INTRODUCTION

A barrister (also known

as barrister-at-law or Bar-atlaw) is a member of one of the
two classes of lawyer found in
many common
law jurisdictions with split legal
professions. Barristers specialize
in courtroom advocacy, drafting
legalpleadings, and giving expert
legal opinions. They can be
contrasted withsolicitorsthe
other class of lawyer in split
professionswho have more
direct access to clients, and may
do transactional-type legal work.
Barristers are rarely hired by
clients directly but instead are
retained (or instructed) by
solicitors to act on behalf of
clients. In some legal systems,
including those
ofScotland, Belgium, South
Africa, India, Pakistan, Scandinavi
an jurisdictions,Israel, Brazil, and
the British Crown dependencies
of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of
Man, a professional with similar
responsibilities is called
anadvocate.
The historical difference between
the two professions and the only
essential difference in England
and Wales today is that
solicitors are attorneys, which
means that they can act in the
place of their client for legal
purposes (as in signing
contracts) and may

conduct litigation on their

behalf by making applications
to the court, writing letters in
litigation to the client's
opponent, and so on.

A barrister is not an attorney

and is usually forbidden,
either by law or professional
rules or both, from
"conducting" litigation. This
means that, while the
barrister speaks on the
client's behalf in court, he or
she can do so only when
instructed by a solicitor or
certain other qualified
professional clients, such as
patent agents.
Many countries with common law
legal systems, including
the United States of America,
have abandoned the separate
systems of legal representation,
and an attorney (United States
terminology) or lawyer can
perform all the functions of each.
Some other jurisdictions have a
"partially fused" profession: for
example, in New Zealand and
some States of Australia, all
solicitors are also qualified to
practise as barristers, but there is
still a separate system of
qualification as barristers only.
A solicitor is a legal
practitioner who traditionally
deals with any legal matter
in court in some jurisdictions.

A person must have legallydefined qualifications, which

vary from one jurisdiction to
another, to be described as a
solicitor and enabled to
practice there as such. For
example, in England and Wales a
solicitor is admitted to practise
under the provisions of
theSolicitors Act 1974. With some
exceptions, practising solicitors
must possess a practising
certificate. There are many more
solicitors than barristers in
England; they undertake the
general aspects of giving legal
advice and conducting legal
proceedings.[1]
In the United Kingdom, a
few Australian states, Hong
Kong, South Africa (where they
are called attorneys) and
the Republic of Ireland, the legal
profession is split between
solicitors
and barristers (called advocates in
some countries), and a lawyer will
usually only hold one of the two
titles. However, in Canada, New
Zealand and most Australian
states, the legal profession is now
for practical purposes "fused",
allowing lawyers to hold the title
of "barrister and solicitor" and
practise as both. The distinction
between barristers and solicitors
is, however, retained. Some legal
graduates will start off as one and
then also qualify as the other

LEGAL PROFESSION
January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE
INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the
Commission on Bar
Integration 1 submitted its Report
dated November 30, 1972, with
the "earnest recommendation"
on the basis of the
said Report and the proceedings
had in Administrative Case No.
526 2 of the Court, and
"consistently with the views and
counsel received from its [the
Commission's] Board of
Consultants, as well as the
overwhelming nationwide
sentiment of the Philippine Bench
and Bar" that "this Honorable
Court ordain the integration of the
Philippine Bar as soon as possible
through the adoption and
promulgation of an appropriate
Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No.
526 formally prays the Court
to order the integration of the
Philippine Bar, after due
hearing, giving recognition as
far as possible and practicable
to existing provincial and

other local Bar associations.

On August 16, 1962, arguments in
favor of as well as in opposition to
the petition were orally
expounded before the Court.
Written oppositions were
admitted, 3 and all parties were
thereafter granted leave to file
written memoranda. 4

the Philippine Bar under such

conditions as it shall see fit in
order to raise the standards
of the legal profession,
improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public
responsibility more
effectively.

Since then, the Court has closely

observed and followed significant
developments relative to the
matter of the integration of the
Bar in this jurisdiction.

SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred

thousand pesos is hereby
appropriated, out of any funds
in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, to carry
out the purposes of this Act.
Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the same purpose
shall be included in the annual
appropriations for the Supreme
Court.

In 1970, convinced from

preliminary surveys that there
had grown a strong nationwide
sentiment in favor of Bar
integration, the Court created the
Commission on Bar Integration for
the purpose of ascertaining the
advisability of unifying the
Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress
passed House Bill No. 3277
entitled "An Act Providing for
the Integration of the
Philippine Bar, and
Appropriating Funds
Therefor." The measure was
signed by President Ferdinand E.
Marcos on September 17, 1971
and took effect on the same day
as Rep. Act 6397. This law
provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from
the approval of this Act, the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect

upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission
abounds with argument on the
constitutionality of Bar integration
and contains all necessary factual
data bearing on the advisability
(practicability and necessity) of
Bar integration. Also embodied
therein are the views, opinions,
sentiments, comments and
observations of the rank and file
of the Philippine lawyer population
relative to Bar integration, as well
as a proposed integration Court
Rule drafted by the Commission
and presented to them by that
body in a national Bar plebiscite.
There is thus sufficient basis as

well as ample material upon

which the Court may decide
whether or not to integrate the
Philippine Bar at this time.

whose names appear in the

Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated
Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must
include all lawyers.

The following are the pertinent

issues:

Complete unification is not

possible unless it is decreed by an
entity with power to do so: the
State. Bar integration, therefore,
signifies the setting up by
Government authority of a
national organization of the legal
profession based on the
recognition of the lawyer as an
officer of the court.

(1) Does the Court have the

power to integrate the
Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of
the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain
the integration of the Bar at
this time?
A resolution of these issues
requires, at the outset, a
statement of the meaning of Bar
integration. It will suffice, for this
purpose, to adopt the concept
given by the Commission on Bar
Integration on pages 3 to 5 of
its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine
Bar means the official
unification of the entire
lawyer population of the
Philippines. This
requires membership and fina
ncial support (in reasonable
amount) of every attorney as
conditions sine qua non to the
practice of law and the
retention of his name in the
Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the
collectivity of all persons

Designed to improve the position

of the Bar as an instrumentality of
justice and the Rule of Law,
integration fosters cohesion
among lawyers, and ensures,
through their own organized
action and participation, the
promotion of the objectives of the
legal profession, pursuant to the
principle of maximum Bar
autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the
Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated
Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of
justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the
part of its members high ideals of
integrity, learning, professional
competence, public service and
conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional
interests of its members;

(4) Cultivate among its members

a spirit of cordiality and
brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the
discussion of law, jurisprudence,
law reform, pleading, practice and
procedure, and the relations of
the Bar to the Bench and to the
public, and publish information
relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal
education;
(7) Promote a continuing program
of legal research in substantive
and adjective law, and make
reports and recommendations
thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among
other things, make it possible for
the legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective
assistance in maintaining the Rule
of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants
against the abuse of tyrannical
judges and prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly,
its responsibility in the disciplining
and/or removal of incompetent
and unworthy judges and
prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which
traditionally cannot defend itself
except within its own forum, from

the assaults that politics and selfinterest may level at it, and assist
it to maintain its integrity,
impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the
selection of judges and
prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized
practice of law, and break up any
monopoly of local practice
maintained through influence or
position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for
families of disabled and deceased
lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services,
and establish legal aid offices and
set up lawyer reference services
throughout the country so that
the poor may not lack competent
legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and
informational materials that are
difficult to obtain in many of our
provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a
program of continuing legal
education for practising attorneys
in order to elevate the standards
of the profession throughout the
country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical
standards, and promulgate
minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and
establish law libraries for legal
research;

(13) Conduct campaigns to

educate the people on their legal
rights and obligations, on the
importance of preventive legal
advice, and on the functions and
duties of the Filipino lawyer; and

the standards of the legal

profession, improve the
administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more
effectively."

(14) Generate and maintain

pervasive and meaningful
country-wide involvement of the
lawyer population in the solution
of the multifarious problems that
afflict the nation.

Resolution of the second issue

whether the unification of the Bar
would be constitutional hinges
on the effects of Bar
integration on the lawyer's
constitutional rights of
freedom of association and
freedom of speech, and on the
nature of the dues exacted
from him.

Anent the first issue, the Court

is of the view that it may
integrate the Philippine Bar in
the exercise of its power,
under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of
the Constitution, "to
promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice
of law."
Indeed, the power to
integrate is an inherent part
of the Court's constitutional
authority over the Bar.
In providing that "the
Supreme Court may adopt
rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine
Bar," Republic Act 6397
neither confers a new power
nor restricts the Court's
inherent power, but is a mere
legislative declaration that
the integration of the Bar will
promote public interest or,
more specifically, will "raise

The Court approvingly quotes the

following pertinent discussion
made by the Commission on Bar
Integration pages 44 to 49 of its
Report:
Constitutionality of Bar
Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of
Bar integration measures has
been put in issue, the Courts have
upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements
support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to
supervise and regulate the
practice of law.
The practice of law is not a
vested right but a privilege; a
privilege, moreover, clothed with
public interest, because a lawyer

owes duties not only to his client,

but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to
the nation; and takes part in one
of the most important functions of
the State, the administration of
justice, as an officer of the court.
Because the practice of law is
privilege clothed with public
interest, it is far and just that the
exercise of that privilege be
regulated to assure compliance
with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
These public responsibilities
can best be discharged through
collective action; but there can be
no collective action without an
organized body; no organized
body can operate effectively
without incurring expenses;
therefore, it is fair and just that all
attorneys be required to
contribute to the support of such
organized body; and, given
existing Bar conditions, the most
efficient means of doing so is by
integrating the Bar through a rule
of court that requires all lawyers
to pay annual dues to the
Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a
member of an integrated Bar
is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to
associate (or the corollary right
not to associate).

Integration does not make a

lawyer a member of any group of
which he is not already a
member. He became a member
of the Bar when he passed the
Bar examinations. All that
integration actually does is to
provide an official national
organization for the welldefined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a
member.
Bar integration does not
compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not attend
the meetings of his Integrated
Bar Chapter or vote or refuse
to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The body compulsion
to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated,
membership in the Unified Bar
imposes only the duty to pay
dues in reasonable amount.
The issue therefore, is a question
of compelled financial support of
group activities, not involuntary
membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar
activities serves the function of
elevating the educational and
ethical standards of the Bar to the
end of improving the quality of
the legal service available to the
people. The Supreme Court, in
order to further the State's

legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of
professional services, may
require that the cost of
improving the profession in
this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program the
lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration
does compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar,
such compulsion is justified as
an exercise of the police
power of the State. The legal
profession has long been regarded
as a proper subject of legislative
regulation and control. Moreover,
the inherent power of the
Supreme Court to regulate the
Bar includes the authority to
integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to
be paid by the members does
not mean that the Court levies
a tax.
A membership fee in the
Integrated Bar is an exaction for
regulation, while the purpose of a
tax is revenue. If the Court has
inherent power to regulate
the Bar, it follows that as an
incident to regulation, it may
impose a membership fee for
that purpose. It would not be
possible to push through an
Integrated Bar program
without means to defray the

concomitant expenses. The

doctrine of implied powers
necessarily includes the power to
impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the
State's power to regulate the Bar
is that the regulation does not
impose an unconstitutional
burden. The public interest
promoted by the integration of
the Bar far outweighs the
inconsequential inconvenience to
a member that might result from
his required payment of annual
dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always
been, to voice his views on any
subject in any manner he wishes,
even though such views be
opposed to positions taken by the
Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a
member's due to promote
measures to which said member
is opposed, would not nullify or
adversely affect his freedom of
speech.
Since a State may constitutionally
condition the right to practice law
upon membership in the
Integrated Bar, it is difficult to
understand why it should become
unconstitutional for the Bar to use
the member's dues to fulfill the
very purposes for which it was
established.

The objection would make every

Governmental exaction the
material of a "free speech" issue.
Even the income tax would be
suspect. The objection would
carry us to lengths that have
never been dreamed of. The
conscientious objector, if his
liberties were to be thus
extended, might refuse to
contribute taxes in furtherance of
war or of any other end
condemned by his conscience as
irreligious or immoral. The right of
private judgment has never yet
been exalted above the powers
and the compulsion of the
agencies of Government.

4. Fair to All Lawyers.

Bar integration is not unfair to
lawyers already practising
because although the requirement
to pay annual dues is a new
regulation, it will give the
members of the Bar a new system
which they hitherto have not had
and through which, by proper
work, they will receive benefits
they have not heretofore
enjoyed, and discharge their
public responsibilities in a
more effective manner than
they have been able to do in
the past. Because the
requirement to pay dues is a
valid exercise of regulatory
power by the Court, because

it will apply equally to all

lawyers, young and old, at the
time Bar integration takes
effect, and because it is a new
regulation in exchange for
new benefits, it is not
retroactive, it is not unequal,
it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final
issue whether the Court
should ordain the integration
of the Bar at this time
requires a careful overview of the
practicability and necessity as
well as the advantages and
disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions,
notably in England, Canada and
the United States, Bar integration
has yielded the following benefits:
(1) improved discipline among the
members of the Bar; (2) greater
influence and ascendancy of the
Bar; (3) better and more
meaningful participation of the
individual lawyer in the activities
of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater
Bar facilities and services; (5)
elimination of unauthorized
practice; (6) avoidance of costly
membership campaigns; (7)
establishment of an official status
for the Bar; (8) more cohesive
profession; and (9) better and
more effective discharge by the
Bar of its obligations and
responsibilities to its members, to
the courts, and to the public. No
less than these salutary
consequences are envisioned and

in fact expected from the

unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been
variously argued that in the event
of integration, Government
authority will dominate the Bar;
local Bar associations will be
weakened; cliquism will be the
inevitable result; effective
lobbying will not be possible; the
Bar will become an impersonal
Bar; and politics will intrude into
its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that
these and other evils prophesied
by opponents of Bar integration
have failed to materialize in over
fifty years of Bar integration
experience in England, Canada
and the United States. In all the
jurisdictions where the
Integrated Bar has been tried,
none of the abuses or evils
feared has arisen; on the other
hand, it has restored public
confidence in the Bar, enlarged
professional consciousness,
energized the Bar's
responsibilities to the public, and
vastly improved the
administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers
themselves regard Bar
integration? The official statistics
compiled by the Commission on
Bar integration show that in
the national poll recently
conducted by the Commission in
the matter of the integration of

the Philippine Bar, of a total of

15,090 lawyers from all over the
archipelago who have turned in
their individual responses, 14,555
(or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor
of Bar integration, while only 378
(or 2.51 per cent) voted against it,
and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are
non-commital. In addition, a total
of eighty (80) local Bar
association and lawyers' groups
all over the Philippines have
submitted resolutions and other
expressions of unqualified
endorsement and/or support for
Bar integration, while not a single
local Bar association or lawyers'
group has expressed opposed
position thereto. Finally, of the
13,802 individual lawyers who
cast their plebiscite ballots on the
proposed integration Court Rule
drafted by the Commission,
12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted
in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per
cent) vote against it, and 285 (or
2.06 per cent) are noncommittal. 5 All these clearly
indicate an overwhelming
nationwide demand for Bar
integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after
a thoroughgoing conscientious
study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526
and the authoritative materials
and the mass of factual data
contained in the
exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration,

that the integration of the

Philippine Bar is "perfectly
constitutional and legally
unobjectionable," within the
context of contemporary
conditions in the Philippines,
has become an imperative
means to raise the standards
of the legal profession,
improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public
responsibility fully and
effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by
virtue of the power vested in
it by Section 13 of Article VIII
of the Constitution, hereby
ordains the integration of the
Bar of the Philippines in
accordance with the attached
COURT RULE, effective on January
16, 1973.
G.R. No. 100113 September 3,
1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON.
JOVITO R. SALONGA,
COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his
capacity as Secretary of
Budget and
Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his
own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene

Garcia-Albano co-counsel for
petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a
controversy of far-reaching
proportions. While ostensibly only
legal issues are involved, the
Court's decision in this case would
indubitably have a profound effect
on the political aspect of our
national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in
Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman
and six Commissioners who shall
be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirtyfive years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any
elective position in the
immediately preceding -elections.
However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten
years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is
patterned after Section l(l), Article
XII-C of the 1973 Constitution
which similarly provides:

There shall be an independent

Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and
eight Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirtyfive years of age and holders of a
college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)
Regrettably, however, there
seems to be no jurisprudence as
to what constitutes practice of law
as a legal qualification to an
appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring
the knowledge and the application
of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of another
with his consent. It is not limited
to appearing in court, or advising
and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and
the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to
clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with
the law. An attorney engages in

the practice of law by maintaining

an office where he is held out to
be-an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney,
counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending
litigation, and fixing and collecting
fees for services rendered by his
associate. (Black's Law Dictionary,
3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases in court.
(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193
N.E. 650) A person is also
considered to be in the practice of
law when he:
... for valuable consideration
engages in the business of
advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to
their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized
to settle controversies and there,
in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending
the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one
who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so

engaged performs any act or acts

either in court or outside of court
for that purpose, is engaged in
the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and
Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo.
852)
This Court in the case
of Philippine Lawyers Association
v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
stated:
The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in
mattersconnected with the
law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal

effect of facts and conditions. (5

Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied)
Practice of law under modem
conditions consists in no small
part of work performed outside of
any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings
in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct
connection with court
proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal
skill, a wide experience with men
and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These
customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far
as concerns the question set forth
in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of
the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part
which involves advice and drafting
of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold

customary functions be performed

by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations
to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953
ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass.],
194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is.
Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144).
(Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines
Law Center in conducting
orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law
in even broader terms as
advocacy, counselling and public
service.
One may be a practicing attorney
in following any line of
employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of
the law and is of a kind usual for
attorneys engaging in the active
practice of their profession, and
he follows some one or more lines
of employment such as this he is
a practicing attorney at law within
the meaning of the statute. (Barr
v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application
of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and

experience. "To engage in the

practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of
the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use
in any degree of legal knowledge
or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission show
that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term
"practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the
session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on
Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir).
The Commissioner will please
proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the
qualifications of the members of
the Commission on Audit. Among
others, the qualifications provided
for by Section I is that "They must
be Members of the Philippine Bar"
I am quoting from the provision
"who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten
years".
To avoid any misunderstanding
which would result in excluding
members of the Bar who are now

employed in the COA or

Commission on Audit, we would
like to make the clarification that
this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar
does not necessarily refer or
involve actual practice of law
outside the COA We have to
interpret this to mean that as long
as the lawyers who are employed
in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then
they are qualified to be
considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even
chairman, of the Commission on
Audit.
This has been discussed by the
Committee on Constitutional
Commissions and Agencies and
we deem it important to take it up
on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made
available whenever this provision
on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar
engaging in the practice of law for
at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz
yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying
that service in the COA by a
lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that
is set forth in the Article on the
Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the

fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it
will involve legal work. And,
therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have
the necessary qualifications in
accordance with the Provision on
qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on
Audit. And, therefore, the answer
is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the
construction given to this is that
this is equivalent to the practice
of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding
Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the
1987 Constitution, provides,
among others, that the Chairman
and two Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit (COA)
should either be certified public
accountants with not less than ten
years of auditing practice, or
members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten
years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term
"private practitioner" and which is
in many ways synonymous with
the word "lawyer." Today,
although many lawyers do not

engage in private practice, it is

still a fact that the majority of
lawyers are private practitioners.
(Gary Munneke, Opportunities in
Law Careers [VGM Career
Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to
define private practice. The term,
as commonly understood, means
"an individual or organization
engaged in the business of
delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are
often called "sole practitioners."
Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a
partnership and members of the
firm are the partners. Some firms
may be organized as professional
corporations and the members
called shareholders. In either
case, the members of the firm are
the experienced attorneys. In
most firms, there are younger or
more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates."
(Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice
by looking to traditional areas of
law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining
the practice of law as that which
lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal
Ethics [West Publishing Co.:
Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The
practice of law is defined as the
performance of any acts . . . in or
out of court, commonly
understood to be the practice of

law. (State Bar Ass'n v.

Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm.
v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d
623, 626 [1941]). Because
lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial
and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too
global to be workable.
(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in
litigation in behalf of a client is at
once the most publicly familiar
role for lawyers as well as an
uncommon role for the average
lawyer. Most lawyers spend little
time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire
practice without litigating a case.
(Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many
lawyers do continue to litigate and
the litigating lawyer's role colors
much of both the public image
and the self perception of the
legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance
of litigation in the public mind
reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late
Alexander SyCip, a corporate
lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a
business counselor in this wise:
"Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose
concept of an attorney is one who
principally tries cases before the
courts. The members of the bench

and bar and the informed laymen

such as businessmen, know that
in most developed societies
today, substantially more legal
work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both
litigation and non-litigation work
also know that in most cases they
find themselves spending more
time doing what [is] loosely
desccribe[d] as business
counseling than in trying cases.
The business lawyer has been
described as the planner, the
diagnostician and the trial lawyer,
the surgeon. I[t] need not [be]
stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be
avoided where internal medicine
can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the
average general practitioner wig
engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different
legal doctrines, legal skills, legal
processes, legal institutions,
clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing
numbers of lawyers in specialized
practice wig usually perform at
least some legal services outside
their specialty. And even within a
narrow specialty such as tax
practice, a lawyer will shift from
one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly
different one such as representing

a client before an administrative

agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this
work involve litigation, unless the
lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types a litigator who specializes
in this work to the exclusion of
much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling, advice-giving,
document drafting, and
negotiation. And increasingly
lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both
effective for many clients and a
source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in nonlitigation legal work or in litigation
work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least
theoretically, so as to remove
from it some of the salient
features of adversarial litigation.
Of these special roles, the most
prominent is that of prosecutor. In
some lawyers' work the
constraints are imposed both by
the nature of the client and by the
way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to
perform that work. The most
common of these roles are those
of corporate practice and
government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business
Star, a business daily, herein
below quoted are emerging trends

in corporate law practice, a

departure from the traditional
concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what
truly may be called a
revolutionary transformation in
corporate law practice. Lawyers
and other professional groups, in
particular those members
participating in various legalpolicy decisional contexts, are
finding that understanding the
major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable
to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major
corporate problems of today
requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by
an accelerating rate of
information accumulation. The
recognition of the need for such
improved corporate legal policy
formulation, particularly "modelmaking" and "contingency
planning," has impressed upon us
the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional
contexts.
In a complex legal problem the
mass of information to be
processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional
factors, the appraisal of major
trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of
given courses of action, and the

need for fast decision and

response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of
sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic
data processing, and electronic
computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress
the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a
"model", of the decisional context
or a segment thereof is developed
to test projected alternative
courses of action in terms of
futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal
profession are regularly engaged
in predicting and projecting the
trends of the law, the subject of
corporate finance law has
received relatively little organized
and formalized attention in the
philosophy of advancing corporate
legal education. Nonetheless, a
cross-disciplinary approach to
legal research has become a vital
necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation
for productive contributions by
those trained primarily in the law
can be improved through an early
introduction to multi-variable
decisional context and the various
approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly
with either a master's or
doctorate degree in business

administration or management,
functioning at the legal policy
level of decision-making now have
some appreciation for the
concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decisionmaking.
Truth to tell, many situations
involving corporate finance
problems would require the
services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each
and every necessary step in
securing and maintaining the
business issue raised. (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a
corporate lawyer is assiduously
referred to as the "abogado de
campanilla." He is the "big-time"
lawyer, earning big money and
with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business
and industry.
Despite the growing number of
corporate lawyers, many people
could not explain what it is that a
corporate lawyer does. For one,
the number of attorneys
employed by a single corporation
will vary with the size and type of
the corporation. Many smaller and
some large corporations farm out
all their legal problems to private
law firms. Many others have in-

house counsel only for certain

matters. Other corporation have a
staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents
and purposes, is a lawyer who
handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern
or jurisdiction may include, inter
alia: corporate legal research, tax
laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board
meetings), appearances in both
courts and other adjudicatory
agencies (including the Securities
and Exchange Commission), and
in other capacities which require
an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer
may assume responsibilities other
than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is
representing. These include such
matters as determining policy and
becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis
supplied.)
In a big company, for example,
one may have a feeling of being
isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one's work
actually fits into the work of the
orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs
to see the results of his work first
hand. In short, a corporate lawyer
is sometimes offered this fortune
to be more closely involved in the
running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's

services may sometimes be
engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large
MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the
international law field. After all,
international law is practiced in a
relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because
working in a foreign country is
perceived by many as glamorous,
tills is an area coveted by
corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to
experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law
libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May
25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable,
i.e., the role of the lawyer in the
realm of finance. To borrow the
lines of Harvard-educated lawyer
Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad
lawyer is one who fails to spot
problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and
the excellent lawyer is one who
surmounts them." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law
practice direly needs a "shot in
the arm," so to speak. No longer
are we talking of the traditional
law teaching method of confining
the subject study to the

Corporation Code and the

Securities Code but an incursion
as well into the intertwining
modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management
issues deal primarily with three
(3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current
advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to
usable disciplinary skins
applicable to a corporate
counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion
to the organization and
management of the legal function
itself.
These three subject areas may be
thought of as intersecting circles,
with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting
managerial jurisprudence," it
forms a unifying theme for the
corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in
behavior and policy sciences
affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer
reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he
provides counsel for are required
to make, and the need to think
about a corporation's; strategy at
multiple levels. The salience of
the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global
multinational entities and

simultaneously with sub-national

governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only
with public entities but with each
other often with those who are
competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's
participation in decision-making
within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modem corporate
lawyer has gained a new role as a
stakeholder in some cases
participating in the organization
and operations of governance
through participation on boards
and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop
alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are
perceived as barriers. These
trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global
operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is
familiar as well with
governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of
technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally
require approaches from industry
that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and
traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies.
And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race a
re examples of collaborative

efforts between governmental and

business Japan's MITI is world
famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary
spanning, the office of the
Corporate Counsel comprises a
distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds
of organizations. Effectiveness of
both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has
been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the groupcontext interaction such as the
groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment
coordinating work with outsiders,
promoting team achievements
within the organization. In
general, such external activities
are better predictors of team
performance than internal group
processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal
managerial capabilities of the
corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations
are challenged. Current research
is seeking ways both to anticipate
effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of
financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis
supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by
the corporate counsel, three
factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field
of systems dynamics has been

found an effective tool for new

managerial thinking regarding
both planning and pressing
immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of
feedback loops, inventory levels,
and rates of flow, enable users to
simulate all sorts of systematic
problems physical, economic,
managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming
techniques now make the system
dynamics principles more
accessible to managers
including corporate counsels.
(Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This
enables users to make better
decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of
a law department, it can be used
to appraise the settlement value
of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost
and risk involved in managing a
portfolio of cases. (Emphasis
supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation
Management. Computer-based
models can be used directly by
parties and mediators in all lands
of negotiations. All integrated set
of such tools provide coherent and
effective negotiation support,
including hands-on on instruction
in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint
venture may be used to illustrate
the point.

[Be this as it may,] the

organization and management of
the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration,
thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by
lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the
general counsel's responsibilities.
They differ from those of remedial
law. Preventive lawyering is
concerned with minimizing the
risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such
legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are
being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is
the framework within which are
undertaken those activities of the
firm to which legal consequences
attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's
evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms
change to stay competitive in a
global, interdependent
environment. The practice and
theory of "law" is not adequate
today to facilitate the
relationships needed in trying to
make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of
the Corporate Counsel's Office.
The general counsel has emerged
in the last decade as one of the
most vibrant subsets of the legal
profession. The corporate counsel
hear responsibility for key aspects

of the firm's strategic issues,

including structuring its global
operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees,
managing expanded liability
exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decisionmakers, coping internally with
more complex make or by
decisions.
This whole exercise drives home
the thesis that knowing corporate
law is not enough to make one a
good general corporate counsel
nor to give him a full sense of how
the legal system shapes corporate
activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the
understand all of the law's effects
on corporate activities, he must,
at the very least, also gain a
working knowledge of the
management issues if only to be
able to grasp not only the basic
legal "constitution' or makeup of
the modem corporation.
"Business Star", "The Corporate
Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of
the bar and the bench) is to have
more than a passing knowledge of
financial law affecting each aspect
of their work. Yet, many would
admit to ignorance of vast tracts
of the financial law territory. What
transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the
lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign

understanding and risk exposure?

(Business Star, "Corporate
Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

.Respondent Christian Monsod

was nominated by President
Corazon C. Aquino to the position
of Chairman of the COMELEC in a
letter received by the Secretariat
of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required
qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission
on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of
office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the
confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen
and taxpayer, filed the instant
petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on
Elections be declared null and
void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a

member of the Philippine Bar,
having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a
grade of 86-55%. He has been a
dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He
has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer
for more than ten years. (p. 124,
Rollo)
After graduating from the College
of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled
the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During
his stint in the World Bank Group
(1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about
two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of
member-countries negotiating
loans and coordinating legal,
economic, and project work of the
Bank.
Upon returning to the Philippines
in 1970, he worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment
bank and subsequently of a
business conglomerate, and since
1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief
executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and
National Chairman (1987) of
NAMFREL. Monsod's work
involved being knowledgeable in

election law. He appeared for

NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In
the field of advocacy, Monsod, in
his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human
Development, has worked with
the under privileged sectors, such
as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for
and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law
and lately the urban land reform
bill. Monsod also made use of his
legal knowledge as a member of
the Davide Commission, a quast
judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as
a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers,
for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission,
Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions
with individual freedoms and
public accountability and the
party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129
Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a
negotiating team of which Atty.
Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance,
a negotiating panel acts as a
team, and which is adequately

constituted to meet the various

contingencies that arise during a
negotiation. Besides top officials
of the Borrower concerned, there
are the legal officer (such as the
legal counsel), the finance
manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo
V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating
Strategies for Developing Country
Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis
supplied)
After a fashion, the loan
agreement is like a country's
Constitution; it lays down the law
as far as the loan transaction is
concerned. Thus, the meat of any
Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5)
events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an
important role in any debt
restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national
development policies as key
factors in maintaining their
countries' sovereignty.
(Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development

Lawyers for Developing Nations,"

submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the
United States Agency for
International Development, during
the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory
Coast, sponsored by the World
Peace Through Law Center on
August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis
supplied)
Loan concessions and
compromises, perhaps even more
so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the
law of contracts, in legislation and
agreement drafting and in
renegotiation. Necessarily, a
sovereign lawyer may work with
an international business
specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan
agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such
a mixture of technical language
that they should be carefully
drafted and signed only with the
advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of
adequate technical support
personnel. (See International Law
Aspects of the Philippine External
Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate
School of Law, 1987, p. 321).
( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt
restructuring/contract
construction is the set of terms

and conditions which determines

the contractual remedies for a
failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good
agreement must not only define
the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the
recourse open to either party
when the other fails to discharge
an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a
devotion to that principle which in
the ultimate analysis issine qua
non for foreign loan agreementsan adherence to the rule of law in
domestic and international affairs
of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
once said: "They carry no
banners, they beat no drums; but
where they are, men learn that
bustle and bush are not the equal
of quiet genius and serene
mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo,
"The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of
the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15,
Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth
Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the
various definitions of the term
Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice,
and taking into consideration the
liberal construction intended by
the framers of the Constitution,
Atty. Monsod's past work
experiences as a lawyereconomist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a

lawyer-negotiator of contracts,
and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor verily more
than satisfy the constitutional
requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case
of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the
Court said:
Appointment is an essentially
discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which
it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being
that the appointee should possess
the qualifications required by law.
If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground
that there are others better
qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations
of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide.
(emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in
the case of (Central Bank v. Civil
Service Commission, 171 SCRA
744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the
appointee is qualified, as in this
case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative
but to attest to the appointment
in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has

no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified
for a particular position. It also
has no authority to direct the
appointment of a substitute of its
choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion
vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is
essentially within the
discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject
to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law.
( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a
regular appointment as in the
case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments; (3) issuance of
a commission (in the Philippines,
upon submission by the
Commission on Appointments of
its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance
e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond,
etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers,
p. 200)
The power of the Commission on
Appointments to give its consent
to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is mandated by Section

1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the

Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the
Commisioners shall be appointed
by the President with the consent
of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of
those first appointed, three
Members shall hold office for
seven years, two Members for five
years, and the last Members for
three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's
separate opinion, suffice it to say
that his definition of the practice
of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished
from the modern concept of the
practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was
intended by the eminent framers
of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice
Padilla's definition would require
generally a habitual law practice,
perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or
twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate

opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz
states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law
practice which really means
nothing because the definition
says that law practice " . . . is
what people ordinarily mean by
the practice of law." True I cited
the definition but only by way of
sarcasm as evident from my
statement that the definition of
law practice by "traditional areas
of law practice is
essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the
phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in
substance that since the law
covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the
law, or in advising others on what
the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense,
perhaps, but we should not lose
sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod
is a lawyer, a member of the
Philippine Bar, who has been
practising law for over ten years.
This is different from the acts of
persons practising law, without
first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the
Supreme Court can even
disqualify an elected President of
the Philippines, say, on the
ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I
greatly doubt. For one thing, how
can an action or petition be

brought against the President?

And even assuming that he is
indeed disqualified, how can the
action be entertained since he is
the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of
evidence submitted doling the
public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the
necessary qualifications as
required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in
the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only
upon a clear showing of a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art.
VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,
only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall
the Court interfere with the
Commission's judgment. In the
instant case, there is no occasion
for the exercise of the Court's
corrective power, since no abuse,
much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and
would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly
shown.
Additionally, consider the
following:
(1) If the Commission on
Appointments rejects a nominee
by the President, may the

Supreme Court reverse the

Commission, and thus in
effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the
Court reject the nominee, whom
the Commission has confirmed?
The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate
(which is the confirming body in
the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirma Presidential nominee,
it would be incredible that the U.S.
Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal
maxim is:
We must interpret not by the
letter that killeth, but by the spirit
that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of
Samson and Delilah. Once, the
procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for
help in capturing Samson. Delilah
agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut
by Delilah) was captured, the
procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three
inches away from in front of
Samson's eyes. This blinded the
man. Upon hearing of what had
happened to her beloved, Delilah

was beside herself with anger,

and fuming with righteous fury,
accused the procurator of
reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did
any blade touch his skin? Did any
blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on
the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this
petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17,
1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC,
INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to
order the respondent to cease and
desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the
same tenor as that of annexes "A"
and "B" (of said petition) and to
perpetually prohibit persons or
entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the
exercise of the law profession
other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained
of by herein petitioner are as
follows:

Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL
5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC.
8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria
Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving
FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce
through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday
during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of
Marriage. Immigration Problems,
Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &
Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration
of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in
the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for
Filipina Spouse/Children. Call
Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,
LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US
Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 5217232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 5210767
It is the submission of petitioner
that the advertisements above
reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the

confidence of the community in

the integrity of the members of
the bar and that, as a member of
the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the
said advertisements, hence the
reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition,
respondent admits the fact of
publication of said advertisement
at its instance, but claims that it is
not engaged in the practice of law
but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further
argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising
these services should be allowed
supposedly
in the light of the case of John R.
Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly
decided by the United States
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical
implications on the legal
profession of the issues raised
herein, we required the (1)
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), (2) Philippine Bar
Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4)
U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines
(WLAP), and (6) Federacion

International de Abogadas (FIDA)

to submit their respective position
papers on the controversy and,
thereafter, their
memoranda. 3 The said bar
associations readily responded
and extended their valuable
services and cooperation of which
this Court takes note with
appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for
resolution before the Court are
whether or not the services
offered by respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in
either case, whether the same
can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein
complained of.
Before proceeding with an indepth analysis of the merits of
this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder
excerpts from the respective
position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations
and the memoranda submitted by
them on the issues involved in
this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the
Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle
manner by which respondent
endeavored to distinguish the two
terms,i.e., "legal support
services" vis-a-vis "legal services",

common sense would readily

dictate that the same are
essentially without substantial
distinction. For who could deny
that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in
need of basic institutional services
from government or nongovernment agencies like birth,
marriage, property, or business
registration, obtaining documents
like clearance, passports, local or
foreign visas, constitutes practice
of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) does not wish to
make issue with respondent's
foreign citations. Suffice it to state
that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly
opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that
today it is alright to advertise
one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no
uncertain terms its opposition to
respondent's act of establishing a
"legal clinic" and of concomitantly
advertising the same through
newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke
the administrative supervision of
this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent
from undertaking highly unethical
activities in the field of law
practice as aforedescribed. 4

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." gives the impression
that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and
that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly
denies that it offers legal services
to the public, the advertisements
in question give the impression
that respondent is offering legal
services. The Petition in fact
simply assumes this to be so, as
earlier mentioned, apparently
because this (is) the effect that
the advertisements have on the
reading public.
The impression created by the
advertisements in question can be
traced, first of all, to the very
name being used by respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a
name, it is respectfully submitted
connotes the rendering of legal
services for legal problems, just
like a medical clinic connotes
medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the
term "Legal Clinic" connotes
lawyers, as the term medical
clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's
name, as published in the
advertisements subject of the
present case, appears with (the)
scale(s) of justice, which all the
more reinforces the impression
that it is being operated by
members of the bar and that it

offers legal services. In addition,

the advertisements in question
appear with a picture and name of
a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this
practically removes whatever
doubt may still remain as to the
nature of the service or services
being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant
whether respondent is merely
offering "legal support services"
as claimed by it, or whether it
offers legal services as any lawyer
actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction
between "legal services" and
"legal support services," as the
respondent would have it. The
advertisements in question leave
no room for doubt in the minds of
the reading public that legal
services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question
are meant to induce the
performance of acts contrary to
law, morals, public order and
public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the
respondent claims, the
advertisements in question are
only meant to inform the general
public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize to Guam
divorce, and any law student
ought to know that under the

Family Code, there is only one

instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that
the Family Code (defines) a
marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special
contract of permanent
union between a man and woman
entered into accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation
of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the
property relation during the
marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned
advertisements, it is obvious that
the message being conveyed is
that Filipinos can avoid the legal
consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our
law, by simply going to Guam for
a divorce. This is not only

misleading, but encourages, or

serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least,
this can be considered "the dark
side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws
are exploited for the sake of
profit. At worst, this is outright
malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be
relevant to point out that
advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the
Petition, which contains a cartoon
of a motor vehicle with the words
"Just Married" on its bumper and
seems to address those planning
a "secret marriage," if not
suggesting a "secret marriage,"
makes light of the "special
contract of permanent union," the
inviolable social institution," which
is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize
its sanctity and inviolability.
Worse, this particular
advertisement appears to
encourage marriages celebrated
in secrecy, which is suggestive of
immoral publication of
applications for a marriage
license.
If the article "Rx for Legal
Problems" is to be reviewed, it can
readily be concluded that the

above impressions one may

gather from the advertisements in
question are accurate. The Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it
can be seen that criminal acts are
being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong
Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity
simply because the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts does not extend
to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo,
(that) the "legal support services"
respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as
commonly understood, the
advertisements in question give
the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal
services, as earlier discussed.
Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes
of an ordinary newspaper reader,
members of the bar themselves
are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good
customs and the public good,
thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the
Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that
respondent should be enjoined
from causing the publication of

the advertisements in question, or

any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited
from further performing or
offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services
to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that
providing computerized legal
research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will
greatly benefit the legal
profession and should not be
stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of
such business by non-members of
the Bar encroaches upon the
practice of law, there can be no
choice but to prohibit such
business.
Admittedly, many of the services
involved in the case at bar can be
better performed by specialists in
other fields, such as computer
experts, who by reason of their
having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot
fulfill the exacting requirements
for admission to the Bar. To
prohibit them from "encroaching"
upon the legal profession will
deny the profession of the great
benefits and advantages of
modern technology. Indeed, a
lawyer using a computer will be

doing better than a lawyer using a

typewriter, even if both are
(equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar,
however, should be careful not to
allow or tolerate the illegal
practice of law in any form, not
only for the protection of
members of the Bar but also, and
more importantly, for the
protection of the public.
Technological development in the
profession may be encouraged
without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal
practice.
There might be nothing
objectionable if respondent is
allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services
are made available exclusively to
members of the Bench and Bar.
Respondent would then be
offering technical assistance, not
legal services. Alternatively, the
more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which
service may be offered to the
public in general and which
should be made available
exclusively to members of the Bar
may be undertaken. This,
however, may require further
proceedings because of the
factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however,
that some of respondent's
services ought to be prohibited
outright, such as acts which tend

to suggest or induce celebration

abroad of marriages which are
bigamous or otherwise illegal and
void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited
from simply disseminating
information regarding such
matters, it must be required to
include, in the information given,
a disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be
illegal under Philippine law, that it
is not authorized or capable of
rendering a legal opinion, that a
lawyer should be consulted before
deciding on which course of action
to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer
without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal
practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to
advertise, advertising should be
directed exclusively at members
of the Bar, with a clear and
unmistakable disclaimer that it is
not authorized to practice law or
perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by
paralegals cannot be ignored. But
nobody should be allowed to
represent himself as a "paralegal"
for profit, without such term being
clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any
adequate and effective means of
regulating his activities. Also, law
practice in a corporate form may
prove to be advantageous to the

legal profession, but before

allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's
Article of Incorporation and Bylaws must conform to each and
every provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and
the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not
engaged in the practice of law but
engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen,
through experienced paralegals,
with the use of modern computers
and electronic machines" (pars. 2
and 3, Comment). This is absurd.
Unquestionably, respondent's acts
of holding out itself to the public
under the trade name "The Legal
Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting
employment for its enumerated
services fall within the realm of a
practice which thus yields itself to
the regulatory powers of the
Supreme Court. For respondent to
say that it is merely engaged in
paralegal work is to stretch
credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which
announces a certain Atty. Don
Parkinson to be handling the fields
of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." is offering and
rendering legal services through
its reserve of lawyers. It has been
held that the practice of law is not

limited to the conduct of cases in

court, but includes drawing of
deeds, incorporation, rendering
opinions, and advising clients as
to their legal right and then take
them to an attorney and ask the
latter to look after their case in
court See Martin, Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural
persons can engage in the
practice of law, and such
limitation cannot be evaded by
a corporation employing
competent lawyers to practice for
it. Obviously, this is the scheme or
device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself
to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services.
It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the
public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against
the business conduit. Precisely,
the limitation of practice of law to
persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar
(Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of
Court) is to subject the members
to the discipline of the Supreme
Court. Although respondent uses
its business name, the persons
and the lawyers who act for it are
subject to court discipline. The
practice of law is not a profession
open to all who wish to engage in
it nor can it be assigned to
another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is
a personal right limited to persons

who have qualified themselves

under the law. It follows that not
only respondent but also all the
persons who are acting for
respondent are the persons
engaged in unethical law
practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers'
Association's position, in answer
to the issues stated herein, are
wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in
the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained
of are not only unethical, but also
misleading and patently immoral;
and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court
has the power to supress and
punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its
unauthorized practice of law and
for its unethical, misleading and
immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not
engaged in the practice of law. It
claims that it merely renders
"legal support services" to
answers, litigants and the general
public as enunciated in the
Primary Purpose Clause of its
Article(s) of Incorporation. (See
pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's
Comment). But its advertised

services, as enumerated above,

clearly and convincingly show that
it is indeed engaged in law
practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general
public its advisory services on
Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign
divorces, annulment of marriages,
secret marriages, absence and
adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related
problems, immigration problems;
the Investments Law of the
Philippines and such other related
laws.
Its advertised services
unmistakably require the
application of the aforesaid law,
the legal principles and
procedures related thereto, the
legal advices based thereon and
which activities call for legal
training, knowledge and
experience.
Applying the test laid down by the
Court in the aforecited Agrava
Case, the activities of respondent
fall squarely and are embraced in
what lawyers and laymen equally
term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this
Honorable Court, paramount
consideration should be given to
the protection of the general
public from the danger of being
exploited by unqualified persons

or entities who may be engaged

in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer
requires one to take a rigorous
four-year course of study on top of
a four-year bachelor of arts or
sciences course and then to take
and pass the bar examinations.
Only then, is a lawyer qualified to
practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is
sanctioned in many jurisdiction as
an aid to the administration of
justice, there are in those
jurisdictions, courses of study
and/or standards which would
qualify these paralegals to deal
with the general public as such.
While it may now be the
opportune time to establish these
courses of study and/or standards,
the fact remains that at present,
these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this
Honorable Court may decide to
make measures to protect the
general public from being
exploited by those who may be
dealing with the general public in
the guise of being "paralegals"
without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general
public should also be protected
from the dangers which may be
brought about by advertising of
legal services. While it appears
that lawyers are prohibited under
the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it

appears in the instant case that

legal services are being
advertised not by lawyers but by
an entity staffed by "paralegals."
Clearly, measures should be taken
to protect the general public from
falling prey to those who advertise
legal services without being
qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned
advertisements of Respondent,
however, seems to give the
impression that information
regarding validity of marriages,
divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption
and foreign investment, which are
in essence, legal matters , will be
given to them if they avail of its
services. The Respondent's name
The Legal Clinic, Inc. does
not help matters. It gives the
impression again that Respondent
will or can cure the legal problems
brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed
purely by paralegals, it also gives
the misleading impression that
there are lawyers involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are
doctors in any medical clinic,
when only "paralegals" are
involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are
further belied by the very
admissions of its President and
majority stockholder, Atty.
Nogales, who gave an insight on
the structure and main purpose of

Respondent corporation in the

aforementioned "Starweek"
article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of
the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the
petition are clearly
advertisements to solicit cases for
the purpose of gain which, as
provided for under the above
cited law, (are) illegal and against
the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this
country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not
only illegal in that it is an
advertisement to solicit cases, but
it is illegal in that in bold letters it
announces that the Legal Clinic,
Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage
which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to
said agency and pay P560 for a
valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid
marriages in the Philippines are
solemnized only by officers
authorized to do so under the law.
And to employ an agency for said
purpose of contracting marriage is
not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in
the USA, Canada and other
countries the trend is towards
allowing lawyers to advertise their
special skills to enable people to
obtain from qualified practitioners

legal services for their particular

needs can justify the use of
advertisements such as are the
subject matter of the petition, for
one (cannot) justify an illegal act
even by whatever merit the illegal
act may serve. The law has yet to
be amended so that such act
could become justifiable.
We submit further that these
advertisements that seem to
project that secret marriages and
divorce are possible in this
country for a fee, when in fact it is
not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to
consult this clinic about how they
could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor
should ever be attempted, and
seek advice on divorce, where in
this country there is none, except
under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws in the Philippines. It
is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely
represents to the public to be able
to do that which by our laws
cannot be done (and) by our Code
of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53
Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held
that solicitation for clients by an
attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional,
and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from
the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de
Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not
engaged in the practice of law,
such as management consultancy
firms or travel agencies, whether
run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent
does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that Respondent is not
unlawfully practicing law. In the
same vein, however, the fact that
the business of respondent
(assuming it can be engaged in
independently of the practice of
law) involves knowledge of the
law does not necessarily make
respondent guilty of unlawful
practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . .
acting as a consultant can render
effective service unless he is
familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful
not to suggest a course of
conduct which the law forbids. It
seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the
law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he
shall recommend, do not
constitute the practice of law . . . .
It is not only presumed that all
men know the law, but it is a fact
that most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features
of the law . . . . Our knowledge of

the law accurate or inaccurate

moulds our conduct not only
when we are acting for ourselves,
but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and
laymen generally possess rather
precise knowledge of the laws
touching their particular business
or profession. A good example is
the architect, who must be
familiar with zoning, building and
fire prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and
who draws plans and specification
in harmony with the law. This is
not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked
by his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the
statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor
Relations Board. Are they
practicing law? In my opinion,
they are not, provided no
separate fee is charged for the
legal advice or information, and
the legal question is subordinate
and incidental to a major nonlegal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree
and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending
to erect a building on his land to
engage a lawyer to advise him
and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an
architect who performed this

function would probably be

considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed
attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field had been
pre-empted by lawyers, or custom
placed a lawyer always at the
elbow of the lay personnel man.
But this is not the case. The most
important body of the industrial
relations experts are the officers
and business agents of the labor
unions and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger
corporate employers, it has been
the practice for some years to
delegate special responsibility in
employee matters to a
management group chosen for
their practical knowledge and skill
in such matter, and without
regard to legal thinking or lack of
it. More recently, consultants like
the defendants have the same
service that the larger employers
get from their own specialized
staff.
The handling of industrial
relations is growing into a
recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered by
our leading universities. The court
should be very cautious about
declaring [that] a widespread,
well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful,
or that the considerable class of
men who customarily perform a
certain function have no right to
do so, or that the technical

education given by our schools

cannot be used by the graduates
in their business.
In determining whether a man is
practicing law, we should consider
his work for any particular client
or customer, as a whole. I can
imagine defendant being engaged
primarily to advise as to the law
defining his client's obligations to
his employees, to guide his
client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client
along the path charted by law.
This, of course, would be the
practice of the law. But such is not
the fact in the case before me.
Defendant's primarily efforts are
along economic and psychological
lines. The law only provides the
frame within which he must work,
just as the zoning code limits the
kind of building the limits the kind
of building the architect may
plan. The incidental legal advice
or information defendant may
give, does not transform his
activities into the practice of law.
Let me add that if, even as a
minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are
customarily reserved to members
of the bar, he would be practicing
law. For instance, if as part of a
welfare program, he drew
employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's
work is the representations of the
employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective

bargaining, with or without a

mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use
an agent for negotiations and may
select an agent particularly skilled
in the subject under discussion,
and the person appointed is free
to accept the employment
whether or not he is a member of
the bar. Here, however, there may
be an exception where the
business turns on a question of
law. Most real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers who are not
lawyers. But if the value of the
land depends on a disputed rightof-way and the principal role of
the negotiator is to assess the
probable outcome of the dispute
and persuade the opposite party
to the same opinion, then it may
be that only a lawyer can accept
the assignment. Or if a
controversy between an employer
and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of
a statute, it is quite likely that
defendant should not handle it.
But I need not reach a definite
conclusion here, since the
situation is not presented by the
proofs.
Defendant also appears to
represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the
federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board.
An agency of the federal
government, acting by virtue of

an authority granted by the

Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before
such agency. The State of New
Jersey is without power to
interfere with such determination
or to forbid representation before
the agency by one whom the
agency admits. The rules of the
National Labor Relations Board
give to a party the right to appear
in person, or by counsel, or by
other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th,
1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here
means a licensed attorney, and
ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do
whatever the Labor Board allows,
even arguing questions purely
legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A.
2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism
[1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be
said that a person engaged in a
lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not
engaged in the practice of law
provided that:
(a) The legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are
not customarily reserved to
members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for
the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in

relation to the work for any
particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both
lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code
of Professional Responsibility
succintly states the rule of
conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is
engaged in another profession or
occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to
his client whether he is acting as
a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the
Legal Clinic appears to render
wedding services (See Annex "A"
Petition). Services on routine,
straightforward marriages, like
securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a
priest or a judge, may not
constitute practice of law.
However, if the problem is as
complicated as that described in
"Rx for Legal Problems" on the
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion-Richard Gomez case,
then what may be involved is
actually the practice of law. If a
non-lawyer, such as the Legal
Clinic, renders such services then
it is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also
appears to give information on
divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes
"A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving

informational materials may not

constitute of law. The business is
similar to that of a bookstore
where the customer buys
materials on the subject and
determines on the subject and
determines by himself what
courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable,
however, that aside from purely
giving information, the Legal
Clinic's paralegals may apply the
law to the particular problem of
the client, and give legal advice.
Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the
publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which
purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the
mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as
a solution to his problem does not
affect this. . . . . Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining of these
two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to how the
forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice
of law. But that is the situation
with many approved and
accepted texts. Dacey's book is
sold to the public at large. There
is no personal contact or
relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist
that relation of confidence and
trust so necessary to the status of

attorney and client. THIS IS THE

ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE
THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice
on common problems, and does
not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not
purport to give personal advice on
a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified
person in a particular situation
in their publication and sale of the
kits, such publication and sale did
not constitutes the unlawful
practice of law . . . . There being
no legal impediment under the
statute to the sale of the kit, there
was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant
maintaining an office for the
purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation,
annulment or separation
agreement any printed material or
writings relating to matrimonial
law or the prohibition in the
memorandum of modification of
the judgment against defendant
having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his
manuscript on divorce and against
his having any personal contact
with any prospective purchaser.
The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the

change of $75 or $100 for the kit,

the defendant gave legal advice
in the course of personal contacts
concerning particular problems
which might arise in the
preparation and presentation of
the purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of action or
pursuit of other legal remedies
and assistance in the preparation
of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to)
enjoin conduct constituting the
practice of law, particularly with
reference to the giving of advice
and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of
particular individuals in
connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of
separation agreement sought and
should be affirmed. (State v.
Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course,
states that its services are
"strictly non-diagnostic, nonadvisory. "It is not controverted,
however, that if the services
"involve giving legal advice or
counselling," such would
constitute practice of law
(Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this
light that FIDA submits that a
factual inquiry may be necessary
for the judicious disposition of this
case.
xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically

objectionable in that it can give
the impression (or perpetuate the
wrong notion) that there is a
secret marriage. With all the
solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See
Articles 2, et seq., Family Code),
no Philippine marriage can be
secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be
ethically objectionable. The
second paragraph thereof (which
is not necessarily related to the
first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal
services?" or "legal support
services", and not legal services,
are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the
meaning of the phrase "practice
of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues
raised by the petition at bar. On
this score, we note that the clause
"practice of law" has long been
the subject of judicial construction
and interpretation. The courts
have laid down general principles
and doctrines explaining the
meaning and scope of the term,
some of which we now take into
account.
Practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law,
legal procedures, knowledge,
training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to

perform those acts which are

characteristic of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to
give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal
knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases in court. It
includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of legal
instruments and contract by
which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may
not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a
licensed attorney at law generally
engages in three principal types
of professional activity: legal
advice and instructions to clients
to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients
of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman,
and appearance for clients before
public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine
rights of life, liberty, and property
according to law, in order to assist
in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the
a trial and advertises himself as a
lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. 15 One who confers with
clients, advises them as to their
legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks
the latter to look after the case in

court, is also practicing

law. 16 Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and
the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of
law. 17 One who renders an
opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and
receives pay for it, is, to that
extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs.
Monsod, 19 after citing the
doctrines in several cases, we laid
down the test to determine
whether certain acts constitute
"practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring
the knowledge and the application
of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of another
with his consent. It is not limited
to appearing in court, or advising
and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and
the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to
clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with
the law.
The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases on court.
(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.

v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23,

193N. E. 650). A person is also
considered to be in the practice of
law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration
engages in the business of
advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to
their right under the law, or
appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in
proceedings, pending or
prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized
to settle controversies and there,
in such representative capacity,
performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending
the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one
who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts
either in court or outside of court
for that purpose, is engaged in
the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co.,
102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case
of Philippines Lawyers Association
v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the

preparation of pleadings and

other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters
connected with the law
incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in
matters or estate and
guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5
Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern
conditions consists in no small
part of work performed outside of
any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings
in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of
subjects and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and

other affairs. Although these

transactions may have no direct
connection with court
proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal
skill, a wide experience with men
and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These
customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far
as concerns the question set forth
in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of
the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part
which involves advice and drafting
of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold
customary functions be performed
by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations
to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on
the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973
ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194
N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore,
covers a wide range of activities

in and out of court. Applying the

aforementioned criteria to the
case at bar, we agree with the
perceptive findings and
observations of the aforestated
bar associations that the activities
of respondent, as advertised,
constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that
it merely offers legal support
services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said
proposition is belied by
respondent's own description of
the services it has been offering,
to wit:
Legal support services basically
consists of giving ready
information by trained paralegals
to laymen and lawyers, which are
strictly non-diagnostic, nonadvisory, through the extensive
use of computers and modern
information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of
information and communication,
such as computerized legal
research; encoding and
reproduction of documents and
pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating
parties or witnesses to a case;
fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of
basic institutional services from
government or non-government
agencies, like birth, marriage,
property, or business

registrations; educational or
employment records or
certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances,
passports, local or foreign visas;
giving information about laws of
other countries that they may find
useful, like foreign divorce,
marriage or adoption laws that
they can avail of preparatory to
emigration to the foreign country,
and other matters that do not
involve representation of clients in
court; designing and installing
computer systems, programs, or
software for the efficient
management of law offices,
corporate legal departments,
courts and other entities engaged
in dispensing or administering
legal services. 20
While some of the services being
offered by respondent corporation
merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the
installation of computer systems
and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids
and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to
the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that
respondent corporation gives out
legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such
function is non-advisory and nondiagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for
example, about foreign laws on

marriage, divorce and adoption, it

strains the credulity of this Court
that all the respondent
corporation will simply do is look
for the law, furnish a copy thereof
to the client, and stop there as if it
were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have
to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise
him or her on the proper course of
action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is
what its advertisements represent
and for the which services it will
consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within
the jurisprudential definition of
"practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by
the fact that respondent
corporation does not represent
clients in court since law practice,
as the weight of authority holds, is
not limited merely giving legal
advice, contract drafting and so
forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further
strengthened by an article
published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday
Magazine of the Philippines Star,
entitled "Rx for Legal Problems,"
where an insight into the
structure, main purpose and
operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own
"proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is

transacted everyday at The Legal
Clinic, with offices on the seventh
floor of the Victoria Building along
U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter
what the client's problem, and
even if it is as complicated as the
Cuneta-Concepcion domestic
situation, Atty. Nogales and his
staff of lawyers, who, like doctors
are "specialists" in various fields
can take care of it. The Legal
Clinic, Inc. has specialists in
taxation and criminal law, medicolegal problems, labor, litigation,
and family law. These specialist
are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal
Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the
trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients
who cannot afford the services of
the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and
walk-in clients. "when they come,
we start by analyzing the
problem. That's what doctors do
also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you,
they take your temperature, they
observe you for the symptoms
and so on. That's how we operate,
too. And once the problem has
been categorized, then it's
referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in
medical terms, require surgery or

follow-up treatment. These The

Legal Clinic disposes of in a
matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or
an affidavit of loss can be taken
care of by our staff or, if this were
a hospital the residents or the
interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis.
Again, kung baga sa hospital, outpatient, hindi kailangang maconfine. It's just like a common
cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.
Those cases which requires more
extensive "treatment" are dealt
with accordingly. "If you had a rich
relative who died and named you
her sole heir, and you stand to
inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would
be real estate taxes and arrears
which would need to be put in
order, and your relative is even
taxed by the state for the right to
transfer her property, and only a
specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with the
problem. Now, if there were other
heirs contesting your rich
relatives will, then you would
need a litigator, who knows how
to arrange the problem for
presentation in court, and gather
evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation
employs paralegals to carry out
its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is

engaged in the practice of law by

virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby
brings it within the ambit of the
statutory prohibitions against the
advertisements which it has
caused to be published and are
now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and
appropriately pointed out by the
U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main
purpose of respondent is to serve
as a one-stop-shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a
client may avail of legal services
from simple documentation to
complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond
the domain of paralegals, but
rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of
law. 22
It should be noted that in our
jurisdiction the services being
offered by private respondent
which constitute practice of law
cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar,
or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of
the Rules of Court, and who is in
good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the
practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in

education and character. The

permissive right conferred on the
lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain
proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose
is to protect the public, the court,
the client and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of
those unlicensed to practice law
and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the
american jurisdiction wherefrom
respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The
doctrines there also stress that
the practice of law is limited to
those who meet the requirements
for, and have been admitted to,
the bar, and various statutes or
rules specifically so
provide. 25 The practice of law is
not a lawful business except for
members of the bar who have
complied with all the conditions
required by statute and the rules
of court. Only those persons are
allowed to practice law who, by
reason of attainments previously
acquired through education and
study, have been recognized by
the courts as possessing profound
knowledge of legal science
entitling them to advise, counsel
with, protect, or defend the rights
claims, or liabilities of their
clients, with respect to the
construction, interpretation,

operation and effect of law. 26 The

justification for excluding from the
practice of law those not admitted
to the bar is found, not in the
protection of the bar from
competition, but in the protection
of the public from being advised
and represented in legal matters
by incompetent and unreliable
persons over whom the judicial
department can exercise little
control. 27
We have to necessarily and
definitely reject respondent's
position that the concept in the
United States of paralegals as an
occupation separate from the law
profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its
merits, respondent cannot but be
aware that this should first be a
matter for judicial rules or
legislative action, and not of
unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are
trained professionals. As admitted
by respondent, there are schools
and universities there which offer
studies and degrees in paralegal
education, while there are none in
the Philippines.28 As the concept
of the "paralegals" or "legal
assistant" evolved in the United
States, standards and guidelines
also evolved to protect the
general public. One of the major
standards or guidelines was
developed by the American Bar
Association which set up
Guidelines for the Approval of

