Italian Football in an Era of

Globalisation: Neo-Patrimony,
New Localism and Decline
Submitted by Mark Doidge to the University of Exeter
as a thesis for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology
In October 2010
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material
and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper
acknowledgement.

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and
that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree
by this or any other University.

Signature: ..

Abstract
Italy and Italian football have captured the imagination of writers and fans across the
globe. The Italia 90 world cup reaffirmed Italys standing as a world power in football. It
also marked a turning point in global sport. At the end of the twentieth century, global
sport underwent a period of profound transformation. In parallel to similar process
taking place elsewhere in politics, economics and society, sport was entering a period of
de-regulation and commodification, which impacted national leagues and local fans.
Despite the intensification of transnational global networks resulting from de-regulation,
individual nation states still hold significant power. Likewise, national leagues are still
significant to football clubs despite the growth of global markets and transnational
competitions. Yet these global processes of commodification and de-regulation have
impacted fans in vastly different ways.
This thesis provides analysis of Italian football in relation to the impact of the changing
global political economy. Through analysis of the Italian political economy, it will identify
the complex personal networks operating across Italian business, politics and football.
This has witnessed the emergence of a number of significant charismatic leaders who
operate across these networks and utilise patronage to gain an advantage. These
patrimonial networks were initially successful, as Italian football quickly adapted to the
changing global economy. However, it has not capitalised on this early success. Italian
clubs are struggling financially in relation to their European peers. This has been
compounded by a series of crises have impacted Italian football.
The crises within Italian society and football have impacted the engagement of fans.
Political engagement has fallen and this is replicated in the stadiums. The historical
failure of the Italian state to impose itself has been further undermined by globalisation
processes. Traditional regional identities have been reinforced as globalisation has further
weakened the nation state. Changes to the patterns of consumption have combined with
these traditional identities and has led to a greater particularisation in society.
Individualism and regionalism have grown, and this has led to a decline in engagement
with wider public life and social capital. One aspect of this decline has been
demonstrated by several high profile violent incidents, and deaths at Italian matches. The
impact of this decline will be addressed in relation to the formation of supporters groups
and the match-day experiences of fans. Ultimately this decline is financially affecting the
clubs which further contributes to the overall crisis within Italian football.

Contents

Preface

SECTION 1
Introduction
1

Introduction

11

Sport and Community

55

SECTION 2
The Political Economy of Italy
3

Modernity and Deregulation in Italy

80

Deregulation and Crisis in Italian Football

117

SECTION 3
Italian Football Fans
5

The Match-day Experience: Stadiums and Policing

170

The Social Capital of Italian Football Fans

227

SECTION 4
Conclusion
7

Year Zero and an Italian Winner of the Champions League

290

Appendix: Glossary of Italian Terms

307

Bibliography

312

Preface

It was whilst sipping a nice glass of Primitivo in the courtyard of the British School at
Rome that this thesis became envisioned. I had been studying sport and fitness in
Ancient Rome as part of my Masters and through a conversation with an archaeologist
friend, it was concluded that Italian football would make an apposite subject of study.
The wheels were set in motion for a journey that would allow me to complete several
personal ambitions.

Yet journeys rarely begin and end in isolation. The journey that took me to Rome to
study the wonders of the citys ancient civilisation began in less extravagant places than
the courtyard of the British School at Rome. A nondescript schooling and university
education led to a sensible career in the logistics department of a (paradoxical) local
multinational telecommunications company. Climbing the corporate ladder resulted in
me having to implement a wide range of strategies and plans. Team working and kaizen
were introduced to our manufacturing lines as the company embraced the
telecommunications revolution. The dot.com bubble was inflating and our company was
adapting to capitalise on the boom. Technology and telecommunications accelerated,
transforming our working patterns and our lives as we struggled to maintain the
momentum. Yet our human endeavour could not prevent the bubble from bursting.

Redundancies followed as the company rationalised its operation. The local plant was
sold to a third party in a further process of rationalisation, but this could not prevent
further redundancies. As the new company tried to maintain its market position and its
finances, they decided to move the manufacturing facility to China to capitalise on the

cheaper labour costs. Globalisation had finally hit South Devon. For those that embraced
change, China represented an enormous possibility. We helped set-up the factory in
Shenzhen, near Hong Kong, and saw the globalised world from a different perspective.
For others it brought domestic upheaval and change. The impact of the decline of that
factory in South Devon is still being felt ten years after the dot.com bubble burst in 2000.

Globalisation and corporate re-structuring presented an opportunity. I asked to be made

redundant so that I could follow my dream of studying Ancient Rome, and living in Italy.
Enrolling in a Masters at the University of Exeter allowed me to reinforce my love of
Italy. Rather than being simply a tourist, I would learn Italian and study in Rome. This
would then help me become an archaeologist discovering the material culture of one of
the greatest civilisations that has existed. The study in Rome impressed upon me the
importance of history and its importance on contemporary life. It made me realise that
my dream was not about understanding the past, but understanding the present.

Sport is a central element of many peoples lives. As a young male it gave me the skills to
communicate with friends and strangers through a shared interest and common language.
This interest led to my research into sport in Ancient Rome, which also revealed its
centrality in the lives of many Romans. Sport seemed the best vehicle to understand
contemporary society, and football seemed an appropriate way of understanding Italy. I
had succumbed to the glamour and culture of Italian football during Italia 90. It
combined with my childhood love of Ancient Rome and I built my interest in Italy.
Numerous visits continue to reveal a nation of beauty; the language, culture, food, wine,
architecture and art are captivating. Yet it is also a nation of contradictions; the streets
are dirty and chaotic as Italians hurry around in their own individual worlds.

Through the support and expertise of my supervisor, Anthony King, I have been able to
turn my experiences into a thesis. In doing so I have made sense of myself and it has
allowed me to understand my place in a globalised world. I now understand the changes
that took place in the telecommunications company in which I worked, that I did not
understand at the time. I have been able to utilise this background to tutor students and
illustrate that our subject is not a series of abstract ideas but directly impacts everyday
people across Britain, Europe and the World. We all sit in a complex network of
interactions that impact us in different ways. Consequently, this is a story of the impact
of those global forces on Italy and Italian football.

This journey could not have been completed alone. Without Anthony King taking a
chance on an unknown with no background in sociology, this thesis would not have
been possible. He is the epitome of supervisors upon whom all others should be
measured. Thanks, and I hope that I havent let him down. I have been fortunate to have
been based in an incredibly supportive department, whose reputation is well earned.
They have provided immense assistance and guidance. Financially they provided me with
a scholarship and funds to pursue my research. They also provided me with the
opportunities and training to teach thus allowing me to develop more skills than just
research. The department of Sociology and Philosophy has provided a caring, nuuring
environment that has helped me bring the best out of myself. Professor Grace Davie,
Professor Tia DeNora, Dr Nigel Pleasants, Dr Matthias Varul, Dr Massimo Mazzotti and
Professor Michael Hauskeller have all provided help and advice throughout this journey.
The strength of the department has created a strong support network amongst the
students and they have all helped in various ways. Therefore, thanks should go to Trever
Hagen, Eduardo De-Andrade-Chemin-Filho, Dawn Fox-Davies, Richard McCallum,
Duygu Tekgl, Pinar Guran, Louise Bezuidenhout, Mattia Gallotti, Trijsje Franssen, Mila

Petrova, Nathaniel Holmes, Mariko Hara, Pedro Santos-Boia, Sigrun Einarsdottir,

Timothy Gooding, Daniele Carrieri, and Marco Liverani. I am also grateful to Dr
Rebecca Catto for her support with my early teaching experience. Special thanks should
go to Dave Morning for this admin support.

The wider Exeter community has provided invaluable support and football practise. A
big thanks should go to Dr Matt Smith, Dr Michelle Smith, Claude Kananack, Lindsey
Light, Shane Brennan, Dr Khalid Almezaini; Mansour Rahat, Kie Yiu, Dr Kyle Erickson,
Dr Rowan Fraser, Sharon Marshall, Ayako Nakamura, Shinsuke Satsuma, Dr Anna
Collar, Dr Jonathan Davies, and Dr Fabrizio De Francesco. The Qualitative Unit at St
Lukes has provided fantastic seminars which offered an alternative perspective on
research. Thanks to Helen Owton and Professor Andrew Sparkes for organising these.
Thanks to Helen, in particular, for the chats.

I have been privileged to work for the British Sociological Association and its
postgraduate forum. I have been proud to work as a Postgraduate Forum Convenor and
this has given me numerous skills and opportunities. Through it I have met some great
people, namely Mike Bracher, Allison Hui, Yiu-Tung Suen, Hasnain Quayyum, Dr Ruth
Lewis and Dr David Mellor. Most importantly though it gave me the opportunity to be
friends with Dr Lara Killick, one of the most dynamic, talented and exceptional people I
have had the good fortune to meet. She is the model for which all PhDs and ECRs
should aspire to and has a great future ahead of her.

Through the BSA I also participated in the Sport Study Group. Likewise, this led me to
many other great people, such as Professor Alan Bairner, Dr Dominic Malcolm, Dr Tom
Gibbons, George Jennings, Craig Owen and many others. Also, thanks to Beth

Simmonds for being a sounding board when things got tough. A special thanks should
also go to Dr Rob Lake for providing me with great advice, and more significantly,
lecturing opportunities.

Obviously this thesis would not have been possible without the warmth and generosity
of the Livornese. Many people travel to Italy for the weather, the architecture, the food,
the wine, the art and the history. In concentrating on these factors they miss the warmth
of the people who make up the individual cities and create the special culture that exists
in Italy. Early support was provided by Roberto Filippi and Professor John Foot.

Thanks to all the raggazzi in the curva. Thanks for letting me come to games with you and
most of all, for making me feel so welcome.

A substantial amount of my ethnography was undertaken at the Club Luca Rondina in

Livorno. The members of the Club were amazingly generous with their time and
contacts and this provided me with so much information and analysis. Through them I
met so many great people, both within the club and within the fans. I cannot find the
words (in English or Italian!) to express this gratitude. You are a credit to the football
fans in Livorno, Italy and the World

For Our (wo)man in Livorno I would like to thank Sarah Thomson who runs the
website livornonow.com. Not only did she allow me to write match reports for the
website, she worked hard to make me feel integrated. She also provided me with one
very important resource: the contact of Elena Batazzi. Elena wrote for Il Tirreno
newspaper and kindly wrote two articles about me. These articles provided me with
many contacts and allowed my research to flourish. Elena and Sarah, I thank you.

My Rosetta Stone was provided by Riccardo (Rick) Bertani whose archives, personal
history and interest in all things football, Livorno, England and Italy provided me with so
much information. Riccardo and the raggazzi made my time in Livorno so much more
enjoyable and made me feel at home. Youll never know how important this was.

Outside of football, a special mention should go to Silvia Cavalieri who showed me the
sites, the sounds, and the faces of the city that allowed me to settle quicker. Daniele
Bavone deserves a special mention for helping me find somewhere to live. To Gabriella
Bianchi I would like to thank you for letting me into your home. What a wonderful
apartment and location.

Thank you to Antonella Freschi, my Italian teacher for the linguistic support and
providing me with the foundations to make this PhD work. Ultimately, I would like to
say a big thank to Dr Giuseppe Boni whose generosity, help and support provided a
concrete foundation for my stay in Livorno. Without you, this thesis would not exist.
Grazie mille and sorry about the cooker.

Obviously I should thank my parents, grandparents and brothers for providing me with
the development and support to pursue this research. My parents have always advised us
that anything is possible if you put your mind to it. And last, but not least, I would like to
thank my partner Claire for the support that has made this possible, giving me the
confidence to continue and the diversions when I needed them. The journey has not
always been fun, but I hope she enjoyed the Italian cheese and wine.

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

10

Chapter 1

Introduction

What should they know of England who only England know? - Rudyard Kipling

A man who has not been in Italy, is always conscious of an inferiority, from his not having
seen what it is expected a man should see. - Samuel Johnson

It was a sultry Tuscan night that wasnt abated by the soft breeze blowing off the
Tyrrhenian Sea. The esplanade that passed along the coast was deluged with people, cars
and scooters. The night air was punctuated with whistles, car horns and chants as the
participants and vehicles voiced their elation. Songs ranged from chants of campione to
Bella Ciao, a Partisan song from the Second World War. Alongside the noise, the streets
were awash with a deep burgundy colour. Flags and scarves were being waved and
displayed from every car and scooter, as well as prominently carried by the pedestrians.
Included in this cacophony of colour were red flags emblazoned with images of hammer
and sickles or Che Guevara, as well as national flags of countries such as Brazil. People
of all ages and genders were showing their delight. It seemed that most of the city had
descended on the seafront to join in the frivolity. The reason for the celebration was due
to a football match that had just finished in the Stadio Armando Picchi not far from the
promenade. The local football team, Livorno, had just beaten Brescia by three goals to
nil. In doing so they were promoted back into Serie A, Italys top division, after a one
year hiatus in Serie B. After the match there was a pitch invasion; fans took mementos of

11

shorts and shirts from the players who hailed from across Europe and South America.
The fans then headed to the five mile promenade to begin their party; a party that
extended deep into the night.

Clich and metaphor permeate the sport of football. Its global popularity permits the use
and abuse of clichs from the ubiquitous post-match interviews of players and managers
to the recurring tropes of journalists and writers. It is in this sense, that football is the
global sport and represents the deep play of many societies (Geertz 1972). Few cultural
pastimes generate the volume of excitement and emotion to so many people. Football
represents a lingua franca where participants, especially males, can communicate across
cultures and nations, as Sugden and Tomlinson state:

Football is peerless in its capacity to generate passionate and rooted feelings of

local and national pride or shame. In the latter part of the century, there are few,
if any, other social gathering points like football. People congregate around
football, either interpersonally, through the media and other forms of popular
communication, to make strong public declarations of who they are, what groups
they identify with, what they stand for and who and what they stand against.
(Sugden and Tomlinson 1998: 4)

As the most popular sport in the world, football becomes an excellent vehicle for
understanding the unfolding process of globalisation in the latter decades of the
twentieth century. This point is reinforced by Giulianotti and Robertson:

The dynamics of globalisation are manifest in the game's long-term changes...

sport, and especially football, is epicentral to contemporary globalisation

12

processes... analysis of football's globalisation can advance both the sociology of

the game and our theoretical understanding of globalisation (Giulianotti and
Robertson 2004: 561).

Football, like all sports, produces winners and losers. The art of the game is to defeat
ones opponent, both in direct competition on the pitch and over the course of a series
of games in a cup competition or league. Some, like Livorno, win promotion or
championships, while others face relegation and defeat. The emotionally charged nature
of the sport creates a powerful stimulus for the articulation of identity and helps
reinforce the difference between teams.

As with other areas of football, the location of football within academia had become a
clich. Initially, sport, and football in particular, were not deemed creditable avenues of
study, as King argues:

For many, football is entertainment and therefore unworthy of serious

consideration For enthusiasts, football is compelling because the outcome is
uncertain. The game thrives upon the random and the accidental, which inspire
ecstasy and despair among players and fans alike. Yet, the very excitement which
the game engenders obstructs a proper appreciation of the social significance of
the game. Although the exiting contingencies of football are not irrelevant to the
analysis of it, contingencies need to be situated within a wider historical context
which render them meaningful in a deeper and less emotive sense. It is necessary
to become detached from the game and to become defamiliarised with it while at
the same time recognising its profound social importance (King 2003: 12)

13

Football, therefore, is an apposite vehicle with which to study the social interactions that
constitute contemporary social life. The emotions and identities which become generated
in local settings, like the events described in Livorno above, can be understood through
the historical analysis of the development of football within its global context.
Globalisation has increased international competition which has increased the
opportunities for articulating these differences. As competitions and clubs adapt to the
changing global network, the scope of winners and losers grows. Some clubs and
national leagues adopt strategies that permit victory in the global marketplace. Others
choose incorrect tactics or maintain anachronistic strategies that fail to manage the
changing circumstances. It is within this global context that the success and failure of
clubs like Livorno within national leagues such as Italy must be viewed. Italy quickly and
successfully adapted to the global transformations sweeping across football in the 1990s.
As these transformations have developed, Italian clubs have found it increasingly difficult
to adjust to the changing global order. As football is situated at the nexus of research into
globalisation and sport, this thesis will illustrate how Italian football has adapted to the
new global order and how this incomplete transition has led to the bankruptcy of the
Italian approach.

Globalisation and Football

As the global sport, football has not been unaffected by intensifying globalisation
processes towards the end of the twentieth century. Globalisation itself had acquired
much academic attention during the same period (Appadurai 1990; Giddens 1990;
Mennell 1990; Giddens 1991; Robertson 1992; Featherstone 1995; Castells 1996;
Tomlinson 1999; Sassen 2001; Nederveen Pieterse 2004; Ritzer 2004) (Held 1999). The

14

breadth of research illustrates the importance of globalisation to society, as Maguire

states:

Every aspect of social reality peoples living conditions, beliefs, knowledge and
actions is intertwined with unfolding globalization processes. These processes
include the emergence of a global economy, a transnational cosmopolitan culture
and a range of international social movements (Maguire 1999: 3).

These unfolding globalisation processes have profoundly affected the global political
economy. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the nation state was
central to economic and cultural development. The collapse of Keynesian national
economies in the 1970s and the subsequent development of neo-liberal capitalism has
challenged the centrality of the nation state and its ability to regulate its economy.
Extensive de-regulation of the market and the media took place throughout the latter
two decades of the twentieth century. This de-regulation permitted the multi-directional
movements of people, practises and customs to flow throughout an expanding global
network of inter-dependent entities (Appadurai 1990; Hannerz 1990; Castells 1996).
Consequently, the growth of these networks has permitted the re-structuring of the
global economy as capital flows to those spaces which have the means to attract and
accumulate global resources (Castells 1996; Sassen 2005).

These global flows have also had a profound affect on national and local cultures.
Throughout history, technology and communication have impacted culture. Roland
Robertson, in particular, has highlighted the chronology of globalisation and has
identified the significance of transformations in the late 1960s as constituting a significant
shift in the history of globalisation (Robertson 1992). Significantly, Robertson has

15

demonstrated how the dual processes of transnationalisation and concentration has

contributed to new cultural developments. For Robertson, Globalisation as a concept
refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of
the world as a whole (Robertson 1992: 8). This has been facilitated by the expansion of
the media of communication, not least the development of global TV, and of other new
technologies of rapid communication and travel. [which] has made people all over the
world more conscious of other places and of the world as a whole (Robertson 1992:
184).

However, Robertson highlights the complexity of globalisation as increasing

interaction between individuals, groups and capital on a global level is creating both
greater similarity, and greater difference. Neo-liberal capitalism facilitates this process:

Global capitalism both promotes and is conditioned by cultural homogeneity

and cultural heterogeneity. The production and consolidation of difference and
variety is an essential ingredient of contemporary capitalism, which is, in any case,
increasingly involved with a growing variety of micro-markets [original italics]
(Robertson 1992: 173).

Local actors absorb these global flows in diverse ways. These processes see local
identities re-articulated in relation to global influences and permit the articulation of new
global-local identities. Robertson utilises the notion of glocalisation to highlight how
these global-local (glocal) identities are articulated

(Robertson 1992: 173).

Consequently, the political economic transformations of the 1970s have witnessed the
intensification of global capital flows which have accumulated outside the earlier national
model. Local cultures have utilised these global flows in diverse ways in relation to the
changing dynamics of globalisation.

16

Sport, and football in particular, operates within this new global network. It also provides
a stage for local identities to be articulated in relation to global transformations.
Consequently, leading academics have integrated sport into the wider body of literature
on globalisation (Sugden and Tomlinson 1997; King 1998; Maguire 1999; King 2003;
Sandvoss 2003; Giulianotti 2005; Horne 2006; Giulianotti and Robertson 2007;
Goldblatt 2007; Porro 2008; Giulianotti and Robertson 2009). Despite the broad range
of theoretical approaches taken within these studies, it is possible to discern a broad
consensus of the historical and political economic development of globalisation. Joseph
Maguire, for example, highlights the development of sport in relation to Robertsons
periodisation of globalisation (Maguire 1999). Through his figurational analysis of sport
and globalisation, Maguire also highlights the significant transformations of sport
emerging in the latter decades of the twentieth century. He highlights the thickening of
networks between sport, business and the media, as transnational corporations intensify
their links with sport. These networks (or figurations) have permitted the accumulation
of resources on a global level:

The global sports figuration accordingly involves the following mechanism of

production, experience and consumption: achievement sport involves the
identification and development of talent and its production on a global stage, in a
single or multi-sport event, and its consumption by direct spectators or, through
the media complex, a global mass audience. Traced over time there is a tendency
towards the emergence of a global achievement sport monoculture a culture
where administrators, coaches and teachers promote and foster achievement
sport vales and ideologies and where competitions and tournaments are
structured along highly commodified and rationalized lines (Maguire 1999: 90-1)

17

The accumulation of sporting resources has been facilitated by de-regulation of the

market. Maguire demonstrates the extensive global commodity chains connecting
transnational sporting businesses who utilise extensive supply chains to design,
manufacture and market their products on a global scale. This is facilitated by
intensifying links between sports businesses and the media. Maguires discussions of the
global media-sport complex illustrate the intensifying relationship between the media
and sport. The production and consumption of global flows of mediated images help
reinforce the dominant groups within the network. In particular: Sport has also become
a commodity whose media value is determined by the size and composition of the
audience it can deliver to potential advertisers and sponsors of media broadcasts.
(Maguire 1999: 151-2). The transnational media helps place sport at the nexus of
business and entertainment and helps sport become a strategic component of wider
marketing strategies. Sports teams provide advertising and sponsorship opportunities to
the transnational companies who can present their merchandise to a global audience.
Sponsorship and advertising have amplified the role of the athlete and transformed them
into celebrities. De-regulation of national markets of athletes has permitted the increased
migration of sports personalities. The Bosman ruling in particular, has permitted the
accumulation of playing resources at the top European football clubs (Maguire and Stead
1998; Maguire and Pearton 2000).1 Greater migration has also led to greater intercivilizational interaction.

Jean-Marc Bosmans contract had expired at the end of his contract with Standard Liege in Belgium. The
French club Dunkerque attempted to sign the player, but Liege refused, fearing that they would not receive
a fee, and suspended Bosman on a third of his pay. Supported by the European professional players
association, FIFPro, the Bosman case became an ideal opportunity to test European law. In 1995 the
European Court of Justice found that clubs withholding pay and preventing transfers were a restriction on
the free movement of players and a restraint of trade. An ancillary motion also held that quota systems
imposed by national leagues on foreign players were also a restriction on the free movement of European
citizens. As a result of the ruling, foreign quotas were removed from many national leagues, and from
European competition. Furthermore, players became free agents at the end of their contracts and were free
to move without a transfer fees.

18

The intensification of links between global capital, media and sport has impacted local
culture. As Robertson highlighted, greater interaction between cultures has resulted in
the re-articulation of national and local identities. For Maguire, this has led to
diminishing contrasts and increasing varieties (Maguire 1994; Maguire 1999). In
relation to transformations in the global economy, national identities have been
profoundly impacted (Maguire 1994; Maguire and Poulton 1999; Maguire 1999; Poulton
2004). As Maguire states: The interconnected processes of globalisation and further
European integration have fostered in sections of the English both a defensive ethnic
reassertiveness but also a deep sense of nostalgia (Maguire 1999). Maguire utilises
Robertsons notion of wilful nostalgia to illustrate the growth of nostalgia in the
construction of national and local identities in relation to globalisation.

Similar themes emerge in the work of Richard Giulianotti. In his sociology of football he
identified three phases of football, in particular citing transformations during the 1970s
as contributing to a third phase, where:

Football has entered a period of post-modernity. Deindustrialisation has

fractured the nexus of the working classes with inner-city clubs. Television
dominates the finances and administration of football leagues and their member
clubs. The largest nations benefit, importing players from throughout the world,
while smaller nations become dependent on overseas transfers. The global
circulation of labour and ideas begins to undermine footballing traditions,
increasing the hybridity of playing styles (Giulianotti 1999: 32)

Giulianotti has developed this argument in collaboration with Robertson (Giulianotti and
Robertson 2004; Giulianotti and Robertson 2006; Giulianotti and Robertson 2007;

19

Giulianotti and Robertson 2009). Together they place sport and football into Robertsons
earlier chronology of globalisation, reinforcing the significance of cultural and economic
factors during the late 1960s and 1970s. Giulianotti and Robertson make a clear
argument to place sport, and football in particular, at the centre of the study of
globalisation processes. In particular, they argue that global sport has brought more
cultures into contact with one another and through this awareness of others, social
processes become articulated.

Football provides a platform for diverse cultures to meet and interact. Where Maguire
utilised Eliasian theory to explain the inter-civilizational interactions that permitted
diminishing contrasts and increasingly varieties, Robertson and Giulianotti utilise
Robertsons notion of the universal and the particular to illustrate new glocal identities
in football (Robertson 1992; Giulianotti and Robertson 2004; Giulianotti and Robertson
2009). As the global economy becomes more united and increasingly operated by
transnational corporations, many groups are operating under similar circumstances. Yet
decisive local factors operate which render the universal, global conditions increasingly
particular. For Giulianotti and Robertson this creates a new, glocal identity which is
created through a concept of relatavisation:

Globalization brings cultures into sharper reflexive and comparative focus,

thereby compelling these cultures to respond to each other in an ever-amplifying
manner across the universal domain (Giulianotti and Robertson 2009: 36)

Through inter-relation and interaction with other cultures global factors are rearticulated
locally to create a glocal identity. Drawing upon a range of global examples, Giulianotti
and Robertson provide a rich account of global processes operating within global fan-

20

groups (Giulianotti and Robertson 2004; Giulianotti and Robertson 2006; Giulianotti and
Robertson 2009). In doing so, they demonstrate the importance of grounded research
into the implications of globalisation at a local level. In particular, Giulianottis use of
Scottish fans in North America provides the kind of deep ethnography that is required to
develop a wider understanding of global forces (Giulianotti and Robertson 2006).
Consequently, the globalisation of football has permitted the re-articulation of national
and local identities. The transformation of local identity has been facilitated by
transformations in the global political economy. Neo-liberal economics have intensified
the links between sport, the media and business and operate in relation to existing power
relationships. Glocalised sport has been transformed by intensified flows: in football,
this involves the transnational circulation of labour, information, capital and
commodities that can underpin non-national forms of cultural particularity (Giulianotti
and Robertson 2004: 549). These flows have intensified through increased mediation as
global satellite and cable companies emerged during the 1980s and helped transform the
presentation of sports stars, sports teams and competitions.

Elsewhere, Anthony King has demonstrated similar global processes affecting European
football. King has identified a similar chronology and indicated that a new phase
emerged from the collapse of the national Keynesian model in the 1970s which exposed
European football to wider cultural and economic flows. Subsequent de-regulation of the
television markets, and new satellite and cable technology, facilitated the initiation of
transnational media companies, such as Kirch in Germany, Sky in Britain and Mediaset
in Italy. As the media companies competed for advertising revenue, audience share
became fundamental, and sport was a major driver. This consolidation was facilitated by
the governing body of European football, UEFA, who re-packaged elite European
competition, the European Cup, as the Champions League (King 2003; King 2004). The

21

growth in exposure of the Champions League through the transformation of global

capital has demanded a change in approach from football clubs:

transnational competition has demanded new strategies from the clubs. In the
face of increasing competition, clubs have been forced to increase the traditional
income from gate revenue, while developing new forms of revenue streams, such
as merchandising, stadium reconstruction, sponsorship, flotation on the stock
exchange and the exploitation of new internet rights (King 2003: 119)

The transformation of European competition was also facilitated by the de-regulation of

players contracts under the Bosman ruling. Consequently, those national markets which
could accumulate the most resources from television and sponsorship could also
accumulate the most playing resources. As King highlights:

The unification of the player market has facilitated a concentration of playing

power in the core football markets of the New Europe in England, Germany,
Spain and Italy because the clubs in these countries are financially better
equipped than those in smaller leagues (now unprotected by national trade
limitations) to buy players (King 2003: 83)

Those clubs within national markets which could leverage the greater revenue could also
further accumulate playing resources. Consequently, the elite clubs in England, Germany,
Italy and Spain became central actors on the global network. They replicated wider
transformations in global capitalism which witnessed global cities emerging as central
nodes for company headquarters, while subsidiary companies were dispersed across the

22

globe (Sassen 2001; King 2003). This permitted the paradoxical process of accumulation
and diffusion.

King also identifies similar transformations of localised identity which have occurred in
relation to global and European transformations. The growth and accumulation of elite
clubs has facilitated the construction and re-construction of fandom and its expression
through consumption (King 1997; King 1998; King 2000; King 2003). Yet these localised
identities have also become constructed in relation national identities. In the same way
that national imagined communities became articulated through historic invented
traditions, neo-local communities constructed their own historic narratives (Hobsbawm
and Ranger 1983; King 1997; King 1998; Maguire 1999; King 2003; Anderson 2006).
These localised identities become articulated in relation to other clubs as a consequence
of greater interaction between rival fans. The greater number of games that take place as
a result of European competition ensures that fans are exposed to a greater range of fan
cultures. Exposure takes place through the physical attendance at games, as well as
through mediated images. Furthermore, exposure to other national cultures takes place
through the increased number of players from outside the national market.
Consequently, local and national identities have become rearticulated as a result of
globalised media, increased commodification of sport, and transformations in the
operation of sport.

David Goldblatts global history of football observes similar processes. Goldblatt follows
an analogous chronology to King, and details how the industrial development of football
entered a period of crisis in the 1970s before developing into a globalised game in the
1990s (Goldblatt 2007). Goldblatt demonstrates that this globalised sport underwent
profound economic transformation. He argues that in the 1990s European footballs

23

long economic decline was spectacularly reversed: the ailing rustbelt of Fordist football
was transformed into a booming post-industrial service sector awash with money and
hubris (Goldblatt 2007: 688). Goldblatt identifies how clubs have been turned into
global brands through the collaboration and co-operation of global corporations,
particularly through sponsorship and de-regulated television (Goldblatt 2007). This
transnationalisation of the game resulted in a process of accumulation at the wealthiest
clubs within the wealthiest national leagues of England, Italy, France, Spain and
Germany (Goldblatt 2007: 685). The economic de-regulation of national economies and
national leagues permitted this accumulation:

The logic of economic concentration has allowed the leading teams in Europe
to assemble the global elite of football talent, drawing on players from every
continent. Most teams in the final stages possessed a majority of internationals,
the leading players from Africa and Latin America as well as the very best from
Europe, the concentrated talent of which has been sharpened by the regularity of
European games (Goldblatt 2007: 696)

De-regulation had facilitated the transformation of the global economy, and global
football. This process permitted the accumulation and concentration of resources at a
small number of elite clubs.

Other British academics also highlight the growing intensification of global commercial
interactions within sport. Although they do not periodise globalisation as Maguire,
Giulianotti, Goldblatt and King have, Bairner, and Horne and Manzenreiter have also
identified commercial transformations during the last thirty years as being a driving
factor in globalisation of sport. Manzenreiter and Horne highlight that although there has

24

always been commercial activity within football, this has intensified with the growing
influence of television. For these authors, television has produced a serious challenge to
live spectators, hospitality and associated merchandise as the major income stream for
football clubs in national leagues and associations (Manzenreiter and Horne 2004: 11).
Although Bairner does not emphasise television as a significant factor, he reinforces that
political, economic and cultural transformations globally have impacted the articulation
of national identities (Bairner 2001). He also reinforces that changes to consumption
since the 1970s, facilitated by the global media, have permitted the articulation of many
forms of identity (Bairner 2001: 165). Sport facilitates this identity formation as sports
fans support teams from across the globe, and across sporting spheres. This reciprocal
process between identity formation and commercial consumption leads to a uneven and
diverse interaction between the various actors in global sport.

Similar transformations have been observed in academic literature in Italy. Although this
is not explicitly linked to globalization, many Italian academics have highlighted the
global processes highlighted above, but view these as a result of postmodernity. Through
the ascription of prefixes, they identify contemporary football as being distinct from its
earlier incarnation. All highlight the significant economic and cultural transformations
which took place in the 1990s and germinated in the two previous decades. Russo calls
the new product ultracalcio (ultrafootball) and suggests that the sport is extreme and has
mutated from its earlier forms (Russo 2005). Meanwhile, Liguori and Smargiasse term the
sport neocalcio (neofootball) to highlight the postmodern changes to the sport (Liguori
and Smargiasse 2003). Significantly, they identify the many continuities of the sport.
Alternatively, Porro focuses on the role of television and media within the new type of
football which he labels media-calcio (media-football) (Porro 2008). For Porro, the deregulation of television had a profound affect on the cultural medium of football, as well

25

as providing increased finances for clubs. These works reinforce the broad consensus
illustrated above. They highlight the importance of de-regulation, particularly of
television, in the transformations of Italian football. However, there is a tendency to limit
the analysis to the Italian football within these works. These processes were not restricted
to Italy, and it is important to understand these wider changes in the global context.
Consequently, this thesis will incorporate Italian football into the wider body
globalisation literature originating in the UK.

Widespread global transformations have impacted nations in vastly different ways.

Although national analyses have been displaced by global accounts of football
(Giulianotti and Robertson 2009), national analysis is still required to understand the
impact on the local level. It is therefore important to review its influence within diverse
localities so that the full implications of the global transformations can be understood.
As Rudyard Kiplings quote at the opening of this chapter highlights, What should they
know of England who only England know?. If academics (and fans) only study their
own field then they produce a restricted image and understanding of their work. Only
through the wide research of subjects outside its common frames of reference, can the
academy broaden its understanding and produce a comprehensive analysis of societys
changes. Along these lines, there is a broad range of research and analysis of global
leagues. In addition to Giulianottis analysis of Scottish football fans in America
(Giulianotti and Robertson 2006), research has been undertaken into a number of
national leagues. Miller and Crolley have edited a work that actively engages with the
contemporary research on globalisation and provides a sublime account of football in the
Americas (Miller and Crolley 2007). Furthermore, Manzenreiter and Horne have edited
and published a range of books and articles related to football in China, Japan and Korea
(Horne and Manzenreiter 2002; Horne 2004; Manzenreiter and Horne 2004; Horne and

26

Manzenreiter 2008; Manzenreiter 2008). Bairner also expands attention away from
England through his analysis of Swedish sporting idenities (amongst others) (Bairner
2001). Elsewhere, several special editions of journals have investigated wider themes in
European and Global football. Notable examples include the Journal of Sports Economics
edition on the economics of European football (Lago, Simmons et al. 2006), Global
Networks edition on globalisation and sport (Giulianotti and Robertson 2007) and a
special edition of the journal Soccer and Society in 2010 featured analysis of various
governance models in a global context (Hassan and Hamil 2010). In terms of grounded
ethnography, Armstrong and Mitchell have provided a rich account of Maltese football
but require more engagement with the wider literature to provide fruitful analysis
(Armstrong and Mitchell 2008). Elsewhere, Spaaij provides a thorough analysis and
grounding of six clubs within the Netherlands, England and Spain in his work on
hooliganism (Spaaij 2006). Whilst there is a thorough engagement with contemporary
discourses on globalisation, these are focussed on hooliganism, rather than wider
transformations.

Wider research on Italian football in English has focussed predominantly on the fans.
The 1990s produced a range of articles and chapters by Italian authors detailing the
change in football fandom in Italy (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994; De Biasi 1996;
Lanfranchi and De Biasi 1997; De Biasi 1998; Podaliri and Balestri 1998; Roversi and
Balestri 2000). Most of these focussed on the ultr phenomenon and were directly related
to the similar problem of hooliganism in Britain. Subsequent sporadic articles on Italian
football have also focussed on the ultr (Guschwan 2007; Scalia 2009). The most detailed
and grounded research into the ultr written in English comes from Testas ethnographic
accounts of Lazio and Roma fans (Testa and Armstrong 2008; Testa 2009; Testa 2010;
Testa and Armstrong 2010). Although these accounts focus on the ultr, they are

27

beginning to bring in wider sociological analysis, in particular the impact of media

constructions of football fans. Elsewhere, Porro and Russo have published a range of
articles that actively integrate the wider political economy into analysis of Italian football
(Porro and Russo 2000; Porro and Russo 2004). These integrate the transformation of
football into the wider political economic context in Italy. In particular they highlight the
role of Silvio Berlusconi, who combines his role as the president of AC Milan with
ownership of Italys largest media network and his position as prime minister of Italy.

Alternative accounts of Italian football in English are limited. The comprehensive

economic and cultural history of Italian football by John Foot, is a necessity for anyone
with an interest in Italian football (Foot 2007). Alternatively, accounts are restricted to
the journalistic works of Joe McGinniss and Tim Parks who narrated respective seasons
with Castel Di Sangro and Hellas Verona (McGinniss 2000; Parks 2003). Similar works
also narrate the wider Italian context with several references to football (Parks 2001;
Parks 2001; Agnew 2006; Jones 2007). However, these do not engage with wider
sociological discourses. This thesis attempts to rectify this discrepancy by providing an
account of Italian football in relation to contemporary debates within globalisation and
football. These debates, as illustrated above, emphasise that globalisation involves a
dynamic of glocalisation or concentration and transnationalisation. In Italy this has
assumed a more national form through a patrimonial system, which contrasts sharply
with the neo-liberal approach taken in Britain. This contrast has been utilised by many
writers, especially the media, who romanticise foreign football to amplify the negative
aspects of the English game. This will be addressed in the following section.

English Clubs in Crisis and Romaticisation of Foreign Football

28

Italy has been transformed into a powerful historical and cultural symbol. As the
birthplace of the Renaissance, Italy has been constructed as a cultural colossus. Samuel
Johnsons comment at the introduction to this chapter highlights the imagined inferiority
of those who never visit Italy. The 1990 World Cup in Italy permitted the re-articulation
of some of these tropes. British television, in particular the BBC, played to this imagined
cultural image of stylish and cultural Italians. The BBC packaged its presentation with
several cultural symbols (Williams 2006). Through their use of the aria Nessun Dorma,
performed by Luciano Pavorotti, Italy was presented as the epitome of high culture. The
British broadcaster Channel 4 capitalised on this image in 1992. In response to the
instigation of the English Premier League and its ensuing move to BskyB, Channel 4
introduced Football Italia to terrestrial television screens two years after Italia 90. At the
time Italys top division, Serie A, contained international stars at the peak of the abilities,
such as Ruud Gullit, Marco Van Basten and Maradona. In addition, Paul Gazza
Gascoigne, one of Englands star players and the unlikely hero of Englands campaign at
Italia 90, had just moved to Lazio. Italian football exuded glamour and this was reflected
in Channel 4s production. The presenter James Richardson hosted the shows from a
range of alluring locations, from Florentine piazzas to Roman cafes. The outside
broadcasts in world famous cultural locations were congruent to the image of Italian
football; it exuded quality, culture and style.

There was a clear distinction with British football. Italia 90 had demonstrated the
superior infrastructure and organisation of the Italian game (King 1998: 103-4). This,
along with the production of Football Italia, created a sharp contrast to English football,
which was emerging from a sustained period of crisis. Although there was a long history
of disorder at British football matches, hooliganism became entrenched in the 1970s
(Dunning, Maguire et al. 1982; Dunning, Murphy et al. 1986; Williams 2006). Sustained

29

patterns of hooligan disorder culminated in the Heysel Stadium disaster in 1985. Thirtynine Juventus fans were killed when a stadium wall collapsed after Liverpool fans rushed
towards the Juventus fans. This resulted in English clubs being excluded from European
competition for the first time since its inception in 1955.2 In addition to the ignominy of
being excluded from Europe, English football suffered a further stadium crisis at
Hillsborough four years later. Poor facilities and policing at the Sheffield stadium saw
ninety-six Liverpool fans crushed on the terraces. The resulting government investigation
by Lord Justice Taylor, saw a period of sustained investment in stadiums and policing
(Taylor 1989; King 1998; Giulianotti 1999). These factors, when combined with the
restructuring of the Premier League and Champions League, contributed to the
transformation of English football in the 1990s.

These transformations have led to great introspection within English discourse. As

mentioned above, there has been widespread academic research into the impact of wider
global transformations. There has also been a wide range of popular football writing that
questions the nature of the changes. Despite its relative success, Williams states: why,
then, does English football today still feel like a sport that is perpetually in crisis? [original
italics] (Williams 2006). This feeling pervades much of football writing in England. The
writer, anthropologist or sociologist does not simply present an account of other
cultures, but also presents their own cultural values. These values can pervade and
represent an underlying text. Paradoxically, through understanding other cultures, we can
also understand ourselves (Winch 1964). And this can challenge those pervasive cultural
assumptions. In his seminal studies of the Trobrianders, Malinowski argued that the
2

The European Cup was instigated in 1955 to provide a European competition in order to create a clear
mechanism to affirm European Champions. This was in response to the British Press assertions that
Wolverhamption Wanderers were the Champions based on a number of friendly matches. The English
FA prevented Chelsea from entering the first tournament in 1955, although Manchester United were
allowed to enter in the following year King, A. (2003). The European Ritual: Football in the New Europe.
Aldershot, England; United Kingdom, Ashgate.

30

people of the Trobriand Islands did not operate with a natural economic approach to
social life (Malinowski 1922). By constructing the generalised argument as a straw man,
Malinowski could provide an alternative analysis to the general accounts of economists.
In doing so he identified the pervasiveness of these arguments. Through understanding
the Trobrianders, Malinowski began to understand his own position, and challenge the
assumptions of Western culture. By doing this however, Malinowskis approach became
a straw man in itself. The following account represents a similar straw man by
suggesting that there is a pervasive argument relating to the condition of English football,
in contrast to foreign football. It is not intended as a singular criticism, but a more
general observation to call for further in depth ethnographic analysis of other football
cultures, and for this understanding to be incorporated into the broader argument.

Journalists are principal amongst those that perpetuate this image. The Observer journalist
Will Buckley sums up this sentiment with his novel The Man Who Hated Football (Buckley
2005). Buckley disparages the contemporary fascination with football and its attendant
celebrity. Similarly, The Guardians David Conn frequently questions the greed and
organisation of contemporary British football in his Inside Sport blog on The Guardians
website.3 He has also penned several books, including The Football Business and The
Beautiful Game?: Searching the Soul of Football (Conn 2001; Conn 2005). The inference is that
the game has changed beyond all recognition and has lost its soul. This is echoed in
Matthew Bazells Theatre of Silence: The Lost Soul of Football which rails against the changes
in English football (Bazell 2008). Elsewhere, the reporter and author, Tom Bowers
novel entitled Broken Dreams alludes to a game ridden with corruption, greed and media
hype (Bower 2003). Once again, the author intimates that football is broken. The most
illustrative of this range of books is simply called Modern Football Is Rubbish: An A-Z of All
3

http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/david-conn-inside-sport-blog

31

That Is Wrong with the Beautiful Game by Nick Davidson and Shaun Hunt (Davidson and
Hunt 2008). This book is unashamedly nostalgic with laments for muddy pitches,
floodlight pylons, casual sexism and black boots. These instances highlight a recurring
trope against English football that insinuates that football is destroyed beyond repair.
The past represented a Golden Age where even poor playing surfaces were seen as
good. Like their academic counterparts, many of these writers limit their field of enquiry
to English football. It is not possible to develop a full conception of the English context
in an academic vacuum. To paraphrase the earlier quote from Kipling: What should
they know of English football who only English football know?.

When using examples of rival leagues, many journalists and popular writers fail to
provide sufficient depth of understanding to develop the context. The media help
construct a powerful image of rival leagues that reinforce the notion of English football
in crisis. David Conn compared the ownership structure of the 2009 Champions League
finalists Manchester United and Barcelona and concluded that Barcelona have the edge
over Manchester United in that they will never be sold (Conn 2009). He concludes, as
he does in his book The Football Business, that personal ownership corrupts the institution
and leads to the rampant commercialism which is destroying the game. Conn argues
that the concept of private shareholders in the English Premier League drives
commercialism for private economic gain, rather than for the wider benefit of fans
(Conn 2001). One article provides an apposite example of this trend in English
journalism. Entitled What Money Cant Buy (Conn 2007) illustrates the tendancy to
simultaneously romanticise rival leagues in order to denigrate the English Premier
League. For example:

32

No other country has a perfect system, but in Spain the tradition of the
membership club survives. Barcelona and Real Madrid are both owned by
members who democratically elect a president and board. The clubs are resented
for receiving the largest share of Spanish football's TV money and are ruthlessly
ambitious, but nevertheless Barcelona, particularly, embody a sense of belonging
in their very structure. (Conn 2007)
In glamorising the Spanish clubs ownership, Conn overlooks the commercial aspects
that have helped transform Barcelona and Real Madrid into the two richest clubs of 2010
(Deloitte and Touche 2010). The dominance of Spains top two clubs has led to an
accumulation of resources at Barcelona and Real Madrid to the detriment of the rest of
the league (Lowe 2010). The inequity in the Spanish League resulted in Real Mallorca,
who finished fifth in the league in 2010, entering administration over unpaid debts.
Sevilla, who pipped Real Mallorca to forth spot on the last game of the 2009-2010
season, finished thirty-three points behind Real Madrid in second place. Sevilla were
closer in points to Xeres, who finished the season in last position, than they were to Real
Madrid. Furthermore, Conn does not highlight the other problems that this situation has
created. For example, despite its membership structure, Barcelona still accrued 77
million of debt during the 2009-2010 season (The Guardian 2010). Although the
ownership model of Barcelona is ideologically laudable, there is a danger that writers and
fans valorise the administration of one president, Joan La Porta, rather than the
ownership model. A similar model operated under the previous regime of Josep Nez
without widespread transparency. Likewise, a similar ownership model is in place at Real
Madrid which has its own problems. Although the president of these clubs are elected by
members, in order to become Real Madrids president one has to guarantee the funds
that will be used to run the clubs. In this way, Florentino Perez was elected unopposed in

33

2009 as he was the only person who could guarantee the 57 million in order to take
control (BBC 2009). This process still provides limited access to the club for millions of
fans.

German football receives similar respect. The German Football Association decrees that
no single investor can own more than forty-nine percent of the club. This limits control
passing to rich presidents. Paul Wilson states that in putting fans and tradition before
profit, the Bundesliga upholds values the Premier League has lost (Wilson 2009). Once
again, the allusion is made that English football is broken. Conn also maintains that this
policy ensures that clubs should remain connected to their local communities (Conn
2007). This suggests that clubs have always been tied to their local community where
fans and players have never originated from outside their locality. In valorising the
German model, both Conn and Wilson overlook the special dispensation afforded to
Wolfsburg and Bayer Leverkusen who are financially supported by Volkswagen and
Bayer Pharmaceuticals respectively (Giulianotti 1999: 88). In addition, there is no
mention made of the club 1899 Hoffenheim, a football club from a suburb of threethousand inhabitants near the small town of Sinsheim in the South West of Germany.
The club was an amateur club playing in a local league at the eighth level of German
football until the 1990s when the co-founder of software giant SAP, Dietmar Hopp,
provided money to the club. Hopp funded the construction of the 40 million stadium
Rhein-Neckar-Arena which underpinned Hoffenheims successive promotions which
took them to the Bundesliga in 2008. This helps to illustrate that despite stringent
regulations in Germany, global capital is still permitting some clubs to circumvent the
rules.

The ownership model in Italy is also under-analysed. Even though Italian clubs are not
owned by fans, Conn enhances the benefits of being tied to a multinational company:

34

In Italy, the clubs have long been owned by businessmen or, as with Juventus
and Milan, by corporations. In theory the clubs could have been ripe for
takeovers, but US-leveraged buy-out investors see England, not Italy, as the
honeypot. Abramovich is said to have looked at the Italian giants, but Fiat and
Silvio Berlusconi's Fininvest are not for selling Juve or Milan, which add prestige
to their corporate, and in Berlusconi's case political, image (Conn 2007).
This logic permits egotism for Italian presidents but precludes profit for foreign owners
of English teams. This thesis will demonstrate the paucity of this argument. The lack of
depth to the analysis seriously undermines the broader argument. The overall argument
which denigrates English football presupposes that all other leagues are equal, or better,
than the English leagues. Therefore it is perfectly acceptable for Juventus to be owned by
Fiat, but not for Manchester United to be owned by an American. This argument also
fails to account for smaller clubs who do not have the luxury of being owned by a rich
multinational company which further extends the difference between the elite clubs and
the provincial clubs. Despite the valorisation of the fan-owned model of Barcelona and
Germany, no mention is made of Italian fans channels of communication with their
clubs.

These mediated constructions are extended to other images of national teams and
leagues. King illustrates the extension of national identity to clubs playing European
competition (King 2003). Elsewhere, Crolley and Duke highlight the manner in which
national images and stereotypes are shaped and constructed through mediatised
narratives (Crolley and Hand 2002; Crolley and Hand 2006). The Italian national league
has acquired a similar prestige to the glamour of Italian national culture. In particular, the
media has utilised several imagined constructions of Italy and Italian football. Across

35

Europe, Italians were seen as technically superior, confident and stylish (Crolley and
Hand 2006). These constructions conform to the history of culture and style of Italy and
Italians. Furthermore, European media also reinforce stereotypes of Italian
tempestuousness and passion (Crolley and Hand 2006). This leads inevitably to
Machiavellian conspiracies and deviousness. Similar narratives construct the Germans as
an efficient machine, or the Spanish as tempestuous (Crolley and Hand 2006). These
constructions contrast sharply with the representation of the bravado and never-say-die
spirit of English football; the very qualities that have helped shape the popularity of the
English Premier League and promote its growth. Consequently, media accounts help
shape wider opinion of national leagues and teams.

As a key component of identity, sport facilitates the construction of interpretive

frameworks to understand profound societal transformations. Robertson highlights that
in times of intense change, particularly in relation to globalisation, society experiences an
upsurge in wilful nostalgia for the disappearing past (Robertson 1992). Maguire and
Poulton adroitly utilise this concept to illustrate the nostalgic approach of the British
media in the 1990s (Maguire and Poulton 1999; Maguire 1999; Poulton 2004). In relation
to an expanding Europe, Britain was feeling a sense of loss: the loss of sovereignty to
Europe; the loss of industry to Japan; and various sporting losses (Maguire 1999). This
loss of a perfect past coloured subsequent media representations of sporting
disappointments. Similar romanticisation of a nostalgic past has been demonstrated by
Gruneau and Whitson in relation to Canadian Ice Hockey (Gruneau and Whitson 1993).
This acted as an interpretive framework to manage the overt commercialisation and
American influence of Ice Hockey, whilst overlooking the explicit masculinity,
individualism and commercialism of the past.

36

The wilful nostalgia exhibited in sports journalism crystallised during the de-regulated
transformation of the nascent Premier League and Champions League. This period
coincided with new forms of football writing. Two publications symbolise this
transformation: Nick Hornbys Fever Pitch; and the magazine When Saturday Comes (King
1998; Giulianotti 1999). King identifies how there was a nostalgic focus on a mythical
Golden Age in this new football writing (King 1998). The 1960s and 1970s represented
a Golden Age of English football; in addition to England winning the World Cup in
1966, British teams were successful in Europe. It also represented, King asserts, the
national, Keynesian ideal of sport before the post-Fordist transformations of the 1990s.
The irony of this exhibition of wilful nostalgia is that it was chiefly written by writers,
such as the Cambridge-educated Hornby, who were drawn from the middle class
managerial and sales roles which had been created as a result of the changing economy
(Giulianotti 1999).

The construction and re-articulation of the mythical Golden Age represented

authenticity for the new football writers, as most of these writers were white, middleclass and male. In this quest for authenticity, the writers have had to rearticulate their
own notions of masculinity to reaffirm their authenticity and distinguish themselves from
the changes taking place. As a result, the quest for authenticity colours much of the
writing on football. Crawford highlights that:

there has been a tendency to view the recent changes in the nature of the
relationship between mass spectator sports and its audience as pivotal in creating
a new kind of sport supporter, which sees traditional and authentic fans
transformed into (or more specifically replaced by) a new consumer market
(Crawford 2004: 11).

37

Commercialisation has been seen as countering the working class ethic of the sport. The
encroachment of commercial interests into football was given as an early cause of
hooliganism (Taylor 1971). Through the creation of typologies by writers such as
Redhead and Giulianotti, Crawford highlights that new consumer fans are seen as
inauthentic and false (Redhead 1993; Giulianotti 2002; Crawford 2004). Much academic
focus is placed on those fans who are deemed authentic. Principally this focuses on
predominantly white, masculine groups who demonstrate solidarity through chanting,
aggression and anti-commercialism. As Crawford states,

Fans who buy a large volume of merchandise, those who follow sport via mass
media, those who attend live games in family units, or even those who do not
conform to the typical image of a traditional fan (such as women or people
with disabilities) are largely ignored in a large number of discussions of fan
cultures. (Crawford 2004).

However, this should not preclude the fact that fans themselves construct these binary
oppositions. Markers of distinction permit the fan groups to distinguish themselves from
alternative fan groups. These patterns of distinction are not restricted to football but take
place across many forms of fan communities (Hills 2002). Many football fans identify
themselves as devout supporters in contrast to other patterns of support. For example, a
young masculine group, the lads, distinguished themselves from the new fans of
Manchester United (King 1997). They eschewed the commercial elements of the football
club which were seen as indicative of non-Mancunian supporters. Within football,
attending a match at the stadium is seen as being more authentic, whilst the pub is a
suitable secondary alternative (Crabbe and Brown 2004). The display of willful nostalgia

38

does not lament the creation of new spaces of consumption, like pubs, nor the fact that
there were few televised matches during the Golden Age. Fans either attended the
stadium, or listened to a radio. Authenticity is bound within contemporary conceptions
of fandom and utilises nostalgia to reinforce this notion.

These constructions demonstrate that perspectives of authenticity and inauthenticity are

only valid from the standpoint of the masculine group. Those outside the group will have
different conceptions of authentic and inauthentic. Many fans from outside these
groups also invest their time and money in the support of their club and are no less
authentic than the masculine groups. Researchers must be careful to avoid the trap of
valorising these masculine supporters groups and reinforcing the construction. The
challenge for writers, whose personal demographic is the same as that of the masculine
groups, is to traverse the boundary between retention of contacts within the group and
presenting the information from more than one standpoint. Although changes to
conceptions of masculinity are important areas of study, they are not the only areas.

Changing attitudes of masculinity and consumption emerged in relation to the role of

players. Global deregulation of players contracts and mobility has seen similar nostalgic
allusions to a Golden Age. Taylor lamented the loss of the local (working-class) player
who grew up in the same town as his club, before retiring back to the same locale (Taylor
1971). In place of this nostalgic hero, we are confronted with international mercenaries
who do not share the same passion for the club as the authentic fans. Football provided
the opportunity to display masculine values. It provided an opportunity for the male
gaze where men could observe other men in a non-sexual environment (Coad 2008).
Players embodied the masculinity of the terrace through bodily development, physical
challenges and endurance (Kennedy 2004). These tropes re-emerged during the 1990s as

39

new football writing and political changes saw the development of the the new lad
movement (Whannel 1999). The new lad reinforced a particular brand of national, white
masculinity (Carrington 1998). Despite fears that the game was changing, football
remained a sport for young, white males (Waddington, Malcolm et al. 1998). This has
accentuated the nostalgic Golden Age as an influx of foreign football stars was deemed
to be outside the national-masculine image of tough British footballers.

This British masculine image has been affected by changes to the consumption of
footballers. Since the removal of the maximum wage of footballers in Britain in 1960,
footballers have acquired an increasing leisure class (Giulianotti 1999). Lucrative
contracts have turned players into conspicuous consumers. Through consumption, and
the resultant media spotlight, they are challenging the traditional notions of masculinity.
David Beckham, in particular, has attracted much attention for his narcissistic selfabsorption and his departure from the dominant masculinised codes of footballer
style (Whannel 1999: 202). The formation of a celebrity class of footballers was not the
result of the transformations of the 1990s. Within Britain, 1960s pop culture and
increased consumption saw a number of footballers gain celebrity (Whannel 1999).
George Best was dubbed the fifth Beatle because of his style and demeanour (Bairner
2004). In Italy and South America, Lanfranchi argues that footballers were seen as stars
much earlier. Giuseppe Meazza, the captain of the Italian national team during the 1938
tournament, was incredibly popular. French weekly magazine, Match, said Meazza is an
idol. Many perfumed letters have been intercepted by his motherIf you go to Italy, do
not ask who was Meazza, it is the same as someone in France asking who is Maurice
Chevalier (Lanfranchi 2001: 85).

40

The overt wilful nostalgia that is exhibited by academics and journalists alike overlooks
the origins of football research in Britain. The nascent discipline of Sociology of Football
was primarily focussed on the hooligan phenomenon (Taylor 1968; Marsh, Rosser et al.
1978; Carroll 1980; Dunning, Maguire et al. 1982; Dunning, Murphy et al. 1986; Murphy,
Williams et al. 1990). The wealth of early research into football hooliganism highlights
the extent of the problem and led to Moorhouse lamenting the focus on the subject
(Moorhouse 1991). The subsequent disasters at Heysel and Hillsborough reinforced the
necessity of the focus. The emerging discipline retained the focus on hooliganism during
the 1990s (Dal Lago 1990; Armstrong and Harris 1991; Giulianotti, Bonney et al. 1994;
King 1997; Armstrong 1998; Giulianotti 1999). Ancillary to this, research was carried out
into the Casuals, the related cultural phenomenon of young males who consumed
fashion, music and football violence (Redhead and McLaughlin 1985; Giulianotti 1993;
Redhead 1993; Giulianotti 1994). The fact that British research has moved away from
hooliganism as a research topic is indicative of this change, despite its relevance
elsewhere (Spaaij 2006; Tsoukala 2009). Italy, in particular, is continuing to experience
widespread fan disorder which is contributing to a crisis within the sport.

Only through the wider analysis of the political economy of football and through analysis
of alternative nations and leagues can we fully understand the global phenomenon of
football. In one small way this thesis attempts to rectify this disparity through
investigation into Italian football. As the following section demonstrates, Italian football
has not built on its successes of the 1990s and is struggling to compete in European
competition.

Decline of Italian Football

41

During the twenty years since Football Italia was first broadcast on British Television,
globalisation processes have profoundly impacted the respective fortunes of Italian and
English football. Whereas the English premier League has developed into the most
successful league in the world, Italian football has experienced profound crisis during the
twenty-first century. Italy was initially successful in adapting to the changing global
political economy in the 1990s. However, Italy has not been able to capitalise on this
early success. The turnover for Serie A in the 1996-7 season was second to the English
Premier League. By 2006-7 it was fourth behind Germany and Spain (Hamil, Morrow et
al. 2010). This has impacted Serie A clubs ability to compete financially over wage
expenditure on players, and financially many clubs operate with significant debt. The top
leagues in Europe all made operating profits during this period4. However, Serie A made
an operating loss of 1355m over the same period (Hamil, Morrow et al. 2010). The
financial crises have been compounded by a number of scandals relating to match-fixing
and administration. Furthermore, Italian football has been blighted by fan violence for
decades which reached its nadir in 2007 when a policeman, Filippo Raciti, was killed
during a riot between Catania and Palermo fans in February. This was followed in
November of the same year by the death of a Lazio fan, Gabriele Sandri, who was shot
by a policeman on his way to the game.

Crises in the Italian game have resulted in fan apathy and a decline in attendance at
matches. The over-reliance on familial and patrimonial networks has prevented the
Italian clubs from understanding and exploiting wider global transformations. The
infrastructure has not been updated to reflect the changes taking place elsewhere. Failure
to update stadiums and instigate effective business policies has limited the range of fans

English Premier League (1562m), Ligue 1 (France) (337m) and Bundesliga (1038m) Hamil, S., S.
Morrow, et al. (2010). "The governance and regulation of Italian football." Soccer & Society 11(4): 373 413..

42

clubs can attract. This has been compounded with continuing problems with violence at
football matches. These problems have impacted attendances at Italian football matches
and contrast sharply with average attendances in the Germany and England. Figure 2.1
highlights the contrasting average attendance between the five elite football competitions
in Europe. After comparable average attendances in the 1970s between Italy and
England, the two national leagues encountered contrasting fortunes. England faced
continuing problems with hooliganism that resulted in English clubs being excluded
from European competition after the Heysel Stadium tragedy. Italian football began a
similar decline at the end of the 1970s but sustained a rapid growth in attendances after
Italy won the 1982 World Cup in Spain. A sharp decline began in the middle of the
1980s that was again halted by a successful World Cup tournament. Italia 90 rejuvenated
interest in Italian football, both domestically and internationally. However, this success
was not capitalised upon. Elsewhere, in Germany and England in particular, stadiums
were transformed, leagues re-formatted and wider business models incorporated. The
assimilation of football into the broader global economy facilitated the wider popularity
of the sport. As a consequence, Germany and England have experienced continued rises
in average attendances, whilst Italys continue to fall.

43

45

Average Attendance (1,000s)

40

35

30

25

20

15
1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

Year
Italy

Germany

England

Spain

France

Figure 1.1 Elite League Average Attendances5

The problems in Italian football are not only affecting attendances at stadiums, but are
impacting its ability to capitalise on the new global market for football. The English
Premier League has negotiated a range of television contracts with international
television companies which promote the English Premier Leagues brand globally. Serie
A has not been able to do the same as they individually negotiated their television rights
(until 2010). As a consequence, they have not been able to turn their matches into global
television events. By restricting their focus to the domestic market, the Italian clubs have
not maximised their global image and are losing market share to rival leagues. The impact
of the failure to respond to these transformations is affecting the performances of the
clubs outside of their domestic league. Rather than Italian football being seen as the
epitome of European football, it is in danger of joining the second tier of European
5

Source data from www.european-football-statistics.co.uk

44

2010

leagues. The organiser of the Champions League, UEFA, determines the number of
participants from national leagues based upon their success in Europe. Since 1997 UEFA
expanded the Champions League to include runners-up in the national leagues. This was
calculated on a coefficient system which calculated national leagues results over a five
year period. Higher ranked national leagues have more representatives in the
competition. Since the coefficients inception, England, Spain and Italy have been in the
first tier of the coefficient, each having four representatives in the Champions League.
However, Italian clubs have not maintained their previous standard. As a consequence
they will lose their status in the top tier to the German Bundesliga (La Repubblica 2010).
The victory of Inter, from Milan, over Bayern Munich in the final of the 2010
Champions League postponed this eventuality, yet without major changes, the
trajectories of German and Italian football will not alter drastically in the short term.

16
14
12
10

1992-1999

2000-2010
2005-2010

6
4
2

England

Italy

Winner

France Netherlands Portugal

Figure 1.2 Champions League Semi-finalists and Finalists by nation

45

Final

Semi-final

Winner

Final

Winner

Semi-final

Final

Winner

Germany

Semi-final

Final

Winner

Semi-final

Final

Winner

Spain

Semi-final

Final

Semi-final

Final

Winner

Semi-final

Since the inception of the Champions League there has been a dramatic reversal in the
fortunes of the various national leagues. Figure 2.2 graphically details the number of
Semi-finalists, Finalists and Winners of the Champions League for the most significant
countries. In the last decade of the twentieth century, Italy was the undisputed leader of
the Champions League. It had seven representatives in the semi-finals, six of whom
proceeded to the final. Of these AC Milan and Juventus won the competition in 1994
and 1996 respectively. Of all the national leagues in the Champions League in the 1990s,
Italy had more semi-finalists than any other national league. This led to them having
more finalists, and consequently more winners. During the same period, the English
Premier League managed just two semi-finals, with Manchester United being the only
club to achieve that feat in 1997 and 1999. The last year of the decade saw Manchester
United progress to the final and win the competition in the last minute of their game
against the German side Bayern Munich. This victory marked a turning point for the
English Premier League in the following decade.

The twenty-first century has seen a dramatic reversal of fortunes for the respective
leagues. Since 2000, Italy maintained its standing at the semi-final level, by having six
semi-finalists. Of these, four progressed to the final, with AC Milan winning the
tournament twice, in 2003 and 2007. The former was an all-Italian final against Juventus.
In contrast, the same period has seen a dramatic increase in the number of English clubs
at the semi-final stage. In stark contrast to the two semi-final appearances of Manchester
United in the previous decade, the English Premier League had fifteen representatives in
the decade after Manchester Uniteds 1999 victory. Six teams subsequently qualified for
the final, which resulted in two clubs winning the competition: Liverpool beat AC Milan
in 2005, and Manchester United beat their fellow English club Chelsea in 2008. In sharp
contrast to the dominance of Italian clubs in the early years of the Champions League,

46

representatives from the English Premier League now demonstrate their European
dominance.

This relative dominance of English clubs became more acute from 2005 until 2010.
Twelve of Englands semi-finalists have been achieved during this period. All six of the
English Premier Leagues finalists were achieved during the same period, which resulted
in two victories. In contrast, the all-Italian final of 2003 marks the zenith of Italian
football. Since then only three Italian clubs have achieved the semi-final stage; on each
occasion AC Milan were the participants. Juventus matched the feat in 2003, as did
Internazionale of Milan. Juventus were the only other Italian club represented at the final
stage after the first year of the competition. In 1992, the inauguration year of the
Champions League, Sampdoria were Italian champions and runners-up, losing to
Barcelona. 2010 saw the triumph of Internazionale under the management of the
charismatic Jose Mourinho from Portugal, who reached their first final since 1972.
Meanwhile, all of the top four clubs from the English Premier League, Manchester
United, Liverpool, Chelsea and Arsenal, have achieved a Champions League semi-final.
All of these have also progressed to the final. This is in addition to Leeds United
reaching the Champions League semi-final in 2001.

English clubs fared less well in 2010. For the first time since 2003, no club from the
English premier League reached the semi-finals of the Champions League. Meanwhile,
Italy was represented by the Milanese side Inter. This resulted in speculation in the
English media that the English Premier League had reached the end of its life-cycle.
However, this analysis was premature. It failed to take into account the fact that three of
the English clubs qualified from the group stages where both Manchester United and
Arsenal proceeded to the quarter-finals. Like the English clubs, three Italian clubs

47

proceeded from the group stages. Of these, only Fiorentina qualified in first place. Both
Fiorentina and AC Milan were subsequently knocked out in the next round. One club
from each nation did not qualify from the group stages and consequently qualified for
the Europa League: Juventus and Liverpool. Liverpool reached the semi-finals of the
competition. Meanwhile, Juventus were defeated in the round of 16 by the English side,
Fulham. Fulham subsequently exceeded all expectations by reaching the final. Although
no English sides qualified for the semi-finals of the Champions League, two sides
qualified for the equivalent in the Europa League. Only Inter proceeded with any credit
in either competition. An exceptional year for Inter should not mask the respective
fortunes of the two national leagues.

Consequently, Italys approach to globalisation represents an apposite case study. This

thesis addresses the impact of the global transformations on Italy and in doing so, adds
to the range of literature addressing diverse national leagues, from Europe to South
America and Asia. The following section details the methodology and approach taken in
this thesis to address the impact of globalisation on Italian football.

Livorno and Italian Football

The romantic construction of foreign football needs further analysis and needs to be
situated within the wider body of literature on globalisation. This thesis seeks to address
this aspect and seeks to expand the frame of reference. In order to develop an
appropriate understanding of Italian football, a period of participant observation was
undertaken in the city of Livorno, ten miles south of Pisa, on the Tuscan coast. Although
some research has been undertaken into the fans of Livorno, this is extensively
quantitative in outlook (Ampola 2002; Grillo 2010). In order to address this, and to fully

48

understand the impact of globalisaiton on a provincial Italian club, I needed to undertake

a significant amount of qualitative research. Consequently, this research is based upon six
months of participant observation in Livorno. During the period, I stayed with two
Italian families which gave me extensive insight into Italian culture. Through these
families, I made many acquaintances with whom I could familiarise myself with
Livornese culture and Italian football.

