should put in
place effective anti-discrimination measures. Empowering people
and promoting labour market participation for those furthest away
from the labour market while preventing in-work poverty will help
fight social exclusion. This would require enhancing social protection systems, lifelong learning and comprehensive active inclusion
policies to create opportunities at different stages of peoples lives
and shield them from the risk of exclusion, with special attention to
women. Social protection systems, including pensions and access to
healthcare, should be modernised and fully deployed to ensure adequate income support and services thus providing social cohesion
23
whilst remaining financially sustainable and encouraging participation in society and in the labour market. Benefit systems should
focus on ensuring income security during transitions and reducing
poverty, in particular among groups most at risk from social exclusion, such as one-parent families, minorities including the Roma,
people with disabilities, children and young people, elderly women
and men, legal migrants and the homeless. Member States should
also actively promote the social economy and social innovation in
support of the most vulnerable. All measures should also aim at
promoting gender equality. The EU headline target, on the basis of
which Member States will set their national targets, taking into account their relative starting conditions and national circumstances,
will aim at promoting social inclusion, in particular through the reduction of poverty by aiming to lift at least 20 million people out of
the risk of poverty and exclusion9. (EU Council of Ministers,
2010a)
Recitals 15, 16, 18 and 19 that accompany the Guidelines are important for the purpose of this book (EU Council of Ministers, 2010a):
Recital 15 reminds that cohesion policy and its structural funds
are amongst a number of important delivery mechanisms to
achieve the priorities of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth
in Member States and regions. In its conclusions of 17 June
2010, the European Council stressed the importance of promoting economic, social and territorial cohesion in order to contribute to the success of the new Europe 2020 Strategy.
Recital 16 requires that when designing and implementing their
NRPs Member States should ensure effective governance of
employment policy. While these Guidelines are addressed to
Member States, the Europe 2020 Strategy should, as appropriate,
be implemented, monitored and evaluated in partnership with all
national, regional and local authorities, closely associating parliaments, as well as social partners and representatives of civil
society, who shall contribute to the elaboration of NRPs, to their
implementation and to the overall communication on the strategy.
Recital 18 stresses that the Employment Guidelines should form
the basis for any country-specific recommendations that the
9
The population is defined as the number of persons who are at risk-of-poverty and
exclusion according to three indicators (at-risk-of poverty; material deprivation; jobless household), leaving Member States free to set their national targets on the basis
of the most appropriate indicators, taking into account their national circumstances
and priorities.
24
Council may address to the Member States under Article 148(4)

of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in parallel with the country-specific recommendations addressed to the
Member States under Article 121(4) of the Treaty, in order to
form a coherent package of recommendations. The Employment
Guidelines should also form the basis for the establishment of the
Joint Employment Report sent annually by the Council and
Commission to the European Council.
Recital 19 highlights that the Employment Committee and the
Social Protection Committee should monitor progress in relation
to the employment and social aspects of the Employment Guidelines, in line with their respective Treaty-based mandates. This
should in particular build on the activities of the open method of
coordination in the fields of employment and of social protection
and social inclusion. In addition the Employment Committee
should maintain close contact with other relevant Council preparatory instances, including in the field of education.
1.2.5 European semester

In terms of overall socio-economic governance, it is important to
mention that in September 2010 the Council agreed to change the way
in which the EUs Stability and Growth Pact is implemented in order to
allow a European semester to be introduced, as from 2011. This
change is expected to improve economic policy coordination and help
strengthen budgetary discipline, macro-economic stability and growth,
in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy. The European semester will start
each year in March when the European Council will identify the main
economic challenges and give strategic advice on policies, on the basis
of a European Commission report entitled Annual Growth Survey.
Taking account of this advice, countries will review their medium-term
budgetary strategies during April and at the same time draw up NRPs
setting out the action they will undertake in areas such as employment
and social inclusion. In June and July, the European Council and the
Council will provide policy advice to countries before they finalise their
budgets for the following year. The Commissions reports in the following year will then assess how well this advice has been implemented.
1.2.6 Key role of the EU Social Protection Committee

in implementing and monitoring
the social dimension of Europe 2020
The social goals of Europe 2020 are clear from Guideline 10 as well
as other Guidelines. It should be stressed that these goals are not limited
to social inclusion but also encompass social protection. The SPC, given
25
its responsibility for EU coordination and cooperation in the social field,

has a potentially major role to play in ensuring a strong social dimension for the Europe 2020 Strategy and, more generally, in implementing
a more Social EU (see Section 1.2.4, Recital 16 accompanying the
Integrated Guidelines). In effect, it will be critical that in the future it
plays a full and equal role alongside the EU Economic Policy Committee (EPC) and the EU Employment Committee (EMCO) in the overall
implementation and monitoring of the Europe 2020 Strategy.
As a first step to ensuring this, the SPC has decided to issue an annual report covering the following elements (Social Protection Committee, 2010):
An assessment of progress towards the EU headline target on
social inclusion and poverty reduction, which should: monitor
progress towards the national targets and their contribution to
the EU target; analyse the trends in poverty and social
exclusion as well as the situation of population sub-groups (on
the basis of relevant existing and yet-to-be agreed EU
indicators); draw from the relevant findings of the analysis
conducted under the various activities undertaken in the
framework of EU coordination and cooperation in the social
field.
A monitoring of the implementation of the social aspects of the
Integrated Guidelines (in particular Guideline 10), on the basis
of a Joint Assessment Framework agreed upon by the Employment Committee, the SPC and the European Commission. The
SPC will also contribute to assessing the social implications of
the six economic Integrated Guidelines in dialogue with the
Economic Policy Committee.
Other activities to monitor the social situation and the development of social protection policies undertaken in the context of
EU coordination and cooperation in the social field. This will
include the results of other work conducted by the SPC in line
with its Treaty-based mandate to monitor the social situation
and the development of social protection policies in the EU and
in Member States. This work will draw on already agreed and
possible updated or new EU indicators, as well as specific
analytical work such as the joint SPC/Commission EU monitoring of the social impact of the crisis.
The SPC report will be transmitted to the EPSCO Council at the beginning of each year, with a view to contributing to the EPSCO preparation of the Spring European Council as regards the Europe 2020 Strategy.
26
Furthermore, the SPC and EMCO have agreed that the elements of
the draft Joint Employment Report concerning the implementation of
Guideline 10 in relation to the EU headline target on social inclusion/
poverty reduction will be discussed and agreed by the SPC and transmitted to EMCO for adoption in the Joint Employment Report.
Further details of how the SPCs role in promoting the social dimension of the Europe 2020 Strategy can be enhanced have still to be
finalised. Suggestions on this are contained in this and later chapters of
this book.
1.3 Outline of the Contents

In this section, we briefly outline the contents of the individual chapters and their main messages. As mentioned above, the chapters assess
the logic of the Europe 2020 Strategy and of the instruments to be
mobilised for improving social policy coordination and cooperation at
EU level. In doing so, many contributions reflect on and draw lessons
from the Social OMC over the past decade while others consider the
broader aspects of EU governance in the social field.
The analysis opens in Chapter 2 with a contribution by Maurizio
Ferrera aimed at mapping the components of the Social EU and analysing its current institutional patchwork. The fundamental question he
raises is whether the EU can reconcile the logic of opening, which
drives economic integration, with the logic of closure, which underpins nation-based welfare arrangements. He responds positively to this
question and suggests a strategy of institutional reconciliation.
He argues that the key for a successful reconciliation lies in a more
explicit and effective nesting of the national welfare states within the
overall spatial architecture of the EU. In general terms, the challenge is
twofold. First, counterbalance the disruptive effects that free movement
and competition rules have on nation-based social protection systems.
Secondly, promote a more symmetrical balance between the economic
and social spaces of the EU. More practically, Ferrera suggests that in
the medium term the reconciliation agenda should focus on three priorities: a) the implementation of the so-called Horizontal Social Clause
of the Lisbon Treaty (see above, Section 1.1); b) the clarification and
operationalisation of the Social Protocol; and c) the introduction of the
most urgent social complements of the internal market, building on
the recommendations of the Monti Report on the re-launching of the
internal market and the Barca Report on the reform of cohesion policies.
The key focus of Chapter 3, by Roger Liddle, Patrick Diamond and
colleagues, is on the social aftershocks of the crisis. The chapter develops four main arguments. First, there are five interlocking potential
27
social crises, which in the main reflect long term trends apparent in
Europe before the crisis, but the crisis has made the context in which
they need to be addressed more difficult, particularly as a result of fiscal
austerity. At the same time, the long term challenges have not gone away
(e.g. tackling the public spending implications of an ageing demography). Secondly, the crisis has highlighted the issue of social and economic inequality. This forces a re-assessment of the Lisbon Agenda
policy consensus established before the crisis i.e., more flexible labour
markets, higher employment participation, social investment, getting a
job as the best answer to poverty. Thirdly, the EUs economic policy
response to the crisis highlights the zero sum risks of Member States
seeking to gain competitive advantage against each other through a
brand of welfare nationalism which transmutes into a race to the
bottom in social standards. And fourthly, a full blown Euro-Keynesian
response to these problems is politically unrealistic and anyway would
prove ineffective as it ignores the need for domestic reforms to improve
the resilience of national social models in face of the emergence of new
social risks. However, the EU as a whole needs to develop a new policy
paradigm based on a combination of social investment and regulatory
intervention, the implementation of which requires both policy reforms
within Member States and action at EU level. Improved policy action
and coordination at EU level could provide a more favourable structural
context for the evolution of social reforms.
In Chapter 4, David Natali suggests that in the post-crisis context
three issues will need particular attention. The first relates to the political and economic foundation of the EU project. The Lisbon agenda
represented a first attempt to find a new compromise but its limits have
been obvious. Europe 2020 and the Lisbon Treaty represent important
steps forward but the tight timing is a problem as the effective implementation of the new Strategy and the new Treaty requires time and
political mobilisation. The crisis as well as the stricter application of
budgetary stability may rapidly reduce the room for defending social
entitlements. The second issue has to do with the need for effective
governance: the system introduced through the Lisbon Strategy is still in
need of improvement. The recent economic and budgetary crisis has
shown that EU governance is still weak. Here again, Europe 2020 as
well as other important parallel EU developments (e.g. the Monti and
Barca Reports mentioned above) seem promising in their attempt to
mobilise the various instruments available at EU level. The definition of
a more ambitious strategy for the EU budget is a key part of it. Finally,
the third issue is related to insufficient participation, transparency and
knowledge-based governance. For Natali, EU political legitimacy has
not significantly improved between 2000 and 2010. There have been
advances in deliberation, sharing of information, benchmarking and
28
learning but these have not had a decisive impact on national policies.
For the Europe 2020 Strategy to change this, more emphasis on the
integration of European and national parliaments and on stakeholder
involvement will be needed.
Chapter 5, by Bart Vanhercke, reviews some of the main advances
and limits of the implementation of the Social OMC to date. It argues
that the debate on Europe 2020 and its social dimension (the future role
of the Social OMC and of the European Platform against Poverty) needs
to better take into account the empirical evidence of the effects of the
Social OMC as it has developed between 2000 and 2010. It suggests an
analysis of this evidence in terms of two key dimensions: the adequacy of the Social OMC (assessed against the main goals proposed at
the launch of the process) and its actual impact on national policymaking and reforms. A first conclusion of the chapter is that in different
policy areas the Social OMC has been much harder than might have
been expected from a soft law. In part this is due to the fact that the
Social OMC is being used strategically by national and sub-national
actors as a resource for their own purposes and independent policy
initiatives. A second conclusion is that the Social OMC has become a
template for soft governance not only at EU level but also at country level in some federal Member States. A final conclusion is that the
idea of hybrid EU governance should be explored because of the
linkages between the Social OMC and other EU policy instruments. The
chapter also puts forward various proposals aimed at further improving
the Social OMCs infrastructure, such as: a) continuing a broad
Social OMC, covering not only poverty and social exclusion but also
social protection; b) developing further the set of EU social indicators
(for instance in relation to social adequacy of benefits and participatory
governance); and c) strengthening the link between the Social OMC and
EU funding (i.e. making the use of European Social Fund (ESF)
money conditional upon the achievement of the EU social objectives).
In Chapter 6, Mary Daly analyses EU engagement with poverty and
social exclusion as they were conceived and operationalised in the
Lisbon process between 2000 and 2010, and draws out some implications for the further elaboration of EU coordination and cooperation in
the social field. She shows, first, that as a set of social policy ideas the
Social OMC was both innovative and far-reaching. It contributed significantly to elaborating the relationship between poverty and social
exclusion, as problems and phenomena in their own right and also as
approaches to social policy. She then highlights inconsistencies or lack
of coherence in the social policy substance of the OMC. While poverty
and social exclusion are evolving ideas and are located in highly contested political processes both nationally and in the EU, very different
29
approaches have appeared in the Social OMC at different times. For

example, in the early stages of Lisbon social inclusion was a goal in its
own right whereas the revisions made in 2005 rendered social development a by-product of economic development. The process has been
quite unstable. Daly argues that all in all, the Social OMC has had
significant achievements and offers numerous insights about what is
possible in regard to changing social policy considerations at EU and
national levels. In particular, emerging risks and target groups have
been highlighted, information assembled and procedures put in place for
improving policy-making at national and transnational levels. Daly also
highlights the most useful role that the European Platform against
Poverty (EPAP) could play. She suggests that among the functions it
could undertake are investigation of innovative approaches to emerging
problems, raising awareness and visibility of social issues and especially
EU approaches to them at national and EU levels and promoting a much
more systematic impact assessment.
A territorialised social agenda to guide Europe 2020 and the future
EU cohesion policy is proposed by Marjorie Jouen in Chapter 7. This
concept of a territorialised social agenda was put forward by Fabrizio
Barca (2009) with a view to giving coherence to the future, post-2013
EU cohesion policy. In the light of the future EU budgetary negotiations
and the Europe 2020 priorities, the chapter first examines the main
messages set out in the Barca Report. Then, it discusses the various
methods and tools that could be used to socialise cohesion policy, i.e.
to reorganise the menu offered to the regions following 6 priorities
which will deal separately with territorial and economic efficiency on
the one side, and social inclusion on the other (innovation, climate
change, migration, children, skills and ageing). Along with the EU
indicators for monitoring the social dimension of the Europe 2020
Strategy in the broader sense, new social performance criteria should be
developed at regional level immediately. As regards the territorialisation of the EU social objectives, which was not treated as such by
Barca and which is not tackled by the Europe 2020 Strategy, it would
consist of ensuring that links are developed between EU social objectives and cohesion policy. In other words, exploring the implications of
the new territorial cohesion objective (introduced by the Lisbon Treaty)
in the next programming regulations, ensuring that cohesion policy fully
takes on board the EU social objectives and also incorporating the
territorial approach as element in EU coordination and cooperation in
the social field.
The aforementioned Horizontal Social Clause of the Lisbon Treaty
should provide a more solid basis for requiring the European Commission and EU countries to mainstream the EUs social objectives into
30
policy-making and, for this to be effective, to systematically carry out

social impact assessments (social IAs) of all relevant policies. Social IA
is therefore an important area where progress is urgently needed. This is
the topic of Chapter 8, by Martin Khnemund. Based on an EU study
funded by the European Commission, the chapter comments that although most Member States and several regions have systems in place
for an ex ante assessment of the likely social impacts, there are significant implementation gaps. Examples of IAs that contain an in-depth
analysis of social impacts are few and far between; where they do exist,
they are most often conducted on policies with specific social objectives
(and therefore largely irrelevant for mainstreaming social policy objectives into policies in other areas). Nonetheless, Khnemund shows that
there are examples of good practices. At the same time, he also identifies a number of key challenges that any country or region looking to set
up an effective system for social IAs, or to improve their current system,
needs to be aware of and to address. Some of these challenges relate to
(integrated) IAs in general: this is still a relatively new process and tool
in most countries and its application tends to be far from perfect. IAs are
generally difficult to reconcile and integrate with previously existing
policy processes. To be fully effective, there needs to be a shift in the
policy-making culture, and officials need to have sufficient time,
knowledge, skills and support to make it work. In order to facilitate
more effective social IAs, countries need to work towards establishing a
general IA culture. In addition, they have to address specific challenges
for social IAs that relate to three key aspects: understanding social
impacts (through an agreed reasonably simple categorisation), embedding social impacts in the broad governance process (through proper
guidance and support as well as screening tools), and analysing social
impacts (through the development and dissemination of appropriate
tools, methods and data sources).
The next chapter, by Robert Walker, discusses the potential of targets, an area where expertise also needs to be built at EU and national
levels. The aim of the chapter is to draw selectively on the experience
gained from the use of targets at national level to begin reflection on the
challenges that will need to be overcome if the recently agreed EU
targets are to drive rather than obstruct progressive EU policy-making.
Targets work by adding a new dynamic the measurement of progress
to policy-making, thereby increasing accountability and stimulating
public debate and engagement that is often led by civil society organisations. Walker argues that the intention of targets is not just to set policy
goals but typically also to shake up the policy-making process, to
challenge ways of working and to change institutional cultures. For EU
targets to be effective, powerful champions must be appointed at EU
and country levels to monitor achievements and to encourage, facilitate
31
and cajole the various stakeholders to take those actions necessary to

meet the targets set. There may even be a case, based on the experience
of implementing national targets, for establishing financial incentives
that reward success. Furthermore, EU targets provide an opportunity to
enhance the legitimacy of the EUs democratic institutions by bringing
the role of the European Parliament to the fore, alongside that of civil
society, in holding Member States to account as they endeavour through
policy and institutional change to attain or, preferably, to exceed their
targets by 2020. Walker warns that targets need accurately to reflect the
causal mechanisms embodied in policy logic. They must measure the
right outcomes in an appropriate manner so as to avoid distortion and
not to encourage gaming i.e. that targets may be met but policy objectives are forgotten or ignored. In his view, the policy logic underpinning
the poverty target is unclear both at EU and country levels, which
increases the scope for gaming and creaming. It is therefore essential to
continue to monitor the whole set of commonly agreed social indicators
to guard against both possibilities and also to better understand why
some Member States may be performing worse than others against their
respective national targets.
In Chapter 10, Frazer and Marlier analyse the EUs current approach
to promoting social inclusion and combating poverty and social exclusion. They briefly describe the functioning of the Social OMC since
2000 and then assess the strengths and weaknesses of the process. They
highlight important progress that has been made in putting poverty and
social exclusion on the EU agenda, in increasing understanding, in
improving data, indicators and analysis, in mobilising actors, and in
developing the exchange of learning and good practice. However, they
also highlight that the process has not achieved a significant reduction
in poverty and social exclusion, has remained a rather soft and peripheral process at both (sub-)national and EU levels with insufficient
interaction with the EUs economic and employment policies. Frazer
and Marlier go on to suggest what needs to happen to build a stronger
EU social process in the future and to bring together the patchwork of
different strands that currently makes up Social EU into a more coherent
whole. They suggest the importance of both building on the positive
elements of the Social OMC but also using the increased status accorded to poverty and social inclusion issues in Europe 2020 to address
some of the political and institutional weaknesses identified and to
strengthen the central element of the Social OMC, the National Strategy
Reports on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (especially the
NAPs/inclusion). They make concrete proposals for setting clear EU
social objectives with EU and national social outcome targets, for
improved benchmarking, monitoring and evaluation, for strengthening
social inclusion in the Europe 2020 Integrated Guidelines and in NRPs,
32
for developing more effective national social protection and social

inclusion strategies, for taking advantage of the Lisbon Treatys Horizontal Social Clause, for developing the EPAP, for building on the
thematic approach (e.g. active inclusion, child poverty, and homelessness and housing exclusion), for strengthening governance, for better
linking EU social inclusion and EU Structural Funds objectives and for
improving exchange, learning and communication.
The final chapter, by Jonathan Zeitlin, starts by looking backward at
the governance of the Lisbon Strategy since March 2000, providing a
critical overview of the three principal phases of its development. It then
looks forward, examining the emerging governance architecture for EU
policy coordination after 2010. The argument proceeds in three main
steps. The first analyses the reformed governance architecture of Europe
2020, drawing attention both to its strengthened social dimension, and
to serious risks to the broader European social policy coordination and
monitoring capacities developed over the past decade arising from
ambiguities in the institutional design of the new Strategy. The second
step advances a series of proposals to counteract these risks by incorporating into the governance architecture of Europe 2020 key components
of EU social policy coordination developed under the Social OMC,
notably the common social objectives, common indicators, and European monitoring, peer review, and evaluation of national social protection and inclusion strategies. The final step in the argument proposes a
series of reflexive reforms aimed at overcoming weaknesses within the
Social OMC itself, with a particular focus on reinforcing mutual learning and enhancing stakeholder participation.
1.4 A More Social EU

1.4.1 Overall conclusions
Increased awareness of the need for a more Social EU
One of the positive effects of the economic and financial crisis has
been to increase awareness of the important role that social policy in
general and social protection systems in particular can play as economic
stabilisers. This in turn has reinforced the need to address the tensions
between economic, employment and social objectives and to develop a
more balanced and sustainable approach in the future. The Lisbon
Strategy, especially since it was refocused in 2005 solely on jobs and
growth, has demonstrated that an approach dominated by a trickle
down ideology, which assumes that economic growth through increased competition will automatically benefit all, has not worked and is
not sustainable. Levels of poverty, inequality and social exclusion, even
33
before the economic crisis, have remained stubbornly high. The challenges of an ageing population and the effects of increased mobility and
diversity have been seen to have very serious social consequences and
to have the potential to undermine future economic progress if not
addressed through strong social policies. The growing sense of many
EU citizens that the EUs (primarily economic) project has not been
beneficial to them and that indeed it may be endangering the social
standards they aspire to has called into question the political support for
the EU project and therefore its democratic legitimacy. Thus it is clear
that building a stronger Social EU is both a necessary investment to
support economic growth and underpin free movement and an indispensable requirement to ensure the EUs continuing political legitimacy.
Insufficient overall policy coordination under the Lisbon process

The various chapters in this book reinforce the urgent need to build a
stronger Social EU. They show that the Lisbon Strategy between 2000
and 2010 played an important role in raising the importance of the EUs
social dimension and promoting increased EU coordination and cooperation in the social field. In particular, the Social OMC helped to raise
the importance of social policy at both EU and national levels, to develop new ideas and thinking, to deepen analysis, knowledge and
expertise, to improve data collection and to mobilise a range of actors.
However, although the need to find a better balance between economic,
employment and social policies (particularly in the context of sustainable development) and to ensure that they are mutually reinforcing was
repeatedly highlighted, in practice the Social OMC did not succeed in
satisfactorily addressing the tensions between them. Social policy is still
the poor relation of the Lisbon policy triangle and the disruptive effects
that free movement and competition rules have had on nation-based
social protection systems were not resolved. Also, social policy at EU
level has remained a rather uncoordinated patchwork with insufficient
integration between social protection, social inclusion, education,
health, justice, housing and other policy areas.
New opportunities under the Lisbon Treaty and Europe 2020

In the light of the above, a major challenge in the next decade is to
find ways of ensuring that the insights gained under the Lisbon process
are built on and that a more coherent, integrated and balanced approach
to sustainable development is adopted. Thus it is encouraging that many
of the authors in this book highlight that the Lisbon Treaty and the
Europe 2020 Strategy provide a significant, if far from perfect, opportunity to move towards a better and more mutually reinforcing balance
between economic, employment and social objectives and thus,
towards a stronger Social EU. In particular, five opportunities stand out.
34
First, the Lisbon Treaty, through its Horizontal Social Clause, provides
a legal basis for better taking into account the social impact of policies
and for using this as a tool to mainstream social objectives across all
relevant policy areas (including non social policies and measures) as
well as to more rigorously monitor and report on the impact of policies.
Secondly, the Treaty and the Europe 2020 Strategy (with its headline
EU targets and its EU flagships) have increased the potential visibility
and importance of social issues especially, though not solely of social
inclusion and poverty. Thirdly, the Strategy holds out the possibility of
a much more integrated and coordinated approach to economic, social,
employment and also environmental governance. This could ensure that
policies in these areas become genuinely reinforcing. Fourthly, under
the new Treaty there is an increased possibility of better safeguarding,
strengthening and modernising national social protection systems and
protecting non-economic services of general interests, which can contribute to restoring the balance between the EU and national levels.
Fifthly, the Treaty provides the justification for EU action on a broader
range of social issues than heretofore such as a high level of education
and training, the protection of human health and a reduction of inequality. This may lead to greater coordination of the current patchwork of
social policies in the broader sense than heretofore.
Risks to progress
Of course these are only possibilities and not certainties. This volume identifies some very real dangers to their achievement. There are at
least five such dangers. First, there is a risk that with an increased
emphasis on coordinated governance arrangements the issue of poverty
and social exclusion in particular and social protection and social inclusion more generally may become swamped by economic considerations
and in fact lose rather than gain importance and visibility. Secondly,
there is a risk that the tendency which begun in 2005 (when the Lisbon
Strategy was refocused on jobs and growth) may be reinforced; namely
the risk of moving further from a multilateral and dynamic process
involving and mobilising many actors to a more bilateral and technocratic process involving national and EU civil servants in limited circles
of experts. This could result in less emphasis being given to the engagement by civil society and social partners as well as local and regional stakeholders. This would both reduce the extent of mutual learning and involvement, especially at sub-national levels, and would not
address the challenge of building increased democratic legitimacy and
support for the EU project. Thirdly, there is also the risk that in the
current phase of the economic and financial crisis the growing emphasis
on austerity packages and the stricter implementation of budgetary
stability may rapidly reduce the room for defending social entitlements
35
and making progress on social issues. Fourthly, it is not clear how the
new governance arrangements under the Europe 2020 Strategy will
connect with the broader EU coordination/ cooperation and monitoring
capacities in the social field developed through the Social OMC over
the past decade. Fifthly, there is a risk that the common social objectives
may only be incompletely and selectively integrated into National
Reform Programmes (NRPs) and that future EU monitoring of social
protection and social inclusion policies may be narrowly focused on the
EU social inclusion target. As rightly emphasised by the President of the
European Commission, Jos Manuel Barroso, the Europe 2020 agenda,
in setting a social inclusion target, has highlighted three dimensions of
poverty and social exclusion. It is also essential, however, that Member
States and the EU as a whole continue to monitor performance
according to the full set of commonly agreed social indicators underpinning EU coordination and cooperation in the social field. (Barroso,
2010)
1.4.2 Recommendations
Moving forward the challenge will be to ensure that the positive developments identified above are maximised and that the risks are mitigated to the greatest extent possible. The various chapters in this volume make a range of detailed suggestions as to how best progress may
be achieved. Drawing on these we would particularly highlight and
make recommendations in relation to nine interrelated areas. These are
areas in which we consider that the Europe 2020 Strategys institutional
arrangements can be developed so as to maximise the possibility of
building a more Social EU. The areas covered are: reinforcing interactions between all strands of Europe 2020 and between the various
components that make up Social EU; embedding targets in national
policy-making and developing leadership in their implementation;
enhancing mainstreaming of social objectives through social impact
assessments at EU and country levels; reinforcing social reporting and
building on the Social OMC; developing complementary tools and
instruments through the EPAP; mobilising EU resources to support
Social EU and linking the EUs social and territorial objectives; enhancing social monitoring and strengthening analytical capacity; increasing
democratic legitimacy and reinforcing stakeholder involvement; and
enhancing mutual learning.
36
Recommendation 1: Reinforcing interactions

between all strands of Europe 2020 and between
the various components that make up Social EU
A key challenge will be to ensure mutually reinforcing interactions
between all strands of Europe 2020 and between the various components that (potentially) make up Social EU, and to make certain that the
social dimension is fully taken into account. A number of things could
help in this regard. First, it will be essential that social ministers play a
central role (through the EPSCO Council) in the close monitoring of the
social dimension of the Europe 2020 Strategy. Secondly, the different
EU Committees (in particular SPC, EMCO and EPC) but also other
high level groups (in areas such as health, education and justice) should
be encouraged to cooperate more systematically on a number of key
issues and join forces to develop synergies between their respective
areas of competence. More particularly, it is important that the SPC
plays a central role in monitoring the implementation of the Integrated
Guidelines. This means both taking the lead in monitoring the specifically social Guidelines (especially, though not solely, Guideline 10)
and contributing to monitoring the social impact of the other Guidelines;
this also means producing an annual Social Protection and Social Inclusion report on this for the attention of the EPSCO Council. (See also
Recommendation 5.)
Recommendation 2: Embedding targets in national

policy-making and developing leadership in their implementation
The EU social inclusion/poverty reduction headline target is a major
step forward in demonstrating the political social commitment of the EU
and represents an essential element of the social dimension of the
Europe 2020 Strategy. Translating the EU target into meaningful national (and possibly also sub-national) targets is essential. To ensure that
appropriate targets are set we would recommend the following. National
targets should clearly contribute to the overall achievement of the EU
target. Targets should be evidence based. They should accurately reflect
the mechanisms causing poverty and social exclusion and reflect the
overall policy objectives set for increasing social inclusion. They must
measure real policy outcomes and avoid the risk that, in meeting the
target, policy objectives are distorted, forgotten or ignored. To ensure
ongoing public and political support, targets should be set following a
robust, rigorous and transparent process. Thus they should also take into
account the views of stakeholders. Progress towards the EU and
(sub-)national targets needs to be closely monitored and reported on.
(See also Recommendations 4 and 7).
37
Recommendation 3: Enhancing mainstreaming

of social objectives through social impact assessments
at EU and country levels
In the light of the new Horizontal Social Clause and in view of the
recommendations of the 2010 Monti Report on the re-launching of the
internal market, the European Commission should systematically
strengthen the role of social evaluation within its Impact Assessment
system. This should be recognised as a key tool for systematically
ensuring that social objectives are mainstreamed in all relevant EU
policy areas. At the same time, the EPAP should be given the task of
systematically monitoring and reporting on the application of social
impact assessments across the Commission. In order to also promote
and strengthen social impact assessment at the national and sub-national
levels the SPC, in the context of the ongoing implementation of the
Social OMC, should give a high priority to deepening existing work on
this issue. It should promote increased understanding of this tool, encourage Member States to build its use into their policy processes from
an early stage, support the development and dissemination of knowledge about the tools, methods and data sources needed to make it effective and develop a systematic process of exchange and mutual learning.
At the same time, it should monitor and report regularly on the use of
social impact assessments by Member States in the context of the
development of the NRPs. (See also Recommendation 5.)
Recommendation 4: Reinforcing social reporting

and building on the Social OMC
The Commission has indicated its intention to continue the Social
OMC as part of the new Europe 2020 Strategy. This is important as
there is much that is positive to build on and it is essential that the full
range of commonly agreed social objectives and indicators are maintained and taken into account into the Europe 2020 Strategy. However,
in doing so it is important that a major element of the OMC, the requirement for Member States to develop national strategy reports on
social protection and social inclusion (NSRSPSIs), is not abandoned.
Strengthened national strategy reports (including National Action Plans
on social inclusion (NAPs/inclusion)) and annual Joint Reports on
Social Protection and Social Inclusion (JRSPSIs) are an essential basis
for properly preparing and implementing the contribution of the social
strand to the Europe 2020 Strategy. In particular, the continuation of
NSRSPSIs would provide the necessary social underpinning to Member
States NRPs. This should help to ensure that the national poverty/
social inclusion targets and the social dimension of NRPs have real
substance, that they are anchored in national policy-making processes
38
and encompass the whole range of social protection and social inclusion
policies. They would also provide the essential basis for continuing and
deepening the involvement of all stakeholders. In addition, they would
allow for the continuation and deepening of mutual learning and exchange of good practices across a broad range of policy fields relevant
to social protection and social inclusion. At the same time, it will be
important to maintain and build on the thematic approach (i.e. the
detailed focus on key issues such as active inclusion, child poverty and
well-being, housing exclusion and homelessness) to ensure that concrete
progress is made on these key issues. JRSPSIs could in effect become
the Annual Assessment of the social dimension of Europe 2020 and feed
into the Commissions Annual Growth Survey and EU policy guidance
and possible recommendations to Member States on their NRPs. (See
also Recommendations 7 and 8.)
Recommendation 5: Developing complementary tools

and instruments through the EPAP
While it is important that the Social OMC is continued and reinforced, the analysis in this book clearly demonstrates that it is not, on its
own, a sufficient tool to develop a stronger Social EU. The EPAP could
become a very important and complementary mechanism to add value to
the work of the Social OMC. In this context, we would suggest that it
should be given four priority tasks. First, it should provide a place
which regularly brings together representatives of all the stakeholders
(potentially) contributing to building a more Social EU and where they
can engage and debate the effectiveness of EU cooperation and coordination in the social field (in particular, the social dimension of Europe
2020) and suggest ways in which this can be enhanced. Secondly, as
already suggested, it should monitor and promote the use of social
impact assessments within the Commissions impact assessment process. It could also contribute to building knowledge in this field and
disseminating this to countries and to promoting the involvement of
stakeholders in the process. Thirdly, it should play a key role in ensuring and proposing greater linkages between the patchwork of different
components that currently makes up Social EU and in effect it should
become the visible face of the Social EU. Fourthly, it should support the
Social OMC and the SPC in monitoring the implementation of the social
dimension of Europe 2020 and in particular the extent to which the
social dimension is being taken into account not only in the social
Integrated Guidelines but also in the other Guidelines and in Europe
2020 more generally. This should also involve systematically monitoring the extent to which real synergies are taking place between the
different policy areas and the extent to which real feeding in and
feeding out is being achieved. As part of this, it could also monitor
39
and review how other EU policies (including the structural funds) are
contributing to achieving the Unions common social objectives. (See
also Recommendations 1 and 3.)
Recommendation 6: Mobilising EU resources to support Social

EU and linking the EUs social and territorial objectives
It will be important to ensure that sufficient resources, including in
terms of staff, are allocated to support the continuation and strengthening of the Social OMC and the implementation of the EPAP. As one of
the key weaknesses of the Social OMC during the Lisbon process was
the weak link between the commonly agreed EU social objectives and
the use of EU Structural Funds, a key challenge for the Europe 2020
Strategy will be to ensure close synergies between these. Fully in line
with the new EU objective of territorial cohesion (introduced by the
Lisbon Treaty) and with the aim of the recent Budget Review10 to
concentrate cohesion funding on all Europe 2020 objectives and to
strengthen cohesion policy accordingly, and building in particular on
the Barca Report, the ultimate goal, which ought to be put at the heart of
the next financial perspectives (for the post-2013 period), should be to
ensure that the EU social objectives are fully taken into account in EU
territorial policies and programmes. This would consist of ensuring
that links are developed between EU social objectives and cohesion
policy i.e., exploiting the potential of the new territorial cohesion
objective in the next programming regulations, ensuring that cohesion
policy is used as a preventive arm11 to promote structural and institutional reforms that enhance the achievements of the EU social objectives, and also incorporating the territorial approach as an important
element in EU coordination and cooperation in the social field. It is
important to highlight that an important dimension of this territorialisation will be the active participation of local and regional actors.
Recommendation 7: Enhancing social monitoring

and strengthening analytical capacity
We have already stressed the importance of putting in place effective
governance arrangements for monitoring progress on the social dimension of Europe 2020. However, if this is to be really effective it will be
important that policy goals, in-depth socio-economic analysis, targets
and indicators are brought much closer together. In this way, policy
development, targeting and monitoring can be given a stronger evidence
base.
10
11
European Commission, 2010c.

European Commission, 2010b.
40
It will also be important that monitoring is not confined just to the

specific EU social inclusion target and related national targets. Member
States and the Commission should monitor and report on EU and national performances against the full set of commonly agreed social
protection and social inclusion indicators. It will also be important to
ensure that possible gaps in the current portfolio of EU social indicators
be identified and addressed. Developing indicators and methods for
monitoring interactions between social, economic, employment, and
environmental policies will be particularly important. Enhanced timeliness of social indicators is also an important condition for effective
monitoring of the social dimension of the Europe 2020 Strategy. As
highlighted in Recommendation 9 below, EU indicators have also an
important role to play in boosting mutual learning. (See also Recommendations 2 and 4.)
Recommendation 8: Increasing democratic legitimacy

and reinforcing stakeholder involvement
To avoid the Europe 2020 Strategy becoming a technocratic and remote high level process and to safeguard the social dimension of the
Strategy it will be important to increase the visibility and accountability
of the process. This will mean among other things strengthening the role
of EU, national and possible sub-national parliaments in the process as
well as extending the possibilities for the active involvement of EU and
(sub-)national stakeholders (including social partners and civil society)
and of all levels of governance (local and regional as well as national).
One possibility in this regard would be to establish stakeholder fora
linked to the EPAP and the Social OMC at both EU and (sub-)national
levels and to actively use these fora as a means of ensuring stakeholder
participation in the preparation, implementation, and assessment of
NRPs and NSRSPSIs/NAPs. There is now a sufficient body of good
practice available to enable the SPC and the Commission to prepare and
agree guidelines for the involvement of stakeholders. These could then
be promoted with other EU Committees (e.g. EPC and EMCO) and with
Member States. Member States performance on mobilising and involving stakeholders in the development, implementation and monitoring of
the Europe 2020 Strategy in general and the NRPs in particular should
then be monitored and reported on the basis of these guidelines. (See
also Recommendation 4.)
Recommendation 9: Enhancing mutual learning

One of the strengths of the Social OMC to date has been to promote
the exchange of good practice and mutual learning between Member
States. However, this could be made more extensive and effective in the
future. In particular it will be important to improve coordination so as to
41
allow for more systematic and in depth exchanges built around specific
priorities and themes. The dissemination of policy analysis and learning
in ways that will make it more specific and relevant for domestic actors
needs to be enhanced. In particular, the outcomes of peer reviews,
policy studies and exchange projects need to be fed back into the policy-making process in a clearer way. A more extensive and systematic
involvement of civil society organisations, local and regional authorities
and independent experts in exchange and learning will also be necessary. Finally, the (potential) key role of the EU social indicators as
mutual learning tools tends to be largely underestimated. Here, we find
it useful to highlight two important applications where progress is
needed. First, EU indicators can be used in a more diagnostic manner to
undertake (properly contextualised) benchmarking and to help to
identify and understand the impact (both positive and negative) of
policies on differences in Member State performance.12 Secondly, they
can serve as a point of reference for countries. Countries should obviously not rely solely on these EU indicators in reporting on progress
towards national/ EU social objectives but the national indicators they
develop and use for this purpose should be linked back to the common
indicators as far as possible again, with a view to facilitating mutual
learning.
1.4.3 A final word

Suggestions and recommendations in relation to many of the areas
described above are developed in more detail in the following chapters
in this book. There are also many additional and helpful ideas put forward on specific aspects which are too detailed to cover in this introductory chapter. However, we hope that we have outlined a number of
practical steps that can be taken to ensure that EU coordination and
cooperation in the social field will take a significant step forward under
the Europe 2020 Strategy and that we will indeed move to a more Social
EU.
At the same time, we are also very aware that progress will not be
easy. The experience of the last decade has shown that building political
support and commitment for a strong social dimension will be an ongoing challenge and will continue to require the active involvement and
efforts of all stakeholders.
As argued at the beginning of this opening chapter, EU integration is
in many respects at a critical juncture. On the one hand, issues of legitimacy persist and there is a growing danger of an increasingly uni12
To date, the only EU example of such an exercise is the SPC report on child poverty
and well-being (2008).
42
dimensional focus on economic competitiveness and financial austerity

as a response to the economic and financial crisis. This could further
marginalise social questions. On the other hand, Europe 2020 and its
social dimension could be a window of opportunity. However, this is
not certain and it will be important to ensure that the new Europe 2020
governance arrangements, including the new social inclusion/ poverty
target and the EPAP, do not lead to narrowing the EUs social dimension and limiting the type of flexible initiatives that were developed
under the Social OMC. Political leadership will therefore be required to
open this window and to seize the opportunity to redefine Social EU, to
frame solidarity across national borders while maintaining strong national social protection systems and to avoid a race to the bottom in the
search for economic competitiveness.
Thus we would end with a warning. If progress is not made in building a stronger Social EU as part of developing a fairer and more equitable model of development then the success of the whole Europe 2020
Strategy will be put at risk and popular support for the EU project is
likely to be increasingly withdrawn.
References
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approach to meeting European Union challenges and expectations,
Independent Report prepared at the request of Danuta Hbner, Commissioner
for Regional Policy, Brussels: European Commission. Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/future/pdf/report_barca_v0306.pdf.
Barroso, J. M. (2010), Foreword to A.B. Atkinson and E. Marlier (editors),
Income and living conditions in Europe, Luxembourg: Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities.
EU Council of Ministers (2010), Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States
and of the Union, Document 11646/10 dated 7 July 2010, Brussels: EU
Council of Ministers.
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employment policies of the Member States, Document 14338/10 dated
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European Commission (2010), Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable
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European Commission (2010a), Governance, Tools and Policy Cycle of Europe
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European Commission (2010b), Enhancing economic policy coordination for
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com_2010_367_en.pdf.
European Commission (2010c), The EU Budget Review, Communication
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European Council (2010), European Council 17 June 2010: Conclusions,
Brussels: European Council.
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Monti, M. (2010), A New Strategy for the Single Market. Available at:
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the Europe 2020 Strategy, SPC/2010/10/7final. Available at: http://ec.europa.
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&furtherPubs=yes.
44
2. Mapping the Components of Social EU:

A Critical Analysis
of the Current Institutional Patchwork
Maurizio FERRERA1
2.1 Introduction
By the end of 2010 the welfare state will have celebrated its centennial in several European Union (EU) Member States. A genuine European invention, public protection schemes were introduced to respond
to the mounting social question linked to industrialisation. The disruption of traditional, localised systems of work-family-community
relations and the diffusion of national markets based on free movement and largely unfettered economic competition within the territorial
borders of each country profoundly altered the pre-industrial structure
of risks and need. The regulation of the new national labour markets, by
establishing common standards, rights and obligations (through labour
laws, unemployment and more generally social insurance, national
labour exchanges etc.), was one of the fundamental institutional and
political responses that European states gave to the big social question
which confronted them.
In his ground-breaking historical analysis of modern citizenship,
T.H. Marshall suggested that the evolution of the national welfare state
involved a two-fold process of fusion and of separation (Marshall,
1950). The fusion was geographical and entailed the dismantling of
local privileges and immunities, the harmonisation of rights and obligations throughout the national territory concerned, and the establishment
of a level playing field (the equal status of citizens) within state borders.
The separation was functional and entailed the creation of new sources
of nationwide authority and jurisdiction as well as new specialised
institutions for the implementation of that authority and that jurisdiction
at a decentralised level. The development of national markets, accom1
This chapter builds on previous work, partly carried out with Stefano Sacchi;
I am grateful for the fruitful collaboration. I also warmly thank the editors of the
book for their precious inputs and suggestions. Address for correspondence:
[email protected].
45
Mapping the Components of Social EU
panied by the creation of new social entitlements and public protection schemes, triggered off at least in liberal democracies a phase of
unprecedented economic growth and social progress, while strengthening at the same time the political loyalty of citizens and the overall
legitimacy of the state.
To a large extent, the present historical phase is witnessing the
emergence of a new (a second) social question in Europe, which is
reproducing under new guises the double challenge of fusion and separation already experienced between the 19th and the 20th centuries.
Historical parallels are always slippery and can be misleading when
taken too literally, yet they may serve a useful heuristic function. As
was the case one hundred years ago at the domestic level, the Europeanisation (fusion) of national markets through freedom of movement
and competition rules is (already has been) a tremendous trigger for
growth and job creation in the EUs economy, enhancing life chances
and welfare for European citizens. But it is also a source of social and
spatial disruptions. Again, economic fusion requires the introduction
of some common social standards, rights and obligations through a
socially-friendly institutional re-articulation of the novel Europeanised
space of interaction.
We can think of at least three reasons which make such a sociallyfriendly re-articulation desirable2. First, the re-articulation is needed in
order to secure a fairer, more equitable distribution of life chances for
EU citizens, both within and between Member States. This is the social
cohesion, or social justice rationale. Unless one believes in a naive
version of the trickle-down effect of growth, the pursuit of economic
prosperity through efficient and open markets should be accompanied
by an agenda for social progress, resting on key values (such as social
justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity
between generations and protection of the rights of the child now
enshrined in Article 3 of the Lisbon Treaty) which are widely shared
and deeply rooted in Europes political cultures. While there can be no
doubt that this agenda includes areas and policies which legally come
under national jurisdiction, it should be equally clear that the EU can
play an important role, both directly (by exercising its legal powers to
sustain and complement national social justice agendas) and indirectly
(by mainstreaming social cohesion/ justice considerations within its
entire array of policies). Second, a more Social EU is desirable in order
to improve the very functioning of the internal market, and thus generate more growth and jobs (this is the economic efficiency rationale).
A wealth of political economy research has in fact shown that social
2
For a more expanded discussion and references see Ferrera and Sacchi (2009).
46
Maurizio Ferrera
policies can play an important role not only as redistributive instruments, but also as productive factors (Fouarge, 2003). Thirdly, and
possibly most importantly, a more Social EU is needed in order to
secure continuing support for the integration process itself on the part of
increasingly worried national electorates (this is the social and political
legitimacy rationale). There is indeed growing evidence that the EU is
now perceived as a potentially dangerous entity by a majority of its
citizens, as a threat to national labour markets and social protection
systems, as a Trojan horse serving the malevolent interests of globalisation. As noted above, post-war social protection systems have built
extraordinary bonds between citizens and their national institutions,
bringing about a very robust form of allegiance, based on the institutionalised exchange of material benefits for electoral support. The EU,
conversely, has been rather weak in terms of identity and allegiance
building. If voters anxieties vis--vis markets and competition are not
alleviated, if voters are not convinced that the EU cares (through
direct and indirect action, or non-action), the integration process as such
may be seriously de-legitimised and jeopardised by xenophobic sentiment and neo-protectionist demands voiced by those social groups that
are most directly affected by economic opening and the economic
crisis has undoubtedly intensified this challenge.
The institutional re-articulation which is required in order to build a
stronger Social EU (better: a fully fledged EU social model) is much
more complex and difficult than the organisational separations that took
place within the nation states about a hundred years ago. In late
19th century Europe, social rights emerged on a tabula rasa (or at least
almost rasa): there was not much to fuse and there were wide margins
for creating ex novo in terms of social policies. In todays EU, the
institutional material to be integrated is very thick and very solid in the
welfare realm, and decision making rules at the EU level are inherently
biased against efforts of positive integration. But there is an even more
fundamental obstacle: the institutional clash between the logic of closure, which underpins nation-based social programs, and the logic of
opening which drives the integration process. By its very nature, the
welfare state presupposes the existence of a clearly demarcated and
cohesive community, whose members feel that they belong to the same
whole and that they are linked by reciprocity ties vis--vis common
risks and similar needs. Since the 19th century (or even earlier in some
cases) the nation-state has provided the closure conditions for the
development of an ethos of social solidarity and redistributive arrangements within its geographical territory. By contrast, EU integration is
clearly guided by a logic of opening, aimed at fostering free movement (in the widest sense) and non discrimination by weakening or
tearing apart those spatial demarcations and closure practices that
47
nation-states have historically built around themselves, especially in the

social sphere.
Finding a well-designed and viable institutional response to EUs
second social question means, essentially, addressing the clash between the logic of closure and the logic of opening. Can the Union
reconcile these two logics and transform the encounter between nationbased welfare and EU-based economic unification into a happy marriage, i.e. into an institutional engine for further expanding and
strengthening the life chances of its citizens? This chapter argues in
favour of a positive answer and discusses possible pathways towards the
happy marriage scenario. Section 2.2 presents the main argument by
illustrating the programmatic contrast and growing tensions between the
welfare state, on the one hand, and the EU, on the other. Section 2.3
outlines a possible strategy of institutional reconciliation. It argues that
the key for a successful reconciliation lies in a more explicit and effective nesting of the national welfare state within the overall spatial
architecture of the EU. The next two sections try to identify and discuss
some possible building blocks (and even some ongoing developments)
which may promote the formation and consolidation of the new architecture and thus activate a virtuous nesting scenario, in which the economic and the social spaces of Europe will be able not only to co-exist
without colliding, but also to re-enforce each other. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Challenge: Closure vs. Opening

As has been shown by a large scholarship in sociology and political
science3, welfare state formation can be seen as the last phase or step in
the long term historical development of the European system of nation
states: the step through which territorially bounded political communities came to introduce redistributive arrangements for their citizens, thus
transforming themselves into self-contained and inward-looking spaces
of solidarity and inaugurating novel and original models of statemediated social sharing.
While this transformation was being completed within each domestic
arena, during the so-called Trente Glorieuses, a new institutional development took off in the inter-state or supranational arena: the process of
EU integration. Even though originally meant to rescue the nationstate (Milward, 2000) by boosting economic growth, the Rome Treaty
3
I have reconstructed and discussed this strand of scholarship in Ferrera, 2005. One of
the most prominent Founding Father of this tradition is of course Stein Rokkan
(Flora, 1999).
48
Maurizio Ferrera
pulled a strong brake on the long-term dynamic of nation- and statebuilding in Europe.
The original EU Treaties envisaged a division of labour between supranational and national levels: the European Community was to be
instrumental in opening up markets and helping to achieve otherwise
unattainable economies of scale, so as to fully exploit Europes (initially, the Sixs) economic potential. Member States could use part of
the extra surplus in the institutionalised exchange of social benefits
flowing from their national welfare institutions for anchoring support on the part of their domestic political communities. Keynes at
home, Smith abroad, as Robert Gilpin aptly dubbed this kind of embedded liberalism arrangement (Gilpin, 1987, page 355). This justified
the weakness of the social provisions in the Rome Treaty: from equality
of treatment for men and women to the coordination of social security
regimes, all the social provisions and articles contained therein were
instrumental in the dismantling of non-tariff barriers to trade and the
creation of a higher economic order featuring unconstrained economic
trade flows. However, this supranational liberal order rested upon, or
rather was embedded into national welfare states that were to be equally
unconstrained in terms of social regulation capabilities, and in particular
would not be constrained by the supranational authorities. This division
of labour implied separating jurisdiction between the supranational and
national levels, thus establishing mutual non-interference between
market-making and market-correcting functions. EU competition law
and the four freedoms (free movement of workers, capitals, goods and
services) were not supposed to impinge upon Member States sovereignty in the social sphere (Giubboni, 2006).
This did not last. Firstly, since the 1970s, international political
economy conditions have changed, and the embedded liberalism compromise has floundered. Moreover, and more importantly still as regards
EU integration, the Community legal order has been constitutionalised
(Weiler, 1999). The supremacy of Community law over domestic
legislation has, along with direct effect, torn the initial division of
labour to pieces: if Community law trumps national law, then provisions
geared to foster free movement and unconstrained competition (i.e., the
Treaty provisions) trump social regulation, as enshrined in national
constitutions and laws, and EU Court of Justice (CJEU) judges, contrary
to national constitutional judges, will be constrained in balancing
economic and social interests whenever these clash (Scharpf, 2009). To
be sure, the CJEU has not always operated as a market police force,
and has on several occasions granted some degree of immunity
against EU market law to national welfare institutions and practices.
However, in the absence of a Treaty hook, it has done so on the
49
grounds of judicial doctrines that lack a stable legal anchoring and may
well be overridden in other rulings or legislative acts.
The de-bounding and opening logic of EU integration has raised increasingly severe problems for the welfare state, as it has put in question
two central tenets of this institution: the territoriality principle and the
principle of compulsory affiliation to state-controlled insurance
schemes. More specifically, through the four freedoms, competition
rules and the rules of coordination of national social security systems,
the EU law has launched two basic challenges to nation-based welfare:
A challenge to its territorial closure, through the explicit prohibition of (most) cross-border restrictions regarding access to
and consumption of social benefits and to some extent also the
provision of services. The nationality filter has been neutralised
for admission into domestic sharing spaces and some core social rights (such as pensions) have become portable across the
territory of the whole EU.
A challenge to the very right to bound, i.e. the right of each
national welfare state to autonomously determine who can/must
share what with whom and then enforce compliance through
specific organisational structures backed by coercive power
(e.g. setting up a compulsory public insurance scheme for a
given occupational category).
These challenges have manifested themselves gradually and incrementally over time, affecting in different ways and with different intensity the various risk-specific schemes and the various tiers and pillars of
provision in different countries (Martinsen, 2005 and 2005a). So far the
two challenges have not caused major organisational upheavals. But
during the last two decades the institutional status quo has been explicitly and directly attacked on several occasions in some of its founding
properties: for example the link between legal residence and the right to
enjoy means-tested social assistance benefits or the public monopoly
over compulsory insurance (see Box 2.1).
50
Maurizio Ferrera
Box 2.1: Examples of effects of EU law on national social spaces

Nationality/citizenship no longer a legitimate instrument of closure in
the access to social benefits Equal treatment for all legal residents
Increasing top-down harmonisation of criteria for obtaining legal
residence
Compulsory membership to public social insurance schemes (monopoles
sociaux) legitimate only if certain conditions apply
Patients legally residing in a EU Member State can seek medical care
abroad at the expenses of national schemes
Liberalisation of second pillar pension schemes
Right to industrial action/strike and application of collective agreements
challenged if clashing with freedom of movement (Laval, Viking,
Rueffert cases)
Closure rules in higher education challenged if clashing with freedom of
movement
During the last couple of decades, Member States have been investing a lot of energy in cushioning their social protection systems against
challenges stemming from EU law, e.g. by not complying with rulings,
agreeing among themselves to change EU law, or even failing to introduce new social programmes that could subsequently become the object
of EU Court of Justice (CJEU) action. This may well be one of the
reasons why such issues have not yet come to the fore of public debate
at EU level and remain confined to restricted insider circles: their
potentially disruptive outcomes have so far been (relatively) buffered by
Member States reactions. But how long can this last? What risks are
involved in terms of social and political consensus?
The new situation of social semi-sovereignty (a term originally
coined by Leibfried and Pierson, 1995) has already prompted in recent
years a growing politicisation of the opening issue and, in some
countries more than others, of the integration process as a whole. The
most evident manifestation of this politicisation occurred in spring
2005, during the campaigns for the French and Dutch referendums,
which rejected the EU Constitutional Treaty (and the Irish referendum
on the Lisbon Treaty held in June 2008 confirmed that popular fears
about opening have certainly not abated). Not surprisingly, questions
regarding the social sharing dimension (who shares what, and how
much? Is it appropriate for the EU to interfere in such decisions? More
crucially still, is the EU undermining national welfare arrangements and
labour markets?) have been playing a central role in this process of
51
politicisation, while national governments find themselves increasingly

sandwiched between the growing constraints imposed by the EU on the
one hand and the national basis of their political legitimacy on the other
a legitimacy which remains highly dependent on decisions in the
social protection domain.
As witnessed, again, by the referendum debates, the vast majority of
ordinary citizens and a good number of policy-makers think that the
growing friction between the welfare state and the EU has or could have
an easy solution: the two institutions should be put back on separate
tracks, as they were in the first couple of decades after the Rome
Treaty. Anyone that has some familiarity with institutional theory
knows, however, better: macro-historical trends cannot be reversed
(Pierson, 2004). The welfare state and the EU which can undoubtedly
be regarded as the two most important achievements of the 20th century
in Europe have now encountered each other and are bound to remain
on the same track of development: there is no going back to separate
tracks. If, as is here argued, the logic of integration does have a high
destabilising potential with respect to national social protection, then
can we think of ways to mitigate this potential and imagine a strategy of
compromise and institutional reconciliation?
2.3 A New Nested Architecture