Legal Assistant Education

Programs (1973). Legislation has
even been proposed to certify
legal assistants. There are also
associations of paralegals in the
United States with their own code
of professional ethics, such as the
National Association of Legal
Assistants, Inc. and the American
Paralegal Association.29
In the Philippines, we still have a
restricted concept and limited
acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service.
As pointed out by FIDA, some
persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been
allowed limited representation in
behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable
services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission
therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the
American judicial policy that, in
the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who
has not been admitted as an
attorney cannot practice law for
the proper administration of
justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person
into the practice of law. 31 That
policy should continue to be one
of encouraging persons who are
unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance

only from persons licensed to

practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of
the questioned advertisements,
the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a
lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or
statement of facts. 33 He is not
supposed to use or permit the use
of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or
legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay
or give something of value to
representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal
business. 35 Prior to the adoption
of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also
warned that lawyers should not
resort to indirect advertisements
for professional employment, such
as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or
procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with
causes in which the lawyer has
been or is engaged or concerning
the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other
like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal

profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating
the ethics of his profession.
advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. 37 The
prescription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of
legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the
that the practice of law is a
profession. Thus, in the case of
The Director of Religious Affairs.
vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of
respondent which are involved in
the present proceeding,39 was
held to constitute improper
advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision
therein reads:
It is undeniable that the
advertisement in question was a
flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the
public. Section 25 of Rule 127
expressly provides among other
things that "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally
or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is
highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares.
Law is a profession and not a

trade. The lawyer degrades

himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices
of mercantilism by advertising his
services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar,
he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the
temple of Jehovah. "The most
worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for
a young lawyer, . . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This
cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of
Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the
profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is
a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity
to trust, which must be earned as
the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching
public attention. That publicity is
a normal by-product of effective
service which is right and proper.
A good and reputable lawyer
needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his
success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal byproduct of able service and the

unwholesome result of
propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of
advertising or solicitation are
prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions
to the rule against advertising or
solicitation and define the extent
to which they may be undertaken.
The exceptions are of two broad
categories, namely, those which
are expressly allowed and those
which are necessarily implied
from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the
publication in reputable law lists,
in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by
the canons, of brief biographical
and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may
include only a statement of the
lawyer's name and the names of
his professional associates;
addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth
and admission to the bar; schools
attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other
educational distinction; public or
quasi-public offices; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership
and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in
other reputable law lists; the
names and addresses of

references; and, with their written

consent, the names of clients
regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable
law list published primarily for
that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or
periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For
that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data
in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor
may a lawyer permit his name to
be published in a law list the
conduct, management or contents
of which are calculated or likely to
deceive or injure the public or the
bar, or to lower the dignity or
standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple
professional card is also
permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the
name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address,
telephone number and special
branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a
law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm
name or office address, being for
the convenience of the profession,
is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under

a designation of special branch of

law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration
the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task,
which even includes a quotation
of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for
services rendered, we find and so
hold that the same definitely do
not and conclusively cannot fall
under any of the abovementioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et
al. vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly
invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not
applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said
case explicitly allows a lawyer, as
an exception to the prohibition
against advertisements by
lawyers, to publish a statement of
legal fees for an initial
consultation or the availability
upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of
the fee to be charged for the
specific services. No such
exception is provided for,
expressly or impliedly, whether in
our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Besides, even the disciplinary rule
in the Bates case contains a

proviso that the exceptions stated

therein are "not applicable in any
state unless and until it is
implemented by such authority in
that state." 46 This goes to show
that an exception to the general
rule, such as that being invoked
by herein respondent, can be
made only if and when the canons
expressly provide for such an
exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case
at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey
conducted by the American Bar
Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the
public about lawyers after viewing
television commercials, it was
found that public opinion dropped
significantly 47 with respect to
these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that
with the present situation of our
legal and judicial systems, to
allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used
by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a
deteriorating public opinion of the
legal profession whose integrity
has consistently been under
attack lately by media and the
community in general. At this
point in time, it is of utmost

importance in the face of such

negative, even if unfair, criticisms
at times, to adopt and maintain
that level of professional conduct
which is beyond reproach, and to
exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the
legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a
misbehavior on the part of the
lawyer, subject to disciplinary
action, to advertise his services
except in allowable instances 48 or
to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of
law. 49 Considering that Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the
prime incorporator, major
stockholder and proprietor of The
Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of
the Philippine Bar, he is hereby
reprimanded, with a warning that
a repetition of the same or similar
acts which are involved in this
proceeding will be dealt with more
severely.
While we deem it necessary that
the question as to the legality or
illegality of the purpose/s for
which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was
created should be passed upon
and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing
into an obiter on that aspect since
it is clearly not within the
adjudicative parameters of the
present proceeding which is
merely administrative in nature. It
is, of course, imperative that this
matter be promptly determined,

albeit in a different proceeding

and forum, since, under the
present state of our law and
jurisprudence, a corporation
cannot be organized for or engage
in the practice of law in this
country. This interdiction, just like
the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted
by employing some so-called
paralegals supposedly rendering
the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent
breach of this prohibition by
respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General
who can institute the
corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual
background and basis for the
grant of respondent's corporate
charter, in light of the putative
misuse thereof. That spin-off from
the instant bar matter is referred
to the Solicitor General for such
action as may be necessary under
the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved
to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of
any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar
tenor and purpose as Annexes "A"
and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly,
any activity, operation or
transaction proscribed by law or

the Code of Professional Ethics as

indicated herein. Let copies of this
resolution be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Office of the Solicitor
General for appropriate action in
accordance herewith.
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18,
1970
IN THE MATTER OF
PROCEEDINGS FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION
AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL
ALMACEN In L-27654,
ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen's "Petition to Surrender
Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed
on September 25, 1967, in protest
against what he therein asserts is
"a great injustice committed
against his client by this Supreme
Court." He indicts this Court, in his
own phrase, as a tribunal
"peopled by men who are
calloused to our pleas for justice,
who ignore without reasons their
own applicable decisions and
commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity." His
client's he continues, who was

deeply aggrieved by this Court's

"unjust judgment," has become
"one of the sacrificial victims
before the altar of hypocrisy." In
the same breath that he alludes
to the classic symbol of justice, he
ridicules the members of this
Court, saying "that justice as
administered by the present
members of the Supreme Court is
not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb." He then vows to argue the
cause of his client "in the people's
forum," so that "the people may
know of the silent injustice's
committed by this Court," and
that "whatever mistakes, wrongs
and injustices that were
committed must never be
repeated." He ends his petition
with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the
Clerk of Court to receive the
certificate of the undersigned
attorney and counsellor-at-law IN
TRUST with reservation that at
any time in the future and in the
event we regain our faith and
confidence, we may retrieve our
title to assume the practice of the
noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the
press the contents of the
aforementioned petition. Thus, on
September 26, 1967, the Manila
Times published statements
attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an
unprecedented petition, said he

did it to expose the

tribunal's"unconstitutional and
obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily
denying petitions or appeals
without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "shortcut justice," Almacen deplored,
his client was condemned to pay
P120,000, without knowing why
he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law
practice, Almacen said in this
petition, "where our Supreme
Court is composed of men who
are calloused to our pleas for
justice, who ignore without reason
their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by
divesting himself of his title by
which he earns his living, the
present members of the Supreme
Court "will become responsive to
all cases brought to its attention
without discrimination, and will
purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious
"lack of merit" or "denied
resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is
composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas of [sic]
justice, who ignore their own

applicable decisions and commit

culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente
Albano Pacis in the issue of
the Manila Chronicle of September
28, 1967. In connection therewith,
Pacis commented that Atty.
Almacen had "accused the high
tribunal of offenses so serious that
the Court must clear itself," and
that "his charge is one of the
constitutional bases for
impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate
incident was a civil case
entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs.
Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty.
Almacen was counsel for the
defendant. The trial court, after
due hearing, rendered judgment
against his client. On June 15,
1966 Atty. Almacen received a
copy of the decision. Twenty days
later, or on July 5, 1966, he
moved for its reconsideration. He
served on the adverse counsel a
copy of the motion, but did not
notify the latter of the time and
place of hearing on said motion.
Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the
plaintiff moved for execution of
the judgment. For "lack of proof of
service," the trial court denied
both motions. To prove that he did
serve on the adverse party a copy
of his first motion for
reconsideration, Atty. Almacen
filed on August 17, 1966 a second
motion for reconsideration to

which he attached the required

registry return card. This second
motion for reconsideration,
however, was ordered withdrawn
by the trial court on August 30,
1966, upon verbal motion of Atty.
Almacen himself, who, earlier,
that is, on August 22, 1966, had
already perfected the appeal.
Because the plaintiff interposed
no objection to the record on
appeal and appeal bond, the trial
court elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the
authority of this Court's decision
in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.,
Inc. vs. Batu Construction &
Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965,
dismissed the appeal, in the
following words:
Upon consideration of the motion
dated March 27, 1967, filed by
plaintiff-appellee praying that the
appeal be dismissed, and of the
opposition thereto filed by
defendant-appellant; the Court
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it
hereby dismisses, the appeal, for
the reason that the motion for
reconsideration dated July 5, 1966
(pp. 90-113, printed record on
appeal) does not contain a notice
of time and place of hearing
thereof and is, therefore, a
useless piece of paper (Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., G.R. No. L16636, June 24, 1965), which did
not interrupt the running of the

period to appeal, and,

consequently, the appeal was
perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to
reconsider this resolution, urging
that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is
not decisive. At the same time he
filed a pleading entitled "Latest
decision of the Supreme Court in
Support of Motion for
Reconsideration," citing Republic
of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.
Venturanza, L-20417, decided by
this Court on May 30, 1966, as the
applicable case. Again, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are
the motion dated May 9, 1967 and
the supplement thereto of the
same date filed by defendantappellant, praying for
reconsideration of the resolution
of May 8, 1967, dismissing the
appeal.
Appellant contends that there are
some important distinctions
between this case and that
of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co.,
Inc. vs. Batu Construction &
Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24,
1965, relied upon by this Court in
its resolution of May 8, 1967.
Appellant further states that in
the latest case,Republic vs.
Venturanza, L-20417, May 30,
1966, decided by the Supreme
Court concerning the question
raised by appellant's motion, the

ruling is contrary to the doctrine

laid down in the Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction
between this case and that of
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs.
Venturanza, the resolution
denying the motion to dismiss the
appeal, based on grounds similar
to those raised herein was issued
on November 26, 1962, which was
much earlier than the date of
promulgation of the decision in
the Manila Surety Case, which was
June 24, 1965. Further, the
resolution in the Venturanza case
was interlocutory and the
Supreme Court issued it "without
prejudice to appellee's restoring
the point in the brief." In the main
decision in said case (Rep. vs.
Venturanza the Supreme Court
passed upon the issue sub
silencio presumably because of its
prior decisions contrary to the
resolution of November 26, 1962,
one of which is that in the Manila
Surety and Fidelity case.
Therefore Republic vs.
Venturanza is no authority on the
matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to
this Court by certiorari. We
refused to take the case, and by
minute resolution denied the
appeal. Denied shortly thereafter
was his motion for reconsideration
as well as his petition for leave to

file a second motion for

reconsideration and for extension
of time. Entry of judgment was
made on September 8, 1967.
Hence, the second motion for
reconsideration filed by him after
the Said date was ordered
expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty.
Almacen gave vent to his
disappointment by filing his
"Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title," already
adverted to a pleading that is
interspersed from beginning to
end with the insolent
contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory
remarks hereinbefore reproduced,
against this Court as well as its
individual members, a behavior
that is as unprecedented as it is
unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by
resolution dated September 28,
1967 to withhold action on his
petition until he shall have
actually surrendered his
certificate. Patiently, we waited
for him to make good his proffer.
No word came from him. So he
was reminded to turn over his
certificate, which he had earlier
vociferously offered to surrender,
so that this Court could act on his
petition. To said reminder he
manifested "that he has no
pending petition in connection
with Case G.R. No. L27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said

case is now final and executory;"

that this Court's September 28,
1967 resolution did not require
him to do either a positive or
negative act; and that since his
offer was not accepted, he "chose
to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent
power to discipline a member of
the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on
November 17, 1967 resolved to
require Atty. Almacen to show
cause "why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him."
Denying the charges contained in
the November 17 resolution, he
asked for permission "to give
reasons and cause why no
disciplinary action should be
taken against him ... in an open
and public hearing." This Court
resolved (on December 7) "to
require Atty. Almacen to state,
within five days from notice
hereof, his reasons for such
request, otherwise, oral argument
shall be deemed waived and
incident submitted for decision."
To this resolution he manifested
that since this Court is "the
complainant, prosecutor and
Judge," he preferred to be heard
and to answer questions "in
person and in an open and public
hearing" so that this Court could
observe his sincerity and candor.
He also asked for leave to file a
written explanation "in the event
this Court has no time to hear him

in person." To give him the

ampliest latitude for his defense,
he was allowed to file a written
explanation and thereafter was
heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified
and cynical as it is unchastened,
offers -no apology. Far from being
contrite Atty. Almacen
unremittingly repeats his jeremiad
of lamentations, this time
embellishing it with abundant
sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote
passages from the Holy Bible,
Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
"Do not judge, that you may not
be judged. For with what
judgment you judge, you shall be
judged, and with what measure
you measure, it shall be measured
to you. But why dost thou see the
speck in thy brother's eye, and
yet dost not consider the beam in
thy own eye? Or how can thou say
to thy brother, "Let me cast out
the speck from thy eye"; and
behold, there is a beam in thy
own eye? Thou hypocrite, first
cast out the beam from thy own
eye, and then thou wilt see clearly
to cast out the speck from thy
brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men
to do to you, even to do you also
to them: for this is the Law and
the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx

Your respondent has no intention

of disavowing the statements
mentioned in his petition. On the
contrary, he refirms the truth of
what he stated, compatible with
his lawyer's oath that he will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court. But he
vigorously DENY under oath that
the underscored statements
contained in the CHARGE are
insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory to
the individual members of the
Court; that they tend to bring the
entire Court, without justification,
into disrepute; and constitute
conduct unbecoming of a member
of the noble profession of law.

what did we get from this COURT?

One word, DENIED, with all its
hardiness and insensibility. That
was the unfeeling of the Court
towards our pleas and prayers, in
simple word, it is plain callousness
towards our particular case.

xxx xxx xxx

Did His Honors care to listen to

our pleadings and supplications
for JUSTICE, CHARITY,
GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did
His Honors attempt to justify their
stubborn denial with any
semblance of reason, NEVER. Now
that your respondent is given the
opportunity to face you, he
reiterates the same statement
with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is
this. the way of life in the
Philippines today, that even our
own President, said: "the story
is current, though nebulous ,is to
its truth, it is still being circulated
that justice in the Philippines
today is not what it is used to be
before the war. There are those
who have told me frankly and
brutally that justice is a

Respondent stands four-square

that his statement is borne by
TRUTH and has been asserted
with NO MALICE BEFORE AND
AFTER THOUGHT but mainly
motivated with the highest
interest of justice that in the
particular case of our client, the
members have shown callousness
to our various pleas for JUSTICE,
our pleadings will bear us on this
matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings,
supplications, words of humility,
appeals for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding,
sympathy and above all in the
highest interest of JUSTICE,

xxx xxx xxx

Now that your respondent has the
guts to tell the members of the
Court that notwithstanding the
violation of the Constitution, you
remained unpunished, this Court
in the reverse order of natural
things, is now in the attempt to
inflict punishment on your
respondent for acts he said in
good faith.

commodity, a marketable
commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the
SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not
the ACTOR. We attack the
decision of this Court, not the
members. ... We were provoked.
We were compelled by force of
necessity. We were angry but we
waited for the finality of the
decision. We waited until this
Court has performed its duties.
We never interfered nor obstruct
in the performance of their duties.
But in the end, after seeing that
the Constitution has placed
finality on your judgment against
our client and sensing that you
have not performed your duties
with "circumspection, carefulness,
confidence and wisdom", your
Respondent rise to claim his God
given right to speak the truth and
his Constitutional right of free
speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have
attributed to this Court and the
further violations we sought to be
prevented is impliedly shared by
our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and
condemned, are the very things
that were applied to us. Recalling
Madam Roland's famous
apostrophe during the French

revolution, "O Liberty, what

crimes are committed in thy
name", we may dare say, "O
JUSTICE, what technicalities are
committed in thy name' or more
appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what
injustices are committed in thy
name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is
not free from commission of any
abuses, but who would correct
such abuses considering that
yours is a court of last resort. A
strong public opinion must be
generated so as to curtail these
abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is
symbolize in paintings that can be
found in all courts and
government offices. We have
added only two more symbols,
that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf
in the sense that no members of
this Court has ever heard our
cries for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding sympathy
and for justice; dumb in the
sense, that inspite of our
beggings, supplications, and
pleadings to give us reasons why
our appeal has been DENIED, not
one word was spoken or given ...
We refer to no human defect or
ailment in the above statement.
We only describe the. impersonal
state of things and nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost
our faith and confidence in the
members of this Court and for
which reason we offered to
surrender our lawyer's certificate,
IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has
been lost today may be regained
tomorrow. As the offer was
intended as our self-imposed
sacrifice, then we alone may
decide as to when we must end
our self-sacrifice. If we have to
choose between forcing ourselves
to have faith and confidence in
the members of the Court but
disregard our Constitution and to
uphold the Constitution and be
condemned by the members of
this Court, there is no choice, we
must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce,
the vituperative chaff which he
claims is not intended as a
studied disrespect to this Court,
let us examine the grain of his
grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution
denial of his petition for review.
We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this
Court's practice of rejecting
petitions by minute resolutions.
We have been asked to do away
with it, to state the facts and the
law, and to spell out the reasons
for denial. We have given this
suggestion very careful thought.
For we know the abject frustration

of a lawyer who tediously collates

the facts and for many weary
hours meticulously marshalls his
arguments, only to have his
efforts rebuffed with a terse
unadorned denial. Truth to tell,
however, most petitions rejected
by this Court are utterly frivolous
and ought never to have been
lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit
a first-impression cogency, but fail
to, withstand critical scrutiny. By
and large, this Court has been
generous in giving due course to
petitions forcertiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to
accept every case or write a full
opinion for every petition we
reject, we would be unable to
carry out effectively the burden
placed upon us by the
Constitution. The proper role of
the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief
Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme
Court has defined it, is to decide
"only those cases which present
questions whose resolutions will
have immediate importance
beyond the particular facts and
parties involved." Pertinent here is
the observation of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Maryland vs.
Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed
562, 566:
A variety of considerations
underlie denials of the writ, and
as to the same petition different
reasons may read different
justices to the same result ... .

Since there are these conflicting,

and, to the uninformed, even
confusing reasons for denying
petitions for certiorari, it has been
suggested from time to time that
the Court indicate its reasons for
denial. Practical considerations
preclude. In order that the Court
may be enabled to discharge its
indispensable duties, Congress
has placed the control of the
Court's business, in effect, within
the Court's discretion. During the
last three terms the Court
disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases,
respectively, on their merits. For
the same three terms the Court
denied, respectively, 1,260,
1,105,1,189 petitions calling for
discretionary review. If the Court
is to do its work it would not be
feasible to give reasons, however
brief, for refusing to take these
cases. The tune that would be
required is prohibitive. Apart from
the fact that as already indicated
different reasons not infrequently
move different members of the
Court in concluding that a
particular case at a particular time
makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et
al., vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60
O.G. 8099), this Court, through
the then Chief Justice Cesar
Bengzon, articulated its
considered view on this matter.
There, the petitioners counsel
urged that a "lack of merit"

resolution violates Section 12 of

Article VIII of the Constitution.
Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short
resolutions, the same question
has been raised before; and we
held that these "resolutions" are
not "decisions" within the above
constitutional requirement. They
merely hold that the petition for
review should not be entertained
in view of the provisions of Rule
46 of the Rules of Court; and even
ordinary lawyers have all this time
so understood it. It should be
remembered that a petition to
review the decision of the Court of
Appeals is not a matter of right,
but of sound judicial discretion;
and so there is no need to fully
explain the court's denial. For one
thing, the facts and the law are
already mentioned in the Court of
Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal
has as intended helped the
Court in alleviating its heavy
docket; it was patterned after the
practice of the U.S. Supreme
Court, wherein petitions for review
are often merely ordered
"dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases
taken to this Court on petitions
for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of
appellate review. Hence, the need
for compelling reasons to buttress
such petitions if this Court is to be

moved into accepting them. For it

is axiomatic that the supervisory
jurisdiction vested upon this Court
over the Court of Appeals is not
intended to give every losing
party another hearing. This axiom
is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals'
decision discretionary.A review
is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion, and will
be granted only when there are
special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while
neither controlling nor fully
measuring the court's discretion,
indicate the character of reasons
which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of substance,
not theretofore determined by the
Supreme Court, nor has decided it
in a way probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has
so far departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned
such departure by the lower court,
as to call for the exercise of the
power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition
for review, we found, upon a
thoroughgoing examination of the
pleadings. and records, that the
Court of Appeals had fully and
correctly considered the dismissal

of his appeal in the light of the

law and applicable decisions of
this Court. Far from straying away
from the "accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings," it
traced the procedural lines etched
by this Court in a number of
decisions. There was, therefore,
no need for this Court to exercise
its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was
admitted to the Bar as far back as
1941, Atty. Almacen knew or
ought to have known that for a
motion for reconsideration to stay
the running of the period of
appeal, the movant must not only
serve a copy of the motion upon
the adverse party (which he did),
but also notify the adverse party
of the time and place of hearing
(which admittedly he did not).
This rule was unequivocally
articulated in Manila Surety &
Fidelity vs. Batu Construction &
Co., supra:
The written notice referred to
evidently is prescribed for motions
in general by Rule 15, Sections 4
and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which
provides that such notice shall
state the time, and place of
hearing and shall be served upon
all the Parties concerned at least
three days in advance. And
according to Section 6 of the
same Rule no motion shall be
acted upon by the court without
proof of such notice. Indeed it has
been held that in such a case the

motion is nothing but a useless

piece of paper (Philippine National
Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb.
28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla,
42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic
Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of
Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director
of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117).
The reason is obvious: Unless the
movant sets the time and place of
hearing the Court would have no
way to determine whether that
party agrees to or objects to the
motion, and if he objects, to hear
him on his objection, since the
Rules themselves do not fix any
period within which he may file
his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the
appellate court to review the
lower court's judgment, he has
only himself to blame. His own
negligence caused the forfeiture
of the remedy of appeal, which,
incidentally, is not a matter of
right. To shift away from himself
the consequences of his
carelessness, he looked for a
"whipping boy." But he made sure
that he assumed the posture of a
martyr, and, in offering to
surrender his professional
certificate, he took the liberty of
vilifying this Court and inflicting
his exacerbating rancor on the
members thereof. It would thus
appear that there is no
justification for his scurrilous and
scandalous outbursts.

Nonetheless we gave this

unprecedented act of Atty.
Almacen the most circumspect
consideration. We know that it is
natural for a lawyer to express his
dissatisfaction each time he loses
what he sanguinely believes to be
a meritorious case. That is why
lawyers are given 'wide latitude to
differ with, and voice their
disapproval of, not only the
courts' rulings but, also the
manner in which they are handed
down.
Moreover, every citizen has the
right to comment upon and
criticize the actuations of public
officers. This right is not
diminished by the fact that the
criticism is aimed at a judicial
authority,4 or that it is articulated
by a lawyer.5 Such right is
especially recognized where the
criticism concerns a concluded
litigation,6 because then the
court's actuations are thrown
open to public consumption.7 "Our
decisions and all our official
actions," said the Supreme Court
of Nebraska,8 "are public property,
and the press and the people
have the undoubted right to
comment on them, criticize and
censure them as they see fit.
Judicial officers, like other public
servants, must answer for their
official actions before the
chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the
fury of human reaction to an

attack on one's integrity,

competence and honesty, with
"imminent danger to the
administration of justice," is the
reason why courts have been
loath to inflict punishment on
those who assail their
actuations.9 This danger lurks
especially in such a case as this
where those who Sit as members
of an entire Court are themselves
collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance
and restraint a lawyer who
vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and
fearless advocates are the strands
that weave durability into the
tapestry of justice. Hence, as
citizen and officer of the court,
every lawyer is expected not only
to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to expose the
shortcomings and indiscretions of
courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not
sacrosanct. 12 They should and
expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the
executive and the legislative
branches, the judiciary is rooted in
the soil of democratic society,
nourished by the periodic
appraisal of the citizens whom it
is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the
right of a lawyer, both as an
officer of the court and as a
citizen, to criticize in properly

respectful terms and through

legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges. The reason is
that
An attorney does not surrender, in
assuming the important place
accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right
as a citizen to criticize the
decisions of the courts in a fair
and respectful manner, and the
independence of the bar, as well
as of the judiciary, has always
been encouraged by the courts.
(In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has,
indeed, been an important part of
the traditional work of the bar. In
the prosecution of appeals, he
points out the errors of lower
courts. In written for law journals
he dissects with detachment the
doctrinal pronouncements of
courts and fearlessly lays bare for
-all to see that flaws and
inconsistence" of the doctrines
(Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286).
As aptly stated by Chief Justice
Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman,
40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought
to be allowed freer scope in the
expansion or publication of
opinions as to the capacity,
impartiality or integrity of judges
than members of the bar. They
have the best opportunities for
observing and forming a correct
judgment. They are in constant

attendance on the courts. ... To

say that an attorney can only act
or speak on this subject under
liability to be called to account
and to be deprived of his
profession and livelihood, by the
judge or judges whom he may
consider it his duty to attack and
expose, is a position too
monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer
of the court a lawyer is expected
not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to avail
of such right. No law may abridge
this right. Nor is he "professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the
official conduct of the judges,
which would not expose him to
legal animadversion as a citizen."
(Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657,
665).
Above all others, the members of
the bar have the beat Opportunity
to become conversant with the
character and efficiency of our
judges. No class is less likely to
abuse the privilege, as no other
class has as great an interest in
the preservation of an able and
upright bench. (State Board of
Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116
N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to
be critical of the foibles of courts
and judges is to seal the lips of
those in the best position to give
advice and who might consider it

their duty to speak disparagingly.

"Under such a rule," so far as the
bar is concerned, "the merits of a
sitting judge may be rehearsed,
but as to his demerits there must
be profound silence." (State v.
Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of
all such criticism that it shall
be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the One
hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on
the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the
duty of respect to courts. It is
Such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar
imposes upon a person
obligations and duties which are
not mere flux and ferment. His
investiture into the legal
profession places upon his
shoulders no burden more basic,
more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful
behavior toward the courts. He
vows solemnly to conduct himself
"with all good fidelity ... to the
courts; 14 and the Rules of Court
constantly remind him "to observe
and maintain the respect due to
courts of justice and judicial
officers." 15 The first canon of
legal ethics enjoins him "to
maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the

sake of the temporary incumbent

of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme
importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys
impliedly assume, if they do not
by express declaration take upon
themselves, when they are
admitted to the Bar, is not merely
to be obedient to the Constitution
and laws, but to maintain at all
times the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers. This
obligation is not discharged by
merely observing the rules of
courteous demeanor in open
court, but includes abstaining out
of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct
toward judges personally for their
judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher,
20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render
respectful subordination to the
courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence,
in the assertion of their clients'
rights, lawyers even those
gifted with superior intellect are
enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or
may not be an abler or more
learned lawyer than the judge,
and it may tax his patience and
temper to submit to rulings which
he regards as incorrect, but
discipline and self-respect are as
necessary to the orderly

administration of justice as they

are to the effectiveness of an
army. The decisions of the judge
must be obeyed, because he is
the tribunal appointed to decide,
and the bar should at all times be
the foremost in rendering
respectful submission. (In Re
Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may
think highly of his intellectual
endowment That is his privilege.
And he may suffer frustration at
what he feels is others' lack of it.
That is his misfortune. Some such
frame of mind, however, should
not be allowed to harden into a
belief that he may attack a court's
decision in words calculated to
jettison the time-honored
aphorism that courts are the
temples of right. (Per Justice
Sanchez in Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979.
June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a
lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere
citizen at another. Thus,
statements made by an attorney
in private conversations or
communications 16 or in the
course of a political,
campaign, 17 if couched in
insulting language as to bring into
scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may
subject the attorney to
disciplinary action.

Of fundamental pertinence at this

juncture is an examination of
relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a
public official is neither sacrosanct
nor immune to public criticism of
his conduct in office," the
Supreme Court of Florida in State
v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608,
nevertheless declared that "any
conduct of a lawyer which brings
into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice demands
condemnation and the application
of appropriate penalties," adding
that:
It would be contrary to, every
democratic theory to hold that a
judge or a court is beyond bona
fide comments and criticisms
which do not exceed the bounds
of decency and truth or which are
not aimed at. the destruction of
public confidence in the judicial
system as such. However, when
the likely impairment of the
administration of justice the direct
product of false and scandalous
accusations then the rule is
otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d
672, an attorney was suspended
for putting out and circulating a
leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN
OTUMWA," which accused a
municipal judge of having
committed judicial error, of being
so prejudiced as to deny his
clients a fair trial on appeal and of

being subject to the control of a

group of city officials. As a
prefatory statement he wrote:
"They say that Justice is BLIND,
but it took Municipal Judge Willard
to prove that it is also DEAF and
DUMB!" The court did not hesitate
to find that the leaflet went much
further than the accused, as a
lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a
desire on the part Of the accused
to belittle and besmirch the court
and to bring it into disrepute with
the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac.
60, the Supreme Court of
California affirmed the two-year
suspension of an attorney who
published a circular assailing a
judge who at that time was a
candidate for re-election to a
judicial office. The circular which
referred to two decisions of the
judge concluded with a statement
that the judge "used his judicial
office to enable -said bank to keep
that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line
of authorities which place no limit
to the criticism members of the
bar may make regarding the
capacity, impartiality, or integrity
of the courts, even though it
extends to the deliberate
publication by the attorney
capable of correct reasoning of
baseless insinuations against the
intelligence and integrity of the

highest courts. See State Board,

etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA
(N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and
note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac.
220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first
case mentioned it was observed,
for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so
decide) that a libelous publication
by an attorney, directed against a
judicial officer, could be so vile
and of such a nature as to justify
the disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an
attorney in that case were of
graver character than those made
by the respondent here. But, in
our view, the better rule is that
which requires of those who are
permitted to enjoy the privilege of
practicing law the strictest
observance at all times of the
principles of truth, honesty and
fairness, especially in their
criticism of the courts, to the end
that the public confidence in the
due administration of justice be
upheld, and the dignity and
usefulness of the courts be
maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac.
220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar
Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an
attorney, representing a woman
who had been granted a divorce,
attacked the judge who set aside
the decree on bill of review. He
wrote the judge a threatening
letter and gave the press the

story of a proposed libel suit

against the judge and others. The
letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen
v. Petersen is cleared up so that
my name is protected from the
libel, lies, and perjury committed
in the cases involved, I shall be
compelled to resort to such
drastic action as the law allows
and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me
assure you I do not intend to allow
such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he
was engaged in dealing with men
and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men.
Ordering the attorney's
disbarment, the Supreme Court of
Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just
criticism, and whenever there is
proper ground for serious
complaint against a judge, it is the
right and duty of a lawyer to
submit his grievances to the
proper authorities, but the public
interest and the administration of
the law demand that the courts
should have the confidence and
respect of the people. Unjust
criticism, insulting language, and
offensive conduct toward the
judges personally by attorneys,
who are officers of the court,
which tend to bring the courts and
the law into disrepute and to
destroy public confidence in their

integrity, cannot be permitted.

The letter written to the judge
was plainly an attempt to
intimidate and influence him in
the discharge of judicial functions,
and the bringing of the
unauthorized suit, together with
the write-up in the Sunday
papers, was intended and
calculated to bring the court into
disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode
Island lawyer accused the courts
of the state of being influenced by
corruption and greed, saying that
the seats of the Supreme Court
were bartered. It does not appear
that the attorney had criticized
any of the opinions or decisions of
the Court. The lawyer was
charged with unprofessional
conduct, and was ordered
suspended for a period of two
years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if
believed, would tend to weaken
the authority of the court against
whose members it was made,
bring its judgments into
contempt, undermine its influence
as an unbiased arbiter of the
people's right, and interfere with
the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of
the bar the court will not, under
the guise of disciplinary
proceedings, deprive him of any
part of that freedom of speech
which he possesses as a citizen.

The acts and decisions of the

courts of this state, in cases that
have reached final determination,
are not exempt from fair and
honest comment and criticism. It
is only when an attorney
transcends the limits of legitimate
criticism that he will be held
responsible for an abuse of his
liberty of speech. We well
understand that an independent
bar, as well as independent court,
is always a vigilant defender of
civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl.
723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS
879, an attorney was suspended
for six months for submitting to
an appellate court an affidavit
reflecting upon the judicial
integrity of the court from which
the appeal was taken. Such
action, the Court said, constitutes
unprofessional conduct justifying
suspension from practice,
notwithstanding that he fully
retracted and withdrew the
statements, and asserted that the
affidavit was the result of an
impulse caused by what he
considered grave injustice. The
Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the
fact that there is a growing habit
in the profession of criticising the
motives and integrity of judicial
officers in the discharge of their
duties, and thereby reflecting on
the administration of justice and
creating the impression that

judicial action is influenced by

corrupt or improper motives.
Every attorney of this court, as
well as every other citizen, has
the right and it is his duty, to
submit charges to the authorities
in whom is vested the power to
remove judicial officers for any
conduct or act of a judicial officer
that tends to show a violation of
his duties, or would justify an
inference that he is false to his
trust, or has improperly
administered the duties devolved
upon him; and such charges to
the tribunal, if based upon
reasonable inferences, will be
encouraged, and the person
making them
protected. ... While we recognize
the inherent right of an attorney
in a case decided against him, or
the right of the Public generally,
to criticise the decisions of the
courts, or the reasons announced
for them, the habit of criticising
the motives of judicial officers in
the performance of their official
duties, when the proceeding is not
against the officers whose acts or
motives are criticised, tends to
subvert the confidence of the
community in the courts of justice
and in the administration of
justice; and when such charges
are made by officers of the courts,
who are bound by their duty to
protect the administration of
justice, the attorney making such
charges is guilty of professional
misconduct.

7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a

lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this
case, however, with patience,
barring possible temporary
observations more or less
vituperative and finally concluded,
that, as my clients were
foreigners, it might have been
expecting too much to look for a
decision in their favor against a
widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama
declared that:
... the expressions above set out,
not only transcend the bounds of
propriety and privileged criticism,
but are an unwarranted attack,
direct, or by insinuation and
innuendo, upon the motives and
integrity of this court, and make
out a prima facie case of improper
conduct upon the part of a lawyer
who holds a license from this
court and who is under oath to
demean himself with all good
fidelity to the court as well as to
his client.
The charges, however, were
dismissed after the attorney
apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v.
Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an
attorney published in a newspaper
an article in which he impugned
the motives of the court and its
members to try a case, charging
the court of having arbitrarily and

for a sinister purpose undertaken

to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus. The Court suspended the
respondent for 30 days, saying
that:
The privileges which the law gives
to members of the bar is one most
subversive of the public good, if
the conduct of such members
does not measure up to the
requirements of the law itself, as
well as to the ethics of the
profession. ...
The right of free speech and free
discussion as to judicial
determination is of prime
importance under our system and
ideals of government. No right
thinking man would concede for a
moment that the best interest to
private citizens, as well as to
public officials, whether he labors
in a judicial capacity or otherwise,
would be served by denying this
right of free speech to any
individual. But such right does not
have as its corollary that
members of the bar who are
sworn to act honestly and
honorably both with their client
and with the courts where justice
is administered, if administered at
all, could ever properly serve their
client or the public good by
designedly misstating facts or
carelessly asserting the law. Truth
and honesty of purpose by
members of the bar in such
discussion is necessary. The
health of a municipality is none

the less impaired by a polluted

water supply than is the health of
the thought of a community
toward the judiciary by the filthy
wanton, and malignant misuse of
members of the bar of the
confidence the public, through its
duly established courts, has
reposed in them to deal with the
affairs of the private individual,
the protection of whose rights he
lends his strength and money to
maintain the judiciary. For such
conduct on the part of the
members of the bar the law itself
demands retribution not the
court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v.
Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing
of an affidavit by an attorney in a
pending action using in respect to
the several judges the terms
criminal corrupt, and wicked
conspiracies,," "criminal
confederates," "colossal and
confident insolence," "criminal
prosecution," "calculated
brutality," "a corrupt deadfall,"
and similar phrases, was
considered conduct unbecoming
of a member of the bar, and the
name of the erring lawyer was
ordered stricken from the roll of
attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v.
Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring
attorney claimed that greater
latitude should be allowed in case
of criticism of cases finally
adjudicated than in those

pending. This lawyer wrote a

personal letter to the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of
Minnesota impugning both the
intelligence and the integrity of
the said Chief Justice and his
associates in the decisions of
certain appeals in which he had
been attorney for the defeated
litigants. The letters were
published in a newspaper. One of
the letters contained this
paragraph:
You assigned it (the property
involved) to one who has no
better right to it than the burglar
to his plunder. It seems like
robbing a widow to reward a
fraud, with the court acting as a
fence, or umpire, watchful and
vigilant that the widow got no
undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is
a proper motive for the decisions
discoverable, short of assigning to
the court emasculated
intelligence, or a constipation of
morals and faithlessness to duty?
If the state bar association, or a
committee chosen from its rank,
or the faculty of the University
Law School, aided by the
researches of its hundreds of
bright, active students, or if any
member of the court, or any other
person, can formulate a
statement of a correct motive for
the decision, which shall not
require fumigation before it is
stated, and quarantine after it is

made, it will gratify every rightminded citizen of the state to read

it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota,
in ordering the suspension of the
attorney for six months, delivered
its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the
accused was guilty of professional
misconduct in sending to the
Chief Justice the letter addressed
to him. This was done, as we have
found, for the very purpose of
insulting him and the other
justices of this court; and the
insult was so directed to the Chief
Justice personally because of acts
done by him and his associates in
their official capacity. Such a
communication, so made, could
never subserve any good purpose.
Its only effect in any case would
be to gratify the spite of an angry
attorney and humiliate the
officers so assailed. It would not
and could not ever enlighten the
public in regard to their judicial
capacity or integrity. Nor was it an
exercise by the accused of any
constitutional right, or of any
privilege which any reputable
attorney, uninfluenced by passion,
could ever have any occasion or
desire to assert. No judicial
officer, with due regard to his
position, can resent such an insult
otherwise than by methods
sanctioned by law; and for any
words, oral or written, however
abusive, vile, or indecent,

addressed secretly to the judge

alone, he can have no redress in
any action triable by a jury. "The
sending of a libelous
communication or libelous matter
to the person defamed does not
constitute an actionable
publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc.
Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these
respects the sending by the
accused of this letter to the Chief
Justice was wholly different from
his other acts charged in the
accusation, and, as we have said,
wholly different principles are
applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in
every way discreditable; but so far
as he exercised the rights of a
citizen, guaranteed by the
Constitution and sanctioned by
considerations of public policy, to
which reference has been made,
he was immune, as we hold, from
the penalty here sought to be
enforced. To that extent his rights
as a citizen were paramount to
the obligation which he had
assumed as an officer of this
court. When, however he
proceeded and thus assailed the
Chief Justice personally, he
exercised no right which the court
can recognize, but, on the
contrary, willfully violated his
obligation to maintain the respect
due to courts and judicial officers.
"This obligation is not discharged
by merely observing the rules of
courteous demeanor in open

court, but it includes abstaining

out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct
toward the judges personally for
their official acts."Bradley v.
Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L.
Ed. 646. And there appears to be
no distinction, as regards the
principle involved, between the
indignity of an assault by an
attorney upon a judge, induced by
his official act, and a personal
insult for like cause by written or
spoken words addressed to the
judge in his chambers or at his
home or elsewhere. Either act
constitutes misconduct wholly
different from criticism of judicial
acts addressed or spoken to
others. The distinction made is,
we think entirely logical and well
sustained by authority. It was
recognized in Ex
parte McLeod supra. While the
court in that case, as has been
shown, fully sustained the right of
a citizen to criticise rulings of the
court in actions which are ended,
it held that one might be
summarily punished for assaulting
a judicial officer, in that case a
commissioner of the court, for his
rulings in a cause wholly
concluded. "Is it in the power of
any person," said the court, "by
insulting or assaulting the judge
because of official acts, if only the
assailant restrains his passion
until the judge leaves the
building, to compel the judge to
forfeit either his own self-respect

to the regard of the people by

tame submission to the indignity,
or else set in his own person the
evil example of punishing the
insult by taking the law in his own
hands? ... No high-minded, manly
man would hold judicial office
under such conditions."
That a communication such as
this, addressed to the Judge
personally, constitutes
professional delinquency for which
a professional punishment may be
imposed, has been directly
decided. "An attorney who, after
being defeated in a case, wrote a
personal letter to the trial justice,
complaining of his conduct and
reflecting upon his integrity as a
justice, is guilty of misconduct
and will be disciplined by the
court." Matter of Manheim 133
App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87
The same is held in Re Griffin (City
Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City
Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it
appeared that the accused
attorney had addressed a sealed
letter to a justice of the City Court
of New York, in which it was
stated, in reference to his
decision: "It is not law; neither is it
common sense. The result is I
have been robbed of 80." And it
was decided that, while such
conduct was not a contempt
under the state, the matter should
be "called to the attention of the
Supreme Court, which has power
to discipline the attorney." "If,"

says the court, "counsel learned in

the law are permitted by writings
leveled at the heads of judges, to
charge them with ignorance, with
unjust rulings, and with robbery,
either as principals or accessories,
it will not be long before the
general public may feel that they
may redress their fancied
grievances in like manner, and
thus the lot of a judge will be
anything but a happy one, and the
administration of justice will fall
into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v.
State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in
this respect much the same as the
case at bar. The accused, an
attorney at law, wrote and mailed
a letter to the circuit judge, which
the latter received by due course
of mail, at his home, while not
holding court, and which referred
in insulting terms to the conduct
of the judge in a cause wherein
the accused had been one of the
attorneys. For this it was held that
the attorney was rightly disbarred
in having "willfully failed to
maintain respect due to him [the
judge] as a judicial officer, and
thereby breached his oath as an
attorney." As recognizing the
same principle, and in support of
its application to the facts of this
case, we cite the following: Ex
parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364,
19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22
Ark. 149;Commonwealth v.
Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People

v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac.

65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's
Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134;
Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270,
Atl. 481.

breed disrespect for courts and

bring the legal profession into
disrepute with the public, for
which reason the lawyer was
disbarred.

Our conclusion is that the charges

against the accused have been so
far sustained as to make it our
duty to impose such a penalty as
may be sufficient lesson to him
and a suitable warning to
others. ...

14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d

108, an attorney, dissatisfied with
the loss of a case, prepared over a
period of years vicious attacks on
jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court declared that his acts
involved such gross moral
turpitude as to make him unfit as
a member of the bar. His
disbarment was ordered, even
though he expressed an intention
to resign from the bar.

11. In Cobb v. United States, 172

F. 641, the court affirmed a
lawyer's suspension for 18
months for publishing a letter in a
newspaper in which he accused a
judge of being under the sinister
influence of a gang that had
paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411,
the court held that an attorney's
unjustifiable attack against the
official acts and decisions of a
judge constitutes "moral
turpitude." There, the attorney
was disbarred for criticising not
only the judge, but his decisions
in general claiming that the judge
was dishonest in reaching his
decisions and unfair in his general
conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659,
an attorney published newspaper
articles after the trial of cases,
criticising the court in
intemperate language. The
invariable effect of this sort of
propaganda, said the court, is to

The teaching derived from the

above disquisition and impressive
affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable:
Post-litigation utterances or
publications, made by lawyers,
critical of the courts and their
judicial actuations, whether
amounting to a crime or not,
which transcend the permissible
bounds of fair comment and
legitimate criticism and thereby
tend to bring them into disrepute
or to subvert public confidence in
their integrity and in the orderly
administration of justice,
constitute grave professional
misconduct which may be visited
with disbarment or other lesser
appropriate disciplinary sanctions
by the Supreme Court in the
exercise of the prerogatives
inherent in it as the duly

constituted guardian of the morals

and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded
our disciplinary powers in the face
of unwarranted outbursts of
counsel such as those catalogued
in the above-cited jurisprudence.
Cases of comparable nature have
generally been disposed of under
the power of courts to punish for
contempt which, although resting
on different bases and calculated
to attain a different end,
nevertheless illustrates that
universal abhorrence of such
condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more
representative of these instances
may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61
Phil. 724, where counsel branded
the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely
erroneous and constituting an
outrage to the rigths of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will
expressed at the polls," this Court,
although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an
attorney, in defending the cause
and rights of his client, should do
so with all the fervor and energy
of which he is capable, but it is
not, and never will be so for him
to exercise said right by resorting
to intimidation or proceeding
without the propriety and respect
which the dignity of the courts

requires. The reason for this is

that respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of their
institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would
be resting on a very shaky
foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt
inasmuch as, in its opinion, the
statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of
the authority of the court and an
intentional contempt of its dignity,
because the court is thereby
charged with no less than having
proceeded in utter disregard of
the laws, the rights to the parties,
and 'of the untoward
consequences, or with having
abused its power and mocked and
flouted the rights of Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595,
counsel, a senator and the author
of the Press Freedom Law,
reaching to, the imprisonment for
contempt of one Angel Parazo,
who, invoking said law, refused to
divulge the source of a news item
carried in his paper, caused to be
published in i local newspaper a
statement expressing his regret
"that our High Tribunal has not
only erroneously interpreted said
law, but it is once more putting in
evidence the incompetency or
narrow mindedness of the
majority of its members," and his
belief that "In the wake of so

many blunders and injustices

deliberately committed during
these last years, ... the only
remedy to put an end to go much
evil, is to change the members of
the Supreme Court," which
tribunal he denounced as "a
constant peril to liberty and
democracy" and "a far cry from
the impregnable bulwark of
justice of those memorable times
of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino
Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other
learned jurists who were the
honor and glory of the Philippine
Judiciary." He there also
announced that one of the first
measures he would introduce in
then forthcoming session of
Congress would have for its object
the complete reorganization of
the Supreme Court. Finding him in
contempt, despite his avowals of
good faith and his invocation of
the guarantee of free speech, this
Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written
statement which he caused to be
published in the press, the
respondent does not merely
criticize or comment on the
decision of the Parazo case, which
was then and still is pending
consideration by this Court upon
petition of Angel Parazo. He not
only intends to intimidate the
members of this Court with the
presentation of a bill in the next
Congress, of which he is one of
the members, reorganizing the

Supreme Court and reducing the

number of Justices from eleven, so
as to change the members of this
Court which decided the Parazo
case, who according to his
statement, are incompetent and
narrow minded, in order to
influence the final decision of said
case by this Court, and thus
embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice. But the
respondent also attacks the
honesty and integrity of this Court
for the apparent purpose of
bringing the Justices of this Court
into disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this
Court has been for the last years
committing deliberately so many
blunders and injustices, that is to
say, that it has been deciding in
favor of Que party knowing that
the law and justice is on the part
of the adverse party and not on
the one in whose favor the
decision was rendered, in many
cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the
people in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this
Court, and consequently to
lower ,or degrade the
administration of justice by this
Court. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to
which the Filipino people may
repair to obtain relief for their

grievances or protection of their

rights when these are trampled
upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this
Court and believe that they
cannot expect justice therefrom,
they might be driven to take the
law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might
be the result. As a member of the
bar and an officer of the courts,
Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other,
is in duty bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court,
to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has
taken as such attorney, and not to
promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect
to the courts guarantees the
stability of other institutions,
which without such guaranty
would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court
therein hastened to emphasize
that
... an attorney as an officer of the
court is under special obligation to
be respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts; he
may be removed from office or
stricken from the roll of attorneys
as being guilty of flagrant
misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586,
594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs.
Ferrer: In re Proceedings against

Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra,

where counsel charged this Court
with having "repeatedly fallen"
into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering
to its previous "erroneous"
pronouncements, "in disregard of
the law on jurisdiction" of the
Court of Industrial Relations, our
condemnation of counsel's
misconduct was unequivocal.
Articulating the sentiments of the
Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez
stressed:
As we look back at the language
(heretofore quoted) employed in
the motion for reconsideration,
implications there are which
inescapably arrest attention. It
speaks of one pitfall into which
this Court has repeatedly
fallen whenever the jurisdiction of
the Court of Industrial Relations
comes into question. That pitfall is
the tendency of this Court to rely
on its own pronouncements in
disregard of the law on
jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping
charge that the decisions of this
Court, blindly adhere to earlier
rulings without as much as
making any reference to and
analysis of the pertinent statute
governing the jurisdiction of the
industrial court. The plain import
of all these is that this Court is so
patently inept that in determining
the jurisdiction of the industrial
court, it has committed error and
continuously repeated that error
to the point of perpetuation. It

pictures this Court as one which

refuses to hew to the line drawn
by the law on jurisdictional
boundaries. Implicit in the quoted
statements is that the
pronouncements of this Court on
the jurisdiction of the industrial
court are not entitled to respect.
Those statements detract much
from the dignity of and respect
due this Court. They bring into
question the capability of the
members and some former
members of this Court to render
justice. The second paragraph
quoted yields a tone of sarcasm
which counsel labelled as "so
called" the "rule against splitting
of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments
have been expressed in other
cases 18 which, in the interest of
brevity, need not now be
reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common
denominator underlies the
aforecited cases all of them
involved contumacious
statements made in pleadings
filed pending litigation. So that, in
line with the doctrinal rule that
the protective mantle of contempt
may ordinarily be invoked only
against scurrilous remarks or
malicious innuendoes while a
court mulls over a pending case
and not after the conclusion
thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would
now seek to sidestep the thrust of
a contempt charge by his studied

emphasis that the remarks for

which he is now called upon to
account were made only after this
Court had written finis to his
appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after
a judicial proceeding has
terminated, has lost much of its
vitality. For sometime, this was
the prevailing view in this
jurisdiction. The first stir for a
modification thereof, however,
came when, inPeople vs.
Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice
Manuel V. Moran dissented with
the holding of the majority,
speaking thru Justice Jose P.
Laurel, which upheld the rule
above-adverted to. A complete
disengagement from the settled
rule was later to be made in In re
Brillantes, 21 a contempt
proceeding, where the editor of
the Manila Guardian was
adjudged in contempt for
publishing an editorial which
asserted that the 1944 Bar
Examinations were conducted in a
farcical manner after the question
of the validity of the said
examinations had been resolved
and the case closed. Virtually, this
was an adoption of the view
expressed by Chief Justice Moran
in his dissent in Alarcon to the
effect that them may still be
contempt by publication even
after a case has been terminated.
Said Chief Justice Moran
in Alarcon:

A publication which tends to

impede, obstruct, embarrass or
influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending
suit or proceeding, constitutes
criminal contempt which is
'summarily punishable by courts.
A publication which tends to
degrade the courts and to destroy
public confidence in them or that
which tends to bring them in any
way into disrepute, constitutes
likewise criminal contempt, and is
equally punishable by courts.
What is sought, in the first kind of
contempt, to be shielded against
the influence of newspaper
comments, is the all-important
duty of the courts to administer
justice in the decision of a
pending case. In the second kind
of contempt, the punitive hand of
justice is extended to vindicate
the courts from any act or
conduct calculated to bring them
into disfavor or to destroy public
confidence in them. In the first
there is no contempt where there
is no action pending, as there is
no decision which might in any
way be influenced by the
newspaper publication. In the
second, the contempt exists, with
or without a pending case, as
what is sought to be protected is
the court itself and its dignity.
Courts would lose their utility if
public confidence in them is
destroyed.

Accordingly, no comfort is
afforded Atty. Almacen by the
circumstance that his statements
and actuations now under
consideration were made only
after the judgment in his client's
appeal had attained finality. He
could as much be liable for
contempt therefor as if it had
been perpetrated during the
pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however,
consideration of whether or not he
could be held liable for contempt
for such post litigation utterances
and actuations, is here
immaterial. By the tenor of our
Resolution of November 17, 1967,
we have confronted the situation
here presented solely in so far as
it concerns Atty. Almacen's
professional identity, his sworn
duty as a lawyer and his fitness as
an officer of this Court, in the
exercise of the disciplinary power
the morals inherent in our
authority and duty to safeguard
and ethics of the legal profession
and to preserve its ranks from the
intrusions of unprincipled and
unworthy disciples of the noblest
of callings. In this inquiry, the
pendency or non-pendency of a
case in court is altogether of no
consequence. The sole objective
of this proceeding is to preserve
the purity of the legal profession,
by removing or suspending a
member whose misconduct has
proved himself unfit to continue to

be entrusted with the duties and

responsibilities belonging to the
office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within
our authority to do. By
constitutional mandate, 22 our is
the solemn duty, amongst others,
to determine the rules for
admission to the practice of law.
Inherent in this prerogative is the
corresponding authority to
discipline and exclude from the
practice of law those who have
proved themselves unworthy of
continued membership in the Bar.
Thus
The power to discipline attorneys,
who are officers of the court, is an
inherent and incidental power in
courts of record, and one which is
essential to an orderly discharge
of judicial functions. To deny its
existence is equivalent to a
declaration that the conduct of
attorneys towards courts and
clients is not subject to restraint.
Such a view is without support in
any respectable authority, and
cannot be tolerated. Any court
having the right to admit
attorneys to practice and in this
state that power is vested in this
court-has the inherent right, in the
exercise of a sound judicial
discretion to exclude them from
practice. 23
This, because the admission of a
lawyer to the practice of law is a
representation to all that he is

worthy of their confidence and

respect. So much so that
... whenever it is made to appear
to the court that an attorney is no
longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public and of
the courts, it becomes, not only
the right, but the duty, of the
court which made him one of its
officers, and gave him the
privilege of ministering within its
bar, to withdraw the privilege.
Therefore it is almost universally
held that both the admission and
disbarment of attorneys are
judicial acts, and that one is
admitted to the bar and exercises
his functions as an attorney, not
as a matter of right, but as a
privilege conditioned on his own
behavior and the exercise of a just
and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that
power to remove or suspend has
risen above being a mere inherent
or incidental power. It has been
elevated to an express mandate
by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the
premises being unmistakable, we
now proceed to make an
assessment of whether or not the
utterances and actuations of Atty.
Almacen here in question are
properly the object of disciplinary
sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his
lawyer's certificate is, of course,
purely potestative on Atty.

Almacen's part. Unorthodox

though it may seem, no statute,
no law stands in its way. Beyond
making the mere offer, however,
he went farther. In haughty and
coarse language, he actually
availed of the said move as a
vehicle for his vicious tirade
against this Court. The integrated
entirety of his petition bristles
with vile insults all calculated to
drive home his contempt for and
disrespect to the Court and its
members. Picturing his client as
"a sacrificial victim at the altar of
hypocrisy," he categorically
denounces the justice
administered by this Court to be
not only blind "but also deaf and
dumb." With unmitigated acerbity,
he virtually makes this Court and
its members with verbal talons,
imputing to the Court the
perpetration of "silent injustices"
and "short-cut justice" while at
the same time branding its
members as "calloused to pleas of
justice." And, true to his
announced threat to argue the
cause of his client "in the people's
forum," he caused the publication
in the papers of an account of his
actuations, in a calculated effort
;to startle the public, stir up public
indignation and disrespect toward
the Court. Called upon to make an
explanation, he expressed no
regret, offered no apology.
Instead, with characteristic
arrogance, he rehashed and
reiterated his vituperative attacks

and, alluding to the Scriptures,

virtually tarred and feathered the
Court and its members as
inveterate hypocrites incapable of
administering justice and
unworthy to impose disciplinary
sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident
in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer
and oral argumentation speaks for
itself. The vicious language used
and the scurrilous innuendoes
they carried far transcend the
permissible bounds of legitimate
criticism. They could never serve
any purpose but to gratify the
spite of an irate attorney, attract
public attention to himself and,
more important of all, bring ;this
Court and its members into
disrepute and destroy public
confidence in them to the
detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of
this character and texture
presents no redeeming feature,
and completely negates any
pretense of passionate
commitment to the truth. It is not
a whit less than a classic example
of gross misconduct, gross
violation of the lawyer's oath and
gross transgression of the Canons
of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot
be allowed to go unrebuked. The
way for the exertion of our
disciplinary powers is thus laid
clear, and the need therefor is
unavoidable.

We must once more stress our

explicit disclaimer of immunity
from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable
democracy, the Court is not, and
should not be, above criticism.
But a critique of the Court must
be intelligent and discriminating,
fitting to its high function as the
court of last resort. And more than
this, valid and healthy criticism is
by no means synonymous to
obloquy, and requires detachment
and disinterestedness, real
qualities approached only through
constant striving to attain them.
Any criticism of the Court must,
possess the quality of
judiciousness and must be
informed -by perspective and
infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it
an obstacle to the exercise of our
authority in ;the premises, that, as
Atty. Almacen would have appear,
the members of the Court are the
"complainants, prosecutors and
judges" all rolled up into one in
this instance. This is an utter
misapprehension, if not a total
distortion, not only of the nature
of the proceeding at hand but also
of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact
that disciplinary proceedings like
the present are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, this proceeding is not
and does not involve a trial of
an action or a suit, but is rather

an investigation by the Court into

the conduct of its officers. 27 Not
being intended to. inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein It may be
initiated by the Court motu
proprio. 28 Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real
question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still
a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of
members who by their
misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to
be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. 29 In such
posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the
Court are, to a certain degree,
aggrieved parties. Any tirade
against the Court as a body is
necessarily and inextricably as
much so against the individual
members thereof. But in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers,

the Court acts as an entity

separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its
members. Consistently with the
intrinsic nature of a collegiate
court, the individual members act
not as such individuals but. only
as a duly constituted court. Their
distinct individualities are lost in
the majesty of their office.30 So
that, in a very real sense, if there
be any complainant in the case at
bar, it can only be the Court itself,
not the individual members
thereof as well as the people
themselves whose rights, fortunes
and properties, nay, even lives,
would be placed at grave hazard
should the administration of
justice be threatened by the
retention in the Bar of men unfit
to discharge the solemn
responsibilities of membership in
the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude
persons from the practice of law is
but a necessary incident of the
power to admit persons to said
practice. By constitutional
precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty
it cannot abdicate just as much as
it cannot unilaterally renounce
jurisdiction legally invested upon
it. 31 So that even if it be
conceded that the members
collectively are in a sense the
aggrieved parties, that fact alone
does not and cannot disqualify
them from the exercise of that

power because public policy

demands that they., acting as a
Court, exercise the power in all
cases which call for disciplinary
action. The present is such a case.
In the end, the imagined anomaly
of the merger in one entity of the
personalities of complainant,
prosecutor and judge is absolutely
inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the
nature and extent of the sanctions
that may be visited upon Atty.
Almacen for his transgressions. As
marked out by the Rules of Court,
these may range from mere
suspension to total removal or
disbarment. 32 The discretion to
assess under the circumstances
the imposable sanction is, of
course, primarily addressed to the
sound discretion of the Court
which, being neither arbitrary and
despotic nor motivated by
personal animosity or prejudice,
should ever be controlled by the
imperative need that the purity
and independence of the Bar be
scrupulously guarded and the
dignity of and respect due to the
Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed
by Atty. Almacen is of
considerable gravity cannot be
overemphasized. However,
heeding the stern injunction that
disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction
would accomplish the end
desired, and believing that it may

not perhaps be futile to hope that

in the sober light of some future
day, Atty. Almacen will realize that
abrasive language never fails to
do disservice to an advocate and
that in every effervescence of
candor there is ample room for
the added glow of respect, it is
our view that suspension will
suffice under the circumstances.
His demonstrated persistence in
his misconduct by neither
manifesting repentance nor
offering apology therefor leave us
no way of determining how long
that suspension should last and,
accordingly, we are impelled to
decree that the same should be
indefinite. This, we are
empowered to do not alone
because jurisprudence grants us
discretion on the matter 33 but
also because, even without the
comforting support of precedent,
it is obvious that if we have
authority to completely exclude a
person from the practice of law,
there is no reason why indefinite
suspension, which is lesser in
degree and effect, can be
regarded as falling outside of the
compass of that authority. The
merit of this choice is best shown
by the fact that it will then be left
to Atty. Almacen to determine for
himself how long or how short
that suspension shall last. For, at
any time after the suspension
becomes effective he may prove
to this Court that he is once again
fit to resume the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of

the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen be, as he is hereby,
suspended from the practice of
law until further orders, the
suspension to take effect
immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be
furnished the Secretary of Justice,
the Solicitor General and the
Court of Appeals for their
information and guidance.
Resolution
1954

March 18,

In the Matter of the Petitions

for Admission to the Bar of
Unsuccessful Candidates of
1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET
AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya,
Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio
Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General
Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial
issues have aroused so much
public interest and concern as
Republic Act No. 972, popularly
known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of
1953." Under the Rules of Court
governing admission to the bar,
"in order that a candidate (for
admission to the Bar) may be
deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general

average of 75 per cent in all

subjects, without falling below 50
per cent in any subject." (Rule
127, sec. 14, Rules of Court).
Nevertheless, considering the
varying difficulties of the different
bar examinations held since 1946
and the varying degree of
strictness with which the
examination papers were graded,
this court passed and admitted to
the bar those candidates who had
obtained an average of only 72
per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in
1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74
per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953,
the 74 per cent was raised to 75
per cent.
Believing themselves as fully
qualified to practice law as those
reconsidered and passed by this
court, and feeling conscious of
having been discriminated against
(See Explanatory Note to R.A. No.
972), unsuccessful candidates
who obtained averages of a few
percentage lower than those
admitted to the Bar agitated in
Congress for, and secured in 1951
the passage of Senate Bill No. 12
which, among others, reduced the
passing general average in bar
examinations to 70 per cent
effective since 1946. The
President requested the views of
this court on the bill. Complying
with that request, seven members
of the court subscribed to and
submitted written comments
adverse thereto, and shortly

thereafter the President vetoed it.