Participant Observation

Deep ethnographic research has been a proved instrument within research into football
groups (Marsh, Rosser et al. 1978; Murphy, Williams et al. 1990; Giulianotti 1995;
Armstrong 1998; King 1998; Giulianotti 1999; Spaaij 2006; Testa and Armstrong 2010).
These experiences covered a mixture of overt and covert participant observation, where
the ethnographer is overt to some and covert to others. This situation can present a
number of problems to the ethnographer. Sugden has highlighted the perils and pitfalls
associated with ethnographic study. The ethnographer needs to immerse themselves in
their chosen surroundings, and strike the fine line between understanding the natives
and going native (Sugden 1996). In order to traverse this fine line, Sugden provided a
series of rules:

be up front about the research role; remember, we are not secret agents and
neither are we investigative journalists, although occasionally we may borrow
information-gathering techniques from either camp; neither are we agents
provocateurs we should not set in motion procedures which otherwise would not
have happened in order to unearth interesting material; we are interested in
naturally emergent (or concealed) social truths, not good stories; under (almost)

49

all circumstances we should stay within the laws which govern the land within
which we are operating. (Sugden 1996)

These rules provided a framework for my participant observation. My status as a

foreigner in Livorno automatically set me apart. Therefore, I openly detailed my presence
in the city as conducting research for university. This would naturally lead to further
questioning, as Livorno is not a city or football team that generally attracts investigation
from foreigners. This also allowed me to ask questions as the impartial observer which
helped to reveal these social truths.

Reflexivity is also vital when participating in ethnographic research. Sparkes has argued
that the researcher is a key actor within the research (Sparkes 1992). The researcher has
their own life histories, viewpoints and ideologies which frame their understanding of the
social action that they witness. My position as a white, heterosexual, male from the south
west of England provided an alternative perspective to the social situations I was
observing. As Sparkes highlights:

researchers need to reflect on the political dimensions of fieldwork, the webs of

power that circulate in the research process, and how these shape the manner in
which knowledge is constructed. Likewise, they need to consider how issues of
gender, nationality, race, ethnicity, social class, age, religion, sexual identity,
disability, and able-bodiedness shape knowledge construction. These issue may
affect interactions in the field; who gets studied and who gets ignored; which
questions are asked and which are left unasked; how people are written in and
out of accounts; and how others and the self of the researcher are represented
(Sparkes 2002: 17)

50

Consequently, reflexivity of the researcher is paramount. My position as researcher had

to be understood and reflexively interrogated throughout.

On the one hand, my

othenerness as a foreigner made certain aspects of this reflexivity straightforward. At

other times, it became a yoke around my neck. Comparisons with football in England
were obvious. These affected my understanding, not only of Italian football, but also
football in England. Seeing an alternative system, with its variety of positives and
negatives also led me to challenge some long-standing assumptions I had held regarding
English football. I generally agreed with many of the things written about the change in
English football, and held a deep-seated distrust of commercial clubs like Manchester
United. But researching football in Italy, and witnessing first-hand the conditions in the
stadium, the police presence and the chronic ego building of club presidents, made me
re-evaluate my position. There are problems in English football; but many other
countries are in a far worse situation as a result of globalisation. And these are the issues
we should be addressing.

Participant observation took place at a number of locations, not all of them football
related. Most of these were in public settings (Hammersley 1983), where all members of
the public were able to attend. Specifically linked to football matches, participant
observation took place at the football-related spaces, namely the stadiums and football
supporters clubs. Various spaces en route to the match were also included, such as
supporters coaches, trains (and stations), Autogrills and car trips. Broader locations were
also incorporated, such as bars, nightclubs, restaurants and parties (Livorno has a
number of outdoor parties and festivals during the spring and summer). Some of these
sites were less public, or closed, such as the supporters coaches, and some supporters
clubs meetings. Most fans were ordinary fans, as opposed to ultr, and participation was

51

passive and moderate (Spradley 1980) or in the terminology of Gold, participant-asobserver (Gold 1958). Participant observation was not only a way of obtaining data, but
as a means to develop a feeling for the Livornese, and to understand the themes and
approaches which the Livornese took to everyday life and football in particular. To
embellish the participant observation, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with
various fans. Five interviews were conducted with supporters club members.
Appointments for these were simpler as they regularly attended these clubs. Additionally,
a focus group was conducted with leading members of one of Livornos ultr groups,
Livornesi. This was conducted in the bar which they used as their headquarters.

Gaining access to rival fan groups can prove problematic. Alberto Testas excellent
ethnographic account of ultr groups of Roma and Lazio highlighted the difficulties in
gaining access to important members (Testa and Armstrong 2010). The subjects of
Testas research were infamous amongst ultr groups and were suspicious of police or
journalistic infiltration. Testa needed gatekeepers in order to access these privileged
domains. These gatekeepers were actors with control over key resources and avenues of
opportunity (Hammersley 1983: 38). After gaining access, he had to pass a series of
filters in order to gain acceptance. As a Roman, Testa had sufficient cultural capital
(Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu 1986) to allow access through the filters. Meanwhile, his time
away from the city (whilst studying in London) permitted sufficient distance from the
ultr subculture to analyse the group impartially, and also provided a focus of interest for
his subjects.

Elsewhere, Giulianotti has highlighted how perceived difference can impede access to
football fan groups (Giulianotti 1995). Giulianottis school friends provided easy access
to a hooligan group of Aberdeen fans. However, when Giulianotti tried to access a

52

similar group of Hibernian fans in Edinburgh, he faced significant problems. His

Aberdeen accent was treated with suspicion and this was not helped by media reports
into the Hibernian group that surfaced at the same time which led to a fear amongst
group members that the police were about to start an infiltration operation (Giulianotti
1995: 5). In order to gain acceptance, Giulianotti had to engage in a research bargain
and provide details of Aberdeens group. What this required is a constant re-performance
of the participation. Armstrong identified how ethnographers have to constantly
renegotiate with their subjects throughout the research period, especially as new contacts
are made (Armstrong 1993). Researchers have to re-perform their identity throughout to
ensure that they pass as members of the group. This constant awareness of ones place in
the group ensures that the researcher remains reflexive about their position and ensures
that there are no dangers of going native.

As an English researcher, who spoke Italian with a clear accent, it was not possible for
me to operate covertly, regardless of any ethical issue this represented. This however
provided alternative problems, in that an English researcher with no background in Italy,
or Livorno specifically, ensured that finding gatekeepers would be difficult. Serendipity
led me to discuss the research with a former Italian teacher (from Florence), who
directed me to another former Italian teacher who was from Livorno. In passing, she
discussed it with her husband, who in turn, was a close friend of someone who organised
local charity football tournaments. Through these tournaments, he knew a local
supporters club and discussed the research with them. On a preliminary visit to Livorno,
the directors of the supporters club invited me to meet with them. The social network
led me to my first significant gatekeeper.

53

Although I am not Italian, and did not have the cultural capital associated with being
Livornese, football fandom provides certain cultural passports (Back, Crabbe et al.
2001) that enable fans to access alternative groups. As a keen football fan, and a fan of
Italian football in particular, I had access to a set of resources that could be drawn upon
in the field. Resources such as common knowledge of players, tactics and the rituals
surrounding football, allowed me to converse with the members and directors of the
supporters club with ease. However, preparation for this specific group was also
essential. As part of my research I had immersed myself in the history of the city of
Livorno and its football club. History provides a key structuring narrative to social
groups and helps establish key traditions and memories. By knowing and acknowledging
this history I was able to demonstrate my commitment to the research and pass the
initiation. The supporters club headquarters was adorned with pictures and photographs
of Livorno football club and its players. In particular, knowing that Igor Protti was the
most celebrated player in the football clubs history clearly demonstrated this cultural
capital. Protti was a journeyman footballer who came to Livorno late in his career.
However, he was a prolific goal scorer for the club and his goals powered Livorno to two
promotions. Yet Protti would not be a familiar name to many English fans, even those
with an intimate knowledge of Italian football. His relevance was to Livorno and their
fans, not to Italian football. Knowing the players like Igor Protti, and their relevance to
the team, permitted me to demonstrate my understanding of their importance to the
fans.

Passing the initiation permitted me to attend the club as a member. In this capacity, I
attended on a regular basis to observe the daily undertaking of the club. In addition, I
was able to purchase tickets for away matches. The supporters club organised travel to
away matches, and as a member, I joined these coaches as they traversed the peninsular.

54

This provided several opportunities to converse with other fans. Being English, they saw
me as a VIP and an object of curiosity. I could exploit this to talk to people, explain the
research and ask questions about their fandom. As always, my cultural capital as a
football fan enabled me to talk to fans regardless of my nationality. My difference merely
permitted me to ask questions about the differences between English and Italian football.
In one of Garfinkels famous breaching experiments, he asked his students to act as
though they were boarders in the family home (Garfinkel 1967). This led to perplexity
and confusion from the students families. My status as a foreigner allowed me to
undertake this type of breaching experiment without causing embarrassment. I could
ask obvious questions under the pretence of being English, which allowed me to illicit
clear answers. If I had asked similar questions to English football fans, I would have
been treated with incredulity, and this would have undermined my cultural capital.

Gaining access to the supporters club did not just allow me to attend as a member. One
of the directors, in particular, was an active member within the network of supporters
clubs. He introduced me to various clubs throughout Livorno and this allowed me to see
the variety of supporters clubs in the city. It also allowed me to see the variety of
locations and directors who ran these clubs. Many of these clubs are in residential areas,
and although many are situated in bars, others are housed in shop units or as part of
domestic buildings. Knowing where these clubs were, let alone being permitted to visit,
would have been incredibly difficult without a gatekeeper to lead the way. Despite these
introductions, as Armstrong argued, I had to re-demonstrate my cultural capital at every
new meeting (Armstrong 1993).

Having a common knowledge and understanding of football and the history of Livorno
allowed me access to the gatekeepers at the supporters club. Elsewhere, a shared

55

nationality granted me access to another gatekeeper. Through my extensive research to

understand Livornos history and culture, I found a website written by an English
resident in the city. Despite a rich historical association with the British, twenty-first
century Livorno is not a popular location for British tourists or expatriates, most of
whom reside in the Tuscan hills or at cultural centres like Pisa, Siena or Florence. The
website livornonow.com provided a database for the few English speakers in Livorno, as
well as publishing English language news. Through this website, I wrote a series of match
reports that granted me further cultural capital with fans, and other contacts. Most
importantly, the webmaster of livornonow.com acted as another gatekeeper. She had a
friend who was a local journalist and I was asked to provide an interview for the local
paper, Il Tirreno. Once again, my nationality provided enough to pique the interest of the
local paper, and the local football community. This was followed up with a second
interview following the relative failure of Italian clubs, and the success of English clubs,
in the 2009 Champions League. These interviews yielded a number of contacts and
acquaintances. I was also interviewed for AS Livornos club magazine, Amaranto.
However, this failed to produce any additional contacts. Through these interviews, I
gained a certain amount of notoriety. I became increasingly aware of being called
Linglese (The Englishman) when visiting some contacts. This fuelled further
interactions.

As an Englishman in Livorno, language was vital. As already stated, Livorno does not
have a large English-speaking population, nor is it popular with tourists. Unlike a city like
Rome or Florence, I could not rely on my participants being able to speak English. Prior
to commencing this research, I had been studying Italian for two years. In addition, I also
attended an intensive language school in Livorno one year prior to commencing my
fieldwork. This allowed me to familiarise myself with the geography, as well as giving me

56

the requisite language skills; there is a vast difference between learning a language in a
classroom in England to speaking in a conversation in a bar in Italy. The vagaries of the
Italian language also posed a problem. Although the Italian language is based on the
Florentine dialect, Livorno has a distinctive vernacular. Specific words and turns of
phrase had to be absorbed and understood, although my nationality permitted me much
leeway in this regard. Older participants also proved more difficult to understand than
younger participants. Older speakers often had much stronger accents, which could
become difficult to decipher on occasions. In contrast, many speakers under forty also
had an awareness of speaking to an audience which was not native-speaking, and they
modulated their speech accordingly.

Impression management also helped to present the correct image to fans. In addition to
having the requisite cultural capital and language skills, Hammersley and Atkinson
highlight the importance of dress when undertaking ethnographic research (Hammersley
1983). Although there is a common stereotype about Italian style and dress, Livorno is a
port city with a strong beach culture. Like many similar cultures around the world,
relaxed, informal dress is worn. Shorts and T-shirts will be worn in summer, while during
the winter months, jeans and hoodies are worn. Although this style of dress would be
inappropriate for Florence or Rome, it was perfectly acceptable in Livorno. Growing up
in a seaside town gave me this common cultural capital and made participation in this
beach culture unproblematic. In addition, Livorno has a strong left-wing identity and this
is demonstrated in political T-shirts, army-style clothing, and green military-style coats.
Purchasing, and wearing, the specific T-shirts and coats allowed me to present the
correct image on the terrace, and facilitated acceptance within the groups.

Literature

57

Local newspapers play an important part of Livornese daily life. As a result, the two
Livornese daily newspapers, Il Tirreno and Il Corriere di Livorno have been analysed to
provide an insight into public and media representations of the football and club and fan
activities. Archival research was undertaken to locate notable earlier newspaper reports
and some ultr and fans allowed me to access to their own collections of cuttings and
articles. Livorno also has a local political group who produce a monthly left-wing
publication called Senza Soste (Nonstop). This newsletter provides a wide range of news
articles that are absent from commercial Italian newspapers. Every edition will have one
page devoted to football coverage, with special focus on Livorno. Italy does not have a
widespread culture of consumption of match-day programmes. These are produced by
the club and provided free to fans at designated outlets (bars, supporters clubs).
Principally these provide a small range of details and statistics of the teams. The majority
of the programme is composed of advertising space (which pays for the programme). In
addition to the match-day programme, AS Livorno also produces a monthly magazine.
Entitled Amaranto, after the colours of the city and the football club, it includes various
articles on the football club, supporters and players. Archival work was also done to
understand the background of the football club and its fans.

A useful source of information, particularly at the beginning of my fieldwork, was the

wealth of literature available on Livorno Calcio. A wide range of official and unofficial
histories of the club and the city exists (Abse 1986; De Luca 2000; Vivoli 2001; Galasso
2002; Chiarello 2005; Vaccari, Frattarelli Fischer et al. 2006). On account of its varied
and interesting history, the city of Livorno has a particularly wide range of books
detailing its history. Recent years has seen the emergence of some less academic, but
nonetheless interesting accounts into the Livornese persona, often written in the local

58

vernacular (Noberini 2003; Bongini, Pannocchia et al. 2007). Specifically related to the
principal supporters club where my research was based, one book gave a fascinating
insight into football fandom in Livorno. On the death of their son Luca, the founders of
Club Luca Rondina produced a book detailing the co-operation they received from the
football club. The city library of Livorno housed a significant collection of works on the
city and with the co-operation of the local library staff, a significant proportion of my
early work in Livorno was based there. Wider academic research of football literature was
also undertaken at the libraries of the University of Pisa and University of Bologna.

Fanzine culture within football fan cultures is particularly strong. The medium developed
strongly during the 1990s, especially in Britain, and has been shown to be a valuable
insight into the outlook of particular fan communities and worthy of academic attention
(Jary, Horne et al. 1991; King 1998; Giulianotti 1999; Millward 2008). Fanzines have also
been adopted across Europe, particularly in Germany and the Netherlands (Spaaij 2006).
However, there is not a similar fanzine culture within Italy. Dal Lago and De Biasi
ascribe this to the intense co-ordination of the match-day choreographies (Dal Lago and
De Biasi 1994). However, there are two national fanzines that are produced in Italy and
are easily obtained in Livorno. The fanzine Supertifo (Superfan) started in 1985 and has
recommenced publishing in 2010.6 Supertifo conforms to the British notion of a fanzine,
in that it contains a large number of comment features, where ultr recount their
experiences at football. Many of these are nostalgic stories of solidarity as fans attend
away games, whilst others are historical reconstructions of the ultr. The fanzine also
provides an agony aunt column called Lavvocato risponde (The lawyer replies). In this
article, a well-known solicitor and ultr of AS Roma, Lorenzo Contucci, responds to a
question relating to legal issues relating to football fandom. Contucci also organizes the
6

http://www.supertifo.it/

59

comprehensive ultr website called asromaultras.org and defends a number of ultr

members in the courts. Consequently, he is highly regarded within the ultr world.
Supertifo also provides a large section devoted to fans photos of choreographies. The
provide commentary and opportunities for ultr to re-perform their identity outside the
stadium.

The other fanzine principally operates as a medium to further display ultr

choreographies. Entitled Fans Magazine, it is produced by ultras of Salernitana.7 Fans
Magazine re-produces the various choreographies of ultr groups throughout the football
league structure, as well as some basketball games (The ultr phenomenon has been taken
up by basketball fans). These magazines highlight the sophisticated ways that the ultr
identity is produced and consumed. Principally, it publishes photos that provide
opportunities for ultr to display and re-perform the choreographies. They also display
photos of scenes from outside the stadium. They illustrate the chanting and clapping that
takes place as ultr approach the stadium. They also highlight the positioning of police in
relation to these choreographies outside the stadium. More importantly, it illustrates key
ultr messages. For example, the title of the 212th edition of April 2010 stated: Gli ultras
non muoiono mai (The ultras never die). Despite being predominantly
photographic, it does include commentary and discussion related to government
measures and police actions, so operates as an important method to investigate ultra
viewpoints.

A noteworthy trend in British football literature concerns books written about

hooliganism. Covering both fiction and autobiographies, there is a sizable market related
to football hooliganism (Dart 2008; Poulton 2008). Nicknamed hoolie-lit, works of
7

http://www.fansmagazine.eu/

60

fiction, such as The Football Factory and Awaydays have been turned into films, alongside
others such as I.D. and Green Street. Pioneered by Colin Ward with Steaming In, and
developed by Cass Pennant, a cottage industry has developed producing a number of
autobiographical works based on the lives and actions of key members of various crews.
This trend has not been replicated in Italy. Although Pennants seminal Congratulations
You Have Just Met the ICF has been translated into Italian, it is not possible to purchase a
similar range of books in Italy. Fan accounts do exist, but are only obtained locally,
through fan networks. Football-related books are limited to club histories, season diaries,
or academic books. There exists one, simply written, fictional short story on the life of an
ultr, Io, ultras (I, ultras). In addition there are faux academic books, written by
journalists, and the occasional ultr, to try and investigate the phenomenon. As a result,
there is not an extensive resource available for investigation in this field.

Internet and Social Networking

The internet has produced a number of instruments for ultr identity to be re-performed
and re-articulated. In addition to the official website of AS Livorno, there are a number
of websites which have been created and maintained by fans of the club.8 These provided
useful resources to understand significant historical events, memorable players, and
current debates. There are also a number of websites dedicated to ultr.9 In particular, the
website www.asromaultras.org provides extensive information on the ultr, in addition to
information on AS Roma and its fans. This website is maintained by Lorenzo Contucci,
the lawyer who defends ultr, and provides legal advice for the fanzine Supertifo. Video
footage was also analysed to provide further analysis of spectator behaviour. Youtube
also proved to be a valuable resource. Fans and ultr actively post videos and clips
8
9

www.livornocalcio.it; www.alelivorno.it; www.amaranta.it; www.uslivorno.it; www.sportamaranto.it

www.tifonet.it; www.europeanultras.com; www.ultrasspirit.com

61

displaying their activities, in particular their choreographies and confrontations. Although

these videos are not unbiased, they provide an apposite example of how ultr actively
perform their identity and re-perform it through the internet. Youtube, and other
internet sites, provide extensive platforms for ultr to actively choose the image they want
to portray. In turn this reinforces the invented traditions of the ultr as they seek to
maintain their image. Other forms of social networking did not provide to be as useful,
especially in gaining access to contacts. Early in the research, Facebook and
Couchsurfing.com were used to try to build contacts. I also participated on internet
forums related to Livorno football club. However, there is not a strong internet culture
in Livorno (in contrast to England) and these approaches yielded little success. After a
brief summary, the following section will present an outline of the thesis to address
Italys approach to globalisation in football and contributing factors to the decline of
Italian football.

Summary

This thesis will provide an analysis of Italian football in terms of globalisation in order to
contribute to debates in the sociology of sport in the UK. These debates have often
ignored the reality of Italian football and utilised a romanticised notion to reinforce
criticisms of the English game. The analysis will be grounded in the global political
economy; through the complex transformations which have taken place it is possible to
see the profound affect that these have had on the nation state. The rolling back of the
state has led to a decline in the social capital of urban communities and an increased
individualisation which is contributing to a decline of Italian football. This is
compounded by the continued practise of patrimonial networks that undermine the state
and its institutions.

62

Consequently, this thesis is sub-divided into four sections. The following chapter will
conclude the introductory section by outlining the theoretical context that will frame this
thesis. The second section will focus on the Italian political economy. Chapter 3 will
illustrate the historical development of Italys national political economy. In particular it
will focus on the transition from the Keynesian state-capitalism of the immediate postwar period into the de-regulated global economy of the 1980s and beyond. These
globalised transformations are not uniform; in Italy, they have developed a specific
characteristic due to the prior weakness of the State and extensive patrimonial networks.
This argument will be explored in Chapter 4 as the culture of mistrust in the central
authorities and patrimonial networks has been replicated within the world of football.
The weakness of the de-regulated institutions has facilitated the emergence of strategic
actors who can manipulate their networks for the benefit of the major clubs.

The third section will focus on the experience of fans. The crisis of Italian football is
compounded by a poor infrastructure with antiquated stadiums and extensive policing.
These factors will be explored in Chapter 5 whilst looking at match-day experiences.
Chapter 6 will trace the historical development of the fans and how their social and
political affiliations have fragmented in parallel to the de-regulation of the national
political economy. The fragmentation of the fan groups has substantially weakened the
position of the fans and facilitated the emergence of the strategic actors in football.
Finally, the concluding section and chapter will situate the victory of Inter in the
Champions League final within this framework. A tentative future for Italian football will
then be proposed to conclude the thesis.

63

Chapter 2

Sport and Community

The imagined community of millions seems more real as a team of eleven named people
Eric Hobsbawm10

Every year the progress of advanced capitalist society makes our population consist of more and
more isolates. This is because of the infrastructure of the economy, especially electronic
communications - Mary Douglas

Filippo Raciti died on 2nd February 2007; the police officer died from severe liver damage
after being struck by a blunt object. Raciti was one of hundreds of police officers
attending the Sicilian derby between Catania and Palermo. The match started in an
unusual fashion as the teams held a minutes silence to commemorate Ermanno Licursi,
the manager of an amateur side who was killed when he tried to stop a brawl during a
match the week before. Despite the austere beginnings of the match, fans continued with
their usual choreographies. There was such a quantity of smoke from the smoke bombs
that the referee had to suspend the game for fifteen minutes. Palermo won the game 2-1
and their fans were being escorted from the ground by the police when they were
ambushed by the Catania fans. The home fans had several weapons including one
hundred home made bombs. The Catania fans threw various objects at the police,

10

Hobsbawm, E. J. (1992). Nations and nationalism since 1780 : programme, myth, reality, Cambridge
University Press.

64

including pipes, sinks and a scooter (Craig and Pisa 2007). It was the ensuing riot that
resulted in the tragic death of Filippo Raciti.

In contrast to the romantic notion of Mediterranean carnival fans, the Italian league has
experienced a series of profound crises. The death of Filippo Raciti came less than year
after Calciopoli, a major corruption and match-fixing scandal which affected many of the
top Italian clubs. This contrasted with the presentation of television shows such as
Football Italia on Channel 4 in Britain, which simultaneously reflected Italian success in
the 1990s, and reaffirmed its dominance. Italys top division, Serie A, became known as
il campionato piu bello del mondo, the most beautiful championship in the world (Clegg
2010). Italy had capitalised on its success by successfully hosting Italia 90 and their
legacy seemed assured. However, globalisation has impacted Italian football in number of
ways. Despite the success of Serie A during the 1990s, it has experienced a range of crises
and faces declining attendances. As the global political economy has changed, Italy has
struggled to maintain its position.

This chapter seeks to provide a theoretical framework for the thesis. Through the
complex global transformations which have taken place, it is possible to see the
profound affect that these have had on the nation state of Italy. The worldwide rolling
back of the state has led to a decline in the public participation of urban communities
which is reflected in the decline of Italian football. Through understanding the nation we
can situate football in the wider political economy. In order to highlight these
transformations, this chapter will locate the development of sport within the parallel
development of the nation state. It will then build on this understanding of the nation
state to illustrate the role of political economy within the nation state and how this has
changed with globalisation. The subsequent section will address the literature on

65

declining participation in public life, in particular focussing on the fashionable term

social capital.

Sport and the Nation State

Modern sport is intimately linked with the role of the nation state. During the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, the nation state became a central component of social identity.
The processes of rationalisation and codification that led to the development of modern
sport also took place elsewhere in society. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries the nation states increasingly centralised and monopolised national assets.
Through control of the police and the armed forces, the state monopolised violence and
gradually coerced and controlled the populace which changed the traditional role of the
family to protect its members (Weber 1968; Elias 1982). Through coercion and elite
distinction saw uncivilised behaviours, such as violence, madness and personal bodily
functions, became increasingly separated from daily life and removed from sight (Elias
1978; Foucault 2009). The designation of crimes and appropriate punishments allowed
the state to increase surveillance over the individual (Foucault 1991). The redefinition of
roles between the state and the individual facilitated the requirements for an independent
bureaucracy to administer the organs of state (Weber 1968). This led to the creation of a
separate bureaucratic class which necessitated a common official language that reinforced
a commonality between all national members (Anderson 2006). With the states
monopoly of violence, protection of the community and the family was performed by
the States police and military. Sport provided an avenue to continue the traditional
masculine traits of toughness and physicality (Dunning and Sheard 1979).

66

The rationalisation processes that formed the modern state occurred within sport. Sport
in general, and football in particular, were the product of the British public school system
(Dunning and Sheard 1979). These schools took the folk football games that had
developed in British towns and villages since the fourteenth century and applied a
regulatory system to control the violence and produce uniformity. Regulation and
codification permitted measurement and specialisation which encouraged the
maintenance of records for comparisons and opportunities to distinguish between
athletes (Guttmann 1978). Records and measurement permitted public schools and
sports clubs to compare themselves with others (Dunning and Sheard 1979: 4). Sporting
success also acted as a marker of distinction as the public schools sought to differentiate
themselves from the emerging industrial classes (Dunning and Sheard 1979; Bourdieu
1984). Sport also provided an emotional outlet from the constraining rationality of
modernity, a quest of excitement (Elias and Dunning 1986). Consequently, a
combination of factors led to Britain becoming the birthplace of modern codified sports
(Guttmann 1978; Dunning and Sheard 1979; Elias and Dunning 1986; Huizinga 1992;
Giulianotti 1999; Maguire 1999; Miller, Lawrence et al. 2001). British industrialisation and
urbanisation in the nineteenth century provided the spectators and interest for these new
forms of sport. Meanwhile British colonisation and imperialism exported them across the
globe where they were adopted by new urban groups emerging in the newly formed
nations.

The growth of the nation state required powerful cultural identification. Consequently,
the centralisation of resources under the auspices of the state ran in parallel to the
growth of national identification. Powerful national symbols permitted the creation and
execution of national rituals that engendered emotions and sentiments towards the
nation. Hobsbawm illustrates the increasing number of invented traditions that arose

67

during the late nineteenth century which initiated rituals that permitted the participants to
share similar symbols which in turn provided the participants with the same emotional
focus (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Collins 2005). Hobsbawm suggests that these
invented traditions were proscribed by political elites, and this denies the masses and
agency within their participation (Smith 1998). As the following chapter will illustrate, in
the case of Italy, the nation was a political construct. But this is not to deny the wider
agency of those who fought and died for Garibaldi and the architects of the
Risorgimento. More importantly, however, it should be noted how invented traditions
did not appear out of the ether, but were rituals and symbols which incorporated several
motifs and traditions from previous epochs and earlier ceremonies, and that is, in part,
why they resonated with the public. To call them 'inveneted' tradtions does scant justiec
to the complex ways in which these, and other ceremonies, were reconstructed and
reinterpreted (Smith 1998: 130). Thus, groups and nations incorporate a variety of
memories, symbols and traditions into their identity.

The shared focus and emotional attachment engendered by shared symbols leads
members to form a sense of shared belonging and collective memory. This participation
developed an imagined community of members. As Anderson states, it is:

imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds
of each lives the image of their communities (Anderson 2006: 6).

Whilst the participants will not know their contemporaries, they share the same symbols
that provide the focus for their community. Although Smith suggests that this imagined
political community underplays ethnic and historic resources which engender powerful

68

feelings of attachment, the political aspects should not be underestimated (Smith 1998:
130). Several elements impact identification with the nation. Political and religious
identification can assist or impede this wider identification. In Italy, for example, the two
mass political parties identified with global movements like Catholicism and
Communism. Consequently, the nation has to find other ways to encourage participation.

Sport provides the powerful symbols and invented traditions for national identities to be
articulated. Hobsbawms quote at the start of the chapter illustrates this position: The
imagined community of millions seems more real as a team of eleven named people
(Hobsbawm 1992: 143). Sport and football in particular, provides the symbols and
invented traditions that permit thousands of participants to share in the same activity.
This shared participation with strangers engenders powerful feelings of belonging. As
Durkheim highlighted, emotional attachment is fuelled through increased participation in
the rituals of the group (Durkheim 1915). This creates a distinction between the profane
and the sacred and further delineates the membership of the group. Sports competitions
provide opportunities to reinforce the sacred and profane of the nation. International
events, such as the Olympics, provided apposite opportunities for nations to compete
with each other (Roche 2000). As a consequence, the increased internationalisation of
competition helped sharpen national identities (Maguire 1999; Miller, Lawrence et al.
2001). International sport helped demarcate the boundaries of the imagined community
and reinforce the emotional attachments of the group. As a consequence, nationalism
proceeded in parallel with increased internationalisation.

As the nation state developed it incorporated further aspects into its sphere of influence.
In addition to monopolising violence and appropriating the role of defence of its citizens
it also incorporated aspects of the economy within its control. This heightened after the

69

Second World War as state-capitalism, influenced by John Maynard Keynes, became

fashionable in many western democracies (Marquand 1988; Gamble 1994; Lash and Urry
1994; Gilpin and Gilpin 2000; Trigilia 2002; Sennett 2006; Kiely 2007; Kaletsky 2010).
Keynes argued that recession was caused by under-consumption and advocated that
states should take an active role in managing the national economy to promote full
employment. This approach necessitated large numbers of nationalised industries and
large-scale mass manufacturing industries operating along Fordist principles. The
national welfare state provided the security to maintain consumption, whilst international
agreement at the Bretton Woods conference ensured national controls of national
economies. To promote stability and peace during the post-war period, states within the
Bretton Woods system agreed to national autonomy over borders. Exchange rates were
fixed or pegged by the nation state to prevent excessive speculation on the international
currency markets. The US dollar in particular was pegged to its extensive gold reserves
which provided a firm foundation for its exchange-value. National control of exchange
rates and import duties also protected the national markets from cheaper imports. This
maintained national industry and preserved aspirations for full-employment within the
Keynesian system.

Global factors began to impinge on national control during the 1970s. As Castells states:

A global economy emerged in the last years of the twentieth century. It

resulted from the restructuring of firms and financial markets in the wake of the
1970s crisis. It expanded by using new information and communication
technologies. It was made possible, and by and large induced, by deliberate
government policies. The global economy was not created by markets, but by the
interaction between markets and governments and international financial institutions acting on

70

behalf of markets or their notion of what markets ought to be [emphasis added]

(Castells 1996: 135)

The rising cost and resultant inflation of the Vietnam War saw Richard Nixon attempt to
reassert some control of the American economy. In 1971 Nixon removed the link
between the US dollar and gold. This action became the beginning of the end of Bretton
Woods and permitted the American currency to speculation on international monetary
markets. The crisis was exacerbated by the Oil Crisis of 1973 with the formation of
OPEC by the oil-producing countries of the Middle East which led to a sharp increase in
the price of oil. The combination of increased fuel costs and flexible exchange rates
directly impacted the Fordist mass-manufacturing companies. These economic factors
were compounded by growing social unrest. Full-employment had led to increased union
strength and demands for higher wages. Within a Keynesian national economy, wages
need to be carefully controlled to maintain inflation at a low level. Rising inflation and
unemployment resulted in stagflation which led to growing social discontent and a global
economic crisis.

The exhaustion of the Keynesian system in the 1970s resulted in a new political approach
to national economies. A change in the political ideology in Britain and the US under the
guidance of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan saw widespread de-regulation of the
state. They advocated a market-led, neo-liberal approach which insisted that the state
should be disentangled from the markets. The removal of the US dollar from the gold
standard allowed open currency speculation which removed national control of currency
values and with it their ability to control imports and exports. This Widespread deregulation and privatisation took place that resulted in widespread restructuring of the
economy and society. In Britain this was characterised by a reliance on a historical

71

tradition of financial services (Marquand 1988). The incomplete nature of

industrialisation in Britain resulted in the difficult transition to a post-industrial society
and an over-reliance on financial services. In Japan and elsewhere, manufacturing
industries re-structured to become more flexible and responsive to consumer demand
(Lash and Urry 1994). This transition to post-Fordist economies not only affected the
production of commodities, but transformed the patterns of consumption within the
global economy. The reinvigorated focus of consumption facilitated the widespread
restructuring of global football as the sport incorporated free market approaches to
maximise exposure and revenue (King 1998; Maguire 1999).

The response of the state to these global transformations necessitated a paradox. As the
state was systematically weakened from its controls over the economy, its authority had
to be reasserted over citizens (Gamble 1994; Wacquant 2009). The State has to be strong
enough to disentangle state involvement in the market, whilst at the same time remaining
strong enough to police this new economic order. This involves effective regulation to
maintain the liberty of the market as well as having the strength to fight the vested
interests of the previous Keynesian regime. For example, in Britain, Thatcher undertook
a series of contests with Trade Unions and other vested interests in the state-controlled
market (Gamble 1994). The end of protectionism, especially of national industries,
resulted in open international markets. The strong state had to be prepared to manage
the effects that this openness created, such as redundancies, bankruptcy and immigration.
Conversely, a state which failed to regulate the new global order would face a
legitimation crisis (Habermas 1975).

Globalisation has affected the nation state in different ways. Transformations in the
global political economy have facilitated the emergence and reinforcement of new

72

patterns of consumption, international migration and identity formations. Removal of

state regulation has permitted new connections to be made across the global network.
Capital flows to the areas that can best adapt and accumulate the resources (Castells
1996; Sassen 2001). This has permitted inter-connections between businesses and
institutions to develop and intensify. Sport has witnessed the growing intensification of
connections between clubs, media and business (Maguire 1999; Sugden 2002; King
2003). However, the political element of political economy needs further analysis.
Political actors are instrumental in providing the conditions that contributed to economic
transformation (Castells 1996). Consequently, the roles of politics and politicians operate
within these global networks and have contributed to the re-configuration of the nation
state. The combination of the political and the economic has seen the emergence of new
symbols and invented traditions which have emerged to challenge the national monopoly
and facilitated the emergence of new forms of identification. Furthermore, the flexibility
and fluidity of global capital has had a concomitant affect on local communities. There is
a wide range of literature focussing on how the identities of local groups and
communities have adapted to global forces (Maguire 1994; Maguire 1999; King 2000;
Maguire and Pearton 2000; Giulianotti and Robertson 2006). However, these principally
focus on identity formation and do not take into account the literature on fragmentation
of community and the decline of participation in public life. The following section will
outline a theoretical framework for this decline. This will permit the investigation of the
impact of changes to the global political economy on Italy, and the decline of Italian
football.

73

Decline in Participation in Public Life

The decline in public engagement in civil society has been a central focus of academic,
media and political discourse for centuries. Rapid industrialisation and urbanisation
during the nineteenth century led to increased academic analysis of transitions from
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft and resulted in the birth of sociology as a discipline (Tnnies
2001). Communities began to more from the ridid mechanical solidarity of small kinship
communities to the organic solidarity of larger, fragmented society (Durkheim 1964).
This transition was seen to contribute a sense of helplessness, or anomie, as members of
society lost their traditional purpose and focus of life (Durkheim 1952). Technological
advances and global transformations at the end of the twentieth century have attracted
similar academic interest into the change in community caused by profound economic
transformations. The zeitgeist was captured by Robert Putnams Bowling Alone which
utilised the concept of social capital to demonstrate the increased individualism and
resultant decline in community (Putnam 2000). Sport is one area that has been identified
as having a wider social role in the formation of community (Jarvie 2003; Coalter 2007).
Therefore, this thesis will add the wider discussion on social capital to the general
account of political economy to present a synthesis of the impact of globalisation on
local community participation through football.

Social transformation has been at the heart of sociological investigation since the
disciplines inception. The post-war period proved to be a fertile period as the economic
transformations of Keynesian mass production and consumption combined with
changing social ideals, which had fermented during the war. One of the first post-war
writers to identify this emerging social change was Riesman, whose seminal work entitled
The Lonely Crowd began to describe the changing composition of individuals within

74

society (Riesman 1961). Riesman suggested that social actors have moved through
various character traits. Society has moved from groups of tradition-directed
individuals, who focused on tradition to provide group solidarity and regulation to more
inner-directed individuals of the modern era. These individuals had internalised a moral
compass through their education and upbringing and this drove the individual to
succeed. These individuals were driven by a strong work ethic and focussed inwards; on
themselves and their family. As businesses changed from small family businesses into
large corporations, and as the service sector and bureaucracy grew, individuals became
more other-directed. They had to be aware of other people, as they had to rely on them
for support. Morality wasnt internalised, but was done in relation to others, depending
on the context and impact. This affected politics as politicians were no longer elected on
the basis of ideology and morality, but on their ability to appeal to the electorate. Otherdirected voters approached politics as amoral consumers, rather than moral producers.
Although Riesman identifies these ideal types, like Weber before him, these should not
be taken in isolation and combinations of all three can exist in any one individual or
society at any point in time.

Elias noted a simlar trend emerging in the princely courts of Europe (Elias 1978; Elias
1982). The public body became increasingly privatised as intimate actions, such as eating,
bathing and going to the bathroom, were removed from the public gaze. These new
manners and morals became internalised by cultural elites which then acted as a marker
of distinction for others (or those who Riesman would call other-directed) to emulate.
As human activities became increasingly specialised with greater division of labour,
individuals began to form figurations, or networks of interdependence. As these
networks grew, individuals became increasingly fragmented and it became harder for the
individual to understand the overall context (Elias 2001). This encouraged individuals to

75

focus on their immediate needs, rather than the wider good. As individual personality
was asserted, social actors removed themselves from the wider public which has been
assisted by the increased range of privatised spaces available to individuals (Elias 2001).
However this privatisation and individualisation necessitated a paradox. The public
became a space where private individuals utilised the knowledge they had amassed
privately to debate wider issues publicly. As the public debated politics and science in
associations and coffee houses, there was a greater interest in the wider public life, which
led to the state and society becoming entwined (Habermas 1989). Separation from the
public would contribute to a reduction in public debate and wider public opinion, which
would fuel continued individualisation.

Whilst individual personalities were asserted, there was increased awareness of similarities
and difference. Other-directed individuals with similar goals began to develop networks
of inter-dependence (Riesman 1961; Elias 2001). As these like-minded individuals came
together to debate issues in the coffee shops of Europe, they facilitated in creating a
public sphere and laid the foundations of clubs and associations (Habermas 1989).
These associations, De Tocqueville argues, contributed to political debate separated from
the state and this helped underpin American democracy (De Tocqueville 1969). For
Habermas, although associations provide a public sphere in which to discuss wider
issues, they also can become vehicles for private interests (Habermas 1989). The
formation of Sport in particular was assisted by debate within Gentlemans clubs (Elias
and Dunning 1986). The increased number and range of associations, both political and
private, further contributed to the individualisation of society as collective identities
became difficult, as boundaries have to be policed which leads to exclusion of specific
groups (Sennett 1976). Collective identities become areas of inclusion and exclusion and
this inhibits the growth of a wider collective identity. This impedes the growth of a

76

widespread public identity and actually decreases the role of public individuals (Sennett
1976).

Changes to consumption have facilitated the increased individualisation of society. For

Riesmans student, Sennett reinforced how other-directed individuals who became
focussed on presenting themselves to other people, lost sight of the wider public
engagement which built a cohesive society. Other-directed social actors learnt to
develop themselves in relation to others, but in Sennetts opinion, this has led to
increased narcissism and inward-focus, rather than wider public engagement. Increases in
production, especially under the Keynesian system, actively promoted and provided an
increased range of commodities for consumption. This permitted individuals to consume
commodities which could present their personality and identity to the public gaze
(Sennett 1976). As social actors asserted their individual personalities, participation in
associations fragment and collective identities become difficult to form.

Individuals simply present themselves in public, but do not participate in it and do not
take part in wider political debate. Consequently, this has facilitated the emergence of
charismatic individuals who can appeal to the widest range of the populace and
temporarily unite the imagined community of the nation (Sennett 1976). This is fuelled
by changes to patterns of consumption, as Habermas argues:

the presentation of the leader or the leaders team plays a central role; they too
need to be packaged and displayed in a way that makes them marketable
(Habermas 1989: 218)

77

The image of the charismatic leader is increasingly mediatised. Mass media, particularly
television, permits the charismatic leaders to directly access the floating voters.
Significantly, those voters who:

are most decisively predisposed to avoid a public opinion formed by discussion

are the ones most likely to be influenced in their views but this time by the
staged or manipulatively manufactured public sphere of the elections campaign
(Habermas 1989: 214)

Thus mass media permits the charismatic leader to market themselves in the same
manner as other commodities operating within the consumer market. Politics and voting
become extensions of the acts of consumption of individuals.

Changes to technology have facilitated new forms of political identities that have
fragmented national politics. New social movements have witnessed the emergence of a
number of political movements which aim to tackle a wide range of global, national and
local issues politics, many of which are single-issue movements (Touraine 1981; Melucci
and Mier 1989). Mass technology, especially the internet, permits the rapid dissemination
of information across the network of supporters and activists. Therefore in parallel to the
decline in participation in public life, there has been a widespread fragmentation of
politics. Consequently, the role of the charismatic leader becomes magnified as they
attempt to unite the disparate political groups.

The decline of community has captured the imagination of politicians, academics and the
media. In particular, the term social capital has evolved to reflect this decline and has
become a popular academic abstraction. Broadly speaking, the term social capital refers

78

to the networks of people an individual can call upon in order to navigate their way
through life (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988; Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993; Portes 1998;
Putnam 2000). The current popularity of social capital has enabled it to be seen as the
missing link between the anomie of society and the increased individualism and decline
of participation in public life. Furthermore the term has been extended to explain
political involvement and democracy. In his analysis of the success and failure of Italian
regions, Putnam has suggested that social capital generated in civic associations helps in
making democracy work (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993). Putnam builds on the
observations of De Tocqueville who suggested that lack of associationism led to soft
despotism, where individuals stop engaging with government in exchange for material
needs (De Tocqueville 1969). The following section will critique the term social capital
in order to account for its relevance to the current situation in Italian football so as to
determine whether public participation through civic associations can build a network of
social capital and lead to greater political participation..

Social Capital and the Decline of Community

Social capital has become a popular term within academic literature in the twenty-first
century. The generalised nature of the concept has permitted it to be applied to a range
of situations, from ten-pin bowlers (Putnam 2000) to inner-city gangs (Deuchar and
Holligan 2010), and from successful democracy (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993) to
successful economies (Dasgupta and Serageldin 2000). As a consequence it becomes a
difficult concept to isolate and has led to the theory being extrapolated and abstracted.
Ultimately, there exists a theoretical gap between the decline in participation in public life
and successful democracy or economy. Several academics have attempted to define social
capital and identify the possibilities for the creation of networks. Coleman, for example,

79

identifies social capital as a facet of social structures that facilitates the action of actors
within the structure (Coleman 1988). As a consequence of this structuralist conception,
Coleman focuses on the social capital acquired in social structures such as the family and
religious organizations. This detracts from many other types of networks which are fluid
and temporary and do not derive from family and religion. Colemans contemporary,
Bourdieu, suggests that social capital is inter-related to two other forms of capital,
economic and cultural (Bourdieu 1986). Significantly, he defines social capital as:

the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession
of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual
acquaintance and recognition or in other words, to membership in a group
(Bourdieu 1986: 247).

Once again, social capital is seen as a resource for facilitating the action of individuals. In
particular, Bourdieu sees social capital as a resource that can be accumulated like other
forms of capital, such as economic and cultural capital, that can be utilised to distinguish
oneself from others. Consequently, social capital is produced and reproduced through
exchange and investment within the social network in much the same way as economic
capital. Thus, social capital is not a natural by-product or a given but has to be
constructed through the investment of economic, temporal and cultural resources
(Portes 1998: 3-4). However, neither Coleman nor Bourdieu discuss the relationship of
social capital to political participation or economic development.

As Bourdieu suggested, social capital was one form of capital along with cultural and
economic capital. These forms are not mutually exclusive and possession of one can
facilitate accumulation of the others. For example, attending a school such as Eton can

80

provide the cultural capital and distinction of participating in an exclusive institution, as

well as providing a network of friends and acquaintances who can assist the individual in
acquiring other resources, including jobs opportunities. In some cases, being a member
of an established group provides the necessary cultural and social capital which facilitates
members of the established group, whilst excluding ousiders (Elias and Scotson 1965).
The success of these networks of social capital has been attributed to the success of
accumulation of economic capital (Fukuyama 1995; Portes 1998; Lin 2001). Lin makes
this link explicit as he sees social capital as an investment in social relations with
expected returns in the marketplace (Lin 2001: 19). He sees the concept as a means for
individuals profiting from their social networks and connections. These networks permit
the individual to acquire information, exert influence and demonstrate their social
credentials, as well as being a vehicle for identity reinforcement (Lin 2001: 20). Similarly,
Portes excellent overview and critique of social capital provides a calculating,
individualistic approach to social capital (Portes 1998). Fukuyama also sees social capital
as social networks as a driver of economic capital (Fukuyama 1995). Networks of social
capital permit the development of trust which allows individuals to free themselves from
the constraints of familialism and opens those to new economic opportunities
(Fukuyama 1995 1248). Through social interactions individuals acquire knowledge about
contemporaries which permits them to enter into economic transactions. A similar
observation was made by Weber in relation to the Protestant sects of North America
(Weber 1948). The protestant sects created new social groups that actively encouraged
hard work and profit. However, Weber did not attribute their success in encouraging
capitalism to breaking from the family, but from the guild system where competitors
remained within the same association. Therefore social capital within associations can
actively impede and restrain economic capital accumulation.

81

The proliferation of the term social capital has continued with Robert Putnams
influential research. Initiated with his study of the Italian regions, Putnam transferred his
hypothesis to America to observe the decline of participation in public life (Putnam,
Leonardi et al. 1993; Putnam 2000). Putnam places social capital back into social
structures and aims to expand the outcome of social capital to encompass benefits to the
wider society:

Social capital here refers to features of social organisation, such as trust, norms,
and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating
coordinated actions (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993: 176)

Fundamentally, Putnam sees social capital as trusting networks working towards shared
objectives (Putnam 1996: 56). Putnam promotes the participation in civic associations as
this permits the social interactions and networks to provide the social glue for group
members to work together towards a common goal. Social networks are not necessarily
developed for personal economic profit, but can be utilised for identity formation,
solidarity and altruistic values. Putnams focus on face-to-face interactions in civic
associations underplays the significance of global cyber-networks in creating new social
networks and new forms of social capital (Lin 2001). Putnam therefore suggests that
civic associations create a public sphere with which individuals can engage with politics
and promote democracy and economic growth (Putnam 2000), despite Habermas
assertion that some associations become vehicles for private interests (Habermas 1989).

Although Bowling Alone attracted a lot of public and political attention in the United
States, Putnams earlier work focussed on economic success in Italy. Deregulation of the
Italian state in the 1970s saw increased autonomy granted to the Italian regions. During

82

the twenty years since de-regulation, each region performed significantly differently in
terms of economic growth and political engagement. In order to analyse the respective
differences, Putnam analysed the history of the Italian regions. Although this thesis will
do likewise in the following chapters, a brief synopsis of Putnams argument suggests
that successful Italian regions in the late twentieth century had long histories of civic
virtue. He argues that strong civic associationism has resulted in successful regional
governments and businesses in the north of Italy. In contrast, the south has struggled to
be fully integrated into the Italian state. This has seen increased corruption, organised
crime and under-investment. This represents a paradox that is illustrated by Portes who
suggests that: if your town is civic, it does civic things; if it is uncivic, it does not
(Portes 1998: 20). For an actor to overcome the problems of lack of trust and civic
virtue, they must be more civic and needs to place more trust in strangers. This places
the dilemma centrally within the agency of the individual actor. In doing so it neglects the
opportunities for the accumulation of resources through interaction between actors. For
Putnam:

Personal interaction generates information about the trustworthiness of other

actors that is relatively inexpensive and reliable (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993:
172-3).

The actor is not operating independently, but through interaction with others across the
social network. As Riesman argued, other-directed individuals understood that they
needed to co-operate and interact with others in order to achieve individual goals
(Riesman 1961). Furthermore, Durkheim argues that increased social congregation builds
collective emotion and solidarity (Durkheim 1915). Increased interaction will accumulate

83

increased emotional energy and solidarity between members of the group which could
facilitate the accumulation of trust.

Significantly, Putnam suggests that declining social capital acquired through civic
participation is contributing to a decline in participation in public life. In Bowling Alone,
Putnam identifies falling associationism in the church, unions and political membership
(Putnam 2000). There is a danger of constructing a Golden Age of civic participation
which descends into wilful nostalgia; a lament for traditional mass participation activities,
such as national political parties and trade unions. This wilful nostalgia suggests that civic
participation is unequivocally beneficial to society and democracy. Putnam acknowledged
that there was a dark side to social capital as this Golden Age was also the age of
extreme racial segregation in the United States (Putnam 2000). Furthermore, associations
like the Ku Klux Klan would still generate social capital for its members despite not
contributing to a fair and equitable democratic society. Even traditions of civic
engagement do not necessarily generate positive results. For example, Putnam attributes
the civic traditions of the successful economic areas of Lombardy, Tuscany and EmiliaRomagna as a reason for their success in the 1980s and 1990s. However, as will be seen
in the following two chapters, several high-profile scandals have arisen in the north of
Italy despite its civic nature. Furthermore, Riley argues that during the 1920s, the civic
nature of these northern regions also facilitated Fascist recruitment (Riley 2005). In
contrast to facilitating democracy, as Putnam argued, it actually permitted
authoritarianism. However, the anti-Fascist partisan movement also grew in the same
regions (Ginsborg 1990). Therefore, the generation of civic traditions through social
capital does not necessarily contribute to the formation of democractic institutions of
government.

84

The decline of participation in associations underplays the proliferation of new forms of

association and new social movements since the 1960s. There has been an increase of
single issue movements which focus on a wide range of issues, from environmentalism
to consumer groups (Touraine 1981; Melucci and Mier 1989). These groups have also
been affected by changes to consumption. Putnam identifies this range of social
movements and suggests that they have been reduced to acts of consumption where
individuals purchase a social movement through a regular donation (Putnam 2000).
Furthermore, Putnam identifies the internet as a possible reflection of this change. The
network of information that constitutes the internet permits the rapid exchange of
information as individuals and groups interact online. Putnam attributes the lack of faceto-face interaction as a possible inhibitor for the creation of social capital. However, the
fragmentation of contemporary society has witnessed millions of people migrating for
work, family or leisure and the internet permits the maintenance of social connections
across space and time. It also permits people to connect with other people with similar
interests across the globe. This can provide networks of social capital as individuals
exchange ideas and knowledge using the medium of the internet. However, as Putnam
argues, this could lead to balkanisation where groups become increasingly particular in
their outlook. Groups become so specialised they appeal to an ever decreasing
population and this prevents members creating bridging capital by connecting with
people from outside the social group. The individualisation of society is being replicated
as social groups fragment and focus on increasingly narrow horizons. The continued
fragmentation of social groups would therefore reinforce the necessity of charismatic
leaders to unite these disparate groups (Sennett 1976).

The fragmentation of political and social groups leads to a dislocation between personal
and national politics. The politics of identity that characterise the new social movements

85

reflect an increased individualisation of society. More significantly, many of these

movements do not align with national politics and therefore do not clearly correlate to
national politics. Global movements, such as environmentalism do not contribute an
attachment with the national imagined community. Likewise there has also been a growth
of regional movements that resolutely focus on local issues. The following chapter will
highlight the emergence of the Lega Nord as a political movement which advocates
cessation from the Italian state. Herein lies the problem of Putnams Italian research. By
analysing Italys regions, Putnam examined the success of regional government to explain
the success of national democracy. Regional and global movements do not facilitate a
sense of belonging with national politics and it is not clear, as Putnam asserts, that
participation in civic associations naturally leads to attachment with national politics.
Civic associations can only contribute to national democracy when they connect with the
wider narratives that constitute the imagined community. National movements, such as
national political parties, religions and trade unions all operate within the national
narrative. Transformations in the global political economy have permitted the
fragmentation of these movements, which has led to the creation of global and regional
movements. These are not necessarily weaker in creating social capital, but they do not
generate social capital towards a national purpose.

Despite the fragmentation of national social movements, civic associations can still
contribute to national politics. Through these networks individual actors can interact and
exchange information related to wider issues. As Andrews argues:

the associations can play an important role in facilitating public debate, as

intermediate channels of participation, and in helping to define boundaries
between private and public interests. They will become important in helping

86

renovate the institutions of the state by providing new channels of accountability

and participation (Andrews 2005: 176).

Although Andrews takes the same national outlook as Putnam, he highlights that
associations provide a public sphere where politics and other opinions can be
exchanged and cultivated (Habermas 1989). Despite the fragmentation and resultant
weakness of new forms of association, they can provide a space to contribute to political
debate.

Despite this new form of association, Italy still finds itself in the lowest tiers of civic
associationism in Europe. On a European level, participation in voluntary and civiv
associations is high within Scandinavia, followed by a second tier in cluding the
Netherlands, Germany and the UK (Delaney and Keaney 2005). The lowest tier of civic
associationism in Europe comprises Greece, Portugal, Poland and Italy. Delaney and
Keaney show that there are strong correlations between participation in civic
associations, and levels of trust within society (Delaney and Keaney 2005). Italy also sits
in the lowest tier of nations based on levels of individual trust. Although this does not
prove causality, this suggests that participation in civic community also helps to generate
trust (Putnam 2000). Although there are historic factors affecting the levels of trust in
Italy, the lack of participation in civic associations is a significant feature of Italian
politics.

For Putnam, political participation rests solely with individual actors within social
institutions. Despite his analysis of regional governments, he omits the role of the state in
facilitating economic conditions, national identity and continued political participation.
As argued above, the wider political economy, and sport in general, have developed in

87

parallel with the nation state. Yet they have changed with an increasingly global economy.
The ability of the state to impose the shared memories and invented traditions on its
citizens directly impinges upon the participation of shared national rituals. Van Deth
highlights that:

The higher the degree of state intervention, the higher the chances are that
citizens will be confronted with state activities, and the more likely it is that their
interests are affected by these activities (Van Deth 2008: 208).

This argument has been supported by historic evidence on civic participation in Britain.
Hilton et al argue that the welfare state strengthened participation in civic groups (Hilton,
McKay et al. 2010). These groups adapt and evolve alongside state institutions as
volunteer organisations adapt to the strengths and weaknesses of state provision.
Britains National Health Service provides a good example here. Alongside the state
provision of healthcare, groups of volunteers within League of Friends have formed in
conjunction with the NHS and provide equipment and services, alongside the state.
Therefore, civic associations and the state are not mutually exclusive, but co-dependent.

The rolling back of the state from the market has contributed to the decline in public
participation. The wide scale restructuring of the economy has led to a fragmentation of
working contracts which has promotes flexibility amongst the work force (Sennett 1998).
Flows of global capital are accumulating in global cities which necessitate the increased
movement of people (Castells 1989; Sassen 2001). The focus on work has also promoted
a head down mentality as workers try to focus on the immediate working tasks rather
than network with colleagues (Sennett 1998). Furthermore, suburbanisation and
extended commuting time is impinging on individuals ability to participate in public life

88

(Putnam 2000). This is compounded by widespread changes in technology. The internet

has become a powerful vehicle for new social movements as they seek to disseminate
information widely and quickly, but has also led to social and political groups
fragmenting. More significantly, television has been credited with the impact on political
participation (Habermas 1989; Putnam 2000). The print media fuelled debate within the
public sphere and helped establish national boundaries through the promotion of
national institutions (Habermas 1989; Anderson 2006). In contrast, television promotes a
superficial contribution participation in the medium (Robinson 1976; Habermas 1989;
Putnam 2000). Physically, television viewing is removed to the private space of the home
and is rarely done in public. This has been amplified since deregulation of the television
industry during the 1980s. More significantly, television permitted the direct
communication of politicians with the voting public and shifted the presentation of
politics towards television (Robinson 1976; Habermas 1989). Consequently, state deregulation has impacted civic participation through transformations in the economy, as
well as impacting the presentation of politics to the public.

As the restructuring of the economy has impacted the ability of some sections of society
to participate has been affected. As with transformations of the global political economy,
economic capital is accumulated by those with the resources to accumulate it. A similar
situation occurs with social capital, as Skidmore et al states: those already well
connected tend to get better connected community participation tends to be
dominated by a small group of insiders who are disproportionately involved in a large
number of governance activities (Skidmore, Bound et al. 2006). Consequently, we are
not witnessing a decline in social capital, but a restructuring (Warde, Tampubolon et al.
2003). This is also facilitated by access to economic resources. So while institutions like
the National Trust may see an increase in participation, this may not be replicated in

89

areas with fewer economic resources. Consequently, the Bourdieu concept of social
capital is useful to understand the link with economic capital. So social capital should be
seen as a resource which is linked to other forms of capital (Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu
1986), as well as a general principle denoting participation in public life (Putnam,
Leonardi et al. 1993; Putnam 2000). This thesis will concentrate on Putnams wider
argument, although Bourdieus theory should also be considered.

Sport becomes an apposite vehicle to analyse the transformations in the global political
economy and their effect on local society. During the 1990s, British Football scholarship
shifted its focus from analysis of football hooliganism to analysing changes resulting
from de-regulation of the global political economy. Elsewhere, contemporary research
has embraced social capital as a concept to explain the decline in participation in public
life. There is a growing body of work which is analysing the role of sport and social
capital (Warde, Tampubolon et al. 2003; Bailey 2005; Coalter 2007; Palmer and
Thompson 2007). Through his analysis of Scottish sport, Jarvie highlights the
importance of sport in educating and promoting communitarian ideals (Jarvie 2003).
Through sport there is the opportunity to promote communitarian philosophy based
upon mutuality and obligations rather than individualism and some ideological notion of
sport for all (Jarvie 2003: 152). However, he highlights that sport is just one aspect in
this process and should not have the sole responsibility. Likewise, Coalter questions the
ability of sport to regenerate community (Coalter 2007). In recent years, sport has been
seen as a cost-effective way to rejuvenate community and engage in local participation.
Furthermore, the studies which have been done investigate participation in the act of
sport itself, or through membership of an association where sport is performed. Few
studies have been performed into the associations of sport fans (Palmer and Thompson
2007). The participation of fans within a fans group does not necessarily correlate to the

90

participation in a sports team or association. Therefore, this thesis will build on the
earlier research into globalisation and incorporate contemporary debates on social capital
by incorporating Italian supporters clubs into the research. Through grounded research
undertaken in Livorno, it will highlight how Italy has adapted to transformations in the
global political economy and address whether civic associations are a solution to the
decline of Italian football.

Summary

Transformations in the global political economy since the 1970s have profoundly
affected local communities. Many scholars assert that this period has also coincided with
a decline in the participation in public life. The restructuring of the global political
economy has resulted in social capital being lost at a local level. Political participation has
fallen, as has membership in some civic associations. In Italy, this period has also
witnessed a decline in Italian football attendances and the sport has become blighted by
scandal and crisis. Yet civil society continues in spite of the impact of globalisation on
the state. Fan groups continue to exist, even though attendances are in decline. The
social capital which makes communities strong at the local level also operates within elite
institutions. The capricious processes of globalisation have resulted in the intesnification
of connections between individuals and institutions. This has facilitated the accumulation
of power and resources at those nodes which have the resources to accumulate them.
The restructuring of the economy has also witnessed the restructuring of social networks
and these aspects will be explored in subsequent chapters. The following chapter will
outline the history of the Italian nation and its political economy to illustrate the
development of social and political identity. As the political economy of Italy has

91

changed, so has the articulation of its social networks. This pattern is replicated in
relation to Italian football which will be explored in chapter 4.

92

SECTION 2

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

OF ITALY

93

Chapter 3

Modernity and Deregulation in Italy

If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change. - Prince Tancredi
Falconieri11

We have made Italy, now we must make Italians - Massimo D'Azeglio

Standing in the bedroom of his sumptuous Sicilian villa, Prince Fabrizio faced the mirror
whilst shaving. In the reflection he saw his nephew, Prince Tancredi enter the room.
Tancredi has come to tell his uncle that he will be leaving and heading into the
mountains to fight for Garibaldi. Garibaldis red shirts have landed on the Sicilian coast
and are fighting to unite the island with the new Italian nation. Sicilian aristocracy, like
Prince Fabrizio, were being confronted with exclusion or death. Initially there was
familial concern for his nephews well-being in the campaign. Tancredi allayed these fears
and explained that the northern politicians will impose a republic unless the aristocracy
take control of the situation: If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to
change. Tomasi di Lampedusas novel entitled Il Gattopardo (The Leopard) illustrated
the turmoil of the Risorgimento during the mid-nineteenth century. Unification required
participants to change their way of life or face extinction. Those that changed were
incorporated into the new state, a phenomenon which introduced the term gattopardismo

11

Tomasi di Lampedusa, G. (1991). The Leopard. New York, Pantheon Books.

94

into the Italian language, to illustrate the way that people and traditions remain
continuous despite tumultuous change.

In 2011 Italy will celebrate the one-hundred and fiftieth anniversary of its inception. Italy
is a relatively young nation and through its short life it has encountered several diverse
forms of government, from a monarchy through Fascism to a Republic. The incomplete
nature of the Italian state has created intense cleavages and a profound crisis of
legitimacy which undermines central authority. Its youth and crisis of legitimacy has
permitted the continuance of several pre-unification traditions and identities which
reinforce the weakness of the state. Central amongst these, is the reliance upon the
family. The weakness of the state and the continuance of traditional practises results in
the family becoming the central unit of support. Family connections supersede those of
the state and permit the persistence of patrimonial networks of support (Banfield 1958;
Ginsborg 1990; Cento Bull and Corner 1993; Sapelli 1995; Ginsborg 2003). This has
resulted in a vacuum within public politics as the family provides the focus. This vacuum
has facilitated the growth of charismatic leaders who exploit their patrimonial networks
to provide a focus for political and national identity.

To present a background to the thesis, this chapter will outline the one-hundred and fifty
years of Italian history. In doing so it builds on the historical and theoretical framework
described in the previous chapter. Through this historical outline, several recurring
themes emerge. There is a strong regionalist identity throughout Italian history which
contributes to a crisis of legitimacy of the central state. Local familial and patrimonial
networks become strengthened as the weakness of the central state fails to institute a
legitimate alternative. In order to overcome the resultant factionalism, charismatic leaders
emerge to temporarily unite the peninsular. However, these charismatic leaders operate

95

within their own patrimonial networks which further de-legitimise the central state and
perpetuate the crisis. The first section will detail the importance of understanding the
role of the nation in the development of sport, before addressing the formation of nation
states. As nations grew and developed, changes to the political economy profoundly
changed traditional society through widespread industrialisation and urbanisation. As the
global and national political economies transformed, groups within society adapted to the
changes in different ways. In order to understand Italian football, particular focus will be
placed on Italys post-war development to account for the transition from a protectionist
national economy into a deregulated global economy. The collapse of the Fordist massmanufacturing system facilitated the emergence of a new form of economy. It also
resulted in the continuance of existing patrimonial practises as gattopardismo remained.
Patrimonial networks and de-regulation has permitted the close networks between
football, business and politics to be intensified. This has occurred spectacularly with
Silvio Berlusconi who combines being the leader of a political party and prime minister
with ownership of a number of businesses, and one of Italys top football clubs, AC
Milan.

Italian Modernity

In order to understand Italian football we must situate it within Italian society. Italy is
essentially a modern construct which refers to the geographic peninsular south of the
Alps. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the Italian peninsular was an historical oddity; it
was still an assortment of regions with disparate forms of government. However, the
increased influence of the nationalist model spreading across Northern Europe saw
nationalistic sentiment grow across the peninsular, particularly in the north. Austrian
political influence in the north resulted in strong anti-Austrian sentiments and fuelled

96

calls for a unified independent nation state. The charismatic leader Giuseppe Garibaldi
became a focus for the political project of unification, the Risorgimento (Resurgence).
Supported by thinkers and politicians from Piedmont, such as Count Cavour and
Giuseppe Mazzini, unification effectively became a Piedmontization of Italy (Arvidsson
2003: 14). Through political machinations and conquest, the peninsular was declared a
united kingdom in 1861. The new state has become the apposite example of an imagined
community (Dickie 1996; Anderson 2006). Successive governments have struggled to
impose the unifying myths, memories and symbols and invented traditions on the
nation state (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Smith 1987). Traditional practises continued
after unification and this created a number of religious, political and geographical
cleavages. Traditional identities conflicted with emerging national identities with neither
becoming dominant. As a result the state struggled to impose itself over its subjects and
faced a perpetual crisis of legitimacy.

The Catholic Church is central to the conflict between traditional practises and state
control; it destabilises the state from above and below. To unite the peninsular, and the
nation, the city of Rome had to be incorporated into the new kingdom. As a key symbol
to a glorious past, Rome had been declared the capital of the new state even though it
had not been physically incorporated into the nation. To unify the peninsular, Garibaldi
had to invade Rome, leading Pope Pius IX to declare himself a prisoner in his own
city. As a consequence, he refused to acknowledge the new state and forbade all
Catholics, both at home and abroad, from participating in Italian politics and affectively
destabilising the state at its inception (Wood and Farrell 2001: 133). Through the Church,
local identity remains as Catholic rituals revolving around town and villages patron saints
reinforce individuals strong attachments to ones home-town or village. Localised
festivals worshipping the towns patron saint combine with annual festivals in the

97

religious calendar, such as Easter and Christmas, to fuel local sentiments. The love of
ones home town is manifested in the term campanilismo (Richards 1995: 81). Literally this
means the love of ones bell-tower. As the most dominant urban symbol, the bell-tower
could be seen and heard from all areas of the town or locality and came to symbolise the
town and ones attachment to it. Campanilismo is fuelled through local historic festivals.
Throughout Tuscany there are many folk games that reaffirm a localised, pre-unification
activity, such as the palio at Siena, the palio marinario in Livorno and the game of the
bridge in Pisa. The paradox of conflicting symbols emerges through the folk game of
calcio fiorentino that originated in Florence. Mussolini emphasised the links between the
Florentine game and the new game of football (Martin 2004; Foot 2007). In doing so he
reinforced the Italian origins of the game whilst simultaneously reaffirming a localised,
pre-unification activity.

The Churchs focus on the role of the family provides an alternative challenge to the
state. The Church stresses that the family is the only social unit and this creates a strong
kinship society (Lane 2004: 62). As the family constituted the first and primary point of
reference for individuals, this colours their interactions with others. During fieldwork in
the 1950s, Banfield highlighted the lack of civic association within a rural community in
the South of Italy (Banfield 1958). This focus on the family led to amoral familism
which restricted the individual to assisting their immediate family rather than aspiring to
a higher, civic ideal. Helping others will not only cause the individual a material or
temporal loss, but potentially makes rivals stronger than the immediate family. Those
that are seen as helping others are seen as frauds or hypocrites (such as the Church or
Communists) or doing it because it is their job (like council officials). These officials are
seen as corrupt, whether they are or not; they will perform to the same cultural amoral
familism and favour their own family. With a weak state without the legitimacy to

98

overcome these challenges, amoral familism remains within bureaucratic systems and
everyday life. The generation of bridging social capital is inhibited and this vicious cycle
leads to further entrenchment in the family as state support and control are not utilised
to overcome the problems instigated by amoral familism.