Our answer to such question is: Yes, we can. As mentioned in the
Introduction, the key for a successful reconciliation lies in a more
explicit and effective nesting4 of the national welfare state within the
overall spatial architecture of the EU. Figure 2.1 shows how the nesting
between the welfare state and the EU could be achieved. Let us illustrate and discuss the underlying rationale and the various elements of
this Figure in some detail5
As can be seen, the national welfare state is placed at the very centre
of Figure 2.1. For responding to the big social risks of the life-cycle, the
broad-based national insurance schemes remain today the most efficient
and equitable institutions at our disposal. These schemes must be updated and modernised, of course, in order to respond to a host of endogenous transformations (see below). But they must also be safeguarded as precious instruments to promote distributive equity (the
4
5
I have discussed the concept of nesting and its use in the social sciences in Ferrera
(2009).
An earlier version of this Figure is included in Ferrera (2005). I re-propose here a
slightly modified version: not only do I still consider it a useful heuristic tool, but my
impression is that a number of developments since 2005 have made that nesting scenario more feasible, i.e. have brought it within an easier reach.
52
Maurizio Ferrera
social justice rationale), cohesion and social consensus (the legitimacy rationale) and even a smooth and correct functioning of market
transactions (the economic efficiency rationale).
Figure 2.1: The nesting of nation-based welfare within the EU
EU common values and elements
of shared identity (symbolic boundaries)
EU economic
space
(EMU)
Cross-border
private insurance
schemes
A1
Trans-national
sharing schemes
A2
Nation-based
welfare state
EU social
space
Supra-national
sharing schemes
A4
Sub-national &
cross-regional
sharing schemes
A3
B
D
In the wake of half a century of supranational integration, the welfare state is already inserted as shown in the previous section within
the economic spaces of the EU: space B consists of the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU), resting on free movement provisions, competition law, the fiscal rules of the Growth and Stability Pact and, in the
Euro-zone, a common currency and monetary policy. Space B has been
the very epicentre of the opening waves of the integration process. We
know that such waves were well-meant, so to speak, and that they have
brought unquestionable advantages from an economic point of view.
The EMU project was elaborated during the 1980s and 1990s in order to
respond to the threats of stagnation and Euro-sclerosis, with a view to
revamping growth, competitiveness and employment: the EU Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) is now significantly larger than it would have
been without enhanced market integration. Liberalisations have made
many goods and services more affordable to consumers (let us think of
low-cost air fares), increasing the range of options available to them
(including cross-border private insurance schemes, as shown by the
Figure). In certain areas (e.g. health and safety), market integration has
also brought about more consumer protection and higher labour stanThis document is licensed to Eniko Vincze (3-5256156|00)
53
dards. In addition, the tighter coupling between economic integration

and national welfare states has prompted several countries to undertake
much needed functional and distributive recalibrations of their social
protection systems (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003; Ferrera and Gualmini,
2004).
However, as explained in the previous section, space B has also increasingly become a source of instability for national welfare state
programmes: its principles and policies are eroding the foundations of
the nest, i.e. those closure preconditions which are necessary from an
institutional and political point of view for sustaining social solidarity
over time. As convincingly argued by Fritz Scharpf, this process of
erosion is largely driven by decision-making rules that systematically
favour negative over positive integration, but is also intensified by a sort
of general pro-integration bias on the side of supranational authorities
(and in particular the CJEU) that treats any progress in mobility, non
discrimination and the removal of national obstacles to integration as an
unmitigated good and an end in itself (Scharpf, 2009, page 15). In
other words, the destabilising pressures of space B are linked to institutional and ideational dynamics that often push the logic of opening well
beyond the functional and normative requirements (and overall rationale) of economic integration per se.
A strategy of reconciliation thus calls for the formation within the
EU architecture of a second circle, which Figure 2.1 calls the EU social
space and whose main function should be to safeguard or re-construct
those institutional preconditions (the boundary configuration) that
underpin domestic sharing arrangements. To be sure, especially after the
Amsterdam and Nice Treaties (not to speak of the Lisbon Treaty: see
below), various important steps have already been taken in this direction: in space C we now have a Charter of Fundamental Rights, hard
laws on some common labour and social security standards and soft
laws on employment, social inclusion, pensions as well as healthcare
and long-term care. In recent years, the Spring European Councils have
also agreed on a number of grand Pacts6 that have reaffirmed the EUs
recognition of fundamental social objectives, its commitment to the
caring dimension of the Union. These are all steps in the right direction, but, as will be argued below, some key and strategic elements are
poorly defined or altogether missing. Before discussing what is to be
improved, let us however complete the description of the nested architecture of Figure 2.1.
Pact on Youth policies and youth mainstreaming (2005); Pact on Equal opportunities and work-life balance (2006); and Alliance on Family policy (2007).
54
Maurizio Ferrera
As mentioned earlier, an institutional reconciliation between the welfare state and the EU implies not only mutual acknowledgement, as it
were, but also some mutual concessions. A strengthened Space C can be
seen as the concession that the EU makes to the welfare state, recognising the fundamental role played by nation-based sharing programmes in
enriching and stabilising citizens life chances. But the national welfare
state must make concessions too. First, it must learn how to live with
(and hopefully take advantage of) some of the opening spurs coming
from space B a learning process that seems to be already under way,
as we have seen. But the welfare state must also be ready to delegate or
transfer some of its traditional social sharing functions to novel postnational forms of risk-pooling and redistribution.
More specifically, Figure 2.1 indicates three new possible types of
sharing spaces:
1. trans-national sharing spaces, centred on specific risks and
occupational sectors and resting on novel functional alignments;
2. sub- and cross-regional sharing spaces, possibly addressing a
plurality of risks or social needs and resting on new territorial
alignments; and
3. supranational sharing spaces, i.e. novel redistributive schemes
directly anchored to EU institutions and based on EU citizenship
(or denizenship) alone, i.e. without the filter of national
institutions and politics.
In the virtuous nesting scenario envisaged by the Figure, the spatial architecture of the EU must become more protective of the institutional core of the national welfare state, but at the same time it must
make room and encourage innovation and experimentation on each of
these three post-national fronts. What kind of institutional reforms,
specifically, could be introduced in order to make progress in both
directions?
2.4 A More Social EU: Reconfiguring the Patchwork

Let us first address the issue of how to introduce stronger protections
for the core social schemes operating at the national level, enabling
them to withstand the destabilising challenges originating from space B.
As is well known, such challenges rest on the strongest base that the EU
constitutional framework can offer: primary law, i.e. explicit and binding Treaty clauses on free movement and competition. In order to be
effective, the institutional buffers which must be provided by space C
should rest on an equally strong legal basis. Identifying these buffers is
far from easy and requires a delicate balancing act. The general goal is
however sufficiently clear: the EU constitutional framework (in the
55
wide sense) ought to explicitly define the content and the boundaries of
social protection as a distinct and relatively autonomous space, and
specify the limits of free movement and competition rules in respect of
this space.
Ever since the landmark rulings of the CJEU in the 1990s (especially
the Poucet-Pistre and Albany rulings, which had to adjudicate on some
foundational questions regarding the balance between opening and
closure)7, we know that this goal has been on the EU agenda: not only
the social agenda, but also the wider agenda of broad institutional
reform, and some progress has indeed been made. A detailed reconstruction of the winding road of such progress from the Single European Act
to the Lisbon Treaty would fall far beyond the scope of this chapter: let
us therefore focus on the latter only.
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) does
contain a series of provisions that could significantly strengthen space C
and offer a promising basis for a (more) virtuous nesting between social
welfare and economic integration. A highly competitive social market
economy, full employment and social progress have been explicitly
included amongst the Unions objectives. The coordination of Member
States economic policies and employment policies is now within the
sphere of competence of the Union, which allows for the possible
coordination of Member States social policies as well. Fundamental
rights have also been explicitly recognised by the Lisbon Treaty through
the incorporation of a legally binding reference to the Nice Charter of
Fundamental Rights. The latter contains a section on solidarity, which
lists a number of rights and principles directly relevant to the social
field, such as the right to information and consultation within undertakings, the right to negotiate collective agreements and to take collective
action, the right of access to free placement services and protection
against unjustified dismissals, and the right to have access to social
security and social assistance. With the new Treaty, the EU has also
acceded to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which shall constitute general
principles of the Unions law (Article 6).
7
In the Poucet-Pistre joined cases (C-159-91 and C-160-91) the Court had to establish
whether the state monopoly over social insurance in France was legitimate according
to EU law. In its ruling the Court found that the freedom of service and competition
norms could not be invoked to justify exit from mandatory public insurance schemes.
In the Albany case (C-67-96) the Court had to establish whether a textile company in
the Netherlands was obliged to pay the contributions requested by its industrial pension fund, as envisaged by collective agreements. The Court ruled in favour of the
pension fund. These cases and the political contexts under which they occurred are
reconstructed in detail in Ferrera (2005).
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Maurizio Ferrera
Possibly the most important innovation of the Lisbon Treaty is however the so-called Horizontal Social Clause (Article 9), which states
that: In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union
shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high
level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the
fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training
and protection of human health. It must be added that two other horizontal clauses (Articles 8 and 10) extend the scope of what might be
called social mainstreaming to the reduction of inequality and the
fight against discrimination8. The horizontal clauses and the recognition
of fundamental rights mark the appearance within the EU constitutional
arena of two potentially strong anchors that can induce and support all
EU institutions (including the Court of Justice of the EU) in the task of
finding an adequate (and more stable) balance between economic and
social objectives.
There are at least two additional provisions of the Treaty which deserve to be highlighted for their re-bounding potential. The first is
Protocol 26 on services of general interest, included as an Annex to the
TFEU (especially in the wake of Dutch, French and Belgian pressure).
Article 2 of this Protocol explicitly says that the provisions of the
Treaties do not affect in any way the competence of Member States to
provide, commission and organise non economic services of general
interest. As can be immediately appreciated, this is an important statement, that seems to grant to these services a sort of constitutional
immunity from the opening logic of the integration process and in
particular from the competition regime that pervades space B. The
article is very short and its wording is not very precise. But, as specified
by various European Commission documents (see in particular European Commission, 2008), non economic services of general interest
definitely include social services, which in turn comprise the institutional core (and also some of the periphery) of national welfare programmes, namely: 1) health care; 2) statutory and complementary social
security schemes covering the main risks of life; and 3) personal social
Interestingly, the Horizontal Social Clause did not exist in the Treaty establishing the
European Community (TEEC), which only dealt with equality between men and
women and non discrimination. Article 9 thus represents a genuine social improvement achieved during the Intergovernmental Conference, especially in the wake of
effective mobilisation of the former members of the Social Europe Working Group
of the European Convention (Vandenbroucke, personal communication). It also owes
much to the direct efforts of civil society and in particular to EAPNs intervention
with the Irish Presidency to highlight the importance of such a clause.
57
services (such as social assistance, employment and training services,

social housing, childcare and long term care services)9.
The second provision of the Lisbon Treaty that deserves to be highlighted is Article 48 (TFEU). This article (which in euro-treaty parlance is known as the social security emergency brake, a term apparently coined by UK negotiators) recognises to each Member State the
right to suspend the adoption of a legislative proposal related to the
social entitlements of migrant persons if its implications are considered
to negatively affect important aspects of its social security system,
including cost, scope, financial balance or structure. If a Member State
requests the suspension, the matter is referred to the European Council
where the proposal can be blocked10. Under the pre-Lisbon status quo,
Member States did have the possibility of ultimately blocking a proposal in this delicate sphere: the co-decision procedure that regulates
legislation on the social security rights of migrants envisaged unanimity
for Council decisions. But a blockage that can be exerted (or threatened)
at the very beginning of a legislative process as in the new Article 48
procedure is likely to be much more effective than a blockage that is
attempted at its very end, possibly after a lengthy and controversial
conciliation process between Parliament and Council. Article 48 is, in
other words, a second important innovation of the Lisbon Treaty that
puts back into the hands of the nation state some gating powers in
respect of its own sharing spaces and thus strengthens its capacity to
respond to the destabilising potential linked in this case to free
movement provisions.
9
10
Steps to formalise such definitions are already under way on the side of the Commission.
The European Council has four months for either referring back the draft legislative
proposal to the Council (in which case the ordinary legislative procedure will continue) or requesting the Commission to submit a new proposal (in which case the act
originally proposed will be considered as non adopted). There is also a simpler solution for the European Council: taking no action, which means that the proposed act
falls without the need for further initiatives. This simpler option was not envisaged
by the Constitutional Treaty and has been inserted during the Lisbon negotiations. A
declaration agreed by all Member States specifies that the European Council shall
decide by consensus in the procedure envisaged by Article 48.
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Maurizio Ferrera
Box 2.2: Impact assessment in the EU

and the Horizontal Social Clause
2002: The European Commission establishes a new system of integrated
Impact Assessment (IA) to consider the effects of policy proposals in their
economic, social and environmental dimension
2005: Better Regulation Action Plan, European Strategy for Sustainable
Employment and Lisbon Strategy adopt IA
2009: External evaluation of IA revision of the guidelines and extension of IA to all legislative initiatives
2009: Lisbon Treaty enters into force: Horizontal Social Clause
2010: European Court of Auditors presents own evaluation of IA and
recommends enhancement and more publicity
2010: The Belgian Presidency (2nd semester 2010) launches a debate on

strengthening the social dimension within the IA in the wake of the new
Horizontal Social Clause ( generating evidence-based knowledge for its
systematic implementation)11
The new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty will obviously require time,
intellectual and political mobilisation, litigation and jurisprudence in
order to become effective as re-balancing tools. But if we compare the
current climate with that which prevailed at the time of the Single
European Act (SEA) there are some reasons for moderate optimism
about the virtuous nesting scenario outlined in Figure 2.1. Could more
have been achieved with the new Treaty? Certainly, yes: various interesting proposals did in fact emerge during the work of the Convention
and the Treaty negotiations (from the constitutionalisation of the Open
Method of Coordination (OMC) to the introduction of qualified
majority voting for the social issues on which the EU has legislative
powers). Without entering into the merit of such proposals, it can be
generally said that the goal of reaching a full (or at least quasi-full)
symmetry between Economic and Social Europe still remains to be
attained12. For the time being, the best strategy is that of a full
11
12
Under the spur of the Belgian Presidency, the EPSCO Council has already started a
reflection on strengthening social mainstreaming in the follow up of the Horizontal
Social Clause (see http://www.eutrio.be/pressrelease/informal-meeting-epscocouncil-social-security-and-social-inclusion).
On the persistent conditions of asymmetry and bold proposals (through political
action by the European Council) for breaking the negative integration bias of the EU
and in particular the CJEU, see Scharpf, 2009. The European Trade Unions have proposed further amending the Lisbon Treaty with a Social Progress Protocol clearly
stating that Nothing in the Treaties and in particular neither economic freedoms nor
competition rules shall have priority over fundamental rights (). In case of conflict
59
exploitation of the existing building blocks for a better balancing. There

are three more obvious critical priorities for moving in this direction.
The first and possibly top priority has to do with the new Horizontal
Social Clause of the Lisbon Treaty, which needs to be clarified in its
meaning and scope and made operative as soon as possible, especially
by linking it with the already existing procedural framework for the
impact assessment of EU policies (see Box 2.2). The clause can serve as
a leverage for systematically and transversally identifying and, if
possible, quantifying, the social impact of all EU policies, thus
encouraging (or even making possible) a better balancing (see
discussion in chapter by Khnemund).
Box 2.3: Workers rights in the internal market:
Key recommendations of the Monti Report
Clarify the implementation of the Posting of Workers Directive and

strengthen dissemination of information on the rights and obligations of
workers and companies, administrative cooperation and sanctions in the
framework of free movement of persons and cross-border provision of
services
If measures are adopted to clarify the interpretation and application of

the Posting of Workers Directive, introduce a provision to guarantee the
right to strike modelled on Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No.
2679/98 and a mechanism for the informal solutions of labour disputes
concerning the application of the directive.
The second priority is that of working on the Social Protocol and

transforming its general principles into more detailed and operational
regulations. The third priority is finally the introduction/ strengthening
of what might be called the social complements of the internal market
(Ferrera and Sacchi, 2009), i.e. positive measures that are capable of
offsetting the specific negative social implications of free movement
and cross-border competition as they clearly manifest themselves (as,
for example, in the case of the Laval, Viking and Rueffert rulings of the
CJEU, which seem to have challenged three fundamental rights of the
modern EU institutional order, i.e. freedom of association, freedom to
strike and freedom to establish and enforce collective agreements: see
Bueckert and Warner, 2010). Interesting proposals on this front have
been recently advanced by Mario Montis Report on the re-launching of
fundamental social rights shall take precedence. See Bueckert and Warner, 2010,
pages 143-145.
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Maurizio Ferrera
the internal market, especially as regards the posted workers regime and
the right to strike (Monti, 2010: see Box 2.3). It is to be noted that the
Monti Report also calls for a strengthening of social evaluation within
the European Commissions impact assessment exercises.
But what about the other element of this scenario, i.e. the formation
of post-national sharing spaces? On at least two of these fronts some
signs of innovation and experimentation are already clearly visible.
As far as trans-national sharing spaces are concerned (space A1 in
Figure 2.1), the most significant development is the formation of the socalled cross-border institutions for occupational retirement provision
(IORPs). An EU directive adopted in 2003 has laid down the legal
framework for the establishment of occupational pension funds covering
workers of different Member States13. Closely linked, as they are, to
contributions, second pillar pension schemes incorporate limited
amounts of redistribution and solidarity; they still are, nevertheless,
recognisable sharing spaces, with the potential for activating a modicum
of bonding among their affiliates. The Commissions doctrine already
counts second pillar pension schemes among social services of general
interest (European Commission, 2008). A number of cross-border
schemes were already operating prior to the 2003 directive, mostly
based in the UK. The directive has however given a significant spur to
new establishments of this kind. In the years since the implementation
of the directive (which entered into force in 2005), the number of crossborder pension schemes has increased from 9 to 61 (Guardiancich,
2009).
These are very new developments on which reliable data are lacking
and empirical research is urgently needed. It would thus be imprudent
and unwarranted to make bold evaluative statements. For the time being
and for the purposes of this chapter, it is sufficient to conclude that the
institutional landscape is in flux, that a new phase of trans-national
experiments in the field of social protection has clearly dawned and that
the EU seems to be providing at least some of the correct incentives and
supports.
The same holds true for the other front, that of cross-regional experiments providing jointly some types of services (space A2 in the
Figure). Here, especially in the wake of the INTERREG initiatives of
the European Commission, a growing number of interesting experiences
have been taking place during the last fifteen years, in the context of a
wider process of sub-nationalisation of welfare provision within the
13
Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 3 June 2003
on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision.
61
domestic arenas and the activation of what has been called competitive
region building (Keating, 1998; McEwen and Moreno, 2005). Virtually
all these experiences include a social policy component, typically in the
field of health, employment or care services and all of them have set up
permanent institutional structures for the managing and monitoring of
cooperation (Pancaldi, 2010). Full use should be made of the potential
of the European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), a promising instrument aimed at facilitating economic and social cohesion
through cross-border, trans-national or inter-regional initiatives (Regulation 1086/2006). A host of public and non public actors are allowed to
join forces and establish the EGTC through direct agreements, within a
general legal framework set up by the EU a framework which recognises the legal personality of the grouping. Though not exclusively
centred on social sharing objectives, this instrument is likely to encourage the coming together of sub-national territories belonging to different
Member States and thus open up channels and opportunities for spatial
reconfigurations above and beyond the established boundaries of nation
states including their social boundaries (Spinaci and Vara-Arribas,
2009). The Barca Report on the reform of cohesion policies contains
several insights and proposals for place-based measures and incentives that may facilitate this process, with a view to socialising the
territorial agenda of the EU as well as territorialising the social
agenda (Barca, 2009). The place based approach may play an important
role also for promoting and underpinning sub-national policies and
social agendas. The Europe 2020 Strategy should be improved in this
respect, as suggested by the Committee of the Regions (2010) and by
Marjorie Jouen in her contribution to the present volume.
Finally, what about innovation and experimentation on the third
front of post-national solidarities (space A4 in the Figure), i.e. supranational sharing schemes directly anchored to the EU? The last two
decades have indeed witnessed an increasingly richer and imaginative
debate on possible institutional pioneers, such as a pan-European
minimum income scheme for the needy (dubbed as Euro-stipendium by
Schmitter and Bauer, 2001), a child or birth grant payable to all (or
needy) newly born Europeans14, an EU minimum income for children
(Atkinson and Marlier, 2010), or the establishment of a supranational
social insurance scheme for migrant workers (a proposal originally put
14
The proposal to establish an EU Capital Grant for Youth was presented by Julian Le
Grand at a seminar of the Group of Social Policy Advisors to the European Commission, held in Brussels on 8 September 2006. See Barrington-Leach, Canoy, Hubert
and Lerais (2007).
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Maurizio Ferrera
forward in the 1970s under the name of 13th state scheme and recently
resurrected by the French debate) (Lamassoure, 2008)15.
As is known, a number of redistributive funds are already operative
at the supranational level for broad social cohesion purposes. None of
these funds and programmes qualifies, however, as a genuine pioneer
for supranational social sharing. The fault line that needs to be crossed
is that which separates forms of territorial or inter-level redistribution
from inter-personal redistribution. Even the last addition to the long list
of EU social policy funds, the Globalisation Adjustment Fund, has not
made this quantum leap, as the Fund does not grant benefits to individual workers, but limits itself to transferring funds to the local-level
collective actors that have applied for assistance (Novaczek, 2007).
Crossing this critical fault line will not be easy from a political and
institutional point of view, as witnessed by the experience of all historical federations in the 20th century (Obinger, Leibfried and Castles,
2005).
A more realistic medium-term target for the consolidation of the
EUs social space could be the strengthening of binding regulatory
standards and possibly the establishment of some social snakes (to use
the jargon of the 1970s and 1980s: see Pennings, 2001) forcing the
Member States to loosely align themselves to a European norm
regarding certain areas of social protection. The setting of precise and
measurable targets within the Social OMCs (a goal that has already
been on the agenda for some time: see European Commission, 2008a)
could be the first concrete step in this direction, in the wider framework
of the newly launched Europe 2020 Strategy.
2.5 Europe 2020 and Its Institutional Potential

Europe 2020 must certainly be appreciated as a promising governance tool for the strategy of institutional reconciliation discussed in the
previous section. A number of critics at both national and supranational
15
The Monti Report discusses this proposal in respect of occupational pensions and
health insurance schemes: The Commission should prioritise the issue of obstacles
to transnational labour mobility in its forthcoming consultation on the pensions systems in Europe. In this context, an option to explore would be to develop a 28th regime for supplementary pension rights. This would be a regime entirely set by EU
rules but existing in parallel to national rules, and thus optional for companies and
workers. A worker opting for this regime would be subject to the same rules for its
non statutory benefits wherever it goes in Europe. To make things easier, a suboption would be to limit the possibility to opt in this regime only to workers taking
up their first work contract. This would serve as an incentive for the mobility of certain young workers, who are the keenest on international mobility. (Monti, 2010,
page 57).
63
level have already started to dismiss it as cheap talk, taking it for

granted that it is doomed to the same destiny of (alleged) failure of its
soft and wet predecessor, the Lisbon Strategy16. As noted by other
contributors to this volume, such sweeping negative judgements are
definitely unwarranted: programmatic pessimism is itself cheap. To
begin with, significant empirical evidence signals that the Lisbon Strategy has not been a failure, even acknowledging its many shortcomings
and limitations, especially in respect of its over-ambitious original goals
(see chapter by Natali). The impact of Lisbon is clearly detectable also
as regards employment and social objectives (Heidenreich and Zeitlin,
2009). More importantly, Europe 2020 does contain some significant
improvements compared to Lisbon on the specific front which interests
us, namely the relationship between Economic and Social EU.
First, there is improvement at the ideational level (which is anything
but cheap in political matters). As it clearly emerges from all the
soft and hard acts that have launched the new strategy, its overall
blueprint for a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth offers a wealth
of normative and functional justifications for both the protection (nesting, in our language) and the ameliorative recalibration of the nationbased welfare state. In line with a vast literature, we have noted above
that welfare programmes are in urgent need of modernisation and
updating in the wake of the changed structure of risks and needs (in
particular demographic ageing). Three out of the seven so-called flagship initiatives (Youth on the move, an Agenda for skill and jobs,
and in particular the European platform against poverty) of Europe
2020 are geared towards this task and, if correctly developed and articulated, can provide precious ideational resources for national puzzling
around welfare reform. A significant step forward in respect of Lisbon
is that the Europe 2020 Integrated Guidelines for the annual cycles of
the strategy will integrate the economic policy and the employment
policy dimensions and via the latter the social policy dimension as
well (see opening chapter). Guideline 10 is entirely devoted to promoting social inclusion and combating poverty, with the headline target
that will consist of promoting social inclusion, in particular through the
reduction of poverty by aiming to lift at least 20 million people out of
the risk of poverty and exclusion (based on three indicators: poverty
risk, severe material deprivation and very low work attachment)17.
Needless to say, the ideational component of Europe 2020 will be able
to make a difference only if accompanied by a deliberate strategy of
16
17
A good source for the Europe 2020 debate is Euroarchiv (www.euroarchiv.com).

The significance of this guideline is discussed in this volume by Daly and by Frazer
and Marlier; on the issues raised by targets, see also chapter by Walker.
64
Maurizio Ferrera
both communicative and coordinative discourse on the part of EU

institutions, the Commission in particular18.
Second, there is improvement at the practical, operational level. The
addition of thematic coordination to the overall governance of the
strategy (i.e. focussed monitoring on growth enhancing reforms, including welfare state modernisation, with the possibility of issuing recommendations based on Article 148 not only on employment but also
other selected thematic issues, presumably including social policies),
the launch of the European semester, the institutional re-location and
procedural refinement of the Social OMC: these are all promising
innovations that can contribute to a more effective nested delivery of
the strategys array of policies. It is to be noted that the Horizontal
Social Clause has already played a role in fostering and underpinning
the operational definition of Europe 2020, especially as regards the
enhancement of horizontal coordination and mainstreaming of the
Lisbon common social objectives which will be hopefully firmed up
and articulated through pertinent indicators.
Referring back to Figure 2.1: Europe 2020 does seem to have the
adequate institutional potential for steering the Unions architecture
towards a more virtuous nesting, both between nation-based welfare and
its wider supranational spaces and between space B (economic Europe)
and space C (social Europe). Acknowledging the potential of Europe
2020 does not mean, of course, that the strategy has no weaknesses
both substantive and procedural that ought to be addressed (as recommended by all the chapters of this book). With appropriate institutional gardening in the years to come, coupled with some political
ambition, imagination, and consensus-building, Europe 2020s social
agenda could be used to lay the conditions not only for creating a
somewhat stringent social snake binding Member States to remain
within certain quantitative bands after reaching the headline targets
(e.g. in terms of social inclusion levels) but also for establishing a fully
fledged EU system of social protection consisting of coordinated and
correctly nested national, sub-national and post-national sharing spaces.
2.6 Conclusion
The national welfare state and the EU are probably the most salient
and distinctive institutional legacies that the 20th century has bequeathed
to our continent: two institutions that have given an invaluable contribu18
According to Vivien Schmidt, discourse is the interactive process of conveying ideas

throughout a political system. It comes in two forms: the coordinative discourse
among policy actors and the communicative discourse between political actors and
the public (Schmidt, 2006).
65
tion to enriching and expanding the life chances of millions of ordinary

people, in a context of economic growth, social security, cohesion and
peace. The 21st century has however opened with some turbulence and
tension regarding, precisely, the mutual relationship between these two
institutions. As argued in the previous sections, this tension ought to
(and can) be contained. The search for a strategy of institutional reconciliation must become a top priority for the political agenda and the
most promising point of departure should be a rapid definitional and
procedural operationalisation of the Horizontal Social Clause, in
parallel with a cleared definition of the scope and legal implications of
the Social Protocol. The challenge ahead of us is that of imagining and
then engaging in the actual construction of a recognisable EU social
model: not just and generically European, but a distinctive EU
social model, resting on a well-designed and protective nesting of social
sharing goals and practices (including nation-based practices) within the
overall legal framework of the Union. The prime institutional rationale
behind this new model should be that of promoting a virtuous and
dynamic balance between the logic of opening and the logic of closure,
in order to effectively underpin the self-sustaining production of both
individual opportunities and social bonds, i.e. the two sides of life
chances European style.
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68
3. Aftershock: The Coming Social Crisis

in the EU and What Is to Be Done
Roger LIDDLE and Patrick DIAMOND1,
with Simon LATHAM and Tom BRODIE
3.1 Introduction
The focus of this chapter is on the social aftershocks of the economic
crisis of 2008-2009. This crisis will have fundamental implications for
the future of the European Union (EU). It has called into question the
political economy of the preceding two decades. Not only has it
knocked the Anglo-Social model2 (Dixon and Pearce, 2005) of a once
elevated pedestal that now appears to have distinctly weak foundations.
It has simultaneously thrown the Eurozone into turmoil, exposing fault
lines in its governance that raise doubts about the Euros long term
viability as presently constituted. In redrawing the boundaries between
states and markets, the crisis is initiating a major structural transformation of the EU economy, throwing up new social challenges for the EU
in the decades ahead.
Section 3.2 discusses the nature of this crisis and highlights the links
between three central framing arguments of the chapter: the multidimensional nature of the crisis, the challenge it poses to solidarity and
the present ambiguity of EU integration. The first framing argument is
that current crisis aftershocks originate not just in the financial sector
crash itself, but in long term structural trends relating both to profound
social changes in the life expectations, aspirations and risks that EU
citizens are experiencing as well as the changing shape of the productive economy in the West, in part as a result of globalisation. These pose
major long term challenges that have not gone away. For example,
coping with the public spending consequences of an ageing demogra1
2
Addresses for correspondence: [email protected] and [email protected].

Anglo-Social was first coined by Nick Pearce to describe how the New Labour
policies of public intervention and social inclusivity were modifying the AngloAmerican, Thatcherite model which aimed for a purer form of capital, product and
labour market flexibility.
69
Aftershock: The Coming Social Crisis in the EU
phy, or tackling climate change, may prove as big a fiscal challenge as

the present need for consolidation to reduce indebtedness. The second
of our framing arguments is that these aftershocks in combination put
social and economic inequality back at the centre of the public policy
agenda, alongside the emerging problems of the squeezed middle.
This forces a reassessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the precrisis policy consensus based on the Lisbon agenda principles: more
flexible labour markets, higher employment participation, social investment and getting a job as the best answer to poverty. This is not to
say these principles are wrong, but they certainly need refinement as
experience suggests that social investment strategies for welfare reform
will only work when combined with more effective regulatory intervention.
The third framing argument concerns what the authors see as the
ambiguity of the EUs own role in this social crisis: how on the one
hand, the existing path of EU integration might be intensifying the
social challenge and on the other, the potential of the EU to present
itself as a positive strategic actor, facilitating the return of EUs economy and welfare regimes to stability and good health. For at present
EUs economic policy response highlights the zero sum risks of Member States seeking to gain competitive advantage against each other
through a brand of welfare nationalism which transmutes into a race to
the bottom in social standards.
Section 3.3 amplifies the multidimensional nature of the crisis. The
paper argues that it is not just one crisis that the EU faces, but five
interlocking social crises: rising unemployment and the social consequences of the global financial crash; the long-term crisis of winners
and losers that originates in economic globalisation; the structural trends
of demography and rising life expectancy that bear down on the welfare
state; the impact of migration, integration and identity on social citizenship and cohesion; and growing divergence throughout the EU, as
countries seek alternative paths to entrenching macro-economic stability
and coping with new structural pressures.
Section 3.4 expands on the role of the EU in these aftershocks. It
highlights the present trade offs between economic integration and a
socially inclusive modernisation (not a retrenchment) of EUs welfare
states and considers how a strengthening of the EUs social dimensions
might help resolve these tensions. It argues that a Euro-Keynesian
solution is both simplistic and unrealistic as individual Member States
need to pursue distinctive reform strategies in order to improve their
resilience in coping with present challenges and future social risks.
However, the EU as a whole needs to develop a new policy paradigm
based on a combination of social investment and regulatory intervenThis document is licensed to Eniko Vincze (3-5256156|00)
70
Roger Liddle & Patrick Diamond, with Simon Latham & Tom Brodie
tion, the implementation of which requires both policy reforms within

Member States and action at EU level.
Section 3.5 concludes with some pointers to how improved policy
action and coordination at EU level could provide a more favourable
structural context for the evolution of social reforms and how, following
Ferreras argument in this volume, the development of the EU social
space, through for example the poverty target agreed by the European
Council in June 2010, could provide some safeguard against a destructive race to the bottom.
3.2 The Multidimensional Nature of the Crisis,

the Challenge It Poses to Solidarity
and the Present Ambiguity of EU Integration
In the wake of the crash, intellectual and political attention has unsurprisingly focused on immediate crisis management, in particular
restoring stability and resilience to the financial sector and handling the
rise in public indebtedness. But major questions about the sustainability
of EU social protection regimes and the models of capitalism which
underpin them, still remain unanswered.
The term crisis remains somewhat nebulous and should be used
within a specific structural context. It is clear that every major crisis has
a political dimension, as well as an economic one (Gamble, 2009). We
use the term crisis to denote major adjustments in existing institutions
and policy regimes as the result of new structural forces and pressures.
Crises are not only moments of catastrophe, but create unprecedented
opportunities for social and economic reform. Of course, the current
crisis has thrown up many challenges, but it also presents a window in
which to transform the existing social and economic order. It needs to
be acknowledged, however, that crises do not necessarily lead to major
ideological and political shifts. There is always the possibility that the
previous order will be restored, in this instance the neo-liberal order that
prevailed prior to the financial crisis in 2008-2009. In particular the
leadership of Germany, which has been forced reluctantly by events
once again to assume the role of economic hegemony within the Eurozone, and for the moment is itself basking comfortably in an export
boom, may well believe that tighter financial regulation, tougher fiscal
rules and better crisis management capabilities will be sufficient in
themselves to resolve the problems with the current EU economic and
social order. The reforms we argue for in this chapter are therefore not
inevitably bound to happen: they will require a significant change in the
prevailing orthodoxy.
71
The present structural context of the EU makes the term aftershock

just as appropriate as the notion of crisis: EU countries are confronted
by the prospect of a series of aftershocks that will delay or even jeopardise the recovery, and constrain the options available to governments
in the future (Proissl, 2010). Unless concrete steps are taken to deal with
the fall-out of after-shocks, EUs ability to overcome the social impact
of the global financial crash will be seriously impaired.
The first of our three central framing arguments is that the aftershocks of the current crisis originate in long-term structural trends
relating to demography, life expectancy, globalisation, and the changing
shape of the productive economy in the West, not just the financial
sector crash itself. These trends are clearly visible in all the Member
States of the old EU15, despite the diversity of their social models.
They also have relevance in the EU27 despite the much wider differences in living standards and stages of economic development within
the EU which have been the consequence of the 2004 and 2007
enlargements. In some respects these trends have been exacerbated by
the global shocks of 2008-2009, which in particular have underlined the
global shift in economic power away from the EU and the rest of the
developed world, as shown by the remarkable recent resilience of the
emerging Asian economies since the crisis. By contrast, within the EU,
the shock to growth and the public spending consequences of the resulting need for fiscal consolidation will make it even harder to address
long-term social and economic challenges. For example some estimates
of the scale of the fiscal challenge posed by EUs ageing demography
suggests that this could be as large as the formidable scale of fiscal
consolidation ultimately required in several Member States as a result of
the financial crisis.3 Equally significant is the long term challenge of
tackling climate change. The failure of the Copenhagen Summit and the
impact of the economic crisis itself, in reducing, then delaying the
upward path of carbon emissions, have reduced the immediate political
pressure for action. But it is inconceivable that climate change will not
at some stage burst back into prominence as a policy priority. And there
will be major public finance implications. While the EU could do far
more to set a more robust economic framework of carbon pricing that
would incentivise private actors to invest in carbon reduction, major
infrastructure investments will require at the minimum costly public
guarantees and welfare states will face a new challenge in ameliorating
the impact of much higher energy prices on the poor (Giddens, 2009;
Liddle and Latham, 2009).
3
DG ECFIN in conjunction with the ECOFIN Council carried out a series of detailed
studies on the fiscal consequences of the ageing society in the mid-2000s.
72
Many EU governments have struggled to implement immediate crisis management measures and have had to deal with the fall-out of the
sovereign debt crisis. In the meantime, hastily conceived fiscal austerity
measures are beginning to bite. The danger is that during an era of
serious fiscal retrenchment, existing welfare policy regimes will be
frozen as governments struggle to reassure citizens and protect people
from the adverse consequences of the crisis. It is precisely at this moment, however, that reform is needed most, not only to manage new
financial pressures, but to make welfare states more resilient for the
future and prevent the crisis from further damaging the life-chances of
the least advantaged in society.
The second central framing argument is that crisis aftershocks put
social and economic inequality back at the centre of the public policy
agenda. Recently, unequal societies were purported to do far worse on a
range of important social indicators including crime rates, public health,
educational achievement, work-life balance, personal well-being, and so
on (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). There is much debate among experts
as to whether inequality is generally on a rising long term trend in the
EU, as opposed to there having just been episodic shocks that have led
to large increases in inequality within (some) Member States. Tony
Atkinson in examining trends in inequality in Europe has argued, for
example, that a large rise in inequality in the United Kingdom occurred
in the late 1980s and can be explained by the combined impact of labour
market reforms, a big rise in worklessness and discretionary tax changes
favourable to the better off, returning the UK to levels of inequality not
seen since before the Second World War.4 By comparison, the position
has been relatively stable since, despite the Labour Government successes between 1997-2010 in reducing poverty among families with
children and old people (Joyce et al., 2010). In a 2010 study of Income
and Living Conditions in Europe, Atkinson and Marlier conclude that
while it is widely believed that income inequality was increasing
globally prior to the economic crisis () the EU-SILC5 data suggest
that the EU picture is more nuanced, with some Member States exhibiting declining inequality (Chapters 1 and 5 in Atkinson and Marlier,
2010). It is however the case that the at-risk of poverty rate is closely
correlated with the degree of income inequality (as measured by the
S80/S20 ratio and the Gini coefficient). Also there is no data yet available on what has happened to inequality since the crisis broke, though
one can reasonably presume that the overall impact of spending cuts
will be harsher on poorer households than the better off.
4
5
Sir Tony Atkinson made this argument in paper for the DG ECFIN Economics
Conference in 2008.
EU-SILC stands for EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions.
73
The inequality debate has in recent years become broader than the
traditional focus on economic inequality and the relationship between
the top and bottom of the distribution. A new focus in the debate relates
to the stagnation of the squeezed middle and the downward pressure
on wages created both by globalisation, and internally-driven pressures
such as deregulatory labour market reforms undertaken with the objective of making work pay and raising employment participation rates
(Hans Boeckler Stiftung, 2006). The relative position of low skilled men
in jobs at the margin of the labour market appears to have declined. The
impact on household incomes of these trends will in part have been
offset by the widespread sharp rise in female employment participation
in the last decade, for example in Germany, though a large gender pay
gap still adversely affects the position of women in the labour force in
many Member States.
The question of inequality cannot be separated from the wider debate about the nature of capitalism in the West, which in the UK has led
to a revival of interest among economic and social commentators in the
German coordinated social market economy regime. Also throughout
the crisis, the globally-orientated Nordic social democracies have
continued to be successful in combining efficiency and equity, though
Sweden has experienced particularly high youth unemployment.
The final argument of the chapter concerns the capacity of the EU to
present itself as the strategic actor best placed to deal with the fall-out of
crisis aftershocks, and help facilitate the return of EUs economy and
welfare regimes to stability and good health. This optimistic view of the
EUs potential role underestimates the extent to which the EU itself has
accentuated the scale of the social challenges facing the EU principally
through the dynamics of the internal market. Combined with EU
enlargement, the single market has contributed to the increasingly
adverse fortunes of the lowly skilled in the labour market and the erosion of labour standards. There is also the issue of whether the established EU policy framework, with its emphasis on fiscal discipline,
national competitiveness and labour market reforms has contributed to
the rise of zero sum competition between Member States. Whereas
before the crisis social policy experts imagined that membership of the
EU contributed to a positive race to the top dynamic for its national
welfare states, the real impact of the crisis has been to exacerbate economic and social divergence in the EU, as Member States find themselves with widely differing room for manoeuvre and therefore seek
different remedies to the challenges presented by the crisis. The ethic of
solidarity between EU countries is weakened as a result. The very
legitimacy of the EU as a social and political actor is put in question.
These issues are more fully debated in Ferreras contribution to this
74
volume which points out how national welfare states within the EU
operate both within a clearly defined EU economic space and a more
imprecise EU social space. The parameters of this social space could
now be strengthened, not least as the practical application unfolds of the
new social provisions of the Lisbon Treaty through its Horizontal Social
Clause, the Social Protocol covering services of general economic
interest and the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
This raises the question of what the common principles of solidarity
are that should mould a collective EU approach in future and what
concrete steps might be taken by the EU institutions. Proposals on this
theme are contained in the contributions to this volume by Frazer and
Marlier on ensuring a stronger approach in the new Europe 2020 Strategy and by Vanhercke in his review of the Social OMCs adequacy and
impact. While the authors of this chapter recognise the importance of
these policy initiatives, we advocate a broader brush approach: what is
needed in the EU is a new model of social investment and regulatory
intervention. The social investment paradigm as developed by policymakers in the last decade has rightly focused on making pro-active
contributions to human and social capital, instead of relying on the
passive income redistribution mechanisms of the post-war welfare state.
However this strategic approach did not sufficiently acknowledge that
the success of social policy itself rests on how effectively national
governments and international institutions are able to regulate global
capital, labour and product markets. Investment in training or education
programmes, for example, cannot protect disadvantaged citizens from
the impact of financial shocks that lead to the drying up of capital, and
weaken public provision by depriving governments of tax revenues.
One of the central lessons of the crisis, particularly in countries such
as Britain, Ireland, and Spain, is that social policy cannot adequately
compensate for the effects of models of capitalism that tend to strongly
amplify inequality and risk. This is also a lesson for some of the new
Member States, for example the Baltics. In the future, social investment
and regulatory intervention have to be seen as two sides of the same
coin. Social policy has to operate within the context of robust regulation
of markets, instead of relying solely on the post hoc cushioning provided by the central state. A deregulated financial sector, for example,
will impair social investment, as well as the resilience and stability of
the wider economy. In tackling the crisis aftershocks analysed in this
article, social policy has to help shape market outcomes as a positive
productive factor, instead of seeking only to correct adverse consequences after the event. This clearly has implications for how the EU
conceives its future policy for the Single Market, not simply as an
instrument of liberalisation and deregulation, but as a common set of
75
rules designed to combine greater economic efficiency with better social

outcomes.
3.3 The Multidimensional Nature of the Crisis

To understand the full implications of the crisis, one has to distinguish between five interlocking aftershocks which are at work.
3.3.1 Aftershock I: Rising unemployment and

the social consequences of the financial crisis
An immediate consequence of the financial crisis has been the increase in Eurozone unemployment, which currently stands at 10%. This
reverses the progress made in reducing unemployment from 2004 to
2008 when the EU was more successful than the United States in creating new jobs.6 However, one of the positive features of the current crisis
is that in the core EU countries Britain, France and Germany unemployment has risen significantly slower than was forecast. This suggests
that government-led labour market interventions and stimulus policies
have in the short term been effective. A good example is the German
subsidy to support temporary short time working. However despite
these positive interventions, the diverse impact of unemployment on
national labour markets in the EU is reflected in its diverging severity
across Member States. Averages mask a deeper malaise in some Member States. Contrast Spain that suffers from over 20% unemployment or
Estonia from 18.6%, with the figure in Germany at 6.9%. Even in
France, unemployment is much lower at 9.6%7; the rate in Austria is
only 3.8%.8 There is a clear contrast between the core of the Eurozone
and a periphery of countries in which there are severe problems. This
raises the question of how unemployment is affecting social and geopolitical cohesion among various age groups and Member States within
the Eurozone.
Crucially, the young are disproportionately affected. Across the EU,
youth unemployment (defined as ages 15-24) stands at 19.6%, rising to
41.5% in Spain and 39.5% in Latvia.9 The Netherlands is the only
6
7
8
9
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Unemployment
statistics#Youth_unemployment_trends_in_Europe.
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-31082010-BP/EN/3-3108
2010-BP-EN.PDF
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11138110.
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-31082010-BP/EN/3-31082
010-BP-EN.PDF.
76
Member State whose youth unemployment is ranked below 10%.10 The

severe impact of the crisis on the young raises major social concerns
about the long term scarring effects of youth unemployment as well as
the loss of productive potential for the future.
Similarly, unemployment has increased faster amongst workers on
temporary contracts than those with permanent positions. The Spanish
case is the most extreme. In 2009, fixed term employment fell by a
staggering 35% in the Spanish construction sector, while at the same
time the countrys permanent workers wages actually increased by
4%.11 This suggests that the pattern of rising unemployment and its
social impact in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis reflects
the existence of two-tier labour markets where those at the margins have
proved most vulnerable. But this has been offset in those countries
unlike Spain that have enjoyed the fiscal policy space to intervene
directly to save jobs. Clearly however, in the second round of the crisis,
where measures are now being taken to execute exit strategies from
public indebtedness, the social consequences will differ greatly in scale
and social impact as Member States face a wide divergence of fiscal
challenges. A central indicator is how levels of public debt vary between Member States. In 2009, Irelands budget deficit was 14.3% of
GDP and Spains 11.2%, but in contrast Germanys was only 3.3%, and
Austrias 3.4%.12 The imperative of fiscal consolidation varies widely.
Whereas the UK government is committed to 113 billion of savings
over the next four years,13 the current masochistic reductions in
Irelands debt as a proportion of GDP would amount in equivalent terms
to 150 billion sterling14 and the Irish now face the need for a second
round of cuts. Meanwhile, the scale of the UK Coalition Governments
onslaught on the national budget is itself significantly more ferocious
than the German governments austerity regime. Germany is a larger
economy than the UK, with over 20 million more citizens. The German
government has announced 80 billion Euros of cuts over 4 years15
equivalent only to 67 billion in sterling terms. Moreover, while the
German government intends to cut 15,000 public sector jobs over the
10
11
12
13
14
15
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Unemployment
_statistics#Youth_unemployment_trends_in_Europe.
http://www.voxeu.com/index.php?q=node/5289.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10150007.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/26/ireland-economic-collapse.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-pledges-recordeuro80bn-of-budget-cuts-1994087.html.
77
next four years,16 while the UK government anticipates a cull close to a

staggering 500,000 by 2015 on current projections.17
Despite these differences, common themes do emerge across the EU.
Welfare spending on transfer payments is being cut in many Member
States, though there are exceptions so far such as Belgium. For example,
30 billion Euros have been slashed from the budget in Germany,18 with
parents on unemployment benefits losing their entitlement to Elterngeld
of 300 Euros a month.19 In the UK, 11 billion pounds of cuts to benefits
have been announced, with another 4 billion planned.20 Commentators
have noted that the predominant impact of the welfare changes so far
announced will be on poor families with children, despite the Coalition
Governments commitment to tackle child poverty. 760 million Euros
are being cut from social welfare in the Republic of Ireland.21 Further
major cuts are expected in the December 2010 EU budget as Ireland has
agreed with the EU to reduce spending in 2011 by a minimum of 3
billion Euros, though there is every chance this could become a considerably higher figure. These cuts tend to fall on the most politically
marginalised; above all, they affect the young much more than the
electorally influential elderly. It is telling that the UK government, for
example, has displayed great caution in cutting funding for the National
Health Service (NHS), free travel cards for the elderly and the winter
fuel allowance. The danger is that fiscal retrenchment will reinforce the
elderly bias that has predominated in Western welfare state regimes
(Esping-Andersen, 2009).
3.3.2 Aftershock II: The long-term globalisation crisis

of winners and losers
Greater divergence between Member States at the macroeconomic
level is accompanied by the increasing polarisation of labour markets
between winners and losers within Member States. The labour
market has been increasingly hollowed out, squeezing real wages for
those in the middle and low deciles of the wage distribution, as Maarten
Goos and Alan Mannings cogently argue in their seminal work, Lousy
and Lovely Jobs (Goos and Manning, 2007). Since the 1990s, employment as a share of the total workforce has declined by more than 7.5%,
while the share of both low- and high-skilled jobs increased (Goos
16
17
18
19
20
21
http://www.thelocal.de/money/20100608-27715.html.
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE65625L.htm.
http://www.thelocal.de/money/20100608-27715.html.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11287172.
78
et al., 2009). Lower skilled workers are also increasingly vulnerable to

the threat of redundancy and unemployment. While 84% of highly
skilled Europeans have a job, more than half of low-skilled workers are
currently unemployed.22 In France, 72% of those with Bac+2 qualifications have full time jobs, whilst the figure for those without a diploma is
43%.23 Downward pressure on wages and fear of unemployment have
heightened economic insecurity for those on lower and middle incomes,
compounded by the growth of income volatility. Across the OECD,
median income households experience much sharper changes in incomes over time than was the case thirty years ago (OECD, 2008).
While the poorest 10% of the UK population have on average seen a
fall in their real incomes over the previous decade, after deducting
housing costs24 and the wealthiest 10% by contrast have seen much
larger proportional rises in income than other social groups,25 the interesting development in the last decade is how those in the middle of the
income distribution have lagged behind as well. Overall, wage share as
a proportion of national income has declined sharply since 1980 in the
EU15, Japan and the United States, implying that average wages have
failed to keep pace with labour productivity. In seventeen out of twenty
countries in the survey, earnings at the top of the wage distribution rose
sharply relative to those at the bottom after the early 1990s. There is
also evidence of higher levels of income volatility and wage instability
in the major industrialised countries (OECD, 2008).
The City of London appears to be recovering rapidly from the initial
impact of the financial crisis, with the return of extravagant bonuses
(6.8 billion forecast for 201026) and even a return to the irrational
exuberance of the boom decade in the late 1990s.27 There were twice as
many financial sector job vacancies in the spring of 2010 than the
previous year,28 in stark contrast to the 50% fall in the UK manufacturing sector (Diamond and Liddle, 2009). The decline of good working
class jobs is grimly illustrated by the rise in poverty rates among
households where both parents are working: in 1999, 40% of children
classed as living in poverty came from families with at least one working parent; by 2009, this had increased to 50%.29 In Germany, the
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,5218569,00.html.
http://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2009/03/inequalities-in-france.html.
http://www.poverty.org.uk/09/index.shtml.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2010/jan/27/pensioners-poverty-onsinequality.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/apr/23/city-bonuses-forecast-to-rise.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/nov/01/city-parties-again.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ad3deabe-5df5-11df-8153-00144feab49a.html.
http://campaigns.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2009-2010/rrep549.pdf, p. 7.
79
National Institute for Economic Research calculated that domestically

11.5 million individuals were living in poverty; a third more than a
decade previously.30 Vital in this regard was the increase from the early
1990s to 2008 of the proportion of jobs paying only basic wages, from
slightly over a quarter, to over a third of the total.31 Work doesnt
protect against poverty cried the German Stern newspapers headline.
The situation in the EU is of course characterised by diversity. Some
Member States have sought to cope with structural challenges by maintaining strong protections for those in work at the cost of a higher
unemployment and inactivity, while others have put employment activation first and tolerated more widespread low pay and in-work poverty.
There has been a tendency to increased dualism in both labour markets
and the design of welfare states, with employers on the one hand restructuring their operations to offer near lifetime opportunities to a
highly skilled core, whereas on the other hand welfare states have
needed to adjust to the risks of in-work poverty among increasingly
excluded groups of low-paid and low-skilled workers (Palier and
Thelen, 2010). Of all Member States the Nordics have by far the best
record in finding a way through this dilemma.
Access to the necessary skills for an individual to succeed in the
global knowledge economy also remains unequally distributed. In the
UK, the class divide in educational achievement between children from
high and low income households remains stubborn and persistent.
According to Professor Anne West of the London School of Economics,
There is an achievement gap between children from poor family backgrounds and others; this is not unique to the UK, but found in all other
countries of the OECD (West, 2009). It appears that family, income
and material resources are highly significant, although schools also play
an important role in reproducing such inequalities.
These educational inequalities exacerbate the polarisation between
lovely and lousy jobs, ensuring that existing social inequalities in
ethnic and class terms are hardwired into this diverging labour market.
This has wider social ramifications, as the decline of stable workingclass jobs fuels a loss of self-esteem and identity particularly among
younger and older men, leading to the rise of social pessimism across
the EU and even disengagement from politics itself (Liddle and Lerais,
2007). It also raises the issue of a potential cultural cleavage in the EU
between the cosmopolitan liberal middle classes, who have done well
30
31
http://www.focus.de/finanzen/news/untersuchung-armut-trifft-zunehmend-jungemenschen_aid_481122.html.
http://www.stern.de/panorama/armutsbericht-arbeit-schuetzt-nicht-vor-armut620763.html.
80
as a result of globalisation, and the communitarian traditional working-classes who feel left out and left behind, their living standards
increasingly imperilled.
3.3.3 Aftershock III: Demography and life expectancy

the long-term viability of the European Social Model
The threat to social cohesion created by the polarisation of the EU
labour market is heightened by the increasing strains imposed on the
post-war welfare state by changing patterns of longevity and life expectancy, as the Commission has recently recognised in a green paper on
pensions (European Commission, 2010a). For example, one in five
Italians are now of pensionable age; Italy is projected to have at least
one million individuals over the age of 90 by 2024 (2020 Public Services Commission, 2010). The March 2000 Lisbon European Council
estimated that Italys workforce will be 16% smaller in 2030 than in
2005.32 Whereas in contemporary Germany there are roughly 2.6 people
of working age for every over 60 year old, this ratio is projected to
decline to 1.4 by 2030.33 Similarly in Britain, it is estimated that by
2034, 23% of the population will be aged over 65, in comparison to
16% in 2009.34 Today three workers support every older Briton; by
2025, just over two will have to manage the load.35
Whether post-war welfare regimes in the EU can survive these structural pressures is still unknown. The 2020 Public Services commission
report published on 14 September 2010 warns that UK public services
are increasingly unsustainable in the light of an ageing population,
requiring an annual funding increase from 4 to 6% of GDP in the long
term.36 A profound tension is emerging between the increasing longterm costs of welfare provision, and Member States immediate drive
for fiscal austerity. In simplistic terms, once the painful fiscal consolidation resulting from the events of 2008 is complete, Member States face
the challenge of having to do it all over again to meet the spending costs
of EUs demographic crisis.
Moreover, an ageing population is likely to be accompanied by rising social inequalities. In the UK, for example, for every 100 people
dying in the wealthiest areas, 199 die in the poorest places: this is the
32
33
34
35
36
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/eaf2c538-57af-11df-855b-00144feab49a.html.
http://www.goethe.de/ges/soz/dos/dos/age/dgw/en1274578.htm.
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=949.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/why-an-ageing-population-isthe-greatest-threat-to-society-656997.html.
http://www.localgov.co.uk/index.cfm?method=news.detail&id=91763.
81
largest divide recorded since 1921.37 Male life expectancy in the northern town of Blackpool is 73.6 years, whereas in affluent Kensington and
Chelsea it is 84.3.38 Even in Germany, women who are among the
highest 10% of earners live three years longer on average than those in
the bottom 10%.39 In addition, to straining the capacities of national
welfare systems, the ageing of EUs populations threatens to widen the
gulf between rich and poor.
There is also the aftershock of the financial crisis in pensions the
sharp fall in equity markets has seriously affected the level of pension
fund assets, squeezing pensioners incomes in countries with large
private sector provision (Hemerijck et al., 2010). Whereas in the UK in
1977, the state pension made up 53% of a retired persons income, and
occupational pensions 18%, by 2007/08, the state pension had declined
to 37% and occupational pensions risen to 36%.40 Whatever the design
of the pension system, nearly a fifth of Europes older people are still
prone to poverty in old age, particularly where they have an inadequate
occupational pension and live alone. Single elderly women are particularly at risk, with 22.1% over-65 living in poverty in Germany.41
The favoured policy response to the sustainability of the welfare
state in face of an ageing demography is to raise the retirement age and
promote higher employment participation rates among the active older
worker. Clearly the financial crisis, recession and rise in unemployment
pose a potential threat to this strategy. While the first signs are that
employers and unions are not following the restructuring strategies of
the 1980s and 1990s in laying off older workers and encouraging early
retirement, the costs of which are now much higher and more transparent, it is unclear whether the welcome rise in the employment participation rate among the over-50 in the last decade will be sustained. For
example, in August 2010 in the UK were witnessed the highest levels of
over-50 unemployment since June 1997.42
37
38
39
40
41
42
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jul/23/uk-health-gap-widest-ever.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2010/jul/02/poor-in-uk-dying-10-years-earlierthan-rich.
http://www.faz.net/s/Rub8EC3C0841F934F3ABA0703761B67E9FA/Doc~E
E313C38A84EF44C6BE8F86874C578271~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2010/jan/27/pensioners-poverty-ons-inequality.
http://www.prb.org/Journalists/Webcasts/2008/olderwomen.aspx.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2010/aug/11/older-workers-long-term-unemploy
ment.
82
3.3.4 Aftershock IV: Migration, integration and identity

