ANDRES GARCES vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G.

ESTENZO
G.R. No. L-53487. May 25, 1981.

FACTS:
Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City, a wooden image of
San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by means of solicitations
and cash, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-
religious celebration of the feast day of the saint. As per Resolution No. 6, the image was brought to
the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast day which also designated the hermano mayor as
the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao
Osmeña, refused to return custody of the image to the council on the pretext that it was the property
of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition until after the latter, by resolution,
filed a replevin case against the priest and posted the required bond. Thereafter, the parish priest
and his co-petitioners filed an action for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the subject
image contending that when they were adopted, the barangay council was not duly constituted
because the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was not allowed to participate; and that they
contravened the constitutional provisions on separation of church and state, freedom of religion and
the use of public money to favor any sect or church.

ISSUE:
Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for purchase of saint's image with private funds
in connection with barangay fiesta, constitutional.

HELD:
Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City, "reviving the traditional
socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the
patron saint of Valenzuela", and providing for: (I) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer;
and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects, funds for which would be
obtained through the "selling of tickets and cash donations", does not directly or indirectly establish
any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit of any sect, priest or
clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of the
waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the
celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose
of favoring any religion or interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the
highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed
in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding
a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of
the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As
noted in the resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained
tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the
masses.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent
Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of
the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such
issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose –
for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not
contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event considered of
international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the
Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is
not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’.
Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby
manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of
religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, July 26,
1996

PUNO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the religious group
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by the respondent Board of
Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly “offend[ed]
and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law” because of
petitioner INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and its “attacks” against contrary religious
beliefs.

Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered
the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on
appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent
Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the
respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition
on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an
attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law
and contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the
Supreme Court.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioner’s TV program?

(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it
prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program?

III. THE RULING

[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the CA sustained the action of the
respondent Board’s X-rating petitioner’s TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also voted
10-4 to AFFIRM the CA insofar as the CA it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to
review petitioner’s TV program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.”]

1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioner’s TV program.

Petitioner contends that the term “television program” [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the
respondent Board has the power to review and classify] should not include religious programs like its
program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article
III of the Constitution which guarantees that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.”

[The Court however] reject petitioner’s postulate. Petitioner’s public broadcast on TV of its
religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches
even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule thatthe exercise of religious freedom
can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some
substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more
overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the
exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its
blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country
today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of
religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man.
For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.

2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of
petitioner’s religious program.

[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be
greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption.
If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.

The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for “attacking”
either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence . . . will show that the
so-called “attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other
religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as
evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good
customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling
clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion. xxx.

The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but
that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an
attack by another religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner
Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the
most numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between the
appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better
theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by
encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of
ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the
heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.

In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and
present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: “The constitutional
guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right
to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints
on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent.” In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we
further ruled that “. . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave
danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be
justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.”

The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent
appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video
tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of
the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened
harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears
but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality
already on ground.
American Bible Society v. City of Manila, GR No. L-9637,
April 30, 1957
Facts: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly
registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in
November, 1898. The defendant appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be
exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila.
During the course of its ministry, plaintiff sold bibles and other religious materials at a very minimal
profit.
On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was
conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with
the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended,
and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the
corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th
quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A).
Plaintiff now questions the imposition of such fees.
Issue: Whether or not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free
exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).
Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:
(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights. The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information.
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was
in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that
appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this
reason. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended,
cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its
religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any charge
upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices.

It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, however
inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City
of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax the business
of plaintiff Society.
 Gerona, et. al v SEC. OF EDUCATION

106 Phil 2 Aug. 12, 1959

FACTS:

1. Petitioners belong to the Jehova’s Witness whose children were expelled from their schools when they
refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8
issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The
petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their plight and requested to reinstate their children.
This was denied.

2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary and Director
of Public Schools to restrain them from implementing said DO No. 8.

3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional

DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a religious
group, whether or not a certain practice is one.

1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an
emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and
the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our
system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag
consequently does not involve any religious ceremony.

After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with
the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect;
otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations
and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or
followers.

2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption
form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations
promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was
absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the
flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat
of penal sacntion. If they chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of
public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a
popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations
about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.

3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic
of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute
is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the
fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was
duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of
observance of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate
the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the
non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including observance of
the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to
participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public
school they were attending.