Regional and family identification became a feature of the Italian media. The late political
development of Italy prevented the formation of a national print capitalism which could
unite the imagined community (Anderson 2006). Early industrialisation in Italy took
place in the north and around certain ports. The lack of national industrialisation
prevented the formation of a national consumer market which prevented manufacturers
from advertising nationally and providing additional economic stimulus to the newspaper
industry (Nowell-Smith 1990: 54). This led to a lack of independent newspapers who
derived their revenue from publishing and advertising. As a consequence, Italian
newspapers are:

owned by companies which exist for, and earn most of their revenue from,
other activities, and for whom the newspaper is merely a tool for promoting
those activities. (Wagstaff 2001: 297)

Although some independent publishers have emerged, such as Rizzoli (who owns the
Corriere della Sera) and De Benedetti (who owns La Repubblica) (Hanretty 2010), many
Italian newspapers have been incorporated into the wider business conglomerates of
leading families.

Political identities were forming before unification in the same way as regional and
religious identities. The Socialist party and the trade unions represented workers before

99

universal suffrage was extended to all males after the First World War (Sapelli 1995).
Thus there was a serious disjuncture between the social citizenship of most Italians and
their political relationship. This political membership was further divided by religious
membership which precluded political involvement. Political and religious discord
divided the urban and rural bourgeoisie and prevented the formation of a middle-class
party, such as the British-style Conservatives (Sapelli 1995). This inhibited the formation
of mass-political parties and created a fragmented political system. This contributed to a
feature of Italian politics after unification called trasformismo (transformism) where
politicians would change political allegiances so as not to lose power or influence. Its
prevalence and success led to Antonio Gramsci developing his theory of hegemony as he
observed how the dominant power incorporated opponents into its sphere of influence
(Gramsci 2000).

The fragmented political system necessitated a charismatic leader who could extend their
patronage to unite the factions (Sennett 1976). Through patronage, successful leaders
could utilise trasformismo to alienate the extremes of the political spectrum and create a
relatively stable centrist government. Giovanni Giolitti utilised this system with some
success and acted as Italian Prime Minister five times between 1903 and 1921. However,
the First World War led to the collapse of the liberal post-unification political system and
the emergence of another charismatic leader. Military failure in the war culminated in the
humiliating Battle of Caporetto in 1917. The post-war territorial settlement resulted in
Italy losing territory and gaining nothing of Germanys overseas colonies (which were
divided between Britain and France). Embarrassing military defeat in the First World
War and the weakness of the coalition governments nesceitated a charismatic leader to
unite the disparate sections of society. This context permitted Benito Mussolini and his
Fascist Party to assume control in 1922 (Gundle 1998). Mussolini proceeded to impose a

100

centralised bureaucratic state and reinforced national identity through carefully invented
traditions. Mussolini invoked the image of Rome and the Renaissance to reassert Italian
national identity (Adamson 1992; Minor 1999). Football subsequently became central in
Mussolinis strategy as Italy hosted and won the second World Cup in 1934, before
successfully defending their title four years later in France (Martin 2004).

The fall of Fascism in 1943 and the post-war reconstruction of Italy retained many of the
features of pre-Fascism. Co-operation between the Catholics and the Communists during
the Resistance resulted in an agreement to support parliamentary democracy and the
birth of the first Italian republic (Sapelli 1995). Despite the co-operation, the Vatican
entered politics and actively supported the Democrazia Cristiana, the Christian Democrat
Party (DC), to prevent the Communists taking power. To assist, Pope Pius XII
excommunicated all members of the Partito Comunista Italiano, the Italian Communist
Party (PCI) (Sapelli 1995). The Churchs support for the DC reinforced key aspects of
Italian society. The DC fought to have the rights of the family guaranteed in the
Constitution. As Bernini states, this resulted:

In the Constitution, the rights of the family as an institution superseded the

rights of its individual members, and the protection of the family as a whole took
priority over the guarantee of the legal and moral equality of the spouses
(Bernini 2010: 74-5)

Consequently, the DC reaffirmed the role and influence of the Catholic Church in Italian
society. It also reinforced the centrality of the Italian family which precluded
identification with wider associations or the state. Vatican support also operated to
alienate the PCI and maintain a Catholic hegemony.

101

The emergence of two mass parties did not prevent political fragmentation. Proportional
representation permitted many localised, independent parties whereas factionalism
remained within the DC and PCI. In order to maintain parliamentary democracy and
prevent the PCI from obtaining power, the DC utilised its patrimonial influence to
maintain its hegemony. The negotiation practised through clientelistic relationships and
trasformismo continued. In order to control the factions and independent parties, the mass
parties retained localised patrimonial networks and used these to distribute resources
quickly and readily to supporters (Sapelli 1995). As a result Italy continued, as in other
southern European countries, to be governed more by the division of the spoils by the
parties than by legal and bureaucratic rationality (Sapelli 1995: 115). Through effective
control of government and distribution of the resources the DC exercised control to
prevent the Communists forming a government. As a result, Italy became a one party
state, or partitocrazia (partyocracy) (Della Porta 1995: 97; Ginsborg 1996: 23). The
partitocrazia and factionalism reinforced the need for charismatic leaders to control the
patrimony. Alcide De Gasperi was the founder of the DC and led the party for eight
successive years from 1945. De Gasperi was instrumental in negotiating the terms of the
Marshall Plan to provide American aid for European reconstruction. American support
through the Marshall Plan provided the political capital for De Gasperi to reinforce
public opinion against the Communists as the PCI became the largest Communist party
outside Eastern Europe. American aid also provided economic capital to lubricate the
system of patrimony and financially reward DC supporters, thus further alienating the
PCI.

The patrimonial system under the partitocrazia was assisted by state control of the
economy. As a result Keynesianism in Italy was distorted to facilitate clientelism (Della

102

Porta 1995: 50; Farrell 1995). Consequentially, Italy has retained a large nationalised
industrial sector into the twenty-first century. Mussolini set up the Instituto per la
Ricostruzione Industriale (ISI) to retain certain industries within national control. The ISIs
involvement in Italian industry was so great, that by 1962 it was the second largest
industrial group in Europe; only the Royal Dutch Shell group was larger (Sassoon 1986:
37). ISI was augmented in 1953 with the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), the state oil and
gas company, which (literally) provided the energy to support Italys post-war recovery
(Sassoon 1986). A further agency of the state was instigated to overcome the southern
question. The Cassa per il Mezzogiorno was set-up in 1950 to provide state support for
development in the South of Italy, as the fragmented political system had contributed to
a piecemeal industrialisation which had left the south significantly under-developed. The
Cassa, ISI, ENI and similar government bodies became vehicles for clientelism as public
money was used to facilitate existing patrimonial networks. Patronage was embedded in
the system to such an extent that a process called the Cencelli Manual was implemented
in 1968 to allocate positions (Foot 2003). Massimiliano Cencelli, a DC under-secretary,
devised a mathematic formula to calculate the number of factions and ministers and
allocate positions according to supporters. An apposite example of patronage occurred
within the state-controlled television station, RAI. By the 1960s, state-control, and
therefore control by the DC, was contested by the other political parties. A form of
political de-regulation occurred with the lottizzazione (Ginsborg 1996; Hanretty 2010).
The two television stations were divided between the DC and the Italian Socialists (PSI).
A third channel, RAI Tre (RAI Three), was added in 1979 to provide a station for the
PCI.

The dominance of a single political party in the partitocrazia politicised much of society.
As the DC maintained control, public appointments from teachers to council workers

103

became acts of political patronage. This led to the formation of a state bourgeoisie, a
compliant network of public officials who relied on the patronage of the DC (Scalfari
and Turani 1974). As opposed to the independent, rational and efficient Weberian
bureaucracy, the Italian system stagnated; it necessitated the need to utilise personal
contacts and family to circumvent the system. The clientelistic relationships in Italian
society encouraged: people to become negotiators. Because everything is fluid,
everything may also be considered negotiable (LaPalombara 1987: 59). As Riesman
argued in relation to American society, Italy also developed other-directed individuals
who utilised their social networks and through negotiations, developed ways to improve
their position (Riesman 1961). Consequently, social capital became a vehicle for
patrimony. Gundle argues that: the speed and efficacy of a bureaucratic act depended to
a great extent upon the pressures that a citizen could exert upon the administrator
(Gundle and Parker 1996: 23). This resulted in a variety of practises being used, ranging
from a network of contacts to systemised corruption (Ginsborg 1990: 149; Della Porta
1996: 103-4; Ginsborg 1996: 23).

State support and Fordist manufacturing facilitated the Economic Miracle which
originated around Milan and the north (Foot 2001). During the 1950s large scale mass
production provided the catalyst for this miracle. The concentration in the north
intensified the contrast between north and south. This was exacerbated by extensive
internal migration as young workers from the impoverished south migrated to work in
the northern factories. Alongside the demographic transformation within Italy,
consumption dramatically changed. Increased prosperity led to demand for (Italian
made) consumer items such as televisions, white goods, scooters and cars (Foot 2003:
138). Large-scale manufacturing was central and this was dominated by the car industry.
This led to the dominance of ancillary companies, such as road building, rubber, oil and

104

steel manufacturing. Fiat controlled ninety percent of the national market and its
dominance turned many small and medium sized enterprises into dependent companies
(Sassoon 1986: 40). The dominance of certain industrial families saw Italian industry
become an extension of the political patrimonial system.

Economic Crisis and Deregulation

The industrial success that fuelled the growth in consumption and football started to
collapse in the 1960s. Economic recession, state inefficiency and dramatic cultural
changes caused by the Miracle culminated in the hot autumn of 1969. The increase in
trade union power led to wide-scale strikes across the country. Italys economic problems
were exacerbated during the decade as their inflation and balance of deficits grew. Low
wages saw Italy increasingly at the bottom of the division of labour, as high technology
remained in the US, Germany and Japan. Further changes in international trade left Italy
open to increased foreign competition and its low technology base meant that it could
not compete (Sassoon 1986: 63). These transformations were heightened with the
devaluation of the dollar and the oil crisis. Large mass-manufacturing companies had to
restructure themselves to compete. Fiat, which epitomised the large Fordist massmanufacturing of the Miracle, was forced to restructure with redundancies and
outsourcing (Foot 2003: 141). Under these economic pressures, Italian society began to
politicise around earlier historical traditions.

The political turmoil during the 1970s saw the emergence of political terrorism, termed
the anni di piombo (years of lead) (Wagstaff 2001: 55; Foot 2003: 38; Bartali 2006; Cooke
2006; Ignazi 2006). The period saw the emergence of a number of invented traditions

105

that harked back to the Resistance (Ginsborg 1990: 361; Wood and Farrell 2001: 137;
Cooke 2006). With memories of the war and Fascism fading, the 1970s saw the reemergence of the extreme right within Italy. Groups such as the Ordine Nero and
Squadre di Azione Mussolini created a line back to Mussolinis black-shirted Fascist
squadristi (Ignazi 2006: 17). Bombings at Piazza Fontana in Milan in 1969 and at Bologna
Railway Station in 1974, were neo-Fascist attempts to create a strategy of tension
(Ginsborg 1990: 333, 371). In the same way that the squadristi caused chaos in the 1920s,
the neo-Fascists hoped that creating disorder in the 1970s would allow a strong,
Mussolini-like figure, to emerge from the chaos to unite the nation and restore order
(Wood and Farrell 2001: 138). More insidious was that this strategy of tension was
initially blamed on left-wing anarchists by the government and police. However,
investigative journalists uncovered details which highlighted that neo-Fascists were to
blame and that they were in contact with Guido Giannettini, the head of the Italian
secret service (Ginsborg 1990). State complicity in terrorism left a scar in the national
memory, that has not been successfully reconciled (Cento Bull 2010).

Parallel to the growth of right wing political identity in Italy, was a similar left wing
identity. The 1970s saw an increase in popularity of partisan songs from the Second
World War. Political groups used names that were deliberately evocative of the
Resistance movement such as Stella Rossa (Red Star), Volante Rossa (Flying Star), and
most importantly, the Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades) (Cooke 2006: 172). The Brigate Rosse
became infamous for their kidnapping and assassination of the DC president, Aldo Moro
in 1978 (Dombroski 2001: 128; Bartali 2006). Moro was a key proponent of the historic
compromise between the DC and PCI that maintained the PCIs commitment to civic
participation through parliamentary democracy rather than revolution. The intense
politicisation within Italian daily life impacted football as the politics of the piazza were

106

transferred to the stadium. This led to a politicisation of fan groups, and will be discussed
in more detail in subsequent chapters.

Local political agitation resulted in the Italian regions winning significant autonomy in
the 1970s. Fifteen regional governments were instigated to provide increased regional
representation. After an intense political struggle, these regions were provided with
increased autonomy in 1976 (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993). Increased autonomy and
politicisation resulted in a wave of invented traditions as regions sought to impose their
identity. Monuments were built to commemorate local figures and events, whilst street
names were renamed in honour of local and political luminaries. Many traced an
historical lineage back to the Resistance. For example, a monument was erected in
Bologna after two demonstrators were killed when a carabinieri car mounted a pavement.
Their epitaph was inscribed as: Fallen partisans of the new resistance and now and
always Resistance (Cooke 2006: 172). The contradictions between national and regional
identification continues in 2010, with the cities of Florence and Rome contesting the
national ownership of icons, such as the statue of David and the Colosseum (Kington
2010; Kington 2010)

These social and economic problems saw the development of a distinctly Italian brand of
post-Fordist manufacturing. The combination of regional autonomy and family
businesses created the appropriate environment to successfully adapt to the emerging
global marketplace. A new geographical distinction emerged in Italy between the
industrial Northern region and the impoverished South. The central regions of Tuscany,
Umbria, Emilia-Romagna and Le Marche became known as the Third Italy (Bagnasco
1977). In particular, the Emilia-Romagna region gave its name to a new type of
manufacturing system called the Emilian Model (Brusco 1982; Piore and Sabel 1984).

107

Excessive unionisation in larger firms saw increased subcontracting of production which

was driven by an increasingly flexible consumer market (Brusco 1982). This necessitated
a new form of dynamic small business that could respond quickly. The family orientation
also provided the economic capital as support and security during the early years of the
company. In addition tax exceptions for small businesses with fewer than fifteen
employees facilitated their survival (Piore and Sabel 1984). The newly autonomous
regional authorities assisted with support for new industrial zones that permitted the
formation of extensive co-operative networks that reinforced the social capital of the
families (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993). More significantly, globalisation permitted these
organisations to capitalise upon historical trade networks direct to foreign markets. As a
consequence, Italian family businesses, such as Benetton, Armani and Gucci became
iconic global names.

Transformations in the global and Italian political economy necessitated a new type of
charismatic leader. The economic shift from mass-manufacturing to flexible
specialisation was not restricted to manufacturing. Post-Fordist services, like advertising
and finance, emerged to augment the changing economy. The combination of this
growth resulted in Italy overtaking Britain in 1987 to become the fifth largest economy,
according to OECD figures (Goldblatt 2007: 578). Increasing affluence introduced a new
middle-class of consumers. As Sapelli notes:

The roots of this [new charismatic leader] can be found in the fact that, in the
1980s, the electoral growth of all the parties was due to the leaders ability to
attract the new middle classes, only too happy to receive the resources dispensed
by the party system of government that controlled the state (Sapelli 1995: 116)

108

For the political parties to continue to function as before, they had to extend the
patrimonial system to the new middle classes. However, post-Fordist consumerism
constituted an ideological issue for the mass-parties of Catholicism and Communism.
State-control and regulation could uphold traditional virtues without succumbing to the
unconstrained vices of consumption. Italys third party, the PSI, was less ideologically
restricted and openly appealed to the emergent middle-classes (Arvidsson 2003). Bettino
Craxi was leader of the Socialist party who capitalised on divisions in the DC to negotiate
his way to becoming Prime Minster. Although he represented an ideological break from
the two mass-parties, he still operated within the political patrimonial system. Craxi was a
new charismatic leader for the consumer age and attracted new middle-class voters
through deregulation. Under Craxi, A whole army of careerists, social climbers and
yuppies entered the PSI, and used it as an instrument of political and economic
promotion (Padellaro and Tamburrano 1993: 35). Unencumbered by ideological issues,
as the DC and PCI were, Craxi simplified politics and made it more media-friendly
(Ginsborg 2003). He embraced the post-Fordist, de-regulated changes taking place in
other Western democracies and this facilitated the growth of the Third Italy and the
resultant economic boom.

Craxis reforms were driven by political expediency rather than ideology. A key element
of the New Right of Thatcherism in the UK was the notion of a free economy/strong
state (Gamble 1994). The State has to be strong enough to disentangle state involvement
in the market, whilst at the same time remaining strong enough to police the new
economic order through effective regulation and contesting the vested interests of the
previous Keynesian regime. Thatcher undertook a series of contests with trade unions
and other vested interests to end protectionism in the state-controlled market (Gamble
1994). Rolling back the state in Britain paradoxically re-legitimised the state as it

109

successfully disentangled itself from the economy and reinforced the role of central
government. The factional nature of Italian politics meant that government measures
always risked defeat in parliament. Consequently, vested interests and state involvement
in industry were not disentangled by Craxi. Likewise, the battle with the trade unions was
not undertaken in Italy as it was in the UK. Direct taxation on larger businesses was not
reduced, which was a key aspect of Thatcherite policy, and this facilitated the growth of
the smaller business within the Emilian model. Most significantly, there was no
systematic privatisation in Italy, as the ISI and ENI retained a number of nationalised
industries.

Craxis significant contribution to deregulation in Italy occurred in the world of television

through his friendship with a fellow Milanese called Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi
symbolised the new affluence in Italy and represented a significant shift from the
traditional industrial families like the Agnellis and Pirelli. Furthermore, Berlusconi
embodied the notion of the other-directed individual (Riesman 1961). He was acutely
aware of his public image, and developed extensive social networks. Through his
friendship with Craxi, Berlusconi represents a shift towards neo-patrimony; networks
based on personal connections (Eisenstadt 1973; Sapelli 1995). Craxi was godfather to
Berlusconi's daughter Barbara who was born out of wedlock to his mistress Veronica
Lario in 1984 (Ginsborg 2004: 34). Craxi subsequently acted as Berlusconi's best man at
his marriage to Lario six years later (Stille 1999). Berlusconi started his career as a singer
on a cruise ship before capitalising on his personal contacts by persuading the manager
of the bank, in which his father worked, to loan him the money to build an apartment
complex in 1961. Showing his entrepreneurial spirit, he sold these apartments through
adverts in the local newspaper (Ginsborg 2004: 17; Andrews 2005: 23). Three years later,
Berlusconi used a further guarantee from his fathers bank, and money from a Swiss

110

bank with unknown proprietors, to build another residential complex (Ginsborg 2004:
18). However, it was with his third venture that signalled the arrival of Silvio Berlusconi.

Berlusconis third construction project signalled the emergence of a postmodern,

individual consumer orientated business in Milan. Entitled Milano 2, it was built
throughout the 1970s and represented an early Italian example of bounded space, with
resident-only access and security guards (Foot 2003). Its location in the outskirts of
Milan, close to Linate airport, meant that Berlusconi had to sharpen his negotiation skills
and persuade various administrative bodies, such as the council, magistrates and unions,
to receive the approval for its construction (Andrews 2005: 23). He also persuaded the
airport authorities to change their flight paths so that they did not disturb residents
(Ginsborg 2004: 20). The complex was marketed to the new affluent, yet individual,
middle-class family and had to appeal to every generation of the family. Many green
spaces and sports facilities were preserved by underground parking and were combined
with schools, a church, shops and bars to provide an environment for the emerging
consumer-orientated residents of Milan. In addition, and most significant for
Berlusconis future, was that each apartment within the Milan 2 complex was provided
with pre-installed cable television. One of these channels was supplied by TeleMilano,
the cable company set-up by Berlusconi in 1974 to provide local news and entertainment
for the Milano 2 complex (Ginsborg 2004: 19). This independent postmodern approach
to residential complexes marked a profound departure from the Fordist residencies of
the past. For example, the Mirafiori Sud apartment blocks next to the Fiat plant in Turin,
had communal heating systems rather than individual control (Foot 2003: 141).

De-regulation of RAI, the state-broadcaster, presented Berlusconi with an opportunity to

expand his media enterprise. In 1975 attempts were made by a parliamentary commission

111

to make local television and radio more regional in outlook. A year later the
Constitutional Court decided that the state broadcaster, RAI, should no longer hold a
monopoly of radio and television within the regions (Schlesinger 1990: 272). This led to
the development of a number of local networks and presented Berlusconi with an
opportunity to grow TeleMilano. Berlusconi acquired many regional stations and
changed the name of his media company to Mediaset. Through Mediaset, Berlusconi
actively challenged the regulators and RAI. He circumvented regulations by prerecording entire schedules and sending them to each regional station for concurrent
transmission (Lane 2004: 54). This gave, in Berlusconis own words, the illusion of a
network (Schlesinger 1990: 273). With these transmissions he deliberately targeted the
weak spots in RAIs scheduling, using American imports such as Dallas, to increase
audience share (Schlesinger 1990: 274). Dallas was the focus of another battle with the
regulators, who wanted to control commercial programmes, and banned Berlusconi from
showing consecutive episodes of Dallas and Dynasty. To circumvent this, he showed them
concurrently on different channels (Andrews 2005). Eventually these clashes culminated
in 1984 when three magistrates from Rome, Pescara and Turin decreed that these
regional television networks were for regional, not national broadcasting and ordered for
his channels to be suspended. This coincided with broadcasts of some of Mediaset's
most popular programmes, Dallas, Dynasty, the Smurfs and High Noon (Schlesinger 1990:
277-8; Ginsborg 2004: 34-5). Unsurprisingly, Berlusconi won much public sympathy and
the matter had to be resolved by a special decree from his friend, the Prime Minister
Bettino Craxi.

Berlusconis friendship with Craxi facilitated his contest with the regulators. As Prime
Minister, Craxi could pass an emergency decree to temporarily permit the national
broadcasts of Mediaset. However, Craxis 1984 decree was declared unconstitutional so

112

Craxi leveraged all of his political support to pass a new law effectively deregulating
Italian television. The Mammi Law was named after its author Oscar Mammi, and
eventually passed through parliament six years later (Lane 2004: 58). The Mammi Law
ended the unregulated free-for-all that existed since the emergency decree. Yet rather
than create a regulatory framework to ensure pluralism, the law confirmed the duopoly
between RAI, the state broadcaster, and Berlusconis Mediaset. Although the law was
drafted to look like Berlusconi had made sacrifices, it still looked bespoked to the media
magnate. It maintained that no-one could own more than three stations, yet also stated
that the owner of the commercial television stations could not also own stakes in satellite
stations or newspapers. Berlusconi sold the daily newspaper Il Giornale to his brother,
Paolo, and his stake in a pay-TV satellite channel to a group of investors to whom he lent
the money (Stille 1999; Lane 2004: 64). The friendship between Berlusconi and Craxi
facilitated new forms of patrimony based on personal contacts.
Neo-Patrimonialism: Development and Change of Italys Patrimonial System

This new patrimony of Craxi and Berlusconi operated on a personal quid pro quo basis.
These neo-patrimonial networks (Eisenstadt 1973; Sapelli 1995) relied on personal
contacts, rather than a simple distribution of the resources; political support was granted
in return for favours. After the Mammi Law was passed, allegations surfaced that
consultative fees were paid to the government office by Fininvest, Berlusconis umbrella
company (Stille 1999). This was amplified when one of the key authors of the Mammi
Law was employed by Fininvest shortly after leaving the ministry (Lane 2004: 59).
Similarly, Berlusconi had offered Craxi political support during the politically delicate
takeover of the publisher Mondadori. Berlusconi already had a stake in Mondadori and
had bought the ailing television station Rete-4 from them in 1984 (the same year as

113

Craxis emergency decree). In 1989 Mondadori merged with the LEspresso group which
publishes the left-leaning newspaper La Repubblica and the weekly magazine, LEspresso.
The group was owned by the anti-governmental chairman of Olivetti, Carlo De
Benedetti. Berlusconi entered the takeover to ensure that he gained control of
Mondadori, while De Benedetti was left with the LEspresso group. Although Berlusconi
won access to another media outlet, by taking on the powerful anti-governmental
LEspresso group he also provided political support to Craxi (Gundle and O'Sullivan
1995).

Italys neo-patrimonial system was spectacularly exposed in the Tangentopoli scandal of

1992. Tangentopoli (Bribesville) originated in Milan, the same city as the Economic
Miracle of the 1950s and the fashion and finance boom of the 1980s (Foot 2001; Foot
2003; Ginsborg 2003). Milan is also based in the region of Lombardy which Putnam
classed as civic and more likely to be economically successful (Putnam, Leonardi et al.
1993). However, its civic nature did not prevent widespread political scandal. The
scandal began on 17 February 1992 when the PSI politician Mario Chiesa was arrested
for accepting a bribe. Chiesa was also the president of an old-peoples home and
frequently received tangente (bribes) in return for providing cleaning contracts (Ginsborg
2003). Chiesa was ostracised as a rogue by Craxi and the PSI, and this led to Chiesa
recounting the widespread systemised corruption taking place in Italy (Ginsborg 2003).
Pandoras Box had been opened and revelations of bribes between businessmen and
politicians proliferated. The magistrates intensified investigations and arrests, which
magnified media interest. The investigations became known as mani pulite (clean hands)
and profoundly affected the Italian political system.

114

The 1992 general election marked the beginning of the end of Italys First Republic.
Craxi and the PSI were heavily implicated in the scandal. Craxi initially dismissed Chiesa
as a rogue before acknowledging that the system was widespread, and performed by all
politicians, when he stated that: We are all guilty. We all knew. (Goffredo 1993;
Gundle 1996: 88). Craxi went into exile in Tunisia. The loss of their charismatic leader
resulted in the PSI disintegrating. The DC were also heavily implicated in tangentopoli and
polled their lowest ever share of the vote (Ginsborg 2003). Parallel to mani pulite there
was an ongoing Mafia trial in 1993 concerning the DC leader Giulio Andreotti, who had
acted as Prime Minister on three separate occasions. He was heavily implicated in his
connections to the Mafia, through whom the DC could garner more votes, and maintain
the balance of power within Parliament. After being tried for collusion with the Mafia,
judges declared that He fully understood that his Sicilian associates had amicable
relations with Mafia bosses, and he cultivated, therefore, amicable relations with the same
bosses ... he asked them favours and he met them. (Popham 2003). However, no proof
of collusion could be proved after 1980 as the law decreeing that association with the
Mafia only came into force in 1982 (Andrews 2005: 9). The PCI was least tainted by
scandal but could not capitalise upon the weakness of the other two parties. The crisis of
Eurocommunism and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 substantially weakened the PCI.
The symbolic discrediting of Communism led to a period of introspection for the party.
By 1991 the party had split into the centre-left Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS) and
the Rifondazione Conmunista. The weakness of the PCI also substantially weakened the DC
who had established themselves as a bulwark against Communism. With the continued
scandal and the defeat of Communism, the DC was further discredited and its factions
split into various minor parties.

115

The Impact of Deregulation

Before detailing the outcome of tangentopoli and mani pulite it is necessary to make a brief
excurses to illustrate the affect deregulation had on Italian society. These changes
facilitated the political transformations that took place after 1994 when Silvio Berlusconi
dramatically entered politics. Deregulation transformed the operation and consumption
within the Italian economy. This permitted the emergence of a new business elite who
operated new forms of business. However, they continued to operate within the
patrimonial system as personal relationships blurred the boundaries between politics and
business. Football operated within this patrimonial system as it became incorporated
within the wider business groups of the new business elite. Silvio Berlusconi, for
example, purchased and transformed AC Milan. The impact of deregulation on football
will be considered in the following chapter on the development of Italian football.
However, it is also important to consider football within the wider political
transformations that took place in Italy during the 1990s. In particular, football facilitated
Silvio Berlusconis move into politics. Therefore aspects of Berlusconis utilisation of
football will be covered within this section as it is instrumental in understanding the
move. This section will detail the impact of deregulation on television and consumption
before assessing their influence on Berlusconis dramatic emergence in Italian politics.

A central feature of Italian deregulation under Bettino Craxi was the support provided to
Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi fundamentally changed the role and approach towards
television within Italy. Under the state monopoly, RAI was regulated to provide a public
service, in the same way as the original BBC mission which was to inform, educate and
entertain. In contrast, Berlusconis strategy was simply to entertain. This led to a
dramatic shift towards neo-television (Eco 1990). There was no ideology underpinning

116

Berlusconis neo-television provided they generated audience figures (Ginsborg 2004:

42). Indeed it was not until 1991 that they complied with the law and broadcast a news
programme, and the news was only broadcast across all three of Mediasets channels a
year later (Menduni 1996: 17). As mentioned in the previous section, Berlusconis
networks bought cheap American imports, like Dallas and a number of Hollywood films
(Ginsborg 2004: 40). These were supplemented by extravagant variety shows with
popular presenters, some of whom were symbolically signed from RAI (Schlesinger
1990: 275; Foot 2001: 102). Through these variety shows Berlusconi helped to reinforce
gender divisions. Female presenters are invariably decorative to the more commanding
presence of the central, male presenter (Ginsborg 2004: 43). In addition, Canale 5 was
constructed as a feminine friendly station to appeal to the new consumer orientated
housewives (Arvidsson 2003). Football also constituted a large aspect of Berlusconis
neo-television and will be covered in the following chapter.

Neo-television provided large audiences with which to advertise new consumer products
and identities. In 1979 Berlusconi created an advertising company, Publitalia, in order to
exploit the new commercial television which he was introducing. Through control of his
television stations and Publitalia, Berlusconi dramatically reduced the advertising costs
associated with advertising. In doing so, he opened up many new commercial avenues
for consumer-orientated companies. This increased exposure to consumer culture
coincided with the post-Fordist changes taking place under Craxis reforms. Through
Publitalia, the Italian population became acculturated into this new post-Fordist
consumer culture (Arvidsson 2003: 135). The new consumption taking place in 1980s,
Italy took on a political agenda. Driven by Craxi and supported by the DC, the boom
was fiercely contested by the PCI who saw excessive consumption as an erosion of
traditional class boundaries which would lead to the formation of a mass culture

117

(Arvidsson 2003: 139). Despite recognising this transition, the PCI didnt respond to
these changes in their traditional support and this contributed to their weakness after the
tangentopoli. With the mass political parties heavily ideologically based, in either
Catholicism or Communism, Fordist consumption could be heavily regulated. With the
removal of television and advertising regulations, ideological morality could be eroded
and a consumer culture created. In doing so it opened the wider population to other
aspects of Berlusconis empire and ambitions.

Deregulation of television facilitated the transformation of commercial neo-television

and transformed television into a spectacle presented to entertain. The collapse of the
political system after Tangentopoli presented an apposite opportunity of a new form of
media spectacle. Berlusconi was central to the polarisation of information and
entertainment throughout the scandal (Menduni 1996). As Robinson observed in relation
to the Watergate scandal and political news broadcasting in general, network television
has the power to make the issues of our times those issues which best accommodate the
medium (Robinson 1976). Mediaset began broadcasting the political events as they
unfolded and turned the scandal into public information and entertainment. It created a
soap opera; the scandal created characters and plots as the drama unfurled. This was in
sharp contrast to the state broadcaster, RAI, who did not take the same action. The
result was a polarised audience between Mediaset and RAI viewers. The spectacle of
Tangentopoli also created a strong feeling of anti-partyism (Lipow and Seyd 1996; Axford
and Huggins 1998) and resentment towards the traditional mass parties of the Christian
Democrats (DC), the Socialists (PSI) and the Communists (PCI). The feeling of antipartyism fuelled by Berlusconis media organisation, led to him entering the field of
politics in 1994.

118

Berlusconi utilised his full range business and media operations to assist his political
emergence. Berlusconi built a broad business portfolio that was incorporated into an
umbrella company called Fininvest. The company included Mediaset and Publitalia, in
addition to AC Milan, Mondadori publishing, cinemas, supermarkets and financial
services.12 Fininvest was founded in 1979 and entrusted to Berlusconis friend and
confident, Marcello DellUltri. DellUltri was subsequently convicted of collusion with
the Mafia and imprisoned for six years before having his conviction overturned in 2010
as the judges could find no evidence of collusion after 1992 (Ginsborg 2004; Lane 2004;
Hooper 2010). Berlusconi made full use of his executives to construct and present a new
political party called Forza Italia (FI). Publitalia chose the parliamentary candidates and
charged them 500,000 lire (approximately 240) per day for their media training (Farrell
1995). All policies were market tested on voters by the market researcher Diakron,
another Fininvest subsidiary (Farrell 1995). This market research permitted Berlusconi to
communicate directly with the voters without the ideology of the traditional mass-parties.
As Habermas argues, the breakdown of the electorate as a public enables the mass media
to advertise the leader and his/her party to the section of society least engaged with the
political process (Habermas 1989). Berlusconi treated the electorate as consumers and
successfully utilised his media empire to target the crucial voters.

Berlusconis media ownership facilitated direct communication. Neo-television had

blurred the boundaries between news and entertainment. Berlusconis political
emergence reinforced the blurred boundaries as the distinction between TV advertising,
party political broadcasts, current affairs programmes and even light entertainment was de
facto abolished (Farrell 1995: 47). This was demonstrated when Berlusconi announced
his entering the field through a television address broadcast live across all three of his
12

http://www.fininvest.com/_eng/index.shtml

119

networks. His direct televisual style utilised simple language and allowed him to develop
his populist, anti-party appeal. During the factional days of the partitocrazia, political
language, dubbed politichese, was opaque and cryptic as politicians tried to avoid revealing
too much (Croci 2001). With his media and football background, Berlusconi began
speaking in a clearer, more open style, gentese. This style facilitated the television
orientated approach of Berlusconi and helped present him to Mediaset viewers as a sharp
contrast to the traditional parties. For example, housewives, the target market of Canale
5, were more likely to vote for FI than for the traditional parties (Farrell 1995).

His media and football image combined to carefully symbolise his populist, man-of-thepeople image. His choice of entering the field is a direct reference to footballers
running onto the pitch. Yet, despite his anti-partyism, he still created a political party,
Forza Italia. This was another direct reference to football as it was taken from a chant
sung by Italian football fans at international matches. In addition, Berlusconi also
referred to his cabinet, as his team, and FIs political associations as Azzurri Supporters
Clubs (Porro and Russo 2000: 357). This made another explicit reference to the Italian
national team who are nicknamed the Azzurri after the colour of their shirts. Fininvest
also used the transformation of AC Milan as a paradigm for Forza Italia. Following his
success with AC Milan supporters clubs, the Azzurri Supporters Clubs were constituted
in the same way. He used targeted advertising to attract new members, and provided
incentives and discounts to join. Members were offered discount language courses,
vacations and financial services (Porro and Russo 2000: 357). The direct correlation
between football and politics was complete when he used the Milan supporters clubs to
directly recruit Forza Italia members. The 2500 supporters clubs of AC Milan recruited
nearly 200,000 FI members (Porro and Russo 2000: 357).

120

Distinctions between politics and football have blurred through Berlusconis media
engagements. During the 1994 election, Berlusconi was campaigning against the
economist Luigi Spaventa. Berlusconi quipped: This Spaventa, how many championship
cups has he won? (Porro and Russo 2000: 365). Berlusconi himself takes part in chat
shows in his guise as an owner of a football club (Foot 2007). This allows him to present
his populist image and make political points. Much media attention is also created when
Berlusconi visits the changing room of AC Milan to chat to the star players, or when
visiting other squads. During the 2008 electoral campaign, Berlusconi visited the
Juventus squad to encourage them to beat Fiorentina, so that AC Milan could qualify for
the Champions League (Lewis 2008: 99). This trend is not restricted to television, or the
media controlled by Berlusconi. The boundaries are also blurred in the print media as the
Corriere dello Sport ran a headline confidence vote while score 2-0 which referred to
Berlusconi facing a confidence vote in Parliament at the same time as Milan were playing
Barcelona in the Champions League final; a match they subsequently won 4-0 (Porro and
Russo 2000). Elsewhere, Berlusconi has further blurred the boundaries between football
and politics. Despite his position as prime minister and upholder of law and order,
Berlusconi frequently attacks magistrates for being Communist (Lane 2004). In a similar
fashion, Berlusconi also criticised a referee after Milan lost to the newly promoted
Cesena in September 2010, because the problem is that often Milan get left wing
referees (La Gazzetta dello Sport 2010). Political comments are bound into the wider
social narratives.

The fractious nature of Italian politics means that even Berlusconi cannot win enough
votes to maintain power without support. Since Forza Italias inception Berlusconi has
maintained a delicate balance of power with two right wing parties which hold very
different ideologies: Allianza Nazionale and Lega Nord (The Northern League). Both

121

parties make strange bedfellows, yet they both owe their proximity to power to the
profound global transformations which took place at the end of the twentieth century.
Both the Lega Nord and Allianza Nazionale appeal to popular, anti-party concerns and
typify the postmodern shift from mass parties. They also represent another major
paradox of Italian politics. Despite both campaigning for more autonomy and
immigration controls, they represent two very different aspects of Italy. The anti-Fascist
composition of post-war Italy not only created the polarity of the DC and the PCI, but
also excluded the Fascists. Mussolini's heirs continued under the neo-fascist party, the
Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social Movement). Led by Gianfranco Fini, they took
the opportunity that tangentopoli presented them to embrace democratic government and
reconstituted themselves as a centre-right political party, the Allianza Nazionale.
Following in the Mussolini tradition they remain staunchly in support of a strong
centralised state and gain most of their support from the South of Italy. Their move
towards the centre was complete when Allianza Nazionale merged with Forza Italia in
March 2009 to form a new centre-right party called Il Popolo della Liberta (The People of
Freedom). Thus despite the anti-party populism of Berlusconis rhetoric, he continues to
utilise the model of the political party (Von Beyme 1996). However, in contrast to this
Southern, centralising influence, Berlusconi's other coalition member comes from the
North and is resolutely secessionist.

Lega Nord represents an apposite example of a new social movement that has developed
a significant political following. Its populist rhetoric typifies the anti-party, single issue
politics of contemporary Italy. Lega Nord grew out of the Lombard League which was
started by Umberto Bossi in 1984. It developed throughout the 1980s as increased
economic success in Milan, combined with increasing regional identities, brought a
stronger affiliation for the pre-Italian regions. Lega Nord itself represents the imagined

122

nation of Padania in the north of Italy. Despite Putnams assertion that associations
contribute to national democracy, the Lega Nord is resolutely regionalist in outlook.
Secessionist policies are fuelled by strong anti-state sentiments, echoed in chants of Roma
ladrona (thieving Rome). These sentiments were confirmed during the tangentopoli
scandal, despite the scandal originating in Milan itself. Despite Lega Nords strong antistate and anti-party rhetoric, they became key allies of Berlusconi and Forza Italia,
although they have remained independent and did not join Il Popolo della Liberta. Bossi
and Lega Nord not only combines anti-centralisation and local identity rhetoric, but also
strong anti-Southern and anti-immigration tendencies. Bossi orchestrated one of the
most punitive immigration laws in Europe by effectively criminalising immigrants
(Andrews 2005), as well as being quoted as saying that officials should open fire on boats
of immigrants to prevent them landing: I want to hear the roar of the canon. The
immigrants must be hunted down, for better or worse ... At the second or third warning boom! Fire the canons at them! Otherwise this will never stop (Popham 2003; Andrews
2005: 56). Fragmentation of the traditional mass parties has provided the right conditions
for the emergence of Berlusconi and his allies.

The combination of political support and mediatised populist rhetoric has enabled
Berlusconi to act as Prime Minister on three separate occasions. His first coalition after
tangentopoli lasted one year. However, he was the first Prime Minister to serve a full five
year term after the 2001 elections and narrowly lost the 2006 elections (by 0.1%). The
centre-left Union party was unable to maintain control and subsequently called an
election in 2008, which Berlusconi won with his new Popolo della Liberta party. Unlike the
partitocrazia of the Christian Democrats, the new Italian political settlement rests with one
charismatic leader, Silvio Berlusconi. The following section will discuss the reasons and
implications for this political transition.

123

Postmodern Populism: The Continuance of Berlusconi

Postmodern politics sees the transition from modern mass-association political parties
into a new form of political approach. The crisis in global Communism and the
tangentopoli scandal saw the decline of traditional mass-parties within Italy. This has
coincided with the rise in anti-partyism where voters replaced their identification in the
traditional mass parties and began to focus on single issue movements of personal
identification. Axford and Huggins define this situation as postmodern populism
(Axford and Huggins 1998). Yet it is not just the dissolution of traditional boundaries
and frustration with the previous system which accounts for this. Changes to
consumption have shifted the traditional left-right politics centred on class and moved to
politics of identity (Axford and Huggins 1998). In addition, as Castells suggests, society is
increasingly becoming framed by electronic media (Castells 1996). As a consequence,
politics is becoming increasingly mediatised and being fused with the culture industry.
Berlusconis broadcasting of tangentopoli turned the scandal into a soap opera. The timespace compression facilitated by the media, has transformed the public sphere into
regional and virtual spaces, as well creating a new immediacy to politics as politicians
seek to build their public image quickly (Axford and Huggins 1998).

New social movements of the 1970s have developed into anti-partyism of the 21st
century. These new forms of association are characterised as single-issue movements,
with a more inclusive approach (Touraine 1981; Melucci 1988; Melucci and Mier 1989).
In Italy there has been an increase in popularity for anti-Mafia movements in the south
as local issues become paramount (Andrews 2005). Other movements are adjusting to
global transformations, such as the Slow Food movement which was born in Italy as a

124

reaction against fast food and McDonalds.13 It campaigns for locally sourced produce,
rather than mass-produced fast food (Andrews 2005). The Lega Nord represents another
form of regional new social movement. It campaigns against state interference and
immigration for the imagined nation of Padania. Under the charismatic leader of
Umberto Bossi, it has been transformed into a powerful political party that embodies
postmodern populism (Andrews 2005).

Like Bossi, Berlusconi utilises the anti-party rhetoric of postmodern populism. He has
fused football, politics and media into a populist anti-party movement (Andrews 2005).
Through ownership of various media platforms, as his entering the field showed,
Berlusconi can operate quickly and efficiently. He can access many television networks to
make political addresses, including using his populist football appeal to participate in
many non-political broadcasts. In addition he draws political candidates from television
and football. In 2008 he appointed the former model and winner of Miss Italy, Mara
Carfagna, as Equal Opportunities Minister (Hooper 2008). Likewise, candidates for the
2010 European elections included another Miss Italia contestant, Italia Caruso, a former
dancer from Mediasets variety shows, Nicole Minetti, and Giorgio Puricelli, a
physiotherapist at AC Milan (Kington 2010; Owen 2010). Populist candidates are
combined with continued anti-party and anti-state rhetoric; for example, Berlusconi
continues to decry the influence of the independent magistracy (Ginsborg 2004; Lane
2004; Jones 2007). This has coincided with extensive investigations into the Berlusconis
financial affairs and has resulted in charges (and acquittals) of corruption, fraud, false
accounting and bribery. Many cases have expired due to the case running out of time
under statute of limitations laws, many of which were shortened by Berlusconis
governments (Ginsborg 2004; Lane 2004). As a consequence of Berlusconis postmodern
13

www.slowfood.com

125

populism, he continues to undermine the central state even though his role of Prime
Minister symbolises the governance of the state.

Berlusconi has come to embody and symbolise postmodern populism. Postmodern

politics is increasingly personalised and constructed around the charismatic leaders (Von
Beyme 1996). Berlusconi has mobilised a part of the population as a client in opposition
to the state and political opponents. Forza Italia and Berlusconi were indivisible as there
was no process within the partys constitution which allowed members to remove him
(Farrell 1995). Berlusconi carefully crafted his public image to distance himself from the
corruption of tangentopoli even though he was a good friend of Craxi. His party
represented the neo-patrimonial nature of Italian politics. The corrupt links between
political parties and industry were replaced with personal ties (Von Beyme 1996: 137). As
Farrell states:

Berlusconi talks of creating a new democratic order, but his own approach is
czarist. His movement is a personal clique rather than an orthodox party - it is
composed of followers and dependents rather than members or equals and has
more in common with a court than with a democratic functioning organisation
(Farrell 1995: 41)

Under the Popolo della Liberta the partys statute, the president of the party is now an
elected post.14 In spite of this democratic shift, the postmodern populism of Berlusconi is
still based upon the cult of personality of its leader. In the summer of 2010, Berlusconis
key ally in the PdL, and speaker of the lower house of the Italian parliament, Gianfranco
Fini, led a faction away from the party. Fini wanted more internal democracy within the
14

http://www.ilpopolodellaliberta.it/speciali/statuto-del-pdl.pdf

126

party and greater sanctions over those found guilty of corruption (Hooper 2010). It is
illustrative that Berlusconi demanded that Fini step down as leader of the lower house,
despite it not being within the gift of the prime minister.

Despite various personal and political issues, Berlusconi remains publicly popular. Even
scandals in his personal life have not impacted his popularity. During a 2009 Berlusconi
became embroiled in a series of sex scandals. In May, Berlusconi attended the eighteenth
birthday party of an aspiring model, Noemi Letizia, who he claimed was the daughter of
a family friend and he presented her with an expensive necklace. However, his wife,
Veronica Lario, stated that he did not attend his own childrens eighteenth birthday
parties and filed for divorce stating that he: spends too much time with minors
(Kington 2009; Pisa 2009). The following month, photographs were published in Spain
of semi-naked guests attending a party at Berlusconis Sicilian villa (Hooper 2009). In
July, it emerged that a businessman from Bari had paid for female escorts to attend
parties with Berlusconi in order to receive favourable business decisions (Hooper 2009;
Kington 2009; Owen 2009). One escort, Patrizia DAddario, released tapes intimating
that she had spent the night with the Prime Minister. She decided to release the detail
after she claimed that Berlusconis promise of support for a hotel planning application
was not fulfilled (Kington 2009). Despite these allegations, Berlusconi remains a
powerful symbol for his supporters. In a political rally in September 2010, Berlusconi
joked of his sexual prowess as he suggested that a way for young people to escape the
recession was to marry into money (Kington 2010). His man-of-the-people charisma
appeals to that section of society which is incorporated into his patrimonial network, and
isolates his political opponents.

127

Political opposition has become reduced to opposition of Berlusconi. Despite

Berlusconis power, he has become a powerful symbol for opponents. For example,
Antonio Di Pietro was a leading prosecutor in the mani pulite corruption trial into
tangentopoli. During Berlusconis first government in 1994 a number of counterinvestigations were started against Di Pietro and were deemed to be politically motivated.
Subsequently, he founded the anti-corruption party called Italia dei Valori (Italy of
Values). This party demonstrates the personalised and mediatised nature of new political
movements. Di Pietro has made extensive use of information technology to highlight
corruption and continues to publish a blog and weekly vidcasts to communicate directly
with supporters.15 Even though Di Pietro has a broad political remit, the personalised
nature of Italian politics has resulted in many attacks on Berlusconi. A political
movement led by comedian Beppe Grillo replicates this transition. Like Di Pietro, Grillo
makes extensive use of new media forms to campaign against corruption and for
environmental issues.16 In 2007 he initiated a V-Day (Vaffanculo or Fuck Off Day) to
persuade people to sign a petition to prevent people with criminal convictions from
standing for parliament.17 Grillo has also started a political movement called the
Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement) to fight the 2010 regional elections on
environmental and anti-corruption issues (Hooper 2010).18 A similar movement was
launched in October 2009 by a group of bloggers, citizens and celebrities, including
Grillo, who called themselves Il Popolo Viola (The Purple People).19 They designated 5th
December as No Berlusconi Day after Berlusconi tried to pass an immunity of
prosecution law for the heads of government, which would effectively make him

15

http://www.antoniodipietro.it/; http://www.youtube.com/profile?user=IDVstaff
http://www.beppegrillo.it/
17 http://151.1.253.1/vaffanculoday/
18 http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/index.php#post_grillo
19 http://www.ilpopoloviola.it/
16

128

immune from prosecution.20 Il Popolo Viola have organised several more anti-Berlusconi
rallies where participants all wear a purple item of clothing to symbolise their
participation (Owen 2010). A more violent demonstration of anti-Berlusconi sentiment
occurred in December 2009 after a political rally Berlusconi held in the square alongside
Milan cathedral. Massimo Tartaglia, an engineer with a history of mental health issues,
threw a marble replica of Milans cathedral at Berlusconi which broke his nose and two
teeth (Owen 2009). Ultimately, political opposition to Berlusconi is so fragmented that it
is reduced to wearing purple or a lone protester throwing an object.

Summary

The unification of the Italian state has created an Italian solution to the nation state.
The lack of legitimacy derived from its political construction, led to the state evolving in
a clientelistic way as individuals sought to maintain power through a patrimonial system
of patronage and corruption. As a consequence, Keynesian economics became distorted
and developed into systemised corruption that eventually brought down the First
Republic. In order to navigate around the corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy, Italian
firms developed small and flexible post-Fordist enterprises that remained under family
control. These businesses were well-placed to respond to global deregulation in trade and
its subsequent consumer-driven economy. However, their rapid development and
restrictive family control minimised the development of a separate business class. This
was constrained by the political and bureaucratic system that permitted the business
families to operate within the political realm. Berlusconi represents the neo-patrimonial
shift which took place in Italy after the 1970s. He fought the existing state regulation and
20

http://www.noberlusconiday.org/

129

capitalised on the complete de-regulation to build a personal empire in the new postFordist services. Through media and football he represents the shift from state control to
power divested to individuals. However, he also represents a continuance with past
practises as he utilised personal contacts to win governmental concessions, and has
retained extensive personal and family control of his business empire. The family became
the perfect image for Berlusconi, as Bernini states:

The family was used by Berlusconi as a useful metaphor to describe his own
political and personal trajectory, as he presented himself alternatively as a father
engaged in the rescue of his country, the offspring of a hard-working family, the
devout son, and the patriarch at the head of a large family (Bernini 2010: 77).

It is for this reason that the 2009 allegations of matrimonial impropriety affected
Berlusconi more than any other. Berlusconis transition into politics represents the fusion
of these various postmodern aspects, but with the retention of individual and family
control.

The new social movements of the 1970s have developed into anti-partyism of the 21st
century. These new forms of association are characterised as a single-issue, with a more
inclusive approach (including more female involvement). They encompass a wider range
of issues, such as anti-Mafia, anti-globalisation, slow food and anti-war. Despite the
social capital accumulated with these movements, they are not contributing to national
democracy. Lega Nord in particular actively undermines the state. Consequently,
fragmentation has permitted the emergence of the charismatic leader of Berlusconi who
can utilise control of the media, football and the political system to neutralise dissidence.
The following chapter will show how these developments are reflected within Italian

130

football, and more significantly, how Silvio Berlusconi contributed to the transformation
of Italian football.

131

Chapter 4

Deregulation and Crisis of Italian Football

I'll break the balls of all the false moralists of this world who think that everything is clean
now because they got rid of ... Luciano Moggi Luciano Moggi21

I'll make him an offer he can't refuse Michael Corleone22

Fabio Cannavaro, the handsome and tattooed captain of the Italian national football
team, stood upon the podium and raised himself above his azzuri team-mates. The
captain, wearing the world famous azure blue kit of Italy, received the world cup and
held it above his head. Fireworks and confetti erupt from the back of the podium as
Cannavaro and his Italy team-mates celebrated winning the 2006 world cup, the forth
time the nation had won the competition; only Brazil have won the competition on more
occasions. The team had just beaten France in a dramatic penalty shoot-out in the final in
Germany. As the Italy team huddled around the cup and took turns in kissing the gold
trophy, they became drenched in confetti and emotion. Over the public-address system
the Triumphal March from Verdis Aida reinforced the Italian victory. The world cup
triumph appeared to be a vindication of the players who had endured a turbulent two
months after allegations of match-fixing surfaced in the Italian media. This scandal
affected the futures of many of the players at the tournament and the world cup
provided a suitable liberation from the travails at home.
21
22

Burke, J. (2006). Paradiso to inferno. The Observer.

Coppola, F. F. (1972). The Godfather.

132

Triumph and crisis have been regular partners in Italian football. Italys short but
colourful history has left an indelible mark on its football. Many of the actors operate
across the fields of politics, business and football. The over-reliance on familial and
patrimonial networks can provide rapid outcomes, but these often prove unsustainable.
Global patterns of de-regulation were initially successful within Italy as these networks
quickly adapted to the new order. However, the nature of globalisation has seen other
nations surpass Italys success. This pattern was replicated in football where initial Italian
success has been surpassed by relative English, German and Spanish success. This is
compounded by the weakness of central authority which fails to adequately impose the
necessary requirements on the federations and clubs to rectify the issue. The vacuum in
national politics is replicated within the club structure as fans continue to remain outside
the organisational hierarchy, yet still operate within the patrimonial system.

In order to witness these transformations within the Italian game, this chapter will
present a history of Italian football to introduce the organisational structure of the Italian
game. Several recurring themes re-emerge within the football context. In particular, there
is a profound crisis of legitimacy of the central authorities which is undermined by
widespread familial and patrimonial networks. Dense networks manifest in strategic cities
which intensify regional differences. This chapter will present the history of Italian
football within the framework of political economy illustrated in the previous chapters. It
will chart the development of football from its inception, through Fascism to the Miracle
and the 1970s. It will then illustrate the fragmentation that occurred after the 1970s and
illustrate the transformations which occurred in the subsequent decades. Italys
development and approach to these transformations helps explain the subsequent crises,

133

which will be detailed in the following sections. The chapter will conclude with details of
the Calciopoli scandal which reinforced the continued weakness of the authorities.

The Development of Italian Football

Football in Italy is entwined with formation of the nation state and the global diffusion
of the codified sport. During the nineteenth century the modern nation state began to
crystallise and the newly codified sports provided an apposite opportunity for
identification for nations and citizens. As with elsewhere in the world, the playing of
organised games of football dispersed from ports. British sailors landing at ports, such as
Livorno, Genoa and Naples, led to a growth in interest in these cities which were
undergoing extensive urbanisation and industrialisation (Foot 2007). In keeping with the
English origins of the organised game, the English word football entered the Italian
lexicon. As a result the original governing body set up in 1898 adopted the name
Federazione Italiana Football (FIF). The nascent governing body subsequently set up a
national championship which was won by Genoa Cricket and Football Club (Foot 2007).
Increasing internationalisation of the sport led to the development of FIFA and UEFA,
which Italy joined as a founding member.

The governing body in Italy has faced a crisis of legitimacy almost since its inception as it
struggled to impose national regulation. Early teams were set-up and populated by
foreign players. The Englishman James Richardson Spensley founded the football section
of Genoa Cricket and Football Club in 1897. Meanwhile, another Englishman called
Herbert Kilpin founded AC Milan in 1899. Elsewhere Torino was formed by a collection
of English and Swiss businessmen, and Swiss and Italians formed Internazionale (Papa
and Panico 2002; Foot 2007). Meanwhile, in 1905 the first club formed in Livorno,

134

Virtus Juventusque, was founded by Carmichael Montgomery, the son of the British
Vice-counsel in Livorno (Chiarello 2005). The English influence of the game in Italy has
resulted in the Italian colloquial term for a manager being Il Mister, named after the first
organised manager, William Garbutt (Foot 2007). The extensive foreign influence in the
Italian game led to the FIF banning foreign players in 1908. This provides the first
example of a challenge to the federations legitimacy. Milan, in particular, felt that this
prevented them from winning their third championship in a row, and with it, the
opportunity to win the Spensley Cup for such a feat. As a consequence, Milan, Torino
and Genoa boycotted the tournament leading to the federation readmitting foreign
players in the following season (Papa and Panico 2002; Foot 2007).

Football in Italy provided an early opportunity for nationalist symbols to become

constructed. In 1909 the governing body changed its name to the Federazione Italiana
Gioco Calcio (FIGC) to reflect the adoption of the Italianised word of calcio, rather than
the English term of football. This made an explicit reference to the historic game of Calcio
Fiorentino which had been played in Florence during the Renaissance. This represented an
invented tradition (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) as the historic version of the sport bore
little resemblance to the organised game introduced by the English as Calcio Fiorentino was
more akin to modern Rugby and the hurling games of Britain (Dunning 1972). The
Italianising trend continued under Mussolini who continued to develop a nationalised
Italian origin for this invented tradition. Calcio Fiorentino was reintroduced to Florence in
1930 to construct a clear link between the Medieval and modern games. Indeed, Foot
suggests that the historic Florentine game has been adapted to appear more like football
[original italics] (Foot 2007). In highlighting this reinvention of tradition we see the
incorporation of historical symbols of football into the nationalising tendencies of
modern Italy.

135

Football in Italy quickly became incorporated into the industrial fabric. Industrialisation
and urbanisation ensured a rapid participation rate in the new sport. The successful early
teams came from the port of Genoa and the industrial cities of Milan and Turin.
Industrialists quickly adopted the games popularity and incorporated it into their
industrial network. The owner and founder of Pirelli was an early member of AC Milan
and became president of the club from 1908 until 1929 (Foot 2007). Edoardo Agnelli,
the son of Fiats founder became president of Juventus in 1923 until 1935 and initiated
the long and successful association between the club and the company that has
continued into the twenty-first century. Furthermore, Inters president from 1923 was
Enrico Olivetti, from the type-writer manufacturers Olivetti, before he sold it to
Senatore Borletti from another leading industrial family (Foot 2007). The industrial
growth of the two cities led to power struggles between clubs in Milan and Turin. This
further undermined the Federation as the seat of the FIGC transferred several times
between the two cities as appeasement (Papa and Panico 2002; Foot 2007).

The extensive patrimonial networks within the clubs, and the failure of the FIGC to
impose its authority, have successively de-legitimised it. The early game in Italy replicated
its English forebears through the pursuit of amateurism. Industrial influence and the
kudos of victory created a sham amateurism. In 1913 Genoas star player, Renzo De
Vecchi, was paid as a bank clerk and with travel expenses (Foot 2007). The system was
exposed during the Rosetta Case which resulted from Juventus paying fifty thousand
lire for the Pro Vercelli player Virginio Rosetta in 1923 (Foot 2007: 32). The president of
Pro Vercelli, a lawyer called Luigi Bozino, was also president of the FIGC and authorised
the sale of Rosetta. The player meanwhile was an accountant by profession and was set
up with a new accountancy post in Turin, underwritten by Juventus (and by extension,

136

Fiat, the owners of Juventus). The money involved ignited the scandal, and led to a
number of resignations within the FIGC. Ultimately the federation docked Juventus
points (preventing them from winning the title) and barred Rosetta from playing. The
following season, however, he was allowed to re-join Juventus and went on to win six
championships, as well as winning the World Cup with Italy in 1934 (Foot 2007: 33). In
addition to paying players additional emoluments in order to accumulate resources to the
detriment of rivals, clubs have also utilised match fixing to gain an advantage. The most
notable example occurred during the 1926-7 season when Torino was found guilty of
bribing a Juventus player. As a result, Torino had their title rescinded and the 1926-7
scudetto remains vacant (Foot 2007: 238).

Fascism attempted to assert a nationalist and centralised control over the national game.
Mussolini saw football as the perfect way to create the necessary national symbols to
unite the young nation. Alongside the reinvented tradition of Calcio Fiorentino, he also
incorporated the powerful symbols of ancient Rome, which included the notion of mens
sana in corpore sano (a healthy mind in a healthy body) (Martin 2004: 15). Mussolini
supported the building of a number of municipal stadiums which would house the
various sports clubs he initiated (Martin 2004). This permitted Italy to host the second
World Cup in 1934 (Martin 2004). Not only did they act as powerful symbols to the
power of Fascism, but they simultaneously harked back to ancient Rome and looked
forward to a Modernist future. As a consequence, many stadiums in Italy date from this
period, in particular the Stadio Olimpico in Rome, the Stadio Artemio Franchi in
Florence, and Livornos Stadio Armando Picchi. Foreign names of football teams were
changed, with Internazionale changing its name to a more Italian sounding Ambrosiana
(Foot 2007). Fascist centralisation and nationalism led to a major re-structuring of
football in Italy in 1926. The Viareggio Charter revolutionised football within Italy and

137

instituted many of the features that exist today (Foot 2007: 37-8). The charter introduced
a professional national league and set up Serie A and Serie B. This abolished the previous
provincial leagues, and likewise illustrated the boundaries of the Italian nation. The city
of Trieste acquired in the settlement of the First World War could now be affirmed as
Italian as it would play in the Italian national league (Martin 2004: 74). Furthermore, the
charter permitted professionalism which allowed for the best players to participate in
these national leagues. Finally, echoing previous attempts to ban foreigners, the charter
instituted a ban on non-Italians playing in the national leagues. Even under Fascism, the
illusion continued. Hungarians or Austrians were obviously barred from playing;
however, players of Italian extraction (an oriundo) were permitted. Due to large numbers
of Italians immigrating to South America in the previous century, a number of oriundi
transferred from South America to play in the new professional Italian leagues.
Ultimately, some of these oriundi represented Italy in the national team and consequently
won an Olympic gold medal in 1932 and the World Cups in 1934 and 1938 (Martin 2004;
Foot 2007).

Direct central Fascist control did not minimise scandal within Italian football. Fascism
also influenced the patrimonial structure of Italian football. For example, the leader of
the Bologna Fascists (and future mayor of Bologna), Leandro Arpinati, took an active
interest in the championship play off between Bologna and Genoa in 1925 (Foot 2007:
34). Teams that finished level at the end of the season took part in a play-off that was
replayed if the game finished in a draw. In the 1925 playoff final the two teams had
already played two games and had drawn them both. The third match was played in
Milan and watched by a crowd of 20,000 fans. Genoa proceeded to take a 2-0 lead before
Bologna had an attack in the second half. A shot was made, the keeper dived and the
referee indicated a corner. This resulted in a pitch invasion led by a group of black-

138

shirts and delayed the game for fifteen minutes The referee changed his mind and gave a
goal, a goal that Bologna subsequently doubled later in the game to force another draw.
Under Federation rules, the pitch invasion should have led to Genoa being awarded the
championship. Arpinati, however, pressured the referee to attribute no blame for the
pitch invasion. This permitted the Federation to call for another play off. The subsequent
play off, in Turin, was marred by gunshots being fired amongst fans at the train station
after the match finished in yet another draw. Turin refused to allow another game to be
held in the city on the grounds of public order, so the following match was held in Milan
two months later, a match Bologna duly won. Arpinati went on to become president of
the FIGC and produced a period of unprecedented success for the Italian national team
and Bologna football club. The control and influence of football by Arpinati and
Mussolini also led to a number of accusations being made regarding the 1934 World Cup
final, hosted by Italy (Foot 2007: 440). Despite this, Italy successfully defended their title
four years later in France.

Suspicion of central authority has undermined the FIGCs ability to regulate effectively.
This suspicion has also created the symbolic figure of the referee who becomes the focus
of allegations of corruption. As a consequence, referees have become victims of abuse,
violence and suspicion (Foot 2007: Chapter 2). Through the deep play of football,
historian Paul Ginsborg makes a clear comparison with wider society:

Reactions to the games rules and refereeing can be seen as a mirror of wider
reactions to authority in contemporary Italian society the rules exist, but they
are not easy to interpret. In these circumstances, the referees authority is
perforce uncertain, but it is made much more so in Italy by the almost universal
climate of suspicion, if not derision, that accompanies his decisions it is not

139

difficult to discern here a series of emotions suspicion, contempt, cynicism,

even hatred that characterise the relationship between Italians and the state
(Ginsborg 2003: 113).

The pressure Arpinati exerted on the referee in the Genoa-Bologna game in 1925 is
merely an extension of this struggle for authority. The 1926 Viareggio Charter attempted
to limit the opportunity for corruption by establishing a committee to select referees who
were subsequently announced at the game (Foot 2007: 55). However, by the 1950s, this
clandestine information had become valuable to third parties who sought to gain an
advantage. One such scandal involved Catania football club when a local reporter
claimed that whilst working for Catania, he bribed a referee and his cousin in order to
gain access to the information (Foot 2007: 58). In the following decade the big clubs
tried to exert pressure on the selection of certain referees. In one case, Juventus tried to
go to court to bar a referee from officiating their matches and reinforcing the lack of
legitimacy of the central federation (Foot 2007: 55). This has continued into the twentyfirst century as Silvio Berlusconi used the media to accuse referees of being left wing and
biased against Milan (La Gazzetta dello Sport 2010).

Italian Football During the Miracle

The economic Miracle of the 1950s reaffirmed the hegemony of the cities of Turin and
Milan. At the end of the Second World War, Torino emerged as the major force in
Italian football. After winning the 1943 scudetto by one point over Livorno, the team won
five consecutive titles and became know as Grande Torino (Great Torino). The team
established a number of Italian football records and provided the majority of the Italian
national team (Foot 2007). Tragedy struck on 4th May 1949 when a plane transporting the

140

players encountered difficulty in fog around Turin and crashed into Mount Superga. All
thirty-one passengers were killed. The catastrophe marked the end of Torino (despite a
brief resurgence in the 1970s) and permitted the consolidation of the three major clubs
of Juventus, Milan and Inter. The economic support provided by the industrial patronage
of leading families ensured that Italian clubs could afford to pay the highest transfer fees
for players. Since 1952, the world record transfer fee was held by Italian clubs, and Milan,
Inter and Juventus in particular, for nearly fifty years (BBC 2009). Only the transfers of
Johan Cruyff and Diego Maradona to Barcelona, Alan Shearer to Newcastle and
Denilson to Real Betis dented the Italian monopoly.

The Miracle reinforced the financial dominance of the three elite clubs. The growth of
mass-manufacturing based on Fordist principles necessitated large numbers of industrial
workers. The success of the Miracle also provided increased economic rewards with
which the owners could reinvest in their team. Juventus, in particular, benefitted from
the success of Fiat. Fiat contributed over four percent of Italian gross domestic product
and was the biggest employer in Italy; its staff canteen could host ten thousand
employees (Foot 2007). Consequently, Umberto Agnelli, the clubs president during the
1950s and 1960s, stated that: The team has followed the evolution of the nation (Foot
2007: 79). Not only could the Agnelli family provide industrial patronage to finance the
clubs success, but the extensive internal migration caused by the Miracle transformed the
supporter-base of the club. Millions of workers left their hometowns, particularly in the
south, and moved to Turin to work in the Fiat factory. The subsequent return of these
workers to their home towns has resulted in Juventus being the most widely supported
football club in Italy, with every town and village having a Juventus supporters club.

141

Financial support and industrial patronage also permitted the growth of the Grande Inter
side of the 1960s. The oil magnate Angelo Moratti purchased Inter in 1955 and provided
the financial support for the club to win three scudetti in 1963, 1965 and 1966, as well as
winning consecutive European Cups in 1964 and 1965. Morattis financial support was
augmented by the clubs Argentinean manager, Helenio Herrera, who implemented a
highly professional training regime to drill the players in a quasi-militaristic style (Foot
2007). Herrera also bequeathed a lasting legacy on Italian football through his adoption
and success of the catenaccio style of defence. Named after the Italian for door-bolt,
catenaccio was a highly defensive tactic that sought to nullify the opposition in attack and
quickly counter attack. The rigidity and discipline required to execute catenaccio emulated
the Fordist principles operating within the factories of Milan and Turin.