As demographic change poses profound questions about the future
sustainability and structure of the welfare state in the EU, an obvious
answer would be for the Union to be the welcoming recipient of
younger migrants both from its economically less well developed
regions and from outside. Internal migration was a huge driver of economic growth in EU in the past, both in the movement from rural village to urban town and city and in the massive population shifts from
poorer regions such as the Italian South and Andalusia in Spain. From
the 1960s on, migrants came to the EU from Turkey, North Africa and
former colonies throughout the world. In the last decade and half there
has been a huge growth in migration to southern Europe from Africa,
the Balkans and Latin America, while the UK and Ireland saw a large
influx of East Europeans after EU enlargement in 2004.
Economically however the EU has failed to make the most of this
potential talent pool and it is likely that the aftershocks of the economic
crisis both on job opportunities and social provision will worsen this
situation markedly. In Germany, only 12.2% of boys and 14.8% of girls
from a Turkish background attend an elite Gymnasium, in comparison to
41.7% and 47.4% of their native contemporaries.43 Turkish pupils are by
contrast disproportionately represented at the lower end of the school
system; with 44.3% of Turkish boys attending a Hauptschule, as
opposed to only 16.7% of German males.44 Similar ethnic inequalities
are present in France, where according to a 2003 study, 10.1% of second generation Turkish pupils attend university, in contrast to 18.6% of
those from the French working class (Windle, 2008). In some countries, such as the UK, children from some ethnic minorities do better at
school than their white working class equivalents, though the children
of other minorities such as Afro-Caribbeans, Bangladeshis and some
Pakistanis fare much worse. However a recent study showed that only in
Sweden does the second generation of migrants enjoy the same educational opportunities for their children as the native community (OECD,
2008).
There are growing concerns about the social and political impact of
migration across the EU, despite the many economic and cultural benefits which migrants bring to Member States. The 2009 European Parliament elections witnessed significant success by far-right political
parties standing on an anti-immigration agenda. Geert Wilders anti
43
44
http://www.bildung.koeln.de/schule/artikel/artikel_05149.html?PHPSESSID
=188603ef2f272941edc2dd11b5ff9337.
http://www.bildung.koeln.de/schule/artikel/artikel_05149.html?PHPSESSID =18860
3ef2f272941edc2dd11b5ff9337.
83
Islamic party came second in the Netherlands with 15% of the vote,45
with Jobbik, a Hungarian anti-Semitic party antagonistic towards Sinti
and Roma, winning 3 of the countrys 22 seats.46 Austrias two main farright parties claimed over 28% of the vote in the 2008 general election.47
The British National Party is strong in disadvantaged areas of Northern
England, winning seats in the European Parliament for the North West
and Yorkshire and Humberside in 2009.48 With high levels of unemployment due to the financial crisis, it seems that hostility to immigrants
has plenty of fuel to hand. It can hardly be coincidental that the neoNazi National Party of Germany is most entrenched in two former
eastern Lnder, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Saxony, possessing seats in their regional parliaments.49
Beyond these alarming successes by extremist parties, there are new
concerns about the integration of Muslim communities. Whilst Thilo
Sarrazin has been forced to resign from the Bundesbank due to his
polemical attack on the impact of Islamic immigration in Germany, the
debate he initiated is infinitely more difficult to dispel.50 The Swiss
Peoples party, the largest in parliament, received popular backing via
referendum for a constitutional ban on the building of minarets.51 Symbolically, the first question posed during the UKs first ever televised
Leaders debates in the 2010 election concerned immigration.52 The
Sarkozy governments much publicised debate regarding national
identity has been widely criticised as an attempt at right-wing populism,53 as has the recent forced repatriation of Sinti and Roma.54 This
increasingly defensive discourse concerning immigration and identity
may propel mainstream parties towards a tougher stance.
The capacity of migration to emerge as a major political issue is
greatly exacerbated by divergences between the richer and poorer
Member States in the EU after the financial crisis. If the Polish
plumber emerged as a major issue in the French referendum of 2005, at
a time of relative economic stability and prosperity, how much greater
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/jun/05/european-elections-the-netherlandsfar-right.
http://ceeuropeaninfo.blogspot.com/2010/04/rising-rightwing-extremism-in-eastern.html.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a4cc3cf0-be9f-11de-b4ab-00144feab49a.html.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8088381.stm.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,614209,00.html.
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,715836,00.html.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8385069.stm.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/apr/18/general-election-2010-immi
gration.
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1963945,00.html.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11020429.
84
will the impact be at a time of increasing unemployment and social

austerity?
3.3.5 Aftershock V: The impact of EU divergence

While much of the EUs half century history has been a positive
story of increasing convergence between Member States, the present
crisis is forcing divergence. To take an extreme example, in the second
quarter of 2010, Greeces GDP fell by 1.5%55, while Germanys grew in
stark contrast by 2.2%.56 Several of the new Member States have witnessed much more dramatic falls in GDP. For example, Romanias
economy shrunk by 8.7% in the second quarter of 2009.57 This is in a
country where the average standard of living of its weakest regions is
little more than a quarter of the EU27 average. However, solidarity
among Member States might become more limited and may begin
declining in line with the pressures of domestic austerity.
The diverging impact of the economic crisis across the European
continent is also exacerbating regional divisions within EU countries.
Whereas London is forecast to recover its pre-recession employment
peak in 2013 due to strong private sector presence, Wales will not do so
until after 2025.58 Cuts to public sector jobs, a source of employment for
over 27% of the Welsh workforce, are expected to produce an unemployment rate of over 10%.59 Research commissioned by the BBC
indicates that within England, deprived northern communities are at far
greater risk from government cuts than wealthier counterparts in the
south. Middlesbrough is ranked as most vulnerable, Elmbridge in Surrey
as the least.60
The threat to national solidarity produced by such polarisation has
been revealed in Germany, where FDP finance expert Frank Schffler
advocated in August 2010 the abolition of solidarity payments by
West German citizens to fund investment in the former east.61 In January 2010, unemployment in eastern Lnder stood at 13.5% in contrast to
7.4% in the west.62 The irony is that higher wage settlements in Germany would help to boost domestic consumption, strengthening the
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/12/greece-recession-gdp-unemployment.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-10962017.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2207f1ca-a9cc-11de-a3ce-00144feabdc0,dwp_uuid=cfff
5f9a-a803-11de-8305-00144feabdc0.html.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0f1a58a0-90bc-11df-85a7-00144feab49a.html.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-11151909.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-11141264.
http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-50988720100821.
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,5265094,00.html.
85
German economy as well as helping lower paid workers. However,

wage share as a proportion of GDP in Germany has fallen rapidly over
the last decade, as it has across many other major industrialised nations.
Employers, especially in tradable sectors that face fierce foreign competition, have been able to enforce lower wage settlements.
3.4 The Role of the EU and How Its Social

Dimension Might Be Strengthened
While a strong case in principle can be made for greater EU economic integration in the wake of the crisis, at the level of domestic
politics, the major Member States appear to be reverting to welfare
nationalism and beggar thy neighbour policies in labour market
regulation and welfare spending. Crucially, major EU Member States
are currently committed to allying domestic austerity, based on the
notion of a balanced household budget, with the cultivation of export
surpluses as their route to economic recovery. A host of experts have
lined up to criticise the detrimental reverberations of such an approach
across the Eurozone. Leading Financial Times commentator Samuel
Brittan describes such policies as beggar-my-neighbour in their scope,
highlighting that: Do I have to add that not every country can have an
export surplus? before noting pessimistically that countries now in
surplus, including China and Germany, are not going to spend their way
into payments deficit because of exhortations by the UK or even the
International Monetary Fund.63
Yet, such criticism has had little impact on policy-makers. Many
economists are incredulous about the universal export-centric approach
to the recovery as all the economies cutting back on public spending
hope to compensate for the negative impact on growth by increasing
exports in the EU maybe into shrinking markets. But Germany looks
likely to emerge the sure-fire winner in this contest. With the euros
exchange rate depressed by worries about debt default in parts of the
Eurozone, Germanys hidden bonus from the creation of the Euro is a
much greater export competitiveness than if the Deutschmark had
remained an independent currency. The result is that while these exports
and ensuing growth benefit Germany, the countrys chosen path to
recovery bulldozes those of weaker Eurozone economies. Beyond
therefore the widely publicised threat of a double dip recession, leading
Member States economic policies display a dangerous focus on their
own narrowly defined interests, to the detriment of the broader EU
economy and solidarity. As The Guardians economic editor put it,
what we are seeing is a race to the bottom. Every country is being
63
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fca56f34-b154-11df-b899-00144feabdc0.html.
86
urged to tighten fiscal policy and every country is being forced to

emulate Germanys downward pressure on labour costs. This is the
recipe for deflation and depression.64
These developments are detrimental to the future cohesion and stability of the EU in a globalising world. There are strong arguments for
greater economic coordination at the EU level as well a social policy
framework that would constrain the present tendency towards a negative
welfare nationalism where each Member States struggle to secure
competitive advantage results in a social race to the bottom. There are
some who yearn in the wake of the crisis for an EU Keynesian state that
recreates the powers of economic intervention that nation-states were
able to exercise at the height of the post-war consensus based on capital
and exchange controls, expansionary fiscal policies, the imposition of
import quotas and external tariffs, and so on. These interventionist
policies would then provide the basis for a wider and deeper framework
of social protection across the EU, based on the revival of the traditional
post-war welfare state.
However, the crisis has underlined why the model of full blown
Keynesian interventionism at EU level would be unlikely to succeed.
There is little sign of significant political support for it: rather the
political mood is currently one of a reversion to national sovereignty
and a rejection of the idea that a stronger EU offers a way forward. But
even if the political support did exist, such a prescription would not deal
with the major structural trends alluded to in this chapter, which will
dramatically transform patterns of need and dependency in the welfare
state for generations to come and need to be tackled through national
reforms.
As we noted earlier, what the Union needs is a new policy paradigm
based on a combination of social investment and regulatory intervention, given the multiple risks of the demise of the social investment
paradigm in the post-crisis period (Hemerijck, 2010). Policies of social
investment require welfare state reforms which in the main have to be
delivered at the level of the individual Member State. But they will not
work unless they are coupled with stronger regulatory interventions
designed to shape market outcomes, rather than simply attempting to
correct the social consequences of the market. This imperative for
national action should however be complemented by a stronger social
framework at the EU level which conditions national reforms to Member State economic and social models. This is urgently needed because
the liberalisation enforced by the single market and European Monetary
Union (EMU) requires ongoing and wrenching economic adjustment. A
64
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/sep/20/liberal-democrats-eurozone-policy.
87
strong social model is required to handle the ensuing shocks and transitional costs such as redundancy and downward pressure on wages,
particularly for the most disadvantaged. Second, effective social policies
help to increase employment participation which makes the EU more
economically efficient, adds to the EUs long-term growth potential and
improves the sustainability of the social model. Finally, if it is to sustain
popular legitimacy with EU citizens, the EU cannot be reduced to a neoliberal project which is simply concerned with enabling markets to
function more efficiently. The EU needs a coherent vision based on
greater equity and personal well-being which advances collective
solidarity. For all these reasons we agree with the conclusion of the
EUs 2010 Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion
(JRSPSI): The crisis has emphasised the added value of policy coordination through the Open method of Coordination on Social Protection
and Social Inclusion and provided further incentive to reinforce and
exploit its potential fully (European Commission, 2010).65
But action at EU level also has a strengthened role to play in shaping
more socially acceptable market outcomes. A good example of what we
have in mind is contained in many of the recommendations of the recent
report on the future of the Single Market (Monti, 2010). Montis purpose is to reinvigorate the Single Market and he is not himself an enthusiast for the notions of Social EU that some favour that would imply
large scale transfers of competence for setting social standards from
national to EU level. However he does recognise that EU policies have
a key role to play in shaping socially fairer market outcomes and
thereby contributing to the greater acceptability of further market liberalisation, for example through stronger tax coordination to brake a
social race to the bottom and a strengthened Posting of Workers
Directive as a counterpart to free movement of labour. It is this combination of structural market shaping and EU guidelines to promote social
investment that we favour.
3.5 Conclusion: Pointers for the Future

Solidarity at the EU level is problematic, given that many traditional
forms of solidarity have waned within Member States. But there are
practical and concrete steps the EU can take to shape more positive
social outcomes.
First, as referred to above, one important area concerns free movement of labour within the EU. The EU could do more to promote an
acceptance of the free movement of labour which adds to both economic
65
This was adopted in March 2010 by the European Commission and the EPSCO
Council of Ministers.
88
efficiency and personal freedom. It could ensure greater portability of

social rights within the EU. At the same time it could ease potential
tensions from internal migration by revising the Posted Workers Directive in order to strengthen its protection of established domestically
based terms and conditions of employment in host countries. This is
essential to remove popular fears of wage undercutting by migrant
workers.
Secondly, the EU could also strengthen the capacity of its Member
States to fund a decent welfare state through new tax measures. In the
new circumstances of post-crisis fiscal austerity, Member States should
look more favourably on an ambitious tax agenda. This should include
strengthened tax coordination to clamp down on tax evasion and abuse.
The combined power of the EU should be brought to bear in order to
tighten regulation of tax havens. Member States should coordinate more
closely their approach to business taxation in order to prevent tax
competition eroding the business tax base to the ultimate disadvantage
of all. Member States should welcome proposals for new taxes levied at
EU level for example for a financial activities levy and carbon tax. Such
taxes will only raise decent amounts of revenue if imposed at an EU
level. Otherwise if levied at Member State level their effectiveness will
be diluted by fear that business will migrate to elsewhere in the EU.
Thirdly, the EU should develop and finance a low carbon transition
plan. This will require huge public-private investments in cross border
energy grids and transport infrastructure. By this means EU wide measures could be taken to stimulate growth and employment across the
whole EU. This will be of particular though not exclusive benefit to
those Member States where the degree of fiscal austerity they are currently required to pursue, precludes the possibility of them making
sensible low carbon investments of their own. This low carbon investment plan would be financed by the issuance of bonds at EU level. Far
from being a radical step towards a federal EU that pro-sovereignty fear,
this would simply extend the practice of the European Investment Bank
in issuing bonds for productive purposes, taking advantage of the lowest
possible interest rates at which money can be borrowed within the EU.
All that is needed is an extension of that principle.
Fourthly, the EU Structural Funds could be used more effectively to
mitigate the impact of economic shocks on dislocated regions across the
EU. Structural fund transfers ought to be sustained, but with greater
conditionality attached. Member States should use EU finance for EU
purposes. That should include the pursuit of EU social objectives, as the
Barca report recommends (Barca, 2009). Structural funds can also help
to promote positive policy synergies, bringing together employment
policy, welfare provision, education, health, and so on.
89
Fifthly, the EU should focus far greater attention on key social policy targets such as child poverty, school drop-out rates, ethnic minority
integration, and employability. The Europe 2020 Strategy rightly focuses on these issues. However, a major development in EU policy is
the agreement by the June 2010 European Council to reduce poverty
and social exclusion by 20 million by 2020. This is a significant breakthrough for Social EU and should assume great importance, precisely
because it will be particularly difficult to meet because of the crisis
aftershocks that the EU is experiencing. If made operational and effective, it also offers the potential to act as an EU wide brake on the more
extreme consequences of increasing welfare nationalism and a social
race to the bottom of which this paper has warned.
The framing of the new poverty target in terms of three dimensions
of relative poverty, absolute material deprivation and worklessness will
require much detailed technical work. But it could enable a broader
policy framework to be developed that addresses the nature of the new
social risks of poverty. This should include serious examination of the
structure of the labour market, the problems of addressing low wage
equilibria, the effectiveness of minimum wages and in work benefits,
and the need to modernise EUs welfare states to cope with new social
challenges as well as the adequacy of existing social protection arrangements. We note the grim conclusion of the 2010 JRSPSI: The
crisis has highlighted great diversity within the EU. Its scope, magnitude and effects vary as does the capacity of national welfare systems to
provide adequate protection. Not all Member States have the financial
means to meet rising demand and some have large gaps in their safety
nets. Narrowing these gaps is now a priority (European Commission,
2010).
The 2008-2009 financial crisis is unlikely to transform the economic
and social landscape of the EU, and it poses many threats to the most
vulnerable. But the crisis also presents new opportunities for social and
economic reform. In the past, change has been very difficult to achieve
in EU welfare regimes, precisely because many groups have effectively
defended the current constellation of social rights as being in the public
interest. Periods of upheaval and stress on existing frameworks of
provision can help to unblock frozen welfare landscapes. The crisis
aftershocks that the EU is currently experiencing may be the catalyst for
rebuilding the collective solidarities that a strong EU social model
entails.
90
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4. The Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020

and the Crisis in Between
David NATALI1
4.1 Approaching Europe 2020:
the Lisbon Strategy and the Crisis
The Lisbon Strategy launched in 2000 represented a twofold ambitious goal for the European Union (EU): to transform the EU economy
of the 21st century (and make it the most competitive and knowledgebased economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth
with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion) and to make
innovations in EU governance through developing new forms of interaction between national practices and EU objectives.
A lively multi-disciplinary debate has developed since the early
2000s amidst much controversy between scholars and experts. This
chapter provides a brief overview of the Lisbon Strategy, its political
and economic rationale, and its main advances and limitations. This is
essential for asking some analytical and political questions on the postLisbon phase and the launch of the Europe 2020 Strategy.2 In the following sections, the reference is to the broad logic of the new Strategy
and the role of social policy coordination in it.
The present contribution is organised in four parts. The first part
looks at the normative political and economic foundations (the complex
interplay of social and economic goals) and the key aspects of the
governance (especially through the Open Method of Coordination
OMC) of the Strategy launched in Lisbon. The second part sheds light
on the ongoing economic-financial crisis (and its social consequences).
This is understood as the sum of the global challenges the EU is facing
and the Lisbon Strategy was supposed to deal with. The third part refers
to shadows and lights of the Lisbon Strategy. Some open questions
on the design of the new Europe 2020 Strategy will be asked. The
reference will be to two broad tensions (and seven critical points) that
1
2
Address for correspondence: [email protected].

For a systematic review of the literature, see Natali (2009).
93
The Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020 and the Crisis in Between
require more political and analytical attention. A short conclusion

summarises some key promising strategies to improve EU socioeconomic governance.
4.2 The Lisbon Strategy: Logics and Promises

When the Lisbon Strategy was launched many academic and political commentators viewed its agenda and the related governance tools as
a promising step to improve EU socio-economic performance while also
legitimising EU integration. The Strategy was widely interpreted to be a
fundamental transformation of the EU project in economic, social and
environmental dimensions (Sapir, 2004; Rodrigues, 2002; Zeitlin, 2008).
4.2.1 The economic and political rationale

of the Lisbon Strategy
The conclusions of the Lisbon Summit of 2000 were based on the
assumption that EU economic models needed to change to be competitive in the global economy. Such an assumption was based on a critical
understanding of the EU development trajectory since the 1970s: EU
problems in productivity and innovation (and the increased gap with US
dynamism) were largely interpreted to be the result of economic and
social rigidities (Alesina and Giavazzi, 2006).
In the words of Begg (2008), a systematic lack of competitiveness
was made evident by the deteriorating economic performances, persistent unemployment and delay in developing knowledge-intensive
sectors. To remedy the EU shortcomings some key reforms had to be
implemented. From a micro-economic perspective, structural reforms
had to be introduced to boost productivity and employment rates. More
investment on information technologies, fewer obstacles to the freedom
of services provision and the liberalisation of transport and energy
markets were some of the innovations to be introduced (Daveri, 2002).
In order to achieve the objective of a competitive and dynamic economy, the EU had to achieve results in reforming social and environmental policies (Begg et al., 2007).
Economic reasoning was also at the basis of the perceived need for
more economic and social coordination (Collignon, 2008). In line with
Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2006) two types of reasoning justify embarking
on EU coordination. First, interdependence may render independent
decision making undesirable. Spill over effects of national decisions
may be active in the policy areas where benefits are not confined to the
country where decisions are taken (e.g. research and development), and
in policy domains where complementarities exist (as is the case of
product market and employment policies). Secondly, policy-makers may
94
David Natali
learn from each other. Policy learning may be improved through crosscountry comparisons and benchmarking.3 In addition, common programmes may represent a reform lever for national policy-makers
through a shared understanding of the needed reforms.
Yet, as argued by Rodrigues (2002) one of the architects of the
Lisbon agenda the emphasis of this new EU Strategy was political
more than economic. While the need to ensure peace within the EU
borders was taken for granted by new generations, a more forwardlooking approach to socio-economic development had to be stressed.
The new impetus for EU integration had to be based on sustaining EU
citizens living conditions, making the Union a key player in globalisation and on the improvement of the EU institutions legitimacy. Structural reforms had to be paralleled by a new focus on multilateralism and
democratic deepening for new Member States (Rodrigues, 2010).
One of the key targets of the Strategy was the European social
model, its reform and the contribution it could make to the broader
revamping of economic growth (Ferrera et al., 2000). In such a context,
social and employment policy moved higher up on the EU agenda.
Social protection was defined as a productive factor and part of the
Lisbon triangle. The latter consisted of the mutual reinforcement of
economic competitiveness and growth, social protection and inclusion,
and employment. All this was consistent with a higher commitment to a
Social EU.
The coordination of social policy (both social protection and social
inclusion) was part of this attempt to redefine the EU integration project. On the one hand, the Lisbon Strategy (through the OMC) was
intended to address growing imbalances between national welfare states
and an increased EU role (or interference) in the social domain. Such a
new mode of governance had to combine the respect for national competences while allowing for the EU coordination of welfare states. On
the other hand, the Strategy and social policy coordination in it was
expected to secure structural coupling between economic integration
and the defence of social rights (see Pochet, 2006; see also chapter by
Ferrera in this volume).
On cross-country comparisons and benchmarking, a good practice worth highlighting

is the thorough report produced by the EU Task-Force on Child Poverty and Child
Well-Being almost exclusively on the basis of the commonly agreed EU social indicators (Social Protection Committee, 2008).
95
4.2.2 The Lisbon Strategy as a new participatory

and knowledge-enhancing form of governance
While the Strategy was based on a set of policy tools including regulation, social dialogue and structural funds, the new modes of governance have attracted much of the scientific debate.4 Terms such as soft
law, experimental governance and self-regulation have been widely
used to characterise the OMC that is, the new governing instrument
agreed upon at the European Council of March 2000 (Falkner et al.,
2005).
For political scientists, international relations theorists and lawyers
the OMC represented an important change in EU policy-making. In line
with Scott and Trubek (2002), the OMC was characterised by experimentation and knowledge creation, flexibility and revisability of normative and policy standards, and diversity and decentralisation of policymaking (Hritier, 2002). The revised EU toolkit was assumed to represent a promising instrument to face up to common EU challenges while
at the same time respecting national diversity and sovereignty. It was
also intended as a means to use the diversity of national policies as a
resource to find solutions to intractable problems.
Another key dimension of the Strategy consisted of participation.
Stakeholders (i.e. business and trade unions, civil society (NGOs), etc.)
in the EU and national arenas have been encouraged to participate in all
stages of the process and have been in particular called upon to take an
active role in the elaboration of national reports and of common guidelines to be followed for drafting them (Natali and de la Porte, 2009).
According to the input legitimacy perspective, the Lisbon Strategy
was intended to ensure the concrete implementation of the principles of
participation, transparency and openness. In this case, the reference is to
the theory of directly deliberative polyarchy that stresses the importance
of the participation of different citizens in a bottom-up process (Sabel
and Zeitlin, 2007).
The Lisbon Strategy was the source of new forms of multi-level
governance through: the exchange of information among policy-makers;
learning from each others experience, practices and intentions; national
ownership and the exertion of peer pressure to galvanise governments
into taking appropriate policy action (Ioannou et al., 2008, page 13).
Zeitlin (this volume) rightly argues that the OMC was never intended to serve as the
sole governance instrument for the Lisbon Strategy, but was always supposed to be
combined with the full set of EU policy tools, including legislation, social dialogue,
Community action programmes, and the structural funds.
96
David Natali
4.3 Economic and Financial Crisis: A Three-Step Process

While early research viewed the Strategy as a promising project for
the EU, more recent contributions have contributed to a more complex
and nuanced understanding. Much criticism (of both the Lisbon Strategy
and the new Europe 2020) has increased after the huge financial, economic and then budgetary crisis affecting most advanced western
economies (see Pochet, 2010).
This section sheds light on the key aspects of the crisis and the most
evident questions raised by experts, scholars and policy-makers on the
coherence of the Lisbon policy agenda and its capacity to face socioeconomic challenges, especially after the crisis (see Liddle in this
volume for an encompassing summary of present and future challenges).
The latter is summarised in line with the three major steps that have
characterised its evolution: the financial crisis (worsened following the
collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008); the broad economic recession
that hit Europe in 2009; and the Greek crisis and the consequent budgetary tensions in the EU in 2010.
4.3.1 Financial crisis in 2008

In its early stages, the crisis manifested itself as an acute liquidity
shortage among financial institutions as they experienced ever stiffer
market conditions for rolling over their short-term debt. The inter-bank
market virtually closed and risk premiums on inter-bank loans soared.
Banks faced a serious liquidity problem. In this phase, concerns over the
solvency of financial institutions were increasing, but a systemic collapse was deemed unlikely (European Commission, 2009).
It was also widely believed that the European economy, unlike the
US economy, would be largely immune to the financial turbulence. This
belief was fed by perceptions that the real economy, though slowing,
was thriving on strong fundamentals such as rapid export growth and
sound financial positions of households and businesses. This perception
dramatically changed when major investment banks defaulted in September 2008. Confidence collapsed, taking down major US and EU
financial institutions. The crisis thus began to feed on itself, through:
credit cuts, economic activity plummeting, loan books deteriorating and
so on. The downturn in asset markets snowballed rapidly across the
world.
Western governments did introduce emergency measures to prevent
collapse of the financial system, while the debate about the regulation of
97
financial markets increased.5 As far as the Lisbon Strategy is concerned,

it has been largely criticised for the weakness of the better regulation
approach to financial markets. Some authors assume the crisis to have
been the result of a twin failure, namely the ineffective regulation of the
global financial markets and excessive financial liquidity due to historically low interest rates (Quaglia, 2010; Natali, 2010).
4.3.2 Economic recession in 2009

From then onward the EU economy entered the steepest downturn
since the 1930s. The transmission of financial distress to the real economy evolved at record speed, with credit restraint and sagging confidence hitting both investment and demand. The cross-border transmission was also extremely rapid through global financial and product
markets (European Commission, 2009, page 27; Pisani-Ferry et al,
2008). As can be seen in Table 4.1, potential growth decreased across
western countries: the negative trend was particularly severe in the US,
but Europe was hit too.
Table 4.1: World economic projections 2009-2010
2009
-1.3
-3.8
-2.8
-4.2
-6.2
-4.1
-2.5
World Output
Advanced Economies
United States
Euro Area
Japan
United Kingdom
Canada
2010
1.9
0.0
0.0
-0.4
0.5
-0.4
1.2
Source: International Monetary Fund (2009)
New risks have emerged and have made many economists fear that it
may still weigh on economic performance for some time to come and
that a recovery will only be in sight after a protracted period of time.
Labour markets in the EU started to weaken considerably in the second
half of 2008, deteriorating further in the course of 2009. The EU unemployment rate has increased by more than 2 percentage points, and a
further sharp increase is likely in the future. In the second quarter of
2009 the unemployment rate increased by 2.2 percentage points.
Progress made in bringing the unemployment rate down vanished in
about a year. A major challenge stems from the risk that unemployment
5
As for the EU, in 2008, European Commission President Barroso set up the so-called
Larosire Group to give advice on the future of European financial regulation. This
high-level group has reported on its main goals for increasing financial market
stability.
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David Natali
may not easily return to pre-crisis levels once the recovery sets in. This
could threaten EU welfare states, which are already under strain as a
result of ageing populations (European Commission, 2009).
Economic downturn and its consequences on the labour market have
contributed to the criticism of the Lisbon Agenda. Many scholars have
questioned the belief that economic deregulation and flexibility in
labour markets is the right path for more economic growth and for
reducing the impact of the crisis (Amable, 2009). Others have stressed
that inequality and the adequacy of welfare benefits have been largely
neglected in the implementation of the Strategy even though they
contribute to reducing the negative impact of the economic cycle
through promoting a more inclusive society (Pochet, 2010).
4.3.3 Growing budgetary tensions in the Euro-zone in 2010

The condition of the EU economy prevailing in this crisis
corresponds almost exactly to the textbook case for a budgetary
stimulus. The fiscal stimulus adopted by EU governments as part of the
EU Strategy for coordinated action, has weighted heavily on public
budgets. As a consequence, the International Monetary Fund (2009)
projects an increase in the average debt-to-GDP ratio in the euro area of
30% and that this will reach 90% of GDP by 2014. This average
disguises substantial increases for some Member States. Part of the
budgetary deterioration is cyclical, but part is permanent. In the years
following a shock, growth rates often recover to the pre-crisis pace but
the loss in output level typically remains permanent, implying a parallel
fall in public revenues (Von Hagen et al., 2009).
According to the Commissions autumn economic forecast, as a result of automatic stabilisers and discretionary measures to enhance
social benefits, social expenditure in the EU is expected to increase by
3.2 percentage points of GDP between 2007 and 2010. A Commission
estimate shows that spending on overall recovery measures varies from
less than 1% of GDP to more than 3.5% (Social Protection and European Commission, 2009).6
Many EU countries have thus started to show increased financial
stress. Greece has represented a special case: no other euro-area country
exhibits a similar combination of budgetary misreporting and misbehaviour (Marzinotto et al., 2010). Throughout the 2000s, the country has
been running an expansionary budgetary policy while attempting to hide
6
Member States have also utilised resources from European Social Funds and from
the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund to combat unemployment and to improve social inclusion of most vulnerable groups (Social Protection Committee and
European Commission, 2009).
99
it. The problem it poses is therefore primarily one of enforcement of the

existing provisions of the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP).
Yet, other EU countries have suffered increased budgetary tensions.
This fiscal stimulus is estimated to amount to up to 2% of GDP on
average in the EU for the period 2009-2010. With the rise in the fiscal
deficit over that period estimated to average about 5% of GDP, the
resulting budgetary developments thus amount to around 3%. Part of
this fiscal expansion is likely to be permanent (European Commission,
2009).
The tensions mentioned above have raised some questions on the reform agenda proposed by the Lisbon Strategy and its own governance
of economic and social matters. As for the former, before the crisis there
was a strong belief in the EU that budgetary discipline was the mother
of all policies (Marzinotto et al., 2010, page 2). Accordingly, budgetary surveillance was deemed sufficient to prevent instability, with no
reference to the private sector. The limits of such neglect started to
become apparent at the beginning of the crisis, as emphasised in the
European Commission report on the first ten years of the euro (European Commission, 2009). Further criticism has focused on the economic
and budgetary coordination in the Euro zone through the Stability and
Growth Pact and especially the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines.
Both mechanisms for crisis prevention and management have been at
the core of the political debate (Pochet, 2010).
4.4 The Lisbon Strategy Ten Years on:

A More Complex Understanding
In the following sections we briefly summarise the main critical
viewpoints on the Strategy in the light of the recent economic crisis
mentioned above. We organise these open questions along the two main
analytical dimensions mentioned in the first part of the chapter: the
political and economic foundations of the Lisbon Strategy and its
governance (see Box 4.1).
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David Natali
Box 4.1: Open questions on the efficacy of the Lisbon Strategy

The Political-economic rationale of the Lisbon Strategy
1) The wrong Strategy for further EU integration?
2) The wrong policy agenda? Tensions between Budgetary Stability and
Structural Reforms?
3) A more central understanding of social and employment policy?
The Lisbon Strategy and its governance
4) Weak economic policy institutions?
5) A limited participation of stakeholders?
6) A more encouraging assessment of learning?
7) Some influence on national policy-making?
Some of these tensions are related to the critical understanding of the

limits the Strategy has proved to have. Others are based on a more
encouraging reading of its implementation and influence on Member
States reforms and performance. All these points represent key elements of the debate on the new Europe 2020 Strategy (see Vanhercke in
this volume).
4.4.1 Questioning the political-economic rationale

of the Lisbon agenda
1) The wrong Strategy for further EU integration?
For some authors, the Lisbon reform package did not represent a
programme to recalibrate the European social model and that of
continental European countries in particular. By contrast, it was an
economic project to destabilise it. Much of the delay in the reform
process and the tensions over its implementation could thus be understood in terms of an ongoing tension between the Lisbon ideology and
the socio-economic compromise of many EU members (Amable, 2009).
A more institutional and historical approach to the risks for the future of EU integration (with evident links with the Lisbon agenda)
seems to converge towards the same insights (Hopner and Schafer,
2007). For these authors, EU economic integration has entered a new,
post-Ricardian phase in which it systematically clashes with national
varieties of capitalism. Rather than enhancing competition that builds on
existing comparative (institutional) advantages, the EU project is propelling convergence. Integration attempts affect liberal market capitalism and organised capitalism differently and result in a clash of capitalisms. Convergence may thus lead to one of two different scenarios.
101
The first is that convergence alters the way in which continental European economies operate. The second is that political resistance in the
organised economies leads to a crisis of political integration.
The EU has moved beyond the stage of technical harmonisation or
purely regulatory policies. Boundary redrawing deeply affects Member
States ability to govern the economy, and governments are unable to
control further integration (Ferrera, 2008). If this is the case, the indirect
legitimacy of EU institutions seems an insufficient democratic basis for
economic liberalisation (ibid., pages 23-24). In the words of Majone
(2005), integration by stealth has reached its limits, in that EU strategies are increasingly in conflict with national socio-economic institutions. The Lisbon process is thus interpreted as a source of political
opposition and disaffection with the EU.
2) The wrong policy agenda? Tensions between

Budgetary Stability and Structural Reforms
A critical reading of the Lisbon Agenda has focused on its liberal
approach. On the one hand, the supposed superiority of the liberal
model implemented in US has been questioned on the basis of evidence
from different productive sectors (see European Commission, 2009).
From a more analytical perspective, some have argued economic analysis should focus on single sectors (industry, service) rather than on
broad economic models. And this revised focus may be used to provide
evidence of a more complex economic dynamic. On the other hand,
scholars have questioned the belief that deregulation and flexibility (in
labour markets) is the right path for more economic growth (Amable,
2009).
A more direct and precise analysis of the overall Lisbon philosophy
has been provided by Mabbett and Schelkle (2007). The authors have
stressed the potential contradiction within the Lisbon and Economic
Monetary Union (EMU) projects and have shed light on the conflicting
political economy of the EUs simultaneous agenda (ibid., page 83).
While for the literature that most embraced the Lisbon Strategy, fiscal
austerity had to contribute to the reform of social and employment
policies (see Rodrigues, 2002). Mabbett and Schelkle agree with the
opposite reading: fiscal consolidation is not expected to help structural
reforms but to lead to more tensions. Reforms losers should be compensated for their losses, but austerity limits the room for that. In such a
context, the Lisbon agenda may get a double whammy from simultaneous fiscal consolidation and welfare reforms: austerity may limit
political consensus in favour of reforms and may lead interest groups to
ask for compensations that obstruct the Lisbon goals. The authors
conclude by challenging the political economy of Lisbon and EMU and
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stressing the potential contradiction between structural reforms and

fiscal stabilisation.
The most recent crisis has largely reinforced such a critical reading:
Pochet (2010) has stressed the persistent tensions (if not contradiction)
between the different aims of the Strategy; especially between the
Stability and Growth Pact and the fight against poverty. Austerity
packages, largely supported by the EU, risk limiting the activation of
social and employment policy to dealing with the further effects of the
crisis.
3) A more central understanding

of social and employment policy?
Political scientists and lawyers have shared a less critical reading of
the Lisbon Strategy and its influence on both EU and national policymaking, and policies. Goetschy (2009) for instance has stressed the
Lisbon Strategys influence on the EUs role in social policies. The
Strategy has been assumed to have contributed to enlarge EU employment and social agenda on matters of national priority (ibid., page
222). And it has been argued that the broader EU agenda with explicit
interaction between economic, social and environmental policies could
help to overcome traditional fragmentation in EU policy-making (see
Zeitlin, 2008). Others have stressed the revised political equilibrium at
the base of the Strategy and the progressive shift of the original compromise between social democracy, liberalism and Third Way towards a more right-centred approach (see Pochet, 2006).
Open questions have recently been asked on the need for a revision
of the key issues at the core of the Strategy and especially on social and
employment policies. For the preparation of the new Europe 2020
Strategy, and in a context of potential long-term employment crisis,
some authors have stressed the problematic implementation of the
flexicurity principle in times of huge economic downturn. Theodoropoulou (2010) stresses flexicurity reforms should not be abandoned
() however the focus must be on creating the conditions to provide
employment security first, before resuming the push for greater flexibility. Another issue has to do with the articulation of the social goals of
the new Strategy: the fact that the EU headline target focuses on social
inclusion/ poverty reduction should not lead to a reduction of both the
visibility and salience of the other policy fields (pensions, healthcare
and long-term care) (see chapters by Zeitlin and by Frazer and Marlier
in this volume).
103
4.4.2 The Lisbon Strategy and its governance

Another strand of the economic literature has seen the foundations of
the Strategy to be correct but has discovered major institutional shortcomings related to EU governance and to the OMC in particular. Such a
research effort has been based on extensive empirical evidence of the
economic performance of EU countries since 2000, the political functioning of the process at national and EU level and the key deliverables of the process.
4) Weak economic policy institutions?

Scholars have firstly analysed the disappointing economic and social performance of the EU since 2000. Comparing the post-Lisbon
period with the previous decade, an extensive literature has stressed that
the EU has not become the most dynamic economy in the world: GDP
growth in EU-15 and the euro area has been much lower than in the US;
long-term productivity has been higher in the US than in Europe; and
while employment rates have improved, the labour market has become
more flexible at the lower end (Collignon et al., 2005; Fitoussi and Le
Cacheux, 2005). Creel et al. (2005) follow a similar approach: the poor
performance of the EU proves that the EU has not developed the coherent economic policy institutions that are needed to foster its potential
growth. The EU thus lacks the real means of a proactive macrostructural policy mix () implementing structural reforms without
coherent macro-economic governance appears to be an impossible
task (ibid., page 4).
Collignon (2003 and 2008) has stressed that the objectives set in
2000 will not be met as a consequence of the weak focus on economic
growth and the ineffective macroeconomic management: institutional
realities and hard-nosed political considerations have often impeded the
realisation of policies necessary to improve the EUs economic performance (ibid., page 5).
The most recent Greek crisis has further contributed to the critical
understanding of the Lisbon governance. This is firstly the case in
regards to the mechanisms implemented through the Stability and
Growth Pact and its interaction with the economic and employment
guidelines. The debate is focused on crisis prevention on the one hand
(need for enforcing existing provisions on auditing, stress-testing of
budgetary policy and incentives for budget reforms) and on crisis
management on the other (e.g. financial assistance, loans, interplay
between EU and International Monetary Fund, etc.) (Marzinotto et al.,
2010). Other contributions to the contemporary literature have then shed
light on the problematic balance between the ministers of finance and
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social policy ministers (Pochet, 2010). And the issue is even more
evident in the governance of the new Europe 2020 Strategy.
5) A still limited participation of stakeholders?

The literature with a more political science and sociological angle
has further developed the analysis of new modes of governance introduced through the Lisbon project. One of the key findings has been that
individual parts of the Lisbon Strategy have their own institutional
dynamics and policy influence. As far as participation is concerned, in
particular, recent research indicates that, in practice, participation in the
whole Strategy has proved to be uneven. As indicated above, the OMC
was interpreted as a particularly participatory mode of governance that
emphasises subsidiarity and as an example of democratic experimentalism (Smismans, 2008; de la Porte and Nanz, 2004).
The social partners and NGOs are involved to varying degrees in the
different strands of the Social OMC (i.e. social inclusion, pensions, and
healthcare and long-term care) at national and supranational level.
Although there is some methodological ambiguity, Tucker (2003)
provided evidence (on the base of reports provided by research networks) that in general the social partners and other groups have not
played a major part in the policy coordination process, but there are
indications that this varies significantly across the OMC and crossnationally. In some coordination processes, for example the OMC on
social inclusion, early indications stressed improvements in facilitating
new forms of meaningful participation of civil society at the domestic
level. This was interpreted as a signal that the OMC has partially
matched the ambition of the Lisbon participatory governance (ibid.,
page 20). This is confirmed by more recent assessments of the Social
OMC (see chapter by Vanhercke in this volume).
Yet, more in-depth analyses of single OMC processes have led to
more sceptical understandings of the participatory dimension. In particular, much research has focused on two categories of actors: social
partners and civil society organisations. Empirical evidence has shown
the broad variety of access venues open at EU level: from informal
meetings between EU officials and NGOs, to formal committee meetings with important differences between policies and competent Directorate-Generals (see also Obradovic and Vizcaino, 2007). But, in the
words of Krger (2008, page 31), access for civil society organisations
to policy processes at EU level is poorly regulated and does not seem to
be equally open to all in all instances () it does not fulfil the democratic norm of both liberal and deliberative democracy.
For Smismans (2008), the European Employment Strategy (EES) to
date has proved to be a top-down approach with an inclusion of
105
regional and local authorities in the implementation of employment

guidelines. The OMC is a technocratic process involving national and
EU civil servants in limited circles of experts.7 In the words of Krger
(2008), consultative practices seem to do little to bridge the gap between the EU and its citizens. As argued by Kerber and Eckardt (2007),
in most strands of the Social OMC the participation of social partners,
local actors, civil society representatives, or even national parliaments,
is weak or non-existent, despite the efforts of the Commission to increase their influence.
6) A more encouraging assessment of learning?

Political scientists have contributed to the more complex understanding of the causal nexus between the Lisbon project and national reforms
introduced so far. As argued by Zeitlin (2009), the national influence
and effectiveness of OMC processes is difficult to assess, not only
because of their variety, complexity and relative newness, but also
because of the methodological problems involved in assessing the
independent causal impact of an iterative policy-making process
without legally binding sanctions.
While economists have been sharply critical of the Lisbon Strategy
and have stressed its lack of efficacy, Zeitlin (2008) has put forward a
more optimistic reading, defining the cognitive impact of the Strategy
and the OMC governance in particular as a qualified success (at least
in some areas). For example, in social and employment policy the
Strategy is held to have helped to raise the importance of national social
policy issues in many Member States, to change policy thinking and
cognitive maps through the introduction in the national debate of EU
concepts (social inclusion, gender mainstreaming, etc), and to redefine
old concepts which have proved increasingly ineffective. The same
reading is shared by Tucker (2003), Jacobsson (2004), de la Porte et al.
(2009) and Frazer and Marlier (present volume) as far as learning
processes in technical committees are concerned. Both EU and national
institutional capabilities have been improved through the definition of
common indicators (Social Protection Committee, 2009).
For Vanhercke (in the present volume) and Zeitlin (2008), OMC
processes have helped to raise the salience and ambition of national
employment and social inclusion policies in many Member States. They
have contributed to changes in national policy thinking by incorporating
EU concepts and categories (such as activation, prevention, lifelong
learning, gender mainstreaming and social inclusion) into domestic
7
For a more positive assessment of participation through the Lisbon Strategy, see
Zeitlin (2007).
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David Natali
debates, exposing policy-makers to new approaches, and pressing them

to reconsider long-established but increasingly counterproductive
policies. Yet, the same authors have focused on the risk of reducing
learning opportunities as a consequence of the introduction (after the
mid-term revision of Lisbon) of a more bilateral (between the Commission and each Member State) rather than multilateral dynamic in the
process.
7) Some influence on national policy-making?

There is also evidence from both official reports and interviews that
OMC instruments have contributed to changes in specific national
policies. Yet, given the active role of Member States in shaping the
development of OMC processes, their relationship to national policymaking should be understood as a two-way interaction rather than a
one-way causal impact. Further positive influence concerns procedural
shifts in governance and policy-making arrangements; mutual learning,
based on the identification of common challenges and promising policy
solutions at EU level; statistical harmonisation and capacity building;
and the stimulus to rethink established approaches and practices. In this
context, some contributions have provided empirical evidence that the
Social OMC has supported a more consensus oriented process of
policy-making (Natali, 2009).
Other scholars (see Kerber and Eckardt, 2007) have advanced some
open questions. In particular, problems with incentives within the
complex process of the OMC have still to be analysed. More detailed
analysis is required to assess the interaction of its many participating
agents, interest groups and institutions, both at the EU and the Member
State level. An important object of future research should be the complex political bargaining processes that lead to common goals, assessment criteria and policy recommendations (ibid., page 241).
Frazer and Marlier (2009) have stressed the need to better link the
future EU social process with other relevant EU processes so that they
are mutually reinforcing. For instance a better integration of the EUs
and Member States social objectives and EU Structural Funds may
improve the influence of the new Europe 2020 on national reforms. (On
the latter point, see also chapter by Jouen in the present volume.)
4.5 Concluding Remarks: Some Hypothesis

on the Future EU Socio-economic Governance
The Lisbon agenda has represented in many respects a decisive step
in the EU approach to social and economic development. Yet, substantive and analytical questions still need to be dealt with to shed light on
107
the present and on the future of EU integration. And the recent financial
and economic crisis has contributed to put them at the core of the scientific and political debate. There are open tensions (or trade-offs) that EU
integration protagonists (and scholars) have to face in the near future.
First, the tensions have to do with the political and economic foundation of the EU project, and the reform of the European social model in
the global economy. The Lisbon agenda represented a first attempt to
find a new compromise through a broad Strategy. Limits have been
evident in its ability to adjust social cohesion and economic competitiveness; environmental policy and productive growth; fiscal stability
and structural reforms. In that respect, the Lisbon Strategy appears as a
mechanical addition of different aims and goals rather than the solution
to such trade-offs. Specific problems have to do with the broad policy
agenda of the future Europe 2020: the tensions between budget, economic, employment and welfare reforms; and the need to focus more on
social and labour market policy. The latter is decisive for the improvement of the EU legitimacy, while economic integration by stealth
does not seem an option for the future of the EU. In this respect, as
argued by Liddle in this volume, Europe 2020 and the Lisbon Treaty
provide room for improvements. The Horizontal Social Clause introduced through Article 9 of the Lisbon Treaty provides a strategic tool
for reinforcing the EU social dimension. And the text of the 10 integrated guidelines and the explicit reference to a smart, sustainable and
inclusive growth are consistent with this more integrated approach.
Here the most problematic aspect is the timing of this attempt for a more
balanced socio-economic agenda. As stressed by Ferrera in his chapter,
these opportunities require time and political mobilisation to be effective. Yet, the crisis and the stricter implementation of budgetary stability
may rapidly reduce the room for defending social entitlements.
Secondly, the governance introduced through the Lisbon Strategy is
still in need of improvements. The recent economic and budgetary crisis
has proved EU governance is still weak. Specifically in the Euro-zone, a
more integrated approach to financial regulation, monetary and economic policy is needed in order to limit the risk of future speculative
attacks against the common currency. And employment and social
policies have to be largely integrated (the new integrated guidelines
represent a promising base for such a comprehensive approach) (European Commission, 2010). Here again, Europe 2020 and the parallel
development of the political and institutional debate (see the recent
Monti (2010) and Barca (2009) Reports) seems promising in its
attempt to mobilise the whole EU toolkit. Both the further integration of
the Single Market and the revision of EU cohesion policy are important
instruments to activate for improving EU socio-economic governance.
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David Natali
The definition of a more ambitious strategy for the EU budget is a key

part of it.
The aim of increased participation and transparency seems far from
being attained. EU democratic legitimacy has not significantly improved
through the Lisbon Strategy, even if improvements in facilitating new
forms of meaningful participation of civil society at the domestic level
are evident. Individual parts of the process have shown different dynamics, with the Social OMC being the most successful. If Europe 2020
wants to improve on that, more emphasis on the integration of EU and
national parliaments and of stakeholders has to be assured. Political
commitment is decisive for the future of the Strategy and of the EU
integration process. More active participation of citizens and stakeholders is necessary for improving the visibility of the process and its
legitimacy. This seems the most urgent problem to face.
It is widely recognised that there have been advances in deliberation,
sharing of information, benchmarking and learning especially through
EU coordination in the field of social protection and social inclusion.
But they seem far from having had a decisive impact on national policies and further impetus has to be granted by the new Europe 2020
Strategy (see Frazer and Marlier, present volume). The latter should be
based on a more effective integration of different policy tools, and the
strict link between coordination and structural funds (EU budget in
general) seems the most obvious step towards a more effective influence
on national reforms (especially in employment and social policy).
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5. Delivering the Goods for Europe 2020?