Congress did not override the
veto. Instead, it approved Senate
Bill No. 371, embodying
substantially the provisions of the
vetoed bill. Although the
members of this court reiterated
their unfavorable views on the
matter, the President allowed the
bill to become a law on June 21,
1953 without his signature. The
law, which incidentally was
enacted in an election year, reads
in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING
MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS
FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTYFIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the
provisions of section fourteen,
Rule numbered one hundred
twenty-seven of the Rules of
Court, any bar candidate who
obtained a general average of
seventy per cent in any bar
examinations after July fourth,
nineteen hundred and forty-six up
to the August nineteen hundred
and fifty-one bar examinations;
seventy-one per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-two
bar examinations; seventy-two

per cent in the in the nineteen

hundred and fifty-three bar
examinations; seventy-three per
cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-four bar examinations;
seventy-four per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-five
bar examinations without a
candidate obtaining a grade
below fifty per cent in any subject,
shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath
of office as member of the
Philippine Bar:Provided, however,
That for the purpose of this Act,
any exact one-half or more of a
fraction, shall be considered as
one and included as part of the
next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who
obtained a grade of seventy-five
per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July fourth,
nineteen hundred and forty-six
shall be deemed to have passed
in such subject or subjects and
such grade or grades shall be
included in computing the passing
general average that said
candidate may obtain in any
subsequent examinations that he
may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect
upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without
the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the
unsuccessful postwar candidates
filed petitions for admission to the

bar invoking its provisions, while

others whose motions for the
revision of their examination
papers were still pending also
invoked the aforesaid law as an
additional ground for admission.
There are also others who have
sought simply the reconsideration
of their grades without, however,
invoking the law in question. To
avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first
reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of
whether or not they had invoked
Republic Act No. 972.
Unfortunately, the court has found
no reason to revise their grades. If
they are to be admitted to the
bar, it must be pursuant to
Republic Act No. 972 which, if
declared valid, should be applied
equally to all concerned whether
they have filed petitions or not. A
complete list of the petitioners,
properly classified, affected by
this decision, as well as a more
detailed account of the history of
Republic Act No. 972, are
appended to this decision as
Annexes I and II. And to realize
more readily the effects of the
law, the following statistical data
are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar
candidates who are to be
benefited by section 1 of Republic
Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified
as follows:

1946
(August)

206

121 18

1946
(November)

477

228 43

1947

749

340 0

1948

899

409 11

1949

1,21 532 164

8

1950

1,31 893 26
6

1951

2,06 879 196

8

1952

2,73 1,0 426

8
33

1953
2,55 968 284
5
TOTAL

12,2 5,4 1,1

30
21 68

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92

have passed in subsequent
examination, and only 586 have
filed either motions for admission
to the bar pursuant to said
Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10
unsuccessful candidates are to be
benefited by section 2 of said
Republic Act. These candidates
had each taken from two to five
different examinations, but failed
to obtain a passing average in any
of them. Consolidating, however,
their highest grades in different
subjects in previous examinations,
with their latest marks, they
would be sufficient to reach the
passing average as provided for
by Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of
candidates to be benefited by this

Republic Acts is therefore 1,094,

of which only 604 have filed
petitions. Of these 604
petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946
to 1951 had individually
presented motions for
reconsideration which were
denied, while 125 unsuccessful
candidates of 1952, and 56 of
1953, had presented similar
motions, which are still pending
because they could be favorably
affected by Republic Act No. 972,
although as has been already
stated, this tribunal finds no
sufficient reasons to reconsider
their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to
enforce a law of far-reaching
effects on the practice of the legal
profession and the administration
of justice, and because some
doubts have been expressed as to
its validity, the court set the
hearing of the afore-mentioned
petitions for admission on the sole
question of whether or not
Republic Act No. 972 is
constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the
study of this question by the
brilliant assistance of the
members of the bar who have
amply argued, orally an in writing,
on the various aspects in which
the question may be gleaned. The
valuable studies of Messrs. E.

Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J.

Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and
Buenaventura Evangelista, in
favor of the validity of the law,
and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers'
Circle, the Solicitor General,
Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique
M. Fernando, Vicente Abad
Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente
del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor,
Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman
Ozaeta against it, aside from the
memoranda of counsel for
petitioners, Messrs. Jose M.
Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R.
Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton,
and of petitioners Cabrera,
Macasaet and Galema
themselves, has greatly helped us
in this task. The legal researchers
of the court have exhausted
almost all Philippine and American
jurisprudence on the matter. The
question has been the object of
intense deliberation for a long
time by the Tribunal, and finally,
after the voting, the preparation
of the majority opinion was
assigned to a new member in
order to place it as humanly as
possible above all suspicion of
prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its
object, according to its author, to
admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials
and inadequate preparation.
Quoting a portion of the
Explanatory Note of the proposed

bill, its author Honorable Senator

Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the
standard 75 per cent passing
grade is the tremendous handicap
which students during the years
immediately after the Japanese
occupation has to overcome such
as the insufficiency of reading
materials and the inadequacy of
the preparation of students who
took up law soon after the
liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took
the examinations from 1946 to
1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is
claimed that in addition 604
candidates be admitted (which in
reality total 1,094), because they
suffered from "insufficiency of
reading materials" and of
"inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law
is contrary to public interest
because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had
inadequate preparation for the
practice of the profession, as was
exactly found by this Tribunal in
the aforesaid examinations. The
public interest demands of legal
profession adequate preparation
and efficiency, precisely more so
as legal problem evolved by the
times become more difficult. An
adequate legal preparation is one
of the vital requisites for the
practice of law that should be
developed constantly and

maintained firmly. To the legal

profession is entrusted the
protection of property, life, honor
and civil liberties. To approve
officially of those inadequately
prepared individuals to dedicate
themselves to such a delicate
mission is to create a serious
social danger. Moreover, the
statement that there was an
insufficiency of legal reading
materials is grossly exaggerated.
There were abundant materials.
Decisions of this court alone in
mimeographed copies were made
available to the public during
those years and private
enterprises had also published
them in monthly magazines and
annual digests. The Official
Gazette had been published
continuously. Books and
magazines published abroad have
entered without restriction since
1945. Many law books, some even
with revised and enlarged editions
have been printed locally during
those periods. A new set of
Philippine Reports began to be
published since 1946, which
continued to be supplemented by
the addition of new volumes.
Those are facts of public
knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the
law in question is valid, it has to
be enforced.
The question is not new in its
fundamental aspect or from the
point of view of applicable

principles, but the resolution of

the question would have been
easier had an identical case of
similar background been picked
out from the jurisprudence we
daily consult. Is there any
precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon
legal history, from which has been
directly derived the judicial
system established here with its
lofty ideals by the Congress of the
United States, and which we have
preserved and attempted to
improve, or in our
contemporaneous judicial history
of more than half a century? From
the citations of those defending
the law, we can not find a case in
which the validity of a similar law
had been sustained, while those
against its validity cite, among
others, the cases of Day (In
re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon
(State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441),
the opinion of the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR
1061), of Guaria (24 Phil., 37),
aside from the opinion of the
President which is expressed in
his vote of the original bill and
which the postponement of the
contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its
favor. When similar laws in other
countries had been promulgated,
the judiciary immediately
declared them without force or
effect. It is not within our power to
offer a precedent to uphold the
disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state

here that we have examined
carefully the case that has been
cited to us as a favorable
precedent of the law that of
Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the
Court of Appeals of New York
revoked the decision of the
Supreme court of that State,
denying the petition of Cooper to
be admitted to the practice of law
under the provisions of a statute
concerning the school of law of
Columbia College promulgated on
April 7, 1860, which was declared
by the Court of Appeals to be
consistent with the Constitution of
the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of
New York at that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not
hold any other office of public
trust. All votes for either of them
for any elective office except that
of the Court of Appeals, given by
the Legislature or the people,
shall be void. They shall not
exercise any power of
appointment to public office. Any
male citizen of the age of twentyone years, of good moral
character, and who possesses the
requisite qualifications of learning
and ability, shall be entitled to
admission to practice in all the
courts of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals,
the object of the constitutional
precept is as follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were

public officers; the power of
appointing them had previously
rested with the judges, and this
was the principal appointing
power which they possessed. The
convention was evidently
dissatisfied with the manner in
which this power had been
exercised, and with the
restrictions which the judges had
imposed upon admission to
practice before them. The
prohibitory clause in the section
quoted was aimed directly at this
power, and the insertion of the
provision" expecting the
admission of attorneys, in this
particular section of the
Constitution, evidently arose from
its connection with the object of
this prohibitory clause. There is
nothing indicative of confidence in
the courts or of a disposition to
preserve any portion of their
power over this subject, unless
the Supreme Court is right in the
inference it draws from the use of
the word `admission' in the action
referred to. It is urged that the
admission spoken of must be by
the court; that to admit means to
grant leave, and that the power of
granting necessarily implies the
power of refusing, and of course
the right of determining whether
the applicant possesses the
requisite qualifications to entitle
him to admission.

These positions may all be

conceded, without affecting the
validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of
April 7, 1860, the decision seems
to indicate that it provided that
the possession of a diploma of the
school of law of Columbia College
conferring the degree of Bachelor
of Laws was evidence of the legal
qualifications that the constitution
required of applicants for
admission to the Bar. The decision
does not however quote the text
of the law, which we cannot find
in any public or accessible private
library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to
make the law consistent with the
Constitution of New York, the
Court of Appeals said of the object
of the law:
The motive for passing the act in
question is apparent. Columbia
College being an institution of
established reputation, and
having a law department under
the charge of able professors, the
students in which department
were not only subjected to a
formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but
to a certain definite period of
study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the
Legislature evidently, and no
doubt justly, considered this
examination, together with the
preliminary study required by the

act, as fully equivalent as a test of

legal requirements, to the
ordinary examination by the
court; and as rendering the latter
examination, to which no definite
period of preliminary study was
essential, unnecessary and
burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with
reference to the learning and
ability of the applicant, and for
the mere purpose of substituting
the examination by the law
committee of the college for that
of the court. It could have had no
other object, and hence no
greater scope should be given to
its provisions. We cannot suppose
that the Legislature designed
entirely to dispense with the plain
and explicit requirements of the
Constitution; and the act contains
nothing whatever to indicate an
intention that the authorities of
the college should inquire as to
the age, citizenship, etc., of the
students before granting a
diploma. The only rational
interpretation of which the act
admits is, that it was intended to
make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the
legal attainments of the applicant,
and nothing else. To this extent
alone it operates as a modification
of pre-existing statutes, and it is
to be read in connection with
these statutes and with the
Constitution itself in order to

determine the present condition

of the law on the subject. (p.89)
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Legislature has not taken

from the court its jurisdiction over
the question of admission, that
has simply prescribed what shall
be competent evidence in certain
cases upon that question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete
inapplicability of the case of
Cooper with that at bar may be
clearly seen. Please note only the
following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not
require that any candidate of
Columbia College who failed in
the bar examinations be admitted
to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according
to the very decision of Cooper,
has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of
admission of attorney at law; in
effect, it does not decree the
admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York
at that time and that of the
Philippines are entirely different
on the matter of admission of the
practice of law.
In the judicial system from which
ours has been evolved, the
admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of
the profession and their

supervision have been disputably

a judicial function and
responsibility. Because of this
attribute, its continuous and
zealous possession and exercise
by the judicial power have been
demonstrated during more than
six centuries, which certainly
"constitutes the most solid of
titles." Even considering the
power granted to Congress by our
Constitution to repeal, alter
supplement the rules promulgated
by this Court regarding the
admission to the practice of law,
to our judgment and proposition
that the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of
the attorneys at law is a
legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is
unacceptable. The function
requires (1) previously established
rules and principles, (2) concrete
facts, whether past or present,
affecting determinate individuals.
and (3) decision as to whether
these facts are governed by the
rules and principles; in effect, a
judicial function of the highest
degree. And it becomes more
undisputably judicial, and not
legislative, if previous judicial
resolutions on the petitions of
these same individuals are
attempted to be revoked or
modified.
We have said that in the judicial
system from which ours has been
derived, the act of admitting,

suspending, disbarring and

reinstating attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession is
concededly judicial. A
comprehensive and conscientious
study of this matter had been
undertaken in the case of
State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW
441, in which the validity of a
legislative enactment providing
that Cannon be permitted to
practice before the courts was
discussed. From the text of this
decision we quote the following
paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion
of legislative power without
parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as
we have been able to ascertain.
There has been much uncertainty
as to the extent of the power of
the Legislature to prescribe the
ultimate qualifications of attorney
at law has been expressly
committed to the courts, and the
act of admission has always been
regarded as a judicial function.
This act purports to constitute Mr.
Cannon an attorney at law, and in
this respect it stands alone as an
assertion of legislative power. (p.
444)
Under the Constitution all
legislative power is vested in a
Senate and Assembly. (Section 1,
art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing
of qualifications for admission to
the bar are legislative in
character, the Legislature is

acting within its constitutional

authority when it sets up and
prescribes such qualifications. (p.
444)
But when the Legislature has
prescribed those qualifications
which in its judgment will serve
the purpose of legitimate
legislative solicitude, is the power
of the court to impose other and
further exactions and
qualifications foreclosed or
exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial
and legislative departments are
distinct, independent, and
coordinate branches of the
government. Neither branch
enjoys all the powers of
sovereignty which properly
belongs to its department. Neither
department should so act as to
embarrass the other in the
discharge of its respective
functions. That was the scheme
and thought of the people setting
upon the form of government
under which we exist. State vs.
Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney
General ex rel. Bashford vs.
Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of
government is responsible for the
plane upon which the
administration of justice is
maintained. Its responsibility in
this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the
powers of sovereignty to the

judicial department of our state

government, under 42a scheme
which it was supposed rendered it
immune from embarrassment or
interference by any other
department of government, the
courts cannot escape
responsibility fir the manner in
which the powers of sovereignty
thus committed to the judicial
department are exercised. (p.
445)
The relation at the bar to the
courts is a peculiar and intimate
relationship. The bar is an attache
of the courts. The quality of
justice dispense by the courts
depends in no small degree upon
the integrity of its bar. An
unfaithful bar may easily bring
scandal and reproach to the
administration of justice and bring
the courts themselves into
disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have
exercised a direct and severe
supervision over their bars, at
least in the English speaking
countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the
case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized
as follows: For more than six
centuries prior to the adoption of
our Constitution, the courts of
England, concededly subordinate
to Parliament since the Revolution
of 1688, had exercise the right of
determining who should be

admitted to the practice of law,

which, as was said in Matter of the
Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's
New Cases 235, "constitutes the
most solid of all titles." If the
courts and judicial power be
regarded as an entity, the power
to determine who should be
admitted to practice law is a
constituent element of that entity.
It may be difficult to isolate that
element and say with assurance
that it is either a part of the
inherent power of the court, or an
essential element of the judicial
power exercised by the court, but
that it is a power belonging to the
judicial entity and made of not
only a sovereign institution, but
made of it a separate
independent, and coordinate
branch of the government. They
took this institution along with the
power traditionally exercise to
determine who should constitute
its attorney at law. There is no
express provision in the
Constitution which indicates an
intent that this traditional power
of the judicial department should
in any manner be subject to
legislative control. Perhaps the
dominant thought of the framers
of our constitution was to make
the three great departments of
government separate and
independent of one another. The
idea that the Legislature might
embarrass the judicial department
by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law

is inconsistent with the dominant

purpose of making the judicial
independent of the legislative
department, and such a purpose
should not be inferred in the
absence of express constitutional
provisions. While the legislature
may legislate with respect to the
qualifications of attorneys, but is
incidental merely to its general
and unquestioned power to
protect the public interest. When
it does legislate a fixing a
standard of qualifications required
of attorneys at law in order that
public interests may be protected,
such qualifications do not
constitute only a minimum
standard and limit the class from
which the court must make its
selection. Such legislative
qualifications do not constitute
the ultimate qualifications beyond
which the court cannot go in
fixing additional qualifications
deemed necessary by the course
of the proper administration of
judicial functions. There is no
legislative power to compel courts
to admit to their bars persons
deemed by them unfit to exercise
the prerogatives of an attorney at
law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful
attempt to exercise the power of
appointment. It is quite likely true
that the legislature may exercise
the power of appointment when it
is in pursuance of a legislative
functions. However, the

authorities are well-nigh

unanimous that the power to
admit attorneys to the practice of
law is a judicial function. In all of
the states, except New Jersey (In
re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A.
12), so far as our investigation
reveals, attorneys receive their
formal license to practice law by
their admission as members of
the bar of the court so admitting.
Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre,
19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565;Ex
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.
Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7
Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs.
Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646,
34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan,
23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130
Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas.
413.
The power of admitting an
attorney to practice having been
perpetually exercised by the
courts, it having been so generally
held that the act of the court in
admitting an attorney to practice
is the judgment of the court, and
an attempt as this on the part of
the Legislature to confer such
right upon any one being most
exceedingly uncommon, it seems
clear that the licensing of an
attorney is and always has been a
purely judicial function, no matter
where the power to determine the
qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts,
in answering a consultation of the

Senate of that State, 180 NE 725,

said:
It is indispensible to the
administration of justice and to
interpretation of the laws that
there be members of the bar of
sufficient ability, adequate
learning and sound moral
character. This arises from the
need of enlightened assistance to
the honest, and restraining
authority over the knavish,
litigant. It is highly important, also
that the public be protected from
incompetent and vicious
practitioners, whose opportunity
for doing mischief is wide. It was
said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex
rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456,
470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60
A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the
bar is a privilege burden with
conditions." One is admitted to
the bar "for something more than
private gain." He becomes an
"officer of the court", and ,like the
court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the end of
justice. His cooperation with the
court is due "whenever justice
would be imperiled if cooperation
was withheld." Without such
attorneys at law the judicial
department of government would
be hampered in the performance
of its duties. That has been the
history of attorneys under the
common law, both in this country
and England. Admission to
practice as an attorney at law is

almost without exception

conceded to be a judicial function.
Petition to that end is filed in
courts, as are other proceedings
invoking judicial action. Admission
to the bar is accomplish and made
open and notorious by a decision
of the court entered upon its
records. The establishment by the
Constitution of the judicial
department conferred authority
necessary to the exercise of its
powers as a coordinate
department of government. It is
an inherent power of such a
department of government
ultimately to determine the
qualifications of those to be
admitted to practice in its courts,
for assisting in its work, and to
protect itself in this respect from
the unfit, those lacking in
sufficient learning, and those not
possessing good moral character.
Chief Justice Taney stated
succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15
L. Ed. 565, "It has been well
settled, by the rules and practice
of common-law courts, that it
rests exclusively with the court to
determine who is qualified to
become one of its officers, as an
attorney and counselor, and for
what cause he ought to be
removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who
collectively filed a petition to
secure license to practice the
legal profession by virtue of a law

of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646),

the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4
Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court,
holding the test oath for attorneys
to be unconstitutional, explained
the nature of the attorney's office
as follows: "They are officers of
the court, admitted as such by its
order, upon evidence of their
possessing sufficient legal
learning and fair private
character. It has always been the
general practice in this country to
obtain this evidence by an
examination of the parties. In this
court the fact of the admission of
such officers in the highest court
of the states to which they,
respectively, belong for, three
years preceding their application,
is regarded as sufficient evidence
of the possession of the requisite
legal learning, and the statement
of counsel moving their admission
sufficient evidence that their
private and professional character
is fair. The order of admission is
the judgment of the court that the
parties possess the requisite
qualifications as attorneys and
counselors, and are entitled to
appear as such and conduct
causes therein. From its entry the
parties become officers of the
court, and are responsible to it for
professional misconduct. They
hold their office during good
behavior, and can only be
deprived of it for misconduct

ascertained and declared by the

judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been
afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron,
admission or their exclusion is not
the exercise of a mere ministerial
power. It is the exercise of judicial
power, and has been so held in
numerous cases. It was so held by
the court of appeals of New York
in the matter of the application of
Cooper for admission. Re Cooper
22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and
Counselors", said that court, "are
not only officers of the court, but
officers whose duties relate
almost exclusively to proceedings
of a judicial nature; and hence
their appointment may, with
propriety, be entrusted to the
court, and the latter, in
performing his duty, may very
justly considered as engaged in
the exercise of their appropriate
judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the
following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is
almost without exception
conceded everywhere to be the
exercise of a judicial function, and
this opinion need not be burdened
with citations in this point.
Admission to practice have also
been held to be the exercise of
one of the inherent powers of the
court. Re Bruen, 102 Wash.
472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is

the exercise of a judicial function,
and is an inherent power of the
court. A.C. Brydonjack, vs.
State Bar of California, 281 Pac.
1018; See Annotation on Power of
Legislature respecting admission
to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a
clear distinction between the
functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the
government.
The distinction between the
functions of the legislative and
the judicial departments is that it
is the province of the legislature
to establish rules that shall
regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent
to the legislative action, while the
judiciary determines rights and
obligations with reference to
transactions that are past or
conditions that exist at the time of
the exercise of judicial power, and
the distinction is a vital one and
not subject to alteration or change
either by legislative action or by
judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that
its province shall be invaded by
either of the other departments of
the government. 16 C.J.S.,
Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus
indirectly control the action of the
courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according

to its own views, it is very plain it

cannot do so directly, by settling
aside their judgments, compelling
them to grant new trials, ordering
the discharge of offenders, or
directing what particular steps
shall be taken in the progress of a
judicial inquiry. Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates
who obtained in the bar
examinations of 1946 to 1952, a
general average of 70 per cent
without falling below 50 per cent
in any subject, be admitted in
mass to the practice of law, the
disputed law is not a legislation; it
is a judgment a judgment
revoking those promulgated by
this Court during the aforecited
year affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this
Court certainly can revoke these
judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less
certain that only this Court, and
not the legislative nor executive
department, that may be so. Any
attempt on the part of any of
these departments would be a
clear usurpation of its functions,
as is the case with the law in
question.
That the Constitution has
conferred on Congress the power
to repeal, alter or supplement the
rule promulgated by this Tribunal,
concerning the admission to the
practice of law, is no valid

argument. Section 13, article VIII

of the Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court
shall have the power to
promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law. Said rules
shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade and shall not
diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. The existing
laws on pleading, practice and
procedure are hereby repealed as
statutes, and are declared Rules
of Court, subject to the power of
the Supreme Court to alter and
modify the same. The Congress
shall have the power to repeal,
alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to
the practice of law in the
Philippines. Constitution of the
Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the
Constitution has not conferred on
Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the
admission to the practice of law.
the primary power and
responsibility which the
Constitution recognizes continue
to reside in this Court. Had
Congress found that this Court
has not promulgated any rule on
the matter, it would have nothing
over which to exercise the power
granted to it. Congress may
repeal, alter and supplement the

rules promulgated by this Court,

but the authority and
responsibility over the admission,
suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law
and their supervision remain
vested in the Supreme Court. The
power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules does not
signify nor permit that Congress
substitute or take the place of this
Tribunal in the exercise of its
primary power on the matter. The
Constitution does not say nor
mean that Congress may admit,
suspend, disbar or reinstate
directly attorneys at law, or a
determinate group of individuals
to the practice of law. Its power is
limited to repeal, modify or
supplement the existing rules on
the matter, if according to its
judgment the need for a better
service of the legal profession
requires it. But this power does
not relieve this Court of its
responsibility to admit, suspend,
disbar and reinstate attorneys at
law and supervise the practice of
the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent
branches, the power to
promulgate and enforce rules for
the admission to the practice of
law and the concurrent power to
repeal, alter and supplement
them may and should be
exercised with the respect that
each owes to the other, giving
careful consideration to the

responsibility which the nature of

each department requires. These
powers have existed together for
centuries without diminution on
each part; the harmonious
delimitation being found in that
the legislature may and should
examine if the existing rules on
the admission to the Bar respond
to the demands which public
interest requires of a Bar endowed
with high virtues, culture, training
and responsibility. The legislature
may, by means of appeal,
amendment or supplemental
rules, fill up any deficiency that it
may find, and the judicial power,
which has the inherent
responsibility for a good and
efficient administration of justice
and the supervision of the
practice of the legal profession,
should consider these reforms as
the minimum standards for the
elevation of the profession, and
see to it that with these reforms
the lofty objective that is desired
in the exercise of its traditional
duty of admitting, suspending,
disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law is realized. They
are powers which, exercise within
their proper constitutional limits,
are not repugnant, but rather
complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a
Bar that would respond to the
increasing and exacting
necessities of the administration
of justice.

The case of Guaria (1913) 24

Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion.
Guaria took examination and
failed by a few points to obtain
the general average. A recently
enacted law provided that one
who had been appointed to the
position of Fiscal may be admitted
to the practice of law without a
previous examination. The
Government appointed Guaria
and he discharged the duties of
Fiscal in a remote province. This
tribunal refused to give his license
without previous examinations.
The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of
section 2 of Act No. 1597, the
applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without
taking the prescribed
examination, on the ground that
he holds the office of provincial
fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597,
enacted February 28, 1907, is as
follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section
thirteen of Act Numbered One
Hundred and ninety, entitled "An
Act providing a Code of Procedure
in Civil Actions and Special
Proceedings in the Philippine
Islands," is hereby amended to
read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly
licensed under the laws and
orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the

United States and are in good and

regular standing as members of
the bar of the Philippine Islands at
the time of the adoption of this
code; Provided, That any person
who, prior to the passage of this
act, or at any time thereafter,
shall have held, under the
authority of the United States, the
position of justice of the Supreme
Court, judge of the Court of First
Instance, or judge or associate
judge of the Court of Land
Registration, of the Philippine
Islands, or the position of Attorney
General, Solicitor General,
Assistant Attorney General,
assistant attorney in the office of
the Attorney General, prosecuting
attorney for the City of Manila,
city attorney of Manila, assistant
city attorney of Manila, provincial
fiscal, attorney for the Moro
Province, or assistant attorney for
the Moro Province, may be
licensed to practice law in the
courts of the Philippine Islands
without an examination, upon
motion before the Supreme Court
and establishing such fact to the
satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose
that on a former occasion this
appellant took, and failed to pass
the prescribed examination. The
report of the examining board,
dated March 23, 1907, shows that
he received an average of only 71
per cent in the various branches
of legal learning upon which he

was examined, thus falling four

points short of the required
percentage of 75. We would be
delinquent in the performance of
our duty to the public and to the
bar, if, in the face of this
affirmative indication of the
deficiency of the applicant in the
required qualifications of learning
in the law at the time when he
presented his former application
for admission to the bar, we
should grant him license to
practice law in the courts of these
Islands, without first satisfying
ourselves that despite his failure
to pass the examination on that
occasion, he now "possesses the
necessary qualifications of
learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the
provisions of the above-cited
statute the applicant is entitled as
of right to be admitted to the bar
without taking the prescribed
examination "upon motion before
the Supreme Court" accompanied
by satisfactory proof that he has
held and now holds the office of
provincial fiscal of the Province of
Batanes. It is urged that having in
mind the object which the
legislator apparently sought to
attain in enacting the above-cited
amendment to the earlier statute,
and in view of the context
generally and especially of the
fact that the amendment was
inserted as a proviso in that
section of the original Act which

specifically provides for the

admission of certain candidates
without examination. It is
contented that this mandatory
construction is imperatively
required in order to give effect to
the apparent intention of the
legislator, and to the candidate's
claim de jure to have the power
exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act
of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of
the United States, articles 2, 16
and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles
13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court
continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus
conferred upon this court by the
commission and confirmed to it by
the Act of Congress would be
limited and restricted, and in a
case such as that under
consideration wholly destroyed,
by giving the word "may," as used
in the above citation from Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any
Act of Congress prescribing,
defining or limiting the power
conferred upon the commission is
to that extent invalid and void, as
transcending its rightful limits and
authority.
Speaking on the application of the
law to those who were appointed
to the positions enumerated, and
with particular emphasis in the
case of Guaria, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein
applications for the admission to

the bar under the provisions of

this statute have been considered
heretofore, we have accepted the
fact that such appointments had
been made as satisfactory
evidence of the qualifications of
the applicant. But in all of those
cases we had reason to believe
that the applicants had been
practicing attorneys prior to the
date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration,
however, it affirmatively appears
that the applicant was not and
never had been practicing
attorney in this or any other
jurisdiction prior to the date of his
appointment as provincial fiscal,
and it further affirmatively
appears that he was deficient in
the required qualifications at the
time when he last applied for
admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative
proof of his defieciency on that
occasion, we do not think that his
appointment to the office of
provincial fiscal is in itself
satisfactory proof if his possession
of the necessary qualifications of
learning and ability. We conclude
therefore that this application for
license to practice in the courts of
the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that
when he took the examination he
fell only four points short of the
necessary grade to entitle him to
a license to practice; and in view

also of the fact that since that

time he has held the responsible
office of the governor of the
Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of
such marked ability in the
performance of the duties of that
office that the Chief Executive,
with the consent and approval of
the Philippine Commission, sought
to retain him in the Government
service by appointing him to the
office of provincial fiscal, we think
we would be justified under the
above-cited provisions of Act No.
1597 in waiving in his case the
ordinary examination prescribed
by general rule, provided he offers
satisfactory evidence of his
proficiency in a special
examination which will be given
him by a committee of the court
upon his application therefor,
without prejudice to his right, if he
desires so to do, to present
himself at any of the ordinary
examinations prescribed by
general rule. (In re Guaria, pp.
48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the
ultimate power to grant license
for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the
law passed by Congress on the
matter is of permissive character,
or as other authorities say, merely
to fix the minimum conditions for
the license.
The law in question, like those in
the case of Day and Cannon, has

been found also to suffer from the

fatal defect of being a class
legislation, and that if it has
intended to make a classification,
it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted
on February 21, 1899 required of
the Supreme Court, until
December 31 of that year, to
grant license for the practice of
law to those students who began
studying before November 4,
1897, and had studied for two
years and presented a diploma
issued by a school of law, or to
those who had studied in a law
office and would pass an
examination, or to those who had
studied for three years if they
commenced their studies after the
aforementioned date. The
Supreme Court declared that this
law was unconstitutional being,
among others, a class legislation.
The Court said:
This is an application to this court
for admission to the bar of this
state by virtue of diplomas from
law schools issued to the
applicants. The act of the general
assembly passed in 1899, under
which the application is made, is
entitled "An act to amend section
1 of an act entitled "An act to
revise the law in relation to
attorneys and counselors,"
approved March 28, 1884, in force
July 1, 1874." The amendment, so
far as it appears in the enacting
clause, consists in the addition to

the section of the following: "And

every application for a license
who shall comply with the rules of
the supreme court in regard to
admission to the bar in force at
the time such applicant commend
the study of law, either in a law or
office or a law school or college,
shall be granted a license under
this act notwithstanding any
subsequent changes in said
rules". In re Day et al, 54 N.Y.,
p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a
double proviso, one branch of
which is that up to December 31,
1899, this court shall grant a
license of admittance to the bar to
the holder of every diploma
regularly issued by any law school
regularly organized under the
laws of this state, whose regular
course of law studies is two years,
and requiring an attendance by
the student of at least 36 weeks
in each of such years, and
showing that the student began
the study of law prior to
November 4, 1897, and
accompanied with the usual
proofs of good moral character.
The other branch of the proviso is
that any student who has studied
law for two years in a law office,
or part of such time in a law
office, "and part in the aforesaid
law school," and whose course of
study began prior to November 4,
1897, shall be admitted upon a
satisfactory examination by the

examining board in the branches

now required by the rules of this
court. If the right to admission
exists at all, it is by virtue of the
proviso, which, it is claimed,
confers substantial rights and
privileges upon the persons
named therein, and establishes
rules of legislative creation for
their admission to the bar. (p.
647.)
Considering the proviso, however,
as an enactment, it is clearly a
special legislation, prohibited by
the constitution, and invalid as
such. If the legislature had any
right to admit attorneys to
practice in the courts and take
part in the administration of
justice, and could prescribe the
character of evidence which
should be received by the court as
conclusive of the requisite
learning and ability of persons to
practice law, it could only be done
by a general law, persons or
classes of persons. Const. art 4,
section 2. The right to practice
law is a privilege, and a license for
that purpose makes the holder an
officer of the court, and confers
upon him the right to appear for
litigants, to argue causes, and to
collect fees therefor, and creates
certain exemptions, such as from
jury services and arrest on civil
process while attending court. The
law conferring such privileges
must be general in its operation.
No doubt the legislature, in

framing an enactment for that

purpose, may classify persons so
long as the law establishing
classes in general, and has some
reasonable relation to the end
sought. There must be some
difference which furnishes a
reasonable basis for different one,
having no just relation to the
subject of the legislation.
Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147
Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs.
People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E.
454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165
U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has
practiced, and the skill acquired
by experience, may furnish a
basis for classification
(Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II
N.E. 881); but the place where
such physician has resided and
practiced his profession cannot
furnish such basis, and is an
arbitrary discrimination, making
an enactment based upon it void
(State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113,
18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature
undertakes to say what shall
serve as a test of fitness for the
profession of the law, and plainly,
any classification must have some
reference to learning, character,
or ability to engage in such
practice. The proviso is limited,
first, to a class of persons who
began the study of law prior to
November 4, 1897. This class is
subdivided into two classes
First, those presenting diplomas

issued by any law school of this

state before December 31, 1899;
and, second, those who studied
law for the period of two years in
a law office, or part of the time in
a law school and part in a law
office, who are to be admitted
upon examination in the subjects
specified in the present rules of
this court, and as to this latter
subdivision there seems to be no
limit of time for making
application for admission. As to
both classes, the conditions of the
rules are dispensed with, and as
between the two different
conditions and limits of time are
fixed. No course of study is
prescribed for the law school, but
a diploma granted upon the
completion of any sort of course
its managers may prescribe is
made all-sufficient. Can there be
anything with relation to the
qualifications or fitness of persons
to practice law resting upon the
mere date of November 4, 1897,
which will furnish a basis of
classification. Plainly not. Those
who began the study of law
November 4th could qualify
themselves to practice in two
years as well as those who began
on the 3rd. The classes named in
the proviso need spend only two
years in study, while those who
commenced the next day must
spend three years, although they
would complete two years before
the time limit. The one who
commenced on the 3rd. If

possessed of a diploma, is to be
admitted without examination
before December 31, 1899, and
without any prescribed course of
study, while as to the other the
prescribed course must be
pursued, and the diploma is
utterly useless. Such classification
cannot rest upon any natural
reason, or bear any just relation to
the subject sought, and none is
suggested. The proviso is for the
sole purpose of bestowing
privileges upon certain defined
persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above
cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W.
441, where the legislature
attempted by law to reinstate
Cannon to the practice of law, the
court also held with regards to its
aspect of being a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for
another reason. If it be granted
that the legislature has power to
prescribe ultimately and definitely
the qualifications upon which
courts must admit and license
those applying as attorneys at
law, that power can not be
exercised in the manner here
attempted. That power must be
exercised through general laws
which will apply to all alike and
accord equal opportunity to all.
Speaking of the right of the
Legislature to exact qualifications
of those desiring to pursue chosen
callings, Mr. Justice Field in the
case of Dent. vs. West

Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S.

Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said:
"It is undoubtedly the right of
every citizen of the United States
to follow any lawful calling,
business or profession he may
choose, subject only to such
restrictions as are imposed upon
all persons of like age, sex, and
condition." This right may in many
respects be considered as a
distinguishing feature of our
republican institutions. Here all
vocations are all open to every
one on like conditions. All may be
pursued as sources of livelihood,
some requiring years of study and
great learning for their successful
prosecution. The interest, or, as it
is sometimes termed, the "estate"
acquired in them that is, the
right to continue their prosecution
is often of great value to the
possessors and cannot be
arbitrarily taken from them, any
more than their real or personal
property can be thus taken. It is
fundamental under our system of
government that all similarly
situated and possessing equal
qualifications shall enjoy equal
opportunities. Even statutes
regulating the practice of
medicine, requiring medications
to establish the possession on the
part of the application of his
proper qualifications before he
may be licensed to practice, have
been challenged, and courts have
seriously considered whether the
exemption from such

examinations of those practicing

in the state at the time of the
enactment of the law rendered
such law unconstitutional because
of infringement upon this general
principle. State vs. Thomas Call,
121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see,
also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs.
Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W.
345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis.
110, 99 N.W. 468.

7th, 1924, known as "World War

Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose
disability is rated at least ten per
cent thereunder at the time of the
passage of this Act." This Act was
held |unconstitutional on the
ground that it clearly violated the
quality clauses of the constitution
of that state. In re Application of
George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn.
331, 227 N.W. 179.

This law singles out Mr. Cannon

and assumes to confer upon him
the right to practice law and to
constitute him an officer of this
Court as a mere matter of
legislative grace or favor. It is not
material that he had once
established his right to practice
law and that one time he
possessed the requisite learning
and other qualifications to entitle
him to that right. That fact in no
matter affect the power of the
Legislature to select from the
great body of the public an
individual upon whom it would
confer its favors.

A good summary of a
classification constitutionally
acceptable is explained in 12 Am.
Jur. 151-153 as follows:

A statute of the state of

Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424)
commanded the Supreme Court
to admit to the practice of law
without examination, all who had
served in the military or naval
forces of the United States during
the World War and received a
honorable discharge therefrom
and who (were disabled therein or
thereby within the purview of the
Act of Congress approved June

The general rule is well settled by

unanimity of the authorities that a
classification to be valid must rest
upon material differences
between the person included in it
and those excluded and,
furthermore, must be based upon
substantial distinctions. As the
rule has sometimes avoided the
constitutional prohibition, must be
founded upon pertinent and real
differences, as distinguished from
irrelevant and artificial ones.
Therefore, any law that is made
applicable to one class of citizens
only must be based on some
substantial difference between
the situation of that class and
other individuals to which it does
not apply and must rest on some
reason on which it can be
defended. In other words, there
must be such a difference
between the situation and
circumstances of all the members

of the class and the situation and

circumstances of all other
members of the state in relation
to the subjects of the
discriminatory legislation as
presents a just and natural cause
for the difference made in their
liabilities and burdens and in their
rights and privileges. A law is not
general because it operates on all
within a clause unless there is a
substantial reason why it is made
to operate on that class only, and
not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur.
pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question,
those who, without a grade below
50 per cent in any subject, have
obtained a general average of
69.5 per cent in the bar
examinations in 1946 to 1951,
70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per
cent in 1953, and those will obtain
72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5
per cent in 1955, will be permitted
to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar,
notwithstanding that the rules
require a minimum general
average of 75 per cent, which has
been invariably followed since
1950. Is there any motive of the
nature indicated by the
abovementioned authorities, for
this classification ? If there is
none, and none has been given,
then the classification is fatally
defective.

It was indicated that those who

failed in 1944, 1941 or the years
before, with the general average
indicated, were not included
because the Tribunal has no
record of the unsuccessful
candidates of those years. This
fact does not justify the
unexplained classification of
unsuccessful candidates by years,
from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953,
1954, 1955. Neither is the
exclusion of those who failed
before said years under the same
conditions justified. The fact that
this Court has no record of
examinations prior to 1946 does
not signify that no one concerned
may prove by some other means
his right to an equal
consideration.
To defend the disputed law from
being declared unconstitutional
on account of its retroactivity, it is
argued that it is curative, and that
in such form it is constitutional.
What does Rep. Act 972 intend to
cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949
were there cases in which the
Tribunal permitted admission to
the bar of candidates who did not
obtain the general average of 75
per cent: in 1946 those who
obtained only 72 per cent; in the
1947 and those who had 69 per
cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent
and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in
1950 to 1953, those who obtained
74 per cent, which was considered
by the Court as equivalent to 75

per cent as prescribed by the

Rules, by reason of circumstances
deemed to be sufficiently
justifiable. These changes in the
passing averages during those
years were all that could be
objected to or criticized. Now, it is
desired to undo what had been
done cancel the license that
was issued to those who did not
obtain the prescribed 75 per
cent ? Certainly not. The disputed
law clearly does not propose to do
so. Concededly, it approves what
has been done by this Tribunal.
What Congress lamented is that
the Court did not consider 69.5
per cent obtained by those
candidates who failed in 1946 to
1952 as sufficient to qualify them
to practice law. Hence, it is the
lack of will or defect of judgment
of the Court that is being cured,
and to complete the cure of this
infirmity, the effectivity of the
disputed law is being extended up
to the years 1953, 1954 and
1955, increasing each year the
general average by one per cent,
with the order that said
candidates be admitted to the
Bar. This purpose, manifest in the
said law, is the best proof that
what the law attempts to amend
and correct are not the rules
promulgated, but the will or
judgment of the Court, by means
of simply taking its place. This is
doing directly what the Tribunal
should have done during those
years according to the judgment

of Congress. In other words, the

power exercised was not to
repeal, alter or supplement the
rules, which continue in force.
What was done was to stop or
suspend them. And this power is
not included in what the
Constitution has granted to
Congress, because it falls within
the power to apply the rules. This
power corresponds to the
judiciary, to which such duty been
confided.
Article 2 of the law in question
permits partial passing of
examinations, at indefinite
intervals. The grave defect of this
system is that it does not take
into account that the laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary,
and when a candidate finally
receives his certificate, it may
happen that the existing laws and
jurisprudence are already
different, seriously affecting in
this manner his usefulness. The
system that the said law
prescribes was used in the first
bar examinations of this country,
but was abandoned for this and
other disadvantages. In this case,
however, the fatal defect is that
the article is not expressed in the
title will have temporary effect
only from 1946 to 1955, the text
of article 2 establishes a
permanent system for an
indefinite time. This is contrary to
Section 21 (1), article VI of the
Constitution, which vitiates and

annuls article 2 completely; and

because it is inseparable from
article 1, it is obvious that its
nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the
following grounds: first, because
they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or
Congress has exceeded its
powers; second, because they
create or establish arbitrary
methods or forms that infringe
constitutional principles; and
third, because their purposes or
effects violate the Constitution or
its basic principles. As has already
been seen, the contested law
suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the
opinion and hereby declare that
Republic Act No. 972 is
unconstitutional and therefore,
void, and without any force nor
effect for the following reasons, to
wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is
to admit 810 candidates who
failed in the bar examinations of
1946-1952, and who, it admits,
are certainly inadequately
prepared to practice law, as was
exactly found by this Court in the
aforesaid years. It decrees the
admission to the Bar of these
candidates, depriving this Tribunal
of the opportunity to determine if
they are at present already
prepared to become members of
the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to

perform something contrary to

reason and in an arbitrary
manner. This is a manifest
encroachment on the
constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a
judgment revoking the resolution
of this Court on the petitions of
these 810 candidates, without
having examined their respective
examination papers, and although
it is admitted that this Tribunal
may reconsider said resolution at
any time for justifiable reasons,
only this Court and no other may
revise and alter them. In
attempting to do it directly
Republic Act No. 972 violated the
Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress
has exceeded its legislative power
to repeal, alter and supplement
the rules on admission to the Bar.
Such additional or amendatory
rules are, as they ought to be,
intended to regulate acts
subsequent to its promulgation
and should tend to improve and
elevate the practice of law, and
this Tribunal shall consider these
rules as minimum norms towards
that end in the admission,
suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers to the
Bar, inasmuch as a good bar
assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions
and is essential to a worthy
administration of justice. It is

therefore the primary and

inherent prerogative of the
Supreme Court to render the
ultimate decision on who may be
admitted and may continue in the
practice of law according to
existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the
pretended classification of
candidates, which the law makes,
is contrary to facts which are of
general knowledge and does not
justify the admission to the Bar of
law students inadequately
prepared. The pretended
classification is arbitrary. It is
undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No.
972 is not embraced in the title of
the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being
inseparable from the provisions of
article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to
declare the nullity of that part of
article 1 referring to the
examinations of 1953 to 1955,
said part of article 1, insofar as it
concerns the examinations in
those years, shall continue in
force.

RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this
Court, after hearing and availing
of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the

contested law by our Chief Justice

at the opening and close of the
debate among the members of
the Court, and after hearing the
judicious observations of two of
our beloved colleagues who since
the beginning have announced
their decision not to take part in
voting, we, the eight members of
the Court who subscribed to this
decision have voted and resolved,
and have decided for the Court,
and under the authority of the
same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1
of Republic Act No. 972 referring
to the examinations of 1946 to
1952, and (b) all of article 2 of
said law are unconstitutional and,
therefore, void and without force
and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in
the eight Justices, that part of
article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the
approval of the law, that is from
1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid
and shall continue to be in force,
in conformity with section 10,
article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the abovementioned petitions of the
candidates who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952
inclusive are denied, and (2) all
candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a
general average of 71.5 per cent
or more, without having a grade

below 50 per cent in any subject,

are considered as having passed,
whether they have filed petitions
for admission or not. After this
decision has become final, they
shall be permitted to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath
of office as members of the Bar on
the date or dates that the chief
Justice may set. So ordered.
BAR MATTER NO. 702 May 12,
1994
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your
information, is a Resolution of the
Court En Banc dated May
12, 1994.
Bar Matter No. 702 (In the Matter
of Petition to authorize Sharia'h
District Court Judges to Appoint
Shari'a Lawyers as Notaries
Public, Atty. Royo M. Gampong,
petitioner)
Petitioner Royo M. Gampong, a
Bachelor of Laws (LIB) graduate of
Notre Dame University who was
admitted to the Philippine Shari'a
Bar on October 7, 1991, filed the
instant petition praying that this
Court, after due notice and
hearing, issue an order
authorizing all Shari'a District
Court Judges to appoint Shari'a
Lawyers who possess the
qualifications and none of the
disqualifications as notaries public
within their respective
jurisdictions.

On the theory that Shari'a District

Courts are co-equal with the
regular Regional Trial Courts in the
hierarchy of the Philippine Judicial
System, petitioner claims that by
analogy, Shari'a District Court
Judges may be authorized to
appoint the members of the
Philippine Shari'a Bar. Petitioner
further argues that, being a
special member of the Philippine
Bar and a practicing Shari'a
lawyer, notarial work is
indispensable and imperative in
the exercise of his profession;
therefore, he is qualified to be
appointed as notary public by
Shari'a District Judge. Petitioner
likewise claims that Shari'a
lawyers cannot be appointed as
notaries public in their places of
residence and in cities and other
pilot centers where Shari'a courts
are established because the RTC
Executive Judges in Cotabato and
Maguindanao require them to
secure certifications from the IBP
Secretary that there are no
practicing lawyers in the place
where they are applying. Thus,
Shari'a lawyers lose their chance
to be appointed as notaries public
because of the policy of the IBP
chapters in Region 12 to appoint
regular IBP members practically in
all municipalities and provinces.
The petition is denied.
The appointment, qualification,
jurisdiction and powers of notaries
public are governed by the

provisions of the Notarial Law

embodied in Sections 231 to
Section 241, Chapter 11 of the
Revised Administrative Code,
Section 232 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended
by Executive Order No. 41, May
11, 1945 provides:
Section 232. Appointment of
notaries public. Judges of Court
of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) in the respective may
appoint as many notaries public
as the public good requires, and
there shall be at least one for
every municipality in each
province. Notaries public in the
City of Manila shall be appointed
by one of the judges of the Court
of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Manila to be chosen
by the judges of the branches of
said court" (Words in parenthesis
supplied)
Strictly speaking, Shari'a District
Courts do not form part of the
integrated judicial system of the
Philippines. Section 2 of the
Judiciary Reorganization Acts of
1980 (B.P. Blg. 129) enumerates
the courts covered by the Act,
comprising the integrated judicial
system. Shari'a Courts are not
included in the enumeration
notwithstanding that, when said
B.P. Blg. 129 took effect on August
14, 1981, P.D. No. 1083 (otherwise
known as "Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines")
was already in force. The Shari'a

Courts are mentioned in Section

45 of the Act only for the purpose
of including them "in the funding
appropriations."
The fact that judges thereof are
required by law to possess the
same qualifications as those of
Regional Trial Courts does not
signify that the Shari'a Court is a
regular court like the Regional
Trial Court. The latter is a court of
general jurisdiction, i.e.,
competent to decide all cases,
civil and criminal, within its
jurisdiction. A Shari'a District
Court, created pursuant to Article
137 of Presidential Decree No.
1083, is a court of limited
jurisdiction, exercising original
only over cases specifically
enumerated in Article 143 thereof.
In other words, a Shari'a District
Court is not a regular court
exercising general jurisdiction
within the meaning of Section 232
of the Notarial Law.
The fact, too, that Shari'a Courts
are called "courts" does not imply
that they are on equal footing or
are identical with regular courts,
for the word "court" may be
applied to tribunals which are not
actually judicial in character, but
are quasi-judicial agencies, like
the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Land Registration
Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics
Boards, Bureau of Patents,

Trademark and Technology,

Energy Regulatory Board, etc.1
Moreover, decisions of the Shari'a
District Courts are not elevated to
this Court by appeal under Rule
41, or by petition for review under
Rule 45, of the Rules of Court.
Their decisions are final "whether
on appeal from the Shari'a Circuit
Court or not" 2 and hence, may
reach this Court only by way of a
special civil action under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, similar to
those of the National Labor
Relations Commission, or the
Central Board of Assessment
Appeals. 3
Furthermore, the qualifications for
appointment as a judge of a
Shari'a District Court are different
from those required of a judge of
a Regional Trial Court under
Section 15 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 which provides:
Section 15. Qualifications No
person shall be appointed
Regional trial Court Judge unless
he is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, at least thirty-five
years of age, and, for at least ten
years, has been engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines
requiring admission to the
practice of law as an
indispensable requirement.
In case of Shari'a Court judges, on
the other hand, a Special Bar
Examination for Shari'a Courts
was authorized by the Supreme

Court in its En Bancresolution

dated September 20, 1983. Those
who pass said examination are
qualified for appointment for
Shari'a court judges and for
admission to special membership
in the Philippine Bar to practice
law in the Shari'a courts pursuant
to Article 152, in relation to
Articles 148 and 158 of P.D. No.
1083. Said Article 152, P.D. No.
1083 provides, thus:
Art. 152. Qualifications. No
person shall be appointed judge of
the Shari'a Circuit Court unless he
is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-five
years of age, and has passed an
examination in the Sharia' and
Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) to be
given by the Supreme Court for
admission to special membership
in the Philippine Bar to practice
law in the Shari'a courts.
The authority thus conferred by
the Notarial Law upon judges of
the Court of First Instance, now
the Regional Trial Court, in their
respective provinces to appoint
notaries public cannot be
expanded to cloth the judges of
the Shari'a District Court with the
same statutory authority. The
authority to appoint notaries
public contemplated under
Section 232 of the Notarial Law
and the corresponding supervising
authority over them authorized
under Section 248 thereof require

the qualifications and experience

of an RTC Judge.

the Spanish sovereignty shall hold

said office.

It must be made clear in this

regard that since a person who
has passed the Shari'a Bar
Examination does not
automatically become a regular
member of the Philippine Bar, he
lacks the necessary qualification
to be appointed a notary public.
Section 233 of the Notarial Law
provides for the qualifications for
appointment as notary public,
thus:

In municipalities or municipal
districts where no person resides
having the qualifications herein
before specified or having them,
refuses to hold such office, judges
of first instance may appoint other
persons temporarily to exercise
the office of notary public who
have the requisite qualifications
or fitness and morality.

Section 233. Qualifications for

Appointment. To be eligible for
appointment as notary public, a
person must be a citizen of the
Philippines (or of the United
States) and over twenty-one years
of age. He must, furthermore, be
a person who has been admitted
to the practice of law or who has
completed and passed in the
studies of law in a reputable
university or school of law, or has
passed the examination for the
office of the peace or clerk or
deputy clerk of court, or be a
person who had qualified for the
office of notary public under the
Spanish sovereignty.
In the chartered cities and in the
capitals of the provinces, where
there are two or more lawyers
appointed as notaries public, no
person other than a lawyer or a
person who had qualified to hold
the office of notary public under

In an En Banc resolution of the

Court dated August 5, 1993, in
Bar Matter No. 681 "Re: Petition to
Allow Shari'a Lawyers to exercise
their profession at the regular
courts," this Court categorically
stated that a person who has
passed the Shari'a Bar
Examination is only a special
member of the Philippine Bar and
not a full-fledged member thereof
even if he is a Bachelor of Laws
degree holder. As such, he is
authorized to practice only in the
Shari'a courts.
Only a person duly admitted as
members of the Philippine Bar in
accordance with the Rules of
Court are entitled to practice law
before the regular courts. Section
1, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may practice law.
Any person heretofore duly
admitted as a member of the bar,
or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of

this rule, and who is in good and

regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.
This Court further emphasized in
its resolution in Bar Matter 681,
that:
In order to be admitted as
member of the Philippine Bar, the
candidate must pass an
examination for admission
covering the following subjects:
Political and International Law;
Labor and Social Legislation; Civil
Law and Taxation; Mercantile Law;
Criminal Law; Remedial Law; and
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises (Sec. 11, Rule 138)
Further, in order that a candidate
may be deemed to have passed
the bar examination, he must
have obtained a general average
of 75% in all the aforementioned
subjects without failing below
50% in any subject (Sec. 14, Rule
138). On the other hand, the
subjects covered by the special
bar examination for Shari'a courts
are: (1) Jurisprudence (Fiqh) and
Customary laws (Adat); (2)
Persons, Family Relations and
Property; (3) Successions,
Wills/Adjudication and Settlement
of Property; (4) Procedure in
Shari'a Courts (See Resolution
dated September 20, 1983).
It is quite obvious that the subject
matter of the two examinations
are different. The Philippine Bar
Examination covers the entire

range of the Philippine Laws and

jurisprudence, while the Shari'a
Bar Examination covers Muslim
personal laws and jurisprudence
only. Hence, a person who has
passed the Shari'a Bar
Examination, who is not a lawyer,
is not qualified to practice law
before the regular courts because
he has not passed the requisite
examinations for admission as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
However, the Shari'a bar lawyer
may appear before the Municipal
Trial Courts as agent or friend of a
litigant, if appointed by the latter
for the purpose but not before the
Regional Trial Courts as only duly
authorized members of the Bar
may conduct litigations in the
latter court (Sec. 34, Rule 138).
Considering, therefore that a
person who has passed the
Shari'a Bar Examination is only a
special member of the Philippine
Bar and not a full-fledged member
thereof even if he holds a
Bachelor of Laws Degree, he is
not qualified to practice to
qualified to practice law before
the regular courts. As a general
rule, a Shari'a Lawyer is not
possessed of the basic requisite of
"practice of law" in order to be
appointed as a notary public
under Section 233 of the Notarial
Law in relation to Section 1, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition to
authorize Shari'a District Court

Judges to appoint Shari'a Lawyers

as notaries public in their
respective jurisdiction is DENIED.
[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February
24, 1997]
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,
vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk
of Court VI, Shari'a District
Court, Marawi
City,respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and
presumably still is) a sales
representative (or coordinator) of
E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd.
of Davao City, a real estate and
housing company. Ashari M.
Alauya is the incumbent executive
clerk of court of the 4th Judicial
Shari'a District in Marawi City.
They were classmates, and used
to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's
agency, a contract was executed
for the purchase on installments
by Alauya of one of the housing
units belonging to the above
mentioned firm (hereafter, simply
Villarosa & Co.); and in connection
therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National
Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more
precisely on December 15, 1995,
Alauya addressed a letter to the

President of Villarosa & Co.

advising of the termination of his
contract with the company. He
wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially
withdrawing from and notifying
you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into
between me and your company,
as represented by your Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI,
of your company's branch office
here in Cagayan de Oro City, on
the grounds that my consent was
vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the aforesaid sales
agent which made said contract
void ab initio. Said sales agent
acting in bad faith perpetrated
such illegal and unauthorized acts
which made said contract an
Onerous Contract prejudicial to
my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in
considerable detail and quite
acerbic language on the "grounds
which could evidence the bad
faith, deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the
unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and
closed with the plea that Villarosa
& Co. "agree for the mutual
rescission of our contract, even as
I inform you that I categorically
state on record that I am
terminating the contract **. I
hope I do not have to resort to

any legal action before said

onerous and manipulated contract
against my interest be annulled. I
was actually fooled by your sales
agent, hence the need to annul
the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to
the Vice-President of Villarosa &
Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City. The envelope
containing it, and which actually
went through the post, bore no
stamps. Instead at the right hand
corner above the description of
the addressee, the words, "Free
Postage PD 26," had been
typed.
On the same date, December 15,
1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr.
Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President,
Credit & Collection Group of the
National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo
Village, Makati City, repudiating
as fraudulent and void his
contract with Villarosa & Co.; and
asking for cancellation of his
housing loan in connection
therewith, which was payable
from salary deductions at the rate
of P4,338.00 a month. Among
other things, he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I
am terminating, as I hereby annul,
cancel, rescind and voided, the
'manipulated contract' entered
into between me and the E.B.
Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as
represented by its sales

agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI,

who maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated said contract and
unlawfully secured and pursued
the housing loan without my
authority and against my will.
Thus, the contract itself is
deemed to be voidab initio in view
of the attending circumstances,
that my consent was vitiated by
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit,
dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no
meeting of the minds between me
and the swindling sales agent who
concealed the real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa &
Co., he narrated in some detail
what he took to be the anomalous
actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to
Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated
February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996,
and May 3, 1996, in all of which,
for the same reasons already
cited, he insisted on the
cancellation of his housing loan
and discontinuance of deductions
from his salary on account
thereof.a He also wrote on January
18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M.
Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal
Management & Budget Office, and
to the Chief, Finance Division,
both of this Court, to stop
deductions from his salary in
relation to the loan in question,
again asserting the anomalous
manner by which he was allegedly
duped into entering into the

contracts by "the scheming sales

agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996,
the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme
Court requesting it to stop
deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan
"effective May 1996," and began
negotiating with Villarosa & Co.
"for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's)
mortgage, and ** the refund of **
(his) payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to
Villarosa & Co. of December 15,
1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this
Court a verified complaint dated
January 25, 1996 -- to which she
appended a copy of the letter,
and of the above mentioned
envelope bearing the typewritten
words, "Free Postage PD
26."[1] In that complaint, she
accused Alauya of:
1.
"Imputation of malicious
and libelous charges with no solid
grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2.
"Causing undue injury to,
and blemishing her honor and
established reputation;"
3.
"Unauthorized enjoyment of
the privilege of free postage **;"
and
4.
Usurpation of the title of
"attorney," which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar
may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references

to her as "unscrupulous, swindler,
forger, manipulator, etc." without
"even a bit of evidence to cloth
(sic) his allegations with the
essence of truth," denouncing his
imputations as irresponsible, "all
concoctions, lies, baseless and
coupled with manifest ignorance
and evident bad faith," and
asserting that all her dealings with
Alauya had been regular and
completely transparent. She
closed with the plea that Alauya
"be dismissed from the service, or
be appropriately disciplined (sic)
** "
The Court resolved to order
Alauya to comment on the
complaint. Conformably with
established usage that notices of
resolutions emanate from the
corresponding Office of the Clerk
of Court, the notice of resolution
in this case was signed by Atty.
Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant
Division Clerk of Court.[2]
Alauya first submitted a
"Preliminary Comment"[3] in which
he questioned the authority of
Atty. Marasigan to require an
explanation of him, this power
pertaining, according to him, not
to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of
Court investigating an Executive
Clerk of Court." but only to the
District Judge, the Court
Administrator or the Chief Justice,
and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a

"strong link" between Ms. Alawi

and Atty. Marasigan's office. He
also averred that the complaint
had no factual basis; Alawi was
envious of him for being not only
"the Executive Clerk of court and
ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and
District Registrar," but also "a
scion of a Royal Family **."[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty.
Marasigan, but this time in much
less aggressive, even obsequious
tones,[5] Alauya requested the
former to give him a copy of the
complaint in order that he might
comment thereon.[6] He stated
that his acts as clerk of court were
done in good faith and within the
confines of the law; and that
Sophia Alawi as sales agent of
Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying
his signature, fraudulently bound
him to a housing loan contract
entailing monthly deductions
of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter
submitted under date of June 5,
1996, Alauya contended that it
was he who had suffered "undue
injury, mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and
untold financial suffering,"
considering that in six months, a
total of P26,028.60 had been
deducted from his salary.[7] He
declared that there was no basis
for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa &
Co. he had merely acted in
defense of his rights. He denied

any abuse of the franking

privilege, saying that he
gave P20.00 plus transportation
fare to a subordinate whom he
entrusted with the mailing of
certain letters; that the words:
"Free Postage PD 26," were
typewritten on the envelope by
some other person, an averment
corroborated by the affidavit of
Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
(subscribed and sworn to before
respondent himself, and attached
to the comment as Annex J);[8] and
as far as he knew, his subordinate
mailed the letters with the use of
the money he had given for
postage, and if those letters were
indeed mixed with the official mail
of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an
honest mistake.[9]
Alauya justified his use of the title,
"attorney," by the assertion that it
is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law," a title to
which Shari'a lawyers have a
rightful claim, adding that he
prefers the title of "attorney"
because "counsellor" is often
mistaken for "councilor,"
"konsehal or the Maranao term
"consial," connoting a local
legislator beholden to the mayor.
Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's
compassion, alleging that what he
did "is expected of any man
unduly prejudiced and

injured."[10] He claims he was

manipulated into reposing his
trust in Alawi, a classmate and
friend.[11] He was induced to sign a
blank contract on Alawi's
assurance that she would show
the completed document to him
later for correction, but she had
since avoided him; despite
"numerous letters and follow-ups"
he still does not know where the
property -- subject of his
supposed agreement with Alawi's
principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is
situated;[12] He says Alawi
somehow got his GSIS policy from
his wife, and although she
promised to return it the next day,
she did not do so until after
several months. He also claims
that in connection with his
contract with Villarosa & Co.,
Alawi forged his signature on such
pertinent documents as those
regarding the down payment,
clearance, lay-out, receipt of the
key of the house, salary
deduction, none of which he ever
saw.[13]

Averring in fine that his acts in

question were done without
malice, Alauya prays for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack
of merit, it consisting of
"fallacious, malicious and baseless
allegations," and complainant
Alawi having come to the Court
with unclean hands, her
complicity in the fraudulent
housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in
contrast to his two (2) letters to
Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan
(dated April 19, 1996 and April 22,
1996), and his two (2) earlier
letters both dated December 15,
1996 -- all of which he signed as
"Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his
Comment of June 5, 1996, he does
not use the title but refers to
himself as "DATU ASHARY M.
ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the
Office of the Court Administrator
for evaluation, report and
recommendation.[14]
The first accusation against
Alauya is that in his aforesaid
letters, he made "malicious and
libelous charges (against Alawi)
with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident
bad faith," resulting in "undue
injury to (her) and blemishing her
honor and established
reputation." In those letters,
Alauya had written inter alia that:

1)
Alawi obtained his consent
to the contracts in question "by
gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;"
2)
Alawi acted in bad faith and
perpetrated ** illegal and
unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial
to ** (his) rights and interests;"
3)
Alawi was an "unscrupulous
(and "swindling") sales agent"
who had fooled him by "deceit,
fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;" and
4)
Alawi had maliciously and
fraudulently manipulated the
contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued
the housing loan without ** (his)
authority and against ** (his) will,"
and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is
that in making these statements,
he was merely acting in defense
of his rights, and doing only what
"is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured," who had
suffered "mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded
feelings and untold financial
suffering," considering that in six
months, a total of P26,028.60 had
been deducted from his salary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA
6713) inter alia enunciates the

State policy of promoting a high

standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service.
[16]
Section 4 of the Code
commands that "(p)ublic officials
and employees ** at all times
respect the rights of others, and
** refrain from doing acts contrary
to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public
order, public safety and public
interest."[17] More than once has
this Court emphasized that "the
conduct and behavior of every
official and employee of an
agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the
presiding judge to the most junior
clerk, should be circumscribed
with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct must
at all times be characterized by,
among others, strict propriety and
decorum so as to earn and keep
the respect of the public for the
judiciary."[18]
Now, it does not appear to the
Court consistent with good
morals, good customs or public
policy, or respect for the rights of
others, to couch denunciations of
acts believed -- however sincerely
-- to be deceitful, fraudulent or
malicious, in excessively
intemperate. insulting or virulent
language. Alauya is evidently
convinced that he has a right of
action against Sophia Alawi. The
law requires that he exercise that
right with propriety, without

malice or vindictiveness, or undue

harm to anyone; in a manner
consistent with good morals, good
customs, public policy, public
order, supra; or otherwise stated,
that he "act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good
faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or
vindication of right cannot justify
resort to vituperative language, or
downright name-calling. As a
member of the Shari'a Bar and an
officer of a Court, Alawi is subject
to a standard of conduct more
stringent than for most other
government workers. As a man of
the law, he may not use language
which is abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing, or
otherwise improper.[20] As a
judicial employee, it is expected
that he accord respect for the
person and the rights of others at
all times, and that his every act
and word should be characterized
by prudence, restraint, courtesy,
dignity. His radical deviation from
these salutary norms might
perhaps be mitigated, but cannot
be excused, by his strongly held
conviction that he had been
grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the
title of "Attorney," this Court has
already had occasion to declare
that persons who pass the Shari'a
Bar are not full-fledged members
of the Philippine Bar, hence may
only practice law before Shari'a

courts.[21] While one who has been

admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and
one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be
considered "counsellors," in the
sense that they give counsel or
advice in a professional capacity,
only the latter is an "attorney."
The title of "attorney" is reserved
to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of
law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who
are authorized to practice law in
this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to
use the title, "counsellor" or
"counsellor-at-law," because in his
region, there are pejorative
connotations to the term, or it is
confusingly similar to that given
to local legislators. The
ratiocination, valid or not, is of no
moment. His disinclination to use
the title of "counsellor" does not
warrant his use of the title of
attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's
alleged unauthorized use of the
franking privilege, the record
contains no evidence adequately
establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari
M. Alauya is hereby
REPRIMANDED for the use of

excessively intemperate, insulting

or virulent language, i.e.,
language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title
of attorney; and he is warned that
any similar or other impropriety or
misconduct in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18727
August 31, 1964
JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendantappellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenorappellant.
Jose W. Diokno for plaintiffappellee.
Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L.
Hofilea for defendant-appellant.
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as
intervenor-appellants.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is a proving in quo
warranto originally filed in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu.
The office in contention is that of
Administrator of the Hospicio de
San Jose de Barili. Judgment was
rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor
of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and
appealed to us by the defendant,
Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the
intervenor, Romulo Cui.