Increased professionalism within football brought greater incentives to win. A number of

teams became involved in doping scandals during the 1960s and this led to the FIGC
attempting to impose order through regular drug testing. Some minor members of the
Grande Inter side were found guilty of doping in 1962 (Foot 2007: 263). The following
year five Genoa players were banned and the authorities decided to instigate a rule that
any player found positive would see their team forfeit the result of the game (Foot 2007:
263). Ultimately this led to recriminations and a further demonstration of the crisis of
legitimacy facing the FIGC. During the 1963-4 season five Bologna players were declared
positive after a game with Torino (Foot 2007: 264-6). Under the rules, they would forfeit
the game, and as a result ended up three points behind Inter at the top of the league.
Riots ensued in the streets of Bologna and the clubs lawyers disputed the validity of the
testing process. With Bologna and Inter tied on points at the end of the season, the
authorities cleared Bologna amidst stories of the possible switching of samples. As a

142

consequence, the league declared that the title should be decided by a play off; the only
time this has ever occurred.

The Crisis of the 1970s

The global financial crisis of the 1970s directly impacted football. King has identified that
European football went through a period of Eurosclerosis during the decade as clubs
faced a reduced economic viability which resulted in a reduction in playing standards,
hooliganism, and increased match-fixing (King 2003). The period marked an end to the
dominance of the top clubs. Both Milanese clubs failed to win a scudetto for ten years
during the period. Although Juventus remained dominant, provincial clubs won a
number of championships. After the hot autumn of 1968, Fiorentina won their second
scudetto in 1969. This was followed by Cagliari in 1970 and Lazio in 1973. 1975 saw the
brief re-emergence of Torino after the Superga tragedy. A similar pattern emerged in the
early 1980s when Roma and Verona won titles in 1982 and 1984 respectively (Foot
2007).

The political agitations that took place in the wider society, which saw increased
industrial action by workers and political militancy, was replicated by footballers. The
players were becoming more political and requesting increased legal rights. In 1968 the
Italian Footballers Association, the Associazione Italiana Calciatori, was created.23 It called
for greater freedom for players and initiated the Italian footballer of the year award to
recognise outstanding players. In 1974 all teams arrived ten minutes late in protest of the
restrictions of movement. Until then, players were forced to move to whichever team
their club decided to sell them to (Foot 2007: 381). Players also reflected the extreme
23

http://www.assocalciatori.it/

143

politics of the piazzas. Paolo Sollier of Perugia was a visible supporter of far Left
organisations (Foot 2007). Elsewhere, the Lazio team of the 1970s exhibited Fascist
sympathies. Many of the players carried guns which they took to training and away
games. Their frivolous approach to their weapons resulted in the death of their
midfielder, Luciano Re Cecconi, in 1977. As a practical joke, he pretended to rob a
jewellery store and was shot by the owner (Foot 2007).

The failure of the central authorities to effectively regulate the sport saw allegations of
match-fixing re-emerge during the same period. In addition to the allegations of drug use
detailed previously, in 1974 the Sunday Times journalist, Brian Glanville, exposed a wide
ranging account of match fixing of European Cup games by Italian clubs called the
Golden Fix (Glanville 1999; Glanville 1999; King 2003; Foot 2007). The allegations
centred on Italo Allodi who was the Sporting Director at Inter in the 1960s before
moving to Juventus in the 1970s. He subsequently became the national team manager
before moving to Napoli in the 1980s; the Napoli side that contained Maradona and
finally wrested the title away from the powers in the north. Glanville suggests that Allodi
used an intermediary to attempt to bribe referees. The intermediary worked for Allodi at
both Inter in the 1960s and Juventus in the 1970s. In some cases, the bribe was deemed
to have worked, such as with Inter in the 1960s, and allegedly with Juventus against
Derby County in 1973. However, the allegations only came to light after a Portuguese
referee, Francesco Marques Lobo, refused to be bribed the following year (Glanville
1999; Glanville 1999; King 2003; Foot 2007). A further match-fixing scandal developed
in 1980 based on the Italian version of the Football Pools called Totocalcio. Two Roman
shop keepers attempted, unsuccessfully, to fix a number of games in a scandal that
became dubbed Totonero (Foot 2007: 244). The scandal included a number of players and
coaches and led to seven clubs having points deducted, and Milan and Lazio relegated.

144

The scandal also led to the suspension of several players, including the superstar of
Italian football, Paolo Rossi. Rossi was suspended for three years, but subsequently had
this reduced to two years, which allowed him to take part in the 1982 World Cup final.
He went on to be the leading scorer in the tournament as Italy won the tournament for
the third time. The inability of the Italian authorities to deal with the causes of corruption
was highlighted six years later when Totonero was replicated on a wider scale in 1986. This
time nine teams were relegated or deducted points, as well as seventeen coaches and
thirty-four players being suspended.

Deregulation in the Craxi Years

The 1980s represented a significant shift in Italian football. Deregulation and changes to
the Italian political economy facilitated a major transformation of Italian football.
Significantly, deregulation of television directly impacted the presentation of football
which led to an increased popularity of the sport. This section will illustrate the
importance of television in the deregulated world of football. Significant focus will be
placed on Silvio Berlusconis contribution to the transformations in Italian television and
football. It will also show how connections between businesses and football intensified
as leading organisations incorporated football clubs into their family of businesses.
Despite their initial success, the system collapsed at the end of the twentieth century.

Global deregulation has re-articulated the inter-relations between sport and industry. In
contrast to earlier forms of industrial patronage, post-industrial patronage centres on
services and information, particularly television. The resulting media-sport complex
(Maguire 1999) or media-calcio (Porro 2008), provided a mutually beneficial
relationship. Football was a primary component of Berlusconis programming despite

145

regulations preventing the broadcast of live footage. Italys victory in the 1982 world cup
led to an upsurge in interest in football. This coincided with the newly emerging
commercial networks which were seeking to increase audience figures and advertising
revenue. As Maguire highlights: Sport has also become a commodity whose media value
is determined by the size and composition of the audience it can deliver to potential
advertisers and sponsors of media broadcasts. (Maguire 1999: 151-2). Berlusconi
announced his entry into football broadcasting in 1980 by purchasing the rights for 1
million to an international event called the Mundialito (Foot 2007: 294). This mini
tournament brought together all winners of previous world cups in Uruguay.
Berlusconis television networks also broadcast friendly football tournaments which did
not conflict with RAIs monopoly of official tournaments.

Mediasets style contrasted with the state controlled and heavily regulated RAI channels
and fuelled consumer demand for increased televised matches and shows about football.
Due to regulations preventing the broadcast of live images, neo-television has led to the
proliferation of football debate shows. The principal purpose of the programme is to talk
about football and the live matches have become superfluous to the debate that is taking
place in the studio. Outside broadcasts provide accounts of the live match taking place,
whilst back in the studio; the important features have become simulacra and are
simulated in various ways (Baudrillard 1983). Often chalkboards will be used to illustrate
the position of players as the action had unfolded. Telelombardia, for example, used exfootballers to recreate the goals, often with more spectacular effects (Foot 2007: 286).
Computer generated players have also been used to recreate the goals and have removed
the human element altogether. When debating games, the moviola (slow motion replay) is
extensively utilised to decide if a player was offside, if they made contact with a player in
the penalty area or if a goal was actually handball. The moviola; is also used to display

146

other controversial events. For example in September 2008, when the Milan and Italy
midfielder Gennaro Gattuso was injured after falling backwards into the tunnel leading
out from the changing rooms, this event was re-shown and debated for several minutes,
and the moviola used over twenty times.

Without the corporal display of football, the focus of the debate becomes a fragmented
collection of spectacles which necessitate a charismatic host to provide cohesion. Like
the neo-television variety shows, football shows create hosts who are personalities. Foot
dubs this phenomenon Biscardism after Aldo Biscardi the host of the longest running
football show Il Processo (The Trial) (Foot 2007: 290). Personality-hosts like Biscardi
facilitate the emotion and spectacle of the debate. They are supported by partisan pundits
who do not hide the fact that they are fans and show the emotion of the game taking
place. They discuss the team, manager and performance and reflect the emotions of the
fans at home. The fan-pundits, such as AC Milan fan and pundit Tiziano Crudelli, have
become celebrities in their own right.(Foot 2007: 290). The debate is fuelled by audience
participation, both from a studio audience and fans at home, who send emails and text
messages which are read out by another (usually female) host. These shows are so
popular that they account for the top twenty-five most watched shows in Italy
(Baroncelli and Lago 2006).

Alongside transforming the media display and popularity of football, Berlusconi

transformed the operation of football. He introduced a business-orientated, mediafriendly approach to football that Italian authors have called neo-calcio (neo-football)
(Liguori and Smargiasse 2003). AC Milan was one of the most successful clubs in Italy
and had endured a difficult start to the 1980s. It was relegated for its role in the
Totocalcio betting scandal of 1980 and despite winning Serie B the following year, it was

147

relegated again in 1982. A second promotion saw them become a mid-table Serie A side
and in serious financial turmoil. In March 1986 Berlusconi purchased the club he
supported as a child, and commenced a major re-structuring. Berlusconi signalled his
intentions as he unveiled the team in July 1986. They arrived by helicopter at the stadium,
to the tune of The Ride of the Valkyries in front of ten thousand fans (Ginsborg 2004:
53). Berlusconi then utilised his television channels to broadcast the event. Berlusconi
was signalling a new approach to football. In his own words, he states that I knew very
well that people would laugh at me, even treat me with irony. But we needed to show
that the whole way of thinking at AC Milan had changed (Ginsborg 2004: 53) By
turning it into a media-orientated spectacle, he was transforming the way the game was
organised, not just at AC Milan, but across Italy and Europe.

By combining his media panache and business acumen, Berlusconi successfully

introduced business practises into AC Milan. He viewed the club as a business
organisation and placed the club in the management of some of his senior managers of
his umbrella company, Fininvest (Poli 2001). The role and importance of the AC Milan
press office was transformed as Berlusconi carefully cultivated the image of the football
club (Poli 2001: 376). To increase customers, Berlusconi targeted season ticket sales using
television commercials created by his advertising company, Publitalia, and then broadcast
on his television channels. Automatic booking systems for the season tickets were
introduced as well as designated seating (Porro and Russo 2000: 354). The popularity of
football after the 1982 World Cup win saw Italy successfully bid for the 1990 World Cup.
This led to a major renovation project of Italian stadiums, which saw AC Milans San
Siro stadium transformed into a world-class, all-seater stadium. The combination of
comfortable stadium, improved ticketing and extensive marketing saw AC Milan sell over
65,000 season tickets for the 1986-7 season (Ginsborg 2004: 53). In addition to income

148

from season tickets, Berlusconi also sought to increase revenue through merchandising.
The range of club playing kits and other official merchandise were increased to provide
more marketing possibilities for the club (Poli 2001: 376). As a consequence, fans could
use post-Fordist consumption to construct their football identity. These identities were
strengthened through the promotion of official supporters clubs. Supporters clubs
became affiliated to the football club who provided additional benefits to club members.
Official merchandising became available to club members, as a well as a new official AC
Milan magazine, Forza Milan (Poli 2001: 376). In addition, Berlusconi introduced other
commercial initiatives, such as discounts on merchandise and events, which were
advertised through his various media forms. Brand loyalty was also fostered through
events which players would attend, thus allowing fans proximity to the stars of the club.
As a result of these transformations, by the early 1990s there were over 350,000
members of AC Milan official supporters clubs.

Television was central to Berlusconis strategy. He took every opportunity to promote

AC Milan on his channels by broadcasting a range of pseudo-events (Boorstin 1971;
Poli 2001: 376). Team unveilings, such as his helicopter entrance in 1986, were televised.
In addition, training sessions were broadcast, as well as events where fans and players
met. The clubs annual budget was even televised on one occasion (Poli 2001: 376).
However he was careful not to over-saturate the coverage of actual matches so that he
could maintain a future market for pay-per-view (Porro and Russo 2000: 354). Friendly
matches and international tournaments were transmitted, but Serie A matches were
carefully controlled. With this co-ordinated use of television, commercial television rights
became a central element of the clubs income. In 1982 television rights provided $2
million to the clubs. This rose to $510 million by 1998 as pay-per-view and commercial
television responded to the larger audience for football (Porro and Russo 2000: 355).

149

De-regulation of television broadcasting has directly impacted European and National

leagues and has had a significant affect in Italy. As a consequence of complete deregulation of television and the weakness of the FIGC and Lega Calcio, the elite clubs
successfully lobbied to negotiate individual television rights (King 2003). This has
permitted all matches in the top two divisions to be broadcast live on pay-per-view
subscription channels. Unlike the more regulated English Premier League which restricts
the broadcasting of live football at three oclock on a Saturday to encourage stadium
attendance, any fan of Serie A and Serie B can watch their club every week without
leaving their home. When combined with the problems affecting football in Italy,
television de-regulation is contributing to the decline in attendance in Italian football.
This is impacting the clubs ability to generate revenue from fans physically attending the
stadium.

Television has also impacted the revenue of Italian football clubs through strengthening
the elite clubs. The commodificiation of sport necessitates a total change in revenue
generation. As Maguire states:

Traditional sources of revenue, for example spectator receipts and patronage,

have declined in importance. Sports organisations have to ensure that they gain
sufficient exposure and are visible in the sponsorship and endorsement marketplace. Media coverage secures this. (Maguire 1999: 150)

However, there have been different national approaches to media de-regulations. The
English Premier League and German Bundesliga operate with collective television
contracts (King 2003; Meier 2003). This ensures greater parity of income amongst clubs

150

and provides for a more competitive league (Morrow 1999; Hamil, Morrow et al. 2010).
However, until 2010, Italian football clubs negotiated television deals independently
(Porro 2008). This gave more power and money to the elite clubs who could guarantee a
larger television audience. These renegotiations contributed to the profound
restructuring of the finances of Italian football clubs. For example, Juventus are the most
successful and best supported club in Italy and derive sixty-five percent of their revenue
from television deals. Yet, the Italian giants only generate eight percent from match-days
(Deloitte and Touche 2010). Elsewhere, television revenue accounts for nearly sixty
percent of both Inter and Romas income. Even with the more commercial approach of
AC Milan, television revenue provides half of the clubs income (Deloitte and Touche
2010). In contrast, when Berlusconi purchased AC Milan in 1986, ninety-two percent of
its revenue came from ticket sales (Poli 2001: 376). With the full range of matches being
broadcast live every weekend, as well as the over-reliance on television income clubs are
losing fans at the stadium and contributing to the decline in attendance.

The boundaries of spectacle and regulation were pushed on the football pitch by
Berlusconi, as he had previously done with television. In 1987 he deployed Arrigo Sacchi
as coach, who had never played the game professionally but knew how to organise a
team. Sacchi abandoned man-marking and introduced zonal defending which allowed the
team to play a high tempo pressing game (Foot 2007: 221). This style of play was in stark
contrast to the staid, catenaccio defensive style that typified many Italian sides in the postwar period. This style of play was complemented by the signing of three of the best
players in the world; the Dutch trio of Ruud Gullit, Frank Rijkaard and Marco Van
Basten. In keeping with many European nations, Italy placed restrictions on the number
of foreign players who could play in each match. Throughout the 1980s the number of
foreigners permitted in a team fluctuated between zero and three, before being

151

suspended for Europeans as a result of the Bosman case in 1995 (Foot 2007: 571). In
1992, Jean-Pierre Papin was signed from Marseilles for a world record fee of 10 million.
This introduced the squad system to European football as AC Milan already had the full
quotient of foreign players. It prevented their rivals from having the best players and also
provided a squad strong enough to compete on all fronts (Porro and Russo 2000: 367;
King 2003). It is also alleged that traditional patrimonial practises were utilised to
maintain a financial advantage. After the signing of Jean-Pierre Papin, AC Milan paid
another world record fee of 13 million for Gianluigi Lentini. AC Milan was accused of
paying the Torino chairman 5 million, outside of the accounts to obtain Lentinis
signature (Lane 2004: 63-4). The club was eventually acquitted in 2002 due to statute of
limitations as the trial ran out of time.

AC Milan also implemented a professional training and recruitment programme to

ensure the best players were signed. The MilanLab is based at the Milanello training
facility of the club.24 It utilises extensive research to forecast physical and psychological
aptitude. Through the PAS (Predictive Analysis Server) technology they predict the
possible risks to the players. This allows the club to support their current players and
predict which possible new players will be able to fulfill their role within the club. As the
originator and head of MilanLab, Jean Pierre Meersseman states: If you can predict the
possibility of injuries, you stop the player before it happens (Wilson 2009). Through
training and medical diagnosis AC Milan had demonstrated a further professional
approach to football. Many other clubs initiated medical support for footballers. In many
cases support came from pharmaceutical products, many of which were outside
regulations. Star players of Napolis scudetto winning team were found guilty of drug use.
Notably this included their talismanic captain and star, Maradona, who was addicted to
24

http://www.acmilan.com/InfoPage.aspx?id=41293

152

cocaine and banned for the use of ephedrine in 1991 (May 2004). Napoli later admitted
that it circumvented the dope tests through the switching of samples (Foot 2007: 269). In
1998 the Roma manager, Zdenk Zemen suggested that Football must get out of the
pharmacy (Eve and Goodbody 2004; Foot 2007: 267; Goldblatt 2007; Malcolm and
Waddington 2008). These allegations led to an investigation which found that Juventus
had two-hundred and eighty-one different pharmaceutical products, most of which were
permitted prescription substances (Malcolm and Waddington 2008). Many players
demonstrated evidence of enhanced red blood cell levels that suggested possible use of
EPO (and at levels that would lead to bans in cycling) (Malcolm and Waddington 2008).
In a classic Italian solution, Juventus were found not guilty as it could not be proved that
they had ordered the administration of drugs. The doctor, Riccardo Agricola, was
sentenced to twenty-two months in prison, but subsequently cleared on appeal (Hawkey
2006; Kempson 2009). A further doping scandal emerged in 2001 when Dutch stars Jaap
Stam and Edgar Davids, and Fernando Couto of Portugal were found guilty of using
nandrolone. Four years later startling footage emerged of the Parma player Fabio
Cannavaro (and future World Cup winning captain) injecting himself with a substance he
later claimed was vitamins (Malcolm and Waddington 2008). Despite increased testing
from the authorities, the clubs were continuing to circumvent the regulations in order to
achieve success.

The success of AC Milans strategies was realised both on an off the pitch. Within two
years of Berlusconis purchase, AC Milan had won the scudetto and this success was
repeated the following year with the European Cup. In the six years between 1988 and
1994, AC Milan won four scudetti, three European Championships, two Intercontinental
cups and three Supercups (Porro and Russo 2000: 354). They had been transformed into
a financial and football super club. The success of his model relied on continual on-field

153

success and maximised television income. Therefore success in European competition

was required to sustain maximum revenue. The knock-out structure of the European
Cup meant that there was always a danger of large clubs, such as AC Milan, being
knocked out by smaller clubs (King 2004). In Berlusconis own words, The European
Cup has become a historical anachronism. It is economic nonsense that a club such as
AC Milan might be eliminated in the first round. It is not modern thinking (Hughes
1993). In addition to the clubs, the national broadcasters and UEFA would lose revenue
through the early elimination of larger clubs. This was observed in 1986 when both
Juventus and Real Madrid were eliminated before the quarter finals of the competition
(King 2003). As a consequence, UEFA introduced seeding to the competition, before
introducing a coefficient system designed to calculate the success of individual clubs and
individual leagues. As King highlights: The seeding system was a conscious concession
to the big clubs in the biggest markets (King 2003: 139). By weighting the competition
in favour of the larger clubs from the larger leagues, UEFA could ensure their longer
participation in the competition. This in turn provided additional television revenue and
greater exposure and revenue for the clubs.

Television revenue and market exposure was crucial for the transformation of the
European Cup in 1992. Significantly, Silvio Berlusconi was a key driver of this
transformation. In 1988, Berlusconi and the president of Real Madrid, Ramon Mendoza,
proposed a new European competition based on the world cup format of mini-leagues,
with the winner of each group progressing to a knock-out quarter-final (King 2003).
When UEFA rejected this idea, Berlusconi commissioned Alex Fynn of Saatchi and
Saatchi to propose a blueprint for the reform of European football (King 2003).
Although Fynns proposal of a regional Superleague was not implemented, it created the
right environment for further debate. Two years later Ramon Mendoza and the chairman

154

of Rangers, David Murray, submitted another proposal for a mini-league which was
adopted by UEFA for the 1991-2 season. The following year UEFA re-branded the
competition as the Champions League (King 2003; King 2004). The formation of the
Champions League created a new brand that was used to market the competition to
investors (King 2004). UEFA created a family of corporate sponsors who had exclusive
rights to the new branding. Likewise, television packages were sold to the highest bidder
based upon market share. Therefore, those nations with the largest television market,
such as England, Italy, Spain, Germany and France, paid more for the exclusive rights to
broadcast the competition. This aligned to the wider transformations that had taken
place elsewhere in sport, as had occurred with the World Cup and Olympics (Tomlinson
and Whannel 1984; Sugden and Tomlinson 1998; Maguire 1999). It also provided
increased revenue to UEFA and the football clubs participating which instigated a
transformation of Italian football.

The Financial Rise and Fall of Italian Football

Increased revenue derived from larger television deals and European competition fuelled
the growth of Serie A. Italian football experienced a growth in popularity after the
success of the Italia 90 World Cup and the continued success of clubs like AC Milan.
Footballs popularity ensured the economic support for clubs to purchase the best
players in the world. AC Milans success was supported by the Dutch trio of Marco van
Basten, Ruud Gullit and Frank Rijkaard, while Maradona helped Napoli to break the
Turin-Milan monopoly. Later Juventus signed players such as Roberto Baggio, Zindine
Zidane, and Edgar Davids. In 1992 alone the world transfer record was broken three

155

times by Italian clubs.25 As Serie A attracted the best players in the world, this fuelled
interest in the league and provided increased revenue from global television deals. It was
this success and popularity which saw the television programme Football Italia broadcast
on British television.

The economic transformation coincided with an increase in industrial patronage in

Italian football. The political processes of de-regulation that affected the media and
business also occurred in football. Regulations governing the ownership of football
teams where relaxed in the 1980s, and this permitted Silvio Berlusconi to purchase AC
Milan (Porro and Russo 2000). The transformation of European football acted as catalyst
for other businesses to intensify their links with Italian football. As Tim Parks states, In
Italy, you havent really arrived until you own a football club (cited in Arie 2004). In
addition to the Agnelli family who owned Fiat and Juventus and Berlusconi who
combined his media operation and AC Milan, many other clubs became incorporated
into this wider patrimonial network. The film producer Mario Cecchi Gori bought
Fiorentina in 1990. After Cecchi Goris death three years later, he bequeathed the club to
his son Vittorio, who was also a film producer and the owner of the telvision station
Telemontecarlo. The sport-media complex ensured that Fiorentina could sign star
players like Gabriel Batistuta and Rui Costa. Meanwhile, Sergio Cragnotti, the owner of
the food conglomerate Cirio (which owned Del Monte), bought Lazio in 1992. He
funded the transfers of a number of international stars, such as Pavel Nedvd and Paul
Gascoigne. Lazio became the first club to float on the Milan Borsa stock exchange in
1998 before winning its second scudetto in 2000 (Capone 2000). Roma followed Lazios
lead and floated two years later. The oil tycoon, Franco Sensi, purchased AS Roma in

25

Jean-Pierre Papin moved from Marseilles to Milan for 10 million, before Gianluca Vialli signed for
Juventus from Sampdoria for 12 million. This was followed by Gianluigi Lentinis move from Torino to
Milan for 13 million.

156

1993 and funded the signing of players like Gabriel Batistuta (in 2000). The financial
contribution from flotation led to Roma winning the championship in 2001. Elsewhere,
the dairy company Parmalat, which was controlled by the Tanzi family, bought Parma
and other football clubs in South America. They used these clubs and their players to act
as ambassadors and advertising agents for Parmalat in addition to utilising them for
Parma football club (Porro and Russo 2000: 367).

The Italian model of family capitalism permits direct involvement from owners and
presidents. Many Italian club presidents remain in close control of their clubs, especially
over the recruitment of players and managers. For example, the president of Livorno is
Aldo Spinelli, the owner of a major Italian logistics company, Gruppo Spinelli.26 Towards
the end of the 2008-2009 season, as the team faltered whilst pushing for promotion,
Spinelli took an active participation in the management of the squad. As well as sacking
the previous manager with two matches remaining in the season, he gave motivational
speeches at training and sat on the bench in these final matches. This continued into the
following season when Spinelli sacked the young manager Gennaro Ruotolo a mere two
months into the new season and replaced him with the effervescent Serse Cosmi.
However, Cosmi resigned his post in January 2010 citing constant presidential
interference. He subsequently retracted his resignation after talks with Spinelli (La
Repubblica 2010; La Repubblica 2010). Cosmi was eventually sacked three months later,
which saw the return of Ruotolo (La Repubblica 2010). This presidential style is in
addition to the regular space that is dedicated to Spinelli in the local newspapers. Before
every match there is a comprehensive preview of the match, with sections dedicated to
the journalists preview and the comments of the manager. In addition there is a section
detailing the thoughts of the president, Spinelli. This is replicated in television broadcasts
26

http://www.gruppospinelli.com/home.htm

157

and the national newspapers, where the quotes of the president often take precedence to
those of the manager or players.

Livorno and Spinelli are not unique within Italian football. Some owners revel in the
autocratic image they portray. Maurizio Zamparini, the owner of Palermo, is a selfconfessed mangiallenatori (manager-eater) who has sacked twenty-seven managers in
fifteen years with Venezia and Palermo (Bandini 2008). Likewise, Aurelio De Laurentiis,
the film producer and owner of Napoli also takes an active role in the running of the
club. This has included entering the changing rooms at half time and interrupting the
managers team-talk to give his own motivational speech (Bandini 2009). Berlusconis
interest in AC Milan was not restricted to the business aspects of the club. Although his
role as Prime Minister has reduced his participation, Berlusconi stills maintains some
direct involvement. In the summer of 2009, Berlusconi is alleged to have made former
World Player of the Year, Ronaldinho, stand on a table and declare that he would act
more professionally (Bandini 2009). The following summer, Berlusconi unveiled the new
manager of AC Milan, Massimiliano Allegri, at a press conference and fielded every
question from journalists, including insisting that the new manager plays two strikers
(Callow 2010). Berlusconi even insisted that had he been the coach of AC Milan in the
2009-10 season, then AC Milan would have won the scudetto rather than finish third (La
Gazzetta dello Sport 2010).

The fans are incorporated into the owners patrimonial network through the signing of
expensive players. These players would operate as gifts to the fans. For example in the
summer of 2010, AC Milan purchased a number of star players, in particular Zlatan
Ibrahimovi from Sweden, and the Brazilian Robinho. With regards to the latter signing,
AC Milan vice president, Adriano Galliani, stated that Robinho Is a gift from

158

Berlusconi (Colombo 2010). Similarly, gifts can be given to the fans and owners of rival
fans. A similar comment was made when the striker Marco Borriello was allowed to join
Roma in August 2010 for 5m less than the asking price, Galliani said that Berlusconi
sanctioned the price cut because he had wanted to give a gift to our friends (Bandini
2010). During the same summer, AC Milan was on the receiving end of a gift. Genoa
purchased the Ghanaian striker Kevin Prince-Boateng from Portsmouth and
immediately allowed him to go on loan to AC Milan (La Gazzetta dello Sport 2010). They
also inserted a clause in his contract permitting AC Milan to purchase the player at the
end of the following season. Essentially, Genoas greater financial liquidity permitted the
purchase of a player on behalf of another club, and possible favours in return.

The direct involvement of presidents ensures that interactions are personalised. As has
been demonstrated elsewhere in Italian society, the networks of industrial patronage
extend into politics. Many of these new post-industrialists operated in extensive politicalindustrial patrimonial networks. Ultimately, the principal example in this case is the
Prime Minister of Italy who owns AC Milan, Silvio Berlusconi. His counterpart at Inter is
Massimo Moratti, the son of Angelo who constructed the Grande Inter side of the
1960s. In addition to being a director is his late fathers oil company, he is also a director
of Telecom Italia and Pirelli. His sister-in-law is Letizia Moratti, the current Mayor of
Milan, a former Education Minister and a former employee of RAI and Sky.27 Elsewhere,
Gianni Agnelli, the owner of Fiat and Juventus, was made a senator for life in Italys
parliament (Jones 2007: 187). Other club owners were members of parliament, such as
the DC supporting Franco Sensi of Roma and Luciano Gaucci of Perugia and Catania

27

http://www.comune.milano.it/portale/wps/portal/CDM?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/co
nnect/contentlibrary/In+Comune/In+Comune/Il+Sindaco/In+Comune_Il+Sindaco

159

(Bianchi 2004; Foot 2007: 256). These personalised, neo-patrimonial networks allowed
strategic actors to operate across boundaries to influence individual goals.

The neo-patrimonial network that exists between politics, business and football extends
beyond the football clubs. The weakness of the central authorities has permitted the
incorporation of the Federation into the patrimonial system of the elite clubs. The intertwined nature of Italian football sees powerful individuals in several positions in the
FIGC. For example:

On the one hand, we have Adriano Galliani, president of the Lega Calcio,
champion of the unity of Italian professional football, and guarantor of equal
treatment for small clubs with respect to the larger clubs. Moreover, he is also
meant to protect the small clubs against the threat of secession of the larger,
richer clubs. On the other hand, we have Adriano Galliani, a leading figure in the
G-14 who participates in secessionist plans at the national and international
levels. (Porro and Russo 2004: 226)

Gallianis position as head of Lega Calcio is fundamentally compromised by his position

as Vice-president of AC Milan. AC Milan is part of the former G-14 group of elite
European clubs who lobbied for increased individual control over national and
European affairs. Furthermore, AC Milan is also owned by Silvio Berlusconi who is in a
unique position as Prime Minister to affect the laws regulating the finances of football.
The inter-relationship between football, politics and business is not restricted to club
presidents and owners. The former president of the FIGC, Franco Carraro, was a former
Mayor of Roma, PSI member and Tourism Minister in the 1980s. He was also president
of MCC, a merchant bank owned by Capitalia. Capitalia was the major investor in a

160

number of Serie A clubs, in particular, Roma, Parma and Lazio. The financial
underwriting of Capitalia permitted a number of clubs to operate despite accruing
considerable debt. The president of the FIGC is also oversees Covisoc, the financial
regulator for the league. In this position the president has a duty to maintain the financial
probity and integrity of the league. However, this was compromised through Carraros
involvement with an organisation that underwrites certain clubs debts. Consequently,
patrimonial networks are re-trenched in a small number of dense familial and personal
networks.

Although the neo-patrimonial networks permitted rapid success in the early years of the
Champions League and expanding global television markets, they quickly proved unable
to further capitalise on the globalised market. Incorporation into the business networks
of leading families did not provide greater financial professionalism for Italian football.
Stock market flotation for Roma did not bring financial transparency and the club were
nearly bankrupt two years after winning the scudetto. The club continued with millions of
euros of debt until 2010 when it was brought under the administration of the clubs
major creditors, the Unicredit bank (Dinmore 2010). Meanwhile, the links between Cirio
and Lazio were so entwined that when Cirio encountered financial difficulties in 2002,
the club were directly affected. Lazio continued to be affected by widespread financial
problems until the club was bought by Claudio Lotito in 2004. This followed Fiorentinas
bankruptcy in 2001 which saw the Florentine club relegated to the amateur leagues. A
similar fate befell Napoli in 2004, who had 70 million of debts. The collapse of Italian
industrial patrimony occurred spectacularly with Parma, the football club owned by
Parmalat. When Parmalat went bankrupt in 2004, the football club was inextricably
linked and this affected results on the pitch. The Parmalat bankruptcy highlighted the
intricate nature of the patrimonial relationship between politics, business and football in

161

Italy. The intensification of relationships within the network affords the owners of the
businesses, and their businesses and clubs, a degree of support and legitimation. The
owner of Parmalat, Calisto Tanzi, built extensive networks with many powerful
politicians:

in the almost 40 pages detailed by prosecuting magistrates [investigating the

bankruptcy] there emerges a design created by 20 years of friendships,
acquaintances and links, resembling a large and intricate spider-web that Calisto
Tanzi spun with the political and institutional elite of the First and the Second
Republic You could call it a work of lobbying. Tanzi did not corrupt
politicians. He only wanted to establish strong links of friendship and
collaboration, thus creating a layer of protection for his activities. He financed
political initiatives, electoral campaigns, sponsored this or that event, provided
advertisements, entered into business with those people nearest to this or that
politician. Not much for the likes of him. From 4 to 6 billion old lira a year. In
exchange he wanted attention paid to the fortunes of his businesses. From a
certain moment onwards, however, Tanzi felt that he was being obliged to
finance the initiatives of politicians, their electoral campaigns, newspapers or
demonstrations. In some ways, to use a metaphor, from a spider that spun an
intricate web to capture insects he became a prisoner of the same web he had
constructed. (La Repubblica (13 February 2004) cited in: Della Porta and
Vannucci 2007)

Calisto Tanzi represents just one example of the extensive personalised neo-patrimonial
networks that inter-laced the worlds of football, politics and business. The collapse of
Parmalat also demonstrated the collapse of the neo-patrimonial system in Italian football.

162

The financial collapse of Italian football and companies like Parmalat and Cirio
highlighted the full range of creative accounting that was taking place within the football
clubs. The difficulty with football accounting is that it is very difficult to account for the
skills and depreciation of a footballer. As a result, statements of accounts become visible
illusions (Morrow 1999: 122). They only present an image of the financial situation of a
club. This saw a range of illusionary measures being employed in Italy. The most serious
example of this style of accounting was called plus-valenze (Foot 2007: 491). This is where
the profit made on the sale of players could be spread over an accounting term: Sales are
immediately entered into the accounts, whilst purchases are spread over the entire period
of the contract [original italics] (Foot 2007: 491). Traditionally, the smaller clubs would
benefit from this system through the sales of players to larger clubs, however the larger
clubs realised that they could also benefit. By 2002 over seventy percent of profits were
comprised of plus-valenze (Foot 2007). Complicated transactions took place where players
transferred between clubs at inflated prices to balance the accounts. This permitted clubs
to inflate their immediate accounts and provided a short term solution to financial
problems. A good example of such a practise was the swapped transfer of Fabio
Cannavaro and Fabian Carini between Inter and Juventus in 2004. Cannavaro was the
Italian captain (who subsequently lifted the World Cup in 2006) whilst Carini was a
Uruguayan reserve goalkeeper at Juventus. They were exchanged for the same value.
Effectively Inter gave away their best player and suggests that there were a number of
reciprocal favours exchanged between clubs (Foot 2007: 492.) Several players were
exchanged in similar ways between both Milan clubs during the 1990s (La Corriere della
Sera 2008).

163

Although plus-valenze accounting was technically legal, other clubs adopted more
controversial approaches. Roma were nearly bankrupt, despite winning only their third
ever scudetto in 2001. By the start of the 2003 season, they had to declare to Covisoc, the
financial regulator, that they could financially fulfil their obligations for the season. They
produced signed fideiussione, financial guarantees, to guarantee the financial eligibility for
the season. However, these fideiussione later turned out to be forged. Roma claimed they
were innocent and had been the victims of fraud themselves. Consequently, they were
allowed to continue operating (Foot 2007: 496). Subsequently, in 2005, Torino were
guilty of using similar methods (Foot 2007: 496). The result demonstrated that, as Porro
and Russo state, that:

Covisoc has had its powers hollowed out over time to such an extent that it
now operates on the opaque frontier between respect for accounting rules and a
technical-financial free-for-all (Porro and Russo 2004 : 223).

Covisoc was a faade, and Italian football was beginning to collapse. Wider economic
problems of Parmalat and Cirio affected Parma and Lazio. Meanwhile, clubs such as
Roma, Napoli and Fiorentina were in severe financial turmoil. The lack of political
support for Fiorentina and Napoli saw them subsequently relegated for financial
irregularities.

The financial crisis within the Italian football was severe and required political
intervention. The inter-laced neo-patrimonial networks operating in Italian society have
resulted in the strategic actors within football operating in politics. Berlusconi, in
particular had a vested interest in finding a resolution to the financial crisis. Despite the
deregulation rhetoric of the 1980s, Berlusconis government attempted to reassert state

164

control and reinforced the inter-related networks affecting football and politics. In
January 2003 the Berlusconi government passed a special debtspreading decree. Dubbed
Salva Calcio (Save Football) by the media, it allowed clubs to spread their debts over ten
years (Porro and Russo 2004: 221). Clubs such as AC Milan and Inter saved over 200
million. Juventus meanwhile accused the government and the clubs of administrative
doping (Foot 2007: 493). Luca di Montezemolo, the manager of FIAT, the owners of
Juventus, declared that this emergency decree was the exact opposite of that which
should be done in a serious country (Foot 2007: 493). The decree was declared illegal
under European law as it contravened competition laws and budgetary regulations
(Corriere della Sera 2004). This led to the government amending the decree. These decrees
permitted clubs to minimise the amount of tax they paid to the state and effectively this
turned Italian football into a state-subsidised industry (Porro and Russo 2004). Thus the
state made is easier for clubs to obtain licenses from Covisoc (Hamil, Morrow et al.
2010). The neo-patrimony of Italian politics and football ensured that the individual
interests of strategic actors in football were supported without addressing the
fundamental issues which caused the crisis.

The financial crisis further demonstrated the weakness of the federations regulation and
the growing strength of the elite clubs. Political-institutional decline of the FIGC and the
Lega Calcio was undermined by clubs who took their grievances to local courts, rather
than to the federation. Silvio Berlusconis government tried to restore the jurisdiction of
the sporting bodies with a law dubbed TAR stopper. The law aimed to bypass the local
courts, the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale (TAR), who always supported the local clubs
whenever they took their cases to court (Porro and Russo 2004: 223). The federations
that felt that justice was not being exercised by the local TAR, could go direct to the

165

Lazio TAR. The inability of the federation to arbitrate its members was a central cause of
the crises and reinforced its own crisis of legitimacy:

When an institution is no longer capable of resolving its internal disputes based

on its own rules and mechanism, forcing actors to look at other spheres of
justice, then the crisis has reached a condition that is close to terminal (Porro
and Russo 2004: 228).

The de-regulation of the football federation had a direct impact on its ability to regulate
the elite clubs. Those that had powerful political patronage were able to circumvent the
regulations. This was supported by the government who granted the clubs the right to
evade the federations arbitration courts. In addition, the government attempted to
provide state subsidies through salva-calcio. The Italian patrimonial system was bankrupt.

The collapse of the Italian neo-patrimonial system was highlighted in another scandal.
Illegal documentation was used to circumvent controls over players. Prior to the Bosman
ruling in 1995 de-regulating the market for footballers, many national leagues imposed
restrictions on the number of foreign players allowed to play in the league. The Italian
football federation has experimented with a number of quota systems since its disastrous
foray in 1908 which saw a number of clubs withdraw in protest. The situation was
further complicated by the use of oriundi, foreign born players of Italian descent. Quotas
permitting oriundi as additional foreigners saw the opportunity for players and clubs to
invent Italian ancestry to evade the restrictions. This led to a number of scandals
involving false passports. Many emerged in the 1940s and 1950s, yet the most
widespread passport scandal occurred in the 1990s (Foot 2007: 436). A large number of
non-Europeans, specifically from South America, produced passports with invented

166

Italian ancestry. Major players, such as the Lazio and Argentina midfielder, Juan
Sebastian Veron, Inter winger Recoba and AC Milan goalkeeper Dida were implicated in
the scandal. The FIGC once again demonstrated their inability to deal with the problem.
As the problem was so widespread and the repercussions potentially explosive, they
decided to remove the regulations of foreign players, at a stroke legalising those who had
infringed the rules (Jones 2007: 71-2). The FIGC reinforced its own crisis of legitimacy
by legitimising the actions of the clubs.

The collapse of the regulatory bodies strengthened the neo-patrimonial system.

Reciprocal favours became more significant in the absence of effective regulation.
Inducements were not always financial. In 1992 the Sporting Director of Torino,
Luciano Moggi, was alleged to have provided prostitutes for referees of Torinos UEFA
Cup matches. Moggi claimed that they were interpreters, and that he wasnt culpable if
they werent used for interpretation (Foot 2007: 255). In the circumstances no-one could
prove who requested the three women, and no charges were found. There are also many
instances of physical gifts being provided to referees. In 2000 Roma president, Franco
Sensi, was accused of trying to corrupt referees when he gave two 8,000 Rolex watches
to the head of the referee panel, as well as lesser priced Rolexes for the other thirty-seven
referees in Serie A (Capone and Cecere 2000; Carroll 2000; Hughes 2000; Foot 2007:57).
Sensi claimed conspiracy and said that it was normal practise which had never been
questioned in the past. Indeed, in 2004 Sensi provided six bottles of Krug champagne in
a Christmas hamper which he gave to every Serie A referee (The Observer 2004). Similarly,
the president of Perugia and owner of a racehorse stable, Luciano Gaucci, provided a
referee with assistance in purchasing three racehorses. The referee, coincidentally,
officiated in the same division as Perugia, and Perugia subsequently went on to win
promotion (Foot 2007: 255-8; Jones 2007: 274). Occasionally, the authorities punish

167

infringements of the rules which illustrate the disparity between clubs and reinforce the
crisis of legitimacy. In light of these events, the Roma president Sensi escaped censure.
Gauccis Perugia, however, were prevented from being promoted, whilst the referee was
banned for life and Gaucci for three years (Foot 2007: 258).

Football provides significant symbolic capital in Italy. The media interest provides the
president with public exposure; something that Berlusconi has exploited to his advantage
when entering politics. As Agnew highlights:

By June 2003, the accountancy firm Practice Audit estimated AC Milan to be 142.8
million in debt, while the club returned a 51.5 million loss for the financial year 20034. Berlusconi, however, understood that, in terms of image, AC Milan was well worth
the investment, and each year he came up with the cash to meet the clubs debts. For
someone with huge commercial and ultimately political ambitions in a country where
football is encoded into the DNA, four [now five] European Cup/Champions League
trophies and seven Serie A league titles over the next 19 seasons were worth more
than money could buy (Agnew 2006: 114)

As the inter-dependencies have intensified between politics, business and football,

prestige and symbolic capital have grown. Clubs and presidents have pushed the
boundaries of authority in order to maximise the benefits for themselves and their
families.

168

Calciopoli

The extent of the Italian neo-patrimonial system was spectacularly demonstrated in 2006.
The Calciopoli scandal demonstrated the extensive neo-patrimonial networks operating
within Italian football and how personalised contacts and quid pro quo favours had
become embedded in the system. A full investigation was not undertaken by the football
federation as the initial findings were passed to the President of the FIGC, Franco
Carraro, who chose to take no course of action. Politics, football and the federation were
so intertwined that the scandal could only emerge through the media and the judiciary.
An investigation into the Neapolitan organised crime network, the Camorra, revealed an
illegal betting ring in Naples. Separate investigations also took place into further illegal
betting rings in Parma and Udine. These were combined with earlier investigations into
the use of drugs by Juventus and a separate investigation into the sports agency, GEA
World, in Rome (Burke 2006; Marcotti 2006; McMahon and Buckley 2006; Foot 2007:
506; Jones 2007). As a result of these inquiries, the results of thirty-nine matches were
investigated and over forty people were investigated for sporting fraud. Over onehundred thousand conversations were transcribed over eight months by six transcribers
(Foot 2007: 505). The leaked transcriptions permitted the various strands of the scandal
to be woven together by the media and named after the Tangentopoli scandal. The
subsequent investigation was conducted by a Tangentopoli magistrate, Saverio Borrelli, and
dubbed piedi puliti or clean feet (Feltri 2006; Kiefer and Fisher 2006; The Independent
2006).

Global deregulation and extensive media coverage had facilitated the emergence of
charismatic leaders who can bypass regulations and use media to communicate direct to
the public. This has occurred in Italy with personalised politicians and football club

169

presidents. Calciopoli demonstrated the emergence of a charismatic leader who operated

out of the media spotlight. Luciano Moggi was the Director of Football at Juventus who
began his career at Napoli under Italo Allodi, the manager of Juventus at the centre of
Brian Glanvilles Golden Fix allegations of the 1970s (Glanville 1999; Hawkey 2006).
Moggi then went to both Roman clubs before making a similar cross-city move from
Torino to Juventus. It was whilst at Torino that Moggi was implicated in the alleged
procurement of prostitutes for referees. Through these various positions he built strong
networks with the politicians in the capital as well amongst the games administrators.
Calciopoli revealed an extensive patrimonial network of reciprocal favours. Moggi was
nicknamed the lollipop man (la paletta) because he controlled the traffic between the
clubs, referees, players and their agents (Dunne 2006). He was at the nexus of a network
of referees, players, politicians and agents and made over four-hundred telephone calls
per day across the network to create la sistema Moggi (The Moggi System) (Mensurati
2007).

Moggis system required a network of compliant referees. A wider culture suspicion of

central authority in Italy has also resulted in match officials being viewed with distrust.
Fans felt that referees suffer from sudditanza psicologica (physiological subjection) and
would naturally favour large clubs to ensure a successful career (Foot 2007: 501; Jones
2007: 277). In the 1926 Viareggio Charter, a committee was created to select referees for
matches. The details of these selections were kept secret in order to prevent corruption.
However, this situation quickly became unworkable as the information became valuable
to fans and clubs. By the 1980s allegations were made regarding two back-to-back
championship wins for Juventus in 1981-2 that were categorised as thefts (especially by
the fans of Roma and Fiorentina who lost out) due to the refereeing decisions in favour
of Juventus. As a result the FIGC implemented a ballot to draw referee names at random

170

and in the only year this was performed, a small provincial team, Hellas Verona, won
their only scudetto in 1985. This has become an oft-quoted example used by fans to
prove the favouritism towards larger clubs (Parks 2003; Foot 2007: 56). The FIGC
reinforced its lack of authority by reverting to a selection committee in the following
year. Under this system, in 1999 Paolo Bergamo and Pierluigi Pairetto had become the
joint heads of the Italian referees association with the power to designate referees for
matches. Three years later Pairetto became the vice-chairman of UEFAs referees
commission (Dunne 2006; Marcotti 2006).

Moggis own neo-patrimonial network allowed him to influence the choice of referees.
Moggi was close friends with both Pairetto and Bergamo and persuaded them to use
their discretion to direct certain referees to certain games. They recruited another referee
to act as an intermediary. Massimo De Santis was a world respected referee who had
been selected to officiate at the 2006 World Cup in Germany; a position he subsequently
lost after the scandal broke (Dunne 2006). De Santis took a certain amount of pride in
the role he played. He was accused by Livorno president, Aldo Spinelli, of being part of
the Roman Gang and as a consequence was punished by De Santis. After refereeing a
match between Livorno and Siena, De Santis sent off the Livorno player Fabio Galante
after seventeen minutes. The referee was recorded speaking to Innocenzo Mazzini, the
vice-president of the FIGC: Mazzini said poor Spinelliyou were, as always, splendid,
to which De Santis replied, Did you see? Ready and go, one off (La Repubblica 2006).
This network of compliant referees would assist Juventus by dismissing rival players like
Fabio Galante at Livorno or by showing leniency to Juventus players. This system also
applied in games that did not involve Juventus so that their rivals star players would be
booked or sent off so that their suspensions would coincide with the game against
Juventus (Dunne 2006; Jones 2007: 272).

171

Moggi influenced the referees in a variety of ways. As Juventus was owned by Fiat,
Moggi could access staff discounts on Fiat cars. These he would provide to acquiescent
referees at a discount of between twenty-three and fifty percent (Dunne 2006; Jones
2007: 271). In one case he called the Agnelli house to request a four-door Maserati as a
gift for an important friend (Corriere della Sera 2006). Pairetto subsequently called the vicepresident of the FIGC, Innocenzo Mazzini, to state that he had the car. This was not the
first time gifts had been provided to referees as the Roma president Franco Sensi gave
gifts of Rolex watches in 2000 and Krug champagne in 2004. Moggi also resorted to
physical threats. In one transcript, the referee observer Pietro Ingargiola was overhead
speaking to Tullio Lanese, the president of the Italian Referees Association:

Ive never seen anything like it in my life. Moggi and Giraudo [Juventus
Chairman] go in, and Moggi starts really threatening him [the referee, Paparesta],
with his finger right up to the referees eye. He was shouting at the linesman too,
Youre an absolute disgrace, not giving that penalty, how dare you? I pretended
not to see anything and went to the toilet (Marcotti 2006).

This is confirmed by Moggi himself, in another transcript when he says that I locked the
referee [Paparesta] and linesmen in the toilet and took the keys away with me to the
airport. (Marcotti 2006).

Moggi used his personal relationship to exert pressure onto Pairetto and Bergamo. The
following exchange demonstrates the tone and exasperation of Moggi after Juventus
drew 2-2 with the Swedish minnows in a Champions League qualifying match:

172

Moggi: But what the fuck kind of referee did you send us?
Pairetto: Fandel is one of the best...
Moggi: Miccoli's goal was valid.
Pairetto: No it wasn't.
Moggi: It was valid, it was valid.
Pairetto: He was in front...
Moggi: What are you talking about in front? And anyway, all through the game he
messed things up for us.
Pairetto: But he's one of the top...
Moggi: He can go and fuck himself. And for Stockholm [the return leg] I'm
counting on you. (Corriere della Sera 2006)

Moggi clearly expected a favour in return from Pairetto for the poor performance of the
German referee Herbert Fandel. He later discovered that the English referee, Graham
Poll was to officiate the second leg. He subsequently rang Pairetto to find out why the
Portuguese referee Lucilio Cardoso was not officiating. Pairetto expressed surprise and
stated that something must have happened at the last moment, I have Cardoso,
something must have happened he must have been sick or something like that
(Corriere della Sera 2006).

Television became another medium to coerce referees. Neo-television has contributed to

an increasing television audience for football (Porro 2008: 60). The football talk show is a
significant contributing factor of this audience share. These shows, like Il Processo, make
extensive use of the moviola (slow motion replay) to analyse contentious decisions,
especially disallowed goals, offside decisions and fouls. The moviola helps to increase the
emotional and dramatic narrative of the game as it fuels debate. The centrality of the

173

technology has entered Italian language, with an episodio da moviola being a controversial
incident within the game (Foot 2007: 69). Every Monday the most popular Italian
national newspaper, La Gazzetta dello Sport, has a match-by-match round-up of these
episodi da moviola.28 Despite the fallibility of referees, the moviola proves their
incompetence. The hyper-real emotion of neo-television becomes heightened as the
referees decisions become scrutinised. This has led to the role of the moviola being
pinpointed as a key factor in discontent and destabilisation of the referee. It has
suggested that it was attributable to fan violence and the referees association took Aldo
Biscardi, the host of Il Processo, to court (Foot 2007: 70). In the year before Calciopoli,
Pairetto and Bergamo admonished the media for their excessive use of the moviola by
highlighting the fact that television had the benefit of the images of forty television
cameras, and the time to replay and dissect decisions, whereas the referee had to make
the decision in real time (Monti 2005). More recently, the respected ex-referee, and 2010
chief referee, Pierluigi Collina, stated that the problem in Italy [the referees] whistle
every contact: the referees have fear of being judged in the evening by the moviola and in
this way, in doubt, they whistle (Palmeri 2010). In this way neo-television reinforces the
sudditanza psicologica exerted on referees to benefit influential teams. The distinction
between the neo-television of Mediaset and the regulation of RAI was confirmed in 2010
when the state broadcaster announced that it would be ceasing to use the moviola during
its football talk shows (La Gazzetta dello Sport 2010).

Moggi used television and the moviola to exert more psychological pressure over the
referees. He realised that more people would have their opinions formed by the
television, than physically in the stadium. He was a close friend of Aldo Biscardi, the
creator and presenter of the longest-running and most popular football show in Italy, Il
28

For example see the following from the first round of matches of the 2009-10 season:
http://www.gazzetta.it/Calcio/24-08-2009/materazzi-alvarez-501118219157.shtml.

174

Processo (Kiefer and Fisher 2006; Jones 2007: 271). Once again, Moggis social capital
lubricated the network. Moggi helped choose the guests and even fixed the results of
phone polls. He asked Biscardi to minimise analysis of debatable decisions. For example
after AC Milan striker Andriy Shevchenko was controversially denied a penalty, he called
Biscardi and said: You need to lay off the referee in this one. You either say the referee
was correct in his decision or you dont show the images at all and gloss over it.(Italian
Calcio Blog 2006). Referees that refused to co-operate would be disgraced on air as
Moggi could request a debatable decision to be shown, and debated at length to discredit
the referee. (Burke 2006). For example, the following conversation took place on 18
October 2005 between Moggi and Fabio Baldas, one of Italys most famous football
presenters and an ex-referee:

Baldas: How are you? Well?

Moggi: Good.
Baldas: Listen Luciano, today we haven't got much ... there is ... [just] Rodomonti
[the referee for a game between Cagliari-Milan over the weekend, later
investigated but cleared by the tribunal]. Is it OK if we make him look bad? If
you agree, of course ...
Moggi: Oh naturally.
Baldas: And then? And then? There's always Siena-Fiorentina ...
Moggi: But was there a penalty?
Baldas: Er ... bloody hell, yes, there was a penalty! ... And there Rosetti [a referee,
also cleared by the inquiry]. You know the guy ... But if we show him, what are
we going to do?
Moggi: No, no, leave him alone ... just drop the Siena game.
Baldas: OK ... if I need a favour will you do me a favour?

175

Moggi: No problem.
Baldas: You'll call me back soon?
Moggi: Yup, soon.
Baldas: Fine, bye (La Repubblica 2006)

As with previous conversations, there is succinctness. Moggi did not request any
particular action against the referee Rodomonti; he trusted Baldas to perform correctly.
In return Baldas requested of Moggi, if I need a favour will you do me a favour?. A
favour bank was created where Baldas now had a credit. As with those referees that
complied, television presenters that acquiesced to Moggis demands got favours in
return. As general manager of Juventus, Moggi had access to the players of Italys most
popular club, and some of the best known players in the world. Many of these players
were Italian international stars and this increased their desirability to the media. In return
for showing the highlights that Moggi requested, Juventus general manager would
provide exclusive access to these players for interviews and features (Burke 2006). Moggi
also had access to a wider network of players through the sports agency GEA World.

Globalised sport has seen the increase in third party intermediaries which has expanded
the opportunity for familial patrimony in Italy. De-regulation of sporting contracts,
accelerated by the Bosman case, has seen the introduction of a professional group being
introduced to the network, including lawyers, accountants and consultants (Maguire
1999; Sugden 2002). Investigations by the Italian anti-trust commission during Calciopoli
highlighted that there were 233 agents working in Italy (AGCM 2007). GEA World was
the largest sports agency in Italy with nearly an eighteen percent share of the market
(AGCM 2007; Jones 2007: 273). The agency was formed in 2001 when three agencies
merged: General Athletic; Football Management; and Riccardo Calleri. These three

176

agencies demonstrate the familial nature of Italian football and business (see figure 4.1).
Calleri, is the son of a former Genoa and Lazio president, Gianmarco Calleri. Meanwhile,
General Athletic was comprised of Andrea Cragnotti, who is the son of former Lazio
and Cirio president Sergio Cragnotti. Cirio went bankrupt at the same time as Parmalat,
who were owned by the Tanzi family. Their daughter, Francesca Tanzi was also a
shareholder of General Athletic. Alongside Francesca Tanzi was Chiara Geronzi, the
daughter of leading Italian banker, Cesare Geronzi, who was also investigated as part of
the Parmalat collapse (Smorto 2001; Hamil, Morrow et al. 2010). Another major investor
in the agency was the bank Capitalia through a trust called Romafides. Capitalia was also
a major investor in Parma and Lazio, as well as underwriting AS Roma (owned by Rolex
giving Franco Sensi) and AC Perugia (owned by racehorse training Luciano Gaucci)
(Malagutti 2003). In addition, Capitalia owned a merchant bank called MCC whose
president was Franco Carraro, the president of the FIGC who suppressed the original
details of the Calciopoli scandal.

Figure 4.1 (Hamil, Morrow et al. 2010)

177

The third body within GEA World reinforces the familial networks operating in Italian
football. Football Management employed one of Italys leading agents, Franco Zavaglia,
as well as Giuseppe De Mita, a former Lazio official and son of a former Italian Prime
Minister, Circiaco De Mita (Burke 2006; Marcotti 2006). It also comprised of Davide
Lippi, the son of the Italian head coach Marcello Lippi. Lippi senior had also managed
Juventus on two separate occasions, from 1994-1999 and from 2001 until he took the
Italian position in 2004. In this position he would have worked closely with Luciano
Moggi, who began working at Juventus in the same year as Marcello Lippi started his first
spell as Juventus manager (Smorto 2001). Most significantly, the agency also employed
Luciano Moggis son, Alessandro. This provided Moggi with access to a wider range of
players with whom he could dispense favours to television and the newspapers. In
return, if players signed for GEA World, they would have access to the networks that
could provide them with the potential opportunity to play for Italys biggest and most
successful club, Juventus, or for the Italian national team. Indeed, there were serious
allegations of favouritism towards both Juventus and GEA players ahead of Italys
participation in the World Cup finals in Germany (Foot 2007: 513).

As with other aspects of Moggis patrimonial system, threats and undue influence were
used. During the instigations Romas general manager, Franco Baldini, claimed that
youth team players were placed under undue pressure to sign for GEA (Leroux 2008). In
2005 the former Siena midfielder, Stefano Argilli, was forced to leave the club because he
refused to sign for GEA. He said that Our new manager was GEA, our general
manager was GEA, half the team was GEA. It was clear to me that if I wanted to stay, I
would have to sack my agent and join GEA as well (Marcotti 2006). It didnt end at
players leaving clubs for not signing with his sons agency. Through his connections and

178

control of agents he could end the careers of those players that displeased him. Fabrizio
Miccoli and Enzo Maresca ended up playing in Portugal and Spain respectively and this
effectively ended their international chances (Jones 2007: 273). Even major players such
as Thierry Henry, Zinedine Zidane and Edgar Davids have been sacrificed when they
didnt succumb to Moggis wishes (Jones 2007: 273). Not only did this control amplify
the opportunities for Moggi to influence television, it also suggests the possibility of
influence of players and teams (Burke 2006). An acute example is that of Siena. When
Juventus played Siena in May 2006 (before the scandal broke), the press highlighted the
close financial links between the two clubs. Of the fourteen players in the squad to play
against Juventus, seven of them were GEA players, as was the coach Gigi De Canio and
the director of football Giorgio Perinetti. After a losing streak of seven games, Juventus
duly went three-nil up inside seven minutes and this did nothing to dispel the rumours of
Juventus undue influence (Richardson 2006b).

The inter-connections between Italian football, business and politics was further exposed
during Calciopoli. Moggi had many friends within politics and would extend the same acts
of patrimony on politicians. The Interior Minister Giuseppe Pisanu was a close friend of
Moggi and consulted with him when Pope John Paul II died to see if the league could be
suspended (Sarzanini 2006)29. The contact between Pisanu and Moggi was further
cemented over Pisanus request for assistance in support of his local side, Sassari Torres
del Viminale, who were given a problem referee. When the team won away for the first
time in two years a few weeks later, Pisanu rang back to ask Moggi if they could be
helped from relegation (Kiefer and Fisher 2006; Sarzanini 2006; Jones 2007: 271-2). The
Finance Minister, Dominico Siniscalco, was also in contact with Moggi to ask if his sons
could attend a Juventus training school. In return Moggi wanted help for a friend who
29

Moggi wanted Juventus game against Fiorentina to go ahead despite the mourning because Fiorentina
had a number of injuries and suspensions. His pressure did not work in this case.

179

wanted to transfer within the Guardia di Finanza (Italys tax police) (Kiefer and Fisher
2006; Sarzanini 2006).

Although Moggi and Juventus were central to the Calciopoli investigations, they were not
the only avenues of investigation. There had been long term suspicion within the Italian
game over the influence of Moggi and some openly tried to fight the system. As
repeatedly demonstrated, Moggi would use the network to damage those that did not cooperate. Fiorentina was bankrupt in 2002 and relegated to Serie C2. Their new president,
the owner of Tods shoes, Diego Della Valle, took over and guided the club back into
Serie A. Della Valle spoke out against the imbalance within the Italian game and
campaigned against the individual television rights that favoured the larger teams.
However, in the 2004-5 season, Fiorentina was facing relegation due to Moggis
influence; an influence so strong that Fiorentina had two players sent off in the first eight
minutes of a game against Sampdoria. Delle Valle repented and asked for Moggis
assistance. As a consequence Fiorentina avoided relegation that season but were
deducted points following the scandal (Dunne 2006; Marcotti 2006; Foot 2007: 509).
Lazio had faced similar financial problems to Fiorentina but were not relegated. After
Cragnottis arrest following Cirios bankruptcy, Claudio Lotito, the owner of a cleaning
services industry, bought the club. Lotito made similar requests of Moggi to help Lazio
avoid relegation (Foot 2007: 509). Franco Carraro, the president of the FIGC, also
supported Lazio. Carraro called the referee designator, Pairetto to say that 'Listen, we
need to give Lazio a hand.... In a subsequent conversation with the vice-president of the
FIGC, Lazio president Lotitio says So you have spoken to Carraro ... thats good ... that
means he is on my side (Burke 2006). In the following game Lazio beat Parma 2-0
thanks to a penalty that was controversially disallowed. A further club, Reggina Calabria,
was also investigated in the scandal as it transpired that club president Lillo Foti asked

180

Moggi for assistance to avoid Regginas relegation. The Tuscan club of Arezzo were also
penalised during Calciopoli for trying to fix matches in Serie B.

Calciopoli revealed that Moggi and Juventus were not the only club or individual to be
developing patrimonial networks. Silvio Berlusconis AC Milan was also trying to
minimise the influence of Moggi and Juventus by building a rival system. AC Milans
referees liaison officer Leonardo Meani was trying to build a separate influential network
of compliant referees (Dunne 2006). Meani was heard in phone-taps talking to the Italian
Football Associations head of linesmen, criticising the appointment of a linesman and
AC Milan lost to Siena: I dont want him. I never asked for him nor wanted him. As a
result he advised that: On Wednesday, try to send two intelligent ones (Williams 2007).
For a game against Chievo Verona, Meani asked for two linesmen by name, including
one, Claudio Puglisi, a noted AC Milan fan. Meani was granted his request from Gennaro
Mazzei, the head of linesmen and AC Milan subsequently won the match with Chievo.
The scandal highlighted that Leonardo Meani was performing his task with the full
approval of the vice-president of AC Milan, Adriano Galliani. As the prosecutor Stefano
Palazzi stated: Meani was in telephone contact with linesmen, who were asked, when in
doubt, to favour AC Milan. Galliani approved (Dunne 2006). Until the scandal, Galliani
was president of Lega Calcio, the Italian football league. In this role, Galliani was the
guardian of the probity of the leagues. He already had a conflict of interests in relation to
the arrangement and negotiation of television deals (Porro and Russo 2004). He now was
operating a Milan system that undermined the integrity of the league. Although he
denied the existence of a Milan system, Galliani resigned from his position at Lega Calcio
for his part in Calciopoli (although he has since rejoined the board of Serie A). AC Milan
was subsequently docked points and disqualified from the Champions League. However,
on appeal, they were reinstated and went on to win the trophy in the following year.

181

The expansive investigation into Calciopoli highlighted the extensive networks utilised by
two of the three biggest clubs in Italy. Inter were the third club of that triumvirate and
were not investigated, even though they had the most to gain from the penalisation of
their two main rivals. After the initial Calciopoli investigation had been concluded, an
alternative power base emerged across the city of Milan. In October 2006 it transpired
that Inter took an active role in the evidence gathering three years before the scandal
broke and were undertaking their own investigations into Massimo De Santis, the leading
referee in the scandal, whom they suspected of favouring Juventus (Richardson 2006).
They did this through the utilisation of phone taps executed by Telecom Italia. Telecom
Italia was also instrumental in authorising and placing the phone-taps that caught the
various protagonists in the Calciopoli scandal, and which were subsequently leaked to the
press. Once again, business networks help piece together the story. Telecom Italia is partowner of Inter and Massimo Moratti, the president of Inter, is also a non-executive
director of Telecom Italia. Although there is no suggestion that Moratti was personally
involved, Inter was complicit in compiling the evidence that led to the downfall of their
biggest rivals. A downfall that has led to Inter winning every subsequent scudetto and the
2010 Champions League

Summary

Italy has a long history of scandal and crisis. The crisis of legitimacy of the state is
reflected in a similar crisis of legitimacy for the football federation. This situation has
become manifest in the distrust of referees who have become symbolic of the crisis.
Patrimonial networks in business and politics meet in football and these networks are
utilised to circumvent existing regulations. These networks of inter-dependency have

182

intensified between a small number of family and personal contacts. Despite social
capital being generated, it is not contributing to a wider public benefit. Calciopoli
demonstrates the bankruptcy of this system. Serie A now has a tarnished image that is
impacting its ability to compete in the global marketplace. This is reflected in reduced
attendances and interest in the game. The failure of the neo-patrimonial system is
restricting Italian footballs ability to implement the necessary changes. The following
chapter will detail the match-day experience to illustrate that despite the politicaleconomic transformations that have taken place in Italy; these transformations have not
been undertaken by the clubs and authorities. The bankruptcy of the neo-patrimonial
system is impeding Italys ability to adjust to the new global order. Consequently,
stadiums and policing has not been radically transformed to adjust to the transformations
in global football.

183

SECTION 3

ITALIAN FOOTBALL FANS

184

Chapter 5
The Match-Day Experience: Stadiums and
Policing

Football spectators are invited by the clubs for entertainment and enjoyment Lord Justice
Taylor30

Quis custodiet ipsos custodies [who guards the guards]? - Juvenal

The early summer sun ensured a relaxing morning on the beach. At the cafes alongside,
hundreds of fans were enjoying a pre-match drink or lunch. Opposite the landmark bar
called the Barrachina Rossa, the police were anticipating the arrival of Lazio fans to
Livorno. Riot police stretched across the road that led to the entrance of the settore ospiti
where the coaches of the away fans would be directed. Meanwhile, further along the
road, young local male fans amassed behind the trees and bushes that divide the seafront
from the road in similar anticipation of the Lazio coaches. The buzz of excitement filled
the air as a police motorcycle drove down the road, quickly followed by four Lazio
coaches flanked by police patrol cars. A flurry of activity ensued as bottles and objects
were thrown at the coaches as they sped through to the away end. The youths melted
back into the bushes and the patrons of the cafes continued with their drinks. The
occasion marked a strange contrast to the exclusive villas that line the esplanade. The
Stadio Armando Picchi, located in the fashionable Ardenza district in close proximity to

30

Taylor, R. H. L. J. (1989). The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster.

185

the sea, is transformed when Livorno have a home match. Every match-day the
residential roads are closed with police cordons controlling access to the stadium. There
followed a two mile wile around the cordons to the home end in order to a guarantee
good vantage point for the match. Approaching the turnstiles, a chant erupted and a
group of ultr began marching towards the entrance, singing and waving a variety of
flags. Anticipating a queue at the turnstiles, we quickly showed our tickets and
identification and walked through, only to be confronted by a wall of riot police ready
with their shields and batons. They rushed towards the gates at the same time as the ultr
descended on the entrance. The police stopped and the gates were opened letting all the
ultr into the stadium. Stewards quickly beckoned us through the second turnstile as a
similar situation occurred with the ultr. The gates were opened and they marched
towards the home end, continuing to wave their flags and singing their anti-Fascist songs.
Despite the fragmentation of Italian politics, games between Livorno and Lazio
continued to provoke strong political emotions.