The Social OMCs Adequacy and Impact Re-assessed
Bart VANHERCKE1
5.1 Introduction
In the ongoing discussions on the future of the Social Open Method
of Coordination (OMC), in particular in the context of the Europe 2020
Strategy, one rather basic element seems to be missing from the debate
(or at least to have been obscured) namely an assessment of the extent to
which the Social OMC (with its three strands on social inclusion, pensions, as well as healthcare and long-term care), has delivered concrete
results. This is a legitimate concern at a time when EU and national
policy-makers are discussing the future role and content of the Social
OMC and the yet-to-be created European Platform against Poverty
(EPAP), the social dimension of the Integrated Guidelines for Economic
and Employment Policies, and the institutional design of the overall
Europe 2020 Strategy.
This chapter therefore assesses the results of the Social OMC with
the aim of answering the question: Has the Social OMC delivered the
goods?2 This issue has in fact been widely debated in the last decade in
the OMC research community: once the initial praise for the OMC (both
by politicians and scientists) started to wane, the process was subjected
to intense scrutiny and found wanting in mainstream academic literature
(Vanhercke, 2007). At first sight this should not come as a surprise.
1
The research done for this chapter benefited from funding from the Communitys
PROGRESS programme and was supported by the Belgian Federal Public Service
Social Security (Directorate-General Strategy and Research) in the context of the
Europe 2020 research project. I wish to thank Caroline de la Porte and Timo
Weishaupt for the collaborative research efforts which led to this chapter; Margherita
Bussi for invaluable around-the-clock research assistance; Eric Marlier, David Natali,
Jonathan Zeitlin, Egidijus Barceviius, Peter Lelie, and an anonymous reviewer at
the European Commission for their constructive criticism on earlier drafts. The views
expressed in this chapter are the sole responsibility of the author. Address for
correspondence: [email protected].
This question is equally addressed in Vanhercke (2010), which presents a more indepth assessment of the recent literature on the Social OMC.
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Delivering the Goods for Europe 2020?
Indeed, viewed in terms of its institutional characteristics, the absence

of a shadow of hierarchy (legislative and executive decisions) would
suggest that this mode of governance cannot deal effectively with the
problems it is supposed to solve (Hritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008). Yet this
chapter argues that through mechanisms such as leverage and policy
learning, this weak policy instrument does produce real effects. The
crux of the matter is this: it is not the hardness or the softness of the
OMC that matters, but its capacity to stimulate creative appropriation
and action by European, national and sub-national actors.
At the same time, this chapter argues that any credible assessment of
the OMC should distinguish between two key dimensions. On the one
hand, the adequacy of the Social OMC is defined as the extent to which
the OMCs architecture (institutional setup) is likely to contribute to
reaching its objectives at EU and national level. In other words, adequacy refers to the theoretical capacity of the OMC toolbox to produce
results. On the other hand, the impact of the Social OMC is defined as
the extent to which the Social OMC has actually influenced policies and
policy-making processes at EU and national level. In other words:
impact refers to the effects of the Social OMC on the ground. Clearly
distinguishing between these two dimensions is indeed important: at
least some of the disagreement between OMC optimists and pessimists can in our view be attributed to the fact that they are looking at
different aspects of the OMC. Quite often theoretically enriched
studies assessing the OMC on the basis of its institutional architecture
(adequacy) do not provide empirical evidence about whether or not
these critical assessments are confirmed by the actual OMC practice.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 explores the different dimensions of the adequacy of the Social OMCs toolbox, reviewing
the Social OMCs communication strategy, its operational value in
coordinating policies at EU level, the features of the OMC toolkit and
its interaction with domestic processes. Section 5.3 assesses the impact
of the Social OMC on the ground, looking at substantive policy
changes, shifts in domestic governance, and its impact on EU-level
policies and politics. Section 5.4 aims at reconciling the apparently
contradictory conclusions with regard to adequacy and impact by looking at some of the mechanisms at work. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes,
providing some forward-looking perspectives with a view to further
strengthening the Social OMCs adequacy and impact.
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5.2 The Adequacy of the Social OMCs Toolbox:

Mixed Evidence (at best)
This section assesses the theoretical capacity of the OMC toolbox to
produce results at EU and national level (adequacy). Wherever possible,
specific attention is paid to the three strands of the Social OMC (social
inclusion, pensions, as well as healthcare and long-term care).
5.2.1 Adequacy of the Social OMCs communication

strategy: public awareness and institutional visibility
Many authors concur with the finding by Krger (2008) that the
OMC is a process marked by its near invisibility in the media and to the
citizens, which explains why labels such as the EUs best kept secret
are attributed to it. A recent evaluation (INBAS et al., 2009) of stakeholder involvement in the implementation of the OMC confirms the
earlier finding (e.g. Bchs and Friedrich, 2005, page 275) that national
reports are rarely, if ever, discussed in Parliament and that the OMC has
not permeated public discourse or the media. What is perhaps even
more worrying is that even for the inner circle of people involved in
the Social OMC, key aspects of the process remain hidden, due to the
fact that the Social Protection Committee (SPC) and its Indicators SubGroup do not make the full panoply of their internal documents (including minutes of meetings) available online (Zeitlin, 2005, page 484;
Marlier et al., 2007, page 244). One of the rare examples of (ad hoc)
public visibility of the OMC is provided by Norris (2007): in 2006, the
recently-elected Portuguese President referred prominently to the inclusion plan in his address on Portugals national holiday commemorating
the return to democracy, resulting in considerable media coverage of the
OMC/inclusion.
But what about the institutional awareness and visibility of the
OMC, including among (sub-)national governmental actors (typically
ministries of social security, pensions and health) and stakeholder
organisations? According to Friedrich (2006) the Social OMC remains
elite-driven and opaque and is therefore limited as regards its democratic potential. Some nuance is in order, however: several national
studies of the OMC/inclusion (less is known about the pensions and
healthcare strands) highlight that the Social OMCs institutional visibility (and thus the awareness of its existence) varies strongly within and
across countries as well as over time. In Belgium some noticeable cases
were reported by Vanhercke et al. (2008) of the strategic use of the
OMC as a governance tool for coordinating local and regional (social
inclusion and gender) policies, indicating a considerable degree of
awareness at different levels of government.
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In spite of these nuances (variation across countries and over time), a

recent assessment of the awareness and perception of the social inclusion strand of the Social OMC3 reaches the firm conclusion4 that it is
clear from the experts analysis that awareness of the social inclusion
strand of the Social OMC is limited to a narrow band of actors in most
Member States. [] In most countries, there is virtually no media or
public awareness of the Social OMC and no political debate about the
process. In only a small number of countries does there appear to be
much interest within the academic community or significant social
partner engagement (Frazer and Marlier, 2008, page 2).
5.2.2 Adequacy of policy coordination at EU level:

objectives, messages and reports
A second dimension whereby the OMC can be assessed is to ask
whether the OMC common objectives, messages and reports are clear,
pertinent and operational. de la Porte (2008) found that the OMC/inclusion objectives are sometimes criticised and sometimes praised in the
literature for their openness. Bchs (2009) notes that the Social
OMCs objectives and guidelines contain different and sometimes
conflicting elements, some of which are more likely to be interpreted in
ways that promote the strengthening of the welfare state whilst others
are more likely to support retrenchment. For this author key concepts
are open to interpretation (e.g. activation).
As regards (the lack of) policy coherence within the OMC, de la
Porte (2007) confirms that the objectives of the Social Inclusion strand
reflect diverging national approaches (Anglo-Saxon, Continental and
Nordic) to this issue. Hamel and Vanhercke (2009) confirm that the first
Common Objective in this strand (to facilitate participation in employment and access by all to the resources, rights, goods and services)
was particularly conflictual and represented the ultimate European
compromise since it is obvious that these are really two distinct priorities, and not one. And yet, the same authors find that the Social Inclusion Common Objectives had a significant influence in Belgian and
French policy-making. This has been most visible in terms of agenda
setting and promoting stakeholder involvement, which clearly facilitated
3
Undertaken in the context of the assessment in social inclusion programme. See:

http://www.peer-review-social-inclusion.eu/network-of-independent-experts/policyassessment-activities.
This conclusion is based on an analysis of the reports produced by the members of
the EU Network of Independent Experts on Social Inclusion (unfortunately, the
national contributions of these OMC awareness assessments were not made
public):
http://www.peer-review-social-inclusion.eu/network-of-independ
entexperts/policy-assessment-activities.
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creative appropriation of the process in both countries (ibid.). Armstrong (2005) in fact doubts whether common EU objectives are all that
significant in stimulating processes of policy problem identification.
The objectives under the pensions strand represent both economic
and social concerns (Pochet and Natali, 2005). On a slightly more
sceptical note, Lodge (2007, page 350) interpreted the principles and
objectives of the pensions strand as the least undesirable outcome of
negotiations between economic and social actors; according to
Lodge the objectives were very weak (and were intended to be so) and
extremely broad, and therefore had no directing capacity since they
allow any policy development to comply with such standards. Similarly, Radulova (2007) concludes that the institutional characteristics of
this strand (lack of Treaty basis, Recommendations etc.) make it a
weak OMC. It should be noted that one of the rare studies available
that actually studied the impact of the Pensions OMC on the ground
(Vanhercke, 2009) concluded that the Common Objectives did indeed
influence the national as well as the EU agenda (see Section 5.3.1).
Discussing the healthcare strand, Greer and Vanhercke (2010) make
the argument that the ambiguous words of the Common Objectives
are in fact useful when there is no fundamental agreement: they create
an opening for new EU competencies while stressing that there would
have been greater efforts to block the common objectives (in health) had
the objectives been clear. And yet the normative orientation of these
healthcare objectives is quite clear for Flear (2009): they not only
extend market rationality and facilitate governing at a distance by
providing inducements for self-management, but they also promote
moves away from equity and solidarity. Writing about the same OMC
strand, Hervey (2008) rejects the claim that the healthcare OMC promotes neoliberal policies, while the European Centre for Social Welfare
Policy and Research et al. (2008) find strong confirmation of pertinence
of overarching objectives of the healthcare strand of the OMC.
Turning to the adequacy of the (subtle) country-specific messages,
observers will recall the negative, collective response of SPC members
to the Commissions implicit efforts to rank the NAPs/inclusion in the
first (2001) Joint Report on Social Inclusion, which closed the door on
anything resembling formal recommendations in the social field. Yet
Hamel and Vanhercke (2009) explain how two cold showers from the
European Commission (through its Draft Joint Reports) with regard to
stakeholder involvement in the elaboration of the Belgian NAPs/inclusion, combined with the acknowledgment (through mutual learning) that
perhaps Belgium was not the best pupil in the class after all, led to real
procedural shifts; i.e. increased stakeholder involvement in the social
inclusion OMC at the beginning of 2005 (see Section 5.3.2).
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It is quite difficult to assess the adequacy of National Strategy reports and guidance notes for the reports. The latter are considered to be
too technical by most scholars, who often do not even know about their
existence. One of the rare reports that addresses the issue is from the
European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN, 2008), which found some
evidence of an increase in specific social inclusion/poverty reduction
targets and for specific groups as a result of the guidance notes. For the
European Social Network the Commissions guidance note should be
more explicit regarding the requirement to set targets and provide
budget details (ESN, 2009).
The adequacy of the National Action Plans and National Strategic
Reports on Social Protection and Social Inclusion can be considered as
a proxy indicator for the quality of the guidance provided. Armstrong
(2005) and Marlier et al. (2007) highlighted that the second
NAPs/inclusion (during the 2003-2005 period) were above all reports,
and called for restructured NAPs/inclusion that should become a
strategic planning exercise, the goal of which is to actually develop an
action plan. This diagnosis is confirmed by Jacobsson and Johansson
(2009) as regards Sweden: the NAP/inclusion is not a strategic document, but instead a report to Brussels about existing activities. This
view is shared by EAPN (2008), while the European Social Network
contends that only a very small number of Member States have used the
reports to (re)assess national social inclusion policies. An analysis of
two rounds of NAPs/inclusion (2004-2006 and 2006-2008) by Sirovtka
and Rkoczyov (2009) confirms this gloomy picture: the NAPs/inclusion reflect the low level of commitment to social inclusion/anti-poverty
efforts in the Czech Republic, which are deemed even lower than in
other new Member States, while the plans do not provide empirical
evidence of how NGOs and civil society have or have not used the
NAPs/inclusion. A different view can be read in Armstrong (2005), who
found that the NAPs/inclusion triggered domestic responses. Norris
(2007) goes even further and describes how in Ireland the processes of
the National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) and the social inclusion
OMC, including their targets and consultations, have largely been
integrated.
The process for analysing reports, consulting with Member
States/other stakeholders and drawing conclusions is, at least in part,
addressed by Sirovtka and Rkoczyov (2009) who note that the
Commission is harsh in its analysis of the Czech report, due to its lack
of precision and commitment. Greer and Vanhercke (2010) provide
illustrations of where the OMC might look soft but, in some cases, it
feels quite hard to those who are affected by it. This was confirmed by
earlier research by Jacobsson (2005), who found that the Swedish
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government showed strong resistance to the social inclusion policy, and

to assessments by the Commission. Another example, provided by
ODonnell and Moss (2005), illustrates this point. They report that the
first Irish NAP/inclusion lacked strategy, data, analysis of problems, and
the identification of or focus on specific target groups. After shaming
by the Commission, the second report was improved, and had a better
strategy and analysis of problems.
A final dimension of the adequacy of policy coordination at EU level
is the Social OMCs capacity to stimulate a genuine policy debate and
build consensus around promising policy approaches. This issue was
addressed by Horvath (2007), who found that most Member States
delegates regard it as essential for the SPC to reach a consensus or
compromise at the end of all discussions. Being able to agree on common opinions is seen as one of the main factors which determine the
success of the SPC. In sum: there seems to be a normative orientation
towards consensus-oriented discussions, even if SPC members who
have been representatives for less than 2 years (became delegates after
the 2004 enlargement) refer less often to consensus, cooperation and
common values.
5.2.3 Adequacy of features of the OMC toolkit:

feeding in/out, indicators and mutual learning
The links between policy strands within the OMC and with other
policy areas at EU level (mutual reinforcement, feeding in/out) can be
considered rather problematic, amongst other reasons due to the lack of
coordination between the strands on pensions, social inclusion and
healthcare. Zeitlin (2008) argues that by excluding the EUs social
objectives from the integrated guidelines, the Union has effectively
returned to the one-sided coordination of Member States social policies
in pursuit of financial sustainability and employment promotion which
the Social OMC was developed to overcome. Unsurprisingly then the
SPC (2009) concluded that the issues of feeding in and feeding out
should be better covered by the Member States and the European Commission, in view of the finding that key social issues are not always
properly acknowledged within the Lisbon agenda. This is corroborated
by Frazer and Marlier (2009) who find that the links between social
inclusion policies on the one hand and employment and economic
policies on the other are in most cases modest and limited. Barbier
(2010) refers to this lack of efficient feeding in/out as les promesses
sociales non tenues (i.e. the broken social promises) of the Lisbon
Strategy.
In the field of health, any attempt to strengthen the adequacy of the
OMC will need to acknowledge the reality, recently spelled out by
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Hervey and Vanhercke (2010), that no fewer than five different sets of
actors are trying to expand their influence on the EU healthcare debate:
the social affairs, internal market, public health, economic and
enterprise players. Together, they have created a very crowded law
and policy-making space to which actors bring their conflicting agendas
and understanding of health policies. According to Greer and Vanhercke
(2010) this reduces the functional capacity of this OMC strand, since it
entails huge competition for time and political attention with other
health policy issues and processes. Others come to a similar conclusion
in the area of pensions, where diverse organised interests try to influence the existing European networks (Natali, 2009; Pochet and Natali,
2005).
The consistency and adequacy of the set of common indicators as
tools for measuring progress towards the common objectives, and for
providing useful guidance for self-corrective action by domestic actors
(diagnostic monitoring) is another key dimension of the OMCs
adequacy. In fact, there seems to be a widely shared understanding that
the availability of comparable and quantifiable indicators constitutes the
litmus test for the political readiness to engage in open coordination
(Vandenbroucke, 2002). In this view, it may come as some surprise that
much of the research on this topic seems to have missed the point that
since the adoption of the initial set of social inclusion indicators by the
Laeken European Council in December 2001 (Atkinson et al., 2002),
work on indicators has continued with a view to refining and consolidating the original set as well as to extending it (Marlier et al., 2007).
Similarly, important progress has been made with regard to pensions
(including an overarching indicator on overall replacement rates of
pensions) and healthcare indicators (Cantillon, 2010). As a result, the
indicators of the Social OMC serve as a source of inspiration for those
working on the analysis and measurement of social policies in a global
context (Atkinson and Marlier, 2010; Social Inclusion Unit (2004).
Nevertheless, critical OMC scholars such as Flear (2009) argue that
even indicators for access and quality of care ultimately seek to optimise
performance, by providing the means to assess whether objectives are
met, and thereby ensure that equity and solidarity are subordinated in a
neoliberal frame. de la Porte (2007) suggested that over-reliance on key
macro-level indicators (such as employment indicators) in Joint Reports
may be misleading as employment/anti-poverty rates depend on multiple factors, not covered by the OMC, while there are no indicators for
some of the OMC objectives (including on participation). Sacchi (2006)
judges that indicators are too general and can be interpreted in different
ways, although they can be seen as flexible tools to be adapted to national needs.
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Clearly, political, institutional and national interests are present in

the decision-making process on definitions and indicators of the Social
OMC. This finding is corroborated by Jacobson (2005), who explains
that while the Swedish and Danish governments are supportive of the
OMC, both countries resist indicators/targets to monitor/assess poverty
and exclusion, due to the norms of the universal welfare state. Similarly,
Greer and Vanhercke (2010) find that difficulties in data collection and
handling, as well as political risks, have slowed down the work on
indicators in the healthcare OMC, and therefore this strand as a whole.
More generally, the latter authors state that new governance mechanisms are intensely political: they are shaped both by deliberative
norms and through hardboiled power games between national and EU
actors (and within Directorate-Generals of the European Commission).
Cantillon (2010, page 2) confirms that the (political) ambiguity of the
poverty concept is reflected in the overarching portfolio of social indicators agreed in the context of the OMC (on the potential role of EU
indicators, see Frazer and Marlier, this volume).
The adequacy of OMC tools available for mutual learning is highly
contested. OMC-sceptical researchers such as Lodge (2007) claim that
the basic infrastructure for the (pensions) OMC to operate has been
found wanting: standards had no directing capacity, informationgathering offered only very little truly comparative information to
encourage benchmarking or learning with others, and voluntary
adjustment pressures seemed hardly present. This finding is confirmed
by Krger (2009), as she finds that the OMC does not satisfy requirements for a learning-friendly environment. Even though it is not entirely
clear what such an environment would actually look like, serious questions can indeed be raised as regards the adequacy of the pensions
OMC, inter alia because the process is not at all visible in the national
arena, and regular peer review sessions (in the SPC) only allow for a
superficial exchange of ideas. Furthermore, more optimistic scholars
such as Greer and Vanhercke (2010) believe that learning, at least in the
healthcare OMC, is of a limited kind because the wrong people will do
the learning (i.e. the international units and not the line officials).
The Tavistock Institute (2006) considers that, in the context of the
Transnational Exchange Programmes, learning did take place within the
programme for those involved but it did not lead to more institutional
changes or partnerships. FEANTSA5 sees the OMC as a way to enhance
mutual learning about the involvement of NGOs (from local to EU
level) in the issue of homelessness; this European Federation is pushing
5
FEANTSA is the European Federation of National Organisations Working with the

Homeless.
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for more thematic peer reviews, which they consider as having a genuine impact (FEANTSA, 2007). SB Consulting (2006) concludes that
peer reviews were most relevant where there were similar initiatives/
governance structures/ problems among peer countries. It seems important, finally, to stress that few of the studies concerned with this issue
make explicit which peer reviews they actually refer to: the largely
formal sessions in the plenary SPC meetings (involving all Member
States), or the more in-depth reviews in smaller groups within the
Peer Review programme6.
5.2.4 Adequacy of the operational framework:

the national level
Another way of assessing the adequacy of the Social OMC is to look
at how it relates to ongoing national processes. Thus, Letzner and
Schmitt (2007) find that the OMC reports are in competition with the
three German national reports on pensions published during each legislature. Bchs and Friedrich (2005) confirm that there are only cautious
signs that some German officials understand the NAP/inclusion as a
national plan and have started to reflect upon a closer relation to the
National Report on Poverty and Wealth (NARB). Similarly, Hamel and
Vanhercke (2009) explain that the NAP/inclusion continues to coexist
with the biannual reports on the evolution of poverty in Belgium, which
the Resource Centre for the Fight against Poverty, Precariousness and
Social Exclusion has been producing since 2001.
This is why Vanhercke et al. (2008) conclude that the social inclusion OMC and pre-existing national reporting and decision-making
channels (with partly overlapping responsibilities) should be better
geared to one another. In a similar vein, EAPN (2008) contends that the
National Strategic Reports (NSRs) should be linked to the national
planning cycle and affirmed as government policy discussed in the EU
and national parliaments. The latter is already the case in Ireland: Norris
(2007) found that national and EU processes have largely been integrated there.
5.2.5 Adequacy of the Social OMC: wrapping things up

Summing up, this section has presented a rather mixed picture of the
theoretical capacity of the OMC toolbox to produce results (its adequacy). Due to the lack of transparency of the process, both the public
awareness about and the institutional visibility of the process are weak
overall, but there are also strong variations between countries and the
6
Peer Review in Social Protection and Social Inclusion: http://www.peer-reviewsocial-inclusion.eu/.
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OMC strands over time. In Section 5.3 we will see that this (lack of
openness) feature of the OMC architecture has important implications
for the possibilities of creative appropriation by actors. The Social
OMCs objectives contain ambiguous and sometimes conflicting elements, while country-specific messages are often deemed too subtle
even to be assessed; at the same time there is evidence that the very
same messages as well as the Common Objectives bite more than is
generally acknowledged. The national reports produced in the context
of the OMC are often seen as administrative documents (rather than
planning devices), but here too important exceptions exist (i.e. triggering national responses, integration into domestic planning efforts). The
adequacy of the linkages both within the Social OMC and with other
policy areas at EU level is rather questionable: feeding in and feeding out do not work.
The adequacy of common indicators as tools for measuring progress
towards the common objectives has equally been criticised by many
authors, especially in the pensions and healthcare strands of the Social
OMC. And yet, some prudence is in order: we pointed to fact that some
of the key developments in the EUs statistical apparatus are simply
ignored by a large part of the literature. There is considerable agreement
that the adequacy of the healthcare and pensions strands of the Social
OMC is severely constrained by the presence of other, competing EUlevel processes. At the same time, the adequacy of OMC tools available
for mutual learning is a subject of intense debate in the literature, not
least because the wrong people would do the learning; in this context,
too, we pointed to an important methodological problem: researchers
should be far more precise about the type of peer reviews they are
assessing, and take into account changes in the OMC toolbox. Finally,
the discussion of the adequacy of the OMC operational framework at
national level suggests that OMC reports are often in competition with
(pre-existing) domestic processes.
In sum, while the Social OMCs institutional setup should allow it to
produce at least some results, some important flaws are also apparent
from the discussion. The question now is whether the flaws imply that
the Social OMC has by and large failed to deliver the goods. The next
section argues that to say so would be jumping to conclusions too fast.
5.3 Assessing the Impact of the Social OMC: Procedural

and Substantive Effects on the Ground
This section assesses the impact of the Social OMC on domestic and
EU policies and politics. This impact has been operationalised along
two lines: the substantive impact of the OMC, i.e. changes in policy
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thinking and individual Member States policies; and procedural

changes, i.e. the impact on the process of domestic policy-making
(shifts in governance and policy-making arrangements)7.
5.3.1 Substantive policy change at the national level:

enhancing commitment,
agenda setting and mirror effects
A reasonable amount of evidence points to the OMCs impact on
maintaining or enhancing commitment to the subject-matter of the OMC
in the political agenda. Thus Zeitlin (2009) empirically demonstrates
that the European Employment Strategy (EES) and the Social OMC
have increased the salience of efforts to tackle long-recognised national
problems: early exit from the labour market, childcare provision, gender
segregation and the integration of immigrants. Others show how the EU
commitment to eradicate poverty pushed the fight against poverty and
the activation issue higher up the domestic inclusion agenda (Hamel and
Vanhercke, 2009). Perhaps even more surprising is that such an impact
has also been felt on sticky institutions such as pension systems.
Thus, when studying the process of pension reform in Greece (prior to
the economic crisis) in the context of the soft policy constraint emanating from the EU, Featherstone (2005) found that the OMC process
lacks the strength to provide a stimulus to domestic reform; at the same
time the author argues that the OMC coverage of pensions affects
Greeces interest in reform (credibility, reputation). A similar finding
applies to Belgium, where EU pressure on the need to reform is strongly
felt, and has become an argument in political negotiations: doing nothing is no longer an option (Vanhercke, 2009). Referring to Germany,
Eckardt (2005, page 263) confirms that, while the OMCs influence on
actual policy transfer seems to be very slight, it may contribute to
accelerating the speed at which reforms are tackled, by repeatedly
putting the overall objectives on the EU and national agendas.
It seems important to underline that not all authors agree with such a
positive account of this aspect of OMC impact. Bchs (2009) for
example, concludes that it is possible that the OMC facilitated retrenching policy reforms by providing necessary discourses and justifications
rendering policy reforms acceptable, e.g. with regard to activation
frameworks: national policy actors seem on average to have interpreted
and implemented them in ways that did not improve or actually worsened welfare state performance. In other words: OMC makes a difference within national social policy development, but not in the way
7
For a more in-depth discussion of the substantive and procedural changes of the
OMC, see Zeitlin (2009a and 2005).
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promoted by the EU or hoped for by optimistic OMC scholars (Cantillon, 2010; Bchs, 2008).
It should be noted that some scholars have pointed out that the OMC
does not merely contribute to enhancing soft law commitments, but is
also used to enhance commitment to the transposition of hard law.
Thus, de la Rosa (2007) explains how soft-law mechanisms are used to
increase the implementation of EU legal initiatives, for example in the
area of non-discrimination. Amitsis (2004) describes how the political
support for soft governance in the field of pensions seems to have
spilled over to its use in the framework of Directive 2003/41 on the
activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement
provision, which uses OMC-type mechanisms (exchange of experience,
benchmarking) to implement this piece of EU legislation. Hervey and
Vanhercke (2010) make a more general point about the introduction of
governance mechanisms within legislative instruments.
There is also considerable agreement about the fact that the Social
OMC is putting new issues on the domestic political agenda: according
to Zeitlin (2009) it has done so in a variety of countries (old and new
Member States) and on a variety of topics, including activation, social
exclusion and child poverty (on the latter topic, see Social Protection
Committee, 2008). This finding is confirmed by Sacchi (2006), who
points to a redirection of national priorities and concerns in the UK (e.g.
more attention to gender issues and child poverty). Illustrating the
hard impact of the OMC, Hamel and Vanhercke (2009), show that in
spite of strong resistance in both France and Belgium against the issue
of child poverty, this topic which previously was virtually absent from
the national agendas gained a place in domestic politics in both countries. It figures among the top priorities of the Belgian Presidency of the
EU in 2010, and was recently associated with a specific target (halving
child poverty) in one of the countrys Regions (Vanhercke, 2009a).
Even more fundamentally perhaps, the OMC/inclusion put poverty on
the policy agenda as a novelty for some countries: particularly in universal welfare states it was not (really) acknowledged as an issue that
deserved specific attention (de la Porte, 2007). It may come as a surprise
that the OMC equally put new issues on some domestic agendas in the
field of pensions. Vanhercke (2009) describes how the pensions OMC
contributed to the (very prudent) introduction of an entirely new element in the Belgian pensions system, i.e. that of actuarial neutrality. It
should be noted that this development has not been particularly welcomed by some of the key Belgian actors: for some it opens the door
for a reduction of solidarity in the Belgian pension system (ibid., page
12).
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Another way of assessing the OMCs impact at the domestic level is

to trace whether its concepts, indicators and categories permeate domestic policy-making, an issue which has in part been dealt with in the
previous paragraphs (e.g. the concept of child poverty). At a general
level, it is widely accepted that the statistical efforts inspired by the
Social OMC enhanced the statistical capacity of many EU Member
States (for a detailed account of the French and Belgian cases, see
Hamel and Vanhercke, 2009). One more concrete illustration of the
permeation of pension OMC indicators into the domestic setting is the
fact that the low (and decreasing) replacement rate of Belgian pensions
has become an issue that for the first time is being studied by the influential Study Committee on Ageing (Vanhercke, 2009). In Germany, by
contrast, EU debates about replacement rates have had no significant
echo according to Letzner and Schmitt (2007, page 237), since they
were already a salient issue in national debate. Another illustration of
the penetration of EU categories is the use of the EU risk-of-poverty
norm, which was developed in the context of the Social Inclusion strand
of the SPSI OMC and which acquired a broader mobilising character, at
least in some countries. Thus, Hamel and Vanhercke (2009) show how a
significant increase in minimum income for the elderly (GRAPA) in
Belgium was politically legitimised by pointing out that the benefit
levels were below the EU risk-of-poverty norm.
Not so much is known about the effective take-up of EU recommended policies (reception and implementation of policy recommendations) within the Social OMC. Those authors who do engage with the
question as to whether recommended policies are being followed often
do so with a command-and-control yardstick, as it is the case for Ania
and Wagener (2008, page 21), who see the OMC as an evolutionary
game, which forces Member States to [] adopt what has turned out
to be the best-performing policy option. Unsurprisingly they conclude
that the plausible idea that the imitation of best practices makes policies converge to efficiency is genuinely misguided. The assessments
by Lodge (2007) and Radulova (2007) discussed in Section 5.2.2 follow
a similar line of thought: since there is no (or insufficient) naming and
shaming, the pensions OMC is necessarily weak. And yet, when
studying the OMC on the ground, Vanhercke (2009) finds that the
pensions OMC, in combination with pressure from the European Employment Strategy, has made the magnitude of the early-retirement
problem crystal clear to Belgian social policy-makers and contributed to
an important mind-shift among trade unions. In other words: naming
and shaming may be more effective than it would appear at first glance
(see also Section 5.2.2).
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The literature provides a number of examples where the OMC has

stimulated self-reflection on national performance. According Letzner
and Schmitt (2007) the pensions OMC has stimulated auto-evaluation in
Germany. In the field of inclusion, Jacobsson and Johansson (2009,
page 175) argue that the OMC/inclusion challenged the normative value
of the universal welfare state, by acknowledging (and indeed framing)
poverty and social exclusion as a challenge to be overcome in Sweden.
While the EAPN (2008) contends that policy self-reflection is not
always effective, process tracing in Belgium and France by Hamel and
Vanhercke (2009) demonstrates how a mirror effect can trigger
significant reforms in domestic policy-making arrangements. For these
authors, the need to expose the national field to others, which is necessary for any comparison, gives a clearer vision of ones own practices
(Hamel and Vanhercke, 2009, page 103-105).
5.3.2 Shifts in domestic governance: horizontal and vertical

integration, evidence-based policy-making
and stakeholder involvement
There is some but not a lot of evidence that the Social OMC is
leading to a more strategic approach (in terms of planning, targeting,
resources assigned and policy analysis) in social policy-making: for
many countries governance by objectives was an entirely new feature
in social policy-making. The impact of the OMC on horizontallyintegrated policy-making seems somewhat more significant. According
to Zeitlin (2009; 2005, pages 457-458) the obligation to draft National
Action Plans for employment and social inclusion (and more recently
also Lisbon National Reform Programmes for Growth and Jobs) has in
many countries strengthened the horizontal integration of interdependent policy fields through the creation of new formal coordination
bodies and inter-ministerial working groups. There is indeed some
evidence that drafting the National Strategy Report was not business as
usual in Germany and led to somewhat enhanced cooperation between
the social and finance ministries (Vanhercke, 2009, page 4), while in
Belgium the preparation of the NAP/inclusion has given rise to new
bodies for coordinating and rationalising policy initiatives across sectors
not only at the federal level, but also at the regional level (Hamel and
Vanhercke, 2009).
Examples of vertically-integrated policy-making (national, regional
and local level) through the OMC have equally been found. Thus,
Sacchi (2006) finds greater coordination among regional and national
actors in Italy, while Armstrong (2006) explains how regional actors in
the UK are involved to varying degrees, some superficially and others
taking the full OMC on board for regional policy development in antiThis document is licensed to Eniko Vincze (3-5256156|00)
129
poverty/social exclusion policy. In France the social inclusion OMC is

providing inspiration for the national administration to redefine its new
(coordinating) role in the context of decentralisation (Hamel and Vanhercke, 2009). In Belgium, participation in the OMC is strengthening
cooperation between (autonomous) Regions, and has increased the
coordination role of the federal level (e.g. through the setting of national
targets for regional competencies). This increased vertical coordination
has created a significant spill-over effect, namely prudent intra-regional
policy learning between Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels (Hamel and
Vanhercke, 2009).
The Social OMC has equally promoted evidence-based policymaking (monitoring and evaluation, the use of indicators, data sources
and analytical capacity). There is in fact widespread agreement that the
EES and the Social OMC have contributed to an increased non-state and
governmental actors awareness of policies, practices and performance
in other Member States; to the identification of common challenges and
the development of shared problem diagnoses (Zeitlin, 2009). Letzner
and Schmitt (2007, page 238) confirm that comparison with other
Member States already existed in Germany, but became more systematic and institutionalised. It is widely accepted that the OMC notably
through the EU-SILC8 statistical system has enhanced statistical
capacity-building in many countries, amongst others in Italy (Sacchi,
2006), France and Belgium (Hamel and Vanhercke, 2009).
As regards stakeholder involvement in the policy-making process,
the evidence is less straightforward. The problem of late consultation
has been established by a variety of sources: in several Member States,
information about the NAP/Inclusion is often organised just before its
submission to Brussels. And yet, contrary to the general claim by
Krger (2009) that the Social OMC is sometimes more closed than the
Community method as it involves a rather closed circle of nonaccountable bureaucrats, Preunkert and Zirra (2009) find that NGOs
have been mobilised, especially in Germany and Italy, due to the
OMC/inclusion process. This point is confirmed by Friedrich (2006): in
Germany the NAP/Inclusion process provided social NGOs with additional arguments and political backing to strengthen their voice in
domestic debates. This evidence supports a recent study on stakeholder
involvement in the implementation of the Social OMC by INBAS et al.
(2009): step-by-step, the process of involving the different stakeholders
within the OMC has improved, even if wide variations persist, both
between Member States and over time.
EU-SILC stands for EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions.
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Bart Vanhercke
In addition, stakeholder involvement through the OMC is largely

limited to the OMC/inclusion, while the other two strands (pensions and
healthcare) remain closed shops. This is why de la Porte and Nanz
(2004, page 278) raise serious questions about the democratic quality of
the pensions OMC strand which fares even worse than the European
Employment Strategy (EES) when assessed according to the criteria of
transparency, public debate, learning and participation. It would indeed
seem that the pension OMC only provides leverage to those policymakers and stakeholders who are already in the inner circle of decision making. As national ministries have acted as gatekeepers of the
pension process, it has not brought new actors to the table (Vanhercke,
2009). Writing about the healthcare OMC, Dawson (2009) equally finds
that the method relies on those already within the inner circle of
Europeanised participants (there is little evidence of the multiplication
or broadening of accountable actors).
5.3.3 Impact on EU level policies and politics:

enhancing commitment, changing actor constellations
and instrument hybridity
A final type of impact relates to the impact of the Social OMC at the
EU level, which includes an enhanced commitment to its subject matter
among new sets of actors. According to Eckardt (2005) the various
OMCs, including that on pensions, make an important contribution.
They provide a forum for the Commission and the various subcommittees involved in developing a commonly accepted European socialpolicy paradigm. Vanhercke (2009a) claims that the recognition that
the pensions challenge is not a financial challenge with some social
constraints, but a social challenge with financial constraints (Vandenbroucke, 2001) allowed for a more balanced EU discourse. The social
dimension acquired a legitimate place, but also gave legitimacy to
economic messages in the field of pensions. Similarly, Hervey and
Vanhercke (2010) explain that the OMC increased the legitimacy of the
ministers of finance to discuss healthcare issues considerably by giving
them a place in the healthcare part of the Concerted Strategy.
The Social OMC has also had an impact on the institutional arrangements in the EU: several authors refer to the important (or even
dominant) role of the European Commission, which skilfully uses the
OMC to expand its influence in sensitive (social) policy areas, as is
shown, among others, by de la Rosa (2007) and Greer and Vanhercke
(2010). This may explain why the Committee on Legal Affairs of the
European Parliament (2007, page 4-5), warns against the indirect legal
effects of soft law which would allow the executive effectively to
legislate by means of soft-law instruments, thereby potentially underThis document is licensed to Eniko Vincze (3-5256156|00)
131
mining the Community legal order. Note that Eckardt (2005) sees only
a mediating role for the European Commission in the pensions OMC.
Vanhercke (2009a) furthermore shows that the EU political playing
field in the area of pensions was changed through the OMC, as the joint
approach to pensions brought a new set of actors to the debate, namely
the Social Affairs Council formation, the SPC and platforms such as the
European Federation of Pensioners and Elderly People (FERPA) and
AGE.
5.3.4 The impact of the Social OMC: wrapping things up

There is broad agreement that the OMC has a considerable impact
both on the Member States and the EUs policies and politics. Substantive policy changes include enhancing commitment to the subject matter
of the Social OMC (also for sticky institutions such as pensions
systems), agenda-setting effects (new issues such as child poverty
emerge) and mirror effects (self-reflection on national performance).
Shifts in domestic governance include horizontal and vertical integration (through new or reinforced structures), evidence-based policymaking and increased stakeholder involvement, at least in some countries and policy areas. The impact on EU level policies and politics
includes enhanced commitment (e.g. reducing early retirement or increasing efforts in the fight against homelessness) and changing actor
constellations. At least in some countries, OMC concepts, indicators,
targets and categories permeate domestic policy-making, while soft-law
mechanisms develop into legal instruments.
Having said this, there is far less agreement about the direction and
scope of OMC impact. While many analyses point to beneficial effects,
others point to undesirable effects, which for some include pushing for
neoliberal solutions and policy tools, worsening welfare state performance and providing legitimacy for economic actors to exert further
influence on social protection and social inclusion. Finally, this section
made it quite clear that impact varies a lot between Member States. This
concurs with the more general conclusion by Vandenbroucke and
Vlemincxk (2011) regarding the Lisbon Strategy: that Open
coordination did not prevent national and regional governments and
social partners from buying in selective bits and pieces of the new
paradigm, but not its gestalt.
5.4 Mechanisms of Change: Explaining the Discrepancy

Between the OMCs Adequacy and Impact
The rather mixed picture of the OMCs theoretical capacity to have
an effect (which we called adequacy) as described in Section 5.2 is
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Bart Vanhercke
largely in line with the more sceptical literature which, on several

occasions, has dismissed the OMC because of its institutional weakness
as a paper tiger: the soft process should not have really significant
effects. At the same time, there is a clear contradiction with the more
optimistic assessments of the OMC in action, which are largely
corroborated by the finding of Section 5.3, namely that the Social OMC
is, at least to some extent, delivering the goods.
This section is aimed at identifying certain factors that could help to
bridge the apparent gap in our understanding of the OMCs adequacy
versus its impact. A first, quite evident element in the explanation is that
many of the studies focussing on the OMCs potential effect (adequacy)
simply omit to look at the actual impact of the OMC on the outcome of
policies or politics. More particularly, few of these theoretically enriched studies (focussing on the instruments of the tool) have looked at
the extent to which the OMC has supported or complemented existing
discourses of particular paths of national reform, which requires a more
in-depth and diachronic analysis.
A second, related explanation is more methodological and has been
addressed in Section 5.2: it seems that few of the (even most recent)
studies dealing with the adequacy of the Social OMC take into account
the many changes in the OMC process e.g. completion of the portfolio
of indicators (e.g. extension to pensions and healthcare), enhancement
of mutual learning activities (e.g. thematic peer reviews), streamlining
(including the introduction of overarching objectives), etc. This is an
important flaw in the literature that will need to be addressed by future
OMC research. It goes without saying that researchers can only include
the state of the art of the OMC toolbox in their analyses if these
instruments are readily available, which is not sufficiently the case at
this moment.
A third, and arguably the most important explanation, is the fact that
the Social OMC is being used by domestic actors. Such creative appropriation involves the strategic use of EU concepts, objectives,
guidelines, targets, indicators, performance comparisons and recommendations by national and sub-national actors as a resource for their
own purposes and independent policy initiatives. It is increasingly
accepted that this is the strongest mechanism of OMC influence on
national social policies9. For domestic actors it is not so important how
hard or soft these instruments of the OMC toolbox are: as long as
they can be used in a credible way, they are real in their effects. This by
9
Note that Baeten et al. (2010) describe Member States creative adaptation in the
shadow of the CJEUs case law on patient mobility. In other words: even though this
is rarely acknowledged, this mechanism also applies to hard law contexts.
133
no means implies that the OMC architecture has no bearing on the

impact of the Social OMC: as we have discussed before, the fact that
the Social OMC remains a relatively closed shop and is a quasi-invisible
process constitutes an important barrier for creative appropriation (see
Sections 5.2.1 and 5.3.2).
A final explanation for the discrepancy between the adequacy and
the impact of the Social OMC is that assessments of the former dimension do not sufficiently acknowledge instrument hybridity, or the
(necessary) interactions between the OMC and other EU instruments.
Thus, the European Social Fund (ESF) Regulation for the 2007-2013
programming period explicitly refers to the OMC, which may provide
important financial incentives that support the (social inclusion component of the) Social OMC. For Hervey and Vanhercke (2010) there is no
reason why in the near future certain elements of the healthcare OMC
would not be taken into account by the Commission, de jure or de facto,
to determine whether expenditure is eligible for assistance under the
Fund (ibid.). For Verschraegen et al. (2011) and de la Rosa (2007) it is
clear that the relationship between the ESF and the OMC works both
ways: if the ESF strengthens the OMC, the latter may (or at least
should) influence cohesion policy (see also chapter by Jouen in the
present volume).
The link between the OMC and the Community method has also received considerable attention. Thus, de la Rosa (2007) explains how the
Social OMC ensures regular follow-up of certain non-discrimination
Directives. Hervey (2010) provocatively examines rulings by the Court
of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in the shadow of the informal settlement.
Even though the latter piece does not directly deal with the Social OMC
(case studies are the European Employment Strategy and the Bologna
Process on Higher Education) the findings are highly relevant, as they
indicate not merely the possibility that the CJEU might take elements of
the OMC into consideration (as already indicated by Greer and
Vanhercke (2010) in the case of healthcare), but takes this one step
further by illustrating that this kind of spillover is happening already.
Again, this could help to explain why soft governance has more
impact on the ground than could be expected from a purely functional
reading.
5.5 Conclusions and Next Steps

In this chapter, we have tried to explain how the Social OMC, in the
absence of a shadow of hierarchy (Hritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008), can
still produce a significant impact on domestic and EU policies. An
important key to this explanation is creative appropriation, which has
replaced policy learning and naming and shaming as the most
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Bart Vanhercke
important mechanism explaining the OMC impact (even if it is clear

that while actors use the OMC for their own purposes, this may involve
changes in their cognitive and normative frames resulting from policy
learning). It is now widely acknowledged that the OMC can only have
an impact if it is being picked up by actors at the domestic level, who
use it as leverage to (selectively) amplify national reform strategies. In
other words: the infrastructure of the processes (having strong
recommendations, NSR, peer reviews, indicators, reporting cycle) only
matters insofar as it enables or constrains actor involvement and leverage (see Section 5.2.5). The CJEUs actual (as opposed to theoretical)
use of soft law mechanisms in its judgements and the integration of the
Social OMC into the ESF Regulations present additional arguments to
nuance views that oppose hard and soft governance.
As a consequence, the hard politics of soft law is not fiction: this
chapter has shown that the OMC in different policy areas is felt and
perceived as being much harder than might have been expected. This
is a first conclusion of this chapter, and it has important consequences
for any future analysis of the Social OMCs impact, which will have to
take into account the degree to which a variety of actors at different
levels have engaged in, and appeal to the OMC to pursue their objectives10. At the same time, this creative appropriation dimension calls
for greater investment, including from the European Commission, in
further strengthening the OMC infrastructure with a view to enhancing
the involvement of stakeholders. At the domestic level, public authorities should organise national peer reviews, in which a wide variety of
domestic actors discuss the Commissions suggestions in the Country
Fiches as well as the reports written by independent experts in the
framework of the peer reviews programme funded by the European
Commission under the Community Programme for Employment and
Social Solidarity (PROGRESS).
A second important conclusion is that the Social OMC has been institutionalised at national and EU levels in ways that may not have
been expected: it has become a template for soft governance, not only
at EU level, but also for coordinating social (inclusion) policies in some
federalised countries. The Social OMC has become a trusted resource
admittedly, among others for a variety of domestic and EU actors; and
it has become linked to other EU policy instruments such as legislation
and EU funds. Yet the linking of the Social OMC to other policy instruments needs to be strengthened. Thus, Ferrera (2009, page 231)
posits that the setting of precise and measurable targets within the
10
Vanhercke and Campaert (2009) make a similar point regarding the creative use of
ESF-funding for pursuing local activating policies under the radar.
135
Social OMC, as recently agreed upon in the Europe 2020 Strategy,

could be the first concrete step towards the establishment of binding
regulatory standards (on the issue of targets, see also chapter by Walker
in the present volume). Of course, we know that the pathway to such
binding regulatory standards will be long and uncertain. The idea of
making the EU Structural Funds (and especially the ESF) conditional on
achieving the objectives of the Social OMC should be further explored
in the context of the post-2013 EU Financial Perspectives. As the saying
goes: Put your money where your mouth is.
It is to be hoped that when domestic and EU decision makers decide
on the next steps to be taken as regards the Social OMC, those choices
will be evidence-based (rather than purely political). In spite of the
flaws and pitfalls surrounding the Social OMC (with its three strands), it
seems that the more Social EU called for by this book will need to
build on a strengthened Social OMC complemented (rather than replaced) by an efficient EPAP. It is essential to further institutionalise a
broad Social OMC, which is not exclusively geared to poverty and
social exclusion, thereby contributing to disambiguating Lisbon
(Cantillon 2010). The Social Protection Committee and the Social
Affairs ministers should safeguard a political space in which they can
have their say on any EU initiative or development with potential social
consequences. This of course not only includes topics such as social
inclusion, but also pensions, healthcare and long-term care, services of
general interest, education and climate change.
This broad reach should also apply to the need to strengthen Social Impact Assessment at national and EU levels (see chapter by
Khnemund in the present volume). In a similar vein, the existing set of
indicators should be further developed so as to underpin the common
objectives, more particularly by focusing resources on indicators that
measure the social adequacy of a variety of benefits, including pensions,
unemployment, invalidity etc. (see also Cantillon, 2010). In parallel,
participatory governance indicators (including at the regional and local
levels) would greatly improve the monitoring and assessment of national practices with regard to social protection and social inclusion
policies.
In spite of its obvious flaws, at least in some important respects, the
Social OMC has delivered the goods after all. And a strengthened Social
OMC has a key role to play in Europe 2020 if one of the objectives of
the new Strategy is indeed to deliver a more Social EU.
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Bart Vanhercke
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6. Assessing the EU Approach

to Combating Poverty and
Social Exclusion in the Last Decade
Mary DALY1
6.1 Introduction
One of the most significant achievements of the Lisbon European
Council in March 2000 was to place social issues firmly on the EU
policy agenda, reinvigorating EU social policy which had been in the
doldrums since the heady days of the Delors era in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. Poverty and social exclusion have been central to the new
momentum the first decade of the new century was a time when the
EU made one of the most concerted attempts anywhere in recent history
to engage with poverty and social exclusion. There was nothing foretold
about this the EU is primarily a project oriented to markets and economic efficiency. It has placed its faith in a market-led strategy for
growth rather than, for example, redistributive policies aiming for social
justice and equality. Moreover, the EUs space for manoeuvre in social
policy was and is limited: the principle of subsidiarity (which grants
Member States autonomy in social policy) as well as the resulting weak
legal competence and lacking funds for redistribution seriously restrict
the EUs role in social policy. Against this background, the aim of this
piece is to outline and assess the anti-poverty/social exclusion activities
of the EU in the last decade. The Lisbon process offers a unique opportunity to study: a) the evolution of poverty and social exclusion as
concepts for policy and analysis in contemporary times; and b) the
extent and coherence of the EUs latest social policy activities.
The aim of the piece is to offer a critical analysis of the ideas and
substantive policy models underlying the Open Method of Coordination
on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (the so-called Social OMC).
Governance is not the focus here (see chapters by Frazer and Marlier, by
Vanhercke and by Zeitlin in the present volume). Rather, the relevant
1
I would like to thank Eric Marlier for his detailed comments on parts of an earlier
draft. I am indebted also to both Dave Gordon and Ruth Levitas for very helpful
feedback. Address for correspondence: [email protected].
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Assessing the EU Approach to Combating Poverty and Social Exclusion
social policy statements, activities and agreements are analysed and

assessed for how they conceptualise and understand poverty and social
exclusion. Focused on the Social OMC, the piece proceeds in four parts.
Section 6.2 is devoted to a short historical tracing of the two concepts in
EU activities prior to Lisbon. We move on from this to analyse how
poverty and social exclusion were framed in terms of objectives and
policy orientations under Lisbon and empirically as objects of measurement and indicator development (Sections 6.3 and 6.4). A short
conclusion brings the piece to a close (Section 6.5).
6.2 The Background to Poverty and Social Exclusion

in the EU Repertoire
Neither poverty nor social exclusion was a newcomer to the EU
stage in 2000. Indeed, the two concepts have a rather long and intertwined history within the EU.
Poverty is the elder of the two concepts. EU policy interest in poverty dates back at least to the early 1970s when the first anti-poverty
programme was introduced. This programme, like its two successors in
the 1980s, mainly consisted of term-limited projects that undertook
research, information exchange and evaluation. The word programme
is something of a misnomer, however, especially if we understand it in
terms set by the national welfare state template wherein anti-poverty
measures usually take the form of minimum income provisions redistribution is their mtier. The EU, as always with social policy, is different. The first poverty programme (subsequent ones also) consisted of a
relatively small number of local projects in Member States which were
focused on experimental actions around information, research and antipoverty activity. Building up a credible information base about social
and economic problems in Europe and how they could be counteracted
was a key goal of these programmes. Following the first programme in
the 1970s, there were two more which ran in the 1980s and early 1990s.
The Commissions plans for a fourth poverty programme in the mid1990s were scuppered mainly by Germany and the UK which opposed
a role for the EU in the area of poverty other than in the capacity of
research coordination. Some say that it was the attention focused on the
politically contentious concept of poverty that was unpopular with
Member States (Berghman, 1995). Since then, a different approach has
been adopted and the concept of social exclusion has increasingly
accompanied that of poverty.
In fact, the EU has been one of social exclusions main advocates
and sponsors, since the concept first appeared in French social policy
discourse in 1974 (Silver, 1994; Levitas, 1998). As it established itself
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Mary Daly
over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, the social problem orientation
of the social exclusion approach was highlighted that is, it focused on
a range of social ills such as unemployment, marginalisation or homelessness. However, social exclusion is a concept with a more wideranging set of references than individual social problems. At the micro
or individual level, it is meant to pick up on the cumulation of numerous
conditions of disadvantage such as low income, poor health, low education and skills and social isolation. People are seen to be cut off from
the mainstream, cast adrift by the disempowering and immobilising
effects of various disadvantages. At a more macro level, the concept
proffers two types of structural critique. On the one hand, economic
change, in particular the decline occasioned by de-industrialisation and
jobless growth, have distanced many people from the labour market. In
its second structural register, social exclusion points to problems in and
of society. The failure here is one of social integration the capacity of
existing structures and arrangements to enable people to be active
participants in social life, to engage in supportive social relations and to
give their loyalty to a common moral and social order. With such a
broad-ranging set of references, social exclusion is one of those chameleon-like concepts whose meaning can be stretched in numerous, even
conflicting, directions.2 It is for this and other reasons a controversial
concept academic scholarship is far more critical of it than social
policy practice (Levitas, 1998; Daly and Saraceno, 2002). In the EUs
usages, the meaning has varied as a short overview of the concept in EU
discourse prior to Lisbon demonstrates.
Social exclusion made its first official appearance on the EU stage in
1989 The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for
Workers (the Social Charter as it is known) was one of the first highlevel EU policy documents to refer to social exclusion. The context here
was the run-up to the Single European Market. The Resolution of the
Council of Ministers for Social Affairs on Combating Social Exclusion,
issued in 1989, was the concepts birth certificate, however (Council,
1989). In this document, social exclusion was differentiated from poverty and emphasis was laid on structural factors and in particular (reduced) access to the labour market. The solution proposed was to
improve opportunities and access to services such as education, employment, housing, community services and medical care. In late 1992, the
Commission issued a Communication with the title Towards a Europe
of Solidarity Intensifying the Fight against Social Exclusion, Fostering Integration (European Commission, 1992). This was the high
watermark of EU discursive engagement with social exclusion prior to
2
Social cohesion is another such concept.
145
Lisbon. A visionary document, the Communication developed a horizontal understanding of social exclusion, pointing out that social exclusion involves not just disparity between the top and the bottom of the
socio-economic scale but also between those comfortably placed within
society and people on the margins. The White Paper on social policy,
issued in July 1994, while very focused on labour-market related measures and with an undertone of what would later become known as
activation, made a case for EU action in the field of poverty and
social exclusion, especially in terms of the integration of those excluded
from the labour market (European Commission, 1994). At this stage
unemployment, employability, labour force adaptation and job creation
were monopolising policy attention in Europe. Conceiving of these as
European phenomena or problems, the extraordinary European Council
held in Luxembourg in November 1997 gave the EU competence in
employment policy. However, in a considerably less-heralded development, it also inserted social exclusion into the Amsterdam Treaty (which
entered into force in 1999), adding a new Article (137(2) TEC) authorising measures to facilitate cooperation among Member States in order to
combat social exclusion. Although if judged against the yardstick of
legal regulation it might be seen as weak in that knowledge exchange
is hardly a substitute for strong EU competence, the new Treaty provision was to provide a legal basis for a specific EU-wide process in this
area in 2000.
Obviously then, social exclusion had a considerable history in EU
social policy deliberations prior to the March 2000 Lisbon European
Council. One has to ask why the preference for social exclusion though?
There are a number of reasons. First, with poverty out of political
favour, social exclusion had numerous benefits in an EU context, not
least the fact that as a diagnosis and set of solutions it seemed to fit
the rapidly changing times and capture the emergence of new forms of
deprivation. Second, social exclusion is a concept with a strong orientation to change and so could easily provide the basis for a discourse
about updating the European social model. A normative concept such as
this could help to identify the common values underlying the European
social model (which has always been an element of EU activity). Third,
there was also the concepts newness. This meant that it was not
associated with any of the existing welfare state models in the Union
and so an EU stamp could be imprinted on it (Daly, 2006). Bauer (2002)
has suggested that the Commission had to generate a new discourse
(that is, social exclusion) in order to legitimate the EU as a social policy
actor (given the subsidiarity principle). Other factors were causal also,
not least the need to develop an approach that spoke to the concerns of a
range of Member States. Social exclusions wide analytic lens and
chameleon-like character meant that the concept could be manipulated
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Mary Daly
and stretched to fit very different kinds of settings. This is almost de

rigueur in an EU social policy context given that the Member States
have very different social policy traditions. So social exclusion, for
example, captures something core to the Continental European welfare
states where social policy serves a social integration function in the
sense of creating a harmonious society and managing the contestation
that emanates from social class inequalities. In the more liberal-oriented
states such as the UK and Ireland, social exclusions references to lack
of involvement in the labour market strikes a chord as does its interest
in minimum income for these are countries oriented to poverty alleviation. Hence, the double use of poverty and social exclusion in the
Lisbon programme has to be attributed to these origins also. When set in
this complex background, it is little wonder that the EUs usage of
social exclusion has varied in meaning and application over time
rather than an accident this was almost a condition of its usage. The next
section focuses on how poverty, social exclusion and more broadly
social protection have been conceived in the Lisbon process.
6.3 Social Policy Emphases in Lisbon

The agreement reached at Lisbon in March 2000 by the EU Heads of
State and Government ushered in a period when social exclusion was
foregrounded for the purposes of EU policy cooperation and coordination. For the first five years of Lisbon anyway, social cohesion (which
was interpreted in terms of reducing social exclusion and poverty) sat
alongside job creation and economic growth as objectives of this new
phase of EU development. Given the simultaneous focus on all three,
one could say that the EU went beyond the market-building project to
develop a positive social policy project (Jacobsson, 2009). As is now
well known, the fields in which EU processes were initiated included
employment, social exclusion, pensions and healthcare, in the overall
goal of achieving a balanced pursuit of economic, employment and
social progress (Dieckhoff and Gallie, 2007, page 481). From the perspective of social policy, the initial Lisbon agreement brought two core
developments: a) an agreement that Member States would coordinate
policy on employment, poverty and social exclusion; and b) the application and development of the OMC to these domains. This very innovative governance mechanism consisted of common objective setting and
regular progress reporting and review of progress at both national and
EU levels. The open method was introduced first for employment in
1997, then in poverty and social exclusion in 2000, pensions in 2001
and healthcare and long-term care in 2004. (For a detailed historical
account, see Marlier et al., 2007, Chapter 2.)
147
It would be wrong to treat Lisbon as if it were a single development

or phase. In fact, there have been two social Lisbons. The first lasted
until March 2005, the second from then until June 2010 when the
Lisbon Strategy and all agreements and plans relating to it were replaced by the Europe 2020 Strategy. Dissatisfaction with results and
the pace of achievement of the original objectives especially in relation
to economic growth and job creation led to a review of the process in
2003 (European Communities, 2004). Against the wishes of some actors
in the process especially the economically-oriented actors3 social
Lisbon survived. A new cycle of governance, begun in 2005 with the
relaunch of Lisbon in March of that year, saw the integration of the
employment and economic policy processes into a single national
reform process (focused on growth and employment making for social
cohesion). The social inclusion OMC was kept separate, although there
was to be greater synergy and conversation (in the sense of each being
expected to feed into the other) between its strategic goals and those of
the national reform process as well as greater synchronisation of timing.
The social process itself also underwent reform, mainly in that the
heretofore separate processes of social inclusion, pensions and healthcare and long-term care were integrated (streamlined in the EUs
inimitable language) from 2006 on in an attempt to rationalise and
strengthen them. Social protection and social inclusion was the umbrella term applied to this integrated set of social policies. The objectives also changed; Table 6.1 shows how.
Table 6.1: Dominant emphases of the common objectives
relating to poverty and social exclusion in the EU under Lisbon
2000-2004*
2005 2010**
Facilitate participation in employment and

access by all to resources, rights, goods and
services
Guarantee access for all to the basic

resources, rights and social services
Address extreme forms of exclusion
Help the most vulnerable
Inclusion in employment
Fight poverty and exclusion among the
most marginalised groups
Prevention of the risks of social exclusion

Ensure good policy coordination
and involvement of all relevant actors,
including people experiencing poverty
Mobilisation of all relevant bodies
* European Council (2000). **As expressed in European Commission (2005) and (2008).
3
These are centred around the European Commissions Directorate-General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), the ECOFIN Council, and the EU Economic Policy Committee.
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Mary Daly
Comparing the emphases over the different periods, Table 6.1 shows
that between 2000 and 2005, EU social policy had a blueprint for a
relatively radical attack on social exclusion. It covered a range of bases:
access to resources, rights, goods and services, helping the most vulnerable, preventing social exclusion, and mobilising those affected. The
orientation was more social democratic than anything else: the desired
European model was one that emphasises social rights and understands
the community as one in which people are or should be economically,
socially and politically included. However, this strong vision did not
survive the changes in 2005 and by 2005 the blueprint had altered
significantly. There were three main changes. First, as mentioned,
making a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty and social
inclusion became one of three strands of a streamlined social process
(along with pensions and healthcare and long-term care) rather than the
prime focus as previously. The second change was in the understanding
of how social inclusion (now dominant as a term) would be brought
about. This was seen to follow from success in achieving targets on
economic growth and jobs and the reform (modernisation) of the
European social model rather than, as previously, the result of concerted
actions. In effect, the social goals were downgraded in the sense that
they were to follow from economic priorities rather than to be aimed for
directly. This set the scene for the third set of changes the objectives
themselves became narrower and more focused on particular domains
and sub-groups (compare the two columns in Table 6.1). In the poverty
and social exclusion strand, labour market participation came to be more
heavily emphasised as did the extreme forms of exclusion. Furthermore, the efficiency of policies and coordination replaced mobilisation. Involvement was the new term used; it was framed in terms of
policy coordination and governance rather than as formerly political
engagement. While it would be an exaggeration to say that the relaunched Lisbon switched to a different paradigm moving from social
development in its own right to social development as trickle down from
economic growth the second phase of Lisbon was much more neoliberal in orientation than the first.
In terms of social policy substance, over the course of the ten years
of Lisbon, four substantive social policy issues have emerged to the
front of the social process (apart from pensions and healthcare) (see also
chapter by Frazer and Marlier in the present volume). The first is active
inclusion, especially of those furthest from the labour market. This was
developed especially in a European Commission Recommendation on
active inclusion which sets out the principles and practical guidelines on
a comprehensive strategy based around three pillars: adequate income
support, inclusive labour markets and access to quality services (European Commission, 2008a). The second strong focus has been child
149
poverty and child well-being. As well as being highlighted throughout

the process, this was activated by a thematic year on the subject in 2007
and the adoption of a report on the subject by the Social Protection
Committee (2008), which Frazer and Marlier (2010) suggest is the first
EU-wide benchmarking exercise based almost exclusively on the commonly-agreed indicators. Thirdly, homelessness and housing exclusion
have been prominent in the Social OMC process and these too were the
subject of a thematic year (2009). Fourthly, underpinning all of these
and also more generally in the EUs approach as developed through
Lisbon is a recognition of the importance of the availability of a range
of social services. All can be traced to a social exclusion perspective
(although they are rooted in other concerns and concepts as well). As
mentioned, social exclusion has a core concern with labour market
issues and so the EUs focus on those furthest from the labour market
evokes a particular interpretation of social exclusion; the concern with
child poverty reflects an understanding of the long-term effects and
inter-generational transmission of poverty and social deprivation; the
emphasis on homelessness picks up on the extreme marginalised
references in the concept; access to housing and other services is underpinned by a recognition that income on its own is an insufficient cause
of and response to exclusion. If Lisbon has a distinctive identity as a
social policy project, it is in the emergence/acceptance of these by the
Council and the Commission (although not necessarily by the Member
States) as common social policy concerns and important objects of
policy attention. It is hard to see a distinctive social policy model here
although some have claimed it as a social investment approach (Palme,
2009). In my view, it is too incomplete, too fragmented and the process
has been too fluid to depict social policy under Lisbon as a distinct
social policy model.
As well as putting substance on a social policy programme around
poverty, social exclusion and social protection, the Lisbon process has
also devoted considerable resources to defining and empirically measuring the phenomena and problems involved.
6.4 Poverty and Social Exclusion in Empirical Terms

One of the key elements of the Social OMC and of the EUs engagement with poverty and social exclusion is that it set in train a series
of data and measurement-related resources, discourses and activities. In
fact, over time these have assumed increasing importance. A new panEuropean data survey the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) was implemented progressively as from 2003; it now
covers all 27 EU countries as well as a growing number of non-EU
European countries (for example, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, SwitzerThis document is licensed to Eniko Vincze (3-5256156|00)
150
Mary Daly
land, Turkey). EU-SILC replaced the European Community Household

