Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U.S.

233, February 10, 1936

I. THE FACTS
The case of Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U.S. 233, February 10,
1936, involved a Louisiana law that imposed on publishing companies a license tax of 2% of
the gross receipts for the privilege of engaging in advertising in newspapers, magazines or
periodicals if their circulation is more than 20,000 copies per week. Nine Louisiana-based
publishers of newspapers, with circulations of more than 20,000 copies per week each, filed a
suit to enjoin the enforcement against them of the said provision. They assailed the validity of
the act on the ground, inter alia, that it abridges the freedom of the press in contravention of
the due process clause contained in the FourteenthAmendment of the U.S. Constitution.
II. THE ISSUE
Did the assailed Louisiana law abridge the freedom of the press in contravention of the due
process clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment?
III. THE RULING
[The Court voted unanimously to AFFIRM the decree of the District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana permanently enjoining the enforcement of the Louisiana state tax on
newspapers.]
A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court held that the act imposing the tax in question is
unconstitutional under the due process of law clause because it abridges the freedom of the
press, thus:
The tax imposed is designated a license tax for the privilege of engaging in such business -that is to say, the business of selling, or making any charge for, advertising. As applied to
appellees, it is a tax of two percent on the gross receipts derived from advertisements carried
in their newspapers when, and only when, the newspapers of each enjoy a circulation of more
than 20,000 copies per week. It thus operates as a restraint in a double sense. First, its effect
is to curtail the amount of revenue realized from advertising, and, second, its direct tendency
is to restrict circulation. This is plain enough when we consider that, if it were increased to a
high degree, as it could be if valid, it well might result in destroying both advertising and
circulation. (Citation omitted.)
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx. The tax here involved is bad not because it takes money from the pockets of the
appellees. If that were all, a wholly different question would be presented. It is bad because, in
the light of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated
device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled
in virtue of the constitutional guaranties. A free press stands as one of the great interpreters
between the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.
New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, June 30, 1971
I. THE FACTS
In New York Times vs. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, June 30, 1971, the federal government of the
U.S. sought to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Postfrom publishing the

contents of a classified Pentagon study entitled History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on

Viet Nam Policy.
II. THE ISSUE
Is freedom of the press, guaranteed by the First Amendment of the federal Constitution,
subordinate to a claimed need of the executive branch of government to maintain the secrecy
of classified information?
III. THE RULING
[The Court AFFIRMED the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (in the
Washington Post case). It also REVERSED the order of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit (in the New York Times case) and REMANDED the case with directions to enter a
judgment affirming the judgment of the District Court for the Southern District of New York in
favor of the New York Times. The stays (preliminary injunction) entered June 25, 1971 by the
Court were vacated.]
Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to [the] Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity. The Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing
justification for the imposition of such a restraint. The Court agreed with the District Court for
the Southern District of New York (in the New York Times case) and the District Court for the
D.C. and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (in the Washington Post case) that in this
particular case the Government had not met that burden.
Thus, the Court vacated the stay (preliminary injunction) it preliminarily issued previously
against the two newspapers.
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996
I. THE FACTS
Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo of the religious group
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated X i.e., not for public viewing by the respondent Board of
Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly
offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by
law because of petitioner INCs controversial biblical interpretations and its attacks against
contrary religious beliefs.
Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered
the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on
appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the
respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo, and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied
permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo on the ground that
the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV
series indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs. Dissatisfied with the CA
decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioners TV program?
(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it
prohibited the airing of petitioners religious program?
III. THE RULING
[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the CA sustained the action of the
respondent Boards X-rating petitioners TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also
voted 10-4 to AFFIRM the CA insofar as the CA it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent
MTRCB to review petitioners TV program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.]
1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioners TV program.
Petitioner contends that the term television program [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the
respondent Board has the power to review and classify] should not include religious programs
like its program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene
section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that no law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed.
[The Court however] reject petitioners postulate. Petitioners public broadcast on TV of its
religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that
reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule thatthe exercise of
religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present
danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious
detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare.
A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history
counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area
of concern in our country today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue to subject any act pinching the
space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its
rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise
destroys, the State should not stand still.
2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of
petitioners religious program.
[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be
greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this
presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It
failed in the case at bar.
The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for attacking
either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence . . . will show
that the so-called attacks are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets
of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not
presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent,
contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section

3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes
with its right to free exercise of religion. xxx.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that
gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it
against an attack by another religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech
of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion
happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be
no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy
against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of
thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When the
luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more
speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the
embers of truth.
In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and
present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: The
constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be
justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. In Victoriano
vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that . . . it is only where it is unavoidably
necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest
extent necessary to avoid the danger.
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent
appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the
subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no
showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and
imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech,
cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and
imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
Primicias v Fugoso 80 PHIL 71 (1948)
Facts:
An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to
them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government.
The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that
passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that
similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people
in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of
the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police
power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927prohibiting as an

offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place,
meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other
persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation
engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.
Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.
Held:
Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two
constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant
or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or
procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the
Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places
to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the
streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize
the risk of disorder. The courtfavored the second construction. First construction tantamount to
authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of
government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government,
except perhaps in cases of national emergency.
The Mayors first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression
of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of
irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear
that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to result in
some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must
be the probability of serious injury to the state.
ADIONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to
its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646
and 7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted
only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any
place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common
posted areas and/or billboards
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the
COMELECs Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile

places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of
Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on
mobile places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized
posting areas that it fixes.
HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No.
2347 of the COMELEC providing that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof is DECLARED NULL
and VOID. The COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places
whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is
null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizens
fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly,
the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the
candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to
express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the
resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should
be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property, which in this
case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded
that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of ones living room or
bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the
Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. (The right to property may
be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a liberty interest,
the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and
irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal
opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II,
Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is
not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be
reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and
other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of
the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of
the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or
private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship
which cannot be justified by the Constitution.
Mutuc vs. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-32717 Nov. 26, 1970
Facts

The petitioner, Amelito Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention
(1970). His candidacy has been given due course by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) but the commission prohibited the petitioner from using "taped jingles" in his
mobile units for campaign purposes because according to COMELEC, such act is a clear
violation on the provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for
candidates "to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral
propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic
goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether
of domestic or foreign origin." It was COMELEC's argument that the jingle proposed to be
used by the petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore
a tangible propaganda material, under the phrase "and the like". Mutuc protested and invoked
his right to freedom of speech.
Issue
Whether or not the said rule which is "prohibiting the use of taped jingles" denied petitioner of
his freedom of speech.
Decision
Doctrinally, courts always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression. Moreover, any act that
restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows.
COMELEC shall not exercise any authority in conflict with the law. It must also be
remembered that there is no higher law than the Constitution.
Regarding the petitioner's invocation of his right to free speech, the Court has constantly held
that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect. What respondent
Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil aginst which this
constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by the
assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself
or through others, to use his mobile units (loudspeakers). Precisely, the constitutional
guarantee is not to be weakened by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not
perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If courts
were to sustain respondent Commission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from
a previous restraint. That cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the
Constitution in express terms assures.
COMELEC is restrained and prohibited from enforcing such rule.

National Press Club vs COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented
from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who
are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May
1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election

Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by

petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the
constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the
prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles
out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular
content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of
1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to
provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue.
Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates,
and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those
appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and
television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of
information concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the
right of voters to information and opinion.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.
Held:
Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines
freedom of speech, freedom of expression andfreedom of the press has to be taken in
conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable
during a specific limited period i.e., "during the election period." In our own society, equality
of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial
resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic
state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the
egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access toopportunities for
public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The essential
question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of
communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has
gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute
unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech andfreedom of the press. The Court
considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or
regulation of media operations during election periods.
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the
operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in
time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by
newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to
candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover,
Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters
or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their
qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and
beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum,
Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in
responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed

to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.

The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates
themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.
Abrams vs US
Facts of the Case
The defendants were convicted on the basis of two leaflets they printed and threw from
windows of a building. One leaflet signed "revolutionists" denounced the sending of American
troops to Russia. The second leaflet, written in Yiddish, denounced the war and US efforts to
impede the Russian Revolution. The defendants were charged and convicted for inciting
resistance to the war effort and for urging curtailment of production of essential war material.
They were sentenced to 20 years in prison.
Question
Do the amendments to the Espionage Act or the application of those amendments in this case
violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment?
Conclusion
No and no. The act's amendments are constitutional and the defendants' convictions are
affirmed. In Clarke's majority opinion, the leaflets are an appeal to violent revolution, a call for
a general strike, and an attempt to curtail production of munitions. The leaflets had a tendency
to encourage war resistance and to curtail war production. Holmes and Brandeis dissented on
narrow ground: the necessary intent had not been shown. These views were to become a
classic libertarian pronouncement.
Primicias vs Fuguso
Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a
permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the
government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is,
"that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the
fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that
similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people
in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of
the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to thedelegated police
power to local government. Stating as well RevisedOrdinances of 1927 prohibiting as an
offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place,
meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other
persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation
engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.1
Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.
Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides
for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion
to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or
procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the
Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places
to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the
streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize

the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount
to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of
government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government,
except perhaps in casesof national emergency.
The Mayors first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression
of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speechto free men from the bondage of
irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear
that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in
some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must
be the probability of serious injury to the state.
Reyes vs Bagatsing
FACTS: Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the AntiBases Coalition sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US
embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied by then Manila
mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports that
indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued City
Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 feet radius of the US
embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to the US
embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution we adhere to generally accepted
principles of international law.
ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the Constitution. Whether or
not the rallyists should be granted the permit.
HELD:
I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any
lawless element. And indeed the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally
accepted principles of international law. But the same cannot be invoked as defense to the
primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds and guarantees the rights to free speech
and peacable assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor
cannot be invoked if the application thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed
rights.
II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present danger test. The mere
assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice. In

this case, no less than the police chief assured that they have taken all the necessary steps to
ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance cannot be applied yet because there was no
showing that indeed the rallyists are within the 500 feet radius (besides, theres also the

question of whether or not the mayor can prohibit such rally but, as noted by the SC, that
has not been raised an an issue in this case).