The match-day experience represents a significant aspect of Italian football. The

organisation and administration of the stadiums and police are major contributing factors
to the crisis in Italian football. As elsewhere in Italian football, the political and
administrative bodies have not adjusted to the transformations in the global political
economy. The continuance of existing patrimonial networks inhibits the opportunities
for the game to reinvent itself and halt the decline. There has been little change in the
policing of football matches or in stadium development and design. Italian football has
not embraced the changes that have taken place elsewhere and this is impeding their
ability to rectify the situation. Through analysis of the fans experience, it will be shown
how the failure of the organising bodies to correctly identify and implement coherent
strategies is affecting the fans, and ultimately harming the sport. Initially, there will be an

186

overview of stadium development within the wider political economy of sport before
addressing its development in Italy. Interviews with fans will be incorporated to illustrate
the problems that are being encountered. This will be followed with a section illustrating
the response from the authorities before providing a similar overview and development
of policing within football. This will be concluded with a discussion on the role of
stewards within football and their limited use in Italian football.

The Stadiums: Mussolini, Italia 90 and Beyond

The development of the football stadium reflects the political economic development of
football. Stadium development has evolved from unregulated spaces in public into multifunctional entities that illustrate the global business of the sport. As football has
developed into a multi-million dollar business with global appeal, the physical spaces
have had to develop in line with these transformations. As Paramio et al state: Modern
and postmodern stadium developments need to be linked to both the socio-economic
conditions of the capitalist mode of production as well as relevant sporting factors of
every historical period (Paramio, Buraimo et al. 2008). It has been shown in previous
chapters that political economic transformations during the 1980s contributed to a
realignment of Italian television and politics. These have impacted the economic aspects
of football and provided increased interest and revenues to clubs. Globally, these
transformations have been replicated within stadium development as stadiums have
shifted from focussing principally on sports and are now expanding their range of
services to maximise revenue (Bale 1993; Giulianotti 1999; Paramio, Buraimo et al. 2008).
However, Italy has not managed this transition well and this is affecting the ability of
football clubs to compete within Europe. This section will chart the development of the
football stadium before illustrating the current situation in Italy.

187

The development of football has coincided with the development of spaces for football.
Before the codification of football, folk games were played in unregulated spaces. Games
took place in fields, churchyards and public squares. They were often confined by the
existing natural boundaries, such as walls, ditches and buildings. Games of Calcio
Fiorentino were played in the piazza opposite the church of Santa Croce in Florence. A
1555 painting by Jan van der Straet depicts the edge of the pitch being de-lineated by the
crowds of spectators.31 Spatial regulation of this historic game emerged by the late
seventeenth century. Pietro di Lorenzo Binis 1688 print depicts railings around the
Piazza Santa Croce.32 This highlights the increased social regulation to maintain the
square free of traffic, rather than the regulation of an annual football tournament.
Nevertheless, these games were still played in public spaces, accessible to all. The
development of industrial cities saw the increased sub-division and regulation of space.
As modern codified football evolved, the physical space for playing the game became
privatised, regulated and commodified which assisted in the creation of football stadiums
(Bale 1993). The link between the wider political economy and sport converged as
grounds were built near large industrial areas with easy access to the emergent railway
infrastructure to encourage an active support (Inglis 1987: 12; Paramio, Buraimo et al.
2008).

Modern stadiums were functional and focussed on the core aspect of the club: football
matches. Matching the phases of globalisation highlighted in the Introduction, three
distinct forms of Modern football stadium have been identified: from the late nineteenth
century until 1920; 1920-1940; and 1940-1990 (Bale 1993; Paramio, Buraimo et al. 2008).
Functional football stadiums began to emerge during the early period of football
31
32

http://italophiles.com/medici_8.htm
http://www.sportbooking.eu/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/calcio_fiorentino_1688.jpg

188

expansion (Bale 1993; Paramio, Buraimo et al. 2008). During the inter-war period,
modern construction materials, such as steel and concrete were used to increase the
match-day capacity and enhance the comfort for the increasing numbers of fans. After
the Second World War, clubs began to incorporate architectural features to maximise
comfort and enjoyment. To increase the revenue from additional games, floodlights were
introduced to allow for regular midweek games. Covered terraces and additional tiers
were constructed so that fans were protected from the elements and capacity was
maximised. Most importantly these maximised the revenue for individual clubs.
Corporate boxes were incorporated into stadiums during the 1960s in a bid to increase
match-day revenue (Paramio, Buraimo et al. 2008). Modern stadiums also incorporated
increased social control. Not only was the space delineated to clarify and commodify the
space, it also demarcated class lines and provided clear social divisions (Giulianotti 1999:
67). Ticket prices were valued according to facilities and comfort, whilst barriers and
fencing were added to physically demarcate the divisions and prevent anti-social
behaviour, such as pitch invasions and hooligan fighting.

The Hillsborough tragedy provided the nadir for modern stadiums. After the tragic
deaths of ninety-six Liverpool fans, Lord Justice Taylor published a report in 1990
recommending a number of changes to the football stadiums. As Bale suggests:

In British football, 1990 might be flagged as the beginning of the postmodern

stadium when the metal fences surrounding many grounds were taken down and
scrapped (Bale 1993).

The Hillsborough tragedy highlighted the antiquated and dangerous stadiums in Britain
that were incoherently policed. Lord Justice Taylor reviewed the state of football in

189

Britain and recommended opportunities for resolution. The report recommended that all
grounds should be converted to all-seater to provide more control and safety:

Put together with progress towards all-seating, improved accommodation, better

facilities, improved arrangements for crowd control, and better training of police
and stewards, I believe these measures would give the best chance of eliminating
or minimising football hooliganism. (Taylor 1990: 75)

The combination of a number of recommendations transformed elite British stadiums, as

all clubs in the top two division have to have all-seater stadiums in place. All-seater
stadiums have led to numbered seating for all ticket holders allowing cameras, police and
stewards to identify and remove troublemakers. In addition, they became increasingly
comfortable spaces that could be enjoyed by all the family (Spaaij 2006). This contributed
to increased attendances and opportunities for market exploitation.

Stadium redevelopments no longer rely on the product of football to generate revenue.

Club superstores and outlets in the concourses have been incorporated into the stadiums
which sell a variety of merchandise. The stores are open throughout the week and are not
limited to fans match-day consumption. Food and drink facilities are also incorporated
into the new stadiums. Rather than fans consuming these commodities outside of the
ground, they are consumed within the ground and provide a source of revenue for the
club. Many stadiums have incorporated restaurants and hotels into their facilities which
operate throughout the week. Clubs and stadium owners also rent out the corporate
spaces within the stadium for meetings, exhibitions and conferences. All of these
generate income and positive emotions towards a football club as the club markets itself

190

as a corporate venue for engagements and as a space for match-day hospitality. As a

consequence the postmodern stadium is synonymous with corporate commodification.

Stadiums have become tourist spaces where post-tourists consume a range of

experiences (Urry 1990; Urry 2002). Some clubs have added a museum to symbolise their
status within world football. Barcelona and Manchester United are notable in this case
and have also added stadium tours to their portfolio of facilities and services (Paramio,
Buraimo et al. 2008: 528-530). Postmodern stadiums also use their facilities for other
unique experiences that are not restricted to that of the football club. Often international
matches or local tournaments are hosted. As the stadium is a facility that can host large
numbers of visitors, this permits the stadium to host alternative large-scale events. For
example, Wembley stadium has hosted Rugby Union, Rugby League, and American
Football matches, in addition to hosting Englands national tournaments and
international football matches. It also allows for various spectacular events to take place,
such as car racing at the Race of Champions. Music events have also become popular
features of new stadiums. International music stars invariably incorporate large stadium
events into their touring schedule. As a result, stadiums have become self-contained
service economies where consumers and fans purchase an increasing range of
commodities and experiences. In the case of the Amsterdam ArenA, they have even
generated their own currency for use within the stadium outlets (Giulianotti 1999: 83).

Innovative design and architectural elegance in postmodern stadiums mark a distinct

difference from the modern stadium with their functional approach. In addition to the
incorporation of architectural features, such as shops, museums and corporate boxes,
postmodern features are becoming architectural events. These redevelopments and
renovations challenged fans emotional attachments (Robson 2000: 111). Modern

191

stadiums generated positive emotions or topophilia, amongst fans who ascribed a symbolic
value to the stadium (Bale 1990; Bale 1993). The personal attachment and the
atmosphere generated by the collective solidarity of the crowd fuelled the construction of
emotional ties to their physical environment. New symbols are being created, as stadiums
become markers of high architecture. As eminent architects design stadiums, such as the
new Wembley stadium, designed by Sir Norman Foster, and the Michel Macary designed
Stade de France, stadiums are attracting renewed interests from fans (Paramio, Buraimo
et al. 2008: 527). These transformations have come to symbolise a clubs standing
amongst its peers as these stadiums become physical manifestations of the clubs status.
As King argues The international standing of clubs like Real Madrid and Barcelona are
physically demonstrated by the Bernabeu and Nou Camp stadiums (King 2003: 130).
Working class fans who resented the commercialisation of Manchester United, still took
pride in the fact that Manchester United was one of the best run clubs, and that Old
Trafford was the best stadium in England, especially in comparison to their rivals
Manchester City (King 1997: 342). New architectural status, allied with the shops,
museums and tour facilities, is contributing to stadiums becoming symbolic spaces for
fans and tourists alike.

Stadium redevelopment in Britain was facilitated by government support, driven by the

emotional tragedy of Hillsborough. As Piore and Sabel demonstrated, local government
assistance facilitated the growth and expansion of small, family-owned businesses in the
Emilian Model (Piore and Sabel 1984). Similar support from the British government
assisted stadium redevelopment, despite the free-market ethic of the Thatcherite
government which implemented the Taylor Report. The stadium renovations could not
be achieved through the free-market alone (King 1998: 100). Most grounds in Britain
were owned by the club and these clubs would not have been able to afford the costs of

192

renovation. As a result money from central government was provided through the
Football Trust, the Football Grounds Improvement Trust and the use of money from
the Football Pools. Taylor also recommended that co-operation could come from local
councils or from private-finance initiatives, such as supermarkets (King 1998: 102).
Similar co-operation exists when countries, such as the Netherlands and Germany, host
international tournaments and generate similarly powerful emotional foci for change.
English football also benefited from the initial injection of revenue generated by the
formation of the Premier League. Clubs like Manchester United realised that they could
incorporate the stadium into the overall package of football provided to fans (King
1998).

Ironically, Italy provided an additional impetus for stadium redevelopment in England.

The popularity and success of Italia 90 acted as a catalyst for the nascent Premier League
as interest in football increased. It also demonstrated the inadequate and antiquated
stadiums in use within Britain. As King notes: Italia 90 demonstrated the inadequacy of
English football grounds but also the potential market for football if it was properly
organised (King 1998: 103-4). Consequently, the recently renovated Italian stadiums
were used as a benchmark against which English stadiums were measured. It is ironic
that English stadiums were considered inferior to their Italian counterparts at this time,
but now those same Italian stadiums are being criticised for their anachronism. However,
it was the renovation for Italia 90 that meant that many Italian stadiums missed the
reforms that arose out of the troubles of the previous decade. Giulianotti held that Italian
stadiums had all the architectural qualities of high modernism, in facilities, scale and
shiny newness, but succumbed to the Fordist vices of soulessness and instrumentality
(Giulianotti 1999: 77). For example, many of the stadiums constructed for Italia 90 failed
to incorporate executive boxes into their structures (Giulianotti 1999: 67).

193

Early success inhibited the opportunities for Italian football to capitalise on the
economic transformation taking place in football. This is compounded by the ownership
structure of Italian stadiums. Most football stadiums in Italy are municipally owned and
are housed in multi-purpose complexes that house a variety of sports, many of which
date to the Fascist period. The area around the Stadio Armando Picchi in Livorno houses
a horse-racing track, basketball courts, football pitches and athletics tracks. Similarly, the
Stadio Olimpico in Rome is housed in the Foro Italico complex built by Mussolini to
host the Olympics. This complex also includes an international swimming pool complex
and a tennis stadium which hosts the Rome Masters international tennis tournament.
However, the nominal communal use maintains that stadiums are for the benefit of the
wider community rather than the club itself. The Stadio San Nicola in Bari is an apposite
example of a stadium that is encumbered by its communal status. It was constructed for
Italia 90 and the spectators gaze is poor, despite its architectural aesthetics.33 Many
communal stadiums, like the Stadio San Nicola, have running tracks encircling the pitch
which places the fans some distance from the pitch. Furthermore, as these stadiums are
communal, the clubs take little interest in enhancements or security issues (Kiefer 2007;
Sinnott 2007; Williams 2007b). Club owners do not welcome investing in facilities that
they do not own, especially when many of the clubs are in dire financial shape. The vicepresident of Juventus, Roberto Bettega, highlighted the difficulty Italian clubs are placed
in because they do not own the ground:

If we want to invest, to put money in to the stadium, to make it better, to make

it nicer, make it a meeting point for the supporters, you have to do it in a place
you know is yours or is yours for the next thirty or forty years. Why invest money
33

http://www.asbari.it/societa/stadio.html

194

in a stadium now when you dont know whether you will be playing in it next
year? (King 2003: 130).

Despite this, Juventus are one of the few Italian clubs that are interested in investing in
their stadium (Bramardo 2008; Squinzani 2009).34 Wider resistance to stadium
redevelopment is also apparent within the media. After Inter defeated Chelsea in a
Champions League match in March 2010, Il Giornales Tony Damascelli wrote:

Some people will be happy for the Uefa ranking points, I prefer to be happy for
the fact of having seen one of our teams win in London. However, what matters
isnt owning your own stadium and having a multimillion turnover, what matters
is not blowing a big match in the key moment (Damascelli 2010).

For this journalist, winning games is more important than any of the off-field aspects of
football. Despite this resistance, clubs in Italy are slowly beginning to see the wider
business benefits from stadium investment.

The transition to consumerism that has been facilitated in wider society through
television has not been utilised by Italian football clubs. The lack of investment in the
stadium not only impinges on spectator comfort, but affects the ability of the clubs to
maximise revenue. Although the San Siro has a shop for AC Milan and Inter, other clubs
do not have stores at their homes. Although some clubs, like Roma, have stores within
the city centre, smaller clubs, like Livorno, sell official merchandise in designated outlets
like the local shopping mall. During the 2008-9 season the club signed a deal with a local
sports shop to sell official Livorno products. However, they are constrained by regulated
34

http://www.juventus.com/site/eng/NEWS_newseventi_B2D329CAFFD04B44A8D09B1B25AEB571.asp
http://www.juventus.com/site/eng/NEWS_newseventi_BF81DA4EEB924A30ACC7B5FF63CDD5C0.asp

195

business practises which prevent them from selling non-clothing items, such as pens and
key rings, as this would infringe on the market of stationers and newsagents in the city.
This limits the range available and minimises opportunities to increase revenue. Likewise,
clubs do not see the benefit in providing tours for visitors. Again, the San Siro has
implemented this service. What differentiates the San Siro from other Italian stadiums is
the fact that Inter and AC Milan have purchased the ground (King 2003: 133). This has
allowed them to invest in these wider business practises and renovate the stadium.
Others are beginning to follow their lead. In November 2008, Juventus announced that
they would be investing in a new stadium (Bramardo 2008; Squinzani 2009).35 The
postmodern design of the stadium includes merchandising outlets, corporate facilities
and catering. Significantly, the football club will own the stadium. The San Siro in Milan
and Romas Stadio Olimpico are designated for redevelopment. However, these will
remain communal and therefore limit the club opportunities to generate revenue
(Deloitte and Touche 2010). Fiorentina have embraced the full concept of postmodern
stadium facilities through their Cittadella proposal. In September 2008, Fiorentina
announced that the new facility would house a modern art gallery, hotels, conference
facilities, and a new stadium (De Pinto and Pasquini 2008; Giudici 2010).

Stadium facilities in Serie B are indicative of the wider situation. Within Serie B during
2008-9, the three clubs that were promoted had the better stadiums. Livorno and Parma
had been relegated from Serie A in the previous season and Bari was one of the larger
teams in Serie B. As previously stated, the stadium of Bari was constructed for Italia 90
and failed to incorporate new facilities.36 Parma was one of the Seven Sisters, the seven
biggest clubs in Italy during the 1990s. Despite this, the Stadio Ennio Tardini highlights
the incomplete development of Italian football stadiums. Constructed in 1923, it has
35
36

http://www.juventus.com/site/eng/NEWS_newseventi_BF81DA4EEB924A30ACC7B5FF63CDD5C0.asp
http://www.asbari.it/societa/stadio.html

196

undergone a series of modernisations.37 The main stand has now incorporated fourteen
executive boxes, a shop and disabled facilities, but the terraces at the ends of the ground
are still uncovered temporary stands made of scaffolding polies and in need of extensive
redevelopment. In contrast to the status of Parma, Livorno is a smaller club with a less
distinguished history. Their stadium, the Stadio Armando Picchi, was constructed during
the Fascist period and inaugurated in 1933 and dedicated to the eldest daughter of Benito
Mussolini, Edda Ciano Mussolini.38 Little modernisation was undertaken until 2005 when
the club returned to Serie A which coincided with the visit of the President of the
Republic, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, who was born in Livorno. This led to the renovation of
the main stand, including the dining room, VIP area and seating. What marks Livorno as
different from other stadiums in Italy, is the incorporation of facilities to eat and drink
within the stadium. Underneath the Curva Nord, which houses the Livornese ultr, there
is a large food outlet that sells a range of fresh sandwiches and drinks. In addition there is
also a bar incorporated into the main stand. This operates as a franchise, and is open
throughout the week as many, mainly older, Livorno fans congregate to observe training,
debate tactics and play cards.

In contrast to these larger clubs, many stadiums in Italy are comprised of poor quality
communal stadiums. Piacenzas Stadio Leonardo Garilli is a typical Serie B stadium of
the 2008-9 season. The away support was housed in temporary stands made of
scaffolding which was distant from the action on the pitch. There was no seating, only
the metal steps of the temporary stand. The need for economic improvements was
exemplified at half time. Like many stadiums, the facilities are housed under the stands.
These stands are subdivided into sections partitioned by steel fences with each section
being able to be opened up dependent upon the away support. The refreshments were
37
38

http://www.fcparma.com/citta-e-stadio/il-tardini.html
http://www.livornocalcio.it/

197

housed in a shopping trolley on the other side of the steel partition. The two vendors
sold their items through the bars of the fence. Similar redevelopment was required for
the toilets, which were unisex and in need of complete renovation. Piacenza was not
unique. A similar structure existed in Grosseto with the Stadio Olimpico Carlo Zecchini.
The temporary metal stands comprising of metal steps were ill prepared for three
thousand Livorno fans attending a Tuscan derby in February 2009. The eating facilities
were more civilised than at Piacenza, where an attendant served snacks from a small
kiosk. However, the location of the toilets was unclear, and this resulted in the large
number of male fans utilising the back of the stands. In fact, the two unisex toilets were
housed in a section close to the home support and were ill-equipped to cope with the
volume of away support. These facilities were not restricted to the stadiums of provincial
clubs in Serie B. Poor toilets and eating facilities were demonstrated at Serie A clubs,
including Fiorentinas Stadio Artemio Franchi, and the Stadio Olimpico, home of Lazio
and Roma.

The communal nature of Italian stadiums is clearly reductive. By permitting the clubs to
own their own ground, they will be inclined to consider the experiences of their fans. If
the clubs can invest in the facilities then they can begin to capitalise on these investments
and begin to compete with other leagues. The following passage demonstrates the
problems and a potential solution:

The first thing to do, in my opinion, the stadiums must be new. Rebuilt Every so
often the Italians should copy the best of others because if not, we see the stadiums
of Serie A or Serie B, also the other leagues, the lower leagues, are not full. It is
difficult. Meanwhile, we see the English championship, the German championship,
the Spanish championship, and there are full stadiums and they have the same

198

television rights as us. A motive must be, therefore, that we make the stadiums not
belong to the community. In Italy the major part of the stadiums are communal. In
my opinion, the stadiums must be privatised, managed by the club, therefore with the
presidents etc etc. There must be space also for the children so they can see the
match. If you want to eat, in my opinion, there must be [an outlet] inside the stadium.
Also a museum and something for merchandising and the directors of the clubs
making this so. Privatise, why privatise? In my opinion, we could change the
hope/trust this way. The solution? No. However it could be a solution. (Max, official
supporters club director, personal interview, June 2009).

Max highlights that the stadiums should be privatised and sold to the clubs. In this
manner the directors of the clubs will be responsible. Max is aware of the
transformations taking place across Europe. Not only does he compare the full stadiums
of England, Spain and Germany, he suggests that the club would benefit by including
post-modern facilities, such as a museum, a family area for children, food and drink
outlets and spaces for merchandising. In addition, the creation of a family area would
actively encourage children and families to attend matches. This would inculcate them
into the football culture and encourage their future support.

Privatisation leads to the question of investment. Although there is widespread

agreement over the requirement for stadium redevelopment, there is little consensus over
who pays. With many parties having an interest in the stadium, the question of
investment is contested.

The community [should pay]. There are the damages effectively paid by the
community an act of damage ultimately Livorno has to pay the bill. There were
199

crazies, I dont remember the team, but they destroyed the toilets in the away
end. Who paid? Us! Our commune and therefore this is not right. As I said
earlier, if the drive is private security, they pay the damages because the private
security is given the authority to take with him the person that makes of damages
and makes them pay. (Max, official supporters club director, personal interview,
June 2009)

Max believes that the long-term cost of retaining the communal stadiums would be more
expensive than providing all of the police and investment required to supervise matches.

Just as Mussolini built many public stadiums in Italy to act as a powerful symbol,
contemporary urban governments try to use them as civic symbols. In an American
context, Schimmel has argued that public investment in stadiums for sports franchises
and mega-events operate as a form of irrational gambling and do not always provide
value-for-money for the public (Schimmel 2006). Elsewhere, Schimmel has highlighted
how urban elites use sport to promote their own interests in the name of regeneration
(Schimmel 2001). In the contemporary Italian context, neither the football clubs nor the
municipal authorities are compelled to invest in the stadiums. More importantly, the local
or national elites are not utilising public money to promote the wider regeneration of
football stadiums. Without statutory regulation enforcing clubs to provide adequate
facilities, the focus of club presidents will be to remain successful on the pitch. As one
respondant states:

The presidents here spend all the money on players salaries. Instead they should
invest in smaller stadiums, but comfortable (Greyhound, official supporters club
member, personal interview, June 2009)

200

Club presidents focus their attention on the playing staff until required by the state or
federation to upgrade stadiums. The weakness of central authority reinforces the
patrimonial nature of Italian football and means that the club presidents are not investing
in football clubs for the economic capital, but purely for the symbolic capital.
Furthermore, failure to invest in the playing staff and its effect on the performance of the
football team would see a president face extreme pressure from vocal fan groups, such as
the ultr. At the end of the 2008-9 season, the Livorno team struggled to maintain the
impetus required to win promotion back into Serie A. The team lost three home games
in succession. The subject of the ire of fans was not the team or the manager, but the
president, Aldo Spinelli. During home games against Ancona and Vicenza the home fans
chanted: Spinelli is not my president, in ten years he spends nothing. A similar
comment was voiced after the disagreement between the manager of Livorno, Serse
Cosmi, and Spinelli:

Spinelli has proved, once again, to be the wrong man here: we need someone who
can raise our attendances and give the supporters something to dream of. We don't
care if the balance sheet is immaculate... (Greyhound, official supporters club
member, personal correspondence, February 2010)

Spinellis focus on maintaining the finances of Livorno football club does not win him
favour with the fans of Livorno. Despite Greyhounds earlier comment suggesting that
presidents should invest in smaller, more comfortable stadiums, when the club struggled
on the pitch, money should have been spent on players. Fans feel that they are not
competing with their peers, who may not be playing by the same financial rules.
Consequently investment in a stadium is not seen as imperative.

201

It is illustrative of the Italian stadiums, that only three of them are fully covered.
Northern Italy especially, encounters the full spectrum of weather, from freezing
temperatures and snow in the winter to dry, hot summers. This can make for an
extremely unpleasant experience, as the following comment illustrates:

For the stadiums, in my opinion, they should make the stadiums a little more
covered, like in England. In Italy they make it disgusting for us. If it rains, we get
soaked, if it is windy, we get blown by the wind. This is the minimum. (Paolo,
official supporters club director, personal interview, June 2009).

Livornos Stadio Armando Picchi location near to the sea means that it feels the full
affect of extreme weather, as Paolo stated. However, this also occurs in the extreme heat
of the interior. The lack of roofs at the Artemio Franchi in Florence, for example, does
not provide shade in extreme sunshine. Stadiums have not adapted to their environments
and only three Italian stadiums are fully covered. In addition to the San Siro in Milan and
the Stadio Olimpico in Rome, the Stadio Comunale Luigi Ferraris in Genoa is fully
contained. Along with the San Siro, it is one of the few Italian stadiums which could be
classed as post-modern in Italy. It is the home of Sampdoria and the oldest club in Italy,
Genoa. It incorporates architectural style with user-friendly facilities (Giulianotti 1999:
77). Although many redevelopments of postmodern stadiums in North America and
Northern Europe have seen stadiums constructed outside the city, the Marassi, as it is
known locally, is located in the heart of the city. In a clear indication of a post-Fordist
approach, the city council has decided to sell the stadium. However this is not a
privatisation as suggested by Max, above, as the council is not selling to either of the
clubs. Instead it is selling the Marassi to a third party business consortium who will seek

202

to capitalise on their investment (Il Secolo XIX 2008). Although the introduction of new
business practises has seen the council release their interest in the facilities, neither of the
clubs are likely to be able to increase their own revenues. Any additional events that
could be located at the stadium, such as conferences and music events, will profit the
individual business owners, rather than the clubs themselves.

Revenue from television is not contributing to stadium development in Italy. In contrast

to the economic stimulus provided to the Premier League from Sky and the British
government, which assisted stadium redevelopment, television money is underpinning
the Italian clubs finances. This is impinging on Italian clubs opportunity to capitalise on
their match-day revenues. One respondent highlights how the clubs are completely overreliant on television revenues:

The clubs are totally dependent on television. They do not have commercial
aspects. They do not own the stadium and there are no merchandising outlets.
They do not invest in the stadium and depend exclusively on television. The
system is for television royalties only. Therefore it is very weak the system [We
need] less money from television and young people to return to the stadium. [We
need] stadiums in an English style to be a fan is more comfortable, more
customer focussed, and above all, the type of police are more civil. It is a civil
country (Greyhound, official supporters club member, personal interview, June
2009).

The patrimonial nature of Italian business and politics permitted the complete deregulation of television rules. This contributed to an over-reliance on television money
and precludes the development of other revenue streams or for the correction of other

203

problems. As already stated, the club presidents do not feel the need to invest in their
stadiums when they do not own them. They also do not have to invest in them when
they are competing in the national league, as television money allows them to compete
with their peers. Television also necessitates the requirements for fans at the stadium.
The choreographies in the stadium generate an additional atmosphere for the fans
watching football on television at home. In keeping with this notion, Silvio Berlusconi
has suggested that in the future, football spectators will be allowed free access in order to
generate the collective atmosphere required to enhance the television audience at home
(Armstrong and Giulianotti 1997: 25). The Italian patrimonial system is not generating
the collective will required to transform the stadium experience for fans which will
enhance the television event.

In light of the prestige accorded to football, the governmental approach to stadium

safety is unplanned and haphazard. There seems to be no over-riding principal driving
change within the Italian leagues. Part of the drive for change in England came through
the Taylor Report and this formed the legislative framework to facilitate improvements
which were enforced by government support. Money for safety improvements came
from the Football Pools and government incentives. Allied to this, commercial pressures
in England led clubs to invest in their own stadiums as they sought to maximise revenue
from all avenues (King 1998: 102). As King notes:

the Taylor report, despite its own intentions, did little more than provide judicial
legitimacy to the free-market arguments which proposed the easiest line of
reform for football in the light of the organic development of the sport, on the
one hand, and the transformations of British society, on the other (King 1998:
106).

204

The British governments political desire to impose a free-market approach, allied with
the desire to impose the rule of law, saw the legal and economic support to these
transformations.

In recognition of the necessity for new stadiums in Italy, the president of Livorno, Aldo
Spinelli, has suggested one proposal. He proposes that the state should provide tax relief
to the clubs to allow the reconstruction of new stadiums:

The Italian State received 100% of the taxes that we pay, I believe it is right that
for 2 or 3 years they reduce the levy in a way that the club, together with the
councils and the government, can make new stadiums (cited in: Liguori 2010).

Clearly, Spinelli is openly absolving club presidents from the responsibility for stadium
improvement. He also does not take into account the salva calcio debtspreading laws that
were implemented in 2003 which effectively acted as state aid to the clubs (Porro and
Russo 2004; Liguori 2010). Yet, Spinelli is also highlighting the need for state
involvement and sees the development of stadiums as a co-operation between the central
state, the council and the club. Stadium renovations in England could not be achieved
through the free-market alone (King 1998: 100). Similarly, Spinelli is proposing an
opportunity to inject public funds into the stadiums and launch the transformations
within Italy. However, without clear management of the funding, it is unclear that
stadium renovations would be managed in compliance with safety regulations.
Assurances must be made that the funds are used only for stadium development, and not
to be appropriated for players or the other functions of the clubs. Furthermore, there
needs to be a clear and unequivocal legal document with the appropriate sanctions to

205

drive through this change. The Football Trust and Football Licensing Authority
implemented new regulations governing safety in England (Hamil, Morrow et al. 2010).
The government enforcing the Taylor Report supported these. The problem in Italy, as
Francesio states, is money and will (Francesio 2008: 88). Many of the rules are in place,
but no one enforces them (Francesio 2008: 89). New regulatory frameworks are required
and supported politically.

There is an acknowledgment from the football authorities that Italys stadiums need to
be renovated or rebuilt. For this reason the FIGC submitted bids to host the 2012 and
2016 European Championships, both of which failed. Like Italia 90, these tournaments
were predicted to act as a catalyst for stadium rejuvenation. However, the patrimonial
nature of Italian politics has accumulated the power within a small number of elite clubs.
Therefore stadium regeneration would only benefit certain clubs, especially the elite
clubs. This is illustrated by the two exceptions to the communally owned stadium in
Italy. As their names suggests, the Stadio Olimpicos in Turin and Rome are owned by the
Italian Olympic Committee, CONI. As one of my respondents observed:

Rome and Turin have Stadio Olimpico made by whom? By CONI. Who are CONI?
We are. Therefore they have marvellous stadiums [and] they dont pay anything
because of CONI (Max, official supporters club director, personal interview, June
2009)

Max states that three of the biggest clubs in Italy (Roma, Lazio and Juventus) have better
grounds because the Italian public pays for their facilities. As a publically funded body,
CONIs support for these two stadiums ensures that the taxpayer is subsidising the
biggest clubs in Italy. The equivalent does not occur for clubs like Livorno whose

206

grounds are paid for by the Comune of Livorno only. The patrimonial connections
within Italian politics, business and sport permit the state subsidence of elite clubs to the
detriment of smaller provincial clubs like Livorno.

Lack of stadium development is contributing to the crisis in Italian football. Stadiums are
not generating the additional revenue required to allow Italian clubs to compete
economically in Europe. Reliance on patrimonial networks circumvents the need to make
profound changes to the infrastructure and allow Italian football to move forward. This
point was clearly made by Marco Mazzocchi, a former football analyst on Il Processo:

The stadiums are old, the tickets cost a lot and so the fans arrive and they are
already angry. The fans feel that the soccer world doesn't respect them and we
are hearing these days the same phrases from officials that we have heard in the
past. If they don't do something now, Italian soccer will die. (Kiefer 2007).

Unsafe stadiums and poor facilities are contributing to fan apathy and declining
attendances. This has been exacerbated by the government response which has
attempted to impose increased regulations on the attendance at games, rather than focus
on stadium redevelopment and safety. The following section will describe the impact of
the Pisanu Law that was implemented after the death of Filippo Raciti in Catania.

The Pisanu Law: An Italian Taylor Report or Criminalisation of Fans?

The de-regulation of the nation state and the football authorities has magnified the
financial crises within Italian football. It permitted the increased control and
manipulation of the situation by the elite clubs. Despite the carnivalesque image of Italian

207

football fans, there have been increased controls over individual fans as extensive
regulations were introduced to control disorder at football matches. Aligned to the
approach of the police, the government have passed a number of measures to try and
combat the problem of violence at football matches. An early attempt at controlling fan
behaviour occurred in 1989 when police authorities were given the authority to serve a
Daspo39 (Diffida ad Assistere alle manifestazioni Sportive, Prohibition to attend sport events)
on fans causing trouble (Scalia 2009: 51). Those holding a Daspo have to sign a register
at the time of the game at the local police station, thus ensuring that they are not in
attendance. The problems arise when these measures appear to be misused or badly
enforced. Daspos have been issued for having keys, flag-poles and mobile telephones as
these could constitute weapons (Marchi 2005: 106-7). Five Pisa fans received Daspos for
taking toilet rolls to a match. The reason given for their allocation was that they were
holding inflammable materials (Lo Bianco and Messina 2008). These contribute to
fans anti-state narratives and reinforce their anti-state identities. They have also not been
successful, as the continued violence in Italian football highlights.

The death of a policeman during fan violence securely focussed the attention of fans, the
media and the government. The Pisanu Law was an attempt to rectify the crisis in Italian
football through increased regulation. The law was named after Giuseppe Pisanu, the
Interior Minister from 2002 until 2006. Pisanu was also implicated in the Calciopoli
scandal, as the minister who wanted assistance for his local team, Sassari Torres del
Viminale, as well as consulting Luciano Moggi when Pope John Paul II died (Kiefer and
Fisher 2006; Sarzanini 2006; Jones 2007: 271-2). The Pisanu Law illustrates the lack of
enforcement within Italian football as the law was enacted in 2005, but was only
enforced in 2007 after the death of Filippo Raciti in Catania. In addition, due to the
39

http://www.osservatoriosport.interno.it/Daspo/index.html

208

heightened interest after the riots in Catania, a full-scale review of all stadiums was
undertaken that highlighted that only four stadiums were safe to hold matches (Roma,
Palermo, Siena and Turin) (Kiefer 2007; Sanminiatelli 2007; Hamil, Morrow et al. 2010).
Few questions were asked regarding investigation of the causes of this lack of safety and
no provisions were made to fund the necessary improvements. There were rumours that
that the Finanziaria (Italian Budget) in 2009 would provide special credit for clubs to
renovate their stadiums (Rossi 2008). However, this has not been implemented in light of
the world-wide recession and Italys growing debt.

The Pisanu Law orders that games can be played behind closed doors or with certain
restrictions, if authorities deem there to be a potential problem. Every month the central
authority, the Osservatorio Nazionale sulle Manifestazioni Sportive40 review the forthcoming list
of fixtures. Those, which they deem to cause a substantial risk to fans and the public, are
placed under additional restrictions. These measures intensified after thousands of
ticketless Napoli fans descended on Rome in August 2007, which saw missiles being
thrown and trains vandalised (Hawkey 2008). The Ossevatorio deemed that both games
between Pisa and Livorno during the 2008-2009 season were subjected to restrictions
(Bernini 2008). The police blockaded every road and rail entry between the two cities to
prevent movement of fans (De Majo 2008). This had the desired effect on disorder, but
led to fan protests and banners being attached to prominent buildings in Livorno stating
that without fans and colour, this is a derby of repression (Corriere di Livorno 2008).
However, inconsistent prognosis reinforces the anti-state narrative of fans. In May 2010
the match between Livorno and Lazio was permitted to go ahead with fans.41 This was in
spite of the fact that there is a history of conflict between Lazio and Livorno due to their
political identities. Livorno has a strong left-wing identity, whereas Lazio fans are noted
40
41

www.osservatoriosport.interno.it
http://www.osservatoriosport.interno.it/allegati/determinazioni/2010/osservatorio_21.pdf

209

for their right wing politics (Foot 2007; Testa and Armstrong 2008; Testa and
Armstrong). In contrast to this declaration was a decree from 17 March 2010 related to
Livornos local rivals, Pisa.42 The Serie D (amateur league) game between Pisa and
Chioggia Sottomarina had a ban imposed on away fans from Chioggia, a small fishing
port south of Venice with fifty thousand inhabitants. This match was deemed to be a
greater risk than Livorno-Lazio and away fans from Chioggia were banned from
travelling even though there is no history of disorder between the fans and only a small
number of fans would have attended. Despite some of the more forceful attempts to
prevent away fans from travelling, lack of enforcement means that fans still circumvent
the restrictions. A decree by the Osservatorio was passed for the Livorno game against
Napoli in January 2010.43 Restrictions were placed on ticket sales to Napoli fans and
away fans were banned. Despite these restrictions, approximately one thousand Napoli
fans attended the game. They obtained tickets from friends and family members in
Livorno and congregated towards one section of the ground. Despite these restrictions,
fans still circumvented them without sanction.

The most striking feature of this monthly review is the composition of the review board.
It contains representatives from each of the police authorities (police, road police, train
police, carabinieri, specials, Guarda di Finanza), the football federation, CONI (the
Italian Olympic Association), the League as well as interested businesses, such as
Autogrills and the train company, Trenitalia. However, it doesnt contain any
representatives from the provincial councils or any fan groups, such as FISSC (Federazione
Italiana Sostenitori Squadre Calcio the Federation of Supporters of Italian Football
Teams).44 Not only does this illustrate the lack of political involvement of the fan groups,

42

http://www.osservatoriosport.interno.it/allegati/determinazioni/2010/osservatorio_13.pdf
http://www.osservatoriosport.interno.it/allegati/determinazioni/2010/osservatorio_02_10.pdf
44 http://89.97.230.138/index.htm
43

210

but it reinforces the patrimonial nature of Italian decision-making. Furthermore, the

reasons for the decisions taken are not explained and alternative assistance is not always
put in place to deal with any potential breaches. For example, the game between Juventus
against Inter in April 2009 was considered a risk and that the committee is invited to
value the opportunity of suggesting measures to make the contest with the participation
of both the fans, but with restrictions on the sale of tickets.45 It is not clear what
measures were suggested, as the Inter striker Mario Balotelli was still subjected to racist
abuse by Juventus fans, whilst the Inter team bus was pelted with eggs and bottles
(Bandini 2009). The result was that Juventus had to play their next home game without
fans (The Independent 2009). This effectively criminalises all fans regardless of their
involvement. Similarly, in 2009, Livorno fans were banned from attending Frosinone
because Frosinone fans had performed the fascist salute, effectively penalising Livorno
fans for the actions of Frosinone fans. Unsurprisingly, this has not addressed some of
the main issues and has further contributed to the narrative against central authority.

The Pisanu Law passed a further Draconian measure which banned all articles that make
the choreographies at matches (Massucci 2007). All items that are deemed to be
offensive or could constitute a weapon are banned from stadiums. These items include
megaphones, banners and flags (except flags in the team colours). At a stroke, the
government banned the one element that differentiated Italian football from other
leagues and provided an opportunity for fan antipathy. As Francesio observes, the
rationale for this is that we must do the English model, and since in England they do
not have banners, megaphones and drums, we ban banners, megaphones and drums and
we have done the English model (Francesio 2008: 197). This false synergism does not
solve the problem, especially as Filippo Raciti was not killed by any of the items, nor was
45

www.osservatoriosport.interno.it/allegati/determinazioni/2009/osservatorio_16.pdf

211

he killed in the stadium. The weakness of the central state contributes to fan apathy as
the decree reinforces the anti-state narrative due to regional authorities being granted
autonomy over the designation of items. Certain banners and items can be allowed with
the prior agreement of the club, police and relevant authorities. This can create a wide
range of difference in the designation and implementation of these items as the following
demonstrates:

In Italy, for example we make an example of Livorno, it is prohibited to enter

with microphones, it is prohibited to enter with drums, the things that make
noise, in this case musical instruments, is prohibited. It is prohibited because the
Osservatorio have said. Last Saturday we were in Salerno, there at Salerno there are
trumpets, loudhailers and also drums. Max, official supporters club director,
personal interview, June 2009

Livornos Osservatorio have designated that flares and certain flags constitute a breach of
the law. The Southern Italian city of Salerno has a different outlook as they deem that
trumpets, loudhailers and drums are within the law and can be taken to games. For
Livorno fans, political symbols constitute a significant aspect of their identity. Under the
Pisanu law, these come under the jurisdiction of the questore, the local chief of police:

The questore of Livorno says that this and that can not enter. According to him
Che Guevara is a political symbol. Perhaps, I dont know. At Florence, it is not
the sameAt Florence the questore decides that Che Guevara is not a political
symbol and can enter. Because the laws in Italy make it this way. (Stefano, ultr,
personal interview, June 2009)

212

The autonomy of the regions creates opportunities to dispute the legitimacy of the
central government. Only Fascist political symbols are illegal in Italy, therefore it is not
illegal to display images of Che Guevara. However, within the jurisdiction of the Pisanu
Law, the questore is permitted to prohibit these images if they feel that these constitute a
breach of the regulations. Consequently these markers of Livornese identity are banned
at certain away games.

The declarations permit the re-articulation of local symbolic markers of distinction. The
fans of Livorno do not restrict the performance of their identity to the use of banners
and flags. They actively perform their identity through costume and songs. Although the
actions of the questore represent a significant infringement of local identity, the fans inflect
other symbols with cultural meaning. In the case of the fans of Livorno, the green
military-style jackets and caps become inflected with greater significance. In the case of
the fans with right-wing identities, the cultural inflection becomes more problematic:

Some fans in Italy, Lazio, Roma, Verona and many others, the tricolour is not
shown for nationalistic pride, but is shown to signify that this is a curva of the
right the origins are not political, however now it becomes associated as a
political symbol. In Italy, a political symbol cannot go into the stadium. The
hammer and sickle, the Celtic cross. So what happens, a right wing fan shows the
tricolour, it is as if they were showing the Celtic cross (Stefano, ultr, personal
interview, June 2009)

Fans with a Right-wing identity have inflected the national flag as a symbol of the Right.
The fans of Roma, Lazio and Verona have reframed the national flag as a marker of
xenophobia and Right-wing politics, and this becomes difficult to legislate against. Yet

213

this also contributes to fan resentment and apathy. During the match between Livorno
and Lazio in May 2010, Lazio fans displayed several tricolour flags, including one
prominent national flag, which stood over twice the height of the carrier, which was
waved throughout the match. The pole required for this flag would undoubtedly fall
within the remit of the Pisanu Laws and could constitute a weapon. In spite of the
contravention of the law, and the reputation of the Lazio fans, the flag was permitted in
the stadium. Livorno fans, however, are frequently prohibited from taking large flags
with poles and political flags into away grounds. For example at Parma in December
2008, Livorno fans tried to enter with a range of flags. The longer flag poles were
deemed to be weapons and had to be returned to the coach. This led to a number of
confused interactions between fans and stewards that eventually saw a senior fan instruct
one fan to return the flag to the coach. The contrasting implementations at Livorno and
Parma undermine fan confidence in the law-making authorities and amplify fan
antipathy.

The Pisanu Law also instigated regulation over the sales of tickets. These controls insist
that fans must purchase a ticket from an official source, either an official supporters club
or official ticket vendor. To obtain the ticket, identity must be provided. The ticket
vendor enters the fans details into a ticket database that verifies that the fan is entitled to
attend the ground. Any fan with a Daspo is prohibited from attending the ground.
However, this does not preclude people without tickets causing trouble before or after
the game. In addition to taking identification to ticket vendors, fans must also take their
identification to the ground. As with the Daspos, the ticket controls are not effectively
controlled. Two months after the death of Raciti, presenters on the television
programme Le Iene (The Hyenas) purchased tickets in the names of Benjamin Franklin,

214

Karl Marx and Alessandro Volta (Stefanini 2009: 143).46

The same programme

highlighted that the presenter was able to enter the San Siro Stadium, in Milan, to watch
Inter, without documentation. These factors inhibit the casual fans from attending
matches. Criminalisation of all fans is compounded through lack of enforcement which
undermines and de-legitimates the central authorities.

The regulations for purchasing tickets necessitated additional security at the stadium. The
Pisanu law instructed all clubs to install fencing around the stadium with a series of
checkpoints. Upon approaching the stadium, tickets are checked by stewards before
entering the stadium confines. Thereafter, one enters the turnstiles and places the ticket
into a barcode reader. Both processes together can slow down entry to the stadium,
causing confusion and resentment and this can reinforce a unified fan identity (Stott and
Pearson 2007: 221). Such an incident occurred at Parma in December 2008 when the
supporters coach arrived late. With two minutes before kick-off, the queue awaiting
ticket inspection by the two stewards was leading to a crush. There was increased anxiety
and emotion amongst the fans who felt that they would miss the start of the game.
Fortunately, the stewards sensed the changing mood and made cursory glances at the
identification to facilitate a rapid entrance into the ground. Thus the stringent checks
required were abandoned due to insufficient processes being in place to deal with large
numbers of football fans arriving at the same time. The rules were circumvented in the
interests of expediency and undermined the rule of law. A more insightful incident
occurred prior to a game with Lazio at Livornos Armando Picchi Stadium in May 2010,
as described in the introduction to this chapter. A group of over fifty Livorno ultr
marched towards the gates of the Livorno curva, waving flags, chanting anti-Fascist and
anti-Lazio songs and performing an image of unity and strength. As they approached the
46

http://www.video.mediaset.it/mplayer.html?sito=iene&data=2007/02/26&id=2316&from=iene

215

gates of the end, riot police mobilised and marched forward. The gates were opened to
allow the ultr to enter without a public order incident and they marched directly into the
stadium, continuing to chant and display their flags. No tickets were displayed, so there
were no identity checks performed. If ultr are a public order problem, the police and
stewards at the ground permitted them entry without legal checks. This undermines the
law, the stewards and the forces of order and de-legitimates the authorities and highlights
the incorporation of the ultr into the patrimonial system.

The government measures also make it increasingly difficult for casual fans to attend
matches at home. The ticket office, by law, has to be separate from the stadium; one
cannot buy a ticket at the turnstile. At Livorno, the ticket booth is part of the sports
complex adjacent to the Armando Picchi Stadium, about two-hundred metres from the
stadium. Livornos stadium is located in a residential area with access from a number of
residential streets. The erection of the steel fences prevents fans from accessing different
areas around the ground without a ticket. Therefore to go to the designated ticket office,
one has to go around the residential streets, onto the main road and back around the
other residential streets. This ring of steel around the ground further inhibits the matchday experience, as Paolo state:

There are the regulations at the stadium. At Livorno, perhaps there is the most
classic example one can make. If you decide on Sunday or Saturday to go to the
match and do not have a ticket you must then go practically five long kilometres:
first to the only open ticket office and then you must return to the other side to
the sector of the stadium for that ticket. Therefore this would be the simplest
thing [to solve] (Paolo, official supporters club director, personal interview,
June 2009)

216

With the imposition of barriers around the ground, someone who decides to go to the
game on the day must walk further to buy a ticket before going to the stadium. As the
state struggles to impose its authority it treats all fans as potential hooligans and this
contributes to fan apathy. This situation acts as a serious disincentive to casual fans and
magnifies the anti-state narrative.

The Ministry of the Interior has attempted other approaches to limit violence at matches.
In 2008 they launched an initiative called Stop alla Violenza (Stop the Violence).47 As
part of this initiative they have created a public information advert that was broadcast
during the advertising breaks between football shows. The advert is a series of sublime
skills from footballers, intersected with acts of violence from fans. With each set of
images, there is a caption, with the last one stating, Violent fans are cowardly in every
stadium.48 The Osservatorio has also implemented an identity card for fans, la tessera del
tifoso. The card allows fans to purchase tickets easier and should prevent away fans from
purchasing home tickets, as was witnessed with Napoli fans in Livorno. It also, however,
affects the casual fan that may not have the tessera. It also makes it difficult for nonItalian nationals to purchase tickets to away matches, thus reducing potential revenue to
clubs. The card also presupposes that consumers of football only watch one team, and
will not watch another. Placing these obstacles prevents all but the most dedicated fans
from attending matches.

The card does, however, provide opportunities to access the loyal fanbase and once
again, AC Milan has seized the initiative. They have instigated the Cuore Rossonero card
which also operates as a Maestro card and a loyalty card. It allows users to accumulate
47
48

http://www.governo.it/GovernoInforma/Dossier/campagna_antiviolenza/index.html
http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=GrqUc8CHDWA

217

loyalty points. These can be redeemed against cheaper tickets, gifts, or events with
players, such as training or a meal.49 Likewise, Livorno have implemented the Triglia Card
(Mullet card, named after the mascot of the club, and one of the symbols of the city).
Like AC Milans card, the Triglia Card accumulates points that can be redeemed against
gifts, and also acts as a MasterCard. Although these initiatives demonstrate an attempt to
deal with the problems in Italian football, the lack of stadium renovation is a major
discrepancy. Furthermore the Q&As related to the Triglia Card at Livorno is instructive
of the wider distrust of authority which undermines effective regulation. Two general
questions answered by Livorno deny that the card has a microchip that emits a radio
signal indicating the physical location of the card owner, and that the details provided for
the card will be transmitted to the chief of police.50 Therefore the role of the police is
central in understanding the match-day experience and in accounting for the decline in
participation in football. The following section will outline the development of the Italian
police forces and highlight how this contributes to the identification of fans their security
at stadiums.

The Italian Forces of Order: Development and Continuity

This thesis has addressed several key groups within Italian football. Initially it illustrated
that the worlds of politics, business and football operate within dense patrimonial
networks that are emptying out public involvement and facilitating the emergence of
charismatic individuals. Significantly, there is another group operating within the Italian
football network. The Italian forces of order are key actors in the execution of state
policy and represent an important aspect of the patrimonial network. The police forces
simultaneously reflect the Italian solution to globalisation processes and illustrate the
49
50

http://cuorerossonero.acmilan.com/main/?menuId=1.146
http://www.livornocalcio.it/

218

problems and contradictions of this approach. This section will highlight the historical
development of the Italian police force to illustrate how they have reflected the
unplanned organic growth of the nation and the failure of the central state to impose
control. As key actors within the Italian patrimonial system, the police play an important
role in the presentation and control of football fans and this can affect the chances of
violence. This section will present a brief history of the Italian police before presenting
the role of the police with particular reference to public order. Changes to European
policing will be also be presented to illustrate the continuance of certain patterns of
policing and their affect on the continuing crisis in Italian football.

There are various divisions of the Italian police that combine under the term forces of
order. The divisions that exist reflect the contested nature of the Italian state and lead to
confusion and lack of co-operation. As we have seen, the Italian state is comprised of
semi-autonomous regions, with enduring local histories and memories, which undermine
the central state. Likewise, the rivalry between the FIGC and Lega Calcio has
undermined the ability of the federations to regulate efficiently the finances and
operations of the Italian football clubs. These patterns are reflected in the development
of the Italian police. Before unification the House of Savoy instigated a two-tier
approach to local security. The Corpo Arma dei Carabinieri Reali (Royal Carabinieri Corps)
was based on the French Gendarmerie and was introduced to Savoy by King Vittore
Emmanuelle I in 1814. With unification the corps was institutionalised as the First
Force of the new nation and represented an armed corps for the state.51 Nearly forty
years later in 1852, the Corpo delle Guardie di Pubblica Sicurezza (Guardians of Public Safety
Corps) were introduced to Savoy which created a dual model of Carabinieri and State
Police which has continued from unification to the present day. Although there are
51

http://www.carabinieri.it/Internet/Multilingua/EN/HistoricalReferences/01_EN.htm

219

further police divisions within Italy; these do not have direct jurisdiction over the
policing of social order and have less impact on football.52 In addition to the other forces
of order, there is a section of the State Police with special responsibility for undercover
surveillance. The Divisione Investigazioni Generali e Operazioni Speciali (Division of General
Investigations and Special Operations), known by their acronym Digos, are charged with
investigating serious offences such as terrorism and organised crime. Under this remit
the Digos also have to investigate football hooligans. They operate as non-uniformed
police who infiltrate fan groups and record their patterns of behaviour and obtaining
positive identifications of known activists. As a result, this sees football hooligans placed
under the same umbrella as terrorists and the Mafia. This constitutes one area where the
Italian police are following similar, pan-European, patterns of surveillance (Tsoukala
2009).

The dual nature of the Italian police reflects the failure of the state to gain control over
individual interests. There are two conceptions in academic literature of the police: the
states police imposed from above; or the citizens police from below (Della Porta 1998:
246). In Italy, since the inception of the police, the forces of order have been seen as a
function of governmental interests imposed from above (Della Porta 1998: 246). This
has been amplified through the police having the absolute right to stop any Italian citizen
for identification. As Barbagli and Sartori state:

The forces of order in fact have the power and duty of identification, which no
citizen can avoid. They can stop any person and request an identifying document,
and, in some cases, when some irregularity is noted or if there is something
52

The forces of order also comprise of the Guardia di Finanzia who deal with tax and customs matters.
Additionally there are Municipal Police, who deal with motoring and local regulations, and Provincial
Police, who deal with country laws such as hunting and fishing regulations. There are also Coast Guards
and National Park Police.

220

suspicious, they may escort the person to the commissariat or to the carabinieri
station (Barbagli and Sartori 2004: 167).

Despite the attempt by the state to impose control over its citizens through
identification, the dual nature of the Italian police reflects its weakness. After unification
the two forces were granted distinct remits with the carabinieri being granted control of
the countryside whilst the State Police monitored the cities. This was semi-clarified in a
law of 1919 stating that the State Police would be responsible for

police functions that [are] preventative, repressive, and related to maintaining

public order in the larger population centres, leaving the supervision to
maintaining public order of the remaining territory of the State to the Royal
Carabinieri (Barbagli and Sartori 2004: 163).

The irregular development of industrialisation and urbanisation which led to chaotic

patterns of migration resulted in the inconsistent growth and development of the two
corps which depended heavily upon local factors and political involvement. By the 1960s
however, parity in numbers was achieved between the two corps (Barbagli and Sartori
2004).

The dual model prevented the creation of an independent, strong and centralised force.
As a consequence the divided forces could be incorporated into the patrimonial system.
Maintaining two parallel forces with similar responsibilities over public order has been
inefficient and has lead to confusion and lack of co-operation and has contributed to
Italy having the largest police force in Europe (Tavares and Thomas 2008). The two
forces frequently refuse to co-operate, as occurred during the years of lead in the 1970s,

221

and this ultimately failed to prevent the assassination of the Christian Democrat leader,
Aldo Moro (Collin 1999: 32). Attempts have been made to rectify this situation and
develop co-operation between the two forces, principally with Law 121 of 1 April 1981.
Law 121 requires that Provincial Committees for Security and Public Order be set up
containing the chiefs of the threes main forces of order, as well as the mayor of the
provincial capital and the president of the province (Barbagli and Sartori 2004: 177).
However, orders made in these meetings are at times reinterpreted, if not actually
ignored, by the Carabinieri (Barbagli and Sartori 2004: 177). The lack of enforcement of
the forces of order ultimately leads to the lack of enforcement of order further along the
network of crimes. Law 121 also proposed a joint operations centre; the first of which
was opened in Milan in 2000, nineteen years after the law was passed. As of 2004,
seventy-four of the one hundred and nineteen provinces did not have these joint
operations rooms implemented, and none were functioning correctly (Barbagli and
Sartori 2004: 177).

The political nature of the Italian forces of order has seen them develop a significant
position within the patrimonial networks of Italian politics. The forces of order help
shape public opinion as they seek to protect their institutions and generate public
goodwill:

Police have a notable discretionary power, not only to the complex level, but
also that of the single politician. The forces of the police can be considered as
policy makers, in the sense that they make the politics ((Della Porta and Reiter
2003) cited in: Ferreri 2008: 100)

222

The forces of order are conscious of public opinion and their public image.
Consequently, they choose appropriate action that will give them the most public
support and in turn constructs an image of a force that operates appropriately (Della
Porta 1998: 230). The 1960s saw a sharp increase in certain distinct forms of crime,
specifically, public protest and crimes against property (Della Porta 1998; Barbagli and
Sartori 2004). This provided the police with an apposite opportunity to manage their
public image. For example, the police would not use force against a group of pensioners
protesting about the cost of living. Therefore, the selective use of violence presents an
image to the media and general public that this particular group required violent action.
As the problems associated with political problems diminished, incidents surrounding
football matches increased (Della Porta 1998). This has resulted in the policing of
football matches being one of the largest exercises performed by the Italian police
(Roversi 2003). Building on Cohens seminal work, Marchi suggests that through
selective use of force, the police help create Folk Devils, as well as the media (Cohen
2002; Marchi 2005). This becomes self-fulfilling; as the football fans are constructed as
Folk Devils, the police feel increasingly justified in using force against them. Their
discrimination in other fields reinforces this construction and magnifies the events
surrounding football. Ferreri develops this argument by stating that the use of the Digos,
the anti-Mafia and anti-terrorist force, to infiltrate ultr transformed the fans into viable
targets: with the Digos, the ultra ceased to be simply hooligans from the stadium and
were transformed into a subversive phenomenon, that needed repression with force
(Ferreri 2008: 100-1). The Pisanu Law legitimated the political role of the police. In the
previous section it was highlighted that the Osservatorio designated certain matches at
risk. The forces of order are key members of this group and become clearly situated
within the patrimonial network. Consequently, through a variety of measures, specific

223

groups and particularly football fans, have been targeted which accounts for a number of
incidents related to football.

Violence at football is not inevitable, despite the political influence exerted by the forces
of order. In his theory of violence, Collins suggests that violence is led by a small number
of key proponents who are supported by the crowd (Collins 2008). Violence is often
ignited over flashpoints which, in turn, are caused by forward panic. When parties are
engaged in the emotional cauldron of physical confrontation they have to maintain face
and preserve the advantage. This can erupt into violence as one partys emotions rise and
seeks to capitalise on a perceived weakness of the opponent. The propensity for violence
increases as the duration of the tension increases before a confrontation. This allows the
emotion to build, and lengthens the period for this emotion to abate. Utilising a
Durkheimian perspective, Collins advocates that an increase in the crowd will build the
emotional energy of the situation and fuel the emotional tension in the parties. A
flashpoint will instigate violence when one of the parties utilises this emotion to gain the
advantage. Collins recommends that participants in these events need to reduce their
confrontational tension (Collins 2008: 464). This is especially true as the numbers of
police increase: the more officers called to the scene, the greater the chance of a
forward panic or other kinds of police violence, quite apart from what the suspect does
(Collins 2008: 464). Furthermore, rumours can spread and fuel the opportunity of
miscommunication and violence. The build up and stand offs increase the opportunity
for forward panic to occur and for one side to provide the flashpoint. The perception of
the police is crucial to the initiation of violence (Della Porta 1998; Stott and Reicher
1998). If parties enter into an situation expecting violence, then this increases the
possibility of forward panic occurring and violence ensuing.

224

The active role of the police in manipulating political and public opinion has combined
with the weakness of the central state which has created a history of aggressive policing
in Italy. This has facilitated the construction of narratives that contribute to the lack of
legitimacy of the state. The G8 summit of 2001 became the zenith for aggressive Italian
policing. The summit was held in Genoa, and attracted a number of anti-globalisation,
anarchist and leftist demonstrators. Riots ensued that resulted in one protestor shot dead,
over 500 people injured and an estimated 30 million damage caused to property
(Johnston 2001; Vidal 2001). Of the two hundred thousand demonstrators, many claim
they were there to protest peacefully. However, chaos ensued as the police took a hardline with the demonstrators. The manner in which the protestor was killed highlighted
the confusion of the police approach. The Guardian reported that, Witness accounts of
the fatality were conflicting, but it appeared last night that the young man had been shot
and then run over by a police armoured vehicle (MacAskill and Elliot 2001). This
account was by no means unique as The Telegraph reported that armoured vehicles were
used to plough into dustbins that protestors hid behind. Thomas Harding, the reporter
of The Telegraph, was attacked by the carabinieri, as were other officially accredited
reporters. Harding states that Anyone, lawbreaker or not, was fair game in the eye of the
carabinieri, which showed itself to be as badly led and ill-disciplined as it was thuggish
(Harding 2001). Indeed, the police action in Genoa was used as an example by the
Scottish police, of what can go wrong when the police act aggressively (Macleod 2005).
The Italian police had demonstrated a clear sign of forward panic by attacking first to
gain the advantage. This forward panic culminated in the raid on the Diaz school, the
protestors headquarters. Accounts suggest that the police had employed rightwing
activists to attack the protestors (Carroll 2007). Indeed, it was reported that the police
sang Fascist songs as they acted (Davies 2008). The police raided the school at night,
whilst the protestors slept. Accounts suggest that people were kicked and beaten with

225

batons whilst they slept. The police methodically went through the school beating all in
their way, regardless of their physical position. Fire extinguishers were fired in peoples
faces, whilst others were spat upon or had their heads thrust down toilets. Several
women were threatened with rape and all ninety-three occupants of the school suffered
serious injuries, some life threatening (Carroll 2001; Ginsborg 2004: 136-7; Jones 2007:
204-5; Davies 2008). The tactics caused international outrage and strained relations with
the Italian government (Johnston, Alleyne et al. 2008).

Heavy police presence at football matches, like the G8, provides several potential
flashpoints that could generate forward panic. As described in the introductory section
above, a potential flashpoint occurred before the match between Livorno and Lazio at
the Stadium Armando Picchi in May 2010. A group of over fifty Livorno ultr marched
towards the gates of their curva. As they approached the gates, armed riot police
approached the gates from inside the ground in anticipation of an attempt to attack the
gates. The ultr were marching, waving flags and chanting anti-Fascist and anti-Lazio
songs. They were not armed, throwing objects or performing any form of ritualised
violence. In spite of this the riot police prepared themselves for violence and marched
forward. No violence ensued, as the ultr were allowed into the stadium without having
their tickets checked. This was an apposite example of how forward panic could escalate;
the police were not responding to any specific acts of violence, but were responding to
the (incorrect) perceived threat of the ultr. In practise the Livorno were more focussed
on their hatred of Lazio and Fascism than confronting the police. In other contexts it
would be clear that the police could ignite the emotional tinderbox.

A further example of aggressive Italian policing surfaced in the media in May 2010. The
Gugliotta affair highlighted the aggressive approach taken by certain sections of the

226

Italian police (Corriere della Sera 2010; La Repubblica 2010). Stefano Gugliotta lived in the
vicinity of Romes Stadio Olimpico. On the night of the Italian Cup final between Roma
and Inter, Gugliotta was riding his scooter, with his cousin, in order to go to a party. He
had not attended the match but was stopped by a policeman. The incident was filmed
from the window of one of the neighbouring apartments and through this it appears that
the policeman held his arm outstretched onto Gugliottas chest to prevent him riding
off.53 Gugliotta pushed the police officers arm away and was subsequently punched in
the face. Gugliottas cousin was confronted by the same policeman and ran off, before a
number of Italian police descended on Gugliotta. Gugliotta had a broken tooth and
evidence of head injuries. The young Roman was arrested and alleged that When I was
brought in jail I was asked to sign a sheet with an X already deleted, which states that I
refused additional medical visits, but I opposed. Only after I was able to sign a sheet with
boxes still empty. (La Repubblica 2010). The case demonstrates the forward panic of
Italian police as they seek to use violence early, rather than as a last resort. They
subsequently attempted to fabricate evidence to suggest that he had refused to seek
medical advice. As they act as an independent, politically orientated body, they attempt to
manipulate their position.

Aggressive policing in Italy has not been restricted to Italian football fans. Fans of
English clubs and the England national team have faced considerable involvement from
the Italian forces of order (Stott and Reicher 1998; Stott and Pearson 2007). The polices
perception of England fans ensured that fans entering Sardinia for the 1990 World Cup
were treated as hooligans as soon as they arrived, with as many as a third of Italys police
force being there to meet them (Stott and Reicher 1998: 366). Similarly, recent games
involving English clubs in Rome have highlighted the continued perceived threat against
53

http://video.corriere.it/?vxChannel=Roma%20Cronaca&vxClipId=2524_d07ccb4c-5acd-11df-903e00144f02aabe

227

English fans. Against Liverpool and Manchester United in 2001 and 2007 respectively,
similar patterns emerge (Stott and Pearson 2007). Both sets of fans were attacked by
Roma fans on their approach to the stadium and the police did not intervene. Inside the
stadium riot police were stationed in the away end. There were no police in the home
curva, only stewards. The Roma fans threw missiles over the barrier into the English
fans, who subsequently threw them back. In the case of the Liverpool fans, they were
attacked by the police for throwing these missiles back (Stott and Pearson 2007: 224).
Regarding the Manchester United fans, United scored and Roma fans surged towards the
barrier. The United fans responded, whereupon the riot police charged down and began
to baton charge indiscriminately into the United fans.54 It is clear from the actions of the
Italian police in relation to English fans is that they police the situations based on
perception of the fan-group. English fans had a reputation for trouble and disorder that
has subsequently subsided (although not disappeared).

The intricate political networks operating in Italian society legitimates these actions.
Politicians and the media want to be seen as taking a firm line and support the police in
their conduct. The Prime Minister, Berlusconi defended the tactics of the police in
Genoa by saying in Parliament that We found ourselves faced with protests that grew in
intensity and numbers that grew beyond all expectations. As a result it was necessary to
intervene in such a way as to guarantee the maximum security for all the delegations.
(Johnston 2001). Similarly, Achille Serra, the Prefect in Rome who was in charge of the
police during Manchester Uniteds incident, argued that The stewards were overrun by
drunk fans, the police had to intervene. I was there and from what I saw they followed
the established protocol. If youre going to try and establish order over a drunk, angry

54

This clip from Danish TV talks to a young Danish Manchester United fans and highlights the events
after Roma fans surge: http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=gIfgEwL2QMo. This reinforces the importance
of situational context as Danish fans may not fall under the same perception as English fans.

228

mob, youre not going to do it carrying a bunch of flowers (Marcotti 2007). This
reinforces the prominence of police perception in their handling of these situations. If
the authorities and police perceive a group to be violent, then they are more likely to
adopt an aggressive stance. This increases the likelihood of forward panic and resulting
violence. Therefore, training needs to be undertaken by the police so that they
understand the culture of the fans attending a match (Stott and Adang 2003: 3; Foot
2007; Stott and Pearson 2007: 241-2). Although public drunkenness is rare in Italy, it is
relatively common around travelling British football fans. Making the correct perceptions
allows the police to operate more effectively and prevents the opportunity for forward
panic to occur.

At the highest level, the Italian police and politicians have not adopted a flexible
approach to policing football fans. Fans are treated as one homogenous group, rather
than dealt with as individual contexts. Most of the focus is on the away fans in the settore
ospiti, the area designated for away fans to park before being escorted to the ground.
There are extensive regulations governing the settore ospiti:

In Italy, I speak of our experience of Livorno, when we organise an away trip, a

major part of the club organised trips is by coach. Therefore according to the
number of people going, the Osservatorio, or its better to say the responsibility of
the forces of order in Livorno, require a list of the number of people going. They
order an escort of one or two patrols to go with us in police cars and therefore
they escort us from the motorway toll booth and escort us to the stadium.
When we make an away trip the questura calls every club what time the coach is
leaving and to know what route we are taking. (Max, official supporters club
director, personal interview, June 2009)

229

Official supporters clubs are required by the questura, the chief of police, to detail the
number of people going, the route and expected departure and arrival times. This allows
for coaches to convene at the motorway toll booths and await the escort by police.
Usually two police cars will escort the away coaches; one at the front, one at the rear. On
arrival at the outskirts of the destination city, the away coaches are collected by a police
escort from that municipality and escorted to the settore ospiti. This will comprise of a
number of police patrol cars and motorbikes. In addition to the escorting patrol cars and
motorbikes, the route will be well marshalled by other police patrol cars and motorbikes
that stop and direct traffic to facilitate a clear route for the escorted coaches. In most
cases the settore ospiti is directly alongside, or inside the stadium. In the case of a trip to
Brescia in March 2009, the settore ospiti was on the outskirts of the city. The coaches
parked in the designated zone and were escorted onto modified city buses to be taken to
the stadium. The buses were fitted with a Perspex barrier separating the fans from the
driver and front door of the bus. Alongside the driver, behind this Perspex barrier, stood
two policemen clearly armed with semi-automatic rifles.