Panel Survey (ECHP). It is based on the idea of a common framework
and no longer a common survey as was the case for the ECHP. The
common framework defines the harmonised lists of target primary
(annual) and secondary (every four years or less frequently) variables to
be transmitted to Eurostat; common guidelines and procedures; common
concepts (household and income) and classifications aimed at maximising comparability of the information produced. EU-SILC mainly focuses on income detailed income components are collected mainly at
personal level although a few income components are included in the
household part. In addition, information is collected on material deprivation, housing conditions, labour-related activities, education and
health.
The process has also generated a considerable degree of activity
around the production of a set of cross-national statistical tools and
benchmarks to inform and improve policy monitoring in the domain of
poverty and social exclusion (as well as pensions and healthcare and
long-term care, which are not addressed here). This has been a primary
task of the EU Social Protection Committee (SPC), the EU body consisting of officials from each Member State as well as representatives of
the European Commission which serves as a vehicle for cooperative
exchange between the European Commission and the Member States in
regard to modernising and improving social protection systems and their
indicators. In 2001 the Committee established an Indicators Sub-Group
to work on the development of indicators and statistics in support of its
tasks.
The result is both an ongoing discourse about the measurement of
poverty and social exclusion and an agreed set of common indicators
that have been continually updated over time.4 At the 2001 Laeken
European Council, 18 indicators for social inclusion were adopted
(Table 6.2, column 2). These have been further developed and reworked. In 2009, the SPC adopted a revised set of indicators covering
all three strands of the Social OMC, with major additions to the EU
social inclusion portfolio which now also covers housing (on the indicators agenda since 2001) and material deprivation. Indicators and data
are of deep significance they help to define a common set of phenomena and obviously to measure it. Marlier et al. (2007, page 146) suggest
that the investment in both the EU-SILC and the development of common indicators have the potential to transform the basis for social
4
The SPC Indicators Sub-Group also develops indicators in the other two strands of
the Social OMC (i.e. pensions as well as healthcare and long-term care), which we
do not discuss in the present chapter.
151
reporting in the EU. They qualify the statement because the indicators
are not used as well as they might be, either in terms of being adopted
by Member States for their own analysis and policy development or
being applied by Member States or the EU in systematic, forensic-type
analyses which detail the problem and the causes.
Table 6.2: Commonly agreed indicators of poverty and social
exclusion (in social inclusion and/or overarching EU portfolios)
Dimensions
2001
2006*
2009**
2010 target
indicators
Income poverty At-risk-of-poverty At-risk-of-poverty At-risk-of-poverty At-risk-of-poverty

and inequality
rate
rate
rate
rate
Relative median Relative median Relative median
at-risk-of-poverty at-risk-of-poverty at-risk-of-poverty
gap
gap
gap
Persistent at-risk- Persistent at-risk- Persistent at-riskof-poverty rate
of-poverty rate
of-poverty rate
S80/S20 (income S80/S20 (income S80/S20 (income
quintile ratio)
quintile ratio)
quintile ratio)
Economic
activity
Long-term
unemployment
rate
Long-term
unemployment
rate
Persons living in
jobless households (0-17 and
18-59)
Persons living in
jobless households (revised
definitions;
0-17 and 18-59)
Persons living in
jobless households (revised
definitions; 0-17
and 18-59)
Employment gap
of immigrants
Coefficient of
variation of
unemployment
rates at regional
level
Educational
disadvantage
Health
Coefficient of
Coefficient of
variation of
variation of
employment rates employment rates
at regional level at regional level
Early school
leavers
Early school
leavers
Early school
leavers
Life expectancy at
birth
Self-defined
health status by
income level
Healthy life
expectancy
Self-reported
unmet need for
healthcare
Healthy life
expectancy
Self-reported
unmet need for
healthcare
152
Persons aged 0-59

who live in
households with
very low work
attachment
(threshold 0.2)
Mary Daly
Dimensions
2001
Material
deprivation
Child
well-being
Housing
Housing costs,
housing quality
and homelessness explicitly
identified as
important
priority for
indicator
development
2009**
2010 target
indicators
Share of population living in

households lacking at least 3
items among the following 9:
i) unexpected expenses,
ii) one week annual holiday
away from home,
iii) pay for arrears (mortgage or
rent, utility bills or hire
purchase instalments),
iv) a meal with meat, chicken or
fish every second day,
v) keep home adequately warm,
or could not afford (even if
wanted to, i.e. enforced lack)
vi) a washing machine,
vii) a colour TV,
viii) a telephone,
ix) a personal car
Share of population living in

households lacking
at least 4 of the 9
deprivation items
agreed in 2009
2006*
To be
developed
In process
To be
developed
2 secondary indicators and 2

context statistics adopted, but
further work, including further
improvement of the quality of
the data is needed before a
primary housing indicator can
be identified.
There are still no EU indicators
on homelessness
* As in the streamlined social inclusion Laeken portfolio of primary indicators as

agreed by the SPC on May 22nd 2006. ** European Commission (2009).
It will be obvious from Table 6.2, which shows only the primary EU
indicators for social inclusion, that the discourse and practice as regards
indicators is becoming more differentiated and complex over time. From
the outset, primary indicators were differentiated from secondary indicators, then revision in 2006 added another layer of context indicators and
made a useful distinction between national and EU indicators. The
latter differentiation has been instrumental in allowing flexibility and
responsiveness to emerging issues and local context (Marlier et al.,
2010). Now, since June 2010, there has been a further elaboration which
will be discussed later.
153
Table 6.2 shows the evolution of the primary indicators over the four
iterations. Looking at the left-most column, we can see that from the
outset, poverty and social exclusion were conceptualised in terms of
four domains: income (level and inequality), economic activity (unemployment, joblessness and regional cohesion measured by regional
variation in employment rates), educational disadvantage, and health
status. Of these, income predominated until 2009; since then, the portfolio has become more balanced across the different dimensions. In 2006,
the indicators were reviewed, especially to reflect the streamlining of
the social protection and social inclusion processes. A glance at the
appropriate column in Table 6.2 shows the inclusion of a new domain in
relation to employment gap of immigrants. A slot for one or more
indicators of child well-being has been foreseen since 2006 and work on
these is in progress since 2007. EU material deprivation indicators,
added in 2009, focus on financial stress, consumption deprivation and
household facilities a threshold of lacking any three is designated as
indicating deprivation (for the Europe 2020 social inclusion target, the
threshold has been raised to four items). This move to a standardised
measure of disadvantage has been in the pipeline for a considerable
period and the agreement to have an indicator on it is significant in an
EU context given strong resistance among some Member States. It is
also controversial since setting out a threshold for the standard and style
of living has many political implications and is considerably adrift of
how many Member States conceptualise and measure poverty and
deprivation.
Taking an overview, we see that income poverty has been to the
fore, especially in the early period, and that there are a number of
different income poverty measures in the EU list:
At-risk-of-poverty rates at different thresholds (40%, 50%, 60%
and 70% of the national median equivalised household
income);
An at-risk-of-poverty gap to measure the intensity of poverty;
An at-risk-of-poverty rate anchored at a point in time;
A persistent at-risk-of-poverty rate.
While the underlying thrust is to be as precise as possible about the
measurement and what is being measured, one outcome of this now
common practice of giving multiple definitions and indicators is to open
up income poverty as a matter of interpretation. Contributing also to a
possible destabilisation of the meaning of poverty is a linguistic change
instead of poverty the EU speaks in terms of at-risk-of-poverty.
While this is a more accurate term from a definitional perspective, it
does tend to change poverty from a condition to a risk and, overall, it
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Mary Daly
destabilises the meaning of poverty and renders it a function of measurement rather than a condition that exists for real people in real life.
We see also that indicator development has extended considerably
beyond income poverty and income inequality, so much so that the
indicator list has now a much stronger claim to multi-dimensionality. In
fact, the indicators have a stronger claim to multi-dimensionality than
the policy substance. This suggests some disjunction between the
objective setting and the indicator setting/ monitoring, as does the
absence of a set of indicators for the fourth objective (of mobilisation
and/or policy coordination see last row of Table 6.1).
The breaking news in relation to the Social OMC is the agreement
by the June 2010 European Council on a social inclusion/ poverty
reduction target of 20 million by 2020. This is a major development.
Targets in the social domain have always proved controversial and no
EU-wide poverty reduction target was agreed over the 10 years of the
Lisbon process in fact this is the first such target ever in the EU and it
has major implications (see chapter by Walker in the present volume).
In the social field in particular, it represents something of a different
tack. The last column in Table 6.2 gives an idea of how the target is to
be operationalised. In effect, there are three possible indicators: at-riskof-poverty rate (based on the 60% median threshold); deprivation (the
indicator used for the target is measured by a less lenient threshold as
compared with the standard EU indicators of lacking at least four of the
nine listed items); and the proportion of people in households with a
low work attachment.
The latter is new and is effectively a measure of so-called work intensity.5 Using a combined measure6 a household is defined as poor if
any of the three conditions hold true:
Low income (60% median threshold)
AND/OR materially deprived
AND/OR in a jobless household.
In July 2010, the SPC and its Indicators Sub-Group agreed to set the threshold for
this work intensity indicator at 0.20 primarily because above this limit the rates of
poverty and material deprivation start decreasing rapidly. The definition used for the
targeted indicator is quite different from that used for the standard indicator of jobless households; the data source is also different (EU-SILC in the case of the target
and the Labour Force Survey in the case of the standard EU indicator of joblessness).
In line with the principle of subsidiarity, Member States may choose to use any of the
three, two, or all three. In fact, they may even choose an indicator of their own preference, although they must (in theory at least) make an evidence-based case for their
choice of indicator if they move away from the EU-specified indicators.
155
On the basis of the figures for 2008, this definition gives an EU

population of 120 million poor or socially excluded people which is
the population level from which progress towards the 20 million target
will be measured.
While much is unknown about how the target as a global or national
target will be reached, there are both opportunities and risks in it. The
opportunities lie in a firmer commitment and normative framework
around poverty and social exclusion. The risks are that it might propel a
move back to a more uni-dimensional approach (rather than the multidimensionality implied by social exclusion), that there is too much
individuality allowed to Member States in defining their conception
of the target, and that the resulting actions will leave untouched those
most mired in poverty and deprivation (what Robert Walker in his
chapter terms creaming; see also chapter by Frazer and Marlier).
6.5 Conclusion and Overview

The Lisbon process constitutes one of the most significant attempts
anywhere to come to terms with the complexity and multidimensionality of poverty and social exclusion, especially from a technical, measurement point of view, and to author a social policy approach which rests centrally on these two concepts. While there is much
debate and discussion over whether the Lisbon process has been a
success or not and it is still too early to come to a definitive conclusion
in this regard, it is possible to identify a range of achievements.
1. Poverty has been put on the EU political agenda and the still new
concept of social exclusion has been elaborated as an approach to
social policy. The EU approach has a number of hallmark features:
a multi-dimensional understanding of disadvantage is offered
which merges incomes with a wider perspective but stays close
to exclusion from the labour market as the guiding frame;
participation by the disadvantaged themselves is raised as an
objective of policy (although is not operationalised from the
perspective of measurement and its significance in the EU programme declined over the 10 years of Lisbon);
agreement has been reached on the use of an innovative and
highly complex set of indicators to measure the nature of the
problems and progress towards addressing them.
2.
Although it offers a broad interpretation, the Social OMC has
focused on emerging risks and target groups. While these are very
worthy of emphasis, there is a critical point to be made that the selective approach risks fragmentation. This is true at two levels.
First, it is evident in the focus on three strands of social policy:
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Mary Daly
poverty/social exclusion, pensions and healthcare and long-term

care. These make for a rather hollow and incomplete social policy
programme. Second, within each of these strands, the Lisbon
process has picked up on particular policy areas. In the poverty
and social exclusion strand for example, there have been four major thematic areas: active inclusion, child poverty and child wellbeing, homelessness and housing exclusion, access to services.
The result is that the EU tends to follow a fragmented or selective
approach which could be said to be patchwork in nature.
At the time of writing (July-October 2010), the details of the post
Lisbon scenario are not yet clear. Apart from the poverty target, two
other developments are known. First, a guideline on poverty and social
inclusion (Guideline 10), which sets out the policies to reach the proposed target and which will probably form an important part of the
future social objectives (though not the sole basis as other guidelines
also include major social elements), has been included under the ten
Europe 2020 Integrated Guidelines for growth and jobs adopted by the
Council (see opening chapter). This guideline, the only one with an
explicit social inclusion focus, is one of four employment guidelines.
For those sceptics who have always seen the EU interest in poverty and
social exclusion as at root a liberal-oriented, labour market-related
project, the location and relative loneliness of the poverty guideline
are proof positive of this. However, in its content the guideline is quite
broad and emphasises the importance of access to high quality, affordable and sustainable services and the key role of social protection
systems (including pensions and access to health care). It therefore
restates some of the fundamental principles established to date and as
Ferrera points out in his chapter has a social rights orientation. The
second known element of the new programme or project is that it will
comprise a European Platform against Poverty (EPAP), one of seven socalled flagship initiatives. No details are available at the time of
writing on what will be the focus and content of this initiative.
As we look forward and take account of what happened under Lisbon, a number of lessons from the first ten years merit emphasis.
1. It is important to stabilise and consolidate the meaning and focus
of the poverty/social exclusion approach. There are two issues
here. First, the ink was hardly dry on the very ambitious objectives
agreed at the Nice European Council in December 2000 when they
were changed in the relaunched Lisbon Strategy in 2005. Secondly,
for this and other reasons, there has been instability in how the EU
has understood the problems that the Social OMC is meant to
address and the causal processes involved. One can identify several
competing visions during the ten years of Lisbon: one focusing
157
2.
3.
4.
primarily on low income and access to minimum income or social

assistance; another focusing on activation and labour market exclusion as the primary cause of social exclusion; a more inclusive,
society-based analysis alongside a narrower, extreme cases type of
focus or, in other words, shifting emphasis on the social conditions
of all to those of the poor and marginalised. No social policy
project can be sustained with such diverse interpretations of what
the core problem is. A longer-term perspective and clarity in the
understanding about the core challenges are therefore essential
preconditions as we go forward.
There is also the matter of closer linkages between the three
strands of the Social OMC: pensions, healthcare and long-term
care, and poverty/social exclusion. These have, to date anyway,
proceeded more or less along separate tracks, in many ways
reflecting policy-making patterns at Member State level where
these are typically covered by different ministries or departments.
The linkages between them have to be much more clearly
explicated for a streamlined process to take root.
As well as greater coherence in the focus of the social policy goals
and objectives, it is also vital to clarify the place of social policy in
the larger economic project. As we saw, social cohesion was
effectively downgraded during the course of Lisbons ten years:
from a stand-alone position at the outset of the process it was
transformed into something that would follow from economic and
employment growth. There is leeway and potential in the Europe
2020 framing to upgrade social exclusion and poverty, making
them a fourth pillar (along with economic development, employment and environmental factors).
The two levels focused on in this piece (policy focus and indicator
development/empirical measurement) have proceeded along
parallel tracks rather than as an integrated whole. They need to be
brought much closer together and in fact can be used in a complementary fashion, not least in that the data and use of indicators can
help to provide a more grounded and causal analysis and lend
policy development a stronger evidence base. If used to best effect,
the developments in conceptualisation and measurement would
allow a more penetrating analysis of the strengths and weaknesses
of existing approaches within and across Member States and also
at EU level. They would also facilitate an understanding of the
more structural references in the concept of social exclusion rather
than the descriptive approaches that have predominated to date.
The processes that lead to exclusion and poverty would be the
focus rather than those affected by the processes (which is the
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Mary Daly
strong tendency in the current emphases on the long-term

unemployed, children and the homeless).
The foregoing analysis provides a basis on which to conjecture about
the possible form and contribution of the EPAP. In my view, the EPAP
should be seen as complementary or value-added to the Social OMC. It
should have more than a single objective or focus and should operate at
a number of levels. In terms of roles, one function could be to identify
innovative linkages among social policies and between social, employment and economic policies for example, treating this as a matter of
policy design, policy implementation and policy monitoring. Another
way in which it could have a forward-looking perspective is in terms of
forecasting and identification of emerging issues and possible solutions.
A third possible role would be to achieve a presence for and raise the
visibility of the Social OMC at national level. As a national-level set of
activities, this could encompass awareness-raising and knowledgediffusing actions around poverty and social exclusion. The hope would
be that this would help to raise political commitment in the Member
States to prioritising social issues. A related function would be to improve or sustain high stakeholder engagement. Of course, awarenessand commitment-raising and stakeholder-binding activities are also
necessary at EU level for the Social OMC has had relatively little
visibility at this level also. A fourth possible role or function is around
monitoring and impact assessment. As shown in this chapter, much
energy has been devoted under the Social OMC to developing a set of
indicators. The next step is to apply these in a systematic fashion to
enable not just stocktaking but monitoring of impact. We need to know
much more about how different policy programmes operate and their
impact in response to the problems they are meant to address in different contexts (see chapter by Khnemund in the present volume).
Finally, all of this has to be set within the new opportunities opened
up by the new Lisbon Treaty and Article 9 in particular (the so-called
Horizontal Social Clause; see opening chapter). As Ferrera shows in
his chapter in this volume, the Treaty provides the justification for EU
action on a broader range of social issues than heretofore (including a
high level of education, training and protection of human health and a
reduction of inequality). Given that there is now a stronger legal base,
EU action on poverty and social exclusion among other domains need
no longer to depend on a community of the willing (a phrase used by
Jacobsson (2009: 127)). What the analysis of the development of poverty and social exclusion under Lisbon suggests, though, is that every
step on this ground will be hard fought and highly contested and that
political commitment (at a range of levels) has to be carefully nurtured.
159
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7. A Territorialised Social Agenda

to Guide Europe 2020 and
the Future EU Cohesion Policy
Marjorie JOUEN1
7.1 Introduction
In April 2009, the European Commission published an independent
report written by Fabrizio Barca, entitled An agenda for a reformed
cohesion policy (Barca, 2009). The report developed an in-depth
analysis of what makes cohesion policy exemplary, and what should be
preserved or deepened, highlighting the excesses and false interpretations that need to be eliminated or re-framed. It included many proposals that aim to give cohesion policy a key role in the dynamics of European integration once more. The key concept that was supposed to give
coherence to the new regional policy was the territorialised social
agenda.
In this post-crisis period, this report should act as a point of reference within the wider debate on the policy model associated with the
European socio-economic model of development. The Europe 2020
Strategy certainly makes more room for the social dimension than the
2005 refocused Lisbon agenda (which considered only growth and jobs
issues), by promoting smart, sustainable and inclusive growth on an
equal footing. Yet it did not establish any clear relationship between the
territorial dimension and the EU targets (in the field of social inclusion,
employment and education; see opening chapter) on the one hand, and
the flagship initiatives on the other (i.e. the agenda for new skills and
jobs, the European Platform against Poverty, and Youth on the Move)
associated to a greater or lesser extent with this third pillar. Worse still,
there were worrying signs that the Commission appeared to be consider-
I wish to thank Fabrizio Barca for his helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier
version of this paper even if I take of course full responsibility for its content. Address for correspondence: [email protected].
163
A Territorialised Social Agenda to Guide Europe 2020
ing the option of separating the European Social Fund (ESF) from the
Structural Funds2 after 2013.
As we approach the start of the official negotiations on the future of
the EUs cohesion policy and as the Member States begin to bring their
policies into line with the Europe 2020 priorities, it is time to examine
the Barca reports proposals so that we can make best use of them.
Some of its ideas should be developed and detailed in the form of
concrete measures and legal provisions, with a view to transforming the
territorialised social agenda into a road-map for EU action in the coming months.
To this end, the present paper begins by returning to the main messages set out in the Barca report. It then proceeds to discuss the various
methods and tools that could be used to socialise cohesion policy, and
ultimately to territorialise the EU social objectives.
7.2 The Barca Report: An Inspiring Blueprint for

Addressing Social Issues from a Territorial Perspective
7.2.1 Cohesion policy as an EU integration tool
In his report, Barca first explains that the EUs legitimacy hinges on
its capacity to have a decisive impact on the lives of EU citizens
without interfering in national or local practices, but rather by marking
out the contours of a common vision. He then considers that the territorial dimension of cohesion policy represents a cornerstone around which
the policies of EU development should be built. In so doing, he is
expanding further on Jacques Delors initial vision, i.e. competition
that stimulates, cooperation that strengthens, solidarity that unites,
which underpinned the Single Act along with its two principal achievements, the single market and regional policy.
In short, from 1988 to 2007, EU action in the field of cohesion policy increased dramatically from 10% to more than 40% of the EU
budget. During the first 10-15 years, the Structural Funds comprised
five funds: ESF, ERDF (European Regional Development Fund), Cohesion Fund, EFF (European Fishery Fund) and EAFRD (European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development). These funds were closely integrated into regional or area-based development programmes, according
to specific objectives (e.g. less-developed regions, declining rural
areas, industrial restructuring areas, etc.). Since 2000, the integration
Currently, the Structural Funds are the European Social Fund (ESF), the European
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund.
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Marjorie Jouen
rule has weakened progressively and the sectoral funds for rural and
coastal areas have been managed separately.
Barca highlights a succession of weaknesses that have hampered cohesion policy over the past ten years:
a gradual shift in semantics and ideas that has led to cohesion
policy being seen as a form of redistribution or an instrument of
approximate convergence by increases in GDP per capita;
the process of Lisbonisation, which as from 2005 emphasises
competitiveness to the detriment of solidarity and which impoverishes the role of multi-level governance in cohesion policy;
the idea that the social dimension is the price we have to pay
for achieving unity in our markets and currency, rather than as
an end in itself.
On this particular issue, Barca believes that, in fact, the reverse is
true: the economic element of the EU project is not the main objective,
but rather a means of achieving prosperity and peace in the Union.
Barca believes that cohesion policy has played a major role in the
paradigm shift at national, regional and local levels in the conduct of
policies to support growth, investment, human resource development
and day-to-day democracy. This policy was not however capable of
creating a broad EU consensus, giving visibility to the most efficient
methods, or of stimulating sustained innovation on the ground.
He criticises the excesses that neo-liberal thinking have brought
about through the intellectual complacency of a majority of the economics profession (quoting D. Acemoglu) over what markets can
achieve. For him, the division of labour between, on the one hand, a
Union that is preoccupied with markets and liberalisation, and, on the
other, Member States which guarantee social protection and well-being
leads to a dead-end. Instead, he believes that the progress of EU integration assumes an allocation of responsibilities and multi-level cooperation mechanisms guided by high-level political compromise. This
compromise, similar to the Rousseauian idea of a social contract, is
vital for todays enlarged Union. To achieve a re-founding status, this
compromise should encompass not only the economic dimension of the
European project but its political and democratic dimensions as well.
7.2.2 Major assets of a place-based development policy

A large part of the Barca report is dedicated to the debate between
cohesion policy (i.e. a place-based policy) and the sectoral policies (i.e.
place-blind policies). Barca devotes much attention to the debate which
is currently raging among the worlds development policy gurus (notaThis document is licensed to Eniko Vincze (3-5256156|00)
165
bly, World Bank 2008 and OECD 2008). Some of these analysts, who
have distanced themselves from the Washington consensus but who are
still uncertain as to the institutional capacities at decentralised levels,
seem to consider geographic inequalities as an inevitable product of
growth. As a result, they call for policies that encourage mobility, along
with spatially blind measures, preferably managed at national level.
Barca positions himself firmly in the opposing camp. He uses the
comparison with the United States to cast aside any thought of replacing
cohesion policy with sectoral policies. He urges the introduction of a
place-based policy, which he considers to be:
a long-term development strategy aimed at fighting both the
under-exploitation of full potential and the persistent social
inequalities in a given place;
centred on the integrated production of public goods and services, determined in accordance with local preferences and
knowledge, through participatory political institutions;
supported by a system of multi-level governance which includes financial transfers subject to strong conditionality.
For him, the place-based paradigm is infinitely superior simply because it is more effective. It makes it possible to identify and take
account of peoples preferences and knowledge. Moreover, it avoids the
one-size-fits-all syndrome, by allowing public goods and institutions
to be tailored to local needs. It is particularly suitable to Europe, where
as a result of various interdependencies and legacies, most challenges to
globalisation and the Single Market concern places rather than sectors.
It is also the only feasible solution since, unlike the sectoral paradigm, it
is compatible with the EUs limited democratic legitimacy. What is
more, sectoral top-down interventions are not consistent with the role of
the Member States in the area of social and economic development. On
the contrary, place-based interventions combine the EUs responsibility
for setting goals and guidelines with the national, regional or local
actors responsibility for implementing policy according to contexts.
In Barcas view, cohesion policy has been constricted by the perpetual tensions between subsidiarity (giving freer rein to lower-level
authorities, following the rationale that they are closer to the ground and
therefore better able to choose suitable measures) and conditionality
(obliging lower-level authorities to follow rules, in line with the imperative to make the ensemble coherent). It has suffered from a prevalence
of poor political reasoning, such as the argument about a fair net
return, hiding the weaknesses of internal governance, the monopolisation of European funds by local elites, favouritism, etc. In a context
where academic discourse is discrediting public intervention, this
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Marjorie Jouen
tension has resulted in a gradual erosion of the consensus around the

added value contributed by the EU.
As a consequence, the cohesion policys territorial dimension has
been gradually limited to local development (with the LEADER programme in rural areas and the URBAN programme in towns) and
territorial cooperation, rather than occupying a place at the heart of the
policy. Priority has been given to support for sectoral economic policy
(tourism, research, support for SMEs etc.) and social policy, effectively
endangering the effectiveness of cohesion policy.
Barca backs his position with reference to current academic knowledge about development dynamics, and the theories of new economic
geography about the role of agglomerations, market forces, institutions,
etc. This analysis allows him to ensure that his plea for external public
intervention directed towards supporting local potential is based on
solid economic arguments. He explains that the endogenous politicaleconomic-social process cannot eradicate certain cases of inefficiency
and social exclusion for three main reasons: local elites may lack the
capacity to innovate, they may not be willing to do so and they may not
be sufficient for innovation.
For Barca, all regions must be eligible for cohesion policy, to the extent that the two problems identified under-exploited local potential,
and social exclusion may very well manifest themselves at subregional levels. It is for the national or regional authorities to determine
the appropriate geographic perimeter where such problems are present
and where public interventions have a chance of success.
His final argument against sectoral policies consists of a rejection of
the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as a possible alternative path
for affluent regions that could no longer benefit from the Structural
Funds. For him, this should be seen as a step backwards, because cohesion policy represents a somewhat more advanced approach. It uses the
right methods to handle different levels of governance and to integrate
various sectors within a comprehensive policy. Today, the OMC targets
only national policies within a sectoral logic. In addition, its capacity to
involve sub-national levels has proved disappointing, despite the willingness of these actors to play an active role.
7.2.3 Territorialised social agenda: a comprehensive concept

Barca calls for a fundamental change in the policys direction, based
on five general principles gleaned from past experience: the concentration of resources; orientation of subsidies towards results; mobilisation
and learning; strengthening of the Commission; reinforcement of a highlevel system of checks and balances. He considers that these proposals
167
cannot be implemented gradually, but instead must be introduced

immediately. Hence, a general agreement needs to be reached, which
assumes the simultaneous conclusion of three types of negotiations
concerning resources, governance and goals. He explains that the EU
would not be withdrawing competences from the Member States in the
welfare sector, but rather accepting the consequences of economic
transformation (globalisation, single market, etc.) and existing policies
(Lisbon Treaty, Stability and Growth Pact).
He sums up his proposals as follows: Re-launching cohesion policy
requires both the adoption of a strong political concept and reform of
the priorities and governance. It also requires building a new political
compromise, linked to an appropriate negotiation calendar.
The so-called political concept is a territorialised social agenda, i.e.
a development policy which aims to achieve both efficiency and social
inclusion in other words, a policy aimed at giving all places the
opportunity to make use of their potential (efficiency) and all people the
opportunity to be socially included independently of where they live
(social inclusion).
Barca insists that cohesion policy should rely on two key concepts:
efficiency and equity. He defines territorial efficiency as the capacity
of a territory to make the most of its resources. In fact, the full exploitation of local potential is determined not by the given technological
conditions, but by the interaction of institutions and decisions both
private and public, economic and political. As for equity, Barca essentially refers to the recent advances made by the OECD, the World Bank
and the EU itself, acknowledging the multi-dimensional character of
social exclusion and the added value of social-inclusion policies which
work against factors beyond the control of individuals. These advances
today open up a little-contested field of possibilities for a territorialised
approach to social exclusion.
Barca considers that these two concepts deserve equal attention.
Even if there are occasionally synergies between efficiency and equity,
the link is not automatic: social exclusion does affect the overall efficiency of a locality, but improving local efficiency does not necessarily
guarantee social inclusion. As an example, he explains that territorialisation should not be seen as a synonym for immobility and that the EU
should bear the extra costs of maintaining populations within its territory and also allow individuals to choose whether or not to move. By
the same token, it would be misleading to consider that affluent regions
should be exempted from concerns about social inclusion, since pockets
of poverty are sometimes highly local in nature and inequalities exist
between individuals.
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Marjorie Jouen
The priorities that should be the focus of cohesion policy may be defined based on the notion of the European public good (a good which
benefits all EU citizens, one of which no one can or should be deprived)
and three criteria the EU character of the problem (EU-wide relevance); the suitability of solving it through the adoption of a territorial
approach (place-based nature); and the possibility of conclusively
checking the effectiveness of the policy (verifiability). Then, six priorities may be envisaged and opened up for discussion: in the area of
territorial efficiency (innovation and climate change); in the area of
social inclusion (migration and children); and, with equal importance,
skills and ageing.
7.2.4 Reforming governance

For Barca, the reason for the failure of the Lisbon agenda is crystal
clear: defective governance, not to mention defective multi-level governance. This diagnosis, even if expressed in a more nuanced manner, is
also shared by several social policy analysts (see for example chapters
by Natali and by Frazer and Marlier in the present volume). Conversely,
however, this very aspect is one of cohesion policys biggest assets
(Bache, 2008). Thus, the strong political compromise that must form the
basis of a European socio-economic development model can be established by drawing up a European strategic development framework
this should take place prior to budgetary negotiations and be detailed at
national and regional levels.
The proposed system aims to restore a balance between the different
levels of governance, and thus, in a certain sense, to put national
authorities in their place authorities which have never been slow to
weaken European action even if this means losing powerful support.
Conscious of the fact that it is not possible to circumvent the national
level entirely, yet equally aware that this level often represents a problem or obstacle to European cohesion, Barca imagines a system which
makes the national level accountable to higher (European) and lower
(regional or local) levels. The formula proposed is a new contractual
relationship between the Commission and Member States (or sometimes
regions), which focuses much more on performance and in terms of
central priorities provides room for adapting institutional changes to
specific contexts. These contracts would be specific to each country
and would take shape according to the results of a strategic national
debate on priorities and objectives.
Barca acknowledges the policys role in spreading a culture of assessment previously unfamiliar to most countries at national level,
and especially at regional and local levels. However, he regrets that it
has not really enabled any growth in knowledge as to the effectiveness
169
of development policy. In general, Barca believes that the weakness of

micro-economic assessments results from the responsibility given to
Member States in the absence of an impact assessment strategy and in
the presence of a strong tropism in terms of criteria and procedures.
Thus, to make the action of multi-level governance effective, Barca
advocates reinforced conditionality within the framework of these
contracts. In his view, they represent the only technique that might be
capable of combining conditionality and subsidiarity. However, he is
not nave as regards the risks of by-passing or blockages that may
threaten tests of conditionality (verification of additionality, performance conditions, etc.). What is more, he has no illusions about the
unwieldy nature of the various controls. He therefore proposes a reversal of current practice: clauses affecting administrative procedures
should be strictly adhered to, whereas those targeting results and impact
should benefit from a degree of tolerance.
Barca does not underestimate the challenge of transforming the current national strategic reference frameworks (NSRF) into agreements on
aims and means, to which Member States and regions will commit
themselves. He therefore foresees a somewhat complex arrangement
which would leave Member States and regions significant room for
manoeuvre regarding the exact targets of subsidies on condition that
the strategic justifications are defined from the start, the objectives
identified and the criteria for the impact assessment are incontestable.
The Commissions role would be substantially changed as a result: it
would intervene to carry out concrete assessments of the implementation capacity of national or regional authorities. The monitoring of
contracts would allow for annual reports by Member States, presentation of the results obtained and their relation to the initial objectives and
targets and would serve as a basis for more thorough discussion
among the Member States.
In addition, various measures are envisaged to improve the quality of
the assessments and collective learning. Although Barca retains the
current systems principle of co-financing, he advocates improving
coherence between cohesion policy and the Stability and Growth Pact
and puts various proposals on the table. To rebuild the cohesion policys
capacity for innovation, he imagines a dual system, with specific budgetary obligations for Member States and a specific budget to enable the
Commission to approve the most interesting experiments and to conduct
its own experimentation.
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Marjorie Jouen
7.3 Europe 2020: an Opportunity to Socialise

the Cohesion Policy
7.3.1 Opening up a new field of action
for local and regional authorities
Unquestionably, the Europe 2020 Strategy marks a turning point in
relation to the policy pursued since the end of the 1990s, for it must not
be forgotten that some of the premises of the Lisbon Strategy were
already present in the European Employment Strategy launched in 1997
and that the Agenda 2000, which served as a basis for the 2000-2006
programmes, was devised in 1998. From the viewpoint of local and
regional authorities and cohesion policy, this change involves both
governance and the stated goals.
As regards governance, while the lack of ownership by the general
public in the Lisbon process was constantly deplored (Committee of the
Regions (CoR), 2009; Fabry and Fernandes, 2010), some experts and
stakeholders have stressed the interaction between the Structural Funds
and the Social OMC as one of the good practices (Metis, 2009; Eichhorst et al., 2010). Drawing on these lessons, the European Commission
states that all national, regional and local authorities should implement
the partnership, closely associating parliaments, as well as social partners and representatives of civil society, contributing to the elaboration
of national reform programmes as well as to its implementation (European Commission, 2010). In return, the Structural Funds and the cohesion policy are called on to help by participating in achieving the
Europe 2020 Strategy objectives.
This new situation seems to have been relatively well perceived by
local and regional authorities, who see here a potentially well-balanced
opportunity to strengthen their involvement in the decision-making
process, rather than comply with constraints which are inappropriate
and ultimately inoperable (Association of European Regions, 2010;
CoR, 2010 and 2010b). After having stressed the specific nature of
cohesion policy and its objectives derived from the Treaties, the Committee of the Regions has transformed the overall offer of partnership
into a campaign encouraging the conclusion of Territorial pacts between national governments and regional and local authorities to
achieve the Europe 2020 objectives (CoR, 2010a). These pacts would
aim at establishing common agreement on quantified targets and policies adapted to the specific conditions of individual countries in order to
feed into national reform programmes. They would also touch upon the
conditions for policy implementation, given that in some fields and in
171
some Member States, in particular the most decentralised ones, implementation is almost exclusively the preserve of the regions.
The Committee of the Regions has also announced its intention to
produce an annual monitoring report on the overall participatory process
and, more particularly for the flagship initiatives, to evaluate the results
achieved according to the level of governance and the methods used.
7.3.2 A possible socialisation of cohesion policy

As regards aligning cohesion policy more closely with the Europe
2020 priorities, not least social inclusion, this requirement can be considered to correspond to the need for EU measures to be more effective,
as has been indicated earlier (Frazer and Marlier, 2009). Moreover, a
better integration of different policy tools and policy coordination, on
the one hand, and the Structural Funds on the other, seems the most
obvious step towards a more effective influence on national reforms
(see chapter by Natali in the present volume).
From the point of view of policy content, this represents an ideal opportunity to put into effect Barcas recommendations (see chapter by
Ferrera in the present volume). Whilst talking about a territorialised
social agenda, Barca drew attention, above all, to the existence of a
new challenge for cohesion policy and argued in favour of taking
greater account of the social cohesion objective. He came to the conclusion that there was a need to introduce criteria concerning individuals,
in addition to criteria for local and regional authorities, in order to
determine the allocation of Structural Funds. Thus he was interested in
finding the best way of giving cohesion policy a social dimension. This
appears to be the very challenge referred to in the June 2010 European
Councils conclusions, which state that neither cohesion policy nor the
common agricultural policy must be sidelined.
It seems possible to reintroduce Barcas six-point agenda (innovation, climate change, migration, children, skills and ageing) on the basis
of which each region will be able to make its own choices, according to
its economic and social circumstances, strengths and weaknesses,
provided that the three strands (smart, sustainable and inclusive) of
Europe 2020 are present. Balancing these three strands will probably
also have to be adapted to the needs of each region.
Faced with the tendency towards an excessive willingness to focus
action, it will probably be important to remember the often-used argument that social inclusion should not be a separate policy objective
since it is naturally correlated with growth. However, empirical evidence shows that no correlation exists and, in reality, the balance between the two is an empirical matter. This suggests that social inclusion
172
Marjorie Jouen
and efficiency objectives must be kept distinct from each other, and the
contracts promoted by Barca may offer a suitable framework for them.
This means too that the use of the ESF and ERDF should be closely
integrated within regional development programmes. Such an approach
now seems to be supported by the European Commission (see the
Commissions Communication of 9 November 2010; European Commission, 2010d).
This broad approach obviously fed into the Communication on the
EU budget review (European Commission, 2010c) which states that, in
the poorest regions, cohesion policy support is important to tackle issues
such as social exclusion or environmental degradation, for example in
urban areas. It also details the content of the menu of thematic priorities directly linked to the Integrated Guidelines and flagship projects of
Europe 2020 which will be offered to Member States and regions for
concentrating EU and national resources. In practice, the European
Commission intends to adopt a Common Strategic Framework which
would encompass the action covered today by the Cohesion Fund, the
ERDF, the ESF, the EFF and the EAFRD and would also identify
linkages and coordination mechanisms with other EU instruments such
as programmes for research, innovation, lifelong learning, and networks.
7.3.3 Performance criteria which can be used immediately

As regards the other major failing highlighted by Barca, namely the
predominance of financial controls and focus on absorption capacity to
the detriment of the evaluation of practical results, the June 2010 European Councils decision to set a social inclusion/poverty reduction
target (see opening chapter) may help considerably. The target and the
indicators on which it is based, together with the other commonly
agreed EU social indicators, should also make it easier to carry out the
monitoring and the analysis needed to establish an appropriate development strategy at national, regional and local level (see chapters by
Frazer and Marlier, by Walker and by Zeitlin in the present volume). In
addition, the commonly agreed indicators should be used diagnostically
to understand why some Member States may be performing worse than
others against their respective national targets (Marlier et al., 2007).
In practice, for small countries with national programmes, these indicators would have a direct impact on the strategy associated with the
Structural Funds, since they would fix the targets to be achieved. For
large and medium-sized countries where programming is done at re-
173
gional level (NUTS II3), the problem of the availability of indicators at

an appropriate level is far from being resolved. True, exploratory work
has begun under the auspices of ESPON (European Observation Network for Territorial Development and Cohesion)4, as part of the 20072013 objective of territorial cooperation, but it will be some years
before this work is complete.
On the eve of the opening of negotiations on the post-2013 financial
perspectives, this obstacle must not be underestimated: it is not only
technical, but also political. Changing the criteria would have major
consequences (including budgetary ones), which to date have not been
fully contained.
To unlock the situation for in the course of recent months the prospect of the introduction of greater conditionality on results achieved has
gained considerable recognition EU regions are considering the
possibility of reversing the process by starting at the end. In other
words, rather than set long-term objectives to be achieved in 2020, the
regions could start to select some indicators already in use to describe
their past situation and shed light on their track record to date (CoR,
2010c). This would enable them to carry out an individual qualitative
evaluation over an average period before making a comparison with the
others. Each region could thus gradually prepare to produce evidence on
results obtained, as regards social inclusion. This would make it easier
for them to set precise tailor-made objectives when the new European
budgetary programming gets under way in 2014. Technical support
from the European Commission and Eurostat would, of course, be
necessary.
The choice of appropriate indicators should respect the following
two conditions:
allow strong ownership by combining simplicity, verifiability
and potential for communication to European citizens;
achieve a consensus among regions, whose social inclusion priorities tend to differ.
7.4 Territorialising the EU Social Objectives

That is not to say that the avenue opened up by the idea of a territorialised social agenda is not worth pursuing. The fact is that it was not
treated as such by Barca, as it was not part of his mandate, which was
limited to cohesion policy. Nor was it really explored by the March
3
4
For more information on NUTS, see: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/

page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction.
Notably the INTERCO project (see http://www.espon.eu).
174
Marjorie Jouen
2010 Commission Communication (2010), which confined itself to

presenting reinforced territorial cohesion as an almost automatic consequence of growth or access to employment for all. It would consist of
firmly bringing the EU social objectives closer to cohesion policy; in
other words, exploring the implications of the new territorial cohesion
objective (introduced by the Lisbon Treaty) in the next programming
regulations, ensuring that the EU cohesion policy fully takes on board
the EU social objectives and also incorporating the territorial approach
into EU coordination and cooperation in the social field.
7.4.1 Social and territorial inclusion, a new objective

Incorporating territorial cohesion into endeavours to achieve more
inclusive growth would, in effect, territorialise those benefitting from
the social inclusion initiatives. This approach is clearly underpinned by
the issues raised by the debate on the 2008 Green Paper on Territorial
Cohesion (European Commission, 2008a; Jouen 2008): differences in
regions exposure to the challenges of globalisation, climate change,
demographic ageing and energy poverty. Conventionally, cohesion
policy uses a rather top down programming process, although the top
(i.e. the regional and local authorities) is not very far from the bottom in
this case. However, when Barca talks about the need for external intervention to overcome the limits of local elite groups, he is thinking more
of empowerment of local communities and their inhabitants and greater
powers for civil society organisations. He refers to the integrated local
development approach, pointing out moreover that cohesion policy has
evolved in such a way as to reduce it to relative insignificance. This
approach consists essentially of creating a push-pull mechanism, to
encourage local authorities to make room for local projects and support
them (pull) and to support them with advice and technical and methodological assistance (push).
The first areas targeted could be those identified by the Lisbon
Treaty (Article 174): rural areas, areas affected by industrial transition,
and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps such as the northernmost regions with very low
population density and island, cross-border and mountain regions.
Urban districts in difficulties would also be included.
The second category could be areas which have experienced internal
social deterioration compared to other regions. Marlier et al. (2007)
suggest that the EU portfolio of social indicators could be complemented with a background statistic based on a common income
threshold of 60% of the EU-wide median, which could be an important
way of addressing the key issue of social cohesion/ convergence across
the Union. Introducing an indicator of this kind could cause scepticism,
175
given the already major disparities in per capita GDP between EU

regions. However, greater comparability can be introduced by making
use of purchasing power parity. Nevertheless, as Marlier et al. highlight
by referring to the word convergence, the value of this indicator lies
not so much in its actual level but rather in its evolution over time.
We will, in effect, see as we already know thanks to the per capita
GDP that over 10 years the situation of certain old-style industrial
regions has not improved, and has even deteriorated. However, it will
also be possible to ascertain whether this relative impoverishment has
exacerbated inequalities, in other words whether the situation of the
poorest people has deteriorated.
Thus, if we apply this EU-wide approach and calculate on this basis
regional poverty risk estimates (rather than national estimates) and if we
look at the evolution of these regional estimates over time, this might
make it easier to identify those regions which have succeeded in preserving a certain level of social cohesion, where others have not. On the
basis of this neutral observation of territorialised social de-cohesion
the causes can be established. In effect, a rise in the number of people in
a situation of poverty or a fall in the income of the poorest people can
be the result of social policy becoming less effective at local level or a
failure of social policy to react to a new situation, or can even result
from other policies or public services becoming generally less effective.
This approach would make it possible to address the areas covered
by the EU social objectives from a territorial perspective, which would
be completely new despite the fact that the importance of places as
factors in the effectiveness of social action has already long been acknowledged. It would build substantially on the progress made by
recognising the multi-dimensional nature of social exclusion.
7.4.2 Incorporating the territorial dimension into EU

coordination and cooperation in the social field
Similarly, the territorial dimension should be mainstreamed into all
socially-related policies in the broad sense: policy to combat social
exclusion; employment policy; training policy; equal opportunities and
anti-discrimination policies, etc.
In any event, the most effective route would be to take the opportunity afforded by the European Councils work to revamp governance of
the different processes related to Europe 2020, in this instance in respect
of EU coordination and cooperation in the social field.
From a territorial point of view, the governance of EU coordination
and cooperation in the social field is currently unsatisfactory. It is too
focused on regulation and the design of policies, and not concerned
176
Marjorie Jouen
enough with the implementation of these policies, i.e. how to ensure

funding, and who does what (Rubio, 2009). A shift in focus would
immediately reveal the important role played by local and regional
authorities in delivering and coordinating social provisions. In fact,
when it comes to employment policies, legislation is usually a national
function, although it can also be regional in federal states. In the social
inclusion policy field, there is a variety of legal arrangements and
coordination provisions with local and regional authorities, the social
partners, other stakeholders and special interest groups in terms of
policy implementation through a large variety of methods. Local and
regional authorities are involved in virtually all policy stages, but there
is a real reporting gap, as they are in general rarely mentioned in
official national reports (Metis, 2009).
This is a request coming not only from local and regional authorities,
but also from the major social policy stakeholders (EAPN 2009, 2010
and 2010a; ESN 2010). For example, the Commission suggested that
the European Platform against Poverty (EPAP) could ensure social
and territorial cohesion such that the benefits of growth and jobs are
widely shared and people experiencing poverty and social exclusion are
enabled to live in dignity and take an active part in society (European
Commission, 2010).
Institutional arrangements for involving local and regional authorities are a vital step towards enhancing the capacity of EU coordination
and cooperation in the social field to promote horizontal and bottom-up
forms of learning (see chapter by Zeitlin in the present volume). In
practice, from an institutional perspective this could mean involving the
Committee of the Regions. From an operational perspective, it might
also be useful to take on board specialised networks or associations,
both in the partnership process put in place in the context of EU coordination and cooperation in the social field and in implementing the three
flagship initiatives concerned. Territorialisation, i.e. active participation of local and regional actors, should be ensured in every coordination process in the social field.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have tried to explain why a territorialised social
agenda might be useful to guide Europe 2020 and the future EU cohesion policy. It would consist of firmly bringing the EU social objectives
closer to cohesion policy. Or, more concretely, it would consist of
exploring the implications of the new territorial cohesion objective in
the next programming regulations, ensuring that the EU cohesion policy
fully takes on board the EU social objectives and also incorporating a
177
territorial approach as element in EU coordination and cooperation in

the social field.
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8. Social Impact Assessment as a Tool for

Mainstreaming Social Protection and
Inclusion Concerns in Public Policy
Martin KHNEMUND1
8.1 Introduction
This chapter summarises the main results of a study commissioned
by the European Commission (Directorate-General Employment,
Social affairs, Equal opportunities (DG EMPL))2 to support mutual
learning on social impact assessment within the Open Method of Coordination on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (Social OMC). The
overall objective was to describe, compare and analyse the different
ways in which social impact assessment is currently carried out in the
European Union (EU) Member States, and to identify recommendations
for the implementation of effective social impact assessment systems
and for effective social impact analysis.
Social impact assessment (IA) is linked with the principle of good
governance, which is firmly integrated in the common objectives of the
Social OMC that were agreed by all EU Member States. On this basis, a
consensus has developed over the years around the idea that if they are
to be effective, social protection and social inclusion policies need to be
integrated (i.e. there is a need for a strategic approach and for mainstreaming social inclusion and social protection objectives into other
policy areas; integration with growth and jobs policies and with sustainable development policies is particularly important). They also need to
be based on facts (evidence-based policies, policy evaluation) and to
involve stakeholders (transparency and stakeholder involvement in the
design, implementation and monitoring of policies).
1
I would like to thank Lorna Schrefler for her valuable contribution to the study and
Peter Lelie for his helpful suggestions and constructive criticisms. Address for correspondence: [email protected].
The study was carried out by The Evaluation Partnership (TEP) and the Centre for
European Policy Studies (CEPS) between 2008 and 2010. The full results are
available from the following DG EMPL website: http://ec.europa.eu/social/
main.jsp?langId=nl&catId=89&newsId=935&furtherNews=yes.
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Social Impact Assessment
Since the start of the OMC, Member States have been reporting on
their efforts to make progress in this respect. In this context, ex ante
social IA has increasingly come to the fore. Several Member States are
currently experimenting with such arrangements and the European
Commission has established a system of integrated impact assessment.
The increased interest in social IA is also reflected in recent EU policy
documents such as the 2008 and 2010 Joint Reports on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (European Commission, 2008 and 2010). For
instance, the 2010 Joint Report emphasises that social IA becomes even
more relevant in the current economic and budgetary circumstances
(European Commission, 2010, page 140): Given that pressure aimed at
limiting public expenditures is to be expected in most of the Member
States in the coming years, the development of an adequate ex ante
social impact assessment capacity in the context of integrated impact
assessment arrangements should be encouraged. Strengthening such
social component can contribute to more effective and efficient social
policy measures. Applied to non social policy measures, it can contribute to avoiding unintended negative social impacts and to better exploiting possibilities for positive synergies (mainstreaming). In this respect,
the Social OMC can be used as a forum for exchanging know how
between the Member States and between the Member States and the
Since 2008, a number of initiatives have been developed to support
Member States that want to put in place social IA at the national and
sub-national levels. In November 2008, a peer review on the subject
was organised in Bratislava.3 Eight Member States and two EU stakeholder networks discussed how to develop and successfully implement
social IA.
The Lisbon Treaty, which came into force on 1 December 2009,
gives an increased status to social issues. Of particular significance is
Article 9, which states that In defining and implementing its policies
and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to
the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate
social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of
education, training and protection of human health (European Union,
2009). As put by Frazer and Marlier in their contribution to the present
volume, a major political and legal challenge will now be to give a
concrete meaning to this new social clause. In the first instance, this
clause should provide a more solid basis for requiring the EU, that is
both the European Commission and EU Member States, to mainstream
3
See: http://www.peer-review-social-inclusion.eu/peer-reviews/2008/social-impactassessment.
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Martin Khnemund
the EUs social objectives into policy-making and, for this to be effective, to systematically carry out social IAs of all relevant policies.
For the purpose of this study, impact assessment (IA) is understood as a tool and process to estimate the likely future impacts of
policy proposals. Its ultimate objective is to lead to better informed and
more evidence-based political decisions. As far as social impacts are
concerned, the study took the definition of social impacts used in the
Commissions IA guidance4 as a starting point, and then developed its
own working definition for analytical purposes.
The study consisted of three main stages. First, a general overview
(mapping) of the social IA arrangements in the EU at the national and,
where applicable, regional level. Then, a comparative analysis of ten
well developed or particularly interesting social IA systems. And finally, a comparative analysis of a sample of 30 concrete examples of
social IAs carried out in the framework of the selected social IA systems.
8.2 Social IA in Europe: Key Findings

Social IA in the EU Member States takes two main forms. It is either
undertaken as one part of an integrated IA that considers all relevant
impacts of a proposal, be they economic, environmental, or social; or
through a specific impact test that only covers one specific type of
social impact (e.g. gender equality or health impacts). The specific
impact tests are usually a reflection of government priorities or even
specific events or situations, such as the paedophilia cases in Flanders in
the late 1990s ( youth IA), the tensions between religious communities in Northern Ireland ( equality IA), a report that uncovered institutional racism in the police in the UK ( race equality IA), or the Irish
1997 National Anti-Poverty Strategy ( poverty IA).
As of early 2009, 21 of the 27 Member States had some form of integrated IA system in place. Several of those systems were only created
relatively recently, or had only recently been revamped. A few others
were about to be reviewed. Most of the integrated IA systems that were
examined were launched as part of a drive for better regulation (some4
The list of possible social impacts considered here cover 9 aspects: a) Employment
and labour markets; b) Standards and rights related to job quality; c) Social inclusion
and protection of particular groups; d) Gender equality, equality treatment and opportunities, non-discrimination; e) Individuals, private and family life, personnel data;
f) Governance, participation, good administration, access to justice, media and ethics;
g) Public health and safety; h) Crime, Terrorism and security; and i) Access to and
effects on social protection, health and educational systems. In the meantime, this list
has been complemented with two more impacts (Culture and Social impacts in third
countries). See European Commission (2009), pages 35-36.
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times instigated or reinforced by international organisations such as the

OECD or the EU), usually with a strong focus on minimising unnecessary administrative and/or compliance burdens. Social considerations
usually did not play a key role in the conception of these systems,
although one can observe a recent trend towards more integrated
systems that take into account the three pillars of sustainable development (economic, environmental, social).
Most of the Member States that do not have an integrated IA system
in place nonetheless have other arrangements to undertake ex ante
reviews of the likely effects of new policies or laws, albeit often on a
less systematic and more ad hoc basis. Some were also planning to
introduce a formal integrated IA system in the near future. All in all,
some kind of mechanism to assess the likely social impacts of new
proposals (be it through an integrated IA system, specific impact tests,
or other tools or processes) exists in 25 of the 27 Member States, as well
as in several regions. The specificities of those systems and mechanisms
vary widely in terms of aspects such as the kinds of social impacts that
are considered, the rules and procedures that have to be followed and
the involvement of different actors. Crucially, the amount of guidance
and orientation provided regarding which types of social impacts (if
any) should be considered varies considerably, as does the extent to
which certain impacts always have to be checked for. Some systems
(such as Finland; see Ministry of Justice, 2008) provide a detailed list of
social impact categories that should be checked; others remain quite
vague (such as the UK; see Department for Business, Innovation and
Skills, 2010). Those systems that do provide categories sometimes use a
different approach: some define types of impacts such as employment or
health (e.g. Poland; see Ministry of Economy, 2006), while others focus
on the affected groups that should be considered, such as those at risk of
poverty (e.g. Ireland; see Office for Social Inclusion, 2008, and Department of the Taoiseach, 2009).
It is also important to note that in many (if not most) Member States,
there is a significant implementation gap between formal IA rules and
requirements, and what actually happens in practice. This is partly due
to the relatively recent introduction or revision of many IA systems. As
regards specifically social IA, the extent to which social impacts are
actually analysed in practice, and the depth and scope of the analysis,
varies considerably from case to case. Generally speaking, the comprehensive and consistent assessment of all likely social impacts of proposals represents a challenge that has not been fully overcome in any of the
systems that were examined (see Section 8.3 below). The comparative
analysis of integrated IAs revealed that the consideration of different
types of social impacts is driven primarily by two factors: the nature of
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the policy in question and the specific social goals it pursues, and
(where applicable) the impacts that are obligatory to assess. In other
words, IAs were most likely to undertake an in-depth assessment of (1)
the specific social benefits of policies (where these could be used to
justify the proposal), and (2) the likely social costs and/or benefits in
areas where the assessment is mandatory (such as employment in Poland or equality in the UK). Other social impacts were frequently mentioned, but rarely analysed in any amount of detail.
Nonetheless, the IAs that were reviewed contain a number of interesting examples of both qualitative and quantitative techniques and
tools for social IA (including multi-criteria analysis to compare hard-toquantify impacts, different approaches to monetise (i.e. analyse in
terms of monetary value) the benefits of increased employment and
skills, micro-simulation models that can be used to estimate the distributional effect of measures on the income of different population subgroups, and a method to determine impacts on disadvantaged areas). In
social IA practice, such relatively sophisticated methods co-exist with
purely narrative, sometimes very brief, mentions of what social impacts
are likely to occur, frequently without any evidence to substantiate this
or allow for an understanding of the order of magnitude of the impacts.
Relevant examples of specific impact tests include equality IA (in
Ireland, the UK and Northern Ireland), poverty IA (in Ireland), child IA
(in Flanders), and income effects tests (in the Netherlands). Each of
these tools shows clear potential to produce an in-depth assessment of a
specific type of social impact, and several of the examples that were
reviewed provided highly useful and relevant results. However, the
number of times such specific impact tests are used in practice tends to
remain low (unless they are made mandatory for all proposals), and their
usefulness depends to a considerable degree on how relevant the specific impact is for the proposal in question. Where this is not the case,
such tests can be perceived as excessively rigid, tedious and burdensome, and lead to results whose usefulness is doubtful.
Summing up, it is clear that social IA is still in its infancy in most
European countries. While most of the IA systems that were examined
do (in theory at least) consider the social dimension in order to arrive at
an integrated, balanced assessment of all likely impacts of new policies,
in practice the assessment of social impacts is often less well developed
than the assessment of economic or financial impacts, and sometimes
even entirely missing. Examples of IAs that contain an in-depth analysis
of social impacts are few and far between; where they do exist, they are
most often conducted on policies with a specific social rationale.
This is not to say that social impacts are systematically and intentionally neglected in the IA systems that were examined. Rather, it is
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primarily a consequence of one or more (depending on the IA system in

question) of the following key factors:
The IA tool is notoriously difficult to reconcile and effectively
integrate with previously existing policy development processes.
Many of the IA systems examined are in a relatively early stage
of their development; to a greater or lesser extent, they all suffer
from systemic flaws and shortcomings (not least among them
time and resource constraints and the fact that political pressure
limits the room for evidence based policy-making) that can impede a thorough and detailed assessment of all likely impacts.
Social impacts can be particularly difficult to assess. The term
social impacts includes a very diverse set of fundamentally different impact categories that can be difficult to fully grasp, identify and analyse for a non-specialist. Furthermore, most social
impacts do not lend themselves well to quantification or monetisation.
Some IA systems do place the main emphasis on economic impacts (either explicitly or implicitly). While none of the IA systems examined categorically exclude social impacts from the
analysis, there are those that dedicate a considerably larger
amount of effort to analysing aspects such as business impacts
(incl. administrative burdens) or impacts on public budgets.
Nonetheless, effective social IA is possible. There are pockets and/or
isolated examples of good practice in all of the systems that were assessed. Because the circumstances (political, cultural, temporal, personal, etc.) of each system, IA tool and specific case vary so much, and
how well rules or systems work usually depends greatly on the specific
policy proposals in question and the mindset and qualifications of the
individuals or departments preparing them, it is very difficult to draw
general conclusions as to the effectiveness of social IA systems or
tools as a whole.
However, there are a number of common challenges that apply, to a
greater or lesser extent, to social IA across most jurisdictions and circumstances. Any Member State looking to set up an effective system for
social IA, or to improve their current systems, will have to be aware of
and address these challenges (although the preferred responses will
inevitably vary depending on the priorities, capacities and constraints of
each Member State).
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8.3 Common Challenges for Social IA

in the EU Member States
This section outlines the ten main common challenges to social IA
that have been identified, and discusses why they should be addressed
in order to facilitate effective social IA systems and practice. Some of
these challenges are not specific to social IA only, but are common to
all dimensions of integrated IA. Section 8.4 expands on the key issues
that are specific to the social dimension of IA, and illustrates some of
the possible approaches to tackling these challenges, and the trade-offs
that they imply.
8.3.1 Acceptance of IA and buy-in