The Hospicio is a charitable

institution established by the
spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa
Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for
the care and support, free of
charge, of indigent invalids, and
incapacitated and helpless
persons." It acquired corporate
existence by legislation (Act No.
3239 of the Philippine Legislature
passed 27 November 1925) and
endowed with extensive
properties by the said spouses
through a series of donations,
principally the deed of donation
executed on 2 January 1926.
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave
the initial management to the
founders jointly and, in case of
their incapacity or death, to "such
persons as they may nominate or
designate, in the order prescribed
to them." Section 2 of the deed of
donation provides as follows:
Que en caso de nuestro
fallecimiento o incapacidad para
administrar, nos sustituyan
nuestro legitime sobrino Mariano
Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra
muerte o incapacidad se hallare
residiendo en la caudad de Cebu,
y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio
Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho
sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese
residiendo entonces en la caudad
de Cebu, designamos en su lugar
a nuestro otro sobrino legitime
Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos
administraran conjuntamente el
HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI.

A la muerte o incapacidad de
estos dos administradores, la
administracion del HOSPICIO DE
SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una
sola persona que sera el varon,
mayor de edad, que descienda
legitimainente de cualquiera de
nuestros sobrinos legitimos
Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente
Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo
de abogado, o medico, o
ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a
falta de estos titulos, el que pague
al Estado mayor impuesto o
contribution. En igualdad de
circumstancias, sera preferida el
varon de mas edad descendiente
de quien tenia ultimamente la
administracion. Cuando
absolutamente faltare persona de
estas cualificaciones, la
administracion del HOSPICIO DE
SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al
senor Obispo de Cebu o quien sea
el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia
Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que
tuviere asiento en la cabecera de
esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su
defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de
Cebu.
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and
his widow continued to administer
the Hospicio until her death in
1929. Thereupon the
administration passed to Mauricio
Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The
first died on 8 May 1931 and the
second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July
1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of
Mauricio Cui, became the

administrator. Thereafter,
beginning in 1932, a series of
controversies and court litigations
ensued concerning the position of
administrator, to which, in so far
as they are pertinent to the
present case, reference will be
made later in this decision.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and
defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are
brothers, being the sons of
Mariano Cui, one of the nephews
of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and
Doa Benigna Cui. On 27 February
1960 the then incumbent
administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui,
resigned in favor of Antonio Ma.
Cui pursuant to a "convenio"
entered into between them and
embodied in a notarial document.
The next day, 28 February,
Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of
office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however,
had no prior notice of either the
"convenio" or of his brother's
assumption of the position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August
1960; on 5 September 1960 the
plaintiff wrote a letter to the
defendant demanding that the
office be turned over to him; and
on 13 September 1960, the
demand not having been
complied with the plaintiff filed
the complaint in this case. Romulo
Cui later on intervened, claiming a
right to the same office, being a
grandson of Vicente Cui, another
one of the nephews mentioned by

the founders of the Hospicio in

their deed of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the
main issue turns upon their
respective qualifications to the
position of administrator. Jesus is
the older of the two and therefore
under equal circumstances would
be preferred pursuant to section 2
of the deed of donation. However,
before the test of age may be,
applied the deed gives preference
to the one, among the legitimate
descendants of the nephews
therein named, "que posea titulo
de abogado, o medico, o
ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a
falta de estos titulos el que pague
al estado mayor impuesto o
contribucion."
The specific point in dispute is the
mealing of the term "titulo de
abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the
degree of Bachelor of Laws from
the University of Santo Tomas
(Class 1926) but is not a member
of the Bar, not having passed the
examinations to qualify him as
one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other
hand, is a member of the Bar and
although disbarred by this Court
on 29 March 1957 (administrative
case No. 141), was reinstated by
resolution promulgated on 10
February 1960, about two weeks
before he assumed the position of
administrator of the Hospicio de
Barili.

The Court a quo, in deciding this

point in favor of the plaintiff, said
that the phrase "titulo de
abogado," taken alone, means
that of a full-fledged lawyer, but
that has used in the deed of
donation and considering the
function or purpose of the
administrator, it should not be
given a strict interpretation but a
liberal one," and therefore means
a law degree or diploma of
Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is
assailed as erroneous both by the
defendant and by the intervenor.
We are of the opinion, that
whether taken alone or in context
the term "titulo de abogado"
means not mere possession of the
academic degree of Bachelor of
Laws but membership in the Bar
after due admission thereto,
qualifying one for the practice of
law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is
defined as "testimonies o
instrumento dado para ejercer un
empleo, dignidad o profesion"
(Diccionario de la Lengua
Espaola, Real Academia
Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and
the word "abogado," as follows:
"Perito en el derecho positivo que
se dedica a defender en juicio, por
escrito o de palabra, los derechos
o intereses de los litigantes, y
tambien a dar dictmen sobre las
cuestiones o puntos legales que
se le consultan (Id., p.5) A
Bachelor's degree alone,
conferred by a law school upon

completion of certain academic

requirements, does not entitle its
holder to exercise the legal
profession. The English equivalent
of "abogado" is lawyer or
attorney-at-law. This term has a
fixed and general signification,
and has reference to that class of
persons who are by license
officers of the courts, empowered
to appear, prosecute and defend,
and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are
devolved by law as a
consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to
the Bar and to the practice of law
is under the authority of the
Supreme Court. According to Rule
138 such admission requires
passing the Bar examinations,
taking the lawyer's oath and
receiving a certificate from the
Clerk of Court, this certificate
being his license to practice the
profession. The academic degree
of Bachelor of Laws in itself has
little to do with admission to the
Bar, except as evidence of
compliance with the requirements
that an applicant to the
examinations has "successfully
completed all the prescribed
courses, in a law school or
university, officially approved by
the Secretary of Education." For
this purpose, however, possession
of the degree itself is not
indispensable: completion of the
prescribed courses may be shown

in some other way. Indeed there

are instances, particularly under
the former Code of Civil
Procedure, where persons who
had not gone through any formal
legal education in college were
allowed to take the Bar
examinations and to qualify as
lawyers. (Section 14 of that code
required possession of "the
necessary qualifications of
learning ability.") Yet certainly it
would be incorrect to say that
such persons do not possess the
"titulo de abogado" because they
lack the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws from some law
school or university.
The founders of the Hospicio de
San Jose de Barili must have
established the foregoing test
advisely, and provided in the deed
of donation that if not a lawyer,
the administrator should be a
doctor or a civil engineer or a
pharmacist, in that order; or
failing all these, should be the one
who pays the highest taxes
among those otherwise qualified.
A lawyer, first of all, because
under Act No. 3239 the managers
or trustees of the Hospicio shall
"make regulations for the
government of said institution
(Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the
conditions subject to which
invalids and incapacitated and
destitute persons may be
admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3,
d); shall see to it that the rules

and conditions promulgated for

admission are not in conflict with
the provisions of the Act; and shall
administer properties of
considerable value for all of
which work, it is to be presumed,
a working knowledge of the law
and a license to practice the
profession would be a distinct
asset.
Under this particular criterion we
hold that the plaintiff is not
entitled, as against the defendant,
to the office of administrator. But
it is argued that although the
latter is a member of the Bar he is
nevertheless disqualified by virtue
of paragraph 3 of the deed of
donation, which provides that the
administrator may be removed on
the ground, among others, of
ineptitude in the discharge of his
office or lack of evident sound
moral character. Reference is
made to the fact that the
defendant was disbarred by this
Court on 29 March 1957 for
immorality and unprofessional
conduct. It is also a fact, however,
that he was reinstated on 10
February 1960, before he
assumed the office of
administrator. His reinstatement is
a recognition of his moral
rehabilitation, upon proof no less
than that required for his
admission to the Bar in the first
place.
Wherefore, the parties
respectfully pray that the

foregoing stipulation of facts be

admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing
other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1wph1.t
Whether or not the applicant shall
be reinstated rests to a great
extent in the sound discretion of
the court. The court action will
depend, generally speaking, on
whether or not it decides that the
public interest in the orderly and
impartial administration of justice
will be conserved by the
applicant's participation therein in
the capacity of an attorney and
counselor at law. The applicant
must, like a candidate for
admission to the bar, satisfy the
court that he is a person of good
moral character a fit and proper
person to practice law. The court
will take into consideration the
applicant's character and standing
prior to the disbarment, the
nature and character of the
charge for which he was
disbarred, his conduct subsequent
to the disbarment, and the time
that has elapsed between the
disbarment and the application for
reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec.
301, p. 443)
Evidence of reformation is
required before applicant is
entitled to reinstatement,
notwithstanding the attorney has
received a pardon following his

conviction, and the requirements

for reinstatement have been held
to be the same as for original
admission to the bar, except that
the court may require a greater
degree of proof than in an original
admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney &
Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)
The decisive questions on an
application for reinstatement are
whether applicant is "of good
moral character" in the sense in
which that phrase is used when
applied to attorneys-at-law and is
a fit and proper person to be
entrusted with the privileges of
the office of an attorney, and
whether his mental qualifications
are such as to enable him to
discharge efficiently his duty to
the public, and the moral
attributes are to be regarded as a
separate and distinct from his
mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S.,
Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p.
816).
As far as moral character is
concerned, the standard required
of one seeking reinstatement to
the office of attorney cannot be
less exacting than that implied in
paragraph 3 of the deed of
donation as a requisite for the
office which is disputed in this
case. When the defendant was
restored to the roll of lawyers the
restrictions and disabilities
resulting from his previous
disbarment were wiped out.

This action must fail on one other

ground: it is already barred by
lapse of time amounting the
prescription or laches. Under
Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly
sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from
section 216 of Act 190), this kind
of action must be filed within one
(1) year after the right of plaintiff
to hold the office arose.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed
himself entitled to the office in
question as long ago as 1932. On
January 26 of that year he filed a
complaint in quo warranto against
Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the
administration of the Hospicio on
2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the
plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma.
Cui came in as intervenors. The
case was dismissed by the Court
of First Instance upon a demurrer
by the defendant there to the
complaint and complaint in
intervention. Upon appeal to the
Supreme Court from the order of
dismissal, the case was remanded
for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui,
60 Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff,
however, did not prosecute the
case as indicated in the decision
of this Court, but acceded to an
arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui
continued as administrator,
Mariano Cui was named "legal
adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui
accepted a position as assistant
administrator.
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to
get the position by a series of

extra-judicial maneuvers. First he

informed the Social Welfare
Commissioner, by letter dated 1
February 1950, that as of the
previous 1 January he had "made
clear" his intention of occupying
the office of administrator of
the Hospicio." He followed that up
with another letter dated 4
February, announcing that he had
taken over the administration as
of 1 January 1950. Actually,
however, he took his oath of office
before a notary public only on 4
March 1950, after receiving a
reply of acknowledgment, dated 2
March, from the Social Welfare
Commissioner, who thought that
he had already assumed the
position as stated in his
communication of 4 February
1950. The rather muddled
situation was referred by the
Commissioner to the Secretary of
Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3
April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950),
correcting another opinion
previously given, in effect ruled
that the plaintiff, not beings
lawyer, was not entitled to the
administration of the Hospicio.
Meanwhile, the question again
became the subject of a court
controversy. On 4 March 1950,
theHospicio commenced an action
against the Philippine National
Bank in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because
the Bank had frozen
the Hospicio's deposits therein.

The Bank then filed a third-party

complaint against herein plaintiffappellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had,
as stated above, taken oath as
administrator. On 19 October
1950, having been deprived of
recognition by the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice he moved to
dismiss the third-party complaint
on the ground that he was
relinquishing "temporarily" his
claim to the administration of
the Hospicio. The motion was
denied in an order dated 2
October 1953. On 6 February
1954 he was able to take another
oath of office as administrator
before President Magsaysay, and
soon afterward filed a second
motion to dismiss in Civil case No.
R-1216. President Magsaysay, be
it said, upon learning that a case
was pending in Court, stated in a
telegram to his Executive
Secretary that "as far as (he) was
concerned the court may
disregard the oath" thus taken.
The motion to dismiss was
granted nevertheless and the
other parties in the case filed their
notice of appeal from the order of
dismissal. The plaintiff then filed
an ex-parte motion to be excluded
as party in the appeal and the
trial Court again granted the
motion. This was on 24 November
1954. Appellants thereupon
instituted
a mandamus proceeding in the
Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540),
which was decided on 28 May

1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma.

Cui should be included in the
appeal. That appeal, however,
after it reached this Court was
dismiss upon motion of the
parties, who agreed that "the
office of administrator and trustee
of the Hospicio ... should be
ventilated in quo
warranto proceedings to be
initiated against the incumbent by
whomsoever is not occupying the
office but believes he has a right
to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The
resolution of dismissal was issued
31 July 1956. At that time the
incumbent administrator was Dr.
Teodoro Cui, but no action in quo
warranto was filed against him by
plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated
in the aforesaid motion for
dismissal.
On 10 February 1960, defendant
Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by
this Court as member of the Bar,
and on the following 27 February
Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as
administrator in his favor,
pursuant to the "convenio"
between them executed on the
same date. The next day Antonio
Ma. Cui took his oath of office.
The failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute his claim judicially after
this Court decided the first case
of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil.
3769), remanding it to the trial
court for further proceedings; his
acceptance instead of the position
of assistant administrator,

allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to

continue as administrator and his
failure to file an action in quo
warranto against said Dr. Cui after
31 July 1956, when the appeal in
Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu
Court was dismissed upon motion
of the parties precisely so that the
conflicting claims of the parties
could be ventilated in such an
action all these circumstances
militate against the plaintiff's
present claim in view of the rule
that an action in quo
warranto must be filed within one
year after the right of the plaintiff
to hold the office arose. The
excuse that the plaintiff did not
file an action against Dr. Teodoro
Cui after 31 July 1956 because of
the latter's illness did not
interrupt the running of the
statutory period. And the fact that
this action was filed within one
year of the defendant's
assumption of office in September
1960 does not make the plaintiff's
position any better, for the basis
of the action is his own right to
the office and it is from the time
such right arose that the one-year
limitation must be counted, not
from the date the incumbent
began to discharge the duties of
said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38
Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil.
161.
Now for the claim of intervenor
and appellant Romulo Cui. This
party is also a lawyer, grandson of

Vicente Cui, one of the nephews

of the founders of
the Hospicio mentioned by them
in the deed of donation. He is
further, in the line of succession,
than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui,
who is a son of Mariano Cui,
another one of the said nephews.
The deed of donation provides: "a
la muerte o incapacidad de estos
administradores (those appointed
in the deed itself) pasara a una
sola persona que sera el varon,
mayor de edad, que descienda
legitimamente de cualquiera de
nuestros sobrinos legitimos
Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente
Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo
de abogado ... En igualdad de
circumstancias, sera preferido el
varon de mas edad descendiente
de quien tenia ultimamente la
administration." Besides being a
nearer descendant than Romulo
Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than
he and therefore is preferred
when the circumstances are
otherwise equal. The intervenor
contends that the intention of the
founders was to confer the
administration by line and
successively to the descendants
of the nephews named in the
deed, in the order they are
named. Thus, he argues, since the
last administrator was Dr. Teodoro
Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio
Cui line, the next administrator
must come from the line of
Vicente Cui, to whom the
intervenor belongs. This

interpretation, however, is not

justified by the terms of the deed
of donation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment
appealed from is reversed and set
aside, and the complaint as well
as the complaint in intervention
are dismissed, with costs equally
against plaintiff-appellee and
intervenor-appellant.

bar. Every applicant for

admission as a member of the bar
must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral
character, and resident of the
Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good
moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving
moral turpitude, have been filed
or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.
Republic Act No. 9225
August 29, 2003

The 1987 Constitution Art.XII

Sec 1 4
Section 14. The sustained
development of a reservoir of
national talents consisting of
Filipino scientists, entrepreneurs,
professionals, managers, highlevel technical manpower and
skilled workers and craftsmen in
all fields shall be promoted by the
State. The State shall encourage
appropriate technology and
regulate its transfer for the
national benefit.

ROC.Rule 138 Sec. 2

Section 2. Requirements for all
applicants for admission to the

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP

OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO
ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS
AMENDED AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Short Title this act
shall be known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003."
Section 2. Declaration of
Policy - It is hereby declared the
policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine

citizenship under the conditions of

this Act.
Section 3. Retention of
Philippine Citizenship - Any
provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born
citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby
deemed to have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking
the following oath of allegiance to
the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemny
swear (or affrim) that I will
support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; and
that I imposed this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of
evasion."
Natural born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative
Citizenship - The unmarried
child, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted, below

eighteen (18) years of age, of

those who re-acquire Philippine
citizenship upon effectivity of this
Act shall be deemed citizenship of
the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political
Rights and Liabilities - Those
who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights
and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following
conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise
their right of surffrage must Meet
the requirements under Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as "The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003" and other
existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public
in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such
public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws
and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public
office shall subscribe and swear to
an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and its
duly constituted authorities prior

to their assumption of
office: Provided, That they
renounce their oath of allegiance
to the country where they took
that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice
their profession in the Philippines
shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice; and

Section 8. Effectivity
Clause This Act shall take effect
after fifteen (15) days following its
publication in theOfficial
Gazette or two (2) newspaper of
general circulation.

A.C. No. 3405 June 29, 1998

(5) That right to vote or be

elected or appointed to any public
office in the Philippines cannot be
exercised by, or extended to,
those who:

JULIETA B.
NARAG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DOMINADOR M.
NARAG, respondent.

(a) are candidates for or are

occupying any public office in the
country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or

PER CURIAM:

(b) are in active service as

commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the
armed forces of the country which
they are naturalized citizens.
Section 6. Separability
Clause - If any section or
provision of this Act is held
unconstitutional or invalid, any
other section or provision not
affected thereby shall remain
valid and effective.
Section 7. Repealing
Clause - All laws, decrees, orders,
rules and regulations inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

Good moral character is a

continuing qualification required
of every member of the bar. Thus,
when a lawyer fails to meet the
exacting standard of moral
integrity, the Supreme Court may
withdraw his or her privilege to
practice law.
On November 13, 1989, Mrs.
Julieta B. Narag filed an
administrative complaint 1 for
disbarment against her
husband, Atty. Dominador M.
Narag, whom she accused of
having violated Canons 1 and
6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Ethics for Lawyers. 2
The complainant narrated:

The St. Louis College of

Tuguegarao engaged the
services of Atty. Dominador M.
Narag in the early seventies as a
full-time college instructor in the
College of Arts and Sciences and
as a professor in the Graduate
School. In 1984, Ms. Gina
Espita, 17 years old and a first
year college student, enrolled
in subjects handled by Atty.
Narag. Exerting his influence as
her teacher, and as a prominent
member of the legal profession
and then member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of
Tuguegarao, Atty. Narag courted
Ms. Espita, gradually lessening
her resistance until the student
acceded to his wishes.
They then maintained an illicit
relationship known in various
circles in the community, but
which they managed to from me.
It therefore came as a terrible
embar[r]assment to me, with
unspeakable grief and pain when
my husband abandoned us, his
family, to live with Ms. Espita, in
utterly scandalous circumstances.
It appears that Atty. Narag used
his power and influence as a
member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Cagayan to cause
the employment of Ms. Espita at
the Department of Trade and
Industry Central Office at Makati,
Metro Manila. Out of gratitude
perhaps, for this gesture, Ms.
Espita agreed to live with Atty.

Narag, her sense of

right[e]ousness and morals
completely corrupted by a
member of the Bar.
It is now a common knowledge in
the community that Atty.
Dominador M. Narag has
abandoned us, his family, to live
with a 22-year-old woman, who
was his former student in the
tertiary level[.] 3
This Court, in a Resolution dated
December 18, 1989, referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. 4
On June 26, 1990, the office of
then Chief Justice Marcelo B.
Fernan received from complainant
another letter seeking the
dismissal of the administrative
complaint. She alleged therein
that (1) she fabricated the
allegations in her complaint to
humiliate and spite her husband;
(2) all the love letters between
the respondent and Gina Espita
were forgeries; and (3) she was
suffering from "emotional
confusion arising from extreme
jealousy." The truth, she stated,
was that her husband had
remained a faithful and
responsible family man. She
further asserted that he had
neither entered into an amorous
relationship with one Gina Espita
nor abandoned his
family. 5 Supporting her letter

were an Affidavit of
Desistance 6 and a Motion to
Dismiss, 7 attached as Annexes A
and B, which she filed before the
IBP commission on bar
discipline. 8 In a Decision dared
October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of
Governors 9 dismissed the
complaint of Mrs. Narag for failure
to prosecute. 10
The case took an unexpected turn
when, on November 25, 1991, this
Court 11 received another
letter 12 from the complainant,
with her seven
children 13 as co-signatories, again
appealing for the disbarment of
her husband. She explained that
she had earlier dropped the case
against him because of his
continuous threats against her. 14
In his Comment on the
complainant's letter of November
11, 1991, filed in compliance with
this Court's Resolution issued on
July 6, 1992, 15 respondent prayed
that the decision of the Board of
Governors be affirmed. Denying
that he had threatened, harassed
or intimidated his wife, he alleged
that she had voluntarily executed
her Affidavit of Desistance 16and
Motion to Dismiss, 17 even
appearing before the investigating
officer, Commissioner Racela, to
testify under oath "that she
prepared the Motion to Dismiss
and Affidavit of Desistance on her
own free will and affirmed the
contents thereof."

In addition, he professed his love

for his wife and his children and
denied abandoning his family to
live with his paramour. However,
he described his wife as a person
emotionally disturbed, viz:
What is pitiable here is the fact
that Complainant is an incurably
jealous and possessive woman,
and every time the streak of
jealousy rears its head, she fires
off letters or complaints against
her husband in every conceivable
forum, all without basis, and
purely on impulse, just to satisfy
the consuming demands of her
"loving" jealousy. Then, as is her
nature, a few hours afterwards,
when her jealousy cools off, she
repents and feels sorry for her
acts against the Respondent.
Thus, when she wrote the Letter
of November 11, 1991, she was
then in the grips of one of her
bouts of jealousy.18
On August 24, 1992, this Court
issued another Resolution
referring the Comment of
respondent to the IBP. 19 In the
hearing before IBP Commissioner
Plaridel C. Jose, respondent
alleged the following: 20
2. Your Respondent comes from
very poor parents who have left
him not even a square meter of
land, but gave him the best
legacy in life: a purposeful and
meaningful education.
Complainant comes from what

she claims to be very rich parents

who value material possession
more than education and the
higher and nobler aspirations in
life. Complainant abhors the poor.
3. Your Respondent has a loving
upbringing, nurtured in the gentle
ways of love, forgiveness,
humility, and concern for the poor.
Complainant was reared and
raised in an entirely different
environment. Her value system is
the very opposite.
4. Your Respondent loves his
family very dearly, and has done
all he could in thirty-eight (38)
years of marriage to protect and
preserve his family. He gave his
family sustenance, a comfortable
home, love, education,
companionship, and most of all, a
good and respected name. He
was always gentle and
compassionate to his wife and
children. Even in the most trying
times, he remained calm and
never inflicted violence on them.
His children are all now fullfledged professionals, mature,
and gainfully employed. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Your Respondent subscribes to the
sanctity of marriage as a social
institution.
On the other hand, consumed by
insane and unbearable jealousy,
Complainant has been
systematically and unceasingly

destroying the very foundations of

their marriage and their family.
Their marriage has become a
torture chamber in which Your
Respondent has been incessantly
BEATEN, BATTERED, BRUTALIZED,
TORTURED, ABUSED, and
HUMILIATED, physically, mentally,
and emotionally, by the
Complainant, in public and at
home. Their marriage has become
a nightmare.
For thirty-eight years, your
Respondent suffered in silence
and bore the pain of his
misfortune with dignity and with
almost infinite patience, if only to
preserve their family and their
marriage. But this is not to be.
The Complainant never mellowed
and never became gentl[e],
loving, and understanding. In fact,
she became more fierce and
predatory.
Hence, at this point in time, the
light at the tunnel for Your
Respondent does not seem in
sight. The darkness continues to
shroud the marital and familial
landscape.
Your Respondent has to undergo a
catharsis, a liberation from
enslavement. Paraphrasing
Dorfman in "Death and the
Maiden", can the torturer and the
tortured co-exist and live
together?
Hence, faced with an absolutely
uncomprehending and

uncompromising mind whose only

obsession now is to destroy,
destroy, and destroy, Your
Respondent, with perpetual regret
and with great sorrow, filed a
Petition for Annulment of
Marriage, Spl. Proc. No. 566, RTC,
Branch III, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. .
..
5. Complainant is a violent
husband-beater, vitriolic and
unbending. But your Respondent
never revealed these destructive
qualities to other people. He
preserved the good name and
dignity of his wife. This is in
compliance with the marital vow
to love, honor or obey your
spouse, for better or for worse, in
sickness and in health . . . Even in
this case, Your Respondent never
revealed anything derogatory to
his wife. It is only now that he is
constrained to reveal all these
things to defend himself.
On the other hand, for no reason
at all, except a jealous rage,
Complainant tells everyone,
everywhere, that her husband is
worthless, good-for-nothing, evil
and immoral. She goes to colleges
and universities, professional
organizations, religious societies,
and all other sectors of the
community to tell them how evil,
bad and immoral her husband is.
She tells them not to hire him as
professor, as Counsel, or any
other capacity because her
husband is evil, bad, and immoral.

Is this love? Since when did love

become an instrument to destroy
a man's dearest possession in life
his good name, reputation and
dignity?
Because of Complainant's virulent
disinformation campaign against
her husband, employing every
unethical and immoral means to
attain his ends, Your Respondent
has been irreparably and
irreversibly disgraced, shamed,
and humiliated. Your Respondent
is not a scandalous man. It is he
who has been mercilessly
scandalized and crucified by the
Complainant. 21
To prove the alleged propensity of
his wife to file false charges,
respondent presented as evidence
the following list of the complaints
she had filed against him and
Gina Espita:
3.1 Complaint for
Immorality/Neglect of Duty . . .
3.2 Complaint for
Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG,
Adm. Case No. P-5-90. . . .
3.3 Complaint for Concubinage.
Provincial Prosecutor's Office of
Cagayan. I.S No. 89-114. . . .
3.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices and
concubinage. OMBUDSMAN Case
No. 1-92-0083. . . .

3.5 Complaint for Civil Support.

RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case No.
4061. DISMISSED.
3.6 Complaint for Concubinage.
Provincial Prosecutor's Office of
Cagayan. I.S. No. 92-109.
DISMISSED. (. . .). Complainant
filed Motion for Reconsideration.
DENIED. (. . .).
3.7 Complaint for Disbarment
(. . .) with S[upreme] C[ourt].
Withdrawn (. . .). DISMISSED by
IBP Board of Governors (. . .). Reinstituted (. . .).
3.8 Complaint for Disbarment,
again (. . .). Adm. Case No. 3405.
Pending.
3.9 Complaint for Concubinage,
again (. . .). Third MCTC, Tumauini,
Isabela. Pending. . . . 22
In his desperate effort to
exculpate himself, he averred:
I. That all the alleged love letters
and envelopes (. . .), picture (. . .)
are inadmissible in evidence as
enunciated by the Supreme Court
in "Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of
Appeals, et.al.", G.R. No. 107383,
February 20, 1996. (. . .).
xxx xxx xxx
II. That respondent is totally
innocent of the charges: He never
courted Gina Espita in the Saint
Louis College of Tuguegarao. He
never caused the employment of
said woman in the DTI. He never
had or is having any illicit

relationship with her anywhere, at

any time. He never lived with her
as husband and wife anywhere at
any time, be it in Centro Tumauini
or any of its barangays, or in any
other place. He never begot a
child or children with her. Finally,
respondent submits that all the
other allegations of Mrs. Narag
are false and fabricated, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
III. Respondent never abandoned
his family[.] Mrs. Narag and her
two sons forcibly drove
respondent Narag out of the
conjugal home. After that, Atty.
Narag tried to return to the
conjugal home many times with
the help of mutual friends to save
the marriage and the family from
collapse. He tried several times to
reconcile with Mrs. Narag. In fact,
in one of the hearings of the
disbarment case, he offered to
return home and to reconcile with
Mrs. Narag. But Mrs. Narag
refused all these efforts of
respondent Narag. . . .
IV. Complainant Julieta B. Narag is
an unbearably jealous, violent,
vindictive, scandalous, virulent
and merciless wife since the
beginning of the marriage, who
incessantly beat, battered,
brutalized, tortured, abuse[d],
scandalized, and humiliated
respondent Atty. Narag,
physically, mentally, emotionally,
and psychologically, . . .

V. Complainant Julieta Narag's

claim in her counter-manifestation
dated March 28, 1996, to the
effect that the affidavit of
Dominador B. Narag, Jr., dated
February 27, 1996 was obtained
through force and intimidation, is
not true. Dominador, Jr., executed
his affidavit freely, voluntarily,
and absolutely without force or
intimidation, as shown by the
transcript of stenographic notes of
the testimonies of Respondent
Atty. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC
Judge Dominador Garcia during
the trial of Criminal Case No.
12439, People vs. Dominador M.
Narag, et. al., before the
Tuguegarao MTC on May 3, 1996. .
..
xxx xxx xxx
VI. Respondent Atty. Narag is
now an old man a senior
citizen of 63 years sickly,
abandoned, disgraced,
weakened and debilitated by
progressively degenerative
gout and arthritis, and hardly
able to earn his own keep. His
very physical, medical,
psychological, and economic
conditions render him unfit and
unable to do the things attributed
to him by the complainant. Please
see the attached medical
certificates, . . ., among many
other similar certificates touching
on the same ailments.
Respondent is also suffering from
hypertension. 23

On July 18, 1997, the

investigating officer
submitted his
report, 24 recommending the
indefinite suspension of Atty.
Narag from the practice of
law. The material portions of said
report read as follows:
Culled from the voluminous
documentary and testimonial
evidence submitted by the
contending parties, two (2)
issues are relevant for the
disposition of the case,
namely:
a) Whether there was indeed
a commission of alleged
abandonment of respondent's
own family and [whether he
was] living with his paramour,
Gina Espita;
b) Whether the denial under
oath that his illegitimate
children with Gina Espita
(Aurelle Dominic and Kyle
Dominador) as appearing on
paragraph 1(g) of respondent's
Comment vis-a-vis his
handwritten love letters, the due
execution and contents of which,
although he objected to their
admissibility for being allegedly
forgeries, were never denied by
him on the witness stand
much less presented and
offered proof to support
otherwise.
Except for the testimonies of
respondent's witnesses whose

testimonies tend to depict the

complaining wife, Mrs. Narag, as
an incurably jealous wife and
possessive woman suffering
everytime with streaks of
jealousy, respondent did not
present himself on the
witness stand to testify and
be cross-examined on his
sworn comment; much less
did he present his alleged
paramour, Gina Espita, to
disprove the adulterous
relationship between him and
their having begotten their
illegitimate children, namely:
Aurelle Dominic N. Espita and Kyle
Dominador N. Espita. Worse,
respondent's denial that he is
the father of the two is a
ground for disciplinary
sanction (Morcayda v. Naz, 125
SCRA 467).
Viewed from all the evidence
presented, we find the respondent
subject to disciplinary action as a
member of the legal profession. 25
In its Resolution 26 issued on
August 23, 1997, the IBP
adopted and approved the
investigating commissioner's
recommendation for the
indefinite suspension of the
respondent. 27 Subsequently the
complaint sought the disbarment
of her husband in a
Manifestation/Comment she filed
on October 20, 1997. The IBP
granted this stiffer penalty and, in
its Resolution dated November 30,

1997, denied respondent's Motion

for Reconsideration.
After a careful scrutiny of the
records of the proceedings and
the evidence presented by the
parties, we find that the
conduct of respondent
warrants the imposition of the
penalty of disbarment.
The Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all
times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Thus, good moral character is
not only a condition
precedent to the practice of
law, but
a continuing qualification for
all members of the bar. Hence,
when a lawyer is found guilty of
gross immoral conduct, he may
be suspended or disbarred.29
Immoral conduct has been
defined as that conduct which

is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of
good and respectable
members of the
community. 30 Furthermore,
such conduct must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral.
That is, it must be so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high
degree 31 or committed under
such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency. 32
We explained in Barrientos vs.
Daarol 33 that, "as officers of the
court, lawyers must not only in
fact be of good moral character
but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading
lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the
community. More specifically, a
member of the Bar and officer of
the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous
relationships or the keeping of
mistresses but must also so
behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards."
Respondent Narag is accused
of gross immorality for
abandoning his family in order
to live with Gina Espita. The
burden of proof rests upon
the complainant, and the

Court will exercise its

disciplinary power only if she
establishes her case by clear,
convincing and satisfactory
evidence. 34
Presented by complainant as
witnesses, aside from
herself. 35 were: Charlie
Espita, 36 Magdalena
Bautista, 37Bienvenido
Eugenio, 38 Alice Carag, 39 Dr.
Jervis B. Narag, 40 Dominador
Narag, Jr., 41 and Nieves F.
Reyes. 42
Charlie Espita, brother of the
alleged paramour Gina Espita,
corroborated complainant's
charge against respondent in
these categorical statements
he gave to the investigating
officer:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know Atty.
Narag?
A Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in
partner of my sister, Gina Espita.
Q If Atty. Narag is here, can you
point [to] him?
A Yes, sir.
(Witness pointed to the
respondent, Atty. Dominador
Narag)
Q Why do you know Atty. Narag?
ATTY. NARAG:
Already answered. He said I am
the live-in partner.

CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT

A Because he is the live-in partner
of my sister and that they are now
living together as husband and
wife and that they already have
two children, Aurelle Dominic and
Kyle Dominador.
xxx xxx xxx
During cross-examination
conducted by the respondent
himself, Charlie Espita repeated
his account that his sister Gina
was living with the respondent,
with whom she had two children:
Q Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty.
Narag is now living with your
sister as husband and wife. You
claim that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you say that?
A Because at present you are
living together as husband and
wife and you have already two
children and I know that is really
an immoral act which you cannot
just allow me to follow since my
moral values don't allow me that
my sister is living with a married
man like you.
Q How do you know that Atty.
Narag is living with your sister?
Did you see them in the house?
A Yes, si[r].
xxx xxx xxx

Q You said also that Atty. Narag

and your sister have two children,
Aurelle Dominic and Kyle
Dominador, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q How do you know that they are
the children of Atty. Narag?
A Because you are staying
together in that house and you
have left your family. 44
In addition, Charlie Espita
admitted (1) that it was he who
handed to Mrs. Narag the love
letters respondent had sent to his
sister, and (2) that Atty. Narag
tried to dissuade him from
appearing at the disbarment
proceedings. 45
Witness Bienvenido Eugenio
strengthened the testimony of
Charlie Espita in this wise:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know the
respondent in this case?
A I know him very well, sir.
Q Could you please tell us why do
you know him?
A Because he was always going to
the house of my son-in-law by the
name of Charlie Espita.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mr. Eugenio, do you know the
residence of Atty. Dominador M.
Narag?

A At that time, he [was] residing

in the house of Reynaldo
Angubong, sir.
Q And this is located where?
A Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir.
Q And you specifically,
categorically state under oath
that this is the residence of Atty.
Narag?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And under oath this is where
Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are
allegedly living as husband and
wife, is it not?
A Yes, sir.

46

Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor

and friend of the estranged
couple, testified that she learned
from the Narag children Randy,
Bong and Rowena that their
father left his family, that she and
her husband prodded the
complainant to accept the
respondent back, that the Narag
couple again separated when the
respondent "went back to his
woman," and that Atty. Narag had
maltreated his wife. 47
On the strength of the testimony
of her witnesses, the
complainant was able to
establish that respondent
abandoned his family and
lived with another woman.
Absent any evidence showing that

these witnesses had an ill motive

to testify falsely against the
respondent, their testimonies are
deemed worthy of belief.
Further, the complainant
presented as evidence the love
letters that respondent had sent
to Gina. In these letters,
respondent clearly manifested his
love for Gina and her two children,
whom he acknowledged as his
own. In addition, complainant,
also submitted as evidence the
cards that she herself had
received from him. Guided by the
rule that handwriting may be
proved through a comparison of
one set of writings with those
admitted or treated by the
respondent as genuine, we
affirm that the two sets of
evidence were written by one
and the same
person. 48 Besides, respondent
did not present any evidence
to prove that the love letters
were not really written by
him; he merely denied that he
wrote them.
While the burden of proof is upon
the complainant, respondent has
the duty not only to himself but
also to the court to show that he
is morally fit to remain a member
of the bar. Mere denial does not
suffice. Thus, when his moral
character is assailed, such that his
right to continue practicing his
cherished profession is imperiled,
he must meet the charges

squarely and present evidence, to

the satisfaction of the
investigating body and this Court,
that he is morally fit to have his
name in the Roll of
Attorneys. 49 This he failed to do.
Respondent adamantly denies
abandoning his family to live with
Gina Espita. At the same time, he
depicts his wife as a "violent
husband-beater, vitriolic and
unbending," and as an "insanely
and pathologically jealous
woman," whose only obsession
was to "destroy, destroy and
destroy" him as shown by her
filing of a series of allegedly
unfounded charges against him
(and Gina Espita). To prove his
allegation, he presented ninetyeight (98) pieces of documentary
evidence 50 and ten (10)
witnesses. 51
We note, however, that the
testimonies of the witnesses of
respondent did not establish the
fact that he maintained that moral
integrity required by the
profession that would render him
fit to continue practicing law.
Neither did their testimonies
destroy the fact, as proven by the
complainant, that he had
abandoned his family and lived
with Gina Espita, with whom he
had two children. Some of them
testified on matters which they
had no actual knowledge of, but
merely relied on information from
either respondent himself or other

people, while others were

presented to impeach the good
character of his wife.
Respondent may have
provided well for his family
they enjoyed a comfortable
life and his children finished
their education. He may have
also established himself as a
successful lawyer and a
seasoned politician. But these
accomplishments are not
sufficient to show his moral
fitness to continue being a
member of the noble
profession of law.
We remind respondent that
parents have not only rights but
also duties e.g., to support,
educate and instruct their children
according to right precepts and
good example; and to give them
love, companionship and
understanding, as well as moral
and spiritual guidance. 52 As a
husband, he is also obliged to live
with his wife; to observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity; and to
render help and support. 53
Respondent himself admitted that
his work required him to be often
away from home. But the
evidence shows that he was away
not only because of his work;
instead, he abandoned his family
to live with her paramour, who
bore him two children. It would
appear, then, that he was hardly
in a position to be a good husband

or a good father. His children, who

grew up mostly under the care of
their mother, must have scarcely
felt the warmth of their father's
love.
Respondent's son, Jervis B. Narag,
showed his resentment towards
his father's moral frailties in his
testimony:
Q My question is this, is there any
sin so grievous that it cannot be
forgiven, is there a fault that is so
serious that it is incapable of
forgiveness?
A That depends upon the sin or
fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is
with the emotional part of myself,
I suppose I cannot forgive a
person although am a God-fearing
person, but I h[av]e to give the
person a lesson in order for him or
her to at least realize his
mistakes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COMR. JOSE:
I think it sounds like this.
Assuming for the sake of
argument that your father is the
worst, hardened criminal on earth,
would you send him to jail and
have him disbarred? That is the
question.
CONTINUATION.
A With the reputation that he had
removed from us, I suppose he
has to be given a lesson. At this
point in time, I might just forgive

him if he will have to experience

all the pains that we have also
suffered for quite sometime.
Q Dr. Narag, your father gave you
life, his blood runs in your veins,
his flesh is your flesh, his bones
are your bones and you now
disown him because he is the
worst man on earth, is that what
you are saying.
A Sort of, sir.
Q You are now telling that as far
[as] you are concerned because
your father has sinned, you have
no more father, am I correct?
A Long before, sir, I did not feel
much from my father even when I
was still a kid because my father
is not always staying with us at
home. So, how can you say that?
Yes, he gave me life, why not? But
for sure, sir, you did not give me
love. 54
Another son, Dominador Narag,
Jr., narrated before the
investigating officer the trauma
he went through:
Q In connection with that affidavit,
Mr. Witness, which contains the
fact that your father is
maintaining a paramour, could
you please tell this Honorable
Commission the effect on you?
A This has a very strong effect on
me and this includes my brothers
and sisters, especially my married
life, sir. And it also affected my

children so much, that I and my

wife ha[ve] parted ways. It hurts
to say that I and my wife parted
ways. This is one reason that
affected us.
Q Will you please tell us
specifically why you and your wife
parted ways?
A Because my wife wa[s]
ashamed of what happened to my
family and that she could not face
the people, our community,
especially because my wife
belongs to a well-known family in
our community.
Q How about the effect on your
brothers and sisters? Please tell
us what are those.
A Well, sir, this has also affected
the health of my elder sister
because she knows so well that
my mother suffered so much and
she kept on thinking about my
mother.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Why did your wife leave you?
A The truth is because of the
things that had happened in our
family, Your Honor.
Q In your wife's family?
A In our family, sir.
Q And what do you mean by that?
A What meant by that is my
father had an illicit relationship
and that my father went to the

extent of scolding my wife and

calling my wife a "puta" in
provincial government, which my
mother-in-law hated him so much
for this, which really affected us.
And then my wife knew for a fact
that my father has an illicit
relationship with Gina Espita,
whom he bore two children by the
name of Aurelle Dominic and Kyle
Dominador, which I could prove
and I stand firm to this, Your
Honor. 55
Although respondent piously
claims adherence to the sanctity
of marriage, his acts prove
otherwise. A husband is not
merely a man who has contracted
marriage. Rather, he is a partner
who has solemnly sworn to love
and respect his wife and remain
faithful to her until death.
We reiterate our ruling
in Cordova vs. Cordova 56: "The
moral delinquency that affects
the fitness of a member of the
bar to continue as such
includes conduct that
outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of
the community, conduct for
instance, which makes a
mockery of the inviolable
social institution of marriage."
In Toledo vs. Toledo, 57 the
respondent was disbarred
from the practice of law, when
he abandoned his lawful wife
and cohabited with another

woman who had borne him a

child.
Likewise, in Obusan vs.
Obusan, 58 the respondent was
disbarred after the complainant
proved that he had abandoned
her and maintained an adulterous
relationship with a married
woman. This Court declared that
respondent failed to maintain the
highest degree of morality
expected and required of a
member of the bar.
In the present case, the
complainant was able to establish,
by clear and convincing evidence,
that respondent had breached the
high and exacting moral
standards set for members of the
law profession. As held in Maligsa
vs. Cabanting, 59 "a lawyer may
be disbarred for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him
to be wanting in moral character,
in honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the
court."

WHEREFORE, Dominador M.
Narag is hereby DISBARRED
and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let copies of this
Decision be in the personal record
of Respondent Narag; and
furnished to all courts of the land,
the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the
Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
[AC-5365. April 27, 2005]
Spouses FRANKLIN and
LOURDES
OLBES, complainants, vs. Atty.
VICTOR V.
DECIEMBRE, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Constituting a serious
transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility was
the malevolent act of respondent,
who filled up the blank checks
entrusted to him as security for a
loan by writing on those checks
amounts that had not been
agreed upon at all, despite his full
knowledge that the loan they
were meant to secure had already
been paid.
The Case
Before us is a verified
Petition[1] for the disbarment of
Atty. Victor V. Deciembre, filed
by Spouses Franklin and

Lourdes Olbes with the Office of

the Bar Confidant of this Court.
Petitioners charged
respondent with willful and
deliberate acts of dishonesty,
falsification and conduct
unbecoming a member of the
Bar. After he had filed his
Comment[2] on the Petition, the
Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBPs Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD), through
Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay,
held several hearings. During
those hearings, the last of which
was held on May 12, 2003,[3] the
parties were able to present their
respective witnesses and
documentary evidence. After the
filing of the parties respective
formal offers of evidence, as well
as petitioners Memorandum,
[4]
the case was considered
submitted for resolution.
Subsequently, the commissioner
rendered his Report and
Recommendation dated January
30, 2004, which was later adopted
and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in its Resolution No.
XV-2003-177 dated July 30, 2004.
The Facts
In their Petition, Spouses Olbes
allege that they were
government employees
working at the Central Post

Office, Manila; and that Franklin

was a letter carrier receiving a
monthly salary of P6,700, and
Lourdes, a mail sorter, P6,000.[5]
Through respondent, Lourdes
renewed on July 1, 1999 her
application for a loan from
Rodela Loans, Inc., in the
amount of P10,000. As
security for the loan, she
issued and delivered to
respondent five Philippine
National Bank (PNB) blank
checks (Nos. 0046241-45),
which served as collateral for
the approved loan as well as
any other loans that might be
obtained in the future.[6]
On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid
respondent the amount
of P14,874.37 corresponding to
the loan plus surcharges,
penalties and interests, for which
the latter issued a receipt,
[7]
herein quoted as follows:
August 31, 1999
Received the amount
of P14,874.37 as payment of the
loan of P10,000.00 taken earlier
by Lourdes Olbes.
(Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre
8-31-99
P10,000.00
PNB Check No. 46241 8/15/99[8]
Notwithstanding the full payment
of the loan, respondent filled up

four (of the five) blank PNB

Checks (Nos. 0046241, 0046242,
0046243 and 0046244) for the
amount of P50,000 each, with
different dates of maturity -August 15, 1999, August 20,
1999, October 15, 1999 and
November 15, 1999, respectively.
[9]

On October 19, 1999, respondent

filed before the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Rizal an
Affidavit-Complaint against
petitioners for estafa and violation
of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. He
alleged therein that on July 15,
1999, around one-thirty in the
afternoon at Cainta, Rizal, they
personally approached him and
requested that he immediately
exchange with cash their
postdated PNB Check Nos.
0046241 and 0046242
totaling P100,000.[10]
Several months after, or on
January 20, 2000, respondent filed
against petitioners another
Affidavit-Complaint for estafa and
violation of BP 22. He stated,
among others, that on the same
day, July 15, 1999, around two
oclock in the afternoon at Quezon
City, they again approached him
and requested that he exchange
with cash PNB Check Nos.
0046243 and 0046244
totaling P100,000.[11]
Petitioners insisted that on the
afternoon of July 15, 1999, they

never went either to Cainta, Rizal,

or to Quezon City to transact
business with respondent.
Allegedly, they were in their office
at the time, as shown by their
Daily Time Records; so it would
have been physically impossible
for them to transact business in
Cainta, Rizal, and, after an
interval of only thirty minutes, in
Quezon City, especially
considering the heavy traffic
conditions in those places.[12]
Petitioners averred that many of
their office mates -- among them,
Juanita Manaois, Honorata Acosta
and Eugenia Mendoza -- had
suffered the same fate in their
dealings with respondent.[13]
In his Comment,[14] respondent
denied petitioners claims, which
he called baseless and devoid of
any truth and merit. Allegedly,
petitioners were the ones who had
deceived him by not honoring
their commitment regarding their
July 15, 1999 transactions. Those
transactions, totaling P200,000,
had allegedly been covered by
their four PNB checks that were,
however, subsequently
dishonored due to ACCOUNT
CLOSED. Thus, he filed criminal
cases against them. He claimed
that the checks had already been
fully filled up when petitioners
signed them in his presence. He
further claimed that he had given
them the amounts of money
indicated in the checks, because

his previous satisfactory

transactions with them convinced
him that they had the capacity to
pay.
Moreover, respondent said that
the loans were his private and
personal transactions, which were
not in any way connected with his
profession as a lawyer. The
criminal cases against petitioners
were allegedly private actions
intended to vindicate his rights
against their deception and
violation of their obligations. He
maintained that his right to
litigate should not be curtailed by
this administrative action.
Report of the Investigating
Commissioner
In his Report and
Recommendation,
Commissioner Dulay
recommended that
respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for
two years for violating Rule
1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The commissioner said that
respondents version of the facts
was not credible. Commissioner
Dulay rendered the following
analysis and evaluation of the
evidence presented:

In his affidavit-complaint x x x
executed to support his complaint
filed before the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Rizal
respondent stated that:
2.
That last July 15, 1999,
in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal,
both LOURDES E. OLBES and
FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x,
personally met and requested me
to immediately exchange with
cash, right there and then, their
postdated checks
totaling P100,000.00 then, to be
immediately used by them in their
business venture.
Again in his affidavit-complaint
executed to support his complaint
filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City
respondent stated that:
2.
That last July 15, 1999,
at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction
of Quezon City, M.M., both
LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN
A. OLBES x x x, personally met
and requested me to immediately
exchange with cash, right there
and then, their postdated checks
totaling P100,000.00 then, to be
immediately used by them in their
business venture.
The above statements
executed by respondent under
oath are in direct contrast to
his testimony before this
Commission on crossexamination during the May
12, 2003 hearing, thus:

ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)

Q. Based on these four (4)
checks which you claimed the
complainant issued to you, you
filed two separate criminal cases
against them, one, in Pasig City
and the other in Quezon City, is
that correct?
A. Yes, Your Honor, because the
checks were deposited at different
banks.
Q. These four checks were
accordingly issued to you by the
complainants on July 15, 1999, is
that correct?
A. I will consult my records, You
Honor, because its quite a long
time. Yes, Your Honor, the first
two checks is in the morning and
the next two checks is in the
afternoon (sic).

A. I could not remember exactly

but in the middle part of the
morning around 9:30 to 10:00.
Q. This was issued to you in what
particular place?
A. Here in my office at Garnet
Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.
Q. Is that your house?
A.

No, its not my house?

Q. What is that, is that your law

office?
A.

That is my retainer client.

Q. What is the name of that

retainer client of yours?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
Your Honor, may I object because
what is the materiality of the
question?

COMM. DULAY:

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

Which are the first two checks?

That is very material. I am trying

to test your credibility because
according to you these checks
have been issued in Pasig in the
place of your client on a retainer.
Thats why I am asking your
client

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
The first two checks covering
check Nos. 46241 and 46242 in
the morning. And Check No.
46243 and 46244 in the
afternoon, Your Honor.
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Q. Could you recall what
particular time in the morning
that these two checks with
number 0046241 and 0046242
xxx have been issued to you?

COMM. DULAY:
The name of the client is not
material I think. It is enough that
he said it was issued here in
Pasig. What building?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor.

COMM. DULAY:
What is the materiality of knowing
the name of his clients office?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Because, Your Honor, the
materiality is to find out whether
he is telling the truth. The place,
Your Honor, according to the
respondent is his client. Now I am
asking who is that client?
COMM. DULAY:
Your answer.
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
A. It is AIC Realty Corporation at
AIC Building.
Q. And the same date likewise,
the complainants in the afternoon
issued PNB Check Nos. 0046243
and 0046244, is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q. So would you want to tell this

Honorable office that there were
four checks issued in the place of
your client in Pasig City, two in the
morning and two in the afternoon?
A.

That is correct, sir.

Respondent was clearly not

being truthful in his narration of
the transaction with the
complainants. As between his
version as to when the four
checks were given, we find the
story of complainant[s] more
credible. Respondent has

blatantly distorted the truth,

insofar as the place where the
transaction involving the four
checks took place. Such
distortion on a very material fact
would seriously cast doubt on his
version of the transaction with
complainants.
Furthermore respondents
statements as to the time when
the transactions took place are
also obviously and glaringly
inconsistent and contradicts the
written statements made before
the public prosecutors. Thus
further adding to the lack of
credibility of respondents version
of the transaction.
Complainants version that they
issued blank checks to respondent
as security for the payment of a
loan of P10,000.00 plus interest,
and that respondent filled up the
checks in amounts not agreed
upon appears to be more
credible. Complainants herein are
mere employees of the Central
Post Office in Manila who had a
previous loan of P10,000.00 from
respondent and which has since
been paid x x x. Respondent
does not deny the said
transaction. This appears to be
the only previous transaction
between the parties. In fact,
complainants were even late in
paying the loan when it fell due
such that they had to pay
interest. That respondent would
trust them once more by giving

them another P200,000.00

allegedly to be used for a
business and immediately release
the amounts under the
circumstances described by
respondent does not appear
credible given the background of
the previous transaction and
personal circumstances of
complainants. That respondent
who is a lawyer would not even
bother to ask from complainants a
receipt for the money he has
given, nor bother to verify and ask
them what businesses they would
use the money for contributes
further to the lack of credibility of
respondents version. These
circumstances really cast
doubt as to the version of
respondent with regard to the
transaction. The resolution of
the public prosecutors
notwithstanding we believe
respondent is clearly lacking
in honesty in dealing with the
complainants.
Complainant Franklin Olbes had to
be jailed as a result of
respondents filing of the criminal
cases. Parenthetically, we note
that respondent has also filed
similar cases against the coemployees of complainants in the
Central Post Office and
respondent is facing similar
complaints in the IBP for his
actions.[15]
The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and

conclusions of Commissioner
Dulay, as approved and adopted
by the IBP Board of Governors.
However, the penalty should be
more severe than what the IBP
recommended.
Respondents Administrative
Liability
Membership in the legal
profession is a special privilege
burdened with conditions.[16] It is
bestowed upon individuals who
are not only learned in the law,
but also known to possess good
moral character.[17]
A lawyer is an oath-bound
servant of society whose conduct
is clearly circumscribed by
inflexible norms of law and ethics,
and whose primary duty is the
advancement of the quest for
truth and justice, for which he [or
she] has sworn to be a fearless
crusader.[18]
By taking the lawyers oath, an
attorney becomes a guardian of
truth and the rule of law, and an
indispensable instrument in the
fair and impartial administration
of justice.[19] Lawyers should act
and comport themselves with
honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach, in order to
promote the publics faith in the
legal profession.[20]

The Code of Professional

Responsibility specifically
mandates the following:
Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold
the constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.
xxx
x

xx
xxx

Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all

times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
xxx
x

xx
xxx

Rule 7.03.
A lawyer shall
not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal
profession.
A high standard of excellence and
ethics is expected and required of
members of the bar.[21] Such
conduct of nobility and
uprightness should remain with
them, whether in their public or in
their private lives. As officers of
the courts and keepers of the
publics faith, they are burdened
with the highest degree of social
responsibility and are thus
mandated to behave at all times
in a manner consistent with truth
and honor.[22]

The oath that lawyers swear to

likewise impresses upon them the
duty of exhibiting the highest
degree of good faith, fairness and
candor in their relationships with
others. The oath is a sacred trust
that must be upheld and kept
inviolable at all times. Thus,
lawyers may be disciplined for
any conduct, whether in their
professional or in their private
capacity, if such conduct renders
them unfit to continue to be
officers of the court.[23]
In the present case, the IBP
commissioner gave credence to
the story of petitioners, who said
that they had given five blank
personal checks to respondent at
the Central Post Office in Manila
as security for the P10,000 loan
they had contracted. Found
untrue and unbelievable was
respondents assertion that they
had filled up the checks and
exchanged these with his cash at
Quezon City and Cainta, Rizal.
After a careful review of the
records, we find no reason to
deviate from these findings.
Under the circumstances, there is
no need to stretch ones
imagination to arrive at an
inevitable conclusion.
Respondent does not deny
the P10,000 loan obtained from
him by petitioners. According to
Franklin Olbes testimony on
cross-examination, they asked
respondent for the blank checks

after the loan had been paid. On

the pretext that he was not able
to bring the checks with him,[24] he
was not able to return them. He
thus committed abominable
dishonesty by abusing the
confidence reposed in him by
petitioners. It was their high
regard for him as a member of the
bar that made them trust him
with their blank checks.[25]
It is also glaringly clear that the
Code of Professional
Responsibility was seriously
transgressed by his malevolent
act of filling up the blank checks
by indicating amounts that had
not been agreed upon at all and
despite respondents full
knowledge that the loan supposed
to be secured by the checks had
already been paid. His was a
brazen act of falsification of a
commercial document, resorted to
for his material gain.
And he did not stop there.
Because the checks were
dishonored upon presentment,
respondent had the temerity to
initiate unfounded criminal suits
against petitioners, thereby
exhibiting his vile intent to have
them punished and deprived of
liberty for frustrating the criminal
duplicity he had wanted to foist
on them. As a matter of fact, one
of the petitioners (Franklin) was
detained for three
months[26] because of the
Complaints. Respondent is

clearly guilty of serious

dishonesty and professional
misconduct. He committed an
act indicative of moral depravity
not expected from, and highly
unbecoming, a member of the
bar.
Good moral character is an
essential qualification for the
privilege to enter into the practice
of law. It is equally essential to
observe this norm meticulously
during the continuance of the
practice and the exercise of the
privilege.[27] Good moral
character includes at least
common honesty.[28] No moral
qualification for bar membership
is more important than
truthfulness and candor.[29] The
rigorous ethics of the profession
places a premium on honesty and
condemns duplicitous behavior.[30]
Lawyers must be ministers of
truth. Hence, they must not
mislead the court or allow it to be
misled by any artifice. In all their
dealings, they are expected to act
in good faith.[31]
Deception and other fraudulent
acts are not merely unacceptable
practices that are disgraceful and
dishonorable;[32] they reveal a
basic moral flaw. The standards
of the legal profession are not
satisfied by conduct that merely
enables one to escape the
penalties of criminal laws.[33]

Considering the depravity of the

offense committed by respondent,
we find the penalty recommended
by the IBP of suspension for two
years from the practice of law to
be too mild. His propensity for
employing deceit and
misrepresentation is
reprehensible. His misuse of the
filled-up checks that led to the
detention of one petitioner is
loathsome.
In Eustaquio v. Rimorin,
the
forging of a special power of
attorney (SPA) by the respondent
to make it appear that he was
authorized to sell anothers
property, as well as his fraudulent
and malicious inducement of
Alicia Rubis to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement to
give a semblance of legality to the
SPA, were sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of
law for five years. Here, the
conduct of herein respondent is
even worse. He used falsified
checks as bases for maliciously
indicting petitioners and thereby
caused the detention of one of
them.
[34]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V.

Deciembre is found guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of Rules
1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby
indefinitely SUSPENDED from the
practice of law effective
immediately. Let copies of this

Decision be furnished all courts as

well as the Office of the Bar
Confidant, which is directed to
append a copy to respondents
personal record. Let another copy
be furnished the National Office of
the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE
ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND
OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL
BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed
on 4 February 1992 with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 101, charging Mr.
A.C. Argosino along with thirteen
(13) other individuals, with the
crime of homicide in connection
with the death of one Raul
Camaligan on 8 September 1991.
The death of Raul Camaligan
stemmed from the infliction of
severe physical injuries upon him
in the course of "hazing"
conducted as part of university
fraternity initiation rites. Mr.
Argosino and his co-accused then
entered into plea bargaining with
the prosecution and as a result of
such bargaining, pleaded guilty to

the lesser offense of homicide

through reckless imprudence.
This plea was accepted by the
trial court. In a judgment dated 11
February 1993, each of the
fourteen (14) accused individuals
was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for a period ranging
from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four
(4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr.
Argosino and his colleagues filed
an application for probation with
the lower court. The application
for probation was granted in an
Order dated 18 June 1993 issued
by Regional Trial Court Judge
Pedro T. Santiago. The period of
probation was set at two (2)
years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the
probation officer assigned to
supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13
July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a
Petition for Admission to Take the
1993 Bar Examinations. In this
Petition, he disclosed the fact of
his criminal conviction and his
then probation status. He was
allowed to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations in this Court's En
Banc Resolution dated 14 August
1993. 1 He passed the Bar
Examination. He was not,
however, allowed to take the
lawyer's oath of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino

filed a Petition with this Court to
allow him to take the attorney's
oath of office and to admit him to
the practice of law, averring that
Judge Pedro T. Santiago had
terminated his probation period
by virtue of an Order dated 11
April 1994. We note that his
probation period did not last for
more than ten (10) months from
the time of the Order of Judge
Santiago granting him probation
dated 18 June 1993. Since then,
Mr. Argosino has filed three (3)
Motions for Early Resolution of his
Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a
natural, absolute or constitutional
right to be granted to everyone
who demands it. Rather, it is a
high personal privilege limited to
citizens of good moral character,
with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained
and certified. 2 The essentiality of
good moral character in those
who would be lawyers is stressed
in the following excerpts which we
quote with approval and which we
regard as having persuasive
effect:
In Re Farmer:

xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character"
prescribed by the statute, as a
condition precedent to the
applicant's right to receive a
license to practice law in North

Carolina, and of which he must, in

addition to other requisites,
satisfy the court, includes all the
elements necessary to make up
such a character. It is something
more than an absence of bad
character. It is the good name
which the applicant has acquired,
or should have acquired, through
association with his fellows. It
means that he must have
conducted himself as a man of
upright character ordinarily would,
or should, or does. Such character
expresses itself, not in negatives
nor in following the line of least
resistance, but quite often, in the
will to do the unpleasant thing if it
is right, and the resolve not to do
the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . .
.
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this
requirement of the statute is
eminently proper. Consider for a
moment the duties of a lawyer.
He is sought as counsellor, and
his advice comes home, in its
ultimate effect, to every man's
fireside. Vast interests are
committed to his care; he is the
recipient ofunbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with is
client's property, reputation, his
life, his all. An attorney at law is
a sworn officer of the Court,
whose chief concern, as such,
is to aid the administration of
justice. . . .

xxx xxx xxx 4

In Re Application of
Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law
Examination of 1926 (1926) 191
Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that
there exists nowhere greater
temptations to deviate from the
straight and narrow path than in
the multiplicity of circumstances
that arise in the practice of
profession. For these reasons the
wisdom of requiring an applicant
for admission to the bar to
possess a high moral standard
therefore becomes clearly
apparent, and the board of bar
examiners as an arm of the court,
is required to cause a minute
examination to be made of the
moral standard of each candidate
for admission to practice. . . . It
needs no further argument,
therefore, to arrive at the
conclusion thatthe highest degree
of scrutiny must be exercised as
to the moral character of a
candidate who presents himself
for admission to the bar. The evil
must, if possible, be successfully
met at its very source, and
prevented, for, after a lawyer has
once been admitted, and has
pursued his profession, and has
established himself therein, a far
more difficult situation is
presented to the court when
proceedings are instituted for
disbarment and for the recalling
and annulment of his license.