On arrival at the away end of the Italian stadiums, the visiting fans are greeted by a wall
of riot police, standing behind full length riot shields. They act as a funnel towards the
turnstiles where the away fans are met by state police, carabinieri and stewards. At this
point the stewards will check any baggage for prohibited items and ascertain the details
of flags and banners. Any banned items can be confiscated for being too political, or for
constituting a weapon. In addition they perform security checks on the fans which
consist of the usual patting down consistent with many sporting events and airports.
After the security checks, the stewards check tickets with the fans identity to ensure that
the name on the ticket matches the identity of the person holding the form of

230

identification. Once this check has been performed satisfactorily, the fans approach the
turnstiles where they insert the barcode on the ticket into the barcode reader of the
turnstile and proceed into the stadium. Stewards and police remain in sections
underneath the stadium, but do not make their presence felt within the curva.

The entire operation creates an overwhelming image of force and control and increases
the tension and emotion of the situation. In a country where the state has faced a long
standing crisis of legitimacy, the presentation of force at away games is potent. Not only
does it criminalise all fans, it can present an altogether different image:

When we arrive in the host city, what we see outside seems to be a war with
Police, Carabinieri... Helicopters. It seems like being where there is a war. (Max,
official supporters club director, personal interview, June 2009)

In addition to highlighting the costs incurred by the local community to fund this
quantity of police, Max also indicates a clear image of the police approach to away fans.
The analogy to a war zone reinforces the notion of a lack of legitimacy. It suggests that
they are an occupying force which has not won the hearts and minds of the people they
are supposed to be protecting. It also reinforces the suggestion that the police and fans
are adversaries. The police are not acting as intermediaries, but adversaries, and this
provides ample opportunity for forward panic and potential violence. It is for this reason
that a number of Italian authors utilise the analogy of war in their research. This is
particularly apposite in Dal Lagos seminal Descrizione di una Battaglia (Description of a
Battle) (Dal Lago 1990). In light of this, however, no violence was witnessed at any of
these games during the ethnographic fieldwork in 2009, and none was reported
subsequently in the media. As Collins highlights, it is rare when fights start as most

231

people avoid them (Collins 2008). However, when the ingredients are right, and the
tension and emotion on both sides increases, this can lead to the flashpoints and forward
panics that precipitate violence.

By treating all fans as one homogenous group, the police do not take account of the
range of fans within the curva. Not all fans are hooligans or looking for violence, as one
respondent notes:

There exists in Italy the settore ospiti, where the mischief inside is often
investigated as if [they] are all assassins. This is not true because a major part of
the persons inside are graduates, by this I mean cultured, someone who knows
what they are doing (Max, official supporters club director, personal interview,
June 2009).

Max is highlighting that a number of the fans are not assassins or people out to
deliberately make mischief. Many of them are educated and aware of their actions. Yet
through the pattern of policing, all fans are treated as potential hooligans. This is
compounded by the Osservatorio which designates a particular game as at risk and places
certain restrictions on fans. This effectively criminalises all fans that may have attended
that game and restricts them from watching their team. The police response to away fans
is to treat them all as potential hooligans. The construction of this homogenous outsider
group contributes to the creation of a unified identity within the group (Stott and Reicher
1998; Stott and Pearson 2007). Consequently, when violent incidents occur, many fans
sympathise with group members and this contributes to the anti-police narrative.

232

Despite the treatment of fans as one homogenous group by politicians and the police
authorities, the officers on the front line operate with extreme flexibility. In specific
situations police officers circumvent the rules depending on circumstances. This is often
done in co-ordination with the police hierarchy. One example related to an incident at
Brescia settore ospiti. The area was directly outside the Stadio Mario Rigamonti and entry
was under police authority, although this English researcher was allowed entry without
questioning whilst waiting for the contact with the ticket. There was a delay in the arrival
of the buses from the parking area and this delay saw the buses directed immediately into
the away end. This led to a series of negotiations inside and outside the ground to allow
admission into the ground. On admission it became apparent that no bags or other
objects would be allowed on the terrace. As the fans had transferred to the specially
modified city-buses, there was nowhere to store a rucksack. A negotiation took place
with the Digos, who refused to take it and suggested to the officer in authority that it
should be allowed to be taken into the ground. This was permitted, without being
searched. This example, as well as the examples described above of English fans having
bottles thrown at them in Rome, illustrates the way that some Italian police make an
exception in certain situations. However, this can increase the opportunity for violence.

Group identities and potential incidents are magnified through the polices all or
nothing approach to policing football. By not proactively responding to minor incidents,
the police allow the tension and emotion to build. This increases the chance of
flashpoints occurring and violence ensuing. Francesio argues that the British police take a
more active role than Italian police at prevention and control (Francesio 2008: 89). Stott
and Adang suggest a more flexible attitude to policing football crowds that centres on a
more interactive and less intimidatory approach (Stott and Adang 2003; Stott and
Pearson 2007). They argue that a good police model is to not wear riot gear and maintain

233

a low profile with high levels of positive interactions with fans (Stott and Pearson 2007:
229-30). This can help prevent major incidents before they start, as well as preventing the
construction of symbolic events that reinforce existing narratives. By treating all fans as
one homogenous group, the collective identity and memory of the group becomes
shaped by events that reinforce the collective narrative. When the police used tear gas
and riot equipment on fans at the derby of the dead child in Rome in 2003, the wider
groups of fans could understand and believe that a child had been killed (Marchi 2005).
Likewise, English fans who were subjected to a baton charge from riot police in Rome
could have been spared this ignominy had the original missile throwers been identified
and arrested (Stott and Pearson 2007).

The poverty of the stadiums inhibits control within the stadium. This encourages the
extensive policing and restrictions outside the stadium. The lack of stadium development
has meant that they have not taken advantage of the transformations in surveillance and
stewarding that have been adopted elsewhere in Europe. This allows the curve to remain
liminal spaces for the creation of ultr identity and legitimised their activities.
Consequently, stadium redevelopment should coincide with changes to the operation of
the police:

[We need] stadiums in an English style to be a fan is more comfortable, more

customer focussed, and above all, the type of police are more civil. It is a civil
country [Interviewer: the police are not civil here?] No. The police do what they
want. Unfortunately the police arrest always and also, when the police are
culpable, they always have the cover of personal liberties and are not punished.
[There are] many cases, for example the case of the G8 at Genoa in 2001.
(Greyhound, official supporters club member, personal interview, June 2009)

234

Not only are the episodes of the G8 at Genoa used to reinforce the image of police
brutality, there is a strong feeling that the Italian police are unaccountable. This image of
accountability contributed to the transition to postmodern policing in Britain, especially
after several high-profile miscarriages of justice (Reiner 1992). These miscarriages of
justice coincided with a transformation of the police in Britain and North America
(Reiner 1992; Bayley and Shearing 1996; O'Malley 1997; Jones and Newburn 2002). Deregulation of the state impacted the position of the police. In particular:

the states monopoly on policing has been broken by the creation of a host of
private and community-based agencies that prevent crime, deter criminality, catch
lawbreakers, investigate offences, and stop conflict (Bayley and Shearing 1996:
586).

The emergence of private security firms has seen the commodification of policing and
the restructuring of police and policing. The docile bodies of Foucaults
governmentality (Foucault 1991; Foucault, Burchell et al. 1991) produces an increasing
trend towards individual responsibility for individual action. The use of third party
security has provided accountability towards clubs (Bayley and Shearing 1996). This
aspect represents a central feature of the Taylor Report (Taylor 1989) and will be covered
in greater depth in the following section.

Stewards

Privatisation of police and security has seen the increased responsibility of stewards at
football matches in Europe. As stated above, the transition to privatisation of security

235

was made explicit in the Taylor Report that facilitated the redevelopment of stadiums in
Britain. Taylor stated that:

The safety of the public inside the ground is the responsibility of those who
stage the event and administer the ground in which it is held, ie the
management. This responsibility applies in both normal and emergency
situations (Taylor 1989: 33)

Not only did Taylor place the responsibility for the hosts to manage their safety and
policing, he also introduced the commercial element into the equation:

In my view a more consistent and businesslike approach should be made to

such charges. If clubs were to find it more economical to recruit efficient
stewards than to delegate duties to the police, there could be a significant
reduction in the number of police deployed at football grounds to the benefit of
the community at large Some clubs presently have efficient stewards whom
they recruit individually and train fully with the assistance of the police. Others
hire security firms to bring in a well-trained team of stewards. (Taylor 1989: 37)

The outcome of this approach was that the police should charge the clubs for the use of
their services within the football stadium. Outside of the private space of the stadium,
the police had the duty to maintain public spaces as part of their public duty. Should the
costs involved be too high, then the club could recruit their own stewards or employ a
third party security firm to cover the stewarding aspects. Furthermore, UEFA have
highlighted that stewards are an importance safety feature of football. enes Erzik, the
chairman of the Stadium and Security Committee stated that:

236

If stewards are well-trained and well-placed, they are the best people to help the
police and allow the game to go smoothly and safely, hopefully, there will be
more work for the stewards in the future, and less for the police.55

In England and the Netherlands, for example, stewards have become a professional
organisation that acts as the clubs arbiters between the police and the fans (Spaaij 2006:
207, 230).

As with other aspects of stadium safety, Stewards have not been fully implemented in
Italy. Although proscribed by law, the stewards in Italy do not fulfil the same function
with the same vigour as in England or the Netherlands. The Osservatorio provides
guidelines for stewards and has published a manual to assist stewards with their
functions.56 However, they are not provided with sufficient support from the state, the
police or the authorities. Many stewards are voluntary and this permits their
incorporation into the patrimonial network. Stewards are provided with free entrance to
the matches but do not have the skills, training or support to manage disorder. One
respondent in Livorno is a volunteer steward in the main stand and highlights the
problems stewards have in Italy:

Because, at the moment, the steward as stated by the law, is quietly an official of
public order. In Italy they continue to say that there should be less police but
in the stadium they continue to be there. The [authority of] the forces of order
[begins] when effectively the fan doesnt understand the figure of the steward.

55

http://www.uefa.com/uefa/keytopics/kind=1048576/newsid=689264.html
http://www.uefa.com/uefa/keytopics/kind=1048576/newsid=600885.html
56 http://www.osservatoriosport.interno.it/pubblicazioni/steward_new.html

237

And only when it is impossible to remove them. I am speaking about inside the
stadium. Outside the stadium certainly the forces of order come into being. We
the stewards cannot intervene certainly. There is not the powers, there is not the
capacity and one cannot act. (Max, official supporters club director, personal
interview, June 2009)

The continuing presence of the police places the legitimacy of the stewards into question.
They are reluctant to place themselves in difficult situations and therefore do not seem to
enforce any rules. Bottles and other objects are frequently thrown at Italian football
matches with impunity. Rather than adequate stewarding, architectural features, such as
netting and Perspex barriers, are added to preserve the safety. The opportunities for an
incident like Hillsborough are manifest.

The lack of stewards authority reinforces the legitimacy of the ultr. As demonstrated
above with the police, the lack of enforcement over minor infringements amplifies the
opportunities for tension and emotion to increase. Some stewards have been complicit
with transgressors and this reinforces the group identity of the fans. The incidents with
Liverpool and Manchester United fans in Rome, saw stewards co-operating with the fans
with some even allowing Italian fans through the segregation line to collect missiles that
they then throw over the barriers (Stott and Pearson 2007: 4). At Livorno, there are no
stewards in the Curva Nord and this reinforces the liminal space of the curva. An incident
during the match between Livorno and Mantova occurred when a debateable corner
decision was given by an assistant referee. This resulted in the assistant referee and the
player taking the corner, being the focus of a barrage of bottles and other assorted
objects. No fans were reprimanded or ejected and the liminality of the curva remained.
The club was subsequently fined 5000 for this infringement, which acts as a calculable

238

cost. The costs of employing dedicated, trained stewards can run into several thousands
of euros.57 The costs of 5000 for occasional infringements are minimal compared to the
costs the club would have to pay if they were charged by the police and stewards.
Ultimately, these costs are born by the community.

There are signs that certain areas are adopting an alternative approach to policing and
stewarding at matches. Two Tuscan clubs have experimented with extensive stewarding.
Empoli and Fiorentina have played a number of matches with minimal police (Giudici
2010). In addition, Fiorentina is planning a new stadium and this will remove the
perimeter fencing and incorporate increased stewarding. As Giudici states: The project
has the objective of demilitarising the stadium, improving excessively the commercial
appeal of the event (Giudici 2010: 199). The Florentine club will provide an apposite
example for the future of Italian football. This point is affirmed by the Chief of Police of
Florence, Franceso Tagliente who stated that:
At Florence is not like this, because in this city a project was taken forward,
launched by the Osservatorio, strongly backed by the head of police, that has taken
away the nets from the away end, to make it that the forces of order are always
moved away towards the centre of the city. The fans, initially sceptical, have
started a constructive dialogue with the chief of police and the authorities.
Florence is a reality seen as a model in international football. I speak for
Florence; there are other problems of security for others. (Cellini 2009)

By taking away the nets that cover the away stands, the police and Fiorentina football
club are beginning to treat the fans in a different manner to other clubs. Furthermore, by

57

For example, in Britain the cost of policing to Wigan (in the Premiership) in 2007-8 were 240,000; for
Hereford (in League 1) were 80,000. House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2009). The Cost of
Policing Football Matches.

239

removing police from the stadium, they are acknowledging that the police are not passive
in relation to fan violence. This approach was taken in the Champions League match
between Fiorentina and Liverpool in October 2009. Fan choreographies from both sets
of fans helped create a carnivalesque atmosphere and Liverpool fans freely went around
the city (Giudici 2010). This situation contrasts with the response of Manchester United
and Liverpool fans in Rome. It will take time to see if the Florence model works, but it
suggests a move towards a more progressive approach when dealing with fans.

Summary

The bankruptcy of the Italian patrimonial system has impeded its ability to undertake the
wider transformations necessary to compete globally. Over-reliance on the revenue from
television is permitting clubs to remain in communal stadiums with poor facilities. The
lack of stadium redevelopment is contributing to the reinforcement of existing corrupt
practises, as witnessed during calciopoli and the financial scandals. Lack of redevelopment
is also impacting safety. Curve are surrounded by Perspex fences and netting, that prevent
easy exit in the event of an emergency. Without important stadium safety regulations
being introduced, the potential for a Hillsborough-type tragedy is a time-bomb waiting to
explode. The poverty of the stadiums is also necessitating increased security outside as
the police struggle to maintain order. Excessive legislation and police actions are
effectively criminalising all fans and contributing to the articulation of localised identities.
This is heightening the already emotional situation that takes place at a stadium and
amplifies the possibility of violence. The political role of the two police forces legitimates
this violence as they seek to maintain their own profile and create the ultr as a folk
devil. Despite these factors, there is acknowledgement that Italy needs to change. The
FIGC submitted bids to host the 2012 and 2016 European Championships to act as a

240

catalyst for stadium redevelopment. Meanwhile, Fiorentina has started the planning
process to build a new stadium and has trialled matches without police. Despite these
plans, the widespread failure of the neo-patrimonial system to adjust to the global
political economic transformations have impacted the match-day experience of fans and
contributed to a decline in participation in football. The following section will detail how
diverse fan groups have adapted to the changes in Italian and global football.

241

Chapter 6

The Social Capital of Italian Fans

Being a fan is our job Roma slogan, 1970s58

In Italy the ultr are in charge Fabio Capello59

The home curva in Livornos Stadio Armando Picchi was awash with colour as the crowd
waited in anticipation for the start of the match. A large burgundy flag depicting the
name of one of Livornos star players, Igor Protti, dominated the end. Elsewhere,
national flags of Jamaica and the Soviet Union were displayed alongside flags in the
colours of the home team. The warm September evening was punctuated with Second
World War Partisan songs and football chants. The songs and flags contributed to the
crackling atmosphere as kick-off approached. Livorno was playing their second home
game after winning promotion to Serie A. Their opponents were AC Milan who boasted
a range of international stars like Ronaldinho, Clarence Seedorf and Alessandro Nesta.
Yet the crowd displayed little interest in the world-class footballers on display. Their
focus was on the owner of their opponents, Silvio Berlusconi, who had just endured six
months of sex scandals. Fans displayed banners satirising the prime minister and released
inflated condoms into the stadium. A number of fans exhibited inflatable sex dolls
dressed in Livorno football shirts to reinforce the sexual nature of Berlusconis scandals.

58

Foot, J. (2007). Winning at all costs : a scandalous history of Italian soccer. New York, Nation Books.
La Gazzetta dello Sport (2009). "In Italia comandano gli ultr" Polemica Capello-Petrucci. La Gazzetta
dello Sport.
59

242

The political nature of the event was reinforced through the songs, many of which were
directed at the Prime Minister. Renditions of the Partisan song, Bella Ciao, were
performed amongst songs extolling the virtues of Livorno. Berlusconis sexual
peccadilloes were satirised with a chant of Silvio pedofilo (Silvio paedophile), while the
greatest participation came from chants of Berlusconi, pezzo di merda (Berlusconi piece of
shit). Politics and local identity combine in the carnival atmosphere of Livornos
stadium.

Italian fan culture is a central image of Italian football. Passionate fans help create a
carnival atmosphere full of flags, fireworks and songs. It can also result in violence, as
the death of Filipo Raciti demonstrates. The recurring themes of this thesis re-emerge in
relation to the fans and fan groups. They operate within their own familial and
patrimonial networks and these are incorporated into the wider networks of the football
clubs and their owners. Global political economic transformations have directly impacted
the identification of fans with their local clubs. The intense politicisation of Italian
society has led to an amalgamation of regional and political identities that reflect the
wider social context. Furthermore, the intense politicisation of everyday life is reflected in
the identities of fan groups. These identities are impacted by the prevailing regionalism
and distrust of central government that exist in Italy. With the rolling back of the state
and changes to the global political economy, mass participation in football and associated
fan groups has fragmented into smaller groups with a diverse range of outlooks. Groups
embody the interests of members and reflect the single-issue outlook of contemporary
Italian politics. Yet this fragmentation also contributes to the falling participation of the
wider public associations.

243

It is this falling participation in public life that has captured the wider political and
academic imagination in the twenty-first century. Scholarship during the 1990s focussed
on globalisation, whereas the following decade was characterised by research into social
capital. Whilst the previous chapters presented the effects of globalisation on Italian
football, this chapter will highlight the impact of globalisation on sporting communities.
This chapter will contribute to this literature in combination with the literature on social
capital, through analysis of Italian supporters and situating this within the wider political
economic transformations in Italy. The following section will provide an historical
account of the development of Italian football fan groups in relation to the wider
political economic transformations in Italy and will present a theoretical approach for
understanding ultr. The extensive deregulation and fragmentation of the Italian state and
politics in the 1980s corresponded to widespread fragmentation of the ultr groups
during the same period. In particular, this will focus on the development of localised
identities, particularly with reference to Livorno. Fragmentation has led to an increased
focus on violence. This in turn had generated interested from the de-regulated media
companies who are searching for news that appeals to a wider audience. By the 1990s,
the ultr began to coalesce around a common identity focussing on symbolic anti-state
targets. Finally, the chapter will provide an account of official supporters clubs, to
present an alternative view of Italian football fans, and highlight how these associations
provide the strengths and weaknesses of social capital formation.

Italian Ultr: Development and Change

Italian games are characterised by spectacular choreographies and passionate fans that
add colour and spectacle to the Italian game. This phenomenon has spread across much
of Europe since its inception in Italy. These fans are called ultr and have attracted much

244

of the focus of the police, authorities, media, and academics. During the 1980s and 1990s
much of the football research in Britain analysed football violence; currently Italian
research is maintaining the same focus. As English football has developed and moved
away from its violent past, Italian football remains mired in corruption and violence.
Whilst a number of Italian academics have focussed on global transformations, in
particular the role of television (Menduni 1996; Menduni 2002; Liguori and Smargiasse
2003; Russo 2005; Porro 2008; Cacciari and Giudici 2010), much of the focus of Italian
literature has centred on the ultr. From Dal Lagos seminal Descrizione di una Battaglia
(Description of a Battle) there has been extensive research analysing the ultr identity
(Dal Lago 1990; De Biasi 1996; Podaliri and Balestri 1998; Roversi and Balestri 2000;
Salvini 2004; Ferreri 2008; Francesio 2008; Lava 2008; Squinzani 2009; Stefanini 2009).
Although the continuing violence at football ensures that the ultr remain a focus of
academic research, there are signs that academic research is beginning to investigate the
wider global issues in Italian football. In particular, English football becomes an apposite
focus (Lava 2008; Manes 2008). Wider analysis is also provided by Cacciari et al (Cacciari
and Giudici 2010). This collection of essays represents an attempt to situate analysis of
Italian football within the wider body of literature on globalisation. As Tintori states in
the Introduction:

This is not a book on the ultras, a work on the animals. A book on the ultras is
inevitably destined to failure as some work of fiction that pretends to represent
reality. Here we search for the exact opposite, inverting the subject and object.
This is a book on modern football: at the centre of interest are the powers and
institutions that govern football, the completely restructured economy, the
conflicts that arise (Cacciari and Giudici 2010)

245

Consequently, although the ultr are a significant aspect of Italian football, they must be
situated in the wider political economic transformations that have affected global
football. Through this analysis, it can be shown how the wider patrimonial networks
operating within the Italian political economy incorporated the ultr and helped legitimise
them.

History and performance are significant aspects of the ultr movement. The term itself
derives from French politics; during the French restoration period (1815-30), an ultrroyaliste was a partisan supporter of Absolute Monarchy (Testa 2009). The term has been
adapted to refer to all hardcore football fans who demonstrate an unwavering support of
their team (Testa 2009). Principally, ultr are young men and although young women
participate, the leaders and core of the ultr are male. Match-days are characterised by
extensive displays of flags and banners which result in a riot of colour. The flags depict
the colours of the team and of the city and are waved at the start of matches, and at
various points throughout the game. Banners or striscione are unfurled across the curve.
These depict membership of the group, political messages or taunts to rivals. In addition
to the visual display, the fans produce an aural performance through orchestrated
choruses combined with drums and trumpets. Many of the songs supplement the visual,
being songs about the team or political views. The choreography is often supplemented
with flares and smoke bombs with add to the aural and visual spectacle. It is this aspect
of spectacle that distinguishes ultr support:

Italians refer to the staging of a match as a spettacolo. No English word

adequately conveys the spettacolo, but it involves creation of a special atmosphere
characterised by a combination of colour, vibrance and noise (De Biasi 1996:
116)

246

The combination of flags, banners, flares, and choruses produce a powerful spectacle
which is orchestrated with a chant-leader. These combine to create a visual and audible
display that enhances the emotion of the situation and increase group solidarity.

The choreographies are not passive displays but powerful displays of identity and
solidarity. A good example of positive ultr display arose in December 2007 when
Fiorentina faced Inter. The wife of Fiorentinas manager, Cesare Prandelli, had died of
cancer on the Monday before the match. The Fiorentina ultr displayed a striscione stating
the time that passes deadens the sorrow, but if you would need her, raise your eyes to
the sky, her star will drive you forever and carry us far. Ultr also undertake a range of
charity work (Testa 2010). After an earthquake struck the Southern Italian town of
LAqullia in 2009, Livornese ultr organised a collection for the victims. In contrast to
these displays of inclusion, charity and membership, ultr are frequently depicted as
violent hooligans. Football matches are often marred by violence between rival groups
and police. This occurred tragically in February 2007 when Filppo Raciti was killed in
riots with Catania and Palermo fans. Although this events focussed the attention of the
authorities squarely on the phenomenon, it represents just one example of violence and
death at Italian football matches.

To understand the ultr phenomenon, it must be analysed in relation to the politicaleconomic transformations occurring across Italy. Widespread internal migration fuelled
by the Miracle contributed to an upsurge in interest in football in the larger industrial
cities. This led to fan-groups organising supporters clubs in the 1950s, such as Inters I
Moschettieri (The Musketeers), to meet and discuss football and their football club and to
organise social events with other fans. The ultr originated from these earlier forms of

247

supporters clubs, with the first ultr group being formed in 1968; the Fossa dei Leoni
(Lions Den) of Milan. This was followed a year later by the Boys of Inter (Foot 2007;
Ferreri 2008). The phenomenon developed throughout the following decade and has
seen various transformations. In this way we can identify three distinct phases of the ultr
(Roversi 1994; Roversi and Balestri 2000; Ferreri 2008; Testa and Armstrong 2008; Scalia
2009). From its development and growth in the early 1970s, the homogeneity of the
groups began to fragment during the 1980s. Despite this fragmentation, a new form of
umbrella ultr identity emerged in the mid-1990s.

The ultr phenomenon originated in the politically fertile period of the 1970s. The
political turmoil during the decade saw the emergence of political terrorism, termed the
years of lead, and also witnessed the emergence of many political movements like the
Brigate Rosse (Wagstaff 2001; Foot 2003: 38; Bartali 2006; Cooke 2006; Ignazi 2006). The
intense politicisation of public life was extended to the football stadiums where the ultr
adopted similar political language when naming their groups. Group names such as Red
and Blue Commandos at Bologna and Tupamaros60 and Vigilantes at Sampdoria
identify the militant tendencies of the groups (Podaliri and Balestri 1998: 90). The ultr
actively incorporated the political symbols of the piazza into the stadium (Stefanini 2009:
101-2). Teams started to reflect the wider political allegiances of the city or wider region.
Bologna, in the Communist stronghold of Emilia, had left-wing supporters whilst the
more conservative Veneto was reflected by the right-wing Verona. Political banners and
flags, of the type paraded on marches and demonstrations, were displayed prominently in
the curve, and political songs were sung throughout the match (Dal Lago and De Biasi
1994; Roversi 1994; Podaliri and Balestri 1998: 91). These features were incorporated
into the choreographies to create the conspicuous spectacle. Likewise the military style of
60

a Uruguayan urban guerrilla group

248

the street was also reflected in the clothes adopted by the groups. The urban guerrilla
style of combat jackets or camouflage outfits, with balaclavas and scarves obscuring the
face, were taken directly from the political turmoil on the streets (Roversi 1994; Podaliri
and Balestri 1998). This represented a marked contrast to certain styles of hooliganism,
such as the English and Dutch, who developed a casual style of dress to evade police
detection (Redhead and McLaughlin 1985; Giulianotti 1993; Spaaij 2006). As a
consequence the ultr became an extension of the politics of the city.

In addition to politics, the ultr incorporated campanilismo into their identity. Campanilismo
is literally the love of ones bell-tower and represents the love of ones home town. While
Putnam ascribes local identity to civic traditions (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993), many of
these traditions were shaped through historical and religious rituals and narratives.
Friendships and rivalries were affirmed through politics and regionalism and this helped
shape intra-group dynamics (Lanfranchi and De Biasi 1997). Within the major cities,
teams polarised around traditional notions of the team and political affiliation. In Milan,
Internazionale were seen as the team of the bourgeoisie and more conservative while AC
Milan, as the traditional team of the railway workers, represented the working class.
(Roversi 1994; Podaliri and Balestri 1998). Similar patterns emerged in Turin where
Juventus represented the owners and mangers of Fiat whereas Torino represented the
workers in the factories. In Rome, Roma represented the city, whereas Lazio represented
the more conservative region of the same name. Campanilismo also facilitated the
emergence of inter-city rivalries. The more passionate derbies operate between close
neighbours, such as Vicenza and Verona, Ascoli and Ancona, or Como and Varese (Foot
2006: 309). There has been long-running conflict between Pisa and Livorno in spite of
their common political affiliations. When the AC Milan striker Luther Blissett scored the
goal that caused Pisa to be relegated, Livorno fans held parties and subsequently unveiled

249

a banner thanking him at their next game (Foot 2006: 390). This continued in the 1990s
when over twenty-thousand leaflets were dropped over Pisa from a specially hired plane
before a derby game (Foot 2006: 390).

The complicated constructions of campanilismo see a complex network of interactions take

place. Dal Lago describes Italian football culture as a form of extended municipalism
(Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994). The battle lines of the football ultr are those of the
ancient rivalries between regions and towns. This led to the emergence of what Dunning
has termed the Bedouin Syndrome (Dunning, Murphy et al. 1986). This is where the
friend of a friend is a friend; the friend of an enemy is an enemy. As a result, the
rivalries are negotiated through gemmellaggio or twinning (Dal Lago 1990; Bruno 1992;
Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994; Marchi 2005; Stefanini 2009: 121; Testa 2009).61 Historical
traces became re-invented. During the religious wars of the Middle Ages, those cities
who supported the Pope (Guelphs) became enemies with those that supported the Holy
Roman Emperor (Ghibellines). Pisa who feared the rise of the Papacy, supported the
Emperor, whereas Genoa supported the Pope due to their proximity to the Emperor. As
Pisa and Siena were political and trading rivals with Florence, Siena also became a
Guelph. Similar patterns emerged centuries later with political and city rivalries. Fans of
Florences Fiorentina are still rivals with Pisa and Siena. Furthermore, supporters of
teams that represented different political views became rivals whilst friendships were
forged with groups of similar beliefs. In this way, Bologna became friends with AC Milan
in the 1970s because of their left-wing politics, yet Verona became enemies based on
their right-wing politics. Livorno, a team affiliated to the Left, had rivalries with Lazio
and Verona, in addition to being rivals with friends of Pisa. Consequently, civic traditions
become bound in with historical narratives and rivalries. The following section illustrates
61

For example, the fan website tifonet details the various twinnings and rivalries with other teams under
its war and peace section: http://www.tifonet.it/guerraepace/

250

the importance of history to the construction of Livornese identity, especially as political

identities become entwined.

Livorno: An Historical Identity

Livorno represents an apposite field of study because its political identity is central to its
local identity. Furthermore, there is a unique flavour to Livornos history that contributes
to this political identity and creates a range of inter-city and inter-club rivalries. As Abse
states: Livorno is interesting not because it is a typical Tuscan city but because it is an
atypical one (Abse 1986: 57). The political and historical development of Tuscany has
created a network of friends and rivals. Pisa, in particular, represents a significant factor
within Livornos history and identity. During the early medieval period, Pisa was the
main port on the Tuscan coast and was one of the main Maritime powers in the
Mediterranean. A decisive naval defeat at the Battle of Meloria to Genoa in 1284, one of
its major mercantile and military competitors, halted Pisan expansion. This was
compounded by the growth of Florence further east along the River Arno. Pisa
eventually succumbed to Florence and became their port and communications access to
the world. The slow moving River Arno began silting up and by the 16th Century Pisa
was unusable as a port. Consequently, the rulers of Florence built a new port at Livorno,
ten miles south of Pisa. To populate this new town, Florence passed the Leggi Livornine in
1593.62 This law welcomed anyone, regardless of background, and as a result the city was
populated with criminals and those fleeing religious persecution (Nudi 1980: 206-7;
Galasso 2002: 17). There were a number of merchants from across Europe and the east
who helped to create a cosmopolitan city (Abse 1986). The free-port status continued
until unification when the city became heavily industrialised which resulted in widespread
62

http://dewey.library.upenn.edu/sceti/ljs/PageLevel/view.cfm?option=view&ManID=ljs379

251

political activism, particularly around working rights. This resulted in the popularity of
Socialism and anarchism which was reinforced during the politically turbulent times of
the 1920s. The period that saw the growth of Fascism, also saw a decisive split in the
Socialist Party. As one of its architects, Antonio Gramsci, stated:

At Livorno, the destiny of the working people of Italy will be under discussion.
At Livorno, a new era in the history of the Italian nation will begin (Gramsci
2000: 121).

The 1921 Socialist Party conference was held at the San Marco Theatre in Livorno.
Those Socialists who wanted to follow the Soviet model engineered a split to form the
Italian Communist Party, the PCI. The links to the Communist Party were reinforced in
1975 with the formation of Eurocommunism. Democratic Communism resulted from
the meeting of the PCI and their Spanish equivalents in Livorno (The Times 1984). In
addition, Livorno has historically voted for left-wing parties, in particular the PCI.

The complex political and local constructions of the fan groups permit the creation of
new forms of imagined communities (Anderson 2006). As with the wider national
constructions demonstrated in chapter two, these imagined communities have unifying
invented traditions that permit the creation of common rituals and collective memories
(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Local rituals and memories help inflect the fan group
with meaning which is reinforced through the rituals of football (King 1997).
Consequently, Livorno fans draw on their history to reinforce their identity and
distinguish themselves from their rivals. Livornos history as a free port shapes much of
the citys narrative. The Leggi Livornine permitted all people, whatever their race, religion

252

or criminal record.63 This created a city of nations as inhabitants from across Europe
and the Mediterranean settled in the city (Nudi 1980: 206-7; Galasso 2002: 17). Many of
these were professional merchants who were attracted by the absence of tax. Others
were criminals and slaves, who would not face investigation in the city, whilst others
were fleeing religious persecution. The religious tolerance exhibited within the city was
reflected in the incorporation of Jews in society. In defiance of a papal edict, the city did
not ghettoise the Jewish population, making it extremely unusual in contemporary
European culture (Galasso 2002: 21). This political image was reinforced through the
creation of the PCI at the Livorno Congress in 1921 (Gramsci 2000: 118; Dombroski
2001: 121).

These significant events in Livornos history create an historical narrative that reinforces
the imagined community of the city and its football fans. Religious and historic rituals
provide the opportunity for the continual reinvigoration of civic solidarity. Simple
classifications and analogies are interwoven into narratives and symbols to facilitate
understanding and memorisation (Rydgren 2007). These historical symbols and
narratives assist in incorporating new members into the groups by familiarising them
with its past values (Llobera 1989; Zerubavel 1996). These narratives are framed by
existing knowledge through the individual interactions of members and this permits
Livornese identity and history to be presented and reinforced (Collard 1989; Tonkin
1992; Rydgren 2007). Historical narratives require trust to assist in memorisation
(Rydgren 2007) so the social capital of the group reinforces the historical tradition of the
imagined community.

63

http://dewey.library.upenn.edu/sceti/ljs/PageLevel/view.cfm?option=view&ManID=ljs379

253

Two narratives are often provided to illustrate a Typical Livornese. In 1984, the city of
Livorno was celebrating the one-hundredth birthday of Amadeo Modigliani, Livornos
most famous son, the Avant-garde artist who later moved to Paris. In addition to an
exhibition of his work, the commune sought to dredge the canals near where Modigliani
used to live and work. Local legend stated that after poor reviews of his work and in a fit
of pique, the artist threw some sculptures into the canal. Whilst the council was dredging
the canals they discovered much debris, which led to residents quipping that the council
had discovered Modiglianis bicycle or shoe. After eight days of dredging, the dream
became reality as a stone sculpture of a head was unearthed. Two hours later a further
two busts were discovered. With the worlds art media focussed on Livorno, many art
critics authenticated the discoveries as Modigliani sculptures. However two months later,
a group of students admitted making one of the busts in their garden with an electric
drill. The art experts immediately denounced them as publicity seekers. However, they
provided pictures of themselves in action and on national television proceeded to make
another Modigliani head. Their explanation for the delay was their confusion over the
other two busts; they had only made one sculpture. The confusion was soon allayed
when a dock worker and part-time sculptor, Angelo Froglia, admitted making the other
two heads as a conceptual work to highlight the pomposity of the art world. Not only is
this story recounted to illustrate the anti-establishment sentiments, it also illustrated that
two distinct groups of people came up with the same idea as a practical joke.

The other story used to demonstrate Livornos identity and character, relates to the fans
of the football team who were attending the first game of the 2004-5 season. Livorno
was returning to Serie A for the first time since 1949 and as a result took nearly ten
thousand fans to the San Siro Stadium for their match with AC Milan. That summer, the
Italian Prime Minister and AC Milans owner, Silvio Berlusconi, was photographed

254

entertaining the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, at his Sardinian villa. In these photos
Berlusconi sported a white bandana that was either a bad fashion accessory or covering a
hair transplant [Pisa 2009]. The Livorno fans took this symbol as an opportunity to mock
Berlusconi, who not only represented the establishment, but also was a right wing
politician. Thousands of Livorno fans arrived at the San Siro, similarly attired to
Berlusconi, with white bandanas emblazoned with the words Silvio, Siamo Arrivando
(Silvio, we are coming) (La Repubblica 2004; Foot 2007). Through the articulation of
these stories, Livornese are articulating and re-articulating an historical narrative that
reinforces local identity and campanilismo. These historic constructions become vital in
narrating the invented traditions of imagined communities and are weaved into the
overall presentation of the group.

The creation of the imagined community with its own invented traditions and based on
the socially constructed history of the community, requires social action to operate. The
imagined community operates within a social space. Football facilitates by providing the
focus and location for this social action to exist. The stadium becomes a central location
for the articulation and expression of the identity of the imagined community. The
atmosphere generated by the collective solidarity of the crowd fuels the construction of
emotional ties to their physical environment. This contributes to a feeling of topophilia to
the stadium (Bale 1990; Bale 1993). This turns the stadium into a temporary sacred space
that subverts the normal everyday practices. Consequently, the curve have become liminal
spaces that are sacred to the ultr (Ferreri 2008: 74). They become decorated with the
signs and markers of the group and these operate as sacred markers which depict
temporary ownership. In the creation of these temporary liminal spaces, the imagined
community builds its own rules and rituals:

255

In a stadium, according to sectors or groups that occupy it, become of fact legal
behaviours that in other situations of daily life tend to be hidden, or however
protected from the gaze of the forces of order. In this way, in a curva one can
smoke marijuana with relative impunity, one can throw objects onto the field,
simulate brawls, tear up the symbols of rival teams and above all express in
various ways transgressive behaviours (Dal Lago 1990: 37)

The importance of liminality is reinforced through the carnivalesque atmosphere

generated within the stadium.

In his concept of the carnivalesque, Bakhtin highlights the spectacle and performance
involved within the carnival. The traditional rules and borders of everyday life became
subverted as degradation of the sacred becomes permitted (Bakhtin 1984). The vocal
choruses and profanities targeted at referees and rival players would not be permitted
outside the carnival. Yet within the sacred space of the curva this ritual denigration
heightens the spectacle. Leading figures outside of the carnival also become ripe for
satire and are transformed into grotesques that are ritually humiliated. Within the
politically afflicted world of Italian football, politics and politicians become targets. The
example of Livorno fans wearing bandanas to AC Milan was a ritual humiliation of the
Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi. Through its performance it reinforced the collective
memory and identity of the group and the liminality of the stadium. The passive
legitimation of these practises permits the carnivalesque to continue as official consent
negates the organic actions of the crowd (Giulianotti 1991). The lack of active policing in
these situations reinforces the legitimacy of the carnivalesque:

256

Quantity not quality seems to be their preferred method, combined with a degree
of non-intervention. Surrounding the curva they permit the fans in it to behave in
a way as if the curva were a zone of liminality. Such discretion points to a
discrepancy between legal requirements and tolerated behaviour which is not
manifested by the police in Britain (Lanfranchi and De Biasi 1997: 101)

Without the gaze of surveillance, the participants can remain in their liminal space and
endorses the carnivalesque. In addition to subverting existing hierarchies, the
carnivalesque spectacle blurs the boundaries between performance and audience. As
Bakhtin states:

Carnival does not know footlights, in the sense that it does not acknowledge a
distinction between action and spectacle. Footlights would destroy a carnival, as
the absence of footlights would destroy a theatrical performance. Carnival is not
a spectacle seen by the people; they live in it, and everyone participates because
its very idea embraces all the people. While carnival lasts, there is no life outside
it. During carnival time life is subject only to its laws, that is, the laws of its own
freedom (Bakhtin 1984: 7).

The actor and performer become entwined as they watch performers creating the
spectacle (Abercrombie and Longhurst 1998: 68-9). The performer is continually
watching other performers for visual and aural cues to reinforce the carnival.

The creation of the imagined community within the carnivalesque stadium needs
constant reaffirmation for the group to continue. Through the production and
consumption of the spectacle, the Livorno fans are continually performing and re-

257

creating their identity. Goffman has suggested that all social actors perform specific roles
depending upon their social environment (Goffman 1990). This presupposes that actors
are calculating and mechanical who drop the faade as soon as they are backstage
(Jenkins 1996: 68; Romania 2005: 66). Social actors acknowledge and learn visual and
aural cues that signify participation within an acknowledged group. Butler suggests that
these cues are utilised to construct the performance and this process reinforces the
identity:

[t]he subject is not determined by the rules through which it is generated because
signification is not a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition that both
conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through the production of
substantialising effects [original italics] (Butler 1990: 145).

Therefore performance is not just an act or masquerade, but is constantly reaffirmed

through daily performance of cultural cues. Where Goffmans actor chooses their face,
Butlers denies the agency of the actor as they merely repeat the actions from the cues
around them (Lloyd 1999: 209):

There is no volitional subject behind the mime who decides, at it were, which
gender it will be today gender is not a performance that a prior subject elects
to do, but gender is performative (Butler 1993).

Consequently, the distinction between performance and performativity becomes blurred.

Even if an individual chooses to wear drag they are still taking cues from previously
performed identities to highlight which is already understood. Therefore, as Lloyd argues,
a performance is itself performative (Lloyd 1999: 202, 209).

258

The choreographies of the ultr constitute such a performance of identity. The actors
within the choreography are not cultural dupes, but active producers with knowledge and
understanding of the elements of the performance. In order to do this they must utilise
the correct commodities to present the group in the correct way and are consequently
performing their consumption:

Each and every expression of fan identity is hence both a non-volitional citation
and the (consumerist) choice of a volitional fan-subject. The performative
consumption which characterises media fandom. Is hence both an act and an
iteration-without-origin [original italics] (Hills 2002: 159)

The ultr participate in this performative consumption with a range of commodities.

Choreographies are created and performed with flags, striscione, and smoke bombs.
Although flags are sold outside the stadium and in the local market, many of the items
are actively produced away from the stadium, at home or in bars. Many of the striscione
are made on rolls of white cloth or paper. Other home-made devices include the bomba
carta which are home-made bombs that make spectacular explosions or smoke for the
choreographies. They have also been used as weapons; Catania fans had amassed over
one hundred bomba carta to ambush Palermo fans during their infamous derby that
resulted in the death of the policeman, Filippo Raciti (Richardson 2007).

Through the performance of the choreography, the ultr are producing the symbolic
markers of their localised imagined community. Livorno fans utilise many left-wing
symbols to symbolise their identity. Flags, scarves, t-shirts and graffiti display
Communist symbols such as the hammer and sickle, red star or image of Che

259

Guevara. National flags, such as Cuba and Palestine, have been adopted to demonstrate
solidarity. Green military-style clothing also reinforces the militancy of the ultr. Military
style jackets are worn during games, in addition to the green army-style cap popularised
by Chairman Mao. These symbols are not freed from political or historical connections
since green military-style jackets were a symbol of left wing identity during the politically
turbulent period of the 1970s and reinforce the invented traditions of the group. This
military style is also locally contingent. When the Americans left the city after the Second
World War, they left much of their equipment behind. A market was set-up which sold
these supplies. This market, the American Market, still exists today and mainly sells
military style clothing. One stall sells a range of unofficial Livorno merchandise, such as
T-shirts and scarves, as well as the various national flags which are displayed at the
ground. Consequently, when the Livorno fans perform at the stadium, displaying leftwing symbols on T-shirts, striscione and flags, they are performing a type of drag which
becomes performative; it not only reaffirms their identity, but reaffirms their collective
memory. Despite the formation of ultr imagined communities based around local
narratives, and the continuance of collective identities like the ones that exist in Livorno,
the groups have still fragmented, a process which started in the 1980s. The following
section will illustrate this transformation in relation to deregulation and globalisation.

Fragmentation of the Ultr

Despite the high level of organisation and planning that the choreographies demonstrate,
the ultr have not been unaffected by changes to the global political economy and neofootball. Although these ultr groups still accumulate social capital, they are no longer a
homogeneous group. The ultr have developed broadly in line with the political
economic phases of global football identified by King and Goldblatt (King 2003;

260

Goldblatt 2007; King 2009; King 2010). Following the highly organised groups of the
1970s, the uniform political blocs began to fragment by the 1980s. The organisation
adapted to new forms of display as younger groups began to focus on neo-localism and
violence (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994; Roversi 1994). Alongside the choreographies,
violence had been a small part of the overall ultr identity. By the end of the 1970s the
number of violent instances began steadily increasing. It is difficult to isolate the timing
of this transition. There is some consensus that the patterns began emerging in the 1970s
and crystallised in the earlier 1980s (Roversi 1994; Podaliri and Balestri 1998; Ferreri
2008). This became apparent by 1983-4 when there was a sharp increase in the number
of occurrences of violence (Roversi 1994; Lanfranchi and De Biasi 1997; Roversi and
Balestri 2000). A clear demarcation of the transition can be assigned through
identification of a significant event (Scalia 2009; Stefanini 2009; Testa 2009). During the
Rome derby between Lazio and Roma on 28 October 1979, a nautical flare was launched
from the Roma curva (De Biasi 1996; Foot 2007: 326). It flew across the stadium and
lodged in the skull of a Lazio fan who was using his brothers season ticket for the
match. The fan, Vincenzo Paparelli, died on the way to the hospital and represented the
first death attributable to ultr. By the 1980s violence became a central feature of ultr
identity and a new way of performing group identity. In contrast to the earlier political
names of ultr groups in the 1970s, the emerging groups names highlighted the change
of focus to violence (Roversi 1994; Stefanini 2009: 120). Names, such as the Sconvolts
(Upsetters) or Kaos, were used by the fragmenting groups (Roversi 1994; Stefanini
2009: 120; Testa 2009). Indeed, Juventus group the Drughi were inspired by the ultraviolence of the Droogs in Stanley Kubriks film, The Clockwork Orange (Foot 2007).

As the ultr focussed on violence, they became more organised and militarised. The ultr
had already become militarised through the political conflict of the anni di piombi. The

261

military uniforms of the 1970s had been adopted, yet more organised tactics emerged
during the 1980s. Alongside these tactics, groups started using weapons. Rather than the
bare fists of the 1970s, the new groups started using knives, bombs, iron bars and rockets
(such as the one that killed Paparelli). (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994; Ferreri 2008: 26).
The groups operated under a hierarchy, with capi-ultr, the heads of the ultr leading the
chants and the choreographies (Foot 2007). This militarisation has led to a number of
Italian commentators using the metaphor of war when discussing ultr. For example, Dal
Lago and De Biasi wrote:

In order to defeat the enemies on the field, ultr groups try to adopt urban
guerrilla tactics (particularly setting ambushes near to stations and involving the
police) (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994: 86)

The parallels with urban guerrillas are used to illustrate the mode of operation of the
groups. The creation of the curva and the city as sacred spaces sees the groups attempting
to defend their territory from outsiders by ambushing opponents and defending their
honour. In line with this militarisation, the police responded with an increased military
presence (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994; Roversi 1994; Marchi 2005). In addition to
seeking out rival fans, the ultr who focus on violence utilise their tactics to evade the
police, as well as incorporating them into the attacks (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994).

The liminal space of the curva became an apposite location to perform the new forms of
politics emerging in Italy. The anti-south rhetoric of the Lega Nord was reflected with
stronger regional rivalries in the stadiums. Striscione in particular, demonstrated the
increasing anti-Southern sentiment. Verona is a city at the heart of the Legas imagined
nation of Padania. The citys historic football team, Hellas Verona, epitomises the

262

Northern anti-Southern bias that is utilised by the Lega Nord. In 1985 the Hellas Verona
fans displayed a banner to rival Napoli fans stating: Welcome to Italy (Foot 2007: 310).
The inference was that the south was not part of the Italian nation. When Mount Etna
started to smoke, Verona fans held up a banner against Catania declaring Forza Etna!
meaning Go Etna! (Parks 2003; Foot 2006: 309). At the same time graffiti appeared in
the North expressing the same sentiment (Hofmann 2008). Similarly, Verona fans
unveiled a banner at Napoli saying Vesuvio facci sognare Help us dream, Vesuvius
(Foot 2006: 309). The fans of other football clubs also suggested that they wanted
volcanoes to destroy the south. AC Milan fans unveiled a similar banner at Napoli saying
Give us a present Vesuvius, highlighting the increasing fragmentation of the Italian
state (Foot 2006: 309). This invective is not confined to geography. The carnivalesque
atmosphere also permits the desecration of sacred symbolic associations. Famously,
Napoli fans retaliated to Verona fans with a striscione that drew on the city of Veronas
literary connection with Shakespeares Romeo and Juliet. The banner stated that Giulietta
na Zoccola e Romeo Cornuto - Juliet is a Slag and Romeo is a cuckold.64 The sentiment has
resulted in a series of books under that title, which have published the various humorous
and offensive striscione displayed on the curva (Militello 2004; Militello 2004; Militello
2005). Although informal associations may generate social capital for its members, they
do not necessarily contribute to a wider feeling of national sentiment, as regional
identities continue to be asserted.

Italia 90 provided an apposite example of the increased regionalism within Italy. During
the group stages of the competition, fans in AC Milan supported Cameroon in their
match against Argentina. Similarly, when Argentina played Brazil in Turin, the local fans
supported Brazil (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994). In both cases the fans were focussing
64

http://www.striscionistadio.com/striscioni-napoli/giulietta-e-na-zoccola-e-romeo-cornuto/

263

their support on the opponents of Maradona. The Argentinean player was the totemic
player of Napoli who had transformed the fortunes of the southern club. On account of
their footballing power and the renewed regionalism within Italy, Maradona became the
focus for the hatred of the fans of AC Milan and Turin. The clubs of those cities, in
particular, Inter, AC Milan and Juventus were fierce rivals with Napoli and consequently,
the fans of these clubs supported Maradonas rivals in the World Cup. Fatefully,
Argentina drew Italy in the quarter finals of the competition; a match that was to be
played in Naples. The situation prompted Maradona to declare to Napoli fans: For 364
days a year you are treated like dirt, and then they ask you to support them (Foot 2007:
478). The statement divided Neapolitan opinion and reveals the contested nature of
national identity in Italy. One banner stated: Diego, we love you but at the end of the
day we are Italians (Foot 2007: 478). Argentina defeated Italy to reach the final in Rome.
Regional and footballing rivalries entered the international arena of the World Cup as the
Roman crowd jeered throughout the Argentinean national anthem (Foot 2006: 126).

The 1980s also saw on the curva an increase in racism against groups from outside Italy.
Increased global migration saw many immigrants move to Italy to work in the northern
factories or in low-paid work, such as fruit picking. As was witnessed in the 1970s, the
politics of the piazza were transferred to the curve. Whereas many ultr groups in the
1970s were left wing, the 1980s saw a trend towards political neutrality or even to the
extreme Right. Racist chants and banners were becoming more widespread across the
stadiums (Podaliri and Balestri 1998; Testa and Armstrong 2008). This does not mark the
ultr as right wing, but identifies a shift in politics elsewhere. This process has occurred
spectacularly with Roma. Traditionally, Roma was associated with the working class area
of Testaccio and had a strong affiliation to the local Jewish community. This led to the
fans of Lazio presenting a striscione to the Roma fans of the Curva Sud stating: Curva Sud

264

full, Synagogues empty (Foot 2007: 310). The racism became more acute when Lazio
fans presented striscioni stating: Your home is Auschwitz and Team of blacks, curva of
Jews (Foot 2007: 310). In recent years the leading ultr groups of Roma have become
affiliated with the far Right (Testa and Armstrong 2008). This has resulted in Roma fans
utilising the same anti-Semitic references against Livorno, another club with strong
Jewish connections. In 2006 Roma fans displayed a banner stating: Lazio-Livorno, stessa
iniziale, stesso forno (Lazio-Livorno, same initials, same oven) (Caccia 2006; La Repubblica
2006). The Roma fans utilised Livornos strong Jewish history through the analogy to the
Auschwitz ovens. They also identify their move from the left wing identity characterised
by Livorno. By placing them in the same category as their fierce local rivals, Lazio, they
were declaring that Livorno fans are enemies. These sentiments were strengthened
through word play with the poetic rhyme of Livorno and forno which reinforced the
statement.

Racism has also frequently been directed at the players. The Bosman ruling de-regulated
the national leagues ability to control player numbers. This has seen an increase in the
number of players from outside the national borders (Maguire and Stead 1998;
Giulianotti 1999; Maguire and Pearton 2000; King 2003). Although Italy has a long
history of overseas players, many were oriundi players of Italian ancestry. Consequently,
the de-regulated player markets saw an increase in players from outside the traditional
European markets. Players who are marked as being outside the norm were targeted.
Based on his Romanian heritage, the Fiorentina player Adriano Mutu, was labelled a
crafty little gypsy by Maurizio Zamparini, the president of Palermo (Kick It Out 2007).
He has also been the subject of gypsy taunts from the curve. Similarly, the Japanese star,
Shunsuke Nakamura, received racist abuse and suggested that this probably explains
why so few Japanese players have made it here. (O'Henley 2008). African players have

265

become particular targets. Frequently black players receive buu buu chants whenever
they touch the ball. This situation has manifested itself in the abuse levelled at Mario
Balotelli. Balotelli was a young Inter player who was widely seen as the future star of
Italian football.65 He was born to Ghanaian parents in Palermo and two years later was
adopted by an Italian family and raised in Brescia. Balotelli has been subjected to
widespread abuse, including chants of There are no black Italians and If you jump up
and down, Balotelli dies (Crosetti 2009; Il Giornale 2009; Il Giornale 2009; Kington 2009;
La Corriere dello Sport 2009; Sorrentino 2009). Rival fans claim that it is not racism, but the
abuse is due to the attitude of the player. Balotelli provokes fans when he scores, and has
an insolent attitude to training which has seen him attract criticism from his manager at
Inter, Jose Mourinho.

The reaction to Mario Balotelli should not be taken in isolation. After being subjected to
abuse from Inters fans in 2005, the Cte dIvoire player Marco Zoro attempted to walk
off the pitch during a game between his team Messina, and Inter (Menicucci 2005). By
2010, players eventually took a stand. In February 2010 players from the amateur club of
Casteltodino in Umbria walked off the pitch (La Repubblica 2010). Castelodino had two
players with Nigerian parents and were labelled Dirty Negroes by an opposition player.
Unfortunately abuse is not restricted to opposition players. After Juventus victory
against Atalanta in March 2010, the French player Jonathan Zebina was slapped by a
Juventus fan (La Repubblica 2010). In response to this Zebina said:

Definitely it is racism it is an ugly thing for the image of Italian football that
does not deserve this. The Federation must do something. I will probably stay

65

Balotelli left Inter, and Italy in August 2010 to join Manchester City.

266

and live in Italy, however, these images must be fought with much force, Italy
deserves better (La Repubblica 2010).

The FIGC has instigated some initiatives to counter these regular episodes of racism.
After the Marco Zoro incident, they requested that players entered the pitch holding No
to Racism banners (Menicucci 2005). They also sanction clubs whose fans participate in
racist chanting. For example Juventus has been ordered to play a match behind closed
doors and fined 20,000 for the various episodes of abuse directed at Mario Balotelli
(Kington 2009). However Jose Mourihno, the manager of Inter, was fined 40,000 and
suspended for three games for making a crossed-arm handcuffs gesture after two Inter
players had been sent off. He was insinuating that the authorities were contriving to
prevent Inter from winning their forth league title (Kington 2010). When accusations
against the Federation are punished more severely than widespread racist abuse, there is
little surprise that the problem continues. Furthermore, the equivalent of the Kick it
Out campaign in the English Premier League does not have a counterpart in Italy and
this illustrates the continued lack of legitimacy of the FIGC. The perceived challenges to
national identity, and the weakness of the central state to impose itself, have permitted
local and regional identities to emerge.

Out of these transformations in fan identity, there was a re-emergence of the imagined
community of Livorno. By drawing on its historical roots as a cosmopolitan city, it could
reinforce its invented traditions. In opposition to the generalised others across Italy,
Livornos ultr remained resolutely left-wing. This saw the emergence of the Brigate
Autonome Livorno (BAL) (Foot 2007: 385). The group utilised the left wing symbols of
Russian, Cuban and red flags, in addition to flags with Che Guevara. Communist songs
were re-employed on the curva, such as the Bandiera Rossa (Red Flag) and the Partisan

267

song Bella Ciao. This also included displaying a striscione dedicated to Stalins birthday:
Eternal Honour to you, Great Man. 21.12.1879 (Foot 2007: 385). BALs potency was
reinforced through their membership of Cristiano Lucarelli. Lucarelli was a striker from
Livorno who took a pay cut to transfer from Torino to play for his home-town club. He
famously stated that some players buy themselves a Ferrari or a yacht, for a billion lire, I
bought myself a Livorno shirt (Foot 2007: 388). After transferring he assigned himself
the number 99 shirt in homage to the date of formation of BAL. This in turn has
become an invented tradition in Italy, where left wing footballers ask for the number 99.

As a consequence of increased global migrations of players, local players become

inflected with increased significance (King 2003). Lucarelli became a potent playersymbol for Livorno; a totemic object for the fans. He attracted much media attention,
including becoming the subject of a documentary, 99 Amaranto.66 Lucarelli can be
contrasted with another potent player-symbol; Paolo Di Canio of Lazio. Both players
were the subject of a parallel interview on Mediasets television show, Le Iene, based on
their image as player-ultr.67 Di Canio was famed for his support of Lazios far right
tendencies and expressed an admiration for Mussolini. He has celebrated scoring goals
with a Fascist salute to the crowd (Phillips 2005). In 2005 he made the same gesture as he
was substituted against Livorno (The Independent 2005). In contrast, when Lucarelli scores
a goal, he holds aloft his clenched fist as a goal celebration, in allusion to the Communist
symbol of solidarity. With actions and interviews, Lucarelli and Di Canio show solidarity
with their comrades on the curva. Di Canio confirmed this after the Fascist salute against
Livorno. He said afterwards, that I will always salute as I did yesterday because it gives
me a sense of belonging to my people (The Independent 2005). His people are the ultr
on the curva. He is highlighting that he understands the ultr and what is important to
66
67

http://www.99amaranto.it/en/index.html
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kblqsUPWLMw

268

them. By behaving in the same way, he is claiming membership of the group. A similar
incident occurred in March 2010 when the Argentine striker Mauro Zarate was
photographed performing the fascist salute with Lazio fans in the home curva, although
he subsequently claimed that he had never heard of Mussolini (La Repubblica 2010). The
subsequent media furore around incidents such as these helps reinforce the outsider
status of the groups and reinforces members solidarity (Testa and Armstrong 2008).
Thus players that empathise with the fans become signified with greater meaning and
importance.

The actions of Di Canio and Lucarelli reaffirm the strong legitimacy ultr groups hold. As
a result they have not been immune to the patrimonial nature of Italian political and
business life. As we have seen, club owners utilise their clubs in the same way they use
their business connections. Just as Moggi dispensed favours to those who helped him,
club owners do the same. Ultr operate within this sphere of influence. This grants the
ultr a degree of legitimacy as the club owners utilise them for their own ends (Scalia
2009). Some clubs provide free tickets or merchandising rights to ultr, who in turn sell
them through their organisations (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994: 84; Kington 2007; Scalia
2009). Originally these concessions were in return for favours to the owners. Owners
realised that empty stadiums were not good for the clubs and provided free tickets to
stimulate interest. Other scenarios have seen presidents looking for justification to sack a
manager, who would call on the ultr to start chanting against the manager and get the
other the fans to support the decision. Similarly, if the club wants a star player to sign a
new contract, then the ultr would perform a similar task (Vialli 2007: 385). On a wider
level, club presidents purchase players as gifts to fans. For example Berlusconi signed
Robinho as a gift to AC Milans fans and permitted Marco Borriello to transfer at a

269

reduced price to Roma, because he wanted to give a gift to our friends (Bandini 2010;
Colombo 2010).

Owner neo-patrimony emerged during the 1980s as owners sought to utilise the power
of the ultr to leverage purchases and control in the boardroom. Once again, Berlusconi
is central to these changes in Italian football as Scalia highlights:

The first example of this dynamic dates back to 1986. As AC Milan was
suffering a deep financial crisis, the old owners tried to sell the team. Many
entrepreneurs and businessmen made their bid, and among them the TV tycoon
Silvio Berlusconi, who promised to bring the team back to the glories of the
recent past. His offer was not considered as the best by the incumbent owners.
Ultr organised a snap protest in the stadium, and they were backed by some
prominent politicians who supported the then-rampant entrepreneur. The result
of this action proved to be successful, and in February 1986 Berlusconi became
the boss of AC Milan (Scalia 2009: 46)

In addition to introducing business and media practises into football, through his
ownership of AC Milan, Berlusconi helped introduce the ultr into the legitimate football
network. Similar scenes occurred at Roma where the co-owners of Franco Sensi and
Pietro Mezzaroma battled for complete control. The ultr campaigned for Sensi, which
helped him obtain full control (Scalia 2009: 46)

As a result, the ultr have been incorporated into the owners patrimonial networks and
this creates a paradoxical relationship the clubs and the fans. The concessions offered to
the ultr simultaneously justify and reinforce the crisis of legitimacy. Providing

270

concessions to ultr undermine the clubs opportunities to deal with the crises and
introduce measures which will allow them to compete fairly in Europe. The ultr are
faced with supporting a club owned by someone who does not feel the same emotional
attachment and can resist attempts to remove their privileges. They have become an
imagined community with an invented tradition of special privileges. Accordingly, they
draw on these traditions and campaign vociferously to maintain their special status. An
official at Palermo reportedly received a goat's head after ending free ticketing (Kington
2007). Similarly, Lazio ultr threw bombs into the grounds of Lazio owners offices after
he withdrew their 800 free tickets per match (Kington 2007). Their legitimation and
propensity for unrest was used by Silvio Berlusconi as a reason for his debt-spreading
decree, salva-calcio. He stated that clubs could not be allowed to fail as there will be a
revolution (Foot 2007: 349). Once again Berlusconi utilised the image of the ultr to
justify his actions relating to football and, by extension, his own football club. All of
which serves to undermine the integrity of the league and the bodies seeking to regulate
it. As a consequence, the ultr see themselves as legitimate members of the club.

Having gained legitimacy from the clubs, the ultr of some clubs have grown in strength.
This has led Fabio Capello, the manager of England and the former manager of AC
Milan, Roma and Juventus to state that: In Italy the ultr are in charge (La Gazzetta dello
Sport 2009). With changes in consumption and technology, the ultr have acquired new
forums to perform their identity. This has combined with the political fragmentation to
create new symbolic markers of identity. Despite social capital being accumulated within
these groups, they are not contributing to a common goal and actively undermine Italian
football. The increased individualisation and fragmentation of the groups is narrowing
the horizons of the groups who fail to see the wider context. The following section will
highlight the development of the ultr group identity through incorporation of

271

consumption. This will be followed with examples of how the new forms of politics have
been integrated into this new collective identity.

Mentalit Ultr: A Collective Identity?

The transition from homogenous political ultr to fragmented violent groups was marked
by the death of Vicenzo Paparelli. Similarly, another death marks the emergence of a new
form of ultr identity. On 29 January 1995 a Genoa fan was stabbed to death before their
game with AC Milan (De Biasi 1996; Foot 2007; Ferreri 2008; Stefanini 2009). Vincenzo
Spagnolo was a twenty-four year old football fan who was part of a group that was
confronted by a small band of AC Milan ultr. A fight ensued and Spagnolo was stabbed
by Simone Brasaglia; Spagnolo died in the street. Brasaglia went to the stadium and even
held showed the knife to his fellow ultr (Foot 2007: 342). The AC Milan ultr even
included a chant declaring that there was one fewer of the Genoa fans: uno di meno, voi
siete uno di meno (Ferreri 2008: 38; Stefanini 2009: 125). News of Spagnolos death
circulated the stadium and led to the Genoa fans demanding that the game be halted.
After initial rebuttals, the referee and players decided to abandon the game; the first time
that a match had been stopped in this manner (Foot 2007: 343). Meanwhile, the Genoa
ultr attempted to storm the AC Milan curva to exact revenge on the culprit. This led to a
seven-hour standoff with police that resulted in a riot outside the stadium. Such was the
shock of the murder; Lega Calcio abandoned all of the following weeks matches (Foot
2007: 344).

There had been deaths relating to football since Paparellis death. It was, however, the
first to be followed directly by the media (Stefanini 2009: 126). The reactions from the
authorities were similar to those employed after Paparelli and Raciti. They introduced

272

swift measures to ban offensive items into the stadiums and reinforced the use of the
Daspo (Diffida ad Assistere alle manifestazioni Sportive, Prohibition to attend sport events) 68
banning order introduced in 1989. These are similar to football banning orders in the
UK, and are hybrid laws that do not require a criminal conviction before ratification
(Tsoukala 2009). The reaction from the ultr, however, was unprecedented. On 5
February 1995, a week after Spagnolos death, ultr from groups from across Italy held a
conference and issued the following statement:

1) On Sunday Vincenzo Spagnolo, an ultr of Genoa, died. This umpteenth

absurd attack leads us to say: Enough! Enough of these people who are not ultr
who try and make the news by using the ultr world to gain importance and by
ignoring the evil of what they do (as in this case irreparably). Enough with this
trend of twenty against two or three and Molotovs or knives.

2) Ultr: once the championship starts again we will be faced with a difficult
period. The police can now do what they like; the only people who will be
blamed will be us, who have nothing to do with these cowards. If being an ultr is
truly a way of life, we must have balls. On other occasions we ignored events,
arguing that they were not our problem, now we must shout enough!

3) What is the alternative? We find ourselves caught between policemen who

would like us to disappear and these filthy scum who dont care about anything
and will continue with their cowardly attacks. Let us unite against those who
want to destroy the world of the ultr, a free and true world despite all its
contradictions (Foot 2007: 344-5; Ferreri 2008: 40-1; Stefanini 2009: 126-7)
68

http://www.osservatoriosport.interno.it/Daspo/index.html

273

The statement, or peace treaty, highlights some significant developments. It utilises the
language of the oppressed, there is little self-criticism, and it calls for unity (Foot 2007).
In the creation of this collective identity, it draws on the invented traditions of the
movement by insinuating that there is no honour in using knives or outnumbering rivals.
The statement is an attempt to create a collective image of honourable ultr.

The formation of this collective identity sees the increased fragmentation of boundaries.
Roma fans have moved away from their traditional left-wing roots and are now
combining with the Lazio fans to achieve common goals. The political symbols have
become reframed as the politics of the curva fragments (De Biasi 1996). Rather than the
traditional left-right axis of politics, the ultr are politicising around single-issue politics
and a common focus. Drawing on extensive fieldwork with Roma and Lazio fans, Testa
highlights how the traditional rivalry between Roma and Lazio is becoming blurred.
Testa has identified this emerging movement, calls them UltraS to differentiate them
from the previous incarnation of ultr (Testa 2009; Testa and Armstrong 2010). He
highlights the charity work and single-issue politics that characterises the new social
movement of the UltraS (Testa 2010). Although these highlight the shifting political
nature of the ultr, they do not take into account the changes to consumption that
facilitate the performative nature of the ultr. Consequently, analysis of the collective
identity should encompass the changing act of consumption and performance, in
addition to the political nature of the groups. A new collective mentality is emerging,
mentalit ultr, that is being performed through consumption and politics.

274

An apposite example of the production and consumption of an identity is demonstrated

with the brand Mentalit Ultras.69 This clothing company was formed in 1995, the year
of Spagnolos death, and produces a range of clothing and designs to exploit the ultr
identity. In addition to having a brand name and logo, Mentalit Ultras also has created
a logo that presents the image of the perfect ultr. The Cheeky Boy logo depicts the
head of an ultr in a hooded sweatshirt, fully zipped up. The hood is designed to
completely cover the face, and leave the eyes free. The eyes are then covered with
goggles so as to completely remove any individuality from the ultr. The result is a
character that resembles a ninja or military individual who cant be identified and
prosecuted. Furthermore, individual ultr groups are also are capitalising on their images
and club concessions, to produce a range of merchandise. Lazios infamous ultr group,
the Irriducibili (The Indomitables), are famed for their explicit racism and right-wing
identity. This provides the Irriducibili with symbolic capital that the group has used to
operate group and club merchandising. The Irriducibili operated Lazios merchandising
until Claudio Lotitio, the current Lazio president, began to reintroduce the
merchandising to the club. The group still runs a number of fan shops, which is distinct
from the official clubs store.70 In a similar fashion, Livornos left-wing ultr group, BAL,
had acquired a similar status. The range of scarves, T shirts and flags became markers of
left wing identity and effectively a brand in itself. These brands contribute to the overall
construction of a collective mentalit ultr.