An indispensable prerequisite for effective IA (including social IA)
is the existence of a general policy-making culture among both policy
officers and managers that does not only see IA as an additional administrative burden, but accepts it as a tool and a process that adds value to
policy-making. If this is lacking, IA can easily turn into a mere tick-box
exercise. When this happens, the analysis of social impacts is often one
of the first victims (as producers focus only on those elements that are
strictly defined and required).
Such an IA culture takes time to evolve, and it is influenced by a
number of factors including the political and administrative system and
culture, and the tradition (or lack thereof) of policy analysis and evidence-based policy-making. In some countries, such as the UK, the
environment is clearly more favourable for IA, and this tends to translate into a higher acceptance, and consequently a more effective use, of
IA tools and processes.
In countries and regions where IA is not yet as firmly integrated in
the policy-making culture, a conscious effort is required to convince
civil servants and politicians of its usefulness. It is also important to
give IA a chance to gain a foothold in public administrations by not
introducing overly complex and burdensome IA systems in environments that are not ready for them. This includes complex social IA
mechanisms and tools: it can be more effective to be less ambitious
initially, and gradually expand the IA toolkit once officials have become
used to it.
8.3.2 IA process and timing

Leading on from the point above, the usefulness of IA is reduced
significantly if it is understood only as another document that accompanies policy or legislative proposals. Such IA reports may help to enhance transparency, but they are very unlikely to have any influence on
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the proposals (in the sense of helping to choose the most favourable
option, maximising positive impacts and minimising costs and unintended consequences). For IA to play this role, it needs to be understood
as a process that runs alongside and informs the entire policy development process.
One of the main challenges in this respect is the timing of that process. To be fully effective, IA needs to start early enough in the process
to be able to affect the policy proposal it accompanies (rather than only
justify it ex post). This is especially true for social impacts: unless any
potentially adverse social effects are identified sufficiently early for the
drafting officials to attempt to mitigate them by adapting the proposal,
there is a high risk that they will be ignored or suppressed at a later
stage. In the case of several of the examples that were reviewed, the IA
was produced very late and only to comply with the formal requirement.
But numerous IAs from across many IA systems were also examined,
which began early enough to help to explore options, frame the policy,
gather input from various relevant actors, and (in some cases) improve
the proposal that was eventually tabled. In terms of a system design that
facilitates and encourages the use of IA as an iterative process, it is
worth highlighting the UK. The fact that an early version of the IA has
to be published for consultation means a late start is usually not an
option. Furthermore, it means that early IAs tend to consider different
options and their likely impacts in an exploratory way, and allows the
final IA to only focus on the preferred option, and undertake an in-depth
assessment of its costs and benefits.
With regard to the IA process, it should be noted that the different
political and administrative environments in Europe represent specific
challenges and opportunities for IA, and in some cases have lead to
variations from the Anglo-Saxon prototype in the way IA is implemented. For example, some countries (such as the Netherlands and
many Nordic countries) run a more de-centralised IA system, where IA
is used flexibly by the ministries as they prepare legislation, but the
results of IA are not necessarily made public or widely disseminated. In
other systems, such as Poland or the Czech Republic, stakeholder
consultation is primarily carried out through committees (rather than
through open public consultations). Furthermore, there can be differences between single-party and coalition governments, with the latter
posing a particular challenge to effective IA (since important decisions
are often subject to negotiation among coalition partners, reducing the
potential influence of IA).
Such factors are important to keep in mind when designing a realistic IA system; some adaptations of standard IA rules and processes
may be required, but such deviations do tend to come with their respecThis document is licensed to Eniko Vincze (3-5256156|00)
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tive risks. The transparency and openness of the IA process in particular

can be a key factor for effective IA; although different IA systems take
different approaches to the publicity of the results, there are indications
that whether or not IAs are publicly accessible can make a big difference to how seriously they are taken.
8.3.3 Commitment to consider social impacts

The primary focus of the majority of integrated IA systems continues
to be on the economic impacts. While there are some systems where
social impacts are not included within the scope of IA to begin with, the
de facto focus on the economic dimension also applies to many systems
that in principle attach equal importance to all three pillars of sustainable development (economic, environmental and social). The challenge
therefore is for MS to: 1) decide (or, where applicable, revisit) whether
social impacts should be embedded within their respective IA systems,
and (if the answer to 1 is yes) 2) ensure that this commitment is clearly
communicated and enforced in practice.
In the context of integrated IA, it is interesting to note that there are
several examples of IA systems that start out by focusing on economic
impacts, but eventually move towards an integrated assessment (sometimes by merging previously fragmented IA tools). However, the fact
that the IA guidance documents place similar weight on the different
pillars often does not filter through to the reality. To some extent, this
might be due to integrated guidance (such as that recently adopted in
Finland, which emphasises social impacts) having come into force only
recently. However, it also seems that merely emphasising the importance of the social dimension in the written guidance is not enough. In
order for social impacts to be assessed seriously, IA producers need to
be under the impression that this coincides with the expectations of
potential IA users and will be enforced systematically.
Specific impact tests such as equality IA or poverty IA can be a useful way of assessing certain types of social impacts. However, it seems
that such tests are more suited to facilitating an analysis of certain
impacts than to ensuring they are consistently mainstreamed into policymaking. In other words, such tests represent an opportunity to explore
specific social impacts in more depth for proposals for which this is
deemed relevant, but they are usually not mandatory and therefore
implementation does not tend to be very widespread. There is a recent
trend to increasingly link such tests with integrated IA in an attempt to
achieve greater consistency and more equal coverage, but the examination of a number of examples suggests that the level of effort and methodological rigour invested in such tests often drops if they are carried
out purely to comply with a legal obligation.
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8.3.4 Definition of social impacts

Another key challenge to effective social IA is the fact that the term
social impact is potentially so broad that it tends to mean very little to
most non-specialists. Unlike the category of environmental impacts,
which immediately evokes certain images, social impacts can be quite
baffling for some. The category as it is generally understood includes a
mix of quite different types of impacts. Some of these are clearly different from the other main impact categories (e.g. impacts on fundamental
rights, safety and security, etc.), but the category of social impacts can
also include impacts that can be perceived as economic or even environmental, if and when they apply to specific segments of society
(especially disadvantaged or vulnerable groups). Furthermore, some
social impact categories, such as on social inclusion, are not widely
understood by civil servants who work in other policy areas.
The integrated IA guidance documents in different countries/ regions
take quite different approaches to the issue of what constitutes a social
impact that should be considered. None of them actually provides a
clear definition of social impacts. As to different types of social impacts,
at one extreme, the Finnish IA guidelines provide a comprehensive list
and explanation of all potentially relevant impact types, as well as a
checklist with concrete sub-questions under each of the seven headings.
At the other extreme, some countries simply state that social impacts
should be assessed, but provide no further guidance as to what and how.
There does not seem to be a direct correlation between the level of
guidance and the diversity of social impacts that were assessed under
the different systems, so it is not possible to determine what the optimal
level of detail is. However, it does seem clear that some orientation is
helpful to guide IA producers towards considering relevant social
impacts, whereas overly complex or lengthy lists or descriptions risk
being ignored in practice. In the absence of useful and realistic basic
guidance, the risk is that the assessment of social impacts is undertaken
(if it is undertaken at all) more with the specific objectives of the proposal in mind, and limited to the direct and easy to identify social
benefits. However, social costs of proposals are less frequently identified, and it is here that guidance is especially useful to help IA producers think through any unintended consequences that proposals may have
on certain groups in society.
8.3.5 Proportionate level of analysis

Leading on from the challenge of defining/ categorising potential
social impact types, the question then becomes: which impacts should
be analysed in each case, and in what level of detail? This is a crucial
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area: if the choice is left entirely to the discretion of the drafting officials, there is a risk that significant impacts may be neglected. However,
if the consideration of certain impacts is mandatory, the assessment can
easily turn into a tick-box exercise. In any case, it is a generally accepted principle in IA that the depth and scope of the assessment should
be proportionate to the significance of the likely impacts, so that scarce
resources are not wasted on analysing irrelevant impacts.
Defining the proportionate level of analysis ex ante is very difficult,
given all the different factors that may come into play (including the
type and content of the proposal, point in the policy process, significance thresholds for different impacts, etc.). Several IA systems therefore follow what is essentially a two-step approach, consisting of a
series of screening questions about different types of social impacts
which civil servants should work through. If a significant impact in a
certain area appears likely, a more detailed assessment (sometimes in
the form of a specific impact test) should be undertaken. Such tools can
be useful to provide orientation and get officials to think systematically
about potential social impacts, but their effectiveness depends on several factors, primarily whether the procedure and prescribed format
appears relevant to the specific case in question and is not excessively
burdensome. This varies to some extent in all of the systems, depending
on the concrete case in question. Generally speaking, if the framework
is mandatory and very rigid, there is a risk of merely formal compliance
without significant added value.
8.3.6 Analytical methods, tools and data sources

One of the challenges mentioned most frequently by IA producers
across nearly all countries and regions is the lack of appropriate tools,
models and/or data sources to assess social impacts quantitatively. Costbenefit analysis (i.e. an estimation of the likely costs and benefits of
proposals expressed in monetary terms) is a core feature of most integrated IA systems, but social impacts can be very hard to reconcile with
this analytical model because they are often difficult to monetise. The
main exception to this are impacts on employment and impacts on
household income levels, which can be quantified via more or less
sophisticated models.
Therefore, most social IA remains purely qualitative. This in itself
does not have to be a major problem, given that most systems acknowledge that quantitative analysis has its limitations, and encourage IA
producers to also specify impacts that cannot be monetised. But in spite
of this, there is a fairly widespread feeling among IA producers and
users that quantitative analysis is necessarily more robust, and qualitative elements largely subjective. Sometimes producers admitted to not
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taking into account social impacts that could not be quantified because
this would not have fitted with the overall analytical approach taken by
the IA.
A related challenge is that when a qualitative analysis of social
impacts is carried out, the examples examined suggest that this most
often takes the form of a simple mention that a certain impact (e.g.
improved health or reduction of inequality) will occur. Depending on
the significance of the respective impacts, this can be entirely appropriate (see the principle of proportionate analysis above). However, if and
when impacts are likely to be significant, even a qualitative assessment
should be based on evidence, including a thorough analysis of the
baseline situation and the likelihood and scope of the impact, drawing
on relevant information (which can include existing studies on the
effects of similar policies or stakeholder consultation results). A few of
the IAs examined provide a blueprint for how this can be done. Thus,
there is room for improvement concerning both quantitative and qualitative methods for social IA, as well as the related data sources such
methods could draw on. Ideally, an explicit strategy should be developed to identify and address specific data gaps for social IAs.
8.3.7 Capacity and expertise

As noted previously, high quality social IA requires officials to have
a solid understanding not only of how the IA process works, but also of
what different types of social impacts might be applicable and how
these can be identified and (where relevant) analysed. A lack of capacity
and expertise among officials who do not regularly deal with social
policy is a frequently cited barrier to more effective social IA. While
high quality guidance documents are undoubtedly important, this barrier
cannot be overcome solely with detailed written material. Most civil
servants use the IA guidelines to obtain an initial overview of the process, but they do not necessarily work through the documents in a systematic way. The often large gap between the rules in the written guidance and the actual practice of (social) IA corroborates this finding.
Therefore, written guidelines should ideally be complemented by
other methods. Training is one way of achieving this, but the numbers
of civil servants that require IA training is high, and very significant
time and resources would have to be invested to train them all. Also,
training on integrated IA normally has to cover a broad range of approaches, cases and eventualities, meaning that the amount of attention
that can be paid to assessing specific types of social impacts will always
be limited.
It therefore seems indispensable to make available ad hoc support
and guidance to officials who have to produce IAs if and when required.
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The available evidence suggests that this is best delivered from within
ministries, as is the case with the Better Regulation Units (for integrated
IA) and Diversity and Equality Units (for equality IA) in individual UK
government departments, or with the IA support functions in European
Commissions Directorate-Generals. Such units or functions can best
play the role of a critical friend that provides assistance in a constructive way and, where necessary, points officials to relevant sources of
information or expertise. However, for this to be effective for social IA,
there needs to be a consistent understanding among all ministries that
social impacts are an important part of IA, and that IA reports will be
scrutinised accordingly (see also point 8.3.3 above and point 8.3.10
below).
8.3.8 Stakeholder consultation

Input from stakeholders and interested parties is conducive to high
quality IA for at least two main reasons: stakeholder input can be an
important source of data and information for the assessment of impacts;
and the scrutiny and challenge by stakeholders constitutes an additional
quality control mechanism. In the IA systems where stakeholders are
extensively involved, their scrutiny tends to be one of the key drivers
for the quality, comprehensiveness and balance of IAs. The role of
stakeholders is particularly crucial as concerns social impacts, since (in
the absence of quantitative data or models) their input can provide key
evidence for the qualitative assessment. The experience and expertise
present in civil society concerning societal issues and problems is
invaluable to ensure relevant social impacts are identified and assessed
adequately.
The examination of a number of examples showed that some form of
consultation (public or targeted) was undertaken for the vast majority of
IAs. Depending on the prevalent political and administrative culture,
this can take different forms, ranging from formal public consultations
in the Anglo-Saxon countries to the frequent use of existing committees
or other fora or bodies to gather stakeholder input (e.g. in Poland or
Finland). Nearly all stakeholders who were interviewed showed a keen
interest in social IA, but emphasised that consultation is only really
useful if the results are actually taken into account when finalising the
IA and the proposal it accompanies. Several concerns with consultation
methods were also raised, including inappropriate timing, channels and
targeting.
Perhaps even more fundamentally, it is important to emphasise that
although consultation generally forms part of the policy-making process
(and therefore also the IA process) in most cases seen across Europe,
the publication of draft IA reports for consultation is the exception
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rather than the norm. In most jurisdictions, consultation results may feed
into and inform the final IA report, but stakeholders are not actually
able to view or comment on the results of the early stages of IA. This is
lamentable considering that early publication of draft IAs (which is
mandatory in the UK) helps to ensure a sufficiently early start of the IA
process (see also point 8.3.2 above), and means that stakeholder input
can still have an influence on fundamental decisions such as the choice
of options or the types of impacts that should be taken into account.
8.3.9 IA as an aid to political decision-making

One of the main objectives of most IA systems (in addition to leading to better, more balanced and less costly policy proposals to come
out of government departments) is to inform the political decisionmaking process, mainly in the legislative branch of governments. In
general terms, the users of IA who were interviewed (i.e. high-ranking
government officials, MPs and their research staff) tended to agree with
the usefulness of IA in principle, but also emphasised that their actual
use as an aide to political decision-making should not be overestimated. According to many interviewees, IAs are primarily useful as
an additional source of background information on what the governments thinking behind a proposal is and to give an indication of likely
costs and benefits. However, there was also widespread agreement that
other factors, such as evidence provided by relevant stakeholders, tend
to be at least as important as IAs as a source of background information.
From the examination of a selection of examples of social IAs, it is
clear that the extent to which IAs are taken into account by political
decision makers varies significantly. Although there are some common
trends across countries and regions, the actual use made of IAs seems to
depend primarily on the specific IA and proposal in question. Some of
the examples that were found to be most useful by the interviewees
were precisely the ones that presented a solid evidence base and were
still relatively succinct. Very long IAs, or IAs that were perceived as
highly subjective, were found much less useful.
In terms of the specific social dimension of IA, the views of users
varied considerably, partly based on their own areas of expertise and
political affiliation. Many of the senior government officials and MPs
who were interviewed were in favour of a stronger consideration of
social impacts, and shared the view that this is currently a weakness of
many IAs. However, not all potential users viewed the social dimension
as a key element of IA, and some interviewees saw a risk that if IAs
consider in detail elements that do not lend themselves to monetisation
(including wider social impacts), they might become too discursive,
broad and lose much of their focus and value. This point links in with
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the challenges outlined under point 8.3.6 above; while there are concerns about subjectivity, there is also clearly a (potential) demand for
methodologically robust social IA.
8.3.10 Quality control and system oversight

The way in which IA system oversight and quality control is provided varies from system to system. Often there are several layers of
quality control, including both internal (within the ministries or departments that produce the IAs) and external elements (in other ministries or
departments, and in some cases via scrutiny by stakeholders, MPs, and
the public at large). However, effective and comprehensive external
quality control is a challenge given both resource constraints (a systematic check of all IAs is often not possible) and political considerations
(ministries are often reluctant to impose additional duties upon each
other). As a result, in many IA systems the central unit or functions role
is largely limited to coordination and the development of guidance,
rather than actual quality assurance of individual IAs.
The available evidence suggests that, given these realities, internal
quality control may be the more promising and realistic option, at least
in the short to medium term. One mechanism that is quite effective is
the sign-off by both the chief economist (who is normally supported by
a team of analysts) and the responsible minister that has recently been
introduced in the UK. Coupled with the external scrutiny, this provides
a strong incentive for producers to ensure that their IAs are thorough
and comprehensive. The cases reviewed suggest that mostly, both
ministers and chief economists do take their role quite seriously, and
often ask for additional information or clarification, and sometimes even
comment on draft IAs in the earlier stages.
Concerning the social dimension, this is not normally represented
strongly in central oversight functions (except for bodies that oversee
the application of specific social impact tests). It may be worth considering how the expertise of ministries dealing with social affairs can best
be leveraged for quality control. An example of where this has happened can be found at the European Commission level, where a DG
EMPL director provides social impact expertise to the IA Board.
8.4. Solutions for Effective Social IA

Many of the challenges outlined in the previous section relate to factors that are broader than social IA, i.e. they have an effect on social IA
because they concern IA in general. It is important to highlight these
insofar as they need to be addressed in order to facilitate effective social
IA. However, the main purpose of this paper is not to reiterate what is
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considered to be good practice with regard to general IA processes,

rules, timing etc.; other studies (such as the EU-commissioned EVIA
project) as well as reports by organisations such as the OECD have
already dedicated many pages to this.
Instead, the focus in the following pages is on the elements that are
specific to social IA. Even the systems that perform relatively well
regarding the more general IA practices and processes (such as the UK)
have not necessarily found adequate responses to some of the specific
challenges of social IA, including how to facilitate a consistent understanding of social impacts, how to ensure they are seriously considered,
and how to analyse them in depth. Potential solutions to the specific
challenges in the social domain can be summarised under the following
three key questions.
8.4.1 How can Member States ensure a common

understanding of what constitutes
a relevant social impact?
In order to overcome the lack of a consistent understanding among
IA producers (as well as managers and users) of what constitutes a
social impact that should be considered as part of the IA process, some
form of guidance is required. Some countries and regions have developed lists of types of social impacts, but these tend to be rather lengthy
and complex, and often include grey areas, duplications and/or overlaps.
However, the vast majority of social impacts can be summarised under a
relatively limited list of impact types, namely:
Employment (including labour market standards and rights)
Income
Access to services (including education, social services, etc.)
Respect for fundamental rights (including equality)
Public health and safety
This list covers a very large part of the impacts considered in IAs.
Crucially, some social impact categories or assessment types that are not
included in the list above are actually covered through the combination
of the five parameters with specific population groups. For example,
social inclusion is normally understood as the result of a combination of
most or all of the factors listed above, when applied to those groups that
are at risk of social exclusion. It is therefore recommended that Member
States examine their respective IA systems (be they integrated systems
or specific impact tests) through the lens of these five broad categories
of social impacts, with a view to identifying overlaps and gaps, and
eventually devising simpler and clearer guidance for social IA.
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Martin Khnemund
8.4.2 How can Member States ensure that relevant social

impacts are considered and identified, particularly
in the early stages of the IA process?
Given the focus on economic impacts that is prevalent in many IA
systems, Member States should clarify whether social IA should indeed
form part of integrated IA, and how this fits and can be reconciled with
the (perceived or real) need to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. If social
IA is seen as a key part of IA, this should be expressed clearly in the
written guidance as well as in IA training sessions. In addition, the
social dimension should ideally be represented in both IA system oversight and in ad hoc assistance (e.g. through the creation of networks of
experts).
Table 8.1: Possible basic format for a screening tool
Is the proposal likely to have an
impact on individuals or
groups of individuals
Likely
positive
impact?
Likely
negative
impact?
Employment status
or opportunities
(Y/N)
(Y/N)
Affected
group(s)
Likely
scale of
impact
Disposable income
Access to services5
Respect for fundamental rights6
Health and safety
Other social impacts
On a more practical level, there have to be appropriate screening

mechanisms or tools to enable and encourage civil servants to actually
consider social impacts seriously when producing IAs. Such tools
already exist in several systems, but they are sometimes not designed
very well. A basic screening framework for social impacts needs to be
reasonably easy to understand and concise, as well as a means of guiding IA producers thought processes in a clear way. Such a framework
could be structured around the five basic impact categories listed above,
and require producers to specify which groups are likely to be affected
5
6
Access to services refers primarily to citizens access to key public services,

including services provided by the social protection, health and educational systems.
The exact fundamental rights to be covered would depend on those granted by the
constitution of each country. They would typically include freedom (of expression,
association, movement etc.), equality or equal treatment, privacy, property, etc.
197
under each impact type. A possible basic format for a screening tool is
shown in Table 8.1.
8.4.3 What approaches, methods, tools and data sources

should be used to assess relevant social impacts?
The tension between the quantitative ambitions of most IA systems
and the qualitative reality of most social IAs was one of the prominent
themes of the study. Developing and disseminating knowledge about
tools, methods and data sources to measure social impacts quantitatively
should certainly be one priority. As regards monetised methods, the
focus should be on widening the awareness and use of existing models
(primarily for employment and income effects; see also Ecorys, 2010),
and on further developing these models and others to make them applicable to a wider set of geographical and policy situations. Improved
quantitative (non-monetised) assessment would require (but also facilitate) the use and development of relevant data sources and indicators.
However, it is also important to set realistic expectations as to which
kinds of social impacts can more easily be quantified, and which will
have to remain (primarily) qualitative. For the latter, facilitating thorough and robust qualitative social IA should be a priority. This could be
done inter alia through providing clearer guidance as to what constitutes
qualitative analysis (as opposed to just a cursory mention), but also by
widening the available evidence base through wider and better use of
stakeholder consultation. Strengthening the link between ex post evaluation and ex ante IA is another key area to enhance social IA and learn
from past experiences.
8.5. Conclusions
Social impact assessment is a potentially very powerful process and
tool for both the European Commission and Member States to mainstream the EUs social objectives into policy-making. But although
most Member States have an integrated IA system in place that could be
used for this purpose, and several have also begun to experiment with
other tools to assess specific types of social impacts, effective social IA
remains a challenge. Seen across Europe, the in-depth analysis of the
likely social impacts of policies (in particular policies that do not pursue
explicitly social objectives) is the exception rather than the norm.
This is partly the result of shortcomings with the application and implementation of IA in general (and not only its social dimension). IA is
still a relatively new process and tool in most Member States and the
concept of evidence-based policy-making can be difficult to reconcile
and integrate with previously existing policy processes. For any kind of
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Martin Khnemund
ex ante IA to be fully effective, there needs to be a shift in the policymaking culture and officials need to have sufficient time, knowledge,
skills and support to make it work. However, it is also true that social IA
is often even less well developed than the other dimensions of IA. This
can be the result of specific methodological difficulties (often related to
the challenge of quantifying social impacts), but it is also often due to
more mundane reasons, including a basic lack of understanding among
many civil servants and policy-makers of what exactly is meant by the
term social impacts, and the fact that economic impacts are often
(explicitly or implicitly) prioritised over social impacts in IAs.
These challenges and shortcomings should not obscure the fact that
examples of effective social IA do exist and have become more numerous in recent years. The fact that several Member States have begun to
review and revise their IA systems to facilitate a better consideration of
social impacts is encouraging. In order to make further progress, all
Member States should carefully consider their respective responses to
the key challenges for effective social IA that are listed in this chapter,
in particular how they can foster an IA culture in general, and enable
and incentivise their government officials to understand, seriously
consider, identify and (where appropriate) analyse in depth the different
relevant types of social impacts.
The European Commission and the Social OMC are in a unique position to support the efforts of Member States to facilitate more effective
social IA. On a strategic level, centralised monitoring coupled with a
system of incentives at the EU level can facilitate the adoption and,
most importantly, the implementation of social IA across Europe. In this
context, clarifying the linkages between the priority areas of the Europe
2020 Strategy and social IA, as well as with strategic indicators developed in the context of the European Employment Strategy (regarded by
Member States as a useful forum for mutual learning; see Begg, Erhel
and Mortensen, 2010) and/or the assessment of EU structural policies,
can help to raise the profile of social IA.
On a more practical level, the Commission and Member States can
use the Social OMC to foster the exchange of experiences and mutual
learning on current social IA practice, inter alia by holding regular
workshops, training and/or benchmarking exercises, with a view to
developing a learning network and fostering a wider usage of existing
approaches and tools which are not widespread or only used in a limited
number of countries. Developing dedicated online tools for social IA,
including a library of examples of social IAs, could form part of this
process. Resources should also be pooled at the EU level to address the
problem of assessing social impacts quantitatively, in particular by
supporting the expansion of existing (and the development of new) panThis document is licensed to Eniko Vincze (3-5256156|00)
199
European datasets and sophisticated statistical and modelling instruments for social IA (in particular micro-simulation models).
References
Begg, I., Erhel, C. and J. Mortensen (2010), Medium-Term Employment
Challenges, special CEPS report for the Directorate-General of Employment,
Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Brussels: Centre for European Policy
Studies.
Ecorys (2010), Review of Methodologies Applied for the Assessment of Employment and Social Impacts, final report, Rotterdam/Brussels: Ecorys.
Inclusion 2008, Brussels: European Commission. Available at: http://ec.
europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=5503&langId=en.
European Commission (2009), Impact Assessment Guidelines. Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/iag_2009
_en.pdf.
Inclusion 2008, Brussels: European Commission. Available at: http://ec.
europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2386&langId=en.
European Union (2009), Consolidated Version of the Treaty of Lisbon, Brussels:
European Union. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ showPage.
aspx?id=1296&lang=en.
Finland, Ministry of Justice (2008), Impact Assessment in Legislative Drafting
Guidelines. Publication 2008:4. Available at: http://www.om.fi/en/Etusivu/
Parempisaantely/Vaikutustenarviointi.
Ireland, Department of the Taoiseach (2009), Revised RIA Guidelines How to
conduct a Regulatory Impact Analysis, June 2009. Available at: http://www.
betterregulation.ie/eng/.
Ireland, Office for Social Inclusion (2008), Guidelines for Poverty Impact
Assessment, March 2008. Available at: http://www.socialinclusion.ie/pia.html.
Poland, Ministry of Economy (2006), Wytyczne do Oceny Skutkow Regulacji
(OSR), October 2006. Available at: http://www.mg.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/49F
92D8B-5D7B-4D1E-AB62-F9E12365DFB9/56421/Wytycznedoocenyskutko
wregulacji1.pdf.
United Kingdom, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2010), Impact
Assessment Guidance, April 2010. Available at: http://www.berr.gov.uk/
assets/biscore/better-regulation/docs/10-898-impact-assessment-guidance.pdf.
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9. The Potential of Eurotargets:

Reflecting on French Experience
Robert WALKER1
9.1 Introduction
Decisions taken by the European Union (EU) Heads of State and
Government at their meeting on 17th June 2010 arguably marked a new
phase in the story of EU policy-making. Most notable was the adoption
of five EU headline targets to be achieved by 2020 (see opening chapter). They include quantifiable targets for reducing by 20 million the
number at risk of poverty and social exclusion, increasing education
attainment (reducing school drop-out rates to less than 10% and increasing the share of 30-34 year olds with tertiary education to at least 40%),
and raising the employment rate (to 75% for persons aged 20-64).
Targets not only establish goals but encourage and facilitate the measurement of progress. They increase accountability and, by doing so,
ratchet up the pressure on politicians and policy-makers to deliver
against the targets, thereby stimulating public debate and engagement
and adding momentum to the policy-making process. Member States are
obliged to act to implement these policy priorities and in close dialogue with the Commission, rapidly [to] finalise their national targets,
taking account of their relative starting positions and national circumstances (European Council, 2010, page 3).
The introduction of targets is a logical but not inevitable development of the approach to policy-making triggered by the Lisbon Strategy
and epitomised by the Social Open Method of Coordination (OMC).
The OMC is characterised by experimentation and knowledge creation
and by participation of the social partners and civil society more generally, thereby giving credibility and legitimacy to a process that could
otherwise be seen as light on democratic input. It makes a virtue of
decentralised policy-making that, in turn, accommodates a wide diversity of normative perspectives and policy mechanisms. At the same
time, peer review and friendly competition is intended to propel national
1
Address for correspondence: [email protected].
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The Potential of Eurotargets
policies forward in ways that are consistent with EU goals. The introduction of targets can exploit the same mechanisms but might, in theory
at least, shift the change dynamic from achievements to performance.
Whereas the beauty competition that is the OMC, with Member States
placed alongside each other, is intended to stimulate admiration and
emulation, the introduction of targets means that Member States can be
ranked by performance, thereby potentially creating the pressures and
policy adrenalin that characterise a race.
Targets are not new in policy-making at the level of Member States.
Moreover, it is at least arguable that the Social OMC and associated
peer reviews have been important in the adoption of policy targets
across the EU. To take the example of poverty, Ireland introduced a
quantitative poverty reduction target in 1997. Initial success encouraged
the Irish government to make the target more ambitious and, with
adoption of EU-SILC as the mechanism for monitoring performance, to
target the elimination of consistent poverty (defined as combination
of income poverty and material deprivation) by 2016. Various countries,
including Belgium, Greece, Portugal and Spain, have since established
quantitative targets to reduce general poverty under the Social OMC,
while the United Kingdom introduced a child poverty target in 1999 and
gave it legislative authority by including it in the Child Poverty Act
2010. The French government is committed to reducing poverty by a
third between 2007 and 2012 and, in May 2009, introduced a set of
indicators the Tableau de bord or Scoreboard against which to
assess progress and which formed the topic of an EU peer review held
in Paris in December 2009 (Walker, 2010). As from June 2010, all
Member States are required to adopt national social inclusion/ poverty
reduction targets consistent with that adopted by the June 2010 European Council at EU level. The EU target is defined in terms of the
number of persons who are at risk-of-poverty and victims of social
exclusion according to three indicators (at-risk-of poverty; material
deprivation; and belonging to a jobless household). Member States
are at liberty to set their national targets on the basis of the most appropriate indicators, taking into account their national circumstances
and priorities (European Council, 2010, page 12) raising obvious
issues about the relationship between national and EU targets.
The new EU policy rubric agreed by EU Heads of State and Government in June 2010 establishes a style of governance powered by
targets, albeit they apply, as yet, to only five areas. If the new Europe
2020 Strategy is perceived to be successful it seems improbable that
targets will not be applied more widely. Hence, the rubric might be
viewed as a pilot, a further element in the experimentation and knowledge building that has characterised EU policy-making since the Lisbon
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Robert Walker
Treaty (see chapter by Zeitlin in the present volume). The aim of this
contribution is to draw selectively on the experience gained from the
use of targets at national level to begin reflection on the challenges that
will need to be overcome if targets are to drive rather than obstruct
progressive EU policy-making. No claim is made to the comprehensiveness of the review; rather recent French experience with the Scoreboard is taken as a case-study to illustrate particular issues. The chapter
therefore begins with a brief account of the French Scoreboard and the
political strategy that underpins it before addressing four issues: the
politics of targets; criteria for setting targets; the risk of policy distortion; and the symbiosis with policy design. In each case the issues are
first discussed in a French context before considering the implications
for the EU strategy. The chapter ends with interim conclusions.
9.2 The French Poverty Target and Scoreboard

When, on 17 October 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France,
announced the intention of the French government to reduce poverty by
a third within five years, he also made clear the point of introducing a
target, namely to galvanise political forces for change: I want to see
this long neglected social issue become a political issue. I set this target
to force us to deliver. It will force us to unearth the mechanisms that
spawn poverty and to set up the ones that will eradicate it. (French
Presidency of the European Union, 2008.)
Table 9.1: Thematic objectives of the French scoreboard
To fight
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
To promote access to
Poverty and inequality;

The accumulation of difficulties in
living conditions;
Child poverty;
Youth poverty;
Poverty in old age;
Poverty of people who have a job;
To support access to
7.
8.
9.
Employment;
Housing and maintaining
housing;
Education and training;
To fight
10. Care;
11. Financial (banking) exclusion.
Source: Walker (2009)
In order to monitor performance against this target the French government, through a process of extensive consultation, developed a set of
indicators the tableau de bord or Scoreboard comprising some
38 indicators organised within 11 thematic policy objectives (Table
9.1). The number of specific indices within each theme varies but in
203
each case includes one or more quantified targets 18 in total that are
required to be met within five years, the clock having been set running
at October 2007. The central index, required to fall by a third, is an
anchored in time measure of income poverty defined with respect to a
threshold of 60% of median. This measure reflects living standards at
the beginning of the monitoring period, maintains the value of the
threshold in terms of what can be purchased but is not adjusted to take
account of rises (or falls) in general French living standards.
Multiple indicators are included in the Scoreboard in order to compensate for the limitations of a single measure of poverty, to better
reflect the multi-dimensional nature of poverty and to recognise the
contribution required from the whole of government for the poverty
reduction target to be met. Relative poverty rates, with thresholds set at
40, 50 and 60% of median income, are included specifically to ensure
that the reduction in poverty achieved is not associated with increased
inequality and social exclusion.
Comparison of the French Scoreboard with the latest incarnation of
the Laeken indicators used to monitor the risk of poverty and social
exclusion at EU level is instructive (European Commission, 2009). The
Scoreboard gives much greater prominence to anchored in time
measures of income poverty than do the Laeken indicators where such
measures only appear as contextual ones. Two primary level Laeken
indicators are not included in the Scoreboard: the difference between
the employment rates of immigrants and non-immigrants, (possibly a
reflection of the nature of French assimilation policies) and the rate of
long-term unemployment. The Scoreboard includes some poverty and
social exclusion dimensions that were not yet in the Laeken indicators
list at the time of implementation, but were included in the list as from
2009 (though with slightly different definitions); and others that are still
not on the Laeken list (and which, therefore, may be of particular interest to other Member States and to the European Commission). Measures
in the first group include material deprivation and housing, while financial (or banking) exclusion features in the second; the latter is a dimension of poverty not yet considered for inclusion in the Laeken indicators
but one shown to be a considerable problem for people living on low
incomes (Carbo et al., 2007; Collard et al., 2001). The Social Protection
Committee and its Indicators Sub-Group should explore this important
aspect on the basis of the module on Over-indebtedness and financial
exclusion that was included in the 2008 wave of the EU Statistics on
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). Finally, while the Scoreboard employs measures of relative poverty to capture inequality,
omitting direct indices of income inequality such as the Gini coefficient
and the S80/S20 income quintile ratio, it includes substantive indicators
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Robert Walker
that nevertheless also reflect inequality. There are two indicators that
both directly measure class-based aspects of inequality (namely in
dental treatment received by young people and access to continuing
education) and two measures that indirectly reference inequality. The
latter, relative health expenditures by persons in the lowest income
decile, and the rate of non-negotiable (Prengages) expenditure among
persons in the lowest income quintile, refer indirectly to inequality
through focusing on one section of the income distribution and thereby
calling into question the relative circumstances of persons with different
levels of income.
The intent of the French leadership is that the poverty target should
simultaneously fulfil three functions: to stimulate interest in poverty and
social exclusion; to build support for reform, and to pressurise all parts
of government to deliver reform and policy outcomes. The Scoreboard is the stimulus through which these goals are to be achieved a
mechanism of accountability that is to take two forms: the political
equivalent of the victors podium when targets are seen to have been
met and the counterpart of medieval punishment stocks, with public
humiliation and opprobrium, when they were missed. Moreover, in the
same way that the poverty target is enshrined in legislation through the
law of 1 December 2008, so, too, is the Scorecard. The same law referred specification of the measurement of poverty to a decree to be
issued by the Conseil dEtat (Council of State) which, when published
on 21st May 2009, specified that a monitoring scorecard, annexed to the
Decree, should be used.
With the target and scorecard intended to create an institutionalised
momentum for change, the policy package was completed by the introduction of active inclusion, a mechanism based on the premise, to cite
President Sarkozy, that it is necessary; to consistently reward work as
opposed to government benefits, and to ensure that work invariably
provides a door out of, and protection from, poverty (French Presidency of the EU, 2008, page 1). In the French version, active inclusion is based on three complementary and inseparable principles: a
guaranteed adequate minimum income; policies promoting labourmarket integration; and access to quality social services. Among the
most important of the reforms introduced in 2007 were: the replacement
of Revenu Minimum dInsertion (RMI) and certain other benefits by
the Revenu de Solidarit Active (RSA) which was piloted in 34 dpartements prior to full implementation on 1 June 2009; the Grenelles de
linsertion (Round-Table on Inclusion) which sought to gather ideas
from stakeholders and produced a set of shared guidelines and priority
projects in 2008; and a call for innovative policy ideas to be tested by
social experiment.
205
The poverty target and the associated Scoreboard are not simply a
technical exercise. Rather they are central elements in a larger strategy
designed to make poverty more visible, to stimulate public debate, to
mobilise policy intent and to incentivise effective policy delivery designed to reduce poverty. The Scoreboard is viewed as an instrument of
observation, evaluation and partnership: it will record trends and suggest whether policy changes are having the desired effect. It is intended
to stimulate interaction within government and beyond in developing
sensitive indicators and in implementing policies likely to be effective
given the multi-faceted nature of poverty.
9.3 Strategy and Politics

Where used, targets frequently become a natural part of the policy
process, essential for establishing attainable policy objectives and useful
for incentivising and monitoring performance. However, there is rarely
much that is natural or neutral about the introduction of targets. They
symbolise proactive policy-making, dissatisfaction with the status quo
and a deliberate initiative to shake up policy by doing things differently.
This was clearly the case in France where targets and the Scoreboard
were part of bold, not to say audacious, attempt to shift the terms of
debate premised on the belief that there was currently insufficient
support both inside and outside government to do more to tackle poverty. The idea was that targets, their publication and discussion about
them build support and public interest that can further motivate and
increase pressure for reform.
It is a little premature to assess the extent to which these premises
hold in France since only one set of results have been published (in
October 2009; Haut-Commissaire aux Solidarits Actives Contre la
Pauvret (HCSACP) [2009]). There is evidence that targets in Ireland
and the UK built sustained political support. The Irish Anti-Poverty
Strategy remained in place for over 12 years, while in the UK, the Child
Poverty Act, giving a legal basis to the target and the establishment of a
Commission to monitor it, was passed in the last days of the 2004-10
Labour government without objection from the opposition parties
subsequently elected into power. Moreover, in the UK the political risks
of failing to meet anti-poverty targets have proved to be less than those
in the case of health, possibly because the targets are recognised to be
ambitious and because comparatively few people perceive themselves to
be personally affected by the outcome (Child Poverty Action Group
(CPAG), 2008).
On the other hand, there is limited evidence that targets stimulate
popular support; rather they empower non-governmental organisations
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Robert Walker
(NGOs) and pressure groups to lobby and engage with government

(Bamfield, 2005). Voters typically underestimate the chances of ever
suffering from poverty and attach greater importance to quality health
care, good education services and sustained employment (European
Commission, 2009a). The evidence is that public support divides on
ideological lines (OKelly, 2007; Castell and Thompson, 2007). Therefore to ensure ongoing debate, the British government explicitly encouraged civil society organisations to lobby to keep child poverty on the
agenda and funded them to do so. In Ireland, the Combat Poverty
Agency fulfilled a similar pressurising function until its absorption by
the Office for Social Inclusion, a move some commentators feared
would remove a powerful irritant for change. The French government
engaged extensively with NGOs in drawing up the content of the Scoreboard. Then, following the onset of the 2008 recession with the need to
develop real-time monitoring of the changing circumstances of low
income families, it similarly consulted the largest associations concerned with the fight against poverty, involving them in the collection
of data on trends in the number of applicants for services such as food
aid, housing assistance, clothing assistance and job search, and information on the nature of problems being encountered.
Experience suggests that there is a need to have powerful and sustained support from the very top of government and a strong champion
to lead, incentivise (possibly financially) and cajole government departments and agencies to take ownership of the anti-poverty targets.
This is perhaps particularly the case when progress falters or other
demands become pressing. The French presidential language emphasises that the French poverty reduction target is a goal for the government as a whole and a goal for every minister and, insofar as the
Scoreboard is the product of an inter-ministerial committee, it reflects
this across government perspective. Moreover, when announcing the
poverty target, the French President gave very public backing to the
High Commissioner charged to champion delivery of the targets. Nevertheless, it may yet prove to be a considerable challenge for a junior
minister to break the mould of ministerial policy-making. In Britain,
under Labour governments, this formal responsibility changed hands
between senior ministers but the personal interest of Gordon Brown, as
Chancellor of the Exchequer and subsequently Prime Minister, is generally viewed to have been the critical motivator. Indeed, under his auspices, the poverty targets were incorporated as Public Sector Agreements (PSAs) between HM Treasury and individual government
ministries and underpinned by the possibility of financial sanction.
Where sustained championing is not forthcoming, poverty targets easily
fall into disuse much as commitments to mainstreaming social inclusion
207
have been shown to be very vulnerable in the face of political neglect.

(OKelly, 2007)
In the EU context, championing is likely to be required at both EU
and Member State levels. The inclusion of social policy goals as EU
wide targets is a landmark development bringing social policy issues
more centre stage and creating new interdependencies both between the
Commission and Member States and between Member States themselves. Nevertheless, ongoing concerns about both the global and
domestic economies could easily cause politicians and policy-makers to
neglect issues of poverty, inclusion and social cohesion. Not every
government will be equally committed to the Euro-target and there is
the ever-present risk that national political realities will dominate over
EU concerns.
The Euro-targets leave open the contribution expected to be made by
each Member State to the overall EU goal. Will some Member States be
expected to make a larger contribution to meeting the target than others
or will an equal proportionate contribution be demanded from each
Member State even if this is not necessarily the most cost effective way
of attaining the EU anti-poverty/social inclusion target? It is certainly
important that the EU targets and the national ones to be agreed are
mutually supportive and that the connecting logic is both transparent
and comprehensive. Getting an effective logic agreed is likely to require
persuasive champions as will sustaining commitment if progress slips
and some Member States prove to be less successful than others.
There is clearly a role, therefore, for the European Commission, no
doubt with the aid of civil society organisations, to champion the contributions made by individual Member States to achieving the EU goal.
The Social Protection Committee (SPC), which coordinates the Social
OMC, might reasonably be charged with this task although historically
it has often wielded limited influence on key decisions and initiatives.
Perhaps, therefore, the President of the European Council (or that of the
European Commission?), or a special envoy reporting directly to the
President, might prove more effective in delivering the targets.
Champions will also be required at Member State level who could
find the leverage of needing to report directly to the President useful if
the brief of the EU champion were to be appropriately drawn. At national level the demands of competing policy goals are, if anything,
more severe than at EU level and are often reinforced by the power of
economic ministries, the impermeability of departmental boundaries and
the difficulty of coordinating the cross-governmental action necessary to
tackle poverty and social exclusion that are both multi-causal in nature.
Experience in France, the UK and elsewhere suggests that anything less
than the public and continuing commitment of a president or prime
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Robert Walker
minister is insufficient. Championing of Social OMC has generally been

at lower level with senior ministers more engaged in the newer Member
States where EU support is seen as essential to enhance basic provisions. Often National Strategy Reports on Social Protection and Social
Inclusion have been seen as addenda to the real process of national
policy-making and relegated to the responsibility of comparatively
junior officials in relatively peripheral ministries. While a missed target
ready to be scooped by an investigative journalist might pose a greater
political threat than the off centre critique offered by peer review, it
remains critical that national targets reflect national policy objectives
and are integral in the delivery and monitoring of policy nationally.
Achieving this is perhaps made more difficult by the narrowly focussed
Euro-targets.
In the absence of strong political champions at national level, representative organisations of civil society have tended to perform the roles
of appraiser, auditor and critic and may well need to continue to do so in
the new age of Euro-targets (McKendrick et al., 2008). An important biproduct of the preparation of National Reports and National Action
Plans under the Social OMC has been a strengthening of the capacity of
civil society in many Member States to engage in policy debate. This
may well have aided the French government in its consultations on the
Scorecard. However, interpretation of statistical trends and the impact
of policies are inherently complex and technical matters that require
specialist skills. It is highly probable, therefore, that the monitoring and
interpretation of indicators is going to require sustained investment in
the analytical capacity of civil society. For many years, the Irish government supported the Combat Poverty Agency to undertake analyses of
poverty and to promote critical discussion.
Targets, therefore, are not a simple addition to Social OMC provisions. For targets to be successful, to generate policy outcomes different
from those that would have occurred anyway, they need to create a new
dynamic that generates additional incentives for relevant stakeholders or
added pressures on them. As they are intended to work in France,
targets increase the transparency and accountability of all levels of
government, between each level and to the public and hence strengthen
democracy. For targets to work well at EU level, similar developments
are likely to be necessary.
9.4 Setting Targets

Targets should be set to stretch organisations but need to be realistic
and attainable. Ideally they should also be simple, understandable and as
few in number as is appropriate given the policy goals and the nature of
the implementation logic. Targets must also accurately reflect both the
209
policy objectives and the priorities among them so that policy distortion
is prevented and the scope for creaming and gaming is curtailed2. The
metrics in which the targets are expressed, for example, the indices of
poverty, employment and educational attainment, need to be statistically
robust, capture the essence of the problem, and be responsive to policy
intervention while not being amenable to manipulation (European
Commission, 2009).
Targets need to be realistic to maintain the credibility of the process
and evidence of some measurable success appears to be important in
keeping the continued involvement of stakeholders; this occurred in
both Ireland and the United Kingdom but not in Lithuania where targets
quite rapidly fell into disuse (Jones, 2009; Walker, 2009). However,
judgements about what is attainable are not straightforward and depend
on context. They need to be informed, but not entirely constrained, by
prior experience including knowledge of local institutions, analysis of
the policy problem and studies of recent trends and policy outcomes.
They should take account of the implementation logic by means of
which it is anticipated policies will have purchase on the targets and
meaningful assessments of the likely effectiveness of new policies. Step
changes of enormous proportions are unlikely to be attainable and
certain policies cannot achieve particular results. However, the rationale
for setting targets is to encourage changes that make it more likely that
policy objectives will be reached. This may require a change of policy,
the reorganisation of institutions and/or working practices and/or an
alteration in the nature and level of funding.
Engaging stakeholders in the design of measures and building a
shared understanding of the scale and nature of the challenge of reducing poverty and increasing social inclusion, as the French government
has done, may lessen criticism if progress proves not to be as anticipated. The British experience demonstrates this to be true such that the
political costs of missing targets do not have to be excessive. Moreover,
it is probable that a common understanding of the nature and scale of
the problem enables politicians and policy-makers to take chances that
may support policy innovation and advance. Whether involving civil
society directly in setting targets would further lessen the political costs
of missing targets is unclear but is at least a possibility. Nevertheless,
the policy logic for targets and public accountability requires some
external critique to maintain a pressure on governments to deliver as
promised; while consultation is essential, taking it to the point of captur2
Creaming refers to the process of targeting individuals and resources explicitly to

maximise measured outcomes, for example by focussing help on those just beneath
the poverty threshold. Gaming refers to the adoption of practices that deliberately
serve to overstate actual success.
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Robert Walker
ing civil society within the inner policy family is likely to prove counterproductive. Some judicious balance of engagement and independence
is required.
Above all, of course, what is attainable is determined by the available volume, quality and use of resources financial, institutional,
managerial and staffing.
It is not clear how the French government determined the level and
timing of the core poverty reduction target and the resources that it is
prepared to invest in ensuring that the target is met. However, as Table 9.2 shows, to reach the target will require a considerable stepchange over past performance. Nevertheless, the simulated results for
2007-2009 presented in the first annual report on the French Scoreboard
look very promising with respect to both the anchored in time indicator
and the relative measure, and it will be interesting to learn how closely
these projections match with the actual figures when they become
available. (See Table 9.3 and HCSACP, 2009.)
To the outsider, it is similarly not immediately evident how the
Euro-targets were chosen and therefore the extent to which the above
considerations played on the minds of decision takers. The core poverty
and social exclusion target implies a reduction in the number of poor or
socially excluded of a sixth (17%) over the next decade. There is no
long-term statistical series that is directly comparable that can indicate
how reasonable this target might be. However, poverty and social
exclusion on this core measure fell by 0.84% between 2007 and 2008,
or 8.4% extrapolated over a decade which, even discounting the effects
of the recession, is a rate of improvement that falls far short of the target
requirement. The more straightforward risk of income poverty measure
(with the threshold set at 60% of equivalised median income) fluctuated
between 15 and 16.2% in the decade to 2008 and was higher at the end
of the decade than at the beginning. This again underlines the ambition
of the EU social inclusion target.
The employment target is possibly even more vulnerable to external
economic shocks than the poverty rate. The aspiration is to increase to
employment rate among 20 to 64 year olds from its current (2009) level
of 69.1% to 75%, which represents a rate of improvement over twice
that which was achieved between 2000 and 2009 (2.5%). In fact, the EU
employment rate peaked at 70.5% in 2008 which means that in a single
year the recession wiped out more than a third of the gross improvement
accomplished during the decade. Only Denmark, The Netherlands,
Finland and Cyprus bettered the EU target in 2009.
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Table 9.2: French scoreboard:

selected income based measures and targets
Latest value
Latest trend
Target (5 years)
12.5% (2007)
-4% (2002-5)
-5% (2006-7)
-33%
13.4% (2007)
Stable (2002-5)
+2% (2006-7)
-15%
Poverty intensity/Severity
18.2% (2007)
+12% (2002-5)
+1% (2006-7)
Stability
Poverty persistence rate
9% (2000)
Stable (1997-2000)
Stability
Rate of non-negotiable (Prengages) expenditure for individuals in the lowest income quintile
53 (2005)
+18% (2002-5)
Stability
Poverty rate anchored in time

(initial threshold at 60% of
equivalent median income)
Rate of income poverty threshold
at 60% of median equivalent
income
Source: HCSACP (2009)
Table 9.3: French scoreboard: selected simulation results

for income based measures 2007-2009
2007-2009
Population
Change in %
points
Change in %
Poverty rate anchored in

time (2006)
Total population
All workers
-1.6
-1.3
-14
-19
Rate of income poverty

threshold at 60% of
median equivalent income
Total population
All workers
-0.7
-0.8
-5.5
-10.4
Poverty intensity/ severity
Total population
-0.8
-4.5
Source: HCSACP (2009)
The educational attainment target to increase participation in tertiary

education from 32% to 40% is, by contrast, only a little more challenging in statistical terms than extrapolating the achievements of the preceding decade during which rates rose from 22.4 to 32.3%. Moreover,
the 2020 target is already exceeded by 10 of the 27 Member States. That
said, one would expect each marginal gain in educational attainment to
be increasingly difficult to deliver. The easy gains, the hanging fruit,
will already have been taken and further progress will require substantial improvements in the quality of primary and secondary education so
as to qualify students for tertiary education rather than merely to provide it for already qualified students. While some countries fall a long
way short of the EU-wide target (Italy, Romania, Slovakia and the
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Robert Walker
Czech Republic would all need to double their provision) and therefore
might be expected to contribute quickly to the Euro-target, many others
may be faced with very high marginal costs of improvement.
At face value, therefore, it seems likely that for these Euro-targets to
be attained there needs to be a step change in the aspirations and political ambition of Member States. Whether the targets are attainable is a
moot point but it is imperative, if they are to retain their motivational
purpose, that they are not considered to be purely aspirational, rhetorical
window dressing separate from the real world of policy-making. For this
to happen, for politicians and civil society to remain engaged to create
the stimulus of public accountability, waypoint targets should be clearly
established to mark progress towards the global goal (Atkinson and
Marlier, 2010). In the light of actual developments it might even be
appropriate to modify the targets to keep them attainable. This could
mean lowering the targets or, if progress is unexpectedly fast, increasing
them as happened in Ireland when economic growth eased the task of
reducing poverty.
9.5 Targets and Distortion