In Re Keenan: 6
The right to practice law is not
one of the inherent rights of every
citizen, as in the right to carry on
an ordinary trade or business. It is
a peculiar privilege granted and
continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in
intellectual attainment and in
moral character. All may aspire to
it on an absolutely equal basis,
but not all will attain it. Elaborate
machinery has been set up to test
applicants by standards fair to all
and to separate the fit from the
unfit. Only those who pass the
test are allowed to enter the
profession, and only those who
maintain the standards are
allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss: 7
Membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with
conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of
them; to refuse admission to an
unworthy applicant is not to
punish him for past offense: an
examination into character, like
the examination into learning, is
merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8
Attorney's are licensed because of
their learning and ability, so that
they may not only protect the
rights and interests of their
clients, but be able to assist court
in the trial of the cause. Yet what

protection to clients or assistance

to courts could such agents give?
They are required to be of good
moral character, so that the
agents and officers of the court,
which they are, may not bring
discredit upon the due
administration of the law, and it is
of the highest possible
consequence that both those who
have not such qualifications in the
first instance, or who, having had
them, have fallen therefrom, shall
not be permitted to appear in
courts to aid in the administration
of justice.
It has also been stressed that the
requirement of good moral
character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general
public and the proper
administration of justice are
concerned, than the possession of
legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License,
55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A.
[N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has
always been to admit no person
to the practice of the law unless
he covered an upright moral
character. The possession of this
by the attorney is more
important, if anything, to the
public and to the proper
administration of justice than
legal learning. Legal learning may
be acquired in after years, but if
the applicant passes the

threshold of the bar with a bad

moral character the chances are
that his character will remain
bad, and that he will become a
disgrace instead of an ornament
to his great calling a curse
instead of a benefit to his
community a Quirk, a Gammon
or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a
Smith or a Ruffin. 9
All aspects of moral character and
behavior may be inquired into in
respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar. The scope of
such inquiry is, indeed, said to be
properly broader than inquiry into
the moral proceedings for
disbarment:
Re Stepsay:

10

The inquiry as to the moral

character of an attorney in a
proceeding for his admission to
practice is broader in scope than
in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells:

11

. . . that an applicant's contention

that upon application for
admission to the California Bar the
court cannot reject him for want
of good moral character unless it
appears that he has been guilty of
acts which would be cause for his
disbarment or suspension, could
not be sustained; that the inquiry
is broader in its scope than that in
a disbarment proceeding, and the
court may receive any evidence
which tends to show the

applicant's character as respects

honesty, integrity, and general
morality, and may no doubt
refuse admission upon proofs that
might not establish his guilt of
any of the acts declared to be
causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral
character to be satisfied by those
who would seek admission to the
bar must of necessity be more
stringent than the norm of
conduct expected from members
of the general public. There is a
very real need to prevent a
general perception that entry into
the legal profession is open to
individuals with inadequate moral
qualifications. The growth of such
a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our
people's confidence in their courts
of law and in our legal system as
we know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in
the deplorable "hazing"
activities certainly fell far
short of the required standard
of good moral character. The
deliberate (rather than merely
accidental or inadvertent)
infliction of severe physical
injuries which proximately led to
the death of the unfortunate Raul
Camaligan, certainly indicated
serious character flaws on the
part of those who inflicted such
injuries. Mr. Argosino and his coaccused had failed to discharge
their moral duty to protect the life

and well-being of a "neophyte"

who had, by seeking admission to
the fraternity involved, reposed
trust and confidence in all of them
that, at the very least, he would
not be beaten and kicked to death
like a useless stray dog. Thus,
participation in the prolonged and
mindless physical beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan
constituted evident rejection of
that moral duty and was totally
irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that
the participant was then
possessed of good moral
character.
Now that the original period of
probation granted by the trial
court has expired, the Court is
prepared to considerde novo the
question of whether applicant A.C.
Argosino has purged himself of
the obvious deficiency in moral
character referred to above. We
stress that good moral
character is a requirement
possession of which must be
demonstrated not only at the
time of application for
permission to take the bar
examinations but also, and
more importantly, at the time
of application for admission to
the bar and to take the
attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore,
submit to this Court, for its
examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now

regarded as complying with the

requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those
seeking admission to the bar. His
evidence may consist, inter alia,
of sworn certifications from
responsible members of the
community who have a good
reputation for truth and who
have actually known Mr. Argosino
for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of
conviction was rendered by Judge
Santiago. He should show to the
Court how he has tried to make
up for the senseless killing of a
helpless student to the family of
the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino
must, in other words, submit
relevant evidence to show that he
is a different person now, that he
has become morally fit for
admission to the ancient and
learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby
DIRECTED to inform this Court, by
appropriate written manifestation,
of the names and addresses of
the father and mother (in default
thereof, brothers and sisters, if
any, of Raul Camaligan), within
ten (10) day from notice hereof.
Let a copy of this Resolution be
furnished to the parents or
brothers and sisters, if any, of
Raul Camaligan.
B.M. No. 712 March 19,

1997
RE: PETITION OF AL
ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE
LAWYERS OATH
RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino passed the bar
examinations held in 1993.
The Court however deferred
his oath-taking due to his
previous conviction for
Reckless Imprudence
Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which
resulted in petitioner's
conviction, arose from the
death of a neophyte during
fraternity initiation rites
sometime in September 1991.
Petitioner and seven (7) other
accused initially entered pleas
of not guilty to homicide
charges. The eight (8) accused
later withdrew their initial
pleas and upon rearraignment all pleaded guilty
to reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the
trial court rendered judgment
dated 11 February 1993
imposing on each of the
accused a sentence of
imprisonment of from two (2)
years four (4) months :and
one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial

court granted herein

petitioner's application for
probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial
court issued an order
approving a report dated 6
April 1994 submitted by the
Probation Officer
recommending petitioner's
discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner
filed before this Court a
petition to be allowed to take
the lawyer's oath based on the
order of his discharge from
probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court
through then Senior Associate
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
issued a resolution requiring
petitioner Al C. Argosino to
submit to the Court evidence
that he may now be regarded
as complying with the
requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those
seeking admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above

resolution, petitioner
submitted no less than fifteen
(15) certifications/letters
executed by among others
two (2) senators, five (5) trial
court judges, and six (6)
members of religious orders.
Petitioner likewise submitted
evidence that a scholarship

foundation had been

established in honor of Raul
Camaligan, the hazing victim,
through joint efforts of the
latter's family and the eight
(8) accused in the criminal
case.
On 26 September 1995, the
Court required Atty. Gilbert
Camaligan, father of Raul, to
comment on petitioner's
prayer to be allowed to take
the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4
December 1995, Atty.
Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the
infliction of severe physical
injuries which led to the death
of his son was deliberate
rather than accidental. The
offense therefore was not only
homicide but murder since the
accused took advantage of the
neophyte's helplessness
implying abuse of confidence,
taking advantage of superior
strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the
accused's plea of guilt to the
lesser offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in
homicide only out of pity for
the mothers of the accused
and a pregnant wife of one of
the accused who went to their
house on Christmas day 1991
and Maundy Thursday 1992,
literally on their knees, crying
and begging for forgiveness
and compassion. They also
told him that the father of one

of the accused had died of a

heart attack upon learning of
his son's involvement in the
incident.
c. As a Christian, he has
forgiven petitioner and his coaccused for the death of his
son. However, as a loving
father who had lost a son
whom he had hoped would
succeed him in his law
practice, he still feels the pain
of an untimely demise and the
stigma of the gruesome
manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say
whether petitioner is now
morally fit for admission to the
bar. He therefore submits the
matter to the sound discretion
of the Court.
The practice of law is a
privilege granted only to those
who possess the strict
intellectual and moral
qualifications required of
lawyers who are instruments
in the effective and efficient
administration of justice. It is
the sworn duty of this Court
not only to "weed out" lawyers
who have become a disgrace
to the noble profession of the
law but, also of equal
importance, to prevent
"misfits" from taking the
lawyer's oath, thereby further
tarnishing the public image of
lawyers which in recent years
has undoubtedly become less
than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue

before us required weighing

and reweighing of the reasons
for allowing or disallowing
petitioner's admission to the
practice of law. The senseless
beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident
absence of that moral fitness
required for admission to the
bar since they were totally
irresponsible, irrelevant and
uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution
in this case we stated:
. . . participation in
the prolonged and
mindless physical
behavior, [which]
makes impossible a
finding that the
participant [herein
petitioner] was then
possessed of good
moral character. 1
In the same resolution,
however, we stated that the
Court is prepared to
consider de novo the question
of whether petitioner has
purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character
referred to above.
Before anything else, the
Court understands and shares
the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert
Camaligan. The death of one's
child is, for a parent, a most
traumatic experience. The
suffering becomes even more
pronounced and profound in
cases where the death is due
to causes other than natural

or accidental but due to the

reckless imprudence of third
parties. The feeling then
becomes a struggle between
grief and anger directed at the
cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement
before the Court- manifesting
his having forgiven the
accused is no less than
praiseworthy and
commendable. It is
exceptional for a parent, given
the circumstances in this case,
to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan
admits that he is still not in a
position to state if petitioner is
now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation
of this case, we resolve to
allow petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino to take the lawyer's
oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys
and practice the legal
profession with the following
admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to
take the lawyer's oath, the
Court recognizes that Mr.
Argosino is not inherently of
bad moral fiber. On the
contrary, the various
certifications show that he is a
devout Catholic with a
genuine concern for civic
duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that
Mr. Argosino has exerted all
efforts to atone for the death
of Raul Camaligan. We are

prepared to give him the

benefit of the doubt, taking
judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and
uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that
the lawyer's oath is NOT a
mere ceremony or formality
for practicing law. Every
lawyer should at ALL TIMES
weigh his actions according to
the sworn promises he makes
when taking the lawyer's oath.
If all lawyers conducted
themselves strictly according
to the lawyer's oath and the
Code of Professional
Responsibility, the
administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer
and easier for everyone
concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that
Mr. Argosino will continue with
the assistance he has been
giving to his community. As a
lawyer he will now be in a
better position to render legal
and other services to the more
unfortunate members of
society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED,
petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino is hereby ALLOWED
to take the lawyer's oath on a
date to be set by the Court, to
sign the Roll of Attorneys and,
thereafter, to practice the
legal profession.
SO ORDERED.

Rules 138 sec. 6

Section 6. Pre-Law. No
applicant for admission to the bar
examination shall be admitted
unless he presents a certificate
that he has satisfied the Secretary
of Education that, before he
began the study of law, he had
pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and
recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto
the completion of a four-year high
school course, the course of study
prescribed therein for a bachelor's
degree in arts or sciences with
any of the following subjects as
major or field of concentration:
political science, logic, english,
spanish, history and economics.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7662
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR
REFORMS IN THE LEGAL
EDUCATION, CREATING FOR
THE PURPOSE, A LEGAL
EDUCATION BOARD AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall
be known as the "Legal Education
Reform Act of 1993."
Section 2. Declaration of
Policies. - It is hereby declared the
policy of the State to uplift the
standards of legal education in
order to prepare law students for
advocacy, counselling, problemsolving, and decision-making, to

infuse in them the ethics of the

legal profession; to impress on
them the importance, nobility and
dignity of the legal profession as
an equal and indispensable
partner of the Bench in the
administration of justice and to
develop social competence.
Towards this end, the State shall
undertake appropriate reforms in
the legal education system,
require proper selection of law
students, maintain quality among
law schools, and require legal
apprenticeship and continuing
legal education.
Section 3. General and Specific
Objective of Legal Education. - (a)
Legal education in the Philippines
is geared to attain the following
objectives:
(1) to prepare students for the
practice of law;
(2) to increase awareness among
members of the legal profession
of the needs of the poor, deprived
and oppressed sectors of society;
(3) to train persons for leadership;
(4) to contribute towards the
promotion and advancement of
justice and the improvement of its
administration, the legal system
and legal institutions in the light
of the historical and contemporary
development of law in the
Philippines and in other countries.

(b) Legal education shall aim to

accomplish the following specific
objectives:
(1) to impart among law students
a broad knowledge of law and its
various fields and of legal
institutions;
(2) to enhance their legal research
abilities to enable them to
analyze, articulate and apply the
law effectively, as well as to
allowthem to have a holistic
approach to legal problems and
issues;
(3) to prepare law students for
advocacy, counselling, problemsolving and decision-making, and
to develop their ability to deal
with recognized legal problems of
the present and the future;
(4) to develop competence in any
field of law as is necessary for
gainful employment or sufficient
as a foundation for future training
beyond the basic professional
degree, and to develop in them
the desire and capacity for
continuing study and selfimprovement;
(5) to inculcate in them the ethics
and responsibilities of the legal
profession; and
(6) to produce lawyers who
conscientiously pursue the lofty
goals of their profession and to
fully adhere to its ethical norms.

Section 4. Legal Education

Board; Creation and Composition.
- To carry out the purpose of this
Act, there is hereby created the
Legal Education Board, hereinafter
referred to as the Board, attached
solely for budgetary purposes and
administrative support to the
Department of Education, Culture
and Sports.
The Board shall be composed of a
Chairman, who shall preferably be
a former justice of the Supreme
Court or Court of Appeals, and the
following as regular members: a
representative of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP); a
representative of the Philippine
Association of Law Schools (PALS);
a representative from the ranks of
active law practitioners; and, a
representative from the law
students' sector. The Secretary of
the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, or his
representative, shall be an ex
officio member of the Board.
With the exception of the
representative of the law
students' sector, the Chairman
and regular members of the Board
must be natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and members of
the Philippine Bar, who have been
engaged for at least ten (10)
years in the practice of law, as
well as in the teaching of law in a
duly authorized or recognized law
school.

Section 5. Term of Office;

Compensation. - The Chairman
and regular members of the Board
shall be appointed by the
President for a term of five (5)
years without reappointment from
a list of at least three (3)
nominees prepared, with prior
authorization from the Supreme
Court, by the Judicial and Bar
Council, for every position or
vacancy, and no such
appointment shall need
confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman and the
representative of the IBP shall
hold office for five (5) years, the
representatives of the PALS and
the PALP, for three (3) years; and
the representative from the ranks
of active law practitioners and the
representative of the law
students' sector, for one (1) year,
without reappointment.
Appointments to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpire
portion of the term of the
predecessor.
The Chairman and regular
members of the Board shall have
the same salary and rank as the
Chairman and members,
respectively, of the Constitutional
Commissions: Provided, That their
salaries shall not be diminished
during their term of office.
Section 6. Office and Staff
Support. - The Department of
Education, Culture and Sports

shall provide the necessary office

and staff support to the Board,
with a principal office to be
located in Metropolitan Manila.
The Board may appoint such other
officers and employees it may
deem necessary in the
performanceof its powers and
functions.
Section 7. Powers and
Functions. - For the purpose of
achieving the objectives of this
Act, the Board shall havethe
following powers and functions:
(a) to administer the legal
education system in the country
in a manner consistent with the
provisions of this Act;
(b) to supervise the law schools in
the country, consistent with its
powers and functions as herein
enumerated;
(c) to set the standards of
accreditation for law schools
taking into account, among
others, the size of enrollment, the
qualifications of the members of
the faculty, the library and other
facilities, without encroaching
upon the academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning;
(d) to accredit law schools that
meet the standards of
accreditation;
(e) to prescribe minimum
standards for law admission and
minimum qualifications and

compensation of faculty
members;
(f) to prescribe the basic curricula
for the course of study aligned to
the requirements for admission to
the Bar, law practice and social
consciousness, and such other
courses of study as may be
prescribed by the law schools and
colleges under the different levels
of accreditation status;
(g) to establish a law practice
internship as a requirement for
taking the Bar which a law
student shall undergo with any
duly accredited private or public
law office or firm or legal
assistance group anytime during
the law course for a specific
period that the Board may decide,
but not to exceed a total of twelve
(12) months. For this purpose, the
Board shall prescribe the
necessary guidelines for such
accreditation and the
specifications of such internship
which shall include the actual
work of a new member of the Bar.
(h) to adopt a system of
continuing legal education. For
this purpose, the Board may
provide for the mandatory
attendance of practicing lawyers
in such courses and for such
duration as the Board may deem
necessary; and
(i) to perform such other functions
and prescribe such rules and
regulations necessary for the

attainment of the policies and

objectives of this Act.
Section 8. Accreditation of Law
Schools. - Educational institutions
may not operate a law school
unless accredited by the Board.
Accreditation of law schools may
be granted only to educational
institutions recognized by the
Government.
Section 9. Withdrawal or
Downgrading of Accreditation. The Board may withdraw or
downgrade the accreditation
status of a law school if it fails to
maintain the standards set for its
accreditation status.
Section 10. Effectivity of
Withdrawal or Downgrading of
Accreditation. - The withdrawal or
downgrading of accreditation
status shall be effetive after the
lapse ofthe semester or trimester
following the receipt by the school
of the notice of withdrawal or
downgrading unless, in the
meantime, the school meets
and/or upgrades the standards or
corrects the deficiencies upon
which the withdrawal or
downgrading of the accreditation
status is based.
Section 11. Legal Education
Fund. - There is hereby created a
special endowment fund, to be
known as the Legal Education
Fund, which shall be under the
control of the Board, and
administered as a separate fund

by the Social Security System

(SSS) which shall invest the same
with due and prudent regard to its
solvency, safety and liquidity.
The Legal Education Fund shall be
established out of, and
maintained from, the amounts
appropriated pursuant to
paragraph 2, Section 13 hereof,
and from sixty percent (60%) of
the privilege tax paid by every
lawyer effective Fiscal Year 1994;
and from such donations,
legacies, grant-in-aid and other
forms of contributions received by
the Board for the purposes of this
Act.
Being a special endowment fund,
only the interests earned on the
Legal Education Fund shall be
used exclusively for the purposes
of this Act, including support for
faculty development grants,
professorial chairs, library
improvements and similar
programs for the advancement of
law teaching and education in
accredited law schools.
The Fund shall also be used for
the operation of the Board. For
this purpose, an amount not
exceeding ten percent (10%) of
the interest on the Fund shall be
utilized.
The Board, in consultation with
the SSS, shall issue the necessary
rules and regulations for the
collection, administration and
utilization of the Fund.

Section 12. Coverage. - The

provisions of this Act shall apply
to all schools and colleges of law
which are presently under the
supervision of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports.
Hereafter, said supervision shall
be transferred to the Board. Law
schools and colleges which shall
be established following the
approval of this Act shall likewise
be covered.
Section 13. Appropriation. - The
amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) is hereby
authorized to be charged against
the current year's appropriation of
the Contingent Fund for the initial
expenses of the Board.
To form part of the Legal
Education Fund, there shall be
appropriated annually, under the
budget of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, the
amount of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00) for a period of
ten (10) years effective Fiscal Year
1994.
Section 14. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is
declared unconstitutional or the
application thereof to any person,
circumstance or transaction is
held invalid, the validity of the
remaining provisions of this Act
and the applicability of such
provisions to other persons,
circumstances and transactions
shall not be affected thereby.

Section 15. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executie orders,

rules and regulations, issuances
or parts thereof inconsistent with
this Act is hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.
Section 16. Effectivity. - This Act
shall take effect after fifteen (15)
days following the completion of
its publication in the Official
Gazette or in any two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
Rule 138 sec. 5-16
Section 5. Additional
requirements for other applicants.
All applicants for admission
other than those referred to in the
two preceding section shall,
before being admitted to the
examination, satisfactorily show
that they have regularly studied
law for four years, and
successfully completed all
prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, officially
approved and recognized by the
Secretary of Education. The
affidavit of the candidate,
accompanied by a certificate from
the university or school of law,
shall be filed as evidence of such
facts, and further evidence may
be required by the court.
No applicant shall be admitted to
the bar examinations unless he
has satisfactorily completed the
following courses in a law school
or university duly recognized by
the government: civil law,

commercial law, remedial law,

criminal law, public and private
international law, political law,
labor and social legislation,
medical jurisprudence, taxation
and legal ethics.
Section 6. Pre-Law. No
applicant for admission to the bar
examination shall be admitted
unless he presents a certificate
that he has satisfied the Secretary
of Education that, before he
began the study of law, he had
pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and
recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto
the completion of a four-year high
school course, the course of study
prescribed therein for a bachelor's
degree in arts or sciences with
any of the following subjects as
major or field of concentration:
political science, logic, english,
spanish, history and economics.
Section 7. Time for filing proof of
qualifications. All applicants for
admission shall file with the clerk
of the Supreme Court the
evidence required by section 2 of
this rule at least fifteen (15) days
before the beginning of the
examination. If not embraced
within section 3 and 4 of this rule
they shall also file within the
same period the affidavit and
certificate required by section 5,
and if embraced within sections 3
and 4 they shall exhibit a license
evidencing the fact of their

admission to practice, satisfactory

evidence that the same has not
been revoked, and certificates as
to their professional standing.
Applicants shall also file at the
same time their own affidavits as
to their age, residence, and
citizenship.
Section 8. Notice of Applications.
Notice of applications for
admission shall be published by
the clerk of the Supreme Court in
newspapers published in Pilipino,
English and Spanish, for at least
ten (10) days before the
beginning of the examination.
Section 9. Examination; subjects.
Applicants, not otherwise
provided for in sections 3 and 4 of
this rule, shall be subjected to
examinations in the following
subjects: Civil Law; Labor and
Social Legislation; Mercantile Law;
Criminal Law; Political Law
(Constitutional Law, Public
Corporations, and Public Officers);
International Law (Private and
Public); Taxation; Remedial Law
(Civil Procedure, Criminal
Procedure, and Evidence); Legal
Ethics and Practical Exercises (in
Pleadings and Conveyancing).
Section 10. Bar examination, by
questions and answers, and in
writing. Persons taking the
examination shall not bring
papers, books or notes into the
examination rooms. The questions
shall be the same for all

examinees and a copy thereof, in

English or Spanish, shall be given
to each examinee. Examinees
shall answer the questions
personally without help from
anyone.
Upon verified application made by
an examinee stating that his
penmanship is so poor that it will
be difficult to read his answers
without much loss of time., the
Supreme Court may allow such
examinee to use a typewriter in
answering the questions. Only
noiseless typewriters shall be
allowed to be used.
The committee of bar examiner
shall take such precautions as are
necessary to prevent the
substitution of papers or
commission of other frauds.
Examinees shall not place their
names on the examination
papers. No oral examination shall
be given.
Section 11. Annual examination.
Examinations for admission to
the bar of the Philippines shall
take place annually in the City of
Manila. They shall be held in four
days to be disignated by the
chairman of the committee on bar
examiners. The subjects shall be
distributed as follows: First day:
Political and International Law
(morning) and Labor and Social
Legislation (afternoon); Second
day: Civil Law (morning) and
Taxation (afternoon); Third day:

Mercantile Law (morning) and

Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth
day: Remedial Law (morning) and
legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises (afternoon).
Section 12. Committee of
examiners. Examinations shall
be conducted by a committee of
bar examiners to be appointed by
the Supreme Court. This
committee shall be composed of a
Justice of the Supreme Court, who
shall act as chairman, and who
shall be designated by the court
to serve for one year, and eight
members of the bar of the
Philippines, who shall hold office
for a period of one year. The
names of the members of this
committee shall be published in
each volume of the official
reports.
Section 13. Disciplinary
measures. No candidate shall
endeavor to influence any
member of the committee, and
during examination the
candidates shall not communicate
with each other nor shall they
give or receive any assistance.
The candidate who violates this
provisions, or any other provision
of this rule, shall be barred from
the examination, and the same to
count as a failure against him,
and further disciplinary action,
including permanent
disqualification, may be taken in
the discretion of the court.

Section 14. Passing average.

In order that a candidate may be
deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general
average of 75 per cent in all
subjects, without falling below 50
per cent in any subjects. In
determining the average, the
subjects in the examination shall
be given the following relative
weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent;
Labor and Social Legislation, 10
per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per
cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent:
Political and International Law, 15
per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent;
Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal
Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5
per cent.

that they have enrolled in and

passed regular fourth year review
classes as well as attended a prebar review course in a recognized
law school.

Section 15. Report of the

committee; filing of examination
papers. Not later than February
15th after the examination, or as
soon thereafter as may be
practicable, the committee shall
file its report on the result of such
examination. The examination
papers and notes of the
committee shall be filed with the
clerk and may there be examined
by the parties in interest, after the
court has approved the report.

About two years later, Severino

Martinez charged him with having
falsely represented in his
application for such Bar
examination, that he had the
requisite academic qualifications.
The matter was in due course
referred to the Solicitor General
who caused the charge to be
investigated; and later he
submitted a report recommending
that Diao's name be erased from
the roll of attorneys, because
contrary to the allegations in his
petition for examination in this
Court, he (Diao) had not
completed, before taking up law
subjects, the required pre-legal
education prescribed by the
Department of Private Education,

Section 16. Failing candidates to

take review course. Candidates
who have failed the bar
examinations for three times shall
be disqualified from taking
another examination unless they
show the satisfaction of the court

A.C. No. 244

1963

March 29,

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION

FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO
A. DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO G.
MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the
corresponding examinations
held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao
was admitted to the Bar.

specially, in the following

particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his
high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended
Quisumbing College, and
never obtained his A.A.
diploma therefrom which
contradicts the credentials he
had submitted in support of
his application for
examination, and of his
allegation therein of
successful completion of the
"required pre-legal
education".
Answering this official report and
complaint, Telesforo A. Diao,
practically admits the first charge:
but he claims that although he
had left high school in his third
year, he entered the service of
the U.S. Army, passed the General
Classification Test given therein,
which (according to him) is
equivalent to a high school
diploma, and upon his return to
civilian life, the educational
authorities considered his army
service as the equivalent of 3rd
and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about
the validity of this claim, what
with respondent's failure to
exhibit any certification to that
effect (the equivalence) by the
proper school officials. However,
it is unnecessary to dwell on
this, since the second charge

is clearly meritorious. Diao

never obtained his A.A. from
Quisumbing College; and yet his
application for examination
represented him as an A.A.
graduate (1940-1941) of such
college. Now, asserting he had
obtained his A.A. title from the
Arellano University in April, 1949,
he says he was erroneously
certified, due to confusion, as a
graduate of Quisumbing College,
in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties
respectfully pray that the
foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing
other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1wph1.t
This explanation is not
acceptable, for the reason that
the "error" or "confusion" was
obviously of his own making. Had
his application disclosed his
having obtained A.A. from
Arellano University, it would also
have disclosed that he got it
in April, 1949, thereby showing
that he began his law studies (2nd
semester of 1948-1949) six
months before obtaining his
Associate in Arts degree. And then
he would not have been permitted
to take the bar tests, because our
Rules provide, and the applicant
for the Bar examination must
affirm under oath, "That previous

to the study of law, he had

successfully and satisfactorily
completed the required pre-legal
education(A.A.) as prescribed by
the Department of Private
Education," (emphasis on
"previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A.
Diao was not qualified to take the
bar examinations; but due to his
false representations, he was
allowed to take it, luckily passed
it, and was thereafter admitted to
the Bar. Such admission having
been obtained under false
pretenses must be, and is hereby
revoked. The fact that he hurdled
the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such
examinations is not the
only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study
in the regular manner is equally
essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to
strike from the roll of attorneys,
the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And
the latter is required to return his
lawyer's diploma within thirty
days. So ordered.
Rules 138 sec 17
Section 17. Admission and oath
of successful applicants. An
applicant who has passed the
required examination, or has been
otherwise found to be entitled to
admission to the bar, shall take
and subscribe before the Supreme

Court the corresponding oath of

office.
Section 1. Who may practice law.
Any person heretofore duly
admitted as a member of the bar,
or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of
this rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.
Section 34. By whom litigation
conducted. In the court of a
justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for the purpose,
or with the aid an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid
of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
Rule 115 sec 1
Section 1. Rights of accused at
the trial. In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be
entitled to the following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation
against him.
(c) To be present and defend in
person and by counsel at every
stage of the proceedings, from

arraignment to promulgation of
the judgment. The accused may,
however, waive his presence at
the trial pursuant to the
stipulations set forth in his bail,
unless his presence is specifically
ordered by the court for purposes
of identification. The absence of
the accused without justifiable
cause at the trial of which he had
notice shall be considered a
waiver of his right to be present
thereat. When an accused under
custody escapes, he shall be
deemed to have waived his right
to be present on all subsequent
trial dates until custody over him
is regained. Upon motion, the
accused may be allowed to
defend himself in person when it
sufficiently appears to the court
that he can properly protect his
right without the assistance of
counsel.
Article VI Sec 14
Section 14. No Senator or
Member of the House of
Representatives may personally
appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasijudicial and other administrative
bodies. Neither shall he, directly
or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or
in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any

government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary,
during his term of office. He shall
not intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government for
his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on
account of his office.
Article VIII sec 15
Section 15.
1. All cases or matters filed
after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided
or resolved within twentyfour months from date of
submission for the Supreme
Court, and, unless reduced
by the Supreme Court,
twelve months for all lower
collegiate courts, and three
months for all other lower
courts.
2. A case or matter shall be
deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum
required by the Rules of
Court or by the court itself.
3. Upon the expiration of the
corresponding period, a
certification to this effect
signed by the Chief Justice or
the presiding judge shall
forthwith be issued and a
copy thereof attached to the
record of the case or matter,
and served upon the parties.

The certification shall state

why a decision or resolution
has not been rendered or
issued within said period.
4. Despite the expiration of the
applicable mandatory period,
the court, without prejudice
to such responsibility as may
have been incurred in
consequence thereof, shall
decide or resolve the case or
matter submitted thereto for
determination, without
further delay.
Article IX sec 2
Section 2. No member of a
Constitutional Commission shall,
during his tenure, hold any other
office or employment. Neither
shall he engage in the practice of
any profession or in the active
management or control of any
business which, in any way, may
be affected by the functions of his
office, nor shall he be financially
interested, directly or indirectly, in
any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by
the Government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Section 8. Each Commission
shall perform such other functions
as may be provided by law.
RA7160 Sec 90-91

Section 90. Practice of

Profession. (a) All governors, city and
municipal mayors are prohibited
from practicing their profession or
engaging in any occupation other
than the exercise of their
functions as local chief
executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may
practice their professions, engage
in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session
hours: Provided, That sanggunian
members who are also members
of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any
court in any civil case wherein a
local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality
of the government is the adverse
party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any
criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the national or local
government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to
his office.
(3) Collect any fee for their
appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an
official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of
the government except when the
sanggunian member concerned is
defending the interest of the
government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may

practice their profession even
during official hours of work only
on occasions of emergency:
Provided, That the officials
concerned do not derive monetary
compensation therefrom.
Section 91. Statement of Assets
and Liabilities. - (a) Officials and
employees of local government
units shall file sworn statements
of assets, liabilities and net worth,
lists of relatives within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity in government service,
financial and business interests,
and personnel data sheets as
required by law.
Rule 138 sec 35
Section 35. Certain attorneys
not to practice. No judge or
other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the Office of
the Solicitor General, shall engage
in private practice as a member of
the bar or give professional advice
to clients.
G.R. No. L-19450
27, 1965

May

THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO
VILLANUEVA, defendantappellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for
plaintiff-appellee.

Magno T. Buese for defendantappellant.

PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief
of Police of Alaminos, Laguna,
charged Simplicio Villanueva with
the Crime of Malicious Mischief
before the Justice of the Peace
Court of said municipality. Said
accused was represented by
counsel de officio but later on
replaced by counsel de parte. The
complainant in the same case was
represented by City Attorney
Ariston Fule of San Pablo City,
having entered his appearance as
private prosecutor, after securing
the permission of the Secretary of
Justice. The condition of his
appearance as such, was that
every time he would appear at the
trial of the case, he would be
considered on official leave of
absence, and that he would not
receive any payment for his
services. The appearance of City
Attorney Fule as private
prosecutor was questioned by the
counsel for the accused, invoking
the case of Aquino, et al. vs.
Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it
was ruled that "when an attorney
had been appointed to the
position of Assistant Provincial
Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein
qualified, by operation of law, he
ceased to engage in private law
practice." Counsel then argued
that the JP Court in entertaining

the appearance of City Attorney

Fule in the case is a violation of
the above ruling. On December
17, 1960 the JP issued an order
sustaining the legality of the
appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961,
counsel for the accused presented
a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule
from Acting as Private Prosecutor
in this Case," this time invoking
Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35,
Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court,
which bars certain attorneys from
practicing. Counsel claims that
City Attorney Fule falls under this
limitation. The JP Court ruled on
the motion by upholding the right
of Fule to appear and further
stating that he (Fule) was not
actually enagaged in private law
practice. This Order was appealed
to the CFI of Laguna, presided by
the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio,
which rendered judgment on
December 20, 1961, the pertinent
portions of which read:
The present case is one for
malicious mischief. There being no
reservation by the offended party
of the civil liability, the civil action
was deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal action. The
offended party had, therefore, the
right to intervene in the case and
be represented by a legal counsel
because of her interest in the civil
liability of the accused.

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of

Court provides that in the court of
a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. Assistant City Attorney
Fule appeared in the Justice of the
Peace Court as an agent or friend
of the offended party. It does not
appear that he was being paid for
his services or that his
appearance was in a professional
capacity. As Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo he had no
control or intervention whatsoever
in the prosecution of crimes
committed in the municipality of
Alaminos, Laguna, because the
prosecution of criminal cases
coming from Alaminos are
handled by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and not by the
City Attornev of San Pablo. There
could be no possible conflict in
the duties of Assistant City
Attorney Fule as Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo and as
private prosecutor in this criminal
case. On the other hand, as
already pointed out, the offended
party in this criminal case had a
right to be represented by an
agent or a friend to protect her
rights in the civil action which was
impliedly instituted together with
the criminal action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court
holds that Asst. City Attorney

Ariston D. Fule may appear before

the Justice of the Peace Court of
Alaminos, Laguna as private
prosecutor in this criminal case as
an agent or a friend of the
offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the
order of the Justice of the Peace
Court of Alaminos, Laguna,
allowing the apprearance of
Ariston D. Fule as private
prosecutor is dismissed, without
costs.
The above decision is the subject
of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed,
for patently being without
merits.1wph1.t
Aside from the considerations
advanced by the learned trial
judge, heretofore reproduced, and
which we consider plausible, the
fallacy of the theory of defense
counsel lies in his confused
interpretation of Section 32 of
Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rules), which provides
that "no judge or other official or
employee of the superior courts or
of the office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private
practice as a member of the bar
or give professional advice to
clients." He claims that City
Attorney Fule, in appearing as
private prosecutor in the case was
engaging in private practice. We
believe that the isolated
appearance of City Attorney Fule

did not constitute private practice

within the meaning and
contemplation of the Rules.
Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise (State vs.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as
customarily and demanding
payment for such services (State
vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,
647). The appearance as counsel
on one occasion is not conclusive
as determinative of engagement
in the private practice of law. The
following observation of the
Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private
practice of law implies that one
must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession
and that his professional services
are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of
his said services.
For one thing, it has never been
refuted that City Attorney Fule
had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary
of Justice, to represent the

complainant in the case at bar,

who is a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE
FOREGOING, the decision
appealed from should be, as it is
hereby affirmed, in all respects,
with costs against appellant..
RA 910
Section 1. When a Justice of the
Supreme Court or of the Court of
Appeals who has rendered at least
twenty years' service either in the
judiciary or in any other branch of
the Government, or in both, (a)
retires for having attained the age
of seventy years, or (b) resigns by
reason of his incapacity to
discharge the duties of his office,
he shall receive during the residue
of his natural life, in the manner
hereinafter provided, the salary
which he was receiving at the
time of his retirement or
resignation. And when a Justice of
the Supreme Court or of the Court
of Appeals has attained the age of
fifty-seven years and has
rendered at least twenty-years'
service in the Government, ten or
more of which have been
continuously rendered as such
Justice or as judge of a court of
record, he shall be likewise
entitled to retire and receive
during the residue of his natural
life, in the manner also
hereinafter prescribed, the salary
which he was then receiving. It is
a condition of the pension

provided for herein that no

retiring Justice during the time
that he is receiving said pension
shall appear as counsel before
any court in any civil case wherein
the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality
thereof is the adverse party, or in
any criminal case wherein and
officer or employee of the
Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to
his office, or collect any fee for his
appearance in any administrative
proceedings to maintain an
interest adverse to the
Government, insular, provincial or
municipal, or to any of its legally
constituted officers
Rule 138 sec 20
Section 20. Duties of attorneys.
It is the duty of an attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and to
support the Constitution and obey
the laws of the Philippines.
(b) To observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers;
(c) To counsel or maintain such
actions or proceedings only as
appear to him to be just, and such
defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law.
(d) To employ, for the purpose of
maintaining the causes confided
to him, such means only as are
consistent with truth and honor,

and never seek to mislead the

judge or any judicial officer by an
artifice or false statement of fact
or law;
(e) To maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of
his client, and to accept no
compensation in connection with
his client's business except from
him or with his knowledge and
approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is
charged;
(g) Not to encourage either the
commencement or the
continuance of an action or
proceeding, or delay any man's
cause, from any corrupt motive or
interest;
(h) Never to reject, for any
consideration personal to himself,
the cause of the defenseless or
oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person
accused of crime, by all fair and
honorable means, regardless of
his personal opinion as to the guilt
of the accused, to present every
defense that the law permits, to
the end that no person may be
deprived of life or liberty, but by
due process of law.

THE FOUR-FOLD DUTY OF THE

COURT
1. It must inform the
defendant that he has a right
to an attorney before being
arraigned
2. After informing him, the
court must ask the defendant
if he desires to have the aid of an
attorney
3. If he desires and is unable to
employ an attorney, the court
must assign an attorney de officio
to defend him
4. If the accused desires to
procure an attorney of his own,
the court must grant him a
reasonable time to procure one

CANON 1
A.C. No. 4585
November 12, 2004
MICHAEL P.
BARRIOS, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO P.
MARTINEZ, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition1 for
disbarment filed against Atty.
Francisco Martinez for having
been convicted by final judgment
in Criminal Case No. 6608 of a
crime involving moral turpitude by

Branch 8 of the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Tacloban City.2
The dispositive portion of the
same states:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the
accused Francisco Martinez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime for (sic) violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 charged in the
Information. He is imposed a
penalty of one (1) year
imprisonment and fine double the
amount of the check which is
EIGHT THOUSAND (8,000.00)
PESOS, plus payment of the tax
pursuant to Section 205 of the
Internal Revenue Code and costs
against the accused.3
Complainant further submitted
our Resolution dated 13 March
1996 and the Entry of Judgment
from this Court dated 20 March
1996.
On 03 July 1996, we
required4 respondent to comment
on said petition within ten (10)
days from notice. On 17 February
1997, we issued a second
resolution5 requiring him to show
cause why no disciplinary action
should be imposed on him for
failure to comply with our earlier
Resolution, and to submit said
Comment. On 07 July 1997, we
imposed a fine of P1,000 for
respondent's failure to file said
Comment and required him to
comply with our previous
resolution within ten days.6 On 27

April 1998, we fined respondent

an additional P2,000 and required
him to comply with the resolution
requiring his comment within ten
days under pain of imprisonment
and arrest for a period of five (5)
days or until his
compliance.7 Finally, on 03
February 1999, or almost three
years later, we declared
respondent Martinez guilty of
Contempt under Rule 71, Sec.
3[b] of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and ordered his
imprisonment until he complied
with the aforesaid resolutions.8
On 05 April 1999, the National
Bureau of Investigation
reported9 that respondent was
arrested in Tacloban City on 26
March 1999, but was
subsequently released after
having shown proof of compliance
with the resolutions of 17
February 1997 and 27 April 1998
by remitting the amount of P2,000
and submitting his long overdue
Comment.
In the said Comment10 dated 16
March 1999, respondent stated
that:
1. He failed to respond to our
Resolution dated 17 February
1997 as he was at that time
undergoing medical treatment at
Camp Ruperto Kangleon in Palo,
Leyte;

2. Complainant Michael Barrios

passed away sometime in June
1997; and
3. Said administrative complaint is
an offshoot of a civil case which
was decided in respondent's favor
(as plaintiff in the said case).
Respondent avers that as a result
of his moving for the execution of
judgment in his favor and the
eviction of the family of herein
complainant Michael Barrios, the
latter filed the present
administrative case.
In the meantime, on 11
September 1997, a certain Robert
Visbal of the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Tacloban City
submitted a letter11 to the First
Division Clerk of Court alleging
that respondent Martinez also
stood charged in
another estafa case before the
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban
City, Branch 9, as well as a civil
case involving the victims of the
Doa Paz tragedy in 1987, for
which the Regional Trial Court of
Basey, Samar, Branch 30
rendered a decision against him,
his appeal thereto having been
dismissed by the Court of
Appeals.
In the said Decision of Branch 30
of the Regional Trial Court of
Basey, Samar,12 it appears that
herein respondent Atty. Martinez
offered his legal services to the
victims of the Doa Paz tragedy

for free. However, when the

plaintiff in the said civil case was
issued a check for P90,000 by
Sulpicio Lines representing
compensation for the deaths of
his wife and two daughters, Atty.
Martinez asked plaintiff to endorse
said check, which was then
deposited in the account of Dr.
Martinez, Atty. Martinez's wife.
When plaintiff asked for his
money, he was only able to
recover a total of P30,000. Atty.
Martinez claimed the remaining
P60,000 as his attorney's fees.
Holding that it was "absurd and
totally ridiculous that for a simple
legal service he would collect
2/3 of the money claim," the trial
court ordered Atty. Martinez to
pay the plaintiff therein the
amount of P60,000 with interest,
P5,000 for moral and exemplary
damages, and the costs of the
suit.
Said trial court also made
particular mention of Martinez's
dilatory tactics during the trial,
citing fourteen (14) specific
instances thereof. Martinez's
appeal from the above judgment
was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals for his failure to file his
brief, despite having been granted
three thirty (30)-day extensions to
do so.13
On 16 June 1999, we
referred14 the present case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP) for investigation, report, and

recommendation.
The report15 of IBP Investigating
Commissioner Winston D.
Abuyuan stated in part that:
Several dates for the hearing of
the case were scheduled but none
of the parties appeared before the
Commission, until finally it was
considered submitted for
resolution last 27 June 2002. On
the same date respondent filed a
motion for the dismissal of the
case on the ground that the
complainant died sometime in
June 1997 and that dismissal is
warranted because "the case filed
by him does not survive due to his
demise; as a matter of fact, it is
extinguished upon his death."
We disagree with respondent's
contention.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B
of the Revised Rules of Court, the
Honorable Supreme Court or the
IBP may motu proprio initiate the
proceedings when they perceive
acts of lawyers which deserve
sanctions or when their attention
is called by any one and a
probable cause exists that an act
has been perpetrated by a lawyer
which requires disciplinary
sanctions.
As earlier cited, respondent
lawyer's propensity to disregard
or ignore orders of the Honorable
Supreme Court for which he was

fined twice, arrested and

imprisoned reflects an utter lack
of good moral character.
Respondent's conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude
(estafa and/or violation of BP Blg.
22) clearly shows his unfitness to
protect the administration of
justice and therefore justifies the
imposition of sanctions against
him (see In re: Abesamis, 102 Phil.
1182; In re: Jaramillo, 101 Phil.
323; In re: Vinzon, 19 SCRA 815;
Medina vs. Bautista, 12 SCRA
1, People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case
No. 3360, 30 Jan. 1990).
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent
Atty. Francisco P. Martinez be
disbarred and his name stricken
out from the Roll of Attorneys
immediately.
On 27 September 2003, the IBP
Board of Governors passed a
Resolution16 adopting and
approving the report and
recommendation of its
Investigating Commissioner.
On 03 December 2003,
respondent Martinez filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation,17 in the instant
case alleging that:
1. The Report and
Recommendation of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner is
tantamount to a deprivation of

property without due process of

law, although admittedly the
practice of law is a privilege;
2. If respondent is given another
chance to have his day in court
and allowed to adduce evidence,
the result/outcome would be
entirely different from that arrived
at by the Investigating
Commissioner; and
3. Respondent is now 71 years of
age, and has served the judiciary
in various capacities (from acting
city judge to Municipal Judges
League Leyte Chapter President)
for almost 17 years prior to
resuming his law practice.
On 14 January 2004, we
required18 complainant to file a
comment within ten days. On 16
February 2004, we received a
Manifestation and Motion19 from
complainant's daughter, Diane
Francis Barrios Latoja, alleging
that they had not been furnished
with a copy of respondent's
Motion, notwithstanding the fact
that respondent ostensibly lives
next door to complainant's family.
Required to Comment on 17 May
2004, respondent has until now
failed to do so.
The records show that
respondent, indeed, failed to
furnish a copy of said Motion to
herein complainant. The records
also show that respondent was
given several opportunities to
present evidence by this

Court20 as well as by the

IBP.21 Indeed, he only has himself
to blame, for he has failed to
present his case despite several
occasions to do so. It is now too
late in the day for respondent to
ask this court to receive his
evidence.
This court, moreover, is unwilling
to exercise the same patience
that it did when it waited for his
comment on the original petition.
At any rate, after a careful
consideration of the records of the
instant case, we find the evidence
on record sufficient to support the
IBP's findings.
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, a member of the
Bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so.
In the present case, respondent
has been found guilty and
convicted by final judgment for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing

a worthless check in the amount

of P8,000. The issue with which
we are now concerned is whether
or not the said crime is one
involving moral turpitude. 22

profession of a lawyer; however, it

certainly relates to and affects
the good moral character of a
person convicted of such
offense26 (emphasis supplied)

Moral turpitude "includes

everything which is done contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals."23 It involves "an act
of baseness, vileness, or depravity
in the private duties which a man
owes his fellow men, or to society
in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and
woman, or conduct contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals."24

Over ten years later, we

reiterated the above ruling
in Villaber v. Commission on
Elections27 and disqualified a
congressional candidate for
having been sentenced by final
judgment for three counts of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in
accordance with Sec. 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which
states:

In People of the Philippines v.

Atty. Fe Tuanda,25 where the
erring lawyer was indefinitely
suspended for having been
convicted of three counts of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, we held
that conviction by final judgment
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves
moral turpitude and stated:
We should add that the crimes of
which respondent was convicted
also import deceit and violation of
her attorney's oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility
under both of which she was
bound to "obey the laws of the
land." Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude might
not (as in the instant case,
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not)
relate to the exercise of the

SEC. 12. Disqualifications. Any

person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion,
or for any offense for which he
has been sentenced to a penalty
of more than eighteen months, or
for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to
be a candidate and to hold any
office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted
amnesty. (emphasis supplied)
Enumerating the elements of that
crime, we held that the act of a
person in issuing a check knowing
at the time of the issuance that he
or she does not have sufficient
funds in, or credit with, the
drawee bank for the check in full
upon its presentment, is a

manifestation of moral turpitude.

Notwithstanding therein
petitioner's averment that he was
not a lawyer, we nevertheless
applied our ruling in People v.
Tuanda, to the effect that
(A) conviction for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22, "imports deceit" and
"certainly relates to and affects
the good moral character of a
person." [Indeed] the effects of
the issuance of a worthless check,
as we held in the landmark case
of Lozano v. Martinez, through
Justice Pedro L. Yap, "transcends
the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the
transaction and touches the
interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is
not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the
public" since the circulation of
valueless commercial papers "can
very well pollute the channels of
trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually
hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest." Thus,
paraphrasing Black's definition, a
drawer who issues an unfunded
check deliberately reneges on his
private duties he owes his fellow
men or society in a manner
contrary to accepted and
customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty or good
morals.28 (emphasis supplied)
In the recent case of Barrientos v.
Libiran-Meteoro,29 we stated that:

(T)he issuance of checks which

were later dishonored for having
been drawn against a closed
account indicates a lawyer's
unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on her. It
shows a lack of personal honesty
and good moral character as to
render her unworthy of public
confidence. [Cuizon v. Macalino,
A.C. No. 4334, 07 July 2004] The
issuance of a series of worthless
checks also shows the
remorseless attitude of
respondent, unmindful to the
deleterious effects of such act to
the public interest and public
order. [Lao v. Medel, 405 SCRA
227] It also manifests a lawyer's
low regard for her commitment to
the oath she has taken when she
joined her peers, seriously and
irreparably tarnishing the image
of the profession she should hold
in high esteem. [Sanchez v.
Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, 03
October 2003]
Clearly, therefore, the act of a
lawyer in issuing a check without
sufficient funds to cover the same
constitutes such willful dishonesty
and immoral conduct as to
undermine the public confidence
in law and lawyers. And while "the
general rule is that a lawyer may
not be suspended or disbarred,
and the court may not ordinarily
assume jurisdiction to discipline
him for misconduct in his nonprofessional or private capacity,

where, however, the misconduct

outside of the lawyer's
professional dealings is so gross a
character as to show him morally
unfit for the office and unworthy
of the privilege which his licenses
and the law confer on him, the
court may be justified in
suspending or removing him from
the office of attorney."30
The argument of respondent that
to disbar him now is tantamount
to a deprivation of property
without due process of law is also
untenable. As respondent himself
admits, the practice of law is a
privilege. The purpose of a
proceeding for disbarment is "to
protect the administration of
justice by requiring that those
who exercise this important
function shall be competent,
honorable and reliable; men in
whom courts and clients may
repose confidence."31 "A
proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not in any sense a
civil action where the complainant
is plaintiff and the respondent
lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely
for the public welfare, and for the
purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official
ministrations of persons unfit to
practice them."32 "Verily, lawyers
must at all times faithfully

perform their duties to society, to

the bar, to the courts and to their
clients. Their conduct must always
reflect the values and norms of
the legal profession as embodied
in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On these
considerations, the Court may
disbar or suspend lawyers for any
professional or private misconduct
showing them to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor or to be
unworthy to continue as officers
of the Court."33
Nor are we inclined to look with
favor upon respondent's plea that
if "given another chance to have
his day in court and to adduce
evidence, the result/outcome
would be entirely different from
that arrived at." We note with
displeasure the inordinate length
of time respondent took in
responding to our requirement to
submit his Comment on the
original petition to disbar him.
These acts constitute a willful
disobedience of the lawful orders
of this Court, which under Sec. 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in
itself a cause sufficient for
suspension or disbarment. Thus,
from the time we issued our first
Resolution on 03 July 1996
requiring him to submit his
Comment, until 16 March 1999,
when he submitted said Comment
to secure his release from arrest,
almost three years had elapsed.

It is revealing that despite the

unwarranted length of time it took
respondent to comply, his
Comment consists of all of two
pages, a copy of which, it
appears, he neglected to furnish
complainant.34 And while he
claims to have been confined
while undergoing medical
treatment at the time our
Resolution of 17 February 1997
was issued, he merely reserved
the submission of a certification to
that effect. Nor, indeed, was he
able to offer any explanation for
his failure to submit his Comment
from the time we issued our first
Resolution of 03 July 1996 until 16
March 1999. In fact, said
Comment alleged, merely, that
the complainant, Michael Barrios,
passed away sometime in June
1997, and imputed upon the latter
unsupported ill-motives for
instituting the said Petition
against him, which argument has
already been resolved squarely in
the abovementioned IBP report.

Moreover, the IBP report cited the

failure of both parties to appear
before the Commission as the
main reason for the long delay,
until the same was finally
submitted for Resolution on 27
June 2002. Respondent, therefore,
squandered away seven years to
"have his day in court and adduce
evidence" in his behalf, which
inaction also unduly delayed the
court's prompt disposition of this
petition.
In Pajares v. Abad Santos,35 we
reminded attorneys that "there
must be more faithful adherence
to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court [now Rule 7, Section 3]
which provides that the signature
of an attorney constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read
the pleading and that to the best
of his knowledge, information and
belief, there is good ground to
support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay, and
expressly admonishes that for a
willful violation of this rule an
attorney may be subjected to
disciplinary action.36 It is
noteworthy that in the past, the
Court has disciplined lawyers and
judges for willful disregard of its
orders to file comments or
appellant's briefs, as a penalty for
disobedience thereof. 37
For the same reasons, we are
disinclined to take respondent's
old age and the fact that he
served in the judiciary in various

capacities in his favor. If at all, we

hold respondent to a higher
standard for it, for a judge should
be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and
independence,38 and his conduct
should be above reproach.39 The
fact that respondent has chosen
to engage in private practice does
not mean he is now free to
conduct himself in less honorable
or indeed in a less than
honorable manner.
We stress that membership in the
legal profession is a
privilege,40 demanding a high
degree of good moral character,
not only as a condition precedent
to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the
practice of law.41 Sadly, herein
respondent falls short of the
exacting standards expected of
him as a vanguard of the legal
profession.
The IBP Board of Governors
recommended that respondent be
disbarred from the practice of law.
We agree.
We come now to the matter of the
penalty imposable in this case.
In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v.
Medel, we upheld the imposition
of one year's suspension for nonpayment of debt and issuance of
worthless checks, or a suspension
of six months upon partial
payment of the
obligation.42 However, in these

cases, for various reasons, none

of the issuances resulted in a
conviction by the erring lawyers
for either estafa or B.P. Blg. 22.
Thus, we held therein that
the issuance of worthless checks
constitutes gross misconduct, for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned
with suspension from the practice
of law.
In the instant case, however,
herein respondent has been found
guilty and stands convicted by
final judgment of a crime
involving moral turpitude.
In People v. Tuanda, which is
similar to this case in that both
respondents were convicted for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 which we
have held to be such a crime, we
affirmed the order of suspension
from the practice of law imposed
by the Court of Appeals, until
further orders.
However, in a long line of cases,
some of which were decided after
Tuanda, we have held disbarment
to be the appropriate penalty for
conviction by final judgment for a
crime involving moral turpitude.
Thus:
1. In In The Matter of Disbarment
Proceedings v. Narciso N.
Jaramillo,43 we disbarred a lawyer
convicted of estafa without
discussing the circumstances
behind his conviction. We held
that:

There is no question that the

crime of estafa involves moral
turpitude. The review of
respondent's conviction no longer
rests upon us. The judgment not
only has become final but has
been executed. No elaborate
argument is necessary to hold the
respondent unworthy of the
privilege bestowed on him as a
member of the bar. Suffice it to
say that, by his conviction, the
respondent has proved himself
unfit to protect the administration
of justice.44
2. In In Re: Dalmacio De Los
Angeles,45 a lawyer was convicted
of the crime of attempted bribery
in a final decision rendered by the
Court of Appeals. "And since
bribery is admittedly a felony
involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S.,
p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this
Court, much as it sympathizes
with the plight of respondent, is
constrained to decree his
disbarment as ordained by
Section 25 of Rule 127."46
3. In Ledesma De Jesus-Paras v.
Quinciano Vailoces,47 the erring
lawyer acknowledged the
execution of a document
purporting to be a last will and
testament, which later turned out
to be a forgery. He was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of falsification of public
document, which the Court held
to be a crime involving moral
turpitude, said act being contrary

to justice, honesty and good

morals, and was subsequently
disbarred.
4. In In Re: Disbarment
Proceedings Against Atty.
Diosdado Q. Gutierrez,48 Atty.
Gutierrez was convicted for
murder. After serving a portion of
the sentence, he was granted a
conditional pardon by the
President. Holding that the pardon
was not absolute and thus did not
reach the offense itself but merely
remitted the unexecuted portion
of his term, the court nevertheless
disbarred him.
5. In In Re: Atty. Isidro P.
Vinzon,49 Atty. Vinzon was
convicted of the crime of estafa
for misappropriating the amount
of P7,000.00, and was
subsequently disbarred. We held
thus:
Upon the other hand, and dealing
now with the merits of the case,
there can be no question that the
term "moral turpitude" includes
everything which is done contrary
to justice, honesty, or good
morals. In essence and in all
respects, estafa, no doubt, is a
crime involving moral turpitude
because the act is unquestionably
against justice, honesty and good
morals (In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case
No. 263, July 31, 1962; Bouvier's
Law Dictionary; In re Basa, 41
Phil. 275-76). As respondent's
guilt cannot now be questioned,

his disbarment is inevitable.