New forms of technology are creating new spaces for the performance of ultr identity.
Although there has not been a widespread fanzine culture in Italy (Dal Lago and De Biasi
1994), as there has in the UK, two national fanzines reproduce images of the ultr. The
fanzines Supertifo (Superfan) and Fans Magazine re-produce the various choreographies
69
70

http://www.mentalitaultras.com/en/index.php
http://www.laziofanshop.com/; http://store.sslazio.it

275

of ultr groups throughout the football league structure. 71 They provide opportunities for
the ultr to perform their identity on a national stage. The photos are self-produced so
the groups exercise agency in selecting the appropriate images that will present their
group in the best light. The internet is also providing the technological space to reinforce
the image and performance of ultr groups. Youtube provides such a space for the
selective presentation of the groups. Portable recording devices permit the
choreographies and chants to be performed to a worldwide audience. Umbrella sites such
as tifonet.it, also provide online communities for the re-articulation of ultr identity.72 In
addition, individual ultr groups have their own websites that reinforce the collective
identity. Many of these sites include online shopping facilities where members can
purchase the assorted paraphernalia that comprises the mentalit ultr. These include the
flags and scarves that help create the choreographies. They also include the hats and
jackets that allow the user to recreate the model ultr through the wearing of the correct
clothing and by covering the face. The performative nature of acquiring the correct
costume for the curva reinforces the collective identity of the ultr imagined community.
As with other imagined communities, the ultr construct powerful symbols that enable
them to articulate their support. The political nature of the ultr ensures that the central
symbolic markers are taken from the central narratives from the wider society. In the
case of Italy, these markers become symbols of the central state.

All Cops are Bastards: A Change of Focus

This thesis has argued that changes to the global political economy have fragmented
political engagement. This has contributed to a decline in social capital which is seeing an

71

http://www.supertifo.it/; http://www.fansmagazine.eu/
www.tifonet.it;
www.europeanultras.com;
http://www.tifo.it/index_uk.html
72

276

http://www.ultraultras.com/;

emptying out of civic engagement. Although the ultr are engaged in political and charity
work (Testa 2010), the fragmentation of ultr has witnessed a reframing of key aspects of
the mentalit ultr political identity. Ironically, the weakness of the state is facilitating the
creation of a collective identity. The statement resulting from Spagnolos death created a
clear indication of this change of focus for the ultr community. The police have become
a symbolic object to the collective identity and this has resulted in the police becoming
the focus of subsequent conflict. The origins of this shift in focus appeared the year
before Spagnolos death. On 13th November 1994 the Deputy Head of Divisional Police
and the Chief Inspector of the State Police were injured in a confrontation after a game
between Brescia and Roma (De Biasi 1996: 121). Reports indicated that around fifty
ultra-right militants travelled from Rome with the specific intention of attacking the
police (Curro 2009). A similar incident occurred two weeks later when Lazio and Roma
fans united during the Rome derby to attack the police, injuring eight officers (De Biasi
1996: 121-2). Ten years later the same group of fans united to create one of the most
haunting spectacles in Italian football. The Rome derby of 24 March 2004 has since been
dubbed the derby of the dead child after several clashes with police before the match, a
rumour circulated the stadium stating that the police had killed a child with their patrol
car (Marchi 2005). This led to chants of murderers to echo around the stadium. Despite
denials being broadcast across the public address system, the ultr of Lazio and Roma
called for the game to be suspended. The capi-ultr of Roma entered the pitch to speak to
the Roma captain, Francesco Totti (Foot 2007). It was suggested that the heads of the
ultr said that they had spoken to the parents of the child and that the players should call
the game off. The Lazio players addressed their fans to ascertain the truth. Meanwhile
the referee phoned the head of the League, Adriano Galliani, for advice. Galliani
permitted the game to be suspended. A riot ensued outside the stadium which resulted in

277

over two-hundred police officers being injured (Foot 2007: 348). The role of the police
has become an important aspect of the identity of the ultr.

The construction of the collective identity is not restricted to the performance of its
members. Outside agents also shape and direct the image of the group. Deregulation of
the media has turned them into active agents within the construction and production of
images for wider public consumption. The fragmentation of the ultr and resultant focus
on violence that took place in the 1980s coincided with the emergence of the newly
deregulated media businesses. As deregulated media companies compete for audience
share, they sensationalise certain aspects of the news. For example, the previous chapter
highlighted that Mediaset dramatised and sensationalised the tangentopoli scandal.
Consequently, the sporadic acts of violence that has accompanied the ultr has been
amplified in the media who have constructed them as a folk devil (Cohen 2002; Marchi
2005). In the case of the derby of the dead child, much of the media speculated that
the ultr had pre-planned the move to protest against laws that would force many clubs
into administration (Owen 2004; Foot 2007). The police assist in this construction as the
Rome chief of police, Achille Serra, corroborated the media by saying that he suspected
that the violence was premeditated (Owen 2004). The police and media construction of
the ultr as folk devils legitimates the requirement for a hard-line approach. The
construction of the ultr folk devil and the emotion of a hot derby confronted with large
numbers of police provided all of the ingredients for forward panic, as the police preempted violence from the fans (Collins 2008). On the night of the Rome derby the police
took aggressive action against all fans because they anticipated that violence would occur.
When the match was initially suspended, fans threw flares towards the police. The police
responded with tear gas. This heightened the emotion of the situation and caused
increased confusion as fans tried to navigate through the smoke of the flares and the

278

clouds of tear gas. In addition to the scenes witnessed by the fans, the police response
contributed to an atmosphere that could lead to fans at the ground to genuinely believe
that the police could have killed a young fan (Marchi 2005).

The creation of the ultr folk devil is assisting in the creation of the mentalit ultr.
Although powerful established groups enable the formation of outside groups, the
groups themselves reinforce this construction (Becker 1963; Elias and Scotson 1965).
Fans expecting a negative police response will have constructed themselves as Outsiders
who will be treated in a different manner to other groups (Stott and Pearson 2007: 289).
This would make them more susceptible to perceived negative policing and therefore
more likely to further embed themselves as Outsiders. Action against the police becomes
legitimised once the Outsider imagined community has been created between us, the
fans, and them, the police. The emergence of the mentalit ultr collective identity
reinforces the Outsider identity. After two-thousand Napoli fans without tickets visited
Rome for their match against Roma on 31 August 2008, they were confronted with zero
tolerance from the police (Hawkey 2008). The situation was exacerbated by the fact that
the police allowed the fans to travel even though they knew they did not have tickets.
Any resulting management of the Napoli fans in Rome would be greeted with confusion
and tension. Unsurprisingly, the situation saw violence around the stadium and at the
train station. The police reinforced their stance, and the folk devil image, by releasing
figures stating that eight hundred of the two thousand fans had criminal records. This
included twenty-seven who had connections with the Neapolitan organised crime
networks, the Camorra. The Napoli fans subsequently demonstrated the Outsider
identity at their subsequent game through an act of consumption, by wearing T-shirts
stating, Ive got a criminal past (Hawkey 2008).

279

The death of the policeman Filippo Raciti in 2007 marks a symbolic moment in the
reinforcement of the mentalit ultr collective identity. Following Racitis death, all Serie A
games were cancelled for the following weekend. For the following round of matches, a
minutes silence was held to commemorate the policeman. However, a different
approach was taken nine months later when a fan was shot dead by a policeman. In
November 2007 Lazio fans had an altercation with Juventus fans at a service station in
Tuscany as both sets of fans were travelling north to attend matches. The situation
resolved itself, in a case of self-policing, until a policeman in the service station on the
opposite carriageway fired his gun in the air to try and calm the situation. The bullet hit
Gabriele Sandri, who was asleep in the back of a car. He was fatally wounded (Moore
2007). After Sandris death, only the Lazio-Inter game was officially cancelled. The
Atalanta-Milan game was also cancelled, but that was as a result of fan violence (Kington
2007; Landolina 2007; Moore 2007). A banner displayed at Parma prosaically stated the
thoughts of the fans: Death is the same for all (Bandini 2007). The authorities and the
police acted differently depending on who was killed which was deemed unfair by ultr
and consequently reinforced their Outsider identity.

This mentalit ultr identity is beginning to transcend existing club and political rivalries.
These rivalries are abandoned when confronted with a perceived police threat (Stott and
Pearson 2007: 97). This was witnessed during the derby of the dead child as Lazio and
Roma fans united against the police aggression and succeeded in suspending the game
before joining together to attack the police after the match. Likewise ultr from various
groups attended the funeral of Gabriele Sandri. This included fans of Livorno and Roma,
groups who traditionally would be sworn enemies of Lazio (Nathanson 2007). Parma
fans reinforced this solidarity on the anniversary of Sandris death. Before their match
with Livorno in November 2008, they attached a banner to the railings alongside the

280

main roundabout approaching the Tardini stadium that read: A year has passed, but we
have not forgotten: justice for Gabriele.73

The creation of ultr as folk-devils has given them an outsider status and reinforces their
opposition to the central authorities and further condemns the central state. As a
consequence of a number of similar events, the police have become the target for fan
violence. This has created ACAB syndrome, named after the English term All Cops
Are Bastards (Stefanini 2009: 131). Consumption is being used to reinforce this aspect
of the performance of the mentalit ultr identity. The abbreviation can be seen on a
number of T Shirts worn by fans and is also exhibited in graffiti around stadiums and
cities. Within Livorno, two of the three ultr groups utilise the acronym. One group is
simply called ACAB; the other is called Visitors 1312. The latter was formed from the
amalgamation of two groups, 1312 and Visitors. 1312 is significant because it refers to
the numerical positions in the alphabet of the letters comprising ACAB. The
performance of the anti-police attitude was witnessed in fan reactions to various
commemorations for carabinieri. 2003 saw an attack on a military base in Iraq which
resulted in the death of twenty-eight people, including nineteen Italians, mostly
carabinieri. Serie A matches were cancelled in honour of the dead, but Serie B games
continued. The depth of feeling towards the police was illustrated in the minutes silence
before kick-off. Mantova fans whistled throughout the silence, whereas in Livorno the
fans continued singing (Francesio 2008: 161). Meanwhile, attacks on police increased
dramatically in the 2006-7 season (Popham 2007). The zenith of this antipathy towards
the police was reached after Racitis death in Catania. During the minutes silence held to
commemorate him, Torino fans sang through the silence, while at Roma, the fans

73

Authors observations 22nd November 2008.

281

whistled throughout (Francesio 2008: 192). ACAB syndrome is reinforcing the mentalit
ultr and fuelling the anti-authority identity.

The mentalit ultr is also being reinforced through the governments actions to contain
the violence. As mentioned, after Racitis death, the government quickly enforced a
declaration called the Pisanu Law which restricts certain articles inside the stadium.
Regional autonomy, however, permits the regional authorities and police discretion over
which items are restricted. In the previous chapter, one respondent highlighted how
Salerno had a different approach to Livorno regarding designation of musical
instruments at stadiums. The perceived injustice is undermining the authority of the state
and contributes to the overall crisis of legitimacy in the Italian state. Other instruments
of the law are also contributing to this overall anti-state, anti-police identity. The use of
the Daspo banning order provides similar examples of inconsistent policing as occurred
when five Pisa fans were given Daspos for carrying toilet rolls classed as inflammable
material (Lo Bianco and Messina 2008). These examples reinforce the notion that the
ultr are persecuted and strengthens the crisis of legitimacy of the police and authorities.

The lack of state legitimation is reinforced through their approach to stadiums. Despite
the stadium restrictions and Daspos, fans are still operating within the liminal space of
the stadium. Police do not enter the curva for fear of causing more trouble. A police
officer interviewed after the riot in Catania that resulted in the death of Raciti, stated that
they dare not enter the curva as: It would have been considered an act of war. That's
another country in there, outside the Italian Republic (Richardson 2007). The police
sanctify the sacred space of the ultr and this simultaneously reinforces the imagined
community of the ultr and de-legitimises the authorities. This permits an anarchic
mentalit ultr to continue. In addition to the wide use of marijuana in the curva banned

282

objects are still smuggled into the stadium. This spectacularly occurred in May 2001
when Inter fans stole a scooter from an Atalanta fan before the game. They smuggled it
into the top tier of the curva, set it alight and pushed it into the tier below.74 Even though
stadium regulations were tightened after the death of Raciti, Roma and Lazio fans still
used homemade carta bomba and flares during their derby in December 2009 (Bandini
2009; Bicocchi 2009). Similarly, during a game between Livorno and Bologna in February
2010, a rocket was fired across the pitch and landed in the Hippodrome next door to
Livornos stadium (Il Tirreno 2010). The perpetrator could not be identified as it was
launched from underneath the stand where there are no CCTV cameras. A month earlier,
Napoli fans were banned by the Osservatorio from travelling to Livorno. In spite of this
restriction nearly one thousand Napoli fans obtained tickets and attended the game. The
lack of enforcement of the law and stadium regulations actively undermines and delegitimises the police and reinforces the mentalit ultr. As a consequence, the ultr are
legitimised by the authorities and are thus incorporated into the neo-patrimonial system
operating in Italian society.

Continued Fragmentation of the Curve: The Berlusconi Factor

In addition to the transition to an anti-police collective identity, political identities are

fragmenting and becoming realigned. The blurring of the boundaries between left and
right-wing party politics has been replicated on the curva. In contrast to the political
affiliations of the 1970s, political debate has moved from the traditional powers of left
and right to the politics of one man, Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi polarises debate to
such an extent that he surfaces in most conversations. His ownership of AC Milan,
television companies and publishing businesses lead to many debates relating to his
74

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L_Nu6HKVSmk

283

conflicts of interests and this debate has crossed to the curve where fans now actively use
the figure of Berlusconi as a symbol of hate between clubs. Fabio Capello, whilst
managing AC Milan, suggested in interviews in the Corriere della Sera that political rivalry
in the early 1990s was because of Berlusconi (De Biasi 1996: 123). For clubs like Livorno
who have constructed an anti-establishment, left-wing identity, Berlusconi cuts a very
potent symbol. Not only do his populist centre-right politics contrast with the left-wing
identity of the city, but their opinions dovetail into the wider public debates on
Berlusconis business interests and his approach to law and order:

The [Pisanu] Law is anti-constitutional for several reasons. It was not debated in
Parliament. If a politician wanted to oppose they would have great difficulty
because it is not a law. It is a decree. It is temporary. This is the way of the
government of Berlusconi. All are like this, decrees. In this way, the rest of
Parliament cannot oppose. (Stefano, ultr, personal interview, June 2009)

Stefano argues that Berlusconi utilises decrees to circumvent democratic debate in

Parliament. Governmental decrees are temporary and were utilised by Bettino Craxi to
deregulate national television. This deregulation permitted Berlusconi to monopolise the
Italian media and facilitated his transition into politics. As Berlusconi utilises decrees to
promote a personal agenda he reinforces the central weakness of the state.

Livorno fans utilise the carnivalesque atmosphere of the curva to reinforce this antiBerlusconi sentiment. In addition to the performance of thousands of Livorno fans
wearing bandanas, fans frequently chant Berlusconi pezza di merda (Berlusconi piece of
shit). It attracts the most participants as fans bend down and begin a dull roar before
members of the curva hold out their arms and wave their hands. This is followed by the

284

chat Berlusconi pezza di merda followed by rhythmic clapping and is often repeated a
number of times. The match between Livorno and AC Milan in September 2009, as
detailed in the introduction to this chapter, provided an apposite opportunity to perform
Livornese identity after the prime minister had endured a summer of sex scandals. These
ranged from his use of state vehicles to transport personal guests to parties at his private
villa, through to his attendance at the eighteenth birthday party of Noemi Letizia, the
daughter of a family friend, who called him Papi (Daddy) (Kington 2009). This led
to his wife filing for divorce before another sex scandal emerged that alleged that
Berlusconi had slept with an escort, Patrizia D'Addario, who had been procured by a
businessman trying to obtain favours from the prime minister (Bannerman 2009; Hooper
2009; Kington 2009). This scandal prompted Berlusconi to declare that: I have never
paid a woman for sex (The Guardian 2009).

The summer of scandal, combined with the promotion of Livorno into Serie A, provided
a perfect opportunity for Livorno fans to articulate their identity in relation to Berlusconi
and politics. The home game between Livorno and AC Milan in September 2009 saw an
opportunity to recreate a spectacle similar to the bandanas of 2004. Newspapers, internet
forums and fans recounted the story of the bandanas and helped reinforce the collective
memory of the crowd (Ceccarini 2009; Il Tirreno 2009). At the match, some fans even
sported white bandanas in a recreation of the earlier episode (Il Tirreno 2009). The match
attracted national television and newspaper coverage and saw a number of incidents. In
addition to the normal plethora of flags depicting Livorno, Che Guevara or Cuba,
political striscione were displayed that reinforced the left-wing nature of the fans identity.
One related to the proposed closures of the Delphi factory and the ENI gas refinery in
Livorno that would result in the loss of a number of jobs: Close the Delphi, close the
refinery. Close also the port and well all go away. Another simply stated: Now enough,

285

respect for the workers (La Nazione 2009). In one example, the fans combined the local
issues of the workers under threat of redundancy with the scandals that were affecting
the Prime Minister: Papi here we stay inc solidarity with the workers in the fight (La
Nazione 2009). By referring to the Prime Ministers sex scandals in the same banner, local
and national politics become entwined in the figure of the prime minister, who clearly
becomes the focus of the blame for the fate of the workers.

In light of the sexual nature of the scandals involving Berlusconi, a number of sexual
references were produced on the curve. Condoms were inflated as balloons and released
onto the curva. A small number of fans held up inflatable sex dolls, some wearing the
Livorno shirt (Il Tirreno 2009). A number of striscione were held up at the same time
stating vergogna (shame). Further banners were held up with direct reference to the
Papi scandal. They utilised humour and satire in an attempt to humiliate the Prime
Minister. One makes a reference to a film entitled Come te nessuno mai: Papi like you,
nobody, never and thank goodness (La Nazione 2009). Another utilised word play to
draw both aspects of the scandal together: Papi, you have the Escort double parked
(Ceccarini 2009). Once again they refer to Berlusconi as Papi. They also utilise the
double meaning of the word Escort. Italian uses the English term escort to refer to the
people operating in high-class prostitution. However, the word Escort also refers to the
make of car manufactured by Ford. By utilising the car, they could incorporate the
double parking reference. This is the illegal practise of parking alongside parked cars in
the middle of the street and causing an obstruction. By making the analogy to double
parking the striscione highlights the fact that Berlusconi was married.

Similar anti-Berlusconi sentiments were performed at Livorno after the Prime Minister
was struck by a model of Milans cathedral in December 2009. At the following game

286

against Sampdoria, Livorno fans sang a variety of chants in support of the perpetrator,
Massimo Tartaglia. Chants included Tartaglia one of us and Sign him up Spinelli
(Calabrese 2009). Livorno fans also held up a striscione stating Berlusconi non parla,
tartaglia, which translates as Berlusconi doesnt speak, he stutters (Bianchi 2009).
Tartagliare is the Italian verb for stutter and conjugates to tartaglia, meaning he
stutters. Livorno fans use word play to emphasise the assailant of the Prime Minister.
The response to the actions of the fans also clearly illustrated the role of the media in
amplifying ultr incidents. Il Giornale, the newspaper owned by Silvio Berlusconis
brother, labelled the fans hooligans and highlighted that the fans let off a smoke
bombs during the game which held up play for two minutes (Il Giornale 2009). La
Repubblica in contrast was more sober and presented the events in relation to the
proposed government sanctions facing Livorno (Bianchi 2009). Livorno football club
was fined eight thousand euros for the offensive chants and banners and were criticised
by the Interior Minister, Roberto Maroni, for the actions of the fans.

Tartaglias actions provide a metaphor for contemporary political discourse in Italy.

Fragmentation of the Italian political spectrum has resulted in political debate being
reduced to symbolic targets of the state. In the case of Tartaglia, debate has been reduced
to throwing a replica of Milans cathedral at Berlusconi. Likewise, the fans perform
similar ritual humiliation of the prime minister within the liminal space of the stadium.
Through the use of humour and satire, the Livorno fans are operating within the
carnivalesque. The subversion of hierarchies is acute as they denigrate one of the most
powerful individuals in their country. They utilised the image of the grotesque, the sex
obsessed individual who abuses their position of power. As a consequence he has
brought shame on himself, his family and the country and attracted the attention of
someone who would seek to harm him. The liminality of the space permitted these

287

transgressions without repercussions. As with the lack of police authority over the curva,
these actions contribute to the legitimation of the fans activities in the curva as well as delegitimise the targets of the abuse. The police become de-legitimised as they cannot enter
or control the curva. Meanwhile, Berlusconi is profaned, which de-legitimises the
authority of the prime minister. Public engagement with national politics has been
reduced to such symbolic targets. It is not clear how social capital formed in associations,
like the ultr can contribute to democracy and re-engage the public with politics. The
following section details the official supporters clubs which offer an alternative form of
association for football fans. In doing so, they simultaneously reflect the continued
decline of social capital and the potential to re-engage with national politics.

Official Supporters Clubs

Official supporters clubs provide an alternative form of supporter association, alongside

the ultr. The official supporters clubs are, as their name suggests, officially affiliated to
the football club and they operate within the patrimonial networks of the football clubs.
Fundamentally, the difference between the groups is demographic (De Biasi 1996: 116).
Most ultr are young males, whereas the official supporters clubs encompass all ages and
genders. Consequently, the focus on choreographies, politics and violence of the ultr is
not replicated by the official supporters clubs, although members may still participate in
the activities of the ultr. Likewise there is no spatial demarcation between groups.
Although the ultr would restrict themselves to the curve at the ends of the pitch, official
supporters club members can be found in the curve, the tribunes along the length of the
pitch or in the grandstand. Therefore, discussion of the official supporters clubs presents
an alternative view of Italian football supporters. This section will detail the organisation

288

and activities of these associations and locate them within the broader argument
illustrating the decline in social capital and political participation in Italy.

The principal participant observation for this study was performed in one Official
Supporters Club in Livorno (The Club). Other ethnography and interviews were
performed at other clubs around the city. The Club is formally constituted with a
headquarters based in a residential area near the stadium. The headquarters is in a small
row of units, along a fairly major road and in close proximity to local shops. These shops
and units are on the edge of a predominantly residential area. As with the majority of the
city, this residential area is comprised of tower blocks of apartments. Next door to the
Club office is the local office of the Partito Democratico, the major political party of the left,
which has local offices in every commune in Livorno.75 This political office has a small
football pitch and childrens activities in the yard outside. Next door, in the other
direction is a bar, with a hairdressers shop being further along the row. Further down
the road there are allotments and sports fields. Returning to the Clubs headquarters, the
interior is decorated with various items of memorabilia relating to the Club and the
football club. Along one wall there are numerous photos of the Clubs directors with
members of the playing and management staff of AS Livorno. These photos have taken
place at various awards or memorial dinners held throughout the last five years, or have
been taken at on-pitch ceremonies, such as player-of-the-season awards. Above these
photos are scarves donated by fans of friendly clubs. Along the back wall there are AS
Livorno posters and a framed insignia of the Club. Above these are a number of signed
football shirts from some of the football clubs key players, notably, Cristiano Lucarelli,
Marco Amelia and the clubs hero and leading goal scorer, Igor Protti. On the other wall
there are pennants of other AS Livorno supporters clubs and other friendly football
75

http://www.pdLivorno.it/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=33

289

clubs, such as Barcelona and Marseilles, which have been donated by the fans of these
clubs. On the storage cupboards there are also posters of the monthly magazine
published by the football club, entitled Amaranto (named after the colours of the city and
the football club).

Official supporters clubs are set-up by fans independently of the football club. In this
manner they are not dissimilar to the ultr. However, supporters clubs can choose to
become affiliated to the football, which the ultr would not do:

Everyone can found a Club Amaranto [supporters club]; later on one can ask to
have relations with the football club and can be a member of associated clubs
Innumerable clubs can exist. There is no limit and the football club of AS
Livorno does not have a voice in this and cannot influence the clubs (Max,
official supporters club director, personal interview, June 2009)

The independent nature of the supporters clubs is reflected in the naming conventions
of the clubs. Some are named after the area of the city in which they are located, such as
Il Porto (The Port). Others are named after prominent players, such as Club Igor Protti.
Local history can also influence the nomenclature of the clubs as in the case of the
female supporters club called B52s. This club is named after the World War II American
bombers that were stationed at Camp Darby, an American airbase located between
Livorno and Pisa.76 Some clubs are also named after family members in order to preserve
their memory. The clubs come to embody their operators and become a space to
perform their identity. The B52s is located in a bar and this provides for a more socially
orientated approach to their club. Like the Clubs headquarters, it is decorated with
76

http://www.usag.livorno.army.mil/

290

memorabilia of AS Livorno, such as team shirts, posters and photographs. This club is
also more frivolous as it embodies the personality of the director. This was evident from
my first meeting with her as she responded to my interest in the club and AS Livorno
with Why Livorno? We are all pirates and prostitutes?. This Livornese performance
reaffirmed the history of the city and the earthy character of its inhabitants. The B52s
club provides other opportunities to perform this Livornese character through the
consumption of a range of products that were produced by the club. T Shirts were sold
in the deep red colours of the city and the football team and were emblazoned with the
passage, Better to be unemployed in Ardenza [the suburb of Livorno near the beach
where the stadium is located] than a worker in Milan. Similarly, they also produced a
range of stickers with similar amusing and vulgar quotations.

The Club itself was set-up following the death of the directors son, Luca, who died in
2005 in a motorbike accident. The director, a shift worker in a local factory, runs the
Club with the brother of his wife (the sons uncle). The Club is named in honour of
Luca, and acts as a vehicle for them to continue their sons memory. By transforming
their personal identities and through the consumption of football they are providing a
fitting memory for their son and building social capital for themselves, the Club and the
football club. This consumption and social capital can be witnessed in a book that was
published shortly after Lucas death. Published by the family, it details the co-operation
they had from the players and management of the football club. At the game following
his death, all players wore T shirts stating Luca you are in our hearts77 and the star
player, Igor Protti, placed flowers at the foot of the Curva Nord, the main stand of the
stadium. This practise was not unique to Luca as during the first home game of the 20089 season against Mantova, the captains of AS Livorno and Mantova presented flowers to
77

Luca sei nel nostro

291

the curva in memory of a young fan who had died during the summer. The book also
highlights the tremendous communal outpouring of grief of the fans. It contains letters
from various friends, fans and Club members honouring Lucas memory. Similarly, after
Lucas death, the Curva Nord organised an impressive choreography that filled the entire
curva. It was comprised of blue cards being held above the heads of the fans, with yellow
cards spelling Luca. The photo of this choreography has become the symbol for the
Club. It is used on their membership cards, the clubs internet homepage, the signage on
the club headquarters and their advertising in magazines and newsletters. It is also
centrally placed on the wall of the Clubs headquarters amongst the memorabilia and
photos.

In keeping with the extensive de-regulation of the Italian state, many of the activities of
Italian football clubs are de-centralised. Many of the activities performed by English
clubs are outsourced to the fans. As highlighted earlier, some ultr organisations like
Lazios Irriducibili were granted the rights to sell tickets or merchandising. In the case of
Livorno, these concessions are granted to official supporters clubs. Season tickets and
match tickets are organised through the Club and members will go to the Club in the
first instance to obtain match tickets. This allows the Club to make block bookings, if
required, to ensure members sit together. Ticket purchases are not restricted to home
games as the Club also organises travel and tickets to away games. Coaches collect fans
from the Club and travel direct to the away stadium. On these coaches, and at Motorway
service stations, members get the opportunity to meet fellow fans who are outside their
demographic group and outside their family and friendship networks.

292

Official status grants the Club concessions to sell merchandise, and to use the football
clubs logo on the supporters clubs details. Consequently they are incorporated into the
football clubs patrimonial network. As the Club director, Max, states:

we have the possibility of the gadgets. We as a club can make, with the
agreement of the football club, gadgets with the official logo of Livorno Calcio
(Max, official supporters club director, personal interview, June 2009)

All individuals must become a member, or socio, at a cost of eleven euros. On joining,
the socio receives a Club rucksack with the logo of AS Livorno and the Club name on it.
They also receive regular newsletter detailing Club benefits and upcoming fixtures. The
Club can also produce gadgets that they distribute through their office. Many of these
gadgets are provided as gifts to members, such as the rucksack provided to new
members. Other items, such as calendars and stickers are also offered. Club gadgets are
also given at Christmas and at the end of season dinner:

Once a year we do a party of the Club at which socios can participate and at this
event we give gadgets to the female members (Max, official supporters club
director, personal interview, June 2009)

The gifts and gadgets provide material benefits for socios and they reinforce the
patriarchal nature of Italian society. Gifts are given in exchange for attendance at special
occasions. In some cases, these are only presented to the female members. The proximity
to the local residences makes it more accessible for fans to purchase club merchandise.
One member commented that one of the reasons he visited the club was for:

293

the possibility of purchasing the clobber of Livorno Calcio directly from the
Club (Nick, official supporters club member, personal interview, June 2009)

Official supporters clubs therefore provide a dual purpose to fans and the football club.
They provide services for the de-centralised football club and they provide a local space
for fans to consume football.

Official supporters clubs also provide financial benefits for their members. Berlusconi
provided a range of incentives to join the AC Milan supporters clubs after he took over
AC Milan. The extent of this patrimonial network facilitated his move into politics as he
utilised the same practises when he set-up Forza Italia, his political party. Membership of
supporters clubs in Livorno also allow for certain economic benefits. Club members can
pay for their season ticket in two or three instalments. Thus, club members can spread
their costs depending upon their economic circumstances. For other fans, the economic
benefits entail having access to cheaper away travel:

I am a socio because the clubs organize away trips; therefore it is easy to travel
to away games. The prices are more advantageous in respect of going by car or
alone (Greyhound , official supporters club, personal interview, June 2009)

Therefore the price of membership of eleven euros is quickly justified by fans that travel
to many away games. Although anyone can travel on coaches organised by the Club,
socios have a discount of two or three euros per trip. This is a reason for Nicks
membership:

294

for away games, the coach costs a little, more or less, for someone who is not a
socio (Nick, official supporters club member, personal interview, June 2009)
(member of the Club).

Along with the cheaper travel and payment options for season tickets, the Club also
provides additional incentives to members. As they have access to a wide network of
fans, they negotiate benefits for their members:

For example we sent an email [to socios] because we made an agreement with
Hotel Rex in Antignano [a suburb of Livorno] in which all socios are offered a
discount of twenty percent on the cost of a room (Max, official supporters club
director, personal interview, June 2009)

Similarly, a cinema chain with a multiplex cinema on the outskirts of Livorno provides
discounts to football fans who can demonstrate that they are a true fan.78 In practise
this requires the presentation of a supporters club membership card or item of
merchandise.

The physical proximity of the club to the local residential area allows for ease of access
for the members and opportunities to create bonding social capital. Due to its proximity
to the local neighbourhood, there are also many regular visitors who come into the Club
for social interaction. Most of these are male, covering a wide age demographic. These
social interactions are given as advantages for club membership and attending the Club
headquarters:

78

http://www.medusacinema.it/promozioni.jsp?Menu=F

295

[I go] when I want to see someone (Maria, official supporters club member,
personal interview, June 2009)

[I go] in order to see friends and relatives and the possibility of buying a ticket
for the match (Nick, official supporters club member, personal interview, June
2009)

Local fans, like Maria and Nick, use the Club as a social space; a place where they can go
and meet friends and socialise. Many clubs are situated in bars, such as the B52s. This
reinforces the public sphere of the clubs. The social space allows members to socialise
with fellow members when purchasing tickets and merchandise. There are four ticket
outlets for the football club within the city, two are based in bars close to the centre of
the city, one is located at the shopping mall on the edge of the city and one is at the
football stadium. Because the Club is located in a local neighbourhood, it allows for
socios to book tickets locally in addition to making block bookings for away travel. Many
members drop-in to inquire about tickets as it is often easier to access the Clubs
headquarters than the official ticket points in the city and is more social. When important
matches approach, the Club becomes a focal point for local fans trying to obtain tickets.

The Club also organises other events which provide opportunities for wider social
interaction. To commemorate Luca, they organise an annual football tournament every
May. This takes place between local youth teams and the proceeds of the tournament are
donated to a local leukaemia charity. This tournament is arranged in co-operation with
the football club. Star players attend the after tournament dinner and provide a star
attraction to entice spectators. It is also organised with the co-operation of the local
council as the tournament is held on the council football pitches that form part of the

296

complex that houses the stadium for AS Livorno. The Club also organises end-of-season
dinners in which socios receive gifts and a meal. Players from the football club attend the
dinners and are presented with awards. It also allows fans to meet their heroes. As Nick
highlights:

there are the parties principally for [meeting] the players (Nick, official
supporters club member, personal interview, June 2009)

For Nick, the opportunity to meet the players of the football club is one of the main
benefits of attending the dinners. Connection to the players is also maintained through
the organisation of an annual end-of-season dinner for the socios of the Club. The
dinners and events allow fans to strengthen their connection to the football club. The
record of these dinners and meetings are photographed and displayed as evidence of the
social capital of the members of the club. The club headquarters has approximately fifty
of these photos displayed on the wall highlighting the club directors meeting players,
managers and club officials. This display allows the member to be aware of the social
capital of the supporters club and reinforces the solidarity and proximity, not only within
the supporters club, but to the wider football club. A major criticism of many football
writers, from fans, journalists and academics, is that increased commodification of sport
has led to an increased distance from the fan (this was even put forward as a reason for
hooliganism (Taylor 1968)). In a similar review of supporters clubs in North America,
Giulianotti and Robertson have demonstrated that members of Celtic and Rangers
supporters clubs felt closer to the players of their respective football clubs than they
would have done in Glasgow (Giulianotti and Robertson 2006: 144). This was because
players and ex-players attended the clubs social engagements and dinners which would
not have happened as regularly in Scotland. Likewise, the supporters clubs in Livorno

297

provide this opportunity to interact with players and management of the football club, as
well as allowing allow them to interact with fellow socios. This provides an environment
for people to socialise and interact away from the family and work colleagues and allows
them to build bridging social capital, trust and associations in a wider community.

Social capital is accumulated through the networks provided by supporters clubs. By

providing spaces for fans to meet and interact, the Club facilitates access to a wider
information network. These nodes provide opportunities to meet with other fans seeking
information. For those running the clubs they are able to access a wide network of
supporters. Max highlights that:

at club level I know all [the clubs] in the city, the province and many from
abroad and across Italy. I also know clubs from other Italian squads (Max,
official supporters club director, personal interview, June 2009)

Thus active members of clubs are ideally situated to accumulate social capital. However,
these clubs are not simply avenues for the organisers to accumulate social capital. They
provide spaces for the fans to meet, interact and build connections. By providing these
spaces, such as the club headquarters, websites, media events and social gatherings, fans
are able to access increased information, which further fuels the network as fans seek
more information. As Durkheim highlighted, regular congregations heighten emotion
and affinity with a totemic image (Durkheim 1915). Participants gather together away
from the mundanity of daily life and participate in rituals that inscribe the group with
emotion and meaning. Coles extended this to reflect the quasi-religious nature of sport
(Coles 1975). Coles argues that sport, like religion, regenerates and amplifies the feelings
expressed in a group context (Coles 1975: 69). The ritual of sport generates solidarity

298

for the group and invests the club with meaning and emotion. Supporters clubs provide
such spaces for the ritualistic regular interaction between fans. In doing so the organisers
of the clubs regularly meet, increasing connections and building social capital. These
clubs act as social clubs for their members. Often they are based in bars that allow for
members to socialise, and enables functions to take place where members can meet the
players (De Biasi 1996: 116). Although the Club was not housed in a bar, it was situated
next to one. These bars and Clubs provide physical spaces for social interaction, as well
as the events to facilitate this interaction. Nowell-Smith has suggested that football is
consumed throughout the week, which is shaped and articulated in representation and
recall (Nowell-Smith 1979: 51). Similarly, King highlights how hooligan collective
memories are recounted and reinforced in bars after the event, and often at much greater
length than the original incident (King 2001). Football is constructed and reinforced
through the memories, social interactions and media representations throughout the
week (and beyond). The Club provides a platform for the reinforcement and rearticulation of these memories. In turn these conversations fuel existing social
relationships, group solidarity and identities. Sharing this intercourse is what makes the
group - if they do not share the collective memory, then they are outside the group.
Reasserting Durkheim's contention that totemic beliefs are reaffirmed by groups coming
together in congregation and re-sharing their collective emotions towards the totem,
collective memory needs constant reaffirming to keep it relevant. As a consequence, the
Club provides the space where the collective memories and identities of fans are
reinforced through social interaction.

These conversations revolve around the same topics. Being a football supporters club,
many exchanges centre on AS Livorno, their games and their rivals. Therefore the Club
provides a platform for Nowell-Smiths assertions of the game of football being shaped

299

and articulated throughout the week (Nowell-Smith 1979). Similarly, wider conversations
of past matches are recalled and reconstructed as group members demonstrate their
knowledge of the game and build their collective memories, such as the fans wearing
bandanas at AC Milan in 2004. Wider issues are also discussed, specifically in relation to
various scandals in Italian football. Calciopoli was discussed on several occasions as it
demonstrated the power relationships which exist within Italian football and how they
favour the larger clubs such as Juventus and AC Milan at the expense of provincial clubs
such as AS Livorno. These power networks were specifically addressed towards the end
of the season when AS Livorno faltered in their drive for promotion. Their major
competitors were Parma and Bari. Parma had been one of the seven biggest clubs in
Italian football, dubbed the Seven Sisters, and a major European team until financial
mismanagement and scandal hit their parent company, the dairy company Parmalat.
Baris owner was highly influential in the Italian Football Federation and had spent a
considerable amount to fund the clubs ambitions. This combined with the significance
of Bari as a trading port in the south of Italy and the political importance of their
success.

The intricate nature of football and politics within Italy, inevitably would lead to wider
conversations about the state of Italian politics. After football, politics was the most
common conversation. Important events in the media would be discussed and most
discussions were related to national politics. Principally, Berlusconi was central to these
discussions as he became embroiled in a scandal relating to the use of state vehicles to
transport personal guests to parties at his private villa. This scandal escalated as
allegations of sexual impropriety at these parties emerged (Kington 2009). Ancillary to
this, the prime ministers wife filed for divorce after Berlusconi attended the eighteenth
birthday party of the daughter of a family friend, who called him Papi (Daddy)

300

(Kington 2009). This was particularly fascinating as Berlusconi did not attend the
eighteenth birthday parties of his own children. These discussions not only highlight the
political nature of much of Italian society, but they were performed in the semi-public
space of the club which existed outside of the family and workplace. Putnams central
argument suggests that participation in voluntary associations contributes to increased
political involvement and this underpins democracy (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993;
Putnam 2000). Likewise, Habermas suggested that public debate created a public sphere
which assisted in the formation of liberal political democracy. Although politics were
discussed and debated at the Club this was not translated into political action. Whilst
social capital was generated and accumulated at the Club, Putnams assertion that
democracy is reinforced lacks empirical support.

The emptying out of political engagement is also replicated in relation to football.

Although the Club provided a public sphere, this is not translated into active political
involvement. The director of the Club took an active interest in the transformation of
football, but this was not translated into involvement with political groups. This is
replicated within the umbrella organisation for supporters clubs. Many clubs are
affiliated to the Centri di Coordinamento (Co-ordination Centres) which in turn is
associated with the FISSC or Federazione Italiana Sostenitori Squadre Calcio (Federation of
Supporters of Italian Football Teams).79 This is not the equivalent of the independent
Football Supporters Federation in Britain which performs a more politically active role in
challenging the transformations in football.80 As a result they are not politically orientated
in the same way as Independent Supporters Associations in Britain (King 2003: Chapter
9). The FISSC has become involved with specific transformations within football,
specifically the Italian governments laws relating to identity cards. For example, the
79
80

http://89.97.230.138/index.htm
http://www.fsf.org.uk/

301

FISSC promotes the Carta del Tifoso along with the advantages associated with being seen
as a positive fan of the football club.81 However, by simply complying with government
proposals, they risk being seen as part of the governments patrimonial network. The
FISSC also promote specific initiatives, in particular Fair Play projects. There are not,
however, any anti-racism or anti-homophobia projects. While they publish a monthly
newsletter, written by fans, entitled La Voce del Tifoso (The Voice of the Fan), this
promotes the various initiatives of the Federation, as well as highlighting the
transformations taking place in football from a fans perspective. In doing so, it promotes
an alternative to the ultr. Its apolitical stance sees it remain relatively passive. In contrast
to the strength and visibility of the ultr, this sees the FISSC struggle to provide an
alternative voice for fans and further illustrates the decline of public life in Italy.

Summary

Football support provides for extensive opportunities to perform ones identity. As

Maguire has stated: Global sport provides some people with opportunities to experience
moments of exciting significance in their daily local lives (Maguire 1999: 212).
Therefore sport, football in particular, provides a space of real significance for certain
groups and how they articulate their identity. Changes to the political economy of Italy
have promoted the act of consumption and fans are consuming football in a variety of
ways. Fans have utilised a range of avenues for this performance that encompasses
choreographies and violence at stadiums through to supporters associations. These
social groups produce and consume their fandom throughout the week, as well as at the
stadium. Yet they have become fragmented. From the more homogeneous groups of the
1970s, the ultr began to fragment and have changed their focus from predominantly left81

http://89.97.230.138/carta_tifoso.htm

302

wing politics to regional and anti-immigration politics, violence and single-issues. The
neo-patrimonial political system that has incorporated business and football
surreptitiously legitimises football fans and ultr. As the England manager Fabio Capello
stated in October 2009: In Italy the ultr are in charge (La Gazzetta dello Sport 2009).
Consequently, violence and deaths have occurred that presents and reinforces the overall
crisis of Italian football. Draconian legislation and continued lack of co-ordinated action
from the authorities and the police has permitted the ultr, in particular, to form a strong
anti-state collective identity. This reinforces their self identity and further undermines the
authorities. Although groups like the ultr and the official supporters clubs provide
spaces to debate political action, in many cases they rely on single-issue politics that fail
to tackle the over-riding problems. Ultr identity has been condensed to symbolic targets
of the police and Berlusconi. Where the ultr are politicised this is less co-ordinated and
undermined by media portrayals of the groups as violent hooligans. For the official
supporters clubs the lack of co-ordinated action permits the status quo. Despite the
clubs being public spheres where politics are discussed, the plethora of official
supporters clubs ensures a fragmented outlook. The following chapter will conclude the
thesis with an overview of the situation in Italian football and suggest a possible future
for the sport in Italy.

303

SECTION 4

CONCLUSION

304

Chapter 7
An Italian Winner of the Champions League:
Year Zero?

Italian football is not liked by the rest of the world Jose Mourinho82

I don't like [Italian Football] and it doesn't like me I always speak with my heart but if I spoke
with my heart now about Serie A, I would be suspended Jose Mourinho83

The flashlights of the cameras were illuminating the pitch of Real Madrids Bernabeu
Stadium. The Milanese side, Inter, had just beaten Bayern Munich by two goals to nil in
the 2010 final of the Champions League and despite football being a team sport, the
focus was on one man. The cameras all focussed on the charismatic manager of Inter,
Jose Mourinho who had been nicknamed the Special One during his time in the English
Premier League. Few would disagree with this moniker as Mourinho became only the
third manager in the history of the European Cup to win the competition with two
different clubs. After Mourinhos first final, in contrast to the scenes in Madrid, the
cameras focussed on the team and the fans of Porto, rather than the manager. In Madrid,
however, the Portuguese manager was photographed striding around the pitch, hugging
his players and demonstrating overwhelming emotion. Amid the hugs from Mourinho,
the international squad of players received their national flags and parade around the
stadium. As the UEFA stewards gathered to prepare for the presentation of the trophy,
82
83

Lawrence, A. (2008). Serie A on the b-list. The Observer.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/europe/8595928.stm

305

Mourihno crouched to lift his son onto his shoulders. Sporting the famous blue and
black stripes of Inter, Jose Jr. was carried across the pitch as his father celebrated.
Mourinhos success in Madrid led to speculation that he would leave Inter for the
Spanish giants Real Madrid, for whom he would sign three weeks after the final.

Inters success in the Champions League represents a paradox. This thesis has analysed
Italian football within its historical context. The peculiar development of the Italian
political economy has fundamentally affected the transformation of football in Italy. The
family model of capitalism has seen football incorporated into the wider groups of
businesses and this initially led to a rapid and successful response to the transformation
of global football in the 1990s. However, the patrimonial nature of Italian business and
politics has seen a number of crises affect the sport, from match-fixing scandals to
doping, from financial mismanagement to fan violence. After the initial success, the last
twenty years has seen an intensification of scandal within Italian football. These crises
have impacted Italian footballs ability to compete globally and Serie A has not developed
and improved. Meanwhile other leagues, in particular the English Premier League, have
exploited the global markets which have brought relative success in European
competition. However, after years of crisis, how is it possible to account for Inters
success in the Champions League Final? This chapter will conclude the current situation
in Italian football and the response from the clubs and authorities. This will illustrate that
wealthy presidents can still fund successful clubs in Europe, whilst continuing to
undermine the long term sustainability of the league. Finally, this chapter will present
some future directions for the discipline and for Italian football

306

The English Model

The introduction to this thesis highlighted the romanticisation of foreign football in

English football writing. In presenting English football as being perpetually in crisis
foreign football is lionised and romanticised. This pattern is not confined to English
football as Italian football continues to have a neurotic relationship with its English
counterparts. As a result it both looks to England for example, but continues to take an
Italian approach to governance and organisation. One such trope that epitomises this
relationship is the term modello inglese (English Model). The Italian government and
media talk about applying an English Model to resolve the problems in Italian football,
especially in relation to hooliganism and policing. Although putatively based on the
Taylor Report, the English Model is not actually explained or developed and had
become rhetoric to symbolise a hard-line approach to violence (Bianchi 2005; Francesio
2008; Il Giornale 2008; La Gazzetta dello Sport 2008; Valdiserri 2008). As has been
demonstrated throughout this thesis, an English Model has not actually been
implemented as there has not been wide scale redevelopment of stadium safety, the
implementation of wider commercial practises, nor reform of policing. Ironically the
changes within the English Model also provide an alternative symbol to fans. The
commercialisation and commodification of the game represents something for many fans
to resist (Francesio 2008: 98). Paradoxically, English fans represented the model of
support for Italian ultr and hooligan groups across Europe (Dal Lago 1990; Dal Lago
and De Biasi 1994; Podaliri and Balestri 1998; Spaaij 2006). As Francesio states
sardonically, evidently there is always an English Model to refer to (Francesio 2008:
73). Yet these constructions become interpreted by different groups.

307

Central to the symbolism of the English Model is the continuing crisis in Italian
football. The first decade of the twenty-first century has seen Italian football rocked by
financial scandals that have affected large Italian businesses and their football
subsidiaries, such as Parma, Lazio, Fiorentina and Napoli. This has been compounded by
scandals including forged passports, forged financial declarations and doping. The nadir
of the crisis in Italian football was reached in 2006 when the calciopoli scandal was leaked
to the Italian media. Calciopoli revealed the intricate patrimonial networks of politicians,
businessmen and the football authorities which were operating in Italian football.
Strategic charismatic leaders were extending their patronage across the network in order
to favour their teams. The culmination of the years of scandal did not lead to any
widespread change within the game as existing practises continued. Fan apathy led to a
decline in attendance at football stadiums and continued violence from the ultr. Less
than a year after calciopoli, violence between Catania and Palermo fans led to the death of
a policeman, Filippo Raciti. The government adopted the Pisanu Law as an attempt to
enforce an English Model, and an attempt to impose some regulation upon football, but
without understanding the full details of the Taylor Report.

The over-arching argument of the Taylor Report was to improve the safety at stadiums
through stadium reconstruction and reformed policing (Taylor 1989). Yet neither of
these points have been addressed in relation to the Pisanu law. Many of the Italian
stadiums are antiquated and have poor facilities. After the death of Raciti, only four
stadiums passed the safety review (Kiefer 2007; Sanminiatelli 2007; Hamil, Morrow et al.
2010). Despite this, there were no provisions to improve stadium infrastructure in the
Pisanu Laws. Fundamentally, the Taylor Report sought to prevent congestion at
entrances to stadiums and on the terraces, which was a significant factor contributing to
the Hillsborough tragedy. However, this aspect has not been acknowledged by the Pisanu

308

Law. The Pisanu law has in fact added to the congestion at turnstiles by instigating an
identity check to ensure hooligans do not enter the stadium. However, these checks
become disregarded when there is excessive congestion at the turnstiles and fans have
been admitted without checks at Parma and Livorno. Controls over ticket sales are also
not adequately controlled as approximately one thousand Napoli fans attended their
match at Livorno despite the Osservatorio banning all away fans. Furthermore, some of the
features of the Taylor Report were never implemented in Britain. For example,
membership cards for fans were never introduced in Britain after widespread opposition
from fans, yet the equivalent in Italy, the tessera del tifoso was introduced in 2009. If an
English Model is to be implemented in Italy, a full understanding of the report must be
undertaken.

A key element of the Taylor Report related to the architecture of the terracing within the
stadium. The report required that perimeter fences should be dismantled to ensure that
fans had a safe exit from the end in the event of an emergency (Taylor 1989). Within
Italy, only Fiorentina has removed the Perspex fencing that encloses the curve (Cellini
2009; Giudici 2010). In addition to the removal of the perimeter fences, numbered
seating was installed in British stadiums, and followed by similar measures in the
Netherlands (Spaaij 2006). In combination with Foucauldian surveillance techniques,
numbered seating permitted the identification of individual trouble-makers. These
surveillance techniques outside of Britain, in Germany in particular, have permitted the
retention of terraces in certain circumstances. However, these practices have not been
fully implemented in Italy. Although there are closed-circuit television cameras in Italy,
perpetrators are not reprimanded. Objects are frequently thrown onto the pitch during
games. For example, at Livornos Armando Picchi stadium, there are no cameras
underneath the stand and this permitted a fan to launch a rocket across the pitch (Il

309

Tirreno 2010). Inter fans have even launched an enflamed scooter, that they stole from an
Atalanta fan, from a stand of the San Siro Stadium.84 The lack of enforcement and the
draconian measures employed against all fans reinforces the Outsider identity of the
ultr. They perform their identity within the liminal space of the stadium in opposition to
the symbolic constructions of the police and the state. As the state does not infringe on
the territory of the ultr problems occur when the two sides re-enter the Italian state
outside the stadium. Consequently, the opportunities for a Hillsborough-style tragedy in
Italy are manifest.

The perceived lack of legitimacy of the central authorities ensures that it does not impose
safety regulations onto the clubs. The Taylor Report placed the responsibility for safety
of fans within the stadium on the clubs (Taylor 1989). In abdicating responsibility for fan
safety, the British state reaffirmed its legitimacy. It advocated individual clubs
responsibility for their consumers, and the individual responsibility of the fans.
Surveillance assumed that all fans were potentially being observed (King 1998). In doing
so, the state imposed neo-liberal economics by placing the economic burden on the
clubs. Consequently, English clubs employed third party security firms to maintain order
which restricted the police to a public order role away from the stadium. However, the
poverty of the stadiums and the Outsider identity of the ultr have necessitated increased
police presence at Italian stadiums; the police operate as the lynchpin that maintains the
status quo. As the police operate within the political patrimonial system they become
active agents in constructing the ultr as the only cause of the problem in Italy (Della
Porta 1998; Marchi 2005). The weakness of the central state to impose reform permits
the maintenance of existing patterns of policing. The heavy police presence operating
around the stadium, combined with the regulations related to the stadium security check
84

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L_Nu6HKVSmk

310

and the tessera del tifoso criminalises all fans. This is apparent from the police presence
afforded to all fans travelling to away games. Without fully understanding the key aspects
of the English Model the Italian authorities are perpetuating the vicious cycle of decline
in Italian football.

The incorporation of football into the patrimonial system permits the presidents of
football clubs to abstain from the responsibility of stadium safety. As most stadiums are
owned by local councils or state institutions like CONI, presidents do not have
responsibility for their maintenance. Consequently, this prevents Italian clubs from
capitalising on their stadiums. An unintended consequence of Stadium redevelopments
in Britain led to football clubs increasing their commercial and match-day revenues (King
1998). Corporate boxes were enhanced and augmented with catering facilities,
merchandising outlets and special events. In addition, stadiums host conference and
restaurant facilities, club superstores and various leisure facilities to extend the
profitability of the stadium over the course of the week, rather than restricting their
facilities to match-days. In contrast, few Italian stadiums include facilities to purchase
club merchandise and even fewer have adequate catering facilities. Fan comfort is
restricted to inadequately maintained curva. Poor seating and temporary stands create an
unsatisfactory fan-experience that is compounded by poor toilets and catering. This point
has been echoed by the England national team manager, Fabio Capello, as he collected a
career award at Parma University in February 2010. Capello stated that:

Italian teams are well equipped but English sides are on top right now. Players
prefer to go to England and Spain and it is not just for the money. They see
Italian stadiums are half empty and realise we've got problems (Kington 2010)

311

The lack of revenue-generating facilities is compounded by the failure to implement

improved stadium safety. This contributes to fan apathy and falling attendances which
impact the financial viability of the clubs. Consequently, match-day revenue constitutes
the smallest percentage of overall revenue for many Italian clubs (Deloitte and Touche
2010). The vicious circle is complete as the restricted revenue further reduces the clubs
ability to improve the facilities of the stadium.

Television revenue has been a key driver of transformation within football. De-regulation
of television networks saw the inauguration of new broadcasters (King 1998; Giulianotti
1999; Maguire 1999; King 2003; Liguori and Smargiasse 2003; Russo 2005; Porro 2008).
These networks had more freedom over content and sport became a key market
opportunity. In Britain, the satellite broadcaster, Sky, was central to the transformations
within the English Premier League. Similarly, television income from the Champions
League helped transform European and national competition. Within Italy, Silvio
Berlusconis Mediaset made extensive use of entertaining neo-television and utilised these
networks to publicise and transform his football club, AC Milan. Neo-patrimonial
networks permitted central actors, like Berlusconi, to accumulate resources at the elite
clubs. This was compounded by the complete de-regulation of the football television
rights in Italy as individual clubs were permitted to negotiate their own television
contracts. This has seen the popular and powerful clubs in Italy maximise their revenue
and lengthened the economic distance between them and the provincial clubs (Porro
2008). Consequently, television revenue constitutes most of the overall revenue for
Italian football clubs. For example, Italys most popular club, Juventus, generates over
two-thirds of its revenue from television (Deloitte and Touche 2010). The neopatrimonial system has permitted the over-reliance of television revenue to the detriment

312

of other aspects of the football experience. Without effective regulation or state pressure,
clubs do not have to utilise their funds to improve the stadiums.

Football requires referees to arbitrate between the sides. In the wider political economy,
the state acted as this arbitrator. Within the global neo-liberal economy, the authority and
power of the state as arbitrator has been challenged, changed and in some cases
diminished. In the absence of a powerful arbitrator, such as the state, powerful actors
operating across business, politics and football can accumulate resources to the detriment
of the wider benefits. The Italian political economic system encourages the incorporation
of football clubs into the wider patrimonial network. The deep play of football within
Italian society sees the sport as a major contributor of social and symbolic capital to
charismatic individuals. As the British novelist and cultural commentator of Italy, Tim
Parks states: In Italy, you haven't really arrived until you own a football club (cited in
Arie 2004). This permits dense inter-dependencies between football clubs, television,
business and politicians which frame the production and consumption of Italian football.
The de-regulation of the 1980s resulted in connections thickening between the media,
politics and football. Silvio Berlusconi utilised television to promote his football club
before using this as a paradigm to enter the field of politics. Italian family-capitalism
and thicker personal connections permitted clubs like Parma and Lazio to be
incorporated into wider family businesses. The lack of regulation and transparency,
however, resulted in the clubs being affected when the parent companies went bankrupt.
The problems affecting Parma and Lazio exposed widespread financial irregularities
across Italian football and sees many clubs operating under incredible debt. Top clubs
such as Parma, Fiorentina and Napoli have all been relegated due to financial
complications. The neo-patrimonial system then saw the government attempt to pass the
salva-calcio law to allow clubs to delay repayment of their tax debts (Porro and Russo

313

2004). Furthermore, the lack of regulation also resulted in several clubs utilising
fraudulent paperwork or doping in order to gain an advantage. Personal connections
across a neo-patrimonial network were exposed spectacularly with the calciopoli scandal in
2006. This permitted a successful club with the right connections to influence the
outcomes of football matches. Calciopoli became a metaphor for the wider Italian state;
personal connections influenced the operation of the system for individual gain at the
expense of the wider interest. The accumulation of resources by strategic individuals,
facilitated by personal networks, permitted the elite clubs to dominate Italian football and
empty out wider involvement.

Several of these factors explain the Champions League success of Inter in 2010. Since its
inception in 1992, the Champions League has only been won by members of the G14
group of the richest clubs in Europe (which has expanded and is now called the
European Clubs Association).85 As a member of this group, Inter represent one of the
richest clubs in Europe. Furthermore, the incorporation of Italian football clubs into the
wider family portfolio of businesses permits revenue to be spent on football. The
president of Inter in particular, Massimo Moratti, invested substantial personal wealth in
order to replicate the success of his fathers Grande Inter squad of the 1960s. In the year
of their Champions League victory, Inter made a financial loss of 154 million (Capone
2010). The combination of calciopoli and economic investment resulted in Inter building
the strongest squad in Italy, and one that could compete in Europe. This was facilitated
with the signing of Jose Mourinho, one of the best managers in the world. Italys
patrimonial system had permitted the accumulation of resources at a small number of
elite clubs. Clubs like Roma, Lazio and Fiorentina are not able to acquire the resources to
compete in Europe; only Juventus, AC Milan and Inter have won the Champions
85

www.g14.com; http://www.ecaeurope.com/

314

League. Global factors also contributed to Inters success. The worldwide recession had
impacted the ability of smaller clubs to compete within the Champions League, whilst
the English clubs were also impacted by the devaluation of Sterling. Meanwhile, the reemergence of Florentino Prez as Real Madrids president dramatically impacted the
network of European clubs. Real Madrid took the best players from Manchester United
and AC Milan (Cristiano Ronaldo and Kak respectively) whilst divesting themselves of
Arjen Robben and Wesley Sneider. These players were sold to Bayern Munich and Inter
respectively and both played key roles in leading their clubs to the Champions League
Final. The 2010 Champions League highlighted how the new European competition is
one of elite clubs who operate within their own European networks and have the
resources to buy the best players in the world. Whether Italy can remain in this elite
network will be explored in the following section.

The Future of Italian Football: Year Zero?

At the start of the 2009-2010 season, Carlo Verdelli of the Gazzetta dello Sport suggested
that it was year zero for Serie A and Italian football (Verdelli 2009). The season passed
without any major scandals or incidents and finished with Inters triumphant victory in
Madrid. The success of Inter has demonstrated that Italian football can still compete on
the global stage. However, much of this is down to personal wealth and ambition, as well
as to the economic weakening of rivals. In order for Italian football to build upon this
success it needs to understand the changing global economic system. After two decades
of deregulation, King has highlighted that the worldwide recession of 2007-2010 could
constitute a renewed process of regulation (King 2010). This signal has been sounded by
the European governing body UEFA, who have announced that from the 2011-12
season they will enforce financial fair play rules to ensure that all clubs who play in

315

UEFA competitions comply with strict financial regulations. As Michel Platini, the
president of UEFA states: The clubs will comply, or they will not play (Conn 2010).
This is confirmed by Uefa's general-secretary, Gianni Infantino, who confirmed that:

There may be intermediate measures. We would have to ask why, maybe there
would be a warning first, but certainly, we would have to bar clubs in breach of
the rules from playing in the Champions League or the Europa League.
Otherwise, we lose all credibility (Conn 2010).

It is instructive that a trans-national body is imposing regulation in the absence of stateregulation. Furthermore, UEFA will need to enforce the regulations to ensure legitimacy;
a problem that has dogged the Italian federation since its inception.

There are signs that Italy is beginning to adapt to this global situation. In 2009, all but
one of the twenty Serie A clubs voted to create a separately administered league, along
the lines of the English Premier League. This league became operational at the start of
the 2010-2011 season and signals the start of a collective television deal for the league
(Prestisimone 2009; Deloitte and Touche 2010). This will represent an opportunity to
make the league more competitive and appealing to a global market. In the short term it
will dramatically affect the revenue of the elite clubs who have received a substantially
larger share of the television revenue during the last twenty years. How these clubs
manage this transition will be crucial. Juventus, for example have struggled since
Caliciopoli and with the loss of television money, their future may not be as successful as
their past. Promotion of other revenue streams, particularly stadium redevelopment, will
mitigate this revenue reduction. Conversely Serie A would not be able to survive another
calciopoli if patrimonial networks become further entrenched.

316

Any form of regulation must be adequately policed. There has been a long history of
patrimonial networks used to circumvent regulations. The Rosetta Case in 1923 resulted
from Juventus providing Virginio Rosetta an accountancy job in addition to his salary.
Similarly, the restrictions on foreign players resulted in passports being forged to prove
Italian ancestry. These scandals are in addition to the opportunities taken by presidents
and players to profit from their positions. Betting scandals and match-fixing payments
has beset the Italian league since 1926 when Torino were found guilty of bribing a player
from Juventus. Brian Glanville highlighted systematic bribery in Italian football during
the 1960s and 1970s. Totonero and Calciopoli are further examples of individuals utilising
their networks to organise football results. Economic profit is not always the prime
driver for these scandals. Symbolic capital and prestige are equally important. The history
of Italian football is a history of pushing the boundaries of authority.

The football authorities and the elite Italian clubs have highlighted the need for
improved stadiums. The Italian Football Federation made a bid for the 2012 European
Championships to act as a driver for stadium renovation. Fan violence and Calciopoli,
however, saw the Championships granted to the Ukraine and Poland (Praverman 2007).
The Federation subsequently bid for the 2016 tournament, yet this was awarded to
France (The Guardian 2010).86 As a result, the Federation and the clubs will need to seek
alternative funding for any redevelopment. Stadium redevelopment is vital in order for
these clubs to offset the short term loss of television income. This situation is
complicated by the continuing communal control of football stadiums in Italy. This will
restrict opportunities for revenue generation for the clubs. Some clubs have begun the
process of stadium redevelopment. The two Milan clubs and Roma have announced
86

http://www.figc.it/it/3463/22606/Impianti.shtml

317

plans to rejuvenate their stadiums. Meanwhile, Juventus are constructing a new stadium
which is due to open in 2011.87 The stadium will include postmodern design, corporate
facilities and merchandising and catering outlets. The cost of the stadium has been offset
by the advance sales of naming rights and corporate facilities (Deloitte and Touche
2010). More significantly, it will be owned by the club. This will allow them to retain
more of the revenue generated by the stadium. Further south, Fiorentina have
announced their Cittadella project which will house a modern art gallery, hotels,
conference facilities, and a new stadium (De Pinto and Pasquini 2008; Giudici 2010).
Furthermore, Fiorentina have experimented with new policing techniques to minimise
confrontation and violence at the stadium. Time will tell if the new stadium and
reformed policing will constitute a Fiorentina Model for Italian football (Giudici 2010).

Despite the changes to the structure and administration of the leagues, there has been
little widespread reform in the governance of the federation and this will impact the
wider success of the league. Guschwan succinctly summarises this problem:

The difficult task facing Italian government, soccer league and fans is to balance
the requirements of safety and civility with the passion and expression that makes
Italian soccer matches so compelling. (Guschwan 2007)

The crisis of legitimacy affecting the central authorities undermines the potential for
lasting change.

Despite Putnams assertions that social capital contributes to national democracy and
national economic success, this has not been demonstrated in Italy. Restructuring of the
87

http://www.juventus.com/site/eng/JPL_newstadium.asp

318

global political economy has also led to restructuring of local communities. Deregulation
of the economy and the movement of capital as also had a direct impact on individuals
who have less time to attend associations, or have moved away from their community.
This has been facilitated by increased consumption where traditional associations have
been supplanted with new forms of association. Although social capital is generated at all
levels of society and within every social network, it operates in accordance with
economic capital. Capital is generated in greater quantities by those with the resources to
accumulate it. As Skidmore et al suggested, those already well connected tend to get
better connected community participation tends to be dominated by a small group of
insiders who are disproportionately involved in a large number of governance activities
(Skidmore, Bound et al. 2006). Economic and social capital are intimately entwined, as
Bourdieu argued (Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu 1986). So as individuals accumulate these
stocks of capital, it reinforces their position. Consequently, we must make a clear
distinction between the Bourdieu concept of social capital which is a resource that is
used by individuals within a group, and the more generic theory proscribed by Putnam.
Whilst stocks of social capital may increase with thanks to certain inviduals participating
in community life, this does not automatically translate to a wider benefit for the
community in general.

Social capital accumulation amongst elites seriously impacts the work of local
associations. The restructuring of the global economy has opened up the football
economy for new entrepreneurs (King 1997). These have exploited existing social capital
to exploit transformations in the global political economy. Other-directed individuals
like Silvio Berlusconi extend their wide social networks and in doing so win acclaim and
favours from their supporters. This facilitates the accumulation of economic capital and
sets in motion a self-reinforcing cycle. This in turn has accumulated and reinforced

319

patrimonial networks. For example, personal patrimonial connections are retained within
the new structure of the league.88 The president of Roma, Rosella Sensi, is vice-president
of the new Serie A and is supported by various club presidents, including Adriano
Galliani, the president of AC Milan and former president of the Italian League (until he
resigned due to Calciopoli). The central authorities have to impose a regulatory framework
upon Italian football in order to mitigate the patrimonial networks. For example, the
English Premier League is managed by a putatively independent Chairman and Chief
Executive.

The crisis of authority has contributed to player and fan malaise which is contributing to
the decline in Italian football. The culture of mistrust towards the authorities has been
highlighted by the changes to the league structure in the 2010-11 season. These changes
have necessitated a new collective agreement between the players and the clubs. In
September 2010 the players of the Italian Footballers Association (AIC) voted to strike
(which they subsequently suspended) in opposition to a new agreement proposed by the
clubs. In particular they were protesting against the suggestion that footballers should not
have additional jobs outside football, that salaries should be tied to performance, and
significantly, that a club could force the sale of a player in the last year of his contract to
any club which agreed a transfer fee (Bandini 2010; La Gazzetta dello Sport 2010).
Challenges to central regulation have also affected fan involvement. Stadium regulations
have not been enforced and years of scandal, violence and crisis has resulted in fan
apathy and this has resulted in a decline in attendances at the stadium. This has been
compounded by the introduction of the tessera del tifoso. Ultr have protested against the
imposition of this card, and this has seen a dramatic reduction in attendances at Italian
stadiums for the 2010-11 season. For example, Roma only had 18,600 fans for their
88

http://www.legaseriea.it/it/lega-calcio/il-governo-della-lega

320

opening match against Cesena in the 80,000 capacity Stadio Olimpico (Bandini 2010).
These factors are impacting the spectacle, both in the stadium and on television.
Draconian legislation has directly impacted the one area that made Italian football
unique, and has simultaneously created a symbol of resistance for the ultr.