A longstanding criticism of targets used in public policy is that their
very success in directing energies leads to distortion, causing the bigger
picture of strategic objectives to be lost with administrations focusing,
instead, on meeting targets rather than delivering the full range of
services most cost effectively.
It is too soon to say whether application of the French Scoreboard,
let alone the EU targets, will have unintended consequences but the
potential is there. The choice of an anchored in time poverty measure
as the prime target in the French Scoreboard creates the incentive to
focus on economic growth rather than income redistribution as the
principal policy driver, thereby probably stimulating inequality and,
possibly, reducing social cohesion. The French government is sensitive
to this latter possibility, including measures of relative poverty to capture this effect. However, relative poverty measures necessarily focus on
low incomes and will miss the global changes in income distribution
and attenuation resulting from increased higher incomes that direct
measures of income inequality would detect. With a generic poverty
target in place, the policy inducement is to focus on those social groups
that are most easy to lift above the poverty threshold at the expense of
others that are more difficult to help. On the other hand, those most
difficult to help are likely, during their lifetimes, to spend a disproportionately large number of years in poverty thereby contributing to high
poverty rates in the longer term while also increasing measures of the
severity and persistence of poverty.
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The Scoreboard was explicitly designed to shift media interest away

from an exclusive focus on income poverty, but it nevertheless retains a
heavy emphasis on quantitative measures of income poverty omitting
qualitative aspects of the poverty experience and many dimensions of
the broader concept of social exclusion. There are no measures, for
example, of the sense of personal failure, worthlessness, alienation,
powerlessness and lack of choice associated with poverty, all features
that people with direct experience of poverty tend to prioritise (Castell
and Thompson, 2007; Walker et al., 2009). Similarly, there are few
indicators in the Scoreboard that relate to social capital or to the political, cultural and ethnic exclusion associated with poverty. Measures of
victimisation, exploitation, gender inequality and discrimination, of
security, substance abuse and crime, and of isolation, homelessness,
poor infrastructure, physical dilapidation and access to energy are all
largely omitted (Jones, 2009).
While some of these omissions are no doubt explicable in terms of a
lack of available data as well as policy intent, they ensure that the
Scoreboard is, at best, partial and, at worst, biased as a measure of
poverty and social exclusion. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact
that, with one exception, namely the priority given to the anchored in
time measure, equal weight is assigned to each indicator. This effectively means that the importance attached to an aspect of poverty is
determined by the number of measures included. Moreover, while it
might be argued that criticism concerning a lack of weighting is misplaced because no attempt is being made to provide a single cumulative
poverty index, the emphasis given in the cut and thrust of political
debate is likely to be determined by what measures are included and
their number.
The EU poverty/social inclusion target measures (at-risk-of poverty,
material deprivation, jobless households) avoid the trap of relying on
anchored in time measures of poverty that make targets easier to meet
but prioritise growth while ignoring any associated increase in income
inequalities that might prove corrosive to social cohesion. However, the
at-risk-of poverty measure is prone to a number of distortions. It can be
unstable when incomes are clustered around the poverty threshold
(which can occur if benefit levels rates keep people close to the poverty
line). It takes no account of the severity of poverty and ignores both
improvements and deterioration in the circumstances of the very poorest
families. It is also prone to record counterintuitive falls in poverty in
good economic times and increases during bad ones on account of the
sensitivity of median incomes to growth-associated inequality. This last
problem is, in part, countered by inclusion of material deprivation which
is more stable, though it is sensitive to the choice of measures of depriThis document is licensed to Eniko Vincze (3-5256156|00)
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Robert Walker
vation included and vulnerable to becoming outdated due to technological advance and market penetration (e.g. mobile phones replacing
landlines and becoming universal rather an element of deprivation3).
Adding the third measure, workless households, draws attention to the
possible need to accommodate trade-offs between competing targets;
reducing the number of workless households through the supply of low
waged employment could increase income poverty if persons find
themselves to be worse off in work than on benefits. While basing the
target on a combination of just three measures could be justified on
grounds of parsimony and as a means of focussing administrative
energies, it also increases the risk of distortion and the ease of gaming.
It would seem to be essential, therefore, to follow the French example
and to continue to monitor a wide range of Laeken-style indicators to
guard against both possibilities. In addition, the commonly agreed
indicators should be used diagnostically to understand why some Member States may be performing worse than others against their respective
national targets (Atkinson and Marlier, 2010).
The EU social inclusion target is based on a simple additive measure
that takes no account of the trade-offs between the three chosen dimensions of poverty and social exclusion. It counts the number of people
who are at risk-of-poverty and/or materially deprived and/or living in
households with very low work intensity. It generates higher estimates
of poverty than the combined measures used nationally in Britain and in
Ireland because it counts as poor or socially excluded any person who
scores on one or more dimensions rather than on all three. Equally, it
does not acknowledge the possibility that persons who suffer from two
or all three problems considered might warrant higher policy priority
with the result that policy success in effectively targeting this group
would not be appropriately rewarded. Indeed, no account is taken to the
multi-dimensional and cumulative nature of poverty and social exclusion which means that there are many different aspects (experiential and
behavioural) that need to be tackled by different packages of policies
(Tomlinson and Walker, 2009). Furthermore, equal weight is implicitly
given to each of the three dimensions of poverty and social exclusion.
This clearly allows for different national priorities but both ignores
3
The EU measure does not distinguish mobile telephones from landlines. The measure
of material deprivation covers indicators relating to economic strain, durables,
housing and environment of the dwelling. Severely materially deprived persons, according to the definition used in the EU target, have living conditions severely constrained by a lack of resources; they experience at least 4 out of the 9 following deprivations items: cannot afford i) to pay rent or utility bills, ii) keep home adequately
warm, iii) face unexpected expenses, iv) eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent every
second day, v) a week holiday away from home, vi) a car, vii) a washing machine,
viii) a colour TV, or ix) a telephone.
215
debates about the relative merits of each dimension as an index of

disadvantage and permits countries to choose the easiest route to reducing measured poverty and social exclusion which might result in creaming and short-termism.
The failure to prioritise among the poverty and social exclusion indicators on which the EU target is based, instead assigning them equal
weight and ignoring trade-offs between them, is repeated with the five
headline targets. It is neither self evident that there are no trade-offs
between the headline targets, at least in the short term, nor clear that
targets on energy intensity and greenhouse gas emissions, for example, are necessarily compatible with increased employment or lower
poverty rates, especially given the perspective of tight public finances.
What is presumed depends on the theory of change that is employed.
The lack of priorities can be seen as evidence of the determination to
leave Member States in the driving seat of policy reform or, again, one
could argue that the choice of just five targets demonstrates a great deal
of prioritisation. Either way, a lack of prioritisation between policy
targets and the various indices used for monitoring progress has been
found, at national level, to lessen the effectiveness of targets in stimulating fundamental institutional reform. It remains to be seen whether the
same is true of supra-national policy targets.
9.6 Targets and Policy Design

As already noted, policy targets should be fully compatible with the
underlying policy logic or theory of change. Insofar as they are, targets
provide scholars with evidence of the ideological underpinnings of
policy while providing policy-makers with information as to the effectiveness or otherwise of policy and evidence of any need for reform.
In the French case, the ideology and policy logic were made clear by
the President of the Republic (French Presidency of the EU, 2008,
page 1) when he stated that the welfare system (minima sociaux) had to
be reformed: In order to consistently reward work as opposed to government benefits, and to ensure that work invariably provides a door out
of, and protection from, poverty.
The Scoreboard includes certain intermediate indicators, such as inwork poverty, jobless households and access to training, that are consistent with the important role assigned to employment as a defence
against poverty. A priori, these would seem to fulfil the Laeken criterion
for effective indicators, namely being responsive to policy interventions
but not readily subject to manipulation. However, other important
measures are omitted including, for example, unemployment rates,
unemployment duration, benefit replacement rates, wage rates and wage
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Robert Walker
dispersion, security of employment and job quality, employment retention and progression, labour market discrimination and childcare availability. It follows that the Scoreboard is likely to provide a good assessment of trends in the level and nature of poverty across the
dimensions covered but may not, on its own, contribute much to understanding the effectiveness of the active inclusion policies put in place or
to further developing policy.
The EUs supranational policy targets need adequately to reflect two
tiers of policy logic. The first relates to the mechanisms by means of
which national policies address the social problems underlying the
targets. The second concerns two sets of logic: one refers to the mechanisms through which it is intended that the introduction of targets will
influence the priorities and policies of Member States; the other appertains to the aggregation algorithms that ensure that the cumulative
achievements of individual governments will guarantee that the EU
headline targets are met.
The expectation of the European Commission is that Member States
will finalise their national targets reflecting their own circumstances in
just a few months. (Euro-targets were formally agreed by the European
Council in June 2010 and countries are expected to submit to the Commission their draft National Reform Programmes (NRPs), which should
include their national targets, in November 2010; the final NRPs are to
be submitted in April 2011). Rapidity might seem counterproductive
given that the many issues discussed above relating to target setting are
germane to these decisions, as are additional EU-level relevancies to be
discussed below. Moreover, the policy logic linking policies to the
solution of social problems, as found, for example, in the European
Commissions proposals for Integrated Guidelines to deliver on the
Europe 2020 Strategy (European Commission, 2010), is aspirational
more than technical and of limited value in setting national targets. The
presumption might be that national targets will be expressed in the same
metrics as EU ones but the matter of the reasonableness of targets has to
be addressed by each Member State. In this regard, there may be scope
for using micro-simulation models including EUROMOD to assess how
readily national targets could be met through various policy strategies
(Marlier et al., 2007; Atkinson and Marlier, 2010). In addition, as
already noted, there is also potentially much to be gained in terms of
sustainability from actively engaging stakeholders in setting targets.
Finally, there is considerable advantage in developing intermediate
indicators that plot diagnostic steps in the implementation logic so as to
help establish the effectiveness of policy, a process that needs to reflect
the idiosyncrasies of national policies (Marlier et al., 2007).
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Moving to the policy rationale at EU level, the targets represent a

strengthening of the Social OMC logic of a systematic commitment to
policy improvement built upon partnership, performance measurement
and peer review that is driven forward by a cyclical process of agreed
objectives, plans and reports. Targets arguably make performance or
lack of performance transparent and set Member States in clear competition against each other, such competition substituting for the lack of any
explicit formal sanction. For targets to work, effectively on a voluntary
basis, there has to be a minimum political commitment to the policy
goal and target and the presumption must be that the process of agreeing
the objectives through the EU Heads of State and Government will
deliver at least this degree of commitment. However, Member States
have, to date, shown a variable commitment to the Social OMC, policies
are sometimes packaged differently for presentation to the Commission
than to domestic audiences and gaming and creaming are not unknown.
As previously mentioned, therefore, the championing of targets that has
proved necessary to promote them domestically in France and elsewhere
is likely to be needed both at the EU level and within Member States.
Whether champions be they the EU Social Protection Committee
(SPC) or a European Council/ Commission Presidential envoy will
suffice is unclear. The UK government funded civil society organisations both to champion targets and to articulate accountability while, as
previously noted, the French government consulted closely with them.
At EU level, anti-poverty groups have lobbied for Euro-targets and can
therefore be expected to exploit them in their campaigning (Jones,
2009). However, if performance against national targets is expressed as
an issue of accountability, which should be the case, there also needs to
be an important role for the European Parliament and its specialist
committees. There is a risk, though, that focussing on targets and performance might divert attention away the partnership in mutual learning
that has helped erode a natural tendency towards defensiveness and
enabled governments to admit to policy failure and to recognise scope
for policy improvement.
In the UK, as discussed above, policy targets have been fuelled by
financial sanctions, and conditionality is a central component in the
logic underpinning the use of management targets in both the public and
private sectors. There is scope, because the EU social inclusion target is
included in the Europe 2020 Employment Guidelines, for it to be subject to harder law than the Social OMC has been hitherto with the
European Commission having authority to issue recommendations to
delinquent Member States (see opening chapter). There might also be
potential for linking access to the EU Structural Funds to performance
against targets although, since it might be counterproductive to deny
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resources to a Member State failing to meet a target, it would be preferable to think in terms of incentives rather than sanctions.
The aggregation logic that will generate success against EU targets
based on the actions of Member States is, as yet, unclear. However, the
French experience is instructive. The central government is attempting
to engage lower tiers of government in targeting and monitoring poverty
and social exclusion. In France, much of the responsibility for delivery
of services and anti-poverty programmes lies with the dpartements and
the 36,700 communes; 60% of the latter have less than 500 inhabitants.
Nevertheless, communes are legally required, either singly or in concert,
to establish social action centres that, among other responsibilities,
are obliged to prepare social needs analyses (ABS) that include
specifying goals, indicators and policy strategies to inform local policymaking and support national targets. A working party has also been
established to develop indicators at dpartement level and in time, to
develop associated targets.
The French government therefore recognises that it is reliant on local
governments but it has not always gained the local political support
necessary for implementation. The European Commission is similarly
dependent on the activities of Member States to deliver on Euro-targets
and may, by analogy, likewise be frustrated in its dealings with Member
States, especially if targets look in danger of being missed. What action
it might seek to take is uncertain. It is also difficult to predict whether
the EU social inclusion target will create a dynamic in which governments take seriously the interdependency which means that all Member
States have to deliver on their targets if the supranational target is to be
met. This is possibly unlikely, but if it occurred the Commission might
find allies among Member States in its attempt to influence a recalcitrant government.
It is possible that, like France, other Member States will find the
need to develop and devolve targets to local and regional governments
in order to ensure that the national ones are met. This may have significant implications for the different levels of government. Lithuania, for
example, although it has not to date set policy targets, has established a
system analogous to the Social OMC in which a range of indicators are
published for all municipalities with the intention of encouraging local
politicians to compare policy outcomes with those of neighbouring
municipalities (Lazutka, 2009).
While national governments may wish to impose on local authorities
targets consistent with their national goals, the European Commission
will presumably be keen to negotiate targets for Member States consistent with its EU ambitions. However, these ambitions are far from clear
to policy-makers outside Brussels. Even if it is presumed that the EU
219
headline targets are real, and not merely rhetorical, they could be
achieved in numerous ways. For example, the target of reducing by 20
million the number of poor or socially excluded people according to
the Euro-target definition (20 million out of the 120 million, i.e. approximately 17%) could be achieved by a 17% reduction in all countries, or by targeting countries with the highest poverty rates or the
largest populations, by focussing on the countries with the smallest
poverty gaps (creaming) or, most cheaply, by concentrating energies on
countries with the lowest per capital GDP and, hence, the lowest poverty thresholds. It is at least arguable that this last strategy is not only
economical but preferable on grounds of social justice, targeting resources to those whose poverty is most severe by EU-wide standards.
However, it seems unlikely that Member States will prioritise the Eurotarget above their national interests. Nevertheless, a government intent
on curtailing domestic spending might seek to negotiate a less ambitious
national target while arguing that other Member States could more
easily contribute to the agreed EU goal. Equally, the European Commission might not favour a uniform 17% reduction since that would make
the fate of the Euro-target dependent on the contribution of the lowest
performing Member State unless target overshoots in some countries
happened to exceed shortfalls in others.
The policy logic that the European Commission will seek to follow
in its discussions on national targets with Member States has not yet
found its way into the public domain. Nor is it clear what approach
Member States will be taking to setting and negotiating targets. It seems
unlikely, given the speed of the negotiations, that either side will make
use of the EUROMOD micro-simulation although, a priori, it would
seem ideally suited to generating a range of policy scenarios under
different targeting assumptions. It may be that the Commission views
targets as little more than a quantifiable objective and that it sees little
change in the underlying logic of the Social OMC. Perhaps if the targets
offered by Member States in total fall short of the 20 million EU reduction target, the European Commission will accept this as a fait accompli
to be revisited in more auspicious times. However, it is unlikely that
civil society organisations will see targets this way. Instead, it is highly
probable that civil society will use the targets to ratchet up pressure on
national governments and the Commission to deliver on what they will
take to be promises. If this happens, and especially if civil society
succeeds in engaging the public and if the European Parliament takes a
real interest, targets may usher in a new era of political accountability in
EU policy-making.
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9.7 Conclusions
Only with hindsight can one know whether introducing targets into
the EU policy process will prove to be of lasting significance. What one
does know is that if something of significance is not achieved, targets
will have proved to be a failure. Policy targets are typically intended to
shake up the policy-making process, to challenge ways of working and
to change institutional cultures. Moreover, if they do not achieve these
things, targets are unlikely to make a difference and therefore to work. It
is difficult to judge the level of commitment to targets among the various stakeholders so early in the process of implementing them at EU
level. If stakeholders are expecting that little will change as a result of
the introduction of targets, they are being unrealistic and might well be
insufficiently prepared for the consequences of working with targets.
However, if they are determined that nothing will change, they may well
be able to guarantee that targets prove to be ineffectual.
Targets work at national level by adding a new dynamic measured
progress to policy-making, thereby increasing accountability and
stimulating public debate and engagement that is often led by civil
society organisations. Provided targets are attainable, progress is demonstrable and the system has effective political champions, policy
targets can shift policy-making cultures, enhance the role of evidence
and increase achievements. However, targets need accurately to reflect
the causal mechanisms embodied in policy logic, that is, they must
measure the right outcomes in an appropriate manner so as to avoid
distortion and not to encourage gaming that means targets may be met
while policy objectives are forgotten or ignored.
There are many unknowns and uncertainties as policy targets are
transferred from national to EU level. These include questions about the
degree of political support that exists, the nature, robustness and specificity of the policy logic at both EU and Member State levels, the
attainability of the Euro-targets already set, the criteria for setting
national targets and the linkages envisaged between EU, Member State
and possible regional and sub-regional targets. Targets can neither
capture the full complexities of the social and economic issues being
tackled nor reflect all the subtle processes involved in policy delivery
especially at supranational level. Hence, targets are partial and gaming
is certainly possible, particularly if a culture of competition rather than
collaboration is fostered between Member States; it is important that
targets are used to drive policy-making rather than to replace it.
For this to happen, powerful champions must be appointed at EU
and Member State level to monitor achievements and to encourage,
facilitate and cajole the various stakeholders to take those actions
221
necessary to meet the targets set. There may even be a case, based on
the experience of implementing national targets, for establishing financial incentives that reward success. Furthermore, the targets provide an
opportunity to enhance the legitimacy of EUs democratic institutions
by foregrounding the role of the European Parliament, alongside that of
civil society, in holding Member States to account as they endeavour
through policy and institutional change to attain or, preferably, to
exceed their targets by 2020.
Statistics on poverty, exclusion and disadvantage of all kinds demonstrate the imperative to tackle social problems across the EU and to
build the political support needed to do so. Targets could fit well within
the institutional structures that have been created by the Social OMC
and add a new dynamism. Whether the dynamic will embrace the Eurotargets as a collective venture to be addressed through collaborative
action, rather than by the simple summation of nationally focussed
activities, remains to be seen.
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Inclusion: Facing the Challenges, Bristol: The Policy Press.
McKendrick, J., Sinclair, S., Irwin, A., ODonnell, H., Scott, G. and Dobbie L.
(2008), The media, poverty and public opinion in the UK, York: Joseph
Rowntree Foundation.
OKelly, K. (2007), The evaluation of mainstreaming social inclusion in
Europe, Dublin: Combat Poverty Agency.
Tomlinson, M. and Walker, R. (2009), Coping with Complexity: Child and
adult poverty, London: CPAG.
Tomlinson, M., Walker, R. and Williams, G. (2008), Measuring Poverty in
Britain as a Multi-dimensional Concept, 1991 to 2003, Journal of Social
Policy, 37(4): 597-620.
Walker, R. (2010), France 2009: Measuring the impact of active inclusion and
other policies to combat poverty and social exclusion: Synthesis Report,
Vienna: European Commission, Directorate-General Employment, Social
affairs and Equal opportunities.
Walker, R. (2009), Measuring the impact of active inclusion and other policies
to combat poverty and social exclusion, Discussion Paper presented to the
Peer Review on Measuring the impact of active inclusion, Paris, 3-4
December.
Walker, R., Tomlinson, M. and Williams, G. (2009), The problem with
poverty, in G. Walford and E. Tucker (editors), The Sage Handbook of
Measurement, London: Sage, 353-376.
223
10. Strengthening Social Inclusion in the

Europe 2020 Strategy by Learning from the Past
Hugh FRAZER and Eric MARLIER1
10.1 Current Approach
10.1.1 Main elements
Since 2000, the European Union (EU) and the European Commission have been cooperating in the field of social policy on the basis of
the so-called Open Method of Coordination (OMC). This has provided
the framework in which efforts to promote social protection and social
inclusion and to tackle poverty and social exclusion in the EU have
been implemented. EU cooperation and coordination in the social area
have developed significantly over the last 10 years and now cover three
main policy areas or strands: social inclusion (formally launched at
the March 2000 Lisbon European Council as the OMC on poverty and
social exclusion), pensions (launched in 2001) and healthcare and longterm care (2004). There are also information exchanges in the field of
making work pay. Since 2006, the three EU social processes that were
progressively implemented under the OMC (one process for each main
strand) have been streamlined into one integrated Social OMC built
around 12 commonly agreed EU objectives: three for each main strand
as well as three overarching objectives which address horizontal
issues that cut across them.2 The Social OMC is coordinated by the EU
Social Protection Committee (SPC), which consists of officials from
1
This chapter draws on the 10 years of experience of EU cooperation and coordination

in the social area and builds on earlier work we have undertaken such as Frazer and
Marlier (2008, 2010 and 2010a) and also most recently Frazer, Marlier and Nicaise
(2010).
Addresses
for
correspondence:
[email protected]
and
[email protected].
The 12 EU objectives for the streamlined Social OMC were adopted by the EU in
March 2006. See: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=755&langId=en.
The overarching objectives of the Social OMC provide linkage across the three
social policy strands as well as between the EU social, economic and employment
strategies. For instance, the third overarching objective is to promote good governance, transparency and the involvement of stakeholders in the design, implementation and monitoring of policy.
225
Strengthening Social Inclusion in the Europe 2020 Strategy
mainly Employment and Social Affairs Ministries in each Member State

as well as representatives of the European Commission. The SPC
reports to the EU Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer
Affairs (EPSCO) Council of Ministers.
The main elements of the OMC approach are well summarised by
Marlier et al. (2007, pages 22-23): The OMC is a mutual feedback
process of planning, monitoring, examination, comparison and adjustment of national (and sub-national) policies, all of this on the basis of
common objectives agreed for the EU as a whole. Through this peer
review exercise (which involves the European Commission and all
Member States), and thus the sharing of experience and good practices,
all the countries can learn from one another and are therefore all in a
position to improve their policies. As put by Vandenbroucke (2002),
with this approach, the EU has found a way that implies a credible
commitment to a social Europe which, provided certain conditions are
met, can effectively lead to social progress.3
Box 10.1: The three social inclusion objectives of the Social OMC
A decisive impact on the eradication of poverty and social exclusion by
ensuring:
access for all to the resources, rights and services needed for
participation in society, preventing and addressing exclusion, and
fighting all forms of discrimination leading to exclusion;
the active social inclusion of all, both by promoting participation in the

labour market and by fighting poverty and exclusion;
that social inclusion policies are well-coordinated and involve all levels
of government and relevant actors, including people experiencing
poverty, that they are efficient and effective and mainstreamed into all
relevant public policies, including economic, budgetary, education and
training policies and structural fund (notably European Social Fund
(ESF)) programmes.
More concretely, the social inclusion strand of the Social OMC has
consisted of five main elements since 2006. As mentioned above, the
first element is a set of three EU objectives for social inclusion (see
3
In this chapter, we concentrate primarily on drawing out lessons from the social
inclusion strand of the Social OMC. However, in doing so we set this learning in the
broader context of the Social OMC as a whole (i.e. social inclusion as well as pensions and healthcare and long-term care) and we draw out lessons about the importance of social protection in building a stronger Social EU.
226
Hugh Frazer and Eric Marlier
Box 10.1) which are part of a wider set of common objectives on social
protection and social inclusion.
The second element is the National Action Plans on social inclusion
(NAPs/inclusion), which are one section of the streamlined National
Strategy Reports on social protection and social inclusion (NSRSPSIs).
NAPs/inclusion are meant to be the means by which Member States
translate the common objectives into national policies and are drawn up
on the basis of a common framework. Since 2006, there have been two
rounds of NSRSPSIs covering the period 2006-2008 and 2008-2010.
The third element is a set of commonly agreed indicators to enhance
the analysis of poverty and social exclusion and to measure progress
towards achieving the common objectives. These indicators are organised according to the structure of the common objectives for the Social
OMC: one set of indicators and context information appropriate to the
overarching objectives agreed for the Social OMC as a whole and one
appropriate to each of the three social strands covered by the Social
OMC (i.e., social inclusion, pensions and healthcare and long-term
care). The most recent list of indicators was adopted in the second half
of 2009 and provides for each indicator the agreed definition and sociodemographics breakdowns (European Commission, 2009).4
The fourth element is a process of regular monitoring and reporting
on progress which has resulted in regular reports on social inclusion in
the EU. These are the annual Joint Reports on Social Protection and
Social Inclusion.5
Finally, the fifth element consists of the two Community action programmes to underpin and reinforce the process and, more particularly,
to encourage mutual learning and dialogue between Member States with
a view to stimulating innovation and the sharing of good practice. From
2002-2006 there was The Community action programme to encourage
cooperation between Member States to combat social exclusion which
was succeeded for the period 2007-2013 by the Community Programme
for Employment and Social Solidarity (PROGRESS). These programmes
have promoted inter alia: research and policy analysis (e.g., the EU
Network of Independent Experts on Social Inclusion6); data collection
(e.g., Member States have received significant funding from these
Programmes to launch the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) instrument, which is a major EU reference data source
for the Social OMC indicators and statistics); exchange of good practice
4
5
6
For more information on the EU social indicators (their construction and their use in
the policy process), see for instance Atkinson et al. (2002) and Marlier et al. (2007).
See: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=757&langId=en.
See: http://www.peer-review-social-inclusion.eu/network-of-independent-experts.
227
(through transnational exchange projects, peer reviews and studies);

networking across Europe of NGOs and regional and local authorities
active in the fight against poverty and social exclusion; and the funding
of European conferences on poverty and social exclusion.
While the above are the main elements of the social inclusion strand
of the Social OMC, it is important to understand that the other two
strands (i.e. pensions and healthcare and long-term care) have also
played an important role in promoting greater social inclusion. This has
been more evident since the three separate processes were streamlined
into one overall Social OMC, though the synergies between the three
strands need to be further developed (see also chapters by Daly and by
Zeitlin in the present volume). The first two of the overarching objectives of the Social OMC7 have also helped to situate the struggle against
poverty and social exclusion within the broader context of developing
effective and sustainable social protection systems (i.e. income support
and access to services). These overarching objectives also stress the
importance of social protection and social inclusion policies in reinforcing employment and economic objectives (referred to as feeding in in
EU jargon) and economic and employment policies contributing to the
achievement of social objectives (feeding out). Unfortunately, the
mutual interaction between the employment, economic and social
inclusion processes still need to be fully and systematically developed.
However, at least the objectives have helped to highlight the importance
of such synergies being more systematically pursued.
10.1.2 Key policy areas

From 2006, activities carried out in the context of the EU Social Inclusion Process focussed in an increasingly systematic manner around
three policy themes. The first theme was Active Inclusion. Work on this
topic led to the European Commission Recommendation on the active
inclusion of people excluded from the labour market (2008b), which
contains common principles and practical guidelines on a comprehensive strategy based on the integration of three policy pillars: adequate
income support, inclusive labour markets and access to quality services.8 Secondly, child poverty and child well-being became a key issue
7
These objectives are to promote social cohesion, equality between men and women
and equal opportunities for all through adequate, accessible, financially sustainable,
adaptable and efficient social protection systems and social inclusion policies and
to promote effective and mutual interaction between the Lisbon objectives of greater
economic growth, more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, and with the EU
Sustainable Development Strategy.
See:
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:307:00
11:0014:EN:PDF. See also European Commission, 2008b.
228
and this led to a thematic year on the topic in 2007 and the adoption of a
very important report by the SPC on child poverty and well-being that
can be referred to as the first EU-wide benchmarking exercise based
quasi exclusively on the commonly agreed EU indicators (Social Protection Committee, 2008). Thirdly, the issue of homelessness and housing
exclusion was the subject of a thematic year in 2009. All three issues are
being given a lot of attention as key themes during the 2010 European
Year for Combating Poverty and Social Exclusion and thus also during
the 2010 Spanish and Belgian Presidencies of the Council of the EU.
Two other topics have come increasingly to the fore in the most recent
period: the high risk of poverty and social exclusion experienced by
many migrants and ethnic minorities, and the social impact of the
financial and economic crisis.9
In the two other strands of the EU coordination and cooperation in
the social field, i.e. pensions and healthcare and long-term care, there
has also been a tendency to concentrate on particular areas. For instance, activities have inter alia covered the following topics: privately
managed pensions, working longer and reducing early withdrawal from
the labour market, reducing health inequalities, improving the rational
use of resources in healthcare and long-term care while maintaining the
quality and coordination between different healthcare sectors, effectiveness and efficiency of healthcare spending, sustainability and adequacy
of EU pension systems (including long term implications of the crisis
for pension systems), etc.
10.1.3 Governance and institutional arrangements

In addition to these specific policy areas, the Social OMC has also
given considerable emphasis to strengthening governance and institutional arrangements in relation to tackling and preventing poverty and
social exclusion (though this has been more evident in the field of social
inclusion than in the pensions and healthcare and long-term care
strands). As a result, seven themes in particular have emerged though
progress across them has been uneven. These have been:
first, the need to mobilise stakeholders (government agencies,
social partners and non governmental organisations and the
research community) in the design, implementation and
monitoring of policies and programmes;
9
See for instance the Second joint assessment by the Social Protection Committee
and the European Commission of the social impact of the economic crisis and of policy responses Full Report submitted to the EU Council of Ministers in November
2009 and available at: http://register. consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st16/st16169ad01.en09.pdf.
229
secondly, the importance of involving people directly

experiencing poverty and social exclusion;
thirdly, the fact that the social inclusion objectives have to be
mainstreamed into national and sub-national policy-making;
fourthly, the importance of improving the coordination of
different departments and levels of government so that policies
and programmes can better reinforce each other;
fifthly, the need for comprehensive, multidimensional and
strategic responses to poverty and social exclusion which are
evidence-based and which are aimed at achieving clearly
defined and quantified objectives adopted as a result of a
rigorous diagnosis;
sixthly, the necessity to coordinate and integrate the delivery of
policies on the ground in a way that involves partnerships
between the different agencies and that involves all; and
seventhly, the importance of developing effective procedures
for the monitoring of and reporting on the implementation of
strategies and for both the ex ante and ex post assessment of the
impact of policies.
10.2 Assessment of the Social OMC

Drawing on our own work on the Social OMC (e.g., Frazer and Marlier (2008, 2010 and 2010a), Marlier et al. (2007)) as well as on the
assessment made by the European Commission (2008 and 2008a), by
various commentators (e.g., Crepaldi et al. (2010) and Zeitlin (2007))
and by many of the Networks active in the process (e.g., European AntiPoverty Network (2009, 2009a, 2010, 2010a and 2010b) and Platform
of European Social NGOs (2009)), one can identify a fairly clear pattern
of strengths and weaknesses of the EUs approach to tackling poverty
and social exclusion.
10.2.1 Strengths
The first and probably the most important aspect of the Social OMC
is that it has helped to put and keep social inclusion and social protection (including pensions and healthcare and long-term care) on the EU
agenda (if not always as strongly as many would wish). It has created a
space in which it has been possible to argue for enhanced efforts at EU,
national and sub-national levels to prevent and alleviate poverty and
social exclusion and promote greater social inclusion. Secondly, the
Social OMC has provided an opportunity to highlight at EU level the
importance of ensuring that economic, employment and social policies
230
are made mutually reinforcing and thus also an opportunity to insist that
economic and employment objectives should take more into account
social outcomes. Thirdly, it has contributed to Member States, particularly through their involvement in preparing NAPs/inclusion, developing a common understanding of concepts (e.g., multidimensionality,
mainstreaming, evidence-based strategies and quantified objectives,
partnership between actors, participation, policy impact assessments)
and to them identifying and agreeing on key policy priorities in relation
to social inclusion, pensions and healthcare and long-term care at national and sub-national levels. Fourthly, it has generated a considerable
body of very useful learning about how best to prevent and alleviate
poverty and social exclusion and to promote stronger pension systems
and enhanced healthcare and long-term care services whether from the
various Joint Reports on Social Protection and Social Inclusion, the
many studies commissioned as part of the process, the wide range of
reports arising from transnational exchange projects and peer reviews,
or the many reports from the different networks active in the process
such as the AGE Platform Europe, the European Anti-Poverty Network
(EAPN), the European Federation of National Organisations Working
with the Homeless (FEANTSA), Eurochild, the European Social Network and the Confederation of Family Organisations in the EU (COFACE). As already mentioned, the deepening of knowledge and the
exchange of learning in relation to social inclusion has been particularly
evident in the areas of active inclusion, child poverty and well-being, as
well as housing exclusion and homelessness.
Fifthly, as the recent evaluation of the process for the European Parliament points out (see Crepaldi et al., 2010), the Social OMC has
achieved significant progress in improving data, defining commonly
agreed indicators and developing a stronger analytical framework so as
to better understand and assess the phenomena at stake as well as better
monitor and report on progress. Even though there is still a long way to
walk, this has encouraged a more rigorous and evidenced-based approach to policy-making.
Sixthly, it has led to improvements in the governance of social inclusion issues in various Member States. In particular, it has encouraged
mainstreaming a social inclusion concern across a broader range of
policy domains, greater coordination and integration of policies to
prevent and alleviate poverty and social exclusion, and improved structures to mobilise a broad range of different stakeholders, including those
people experiencing poverty and social exclusion. Seventhly, in those
Member States who have chosen to make full use of it, the Social OMC
has proved to be a very helpful tool in strengthening their national and
sub-national efforts to promote social inclusion. Eighthly, it has ensured
231
that the need for a response to the social impact of the financial and
economic crisis has been articulated in EU debates.10 Ninthly, it has
mobilised a wide range of actors and fostered EU wide networks of
people involved in the struggle against poverty and social exclusion and
it has given a voice to the socially excluded.11 Tenthly, without the EU
process it is unlikely that 2010 would have been designated the European Year for Combating Poverty and Social Exclusion.
10.2.2 Weaknesses
In spite of the several positive developments encouraged by the Social OMC, this process has failed in one of its main goals. There has
been little progress made towards achieving the overall objective set in
Lisbon ten years ago of making a decisive impact on the eradication of
poverty and social exclusion by 2010, though some would argue that
this was not something that such a process could achieve. The harsh
reality is that the at-risk-of poverty rate for the 15 countries that were
members of the EU in 2000 has remained stable: the EU-15 weighted
average was 15% in 2000 and in 2008, the most recent data available, it
is 16% (for the 12 newer Member States, the average poverty risk rate
in 2008 is 17%; the 2008 EU-27 average is also 17%).12 In relation to
material deprivation, the situation is however a bit more encouraging
at least in the newer Member States. Indeed, if the EU-15 average has
remained stable between 2005 and 2008 (12-13%), it has dropped in the
10 newer EU countries for which data are available though it still
remains 2.5 times as high as in the older Member States (2005: 43%,
2006: 38%, 2007: 33% and 2008: 29%).13
10
11
12
13
In this regard, it is encouraging that the 2010 Joint Report on Social Protection and
Social Inclusion clearly recognises that the crisis has emphasised the added value of
policy coordination through the Open Method of Coordination on Social Protection
and Social Inclusion (Social OMC) and provided further incentive to reinforce and
exploit its potential fully (EU Council of Ministers, 2010).
See for instance European Anti-Poverty Network (2009a). For the reports summarising the main outcomes of the annual EU Meetings of People Experiencing Poverty,
see: http://www.eapn.eu/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=600%3A
the-european-meetings-of-people-experiencing-poverty-a-process-going-forward&ca
tid=16&Itemid=14&lang=en.
According to the EU definition, people at risk of poverty are people living in a
household whose total equivalised income is below 60% of the median national
equivalised household income (the equivalence scale is the so-called OECD modified
scale). All the figures presented in this paragraph are from the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) data source.
Originally proposed by Guio (2009), this EU indicator significantly improves the
multi-dimensional coverage of the EU portfolio for social inclusion. Based on the
limited information available from the EU-SILC data-set, it focuses on the proportion
of people living in households who cannot afford at least 3 items out of a list of 9.
232
Among the various explanations that have been put forward by

commentators for the relatively limited impact of the Social OMC, the
most important is the low political status given to the process and the
lack of political leadership at EU level, particularly vis--vis the other
strands of the Lisbon agenda (growth and jobs). In reality, the mutually
reinforcing nature of economic, social and employment policy envisaged when the Lisbon process was launched has not been much in
evidence. To put it in EU jargon, there has been little feeding in and
feeding out between the various EU processes. In theory, it was expected that the EUs Social OMC agenda would parallel and interact
closely with the Growth and Jobs agenda (feeding in to growth and
employment objectives while growth and employment programmes
would feed out to advance social cohesion/inclusion goals). However,
as the studies by the EU Network of Social Inclusion Experts have
shown (Frazer and Marlier, 2009), in practice such reinforcing interconnections have been disappointingly weak they have existed more in
theory than in practice and, more broadly, linkages with other EU policy
areas (e.g. competition, agriculture, health, education, justice, migration) have been very limited.
Another reason for the relatively limited impact of the Social OMC
is that up to the present it has remained a soft process; there have been
no sanctions against Member States who fail to make progress and the
European Commission has not issued recommendations to Member
States on what they would need to do to strengthen their efforts (see
below, Section 10.3.2). There has thus been little pressure on Member
States to move forward. Furthermore, the absence of any clear EU
quantified social outcome targets up until very recently (June 2010; see
below) has diminished the status of the Social OMC in relation to
economic and employment policies which, since 2005, have been dealt
with separately at EU level in the context of the Partnership for Growth
and Jobs. All of this has meant that the Social OMC has had a very low
public visibility and (until very recently) there has been a lack of public
promotion of the process.
At national level, the reality has been that most Member States have
failed to integrate the Social OMC process, especially the NAPs/inclusion, into national and sub-national policy-making procedures. Indeed,
in many Member States NAPs/inclusion have been rather bureaucratic
reporting mechanisms whereby countries inform the European CommisFigures for the newer Member States do not include Bulgaria and Romania as data
for these countries are not available for all 4 years considered here. In 2008, the national rate of material deprivation (EU definition) is 51% for Bulgaria and 50% for
Romania. For a characterisation of the income poor and the materially deprived in 24
EU countries and in Norway, see: Fusco, Guio and Marlier (2010).
233
sion and other EU Member States of what they are doing or planning to
do to combat poverty and social exclusion. They have not been used, as
was originally intended, as a means of reviewing policies and developing new and increased strategic efforts to prevent and reduce poverty
and social exclusion. This view is borne out by the European Commissions own recent evaluation of the impact of the Lisbon process, which
refers to the OMC as a method of soft coordination and which rightly
highlights that while the OMC can be used as a source of peer pressure
and a forum for sharing good practice, evidence suggests that in fact
most Member States have used OMCs as a reporting device rather than
one of policy development (European Commission, 2010a).
With a soft process, a key to encouraging greater effort is through
effective monitoring and evaluation of the progress being made by
Member States and benchmarking their performance against other
Member States. In practice, there has been insufficiently rigorous
monitoring, evaluation and reporting of Member States performance in
part due to weak analytical tools and resources. Furthermore, the potential of the Social OMC for putting peer pressure on Member States to do
more through the use of EU benchmarking and more generally transnational comparisons has been made more difficult by the lack of timely
statistical evidence.
Analyses of the NAPs/inclusion by the European Commission, the
EU Network of Independent Experts on Social Inclusion and European
poverty networks like EAPN, Eurochild, European Social Network and
FEANSTA have highlighted that, while a few Member States have
made progress, still too many have very weak governance arrangements
for tackling poverty and social exclusion. Many countries lack effective
mechanisms for mainstreaming social inclusion objectives in national
and sub-national policies, lack effective arrangements for the horizontal
and vertical coordination of policies, and/or have ineffective strategic
planning and poor systems for implementing policies on the ground and
for mobilising and involving all actors.
Finally, one more important factor that has undermined the impact of
the Social OMC is that it has not been sufficiently backed up with
resources. The potential to use the EU Structural Funds to encourage
Member States in the implementation of the EU social inclusion objectives has not been sufficiently developed. EAPN among others has been
critical of the limited amount of Structural Funds available to support
social inclusion measures: Overall, EAPN was disappointed that the
2007-2013 programming period was not made a more effective instrument to combat poverty and social exclusion. The European Commissions own estimates were that only 12.4% of the European Social Fund
was allocated to social inclusion measures. (Harvey, 2008)
234
10.3 The Future

The EU process launched in Lisbon in 2000 ended in 2010. Thus
there is currently much policy debate about what role efforts to prevent
and reduce poverty and social exclusion will play in the EUs agenda
for the next decade, Europe 2020 (European Commission, 2010).
Drawing on the experience of recent years and on important contributions from various civil society networks14 and building on earlier work
we have undertaken (e.g., Frazer (2010), Frazer and Marlier (2008,
2010 and 2010a) and also the independent report we prepared at the
request of the 2010 Belgian Presidency of the EU (Frazer, Marlier and
Nicaise, 2010)), the following are our suggestions as to how the process
could build on past successes and address weaknesses if a more effective EU process is to develop in the future.
In making our suggestions, we would stress that the existing EU
processes on social protection and social inclusion are still relatively
new. As we have documented above, they are far from perfect. However, there is much that is positive and that has gradually become embedded in policy and practice. Looking to the future, it is important to
build on these positives and not to throw out the baby with the bathwater by abandoning key elements of the Social OMC. So, where it is
possible to strengthen the various elements of the Social OMC we
should do so. Those weaknesses that we have identified that cannot be
satisfactorily addressed in this way could then be pursued through the
proposed EU flagship European Platform against Poverty (see Section
10.3.6 below; see also chapters by Daly and by Zeitlin in the present
volume).
10.3.1 Clear EU social objectives with EU

and national social outcome targets
Clear EU social objectives
If social cohesion/inclusion is to have a higher political priority at
EU level, the EUs political objectives must emphasise the interdependence and mutually reinforcing nature of economic, employment, social
and environmental objectives and policies. The new Europe 2020
Strategy must be built around these four pillars and all must be developed at the same time so that they continuously interact and reinforce
14
See, for example: Confederation of Family Organisations in the European Union

(COFACE) (2010), Eurochild (2010), European Anti-Poverty Network (2009, 2010
and 2010b), European Anti-Poverty Network Ireland (2010), European Social Network (2010), FEANTSA (2010), Platform of European Social NGOs (2009) and
Spring Alliance (2009).
235
each other. The objectives should also contain an explicit commitment

to work both for the eradication of poverty and social exclusion and for
the reduction of inequalities. An effective fight against poverty and
social exclusion requires that both prevention (i.e. reducing the inflow
into poverty) and alleviation (i.e. lifting those in poverty out of poverty)
be addressed. This means universal policies aimed at promoting the
inclusion of all and then also, when necessary, targeted policies to assist
those facing particular difficulties or barriers. Comprehensive social
protection systems are then also needed to ensure that all citizens have
access to high quality services and to an adequate income. Finally, a
prerequisite for effectively combating poverty and social exclusion (and
for achieving the Europe 2020 stated goal of inclusive and sustainable
growth) is to address (excessive) inequality.
EU and national social outcome targets

In its proposals for Europe 2020, issued in March 2010, the European Commission suggested that there should be five EU headline
targets to be achieved by 2020. One of these was to reduce the number
of Europeans living below national poverty lines by 25%, lifting 20
million people out of poverty (EU definition; see above). The Commission also proposed that there should be 7 flagship initiatives. One of
these is a European Platform Against Poverty (EPAP), the purpose of
which would be to ensure social and territorial cohesion such that the
benefits of growth and jobs are widely shared and people experiencing
poverty and social exclusion are enabled to live in dignity and take an
active part in society (European Commission, 2010).
On 17th June 2010, following an extensive process of discussion and
negotiation involving primarily the SPC and its Indicators Sub-Group as
well as the European Commission, EU Heads of State and Government
endorsed a compromise target aimed at promoting social inclusion, in
particular through the reduction of poverty (European Council, 2010).
This target is based on a combination of three indicators: the number of
people at risk of poverty (EU definition; total population), the number
of people materially deprived (EU definition but stricter15; total population), and the number of people aged 0-59 who live in jobless households (defined, for the purpose of the EU target, as households where
none of the members aged 18-59 are working or where members aged
18-59 have, on average, very limited work attachment). The target will
consist of reducing the number of people in the EU (120 million) who
15
In the standard EU definition, the threshold for being considered materially deprived has been set as an enforced lack of at least 3 items out of 9 (see above). In
the indicator used for the newly adopted EU target, it has been set as 4 items out of 9
(same list of items).
236
are at risk of poverty and/or materially deprived and/or living in jobless

households by 20 million.1617
Although the target is less ambitious than many hoped, the fact that
the European Commission and all EU countries could adopt it is a major
step forward in demonstrating the political social commitment of the
EU. This represents a positive step towards ensuring that social cohesion/inclusion have the same status as the other political priorities
outlined in the Europe 2020 agenda, all of which having linked quantified targets.
The next challenge is for each Member State to adopt one or several
national and possibly sub-national (outcome) targets. Under the principle of subsidiarity, countries are free to set these targets on the basis of
what they consider the most appropriate indicator(s) given their national
circumstances and priorities. Setting targets is a difficult area for a
combination of political and scientific reasons. Indeed, to be truly
meaningful these targets need to be evidence-based, they should be the
result of a rigorous diagnosis of the causes of poverty and social exclusion in the country and they should take into account the views of
stakeholders. It is also important that Member States be asked to explain
again, on the basis of rigorous analytical evidence how meeting their
(sub-)national targets will contribute to the achievement of the EU level
target. As emphasised by Marlier et al. (2007, page 213), analytical
tools such as tax-benefit simulation can help in projecting forward
benchmark scenarios against which the level of ambition of targets can
be assessed. Significant scientific work is required in this complex area,
and researchers have a major contribution to make in deepening the
information base for decision makers.18
16
17
18
This is less ambitious than the original proposals which was also a reduction of
20 million but only covered 80 million people (i.e., the number of people at-risk-ofpoverty).
At their June 2010 meeting, EU Heads of State and Government endorsed five EU
headline targets which will constitute shared objectives guiding the action of Member
States and the Union as regards promoting employment; improving the conditions for
innovation, research and development; meeting our climate change and energy objectives; improving education levels; and promoting social inclusion in particular
through the reduction of poverty. In the words of EU leaders, the latter will consist
of promoting social inclusion, in particular through the reduction of poverty, by
aiming to lift at least 20 million people out of the risk of poverty and exclusion. EU
leaders have decided that progress towards the headline targets will be regularly
reviewed (European Council, 2010). See also Introduction and Chapter 5 in Atkinson and Marlier (2010).
For a detailed discussion of targets, see: Marlier et al., 2007, Sections 6.2-6.4. See
also chapter by Walker in the present volume.
237
In order to boost political commitment and mutual learning, we believe that countries should set their (sub-)national targets in a transparent way and in a dialogue with the European Commission, and that the
SPC should discuss these. Certainly, if the targets are developed on the
basis we have outlined above, there is likely to be much greater public
and political commitment to them. This is especially important given
that the time frame is up to ten years (i.e. until 2020) and during that
time governments will almost inevitably change. If the targets have been
set as the result of a robust, rigorous and transparent process then there
is a much greater chance that any incoming government will also be
committed to achieving them.
10.3.2 Benchmarking, monitoring and evaluation

A major challenge that will need to be given particular attention in
the post-2010 arrangements is to make rigorous benchmarking, monitoring and evaluation a central and visible feature of the EU process at EU,
national and sub-national levels. This will require the following:
An exploration by the European Commission and Member
States of ways of making the EU social objectives more visible,
measurable and tangible at EU level. Apart from the EU and
(sub-)national targets discussed above, which have a key role to
play in this respect, this could for instance include a more
rigorous, intensive and transparent use of the full set of
commonly agreed indicators underpinning EU coordination in
the social field (and not just the 3 indicators on which the new
EU social inclusion target is based). This could also involve the
commitment of all Member States to set the goal of improving
their performance on a set of commonly agreed indicators
covering each relevant social protection and social inclusion
policy domain (i.e. social inclusion, pensions and healthcare
and long-term care).19
Both a regular and thorough monitoring of and reporting on
progress towards the EU and national targets and towards the
improved performances on the agreed set of EU indicators,
summarised in an annual report to the Spring European
Council, to the European Parliament as well as to national and
possible sub-national parliaments (as part of the annual Joint
19
Marlier et al. (2007) identify four respects in which the commonly agreed indicators could be used more intensively in the Social OMC. They also suggest (page 155)
that the EU portfolio of indicators could be complemented with a background statistic based on a common income threshold of 60% of the EU-wide median which
could be an important way of addressing the key issue of social cohesion/ convergence across the Union.
238
Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion; see also

Section 10.3.7 below).
A much more rigorous approach not only to monitoring but also
to evaluation, with an increased focus on results. This should
involve: more systematic use by Member States of the common
indicators in their national monitoring and analytical frameworks in order to improve mutual learning (see Marlier et al.,
2007, Section 2.7, pages 48-53); boosting statistical and analytical capacity at EU, national and sub-national levels; promoting the use of social impact assessments in all relevant policy
domains; putting in place formal arrangements in all Member
States for genuinely involving civil society organisations and
independent experts in monitoring and assessing social inclusion policies on an ongoing basis.
In the light of this strengthened monitoring and evaluation process,
the European Commission and the SPC, as the bodies in charge of
implementing the EU coordination and cooperation in the social field,
should, as necessary, make clear recommendations to each Member
State on actions it needs to take if it is to achieve the agreed national
and EU targets. These would then be endorsed by the EU Council of
Ministers.20
20
Because of the direct link with the Employment Guidelines (through the Integrated
Guideline 10), there is now a stronger legal basis for monitoring Member States performance in relation to social protection and social inclusion issues and, when necessary, for the European Commission to issue recommendations to Member States for
improvements to their policies. Independent of these new possibilities, it is important
to mention that while the Treaty does not explicitly foresee the possibility of the
European Commission issuing recommendations, it also does not prevent the Commission from doing so through soft law agreements. For instance, Article 5 of the
Treaty, as well as providing for the coordination of economic and employment policies, says that The Union may take initiatives to ensure coordination of Member
States social policies. And Article 160, in outlining the role of the SPC includes
among its tasks to prepare reports, formulate opinions or undertake other work
within its fields of competence, at the request of either the Council or the Commission or on its own initiative. The 2008 European Commission Communication on
reinforcing the Social OMC already suggested that The subjects that are part of the
OMC could be further consolidated by formalising convergence of views whenever it
arises. The Commission will contribute to this by making, where appropriate, use of
Recommendations based on Article 211 of the Treaty, setting out common principles, providing a basis for monitoring and peer review. (European Commission,
2008a) In fact, a precedent for this exists within the Social OMC with the Commissions 2008 Recommendation on Active Inclusion (European Commission, 2008b).
239
10.3.3 Social inclusion in the Europe 2020

Integrated Guidelines for growth and jobs
The overall political decision to make social inclusion a key EU priority and, in this context, to set a quantified outcome target in relation to
poverty and social exclusion at EU level is one (important) part of the
jigsaw. The arrangements for implementation are also critical. On 27
April 2010, the European Commission published its proposals for
Integrated Guidelines to deliver on the Europe 2020 Strategy (European
Commission, 2010b). Ten Guidelines were proposed, under two distinct
legal bases: six Economic and four Employment Guidelines. A Guideline on Promoting social inclusion and combating poverty, which sets
out policies to reach the EU headline target on social inclusion, has been
included under the Employment Guidelines (Guideline No. 10). (A brief
presentation of the final set of ten Guidelines as agreed later on in 2010
by the EU Council of Ministers as well as the final wording of Guideline 10 and some important accompanying recitals is provided in the
opening chapter.)
The Guideline is drawn in a reasonably broad manner, reflecting the
main strands of the existing Social OMC and, importantly, stressing the
importance of access to high quality, affordable and sustainable services
and the key role of social protection systems, including pensions and
access to healthcare. It thus provides an important basis for building on
key elements of the existing Social OMC.
Other parts of the Employment Guidelines also have a potentially
important role to play in promoting greater social inclusion. In particular, Guideline No. 7 (Increasing labour market participation of women
and men, reducing structural unemployment and promoting job quality)
emphasises that flexicurity should be underpinned by an effective active
inclusion approach. It stresses the important role to be played by employment services and adequate social security in supporting those at
risk of unemployment. It highlights the need to fight in-work poverty
and to counter labour market segmentation. The need to reach those
furthest away from the labour market is also stressed.
Guideline No. 9 (Improving the quality and performance of education and training systems at all levels and increasing participation in
tertiary or equivalent education) is also very relevant from a social
inclusion perspective, particularly the requirement that Member States
should take all necessary steps to prevent early school leaving. Tackling
child poverty and exclusion and addressing the intergenerational inheritance of poverty and social exclusion will be key to making progress in
this area.
240
In spite of the positive aspects of the Employment Guidelines, these

have attracted some criticism from organisations concerned to
strengthen the EUs focus on poverty and social exclusion. For instance,
EAPN has stated that poverty and social exclusion risk remaining at
the margins of EU cooperation and called for: A better integration of
inclusion and social cohesion objectives across all the Integrated Guidelines. The separation of the social inclusion and combating poverty
Guideline from the Employment Guidelines to guarantee that actions
on social inclusion and tackling poverty are not limited to employment
related measures. Explicit reference in the Guideline on social inclusion and combating poverty to ensure access to rights, resources and
services in line with the already-agreed common objectives of the Social
OMC. (EAPN 2010a; see also EAPN 2010)
A directly related point is an institutional one. This is the pivotal
role that the SPC should play in monitoring progress towards the EU
objectives for social protection and social inclusion (including of course
the new EU target on social inclusion) and in monitoring the implementation of Guideline 10 and, indeed, the social dimensions of the other
Guidelines. This role would be fully in line with the spirit of Article 160
of the EU Treaty, which outlines the role of the SPC. Encouragingly,
the Integrated Guidelines have moved in this direction as Recital 19
highlights that the Employment Committee and the Social Protection
Committee should monitor progress in relation to the employment and
social aspects of the Employment Guidelines, in line with their respective Treaty-based mandates. This should in particular build on the
activities of the open method of coordination in the fields of employment and of social protection and social inclusion. In addition the
Employment Committee should maintain close contact with other
relevant Council preparatory instances, including in the field of education. (EU Council of Ministers, 2010a)
10.3.4 Social protection and social inclusion strategies

To ensure that Member States develop a strategic, comprehensive
and coherent approach to translating the EUs social protection and
social inclusion objectives into national policies, we consider it essential
that they put in place effective national action plans and that they report
on these on a regular basis. Although, as we highlighted earlier, the
development of NAPs/inclusion (and subsequently National Strategy
Reports on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (NSRSPSIs)) has
been very uneven across the EU, they have been the heart of the Social
OMC and have been very important in encouraging a more strategic
approach to issues of poverty and social exclusion. In particular, these
national reports are essential because:
241
they provide the best opportunity for ensuring the active involvement of a wide range of stakeholders in the EU coordination
and cooperation in the social field, particularly those from local
level. Indeed, the growing trend to develop regional and local
plans to underpin national plans is the best way of addressing
one of the key weaknesses in the EU process to date i.e., the
limited involvement of local and regional governments who, in
many Member States, play a key role in delivering policies to
promote greater inclusion;
they are a way of ensuring that EU social objectives are not
seen as just some part of a narrow and remote intergovernmental process but are a dynamic part of connecting the EU
better to its citizens and building a real Social EU involving the
active participation of all actors;
they are essential to ensure that Member States do not just
adopt targets to reduce poverty and social exclusion in line with
the overall Europe 2020 target but that they underpin these
targets with a comprehensive and strategic social inclusion
approach. They are thus a means of ensuring that the necessary
arrangements are in place not just to temporarily reduce poverty
and social exclusion but to stop them recurring in the longer
term;
they also are a way of ensuring that national (Europe 2020)
targets are not dealt with in isolation from developing a strong
and comprehensive approach to achieving overall social
protection and inclusion objectives;
they provide a rich source of ideas and lessons which is essential to inform and deepen mutual learning between Member
States and to promote the understanding of key concepts and
key policies;
they are an important way of identifying common issues that
are present or emerging in a group of Member States and that
then merit more in depth examination at EU level;
they are an important way of ensuring a broad approach which
links social protection and social inclusion issues in a mutually
reinforcing way.
In our view, there are three ways that such national reports might be
achieved in the context of Europe 2020.
Option 1
The first option is that the existing NSRSPSIs could be continued
and enhanced. As regards the social inclusion strand, this will require a
242
better integration of the NAPs/inclusion into national (and also, where

relevant, into sub-national) policy-making processes and the development of closer links with national (and possible sub-national) parliaments. This might involve reassessing together with Member States and
relevant stakeholders, the timing and structure of the NSRSPSIs cycle
so that it becomes easier for countries to use them as strategic planning
opportunities to strengthen policies and not just as a means of reporting
to the EU on existing and planned policies. Moving from a three to five
year cycle could help in this regard. A major advantage of this solution
is that it will help to ensure that Member States adopt and report on
comprehensive approaches to promoting social inclusion and tackling
poverty and social exclusion that are better integrated into their national
policy-making systems. A possible disadvantage of continuing with the
NSRSPSIs is that unless other strong cross-cutting mechanisms are put
in place, the links between the social dimension and the other strands of
Europe 2020 (especially the economic and employment ones) may
remain weak and lessen the chances of effective synergies (feeding in
and feeding out; see above). To address this problem it would then be
important to create formal mechanisms for examining and reporting on
how Member States are ensuring synergies between their NSRSPSIs
and National Reform Programmes (NRPs).
Option 2
The second option is for the social protection and social inclusion
dimension to become a distinct chapter of Member States NRPs. The
basis for this exists with the ambitious Guideline 10, which largely
encompasses the range of issues currently addressed by the NSRSPSIs,
and also with the potentially very important Horizontal Social Clause
included in the Lisbon Treaty (see below, Section 10.3.5). The advantage of this option could be to make it easier to integrate the social
dimension with the employment and economic strands of the Europe
2020 process. Thus there would be the possibility of achieving stronger
synergies between the processes. In addition, by being linked with the
Employment Guidelines, there should be a stronger legal basis for
monitoring Member States performance in relation to social protection
and social inclusion issues and, when necessary, the European Commission should be in a position to issue recommendations to Member States
for improvements to their policies. However, from a social perspective
there is also a serious risk with this option, which is that the social
dimension could become an afterthought tagged on to the employment
dimension. Furthermore, it could lead to a very narrow approach to
social inclusion issues that only focuses on increasing access to employment without addressing the real problems faced by those outside
the labour market or very distant from it. If, as is likely to be the case,
243
this option is pursued it will be essential that several safeguards are put
in place. In particular, as already noted above, the role of the SPC in
monitoring and reporting on the social dimension should be incorporated into the Employment Guidelines. The new EPAP (see below,
Section 10.3.6) should also be given a clear role in monitoring and
reporting on how the social dimension, including the issue of in-work
poverty and labour market segmentation21, is being addressed in Member States NRPs.
Option 3
The third option is a combination of option 2 (with the necessary
safeguards put in place) and option 1. Here, the social chapter of the
NRPs would be based on quality NSRSPSIs covering in a coherent way
social protection and social inclusion. NRPs could then include five
chapters: four thematic chapters addressing objectives and policies in
the fields of economy, employment, social protection and social inclusion, and environment and an overarching chapter aimed at highlighting the interdependence and mutually reinforcing nature of the four sets
of thematic objectives and policies. While we recognise that this option
is more ambitious than the other two we consider that it is the one that is
most likely to strengthen the EUs social dimension and lead to a really
decisive reduction in poverty and social exclusion.
10.3.5 The Lisbon Treatys Horizontal Social Clause