(emphasis supplied)50
6. In In Re: Attorney Jose
Avancea,51 the conditional
pardon extended to the erring
lawyer by the Chief Executive also
failed to relieve him of the penalty
of disbarment imposed by this
court.
7. In In Re Disbarment of Rodolfo
Pajo,52 a lawyer was charged and
found guilty of the crime of
falsification of public document
for having prepared and notarized
a deed of sale of a parcel of land
knowing that the supposed affiant
was an impostor and that the
vendor had been dead for almost
eight years. We ruled that
disbarment follows as a
consequence of a lawyer's
conviction by final judgment of a
crime involving moral turpitude,
and since the crime of falsification
of public document involves moral
turpitude, we ordered
respondent's name stricken off
the roll of attorneys.
8. In Adelina T. Villanueva v. Atty.
Teresita Sta. Ana,53 we upheld the
recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors to disbar a lawyer
who had been convicted of estafa
through falsification of public
documents, because she was
"totally unfit to be a member of
the legal profession."54
9. In Victoriano P. Resurreccion v.
Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson,55 a lawyer

was disbarred for having been

convicted of estafa by final
judgment for misappropriating the
funds of his client.
In this case as well, we find
disbarment to be the appropriate
penalty. "Of all classes and
professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the
laws. He is their sworn servant;
and for him, of all men in the
world, to repudiate and override
the laws, to trample them
underfoot and to ignore the very
bands of society, argues
recreancy to his position and
office and sets a pernicious
example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body
politic."56
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty.
Francisco P. Martinez is hereby
dISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll
of Attorneys. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in the
respondent's record as a member
of the Bar, and notice of the same
be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and on the Office
of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
[SBC Case No. 519. July 31,
1997]
PATRICIA
FIGUEROA, complainant,

vs. SIMEON BARRANCO,

JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in
1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned
that respondent Simeon Barranco,
Jr. be denied admission to the
legal profession. Respondent had
passed the 1970 bar examinations
on the fourth attempt, after
unsuccessful attempts in 1966,
1967 and 1968. Before he could
take his oath, however,
complainant filed the instant
petition averring that respondent
and she had been sweethearts,
that a child out of wedlock was
born to them and that respondent
did not fulfill his repeated
promises to marry her.
The facts were manifested in
hearings held before Investigator
Victor F. Sevilla in June and July
1971. Respondent and
complainant were townmates in
Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when
they were both in their teens,
they were steadies. Respondent
even acted as escort to
complainant when she reigned as
Queen at the 1953 town
fiesta. Complainant first acceded
to sexual congress with
respondent sometime in
1960. Their intimacy yielded a
son, Rafael Barranco, born on
December 11, 1964.[1] It was after
the child was born, complainant

alleged, that respondent first

promised he would marry her
after he passes the bar
examinations. Their relationship
continued and respondent
allegedly made more than twenty
or thirty promises of marriage. He
gave only P10.00 for the child on
the latters birthdays. Her trust in
him and their relationship ended
in 1971, when she learned that
respondent married another
woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainants motion, the
Court authorized the taking of
testimonies of witnesses by
deposition in 1972. On February
18, 1974, respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion to
Dismiss the case citing
complainants failure to comment
on the motion of Judge Cuello
seeking to be relieved from the
duty to take aforesaid testimonies
by deposition. Complainant filed
her comment stating that she had
justifiable reasons in failing to file
the earlier comment required and
that she remains interested in the
resolution of the present case. On
June 18, 1974, the Court denied
respondents motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court
once again denied a motion to
dismiss on the ground of
abandonment filed by respondent
on September 17, 1979.
[2]
Respondents third motion to
dismiss was noted in the Courts
Resolution dated September 15,

1982.[3] In 1988, respondent

repeated his request, citing his
election as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay,
Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active
participation in civic organizations
and good standing in the
community as well as the length
of time this case has been
pending as reasons to allow him
to take his oath as a lawyer.[4]
On September 29, 1988, the Court
resolved to dismiss the complaint
for failure of complainant to
prosecute the case for an
unreasonable period of time and
to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to
take the lawyers oath upon
payment of the required fees.[5]
Respondents hopes were again
dashed on November 17, 1988
when the Court, in response to
complainants opposition,
resolved to cancel his scheduled
oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the
Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBPs report dated May 17,
1997 recommended the dismissal
of the case and that respondent
be allowed to take the lawyers
oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from
taking the lawyers oath in 1971
because of the charges of gross

immorality made by
complainant. To recapitulate,
respondent bore an illegitimate
child with his sweetheart, Patricia
Figueroa, who also claims that he
did not fulfill his promise to marry
her after he passes the bar
examinations.
We find that these facts do not
constitute gross immorality
warranting the permanent
exclusion of respondent from the
legal profession. His engaging in
premarital sexual relations with
complainant and promises to
marry suggests a doubtful moral
character on his part but the
same does not constitute grossly
immoral conduct. The Court has
held that to justify suspension or
disbarment the act complained of
must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. A grossly
immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute
a criminal act or so unprincipled
or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high
degree.[6] It is a willful, flagrant,
or shameless act which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion
of respectable members of the
community.[7]
We find the ruling in Arciga v.
Maniwang[8] quite relevant
because mere intimacy between a
man and a woman, both of whom
possess no impediment to marry,
voluntarily carried on and devoid
of any deceit on the part of

respondent, is neither so corrupt

nor so unprincipled as to warrant
the imposition of disciplinary
sanction against him, even if as a
result of such relationship a child
was born out of wedlock.[9]
Respondent and complainant
were sweethearts whose sexual
relations were evidently
consensual. We do not find
complainants assertions that she
had been forced into sexual
intercourse, credible. She
continued to see and be
respondents girlfriend even after
she had given birth to a son in
1964 and until 1971. All those
years of amicable and intimate
relations refute her allegations
that she was forced to have
sexual congress with
him. Complainant was then an
adult who voluntarily and actively
pursued their relationship and was
not an innocent young girl who
could be easily led
astray. Unfortunately, respondent
chose to marry and settle
permanently with another
woman. We cannot castigate a
man for seeking out the partner of
his dreams, for marriage is a
sacred and perpetual bond which
should be entered into because of
love, not for any other reason.
We cannot help viewing the
instant complaint as an act of
revenge of a woman scorned,
bitter and unforgiving to the
end. It is also intended to make

respondent suffer severely and it

seems, perpetually, sacrificing the
profession he worked very hard to
be admitted into. Even assuming
that his past indiscretions are
ignoble, the twenty-six years that
respondent has been prevented
from being a lawyer constitute
sufficient punishment
therefor. During this time there
appears to be no other
indiscretion attributed to him.
[10]
Respondent, who is now sixtytwo years of age, should thus be
allowed, albeit belatedly, to take
the lawyers oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED
to take his oath as a lawyer upon
payment of the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.
November 29, 1989
A.M. No. 3249 SALVACION
DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA,
respondent.
RESOLUTION
, J.:
In an unsworn letter-complaint
dated 14 April 1988 addressed to
then Mr. Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee, complainant Salvacion
Delizo charged her husband, Atty.
Laurence D. Cordova, with
immorality and acts unbecoming

a member of the Bar. The lettercomplaint was forwarded by the

Court to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar
Discipline ("Commission"), for
investigation, report and
recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on
the complaint, required
complainant to submit a verified
complaint within ten (10) days
from notice. Complainant
complied and submitted to the
Commission on 27 September
1988 a revised and verified
version of her long and detailed
complaint against her husband
charging him with immorality and
acts unbecoming a member of the
Bar.
In an Order of the Commission
dated 1 December 1988,
respondent was declared in
default for failure to file an answer
to the complaint within fifteen
(15) days from notice. The same
Order required complainant to
submit before the Commission her
evidence ex parte, on 16
December 1988. Upon the
telegraphic request of
complainant for the resetting of
the 16 December 1988 hearing,
the Commission scheduled
another hearing on 25 January
1989. The hearing scheduled for
25 January 1989 was rescheduled
two (2) more times-first, for 25
February 1989 and second, for 10
and 11 April 1989. The hearings

never took place as complainant

failed to appear. Respondent
Cordova never moved to set aside
the order of default, even though
notices of the hearings scheduled
were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6
April 1989, complainant informed
the Commission that she and her
husband had already "reconciled".
In an order dated 17 April 1989,
the Commission required the
parties (respondent and
complainant) to appear before it
for confirmation and explanation
of the telegraphic message and
required them to file a formal
motion to dismiss the complaint
within fifteen (15) days from
notice. Neither party responded
and nothing was heard from
either party since then.
Complainant having failed to
submit her evidence ex
parte before the Commission, the
IBP Board of Governors submitted
to this Court its report
reprimanding respondent for his
acts, admonishing him that any
further acts of immorality in the
future will be dealt with more
severely, and ordering him to
support his legitimate family as a
responsible parent should.
The findings of the IBP Board of
Governors may be summed up as
follows:
Complainant and respondent
Cordova were married on 6 June

1976 and out of this marriage,

two (2) children were born. In
1985, the couple lived somewhere
in Quirino Province. In that year,
respondent Cordova left his family
as well as his job as Branch Clerk
of Court of the Regional Trial
Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino
Province, and went to Mangagoy,
Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one
Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado
was herself married and left her
own husband and children to stay
with respondent. Respondent
Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived
together in Bislig as husband and
wife, with respondent Cordova
introducing Fely to the public as
his wife, and Fely Holgado using
the name Fely Cordova.
Respondent Cordova gave Fely
Holgado funds with which to
establish a sari-sari store in the
public market at Bislig, while at
the same time failing to support
his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent
Cordova and his complainant wife
had an apparent reconciliation.
Respondent promised that he
would separate from Fely Holgado
and brought his legitimate family
to Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
Respondent would, however,
frequently come home from
beerhouses or cabarets, drunk,
and continued to neglect the
support of his legitimate family. In
February 1987, complainant
found, upon returning from a trip

to Manila necessitated by
hospitalization of her daughter
Loraine, that respondent Cordova
was no longer living with her
(complainant's) children in their
conjugal home; that respondent
Cordova was living with another
mistress, one Luisita Magallanes,
and had taken his younger
daughter Melanie along with him.
Respondent and his new mistress
hid Melanie from the complinant,
compelling complainant to go to
court and to take back her
daughter by habeas corpus. The
Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave
her custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent's
promises to reform, he continued
to live with Luisita Magallanes as
her husband and continued to fail
to give support to his legitimate
family.
Finally the Commission received a
telegram message apparently
from complainant, stating that
complainant and respondent had
been reconciled with each other.
After a review of the record, we
agree with the findings of fact of
the IBP Board. We also agree that
the most recent reconciliation
between complainant and
respondent, assuming the same
to be real, does not excuse and
wipe away the misconduct and
immoral behavior of the
respondent carried out in public,
and necessarily adversely

reflecting upon him as a member

of the Bar and upon the Philippine
Bar itself. An applicant for
admission to membership in the
bar is required to show that he is
possessed of good moral
character. That requirement is not
exhausted and dispensed with
upon admission to membership of
the bar. On the contrary, that
requirement persists as a
continuing condition for
membership in the Bar in good
standing.

Mortel, the respondent being

already married, wooed and won
the heart of a single, 21-year old
teacher who subsequently
cohabited with him and bore him
a son. Because respondent's
conduct in Mortel was particularly
morally repulsive, involving the
marrying of his mistress to his
own son and thereafter cohabiting
with the wife of his own son after
the marriage he had himself
arranged, respondent was
disbarred.

In Mortel v. Aspiras, 1 this Court,

following the rule in the United
States, held that "the continued
possession ... of a good moral
character is a requisite condition
for the rightful continuance in the
practice of the law ... and its loss
requires suspension or
disbarment, even though the
statutes do not specify that as a
ground for disbarment. " 2 It is
important to note that the lack of
moral character that we here refer
to as essential is not limited to
good moral character relating to
the discharge of the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney at
law. The moral delinquency that
affects the fitness of a member of
the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages
the generally accepted moral
standards of the community,
conduct for instance, which makes
"a mockery of the inviolable social
institution or marriage." 3 In

In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the

respondent was declared unfit to
continue as a member of the bar
by reason of his immoral conduct
and accordingly disbarred. He was
found to have engaged in sexual
relations with the complainant
who consequently bore him a son;
and to have maintained for a
number of years an adulterous
relationship with another woman.
In the instant case, respondent
Cordova maintained for about two
(2) years an adulterous
relationship with a married
woman not his wife, in full view of
the general public, to the
humiliation and detriment of his
legitimate family which he,
rubbing salt on the wound, failed
or refused to support. After a brief
period of "reform" respondent
took up again with another
woman not his wife, cohabiting
with her and bringing along his
young daughter to live with them.

Clearly, respondent flaunted his

disregard of the fundamental
institution of marriage and its
elementary obligations before his
own daughter and the community
at large.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved
to SUSPEND respondent from the
practice of law indefinitely and
until farther orders from this
Court. The Court will consider
lifting his suspension when
respondent Cordova submits proof
satisfactory to the Commission
and this Court that he has and
continues to provide for the
support of his legitimate family
and that he has given up the
immoral course of conduct that he
has clung to.
LESLIE UI, complainant,
vs. ATTY. IRIS
BONIFACIO, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative
complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly
carrying on an immoral
relationship with Carlos L. Ui,
husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant
Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at
the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in
Quezon City[1] and as a result of
their marital union, they had four

(4) children, namely, Leilani,

Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all
surnamed Ui. Sometime in
December 1987, however,
complainant found out that her
husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying
on an illicit relationship with
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio
with whom he begot a daughter
sometime in 1986, and that they
had been living together at No.
527 San Carlos Street, Ayala
Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City.
Respondent who is a graduate of
the College of Law of the
University of the Philippines was
admitted to the Philippine Bar in
1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant
his relationship with the
respondent. Complainant then
visited respondent at her office in
the later part of June 1988 and
introduced herself as the legal
wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon,
respondent admitted to her that
she has a child with Carlos Ui and
alleged, however, that everything
was over between her and Carlos
Ui. Complainant believed the
representations of respondent and
thought things would turn out well
from then on and that the illicit
relationship between her husband
and respondent would come to an
end.
However, complainant again
discovered that the illicit
relationship between her husband
and respondent continued, and

that sometime in December 1988,

respondent and her husband,
Carlos Ui, had a second child.
Complainant then met again with
respondent sometime in March
1989 and pleaded with
respondent to discontinue her
illicit relationship with Carlos Ui
but to no avail. The illicit
relationship persisted and
complainant even came to know
later on that respondent had been
employed by her husband in his
company.
A complaint for disbarment,
docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319,
was then filed on August 11, 1989
by the complainant against
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio
before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (hereinafter,
Commission) on the ground of
immorality, more particularly, for
carrying on an illicit relationship
with the complainants husband,
Carlos Ui.
In her Answer,[2]respondent
averred that she met Carlos Ui
sometime in 1983 and had known
him all along to be a bachelor,
with the knowledge, however,
that Carlos Ui had children by a
Chinese woman in Amoy, China,
from whom he had long been
estranged. She stated that during
one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui
formalized his intention to marry
her and they in fact got married in
Hawaii, USA in 1985[3]. Upon their

return to Manila, respondent did

not live with Carlos Ui. The latter
continued to live with his children
in their Greenhills residence
because respondent and Carlos Ui
wanted to let the children
gradually to know and accept the
fact of his second marriage before
they would live together.[4]
In 1986, respondent left the
country and stayed in Honolulu,
Hawaii and she would only return
occasionally to the Philippines to
update her law practice and
renew le gal ties. During one of
her trips to Manila sometime in
June 1988, respondent was
surprised when she was
confronted by a woman who
insisted that she was the lawful
wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and
desolate upon her discovery of
the true civil status of Carlos Ui,
respondent then left for Honolulu,
Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and
returned only in March 1989 with
her two (2) children. On March 20,
1989, a few days after she
reported to work with the law
firm[5] she was connected with,
the woman who represented
herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui
again came to her office,
demanding to know if Carlos Ui
has been communicating with her.
It is respondents contention that
her relationship with Carlos Ui is
not illicit because they were
married abroad and that after
June 1988 when respondent

discovered Carlos Uis true civil

status, she cut off all her ties with
him. Respondent averred that
Carlos Ui never lived with her in
Alabang, and that he resided at
26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila. It was
respondent who lived in Alabang
in a house which belonged to her
mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio;
and that the said house was built
exclusively from her parents
funds.[6]By way of counterclaim,
respondent sought moral
damages in the amount of Ten
Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00)
against complainant for having
filed the present allegedly
malicious and groundless
disbarment case against
respondent.
In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990,
complainant states, among
others, that respondent knew
perfectly well that Carlos Ui was
married to complainant and had
children with her even at the start
of her relationship with Carlos Ui,
and that the reason respondent
went abroad was to give birth to
her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the
proceedings before the Integrated
Bar, complainant also charged her
husband, Carlos Ui, and
respondent with the crime of
Concubinage before the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal,
docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but
the same was dismissed for

insufficiency of evidence to
establish probable cause for the
offense charged. The resolution
dismissing the criminal complaint
against respondent reads:
Complainants evidence had
prima facie established the
existence of the "illicit
relationship" between the
respondents allegedly discovered
by the complainant in December
1987. The same evidence
however show that respondent
Carlos Ui was still living with
complainant up to the latter part
of 1988 and/or the early part of
1989.
It would therefore be logical and
safe to state that the
"relationship" of respondents
started and was discovered by
complainant sometime in 1987
when she and respondent Carlos
were still living at No. 26 Potsdam
Street, Northeast Greenhills, San
Juan, MetroManila and they,
admittedly, continued to live
together at their conjugal home
up to early (sic) part of 1989 or
later 1988, when respondent
Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be
amiss to conclude that altho (sic)
the relationship, illicit as
complainant puts it, had been
prima facie established by
complainants evidence, this
same evidence had failed to even
prima facie establish the "fact of

respondents cohabitation in the

concept of husband and wife at
the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala
Alabang house, proof of which is
necessary and indispensable to at
least create probable cause for
the offense charged. The
statement alone of complainant,
worse, a statement only of a
conclusion respecting the fact of
cohabitation does not make the
complainants evidence thereto
any better/stronger (U.S. vs.
Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil.
178).
It is worth stating that the
evidence submitted by
respondents in support of their
respective positions on the matter
support and bolster the foregoing
conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most
respectfully recommended that
the instant complaint be
dismissed for want of evidence to
establish probable cause for the
offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8]
Complainant appealed the said
Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal
of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice,
but the same was dismissed [9] on
the ground of insufficiency of
evidence to prove her allegation
that respondent and Carlos Ui
lived together as husband and
wife at 527 San Carlos Street,
Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila.

In the proceedings before the IBP

Commission on Bar Discipline,
complainant filed a Motion to Cite
Respondent in Contempt of the
Commission [10] wherein she
charged respondent with making
false allegations in her Answer
and for submitting a supporting
document which was altered and
intercalated. She alleged that in
the Answer of respondent filed
before the Integrated Bar,
respondent averred, among
others, that she was married to
Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and
attached a Certificate of Marriage
to substantiate her averment.
However, the Certificate of
Marriage [11] duly certified by the
State Registrar as a true copy of
the record on file in the Hawaii
State Department of Health, and
duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consulate General in
Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed
that the date of marriage between
Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio was October 22, 1987,
and not October 22, 1985 as
claimed by respondent in her
Answer. According to complainant,
the reason for that false allegation
was because respondent wanted
to impress upon the said IBP that
the birth of her first child by
Carlos Ui was within the wedlock.
[12]
It is the contention of
complainant that such act
constitutes a violation of Articles
183[13] and 184[14] of the Revised
Penal Code, and also contempt of

the Commission; and that the act

of respondent in making false
allegations in her Answer and
submitting an altered/intercalated
document are indicative of her
moral perversity and lack of
integrity which make her
unworthy to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To
Cite Respondent in Contempt),
[15]
respondent averred that she
did not have the original copy of
the marriage certificate because
the same was in the possession of
Carlos Ui, and that she annexed
such copy because she relied in
good faith on what appeared on
the copy of the marriage
certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her
Memorandum [16] on February 22,
1995 and raised the lone issue of
whether or not she has conducted
herself in an immoral manner for
which she deserves to be barred
from the practice of law.
Respondent averred that the
complaint should be dismissed on
two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself
in a manner consistent with the
requirement of good moral
character for the practice of the
legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove
her allegation that respondent
conducted herself in an immoral
manner.[17]

In her defense, respondent

contends, among others, that it
was she who was the victim in
this case and not Leslie Ui
because she did not know that
Carlos Ui was already married,
and that upon learning of this
fact, respondent immediately cutoff all her ties with Carlos Ui. She
stated that there was no reason
for her to doubt at that time that
the civil status of Carlos Ui was
that of a bachelor because he
spent so much time with her, and
he was so open in his courtship.[18]
On the issue of the falsified
marriage certificate, respondent
alleged that it was highly
incredible for her to have
knowingly attached such marriage
certificate to her Answer had she
known that the same was altered.
Respondent reiterated that there
was no compelling reason for her
to make it appear that her
marriage to Carlos Ui took place
either in 1985 or 1987, because
the fact remains that respondent
and Carlos Ui got married before
complainant confronted
respondent and informed the
latter of her earlier marriage to
Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further,
respondent stated that it was
Carlos Ui who testified and
admitted that he was the person
responsible for changing the date
of the marriage certificate from
1987 to 1985, and complainant
did not present evidence to rebut

the testimony of Carlos Ui on this

matter.
Respondent posits that
complainants evidence,
consisting of the pictures of
respondent with a child, pictures
of respondent with Carlos Ui, a
picture of a garage with cars, a
picture of a light colored car with
Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the
same car, and portion of the
house and ground, and another
picture of the same car bearing
Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of
the house and the garage,[19] does
not prove that she acted in an
immoral manner. They have no
evidentiary value according to
her. The pictures were taken by a
photographer from a private
security agency and who was not
presented during the hearings.
Further, the respondent presented
the Resolution of the Provincial
Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 895427 dismissing the complaint
filed by Leslie Ui against
respondent for lack of evidence to
establish probable cause for the
offense charged [20] and the
dismissal of the appeal by the
Department of Justice [21] to
bolster her argument that she was
not guilty of any immoral or illegal
act because of her relationship
with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent
claims that she entered the
relationship with Carlos Ui in good
faith and that her conduct cannot
be considered as willful, flagrant,

or shameless, nor can it suggest

moral indifference. She fell in love
with Carlos Ui whom she believed
to be single, and, that upon her
discovery of his true civil status,
she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum [22] filed on
March 20, 1995 by complainant
Leslie Ui, she prayed for the
disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio
and reiterated that respondent
committed immorality by having
intimate relations with a married
man which resulted in the birth of
two (2) children. Complainant
testified that respondents
mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio,
personally knew complainant and
her husband since the late 1970s
because they were clients of the
bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was
the Branch Manager.[23] It was thus
highly improbable that
respondent, who was living with
her parents as of 1986, would not
have been informed by her own
mother that Carlos Ui was a
married man. Complainant
likewise averred that respondent
committed disrespect towards the
Commission for submitting a
photocopy of a document
containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainants
Memorandum [24], respondent
stated that complainant miserably
failed to show sufficient proof to
warrant her disbarment.
Respondent insists that contrary
to the allegations of complainant,

there is no showing that

respondent had knowledge of the
fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to
complainant. The allegation that
her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a
married man does not prove that
such information was made
known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after
which the Commission on Bar
Discipline submitted its Report
and Recommendation, finding
that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged
that at the time respondent was
courted by Carlos Ui, the latter
represented himself to be single.
The Commission does not find
said claim too difficult to believe
in the light of contemporary
human experience.
Almost always, when a married
man courts a single woman, he
represents himself to be single,
separated, or without any firm
commitment to another woman.
The reason therefor is not hard to
fathom. By their very nature,
single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when
respondent became aware the
(sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui,
she left for the United States (in
July of 1988). She broke off all
contacts with him. When she
returned to the Philippines in
March of 1989, she lived with her
brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr.
Carlos Ui and respondent only

talked to each other because of

the children whom he was allowed
to visit. At no time did they live
together.
Under the foregoing
circumstances, the Commission
fails to find any act on the part of
respondent that can be
considered as unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible
to a high degree. To be sure, she
was more of a victim that (sic)
anything else and should deserve
compassion rather than
condemnation. Without cavil, this
sad episode destroyed her chance
of having a normal and happy
family life, a dream cherished by
every single girl.
x..........................x.........................
.x"
Thereafter, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines issued a Notice of
Resolution dated December 13,
1997, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and
APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner in
the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A",
and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws
and rules, the complaint for Gross

Immorality against Respondent is

DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty.
Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for
knowingly and willfully attaching
to her Answer a falsified
Certificate of Marriage with a
stern warning that a repetition of
the same will merit a more severe
penalty."
We agree with the findings
aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege.
A bar candidate does not have the
right to enjoy the practice of the
legal profession simply by passing
the bar examinations. It is a
privilege that can be revoked,
subject to the mandate of due
process, once a lawyer violates
his oath and the dictates of legal
ethics. The requisites for
admission to the practice of law
are:
a. he must be a citizen of the
Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years
of age;
d. a person of good moral
character;
e. he must show that no charges
against him involving moral
turpitude, are filed or pending in
court;
f. possess the required
educational qualifications; and

g. pass the bar examinations.

[25]
(Italics supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that
one of the conditions prior to
admission to the bar is that an
applicant must possess good
moral character. More
importantly, possession of good
moral character must be
continuous as a requirement to
the enjoyment of the privilege of
law practice, otherwise, the loss
thereof is a ground for the
revocation of such privilege. It has
been held IF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER IS
A SINE QUA NON FOR ADMISSION
TO THE BAR, THEN THE
CONTINUED POSSESSION OF
GOOD MORAL CHARACTER IS
ALSO A REQUISITE FOR RETAINING
MEMBERSHIP IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION. MEMBERSHIP IN THE
BAR MAY BE TERMINATED WHEN A
LAWYER CEASES TO HAVE GOOD
MORAL CHARACTER. (Royong vs.
Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for
"grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude". A
member of the bar should have
moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision
and to fix an inflexible standard as
to what is "grossly immoral
conduct" or to specify the moral
delinquency and obliquity which

render a lawyer unworthy of

continuing as a member of the
bar. The rule implies that what
appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced
may not be the immoral conduct
that warrants disbarment.
IMMORAL CONDUCT HAS BEEN
DEFINED AS "THAT CONDUCT
WHICH IS WILLFUL, FLAGRANT, OR
SHAMELESS, AND WHICH SHOWS
A MORAL INDIFFERENCE TO THE
OPINION OF THE GOOD AND
RESPECTABLE MEMBERS OF THE
COMMUNITY." (7 C.J.S. 959).[26]
In the case at bar, it is the claim
of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that
when she met Carlos Ui, she knew
and believed him to be single.
Respondent fell in love with him
and they got married and as a
result of such marriage, she gave
birth to two (2) children. Upon her
knowledge of the true civil status
of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case
may sound, the effects of the
actuations of respondent are not
only far from simple, they will
have a rippling effect on how the
standard norms of our legal
practitioners should be defined.
Perhaps morality in our liberal
society today is a far cry from
what it used to be before. This
permissiveness notwithstanding,
lawyers, as keepers of public
faith, are burdened with a higher
degree of social responsibility and

thus must handle their personal

affairs with greater caution. The
facts of this case lead us to
believe that perhaps respondent
would not have found herself in
such a compromising situation
had she exercised prudence and
been more vigilant in finding out
more about Carlos Uis personal
background prior to her intimate
involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed
which should have at least
aroused respondents suspicion
that something was amiss in her
relationship with Carlos Ui, and
moved her to ask probing
questions. For instance,
respondent admitted that she
knew that Carlos Ui had children
with a woman from Amoy, China,
yet it appeared that she never
exerted the slightest effort to find
out if Carlos Ui and this woman
were indeed unmarried. Also,
despite their marriage in 1987,
Carlos Ui never lived with
respondent and their first child, a
circumstance that is simply
incomprehensible considering
respondents allegation that
Carlos Ui was very open in
courting her.
All these taken together leads to
the inescapable conclusion that
respondent was imprudent in
managing her personal affairs.
However, the fact remains that
her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what

respondent believed was a valid

marriage, cannot be considered
immoral. For immorality connotes
conduct that shows indifference to
the moral norms of society and
the opinion of good and
respectable members of the
community.[27] Moreover, for such
conduct to warrant disciplinary
action, the same must be "grossly
immoral," that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute
a criminal act or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.[28]
We have held that "a member of
the Bar and officer of the court is
not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships x x x but
must also so behave himself as to
avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral
standards."[29] Respondents act of
immediately distancing herself
from Carlos Ui upon discovering
his true civil status belies just that
alleged moral indifference and
proves that she had no intention
of flaunting the law and the high
moral standard of the legal
profession. Complainants bare
assertions to the contrary deserve
no credit. After all, the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant,
and the Court will exercise its
disciplinary powers only if she
establishes her case by clear,
convincing and satisfactory
evidence.[30] This, herein

complainant miserably failed to

do.
On the matter of the falsified
Certificate of Marriage attached
by respondent to her Answer, we
find improbable to believe the
averment of respondent that she
merely relied on the photocopy of
the Marriage Certificate which was
provided her by Carlos Ui. For an
event as significant as a marriage
ceremony, any normal bride
would verily recall the date and
year of her marriage. It is difficult
to fathom how a bride, especially
a lawyer as in the case at bar, can
forget the year when she got
married. Simply stated, it is
contrary to human experience
and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer
would verify the information
contained in an attachment to her
pleading, especially so when she
haspersonal knowledge of the
facts and circumstances
contained therein. In attaching
such Marriage Certificate with an
intercalated date, the defense of
good faith of respondent on that
point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers
to adhere unwaveringly to the
highest standards of morality. The
legal profession exacts from its
members nothing less. Lawyers
are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from
misdeeds and acts constitutive of

malpractice. Their exalted

positions as officers of the court
demand no less than the highest
degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for
disbarment against respondent
Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged
immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby
REPRIMANDED for attaching to
her Answer a photocopy of her
Marriage Certificate, with an
altered or intercalated date
thereof, with a STERN WARNING
that a more severe sanction will
be imposed on her for any
repetition of the same or similar
offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7136

1, 2007

August

JOSELANO
GUEVARRA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL
EALA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant)
filed on March 4, 2002 a
Complaint for Disbarment1 before
the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) Committee on

Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty.
Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli
Eala (respondent) for "grossly
immoral conduct and unmitigated
violation of the lawyer's oath."
In his complaint, Guevarra gave
the following account:
He first met respondent in January
2000 when his (complainant's)
then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent to him as
her friend who was married to
Marianne (sometimes spelled
"Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom
he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on
October 7, 2000, complainant
noticed that from January to
March 2001, Irene had been
receiving from respondent
cellphone calls, as well as
messages some of which read "I
love you," "I miss you," or "Meet
you at Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that
Irene habitually went home very
late at night or early in the
morning of the following day, and
sometimes did not go home from
work. When he asked about her
whereabouts, she replied that she
slept at her parents' house in
Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy
with her work.
In February or March 2001,
complainant saw Irene and
respondent together on two

occasions. On the second

occasion, he confronted them
following which Irene abandoned
the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant
went uninvited to Irene's birthday
celebration at which he saw her
and respondent celebrating with
her family and friends. Out of
embarrassment, anger and
humiliation, he left the venue
immediately. Following that
incident, Irene went to the
conjugal house and hauled off all
her personal belongings, pieces of
furniture, and her share of the
household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the
master's bedroom, a folded social
card bearing the words "I Love
You" on its face, which card when
unfolded contained a handwritten
letter dated October 7, 2000, the
day of his wedding to Irene,
reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, you'll
be moments away from walking
down the aisle. I will say a prayer
for you that you may find
meaning in what you're about to
do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever
met. Is it only for me to find
fleeting happiness but experience
eternal pain? Is it only for us to
find a true love but then lose it

again? Or is it because there's a

bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced
true happiness with me. I have
done everything humanly possible
to love you. And today, as you
make your vows . . . I make my
own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my
life. I loved you from the first time
I laid eyes on you, to the time we
spent together, up to the final
moments of your single life. But
more importantly, I will love you
until the life in me is gone and
until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be
happy for you. I have enough
memories of us to last me a
lifetime. Always remember though
that in my heart, in my mind and
in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS
YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE,
and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND
YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU
FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M
LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2
Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw
respondent's car and that of Irene
constantly parked at No. 71-B
11th Street, New Manila where, as

he was to later learn sometime in

April 2001, Irene was already
residing. He also learned still later
that when his friends saw Irene on
or about January 18, 2002
together with respondent during a
concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,3 respondent
admitted having sent the I LOVE
YOU card on which the abovequoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the
COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were
even FLAUNTING THEIR
ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as
they attended social functions
together. For instance, in or about
the third week of September
2001, the couple attended the
launch of the "Wine All You Can"
promotion of French wines, held at
the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B
at Mandaluyong City. Their
attendance was reported in
Section B of the Manila
Standard issue of 24 September
2001, on page 21. Respondent
and Irene were photographed
together; their picture was
captioned: "Irene with
Sportscaster Noli Eala." A
photocopy of the report is
attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and
emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase
"flaunting their adulterous
relationship" supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER,

stated:
4. Respondent
specifically denies having ever
flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged
in paragraph 14 of the Complaint,
the truth of the matter being
that their relationship was low
profile and known only to the
immediate members of their
respective families, and that
Respondent, as far as the general
public was concerned, was still
known to be legally married to
Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the
COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondent's adulterous
conduct with the complainant's
wife and his apparent abandoning
or neglecting of his own family,
demonstrate his gross moral
depravity, making him morally
unfit to keep his membership in
the bar. He flaunted his aversion
to the institution of marriage,
calling it a "piece of paper."
Morally reprehensible was his
writing the love letter to
complainant's bride on the very
day of her wedding, vowing to
continue his love for her "until we
are together again," as now they
are.6 (Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER
as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies

the allegations in paragraph 15 of
the Complaint regarding
his adulterousrelationship and
that his acts demonstrate gross
moral depravity thereby making
him unfit to keep his membership
in the bar, the reason being
that Respondent's relationship
with Irene was not under
scandalous circumstances and
that as far as his relationship with
his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a
civil, cordial and peaceful
relationship with [his wife] Mary
Anne as in fact they still
occasionally meet in public, even
if Mary Anne is aware
of Respondent's special friendship
with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that
he has flaunted his aversion to
the institution of marriage by
calling the institution of marriage
a mere piece of paper because his
reference [in his above-quoted
handwritten letter to Irene] to the
marriage between Complainant
and Irene as a piece of paper was
merely with respect to the
formality of the marriage
contract.7 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted8 paragraph
18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires

lawyers to support the
Constitution and obey the laws.
The Constitution regards marriage
as an inviolable social institution
and is the foundation of the family
(Article XV, Sec. 2).9
And on paragraph 19 of the
COMPLAINT reading:
19. Respondent's grossly immoral
conduct runs afoul of the
Constitution and the laws he,
as a lawyer, has been sworn to
uphold. In pursuing obsessively
his illicit love for the
complainant's wife, he mocked
the institution of marriage,
betrayed his own family, broke up
the complainant's marriage,
commits adultery with his wife,
and degrades the legal
profession.10 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER,
stated:
7. Respondent specifically denies
the allegations in paragraph 19 of
the Complaint, the reason being
thatunder the circumstances the
acts of Respondent with respect
to his purely personal and low
profile special relationship with
Irene is neither under
scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly
immoral conduct as would be a
ground for disbarment pursuant to
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules

of Court.11 (Emphasis and

underscoring supplied)

counsel did not cross-examine

complainant.17

To respondent's ANSWER,
complainant filed a
REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave
birth to a girl and Irene named
respondent in the Certificate of
Live Birth as the girl's father.
Complainant attached to the
Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a
Certificate of Live Birth13 bearing
Irene's signature and naming
respondent as the father of her
daughter Samantha Irene Louise
Moje who was born on February
14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.

After investigation, IBP-CBD

Investigating Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION18 dated
October 26, 2004, found the
charge against respondent
sufficiently proven.

Complainant's REPLY merited a

REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO
DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003
from respondent in which he
denied having "personal
knowledge of the Certificate of
Live Birth attached to the
complainant's
Reply."15 Respondent moved to
dismiss the complaint due to the
pendency of a civil case filed by
complainant for the annulment of
his marriage to Irene, and a
criminal complaint for adultery
against respondent and Irene
which was pending before the
Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
During the investigation before
the IBP-CBD, complainant's
Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to
Answer were adopted as his
testimony on direct
examination.16 Respondent's

The Commissioner thus

recommended19 that respondent
be disbarred for violating Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional
Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct (Underscoring
supplied),
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of
the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not
engage
in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
(Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors,
however, annulled and set aside
the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and
accordingly dismissed the case for

lack of merit, by Resolution dated

January 28, 2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET
ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and
to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of
the above-entitled case for lack of
merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in
the original)
Hence, the present petition21 of
complainant before this Court,
filed pursuant to Section 12 (c),
Rule 13922 of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with
merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of
Governors, in setting aside the
Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and
dismissing the case for lack of
merit, gave no reason therefor as
its above-quoted 33-word
Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his
Comment23 on the present
petition of complainant, that there
is no evidence against him.24 The
contention fails. As the IBP-CBD
Investigating Commissioner
observed:

While it may be true that the love

letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh.
"C") and the news item published
in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"),
even taken together do not
sufficiently prove that respondent
is carrying on an adulterous
relationship with complainant's
wife, there are other pieces of
evidence on record which support
the accusation of complainant
against respondent.
It should be noted that in his
Answer dated 17 October
2002, respondent through
counsel made the following
statements to wit: "Respondent
specifically denies having [ever]
flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged
in paragraph [14] of the
Complaint, the truth of the matter
being [that]their relationship was
low profile and known only to
immediate members of their
respective families . . . , and
Respondent specifically denies the
allegations in paragraph 19 of the
complaint, the reason being that
under the circumstances the acts
of the respondents with respect to
his purely personal and low profile
relationship with Irene is neither
under scandalous circumstances
nor tantamount to grossly
immoral conduct . . ."
These statements of
respondent in his Answer are
an admission that there is
indeed a "special" relationship

between him and

complainant's wife, Irene,
[which] taken together with
the Certificate of Live Birth of
Samantha Louise Irene
Moje (Annex "H-1")
sufficiently prove that there
was indeed an illicit
relationship between
respondent and Irene which
resulted in the birth of the child
"Samantha". In the Certificate
of Live Birth of Samantha it
should be noted that
complainant's wife Irene
supplied the information that
respondent was the father of
the child. Given the fact that the
respondent admitted his special
relationship with Irene there is
no reason to believe that
Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding
the paternity of the child. It
should be underscored
that respondent has not
categorically denied that he is
the father of Samantha Louise
Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's
Answer, he does not deny
carrying on an adulterous
relationship with Irene, "adultery"
being defined under Art. 333 of
the Revised Penal Code as that
"committed by any married
woman who shall have sexual
intercourse with a man not her
husband and by the man who has

carnal knowledge of her, knowing

her to be married, even if the
marriage be subsequently
declared void."26 (Italics supplied)
What respondent denies
is having flaunted such
relationship, he maintaining that it
was "low profile and known only
to the immediate members of
their respective families."
In other words, respondent's
denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the
admission of the substantial facts
in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. It
was in effect an admission of the
averments it was directed at.
Stated otherwise, a negative
pregnant is a form of negative
expression which carries with
it in affirmation or at least an
implication of some kind
favorable to the adverse
party. It is a denial pregnant with
an admission of the substantial
facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged
with qualifying or modifying
language and the words of the
allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it
has been held that thequalifying
circumstances alone are
denied while the fact itself is
admitted.27 (Citations omitted;
emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

A negative pregnant too is

respondent's denial of having
"personal knowledge" of Irene's
daughter Samantha Louise Irene
Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In
said certificate, Irene named
respondent a "lawyer," 38 years
old as the child's father. And the
phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered
on the desired information on
"DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE."
A comparison of the signature
attributed to Irene in the
certificate28 with her signature on
the Marriage Certificate29 shows
that they were affixed by one and
the same person. Notatu
dignum is that, as the
Investigating Commissioner
noted, respondent never denied
being the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records
custodian of St. Luke's Medical
Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit30 which he identified at
the witness stand, declared that
Irene gave the information in the
Certificate of Live Birth that the
child's father is "Jose Emmanuel
Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years
old and a lawyer.31
Without doubt, the adulterous
relationship between respondent
and Irene has been sufficiently
proven by more than
clearly preponderant evidence
that evidence adduced by one
party which is more conclusive
and credible than that of the other
party and, therefore, has greater

weight than the other32 which is

the quantum of evidence needed
in an administrative case against
a lawyer.
Administrative cases against
lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and
they may proceed independently
of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of
cases differ. In a criminal case,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; in an administrative
case for disbarment or
suspension, "clearly
preponderant evidence" is all
that is required.33 (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that
disbarment does not lie because
his relationship with Irene was
not, under Section 27 of Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court,
reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or
suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor.
A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful

disobedience appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Philippine Bar by a
competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also
been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or
suspension if the basis of such
action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order
of the foreign court or disciplinary
agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for
disbarment or suspension
(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied),
under scandalous
circumstances.34
The immediately-quoted Rule
which provides the grounds for
disbarment or suspension uses
the phrase "grossly immoral
conduct," not "under scandalous
circumstances." Sexual
intercourse under scandalous
circumstances is, following Article
334 of the Revised Penal Code
reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any

husband who shall keep a
mistress in the conjugal dwelling,
or, shall have sexual intercourse,
under scandalous circumstances,
with a woman who is not his wife,
or shall cohabit with her in any
other place, shall be punished by
prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime
of concubinage when a married
man has sexual intercourse with a
woman elsewhere.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual
congress with a woman not his
wife or without the benefit of
marriage should be characterized
as 'grossly immoral conduct'
depends on the surrounding
circumstances."
The case at bar involves a
relationship between a
married lawyer and a married
woman who is not his wife. It
is immaterial whether the affair
was carried out
discreetly. Apropos is the following
pronouncement of this Court
in Vitug v. Rongcal:36

On the charge of immorality,

respondent does not deny that he
had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and
discreet, and which act is not "so
corrupt and false as to constitute

a criminal act or so unprincipled

as to be reprehensible to a high
degree" in order to merit
disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in
disbarment cases that the mere
fact of sexual relations between
two unmarriedadults is not
sufficient to warrant
administrative sanction for such
illicit behavior, it is not so with
respect tobetrayals of the
marital vow of fidelity. Even if
not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under
penal law, sexual relations outside
marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it
manifestsdeliberate disregard
of the sanctity of marriage
and the marital vows protected
by the Constitution and affirmed
by our laws.37 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement
in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38
The Court need not delve into the
question of whether or not the
respondent did contract a
bigamous marriage . . . It is
enough that the records of this
administrative case substantiate
the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner, as well as the IBP
Board of Governors, i.e., that
indeed respondent has
beencarrying on an illicit
affair with a married woman, a

grossly immoral conduct

and indicative of an extremely
low regard for the
fundamental ethics of his
profession. This detestable
behavior renders him
regrettably unfit and
undeserving of the treasured
honor and privileges which his
license confers upon
him.39 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated
the lawyer's oath he took before
admission to practice law which
goes:
I _________, having been permitted
to continue in the practice of law
in the Philippines, do solemnly
swear that I recognize the
supreme authority of the Republic
of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution andobey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court; I will
not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay
no man for money or malice, and
will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the
courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.

So help me God. (Underscoring

supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware
of Section 2 of Article XV (The
Family) of the Constitution
reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family
Code (Executive Order No. 209),
which echoes this constitutional
provision, obligates the husband
and the wife "to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help
and support."40
FURTHERMORE, RESPONDENT
VIOLATED RULE 1.01
OF CANON 1 OF THE CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
WHICH PROSCRIBES A LAWYER
FROM ENGAGING IN "UNLAWFUL,
DISHONEST, IMMORAL OR
DECEITFUL CONDUCT," AND RULE
7.03 OF CANON7 OF THE SAME
CODE WHICH PROSCRIBES A
LAWYER FROM ENGAGING IN ANY
"CONDUCT THAT ADVERSELY
REFLECTS ON HIS FITNESS TO
PRACTICE LAW."
Clutching at straws, respondent,
during the pendency of the
investigation of the case before
the IBP Commissioner, filed a
Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005
informing the IBP-CBD that

complainant's petition for nullity

of his (complainant's) marriage to
Irene had been granted by Branch
106 of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, and that the criminal
complaint for adultery
complainant filed against
respondent and Irene "based on
the same set of facts alleged in
the instant case," which was
pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on
petition of complainant, had been,
on motion of complainant,
withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice's
Resolution of January 16, 2004
granting complainant's Motion to
Withdraw Petition for Review
reads:
Considering that the instant
motion was filed before the final
resolution of the petition for
review, we are inclined to grant
the same pursuant to Section 10
of Department Circular No. 70
dated July 3, 2000, which provides
that "notwithstanding the
perfection of the appeal, the
petitioner may withdraw the same
at any time before it is finally
resolved, in which case the
appealed resolution shall
stand as though no appeal has
been taken."42 (Emphasis
supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between
complainant and Irene was
subsequently declared void ab

initio is immaterial. The acts

complained of took
place before the marriage was
declared null and void.43 As a
lawyer, respondent should be
aware that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband
and wife are presumed, unless
proven otherwise, to have entered
into a lawful contract of
marriage.44 In carrying on an
extra-marital affair with Irene
prior to the judicial declaration
that her marriage with
complainant was null and void,
and despite respondent himself
being married, he showed
disrespect for an institution held
sacred by the law. And he
betrayed his unfitness to be a
lawyer.
As for complainant's withdrawal of
his petition for review before the
DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted
to state that before complainant
filed his December 23, 2003
Motion to Withdraw his Petition for
Review, the DOJ had already
promulgated a Resolution
on September 22, 2003 reversin
g the dismissal by the Quezon
City Prosecutor's Office of
complainant's complaint for
adultery. In reversing the City
Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ
Secretary Simeon Datumanong
held:
Parenthetically the totality of
evidence adduced by complainant
would, in the fair estimation of the

Department, sufficiently establish

all the elements of the offense of
adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed, early on,
respondent Moje conceded to
complainant that she was going
out on dates with respondent
Eala, and this she did when
complainant confronted her about
Eala's frequent phone calls and
text messages to her.
Complainant also personally
witnessed Moje and Eala having a
rendezvous on two occasions.
Respondent Eala never denied the
fact that he knew Moje to be
married to complainant[.] In fact,
he (Eala) himself was married to
another woman. Moreover, Moje's
eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant
had once more confronted her
about Eala, only served to confirm
the illicit relationship involving
both respondents. This becomes
all the more apparent by Moje's
subsequent relocation in No. 71-B,
11th Street, New Manila, Quezon
City, which was a few blocks away
from the church where she had
exchange marital vows with
complainant.
It was in this place that the two
lovers apparently cohabited.
Especially since Eala's vehicle and
that of Moje's were always seen
there. Moje herself admits that
she came to live in the said
address whereas Eala asserts that
that was where he held office. The

happenstance that it was in that

said address that Eala and Moje
had decided to hold office for the
firm that both had formed smacks
too much of a coincidence. For
one, the said address appears to
be a residential house, for that
was where Moje stayed all
throughout after her separation
from complainant. It was both
respondent's love nest, to put
short; their illicit affair that was
carried out there bore fruit a few
months later when Moje gave
birth to a girl at the nearby
hospital of St. Luke's Medical
Center. What finally militates
against the respondents is
the indubitable fact that in the
certificate of birth of the girl, Moje
furnished the information that
Eala was the father. This speaks
all too eloquently of the
unlawful and damning nature
of the adulterous acts of the
respondents. Complainant's
supposed illegal procurement of
the birth certificate is most
certainly beside the point for
both respondents Eala and
Moje have not denied, in any
categorical manner, that Eala
is the father of the child
Samantha Irene Louise
Moje.45 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is
a private offense which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio and thus
leaves the DOJ no choice but to

grant complainant's motion to

withdraw his petition for review.
But even if respondent and Irene
were to be acquitted of adultery
after trial, if the Information for
adultery were filed in court, the
same would not have been a bar
to the present administrative
complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v.
Ramos,46 viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent
Ramos [of] the criminal charge is
not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of
legal profession are not satisfied
by conduct which merely enables
one to escape the penalties of x x
x criminal law. Moreover, this
Court, in disbarment proceedings
is acting in an entirely different
capacity from that which courts
assume in trying criminal
case47 (Italics in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian
Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v.
Atty. Naldoza,48 held:
Administrative cases against
lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and
they mayproceed independently
of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition

is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII2006-06 passed on January 28,
2006 by the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Present:

Panganiban, CJ,
Puno,
Quisumbing,

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel

M. Eala, is DISBARRED for
grossly immoral conduct, violation
of his oath of office, and violation
of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon
7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which
is immediately executory, be
made part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines. And let copies of the
Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect
immediately.

Complainant,

Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
- versus
Martinez,

Austria-

Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,

SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO
SORIANO,
No. 6792

Ynares-Santiago,

A.C.

Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ

Respondent.
January 25, 2006

case was deemed submitted for

resolution.

DECISION

On December 6, 2004,
Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa
rendered her Report and
Recommendation, which was later
adopted and approved by the IBP
Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated
March 12, 2005.

PER CURIAM:
Before us is a ComplaintAffidavit[1] for the disbarment of
Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by
Roberto Soriano with the
Commission on Bar Discipine
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). Complainant
alleges that the conviction of
respondent for a crime involving
moral turpitude, together with the
circumstances surrounding the
conviction, violates Canon 1 of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility;[2] and
constitutes sufficient ground for
his disbarment under Section 27
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
[3]

Because of the failure of Atty.

Dizon to submit his Answer to the
Complaint, the CBD issued a
Notice dated May 20, 2004,
informing him that he was in
default, and that an ex-parte
hearing had been scheduled for
June 11, 2004.[4] After that
hearing, complainant manifested
that he was submitting the case
on the basis of the Complaint and
its attachments.[5] Accordingly,
the CBD directed him to file his
Position Paper, which he did on
July 27, 2004.[6] Afterwards, the

In his Complaint-Affidavit,
Soriano alleged that respondent
had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and that the
conviction of the latter for
frustrated homicide,[7] which
involved moral turpitude, should
result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondents
conviction were summarized by
Branch 60 of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City in this wise:
x x x. The accused was driving
his brown Toyota Corolla and was
on his way home after gassing up
in preparation for his trip to
Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife.
Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver
overtook the car driven by the
accused not knowing that the
driver of the car he had overtaken
is not just someone, but a lawyer
and a prominent member of the
Baguio community who was under
the influence of liquor. Incensed,
the accused tailed the taxi driver
until the latter stopped to make a
turn at [the] Chugum and Carino

Streets. The accused also

stopped his car, berated the taxi
driver and held him by his shirt.
To stop the aggression, the taxi
driver forced open his door
causing the accused to fall to the
ground. The taxi driver knew that
the accused had been drinking
because he smelled of liquor.
Taking pity on the accused who
looked elderly, the taxi driver got
out of his car to help him get up.
But the accused, by now enraged,
stood up immediately and was
about to deal the taxi driver a fist
blow when the latter boxed him
on the chest instead. The
accused fell down a second time,
got up again and was about to
box the taxi driver but the latter
caught his fist and turned his arm
around. The taxi driver held on to
the accused until he could be
pacified and then released him.
The accused went back to his car
and got his revolver making sure
that the handle was wrapped in a
handkerchief. The taxi driver was
on his way back to his vehicle
when he noticed the eyeglasses of
the accused on the ground. He
picked them up intending to
return them to the accused. But
as he was handing the same to
the accused, he was met by the
barrel of the gun held by the
accused who fired and shot him
hitting him on the neck. He fell on
the thigh of the accused so the
latter pushed him out and sped
off. The incident was witnessed

by Antonio Billanes whose

testimony corroborated that of the
taxi driver, the complainant in this
case, Roberto Soriano.[8]
It was the prosecution witness,
Antonio Billanes, who came to the
aid of Soriano and brought the
latter to the hospital. Because
the bullet had lacerated the
carotid artery on the left side of
his neck,[9] complainant would
have surely died of hemorrhage if
he had not received timely
medical assistance, according to
the attending surgeon, Dr.
Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano
sustained a spinal cord injury,
which caused paralysis on the left
part of his body and disabled him
for his job as a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its
Decision dated November 29,
2001. On January 18, 2002,
respondent filed an application for
probation, which was granted by
the court on several conditions.
These included satisfaction of
the civil liabilities imposed by
[the] court in favor of the
offended party, Roberto
Soriano.[10]

According to the unrefuted

statements of complainant, Atty.
Dizon, who has yet to comply with
this particular undertaking, even
appealed the civil liability to the
Court of Appeals.[11]

In her Report and

Recommendation, Commissioner
Herbosa recommended that
respondent be disbarred from the
practice of law for having been
convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude.

The commissioner found that

respondent had not only been
convicted of such crime, but that
the latter also exhibited an
obvious lack of good moral
character, based on the following
facts:

1.
He was under the influence
of liquor while driving his car;
2.
He reacted violently and
attempted to assault Complainant
only because the latter, driving a
taxi, had overtaken him;
3.
Complainant having been
able to ward off his attempted
assault, Respondent went back to
his car, got a gun, wrapped the
same with a handkerchief and
shot Complainant[,] who was
unarmed;
4.
When Complainant fell on
him, Respondent simply pushed
him out and fled;

5.
Despite positive
identification and overwhelming
evidence, Respondent denied that
he had shot Complainant;
6.
Apart from [his] denial,
Respondent also lied when he
claimed that he was the one
mauled by Complainant and two
unidentified persons; and,
7.
Although he has been
placed on probation, Respondent
has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied
his civil liabilities to
Complainant.[12]

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme

Court received for its final action
the IBP Resolution adopting the
Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner.

We agree with the findings

and recommendations of
Commissioner Herbosa, as
approved and adopted by the
IBP Board of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of

the Rules of Court, conviction for a
crime involving moral turpitude is
a ground for disbarment or
suspension. By such conviction, a
lawyer is deemed to have become
unfit to uphold the administration
of justice and to be no longer

possessed of good moral

character.
In the instant case, respondent
has been found guilty; and he
stands convicted, by final
judgment, of frustrated homicide.
Since his conviction has already
been established and is no longer
open to question, the only issues
that remain to be determined are
as follows:
1) WHETHER HIS CRIME OF
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE INVOLVES
MORAL TURPITUDE, AND
2) WHETHER HIS GUILT
WARRANTS DISBARMENT.

Moral turpitude has been defined

as everything which is done
contrary to justice, modesty,
or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and
social duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general, contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.
The question of whether the crime
of homicide involves moral
turpitude has been discussed
in International Rice Research
Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] a labor
case concerning an employee who
was dismissed on the basis of his
conviction for homicide.
Considering the particular
circumstances surrounding the

commission of the crime, this

Court rejected the employers
contention and held that homicide
in that case did not involve moral
turpitude. (If it did, the crime
would have been violative of the
IRRIs Employment
Policy Regulations and indeed a
ground for dismissal.) The Court
explained that, having
disregarded the attendant
circumstances, the employer
made a pronouncement that was
precipitate. Furthermore, it was
not for the latter to determine
conclusively whether a crime
involved moral turpitude. That
discretion belonged to the courts,
as explained thus:

x x x. Homicide may or may not

involve moral turpitude
depending on the degree of the
crime. Moral turpitude is not
involved in every criminal act and
is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute,
but whether any particular
conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of
fact and frequently depends on all
the surrounding circumstances. x
x x.[16] (Emphasis supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the

crime of homicide did not involve
moral turpitude, the Court
appreciated the presence of
incomplete self-defense and total

absence of aggravating
circumstances. For a better
understanding of that Decision,
the circumstances of the crime
are quoted as follows:

x x x. The facts on record

show that Micosa [the IRRI
employee] was then urinating and
had his back turned when the
victim drove his fist unto Micosa's
face; that the victim then forcibly
rubbed Micosa's face into the
filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded
to the victim to stop the attack
but was ignored and that it was
while Micosa was in that position
that he drew a fan knife from the
left pocket of his shirt and
desperately swung it at the victim
who released his hold on Micosa
only after the latter had stabbed
him several times. These facts
show that Micosa's intention was
not to slay the victim but only to
defend his person. The
appreciation in his favor of the
mitigating circumstances of selfdefense and voluntary surrender,
plus the total absence of any
aggravating circumstance
demonstrate that Micosa's
character and intentions were not
inherently vile, immoral or
unjust.[17]

The present case is totally

different. s the IBP correctly
found, the circumstances clearly
evince the moral turpitude of
respondent and his unworthiness
to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the
aggressor, as he pursued and
shot complainant when the latter
least expected it. The act of
aggression shown by respondent
will not be mitigated by the fact
that he was hit once and his arm
twisted by complainant. Under
the circumstances, those were
reasonable actions clearly
intended to fend off the lawyers
assault.
We also consider the trial
courts finding of treachery as a
further indication of the skewed
morals of respondent. He shot
the victim when the latter was not
in a position to defend himself. In
fact, under the impression that
the assault was already over, the
unarmed complainant was merely
returning the eyeglasses of Atty.
Dizon when the latter
unexpectedly shot him. To make
matters worse, respondent
wrapped the handle of his gun
with a handkerchief so as not to
leave fingerprints. In so doing, he
betrayed his sly intention to
escape punishment for his
crime.

The totality of the facts

unmistakably bears the earmarks
of moral turpitude. By his
conduct, respondent revealed his
extreme arrogance and feeling of
self-importance. As it were, he
acted like a god on the road, who
deserved to be venerated and
never to be slighted. Clearly, his
inordinate reaction to a simple
traffic incident reflected poorly on
his fitness to be a member of the
legal profession. His overreaction
also evinced vindictiveness, which
was definitely an undesirable trait
in any individual, more so in a
lawyer. In the tenacity with which
he pursued complainant, we see
not the persistence of a person
who has been grievously
wronged, but the obstinacy ofone
trying to assert a false sense of
superiority and to exact revenge.

IT IS ALSO GLARINGLY CLEAR

THAT RESPONDENT SERIOUSLY
TRANSGRESSED CANON 1 OF
THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY THROUGH
HIS ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
AN UNLICENSED
FIREARM[18] AND HIS UNJUST
REFUSAL TO SATISFY HIS
CIVIL LIABILITIES.[19]
HE HAS THUS BRAZENLY
VIOLATED THE LAW AND
DISOBEYED THE LAWFUL
ORDERS OF THE COURTS. WE
REMIND HIM THAT, BOTH IN

HIS ATTORNEYS OATH[20] AND

IN THE CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, HE BOUND
HIMSELF TO OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND.

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown

through this incident that he is
wanting in even a basic sense of
justice. He obtained the
benevolence of the trial court
when it suspended his sentence
and granted him probation. And
yet, it has been four
years[21] since he was ordered to
settle his civil liabilities to
complainant. To date, respondent
remains adamant in refusing to
fulfill that obligation. By his
extreme impetuosity and
intolerance, as shown by his
violent reaction to a simple traffic
altercation, he has taken away the
earning capacity, good health,
and youthful vigor of his victim.
Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges
complainant the measly amount
that could never even fully restore
what the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude may relate, not to
the exercise of the profession of
lawyers, but certainly to their
good moral character.[22] Where
their misconduct outside of their
professional dealings is so gross
as to show them morally unfit for
their office and unworthy of the

privileges conferred upon them by

their license and the law, the
court may be justified in
suspending or removing them
from that office.[23]

We also adopt the IBPs finding

that respondent displayed an
utter lack of good moral
character, which is an essential
qualification for the privilege to
enter into the practice of law.
Good moral character includes at
least common honesty.[24]

In the case at bar, respondent

consistently displayed dishonest
and duplicitous behavior. As
found by the trial court, he had
sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor
Daniel Farias, an out-of-court
settlement with complainants
family.[25] But when this effort
failed, respondent concocted a
complete lie by making it appear
that it was complainants family
that had sought a conference with
him to obtain his referral to a
neurosurgeon.[26]

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end

there. He went on to fabricate an
entirely implausible story of
having been mauled by
complainant and two other
persons.[27] The trial court had
this to say:

The physical evidence as

testified to by no less than three
(3) doctors who examined [Atty.
Dizon] does not support his
allegation that three people
including the complainant helped
each other in kicking and boxing
him. The injuries he sustained
were so minor that it is
improbable[,] if not downright
unbelievable[,] that three people
who he said were bent on beating
him to death could do so little
damage. On the contrary, his
injuries sustain the complainants
version of the incident particularly
when he said that he boxed the
accused on the chest. x x x.[28]

Lawyers must be ministers of

truth. No moral qualification for
bar membership is more
important than truthfulness.[29]
The rigorous ethics of the
profession places a premium on
honesty and condemns
duplicitous behavior.[30] Hence,
lawyers must not mislead the
court or allow it to be misled by
any artifice. In all their dealings,
they are expected to act in good
faith.

The actions of respondent erode

rather than enhance public
perception of the legal profession.
They constitute moral turpitude
for which he should be disbarred.
Law is a noble profession, and
the privilege to practice it is
bestowed only upon individuals
who are competent intellectually,
academically and, equally
important, morally. Because they
are vanguards of the law and the
legal system, lawyers must at all
times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with
their clients and the public at
large, with honesty and integrity
in a manner beyond reproach.[31]

The foregoing abhorrent acts of

respondent are not merely
dishonorable; they reveal a basic
moral flaw. Considering the
depravity of the offense he
committed, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP proper
and commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for
disbarment is to protect the
administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise
this important function be
competent, honorable and reliable
-- lawyers in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence.[32]
Thus, whenever a clear case of
degenerate and vile behavior
disturbs that vital yet fragile
confidence, we shall not hesitate

to rid our profession of odious

members.

We remain aware that the power

to disbar must be exercised with
great caution, and that
disbarment should never be
decreed when any lesser penalty
would accomplish the end
desired. In the instant case,
however, the Court cannot extend
that munificence to respondent.
His actions so despicably and
wantonly disregarded his duties to
society and his profession. We
are convinced that meting out a
lesser penalty would
be irreconcilable with our lofty
aspiration for the legal profession
-- that every lawyer be a shining
exemplar of truth and justice.

We stress that membership in the

legal profession is a privilege
demanding a high degree of good
moral character, not only as a
condition precedent to admission,
but also as a continuing
requirement for the practice of
law. Sadly, herein respondent has
fallen short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a
vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are
convicted of frustrated homicide,
the attending circumstances not
the mere fact of their conviction
would demonstrate their fitness to

remain in the legal profession. In

the present case, the appalling
vindictiveness, treachery, and
brazen dishonesty of respondent
clearly show his unworthiness to
continue as a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT
MANUEL DIZON is
hereby DISBARRED, and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy
of this Decision be entered in his
record as a member of the Bar;
and let notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and on the Office
of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.

Division) and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his
essay On Liberty, unleashes the
full fury of his pen in defense of
the rights of the individual from
the vast powers of the State and
the inroads of societal
pressure. But even as he draws a
sacrosanct line demarcating the
limits on individuality beyond
which the State cannot tread asserting that "individual
spontaneity" must be allowed to
flourish with very little regard to
social interference - he veritably
acknowledges that the exercise of
rights and liberties is imbued with
a civic obligation, which society is
justified in enforcing at all cost,
against those who would
endeavor to withhold
fulfillment. Thus he says -

[G.R. No. 148560. November

19, 2001]

The sole end for which mankind is

warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. The
only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent
harm to others.

JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third

Parallel to individual liberty is the

natural and illimitable right of the
State to self-preservation. With

the end of maintaining the

integrity and cohesiveness of the
body politic, it behooves the State
to formulate a system of laws that
would compel obeisance to its
collective wisdom and inflict
punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's
individual liberalism to
unsystematic collectivism wrought
changes in the social order,
carrying with it a new formulation
of fundamental rights and duties
more attuned to the imperatives
of contemporary socio-political
ideologies. In the process, the
web of rights and State
impositions became tangled and
obscured, enmeshed in threads of
multiple shades and colors, the
skein irregular and
broken. Antagonism, often
outright collision, between the law
as the expression of the will of the
State, and the zealous attempts
by its members to preserve their
individuality and dignity,
inevitably followed. It is when
individual rights are pitted against
State authority that judicial
conscience is put to its severest
test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
the highest-ranking official to be
prosecuted under RA 7080 (An
Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder),[1] as amended
by RA 7659,[2] wishes to impress
upon us that the assailed law is so
defectively fashioned that it

crosses that thin but distinct line

which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. He
therefore makes a stringent call
for this Court to subject the
Plunder Law to the crucible of
constitutionality mainly because,
according to him, (a) it suffers
from the vice of vagueness; (b) it
dispenses with the "reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes
the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code, all of which
are purportedly clear violations of
the fundamental rights of the
accused to due process and to be
informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the
Plunder Law claimed by petitioner
to have transgressed
constitutional boundaries are
Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which
are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten
wealth" means any asset,
property, business, enterprise or
material possession of any person
within the purview of Section Two
(2) hereof, acquired by him
directly or indirectly through
dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or
series of the following means or
similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation,

conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or
raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or
indirectly, any commission, gift,
share, percentage, kickbacks or
any other form of pecuniary
benefit from any person and/or
entity in connection with any
government contract or project or
by reason of the office or position
of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent
conveyance or disposition of
assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, or government
owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or
accepting directly or indirectly
any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or
participation including the
promise of future employment in
any business enterprise or
undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural,
industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees
and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special
interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official
position, authority, relationship,

connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic
of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime
of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public
officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses, accumulates
or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or
series of overt or criminal
acts as described in Section 1 (d)
hereof, in the aggregate amount
or total value of at least fifty
million pesos (P50,000,000.00)
shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua to death. Any
person who participated with the
said public officer in the
commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished
for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances as
provided by the Revised Penal
Code shall be considered by the
court. The court shall declare any
and all ill-gotten wealth and their
interests and other incomes and
assets including the properties

and shares of stocks derived from

the deposit or investment thereof
forfeited in favor of the State
(underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For
purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and
every criminal act done by the
accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth, it being
sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or
conspiracy (underscoring
supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the
Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate
Informations, docketed as: (a)
Crim. Case No. 26558, for
violation of RA 7080, as amended
by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos.
26559 to 26562, inclusive, for
violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3,
par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e),
of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices
Act), respectively; (c) Crim.
Case No. 26563, for violation of
Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713
(The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and
Employees); (d) Crim. Case No.
26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The
Revised Penal Code); and, (e)

Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal

Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as
amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed
an Omnibus Motion for the
remand of the case to the
Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation with respect to
specification "d" of the charges in
the Information in Crim. Case No.
26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of
the offenses under specifications
"a," "b," and "c" to give the
accused an opportunity to file
counter-affidavits and other
documents necessary to prove
lack of probable
cause. Noticeably, the grounds
raised were only lack of
preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of
offenses, and opportunity to prove
lack of probable cause. The
purported ambiguity of the
charges and the vagueness of the
law under which they are charged
were never raised in
that Omnibus Motion thus
indicating the explicitness and
comprehensibility of the Plunder
Law.
On 25 April 2001 the
Sandiganbayan, Third Division,
issued a Resolution in Crim. Case
No. 26558 finding that "a probable
cause for the offense of PLUNDER
exists to justify the issuance of
warrants for the arrest of the
accused." On 25 June 2001

petitioner's motion for

reconsideration was denied by
the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved
to quash the Information in Crim.
Case No. 26558 on the ground
that the facts alleged therein did
not constitute an indictable
offense since the law on which it
was based was unconstitutional
for vagueness, and that the
Amended Information for Plunder
charged more than one (1)
offense. On 21 June 2001 the
Government filed its Opposition to
the Motion to Quash, and five (5)
days later or on 26 June 2001
petitioner submitted his Reply to
the Opposition. On 9 July 2001
the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this
Court during the oral arguments
on 18 September 2001, the issues
for resolution in the instant
petition for certiorari are: (a) The
Plunder Law is unconstitutional for
being vague; (b) The Plunder Law
requires less evidence for proving
the predicate crimes of plunder
and therefore violates the rights
of the accused to due process;
and, (c) Whether Plunder as
defined in RA 7080 is a malum
prohibitum, and if so, whether it is
within the power of Congress to so
classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of
legal concepts pertaining to the

validity of legislation is predicated

on the basic principle that a
legislative measure is presumed
to be in harmony with the
Constitution.[3] Courts invariably
train their sights on this
fundamental rule whenever a
legislative act is under a
constitutional attack, for it is the
postulate of constitutional
adjudication. This strong
predilection for constitutionality
takes its bearings on the idea that
it is forbidden for one branch of
the government to encroach upon
the duties and powers of
another. Thus it has been said
that the presumption is based on
the deference the judicial branch
accords to its coordinate branch the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis
upon which the legislation may
firmly rest, the courts must
assume that the legislature is
ever conscious of the borders and
edges of its plenary powers, and
has passed the law with full
knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right
and advancing the welfare of the
majority. Hence in determining
whether the acts of the legislature
are in tune with the fundamental
law, courts should proceed with
judicial restraint and act with
caution and forbearance. Every
intendment of the law must be
adjudged by the courts in favor of
its constitutionality, invalidity

being a measure of last resort. In

construing therefore the
provisions of a statute, courts
must first ascertain whether an
interpretation is fairly possible to
sidestep the question of
constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative,
Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as
long as there is some basis fo
r the decision of the court,
the constitutionality of the
challenged law will not be touched
and the case will be decided on
other available grounds. Yet the
force of the presumption is not
sufficient to catapult a
fundamentally deficient law into
the safe environs of
constitutionality. Of course, where
the law clearly and palpably
transgresses the hallowed domain
of the organic law, it must be
struck down on sight lest the
positive commands of the
fundamental law be unduly
eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of
rebutting the presumption weighs
heavily on the party challenging
the validity of the statute. He
must demonstrate beyond any
tinge of doubt that there is indeed
an infringement of the
constitution, for absent such a
showing, there can be no finding
of unconstitutionality. A doubt,
even if well-founded, will hardly
suffice. As tersely put by Justice
Malcolm, "To doubt is to

sustain."[5] And petitioner has

miserably failed in the instant
case to discharge his burden and
overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the Plunder
Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law
contains ascertainable standards
and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused
to determine the nature of his
violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit in its descrip
tion of the acts, conduct and
conditions required or forbidden,
and prescribes the elements of
the crime with reasonable
certainty and particularity. Thus 1. That the offender is a public
officer who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other
persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated
or acquired ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series
of the following overt or criminal
acts: (a) through
misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, or malversa
tion of public funds or raids on
the public treasury; (b) by
receiving, directly or indirectly,
any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any other
form of pecuniary benefits from
any person and/or entity in

connection with any government

contract or project or by reason of
the office or position of the public
officer; (c) by the illegal or
fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to
the National Government or any
of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities of Government
owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries; (d) by
obtaining, receiving or accepting
directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including
the promise of future employment
in any business enterprise or
undertaking; (e) by establishing
agricultural, industrial or
commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special
interests; or (f) by taking
advantage of official position,
authority, relationship, connection
or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the
Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or
total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or
acquired is at
least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some
comprehensible guide or rule that

would inform those who are

subject to it what conduct would
render them liable to its penalties,
its validity will be
sustained. It must sufficiently
guide the judge in its application;
the counsel, in defending one
charged with its violation; and
more importantly, the accused, in
identifying the realm of the
proscribed conduct. Indeed, it
can be understood with little
difficulty that what the assailed
statute punishes is the act of a
public officer in amassing or
accumulating ill-gotten wealth of
at least P50,000,000.00 through a
series or combination of acts
enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of
the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information
itself closely tracks the language
of the law, indicating with
reasonable certainty the various
elements of the offense which
petitioner is alleged to have
committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman,
Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB,
Office of the Ombudsman, hereby
accuses former PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG
SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE
VELARDE,' together with Jose
'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong'
Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN
DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio

Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.

Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas,
and John DOES & Jane Does, of
the crime of Plunder, defined and
penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as
amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No.
7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June,
1998 to January 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/
CONSPIRACY with his coaccused, WHO ARE MEMBERS
OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR
OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING
UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS
OFFICIAL POSITION,
AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE,
did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, illgotten wealth in the aggregate
amount or TOTAL VALUE of
FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS(P4,097,804,173.17),

more or less, THEREBY

UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF
OR THEMSELVES AT THE
EXPENSE AND TO THE
DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO
PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY
OR A combination OR A series of
overtOR criminal acts, OR
SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting,
directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL
INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS
(P545,000,000.00), MORE OR
LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connection
with co-accusedCHARLIE
'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, AND JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES, in
considerationOF TOLERATION
OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING,
misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTL
Y OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR
THEIR PERSONALgain and
benefit, public funds in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
MILLION PESOS

(P130,000,000.00), more or less,

representing a portion of the TWO
HUNDRED MILLION PESOS
(P200,000,000.00) tobacco
excise tax share allocated for the
province of Ilocos Sur under R.
A. No. 7171,by himself and/or in
connivance with co-accused
Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE
a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES
& JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and
compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL
GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE
351,878,000 SHARES OF
STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and
the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF
STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF
THE BELLE CORPORATION IN
THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION ONE
HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS
(P1,102,965,607.50) AND
MORE OR LESS SEVEN
HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P744,612,450.00),
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF

MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION

EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND
FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF
SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES
OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS
(P189,700,000.00) MORE OR
LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME
PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER
THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE
VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching
himself FROM COMMISSIONS,
GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS,
OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE
WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, in the amount of MORE
OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION
ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS

(P3,233,104,173.17) AND
DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER
HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE
VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLEPCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the
foregoing that is vague or
ambiguous - as there is obviously
none - that will confuse petitioner
in his defense. Although subject
to proof, these factual assertions
clearly show that the elements of
the crime are easily understood
and provide adequate contrast
between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. Upon such
unequivocal assertions, petitioner
is completely informed of the
accusations against him as to
enable him to prepare for an
intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the
failure of the law to provide for
the statutory definition of the
terms "combination" and "series
" in the key phrase "a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts"
found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec.
2, and the word "pattern" in Sec.
4. These omissions, according to
petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and
overbroad and deny him the right
to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against
him, hence, violative of his
fundamental right to due process.

The rationalization seems to us to

be pure sophistry. A statute is not
rendered uncertain and void
merely because general terms are
used therein, or because of the
employment of terms without
defining them;[6] much less do we
have to define every word we
use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory
command requiring the legislature
to define each and every word in
an enactment. Congress is not
restricted in the form of
expression of its will, and its
inability to so define the words
employed in a statute will not
necessarily result in the
vagueness or ambiguity of the law
so long as the legislative will is
clear, or at least, can be gathered
from the whole act, which is
distinctly expressed in the Plunder
Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled
principle of legal hermeneutics
that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain
and ordinary acceptation and
signification,[7] unless it is evident
that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning
to those words.[8] The intention of
the lawmakers - who are,
ordinarily, untrained philologists
and lexicographers - to
use statutory phraseology in
such a manner is always
presumed. Thus, Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary contains the

following commonly accepted

definition of the words
"combination" and "series:"

through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, will these be
included also?

Combination - the result or

product of combining; the act or
process of
combining. To combine is to bring
into such close relationship as to
obscure individual characters.

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we

say a series.

Series - a number of things or

events of the same class coming
one after another in spatial and
temporal succession.

REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin

with a combination.

That Congress intended the

words "combination" and "series
" to be understood in their
popular meanings is pristinely
evident from the legislative
deliberations on the bill which
eventually became RA 7080 or the
Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE
BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON
JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued
again by our definition of
plunder. We say THROUGH A
COMBINATION OR SERIES OF
OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS
MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE
HEREOF. Now when we say
combination, we actually mean to
say, if there are two or more
means, we mean to say that
number one and two or number
one and something else are
included, how about a series of
the same act? For example,

REP. ISIDRO: Series.

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include
series.

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When we say
combination, it seems that REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we
seem to mean that two of the
enumerated means not twice of
one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is
not twice - but combination, two
acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words,
thats it. When we say
combination, we mean, two
different acts. It cannot be a
repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to
series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing
one act is repeated, so there are
two.

REP. GARCIA: A series.

REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...

REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its

a combination. Because when we
say combination or series, we
seem to say that two or more, di
ba?

REP. ISIDRO: Now a series,

meaning, repetition...

REP. GARCIA: Yes, this

distinguishes it really from
ordinary crimes. That is why, I
said, that is a very good
suggestion because if it is only
one act, it may fall under ordinary
crime but we have here a
combination or series of overt or
criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after
the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall
under the term series?
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a
combination, ano, two
misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two
misappropriations will not be
combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a
combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say
combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.

DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL

NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with
our interpellations that
sometimes one or maybe even
two acts may already result in
such
a big amount, on line 25, woul
d the Sponsor consider deleting
the words a series of overt or,
to read, therefore: or conspiracy
COMMITTED by criminal acts such
as. Remove the idea of
necessitating a series. Anyway,
the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would
mean a combination of two or
more of the acts mentioned in
this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or
more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because
a series implies several or
many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr.
President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only
one, then he has to be prosecuted
under the particular crime. But
when we say acts of plunder
there should be, at least, two or
more.

SENATOR ROMULO: In other

words, that is already covered by
existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law
speaks of "combination," it is
referring to at least two (2) acts
falling under different categories
of enumeration provided in Sec. 1,
par. (d), e.g., raids on the public
treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar.
(1), and fraudulent conveyance of
assets belonging to the National
Government under Sec. 1, par.
(d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute
a series" there must be two (2) or
more overt or criminal acts falling
under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1, par.
(d), say, misappropriation,
malversation
and raids on the public treasur
y, all of which fall under Sec. 1,
par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had
the legislature intended a
technical or distinctive meaning
for "combination" and "series," it
would have taken greater pains in
specifically providing for it in the
law.
As for "pattern," we agree with
the observations of the
Sandiganbayan[9] that this term is
sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in
relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and
Sec. 2 x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law,
a 'pattern' consists of at least a
combination or series of overt or

criminal acts enumerated in

subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1
(d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2
of the law, the pattern of overt or
criminal acts is directed towards a
common purpose or goal which is
to enable the public officer to
amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth. And thirdly, there
must either be an 'overall
unlawful
scheme' or 'conspiracy' to
achieve said common goal. As
commonly understood, the term
'overall unlawful scheme'
indicates a 'general plan of action
or method' which the principal
accused and public officer and
others conniving with him follow
to achieve the aforesaid common
goal. In the alternative, if there is
no such overall scheme or where
the schemes or methods used by
multiple accused vary, the overt
or criminal acts must form part of
a conspiracy to attain a common
goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be
contended that the law does not
give a fair warning and sufficient
notice of what it seeks to
penalize. Under the
circumstances, petitioner's
reliance on the "void-forvagueness" doctrine is manifestly
misplaced. The doctrine has
been formulated in various ways,
but is most commonly stated to
the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense

must define the offense with

sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence
can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute. It can
only be invoked against that
specie of legislation that is utterly
vague on its face, i.e., that which
cannot be clarified either by a
saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be
vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ in its application. In
such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in
two (2) respects - it violates due
process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle.[10] But
the doctrine does not apply as
against legislations that are
merely couched in imprecise
language but which nonetheless
specify
a standard though defectively p
hrased; or to those that are
apparently ambiguous yet fairly
applicable to certain types of
activities. The first may be
"saved" by proper construction,
while no challenge may be
mounted as against the second

whenever directed against such

activities.[11] With more reason,
the doctrine cannot be invoked
where the assailed statute is clear
and free from ambiguity, as in this
case.
The test in determining whether a
criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently
definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when
measured by common
understanding and practice.[12] It
must be stressed, however, that
the "vagueness" doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be
upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as
petitioner seems to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is
permissible as long as the metes
and bounds of the statute are
clearly delineated. An act will not
be held invalid merely because it
might have been more explicit in
its wordings or detailed in its
provisions, especially where,
because of the nature of the act,
it would be impossible to provide
all the details in advance as in all
other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence
we adopt, the observations of Mr.
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during
the deliberations of the Court that
the allegations that the Plunder
Law is vague and overbroad do

not justify a facial review of its

validity The void-for-vagueness doctrine
states that "a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due
process of law."[13] The
overbreadth doctrine, on the
other hand, decrees that "a
governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected
freedoms."[14]
A facial challenge is allowed to be
made to a vague statute and to
one which is overbroad because
of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech. The theory is
that "[w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily
apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating
the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent
value to all society of
constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify
allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that
the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a
statute drawn with narrow
specificity."[15] The possible harm
to society in permitting some

unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected
speech of others may be deterred
and perceived grievances left to
fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad
statutes.
This rationale does not apply to
penal statutes. Criminal statutes
have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge
is allowed for this reason alone,
the State may well be prevented
from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the
area of criminal law, the law
cannot take chances as in the
area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines then have special
application only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing
the validity of penal statutes. As
the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in
an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, "we have not
recognized an 'overbreadth'
doctrine outside the limited
context of the First
Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v.
Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have
been entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words" and, again, that
"overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been

curtailed when invoked against

ordinary criminal laws that are
sought to be applied to protected
conduct." For this reason, it has
been held that "a facial challenge
to a legislative act is the most
difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger
must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which
the Act would be valid."[18] As for
the vagueness doctrine, it is said
that a litigant may challenge a
statute on its face only if it is
vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is
clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the
law as applied to the conduct of
others."[19]
In sum, the doctrines of strict
scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech
cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment
cases. They cannot be made to
do service when what is involved
is a criminal statute. With respect
to such statute, the established
rule is that "one to whom
application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to
attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other
persons or other situations in
which its application might be

unconstitutional."[20] As has been

pointed out, "vagueness
challenges in the First
Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while
statutes found vague as a matter
of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a
particular
defendant."[21] Consequently,
there is no basis for petitioner's
claim that this Court review the
Anti-Plunder Law on its face and
in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation
of statutes results in striking them
down entirely on the ground that
they might be applied to parties
not before the Court whose
activities are constitutionally
protected.[22] It constitutes a
departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the
Constitution and permits decisions
to be made without concrete
factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts.[23] But, as the
U.S. Supreme Court pointed out
in Younger v. Harris[24]
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed
statute, pinpointing its
deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into
effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the
judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the

legislative process of the relief

sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous
nature of the required line-by-line
analysis of detailed
statutes, . . . ordinarily results in
a kind of case that is wholly
unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be
decided.
For these reasons, "on its
face" invalidation of statutes has
been described as "manifestly
strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as
a last resort,"[25] and is generally
disfavored.[26] In determining the
constitutionality of a statute,
therefore, its provisions which are
alleged to have been violated in a
case must be examined in the
light of the conduct with which
the defendant is charged.[27]
In light of the foregoing
disquisition, it is evident that the
purported ambiguity of the
Plunder Law, so tenaciously
claimed and argued at length by
petitioner, is more imagined than
real. Ambiguity, where none
exists, cannot be created by
dissecting parts and words in the
statute to furnish support to
critics who cavil at the want of
scientific precision in the
law. Every provision of the law
should be construed in relation
and with reference to every other
part. To be sure, it will take more

than nitpicking to overturn the

well-entrenched presumption of
constitutionality and validity of
the Plunder Law. Afortiori,
petitioner cannot feign ignorance
of what the Plunder Law is all
about. Being one of the Senators
who voted for its passage,
petitioner must be aware that the
law was extensively deliberated
upon by the Senate and its
appropriate committees by reason
of which he even registered his
affirmative vote with full
knowledge of its legal implications
and sound constitutional
anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v.
Sandiganbayan[28] must be
mentioned if only to illustrate and
emphasize the point that courts
are loathed to declare a statute
void for uncertainty unless the law
itself is so imperfect and deficient
in its details, and is susceptible of
no reasonable construction that
will support and give it effect. In
that case,
petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo
challenged the constitutionality of
Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act for
being vague. Petitioners posited,
among others, that the term
"unwarranted" is highly imprecise
and elastic with no common law
meaning or settled definition by
prior judicial or administrative
precedents; that, for its
vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e),

violates due process in that it

does not give fair warning or
sufficient notice of what it seeks
to penalize. Petitioners further
argued that the Information
charged them with three (3)
distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving
of "unwarranted" benefits through
manifest partiality; (b) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through
evident bad faith; and, (c) giving
of "unwarranted" benefits
through gross inexcusable
negligence while in the discharge
of their official function and that
their right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the
accusation against them was
violated because they were left to
guess which of the three (3)
offenses, if not all, they were
being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this
Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act does not suffer from
the constitutional defect of
vagueness. The phrases
"manifest partiality," "evident bad
faith," and "gross and inexcusable
negligence" merely describe the
different modes by which the
offense penalized in Sec. 3, par.
(e), of the statute may be
committed, and the use of all
these phrases in the same
Information does not mean that
the indictment charges three (3)
distinct offenses.

The word 'unwarranted' is not

uncertain. It seems lacking
adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized
(Webster, Third International
Dictionary, p. 2514); or without
justification or adequate reason
(Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405
F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and
Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol.
43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual
Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act consider a corrupt practice
and make unlawful the act of the
public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, x x
x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019,
as amended).
It is not at all difficult to
comprehend that what the
aforequoted penal provisions
penalize is the act of a public
officer, in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial
functions, in giving any private
party benefits, advantage or
preference which is unjustified,
unauthorized or without
justification or adequate reason,

through manifest partiality,

evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found
that there was nothing vague or
ambiguous in the use of the
term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3,
par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, which was
understood in its primary and
general
acceptation. Consequently, in
that case, petitioners' objection
thereto was held inadequate to
declare the section
unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner
advances the highly stretched
theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder
Law circumvents the immutable
obligation of the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt
the predicate acts constituting the
crime of plunder when it requires
only proof of a pattern of overt or
criminal acts showing unlawful
scheme or conspiracy SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For
purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and
every criminal act done by the
accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable
doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the

overall unlawful scheme or

conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning
is obvious even to the simplistic
mind. In a criminal prosecution
for plunder, as in all other
crimes, the accused always has
in his favor the presumption of
innocence which is guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights, and unless the
State succeeds in demonstrating
by proof beyond reasonable doubt
that culpability lies, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal.[29] The use
of the "reasonable
doubt" standard is indispensable
to command the respect and
confidence of the community in
the application of criminal law. It
is critical that the moral force of
criminal law be not diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves
people in doubt whether innocent
men are being condemned. It is
also important in our free society
that every individual going about
his ordinary affairs has confidence
that his government cannot
adjudge him guilty of a criminal
offense without convincing a
proper factfinder of his guilt with
utmost
certainty. This "reasonable
doubt" standard has acquired
such exalted stature in the realm
of constitutional law as it gives life
to the Due Process Clause which
protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every

fact necessary to constitute the

crime with which he is charged.
[30]
The following exchanges
between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and
Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score
during the deliberations in the
floor of the House of
Representatives are elucidating DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA
7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it
is also elementary in our criminal
law that what is alleged in the
information must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. If we
will prove only one act and find
him guilty of the other acts
enumerated in the information,
does that not work against the
right of the accused especially so
if the amount committed, say, by
falsification is less than P100
million, but the totality of the
crime committed is P100 million
since there is malversation,
bribery, falsification of public
document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not
everything alleged in the
information needs to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. What
is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt is every
element of the crime
charged. For example, Mr.
Speaker, there is an enumeration
of the things taken by the robber
in the information three pairs of

pants, pieces of jewelry. These

need not be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, but these will
not prevent the conviction of a
crime for which he was charged
just because, say, instead of 3
pairs of diamond earrings the
prosecution proved two. Now,
what is required to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt is the
element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that,
Mr. Speaker, but considering that
in the crime of plunder the totality
of the amount is very important, I
feel that such a series of overt
criminal acts has to be taken
singly. For instance, in the act of
bribery, he was able to
accumulate only P50,000 and in
the crime of extortion, he was
only able to accumulate P1
million. Now, when we add the
totality of the other acts as
required under this bill through
the interpretation on the rule of
evidence, it is just one single act,
so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect,
Mr. Speaker, for purposes of
proving an essential element of
the crime, there is a need to
prove that element beyond
reasonable doubt. For example,
one essential element of the
crime is that the amount involved
is P100 million. Now, in a series
of defalcations and other acts of
corruption in the enumeration the
total amount would be P110

or P120 million, but there are

certain acts that could not be
proved, so, we will sum up the
amounts involved in those
transactions which were
proved. Now, if the amount
involved in these transactions,
proved beyond reasonable doubt,
is P100 million, then there is a
crime of plunder (underscoring
supplied).

that the accused is charged in an

Information for plunder with
having committed fifty (50) raids
on the public
treasury. The prosecution need
not prove all these fifty (50)
raids, it being sufficient to prove
by pattern at least two (2) of the
raids beyond reasonable doubt
provided only that they amounted
to at least P50,000,000.00.[31]

It is thus plain from the foregoing

that the legislature did not in any
manner refashion the standard
quantum of proof in the crime of
plunder. The burden still remains
with the prosecution to prove
beyond any iota of doubt every
fact or element necessary to
constitute the crime.

A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction

with Sec. 4, brings us to the
logical conclusion that "pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of
the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy" inheres in the very
acts of accumulating, acquiring or
amassing hidden wealth. Stated
otherwise, such pattern arises
where the prosecution is able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt
the predicate acts as defined in
Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely
a by-product of the proof of the
predicate acts. This conclusion is
consistent with reason and
common sense. There would be
no other explanation for a
combination or series of

The thesis that Sec. 4 does away

with proof of each and every
component of the crime suffers
from a dismal misconception of
the import of that
provision. What the prosecution
needs to prove beyond reasonable
doubt is only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or
series which would constitute a
pattern and involving an amount
of at least P50,000,000.00. There
is no need to prove each and
every other act alleged in the
Information to have been
committed by the accused in
furtherance of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth. To illustrate, supposing

overt or criminal acts to

stash P50,000,000.00 or more,
than "a scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill
gotten wealth." The prosecution is
therefore not required to make a
deliberate and conscious effort to
prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of

a series or combination of the

predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's
contentions on the purported
defect of Sec. 4 is his submission
that "pattern" is "a very important
element of the crime of
plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two
pronged, (as) it contains a rule of
evidence and a substantive
element of the crime," such that
without it the accused cannot be
convicted of plunder JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other
words, cannot an accused be
convicted under the Plunder Law
without applying Section 4 on the
Rule of Evidence if there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the
commission of the acts
complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he
can be convicted of individual
crimes enumerated in the Revised
Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other
words, if all the elements of the
crime are proved beyond
reasonable doubt without
applying Section 4, can you not
have a conviction under the
Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction
for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not
disregard the application of Sec. 4
in convicting an accused charged
for violation of the Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor,

in the first place Section 4 lays
down a substantive element of
the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said
is - do we have to avail of Section
4 when there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt on the acts
charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor,
because Section 4 is two pronged,
it contains a rule of evidence and
it contains a substantive element
of the crime of plunder. So, there
is no way by which we can avoid
Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is
proof beyond reasonable doubt
insofar as the predicate crimes
charged are concerned that you
do not have to go that far by
applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our
thinking is that Section 4 contains
a very important element of the
crime of plunder and that cannot
be avoided by the prosecution.[32]
We do not subscribe to
petitioner's stand. Primarily, all
the essential elements of plunder
can be culled and understood
from its definition in Sec. 2, in
relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and
"pattern" is not one of
them. Moreover, the epigraph
and opening clause of Sec. 4 is
clear and unequivocal:

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For

purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than
prescribe a rule of procedure for
the prosecution of a criminal case
for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does
not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the
accused but only operates in
furtherance of a remedy. It is only
a means to an end, an aid to
substantive law. Indubitably,
even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be
had, for what is crucial for the
prosecution is to present sufficient
evidence to engender that moral
certitude exacted by the
fundamental law to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, even granting for the
sake of argument that Sec. 4 is
flawed and vitiated for the
reasons advanced by petitioner, it
may simply be severed from the
rest of the provisions without
necessarily resulting in the
demise of the law; after all, the
existing rules on evidence can
supplant Sec. 4 more than
enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA
7080 provides for a separability
clause Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions.
- If any provisions of this Act or
the application thereof to any
person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remaining pr

ovisions of this Act and the

application of such provisions to
other persons or circumstances
shall not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is
that to avoid the whole act from
being declared invalid as a result
of the nullity of some of its
provisions, assuming that to be
the case although it is not really
so, all the provisions thereof
should accordingly be treated
independently of each other,
especially if by doing so, the
objectives of the statute can best
be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again
we agree with Justice Mendoza
that plunder is a malum in
se which requires proof of criminal
intent. Thus, he says, in his
Concurring Opinion x x x Precisely because the
constitutive crimes are mala in
se the element of mens rea must
be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. It is noteworthy that the
amended information alleges that
the crime of plunder was
committed "willfully, unlawfully
and criminally." It thus alleges
guilty knowledge on the part of
petitioner.
In support of his contention that
the statute eliminates the
requirement of mens rea and that
is the reason he claims the statute
is void, petitioner cites the
following remarks of Senator

Taada made during the

deliberation on S.B. No. 733:

proved and the requisite mens

rea must be shown.

SENATOR TAADA . . . And the

evidence that will be required to
convict him would not be
evidence for each and every
individual criminal act but only
evidence sufficient to establish
the conspiracy or scheme to
commit this crime of plunder.[33]

Indeed, 2 provides that -

However, Senator Taada was

discussing 4 as shown by the
succeeding portion of the
transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr.
President, the Gentleman feels
that it is contained in Section 4,
Rule of Evidence, which, in the
Gentleman's view, would provide
for a speedier and faster process
of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr.
President . . .[34]
Senator Taada was only saying
that where the charge is
conspiracy to commit plunder, the
prosecution need not prove each
and every criminal act done to
further the scheme or conspiracy,
it being enough if it proves
beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or ciminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy. As far as
the acts constituting the pattern
are concerned, however, the
elements of the crime must be

Any person who participated with

the said public officer in the
commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished
for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as
provided by the Revised Penal
Code, shall be considered by the
court.
The application of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances in the
Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the AntiPlunder Law indicates quite
clearly that mens rea is an
element of plunder since the
degree of responsibility of the
offender is determined by his
criminal intent. It is true that 2
refers to "any person who
participates with the said public
officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime
of plunder." There is no reason to
believe, however, that it does not
apply as well to the public officer
as principal in the crime. As
Justice Holmes said: "We agree to
all the generalities about not
supplying criminal laws with what
they omit, but there is no canon
against using common sense in

construing laws as saying what

they obviously mean."[35]
Finally, any doubt as to whether
the crime of plunder is a malum in
se must be deemed to have been
resolved in the affirmative by the
decision of Congress in 1993 to
include it among the heinous
crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Other heinous
crimes are punished with death as
a straight penalty in R.A. No.
7659. Referring to these groups
of heinous crimes, this Court held
in People v. Echegaray:[36]
The evil of a crime may take
various forms. There are crimes
that are, by their very nature,
despicable, either because life
was callously taken or the victim
is treated like an animal and
utterly dehumanized as to
completely disrupt the normal
course of his or her growth as a
human being . . . . Seen in this
light, the capital crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal
detention for ransom resulting in
the death of the victim or the
victim is raped, tortured, or
subjected to dehumanizing acts;
destructive arson resulting in
death; and drug offenses
involving minors or resulting in
the death of the victim in the case
of other crimes; as well as
murder, rape,
parricide,
infanticide,
kidnap
ping
and serious illegal
detention, where the victim is

detained for more than three days

or serious physical injuries were
inflicted on the victim or threats
to kill him were made or the
victim is a minor, robbery with
homicide, rape or intentional
mutilation, destructive arson, and
carnapping where the owner,
driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or
raped, which are penalized by
reclusion perpetua to death, are
clearly heinous by their very
nature.
There are crimes, however, in
which the abomination lies in the
significance and implications of
the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger sociopolitical and economic context in
which the state finds itself to be
struggling to develop and provide
for its poor and underprivileged
masses. Reeling from decades of
corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and
impoverished the population, the
Philippine Government must
muster the political will to
dismantle the culture of
corruption, dishonesty, greed and
syndicated criminality that so
deeply entrenched itself in the
structures of society and the
psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the
money to provide even the most
basic services to its people, any
form of misappropriation or
misapplication of government

funds translates to an actual

threat to the very existence of
government, and in turn, the very
survival of the people it governs
over. Viewed in this context, no
less heinous are the effects and
repercussions of crimes like
qualified bribery, destructive
arson resulting in death, and drug
offenses involving government
officials, employees or officers,
that their perpetrators must not
be allowed to cause further
destruction and damage to
society.
The legislative declaration in R.A.
No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous
offense implies that it is a malum
in se. For when the acts punished
are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, they are mala in
se[37] and it does not matter that
such acts are punished in a
special law, especially since in the
case of plunder the predicate
crimes are mainly mala in
se. Indeed, it would be absurd to
treat prosecutions for plunder as
though they are mere
prosecutions for violations of the
Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22)
or of an ordinance against
jaywalking, without regard to the
inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise
assails the validity of RA 7659, the
amendatory law of RA 7080, on
constitutional grounds. Suffice it
to say however that it is now too
late in the day for him to

resurrect this long dead issue,

the same having been eternally
consigned by People v.
Echegaray[38] to the archives of
jurisprudential history. The
declaration of this Court therein
that RA 7659 is constitutionally
valid stands as a declaration of
the State, and becomes, by
necessary effect, assimilated in
the Constitution now as an
integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by
scandals of corruption and
obscene profligacy of officials in
high places which
have shaken its very
foundation. The anatomy of graft
and corruption has become more
elaborate in
the corridors of time as
unscrupulous people
relentlessly contrive more and
more ingenious ways to bilk the
coffers of the
government. Drastic and radical
measures are imperative to fight
the increasingly sophisticated,
extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic lootin
g of the national treasury. Such
is the Plunder Law, especially
designed to disentangle those
ghastly tissues of grand-scale
corruption which, if left
unchecked, will spread like a
malignant tumor and ultimately
consume the moral and
institutional fiber of our
nation. The Plunder Law, indeed,

is a living testament to the will of

the legislature to ultimately
eradicate this scourge and thus
secure society against the avarice
and other venalities in public
office.
These are times that try men's
souls. In the checkered history of
this nation, few issues of national
importance can equal the amount
of interest and passion generated
by petitioner's ignominious fall
from the highest office, and his
eventual prosecution and trial
under a virginal statute. This
continuing
saga has driven a wedge of di
ssension among our people that
may linger for a long time. Only
by responding to the clarion call
for patriotism, to rise above
factionalism and prejudices, shall
we emerge triumphant in the
midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this
Court holds that RA 7080
otherwise known as the Plunder
Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently,
the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4497
September 26, 2001
MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G.
SABURNIDO, complainants,
vs.

ATTY. FLORANTE E.
MADROO,1 respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is the
administrative complaint2 for
disbarment of respondent, Atty.
Florante E. Madroo filed by
spouses Venustiano and Rosalia
Saburdino. Complainants allege
that respondent has been
harassing them by filing
numerous complaints against
them, in addition to committing
acts of dishonesty.
Complainant Venustiano
Saburnido is a member of the
Philippine National Police
stationed at Balingasag, Misamis
Oriental, while his wife Rosalia is a
public school teacher. Respondent
is a former judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, BalingasagLagonglong, Misamis Oriental.
Previous to this administrative
case, complainants also filed
three separate administrative
cases against respondent.
In A. M. No. MTJ-90383,3 complainant Venustiano
Saburnido filed charges of grave
threats and acts unbecoming a
member of the judiciary against
respondent. Respondent was
therein found guilty of pointing a
high-powered firearm at
complainant, who was unarmed at
the time, during a heated
altercation. Respondent was

accordingly dismissed from the

service with prejudice to
reemployment in government but
without forfeiture of retirement
benefits.
Respondent was again
administratively charged in the
consolidated cases of SealanaAbbu v. Judge Madroo, A.M. No.
92-1-084-RTC and Sps. Saburnido
v. Judge Madroo, A.M. No. MTJ90-486.4 In the first case,
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Florencia Sealana-Abbu charged
that respondent granted and
reduced bail in a criminal case
without prior notice to the
prosecution. In the second case,
the spouses Saburnido charged
that respondent, in whose court
certain confiscated smuggled
goods were deposited, allowed
other persons to take the goods
but did not issue the
corresponding memorandum
receipts. Some of the goods were
lost while others were substituted
with damaged goods. Respondent
was found guilty of both charges
and his retirement benefits were
forfeited.
In the present case, the spouses
Saburnido allege that respondent
has been harassing them by filing
numerous complaints against
them, namely:
1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755,5 for
serious irregularity, filed by
respondent against Venustiano

Saburnido. Respondent claimed

that Venustiano lent his service
firearm to an acquaintance who
thereafter extorted money from
public jeepney drivers while
posing as a member of the then
Constabulary Highway Patrol
Group.
2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758,6 for
falsification, filed by respondent
against Venustiano Saburnido and
two others. Respondent averred
that Venustiano, with the help of
his co-respondents in the case,
inserted an entry in the police
blotter regarding the loss of
Venustiano's firearm.
3. Crim. Case No. 93-67,7 for
evasion through negligence under
Article 224 of the Revised Penal
Code, filed by respondent against
Venustiano Saburnido.
Respondent alleged that
Venustiano Saburnido, without
permission from his superior, took
into custody a prisoner by final
Judgment who thereafter escaped.
4. Adm. Case No. 95 33,8 filed by
respondent against Rosalia
Saburnido for violation of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Respondent alleged that Rosalia
Saburnido served as chairperson
of the Board of Election Inspectors
during the 1995 elections despite
being related to a candidate for
barangay councilor.
At the time the present complaint
was filed, the three actions filed

against Venustiano Saburnido had

been dismissed while the case
against Rosalia Saburnido was still
pending.
Complainants allege that
respondent filed those cases
against them in retaliation, since
they had earlier filed
administrative cases against him
that resulted in his dismissal from
the judiciary. Complainants assert
that due to the complaints filed
against them, they suffered much
moral, mental, physical, and
financial damage. They claim that
their children had to stop going to
school since the family funds were
used up in attending to their
cases.
For his part, respondent contends
that the grounds mentioned in the
administrative cases in which he
was dismissed and his benefits
forfeited did not constitute moral
turpitude. Hence, he could not be
disbarred therefor. He then argues
that none of the complaints he
filed against complainants was
manufactured. He adds that he
"was so unlucky that Saburnido
was not convicted."9 He claims
that the complaint for serious
irregularity against Venustiano
Saburnido was dismissed only
because the latter was able to
antedate an entry in the police
blotter stating that his service
firearm was lost. He also points
out that Venustiano was
suspended when a prisoner

escaped during his watch. As for

his complaint against Rosalia
Saburnido, respondent contends
that by mentioning this case in
the present complaint, Rosalia
wants to deprive him of his right
to call the attention of the proper
authorities to a violation of the
Election Code.
In their reply, complainants
reiterate their charge that the
cases against them were meant
only to harass them. In addition,
Rosalia Saburnido stressed that
she served in the BEI in 1995 only
because the supposed
chairperson was indisposed. She
stated that she told the other BEI
members and the pollwatchers
that she was related to one
candidate and that she would
desist from serving if anyone
objected. Since nobody objected,
she proceeded to dispense her
duties as BEI chairperson. She
added that her relative lost in that
election while respondent's son
won.
In a resolution dated May 22,
1996,10 we referred this matter to
the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
In its report submitted to this
Court on October 16, 2000, the
IBP noted that respondent and his
counsel failed to appear and
present evidence in the hearing of
the case set for January 26, 2000,

despite notice. Thus, respondent

was considered to have waived
his right to present evidence in his
behalf during said hearing.
Neither did respondent submit his
memorandum as directed by the
IBP.
After evaluating the evidence
before it, the IBP concluded
that complainants submitted
convincing proof that
respondent indeed committed
acts constituting gross
misconduct that warrant the
imposition of administrative
sanction. The IBP recommends
that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for
one year.
We have examined the records of
this case and find no reason to
disagree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP.

A lawyer may be disciplined for

any conduct, in his professional or
private capacity, that renders him
unfit to continue to be an officer
of the court.11 Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility commands all
lawyers to at all times uphold the
dignity and integrity of the legal
profession. Specifically, in Rule
7.03, the Code provides:
RULE 7.03. A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice

law, nor shall be whether in public

or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Clearly, respondent's act of filing
multiple complaints against herein
complainants reflects on his
fitness to be a member of the
legal profession. His act evinces
vindictiveness, a decidedly
undesirable trait whether in a
lawyer or another individual, as
complainants were instrumental
in respondent's dismissal from the
judiciary. We see in respondent's
tenacity in pursuing several cases
against complainants not the
persistence of one who has been
grievously wronged but the
obstinacy of one who is trying to
exact revenge.
Respondent's action erodes rather
than enhances public perception
of the legal profession. It
constitutes gross misconduct for
which he may be suspended,
following Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, which
provides:
SECTION 27. Disbarment or
suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor.
A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a

crime involving moral turpitude,

or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or
for a wilful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority
so to do.x x x
Complainants ask that respondent
be disbarred. However, we find
that suspension from the practice
of law is sufficient to discipline
respondent.
The supreme penalty of
disbarment is meted out only in
clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court.12 While we will
not hesitate to remove an erring
attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers, where the
evidence calls for it, we will also
not disbar him where a lesser
penalty will suffice to accomplish
the desired end.13 In this case, we
find suspension to be a sufficient
sanction against respondent.
Suspension, we may add, is not
primarily intended as a
punishment, but as a means to
protect the public and the legal
profession.14
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty.
Florante E. Madroo is found
GUILTY of gross misconduct and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one year with a WARNING
that a repetition the same or

similar act will be dealt with more

severely. Respondent's suspension
is effective upon his receipt of
notice of this decision. Let notice
of this decision be spread in
respondent's record as an
attorney in this Court, and notice
of the same served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all
the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and
NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU
AGO and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Quijano and Arroyo for
petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except
Lourdes Yu Ago, have been
commuting to this Court for more
than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio
Castaeda and Nicetas Henson
filed a replevin suit against Pastor
Ago in the Court of First Instance
of Manila to recover certain
machineries (civil case 27251). In
1957 judgment was rendered in

favor of the plaintiffs, ordering

Ago to return the machineries or
pay definite sums of money. Ago
appealed, and on June 30, 1961
this Court, in Ago vs. Castaeda,
L-14066, affirmed the judgment.
After remand, the trial court
issued on August 25, 1961 a writ
of execution for the sum of
P172,923.87. Ago moved for a
stay of execution but his motion
was denied, and levy was made
on Ago's house and lots located in
Quezon City. The sheriff then
advertised them for auction sale
on October 25, 1961. Ago moved
to stop the auction sale, failing in
which he filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court
dismissed the petition and Ago
appealed. On January 31,1966 this
Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., L-19718, affirmed the
dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to
obtain a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the sheriff
from enforcing the writ of
execution "to save his family
house and lot;" his motions were
denied, and the sheriff sold the
house and lots on March 9, 1963
to the highest bidders, the
petitioners Castaeda and
Henson.
Ago failed to redeem, and on April
17, 1964 the sheriff executed the
final deed of sale in favor of the
vendees Castaeda and Henson.
Upon their petition, the Court of

First Instance of Manila issued a

writ of possession to the
properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor
Ago, now joined by his wife,
Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff,
filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City (civil
case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's
sale on the ground that the
obligation of Pastor Ago upon
which judgment was rendered
against him in the replevin suit
was his personal obligation, and
that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half
share in their conjugal residential
house and lots which were levied
upon and sold by the sheriff could
not legally be reached for the
satisfaction of the judgment. They
alleged in their complaint that
wife Lourdes was not a party in
the replevin suit, that the
judgment was rendered and the
writ of execution was issued only
against husband Pastor, and that
wife Lourdes was not a party to
her husband's venture in the
logging business which failed and
resulted in the replevin suit and
which did not benefit the conjugal
partnership.
The Court of First Instance of
Quezon City issued an ex
parte writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the
petitioners, the Register of Deeds
and the sheriff of Quezon City,
from registering the latter's final
deed of sale, from cancelling the

respondents' certificates of title

and issuing new ones to the
petitioners and from carrying out
any writ of possession.
A situation thus arose where what
the Manila court had ordered to
be done, the Quezon City court
countermanded. On November 1,
1965, however, the latter court
lifted the preliminary injunction it
had previously issued, and the
Register of deeds of Quezon City
cancelled the respondents'
certificates of title and issued new
ones in favor of the petitioners.
But enforcement of the writ of
possession was again thwarted as
the Quezon City court again
issued a temporary restraining
order which it later lifted but then
re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the
court finally, and for the third
time, lifted the restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of
the lifting and restoring of the
restraining order was being fought
in the Quezon City court, the Agos
filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with this Court under
date of May 26, 1966, docketed
as L-26116, praying for a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin
the sheriff from enforcing the writ
of possession. This Court found no
merit in the petition and
dismissed it in a minute resolution
on June 3, 1966; reconsideration
was denied on July 18, 1966. The
respondents then filed on August
2, 1966 a similar petition for

certiorari and prohibition with the

Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830R), praying for the same
preliminary injunction. The Court
of Appeals also dismissed the
petition. The respondents then
appealed to this Court (L27140).1wph1.t We dismissed
the petition in a minute resolution
on February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once
more to the Court of Appeals
where they filed another petition
for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction (CA-G.R.
39438-R). The said court gave due
course to the petition and granted
preliminary injunction. After
hearing, it rendered decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary
injunction from enforcement of
the writ of possession on and
ejectment from the one-half share
in the properties involved
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago
dated June 15, 1967 is made
permanent pending decision on
the merits in Civil Case No. Q7986 and ordering respondent
Court to proceed with the trial of
Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the
merits without unnecessary delay.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration,
the petitioners Castaeda and
Henson filed the present petition
for review of the aforesaid
decision.

1. We do not see how the doctrine

that a court may not interfere with
the orders of a co-equal court can
apply in the case at bar. The Court
of First Instance of Manila, which
issued the writ of possession,
ultimately was not interfered with
by its co-equal court, the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City as
the latter lifted the restraining
order it had previously issued
against the enforcement of the
Manila court's writ of possession;
it is the Court of Appeals that
enjoined, in part, the enforcement
of the writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia,
et al., 1 where the wife was a party
in one case and the husband was
a party in another case and a levy
on their conjugal properties was
upheld, the petitioners would
have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly
bound by the replevin judgment
against her husband for which
their conjugal properties would be
answerable. The case invoked is
not at par with the present case.
In Comilang the actions were
admittedly instituted for the
protection of the common interest
of the spouses; in the present
case, the Agos deny that their
conjugal partnership benefited
from the husband's business
venture.
3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera,
67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals
held that a writ of possession may
not issue until the claim of a third

person to half-interest in the

property is adversely determined,
the said appellate court assuming
that Lourdes Yu Ago was a
"stranger" or a "third-party" to her
husband. The assumption is of
course obviously wrong, for,
besides living with her husband
Pastor, she does not claim
ignorance of his business that
failed, of the relevant cases in
which he got embroiled, and of
the auction sale made by the
sheriff of their conjugal properties.
Even then, the ruling in Omnas is
not that a writ of possession may
not issue until the claim of a third
person is adversely determined,
but that the writ of possession
being a complement of the writ of
execution, a judge with
jurisdiction to issue the latter also
has jurisdiction to issue the
former, unless in the interval
between the judicial sale and the
issuance of the writ of possession,
the rights of third parties to the
property sold have supervened.
The ruling in Omnas is clearly
inapplicable in the present case,
for, here, there has been no
change in the ownership of the
properties or of any interest
therein from the time the writ of
execution was issued up to the
time writ of possession was
issued, and even up to the
present.
4. We agree with the trial court
(then presided by Judge Lourdes P.

San Diego) that it is much too late

in the day for the respondents
Agos to raise the question that
part of the property is unleviable
because it belongs to Lourdes Yu
Ago, considering that (1) a wife is
normally privy to her husband's
activities; (2) the levy was made
and the properties advertised for
auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives
in the very properties in question;
(4) her husband had moved to
stop the auction sale; (5) the
properties were sold at auction in
1963; (6) her husband had thrice
attempted to obtain a preliminary
injunction to restrain the sheriff
from enforcing the writ of
execution; (7) the sheriff executed
the deed of final sale on April 17,
1964 when Pastor failed to
redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly
admitted that the conjugal
properties could be levied upon
by his pleas "to save his family
house and lot" in his efforts to
prevent execution; and (9) it was
only on May 2, 1964 when he and
his wife filed the complaint for
annulment of the sheriff's sale
upon the issue that the wife's
share in the properties cannot be
levied upon on the ground that
she was not a party to the logging
business and not a party to the
replevin suit. The spouses Ago
had every opportunity to raise the
issue in the various proceedings
hereinbefore discussed but did
not; laches now effectively bars
them from raising it.

Laches, in a general sense, is

failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier;
it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. 2
5. The decision of the appellate
court under review suffers from
two fatal infirmities.
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of
the writ of possession to and
ejectment from the one-half share
in the properties involved
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This
half-share is not in esse, but is
merely an inchoate interest, a
mere expectancy, constituting
neither legal nor equitable estate,
and will ripen into title when only
upon liquidation and settlement
there appears to be assets of the
community. 3 The decision sets at
naught the well-settled rule that
injunction does not issue to
protect a right not in esse and
which may never arise. 4
(b) The decision did not foresee
the absurdity, or even the
impossibility, of its enforcement.
The Ago spouses admittedly live
together in the same
house 5 which is conjugal property.
By the Manila court's writ of

possession Pastor could be ousted

from the house, but the decision
under review would prevent the
ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which
part of the house would be
vacated by Pastor and which part
would Lourdes continue to stay
in? The absurdity does not stop
here; the decision would actually
separate husband and wife,
prevent them from living
together, and in effect divide their
conjugal properties during
coverture and before the
dissolution of the conjugal union.
6. Despite the pendency in the
trial court of the complaint for the
annulment of the sheriff's sale
(civil case Q-7986), elementary
justice demands that the
petitioners, long denied the fruits
of their victory in the replevin suit,
must now enjoy them, for, the
respondents Agos, abetted by
their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have
misused legal remedies and
prostituted the judicial process to
thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to the extended
prejudice of the petitioners. The
respondents, with the assistance
of counsel, maneuvered for
fourteen (14) years to doggedly
resist execution of the judgment
thru manifold tactics in and from
one court to another (5 times in
the Supreme Court).
We condemn the attitude of
the respondents and their
counsel who,far from viewing

courts as sanctuaries for

those who seek justice, have
tried to use them to subvert
the very ends of justice. 6
Forgetting his sacred mission
as a sworn public servant and
his exalted position as an
officer of the court, Atty.
Luison has allowed himself to
become an insti
gator of controversy and a
predator of conflict instead of
a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, a
virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation instead
of a true exponent of the
primacy of truth and moral
justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in
espousing with candour and
honesty his client's cause
must be encouraged and is to
be commended; what we do
not and cannot countenance is
a lawyer's insistence despite
the patent futility of his
client's position, as in the
case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to
advise his client, ordinarily a
layman to the intricacies and
vagaries of the law, on the
merit or lack of merit of his
case. If he finds that his
client's cause is defenseless,
then it is his bounden duty to
advise the latter to acquiesce
and submit, rather than

traverse the incontrovertible.

A lawyer must resist the
whims and caprices of his
client, and temper his clients
propensity to litigate. A
lawyer's oath to uphold the
cause of justice is superior to
his duty to his client; its
primacy is indisputable. 7
7. In view of the private
respondents' propensity to use
the courts for purposes other than
to seek justice, and in order to
obviate further delay in the
disposition of the case below
which might again come up to the
appellate courts but only to fail in
the end, we have motu
proprio examined the record of
civil case Q-7986 (the mother
case of the present case). We find
that
(a) the complaint was filed on May
2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago)
but trial on the merits has not
even started;
(b) after the defendants
Castaedas had filed their answer
with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs
Agos filed a supplemental
complaint where they impleaded
new parties-defendants;
(c) after the admission of the
supplemental complaint, the Agos
filed a motion to admit an
amended supplemental
complaint, which impleads an
additional new party-defendant

(no action has yet been taken on

this motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed
an answer to the admitted
supplemental complaint; and
(e) the last order of the Court of
First Instance, dated April 20,
1974, grants an extension to the
suspension of time to file answer.
(Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged
causes of action in the complaint,
supplemental complaint and
amended supplemental complaint
are all untenable, for the reasons
hereunder stated. The Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is
alleged that the sheriff levied
upon conjugal properties of the
spouses Ago despite the fact that
the judgment to be satisfied was
personal only to Pastor Ago, and
the business venture that he
entered into, which resulted in the
replevin suit, did not redound to
the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The issue here, which
is whether or not the wife's
inchoate share in the conjugal
property is leviable, is the same
issue that we have already
resolved, as barred by laches, in
striking down the decision of the
Court of Appeals granting
preliminary injunction, the
dispositive portion of which was
herein-before quoted. This ruling
applies as well to the first cause
of action of the complaint.

Upon the second cause of action,

the Agos allege that on January 5,
1959 the Castaedas and the
sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of
seizure, seized and took
possession of certain machineries,
depriving the Agos of the use
thereof, to their damage in the
sum of P256,000 up to May 5,
1964. This second cause of action
fails to state a valid cause of
action for it fails to allege that the
order of seizure is invalid or
illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of
action that the sheriff's sale of the
conjugal properties was irregular,
illegal and unlawful because the
sheriff did not require the
Castaeda spouses to pay or
liquidate the sum of P141,750
(the amount for which they
bought the properties at the
auction sale) despite the fact that
there was annotated at the back
of the certificates of title a
mortgage of P75,000 in favor of
the Philippine National Bank;
moreover, the sheriff sold the
properties for P141,750 despite
the pendency of L-19718 where
Pastor Ago contested the amount
of P99,877.08 out of the judgment
value of P172,923.37 in civil case
27251; and because of said acts,
the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in
damages.
Anent this third cause of action,
the sheriff was under no
obligation to require payment of

the purchase price in the auction

sale because "when the purchaser
is the judgment creditor, and no
third-party claim has been filed,
he need not pay the amount of
the bid if it does not exceed the
amount of his judgment." (Sec.
23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor
of the PNB is the concern of the
vendees Castaedas but did not
affect the sheriff's sale; the
cancellation of the annotation is
of no moment to the Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago
contested the sum of P99,877.08
out of the amount of the
judgment was dismissed by this
Court on January 31, 1966.
This third cause of action,
therefore, actually states no valid
cause of action and is moreover
barred by prior judgment.
The fourth cause of
action pertains to moral damages
allegedly suffered by the Agos on
account of the acts complained of
in the preceding causes of action.
As the fourth cause of action
derives its life from the preceding
causes of action, which, as shown,
are baseless, the said fourth
cause of action must necessarily
fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the
Agos, the Castaedas aver that
the action was unfounded and as

a consequence of its filing they

were compelled to retain the
services of counsel for not less
than P7,500; that because the
Agos obtained a preliminary
injunction enjoining the transfer of
titles and possession of the
properties to the Castaedas,
they were unlawfully deprived of
the use of the properties from
April 17, 1964, the value of such
deprived use being 20% annually
of their actual value; and that the
filing of the unfounded action
besmirched their feelings, the
pecuniary worth of which is for
the court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is
alleged that after the filing of the
complaint, the defendants, taking
advantage of the dissolution of
the preliminary injunction, in
conspiracy and with gross bad
faith and evident intent to cause
damage to the plaintiffs, caused
the registration of the sheriff's
final deed of sale; that, to cause
more damage, the defendants
sold to their lawyer and his wife
two of the parcels of land in
question; that the purchasers
acquired the properties in bad
faith; that the defendants
mortgaged the two other parcels
to the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation while the defendants'
lawyer and his wife also
mortgaged the parcels bought by
them to the Rizal Commercial

Bank; and that the bank also

acted in bad faith.
The second cause of
action consists of an allegation of
additional damages caused by the
defendants' bad faith in entering
into the aforesaid agreements and
transactions.
The Amended Supplemental
Complaint
The amendment made pertains to
the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint, which is,
the inclusion of a paragraph
averring that, still to cause
damage and prejudice to the
plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan
Quijano, in bad faith sold the two
parcels of land they had
previously bought to Eloy Ocampo
who acquired them also in bad
faith, while Venancio Castaeda
and Nicetas Henson in bad faith
sold the two other parcels to Juan
Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo
(40%) who acquired them in bad
faith and with knowledge that the
properties are the subject of a
pending litigation.
Discussion on The Causes of
Action
of The Supplemental Complaint
And
The Amended Supplemental
Complaint
Assuming hypothetically as true
the allegations in the first cause
of action of the supplemental

complaint and the amended

supplemental complaint, the
validity of the cause of action
would depend upon the validity of
the first cause of action of the
original complaint, for, the Agos
would suffer no transgression
upon their rights of ownership and
possession of the properties by
reason of the agreements
subsequently entered into by the
Castaedas and their lawyer if the
sheriff's levy and sale are valid.
The reverse is also true: if the
sheriff's levy and sale are invalid
on the ground that the conjugal
properties could not be levied
upon, then the transactions would
perhaps prejudice the Agos, but,
we have already indicated that
the issue in the first cause of
action of the original complaint is
barred by laches, and it must
therefore follow that the first
cause of action of the
supplemental complaint and the
amended supplemental complaint
is also barred.
For the same reason, the same
holding applies to the remaining
cause of action in the
supplemental complaint and the
amended supplemental
complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the
Court of Appeals under review is
set aside. Civil case Q-7986 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal is
ordered dismissed, without
prejudice to the re-filing of the

petitioners' counterclaim in a new

and independent action. Treble
costs are assessed against the
spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes
Yu Ago, which shall be paid by
their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison.
Let a copy of this decision be
made a part of the personal file of
Atty. Luison in the custody of the
Clerk of Court.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint
arose from a paid advertisement
that appeared in the July 5, 2000
issue of the newspaper, Philippine
Daily Inquirer, which reads:
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.[1]

Cannon 3
[A.C. No. 5299. August 19,
2003]
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR.,
Assistant Court Administrator
and Chief, Public Information
Office, complainant, vs. ATTY.
RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO, respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19,
2003]
ATTY. RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP
COMMISSION ON BAR
DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL
G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity
as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief,
Public Information
Office,respondents.

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a

staff member of the Public
Information Office of the Supreme
Court, called up the published
telephone number and pretended
to be an interested party. She
spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who
claimed that her husband, Atty.
Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in
handling annulment cases and
can guarantee a court decree
within four to six months,
provided the case will not involve
separation of property or custody
of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said
that her husband charges a fee of
P48,000.00, half of which is
payable at the time of filing of the
case and the other half after a
decision thereon has been
rendered.
Further research by the Office of
the Court Administrator and the
Public Information Office revealed
that similar advertisements were
published in the August 2 and 6,
2000 issues of the Manila
Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue
of The Philippine Star.[2]

On September 1, 2000, Atty.

Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity
as Assistant Court Administrator
and Chief of the Public Information
Office, filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo for improper advertising
and solicitation of his legal
services, in violation of Rule 2.03
and Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules
of Court.[3]

Discipline passed Resolution No.

XV-2002-306,[6] finding respondent
guilty of violation of Rules 2.03
and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules
of Court, and suspended him from
the practice of law for one (1)
year with the warning that a
repetition of similar acts would be
dealt with more severely. The IBP
Resolution was noted by this
Court on November 11, 2002.[7]

In his answer, respondent

admitted the acts imputed to him,
but argued that advertising and
solicitation per se are not
prohibited acts; that the time has
come to change our views about
the prohibition on advertising and
solicitation; that the interest of
the public is not served by the
absolute prohibition on lawyer
advertising; that the Court can lift
the ban on lawyer advertising;
and that the rationale behind the
decades-old prohibition should be
abandoned. Thus, he prayed that
he be exonerated from all the
charges against him and that the
Court promulgate a ruling that
advertisement of legal services
offered by a lawyer is not contrary
to law, public policy and public
order as long as it is dignified.[4]

In the meantime, respondent filed

an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration,[8] which was
denied by the IBP in Resolution
No. XV-2002-606 dated October
19, 2002[9]

The case was referred to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and
recommendation.[5] On June 29,
2002, the IBP Commission on Bar

Hence, the instant petition

for certiorari, which was docketed
as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, Atty.
Rizalino T. Simbillo,
Petitioner versus IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G.
Khan, Jr., Asst. Court
Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office,
Respondents. This petition was
consolidated with A.C. No. 5299
per the Courts Resolution dated
March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26,
2003, the parties were required to
manifest whether or not they
were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the
pleadings.[10] Complainant filed his
Manifestation on April 25, 2003,

stating that he is not submitting

any additional pleading or
evidence and is submitting the
case for its early resolution on the
basis of pleadings and records
thereof. [11]Respondent, on the
other hand, filed a Supplemental
Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs
Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and
XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do
or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not
use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or
legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules
of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and
suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor.
A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice
or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct or
by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath

which he is required to take

before the admission to practice,
or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed
that the practice of law is not a
business.[12] It is a profession in
which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a moneymaking venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits.[13] The
gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration.[14] The
duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be
the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate
their personal interests or what
they owe to themselves.[15] The
following elements distinguish the
legal profession from a business:
1.
A duty of public service, of
which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may
attain the highest eminence
without making much money;
2.
A relation as an officer of
the court to the administration of
justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3.
A relation to clients in the
highest degree of fiduciary;
4.
A relation to colleagues at
the bar characterized by candor,

fairness, and unwillingness to

resort to current business
methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice,
or dealing directly with their
clients.[16]
There is no question that
respondent committed the acts
complained of. He himself admits
that he caused the publication of
the advertisements. While he
professes repentance and begs
for the Courts indulgence, his
contrition rings
hollow considering the fact that
he advertised his legal services
again after he pleaded for
compassion and after claiming
that he had no intention to violate
the rules. Eight months after
filing his answer, he again
advertised his legal services in
the August 14, 2001 issue of
the Buy & Sell Free Ads
Newspaper.[17]Ten months later, he
caused the same advertisement
to be published in the October 5,
2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such
acts of respondent are a
deliberate and contemptuous
affront on the Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of
respondents acts is that in
advertising himself as a self-styled
Annulment of Marriage
Specialist, he wittingly or
unwittingly erodes and
undermines not only the stability
but also the sanctity of an
institution still considered

sacrosanct despite the

contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our
society. Indeed, in assuring
prospective clients that an
annulment may be obtained in
four to six months from the time
of the filing of the case,[19] he in
fact encourages people, who
might have otherwise been
disinclined and would have
refrained from dissolving their
marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of
legal business is not altogether
proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must
be compatible with the dignity of
the legal profession. If it is made
in a modest and decorous
manner, it would bring no injury
to the lawyer and to the bar.
[20]
Thus, the use of simple signs
stating the name or names of the
lawyers, the office and residence
address and fields of practice, as
well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief
data, are permissible. Even the
use of calling cards is now
acceptable.[21]Publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canon, of
brief biographical and informative
data is likewise allowable. As
explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal
Clinic, Inc.:[22]
Such data must not be misleading
and may include only a statement

of the lawyers name and the

names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone
numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date
and place of birth and admission
to the bar; schools attended with
dates of graduation, degrees and
other educational distinctions;
public or quasi-public offices;
posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar
associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific
societies and legal fraternities;
the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names
of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable
law list published primarily for
that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or
periodical which is published
principally for other
purposes. For that reason, a
lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical
and informative data in a
daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published
in a law list the conduct,
management, or contents of
which are calculated or likely to
deceive or injure the public or the

bar, or to lower dignity or

standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple
professional card is also
permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the
name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address,
telephone number and special
branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a
law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm
name or office address, being for
the convenience of the profession,
is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under
a designation of special branch of
law. (emphasis and italics
supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of
the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of
Court. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. He is likewise
STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be
entered in his record as attorney

and be furnished the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines and all
courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

Come or write to him in his town,

Echague, Isabela. He offers free
consultation, and is willing to help
and serve the poor.)

SO ORDERED.

The respondent further admits

that he is the author of a letter
addressed to a lieutenant of barrio
in his home municipality written in
Ilocano, which letter, in
translation, reads as follows:

March 23, 1929

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
Duran & Lim for respondent.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and
Provincial Fiscal Jose for the
Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a
practising attorney and a member
of the provincial board of Isabela,
admits that previous to the last
general elections he made use of
a card written in Spanish and
Ilocano, which, in translation,
reads as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela
(NOTE. As notary public, he can
execute for you a deed of sale for
the purchase of land as required
by the cadastral office; can renew
lost documents of your animals;
can make your application and
final requisites for your
homestead; and can execute any
kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he
can help you collect your loans
although long overdue, as well as
any complaint for or against you.

ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September

18, 1928
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like
to inform you of the approaching
date for our induction into office
as member of the Provincial
Board, that is on the 16th of next
month. Before my induction into
office I should be very glad to
hear your suggestions or
recommendations for the good of
the province in general and for
your barrio in particular. You can
come to my house at any time
here in Echague, to submit to me
any kind of suggestion or
recommendation as you may
desire.
I also inform you that despite my
membership in the Board I will
have my residence here in
Echague. I will attend the session
of the Board of Ilagan, but will
come back home on the following
day here in Echague to live and
serve with you as a lawyer and
notary public. Despite my election
as member of the Provincial
Board, I will exercise my legal

profession as a lawyer and notary

public. In case you cannot see me
at home on any week day, I
assure you that you can always
find me there on every Sunday. I
also inform you that I will receive
any work regarding preparations
of documents of contract of sales
and affidavits to be sworn to
before me as notary public even
on Sundays.
I would like you all to be informed
of this matter for the reason that
some people are in the belief that
my residence as member of the
Board will be in Ilagan and that I
would then be disqualified to
exercise my profession as lawyer
and as notary public. Such is not
the case and I would make it clear
that I am free to exercise my
profession as formerly and that I
will have my residence here in
Echague.
I would request you kind favor to
transmit this information to your
barrio people in any of your
meetings or social gatherings so
that they may be informed of my
desire to live and to serve with
you in my capacity as lawyer and
notary public. If the people in your
locality have not as yet
contracted the services of other
lawyers in connection with the
registration of their land titles, I
would be willing to handle the
work in court and would charge
only three pesos for every
registration.

Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is
next in order to write down the
applicable legal provisions.
Section 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as originally conceived
related to disbarments of
members of the bar. In 1919 at
the instigation of the Philippine
Bar Association, said codal section
was amended by Act No. 2828 by
adding at the end thereof the
following: "The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms
in principle to the Canons of
Professionals Ethics adopted by
the American Bar Association in
1908 and by the Philippine Bar
Association in 1917. Canons 27
and 28 of the Code of Ethics
provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR
INDIRECT. The most worthy and
effective advertisement possible,
even for a young lawyer, and
especially with his brother
lawyers, is the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity
to trust. This cannot be forced,
but must be the outcome of
character and conduct. The

publication or circulation of
ordinary simple business cards,
being a matter of personal taste
or local custom, and sometimes of
convenience, is not per
se improper. But solicitation of
business by circulars or
advertisements, or by personal
communications or interview not
warranted by personal relations, is
unprofessional. It is equally
unprofessional to procure
business by indirection through
touters of any kind, whether allied
real estate firms or trust
companies advertising to secure
the drawing of deeds or wills or
offering retainers in exchange for
executorships or trusteeships to
be influenced by the lawyer.
Indirect advertisement for
business by furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments concerning
the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other
like self-laudation, defy the
traditions and lower the tone of
our high calling, and are
intolerable.

indictable at common law. It is

disreputable to hunt up defects in
titles or other causes of action
and inform thereof in order to the
employed to bring suit, or to
breed litigation by seeking out
those with claims for personal
injuries or those having any other
grounds of action in order to
secure them as clients, or to
employ agents or runners for like
purposes, or to pay or reward
directly or indirectly, those who
bring or influence the bringing of
such cases to his office, or to
remunerate policemen, court or
prison officials, physicians,
hospital attaches or others who
may succeed, under the guise of
giving disinterested friendly
advice, in influencing the criminal,
the sick and the injured, the
ignorant or others, to seek his
professional services. A duty to
the public and to the profession
devolves upon every member of
the bar having knowledge of such
practices upon the part of any
practitioner immediately to inform
thereof to the end that the
offender may be disbarred.

28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION,

DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS.
It is unprofessional for a lawyer
to volunteer advice to bring a
lawsuit, except in rare cases
where ties of blood, relationship
or trust make it his duty to do so.
Stirring up strife and litigation is
not only unprofessional, but it is

Common barratry consisting of

frequently stirring up suits and
quarrels between individuals was
a crime at the common law, and
one of the penalties for this
offense when committed by an
attorney was disbarment. Statutes
intended to reach the same evil
have been provided in a number

of jurisdictions usually at the

instance of the bar itself, and
have been upheld as
constitutional. The reason behind
statutes of this type is not difficult
to discover. The law is a
profession and not a business.
The lawyer may not seek or
obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would
be unprofessional.
(State vs. Rossman [1909], 53
Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625;
Peoplevs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L.
R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn
in no uncertain terms the ugly
practice of solicitation of cases by
lawyers. It is destructive of the
honor of a great profession. It
lowers the standards of that
profession. It works against the
confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of
the bar. It results in needless
litigation and in incenting to strife
otherwise peacefully inclined
citizens.
The solicitation of employment by
an attorney is a ground for
disbarment or suspension. That
should be distinctly understood.
Giving application of the law and
the Canons of Ethics to the
admitted facts, the respondent
stands convicted of having
solicited cases in defiance of the
law and those canons.
Accordingly, the only remaining

duty of the court is to fix upon the

action which should here be
taken. The provincial fiscal of
Isabela, with whom joined the
representative of the AttorneyGeneral in the oral presentation of
the case, suggests that the
respondent be only reprimanded.
We think that our action should go
further than this if only to reflect
our attitude toward cases of this
character of which unfortunately
the respondent's is only one. The
commission of offenses of this
nature would amply justify
permanent elimination from the
bar. But as mitigating,
circumstances working in favor of
the respondent there are, first, his
intimation that he was unaware of
the impropriety of his acts,
second, his youth and
inexperience at the bar, and,
third, his promise not to commit a
similar mistake in the future. A
modest period of suspension
would seem to fit the case of the
erring attorney. But it should be
distinctly understood that this
result is reached in view of the
considerations which have
influenced the court to the
relatively lenient in this particular
instance and should, therefore,
not be taken as indicating that
future convictions of practice of
this kind will not be dealt with by
disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of
this case, the judgment of the

court is that the respondent Luis

B. Tagorda be and is hereby
suspended from the practice as
an attorney-at-law for the period
of one month from April 1, 1929,

8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria

Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17,

1993

DON PARKINSON

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC,
INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to
order the respondent to cease and
desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the
same tenor as that of annexes "A"
and "B" (of said petition) and to
perpetually prohibit persons or
entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the
exercise of the law profession
other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained
of by herein petitioner are as
follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL
5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC.

Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.

an Attorney in Guam, is giving

FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce
through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday
during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of
Marriage. Immigration Problems,
Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &
Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration
of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in
the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for
Filipina Spouse/Children. Call
Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,
LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US
Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 5217232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 5210767
It is the submission of petitioner
that the advertisements above
reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of
the bar and that, as a member of
the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the
said advertisements, hence the
reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.

In its answer to the petition,

respondent admits the fact of
publication of said advertisement
at its instance, but claims that it is
not engaged in the practice of law
but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further
argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising
these services should be allowed
supposedly
in the light of the case of John R.
Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly
decided by the United States
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical
implications on the legal
profession of the issues raised
herein, we required the (1)
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), (2) Philippine Bar
Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4)
U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines
(WLAP), and (6) Federacion
International de Abogadas (FIDA)
to submit their respective position
papers on the controversy and,
thereafter, their
memoranda. 3 The said bar
associations readily responded
and extended their valuable
services and cooperation of which

this Court takes note with

appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for
resolution before the Court are
whether or not the services
offered by respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in
either case, whether the same
can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein
complained of.
Before proceeding with an indepth analysis of the merits of
this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder
excerpts from the respective
position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations
and the memoranda submitted by
them on the issues involved in
this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the
Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle
manner by which respondent
endeavored to distinguish the two
terms,i.e., "legal support
services" vis-a-vis "legal services",
common sense would readily
dictate that the same are
essentially without substantial
distinction. For who could deny
that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in
need of basic institutional services
from government or non-

government agencies like birth,

marriage, property, or business
registration, obtaining documents
like clearance, passports, local or
foreign visas, constitutes practice
of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) does not wish to
make issue with respondent's
foreign citations. Suffice it to state
that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly
opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that
today it is alright to advertise
one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no
uncertain terms its opposition to
respondent's act of establishing a
"legal clinic" and of concomitantly
advertising the same through
newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke
the administrative supervision of
this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent
from undertaking highly unethical
activities in the field of law
practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." gives the impression
that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and
that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly

denies that it offers legal services
to the public, the advertisements
in question give the impression
that respondent is offering legal
services. The Petition in fact
simply assumes this to be so, as
earlier mentioned, apparently
because this (is) the effect that
the advertisements have on the
reading public.
The impression created by the
advertisements in question can be
traced, first of all, to the very
name being used by respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a
name, it is respectfully submitted
connotes the rendering of legal
services for legal problems, just
like a medical clinic connotes
medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the
term "Legal Clinic" connotes
lawyers, as the term medical
clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's
name, as published in the
advertisements subject of the
present case, appears with (the)
scale(s) of justice, which all the
more reinforces the impression
that it is being operated by
members of the bar and that it
offers legal services. In addition,
the advertisements in question
appear with a picture and name of
a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this
practically removes whatever
doubt may still remain as to the

nature of the service or services

being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant
whether respondent is merely
offering "legal support services"
as claimed by it, or whether it
offers legal services as any lawyer
actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction
between "legal services" and
"legal support services," as the
respondent would have it. The
advertisements in question leave
no room for doubt in the minds of
the reading public that legal
services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question
are meant to induce the
performance of acts contrary to
law, morals, public order and
public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the
respondent claims, the
advertisements in question are
only meant to inform the general
public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize to Guam
divorce, and any law student
ought to know that under the
Family Code, there is only one
instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is

validly celebrated and a divorce is

thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that
the Family Code (defines) a
marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special
contract of permanent
union between a man and woman
entered into accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation
of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the
property relation during the
marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned
advertisements, it is obvious that
the message being conveyed is
that Filipinos can avoid the legal
consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our
law, by simply going to Guam for
a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or
serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least,
this can be considered "the dark
side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws
are exploited for the sake of

profit. At worst, this is outright

malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be
relevant to point out that
advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the
Petition, which contains a cartoon
of a motor vehicle with the words
"Just Married" on its bumper and
seems to address those planning
a "secret marriage," if not
suggesting a "secret marriage,"
makes light of the "special
contract of permanent union," the
inviolable social institution," which
is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize
its sanctity and inviolability.
Worse, this particular
advertisement appears to
encourage marriages celebrated
in secrecy, which is suggestive of
immoral publication of
applications for a marriage
license.
If the article "Rx for Legal
Problems" is to be reviewed, it can
readily be concluded that the
above impressions one may
gather from the advertisements in
question are accurate. The Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it
can be seen that criminal acts are

being encouraged or committed

(a bigamous marriage in Hong
Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity
simply because the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts does not extend
to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo,
(that) the "legal support services"
respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as
commonly understood, the
advertisements in question give
the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal
services, as earlier discussed.
Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes
of an ordinary newspaper reader,
members of the bar themselves
are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good
customs and the public good,
thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the
Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that
respondent should be enjoined
from causing the publication of
the advertisements in question, or
any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited
from further performing or
offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very

least, from offering such services

to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that
providing computerized legal
research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will
greatly benefit the legal
profession and should not be
stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of
such business by non-members of
the Bar encroaches upon the
practice of law, there can be no
choice but to prohibit such
business.
Admittedly, many of the services
involved in the case at bar can be
better performed by specialists in
other fields, such as computer
experts, who by reason of their
having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot
fulfill the exacting requirements
for admission to the Bar. To
prohibit them from "encroaching"
upon the legal profession will
deny the profession of the great
benefits and advantages of
modern technology. Indeed, a
lawyer using a computer will be
doing better than a lawyer using a
typewriter, even if both are
(equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar,
however, should be careful not to
allow or tolerate the illegal

practice of law in any form, not

only for the protection of
members of the Bar but also, and
more importantly, for the
protection of the public.
Technological development in the
profession may be encouraged
without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal
practice.
There might be nothing
objectionable if respondent is
allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services
are made available exclusively to
members of the Bench and Bar.
Respondent would then be
offering technical assistance, not
legal services. Alternatively, the
more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which
service may be offered to the
public in general and which
should be made available
exclusively to members of the Bar
may be undertaken. This,
however, may require further
proceedings because of the
factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however,
that some of respondent's
services ought to be prohibited
outright, such as acts which tend
to suggest or induce celebration
abroad of marriages which are
bigamous or otherwise illegal and
void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited
from simply disseminating
information regarding such

matters, it must be required to

include, in the information given,
a disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be
illegal under Philippine law, that it
is not authorized or capable of
rendering a legal opinion, that a
lawyer should be consulted before
deciding on which course of action
to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer
without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal
practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to
advertise, advertising should be
directed exclusively at members
of the Bar, with a clear and
unmistakable disclaimer that it is
not authorized to practice law or
perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by
paralegals cannot be ignored. But
nobody should be allowed to
represent himself as a "paralegal"
for profit, without such term being
clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any
adequate and effective means of
regulating his activities. Also, law
practice in a corporate form may
prove to be advantageous to the
legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's
Article of Incorporation and Bylaws must conform to each and
every provision of the Code of

Professional Responsibility and

the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not
engaged in the practice of law but
engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen,
through experienced paralegals,
with the use of modern computers
and electronic machines" (pars. 2
and 3, Comment). This is absurd.
Unquestionably, respondent's acts
of holding out itself to the public
under the trade name "The Legal
Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting
employment for its enumerated
services fall within the realm of a
practice which thus yields itself to
the regulatory powers of the
Supreme Court. For respondent to
say that it is merely engaged in
paralegal work is to stretch
credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which
announces a certain Atty. Don
Parkinson to be handling the fields
of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." is offering and
rendering legal services through
its reserve of lawyers. It has been
held that the practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in
court, but includes drawing of
deeds, incorporation, rendering
opinions, and advising clients as
to their legal right and then take
them to an attorney and ask the

latter to look after their case in

court See Martin, Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural

persons can engage in the
practice of law, and such
limitation cannot be evaded by
a corporation employing
competent lawyers to practice for
it. Obviously, this is the scheme or
device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself
to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services.
It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the
public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against
the business conduit. Precisely,
the limitation of practice of law to
persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar
(Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of
Court) is to subject the members
to the discipline of the Supreme
Court. Although respondent uses
its business name, the persons
and the lawyers who act for it are
subject to court discipline. The
practice of law is not a profession
open to all who wish to engage in
it nor can it be assigned to
another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is
a personal right limited to persons
who have qualified themselves
under the law. It follows that not
only respondent but also all the
persons who are acting for
respondent are the persons
engaged in unethical law
practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers'

Association's position, in answer
to the issues stated herein, are
wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in
the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained
of are not only unethical, but also
misleading and patently immoral;
and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court
has the power to supress and
punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its
unauthorized practice of law and
for its unethical, misleading and
immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not
engaged in the practice of law. It
claims that it merely renders
"legal support services" to
answers, litigants and the general
public as enunciated in the
Primary Purpose Clause of its
Article(s) of Incorporation. (See
pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's
Comment). But its advertised
services, as enumerated above,
clearly and convincingly show that
it is indeed engaged in law
practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general
public its advisory services on
Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign

divorces, annulment of marriages,

secret marriages, absence and
adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related
problems, immigration problems;
the Investments Law of the
Philippines and such other related
laws.
Its advertised services
unmistakably require the
application of the aforesaid law,
the legal principles and
procedures related thereto, the
legal advices based thereon and
which activities call for legal
training, knowledge and
experience.
Applying the test laid down by the
Court in the aforecited Agrava
Case, the activities of respondent
fall squarely and are embraced in
what lawyers and laymen equally
term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this
Honorable Court, paramount
consideration should be given to
the protection of the general
public from the danger of being
exploited by unqualified persons
or entities who may be engaged
in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer
requires one to take a rigorous
four-year course of study on top of
a four-year bachelor of arts or
sciences course and then to take
and pass the bar examinations.

Only then, is a lawyer qualified to

practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is
sanctioned in many jurisdiction as
an aid to the administration of
justice, there are in those
jurisdictions, courses of study
and/or standards which would
qualify these paralegals to deal
with the general public as such.
While it may now be the
opportune time to establish these
courses of study and/or standards,
the fact remains that at present,
these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this
Honorable Court may decide to
make measures to protect the
general public from being
exploited by those who may be
dealing with the general public in
the guise of being "paralegals"
without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general
public should also be protected
from the dangers which may be
brought about by advertising of
legal services. While it appears
that lawyers are prohibited under
the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it
appears in the instant case that
legal services are being
advertised not by lawyers but by
an entity staffed by "paralegals."
Clearly, measures should be taken
to protect the general public from
falling prey to those who advertise
legal services without being
qualified to offer such services. 8

A perusal of the questioned

advertisements of Respondent,
however, seems to give the
impression that information
regarding validity of marriages,
divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption
and foreign investment, which are
in essence, legal matters , will be
given to them if they avail of its
services. The Respondent's name
The Legal Clinic, Inc. does
not help matters. It gives the
impression again that Respondent
will or can cure the legal problems
brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed
purely by paralegals, it also gives
the misleading impression that
there are lawyers involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are
doctors in any medical clinic,
when only "paralegals" are
involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are
further belied by the very
admissions of its President and
majority stockholder, Atty.
Nogales, who gave an insight on
the structure and main purpose of
Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek"
article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of
the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the
petition are clearly
advertisements to solicit cases for

the purpose of gain which, as

provided for under the above
cited law, (are) illegal and against
the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this
country.

We submit further that these

advertisements that seem to
project that secret marriages and
divorce are possible in this
country for a fee, when in fact it is
not so, are highly reprehensible.

Annex "A" of the petition is not

only illegal in that it is an
advertisement to solicit cases, but
it is illegal in that in bold letters it
announces that the Legal Clinic,
Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage
which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to
said agency and pay P560 for a
valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid
marriages in the Philippines are
solemnized only by officers
authorized to do so under the law.
And to employ an agency for said
purpose of contracting marriage is
not necessary.

It would encourage people to

consult this clinic about how they
could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor
should ever be attempted, and
seek advice on divorce, where in
this country there is none, except
under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws in the Philippines. It
is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely
represents to the public to be able
to do that which by our laws
cannot be done (and) by our Code
of Morals should not be done.

No amount of reasoning that in

the USA, Canada and other
countries the trend is towards
allowing lawyers to advertise their
special skills to enable people to
obtain from qualified practitioners
legal services for their particular
needs can justify the use of
advertisements such as are the
subject matter of the petition, for
one (cannot) justify an illegal act
even by whatever merit the illegal
act may serve. The law has yet to
be amended so that such act
could become justifiable.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53

Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held
that solicitation for clients by an
attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional,
and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from
the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de
Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not
engaged in the practice of law,
such as management consultancy
firms or travel agencies, whether
run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent

does not necessarily lead to the

conclusion that Respondent is not
unlawfully practicing law. In the
same vein, however, the fact that
the business of respondent
(assuming it can be engaged in
independently of the practice of
law) involves knowledge of the
law does not necessarily make
respondent guilty of unlawful
practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . .
acting as a consultant can render
effective service unless he is
familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful
not to suggest a course of
conduct which the law forbids. It
seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the
law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he
shall recommend, do not
constitute the practice of law . . . .
It is not only presumed that all
men know the law, but it is a fact
that most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features
of the law . . . . Our knowledge of
the law accurate or inaccurate
moulds our conduct not only
when we are acting for ourselves,
but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and
laymen generally possess rather
precise knowledge of the laws
touching their particular business
or profession. A good example is
the architect, who must be

familiar with zoning, building and

fire prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and
who draws plans and specification
in harmony with the law. This is
not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked
by his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the
statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor
Relations Board. Are they
practicing law? In my opinion,
they are not, provided no
separate fee is charged for the
legal advice or information, and
the legal question is subordinate
and incidental to a major nonlegal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree
and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending
to erect a building on his land to
engage a lawyer to advise him
and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an
architect who performed this
function would probably be
considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed
attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field had been
pre-empted by lawyers, or custom
placed a lawyer always at the
elbow of the lay personnel man.
But this is not the case. The most
important body of the industrial

relations experts are the officers

and business agents of the labor
unions and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger
corporate employers, it has been
the practice for some years to
delegate special responsibility in
employee matters to a
management group chosen for
their practical knowledge and skill
in such matter, and without
regard to legal thinking or lack of
it. More recently, consultants like
the defendants have the same
service that the larger employers
get from their own specialized
staff.
The handling of industrial
relations is growing into a
recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered by
our leading universities. The court
should be very cautious about
declaring [that] a widespread,
well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful,
or that the considerable class of
men who customarily perform a
certain function have no right to
do so, or that the technical
education given by our schools
cannot be used by the graduates
in their business.
In determining whether a man is
practicing law, we should consider
his work for any particular client
or customer, as a whole. I can
imagine defendant being engaged
primarily to advise as to the law
defining his client's obligations to

his employees, to guide his

client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client
along the path charted by law.
This, of course, would be the
practice of the law. But such is not
the fact in the case before me.
Defendant's primarily efforts are
along economic and psychological
lines. The law only provides the
frame within which he must work,
just as the zoning code limits the
kind of building the limits the kind
of building the architect may
plan. The incidental legal advice
or information defendant may
give, does not transform his
activities into the practice of law.
Let me add that if, even as a
minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are
customarily reserved to members
of the bar, he would be practicing
law. For instance, if as part of a
welfare program, he drew
employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's
work is the representations of the
employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a
mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use
an agent for negotiations and may
select an agent particularly skilled
in the subject under discussion,
and the person appointed is free
to accept the employment
whether or not he is a member of
the bar. Here, however, there may

be an exception where the

business turns on a question of
law. Most real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers who are not
lawyers. But if the value of the
land depends on a disputed rightof-way and the principal role of
the negotiator is to assess the
probable outcome of the dispute
and persuade the opposite party
to the same opinion, then it may
be that only a lawyer can accept
the assignment. Or if a
controversy between an employer
and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of
a statute, it is quite likely that
defendant should not handle it.
But I need not reach a definite
conclusion here, since the
situation is not presented by the
proofs.
Defendant also appears to
represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the
federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board.
An agency of the federal
government, acting by virtue of
an authority granted by the
Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before
such agency. The State of New
Jersey is without power to
interfere with such determination
or to forbid representation before
the agency by one whom the
agency admits. The rules of the
National Labor Relations Board

give to a party the right to appear

in person, or by counsel, or by
other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th,
1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here
means a licensed attorney, and
ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do
whatever the Labor Board allows,
even arguing questions purely
legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A.
2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism
[1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be
said that a person engaged in a
lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not
engaged in the practice of law
provided that:
(a) The legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are
not customarily reserved to
members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for
the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in
relation to the work for any
particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both
lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code
of Professional Responsibility
succintly states the rule of
conduct:

Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is

engaged in another profession or
occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to
his client whether he is acting as
a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the
Legal Clinic appears to render
wedding services (See Annex "A"
Petition). Services on routine,
straightforward marriages, like
securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a
priest or a judge, may not
constitute practice of law.
However, if the problem is as
complicated as that described in
"Rx for Legal Problems" on the
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion-Richard Gomez case,
then what may be involved is
actually the practice of law. If a
non-lawyer, such as the Legal
Clinic, renders such services then
it is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also
appears to give information on
divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes
"A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving
informational materials may not
constitute of law. The business is
similar to that of a bookstore
where the customer buys
materials on the subject and
determines on the subject and
determines by himself what
courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable,

however, that aside from purely
giving information, the Legal
Clinic's paralegals may apply the
law to the particular problem of
the client, and give legal advice.
Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the
publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which
purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the
mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as
a solution to his problem does not
affect this. . . . . Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining of these
two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to how the
forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice
of law. But that is the situation
with many approved and
accepted texts. Dacey's book is
sold to the public at large. There
is no personal contact or
relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist
that relation of confidence and
trust so necessary to the status of
attorney and client. THIS IS THE
ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE
THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice
on common problems, and does

not purport to give personal

advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not
purport to give personal advice on
a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified
person in a particular situation
in their publication and sale of the
kits, such publication and sale did
not constitutes the unlawful
practice of law . . . . There being
no legal impediment under the
statute to the sale of the kit, there
was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant
maintaining an office for the
purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation,
annulment or separation
agreement any printed material or
writings relating to matrimonial
law or the prohibition in the
memorandum of modification of
the judgment against defendant
having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his
manuscript on divorce and against
his having any personal contact
with any prospective purchaser.
The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the
change of $75 or $100 for the kit,
the defendant gave legal advice
in the course of personal contacts
concerning particular problems
which might arise in the
preparation and presentation of
the purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of action or

pursuit of other legal remedies

and assistance in the preparation
of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to)
enjoin conduct constituting the
practice of law, particularly with
reference to the giving of advice
and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of
particular individuals in
connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of
separation agreement sought and
should be affirmed. (State v.
Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course,
states that its services are
"strictly non-diagnostic, nonadvisory. "It is not controverted,
however, that if the services
"involve giving legal advice or
counselling," such would
constitute practice of law
(Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this
light that FIDA submits that a
factual inquiry may be necessary
for the judicious disposition of this
case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically
objectionable in that it can give
the impression (or perpetuate the
wrong notion) that there is a
secret marriage. With all the
solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See
Articles 2, et seq., Family Code),

no Philippine marriage can be

secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be
ethically objectionable. The
second paragraph thereof (which
is not necessarily related to the
first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal
services?" or "legal support
services", and not legal services,
are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the
meaning of the phrase "practice
of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues
raised by the petition at bar. On
this score, we note that the clause
"practice of law" has long been
the subject of judicial construction
and interpretation. The courts
have laid down general principles
and doctrines explaining the
meaning and scope of the term,
some of which we now take into
account.
Practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law,
legal procedures, knowledge,
training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to
give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal
knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases in court. It

includes legal advice and counsel,

and the preparation of legal
instruments and contract by
which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may
not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a
licensed attorney at law generally
engages in three principal types
of professional activity: legal
advice and instructions to clients
to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients
of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman,
and appearance for clients before
public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine
rights of life, liberty, and property
according to law, in order to assist
in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the
a trial and advertises himself as a
lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. 15 One who confers with
clients, advises them as to their
legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks
the latter to look after the case in
court, is also practicing
law. 16 Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and
the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of
law. 17 One who renders an
opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and

receives pay for it, is, to that

extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs.
Monsod, 19 after citing the
doctrines in several cases, we laid
down the test to determine
whether certain acts constitute
"practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring
the knowledge and the application
of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of another
with his consent. It is not limited
to appearing in court, or advising
and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and
the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to
clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with
the law.
The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases on court.
(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23,
193N. E. 650). A person is also
considered to be in the practice of
law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration
engages in the business of
advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to

their right under the law, or

appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in
proceedings, pending or
prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized
to settle controversies and there,
in such representative capacity,
performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending
the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one
who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts
either in court or outside of court
for that purpose, is engaged in
the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co.,
102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case
of Philippines Lawyers Association
v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters

connected with the law

incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in
matters or estate and
guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5
Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern
conditions consists in no small
part of work performed outside of
any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings
in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of
subjects and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct
connection with court
proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal
skill, a wide experience with men
and affairs, and great capacity for

adaptation to difficult and

complex situations. These
customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far
as concerns the question set forth
in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of
the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part
which involves advice and drafting
of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold
customary functions be performed
by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations
to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on
the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973
ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194
N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore,
covers a wide range of activities
in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the
case at bar, we agree with the
perceptive findings and
observations of the aforestated
bar associations that the activities
of respondent, as advertised,
constitute "practice of law."

The contention of respondent that

it merely offers legal support
services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said
proposition is belied by
respondent's own description of
the services it has been offering,
to wit:
Legal support services basically
consists of giving ready
information by trained paralegals
to laymen and lawyers, which are
strictly non-diagnostic, nonadvisory, through the extensive
use of computers and modern
information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of
information and communication,
such as computerized legal
research; encoding and
reproduction of documents and
pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating
parties or witnesses to a case;
fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of
basic institutional services from
government or non-government
agencies, like birth, marriage,
property, or business
registrations; educational or
employment records or
certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances,
passports, local or foreign visas;
giving information about laws of
other countries that they may find
useful, like foreign divorce,

marriage or adoption laws that

they can avail of preparatory to
emigration to the foreign country,
and other matters that do not
involve representation of clients in
court; designing and installing
computer systems, programs, or
software for the efficient
management of law offices,
corporate legal departments,
courts and other entities engaged
in dispensing or administering
legal services. 20
While some of the services being
offered by respondent corporation
merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the
installation of computer systems
and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids
and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to
the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that
respondent corporation gives out
legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such
function is non-advisory and nondiagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for
example, about foreign laws on
marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court
that all the respondent
corporation will simply do is look
for the law, furnish a copy thereof
to the client, and stop there as if it
were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so called

paralegals, it will necessarily have

to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise
him or her on the proper course of
action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is
what its advertisements represent
and for the which services it will
consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within
the jurisprudential definition of
"practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by
the fact that respondent
corporation does not represent
clients in court since law practice,
as the weight of authority holds, is
not limited merely giving legal
advice, contract drafting and so
forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further
strengthened by an article
published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday
Magazine of the Philippines Star,
entitled "Rx for Legal Problems,"
where an insight into the
structure, main purpose and
operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own
"proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is
transacted everyday at The Legal
Clinic, with offices on the seventh
floor of the Victoria Building along
U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter
what the client's problem, and
even if it is as complicated as the
Cuneta-Concepcion domestic

situation, Atty. Nogales and his

staff of lawyers, who, like doctors
are "specialists" in various fields
can take care of it. The Legal
Clinic, Inc. has specialists in
taxation and criminal law, medicolegal problems, labor, litigation,
and family law. These specialist
are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal
Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the
trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients
who cannot afford the services of
the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and
walk-in clients. "when they come,
we start by analyzing the
problem. That's what doctors do
also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you,
they take your temperature, they
observe you for the symptoms
and so on. That's how we operate,
too. And once the problem has
been categorized, then it's
referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in
medical terms, require surgery or
follow-up treatment. These The
Legal Clinic disposes of in a
matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or
an affidavit of loss can be taken
care of by our staff or, if this were
a hospital the residents or the
interns. We can take care of these

matters on a while you wait basis.

Again, kung baga sa hospital, outpatient, hindi kailangang maconfine. It's just like a common
cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.
Those cases which requires more
extensive "treatment" are dealt
with accordingly. "If you had a rich
relative who died and named you
her sole heir, and you stand to
inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would
be real estate taxes and arrears
which would need to be put in
order, and your relative is even
taxed by the state for the right to
transfer her property, and only a
specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with the
problem. Now, if there were other
heirs contesting your rich
relatives will, then you would
need a litigator, who knows how
to arrange the problem for
presentation in court, and gather
evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation
employs paralegals to carry out
its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is
engaged in the practice of law by
virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby
brings it within the ambit of the
statutory prohibitions against the
advertisements which it has
caused to be published and are
now assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and

appropriately pointed out by the
U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main
purpose of respondent is to serve
as a one-stop-shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a
client may avail of legal services
from simple documentation to
complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond
the domain of paralegals, but
rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of
law. 22
It should be noted that in our
jurisdiction the services being
offered by private respondent
which constitute practice of law
cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar,
or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of
the Rules of Court, and who is in
good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the
practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the
lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain
proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose
is to protect the public, the court,
the client and the bar from the

incompetence or dishonesty of
those unlicensed to practice law
and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the
american jurisdiction wherefrom
respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The
doctrines there also stress that
the practice of law is limited to
those who meet the requirements
for, and have been admitted to,
the bar, and various statutes or
rules specifically so
provide. 25 The practice of law is
not a lawful business except for
members of the bar who have
complied with all the conditions
required by statute and the rules
of court. Only those persons are
allowed to practice law who, by
reason of attainments previously
acquired through education and
study, have been recognized by
the courts as possessing profound
knowledge of legal science
entitling them to advise, counsel
with, protect, or defend the rights
claims, or liabilities of their
clients, with respect to the
construction, interpretation,
operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the
practice of law those not admitted
to the bar is found, not in the
protection of the bar from
competition, but in the protection
of the public from being advised
and represented in legal matters
by incompetent and unreliable

persons over whom the judicial

department can exercise little
control. 27
We have to necessarily and
definitely reject respondent's
position that the concept in the
United States of paralegals as an
occupation separate from the law
profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its
merits, respondent cannot but be
aware that this should first be a
matter for judicial rules or
legislative action, and not of
unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are
trained professionals. As admitted
by respondent, there are schools
and universities there which offer
studies and degrees in paralegal
education, while there are none in
the Philippines.28 As the concept
of the "paralegals" or "legal
assistant" evolved in the United
States, standards and guidelines
also evolved to protect the
general public. One of the major
standards or guidelines was
developed by the American Bar
Association which set up
Guidelines for the Approval of
Legal Assistant Education
Programs (1973). Legislation has
even been proposed to certify
legal assistants. There are also
associations of paralegals in the
United States with their own code
of professional ethics, such as the
National Association of Legal

Assistants, Inc. and the American

Paralegal Association.29
In the Philippines, we still have a
restricted concept and limited
acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service.
As pointed out by FIDA, some
persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been
allowed limited representation in
behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable
services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission
therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the
American judicial policy that, in
the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who
has not been admitted as an
attorney cannot practice law for
the proper administration of
justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person
into the practice of law. 31 That
policy should continue to be one
of encouraging persons who are
unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance
only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of
the questioned advertisements,
the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a
lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true,

honest, fair, dignified and

objective information or
statement of facts. 33 He is not
supposed to use or permit the use
of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or
legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay
or give something of value to
representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal
business. 35 Prior to the adoption
of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also
warned that lawyers should not
resort to indirect advertisements
for professional employment, such
as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or
procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with
causes in which the lawyer has
been or is engaged or concerning
the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other
like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal
profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating
the ethics of his profession.
advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. 37 The

prescription against advertising of

legal services or solicitation of
legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the
that the practice of law is a
profession. Thus, in the case of
The Director of Religious Affairs.
vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of
respondent which are involved in
the present proceeding,39 was
held to constitute improper
advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision
therein reads:
It is undeniable that the
advertisement in question was a
flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the
public. Section 25 of Rule 127
expressly provides among other
things that "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally
or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is
highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares.
Law is a profession and not a
trade. The lawyer degrades
himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices
of mercantilism by advertising his
services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar,
he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the

money-changers of old defiled the

temple of Jehovah. "The most
worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for
a young lawyer, . . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This
cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of
Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the
profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is
a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity
to trust, which must be earned as
the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching
public attention. That publicity is
a normal by-product of effective
service which is right and proper.
A good and reputable lawyer
needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his
success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal byproduct of able service and the
unwholesome result of
propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of
advertising or solicitation are
prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions
to the rule against advertising or
solicitation and define the extent

to which they may be undertaken.

The exceptions are of two broad
categories, namely, those which
are expressly allowed and those
which are necessarily implied
from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the
publication in reputable law lists,
in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by
the canons, of brief biographical
and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may
include only a statement of the
lawyer's name and the names of
his professional associates;
addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth
and admission to the bar; schools
attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other
educational distinction; public or
quasi-public offices; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership
and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in
other reputable law lists; the
names and addresses of
references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients
regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable
law list published primarily for
that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or

periodical which is published

principally for other purposes. For
that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data
in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor
may a lawyer permit his name to
be published in a law list the
conduct, management or contents
of which are calculated or likely to
deceive or injure the public or the
bar, or to lower the dignity or
standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple
professional card is also
permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the
name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address,
telephone number and special
branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a
law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm
name or office address, being for
the convenience of the profession,
is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under
a designation of special branch of
law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration
the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task,
which even includes a quotation
of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for

services rendered, we find and so

hold that the same definitely do
not and conclusively cannot fall
under any of the abovementioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et
al. vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly
invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not
applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said
case explicitly allows a lawyer, as
an exception to the prohibition
against advertisements by
lawyers, to publish a statement of
legal fees for an initial
consultation or the availability
upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of
the fee to be charged for the
specific services. No such
exception is provided for,
expressly or impliedly, whether in
our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Besides, even the disciplinary rule
in the Bates case contains a
proviso that the exceptions stated
therein are "not applicable in any
state unless and until it is
implemented by such authority in
that state." 46 This goes to show
that an exception to the general
rule, such as that being invoked
by herein respondent, can be
made only if and when the canons

expressly provide for such an

exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case
at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey
conducted by the American Bar
Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the
public about lawyers after viewing
television commercials, it was
found that public opinion dropped
significantly 47 with respect to
these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that
with the present situation of our
legal and judicial systems, to
allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used
by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a
deteriorating public opinion of the
legal profession whose integrity
has consistently been under
attack lately by media and the
community in general. At this
point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms
at times, to adopt and maintain
that level of professional conduct
which is beyond reproach, and to
exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the
legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a
misbehavior on the part of the
lawyer, subject to disciplinary
action, to advertise his services
except in allowable instances 48 or
to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of
law. 49 Considering that Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the
prime incorporator, major
stockholder and proprietor of The
Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of
the Philippine Bar, he is hereby
reprimanded, with a warning that
a repetition of the same or similar
acts which are involved in this
proceeding will be dealt with more
severely.
While we deem it necessary that
the question as to the legality or
illegality of the purpose/s for
which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was
created should be passed upon
and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing
into an obiter on that aspect since
it is clearly not within the
adjudicative parameters of the
present proceeding which is
merely administrative in nature. It
is, of course, imperative that this
matter be promptly determined,
albeit in a different proceeding
and forum, since, under the
present state of our law and
jurisprudence, a corporation
cannot be organized for or engage
in the practice of law in this
country. This interdiction, just like
the rule against unethical

advertising, cannot be subverted

by employing some so-called
paralegals supposedly rendering
the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent
breach of this prohibition by
respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General
who can institute the
corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual
background and basis for the
grant of respondent's corporate
charter, in light of the putative
misuse thereof. That spin-off from
the instant bar matter is referred
to the Solicitor General for such
action as may be necessary under
the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved
to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of
any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar
tenor and purpose as Annexes "A"
and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly,
any activity, operation or
transaction proscribed by law or
the Code of Professional Ethics as
indicated herein. Let copies of this
resolution be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Office of the Solicitor
General for appropriate action in
accordance herewith.

Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10,

1985

Products International, Inc. to H.E.

Gabriel, a client.

ADRIANO E.
DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN
G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA.
GUERRERO, VICENTE A.
TORRES, RAFAEL E.
EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L.
SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS,
LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO
TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN
and JOSE A. CURAMMENG,
JR., respondents.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply

dated December 7, 1979, denied
any liability of Clurman to Gabriel.
He requested that he be informed
whether the lawyer of Gabriel is
Baker & McKenzie "and if not,
what is your purpose in using the
letterhead of another law office."
Not having received any reply, he
filed the instant complaint.

Adriano E. Dacanay for and his

own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles,
Dominguez & Pecson Law Office
for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay,
admitted to the bar in 1954, in his
1980 verified complaint, sought to
enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine
other lawyers from practising law
under the name of Baker &
McKenzie, a law firm organized in
Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16,
1979 respondent Vicente A.
Torres, using the letterhead of
Baker & McKenzie, which contains
the names of the ten lawyers,
asked Rosie Clurman for the
release of 87 shares of Cathay

We hold that Baker & McKenzie,

being an alien law firm, cannot
practice law in the Philippines
(Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
As admitted by the respondents in
their memorandum, Baker &
McKenzie is a professional
partnership organized in 1949 in
Chicago, Illinois with members
and associates in 30 cities around
the world. Respondents, aside
from being members of the
Philippine bar, practising under
the firm name of Guerrero &
Torres, are members or associates
of Baker & Mckenzie.
As pointed out by the Solicitor
General, respondents' use of the
firm name Baker & McKenzie
constitutes a representation that
being associated with the firm
they could "render legal services
of the highest quality to
multinational business enterprises
and others engaged in foreign
trade and investment" (p. 3,
respondents' memo). This is

unethical because Baker &

McKenzie is not authorized to
practise law here. (See Ruben E.
Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p.
115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are
enjoined from practising law
under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-99-1292 February
26, 1999
JULIETA BORROMEO
SAMONTE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO R. GATDULA,
Branch Clerk of
Court, respondent.
RESOLUTION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The complaint filed by Julieta
Borremeo Samonte charges
Rolando R. Gatdula, RTC, Branch
220, Quezon City with grave
misconduct consisting in the
alleged engaging in the private
practice of law which is in conflict
with his official functions as
Branch Clerk of Court.
Complainant alleges that she is
the authorized representative of
her sister Flor Borromeo de Leon,
the plaintiff, in Civil Case No. 3714552 for ejectment, filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of

Quezon City, Branch 37. A

typographical error was
committed in the complaint which
stated that the address of
defendant is No. 63-C instead of
63-B, P. Tuazon Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City. The mistake was
rectified by the filing of an
amended complaint which was
admitted by the Court. A decision
was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff who subsequently filed a
motion for execution.
Complainant, however, was
surprised to receive a temporary
restraining order signed by Judge
Prudencio Castillo of Branch 220,
RTC, Quezon City, where Atty.
Rolando Gatdula is the Branch
Clerk Court, enjoining the
execution of the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court.
Complainant alleges that the
issuance of the temporary
restraining order was hasty and
irregular as she was never notified
of the application for preliminary
injunction.
Complainant further alleges that
when she went to Branch 220,
RTC, Quezon City, to inquire about
the reason for the issuance of the
temporary restraining order,
respondent Atty. Rolando Gatdula,
blamed her lawyer for writing the
wrong address in the complaint
for ejectment, and told her that if
she wanted the execution to
proceed, she should change her
lawyer and retain the law office of

respondent, at the same time

giving his calling card with the
name "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon,
Dimailig and Celera" with office at
Rm. 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717
Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City;
otherwise she will not be able to
eject the defendant Dave Knope.
Complainant told respondent that
she could not decide because she
was only representing her sister.
To her consternation, the RTC
Branch 220 issued an order
granting the preliminary
injunction as threatened by the
respondent despite the fact that
the MTC, Brach 37 had issued an
Order directing the execution of
the Decision in Civil Case No. 3714552.
Asked to comment, respondent
Atty. Gatdula recited the
antecedents in the ejectment
case and the issuance of the
restraining order by the Regional
Trial Court, and claimed that
contrary to complainant
Samonte's allegation that she was
not notified of the raffle and the
hearing, the Notice of Hearing on
the motion for the issuance of a
Temporary Retraining Order was
duly served upon the parties, and
that the application for injunctive
relief was heard before the
temporary restraining order was
issued. The preliminary injunction
was also set for hearing on August
7, 1996.

The respondent's version of the

incident is that sometime before
the hearing of the motion for the
issuance of the temporary
restraining order, complainant
Samonte went to court "very
mad" because of the issuance of
the order stopping the execution
of the decision in the ejectment
case. Respondent tried to calm
her down, and assured her that
the restraining order was only
temporary and that the
application for preliminary
injunction would still be heard.
Later the Regional Trial Court
granted the application for a writ
of preliminary injunction. The
complainant went back to court
"fuming mad" because of the
alleged unreasonableness of the
court in issuing the injunction.
Respondent Gatdula claims that
thereafter complainant returned
to his office, and informed him
that she wanted to change
counsel and that a friend of hers
recommended the Law Firm of
"Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon,
Dimailig and Celera," at the same
time showing a calling card, and
asking if he could handle her
case. Respondent refused as he
was not connected with the law
firm, although he was invited to
join but he choose to remain in
the judiciary. Complainant
returned to court a few days later
and told him that if he cannot
convince the judge to recall the

writ of preliminary injunction, she

will file an administrative case
against respondent and the judge.
The threat was repeated but the
respondent refused to be
pressured. Meanwhile, the
Complainant's Motion to Dissolve
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was denied. Respondent Gatdula
claims that the complainant must
have filed this administrative
charge because of her frustration
in procuring the ejectment of the
defendant lessee from the
premises. Respondent prays for
the dismissal of the complainant
against him.
The case was referred to
Executive Judge Estrella Estrada,
RTC, Quezon City, for
investigation, report and
recommendation.
In her report, Judge Estrada states
that the case was set for hearing
three times, on September 7,
1997, on September 17, and on
September 24, 1997, but neither
complainant nor her counsel
appeared, despite due notice. The
return of service of the Order
setting the last hearing stated
that complainant is still abroad.
There being no definite time
conveyed to the court for the
return of the complainant, the
investigating Judge proceeded
with the investigation by
"conducting searching question"
upon respondent based on the
allegations in the complaint, and

asked for the record of Civil Case

No. Q-96-28187 for evaluation.
The case was set for hearing for
the last time on October 22, 1997,
to give complainant a last chance
to appear, but there was again no
appearance despite notice.
The respondent testified in his
own behalf to affirm the
statements in his Comment, and
submitted documentary evidence
consisting mainly of the pleadings
in MTC Civil Case No. 37-14552,
and in RTC Civil Case No. Q9628187 to show that the
questioned orders of the court
were not improperly issued.
The investigating judge made the
following findings:
For failure of the complainant to
appear at the several hearings
despite notice, she failed to
substantiate her allegations in the
complaint, particularly that herein
respondent gave her his calling
card and tried to convince her to
change her lawyer. This being the
case, it cannot be established
with certainty that respondent
indeed gave her his calling card
even convinced her to change her
lawyer. Moreover, as borne by the
records of the Civil Case No. Q-9628187, complainant was duly
notified of all the proceedings
leading to the issuance of the TRO
and the subsequent orders of
Judge Prudencio Altre Castillo, Jr.
of RTC, Branch 220. Complainant's

lack of interest in prosecuting this

administrative case could be an
indication that her filing of the
charge against the respondent is
only intended to harass the
respondent for her failure to
obtain a favorable decision from
the Court.

offered to her the services of their

law office. Thus, the violation
committed by respondent in
having his name included/retained
in the calling card may only be
considered as a minor infraction
for which he must also be
administratively sanctioned.

However, based on the record of

this administrative case, the
calling card attached as Annex "B"
of the complainant's affidavit
dated September 25, 1996
allegedly given by respondent to
complainant would show that the
name of herein respondent was
indeed include in the BALIGOD,
GATDULA, TACARDON, DIMAILIG &
CELERA LAW OFFICES. While
respondent denied having
assumed any position in said
office, the fact remains that his
name is included therein which
may therefore tend to show that
he has dealings with said office.
Thus, while he may not be
actually and directly employed
with the firm, the fact that his
name appears on the calling card
as partner in the Baligod, Gatdula,
Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law
Offices give the impression that
he is connected therein and may
constitute an act of solicitation
and private practice which is
declared unlawful under Republic
Act. No. 6713. It is to be noted,
however, that complainant failed
to establish by convincing
evidence that respondent actually

and recommended that Atty.

Gatdula be admonished and
censured for the minor infraction
he has committed.
Finding: We agree with the
investigating judge that the
respondent is guilty of an
infraction. The complainant by her
failure to appear at the hearings,
failed to substantiate her
allegation that it was the
respondent who gave her calling
card "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon,
Dimailig and Celera Law Offices"
and that he tried to convince her
to change counsels. We find
however, that while the
respondent vehemently denies
the complainant's allegations, he
does not deny that his name
appears on the calling card
attached to the complaint, which
admittedly came into the hands of
the complainant. The respondent
testified before the Investigating
Judge as follows:
Q: How about your statement that
you even gave her a calling card
of the "Baligod, Gatdula, Pardo,
Dimailig and Celera law Offices at
Room 220 Mariwasa building?

A: I vehemently deny the

allegation of the complainant that
I gave her a calling card. I was
surprised when she presented (it)
to me during one of her follow-ups
of the case before the court. She
told me that a friend of hers
recommended such firm and she
found out that my name is
included in that firm. I told her
that I have not assumed any
position in the law firm. And I am
with the Judiciary since I passed
the bar. It is impossible for me to
enter an appearance as her
counsel in the very same court
where I am the Branch Clerk of
Court.
The above explanation tendered
by the Respondent is an
admission that it is his name
appears on the calling card, a
permissible form of advertising or
solicitation of legal
services. 1 Respondent does not
claim that the calling card was
printed without his knowledge or
consent, and the calling
card 2 carries his name primarily
and the name "Baligod, Gatdula,
Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera
with address at 220 Mariwasa
Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City" in the left corner.
The card clearly gives the
impression that he is connected
with the said law firm. The
inclusion/retention of his name in
the professional card constitutes
an act of solicitation which

violates Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2)

of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as "Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for
the Public Officials and
Employees" which declares it
unlawful for a public official or
employee to, among others:
(2) Engage in the private practice
of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided that such practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict
with official functions.
Time and again this Court has said
that the conduct and behavior of
every one connected with an
office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest
clerk, should be circumscribed
with the heavy burden of
responsibility. His conduct, at all
times must only be characterized
by propriety and decorum but
above all else must be above
suspicion. 3
WHEREFORE, respondent Rolando
R. Gatdula. Branch Clerk of Court,
RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City is
hereby reprimanded for engaging
in the private practice of law with
the warning that a repetition of
the same offense will be dealt
with more severely. He is further
ordered to cause the exclusion of
his name in the firm name of any
office engaged in the private
practice of law.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12871
TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO G. H.
SALVA, respondent.
Baizas and Balderrama for
petitioner.
City Attorney Francisco G. H.
Salva in his own behalf.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:

murder and sentenced them to

death. They all appealed the
sentence although without said
appeal, in view of the imposition
of the extreme penalty, the case
would have to be reviewed
automatically by this Court. Oscar
Castelo sought a new trial which
was granted and upon retrial, he
was again found guilty and his
former conviction of sentence was
affirmed and reiterated by the
same trial court.

This is a petition for certiorari and

prohibition with preliminary
injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz
against Francisco G. H. Salva, in
his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay
City, to restrain him from
continuing with the preliminary
investigation he was conducting
in September, 1957 in connection
with the killing of Manuel Monroy
which took place on June 15, 1953
in Pasay City. To better understand
the present case and its
implications, the following facts
gathered from the pleadings and
the memoranda filed by the
parties, may be stated.

It seems that pending appeal, the

late President Magsaysay ordered
a reinvestigation of the case. The
purpose of said reinvestigation
does not appear in the record.
Anyway, intelligence agents of the
Philippine Constabulary and
investigators of Malacaang
conducted the investigation for
the Chief Executive, questioned a
number of people and obtained
what would appear to be
confession, pointing to persons,
other than those convicted and
sentenced by the trial court, as
the real killers of Manuel Monroy.

Following the killing of Manuel

Monroy in 1953 a number of
persons were accused as involved
and implicated in said crime. After
a long trial, the Court of First
Instance of Pasay City found
Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus,
Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido
Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and
others guilty of the crime of

Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his

co-defendants wrote to
respondent Fiscal Salva to
conduct a reinvestigation of the
case presumably on the basis of
the affidavits and confessions
obtained by those who had
investigated the case at the
instance of Malacaang. Fiscal
Salva conferred with the Solicitor
General as to what steps he

should take. A conference was

held with the Secretary of Justice
who decided to have the results of
the investigation by the Philippine
Constabulary and Malacaang
investigators made available to
counsel for the appellants.
Taking advantage of this
opportunity, counsel for the
appellants filed a motion for new
trial with this Tribunal supporting
the same with the so-called
affidavits and confessions of some
of those persons investigated,
such as the confessions of Sergio
Eduardo y de Guzman, Oscar
Caymo, Pablo Canlas, and written
statements of several others. By
resolution of this Tribunal, action
on said motion for new trial was
deferred until the case was
studied and determined on the
merits. In the meantime, the
Chief, Philippine Constabulary,
head sent to the Office of Fiscal
Salva copies of the same
affidavits and confessions and
written statements, of which the
motion for new trial was based,
and respondent Salva proceeded
to conduct a reinvestigation
designating for said purposes a
committee of three composed of
himself as chairman and Assistant
City Attorneys Herminio A.
Avendaio and Ernesto A.
Bernabe.
In connection with said
preliminary investigation being
conducted by the committee,

petitioner Timoteo Cruz was

subpoenaed by respondent to
appear at his office on September
21, 1957, to testify "upon oath
before me in a certain criminal
investigation to be conducted at
the time and place by this office
against you and Sergio Eduardo,
et al., for murder." On September
19, 1957, petitioner Timoteo Cruz
wrote to respondent Salva asking
for the transfer of the preliminary
investigation from September 21,
due to the fact that this counsel,
Atty. Crispin Baizas, would attend
a hearing on that same day in
Naga City. Acting upon said
request for postponement, Fiscal
Salva set the preliminary
investigation on September 24.
On that day, Atty. Baizas appeared
for petitioner Cruz, questioned the
jurisdiction of the committee,
particularly respondent Salva, to
conduct the preliminary
investigation in view of the fact
that the same case involving the
killing of Manuel Monroy was
pending appeal in this Court, and
on the same day filed the present
petition for certiorari and
prohibition. This Tribunal gave due
course to the petition for certiorari
and prohibition and upon the filing
of a cash bond of P200.00 issued
a writ of preliminary injunction
thereby stopping the preliminary
investigation being conducted by
respondent Salva.

The connection, if any, that

petitioner Cruz had with the
preliminary investigation being
conducted by respondent Salva
and his committee was that
affidavits and confessions sent to
Salva by the Chief, Philippine
Constabulary, and which were
being investigated, implicated
petitioner Cruz, even picturing
him as the instigator and
mastermind in the killing of
Manuel Monroy.
The position taken by petitioner
Cruz in this case is that inasmuch
as the principal case of People vs.
Oscar Castelo, et al., G.R. No. L10794, is pending appeal and
consideration before us, no court,
much less a prosecuting attorney
like respondent Salva, had any
right or authority to conduct a
preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation of the case for that
would be obstructing the
administration of justice and
interferring with the consideration
on appeal of the main case
wherein appellants had been
found guilty and convicted and
sentenced; neither had
respondent authority to cite him
to appear and testify at said
investigation.
Respondent Salva, however,
contends that if he subpoenaed
petitioner Cruz at all, it was
because of the latter's oral and
personal request to allow him to
appear at the investigation with

his witnesses for his own

protection, possibly, to controvert
and rebut any evidence therein
presented against him. Salva
claims that were it not for this
request and if, on the contrary,
Timoteo Cruz had expressed any
objection to being cited to appear
in the investigation he (Salva)
would never have subpoenaed
him.
Although petitioner Cruz now
stoutly denies having made such
request that he be allowed to
appear at the investigation, we
are inclined to agree with Fiscal
Salva that such a request had
been made. Inasmuch as he,
Timoteo Cruz, was deeply
implicated in the killing of Manuel
Monroy by the affidavits and
confessions of several persons
who were being investigated by
Salva and his committee, it was
but natural that petitioner should
have been interested, even
desirous of being present at that
investigation so that he could face
and cross examine said witnesses
and affiants when they testified in
connection with their affidavits or
confessions, either repudiating,
modifying or ratifying the same.
Moreover, in the communication,
addressed to respondent Salva
asking that the investigation,
scheduled for September 21,
1957, be postponed because his
attorney would be unable to
attend, Timoteo Cruz expressed

no opposition to the subpoena,

not even a hint that he was
objecting to his being cited to
appear at the investigation.
As to the right of respondent
Salva to conduct the preliminary
investigation which he and his
committee began ordinarily, when
a criminal case in which a fiscal
intervened though nominally, for
according to respondent, two
government attorneys had been
designed by the Secretary of
Justice to handle the prosecution
in the trial of the case in the court
below, is tried and decided and it
is appealed to a higher court such
as this Tribunal, the functions and
actuations of said fiscal have
terminated; usually, the appeal is
handled for the government by
the Office of the Solicitor General.
Consequently, there would be no
reason or occasion for said fiscal
to conduct a reinvestigation to
determine criminal responsibility
for the crime involved in the
appeal.
However, in the present case,
respondent has, in our opinion,
established a justification for his
reinvestigation because according
to him, in the original criminal
case against Castelo, et al., one of
the defendants named Salvador
Realista y de Guzman was not
included for the reason that he
was arrested and was placed
within the jurisdiction of the trial
court only after the trial against

the other accused had

commenced, even after the
prosecution had rested its case
and the defense had begun to
present its evidence. Naturally,
Realista remained to stand trial.
The trial court, according to
respondent, at the instance of
Realista, had scheduled the
hearing at an early date, that is in
August, 1957. Respondent claims
that before he would go to trial in
the prosecution of Realista he had
to chart his course and plan of
action, whether to present the
same evidence, oral and
documentary, presented in the
original case and trial, or, in view
of the new evidence consisting of
the affidavits and confessions
sent to him by the Philippine
Constabulary, he should first
assess and determine the value of
said evidence by conducting an
investigation and that should he
be convinced that the persons
criminally responsible for the
killing of Manuel Monroy were
other than those already tried and
convicted, like Oscar Castelo and
his co-accused and co-appellants,
including Salvador Realista, then
he might act accordingly and
even recommend the dismissal of
the case against Realista.
In this, we are inclined to agree
with respondent Salva. For, as
contended by him and as
suggested by authorities, the duty
and role of prosecuting attorney is

not only to prosecute and secure

the conviction of the guilty but
also to protect the innocent.
We cannot overemphasize the
necessity of close scrutiny and
investigation of the prosecuting
officers of all cases handled by
them, but whilst this court is
averse to any form of vacillation
by such officers in the prosecution
of public offenses, it is
unquestionable that they may, in
appropriate cases, in order to do
justice and avoid
injustice, reinvestigate cases in
which they have already filed the
corresponding informations. In the
language of Justice Sutherland of
the Supreme Court of the United
States, the prosecuting officer "is
the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win
a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the twofold
aim of which is thatguilt shall not
escape nor innocent suffer. He
may prosecute with earnestness
and vigor indeed, he should do
so. But, while he may strike had
blows, he is not at liberty to strike
foul ones. It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods

calculated to produce a wrongful

conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a
just one. (69 United States law
Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309,
cited in the case of Suarez vs.
Platon, 69 Phil., 556)
With respect to the right of
respondent Salva to cite petitioner
to appear and testify before him
at the scheduled preliminary
investigation, under the law,
petitioner had a right to be
present at that investigation since
as was already stated, he was
more or less deeply involved and
implicated in the killing of Monroy
according to the affiants whose
confessions, affidavits and
testimonies respondent Salva was
considering or was to consider at
said preliminary investigation. But
he need not be present at said
investigation because his
presence there implies, and was
more of a right rather than a duty
or legal obligation. Consequently,
even if, as claimed by respondent
Salva, petitioner expressed the
desire to be given an opportunity
to be present at the said
investigation, if he latter changed
his mind and renounced his right,
and even strenuously objected to
being made to appear at said
investigation, he could not be
compelled to do so.
Now we come to the manner in
which said investigation was
conducted by the respondent. If,

as contended by him, the purpose

of said investigation was only to
acquaint himself with and
evaluate the evidence involved in
the affidavits and confessions of
Sergio Eduardo, Cosme Camo and
others by questioning them, then
he, respondent, could well have
conducted the investigation in his
office, quietly, unobtrusively and
without much fanfare, much less
publicity.
However, according to the
petitioner and not denied by the
respondent, the investigation was
conducted not in respondent's
office but in the session hall of the
Municipal Court of Pasay City
evidently, to accommodate the
big crowd that wanted to witness
the proceeding, including
members of the press. A number
of microphones were installed.
Reporters were everywhere and
photographers were busy taking
pictures. In other words,
apparently with the permission of,
if not the encouragement by the
respondent, news photographers
and newsmen had a filed day. Not
only this, but in the course of the
investigation, as shown by the
transcript of the stenographic
notes taken during said
investigation, on two occasions,
the first, after Oscar Caymo had
concluded his testimony
respondent Salva, addressing the
newspapermen said, "Gentlemen
of the press, if you want to ask

questions I am willing to let you

do so and the question asked will
be reproduced as my own"; and
the second, after Jose Maratella y
de Guzman had finished testifying
and respondent Salva, addressing
the newsmen, again said,
"Gentlemen of the press is free to
ask questions as ours." Why
respondent was willing to
abdicate and renounce his right
and prerogative to make and
address the questions to the
witnesses under investigation, in
favor of the members of the
press, is difficult for us to
understand, unless he,
respondent, wanted to curry favor
with the press and publicize his
investigation as much as possible.
Fortunately, the gentlemen of the
press to whom he accorded such
unusual privilege and favor
appeared to have wisely and
prudently declined the offer and
did not ask questions, this
according to the transcript now
before us.
But, the newspapers certainly
played up and gave wide publicity
to what took place during the
investigation, and this involved
headlines and extensive recitals,
narrations of and comments on
the testimonies given by the
witnesses as well as vivid
descriptions of the incidents that
took place during the
investigation. It seemed as though
the criminal responsibility for the

killing of Manuel Monroy which

had already been tried and finally
determined by the lower court
and which was under appeal and
advisement by this Tribunal, was
being retried and redetermined in
the press, and all with the
apparent place and complaisance
of respondent.

Some of the members of the

Court who appeared to feel more
strongly than the others favored
the imposition of a more or less
severe penal sanction. After
mature deliberation, we have
finally agreed that a public
censure would, for the present, be
sufficient.

Frankly, the members of this

Court were greatly disturbed and
annoyed by such publicity and
sensationalism, all of which may
properly be laid at the door of
respondent Salva. In this, he
committed what was regard a
grievous error and poor judgment
for which we fail to find any
excuse or satisfactory
explanation. His actuations in this
regard went well beyond the
bounds of prudence, discretion
and good taste. It is bad enough
to have such undue publicity
when a criminal case is being
investigated by the authorities,
even when it being tried in court;
but when said publicity and
sensationalism is allowed, even
encouraged, when the case is on
appeal and is pending
consideration by this Tribunal, the
whole thing becomes inexcusable,
even abhorrent, and this Court, in
the interest of justice, is
constrained and called upon to
put an end to it and a deterrent
against its repetition by meting an
appropriate disciplinary measure,
even a penalty to the one liable.

In conclusion, we find and hold

that respondent Salva was
warranted in holding the
preliminary investigation involved
in this case, insofar as Salvador
Realista is concerned, for which
reason the writ of preliminary
injunction issued stopping said
preliminary investigation, is
dissolved; that in view of
petitioner's objection to appear
and testify at the said
investigation, respondent may not
compel him to attend said
investigation, for which reason,
the subpoena issued by
respondent against petitioner is
hereby set aside.
In view of the foregoing, the
petition for certiorari and
prohibition is granted in part and
denied in part. Considering the
conclusion arrived at by us,
respondent Francisco G. H. Salva
is hereby publicly reprehended
and censured for the uncalled for
and wide publicity and
sensationalism that he had given
to and allowed in connection with
his investigation, which we
consider and find to be contempt

of court; and, furthermore, he is

warned that a repetition of the
same would meet with a more

severe disciplinary action and

penalty. No costs.