The fans have a key opportunity to turn the patrimonial networks to their advantage.
Increased individualisation in Italian society has resulted in the overall decline in
participation in public life. The supporters clubs and ultr groups represent excellent
avenues of social capital creation, which Putnam argues would overcome this decline
(Putnam 2000). However, they also represent the emptying out of politics from public
life (Sennett 1976; Habermas 1989; Putnam 2000). Richard Sennett suggested in The
Corrosion of Character that the way to overcome individualisation and to manage changes
brought about by the global deregulated economy is to form small collectives (Sennett
1998). The supporters clubs and ultr already constitute these collectives. Yet they need
to reframe their political outlook. Historically, ultr have reflected the politics of the
piazza. Political symbols of the extreme left and right emerged in the curve during the
1970s. This has been replaced by anti-immigration and secessionist politics that reflect
the growing dominance of the Lega Nord and Berlusconis centre-right government.
There need to be more social movements like Projetto Ultr to present an alternative
image of the fans. There are no equivalents of the Football Supporter's Federation, Kick
it Out or Fan Projects in Italy. 89 Therefore, there is no natural correlation between social
capital and political involvement. Historical, political and cultural factors must be
understood as these can inhibit political involvement and reinforce the emptying out of
public life. More research is required to investigate the connection between social capital

89

http://www.fsf.org.uk/; www.kickitout.org; www.kos-fanprojeckte.info

321

in networks of individuals and political involvement if the concept is to prove useful. It

also needs to include political and economic factors, especially the role of the state.

Italy stands on the precipice. Year Zero and the newly formed Serie A constitute a new
beginning for Italian football. Yet Italy has been adept at gattopardismo which has permited
change whilst remaining the same. For Italian football to reach the echelons they once
occupied, all parties must adopt a controlled strategy to compete across Europe.
Alternatively, Serie A will contract and become a chapter of history. For those who
succumbed to the glamour and style of Channel 4s Football Italia, this will be a sad loss to
world football.

322

Appendix: Glossary of Italian Terms

Allianza Nazionale (AI) The National Alliance Party formed after the dissolution of the
MSI.

Calcio The Italianised word for Football.

Calciopoli Match fixing scandal which emerged in 2006 involving Juventus, AC Milan,
Fiorentina, Lazio and Reggina.

Campanilismo Literally, the love of ones bell tower. Reflects the feelings of attachment
and belonging to ones home town or city.

Carabinieri Corps of armed police with the standing of armed forces (along with Air
Force, Army and Navy).

Cattenaccio Literally padlock; a style of defence popularized by Hellguera in Italy in the

1950s-60s and specialized in preventing the opposition from scoring.

Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (CONI) The Italian National Olympic Committee.
This is the umbrella organisation which administers and manages all national sporting
federations.

323

Covisoc (Commissione di Vigilanza sulle Societ Calcistiche) Literally, Vigilancy Commission

on Football Clubs. This body operated as the financial regulator for CONI to ensure
that football clubs had the financial assets to complete a full season.

Curva (pl. Curve) The ends behind the goals in Italian stadiums, similar to the terrace in
Modern British stadiums.

Daspo (Diffida ad Assistere alle manifestazioni Sportive) Literally Prohibition to attend sport
events. This is the equivalent of a football banning order in Britain. It prevents the
holders of this quasi-legal order from attending football matches.

Democrazia Cristiana (DC) The Christian Democratic Party.

Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC) The Italian Football Federation. Responsible for
the administration and management of Italian Football.

Fideiussione Financial guarantees provided by clubs to guarantee the financial eligibility

for the season.

Forza Italia (FI) The political party started by Silvio Berlusconi in 1992 after the
tangentopoli scandal.

Gattopardismo From the novel entitled Il Gattopardo by Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa.

It reflects the continuance of existing practises despite change.

324

Lega Calcio (Lega Nazionale Professionisti) The Italian Football League; the governing body
for the professional leagues in Italy, principally Serie A and Serie B.

Lega Nord The Northern League. A secessionist political movement which originates
from the north of Italy. Occasional supporter of Silvio Berlusconi.

Mani Pulite Literally clean hands. This is the investigation by magistrates.

Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) The Italian Social Movement (MSI), a neo-Fascist, then
national conservative right wing party.

Moviola The slow motion replay performed on sports broadcasts.

Oriundo (pl. Oriundi) Foreign born players of Italian descent.

Osservatorio Nazionale sulle Manifestazioni Sportive (Osservatorio) Quasi-political body

initiated to review safety at football matches.

Partito Communista Italiano (PCI) The Italian Communist Party.

Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) The Italian Socialist Party.

Plus-valenze An accounting system that spread the profit made on the sale of players
over an accounting term

325

Il Popolo della Libert (PdL) The People of Freedom Party formed after the merger of
Forza Italia and the Allianza Nazionale.

Questora The Chief of State Police.

RAI The state television and radio station. Originally called Radio Audizione Italiana it
changed its name in 1954 to Radio Televsione Italiana to reflect the new medium of
television. The acronym remained unchanged.

Risorgimento The political and social movement that led to the Unification of the Italian
peninsular.

Scudetto (pl. Scudetti) Literally little shield. The winner of the Serie A championship.
Champions are entitled to wear a small shield with the Italian tricolour on their jerseys in
the following season. The winner of ten scudetti is entitled to place a gold star above their
badge. Only three clubs have won this gold star: Juventus (twice), AC Milan and Inter.

Settore Ospiti The area for away fans. This is an area for parking, congregation and
confinement for fans travelling to away games. Occasionally these areas are adjacent to
the stadium. Alternatively, they are located at the edge of the city.

Striscione Banners held up at games to make political, insulting or humorous comments

to the players, opposition or politicians. Usually written on white sheets, or rolls of white
paper.

326

Tangentopoli Political scandal of 1992 which resulted in the Mani Pulite investigation and
the subsequent demise of the First Republic, the DC, PCI and PSI.

Tessera del tifoso The identity card imposed by the FIGC on fans to reduce the
requirement for identity checks at football matches. It also operates as a loyalty card and
MasterCard.

Trasformismo The practise of Italian politicians to switch political support in return for
personal support. Personal patrimony was utilised to ensure that political support
endured. This maintained a stable form of government without ideological shifts to the
right or left. It dates to the pre-fascist period, after unification.

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale (TAR) Regional Administrative Courts which exercise

regional judicial autonomy.

327

Bibliography
Abercrombie, N. and B. Longhurst (1998). Audiences : a sociological theory of
performance and imagination, Thousand Oaks, Calif.
Abse, T. (1986). The Rise of Fascism in an Industrial City: The Case of Livorno 19181922. Rethinking Italian fascism : capitalism, populism and culture. D. Forgacs.
London : Lawrence and Wishart, Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: xxi, 209 p.
Adamson, W. L. (1992). "The Language of Opposition in Early Twentieth-Century Italy:
Rhetorical Continuities between Prewar Florentine Avant-gardism and
Mussolini's Fascism." The Journal of Modern History 64(1): 22-51.
AGCM (2007). IC27 - SETTORE DEL CALCIO PROFESSIONISTICO.
Agnew, P. (2006). Forza Italia : a journey in search of Italy and its football. London,
Ebury.
Ampola, M. (2002). Giovani Ultras in Livorno (1996-2001).
Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined communities : reflections on the origin and spread of
nationalism. London, New York ; Verso.
Andrews, G. (2005). Not a normal country : Italy after Berlusconi, Ann Arbor, Mich.
Appadurai, A. (1990). "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy."
Theory Culture Society 7(2): 295-310.
Arie, S. (2004). Parma FC face ruin as a dynasty crashes. The Observer.
Armstrong, G. (1993). "... Like that Desmond Morris?". Interpreting the Field. D. Hobbs
and T. Maty. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Armstrong, G. (1998). Football hooligans : knowing the score. Oxford, New York.
Armstrong, G. and R. Giulianotti (1997). Entering the field : new perspectives on world
football. Oxford [England], New York.
Armstrong, G. and R. Harris (1991). "Football hooligans: theory and evidence."
Sociological Review 39(3): 427-458.
Armstrong, G. and J. P. Mitchell (2008). Global and local football : politics and
Europeanization on the fringes of the EU, New York.
Arvidsson, A. (2003). Marketing modernity : Italian advertising from fascism to
postmodernity, New York.
Axford, B. and R. Huggins (1998). "Anti-politics or the triumph of postmodern
populism in promotional cultures?" Telematics and Informatics 15(3): 181-202.
Back, L., T. Crabbe, et al. (2001). The changing face of football : racism, identity and
multiculture in the English game. Oxford, New York.
Bagnasco, A. (1977). Tre Italie. La problematica territoriale dello sviluppo italiano.
Bologna, Il Mulino.
Bailey, R. (2005). "Evaluating the relationship between physical education, sport and
social inclusion." Educational Review 57(1): 71-90.
Bairner, A. (2001). Sport, nationalism, and globalization : European and North American
perspectives. Albany, State University of New York Press.
Bairner, A. (2004). Where did it all go right? Manchester United: a thematic study. D. L.
Andrews. Abingdon, Routledge.
Bakhtin, M. M. (1984). Rabelais and his world. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
Bale, J. (1990). "In the Shadow of the Stadium: Football Grounds as Urban Nuisances."
Geography 75(4): 325-334.
Bale, J. (1993). "The Spatial Development of the Modern Stadium." International Review
for the Sociology of Sport 28(2-3): 121-133.
Bale, J. (1993). Sport, space, and the city. London, New York.

328

Bandini, P. (2007). Fan tragedy sends the fight against Ultras back to square one. The
Guardian.
Bandini, P. (2008). Palermo impress but victory isn't always enough for their managereater. The Guardian.
Bandini, P. (2009). Cause for concern at Juventus as Old Lady's fragility is exposed again.
The Guardian.
Bandini, P. (2009). Derby weekend lights up with fireworks on and off the field. The
Guardian.
Bandini, P. (2009). Racist chants overshadow Juventus's stirring comeback against Inter.
The Guardian.
Bandini, P. (2009). Serie A's 'Year Zero' may not be as dire as the doom-mongers
suggest. The Guardian.
Bandini, P. (2010). Ghost goals, grand unveilings and a sacking before the season even
begins. The Guardian.
Bandini, P. (2010). Milan's frailty laid bare by Cesena. The Guardian.
Banfield, E. C. (1958). The moral basis of a backward society. Glencoe, Ill., Free Press;
[Chicago] Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change,
University of Chicago.
Bannerman, L. (2009). Silvio Berlusconi: the parties, the trinkets, the cash. The Times.
Barbagli, M. and L. Sartori (2004). "Law enforcement activities in Italy." Journal of
Modern Italian Studies 9(2): 161-185.
Baroncelli, A. and U. Lago (2006). "Italian Football." Journal of Sports Economics 7(1):
13-28.
Bartali, R. (2006). Allende, Berlinguer, Pinochet ... and Dario Fo. Speaking Out and
Silencing. A. Cento Bull and A. Giorgio. Leeds, Legenda: 244 s.
Baudrillard, J. (1983). Simulations. New York City, N.Y., U.S.A., Semiotext(e), Inc.
Bayley, D. H. and C. Shearing, D. (1996). "The Future of Policing." Law and Society
Review 30(3): 585-606.
Bazell, M. (2008). Theatre of Silence: The Lost Soul of Football. Cambridge, Pegasus
Elliot Mackenzie Publishers.
BBC. (2009, 11 June 2009). "History of the world transfer record " Retrieved 16
September, 2010, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/8085391.stm.
BBC. (2009, 1 June 2009). "Perez to return as Real president." Retrieved 15 June, 2010,
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/europe/8076515.stm.
Becker, H. S. (1963). Outsiders; studies in the sociology of deviance. London, Free Press
of Glencoe.
Bernini, A. (2008). Livorno-Pisa si scopre derby triste Abbonati dentro, gli altri tutti a
casa. Il Tirreno.
Bernini, S. (2010). Family Politics, the Catholic Church and the Transformation of
Family Life in the Second Republic. Italy Today: The Sick Man of Europe. A.
Mammone and G. A. Veltri. London and New York, Routledge.
Bianchi, F. (2004). L'impero di Sensi affari e passione. La Repubblica.
Bianchi, F. (2005). Hooligans, gabbie e steward ecco la verit sul "modello inglese". La
Repubblica.
Bianchi, F. (2009). I cori pro-Tartaglia vanno puniti Maroni contro la curva del Livorno.
La Repubblica
Bicocchi, G. (2009). Roma, un altro derby nero. Il Tirreno. Livorno.
Bongini, R., C. Pannocchia, et al. (2007). Spinelli 'a' deh. Livorno, Benvenuti e
Cavaciocchi.
Boorstin, D. J. (1971). The image : a guide to pseudo-events in America. New York,
Atheneum.

329

Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste.

Bourdieu, P. (1986). The Forms of Capital. Handbook of Theory and Research for the
Sociology of Education. J. Richardson. New York, Greenwood: 241-258.
Bower, T. (2003). Broken dreams : vanity, greed and the souring of British football.
London and New York, Simon & Schuster.
Bramardo, F. (2008). Oggi la Juventus alza il sipario sul nuovo stadio. Gazzetta dello
Sport
Bruno, F. (1992). Vita da ultr. Dentro le curve d'Europa. Bologna, Conti.
Brusco, S. (1982). "The Emilian model: productive decentralisation and social
integration." Cambridge Journal of Economics 6: 167-184.
Buckley, W. (2005). The Man Who Hated Football, HarperPerennial
Burke, J. (2006). Paradiso to inferno. The Observer.
Butler, J. (1990). Gender trouble : feminism and the subversion of identity. New York,
Routledge.
Butler, J. (1993). Imitation and Gender Insubordination The Lesbian and Gay Studies
Reader. H. Abelove, M. A. Barale and D. M. Halperin. New York, London,
Routledge.
Caccia, F. (2006). Svastiche in curva, i nazi-ultr della Roma. Corriere della Sera.
Cacciari, S. and L. Giudici (2010). Stadio Italia - I conflitti del calcio moderno. Florence,
La Casa Usher.
Calabrese, P. (2009). I tifosi del Livorno "Tartaglia uno di noi". La Repubblica. Florence.
Callow, J. (2010). 'New Milan manager must play two strikers,' says Silvio Berlusconi.
The Guardian.
Capone, A. (2000). Da oggi la Roma quotata in Borsa. La Gazzetta dello Sport.
Capone, A. (2010). Bayern batte Moratti. La resa dei conti. La Gazzetta dello Sport.
Capone, A. and N. Cecere (2000). Roma: Rolex in regalo a designatori e arbitri. La
Gazetta dello Sport.
Carrington, B. (1998). 'Football's coming home' but whose home? And do we want it?:
Nation, Football and the Politics of Exclusion. Fanatics! power, identity, and
fandom in football. A. Brown, Routledge: xix, 289 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
Carroll, R. (1980). "Football Hooliganism in England." International Review for the
Sociology of Sport 15(2): 77-92.
Carroll, R. (2000). Roma under fire over Rolexes for referees. The Guardian.
Carroll, R. (2001). Genoa raid was police 'revenge'. The Guardian.
Carroll, R. (2007). The dark side of Italy's paramilitary force. The Guardian.
Castells, M. (1989). The informational city : information technology, economic
restructuring, and the urban-regional process. Oxford, UK, Cambridge, Mass.,
USA.
Castells, M. (1996). The rise of the network society, Blackwell Publishers.
Ceccarini, M. (2009, 11 September 2009). "Reggiseno e striscioni, la curva del Livorno
aspetta il Milan." Retrieved 24 March 2010, from
http://www.amaranta.it/?action=read&idnotizia=1879
Cellini, L. (2009, 27 October 2009). "Questore di Firenze 'Ultr? Qui siamo un modello'."
Retrieved 19 May, 2010, from
http://www.calciomercato.com/index.php?c=5&a=149364&archive=archive.
Cento Bull, A. (2010). The Legacy of the Strategy of Tension and the Armed Conflict in
a Context of (non)Reconciliation. Italy Today: The Sick Man of Europe. A.
Mammone and G. A. Veltri. London and New York, Routledge.
Cento Bull, A. and P. Corner (1993). From peasant to entrepreneur : the survival of the
family economy in Italy. Oxford, Providence.
Chiarello, F. (2005). Enciclopedia Amaranto. Livorno, il Quadrifoglio.

330

Clegg, J. (2010). Italian Football Faces Tough Times. Wall Street Journal.
Coad, D. (2008). The metrosexual : gender, sexuality, and sport, SUNY Press.
Coalter, F. (2007). A wider social role for sport : who's keeping the score?, New York.
Cohen, S. (2002). Folk devils and moral panics : the creation of the Mods and Rockers.
London, New York.
Coleman, J. S. (1988). "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." The American
Journal of Sociology 94: S95-S120.
Coles, R. (1975). Football as a Surrogate Religion? A Sociological Yearbook of Religion
in Britain. M. Hills. London, 8 SCM Press Ltd.: 61-77.
Collard, A. (1989). Investigating 'Social Memory' in a Greek Context. History and
ethnicity. E. Tonkin, M. McDonald and M. Chapman. London, New York: ix,
270 p.
Collin, R. O. (1999). Italy - A Tale of Two Police Forces. History Today. 49: 27-33.
Collins, R. (2005). Interaction ritual chains. Princeton, N.J., Oxford.
Collins, R. (2008). Violence : a micro-sociological theory, Princeton University Press.
Colombo, M. (2010). Milan brasiliano. Corriere della Sera.
Conn, D. (2001). The football business : the modern football classic. Edinburgh,
Mainstream.
Conn, D. (2005). The beautiful game? : searching for the soul of football. London,
Yellow Jersey.
Conn, d. (2007). What Money Can't buy. The Observer.
Conn, D. (2009). Barcelona have edge over Manchester United in that they will never be
sold. The Guardian.
Conn, D. (2010). Michel Platini will expel debt-laden clubs from the Champions League.
The Guardian.
Cooke, P. (2006). Collective memory and childhood narratives : rewriting the 1970s in
the 1990s. Speaking Out and Silencing. A. Cento Bull and A. Giorgio. Leeds,
Legenda: 244 s.
Coppola, F. F. (1972). The Godfather.
Corriere della Sera (2004). Decreto salva-calcio: accordo sul fisco. Corriere della Sera.
Corriere della Sera (2006). Le intercettazioni Ad Amsterdam ti ho messo Meier: lo vedi che
io mi ricordo di te? Corriere della Sera.
Corriere della Sera (2010). Gugliotta scarcerato, indagato agente. Vito: se colpevole,
Viminale parte civile. Corriere della Sera.
Corriere di Livorno (2008). La beffa della curva pisana la citt vietata stata invasa. Corriere
di Livorno.
Crabbe, T. and A. Brown (2004). 'You're not welcome anymore': the football crowd,
class and social exclusion. British football and social exclusion. S. Wagg.
Abington, Routledge.
Craig, O. and N. Pisa (2007). Italian football rocked by new troubles. The Daily
Telegraph.
Crawford, G. (2004). Consuming sport : fans, sport and culture, New York.
Croci, O. (2001). "Language and politics in Italy: from Moro to Berlusconi." Journal of
Modern Italian Studies 6(3): 348-370.
Crolley, L. and D. Hand (2002). Football, Europe, and the press. London, Portland, Or.
Crolley, L. and D. Hand (2006). Football and European identity : historical narratives
through the press. London, New York.
Crosetti, M. (2009). Risse e insulti a Balotelli lo stupido derby dell' odio. La repubblica.
Curro, E. (2009). I bamboccioni di Mou Balotelli e la giovent viziata il problema di
una generazione. La Repubblica.
Dal Lago, A. (1990). Descrizione di una battaglia : i rituali del calcio. Bologna, Il Mulino.

331

Dal Lago, A. and R. De Biasi (1994). Italian Football fans: Culture and Organisation.
Football, violence, and social identity. R. Giulianotti, N. Bonney and M.
Hepworth. London, New York: vi, 268 p.
Damascelli, T. (2010). Mou si mangia Ancelotti Perde solo SuperMario. Il Giornale.
Dart, J. (2008). "Confessional tales from former football hooligans: a nostalgic,
narcissistic wallow in football violence." Soccer & Society 9(1): 42 - 55.
Dasgupta, P. and I. Serageldin (2000). Social capital : a multifaceted perspective.
Washington, D.C., World Bank.
Davidson, N. and S. Hunt (2008). Modern football is rubbish : an A to Z of all that is
wrong with the beautiful game. Cheltenham, SportsBooks.
Davies, N. (2008). The bloody battle of Genoa. The Guardian.
De Biasi, R. (1996). Ultra-political: football culture in Italy. Football, nationality and the
state. V. Duke and L. Crolley. Harlow, New York: xii, 164 p.
De Biasi, R. (1998). The Policing of Hooliganism in Italy. Policing protest : the control of
mass demonstrations in Western democracies. D. Della Porta and H. Reiter.
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press: 302 p.
De Luca, M. (2000). Il calcio a Livorno 1905-1922. Livorno, Mariposa.
De Majo, L. (2008). Bloccate le vie d'accesso alla citt. Il Tirreno.
De Pinto, E. and S. Pasquini (2008). Nuovo Stadio, il come si adegua. Corriere di
Firenze.
De Tocqueville, A. (1969). Democracy in America. Garden City, N.Y. , Doubleday.
Delaney, L. and E. Keaney (2005). Sport and Social Capital in the United Kingdom:
Statistical Evidence from National and International Survey Data, Commissioned
by the Department of Culture, Media and Sport.
Della Porta, D. (1995). "Political Parties and Corruption: Reflections on the Italian Case."
Modern Italy 1(1): 97 - 114.
Della Porta, D. (1996). The sytem of corrupt exchange in local government. The new
Italian Republic : from the fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi. S. Gundle and S.
Parker. London, New York: viii, 334 p.
Della Porta, D. (1998). Police Knowledge and Protest Policing: Some Reflections on the
Italian Case. Policing protest : the control of mass demonstrations in Western
democracies. D. Della Porta and H. Reiter. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota
Press: 302 p.
Della Porta, D. and A. Vannucci (2007). "Corruption and anti-corruption: The political
defeat of 'Clean Hands' in Italy." West European Politics 30(4): 830-853.
Deloitte and Touche (2010). Deloitte Football Money League 2010.
Deuchar, R. and C. Holligan (2010). "Gangs, Sectarianism and Social Capital." Sociology
44(1): 13-30.
Dickie, J. (1996). Imagined Italies. Italian cultural studies : an introduction. D. Forgacs
and R. Lumley. Oxford, New York: p19.
Dinmore, G. (2010). UniCredit wins AS Roma in debt deal. The Financial Times.
Dombroski, R. S. (2001). Socialism, Communism and other 'isms'. The Cambridge
companion to modern Italian culture. Z. G. W. Baranski, Rebecca J., Cambridge
University Press: xix, 363 p. : ill., maps ; 24 cm.
Dunne, F. (2006). Makings of a scandal: Juventus' match-fixing system copied by their
rivals. The Independent.
Dunning, E. (1972). Development of modern football. In Dunning, E., Sport: readings
from a sociological perspective, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1972, p.
133-151. Reprinted from the author's book, Making of football: a sociological
study.

332

Dunning, E., P. Murphy, et al. (1986). "Spectator Violence at Football Matches: Towards
a Sociological Explanation." The British Journal of Sociology 37(2): 221-244.
Dunning, E. and K. Sheard (1979). Barbarians, Gentlemen and Players: a sociological
study of the development of rugby football. Oxford, Martin Robertson.
Dunning, E. G., J. A. Maguire, et al. (1982). "The social roots of football hooligan
violence." Leisure Studies 1(2): 139-156.
Durkheim, E. (1915). The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. London, Unwin.
Durkheim, E. (1952). Suicide: A Study in Sociology. London, Routledge.
Durkheim, E. (1964). The Division of Labor in Society London, Collier-Macmillan.
Eco, U. (1990). A guide to the Neo-Television of the 1980s. Culture and conflict in
postwar Italy : essays on mass and popular culture. Z. Baranski and R. G.
Lumley. New York, St. Martin Press: xiii, 346 p., [4] p. of plates.
Eisenstadt, S. N. (1973). Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism.
Beverly Hills, Sage Publications.
Elias, N. (1978). The civilizing process / Uniform Title: Uber den Prozess der
Zivilisation. English. New York, Urizen Books.
Elias, N. (1982). State Formation and Civilization. Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Elias, N. (2001). The Society of Individuals. London, Blackwell.
Elias, N. and E. Dunning (1986). Quest for excitement : sport and leisure in the civilizing
process. Oxford, OX, UK, New York, NY, USA.
Elias, N. and J. L. Scotson (1965). The established and the outsiders; a sociological
enquiry into community problems. London, F. Cass.
Eve, J. and J. Goodbody (2004). Juventus guilty of drug abuse. The Times.
Farrell, J. (1995). "Berlusconi and Forza Italia: New force for old?" Modern Italy 1(1): 40
- 52.
Featherstone, M. L. S. R. R. (1995). Global modernities, Thousand Oaks, Calif.
Feltri, M. (2006). Da mani pulite a piedi puliti. La Stampa.
Ferreri, A. (2008). Ultras, i ribelli del calcio : quarant'anni di antagonismo e passione,
Bepress.
Foot, J. (2001). Milan since the miracle : city, culture, and identity. Oxford, New York.
Foot, J. (2003). Modern Italy, Palgrave Macmillan.
Foot, J. (2006). Calcio : a history of Italian football. London, Fourth Estate.
Foot, J. (2007). Italian police beating up fans? Big deal. It's what they do. The
Independent.
Foot, J. (2007). Winning at all costs : a scandalous history of Italian soccer. New York,
Nation Books.
Foucault, M. (1991). Discipline and punish : the birth of the prison / Uniform Title:
Surveiller et punir. English. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books.
Foucault, M., G. Burchell, et al. (1991). The Foucault effect : studies in governmentality :
with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault, University of
Chicago Press.
Foucault, M. K. J. (2009). History of madness / Uniform Title: Histoire de la folie l'ge
classique. English. New York, Routledge.
Francesio, G. (2008). Tifare contro : [una storia degli ultras italiani]. [Milano], Sperling &
Kupfer.
Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust : the social virtues and the creation of prosperity. New York,
Free Press.
Galasso, C. (2002). Alle origini di una comunit : ebree ed ebrei a Livorno nel Seicento.
Firenze, L.S. Olschki.
Gamble, A. (1994). The Free Economy and the Strong State: Politics of Thatcherism.
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

333

Garfinkel, H. (1967). Studies in ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., PrenticeHall.

Geertz, C. (1972). Deep play : notes on the Balinese cockfight. Indianapolis, BobbsMerrill.
Giddens, A. (1990). The consequences of modernity. Stanford, Calif., Stanford
University Press.
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity : self and society in the late modern age,
Stanford University Press.
Gilpin, R. and J. M. Gilpin (2000). The challenge of global capitalism : the world
economy in the 21st century, Princeton University Press.
Ginsborg, P. (1990). Family, Culture and Politics in Contemporary Italy. Culture and
conflict in postwar Italy: essays on mass and popular culture. Z. G. Baranski and
R. Lumley. New York, St. Martin Press: p21-49.
Ginsborg, P. (1990). A history of contemporary Italy : society and politics, 1943-1988.
London, England, New York, N.Y., USA.
Ginsborg, P. (1996). Explaining Italy's Crisis. The new Italian Republic : from the fall of
the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi. S. Gundle and S. Parker. London, New York: viii,
334 p.
Ginsborg, P. (2003). Italy and its discontents : family, civil society, state, 1980-2001.
London, New York.
Ginsborg, P. (2004). Silvio Berlusconi : television, power and patrimony, London ; New
York, N.Y. : Verso.
Giudici, L. (2010). Il 'Modello Firenze': Un Laboratorio del Calcio Moderno. Stadio Italia
- I conflitti del calcio moderno. S. Cacciari and L. Giudici. Florence, La Casa
Usher.
Giulianotti, R. (1991). "Scotland Tartan Army in Italy - the Case for the Carnivalesque."
Sociological Review 39(3): 503-527.
Giulianotti, R. (1993). Soccer casuals as cultural intermediaries. The Passion and the
fashion : football fandom in the new Europe. S. Redhead. Aldershot, England :
Avebury, Brookfield, Vt., USA: x, 205 p.
Giulianotti, R. (1994). Taking Liberties: Hibs Casuals and Scottish Law. Football,
violence, and social identity. R. Giulianotti, N. Bonney and M. Hepworth.
London, New York: vi, 268 p.
Giulianotti, R. (1995). "Participant Observation and Research Into Football Hooliganism:
Reflections on the Problems of Entree and Everyday Risks " Sociology of Sport
Journal 12(1): 1-20.
Giulianotti, R. (1999). Football: a sociology of the global game. Cambridge, England;
United Kingdom, Polity Press.
Giulianotti, R. (1999). Hooligans and carnival fans: Scottish football supporter
cultures. Football Cultures and Identities. G. Armstrong and R. Giulianotti. London,
Macmillan.
Giulianotti, R. (2002). "Supporters, followers, fans, and flaneurs: a taxonomy of spectator
identities in football. / Supporteurs, suiveurs, fans et flaneurs." Journal of Sport
& Social Issues 26(1): 25-46.
Giulianotti, R. (2005). Sport : a critical sociology. Oxford, Malden, MA.
Giulianotti, R., N. Bonney, et al. (1994). Football, violence, and social identity. London,
New York.
Giulianotti, R. and R. Robertson (2004). "The globalization of football: a study in the
glocalization of the 'serious life'." British Journal of Sociology 55(4): 545-568.

334

Giulianotti, R. and R. Robertson (2006). "Glocalization, globalization and migration The case of Scottish football supporters in North America." International
Sociology 21(2): 171-198.
Giulianotti, R. and R. Robertson (2007). Globalization and sport, Oxford.
Giulianotti, R. and R. Robertson (2009). Globalization and Football London, Sage
Publications Ltd.
Glanville, B. (1999). Football memories. London, Virgin.
Glanville, B. (1999). Obituary: Italo Allodi. The Guardian.
Goffman, E. (1990). The presentation of self in everyday life. New York [N.Y.],
Doubleday.
Goffredo, B. (1993). Craxi: siamo tutti colpevoli. Corriere della Sera.
Gold, R. L. (1958). "Roles in Sociological Field Observations." Social Forces 36(3): 217223
Goldblatt, D. (2007). The ball is round : a global history of football. London, Viking.
Gramsci, A. F. D. (2000). The Gramsci reader : selected writings, 1916-1935 / Uniform
Title: Selections. English. 2000. New York, New York University Press.
Grillo, A. (2010). Livorno, dal Tifo all Febbre Gialla: Un Sondaggio sulle
Transformazioni del Calcio. Stadio Italia - I conflitti del calcio moderno. S.
Cacciari and L. Giudici. Florence, La Casa Usher.
Gruneau, R. S. and D. Whitson (1993). Hockey night in Canada : sport, identities, and
cultural politics. Toronto, Garamond Press.
Gundle, S. (1996). The Rise and Fall of Craxi's Socialist Party. The new Italian Republic :
from the fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi. S. Gundle and S. Parker. London,
New York: viii, 334 p.
Gundle, S. (1998). "The death (and re-birth) of the hero: cahrisma and manufactured
charisma in mondern Italy." Modern Italy 3(2): 173-189.
Gundle, S. and N. O'Sullivan (1995). "The crisis of 1992-1994 and the reform of Italian
public broadcasting." Modern Italy 1(1): 70 - 81.
Gundle, S. and S. Parker (1996). The new Italian Republic : from the fall of the Berlin
Wall to Berlusconi. London, New York.
Guschwan, M. (2007). "Riot in the Curve: Soccer Fans in Twenty-first Century Italy."
Soccer & Society 8(2): 250-266.
Guttmann, A. (1978). From ritual to record : the nature of modern sports. New York,
Columbia University Press.
Habermas, J. (1975). Legitimation crisis / Uniform Title: Legitimationsprobleme im
Sptkapitalismus. English. Boston, Beacon Press.
Habermas, J. (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry
into a category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press.
Hamil, S., S. Morrow, et al. (2010). "The governance and regulation of Italian football."
Soccer & Society 11(4): 373 - 413.
Hammersley, M. A. P. (1983). Ethnography : principles in practice. London, New York.
Hannerz, U. (1990). "Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture." Theory Culture
Society 7(2): 237-251.
Hanretty, C. (2010). The Media Between Market and Politics. Italy Today: The Sick Man
of Europe. A. Mammone and G. A. Veltri. London and New York, Routledge.
Harding, T. (2001). Carabinieri had a high profile and low tactics. The Telegraph.
Hassan, D. and S. Hamil (2010). "Models of football governance and management in
international sport." Soccer & Society 11(4): 343 - 353.
Hawkey, I. (2006). Italy takes a dive. The Sunday Times.
Hawkey, I. (2006). Old Lady caught in a fix. The Times.
Hawkey, I. (2008). Hooligan hell for shamed Napoli. The Times.

335

Held, D. (1999). Global transformations : politics, economics and culture. Stanford,

Calif., Stanford University Press.
Hills, M. (2002). Fan cultures. London, New York.
Hilton, M., J. McKay, et al. (2010). "'The Big Society': civic participation and the state in
modern Britain." History and Policy.
Hobsbawm, E. J. (1992). Nations and nationalism since 1780 : programme, myth, reality,
Cambridge University Press.
Hobsbawm, E. J. and T. O. Ranger (1983). The Invention of tradition. Cambridge
[Cambridgeshire], New York.
Hofmann, P. (2008). Why Italians Think They Hate Romans. The New York Times.
Hooper, J. (2008). Rightwingers and ex-model in Italian cabinet. The Guardian.
Hooper, J. (2009). Call girl in Silvio Berlusconi sex scandal claims series of attacks and
threats. The Guardian.
Hooper, J. (2009). New audio tapes put Silvio Berlusconi sex allegations back in
spotlight. The Guardian.
Hooper, J. (2009). Silvio Berlusconi fights back over photos of topless guests at villa. The
Guardian.
Hooper, J. (2010). Five-star Movement makes stunning debut in Italian elections. The
Guardian.
Hooper, J. (2010). Silvio Berlusconi ally had no Mafia links after 1992, court rules. The
Guardian.
Hooper, J. (2010). Silvio Berlusconi faces parliamentary crisis as speaker refuses to resign.
The Guardian.
Horne, J. (2004). "The Global Game of Football: The 2002 World Cup and Regional
Development in Japan." Third World Quarterly 25(7): 1233-1244.
Horne, J. (2006). Sport in consumer culture, New York.
Horne, J. and W. Manzenreiter (2002). Japan, Korea and the 2002 World Cup. London,
Routledge.
Horne, J. and W. Manzenreiter (2008). "Football, komyuniti and the Japanese ideological
soccer apparatus." Soccer and Society 9(3): 359-376.
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2009). The Cost of Policing Football
Matches.
Hughes, R. (1993). Uefa Establishes European Cup Cartel. The Times.
Hughes, R. (2000). Furor Erupts as Roma Hands Out Rolexes : Press Blows Whistle On
Gifts for Referees. International Herald Tribune.
Huizinga, J. (1992). Homo Ludens. Boston, Mass., Beacon Press.
Ignazi, P. (2006). Listening and silencing. Italian feminists in the 1970s : between
autocoscienza and terrorism. Speaking Out and Silencing. A. Cento Bull and A.
Giorgio. Leeds, Legenda: 244 s.
Il Giornale (2008). Ultras, Matarrese: "Celle negli stadi". Il Giornale.
Il Giornale (2009). Adesso Balotelli davvero un caso. Hanno vinto gli ultr. Il Giornale.
Il Giornale (2009). Laggressore Cori a Livorno pro Tartaglia E lui: basta tv. Il Giornale.
Il Giornale (2009). Razzismo contro Balotelli Il caso arriva alla Camera. Il Giornale.
Il Secolo XIX (2008). Allasta lo stadio di Marassi. Genoa e Samp non commentano. Il
Secolo XIX.
Il Tirreno (2009). Livorno-Milan in chiave "Papi" reggiseni, condom e striscioni hard. Il
Tirreno.
Il Tirreno (2010). Razzo dalla curva nord, paura allo stadio. Il Tirreno.
Inglis, S. (1987). Football Grounds of Great Britain. London, Willow.

336

Italian Calcio Blog. (2006, May 29 2006). "Rossi: No Calciopoli whitewash " Retrieved 8
July, 2010, from
http://calcioitaliascandal.blogspot.com/2006_05_01_archive.html.
Jarvie, G. (2003). "Communitarianism, Sport and Social Capital: `Neighbourly Insights
into Scottish Sport'." International Review for the Sociology of Sport 38(2): 139153.
Jary, D., J. Horne, et al. (1991). "Football 'fanzines' and football culture: a case of
successful 'culural contestation'." Sociological Review 39(3): 581-598.
Jenkins, R. (1996). Social identity. London and New York, Routledge.
Johnston, B. (2001). Berlusconi defends tactics of riot police. The Telegraph.
Johnston, B., R. Alleyne, et al. (2008). Britons tell of beatings by G8 police. The
Telegraph.
Jones, T. (2007). The Dark Heart of Italy. London, Faber.
Jones, T. and T. Newburn (2002). "The Transformation of Policing? Understanding
Current Trends in Policing Systems." The British Journal of Criminology 42(1):
129-146.
Kaletsky, A. (2010). Capitalism 4.0 : the birth of a new economy in the aftermath of
crisis. New York, NY, PublicAffairs.
Kempson, R. (2009). Fabio Cannavaro drugs controversy casts shadow over Italy match.
The Times.
Kennedy, E. (2004). Under the Skin of Manchester United. Manchester United: a
thematic study. D. L. Andrews. Abingdon, Routledge.
Kick It Out. (2007, 14 March 2007). "Mutu abused in Italy." Retrieved 20 January 2010,
from http://www.kickitout.org/news.php/news_id/3071.
Kiefer, P. (2007). Hooligans kill a policeman, throwing Italy soccer into a void.
International Herald Tribune.
Kiefer, P. (2007). Italian Authorities Propose Barring Fans. New York Times.
Kiefer, P. and I. Fisher (2006). Leader of Italy's Most Revered Soccer Club Takes a Spill
New York Times.
Kiely, R. (2007). The new political economy of development : globalization, imperialism,
hegemony, New York.
King, A. (1997). "The Lads: Masculinity and the New Consumption of Football."
Sociology 31(2): 329-46.
King, A. (1997). "New Directors, Customers, and Fans: The Transformation of English
Football in the 1990s." Sociology of Sport Journal 14(3).
King, A. (1997). "The Postmodernity of Football Hooliganism." The British Journal of
Sociology 48(4): 576-593.
King, A. (1998). The End of the Terraces : the Transformation of English Football in the
1990s. London, New York.
King, A. (2000). "Football fandom and post-national identity in the New Europe."
British Journal of Sociology 51(3): 419-442.
King, A. (2001). "Violent pasts: collective memory and football hooliganism." The
Sociological Review 49(4): 568-585.
King, A. (2003). The European Ritual: Football in the New Europe. Aldershot, England;
United Kingdom, Ashgate.
King, A. (2004). "The New Symbols of European Football." International Review for the
Sociology of Sport 39(3): 323-336.
King, A. (2009). After the Crunch: A new era for the beautiful game.
King, A. (2010). "After the crunch: a new era for the beautiful game in Europe?" Soccer
& Society 11(6): 880-891.

337

Kington, T. (2007). Italian football fan shot dead by police as rival supporters clash at
service station. The Guardian.
Kington, T. (2007). Italy's Mr Clean bids to save football from fascist thugs. The
Observer.
Kington, T. (2009). Berlusconi's wife seeks divorce. The Guardian.
Kington, T. (2009). Italy's culture of racism exposed by fans' abuse of black football star.
The Observer.
Kington, T. (2009). Silvio Berlusconi defiant as escort scandal grows. The Guardian.
Kington, T. (2010). Berlusconi jokes about Hitler at youth rally. The Guardian.
Kington, T. (2010). Fabio Capello tells Italy the Premier League puts Serie A to shame.
The Guardian.
Kington, T. (2010). Italian government battles with Florence for Michelangelo's David.
The Observer.
Kington, T. (2010). Jos Mourinho suspended for three games and fined over handcuffs
gesture. The Guardian.
Kington, T. (2010). Roman politicians gear up for clash over Colosseum cash. The
Guardian.
Kington, T. (2010). A weathergirl, a Miss Italy contestant and a showgirl: Berlusconi
unrepentant over election choices. The Observer.
La Corriere della Sera (2008). Bilanci: prosciolti Milan, Inter e Galliani. Il fatto non
costituisce reato.
La Corriere dello Sport (2009). Juve-Inter, cori contro Balotelli. La Corriere dello Sport.
La Gazzetta dello Sport (2008). San Paolo: chiusura ridotta Matarrese: "Celle allo stadio" La
Gazzetta dello Sport.
La Gazzetta dello Sport (2009). "In Italia comandano gli ultr" Polemica Capello-Petrucci.
La Gazzetta dello Sport.
La Gazzetta dello Sport (2010). Berlusconi: "Con me tecnico il Milan sarebbe campione".
La Gazzetta dello Sport.
La Gazzetta dello Sport (2010). Berlusconi: "Milan sfortunato Incontriamo arbitri di
sinistra". La Gazzetta dello Sport.
La Gazzetta dello Sport (2010). Boateng a Genova per le visite. De Laurentiis vuole Sosa.
La Gazzetta dello Sport.
La Gazzetta dello Sport (2010). L'Aic proclama lo sciopero. Niente calcio il 25/26
settembre. La Gazzetta dello Sport.
La Gazzetta dello Sport (2010). Rai, addio moviola! Ecco la Cassazione. La Gazzetta dello
Sport.
La Nazione (2009). Livorno - Milan, striscioni di solidariet ai lavoratori. La Nazione.
La Repubblica (2004). Il Livorno sfotte Berlusconi tifosi a San Siro con la bandana. La
Repubblica.
La Repubblica (2006). Calcio shock, 21 indagati a Napoli in 6 nella cupola che decideva. La
Repubblica.
La Repubblica (2006). "Consigli" agli arbitri e minacce Le telefonate dei potenti del calcio.
La Repubblica.
La Repubblica (2006). Olimpico, svastiche in curva sud: "Lazio-Livorno: stesso forno". La
Repubblica.
La Repubblica (2010). Caso Gugliotta, interviene Manganelli disposta una "rigorosa"
inchiesta. La Repubblica.
La Repubblica (2010). E dal 2012 avremo soltanto tre club in Champions. La Repubblica.
La Repubblica (2010). I fratelli Egwu come Balotelli insulti razzisti, la squadra se ne va. La
Repubblica.
La Repubblica (2010). Livorno, via Cosmi Torna Ruotolo. La Repubblica.

338

La Repubblica (2010). Rottura con Spinelli. Cosmi si dimette. La Repubblica.

La Repubblica (2010). Torna la pace tra Spinelli e Cosmi. La Repubblica.
La Repubblica (2010). Zarate tra Polverini e saluto fascista. La Repubblica.
La Repubblica (2010). Zebina: "E' razzismo. Voglio essere difeso". La Repubblica.
Lago, U., R. Simmons, et al. (2006). "The Financial Crisis in European Football." Journal
of Sports Economics 7(1): 3-12.
Landolina, S. (2007). "Calcio Debate: Are The Ultras Destroying Our Calcio?", from
http://www.goal.com/EN/Articolo.aspx?ContenutoId=479398.
Lane, D. (2004). Berlusconi's shadow : crime, justice and the pursuit of power. London,
Allen Lane.
Lanfranchi, P. (2001). Un certo sguardo sull'Europa. Correndo correndo... con
Antonello Venditti. L. V. Lazzerini and M. Lazzerini. Florence, Edifir.
Lanfranchi, P. and R. De Biasi (1997). Importance of difference : football identities in
Italy. Entering the field : new perspectives on world football. G. Armstrong and
R. Giulianotti. Oxford [England], New York: vii, 319 p.
LaPalombara, J. (1987). Democracy, Italian style. New Haven, Yale University Press.
Lash, S. and J. Urry (1994). Economies of signs and space, Thousand Oaks, Calif.
Lava, D. (2008). Hooligans e ultras : rito e aggressivit nel mondo del calcio. Falconara
Marittima (Ancona), L'orecchio di Van Gogh.
Lawrence, A. (2008). Serie A on the b-list. The Observer.
Leroux, M. (2008). Fabio Capello, the high-profile victim caught in crossfire as Italy takes
aim at corruption. The Times.
Lewis, A. (2008). "From Alpine clubs to Baggio and Berlusconi: Italy reflected through
sport." Conference on Patricks Special Vision of Italy: 96-103.
Liguori, G. and A. Smargiasse (2003). Calcio e neocalcio : geopolitica e prospettive del
football in Italia. Roma, Manifestolibri.
Liguori, M. (2010). Spinelli: meno tasse; Il Fisco: "Paghi quello che non ha versato".
Quotidiano.
Lin, N. (2001). Social capital : a theory of social structure and action, New York.
Lipow, A. and P. Seyd (1996). "The Politics of Anti-Partyism." Parliam Aff 49(2): 273284.
Llobera, J. (1989). Catalan National Identity: the dialectics of past and present. History
and ethnicity. E. Tonkin, M. McDonald and M. Chapman. London, New York:
ix, 270 p.
Lloyd, M. (1999). "Performativity, Parody, Politics." Theory, Culture & Society 16(2):
195-213.
Lo Bianco, G. and P. Messina (2008). Stadio, spranga e ultras. L'espresso. 36.
Lowe, S. (2010). Domination by Barcelona and Real Madrid making Spain the new
Scotland. The Guardian.
MacAskill, E. and L. Elliot (2001). Protester killed in summit chaos. The Guardian.
Macleod, A. (2005). Scotland Yard back-up for Edinburgh G8 protesters. The Times.
Maguire, J. (1994). "Sport, Identity Politics, and Globalization: Diminishing Contrasts
and Increasing Varieties." Sociology of Sport Journal 11(4): 398-427.
Maguire, J. and R. Pearton (2000). "The impact of elite labour migration on the
identification, selection and development of European soccer players." Journal of
Sports Sciences 18(9): 759 - 769.
Maguire, J. and E. K. Poulton (1999). "European Identity Politics in Euro 96: Invented
Traditions and National Habitus Codes." International Review for the Sociology
of Sport 34(1): 17-29.
Maguire, J. and D. Stead (1998). "Border Crossings: Soccer Labour Migration and the
European Union." International Review for the Sociology of Sport 33(1): 59-73.

339

Maguire, J. A. (1999). Global sport : identities, societies, civilizations. Cambridge, UK :

Polity Press, Malden, MA.
Malagutti, V. (2003). Il vero padrone del calcio italiano? Una banca. Corriere della Sera.
Malcolm, D. and I. Waddington (2008). "'No systematic doping in football': A critical
review." Soccer & Society 9(2): 198-214.
Malinowski, B. (1922). Argonauts of the western Pacific; an account of native enterprise
and adventure in the archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea. London, G.
Routledge & Sons; New York, E.P. Dutton & Co.
Manes, L. (2008). Made in England: Luci e Ombre del Football dei Maestri. Torino
Bradipolibri.
Manzenreiter, W. (2008). "Football in the reconstruction of the gender order in Japan."
Soccer & Society 9(2): 244-258.
Manzenreiter, W. and J. Horne (2004). Football goes east: business, culture and the
people's game in China, Japan and South Korea. Abingdon, Routledge.
Marchi, V. (2005). Il derby del bambino morto : violenza e ordine pubblico nel calcio.
Roma, DeriveApprodi.
Marcotti, G. (2006). 'You are the boss! You own Serie A'. The Times.
Marcotti, G. (2007). United fans pay in blood for Italys loose dogs. The Times.
Marquand, D. (1988). The Unprincipled Society: New Demands and Old Politics.
London, Fontana Press.
Marsh, P. E., E. Rosser, et al. (1978). The rules of disorder. London, Boston.
Martin, S. (2004). Football and fascism : the national game under Mussolini, Berg.
Massucci, R. (2007). Determinazione dellOsservatorio nr.14/2007 dell 8 marzo 2007.
M. dell'Interno.
May, J. (2004, 19 April, 2004). "Maradona's fall from grace." Retrieved 17 February
2010, 2010, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/3639425.stm.
McGinniss, J. (2000). The Miracle of Castel di Sangro. London, Warner.
McMahon, B. and K. Buckley (2006). Scandal hits Italy World Cup plans. The Observer.
Meier, H. E. (2003). "Solidarity and Market Power in German Soccer: The Regulation of
Collective Selling." Football Studies 6(2): 22-38.
Melucci, A. (1988). Social Movements and the Democratization of Everyday Life. Civil
society and the state : new European perspectives. J. Keane. London, New York:
426 p.
Melucci, A. K. J. and P. Mier (1989). Nomads of the present : social movements and
individual needs in contemporary society. Philadelphia, Temple University Press.
Menduni, E. (1996). La pi amata dagli italiani : la televisione tra politica e
telecomunicazioni. Bologna, Mulino.
Menduni, E. (2002). I linguaggi della radio e della televisione : teorie e tecniche. Roma,
Laterza.
Menicucci, P. (2005, 28 November 2005). "Zoro takes a stand on racism." Retrieved 20
January 2010, from
http://www.uefa.com/footballeurope/news/Kind=2/newsId=372816.html.
Mennell, S. (1990). "The Globalization of Human Society as a Very Long-term Social
Process: Elias's Theory." Theory Culture Society 7(2): 359-371.
Mensurati, M. (2007). Funzionava cos il sistema Moggi: 107 partite sospette nel 2004-05.
La Repubblica.
Militello, C. (2004). Giulietta 'na zoccola, tempi supplementari : 500 nuovi esilaranti
striscioni. Milano, Kowalski.
Militello, C. (2004). Giulietta 'na Zoccola. Gli striscioni pi esilaranti degli stadi italiani.
Milano, Kowalski.
Militello, C. (2005). SuperGiulietta 2004-2005. Milano, Kowalski.

340

Miller, R. and L. Crolley (2007). Football in the Americas : ftbol, futebol, soccer.
London., Institute for the Study of the Americas.
Miller, T., G. Lawrence, et al. (2001). Globalization and sport : playing the world, SAGE.
Millward, P. (2008). "The rebirth of the football fanzine - Using e-zines as data source."
Journal of Sport & Social Issues 32(3): 299-310.
Minor, H. H. (1999). "Mapping Mussolini: Ritual and Cartography in Public Art during
the Second Roman Empire." Imago Mundi 51: 147-162.
Monti, F. (2005). Arbitri nel caos: Carraro perde la pazienza. Corriere della Sera.
Moore, M. (2007). Fan killed as football violence sweeps Rome. The Telegraph.
Moorhouse, H. F. (1991). "Football Hooligans - Old Bottle, New Whines." Sociological
Review 39(3): 489-502.
Morrow, S. (1999). The new business of football : Accountability and finance in football.
Basingstoke, Macmillan.
Murphy, P., J. Williams, et al. (1990). Football on trial: spectator violence and
development in the football world. London, Routledge.
Nathanson, P. (2007). Rival fans stand together in mourning The Daily Telegraph.
Nederveen Pieterse, J. (2004). Globalization and culture : global mlange, Rowman &
Littlefield.
Noberini, C. (2003). Ve La Do Io Pisorno. Livorno, Belforte.
Nowell-Smith, G. (1979). "Television - Football - The World." Screen 19(4): 45-59.
Nowell-Smith, G. (1990). Italy: Tradition, Backwardness and Modernity. Culture and
conflict in postwar Italy: essays on mass and popular culture. Z. G. Baranski and
R. Lumley. New York, St. Martin Press: p50-63.
Nudi, G. (1980). Livorno: progetto e storia di una citt tra il 1500 e il 1600. Pisa, NistriLischi e Pacini.
O'Henley, A. (2008). Nakamura's magic touch. UEFA Magazine.
O'Malley, P. (1997). "Politics and Postmodernity." Social and Legal Studies, an
International Journal 6(3): 363-81.
Owen, R. (2004). 'Death of football' as Italian fans riot. The Times.
Owen, R. (2009). Patrizia D'Addario: I was threatened and attacked after meeting Silvio
Berlusconi. The Times.
Owen, R. (2009). Silvio Berlusconi is ruining Italy, Massimo Tartaglia felt before attack.
The Times.
Owen, R. (2010). Purple protesters take to the streets against Silvio Berlusconi. The
Times.
Owen, R. (2010). Silvio Berlusconi under fire after choosing ex-dancer Nicole Minetti as
poll candidate. The Times.
Padellaro, A. and G. Tamburrano (1993). Processo a Craxi. Milan, Sperling & Kupfer.
Palmer, C. and K. Thompson (2007). "The Paradoxes of Football Spectatorship: OnField and Online Expressions of Social Capital Among the Grog Squad."
Sociology of Sport Journal 24(2): 187205.
Palmeri, T. (2010). Il blob della settimana. Drogba redento dal figlio. Gazzetta dello
Sport.
Papa, A. and G. Panico (2002). Storia sociale del calcio in Italia. Bologna, Il Mulino.
Paramio, J. L., B. Buraimo, et al. (2008). "From modern to postmodern: the development
of football stadia in Europe." Sport in Society 11(5): 517 - 534.
Parks, T. (2001). An Italian education. London, Vintage.
Parks, T. (2001). Italian neighbours. London, Vintage.
Parks, T. (2003). A season with Verona : travels around Italy in search of illusion,
national character and --goals! London, Vintage.

341

Phillips, J. (2005). Italy's political scars reopened by Di Canio's 'Fascist salute'. The
Independent.
Piore, M. J. and C. F. Sabel (1984). The second industrial divide : possibilities for
prosperity. New York Basic.
Pisa, N. (2009). Silvio Berlusconi faces new demand to explain relationship with teenager
The Telegraph.
Podaliri, C. and C. Balestri (1998). The Ultras, racism and football culture in Italy.
Fanatics! power, identity, and fandom in football. A. Brown, Routledge: xix, 289
p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
Poli, E. (2001). "The Revolution in the Televised Soccer Market." Journal of Modern
Italian Studies 5(3): 371-394.
Popham, P. (2003). 'Kiss of honour' between Andreotti and Mafia head never happened,
say judges. The Independent.
Popham, P. (2003). Odyssey of despair: and not a twitch of conscience by Europe's
leaders. The Independent.
Popham, P. (2007). The Big Question: Will Italian football recover from its hooliganism
crisis? The Independent.
Porro, N. (2008). Sociologia del calcio. Roma, Carocci.
Porro, N. and P. Russo (2000). "Sport and society in Italy today - Berlusconi and other
matters: The era of 'football-politics'." Journal of Modern Italian Studies 5(3):
348-370.
Porro, N. and P. Russo (2004). "Italian Football between Conflict and State Aid." Italian
Politics 19: 219-234.
Portes, A. (1998). "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology."
Annual Review of Sociology 24: 1-24.
Poulton, E. (2004). "Mediated Patriot Games: The Construction and Representation of
National Identities in the British Television Production of Euro '96."
International Review for the Sociology of Sport 39(4): 437-455.
Poulton, E. (2008). "Toward a Cultural Sociology of the Consumption of Fantasy
Football Hooliganism." Sociology of Sport Journal 25(3): 331-349.
Praverman, F. (2007). Violence in Italy hands Euro 2012 to the Eastern bloc. Times
Online.
Prestisimone, P. (2009). Scissione Lega A e Lega B. "E' una giornata storica". La
repubblica.
Putnam, R. D. (1996). "The Strange Disappearance of Civic America." Prospect 7(24):
66-72.
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone : the collapse and revival of American community.
New York, Simon & Schuster.
Putnam, R. D., R. Leonardi, et al. (1993). Making democracy work : civic traditions in
modern Italy. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.
Redhead, S. (1993). The Passion and the fashion : football fandom in the new Europe.
Aldershot, England : Avebury, Brookfield, Vt., USA.
Redhead, S. and E. McLaughlin (1985). "Soccer's Style Wars." New Society(16th August
1985): 225-8.
Reiner, R. (1992). "Policing a postmodern society." Modern Law Review 55(6): 761-81.
Richards, C. (1995). The new Italians. London, Penguin.
Richardson, J. (2006). Juve and Siena: an affair to remember. The Guardian.
Richardson, J. (2006). Oldy Lady angered as interminable saga takes new twist. The
Guardian.
Richardson, J. (2007). The end of the old Ultras violence. The Guardian.

342

Riesman, D. (1961). The lonely crowd; a study of the changing American character. New
Haven, Yale University Press.
Riley, D. (2005). "Civic Associations and Authoritiarian Regimes in Interwar Europe:
Italy and Spain in Comparitive Perspective." American Sociological Review 70:
288-310.
Ritzer, G. (2004). The McDonaldization of society, Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Pine Forge
Press.
Robertson, R. (1992). Globalization : social theory and global culture, Sage.
Robinson, M. J. (1976). "Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise:
The Case of "The Selling of the Pentagon"." The American Political Science
Review 70(2): 409-432.
Robson, G. (2000). No one likes us, we don't care : the myth and reality of Millwall
fandom. Oxford, Berg.
Roche, M. (2000). Mega-events and modernity : Olympics and expos in the growth of
global culture. London, Routledge.
Romania, V. (2005). Identit e performance. Roma, Carocci.
Rossi, L. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility: analysis of supporters trust model and
its applicability into the Italian context.
Roversi, A. (1994). The Birth of the 'Ultras': The Rise of Football Hooliganism in Italy.
Game without frontiers: football, identity and modernity. R. Giulianotti and J.
Williams. London, Arena.
Roversi, A. (2003). La Violenza Negli Stadi. Rapporto sulla criminalit in Italia. M.
Barbagli. Bologna, Il Mulino: 211-34.
Roversi, A. and C. Balestri (2000). "Italian Ultras Today: Change or Decline?" European
Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 8(2): 183-199.
Russo, P. (2005). L'invasione dell'ultracalcio : anatomia di uno sport mutante, Ombre
corte.
Rydgren, J. (2007). "The Power of the Past: A Contribution to a Cognitive Sociology of
Ethnic Conflict." Sociological Theory 25(3): 225-244.
Salvini, A. (2004). Ultr - psicologia del tifoso violento. Milan, Giunti.
Sandvoss, C. (2003). A game of two halves : football, television, and globalisation.
London, New York.
Sanminiatelli, M. (2007). Officials: Only six Italian soccer stadiums meet security
requirements USA Today.
Sapelli, G. (1995). Southern Europe since 1945 : tradition and modernity in Portugal,
Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey. London, New York.
Sarzanini, F. (2006). Pisanu chiam Moggi: aiuta la Torres Corriere della Sera.
Sassen, S. (2001). The global city : New York, London, Tokyo, Princeton University
Press.
Sassen, S. (2005). "The global city: introducing a concept." Brown journal of world
affairs 11(2): 27-43.
Sassoon, D. (1986). Contemporary Italy : politics, economy, and society since 1945.
London, New York : Longman.
Scalfari , E. and G. Turani (1974). Razza padrona : storia della borghesia di Stato. Milan,
Feltrinelli.
Scalia, V. (2009). "Just a Few Rogues?: Football Ultras, Clubs and Politics in
Contemporary Italy." International Review for the Sociology of Sport 44(1): 4153.
Schimmel, K. S. (2001). Sport Matters. Sport in the City. C. Gratton and I. P. Henry.
London, Routledge.

343

Schimmel, K. S. (2006). Deep play : sports mega-events and urban social conditions in
the USA. Sports mega-events : social scientific analyses of a global phenomenon.
J. Horne and W. Manzenreiter. Oxford, Blackwell Pub./Sociological Review.
Schlesinger, P. (1990). The Berlusconi Phenomenon. Culture and conflict in postwar
Italy : essays on mass and popular culture. Z. Baranski and R. G. Lumley. New
York, St. Martin Press: xiii, 346 p., [4] p. of plates.
Sennett, R. (1976). The Fall of Public Man. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Sennett, R. (1998). The corrosion of character : the personal consequences of work in the
new capitalism. New York, Norton.
Sennett, R. (2006). The culture of the new capitalism, Yale University Press.
Sinnott, J. (2007). "Calcio Crisis." from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/europe/6340341.stm.
Skidmore, P., K. Bound, et al. (2006). Community Participation: Who Benefits? York,
JRF.
Smith, A. D. (1987). The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford, UK, New York, NY, USA.
Smith, A. D. (1998). Nationalism and Modernism. London and New York, Routledge.
Smorto, G. (2001). Procuratori, esplode il caos. "Scandalosi i figli di pap". La
Repubblica.
Sorrentino, A. (2009). Insulti, razzismo, cori di morte Balotelli negli stadi dell' odio. La
Repubblica.
Spaaij, R. F. J. (2006). Understanding football hooliganism : a comparison of six Western
European football clubs. [Amsterdam], Vossiuspers UvA - Amsterdam
University Press.
Sparkes, A. (1992). The paradigms debate: an extended review and a celebration of
difference Research in physical education and sport : exploring alternative
visions. A. Sparkes. London, Washington, D.C.: vi, 303 p.
Sparkes, A. (2002). Telling tales in sport and physical activity : a qualitative journey.
Champaign, IL, Human Kinetics.
Spradley, J. P. (1980). Participant observation. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Squinzani, L. (2009). Lo Stadio di tutti... e i barbari in galera. Torino, Bradipolibri.
Stefanini, M. (2009). Ultras : identit, politica e violenza nel tifo sportivo da Pompei a
Raciti a Sandri. Milano, Boroli.
Stille, A. (1999). Emperor of the Air. The Nation.
Stott, C. and O. Adang (2003). Policing Football Matches with an International
Dimension in the European Union: understanding and managing risk, Liverpool
University.
Stott, C. and S. Reicher (1998). "How Conflict Escalates: The Inter-Group Dynamics of
Collective Football Crowd `Violence'." Sociology 32(2): 353-377.
Stott, C. J. T. and G. Pearson (2007). Football 'hooliganism' : policing and the war on the
'English disease'. London, Pennant Books.
Sugden, J. and A. Tomlinson (1997). "Global power struggles in world football: FIFA
and UEFA, 1954-74, and their legacy." International Journal of the History of
Sport 14(2): 1 - 25.
Sugden, J. P. (1996). Boxing and society : an international analysis, New York.
Sugden, J. P. (2002). Network Football. Power games : a critical sociology of sport. J. P.
Sugden and A. Tomlinson. New York.
Sugden, J. P. and A. Tomlinson (1998). FIFA and the contest for world football : who
rules the people's game? Cambridge, UK : Polity Press, Malden, MA.
Tavares, C. and G. Thomas (2008). Eurostat: Crime and Criminal Justice.
Taylor, I. R. (1971). Soccer Consciousness and Soccer Hooliganism. Cohen, S (ed.)
Images of Deviance. London, Penguin: 134-164.

344

Taylor, R. H. L. J. (1989). The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster.

Taylor, T. (1968). Football mad: a speculative sociology of football hooliganism. In
Dunning, E., Sport: readings from a sociological perspective, Toronto, University
of Toronto Press, 1972, p. 352-377.
Testa, A. (2009). "The UltraS: An Emerging Social Movement?" Review of European
Studies 1(2).
Testa, A. (2010). "Contested Meanings: the Italian Media and the UltraS." Review of
European Studies 2(1): 15-24.
Testa, A. and G. Armstrong (2008). "Italian Ultras and Neo-Fascism." Social Identities
14(4): 473-490.
Testa, A. and G. Armstrong (2010). Football, Fascism and Fandom: The UltraS of Italian
Football A & C Black Publishers Ltd.
The Guardian (2009). Silvio Berlusconi: I have never paid a woman for sex. The Guardian.
The Guardian (2010). France win race to host Euro 2016. The Guardian.
The Guardian (2010). Revealed: Barcelona made 64m losses last season. The Guardian.
The Independent (2005). Di Canio in trouble again for fascist salute. The Independent.
The Independent (2006). The agony and the ecstasy: Two faces of Italian football. The
Independent.
The Independent (2009). Balotelli again abused by Juventus fans. The Independent.
The Observer (2004). Numbers game. The Observer
The Times (1984). Obituary: Enrico Berlinguer. The Times.
Tomasi di Lampedusa, G. (1991). The Leopard. New York, Pantheon Books.
Tomlinson, A. and G. Whannel (1984). Five-ring circus : money, power, and politics at
the Olympic Games. London, Pluto Press.
Tomlinson, J. (1999). Globalization and culture, University of Chicago Press.
Tonkin, E. (1992). Narrating our pasts : the social construction of oral history, New
York.
Tnnies, F. H. J. (2001). Community and civil society / Uniform Title: Gemeinschaft
und Gesellschaft. English, Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press.
Touraine, A. (1981). The voice and the eye : an analysis of social movements / Uniform
Title: Voix et le regard. English. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire], New York.
Trigilia, C. (2002). Economic sociology : state, market, and society in modern capitalism
/ Uniform Title: Sociologia economica. English. Oxford, Malden, Mass.
Tsoukala, A. (2009). Football hooliganism in Europe : security and civil liberties in the
balance, New York.
Urry, J. (1990). The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies.
London, Newbury Park.
Urry, J. (2002). Consuming places, London ; New York : Routledge.
Vaccari, O., L. Frattarelli Fischer, et al. (2006). Breve Storia di Livorno. Pisa, Pacini
Editore.
Valdiserri, L. (2008). Calcio totale. Corriere della Sera.
Van Deth, J. W. (2008). Political Involvement and Social Capital. Social Capital in
Europe: Similarity of Countries and Diversity of People?: Multi-level analyses of
the European Social Survey 2002. H. Meulemann, Brill.
Verdelli, C. (2009). Campianato Anno Zero. La Gazzetta dello Sport.
Vialli, G. M. G. (2007). The Italian job: a journey to the heart of two great footballing
cultures. London, Bantam.
Vidal, J. (2001). The city burns, a young man lies dead... The Guardian.
Vivoli, G. (2001). Guida di Livorno antico e moderno. Livorno, Editrice l'Informazione.
Von Beyme, K. (1996). "Party Leadership and Change in Party Systems: Towards a
Postmodern Party State?" Government and Opposition 31: 135159.

345

Wacquant, L. J. D. (2009). Punishing the poor : the neoliberal government of social

insecurity / Uniform Title: Punir les pauvres. English. Durham [NC], Duke
University Press.
Waddington, I., D. Malcolm, et al. (1998). "The Social Composition of Football Crowds
in Western Europe: A Comparative Study." International Review for the
Sociology of Sport 33(2): 155-169.
Wagstaff, C. (2001). The Media. The Cambridge companion to modern Italian culture. Z.
G. W. Baranski, Rebecca J., Cambridge University Press: xix, 363 p. : ill., maps ;
24 cm.
Warde, A., G. Tampubolon, et al. (2003). "Trends in Social Capital: Membership of
Associations in Great Britain, 1991-98." British Journal of Political Science 33(3):
515-525.
Weber, M. (1948). The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism. From Max Weber:
Essays in Sociology. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Weber, M. (1968). Economy and Society. New York, Bedminster Press.
Whannel, G. (1999). Media sport stars: masculinities and moralities, Routledge.
Whannel, G. (1999). "Sport stars, narrativization and masculinities." Leisure Studies
18(3): 249-265.
Williams, J. (2006). ""Protect Me From What I Want": Football Fandom, Celebrity
Cultures and "New" Football in England." Soccer & Society 7(1): 96-114.
Williams, R. (2007). The loophole that allowed Milan to take Athens road. The Guardian.
Williams, R. (2007). Tragedy must bring change to Italian football. The Guardian.
Wilson, P. (2009). Doing the right thing is German football's forte. The Observer.
Wilson, S. (2009). David Beckham chews the fat in the Milan Lab. The Telegraph.
Winch, P. (1964). "Understanding a Primitive Society." American Philosophical Quarterly
1(4): 307-324.
Wood, S. and J. Farrell (2001). Other voices: contesting the status quo The Cambridge
companion to modern Italian culture. Z. G. W. Baranski, Rebecca J., Cambridge
University Press: xix, 363 p. : ill., maps ; 24 cm.
Zerubavel, E. (1996). "Social memories: Steps to a sociology of the past." 19: 283-299.

346