Strengthening EU cooperation and coordination in the social field is
even more important and urgent because of the increased status given to
social issues in the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force on 1 December 2009. Of particular significance, is Article 9 which states that In
defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall
take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of
employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight
against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and
protection of human health (European Union, 2009). A major political
and legal challenge will now be to give a concrete meaning to this new
social clause. In the first instance, it is to be hoped that this new clause
in the EUs objectives will provide a more solid basis for requiring the
EU, that is both the European Commission and EU Member States, to
mainstream the EUs social objectives into policy-making and, for this
to be effective, to systematically carry out social impact assessments of
all relevant policies (see also Section 10.3.6 below). Over time, it might
21
For information on in-work poverty and labour market segmentation in the EU, see
Frazer and Marlier (2010b).
244
also be taken into account in decisions of the EU Court of Justice

leading to a stronger social dimension to the Courts decisions. This
important Treaty provision is usefully referred to in the Employment
Guidelines (whereas No 2); as it is also relevant for economic policies, this reference should also be included in the preamble of the final
set of the economic policies Guidelines.
10.3.6 The European Platform Against Poverty (EPAP)

The strengthening of the social dimension of the EU, and in particular the delivery of the EUs new social inclusion target will depend
significantly on how the European Platform Against Poverty (EPAP),
one of the 7 flagship initiatives which the European Commission has
proposed in the context of the implementation of Europe 2020, is developed. It is still unclear what shape this Platform will take and how it
will relate to and strengthen the existing Social OMC. This may only be
clarified towards the end of 2010 when the Commission is likely to
publish its proposals on the EPAP.
In our view, the dual challenge to be met is to propose arrangements
that can contribute not only to strengthening the future EU cooperation
and coordination in the field of social protection and social inclusion
but also to bringing together the patchwork of different strands that
currently make up Social EU to ensure that they are better coordinated,
more consistent and mutually reinforcing. For this, the EPAP must
become the visible symbol of this renewed Social EU. It has to play a
central role in ensuring that all other strands of EU policy-making (e.g.
economic, competition, education, migration, health, innovation and
environmental policies) contribute to achieving the EUs social goals,
including the EU target on social inclusion.
This will require explicit arrangements to better link the future EU
social process (i.e., EPAP, renewed Social OMC) with other relevant
EU processes (growth, jobs, environment, education) so that they are
mutually reinforcing. In this regard, and in line with the Lisbon Treatys
Horizontal Social Clause, a key priority will be to mainstream issues
of adequate social protection, the fight against poverty and social exclusion, and also childrens rights across all relevant EU policy areas and
programmes (including the Structural Funds; see Section 10.3.9 below)
in particular through a more systematic application of the required
social impact assessments (both ex ante and ex post) as part of the
Commissions integrated impact assessment process.22 The EPAP
should play a central role in monitoring and reporting on the implemen22
More information on the European Commissions impact assessment process can be

found at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/impact_en. htm.
245
tation of the social impact assessment process and on the extent to

which the other strands of Europe 2020 are contributing to the goal of
reducing poverty and social exclusion. If they are not, it should have the
power to make recommendations as to how they could contribute better.23
Whatever form the EPAP does eventually take, it will be important
to ensure that sufficient resources, particularly in terms of staff, are
allocated to support its implementation and the implementation of the
Social OMC.
10.3.7 A thematic approach

We believe that much of the future EU coordination and cooperation
in the social field should be concentrated around the key thematic issues
that have emerged from the Social OMC. This is especially the case for
the social inclusion strand where active inclusion, child poverty and
well-being, housing exclusion and homelessness, poverty and social
exclusion experienced by migrants and ethnic minorities have become
key themes.24 However, a similar approach might also be adopted in
relation to pensions and healthcare and long-term care as appropriate.
Gender equality and non-discrimination should be clear cross-cutting
aspects of each issue. The work on each theme should be based on clear
objectives and multi-annual work programmes. Member States should
be encouraged to make these themes key parts of their social protection
and social inclusion strategies (see Section 10.3.4). Annual reports on
23
24
It is important to systematically develop poverty and social exclusion impact assessments (both ex ante and ex post) for all relevant policies and not only those specifically aimed at increasing social inclusion, so that policy proposals all take into account the potential (positive or negative) impact they may have on poverty and social
exclusion. Existing policies should also regularly be reviewed for their impact on
poverty and social exclusion. The ultimate goal should be to systematically work at
identifying possible ways (links/ synergies) of adjusting policies to strengthen their
contribution to promoting social inclusion. The European Commission, in cooperation with Member States, should develop and promote the methodology for social
impact assessments at (sub-) national levels. For more on social impact assessment,
see chapter by Khnemund in the present volume.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that at the end of the Conference Roadmap for
a Recommendation on Child Poverty and Child Well-Being, organised by the Belgian
Presidency of the Council of the EU on 2-3 September 2010, the Trio of the European Presidency consisting of Spain, Belgium and Hungary declared itself in favour
of the adoption of a European Commission Recommendation on child poverty and
well-being and called for the fight against child poverty and the promotion of child
well-being to be included as key priorities of the EPAP. The full declaration, including a call for the adoption of quantified sub-targets for the reduction of child poverty
and social exclusion, is available on the Belgium EU Presidency web site at:
http://www.eutrio.be/.
246
progress on each key issue should be incorporated into the Joint Report
on Social Protection and Social Inclusion along the lines described in
Section 4.3.2. Where appropriate data are available (e.g. child poverty
and social exclusion) annual scoreboards should be considered. Building on the successful outcomes of two such experiences in recent years
(Social Protection Committee, 2008 and 2009), Task-Forces or less
structured working groups should be established as appropriate within
the SPC and EPAP to carry forward work on particular issues. In progressing work on these issues, greater use could be made of existing
instruments such as European Commission Recommendations and EU
Framework Directives.25
10.3.8 Guidelines on key governance issues

The EPAP could usefully contribute to supporting Member States to
strengthen their governance arrangements in relation to social protection
and social inclusion issues. On key governance issues where a considerable body of knowledge and good practice has been developed, the
Commission together with the SPC would agree guidelines for Member
States to help them to strengthen their practice. These could then become part of the EPAP acquis and be used as part of the monitoring and
reporting process. Four priority areas for developing such guidelines
could be: mainstreaming of the social objectives and use of social
impact assessments; horizontal coordination across policy areas; preparation of effective regional and local action plans on social inclusion;
and minimum standards on the effective involvement of stakeholders
(including people experiencing poverty) in all phases of the preparation,
implementation, evaluation and monitoring of social inclusion policies.
10.3.9
Better linking EU social objectives

and EU Structural Funds
There should be much closer alignment between the EUs and Member States social objectives and the use of EU Structural Funds. In this
context, the use of Structural Funds should in particular become a key
part of Member States social inclusion strategies. In order to make
certain that this has a real impact it will be important to ensure that there
is a link between measured performance (i.e. the impact on social
inclusion) and the allocation of EU funds. This relation works in both
directions. The allocation of funds may affect country performance and
policy may develop towards linking allocations to measured perform25
The European Commission Recommendation on active inclusion provides a good

example of how work can be advanced with enhanced status and urgency through the
use of such instruments.
247
ance. In relation to the use of Structural Funds for social purposes a very
recent positive development is the May 2010 EU decision to extend the
possibilities for the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) to
be used for supporting housing interventions in favour of marginalised
communities.26 This could play an important role in increasing resources
for initiatives in this field.27
10.3.10 Exchange, learning and communication

Exchange and learning should be enhanced as an integral element in
the EU cooperation and coordination in the social field, inter alia by
resourcing an increased range of opportunities for exchange and learning under the 2007-2013 Community Programme for Employment and
Social Solidarity (PROGRESS). The process of policy learning and
exchange of good practices should be strengthened with more systematic clustering of activities (e.g. studies, peer reviews, exchange projects, EU funded networks) around specific themes. Every effort should
also be made to promote a wider and more systematic involvement of
regional and local actors (policy-makers, stakeholders and civil society)
in the process. More effective and widespread dissemination of results
will be necessary. It is encouraging that the Integrated Guidelines have
moved in this direction. Recital 16 highlights that when designing and
implementing their NRPs Member States should ensure effective
governance of employment policy. While these Guidelines are addressed to Member States, the Europe 2020 Strategy should, as appropriate, be implemented, monitored and evaluated in partnership with all
national, regional and local authorities, closely associating parliaments,
as well as social partners and representatives of civil society, who shall
contribute to the elaboration of NRPs, to their implementation and to the
overall communication on the strategy. (EU Council of Ministers,
2010a)
10.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have documented and analysed the EUs current
approach to promoting social inclusion and combating poverty and
social exclusion through cooperation and coordination on social inclu26
27
For more detail see the European Commissions proposals for an amending regulation (European Commission, 2009a) and Regulation (EU) No. 437/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council which was adopted on 19 May 2010.
Barca (2009) argues for a reformed cohesion policy for the EU and that therefore a
new combination of the social and territorial agendas is required. He suggests that
The social agenda needs to be territorialised, the territorial agenda socialised.
The place-based approach to social inclusion should be the result of these two shifts.
(page 36). See also chapter by Jouen in the present volume.
248
sion and social protection (including pensions and healthcare and longterm care). Our purpose has been three-fold. First, to describe briefly the
functioning of the Social OMC as it has developed since it was
launched (back in 2000): its main elements, the key policy areas it has
focused on and its governance and institutional arrangements. Secondly,
to carry out a systematic analysis of the Social OMC experience, highlighting its strengths and weaknesses, with a particular emphasis on the
period since 2006. Thirdly, on the basis of this critical assessment, to
suggest concrete proposals for building a stronger EU social process in
the future and for bringing together the patchwork of different strands
that currently makes up Social EU so as to ensure that they are better
coordinated, more consistent and mutually reinforcing. We hope that
these proposals will contribute to the complex challenge of developing a
truly social Europe 2020 and thereby to a more effective approach to
combating poverty and social exclusion.
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and social exclusion: Ensuring a stronger approach in the future by learning
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between growth and jobs policies and social inclusion policies across the EU
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252
11. Towards a Stronger OMC

in a More Social Europe 2020:
A New Governance Architecture
for EU Policy Coordination
Jonathan ZEITLIN1
11.1 Introduction
The Lisbon Strategy, which was launched by the European Council
in March 2000 as a medium-term framework for EU socio-economic
policy coordination, formally elapsed in June 2010 with the adoption by
the European Council of the new Europe 2020 Strategy. Almost from
the outset, the Lisbon Strategy was the subject of sharply contrasting
interpretations, while its governance architecture was formally or informally revised several times. This chapter examines and contributes to
the ongoing debate about the future of the Europe 2020 Strategy and the
appropriate governance architecture for EU policy coordination.
The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part looks
backward at the governance of the Lisbon Strategy since March 2000,
providing a critical overview of the three principal phases of its development. The second part looks forward, examining the emerging governance architecture for EU policy coordination after 2010. The argument proceeds in three main steps. The first analyses the reformed
governance architecture of Europe 2020, drawing attention to its reinforced social dimension as well as to serious risks to the broader EU
social policy coordination and monitoring capacities developed over the
past decade arising from ambiguities in the institutional design of the
new Strategy. The second step advances a series of proposals to counteract these risks by incorporating into the governance architecture of
Europe 2020 key components of the Social Open Method of Coordination (OMC), notably the common objectives, commonly agreed EU
indicators, EU monitoring, peer review, and evaluation of national
1
Earlier versions of the first part of this chapter were published in Committee of the
Regions (2009) and La Rivista delle Politiche Sociali/ Italian Journal of Social Policy (2009). Address for correspondence: [email protected].
253
Towards a Stronger OMC in a More Social Europe 2020
social protection and social inclusion strategies. The final step in the
argument proposes a series of reflexive reforms aimed at overcoming
weaknesses identified within the OMC on Social Protection and Social
Inclusion (Social OMC) itself, with a particular focus on reinforcing
mutual learning and enhancing stakeholder participation.
11.2. The Governance of the Lisbon Strategy (2000-2010):

A Critical Overview2
11.2.1 Lisbon I (2000-2005)
As is well known, the original Lisbon Strategy laid out a broad, ambitious agenda aimed at making the EU by 2010 the most dynamic and
competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social
cohesion. This inclusive agenda was based on the concept of a socioeconomic policy triangle, with equal weight for more and better jobs
and social cohesion alongside economic growth and competitiveness as
EU objectives. In 2001, under the Swedish Presidency, environmental
sustainability was added as a fourth pillar or core strategic objective.
To advance this ambitious agenda, the Lisbon Strategy inaugurated a
new approach to EU governance, the OMC, based on iterative benchmarking of national progress towards common EU objectives and
organised mutual learning. Extended across an ever broader set of
policy fields in the wake of the Lisbon Summit, the OMC appeared for a
time to have become the EU governance instrument of choice in complex, domestically sensitive areas where Member State diversity precludes harmonisation and where strategic uncertainty encourages mutual
learning at the national as well as EU level (Zeitlin, 2005). But the
OMC was never intended to serve as the sole governance instrument for
the Lisbon Strategy: it was always supposed to be combined with other
EU policy tools, including legislation, social dialogue, Community
Action Programmes, and the structural funds.
Lisbon I (2000-2005) was widely criticised by the 2004-2005 midterm review for its lack of strategic focus and multiplication of objectives, targets and coordination processes. The OMC in particular was
harshly criticised by the Kok Report and the incoming Barroso Commission for failing to deliver Member State commitment to the implementation of agreed reforms needed to reach the Lisbon targets (Kok,
2004; European Commission, 2005). Some of these criticisms of Lisbon
I were arguably justified, notably the weakness of the overarching
2
For fuller analysis and documentation, see Zeitlin (2007, 2008).
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Jonathan Zeitlin
governance architecture for integrating and reconciling overlapping

sectoral policy coordination processes (coordination of coordination).
But other criticisms were much less justified, since the review process
ignored much of the available evaluation evidence, both official and
academic, which suggested that the OMC should be considered a qualified success in some key policy fields, while in others no definitive
assessment was possible since the method had not yet been systematically implemented.
The national influence and effectiveness of OMC processes is notoriously difficult to assess, not only because of their variety, complexity,
and relative newness, but also because of the methodological problems
involved in disentangling the independent causal impact of an iterative
policy-making process based on collaboration between EU institutions
and Member State governments without legally binding sanctions.3 Yet
there is now a substantial body of empirical research on the operations
of the OMC at national and sub-national levels, drawing on a wide
range of official and unofficial sources. Most of this research focuses on
employment, social inclusion, and social protection as the oldest, most
fully developed, and best institutionalised OMC processes.4
Although the findings of this research remain controversial and subject to multiple interpretations, my reading of the available evidence
supports the view that the OMC in these policy fields should be considered a qualified success in a number of important respects.5 The first of
these concerns substantive policy change. Thus, these OMC processes
have helped to raise the salience and ambition of national employment
and social inclusion policies in many Member States. They have contributed to changes in national policy thinking (cognitive shifts) by
incorporating EU concepts and categories (such as activation, prevention, lifelong learning, gender mainstreaming, social impact assessment,
and social inclusion) into domestic debates, exposing policy-makers to
new approaches, and pressing them to reconsider long-established but
increasingly counterproductive policies (such as early retirement).
These OMC processes have likewise contributed to changes in national
policy agendas (political shifts) by putting new issues on the domestic
agenda and/or raising their relative salience (such as activation, pension
reform, childcare provision, gender equality, child poverty and wellbeing, and integration of immigrants). There is also evidence from both
3
4
5
For a fuller discussion of these methodological problems, see Zeitlin (2005a, pages
26-27; 2009, pages 214-217).
For synthetic overviews, see Zeitlin and Pochet (2005); Heidenreich and Zeitlin
(2009).
For a fuller assessment, see Zeitlin (2005b, 2009) and chapter by Vanhercke in this
volume.
255
official reports and interviews that OMC objectives, guidelines, targets,

and recommendations have contributed to changes in specific national
policies (programmatic shifts), in areas such as activation/ prevention,
tax-benefit reforms, active ageing/lifelong learning, gender equality,
child care, social assistance, and pension reform. Yet given the active
role of Member States in shaping the development of OMC processes,
their relationship to national policy-making should be understood as a
two-way interaction rather than a one-way causal impact.
A second form of positive influence on the part of the OMC concerns procedural shifts in governance and policy-making arrangements.
Here there is abundant evidence that the European Employment Strategy (EES) and the Social OMC have contributed in most Member States
to better horizontal coordination and cross-sectoral integration of interdependent policy areas; enhanced vertical coordination between levels
of governance; improved policy steering and statistical capacity; increased consultation and involvement of non-state actors (especially in
social inclusion, but also to a significant extent in employment); and the
development of transnational networks for participation of non-state and
sub-national actors in EU policy-making. Here too, however, OMC
processes are not the only cause of these shifts in governance arrangements, and the degree of involvement of non-state/ sub-national actors
in particular also depends both on domestic institutional configurations
and the actors own strategies.
A third form of positive influence exerted by the OMC concerns mutual learning. Here we see a prevalence of indirect or higher-order over
direct or first-order effects. Thus, for instance, there are relatively few
examples of direct policy transfer, as national reforms typically draw
analogic inspiration rather than detailed policy blueprints from other
Member States. Even here, however, we find some surprising examples
of more direct borrowing, such as the influence attributed by the UK to
learning from Ireland and several northern European countries on its
childcare, lone parents, indebtedness, and social inclusion policies.6
More prominent instead has been the influence of OMC processes on
the identification of common challenges and promising policy approaches at EU level (heuristic effects); statistical harmonisation and
capacity building (at both EU and national levels); and their stimulus to
Member States to rethink established approaches and practices, as a
result of the obligation to compare national performance to that of other
countries on the one hand, and the obligation to re-examine and reevaluate national policies against their relative progress in meeting
common EU objectives on the other (maieutic or reflexive effects).
6
For these examples, see European Commission (2006, page 6).
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Jonathan Zeitlin
Yet as empirical research shows, these OMC processes in employment and social protection/inclusion also suffered from significant
weaknesses, which are discussed in more detail in the chapter by Frazer
and Marlier in this volume.7 Chief among these were a lack of openness
and transparency, with bureaucratic actors playing a dominant role at
both EU and national levels; weak integration into national policymaking, with National Action Plans (NAPs) serving more as reports to
the EU than as operational policy steering documents; and limited
bottom-up or horizontal policy learning, with few examples of upwards
knowledge transfer and cross-national diffusion of innovative local
practices. Yet most of these observed shortcomings arguably stemmed
not from any intrinsic weaknesses of the OMC per se, but rather from
procedural limitations of specific OMC processes. Hence a potentially
fruitful strategy for improving the effectiveness of existing OMC processes would be to apply to their own procedures the key elements of the
method itself: benchmarking, peer review, monitoring, evaluation, and
iterative redesign. Ongoing initiatives within the EES and Social OMC
over the past few years provide evidence of the practical viability of this
reflexive reform strategy, such as the strengthening of mutual learning
and peer review programmes on the one hand, and proposals by EU
institutions and NGOs for greater openness, stakeholder participation,
and mainstreaming of OMCs into domestic policy-making on the
other.8
If the OMCs in employment and social protection/ inclusion may be
judged a qualified success, the same cannot be said of their counterparts
in fields such as innovation, enterprise promotion and information
society. There the OMC has been widely blamed for Member States
lack of progress towards the R&D investment target of 3% of GDP set
by the 2002 Barcelona European Council, and for the limited impact
and visibility of eEurope policies. Yet OMC processes in these areas are
characterised by lite recipes and fragmentary architectures, with no
agreed NAPs, limited monitoring and reporting, little peer review, and
weak mutual learning mechanisms. Hence according to an independent
evaluation prepared for the European Commission by the Tavistock
Institute (2005), OMC in these areas cannot yet be said to be a success
or failure, because it simply has not been fully implemented.9
7
8
See also Krger (2009).

For a fuller discussion of this reflexive reform strategy, see Zeitlin (2005b, pages
483-93). For recent policy proposals along these lines, see European Commission
(2008a) and Platform of European Social NGOs (2009).
For an unfavourable contrast of the institutionalisation of the OMC in R&D with that
in education and training, see also Gornitzka (2006). For a more positive assessment
257
11.2.2 Lisbon II (2005-2008)

The Lisbon Strategy was formally relaunched in 2005, with a
sharper focus on growth and jobs. The architectural core of Lisbon II
was the fusion of the European Employment Guidelines (EEGs) and the
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) into a single set of 24
Integrated Guidelines (IGs) for Growth and Jobs, divided into separate
macroeconomic, microeconomic, and employment chapters. In line with
this architectural shift, the National Action Plans for Employment
(NAPs/ employment) were replaced by sections within Member States
National Reform Programmes (NRPs). This relaunched, refocused
Strategy was to be implemented through a new set of reform partnerships between the Commission and Member States on the one hand, and
between national governments and domestic stakeholders on the other.
These new reform partnerships were explicitly designed to shift the
focus of the Lisbon Strategy away from coordination through multilateral discussions between 25 Member States and the Commission, on
individual policy themes (the OMC) towards a bilateral in depth
dialogue between the Commission and Member States on a commitment
based national action programme (European Commission, 2005).
On the social side, the three strands of the Social OMCs (inclusion, pensions, healthcare and long-term care) were streamlined as
from 2006 into a single overarching Social OMC, with both common
(overarching) and sector-specific objectives. According to successive
European Council conclusions, the relaunched Lisbon Strategy was
designed to provide a framework where economic, employment and
social policy mutually reinforce each other, ensuring that parallel progress is made on employment creation, competitiveness, and social
cohesion in compliance with European values. This mutually reinforcing dynamic within the revised Lisbon Strategy was supposed to be
achieved by a reciprocal relationship between the streamlined Social
OMC and the IGs for Growth and Jobs at both national and EU levels,
whereby the former feeds in to growth and employment objectives,
while the latter feed out to advance social cohesion goals.
A central objective of the relaunched Lisbon Strategy was to close
the implementation gap through better governance. But the experience
of recent years (2005-2010) suggests that the revised governance architecture introduced under Lisbon II proved problematic in a number of
major respects.
of the contribution of the OMC in R&D to mutual learning, and recommendations for
improving its effectiveness in policy coordination, see European Commission (2009).
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Jonathan Zeitlin
First, the integration of the EEGs with the BEPGs, the enhanced
freedom for Member States to set their own priorities within the NRPs,
and the concomitant disappearance of the NAPs/employment reduced
the visibility of employment policy coordination at both EU and national levels. No less significantly, the revised arrangements led to
greater unevenness in national employment policy reporting and a loss
of EU level monitoring capacity.10
Second, in the absence of any specific institutional mechanisms to
ensure a mutually reinforcing feedback between the social, economic
and employment dimensions of the relaunched Lisbon Strategy, the
practical effectiveness of such feedback remained decidedly limited,
with wide variations across Member States. Only a minority of Member
States included social cohesion objectives in their NRPs, most of which
made relatively limited cross-reference to the Social OMC. Nor was
there much evidence under Lisbon II of explicit feeding out from the
Integrated Guidelines and NRPs to the Social OMC, for example
through systematic impact assessments of the actual or prospective
effects of Member States economic and employment policies on social
cohesion/inclusion outcomes (Begg and Marlier, 2007).
Third, according to a variety of independent sources, the NRP implementation process continued to lack public visibility in most Member
States, while involvement of non-state and sub-national actors was often
confined to formal consultation and/or information exercises, with
limited opportunity to influence substantive policy direction or content.
By all accounts, civil society actors, such as NGOs and voluntary
associations, were much less involved in most Member States, often
because of difficulties in obtaining access to consultation and coordination processes dominated by Finance or Economics ministries with
whom they had little previous contact (Begg and Marlier, 2007; European Anti-Poverty Network, 2007; Begg, 2007; Committee of the
Regions, 2008, 2009a).
Fourth, it proved extremely difficult to sustain the simplified focus
of the revised Lisbon Strategy and the shift from multilateral policy
coordination to bilateral reform dialogue between the Commission and
Member States. Unsurprisingly, the European Council was unable to
10
To compensate for this, the Lisbon Methodology (LIME) Working Group of the EU
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) developed a Lisbon Assessment Framework
(LAF) comprising a national implementation grid, labour reform database, impact
assessment of key reform drivers, and macroeconomic modelling exercise. The EU
Employment Committee (EMCO) has sharply criticised the capacity of this centralised growth accounting approach to capture accurately the relationship between the
EES, national reforms, and employment outcomes, and is working to develop alternative methodologies. See EPC (2008); EMCO (2008).
259
resist adding new priorities to the 24 Integrated Guidelines as circumstances change, such as the four cross-cutting priority areas for more
growth and jobs agreed at the 2006 Spring European Council.11 Unsurprisingly, too, the European Council and the Commission have also
launched new coordination processes and reporting obligations for
Member States in response to these and other emergent priorities such
as the integration of immigrants or the reduction of administrative
burdens. Finally, the Commission itself appeared to have recognised the
limits of bilateral dialogue with Member States on their NRPs, as can be
seen, for example, from its efforts to organise mutual learning workshops within the Network of National Lisbon Coordinators on issues
such as one-stop shops for setting up new enterprises, businessuniversity cooperation, and extending working lives of older workers
albeit at some risk of duplicating the work of the sectoral OMCs.
Nor does it appear to be the case, finally, that the revised governance
arrangements of Lisbon II significantly helped to unblock reforms at the
national level. Thus an official evaluation of the IGs for Growth and
Jobs conducted on behalf of the Commissions Directorate-General
Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) concluded that they had
induced an incremental impact on national reform processes, not
through peer or public pressure, but mainly through framing policy
issues, mutual learning, legitimising reform promoters, and enlarging
stakeholders consensus (Eurval/Rambll Management, 2008).
11.2.3 Lisbon III (2008-2010)

In response to persistent complaints about the weakness of the mutually reinforcing dynamic between economic, employment, and social
policies within the revised governance architecture of Lisbon II, the
Spring 2007 European Council resolved that the common social objectives of Member States should be better taken into account within the
Lisbon Agendain order to ensure the continuing support for European
integration by the Unions citizens. The result was a year-long public
debate under the German and Portuguese Presidencies of the EU (during
the first and second half of 2007, respectively) about how best to
strengthen the social dimension of the Lisbon Strategy. Two countervailing positions emerged within this debate: one advocated incorporating the EUs common social objectives into the Integrated Guidelines
and linking the Social OMC more closely to the Lisbon Strategy; the
other favoured maintaining the stability of the Guidelines while focus11
These four cross-cutting priority areas were: investing more in knowledge and
innovation; unlocking the business potential, especially of SMEs; greater adaptability
of labour markets based on flexicurity; and energy and climate change.
260
Jonathan Zeitlin
ing on better implementation of national reforms. The solution adopted

split the difference: at the Commissions insistence, the IGs were retained unchanged for 2008-2011, but their social dimension was
strengthened by revision of the accompanying explanatory text, which
called for closer interaction with the Social OMC and more systematic
monitoring of feeding in/feeding out. The Commissions Renewed
Social Agenda for 2010-2015 took this approach a step further, proposing to reinforce the Social OMC by bringing it closer to the Lisbon
Strategy through the use of targets, common principles, enhanced
monitoring, and recommendations (European Commission, 2008).
It is hard to consider the governance architecture of Lisbon III as
anything other than a flawed compromise. The disconnection between
the old guidelines and the new explanatory text did not improve European citizens understanding of EU policies, nor did it enhance ownership of the Lisbon Strategy by national actors. Neither was the institutional divide between economic and employment policies on the one
hand and social policies on the other, conducive to the joined-up governance and stakeholder participation needed for innovative structural
reforms. Nor was there much tangible progress in promoting greater
synergy between the IGs/NRPs and the Social OMC.12 At a deeper
level, moreover, this governance architecture left the EU with multiple,
overlapping, and potentially inconsistent mega-strategies, including
not only Lisbon and the Social OMC, but also the Sustainable Development Strategy and the Energy Policy for Europe (Larsson and Begg,
2007).
11.3 An Inclusive Governance Architecture for

the Post-Lisbon Era? Ambiguities of Europe 2020
11.3.1 Europe 2020 as a reformed governance architecture
The relaunched Lisbon Strategy, as the preceding section shows, was
widely criticised for its weak social dimension and unbalanced governance architecture. These concerns figured prominently in the EU debate
about what should succeed the Lisbon Strategy after 2010, with EU civil
society networks spearheading a campaign for a more balanced and
socially inclusive governance architecture. This campaign, which
resonated with concurrent proposals from some Member States, EU
12
The SPC established a Task-Force for the analysis of the interaction between social
cohesion and growth and jobs, which produced an important report on Growth, Jobs
and Social Progress in the EU, as a contribution to the Lisbon post-2010 debate (Social Protection Committee, 2009). On the assessment of feeding in/out in the context
of Lisbon III, see Frazer and Marlier (2009).
261
institutions, local and regional authorities, and academic commentators,13 focused around four core demands, aimed at redressing key
perceived defects of the Lisbon Strategy, especially in its relaunched
version (Frazer and Marlier, 2008; Spring Alliance, 2009; European
Anti-Poverty Network, 2009 and 2009a; Platform of European Social
NGOs, 2009; Armstrong, 2010, chapter 8; Frazer, Marlier and Nicaise,
2010). The first of these was parity: social and environmental objectives
should be given equal status with economic and employment goals as
mutually reinforcing pillars of the EUs post-2010 strategy. A second
demand, reflecting longstanding aspirations of social NGOs and other
advocates of a stronger Social EU, was enhanced political commitment,
to be embodied in specific commitments to quantified EU and national
social inclusion/ poverty reduction targets, backed up by effective
policy measures and financial support. A third demand was for more
effective mainstreaming of social cohesion and inclusion objectives into
EU and Member State policy-making, accompanied by better horizontal
coordination between social and other interdependent policies at both
levels. A final demand was for greater stakeholder participation: nonstate and sub-national actors (civil society organisations, social partners,
local/ regional authorities), along with the European and national parliaments, should be fully involved in the design and implementation of
the new strategy at all levels.
Against the backdrop of mounting unease about the social impact of
the global financial crisis, this campaign met with a sympathetic response from the European Commission. President Barroso himself, who
was running for re-election, acknowledged in his Political Guidelines
for the Next Commission the need to revise the current Lisbon Strategy by bringing different strategies and instruments together, thereby
turning it into a strategy for an integrated vision of EU 2020, while
also calling for a new, much stronger focus on the social dimension in
Europe, at all levels of government (Barroso 2009: 2, 15).14
The design of Europe 2020, as proposed by the Commission in
March 2010 and approved in amended form by the June 2010 European
Council, represents a more radical overhaul of the governance architecture of the relaunched Lisbon Strategy, including a reinforcement of its
social dimension, than many observers (including myself) had expected.
Five major developments stand out (see opening chapter). First is the
broadening of the objectives of the new Strategy beyond those of Lis13
14
See, for example, Committee of the Regions (2009b); Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian

Team Presidency (2009); Social Protection Committee (2009, 2009a); Zeitlin (2008a,
2009a).
For a fuller analysis of the political context of the Europe 2020 debate, see Armstrong (2010, pages 265-72).
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bon II/III. Thus inclusive growth, aimed at fostering a highemployment economy delivering economic, social and territorial cohesion figures as one of three overarching, mutually reinforcing priorities
for Europe 2020, alongside smart (knowledge and innovation-based)
and sustainable (greener, more resource efficient, more competitive)
growth (European Commission, 2010). A second is the adoption of an
EU-wide target, aimed at lifting at least 20 million people out of the
risk of poverty and exclusion as one of five headline targets for the
new Strategy. Following a compromise agreed by the European Council, Member States are required to set their own national targets for how
they will contribute to this overall goal, based on three alternative
indicators, in line with their domestic priorities and circumstances
(European Council, 2010, Annex 1)15. A third innovation is the creation
of a European Platform against Poverty (EPAP) as one of seven
flagship initiatives orchestrated by the Commission to support the
delivery of Europe 2020. A fourth is the incorporation of a Guideline on
Promoting social inclusion and combating poverty as one of the ten
new Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs, which also underlines
the role of pensions, healthcare, and public services in maintaining
social cohesion. Finally, Recital 16 of the Integrated Guidelines explicitly states that the new Strategy should, as appropriate, be implemented, monitored and evaluated in partnership with all national, regional and local authorities, closely associating parliaments, as well as
social partners and representatives of civil society; Member States are
expected to involve all relevant stakeholders in the preparation, implementation and communication of their NRPs.
11.3.2 Be careful what you wish for:

Ambiguities of Europe 2020
Despite these undeniable advances towards a stronger social dimension, it is nonetheless important to underline the problematic fit between
the governance architecture of Europe 2020 and EU social policy
coordination as it has developed over the past decade through the Social
OMC. One key source of concern is the ambiguous status of the EUs
common social objectives, adopted in 2000 and revised in 2006. The
headline target of Europe 2020, as already noted, is focused on reducing
poverty and social exclusion, while the other common social objectives
for pensions and health care enter into the new social inclusion guideline primarily insofar as they contribute to these goals, even if the latter
also refers to the need for modernisation of social protection systems so
15
For a fuller discussion, see chapters by Frazer and Marlier and by Walker in this
volume.
263
that they can provide adequate income support and access to health care
while remaining financially sustainable. Another related issue is that the
social inclusion guideline is inserted within the Employment Guidelines, thereby creating further ambiguities about the appropriate institutional arrangements for monitoring, reviewing, evaluating, and following up its implementation.
Member States NRPs will be closely linked to the preparation of
national Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCPs), and are expected to focus on macro-economic stability and growth-enhancing
reforms, as well as on meeting the headline targets, while concentrating on a limited set of priority measures. Fiscal and macroeconomic
surveillance will be conducted by the EU Economic and Financial
Affairs (ECOFIN) Council, while thematic coordination by the
sectoral Council formations (including the EU Employment, Social
Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs (EPSCO) Council) will focus on
progress towards the headline targets and flagship initiatives, together
with Member States actions to tackle obstacles to achieving these
objectives. Country-specific recommendations will be based on the
Treaty articles governing the Stability and Growth Pact, the Broad
Economic Policy Guidelines and the Employment Guidelines, thus
leaving it uncertain whether and how they will address the implementation of the social inclusion guideline, which also fits uneasily with the
predominant emphasis on breaking growth bottlenecks (European
Commission, 2010a; 2010b).
It thus remains unclear how the EUs common social objectives
beyond combating poverty and social exclusion will be monitored,
reviewed, evaluated, and followed up within the governance architecture of Europe 2020, and what will happen to national reporting of
performance against the common indicators developed within the Social
OMC. It is likewise unclear how mutual interactions between policy
fields and the social dimensions of other guidelines will be monitored,
notably Guideline 1 on the sustainability of the public finances, which
emphasises the need for reform of Member State pension and health
care systems; and Guideline 7 on increasing labour market participation
and reducing structural unemployment, in which active inclusion policies play a crucial part.16
These concerns about the governance architecture of Europe 2020
are compounded by the unclear relationship between the Social OMC
16
It is noteworthy in this regard that the Lisbon Assessment Framework developed by

the EPC did not monitor the social dimension of national reforms addressing these
policy fields under the 2005-2010 Guidelines, whose provisions are largely reprised
in Europe 2020.
264
Jonathan Zeitlin
and the EPAP, whose institutional contours have not yet been defined in
any specific detail. The key question here is what will happen to the
broader role of the Social OMC and the Social Protection Committee
within it in coordinating, monitoring, and (peer) reviewing the full range
of Member State social policies across all three strands of the current
process (Social Protection Committee, 2010).17
Despite the stronger and more explicit social dimension of Europe
2020, these ambiguities and limitations of its governance architecture
thus present a serious risk to the broader EU social policy coordination
and monitoring capacities developed through the Social OMC over the
past decade, at the same time as the common social objectives may be
very incompletely and selectively integrated into NRPs and EU monitoring and policy guidance.
11.4 Towards a Stronger OMC

in a More Social Europe 2020
11.4.1 Building blocks for a more social Europe 2020
So what should be done to counteract these risks? This section advances four proposals for building a more social Europe 2020 by incorporating into its governance architecture key components of EU social
policy coordination developed over the past decade.
1) Anchor the commonly agreed EU social objectives in Europe
2020:
The common objectives have played a central role in social
policy coordination at EU level over the past decade, defining the
Unions core commitments to social protection and social inclusion, delineating agreed priorities for the reform of national systems, and providing a framework for policy experimentation and
mutual learning. It is therefore critical to anchor the common social objectives in Europe 2020, where they could give more specific definition to the new Strategys overarching commitment to
inclusive and sustainable growth. At the same time, however,
the common objectives themselves should also be updated to take
account of the transition from Lisbon to Europe 2020 and incorporate more recent developments such as the Recommendation on
Active Inclusion (European Commission, 2008b).
17
A potentially significant development in this regard may be the recent creation of an

Ad Hoc Commissioners Group on Pensions, initiated by President Barroso and
steered by the Secretariat-General (Barroso, 2010).
265
2)
3)
4)
18
Link the EPAP to the Social OMC, and use both to monitor the
social dimension of Europe 2020:
The new EPAP should become the visible face of Social
Europe, as the European Anti-Poverty Network (2010) has suggested. But it should also be linked organically to the Social
OMC, which has become the body and the brain of Social EU
over the past decade. EPAP and the Social OMC should be jointly
responsible for monitoring, reviewing, and assessing not just progress towards the headline social inclusion/ poverty reduction target and the social inclusion guideline, but also the social dimension of the other Integrated Guidelines and of Europe 2020 more
generally. Together, EPAP and the Social OMC should also be responsible for monitoring, reviewing, and assessing how other EU
policies (including the structural funds) are contributing to achieving the Unions common social objectives, in line with the new
Horizontal Social Clause of the Lisbon Treaty.18 These assessments in turn should be incorporated into the Commissions Annual Growth Survey and EU policy guidance to Member States on
their NRPs, including country-specific recommendations.
Benchmark national performance against the common social
indicators:
To assess progress towards the common social objectives,
stimulate improvement, and support mutual learning, Member
States should be required to monitor and report national performance against the full set of common social indicators, not just
those for social inclusion and poverty reduction. At the same time,
however, continuing work remains necessary to complete the portfolio of common indicators, especially for pensions and healthcare, as well as to develop indicators and methods for monitoring
interactions between social, economic, employment, and environmental policies.
Sustain national social protection and inclusion strategies:
National Reform Programmes for the implementation of
Europe 2020, as we have seen, will be narrowly focused on the
achievement of headline targets and growth-enhancing reforms.
Hence regular National Strategic Reports (NSRs) and/or National
Action Plans (NAPs) will remain a vital component of EU social
policy coordination in order to promote the development of coherent, comprehensive national strategies for social protection and inclusion, taking account of mutual interactions across policy fields;
For a fuller discussion of the Horizontal Social Clause, see chapters by Ferrera and
by Frazer and Marlier in the present volume.
266
Jonathan Zeitlin
to sustain balanced monitoring, review, and assessment of Member State policies and performance across the full range of common social objectives and indicators; and to support mutual learning and exchange of good practices. These NSRs/NAPs should
feed into Member States NRPs, be anchored in national policymaking processes (including parliamentary debates), and be based
on broad participation by civil society and sub-national stakeholders. (For a discussion of the various options that could be followed to implement this concretely, see chapter by Frazer and
Marlier in the present volume.)
11.4.2 Reflexive reforms for a stronger OMC

Many of the main past weaknesses of the Social OMC, such as parity with other EU policy objectives, political commitment, mainstreaming, and horizontal coordination, may be remedied by the revised governance architecture of Europe 2020, especially if augmented by the
additional measures proposed above. But overcoming others would
require revisions to the Social OMC itself, building on the reflexive
reform strategy discussed earlier. This section focuses on two main
areas for improvement: reinforcing mutual learning and enhancing
stakeholder participation. In each of these areas, I suggest four key
measures for strengthening the Social OMC, drawing on recent proposals by NGOs and independent experts, as well as on ongoing debates
and initiatives within the Social Protection Committee (SPC) itself.
1) Reinforcing mutual learning:
There is wide agreement among academic commentators,
NGOs, and the SPC itself that despite the Social OMCs undeniable contributions to promoting mutual learning among EU Member States (see Section 11.2.1 above), its full potential in this area
has not yet been fully exploited (Social Protection Committee,
2007; FEANTSA, 2007; Armstrong 2010). Among the many proposed measures for reinforcing the mutual learning capacity of the
Social OMC, four seem especially promising.
a) Adopt a more deliberative approach to peer review of
national policies and performance: if National Strategy
Reports on Social Protection and Social Inclusion are to be
continued within Europe 2020, as I believe they should, then
it is important that peer review of them become more
deliberative, focusing on identifying the comparative
strengths and weaknesses of particular policies, and drawing
out potential lessons for other Member States.
267
2)
b) Develop a stronger thematic focus: building on recent initiatives by the SPC, as well as on proposals by NGOs and independent experts, peer review, exchange of good practices, and
policy coordination should concentrate on specific issues
where opportunities for cross-national learning from comparative analysis of national and local experience are greatest,
such as child poverty, homelessness, active inclusion, and
health inequalities (see SPC 2007; FEANTSA 2007; Frazer
and Marlier, this volume).
c) Use the common indicators more diagnostically: benchmarking of Member State performance against the common
indicators should serve as a diagnostic tool for assisting
national and local actors in identifying and correcting relative
weaknesses in current policies, rather than as soft sanctions or
shaming devices to secure domestic compliance with EU
targets. Ensuring the availability of timely, comparable, and
disaggregated data to support the common indicators is
likewise essential for this purpose. (See Marlier et al., 2007;
Social Protection Committee, 2008.)
d) Institutionalise arrangements for involving civil society organisations, local and regional authorities, and independent
experts: this is a vital step towards enhancing the OMCs
capacity to promote horizontal and bottom-up forms of
learning by incorporating a wider set of perspectives and
information sources.
Enhancing stakeholder participation:
Of all OMC processes, the Social OMC has the best record of
stakeholder involvement, especially its social inclusion strand. Yet
there is significant scope for enhancing the participation of civil
society and sub-national actors, drawing on the new opportunities
opened up by the creation of the EPAP. Here too, four key measures can be recommended, building on proposals advanced by
European social NGOs (European Anti-Poverty Network, 2010;
Platform of European Social NGOs, 2010).
a) Establish stakeholder fora attached to EPAP and the Social
OMC at both EU and national levels, with representation of
civil society organisations, social partners, local and regional
authorities, and independent experts, as proposed by EU
social NGOs.
b) Use these fora to ensure stakeholder participation in the
preparation, implementation, and assessment of NRPs and
NSRs/NAPs at both Member State and EU levels.
268
Jonathan Zeitlin
c) Use these fora as mechanisms for drawing on bottom-up

expertise about policy effectiveness and good (and bad)
practices, as well as for wider dissemination and follow-up of
results from OMC mutual learning activities.
d) Develop participatory governance guidelines and indicators
for monitoring, benchmarking, and assessing national practice
and performance within both the OMC and Europe 2020.
11.5 Conclusion
This chapter has suggested four building blocks for a more social
Europe 2020, namely: a) to anchor the commonly agreed EU social
objectives in Europe 2020; b) to link the EPAP to the Social OMC (and
use both to monitor the social dimension of Europe 2020); c) to benchmark national performance against the common social indicators; and d)
to sustain national social protection and inclusion strategies through the
continuation of NSRs/NAPs that should feed into Member States
NRPs, be anchored in national policy-making processes (including
parliamentary debates), and be based on broad participation. The chapter has also proposed two areas where the Social OMC would need to be
improved (reinforcing mutual learning and enhancing stakeholder
participation) together with concrete measures for reaching these objectives.
With these proposed reforms in place, EU social, economic, employment, and environmental policies could begin to work together in a
mutually reinforcing way to deliver smarter, more sustainable, and more
inclusive growth, as envisaged by the architects of Europe 2020.
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273
Short Presentation of the Authors

Tom Brodie is a policy officer at the international progressive think
tank Policy Network.
Mary Daly is Professor of Sociology at the School of Sociology,
Social Policy and Social Work at Queens University Belfast (Ireland).
Among the fields on which she has published are poverty, welfare,
gender, family and labour market. Much of her work is comparative, in
a European and international context and she is especially interested in
matters to do with how policies in different European countries relate to
families.
Patrick Diamond is a Senior Research Fellow of the international
progressive think tank Policy Network, a Visiting Fellow of Nuffield
College Oxford, and the former Head of Policy Planning in the UK
Prime Ministers Office.
Maurizio Ferrera is Professor of Political Science and President of
the Graduate School in Social, Economic and Political Studies of the
State University of Milan (Italy). He is currently a member of the European Commissions Group of Societal Policy Advisers, of the Scientific
Committee of Confindustria (in Rome), of the Board of Directors of the
Collegio Carlo Alberto and the Centro Einaudi (in Turin). He has
written extensively on comparative and EU social policies.
Hugh Frazer is Adjunct Professor at the National University of Ireland (Maynooth) and, together with Eric Marlier, he coordinates the EU
Network of Independent Experts on Social Inclusion. From 2001 to
2006, he worked in the European Commission as an expert advising and
assisting in the development of the Social Inclusion Open Method of
Coordination (OMC). Prior to that, he was inter alia Director of the
Irish Governments Combat Poverty Agency (1987-2001). He has
written extensively on the issues of poverty, social exclusion, community development and community relations.
Marjorie Jouen is Special Adviser at Notre Europe, where she has
worked since 1999 on EU policies related to regional development,
rural development, territorial cohesion and local employment. She
graduated in political science and is a former student of the Ecole
Nationale dAdministration (ENA). She has held several posts as a
high-level official in the French Department of Economy and EU institutions. She has written many articles and reports on social, economic
and territorial cohesion in Europe.
275
Martin Khnemund is Principal Consultant for European Evaluation at The Evaluation Partnership (TEP), a London-based consultancy.
He specialises in the evaluation of public policies, programmes, and
other legislative and non-legislative measures, and also heads up TEPs
activities in the area of regulatory impact assessment.
Simon Latham is a senior researcher at the international progressive
think tank Policy Network.
Roger Liddle is Chair of the international progressive think tank
Policy Network and a Labour member of the UK House of Lords.
From 1997 to 2004, he served as Tony Blairs political adviser on
Europe and was closely involved in developing the EUs Lisbon
Agenda. From 2004 to 2007, he was an adviser in the European Commission, first in the cabinet of Peter Mandelson and then to the President, Jose Manuel Barroso. With Frdric Lerais, he authored an EU
consultative paper on Europes Social Reality published in 2006. Since
leaving the Commission, he has written widely on Social Europe, the
future of Europe and the future of social democracy.
Eric Marlier is the International Scientific Coordinator of the
CEPS/INSTEAD Research Institute (Luxembourg) and, together with
Hugh Frazer, he manages the EU Network of Independent Experts on
Social Inclusion. His main research activities include comparative social
indicators, social monitoring, international socio-economic analysis
(esp. on income, poverty and social exclusion) and the Social OMC. He
has written widely on these issues and has also organised several international conferences on behalf of the European Commission and various EU Presidencies.
David Natali is Associate Professor at the R. Ruffilli Faculty of Political Science in Forli (Italy) and Co-Director of the European Social
Observatory (OSE, Belgium). He is currently a member of the board of
the European Network of Social Policy Analysis (ESPANET), and a
member of the OECD working party on pension markets. He is also a
member of Reconciling Work and Welfare (RECWOWE), a Sixth
Framework Programme (FP6) Network of Excellence.
Rudi Van Dam is Coordinator Social Indicators at the Belgian Federal Public Service Social Security (FPSSS). He is country delegate to
the Indicators Sub-Group of the Social Protection Committee. He was
also coordinator of the Belgian EU Presidency Conference EU Coordination in the Social Field in the Context of Europe 2020: Looking Back
and Building the Future (September 2010, La Hulpe, Belgium). Before
joining the FPSSS he worked as senior researcher at the Centre for
Social Policy at the University of Antwerp (Belgium).
276
Short Presentation of the Authors
Bart Vanhercke is Co-Director at the European Social Observatory

(OSE, Belgium). He is finalising his PhD on The hard politics of soft
policy coordination. His current research activity focuses on the Europeanisation of social inclusion, healthcare and pensions policies through
different EU policy instruments, a topic on which he also works as
associate academic staff at the CESO Research Centre of the University
of Leuven. He previously worked as European advisor to the Belgian
Minister for Social Affairs (1999-2004), and was an assistant in the
European Parliament (2004-2006).
Robert Walker is Professor of Social Policy and a Fellow of Green
Templeton College, Oxford University (United Kingdom). He was
formerly Professor of Social Policy at the University of Nottingham and
before that Director of the Centre for Research in Social Policy,
Loughborough University. He is a member of the statutory UK Social
Security Advisory Committee and an expert advisor to the European
Social Fund Evaluation Partnership.
Jonathan Zeitlin is Professor of Public Policy and Governance at
the University of Amsterdam (Netherlands). He has published extensively on the OMC and EU governance, including The Open Method
of Coordination in Action (2005), Changing European Employment
and Welfare Regimes (2009), and Experimentalist Governance in the
European Union (2010). He is currently serving as chief scientific
adviser for an external evaluation of the Social OMC.
277
Work & Society

The series Work & Society analyses the development of employment and social policies, as well as the strategies of the different social
actors, both at national and European levels. It puts forward a multidisciplinary approach political, sociological, economic, legal and
historical in a bid for dialogue and complementarity.
The series is not confined to the social field stricto sensu, but also
aims to illustrate the indirect social impacts of economic and monetary
policies. It endeavours to clarify social developments, from a comparative and a historical perspective, thus portraying the process of
convergence and divergence in the diverse national societal contexts.
The manner in which European integration impacts on employment and
social policies constitutes the backbone of the analyses.
Series Editor: Philippe Pochet, General Director ETUI-REHS
(Brussels) and Digest Editor of the Journal of European Social Policy
Recent Titles
No.69 Europe 2020: Towards a More Social EU?, Eric MARLIER and David
NATALI (eds.), with Rudi VAN DAM, 2010, ISBN 978-90-5201-688-7.
No.68 Generations at Work and Social Cohesion in Europe, Patricia
VENDRAMIN (ed.), 2009, ISBN 978-90-5201-647-4.
No.67 Quality of Work in the European Union. Concept, Data and Debates
from a Transnational Perspective, Ana M. GUILLN and Svenn-ge DAHL
(eds.), 2009, ISBN 978-90-5201-577-4
No.66 Emerging Systems of Work and Welfare, Pertti KOISTINEN, Lilja
MSESDTTIR & Amparo SERRANO PASCUAL (eds.), 2009, ISBN 978-905201-549-1
No.65 Building Anticipation of Restructuring in Europe, Marie-Ange MOREAU
(ed.), in collaboration with Serafino NEGRELLI & Philippe POCHET, 2009,
ISBN 978-90-5201-486-9
No.64 Pensions in Europe, European Pensions. The Evolution of Pension
Policy at National and Supranational Level, David NATALI, 2008, ISBN 97890-5201-460-9
No.63 Restructuring in the New EU Member States. Social Dialogue, Firms
Relocation and Social Treatment of Restructuring, Marie-Ange MOREAU &
Mara Esther BLAS LPEZ (eds.), 2009, ISBN 978-90-5201-456-2
No.62 Jobs on the Move. An Analytical Approach to Relocation and its
Impact on Employment, Bla GALGCZI, Maarten KEUNE & Andrew WATT
(eds.), 2008, ISBN 978-90-5201-448-7
No.61 Les nouveaux cadres du dialogue social, Europe et territoires, Annette
JOBERT (dir.), 2008, ISBN 978-90-5201-444-9
No.60 Transnational Labour Regulation. A Case Study of Temporary Agency

Work, Kerstin AHLBERG, Brian BERCUSSON, Niklas BRUUN, Haris KOUNTOUROS, Christophe VIGNEAU & Loredana ZAPPAL, 2008, 376 p., ISBN 97890-5201-417-3
No.59 Changing Liaisons. The Dynamics of Social Partnership in Twentieth
Century West-European Democracies, Karel DAVIDS, Greta DEVOS &
Patrick PASTURE (eds.), 2007, 268 p., ISBN 978-90-5201-365-7.
No.58 Work and Social Inequalities in Health in Europe, Ingvar LUNDBERG,
Tomas HEMMINGSSON & Christer HOGSTEDT (eds.), SALTSA, 2007, 538 p.,
ISBN 978-90-5201-372-5.
No. 57 European Solidarities. Tensions and Contentions of a Concept, Lars
MAGNUSSON & Bo STRTH (eds.), 2007, 355 p., ISBN 978-90-5201-363-3.
No. 56 Industrial Relations in Small Companies. A Comparison: France,
Sweden and Germany, Christian DUFOUR, Adelheid HEGE, Sofia MURHEM,
Wolfgang RUDOLPH & Wolfram WASSERMANN (eds.), SALTSA, 2007, ISBN
978-90-5201-360-2.
No. 55 The European Sectoral Social Dialogue. Actors, Developments and
Challenges, Anne DUFRESNE, Christophe DEGRYSE & Philippe POCHET (eds.),
SALTSA/Observatoire social europen, 2006, 342 p., ISBN 978-90-5201-0526.
No. 54 Reshaping Welfare States and Activation Regimes in Europe, Amparo
SERRANO PASCUAL & Lars MAGNUSSON (eds.), SALTSA, 2007, 319 p., ISBN
978-90-5201-048-9.
No. 53 Shaping Pay in Europe. A Stakeholder Approach, Conny Herbert
ANTONI, Xavier BAETEN, Ben J.M. EMANS & Mari KIRA (eds.), SALTSA,
2006, 287 p., ISBN 978-90-5201-037-3.
No. 52 Les relations sociales dans les petites entreprises. Une comparaison
France, Sude, Allemagne, Christian DUFOUR, Adelheid HEGE, Sofia
MURHEM, Wolfgang RUDOLPH & Wolfram WASSERMANN, 2006, 243 p.,
ISBN 978-90-5201-323-7.
No. 51 Politiques sociales. Enjeux mthodologiques et pistmologiques des
comparaisons internationales/Social Policies. Epistemological and Methodological Issues in Cross-National Comparison, Jean-Claude BARBIER & MarieThrse LETABLIER (dir./eds.), 2005, 4th printing 2008, 295 p., ISBN 978-905201-294-0.
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A key objective of the book is to take a critical look at and draw lessons from

the past, 2000-2010 Lisbon Strategy. Another important objective is to

Eric Marlier is the International Scientific Coordinator of the CEPS/INSTEAD Research

The adoption in June 2010 by EU leaders of a target to lift at least 20 million

Eric Marlier and David Natali (eds.),

EUROPE 2020: Towards a More Social EU?

P.I.E. Peter Lang

Work & Society

P.I.E. Peter Lang

This document is licensed to Eniko Vincze (3-5256156|00)

P.I.E. Peter Lang

Eric Marlier is the International Scientific Coordinator of the CEPS/INSTEAD Research

The adoption in June 2010 by EU leaders of a target to lift at least 20 million

Eric Marlier and David Natali (eds.),

EUROPE 2020: Towards a More Social EU?

P.I.E. Peter Lang

P.I.E. Peter Lang

P.I.E. Peter Lang

Eric MARLIER and David NATALI (eds.),

Work & Society

Cover picture: Hugh Frazer, Tour Madou, Brussels, 2008.

P.I.E. PETER LANG S.A.

Policy Context and Objectives of the Book ............................. 15

2. Mapping the Components of Social EU:

3. Aftershock: The Coming Social Crisis

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4. The Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020

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7. A Territorialised Social Agenda to Guide Europe 2020

Introduction ............................................................................ 201

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10. Strengthening Social Inclusion in the

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Europe 2020: Towards a More Social EU?

To elucidate some of the key issues at stake, the Belgian Presidency

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List of Main Abbreviations

Broad Economic Policy Guideline

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Europe 2020: Towards a More Social EU?

Haut-Commissaire aux Solidarits Actives

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Europe 2020: Towards a More Social EU?

best to implement the new Strategy so as to achieve its objectives of

It is on purpose that the expression EU coordination and cooperation in the social

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2. to put forward some first ideas on the format and role of EU

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Europe 2020: Towards a More Social EU?

1.2 Overall Architecture of Europe 2020

Integrated Guidelines were adopted at EU level to cover the scope of

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Europe 2020: Towards a More Social EU?

Figure 1.2: Overall architecture of Europe 2020

1.2.1 Three mutually reinforcing priorities

1.2.2 Five EU headline targets

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The EU is committed to taking a decision to move to a 30% reduction by 2020